


Volume IV

The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic  
1931-1934

# MAO'S ROAD TO POWER

*Revolutionary Writings*  
1912-1949



Stuart R. Schram, Editor

Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor

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### *The Cover*

The calligraphy on the cover is an inscription written on the occasion of the Second Soviet Congress in January 1934. The text reads as follows: "The soviets are the organ by which the toiling masses of workers and peasants manage their own lives; they are the organizer and leader of the revolutionary war."

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Stephen C. Averill  
Guest Associate Editor



An East Gate Book

*M.E. Sharpe*

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# Contents



Acknowledgements	xix
General Introduction: Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949	xxi
Introduction: The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1931–1934	xxvii
Note on Sources and Conventions	xcv
About the Maps	cii
Map 1. South-central China	ciii
Map 2. Southern Jiangxi Base Area	civ
<b>1931</b>	
Order to Attack Tan Daoyuan (January 1)	5
Order to Pursue and Attack the Enemy Division of Tan Daoyuan (January 2)	7
Order to Carry Out Decentralized Fund-raising Activities After Smashing the First “Encirclement and Suppression” (January 16)	9
The Tasks of the General Political Department, and the Relation Between Political Departments and Commissars in the Red Army (February 17)	12
Order No. V6 of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Continue to Move Eastward and Intensify Efforts at Fund-raising (February 21)	14
Letter from the General Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to the Soviet Government of Jiangxi Province (February 27)	18
On Making the <i>News Bulletin on Current Affairs</i> Widely Available (March 12–14)	22
The Military Preparatory Work That Must Be Done to Achieve Victory in the Second Phase of Operations (March 17)	28
The Significance of the Second Campaign, the Current Situation Between the Enemy and Ourselves, and Preparatory Work in Striving for a Second Victory (March 20)	34
Order to Move the Troops for Reorganization, Training, and Fund-raising (March 23)	42
A Propaganda Outline for Seeking Victory in the Second Campaign	44
Eight Conditions for a Great Victory in the Second Campaign	45
Opposing the First Great “Encirclement and Suppression” (Spring)	52

Circular of the General Political Department on Investigating the Situation Regarding Land and Population (April 2)	54
Decision Regarding Acceptance of the Letter from the International and of the Resolution Adopted by the Fourth Plenum (April)	56
Order for the Troops to Assemble Before the Battle (April 19)	67
Order to Mobilize the Troops to Help the Masses Plant and Plow the Fields (May 5)	69
Order to Wipe out the Enemy Troops That Are Attacking Donggu (May 13)	71
Orders to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Attack Futian and to Eliminate the Two Divisions of Wang Jinyu and Gong Bingfan (May 14)	74
Order to Attack the Enemy at Zhongcun and Nantuan (May 21)	76
Order to Occupy Nanfeng Before the Enemy (May 24)	78
Minutes of the First Eight Meetings of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army (May 25–June 10)	81
General Order No. 14 of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviets (June 20)	97
Minutes of the Third Day of the First Enlarged Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army (June 22)	98
Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army (June 22)	102
Proclamation of the Headquarters of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: Execute Huang Meizhuang (June)	105
Letter to Zhou Yili, Tan Zhenlin, and Others (June 28)	107
Letter to the Twelfth Army, the Thirty-fifth Army, and the Border Area Working Committee (June 30)	110
Letter to Tan Zhenlin and the Twelfth Army (July 1)	113
Opposing the Second Great "Encirclement and Suppression" (Summer)	114
The Question of the Soviet Area Central Bureau's Special Emergency Circular About "Mobilizing" and Preparing for the Third Campaign (July 4)	115
Letter of Instruction from Zhu De and Mao Zedong to Geng Kai and Longjun (July 12)	118
Letter from Zhu De and Mao Zedong to Regimental Commander Zhu and Political Commissar Liu (July 12)	120

Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Prepare to Eliminate the Enemy Attacking from Laicun (July 24)	121
Regarding the Dispositions for Attacking Longgang (July 30)	123
Order to Take Futian and Xin'an (July 31)	124
Order to Oppose the Third "Encirclement and Suppression" (July)	126
Order to Wipe Out the Enemy Advancing from Chongxian to Gaoxingxu (August 3)	127
Order to Destroy the Enemy in Longgang (August 8)	129
Order from the Central Military Commission to the Red Army and the Local Armed Forces in Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan[an], and Tai[he] (August 12)	131
Order to Reduce Our Baggage and Number of Horses (August 17)	136
The Problem of Opposing Rich Peasants	138
General Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Cut Down on Expenditures (August 22)	142
Order to Shift Positions and Intercept the Enemy Forces (September 11)	145
Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Move to the East (September 12)	147
Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Set Out for Longgangtuo for Consolidation and Replacing Losses after Wiping Out Han Deqin's Troops (September 18)	149
Order to Proceed to Fujian to Work and Collect Revenue (September 23)	151
A Letter to Our Brothers the Soldiers of the White Army on the Forcible Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism (September 25)	154
Eulogy for Comrade Huang Gonglue	157
Order to Gather Experience About Attacking Fortified Village Block-houses (October 14)	158
The Economic Policy of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December 1)	160
Order for the Arrest of Gu Shunzhang, a Traitor to the Revolution (December 10)	163

Letter to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country Concerning the Betrayal of the Interests of the Chinese Nation by the Guomindang (December 11)	167
Directive No. 6 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December 13)	171
An Important Instruction regarding the Building of Soviets (December 15)	175
<b>1932</b>	
Concerning Alteration and Increase of the Ratio of Soviet Deputies to Local Residents (January 28)	179
Resolution Concerning Verdicts of the Provisional Supreme Court in the Trial of Important Criminals Such as AB Corps Members, Reorganizationists, and War Criminals (February)	182
Letter from Mao Zedong to Yuan Guoping (March 6)	184
Letter to Western Fujian Concerning the Work in Shanghang and Wuping (March 9)	187
Directive of the Provisional Central Government to the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets of Fujian Province (March 17)	194
Only by Marching Directly on Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Can We Make the Enemy Move (March 30)	201
The Forces That Are Going Directly to Attack Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Should Act More Quickly and Be More Concentrated (April 2)	203
The Reasons Why the Battle at Longyan Was Victorious, and Future Work in [Long]yan and Yong[ding] (April 11)	204
Manifesto of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Declaring War on Japan (April 15)	206
Directive of the Provisional Central Government on Mobilizing for the Declaration of War Against Japan (April 15)	209
Views Regarding the Central Task in the Future, and the Work in New Red Areas, as Well as in the White Areas (April 22)	215
Views Regarding the Political Appraisal, Military Strategy, and the Tasks of the Eastern and Western Route Armies (May 3)	217

An Open Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Agreement to Sell Out Shanghai (May 9)	219
Decision of the Central Executive Committee Approving the Various Resolutions Adopted at the First Soviet Congress of Jiangxi Province (June 3)	221
The Central Government's Telegram to the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Congresses of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies (June 9)	222
On the Organization and Work of the Committee for Upholding Women's Rights and Improving Women's Lives (June 20)	225
On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear (July 7)	230
The Question of the Direction of Attack at Present (July 25)	242
Proposal to Appoint Mao Zedong as General Political Commissar (July 25)	244
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee Approving the Decision of the Provisional Supreme Court in the Case of the Counter-Revolutionary Crimes of Ji and Huang (August 10)	245
Order to Wipe Out the Enemy in Le'an (August 15)	247
The Situation of the Enemy in Yihuang and Le'an and our Army's Battle Dispositions (August 15)	248
Order to Attack the Forces of Chen Cheng (August 29)	249
Order of the General Headquarters of the First Front Army of the Red Army (August 31)	253
Order That the Troops Must March with Light Packs (September 5)	254
Opinion on Smashing the Enemy's Encirclement of and Attack on the Soviet Area in Western Hubei (September)	255
Order No. 25 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government (September 17)	257
Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army Can Smash the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" (September)	259
Opinion Regarding Strategic and Tactical Problems of the Red Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Area (September)	261
On the Problem of Continuing the Reform of Local Soviet Governments (September 20)	263



Directive of the Central Executive Committee Concerning the Problem of Expanding the Red Army (September 20)	266
Report on the Present Military Operations (September 23)	275
On Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Central Government (September 24)	278
We Propose a Plenum of the Central Bureau at the Front to Discuss Problems of Military Operations (September 25)	280
Opinions Regarding the Operation of the Front Army and the Place for Holding the Plenum of the Central Bureau (September 26)	282
Order for Our Troops to Work in the North for a Period of Time Before the Enemy's Big Offensive (September 26)	284
Opinion Regarding the Need to Select the Enemy's Weak Point in Hunan-Henan-Anhui, and to Destroy One of His Units (September 30)	290
Circular Telegram Opposing the Report of the International Investigation Team (October 6)	292
On Emergency War Mobilization (October 13)	295
Order No. 29 of the Central Council of People's Commissars (October 13)	301
Order No. 30 of the Central Council of People's Commissars (October 13)	302
Campaign Plans for the First Front Army of the Red Army (October 14)	303
Promoting the Sale of the Second Issue of Revolutionary War Bonds (October 21)	308
Directive Letter from the Central Executive Committee to the Presidium of the Fujian Provincial Soviet (October 31)	312
A Work Report to the Whole Electorate by the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviets on its First Anniversary (November 7)	314
Order No. 34 of the Council of People's Commissars (November 12)	326
Conscript the Rich Peasants and Organize Forced Labor Brigades (November 25)	327
Plant More Miscellaneous Grains and Eradicate Narcotic Crops (November 25)	328
On Mobilization for War and Methods of Work (November 29)	330
On the Inspection of the Election Movement at All Levels (December 1)	335

In Commemoration of the Guangzhou Uprising, and of the First Anniversary of the Ningdu Uprising (December 2)	339
A Secret Order on the Problem of Organizing Local Armed Forces (December 20)	340
Directive No. 8 of the Council of People's Commissars (December 27)	344
Tighten Exit Regulations (December 27)	346
Advance the Date of Spring Plowing, and Concentrate our Forces to Smash the Enemy's Big Offensive (December 28)	348
<b>1933</b>	
On Renaming Ningdu <i>xian</i> as Bosheng <i>xian</i> and Holding a Memorial Meeting in Honor of Comrade Zhao Bosheng (January 13)	353
Proclamation of the Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (January 17)	355
On the Revolutionary Masses Lending Grain to Provide for the Red Army (March 1)	357
Oppose Japanese Imperialism's Occupation of Rehe and Attack on Beiping and Tianjin (March 3)	361
On Redistributing the People's Food Supply to Help Provide for the Military (March 4)	364
Tingzhou Should Not Be Easily Given Up (March 5)	367
On the Problem of Eliminating Internal Counterrevolutionaries (March 15)	368
On Mobilizing the Masses to Help Government Staff Members in Their Work of Cultivating the Land, Relieving Government Staff Members of Worries About Their Families, and Increasing the Government's Capacity for Work (April 14)	371
Proclamation by the Provisional Central Government and Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (April 15)	373
Inspecting for and Banning of Privately Owned Firearms, and Prohibiting the Unauthorized Wearing of Military Uniforms (April 15)	377
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee Concerning Committees for Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries (April 15)	380

Letter on the Summer Planting Movement to Those in Charge of the Soviets at All Levels (April 22)	382
Directive on Establishing the Commissariat for the National Economy (April 28)	384
On Limiting Special Express Mail (May 11)	386
Letter from the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the White Troops of Fujian and Guangdong (May 28)	388
Dabodi (Summer)	390
Proclamation of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Opposing the Guomindang Sellout of Beijing and Tianjin (June 1)	391
Carry Out a Broad and Thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement (June 1)	394
Summons to a Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials at and Above the District Level, and to a Congress of Poor Peasant League Representatives from Eight <i>Xian</i> (June 1)	398
Appeal of the Central Government to the Masses in the Four <i>Xian</i> of Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng to Save 50,000 <i>Dan</i> of Grain and Sell It to the Red Army (June)	402
An Open Telegram Repudiating the Traitorous Agreement Signed by the Guomindang (June 10)	405
On the Solution to the Grain Problem of the Masses (June 16)	408
Opening Speech at the Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials from Eight <i>Xian</i> regarding the Land Investigation Movement (June 17)	410
Report at the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Leaders at and Above the District Level from Eight <i>Xian</i> (June 18-19)	413
Conclusions Adopted by the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Leaders at and Above the District Level from Eight <i>xian</i> (June 20)	420
Mass Work in the Land Investigation Movement (June)	434
On the Problem of Launching Food Cooperatives (July 4)	441

Resolution by the Central Government Concerning the Movement to Commemorate "August First" (July 11)	443
Circular Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Recent Dalian Conference for Selling Out the Country (July)	445
Letter to the Huangbai District Soviet in Ruijin Concerning the Land Investigation Movement (July 13)	448
Outline of the Organization and Work of the Poor Peasant League (July 15)	453
A New Situation and New Tasks (July 29)	460
Proclamation of the Provisional Central Government on the Convening of the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies (August 1)	464
Telegram of the Central Government Congratulating the Eastern Red Army on Its Great Victory (August 8)	468
Instructions on the Current Election Movement (August 9)	469
Smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the Tasks of Economic Construction (August 12)	479
The Capture of Ji'an (August 13)	491
Order of the Central Government on Rectifying the Work of the Commissariat for Finance (August 25)	495
On the Method of Selling Treasury Bonds (August 28)	497
On the Issuance of 3,000,000 <i>Yuan</i> in Economic Construction Bonds (August 28)	500
Unfold a Mass Movement to Support a National Currency (August 28)	502
A Preliminary Summing Up of the Land Investigation Movement (August)	504
Proletariat and Oppressed Peoples of the World, Unite! (August 30)	519
Telegram of Congratulations from the Central Government to the Opening Session of the International Conference Against Imperialism and War (August)	522
On Launching a Land Investigation Movement (September 1)	524
This Year's Elections (September 6)	527
Manifesto to the Workers, Peasants, and Toiling Popular Masses Throughout the World (September 6)	536

On Educational Work (September 15)	541
Correct Commandism in Selling Government Bonds (September 23)	544
How to Analyze Classes (October 10)	546
Decision Regarding Certain Questions in the Agrarian Struggle (October 10)	550
Order No. 49 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic (October 10)	568
Order Regarding Emergency Mobilization to Smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" (October 18)	569
Work Report to the Electorate by the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on the Second Anniversary of Its Establishment (October 24)	573
Proclamation to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country About the "Direct Negotiations Between China and Japan" (November 11)	580
Investigation of Changgang Township (November 18)	584
Investigation of Caixi Township (November 26)	623
On the Problem of Deserters from the Red Army (December 15)	641
On Punishing Acts of Embezzlement and Waste (December 15)	643
The First Telegram from the Interim Central Government to the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government and the Nineteenth Route Army (December 20)	644
<b>1934</b>	
Second Telegram from the Interim Central Government to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the People's Revolutionary Army (January 13)	649
Inscription on the Memorial to Red Army Martyrs (January 15)	651
To the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army and Volunteer Army (January 22)	652
Solemn Opening Remarks (January 22)	654
Report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Second National Soviet Congress (January 24–25)	656

Conclusions Regarding the Report of the Central Executive Committee (January 27)	714
Report on Emergency Mobilization (January 29)	723
Decision by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (January)	726
Closing Address at the Congress (February 1)	727
Notice No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (February 3)	729
Proclamation of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Regarding the Fujian Incident (February 11)	732
Order "Central No. 5" of the Central Executive Committee (March 20)	736
How Should We Carry Out the Work of the Township Soviets? (April 10)	737
Proclamation by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Support of the Struggles of the Striking Workers in the America-Asia Silk Factory in Shanghai (April 16)	752
Proclamation by the Central Government Regarding the May 1 Holiday of the Toilers (April)	754
Comrade Mao Zedong on the Plot of the Japanese Imperialists (April)	756
Proclamation by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on the Selling Out of North China by the Guomindang (June 19)	759
Letter from Mao Zedong and Zhu De to the Officers and Soldiers of the White Army (June)	764
Proclamation on the Northward March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Fight Japan (July 15)	767
Six-Point Proposal by Zhu De and Mao Zedong to White Army Soldiers Regarding Guidelines for Resisting Japan (July)	772
Comrade Mao Zedong Discusses the Current Situation and the Red Army's Anti-Japanese Advance Party (July)	773
Order of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (August 15)	778
Huichang	779

**Appendix****1931**

Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (November)	783
Resolution on Issuing Temporary Tax 1480 Regulations (November 28)	786
Temporary Tax Regulations (December 1)	787
Resolution on the Marriage Regulations (November 28)	791
Marriage Regulations (December 1)	792
Detailed Regulations Regarding the Elections in the Chinese Soviet Republic (November)	794
Labor Law (November)	800
Temporary Organizational Regulations for Local Soviet Governments (November)	809
Concerning the Election of Central Committee Members and People's Commissars at the First Congress (December 1)	820
Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December 1)	822
Resolution on Putting the Labor Law into Effect (December 20)	826
Detailed Regulations Regarding the Work of the Election Committees (December)	827
Temporary Financial Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic (December)	830

**1932**

Concerning the Right to Vote and to Be Elected of Those Workers and Peasants Who Once Joined Counterrevolutionary Organizations (January 13)	833
Outline of the Organization of the State Political Security Bureau of the Chinese Soviet Republic (January 27)	835
Order No. 3 of the Central Executive Committee (February 1)	839
Temporary Regulations for the Organization of Military Tribunals (February 1)	840
Practical Methods for Carrying Out the Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Red Army (February 1)	844

Order No. 4 of the Central Executive Committee (June 9)	849
Temporary Organizational and Judicial Regulations of the Judicial Departments (June 9)	850
Temporary Outline of the Organization of Departments of Internal Affairs (June 20)	855
Regulations Regarding the Issuance of Short-Term "Revolutionary War" Bonds (June 25)	858
Amended Temporary Tax Regulations (July 15)	859
<b>1933</b>	
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on Redrawing Administrative Boundaries (July 21)	862
Resolution on Carrying Out the Redrawing of Administrative Boundaries (July 22)	864
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds (July 22)	866
Regulations on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds (July 22)	868
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on Putting into Effect the "Temporary Soviet Election Law" (August 9)	870
Temporary Soviet Election Law (August 9)	871
Temporary Agricultural Tax Regulations (September 18)	879
Labor Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic (October 15)	882
Resolution on the Promulgation of the New Labor Law (October 15)	897
Regulations on Punishment for Violations of the Labor Law (October 15)	898
Supplemental Regulations to the Temporary Rules on the Agricultural Tax (October 26)	900
Temporary Organizational Law for Local Soviets of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Draft) (December 12)	904
<b>1934</b>	
Organic Law of the Central Soviet (February 17)	942



Temporary Regulations for Employing Auxiliary Labor (February 20)	948
Judicial Procedures (April 8)	951
Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries (April 8)	954
Marriage Law (April 8)	958
Bibliography	961
Index	965
About the Editors	1005

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Translations of the materials included in this volume have been drafted by many different hands. Our team of translators has included, in alphabetical order, Hsuan Delorme, Gu Weiqun, Li Jin, Li Yuwei, Li Zhuqing, Lin Chun, Pei Minxin, Shen Tong, Su Weizhou, Tian Dongdong, Wang Xisu, Wang Zhi, Bill Wycoff, Ye Yang, Zhang Aiping, and Zheng Shiping.

Nancy Hodes, Research Assistant since mid-1991, and associate editor of the series, has been involved in all aspects of the work on the present volume. She has played a major role in the revision and annotation of the translations, and in checking the final versions against the Chinese originals. She has also drafted some translations, as has Stuart Schram. In particular, she has prepared the initial drafts of all Mao's poems, which were then revised in collaboration with Stuart Schram. Final responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with him as editor.

As the title indicates, this volume deals with the four years which saw the rise and fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi. The guest associate editor, Professor Stephen C. Averill of Michigan State University, a specialist in this phase in the history of Chinese Communism, has made an invaluable contribution to the book. In particular, he drafted the Introduction to this volume, and though Stuart Schram has made some additions and revisions, the Introduction as it appears here remains in very substantial measure his work. He also wrote many of the notes, especially those dealing with persons, places, and other de-

tails of this complex period, and prepared the two maps. In addition, he brought to our attention important sources published in Jiangxi Province, containing a number of Mao texts not available elsewhere.

Thanks are also due to Mr. Zhang Qi, a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Law School East Asian Legal Studies program from the Peking University Law Department, who reviewed the translations of all the materials in the Appendix to this volume in order to ensure that the correct legal terminology was employed.

This project was launched by Roderick MacFarquhar, Director of the Fairbank Center until June 30, 1992. Without his organizing ability and forceful advocacy, it would never have come into being, and his continuing active participation has been vital to its success. His successor, Professor James L. Watson, likewise took an interest in our work, and the current Director, Professor Ezra Vogel, has consistently shown sympathy and support for the project.

The editor, Stuart Schram, wishes to acknowledge his very great indebtedness to Benjamin Schwartz, a pioneer in the study of Mao Zedong's thought. Professor Schwartz carefully read the manuscripts of earlier volumes of this series, and made stimulating and thoughtful criticisms of the introductions. More recently, he has continued to offer insightful comments on the themes raised by the materials translated. For any remaining errors and inadequacies, the fault lies once again with the editor.

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

### *Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949*

Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao's writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao's ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century.

The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century, and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter.

Mao's native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority, and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the revolution of 1911 was arguably as great as that of Sun Yatsen.<sup>1</sup> In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

Apart from Mao's strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire

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1. Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao's writings, especially those of the early period contained in Volume I of this series. See, regarding Zeng, pp. 10, 72, and 131. On Tan, see "Zhang Kundi's Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong," September 1917, p. 139. On Huang, see "Letter to Miyazaki Tōten," March 1917, pp. 111–12.

eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that they were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values, but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the "antiquated" and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, "Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought."<sup>2</sup> In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization, and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese?

As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao's early exposure to "Westernizing" influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them.

Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This "new thought tide," which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward, and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party's first leader, for the Western values incarnated by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy," he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources.

In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work, and that Russia's proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed.<sup>3</sup> Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship, and the other half to deciding what to do with it, and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From beginning to end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import.

To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent

2. Letter of August 1917 to Li Jinxu, Volume I, p. 132.

3. See his letter of January 21, 1921, to Cai Hesen, Volume II, pp. 35-36.

that, although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always "planted his backside on the body of China,"<sup>4</sup> ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong's most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx's dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world, but to change it.

It is reliably reported that Mao's close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan'an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as *The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. To such detailed historical analyses of foreign experience, he preferred *The Communist Manifesto*, of which he saw the message as "Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng!" (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!) In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history.

Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior, or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some pre-capitalist stage of development (whether "Asiatic" or "feudal"). And, by placing the polarity "oppressor/oppressed" at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression, and the oppression of China by the imperialists, were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle.

Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a "united front" or alliance with Sun Yatsen's Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923, and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kaishek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was to be found in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was not enough. A red army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolu-

4. Mao Zedong, "Ruhe yanjiu Zhonggong dangshi," (How to study the history of the Chinese Communist Party), lecture of March 1942, published in *Dangshi yanjiu* (Research on Party History), No. 1, 1980, pp. 2–7.

tion, and so he put forward the slogan: "Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun."<sup>5</sup> In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party, and soon became known as the "commander-in-chief." This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The "Chinese Soviet Republic," established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kaishek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced to embark in 1934 on the Long March.

There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called "Internationalist" faction, who dominated the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. At other times he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks.<sup>6</sup> Such enquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party's tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating.

The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of the Moscow-oriented faction, and at a conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, in the course of the Long March, Mao began his comeback. Soon he was once again in effective charge of military operations, though he became chairman of the Party only in 1943.

When the survivors of the Red Army established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao's vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victim of oppression came decisively into play. Japanese aggression led in December 1936 to the Xi'an Incident, in which Chiang Kaishek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader. This event was the catalyst which produced a second "united front" between the Communists and the Guomindang. Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China, or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937–1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a

5. See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Volume III, pp. 31 and 36.

6. See, in particular, in Volume III, the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations, pp. 296–418 and 594–655, and in this volume, the circular of April 2, 1931, on investigating the situation regarding land and population, and the texts of 1933 and 1934 on the "Land Investigation Movement."

patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China.

During the years in Yan'an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party, and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published while he was struggling for survival a few years earlier. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926.

In 1938, Mao called for the "Sinification of Marxism," that is, the modification not only of its language but of its substance in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and Chinese realities. By 1941, he had begun to suggest that he himself had carried out this enterprise, and to attack those in the Party who preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The "Rectification Campaign" of 1942-43 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such "Internationalists," or to eliminate them from positions of influence.

When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could out-vote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong's thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China's history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine.

In 1939-1940, Mao had put forward the slogan of "New Democracy" and defined it as a régime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Moreover, as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a "People's Democratic Autocracy." In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people's interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a "powerful state apparatus."



In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall's attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang, and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949.

In March 1949, Mao declared that though the Chinese revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao's leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliastic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for “military communism,” which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao's road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself, and in the Party, attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems.

Revolution in its Leninist guise has loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese revolution has been, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, the impact of Mao is still a living reality in China more than two decades after his death. Particularly since the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao's political and ideological heritage has been stressed ever more heavily by the Chinese leadership. Interest in Mao Zedong has been rekindled in some sectors of the population, and elements of a new Mao cult have even emerged.

Though the ultimate impact of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world, while retaining China's own identity, still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China's first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao's ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.

## INTRODUCTION

### *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1931–1934*

As noted in the Introduction to Volume III, the periods covered by the successive volumes of this edition saw significant changes in the substance and context of Mao Zedong's thought and action. Volume I chronicles above all the efforts of Mao as an individual to come to terms with the encounter between Chinese and Western ideas during the May Fourth Period. Volume II adds to this dimension of Mao's writings his role as a member of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. Volume III, covering the period from the collapse of the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang in mid-1927 to the beginning of the Guomindang government's "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns in late 1930, illustrates Mao's attempts to deal with the new problems posed by the Party's transition from urban to rural struggle and by Mao's own discovery and application of the axiom, "political power is obtained from the barrel of a gun."

The era of the rise and fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi, to which the present volume is devoted, saw yet another mutation. During the years 1931–1934, Mao's status and role in Party affairs underwent a dramatic change that left him for much of the time substantially removed from important decision-making processes, especially in the military field, which he had made peculiarly his own since the earliest days on the Jinggangshan. This fact has dictated a modification in the focus and function of this Introduction, as compared to the pattern previously followed. In Volumes I–III, the introductions were, in large measure, summaries of and commentaries on the story told in Mao's own words in the documents, though attention was also given to the historical background. In dealing with the period 1931–1934, however, because Mao's policy-making role was contested and progressively restricted, emphasis must be placed less on the texts themselves and more on the history of inner-Party struggles, for it is this background which often reveals the extent to which documents bearing Mao's signature really reflected his own views.<sup>1</sup>

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1. In this as in the introductions to previous volumes, citations have been kept to a minimum. The narrative account that follows synthesizes material from various sources, but particular use has been made of Ma Qibin et al., *Zhongyang geming genjudi shi* (History of the Central Revolutionary Base Area) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1986) (hereafter *Central Base History*), and Yu Boliu and Chen Gang, *Mao Zedong zai zhongyang suqu* (Mao Zedong in the Central Soviet Area) (n.p.: Zhongguo shidian, 1993) (hereafter *Mao in the Central Soviet*).

The deterioration in Mao's position did not occur all at once. Indeed, for much of 1931 conditions of military and political emergency helped Mao maintain and in some ways even increase his influence over the sprawling congeries of small bases that were then coalescing into the Central Soviet Area (*Zhongyong suqu*). Beginning in the latter half of 1931, however, Mao's policies and attitudes were challenged by several Central Committee decisions and by the actions of high-level Party representatives. At the same time, the pressures of near-continuous military action and campaigns to "suppress counterrevolutionaries" also intensified a growing controversy among base area cadres over the appropriateness of the overall political and military approach favored by Mao in light of the strategic line adopted by national Party leaders at the Fourth Plenum of January 1931.

The cumulative impact of these developments was severely to circumscribe Mao's influence on political and military decision-making. An important step in this process occurred at the Southern Jiangxi Conference in early November 1931, at which many of Mao's policies were roundly criticized and he himself was removed from a key political post. This was followed in October 1932 by an even more drastic limitation on Mao's power following the Ningdu Conference, a gathering called to resolve arguments over the best military strategy to use in defeating the Guomindang army's repeated encirclement campaigns. After this rancorous meeting, Mao was removed from his military-related offices and relieved of all military decision-making responsibility. For Mao, who from the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927 down to this point had been directly and deeply involved in both the military and political leadership of the revolutionary forces, this was a substantial and humiliating defeat.

Despite this significant loss of power, Mao retained at least a modicum of status and influence within the base area leadership, because he was placed in the highly visible position of chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic when that body was formally established in November 1931. Although not on a par with the main Party and Red Army policy-making bodies, the government chairmanship nonetheless gave Mao day-to-day administrative jurisdiction over a number of significant areas of operation, including land reform and labor movements, internal security, elections and law-making, and a variety of economic activities that were vital to maintaining the fighting capacity and overall viability of the Central Soviet Area.

Mao retained this office and its responsibilities down to the time of the abandonment of the Central Soviet in late 1934. He had, however, increasingly limited capacity to carry out his own ideas. For one thing, Mao was seriously ill for long stretches of time during these years. More importantly, in addition to the persistence of a general political atmosphere uncongenial to many of the policies Mao advocated, the move of the bulk of the Party's central leadership to the Central Soviet in early 1933 brought these powerful individuals at last into a position where they could exert direct personal influence over the Base Area's political apparatus, as well as over Mao himself, for whom they had little sympathy.

Mao apparently contested these measures only sporadically. More often, he cooperated in his own marginalization by retreating to a succession of hospitals, rural dwellings, and out-of-the-way field assignments in which he quietly nursed his physical and political ailments, watched the progressive collapse of the Central Soviet under the leadership of his opponents, and waited for a change in his own and the revolutionary movement's fortunes.

### Repelling Enemy Armies and "Suppressing Counterrevolutionaries"

In December 1930, a deep crisis faced Mao and the entire revolutionary military and political apparatus in the several semi-separate base areas then existing in central and southwestern Jiangxi Province. There were two main elements in this crisis: (1) a powerful military "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign launched by government troops against the main Red Army force and the expanding Donggu base area in which it was situated, and (2) serious dissension and confusion within the revolutionary ranks, centering on local cadres' violent reactions to intensifying efforts to eradicate a counterrevolutionary group known as the AB Corps (*AB tuan*), whose members had allegedly infiltrated Party and soviet government organizations in the region.

By December the enemy's Communist-suppression campaign and the Communists' campaign to "suppress counterrevolutionaries," each following its own rhythm, had suddenly reached a stage where they simultaneously posed serious and immediate dangers to the base areas. Early in the month, as several divisions of the Guomindang armies were beginning to move ponderously across the rugged terrain of central Jiangxi toward the town of Donggu and the main Red Army lurking in the mountains beyond, the Red Army General Front Committee headed by Mao dispatched representatives to Donggu to extend to that region a hunt for AB Corps followers that had already resulted in thousands of arrests and executions within the Red Army itself.

As dozens of Donggu-area Party and army cadres—including high-ranking members of the Jiangxi provincial party apparatus—began to be arrested, officers of the Twentieth Red Army in the nearby town of Futian led their troops in a preemptive strike, which seized the Front Committee representatives and freed their imprisoned fellow cadres. After lengthy discussion, the local cadres then led the Twentieth Army out of the area and across the Gan River to the west-bank town of Yongyang. There they reaffirmed their revolutionary credentials, proclaimed themselves the legitimate provincial Party leadership, and vainly called on Red Army leaders such as Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Huang Gonglue to join them in opposing Mao's self-aggrandizing "despotism."<sup>2</sup>

2. For two complementary recent accounts of the Futian Incident and its context, see Stephen Averill, "The Origins of the Futian Incident," in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.), *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,

For their part, Mao and his associates were too distracted by the government suppression campaign that was by then also well underway to take immediate action against the rebellious revolutionaries. As five enemy divisions made their unopposed way deeper into the Base Area—one unit captured Donggu itself on December 19—the Red Army patiently prepared to counterattack. At the end of the month the Red Army suddenly struck and almost completely annihilated one enemy division in the Battle of Longgang, then routed another a few days later in the town of Dongshao. The remaining government troops promptly retreated, bringing the First Encirclement Campaign to an abrupt end.<sup>3</sup>

The successful repulse of the government campaign provided Mao with welcome and timely evidence of the correctness of the strategy of "luring the enemy in deep" (*youdi shenru*), which he had first articulated at the Luofang Conference in late October 1930.<sup>4</sup> This strategy, which called for allowing enemy armies to advance unopposed into the heart of the base areas so that the smaller Red Army could choose favorable opportunities to concentrate its forces to isolate and defeat individual enemy units one after the other, had been and remained controversial.

The controversy stemmed in part from the fact that the rural-oriented, defensive, counter-punching style of the "luring deep" concept ran counter to the aggressive expansionism of the "Li Lisan Line" of attacking major cities, which leaders in Jiangxi imagined was still official Party policy. But the "luring deep" strategy was also opposed by some influential Jiangxi cadres because of the extensive killing and property destruction that occurred whenever enemy military forces occupied Communist-controlled territory. Instead, they wanted the Red Army to defend the base area frontiers or, even better, to carry the attack to the White areas, thereby diverting enemy armies into following them and sparing the base areas from additional destruction and economic disruption.

Among those who disliked the "luring deep" strategy were a number of important local cadres (including several founders of the Donggu and other central Jiangxi bases), who had also opposed Mao and his allies on a variety of other issues and occasions during the preceding year. Significantly, cadres with this sort of localistic orientation not only figured prominently among the suspects in the major anti-AB Corps purges launched in late 1930 by Party and army organs under Mao's control, but were also heavily represented in the group of

1995), pp. 79–115 (hereafter Averill, "Origins"), and Yung-fa Chen, "The Futian Incident and the Anti-Bolshevik League: The 'Terror' in the CCP Revolution," *Republican China* Vol. 19, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 1–51 (hereafter Chen, "The Futian Incident"). For one of the fullest of many accounts by Mainland historians, see *Mao in the Central Soviet*, ch. 5. See also the letter of December 1930, translated in Volume III, pp. 704–13.

3. See the order of December 29 and the victory communiqué of December 30, 1930, in Volume III, pp. 729–32, as well as the orders dated January 1 and 2, 1931, translated below.

4. This term made its appearance in the order of November 1, 1930, translated in Volume III, pp. 656–57.

cadres who had risen up in violent opposition to the actions of Mao's representatives during the Futian Incident.<sup>5</sup>

Victory against the first of the government's encirclement campaigns therefore not only helped specifically to vindicate the method of "luring deep," but also served more generally to lend an aura of success to Mao and his activities at a time when they were being vociferously and very publicly attacked by the influential group of Futian Incident participants who remained entrenched on the far side of the Gan River out of easy reach.

Once the government campaign had been defeated, the question of how to deal with these breakaway cadres and their sympathizers assumed a high priority. Although public appeals by the "rebels" (as they were called by Mao and his associates) had not led any of the top base area leaders to turn against Mao and his policies, the combined impact of the Futian Incident and the counterrevolutionary suppression campaign that had helped precipitate it had nonetheless caused confusion, disruption, and antagonism within the base areas.

Moreover, while government armies had temporarily retreated, they remained in place on the fringes of the bases while regrouping for another assault. Taking comfort from the support of these armies were swarms of anti-Communist militia forces, many of which were led by and recruited from the dispossessed local elites and poverty-stricken war refugees who crowded into towns and cities just outside the bases. These militias constantly harassed border villages, raided deeper into the base areas, and engaged in various forms of intelligence-gathering, rumor-mongering, and subversion.

In addition, the interiors of the "Red areas" were still pockmarked with numerous "White spots"—irredentist nodes dominated by lineages, sworn brotherhoods, local elites, and militias opposed to Communist rule. Often securely anchored by strong mountaintop fortresses, these areas functioned not only as symbolic reminders of the possible impermanence of Communist power, but also as well-situated bases for troublesome raids and subversive activities directed against the surrounding Communist-controlled countryside.

Using the respite gained by their victory over the First Encirclement Campaign, between January and March 1931 Mao and his fellow Party and Red Army leaders took several measures aimed at reducing such guerrilla threats, while at the same time mobilizing the population more effectively to resist the next enemy army invasion. One of these measures was to employ the Red Army to eradicate the remaining "White spots," a task that made excellent progress despite the fierce resistance put up by cornered foes defending their homes and families. As a corollary to this Red Army campaign, Communist-controlled territory was divided into nine separate subregions, in each of which cadres were to mobilize local people to form security forces to defend against militia raids and enforce a strict "martial law" program of checkpoints and travel passes to pre-

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5. Averill, "Origins," and Chen, "The Futian Incident."

vent espionage and subversion. In case of invasion, these forces were expected to carry out intelligence-gathering, delaying actions, and scorched-earth tactics.<sup>6</sup>

It was as one part of the broader overall struggle involved in waging this ongoing, multifaceted "irregular" war that base area Party leaders continued during this period to promote the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. It was also by analogy with this spectrum of demonstrable external and internal threats that Mao and his associates categorized and articulated the challenge posed by the amorphous but potentially omnipresent AB Corps, and by its concrete incarnation in the form of the Futian Incident participants.

Finding an effective resolution to the Futian Incident problem was an important but difficult part of the struggle to consolidate and secure the base areas. To allow this group of disgruntled, desperate, and quite possibly counterrevolutionary local cadres to continue publicly to criticize and challenge the policies of the Base Area's highest Party and military organs (and of Mao himself) threatened to increase rather than reduce internal dissension. On the other hand, the local origins and ramified personal connections of most of the cadres involved, together with growing local alarm over the perceived zealotry and excessive violence of the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, meant that the "rebels'" actions and attitudes enjoyed a certain amount of popular support.<sup>7</sup>

To complicate matters still more, Mao and his associates were not acting in isolation, but in contact with national Party leaders. Though its personnel and policies were then in a state of flux, the national leadership remained consistent in its desire to establish closer and more effective control over the base areas. The arrival at Mao's headquarters at the end of December 1930 of Xiang Ying,<sup>8</sup> a representative of the Third Plenum Party leadership, which had come to power following the collapse of the Li Lisan Line, constituted an intrusive reminder of this fact.

Xiang's instructions were to establish two new organizations—the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas and, subordinate to it, the Central Military Commission—which were to act as agents of the central leadership and to have supreme political and military authority in the base areas. National Party leaders had

6. For an example of Mao giving advice on problems associated with some of the "White spots," see below, "Letter from Mao Zedong to Yuan Guoping," March 6, 1932.

7. In "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," composed in December 1936, Mao later noted that during this period "in the Futian-Donggu area, the people, having been deceived by the AB Corps, did not trust the Red Army, and were even opposed to the Red Army." (Our translation of this document will appear in Volume V. An English version of the text as revised for publication in 1951 can be found in *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 179–254.)

8. Xiang Ying (1889–1941) was a native of Wuchang in Hubei. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922 and played an important role as a labor organizer first in the textile industry, and then on the Beijing-Hankou railroad. In 1928, at the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Moscow, he was elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. During the ensuing two years, he was probably the third most influential member of the Central Committee, after Li Lisan and Zhou Enlai. Xiang's role after his arrival in the Central Soviet Area in December 1930 is discussed below in this Introduction.

sought for some time to establish such organs to develop better control over the Party's rural activities, but the turmoil surrounding the Red Army's abortive urban attacks in the summer of 1930 and the subsequent infighting leading to the ouster of the Li Lisan leadership had hitherto prevented it.

Xiang had reached the base amid the struggle against the enemy's encirclement campaign, and waited until the campaign was over before proceeding to carry out his instructions. On January 15, 1931, both the Central Bureau and the Military Commission were formally established; at the same time, the General Front Committee, until this point the dominant Party organization in the region and Mao's main power base, was abolished.

The memberships of the new organizations had been previously selected by Party authorities in Shanghai. Because both bodies were nominally responsible for managing the affairs of base areas throughout China, their memberships included several individuals who were not actually present in Jiangxi. Notable among these was Zhou Enlai, then still in Shanghai, who was listed as the Central Bureau's chairman. Xiang Ying became chairman of the subordinate Military Commission, but in practice, as the central representative actually on the spot, he also functioned as *de facto* head of the Central Bureau. Mao and Zhu De, the dominant political and military leaders already established in the area, became essentially joint managers of both new organizations along with Xiang.<sup>9</sup> Mao was appointed director of the General Political Department under the Revolutionary Military Commission.<sup>10</sup> In this capacity, he also issued policy statements regarding broad political questions such as land reform and propaganda.<sup>11</sup>

Xiang Ying had considerable experience dealing with Party affairs in the big cities of the Yangzi Valley, and he came armed with the authority of the Party's central leadership. But he had little practical knowledge of rural base-building, and he was a lone outsider entering an unfamiliar political landscape dominated by well-established, powerful personalities such as Mao. Moreover, the conjuncture of various military threats and ongoing reverberations from the Futian Incident and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries meant that he had arrived in Jiangxi at a particularly tense time.

The Futian Incident was the first issue to assume salience. The importance of settling this problem was as evident to Xiang Ying as to those more personally implicated in the affair. In handling this case, however, Xiang had to consider not only the interests of the revolutionary movement, but also the problem of consolidating his own authority over both established senior Party leaders such

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9. Regarding relations between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and between Mao Zedong and Zhu De, during the period 1928–1930, see the Introduction to Volume III, pp. xxxix–li.

10. See below, Order No. 6 of the Revolutionary Military Commission, February 17, 1931.

11. See below, his letter of February 27, 1931, to Zeng Shan, and the order of March 14, 1931.



as Mao and the ramified networks of local cadres that had likewise played vital roles in building the rural bases.

It may well have been with the aim of reconciling the aims of these two constituencies that on January 16 the Central Bureau issued, under Xiang's auspices, a resolution that attempted to articulate a compromise judgment on the Futian Incident. On the one hand, the resolution agreed with Mao and his supporters that the incident had indeed been a counterrevolutionary affair involving the AB Corps, and it announced the expulsion from the Party of several of the chief "rebels." On the other hand, the resolution also offered comfort to those who had come under attack by criticizing excesses and errors that had turned the whole campaign against counterrevolutionaries into a "Red terror." In February the Central Bureau issued two additional documents that were considerably more conciliatory toward those involved in the incident, conceding that they might have been unknowing dupes rather than conscious followers of the AB Corps, and offering forgiveness to all but the most deeply implicated "counterrevolutionaries" who might still lurk among them.<sup>12</sup>

Mao and his allies, however, had a quite different outlook. Although no relevant contemporary materials written by Mao are publicly available to confirm the point, the overall documentary context of the period makes it clear that Mao opposed Xiang Ying's efforts at compromise and conciliation. Instead, he and his associates held out for harsh verdicts on those who had been involved in the incident and for continued (though perhaps more judicious) efforts to search out other enemies who were presumed still to be lurking within the revolutionary ranks. Although Mao's opposition could not totally negate the power of Xiang's formal rank or overturn his conciliatory policy, it sufficed to keep the issue from being conclusively settled, and it certainly helped ensure that the hunt for other hidden counterrevolutionaries continued to be prosecuted diligently.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, as the start of a new government "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign became imminent, questions of military strategy once again came to the fore. According to Chiang Kaishek's plan, the 200,000 troops gathered (twice the number mustered for the previous campaign) were to utilize a classic "hammer and anvil" strategy, with the hammer consisting of eighteen divisions under Chiang's command in Jiangxi, which would advance along four routes slowly and in concert with one another, and the anvil consisting of other, non-Guomindang armies in Fujian and Guangdong whose passive presence would

12. Chinese texts of the Central Bureau's January 16 resolution and one of its February documents (Circular No. 11, dated February 19, 1931) are available in Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), Vol. 2.

13. Chen, "Futian Incident," pp. 17-20, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 192-95. Some Party historians have mentioned that the Central Archives hold a document by Mao on the Futian Incident. Although we have found no specific printed references to or quotations from such a document, there is little doubt that it exists.

prevent the Red Army from avoiding the blows being delivered by the Jiangxi armies.

In the face of this threat, questions of strategy once again became a focal point for the struggle between Mao, Xiang Ying, and their respective supporters. As previously noted, in defeating the First Encirclement Campaign the Red Army had followed Mao's strategy of "luring deep," and some steps to facilitate the employment of the same approach had been taken to prepare for the next enemy invasion.<sup>14</sup> Thus in late March the bulk of the Red Army was moved deep into the heart of the base areas, where it would be well positioned to strike against enemy troops advancing from any direction, and several previously captured towns near the fringes of the base areas were deliberately abandoned to ensure that the enemy was enticed deeper into the Red areas.

Nevertheless, as the campaign actually began, the question of strategy was reopened and became the subject of acrimonious debate at a series of at least four meetings, beginning with a plenary session of the Central Bureau on March 18 and ending at a final session on April 30. In these meetings, which continued for almost a month after enemy troops began their slow but inexorable advance into the base areas, the main point of contention was whether or not the strategy of "luring deep" could still succeed in light of the magnitude and determination of the government offensive.

Many cadres, including at times a substantial majority of those present at meetings, felt that the huge disparity in strength between the 200,000 well-armed government soldiers and the 30,000 or so poorly armed Red Army troops was simply too great for the latter to prevail in pitched battle, even if full advantage was taken of the Red Army's superior speed and mobility. For these cadres, who included Xiang Ying and several other Central Committee representatives who arrived in the base in early April, the "luring deep" strategy was therefore a recipe for likely disaster.

Instead, they suggested several other possibilities, all of which stressed avoidance of large-scale combat. One proposal called for a strategy of "dispersing the troops to make the enemy withdraw" (*fenbing tuidi*), under which the Red Army would break up into scattered small units that would melt invisibly into the population of the base areas. This, it was reasoned, would deprive the ponderous enemy units of large, well-defined targets to attack, while still allowing Communist forces to carry out mass mobilization and infrastructure-building work. Other alternatives called in one form or another for the Red Army to leave the southern Jiangxi bases, in order either to locate a more favorable site elsewhere (Sichuan was one suggestion), or to lead the enemies on a merry chase that would draw them away from the existing bases.

14. For a text by Mao, dating probably from March 1931, setting forth some of the arguments in favor of his strategy, see below, "Eight Conditions for a Great Victory in the Second Major Campaign."

Xiang Ying and some or all of a three-person team of Central Committee representatives who had arrived in early April were prominent among the advocates of one or another of these alternatives, while Mao, Zhu De, and others unnamed insisted on a continuation of the "luring deep" strategy that would keep the Red Army intact and in its present position, concentrated deep in the base areas where it was poised to strike in any direction as opportunity presented itself. Though Xiang and the Central Committee representatives had nominally superior political rank, they lacked the practical military experience that Mao and Zhu De possessed. The result was a lengthy stalemate that was not broken until the latter half of April, by which point enemy troops had already advanced well into the base areas.<sup>15</sup>

It appears that the crucial turning point in this military debate, and (at least in the short run) in the larger power struggle between Mao and Xiang Ying with which it was intertwined, was the arrival in the base areas in early April of the aforementioned Central Committee representatives. Although these representatives differed from Mao on military matters, the news they brought of changes in Party personnel and policies was so supportive of Mao's views on other contentious issues—most notably the Futian Incident—that it gave him the leverage needed to shift momentum on the military question as well.

The Central Committee representatives had been dispatched by the new leadership that had come to power in January 1931 at the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. The new Central Committee was dominated by the "Returned Student" Wang Ming<sup>16</sup> and several other cadres who had become mutually acquainted during periods of study and political activity in the Soviet Union, and had been shaped by that experience. After returning to China, they had taken advantage of intra-Party factional divisions following the collapse of the Li Lisan Line to assume control of the Party.

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15. Regarding Party meetings and the strategic debate over the Second Encirclement Campaign, see *Central Base History*, pp. 285–88; *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 246–50; and Pang Xianzhi (ed.), *Mao Zedong nianpu 1893–1949* (Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 1, pp. 337–42. (Since Mao Zedong is the central figure in this edition, our short title for this work is simply *Nianpu*; in the case of other *nianpu*, such as that of Zhou Enlai, the name of the subject is included in the short title.)

16. Chen Shaoyu (1904–1974), better known under his *hao*, Wang Ming, was a native of Anhui. He joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1925 and soon thereafter traveled to Moscow to attend Sun Yatsen University. In 1928, he attended the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, where he served as chief Russian interpreter. He returned to China in late 1930 with the Comintern emissary Pavel Mif and participated in the Fourth Plenum of January 1931, at which he was elected to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. For a few months in mid-1931 he was acting secretary general of the Party, but he soon returned to Moscow again, and remained there until 1937. Despite his absence from China, he was commonly regarded as the leader of the "Returned Student" faction and was regularly elected to important offices in the Party.

Within a short time Wang Ming and his fellow Returned Students would become persistent and powerful antagonists of Mao, and the cumulative impact of their collective policies over the next three years would subsequently be identified in Party historiography (under the pejorative label of the "Wang Ming Leftist Line") as the main cause of the eventual collapse of the Central Soviet Area. But at this point, early in its reign, the actions taken by the Fourth Plenum leadership (of which, as discussed in the Introduction to Volume III, Zhou Enlai was also a prominent member) with regard to the Futian Incident and the formal authority of Party organs in the base areas actually favored Mao's cause in his dealings both with Xiang Ying and with the Futian Incident participants.

The initial decisions to establish a Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas and to appoint Xiang Ying and others to it had been made in the fall of 1930 by Party leaders who were now out of power. Rather than simply accept its predecessors' actions, the Fourth Plenum leadership on February 23 wrote Jiangxi leaders that they were sending a delegation to review the organization and activities of the Central Bureau and to examine the question of the Futian Incident and the suppression of counterrevolution. The new leaders gave an indication of their own views on the subject by noting that it was imperative to crack down harshly on AB Corps counterrevolutionaries, and by calling for a full report on the Futian Incident to supplement the incomplete information they had thus far received. Until the delegation's investigation was done, the General Front Committee (which had just been abolished by Xiang Ying) was to be reinstated as the overall Party policy-making authority for the central Jiangxi base areas.<sup>17</sup>

In early April, the central delegation (referred to in sources on Party history as the "Fourth Plenum Delegation" or the "Group of Three"), composed of Ren Bishi, Wang Jiaxiang, and Gu Zuolin,<sup>18</sup> arrived at the combined Party/military

17. The text of the Central Committee's February 23 letter is available in *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 7 (1931) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), pp. 139–42 (hereafter *Central Committee Documents*).

18. Ren Ernan (1904–1950), commonly known by his pen name Ren Bishi, was a native of Hunan. In 1921, he went to Moscow to attend the Communist University of the Toilers of the Far East, where he soon joined the Chinese Communist Party. In 1924, he returned to China and began a career in the Youth League. After being arrested several times, he returned to Shanghai in late 1930 and was elected a member of the Politburo at the Fourth Plenum. Wang Jiaxiang (1906–1974) was a native of Anhui. He joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1925 and soon went to Moscow to study at Sun Yatsen University. In 1928, after joining the Chinese Communist Party, he entered the Institute of Red Professors, where Chen Shaoyu, Qin Bangxian, and Zhang Wentian were also students. He returned to China in 1930 and attended the Fourth Plenum of January 1931, where he was elected to the Central Committee. He became a member of the Politburo following the execution of Xiang Zhongfa in June 1931. Gu Zuolin (1908–1934), a native of Jiangsu, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. In 1930, he became a member of the Yangzi Bureau of the Party.

headquarters at Qingtang in Ningdu *xian*. According to some sources, the three brought the first word to the Base Area regarding the changes in Party leadership made at the Fourth Plenum, though it is not entirely clear what form this communication took.<sup>19</sup> In any event, on April 17 the delegation participated in an important plenary meeting of the Central Bureau in Qingtang. At this meeting the three delegates presented a report on the Fourth Plenum leadership's composition and general policies, and also proposed several resolutions that reflected both the views of the national leadership and the results of their own investigations since their arrival in the base areas.

Among the resolutions (all of which were passed at the meeting) was one giving a generally positive evaluation of the actions of the General Front Committee under Mao's leadership during the latter half of 1930.<sup>20</sup> Even more favorable to Mao was the resolution on the Futian Incident, which unambiguously criticized Xiang Ying and his conciliatory policy and laid out a harsh assessment of the incident similar to that advocated by Mao.<sup>21</sup>

Armed with this centrally sanctioned endorsement of their actions, Mao and his supporters moved quickly to solidify their control over the Central Bureau (now once again officially approved to replace the General Front Committee as the base areas' top Party organ) and vigorously to promote their policies on suppression of counterrevolutionaries and other issues. By contrast, Xiang Ying's influence sank rapidly (if temporarily) following this conference. By late May, Mao had managed to have several of his associates made provisional members of the Central Bureau; shortly thereafter Xiang was removed as acting secretary of the organization and Mao took his place. Although none of these appointments were considered official until reviewed by the Central Committee, in the interim (a period which in this case was several months) they nonetheless gave Mao a clear working majority on the Central Bureau.<sup>22</sup>

19. *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 339, indicates that on April 17, the delegation "transmitted the spirit of the Fourth Plenum."

20. See below, the "Decision Regarding Acceptance of the Letter from the International and of the Resolution Adopted by the Fourth Plenum," dated April 1931.

21. On the arrival of the "Group of Three" and the Qingtang Conference, see *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 196–200; *Central Base History*, pp. 285–86; and *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 339–41. A translation of the Central Bureau's resolution on the Futian Incident is available in Tony Saich (ed.), *The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party. Documents and Analysis, 1920–1949* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 530–35 (hereafter Saich, *Rise to Power*).

22. There is some uncertainty and considerable variation among Party history sources regarding the period during which Mao exercised effective control over the Central Bureau. Although the *Nianpu* is silent on this point, several recent works by well-informed Party historians concur that Xiang Ying lost his position as secretary of the Central Bureau in May 1931, that Mao either formally or informally replaced him, and that Mao in any case achieved a working majority about that time through the provisional election to the bureau of several of his associates (Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Zhou Yili, Chen Yi, and Zeng Shan) (*Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 200–1, and *Central Base History*, p. 279). See also the discussion in Chen, "Futian Incident," pp. 21, 43n72.

The practical effects of the harsh new resolution on the Futian Incident began to be felt even more rapidly. In March, at Xiang Ying's invitation, several leaders of the incident had left the area west of the Gan River and had reported to the Central Bureau. Unfortunately for them, they arrived in Qingtang just when the April 17 Central Bureau conference delivered its verdict on the Futian Incident and were promptly arrested, tried, and executed. During the following several months their fate was shared by thousands of other Party and soviet cadres—most of them local Jiangxi Party members—as the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries steadily intensified.<sup>23</sup>

The general validation of Mao's status and correctness by the Qingtang conference also appears to have provided the impetus needed to break the stalemate over military strategy and to begin to shift the balance in Mao's favor. One day after the conference another meeting was held solely for the purpose of discussing the military situation; on this occasion a number of Red Army officers and local cadres were invited to participate in addition to the Central Bureau members.<sup>24</sup>

At this meeting, some softening became evident in the opposition to doing battle with the government armies. The majority opinion still favored eventual abandonment of the base, but it was now felt that the retreat could be postponed until after the current offensive had been defeated. Though this shift in perspective probably resulted from recognition that enemy forces had already advanced too far into the base areas to allow the Red Army to disengage easily, it nonetheless provided Mao with the nominal agreement he needed to carry out a "luring deep" campaign.

If the Red Army was to fight, however, it remained to determine a plan of action. In line with the continuing strong sentiment in favor of eventually leaving the Jiangxi base, many at the meeting initially favored an attack on the prong of the enemy offensive that was entering the base areas from the southwest, on the grounds that defeating this force would open a convenient hole in the enemy's encirclement through which the Red Army could then retreat west into Hunan. But Mao noted that this particular force was the strongest of the enemy armies and was well established on terrain that did not favor mobile warfare; he argued instead for attacking the northwestern prong of the enemy invasion, a poorly motivated body of heterogeneous troops (*zapai*) that was traversing the more suitable and familiar area around Donggu.

Once again, the assembled leaders could not agree, but the continuing enemy advance made some sort of action imperative. On April 19, therefore, Mao and Zhu De issued orders for the Red Army to move to the northwest to concentrate at Longgang, a mountain town conveniently situated to facilitate attack on either

23. Chen, "Futian Incident," pp. 21–24, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 201–2.

24. One might perhaps see here a foretaste of Mao's Cultural Revolution tactics of packing meetings with his own militant supporters not formally qualified to attend.

the northwestern or southwestern branches of the government offensive.<sup>25</sup> Once in Longgang the army halted for more than a week, while enemy troops continued to march and Communist leaders resumed efforts to reach agreement on conduct of the campaign. Mao himself appears to have spent considerable time in informal conversation trying to win over the young and relatively inexperienced members of the Fourth Plenum Delegation.

In a tribute to Mao's force of personality and resurgent power, the Central Bureau (including the Fourth Plenum delegates) finally reached a consensus in favor of Mao's strategy, which was formally articulated at a meeting held on April 30. In this meeting, Mao presented a detailed rationale for first attacking the enemy's northwestern force, and then moving not west (out of the base toward Hunan) but east, across the main enemy armies' line of advance and toward the Fujian border. Once in the Jiangxi-Fujian border country, a region that had not hitherto been a major object of contention for Communist or government forces, the Red Army could hope to replenish its resources and expand its influence. The meeting accepted Mao's plan and further resolved that the alternate strategy of "dispersing forces" was "opportunistic."

Despite the growing urgency of the situation, however, the Red Army did not immediately go on the offensive. Instead, after creeping quietly eastward a few miles into the mountainous terrain around Donggu, they settled in to wait for the enemy to come to them. Their patience was eventually rewarded in mid-May when they were able to ambush and destroy a reinforced enemy division. With any threat to their rear neutralized by this initial battle, and with the shock waves from their victory rippling out to spread fear and uncertainty among the government armies, the Red Army now embarked on a rapid and remarkably successful campaign to roll up the flank of the enemy's entire northern wing. By the time the Red Army ended its flanking maneuver with a triumphant capture of the city of Jianning in western Fujian on May 31, they had turned the government's Second Encirclement Campaign into a complete shambles. The few remaining government divisions not already destroyed reversed course and headed for their garrison sites well outside the base areas.<sup>26</sup>

For their part, the bulk of the Red Army settled down in the Jiangxi-Fujian border region to carve out a new sphere of influence that might not only provide fresh funds and recruits, but also serve as a territorial bridge linking the rapidly consolidating base areas in southern Jiangxi with the smaller base area to the north astride the Jiangxi-Zhejiang-Fujian border.<sup>27</sup>

25. See below, "Order for the Troops to Assemble Before the Battle."

26. The texts translated here regarding the Second "Encirclement and Suppression" are numerous. See below, in particular, the orders of April 19, and May 13, 14, 21, and 24, 1931, as well as the minutes of the nine meetings of the General Front Committee, from May 25 to June 22, 1931.

27. For texts by Mao himself regarding fund-raising in this area, see below, the orders dated January 16 and February 21, 1931. Regarding propaganda appeals to the masses,

These plans soon had to be put on hold, however, when on July 1 Chiang Kaishek's forces launched yet another full-scale campaign against the base areas. This third campaign involved half again as many troops (300,000, compared to 200,000 in the second campaign), a substantial increase in modern weapons such as airplanes, and the commitment of several of Chiang's top officers and front-line divisions (instead of the reorganized warlord troops who had predominated in previous campaigns).

A full three months had elapsed between the defeat of the First Encirclement Campaign and the beginning of the second. The start of a third, even larger and better equipped campaign only one month after the second had been so thoroughly trounced caught the Communist leaders very much by surprise. No plans of action or preparations had been made; moreover, the bulk of the Red Army was scattered in small units throughout the western Fujian countryside engaged in mass mobilization work, instead of being concentrated into battle-ready units and centrally positioned deep in the base areas ready to strike in any direction.

The immediate priority of the Red Army leaders, therefore, was simply to get the army into proper defensive position. Leaving a small force behind in Fujian to screen their movements, the main body of the army set out from Jianning on a grueling forced march that followed a circuitous route via Ruijin and Yudu to reach Xingguo *xian* in late July. By this time government armies had reached advanced staging areas on the northern and western sides of the base areas, and had also occupied the strategically situated *xian* seats of Ningdu and Ruijin deep in their interior.

As the exhausted Red Army paused to rest in Xingguo, Mao devised a plan that would lead the army on a march deep into the rear of the enemy advance and thence back to the western Fujian region from which it had started, meaning that the army would have marched nearly full circle around the entire circumference of the base areas. Unfortunately for the Communists, the Red Army's presence was detected shortly after it set out, and with the element of surprise lost, the Red Army retreated to Gaoxing in Xingguo *xian* to consider its options. But the government armies, which were slowly learning how to respond more flexibly and rapidly to Red Army movements, immediately began to box the Red Army into a steadily shrinking area whose terrain was not well-suited to its mobile, ambush-oriented style of warfare.

To regain the initiative, the Red Army slipped through a small gap in the gathering enemy forces to reach the mountainous region around their former marshalling area at Huangpi in northern Ningdu *xian*. Once on this familiar

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see below, the order dated March 20, 1931. Regarding the foundations of Communist rule in general, see below, in particular, the "Circular of the General Political Department on Investigating the Situation Regarding Land and Population," April 2, 1931, in which Mao first put forward, as a complement to his slogan "He who has not made an investigation has no right to speak," the formula "He who has not made a correct investigation likewise has no right to speak."



ground, the Red Army moved immediately onto the offensive. After staging three successful attacks on widely separated enemy units in less than a week's time, they then suddenly struck out in a different direction to bypass gathering enemy forces and reach suitable rest areas first in northern and then in western Xingguo.

Before government commanders could react, the national political situation changed dramatically. To the south of Jiangxi in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei, longtime political rivals of Chiang Kaishek, had recently allied with warlords remaining in this part of China to form a government in Guangzhou to compete with Chiang's government in Nanjing. In early September, this southern coalition sent armies north into Hunan Province, where they constituted a military threat that could not be ignored. To find troops to meet this sudden challenge, Chiang was forced to call for a general withdrawal by the armies committed to the encirclement campaign. In a final gesture of defiance, in September the Red Army ambushed and inflicted heavy damage on several of the retreating enemy units.<sup>28</sup>

Mao and his associates had reason to feel both proud of their achievements and somewhat relieved at the outcome of the campaign. Although caught off guard by the speed with which the Guomindang government had launched its offensive, the Red Army leaders had recovered quickly and taken full and effective advantage of the army's superior mobility and local knowledge to execute a series of daring maneuvers which put them into position both to confuse the advancing enemy forces and to inflict serious casualties on them.

On the other hand, the government forces had been both more numerous and more effective than had previously been the case. Their attacks had been ponderous but persistent, and they had kept the Red Army on the run far more effectively than before. Moreover, at the end of the day it had not been the victories of the Red Army but rather the threat from Hunan that had caused the Guomindang armies to break off and retreat. All of these things provided ominous evidence that the enemy was learning from experience and would in due course return to the struggle.

For the moment, however, both the Red Army and the base areas it was defending had won a valuable respite from enemy invasion. For Mao, the government withdrawal could be interpreted as more evidence of the correctness of his policies and another in a recent string of successes. In addition to his spring victories in the arguments over the Futian Incident and the strategy for the Second Encirclement Campaign, he had managed to marginalize Xiang Ying and the Fourth Plenum Delegation, and to obtain at least *de facto* control over the new organs—most notably the Central Bureau—through which these Central Committee representatives were to have extended the national Party leaders' authority over the base areas. The dramatic victory achieved following his strat-

28. Regarding the campaign against the Third "Encirclement and Suppression" see below, the text of July 4, 1931, and the orders dated July 24 and 31, 1931, August 3, 8, and 12, 1931, and September 11, 12, 18, and 23, 1931.

egy during the Second Encirclement Campaign likewise seems to have secured widespread acceptance of his military judgment. In any case, available sources reveal no evidence of any disagreement with or controversy over his leadership (along with that of Zhu De) of Red Army forces against the government's Third Encirclement Campaign during the summer.

During the spring and summer Mao had also remained involved in efforts to counter potential subversion and counterrevolutionary activity. By this time the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries had, to a considerable extent, taken on a momentum of its own, fueled by the combination of a persistent sense of "emergency" generated by the successive government encirclement campaigns, a generalized paranoid suspicion, and a wide variety of specific local jealousies and personal disputes. Nevertheless, the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries was still promoted and overseen by high level cadres (including Mao), and it was institutionalized through a number of Party and government administrative agencies. One of the most powerful of these was headed by Li Shaojiu,<sup>29</sup> the General Front Committee special emissary whose investigations of suspected AB Corps activity in the Donggu area had helped provoke the Futian Incident.

Further waves of arrests and executions of suspected counterrevolutionaries took place during the summer. One notable manifestation of these suppression campaigns involved the Twentieth Army, which, following its participation in the Futian Incident and subsequent flight, had circumspectly kept the Gan River between itself and the Mao-dominated main Red Army forces to the east.

As noted above, several Futian Incident leaders had been executed following their imprudent return to the Central Soviet Area in April. Nonetheless, when government armies embarked on the Third Encirclement Campaign in July 1931, the Twentieth Army obeyed orders from the Central Bureau and the headquarters of the First Front Army to recross the Gan and report to the army's main body to help resist the enemy offensive. At about the same time, Mao and the First Front Army were engaged in their circuitous forced march from western Fujian back to the heart of the base areas.

The paths of the Twentieth and First Front armies converged in northern Yudu *xian* in the third week of July. On July 23, as the Twentieth Army rested in camp, its entire officer corps from the army commander down to the level of assistant platoon leader was suddenly arrested. Shortly thereafter most of the arrested officers were executed as counterrevolutionaries; the army's rank-and-file soldiers were dispersed among various other Red Army units and the Twentieth Army unit designation was abolished.

Thus was the largest and most visible reminder of the Futian Incident dealt with. Moreover, by the end of the summer virtually all other local Jiangxi base

29. Li Shaojiu (1903–1935), a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922 and participated in the struggles on the Jinggangshan. In August 1930, he was appointed chairman of the Committee for Eliminating Counterrevolution (*sufan weiyuanhui*).

area cadres who had been specifically implicated in the incident, and many others who had been more generally involved in opposition to policies favored by Mao, had also been caught up in the intense suppression campaign and arrested as suspected members of the AB Corps or other counterrevolutionary organizations. After being imprisoned for periods ranging from a few days to a year or more, they too were virtually all executed.<sup>30</sup>

To what extent was Mao personally implicated in these activities? Since the late 1970s, when scholars in the Chinese People's Republic first began openly to discuss these issues, a large corpus of published work has developed on the Futian Incident, the AB Corps, and the campaigns to suppress counterrevolutionaries. In general this literature has been very critical of the paranoia, zealotry, and excesses involved in the search for counterrevolutionaries, and has mostly concluded that during this period the AB Corps and other so-called counterrevolutionary organizations never actually existed in the base areas.

Perhaps precisely because of the extent of the criticism, however, the question of Mao's role in these activities is rarely addressed directly. In most accounts, even Mao's name occurs very infrequently; comments explicitly connecting him to the violent purges are even more rare. Nonetheless, close comparison of what is known about Mao's movements, views, and official positions with corresponding information on the development of the campaigns to suppress counterrevolutionaries makes it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that Mao was either directly or indirectly implicated in these purges.<sup>31</sup>

Whatever else might be said about the purges, they assisted Mao's efforts to centralize and consolidate power within the base areas. Mao's struggles with high-level Party rivals have been well documented, but his efforts to gain firmer control over numerous low-level revolutionaries entrenched in their own local bases have attracted much less attention. Improved control was an essential part of the task of welding the scattered bases and their disparate local leaders into a unified, coherent political entity that could resist the increasingly well-coordinated government suppression efforts, but it also concentrated more power in the hands

30. On the intensification of the *sufan* campaigns and the fate of the Twentieth Army, see *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 202–11; Chen, "Futian Incident," pp. 22–25; and Averill, "Origins," pp. 107–8.

31. As noted above, the destruction of the Twentieth Army, which had been centrally involved in activities and statements opposing Mao, had occurred as soon as it arrived in the immediate vicinity of Mao and the First Army. For references to a portion of the recent literature on the Futian Incident and the AB Corps, see the sources cited in Averill, "Origins," and Chen, "Futian Incident." Two good examples of the voluminous Chinese literature are Guo Qi and Dong Xia, "Jiangxi suqu chuqi sufan yu Futian shibian" (The Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries During the Early Period of the Jiangxi Soviet Area and the Futian Incident), *Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* no. 5 (1982), pp. 7–25, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, ch. 5. The latter source comes closer than most Mainland writings to implicating Mao in the suppression campaigns. It also quotes often from unpublished documents that are not available elsewhere.

of higher-level base area leaders such as Mao. The fact that by autumn 1931 a very high percentage—in many places the vast majority—of the founders and leading cadres of local bases throughout southern Jiangxi and western Fujian had been either killed or cowed by the purges did much to facilitate these processes of centralization and consolidation of power into the hands of higher-level regional Party and army organs and their leaders.

### **The Erosion of Mao's Political and Military Power**

Because of the preoccupation of Chiang Kaishek and his military forces with the rival Guangdong government, and then with the even more serious problems posed by the Japanese seizure of Manchuria and the clashes between Chinese and Japanese forces in and around Shanghai, it was not until August 1932, almost a year after breaking off the Third Encirclement Campaign, that the Nanjing government once again directed another major military offensive against the Communists in southern Jiangxi.

During this long interval, the initiative was very much in the hands of the Communists, and they took full advantage of the fact. During this period the numerous disconnected patches of Communist-controlled territory that speckled the map of southern Jiangxi and western Fujian were at last linked together into a single, continuous geographic and administrative entity that could properly be referred to as the Central Soviet Area. Determined efforts were also made to extend revolutionary influence out from this isolated agricultural hinterland to encompass major cities along Jiangxi's Gan River valley and the Fujian coast. And it was at this time that the convening of a National Soviet Congress and the subsequent formation of an elaborate governmental bureaucracy and legal system in the Central Soviet Area began to provide tangible evidence of the Communist Party's emergence as a serious contender for national political power.

This phase of consolidation and expansion for the Central Soviet Area was, in contrast, a time of serious erosion in Mao's individual power and influence. While Mao had surmounted the initial challenge that the arrival of Central Committee representatives and the formation of the Central Bureau had posed to his political and military dominance over the southern Jiangxi base areas, during the year-long period between autumn 1931 and autumn 1932 he was gradually stripped of his most influential formal positions in both Party and Red Army organizations.

Although during the spring of 1931 the Party's Fourth Plenum national leadership had issued opinions that supported Mao's views on key issues, as they settled more securely into power and received more information regarding events in the base areas, whatever limited resonance there may initially have been between their views and Mao's policies and actions gradually disappeared.

By the end of the summer national leaders had become openly dissatisfied with a wide range of base area practices, including a number that were closely

associated with Mao. Their criticisms were clearly expressed in a long letter of August 30, addressed jointly to the Central Bureau and to the General Front Committee. The main thrust of the criticism was that Party and army organs in the Central Soviet Area were too lax in their adherence to a class line and in their mass work. As a result, their leadership had been right-opportunist and they had been guilty of following a rich peasant line. Because of these general failings, numerous other problems had arisen: the base areas and the Red Army had not been fully expanded or consolidated; landlords and rich peasants had been treated too leniently (in particular, through the use of Mao's policies such as "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean");<sup>32</sup> the labor movement had not been developed; the work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries had been too simplistic and mechanical; and an all-soviet national congress (an event repeatedly demanded by national Party leaders) had not yet been held.

On the same day the Central Committee also issued a resolution on Party organization in the Central Soviet Area, which listed the seven people (Mao, Xiang Ying, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, Wang Jiaxiang, Gu Zuolin, and Deng Fa) who should be on the Central Bureau, but did not specify which of them should be the secretary. In October the national leaders, fearing that their original letter had not reached Jiangxi, followed up with a telegram which made the same points as the August 30 letter, but which also explicitly stated that a Party congress was to be held in the Central Soviet Area on the basis of the principles articulated in their communications.<sup>33</sup>

As they began to prepare to hold this congress, the Central Bureau on October 11 sent the Central Committee a request that Mao be confirmed as acting secretary of the Central Bureau (a position that by this time he had apparently been filling for several months without formal permission). In late October, just before the Party congress convened, national leaders approved this request.<sup>34</sup>

In the event, Mao's formal appointment turned out to be both purely nominal

32. In this context, the directive, translated below, "The Problem of Opposing Rich Peasants," dating probably from August 1931 and signed by Mao together with Xiang Ying, though it seems at first glance rather harsh, must have been seen as inadequate proof of his loyalty to the correct line.

33. The text of the August 30 letter is available in *Central Committee Documents* (1931), pp. 355-75; the organizational resolution of the same day and the telegram of mid to late October are not included in that volume, but are mentioned in *Mao in the Central Soviet*, p. 282, and *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 358.

34. *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 357-58. As previously noted, there is uncertainty about Mao's relationship to and degree of control over the Central Bureau during this period. The fact that formal approval for Mao's appointment as secretary of the bureau was sought in October is not incompatible with the argument that Mao controlled the Central Bureau (as provisional secretary without Central Committee authorization and/or as the dominant member of an informal clique whose members constituted a majority of the bureau) from May on.

and extremely short-lived. The First Party Congress of the Central Soviet Area (more commonly known as the Southern Jiangxi Conference), held in Ruijin from November 1–6, was dominated not by Mao but by Xiang Ying, Ren Bishi, and the other Central Committee representatives. As requested by national leaders, the congress was run “completely in the spirit” of the Central Committee’s August 30 letter. Among other things, the congress vowed to expand and consolidate the base areas, discriminate more rigorously against bad class elements in land reform and Party and army recruitment, improve suppression of counterrevolutionaries by making it “special work for experts” rather than one of the many tasks of ordinary cadres, and wean the Red Army from its guerrilla traditions and reorient it toward tactics and skills appropriate for large-scale “regular” army operations needed to seize extensive new territories. As a final act, the congress participants removed Mao as acting secretary of the Central Bureau and appointed Xiang Ying in his place.<sup>35</sup>

This congress marked the start of open struggle between Mao and the Fourth Plenum leadership. At this point, however, the practical outcome of the struggle was still far from certain. Despite the criticism of his views on land reform, Red Army methods, and other issues at the congress, and his removal from the top position within the base area Party apparatus, Mao retained a great deal of power and influence in the Base Area. He retained membership in (though not control of) both the Central Bureau and the Central Military Commission, and was secretary of the General Front Committee (the highest Party organ in the First Front Army).

In addition to these high-level institutional positions, through which he remained deeply involved in both Party and Red Army affairs, Mao had other resources. He was actually present in Jiangxi, while national leaders in Shanghai lacked firsthand knowledge of local circumstances and personalities; at the same time, Mao was older, more experienced, and had a more commanding personality than the central representatives who were on the scene. Mao could also count on considerable support from longtime associates within the base area political and military apparatus. He had been so closely associated with the development of the base areas that it was difficult to mount a comprehensive attack on his methods and actions without implicating a very large number of other cadres, and calling into question the value and legitimacy of the efforts that had gone into building the bases.

Questioning the base-building achievement was particularly problematic in early November 1931 because of the imminence of the First National Soviet

35. Several of the conference resolutions are available in *Central Committee Documents* (1931), pp. 445–91. It is ironic in view of Xiang Ying’s selection as secretary that the Central Bureau’s October 11 telegram seeking Mao’s confirmation as acting secretary had specifically cited Xiang Ying’s “insufficient leadership” as its rationale for making Mao secretary instead.

Congress. This long-delayed event<sup>36</sup> had the practical significance of providing an organizational and legal structure around which to elaborate a working government, but it was at least as important as a symbolic affirmation that the Communist Party had not only passively survived all efforts to suppress it, but had managed actively to construct a viable and attractive political alternative which could coexist with the Guomindang and challenge it for legitimacy. Under the circumstances, public ostracism of a major Party leader would have undermined the celebration of unity and cohesion that was one of the congress's major purposes.

For all these reasons, when the National Soviet Congress opened in Ruijin on November 7, one day after the conclusion of the Southern Jiangxi Conference, Mao was one of the more conspicuously active of the six hundred-odd representatives from various base areas (mostly those in Jiangxi and nearby) in attendance. Much of the twelve-day congress was devoted to ceremonial events and report-giving, and in these activities Xiang Ying and Mao were about equally visible. Xiang Ying headed the small group that presided over the congress, made the opening statement, and presented the labor report. Mao gave the political report. Both he and Xiang Ying participated in the formal closing of the congress.

The congress also formally established a Chinese Soviet Republic, created a number of the new government's main political and military institutions, and passed a series of key laws. Mao was selected as one of sixty-three members of the Soviet Government's Central Executive Committee, and at the committee's first meeting a few days after the congress he was elected as its secretary (Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao<sup>37</sup> became deputy secretaries). Mao also became one of fifteen members of a new Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission (chaired by Zhu De, with Wang Jiaxiang and Peng Dehuai as vice-chairmen) established to serve as a military high command in charge of all Red Army forces.<sup>38</sup>

The cumulative result of the Southern Jiangxi Conference and the National Soviet Congress was to reduce Mao's formal Party power and position signifi-

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36. On the protracted efforts to convene a national soviet congress, see *Central Base History*, pp. 315–22. See also below, "General Order No. 14 of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviets," June 20, 1931, regarding the postponement of the Congress from August 1 to November 7, the anniversary of the October Revolution.

37. Zhang Guotao (1897–1979), *zi* Teli, *hao* Kaiyin, was a native of Jiangxi. He participated in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and was elected to the Central Committee at the First Congress in 1921. From that time forward, he was a major figure in the Party leadership.

38. Chinese accounts of the First National Soviet Congress include *Central Base History*, pp. 322–25, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 286–95. English accounts include Derek Waller, *The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934* (Berkeley: University of California Center for Chinese Studies, 1973), and Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930–1934* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), ch. 15.

cantly, while at the same time greatly expanding his governmental administrative responsibilities. The growing limitation and reorientation of Mao's role in high-level base area affairs was hastened during the months following the conclusion of the Soviet Congress by a series of developments related primarily to base area security and military operations.

The first of these was set in motion by Zhou Enlai's arrival in the Central Soviet Area in late December. In April 1931, the capture and apostasy of Gu Shunzhang<sup>39</sup> had begun a chain reaction of betrayals and exposures that seriously threatened the long-beleaguered Communist Party organization in Shanghai. In response to the danger and operational constraints brought on by these developments, a number of high-ranking Party cadres eventually left Shanghai. Among them were Wang Ming, who returned to Moscow in October, and Zhou Enlai, who finally set off for Jiangxi in early December to take up effectively the post of secretary of the Central Bureau that he had long nominally held.

While passing through western Fujian en route to Ruijin, Zhou began to become personally aware of some of the realities of base area life after a lengthy urban-centered career. He was particularly affected by firsthand exposure to the excesses that were common in the work of "suppressing counterrevolutionaries," and in one of his first acts after arriving in Ruijin, on January 7, 1932, he convened a Central Bureau meeting at which this issue was a major topic. The resolution passed by this meeting at Zhou's behest acknowledged that the past work of suppressing counterrevolutionaries in the base areas had amounted to a harsh "Red terror," that a self-criticism of the Central Bureau on this subject was justified, and that the General Front Committee as well had committed serious errors, especially in dealing with the AB Corps. Shortly afterward, Zhou also encouraged the Central Bureau to order that Li Shaojiu, an associate of Mao's and a prominent proponent of harsh treatment for counterrevolutionaries, undergo mild punishment for errors he had committed in suppression work.<sup>40</sup>

The contents of these resolutions were welcome news indeed to the local cadres who had borne the brunt of the suppression, and Zhou's arrival did signal

39. Gu Shunzhang (1904-1935), a native of Shanghai, was elected to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. In 1928, he became a leading figure in the special security branch of the Party in Shanghai, together with Xiang Zhongfa, who was then secretary general, and Zhou Enlai. Arrested by the Guomindang's Bureau of Investigation in April 1931, he betrayed a number of comrades. For the reaction of Mao and the base area leaders to these events, see below, "Order for the Arrest of Gu Shunzhang, A Traitor to the Revolution," December 10, 1931. Gu was killed by the Guomindang secret services in 1935.

40. Chen, "Futian Incident," pp. 25-30; *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949* (Chronological Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe and Renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 214-16 (hereafter *Zhou Enlai nianpu*), and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 214-17. The January 7, 1932 Central Bureau "Resolution on the Work of Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries in the Soviet Areas," drafted by Zhou, appears in *Central Committee Documents* (1932), pp. 18-28.



the beginning of a lengthy lull in the active search for suspected new counterrevolutionaries. But for Mao these resolutions, with their pointed criticism of activities, organizations, and individuals with which he had been closely associated, were further public signals from a respected national Party leader that Mao and his policies were considered misguided.

At virtually the same time that Zhou Enlai was reevaluating counterrevolutionary suppression in Ruijin, the remainder of the Central Committee in Shanghai was issuing its influential January 9 resolution "On Winning Initial Revolutionary Successes in One or More Provinces." This resolution optimistically called on revolutionary forces to

expand the territory, link up the separated soviet areas to form an integrated Soviet area, and take advantage of the present favorable political and military conditions to seize one or two important central cities so as to win an initial victory of the revolution in one or more provinces.

The resolution went on to specify that the "one or more provinces" envisioned as the site for this initial victory were Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. To carry out this task, it stated, "the Red Army must operate more actively," cooperate closely, and launch offensives to link the Central Soviet Area with other nearby bases "to form a large integrated soviet area." In the course of these offensives, the Red Army in Jiangxi "should aim at taking over the central cities such as Nanchang, Fuzhou, and Ji'an."<sup>41</sup>

After the Third Encirclement Campaign ended, military activity had continued in the base, but not with the urgency or on the scale implied in the Central Committee's resolution. Red Army forces had taken advantage of the absence of an outside threat to eliminate the remaining anti-Communist "White spots" within the Central Soviet Area and attack the extensive Big Sword Society (*Da dao hui*) networks that resisted the Communists in several *xian* on both sides of the Jiangxi-Fujian border. They had also used the relative lull in combat, the prestige gained from their victories, and continued defections from government army units to recruit new soldiers to expand both the regular Red Army and local guerrilla forces.<sup>42</sup>

With the issuance of the Central Committee resolution, however, the Central Bureau met in Ruijin in early January 1932 to consider how to comply with the call for large-scale military offensives to link the base areas and capture large cities. Though the resolution had urged attacks on Jiangxi cities such as Nanchang, Fuzhou and Ji'an, all of these places were too well-defended or inconveniently located to be suitable targets. Therefore, discussion at the meeting

41. Quotations are from the translation of the January 9 resolution provided in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 563-64. The Chinese text is available in *Central Committee Documents* (1932), pp. 34-47.

42. For Mao's views on one aspect of the problem of the remaining "White spots," see below, "Order to Gather Experience About Attacking Fortified Village Blockhouses," October 14, 1931. One notable defection involved the entire Guomindang Twenty-sixth Army, whose mutiny in Ningdu in mid-December 1931 brought over 17,000 soldiers to join the Red Army.

focused mostly on the possibility of attacking Ganzhou, the largest city in southern Jiangxi and also a target that had been mentioned in the Central Committee resolution. Among other advantages, capture of this city would eliminate a major obstacle to the merging of the Central Soviet Area and the Hunan-Jiangxi Base Area at whose center lay Mao's former Jinggangshan base.

At the Central Bureau meeting Mao and Zhu De strongly opposed attacking any of the cities mentioned, on the grounds that they were much too strongly defended, but probably also with unpleasant memories in mind of the military catastrophes that had occurred when the Red Army had attacked major Yangzi valley cities in the summer of 1930. But Zhou Enlai and a majority of the other meeting participants supported an assault on Ganzhou, and on January 10 the attack orders were issued to the army.<sup>43</sup>

A few days later Mao suffered another setback when, during a meeting of the Central Bureau at which he was presiding, his analysis of conditions in China following Japan's occupation of Manchuria was rejected by "some members of the Central Committee delegation." Mao, enunciating a theme that was to become increasingly important in his thinking, argued that the growing tide of anti-Japanese sentiment would lead to a change in the relations among classes within China. Other participants replied bluntly that Japan's main objective was to attack the Soviet Union, and that anyone who did not share this view was a "right opportunist." Those present therefore took the unusual step of removing Mao and replacing him with a new presiding officer in the midst of the meeting.<sup>44</sup>

This humiliation, following closely on the heels of the rejection of his views on attacking Ganzhou and his earlier removal as Central Bureau secretary, apparently convinced both Mao and the Central Bureau of the futility of his further participation in the bureau's deliberations. Shortly thereafter, he went on "sick leave," which he, his wife He Zizhen,<sup>45</sup> and a few guards began in late January at a site approved for them by the Central Bureau: an old temple on Donghua Mountain, 20 to 30 li from Ruijin.<sup>46</sup>

While Mao was entering temporary exile, Red Army forces were surrounding heavily fortified Ganzhou, against which they mounted four unsuccessful and

43. Some sources suggest that Zhou Enlai also initially opposed attacks on cities, but eventually bowed to Central Committee wishes, but the authorized biography of Zhou Enlai states unambiguously that Zhou supported the attack on Ganzhou. See *Mao in the Central Soviet*, p. 328, *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, p. 216, and Jin Chongji, *Zhou Enlai zhuan 1898-1949* (Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1989) (hereafter Jin, *Zhou Enlai*).

44. *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 365. For Mao's reaction at the time of the Japanese invasion, see below, "A Letter to Our Brothers the Soldiers of the White Army on the Forcible Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism," September 25, 1931.

45. Regarding Mao's marriage to He Zizhen, see the Introduction to Volume III of this edition, p. xlvii.

46. *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 366, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 329-32. These sources state that the Central Bureau directed Mao to take leave and specified the place he was to go, but the latter source also notes that Mao himself was very upset at the continued repudiation of his views, so the decision for him to take leave may well have been a mutual one.

exhausting assaults between early February and early March. On March 7, following a sortie from the city's defenders that was beaten back by the Red Army only at great cost, Communist leaders finally ordered a retreat to the large market town of Jiangkou, 60 *li* from Ganzhou.

At this point, Party leaders also sent a telegram to Mao, asking him to end his short "sick leave" and help them decide what to do after the failure before Ganzhou. As Mao's temporary lodgings had no telegraph facilities, the embarrassing task of actually delivering the message to Mao and entreating his cooperation fell to his erstwhile rival Xiang Ying. Mao, doubtless feeling rather satisfied with himself at this turn of events, promptly set off to rejoin Party leaders in Jiangkou.

After Mao's arrival, the Central Bureau held a plenary session in Jiangkou in mid-March at which the main topic was the always contentious issue of military strategy. Some of those present argued that the Red Army should move north to attack Gan valley cities such as Ji'an, a course of action that would conform to the Central Committee's plans for "winning initial victory in one or more provinces." As before, Mao instead sought a resumption of rural-centered mobile warfare. Rather than advancing into the teeth of the enemy's forces defending the cities of central and northern Jiangxi, he urged driving into the weakly defended rural areas of northern Fujian, thereby seeking to revive earlier plans to link the Central Soviet Area with the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Base Area.

Despite having just gone to some lengths to seek Mao's counsel, the majority of the Central Bureau again rejected his proposal. On March 18, the Military Affairs Council issued orders splitting the Red Army into two parts, one of which (designated the "Western Route" force) would march north on the west side of the Gan River, while the other (the "Central Route" force) would head east to Ningdu and then turn northward into east-central Jiangxi. The object of the Western Route force was clearly Ji'an and other Gan valley cities further north, while that of the Central Route force was evidently Fuzhou, a large city in central Jiangxi that had frequently been used as a staging area for government armies.

Mao accompanied the Central Route force. En route to Ningdu, he persuaded Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, the leaders of the First Army Group, to diverge from the ordered route of march and strike instead deep into western Fujian, apparently on the grounds that the military situation there had recently changed in the Red Army's favor. On March 21, the First Army Group set off for Changting in Fujian. Mao stayed behind in Ruijin, where on March 27-28 he met with Zhou Enlai and the Central Bureau and obtained their approval for the course of action on which the First Army Group had in any case already embarked.

After rejoining the First Army Group (now renamed the "Eastern Route Army") in Changting, Mao promptly telegraphed Zhou Enlai that it was now necessary for the Red Army to attack the Zhangzhou-Quanzhou area along the

Fujian coast to open up new revolutionary possibilities in this region. He also noted that, now that the First Army Group had entered Fujian, enemy units from Guangdong had begun to move north to threaten it, so that it was necessary for the Fifth Army Group (which had remained behind in Jiangxi) to be dispatched to Fujian as well to counteract this developing threat. Zhou Enlai immediately went from Ruijin to Changting to discuss these matters, only to find that Mao and the First Army Group had already moved on to Shanghang and Longyan. As Mao and his force continued to move deeper into Fujian during the first half of April, Zhou granted approval to Mao's actions, transferred the Central Bureau and the Military Affairs Commission to Changting, and set the Fifth Army Group in motion into Fujian to cover the First Army Group's rear and eventually join it.<sup>47</sup>

The Eastern Route Army occupied the large coastal city of Zhangzhou on April 20, and then spent a month or so ranging through this prosperous coastal region, looking for resources and helping local Communists. This raid on the city and its environs netted the Red Army more than a million *yuan* in cash; large quantities of cloth, food, salt, and other valuable goods (much of which was sent to Ruijin to help provision the Red Army and the Base Area); and almost a thousand new army recruits.<sup>48</sup>

When examining this sequence of events, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mao had decided to achieve by direct action what he had been unable to accomplish by persuasion. He had induced his longtime subordinates Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen to follow his own personal (and apparently quite spontaneous) plan to invade Fujian instead of the very different operational orders that they had been given by the Military Affairs Commission, and he had then kept himself and this force constantly one step ahead of his superiors. Rather than consulting with them ahead of time, he had consistently waited until his moves were underway before informing them of the army's movements, thus presenting them with a series of *faits accomplis* that were much harder to reverse than to sanction retroactively. Where the Central Bureau's original plan had been for a two-pronged attack to the north, Mao had succeeded in diverting not only half the Red Army's troops but also the personal attention of most of the base area leadership to a major, unplanned offensive in a very different direction.

Ultimately, Mao was to pay dearly for this temporary success, but the reckon-

47. For Mao's communications with Zhou Enlai during this period, see below, "Only by Marching Directly on Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Can We Make the Enemy Move," March 30, 1932, and "The Forces That Are Going Directly to Attack Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Should Act More Quickly and Be More Concentrated," April 2, 1932.

48. For examples of Mao's communications from Zhangzhou, see below, "The Reasons Why the Battle at Longyan Was Victorious and Future Work in [Long]yan and Yong[d]ing," April 11, 1932, and "Views Regarding the Central Task in the Future and the Work in New Red Areas, as Well as in the White Areas," April 22, 1932.

ing was delayed by the rather circuitous journey that he and his Red Army force took in returning from Fujian. As there was no possibility of turning the Zhangzhou region into a long-term base, and as enemy forces were at long last gathering for another encirclement campaign against the Central Soviet Area, the raid into Fujian drew to a close at the end of May. Rather than returning directly to the heart of the Base Area, Mao and his force obeyed orders to swing across northern Guangdong to protect Communist forces in southwestern Jiangxi against a threatened enemy advance from this direction. After a lengthy journey and a fierce, debilitating battle fought against Guangdong army forces at Shuikou in early July, Mao and the First Army Group (the "Eastern Route" and "Western Route" army designations having by this time been abolished at Central Committee request) eventually limped back into Xingguo *xian* in the Central Soviet Area in early August.

By this point a multifaceted intra-Party dispute concerning military strategy and leadership had already begun to brew, with Mao at its center. During Mao's peregrinations outside of the Base Area, both criticism of him and his responses had been attenuated by distance and muffled by inaccessibility, though Mao's views still sometimes came through loud and clear. In one telegram to the Central Bureau, referring to a Central Committee message previously forwarded to him, Mao bluntly stated, "The political appraisal and military strategy of the Center are wholly erroneous."<sup>49</sup> Following his sudden return, the volume of the dispute increased from angry growls to full-throated roars.

This struggle had flared up again following the publication of the new Central Committee policy of "achieving initial victory in one or several provinces," whose optimistic assumptions and expansionist emphases did not mesh well with Mao's own defensively-oriented policies of "luring deep" and "mobile warfare." Mao's public opposition to the attack on Ganzhou and his diversion of major Red Army units from intended attacks on other Jiangxi cities to the raid into Fujian led the Central Committee to conclude that the continuing influence of Mao and his policies was the main reason for the Central Bureau's failure to pursue the new strategy aggressively.

The Central Committee reacted by sending a series of letters to the Central Bureau from mid-April through June that condemned the lack of progress in capturing large Jiangxi cities and strongly criticized the persistence of various traits associated with Mao. Among these were such things as "guerrillaism" (tolerance for loose command structures and irregular warfare), "waitism" (passively waiting for the enemy to advance), and "narrow empiricism." The Central Bureau held meetings and adopted resolutions that duly acknowledged these

49. See below, "Views Regarding the Political Appraisal, Military Strategy, and the Tasks of the Eastern and Western Route Armies," May 3, 1932.

failings; beyond this, they could only pass many of the criticisms on to Mao in Fujian and await his return.<sup>50</sup>

Deeply intertwined with these frictions over policy and personality were problems stemming from the ambiguous and uncertain political and military command structure then existing in the Central Soviet Area. Formal jurisdictional relationships and lines of authority among diverse organizations such as the Central Bureau, the Military Affairs Commission, the Soviet Government, and various Red Army headquarters and Party organs were frequently overlapping and imprecise. Moreover, formal institutional position and actual power were not always congruent, as illustrated by the difficulty that young and relatively inexperienced Central Committee representatives such as Xiang Ying and Ren Bishi had in restricting Mao's influence despite their numerical strength on the Central Bureau. In addition, the long-festering issue of Party-army relations, especially the question of the extent to which Party leaders should intervene in military decision-making, had again become salient in an environment in which strongly held differences of opinion over strategy tended to divide local base-builders with military experience such as Mao and Zhu De from politically-oriented outsiders such as Xiang Ying.

This situation posed particular decision-making problems for the Central Bureau, which included both cadres whose primary responsibilities were for military operations and those whose main duties were political and administrative. In the first few months after its formation in January 1931, the Central Bureau had generally been located in the same place as the main Red Army headquarters. Gradually, however, some bureau members began to settle for a time in other spots to facilitate communications and the supervision of local Party branches and soviets. Following the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic, these cadres generally based themselves in Ruijin, the republic's formal political capital. Other bureau members, meanwhile, remained at the Red Army's frontline headquarters, wherever that might be.

As the size of both Base Area and army grew, and as the division of the Central Bureau into what Party historians refer to as the "frontline" (*qianfang*) and "rear echelon" (*houfang*) segments became more clear-cut, it became incon-

50. *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 371–79, records Central Committee criticisms of the Central Bureau's activities on April 14, April 25 (in an article in *Hongqi zhoubao*), May 20, and July 21. On May 11, the Central Bureau issued a self-criticism in response to the Central Committee's complaints and repudiated Mao's oppositional views expressed in his May 3 telegram. On June 17, they issued a resolution accepting the Central Committee's May 20 criticism. Warren Kuo plausibly argues that the June 17 resolution (the text of which is available in *Central Committee Documents* [1932], pp. 240–61) was one of several items whose contents laid the foundation for the later indictment of Mao at the Ningdu Conference in October 1932. See his *Analytical History of Chinese Communist Party* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 441 (hereafter Kuo, *Analytical History*).

venient for the bureau to hold meetings with all members in attendance. Though increasing use of telegraphy helped close the communications gap to some extent, it was still not easy to have the thorough, face-to-face airings of views needed to reach consensus on controversial issues.

During the spring and summer of 1932, Mao had been able to take advantage of such ambiguities, inefficiencies, and divisions within the Central Soviet Area's leadership structure, as well as of his own experience, connections, and forceful personality, to minimize the impact of efforts to curtail his power. Following his return to southern Jiangxi after the raid on Zhangzhou, he continued to seek avenues—particularly military ones—through which to regain a prominent decision-making position.

When the First Front Army had reentered southern Jiangxi after the raid on Zhangzhou, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang had rejoined the army as its commander and chief political commissar, respectively, though Mao remained very influential. Throughout the Fujian campaign and the march back to the Base Area, Mao had had no formal position in the army or its Party organs. In order to give some retrospective institutional legitimacy to his actions, Chinese sources often justify his accompanying and directing the movements of the army during this period on the grounds that he was acting "in his capacity as chairman of the Soviet Government," but Mao clearly exerted his influence primarily by force of personality and personal connections, rather than by virtue of any formal position.

Zhou Enlai joined the First Front Army in southern Jiangxi in late July as the army was returning to the Central Soviet Area after the Battle of Shuihou. With Zhou thus joining the Central Bureau's "frontline" leadership, Ren Bishi in the rear echelon became acting secretary of the Central Bureau in Zhou's place.

A few days before Zhou's arrival, the Central Bureau had issued orders to various Red Army units for renewed assaults on central Jiangxi cities, such as Ji'an. The First Front Army had been ordered to attack Ganzhou to distract enemy forces, after which they were to march north along the Gan River to aid in the main assault. Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang were able to convince Zhou that these orders were impracticable because of the great enemy strength in the area, and on July 25 Zhou joined the other three men in a joint telegram to that effect sent to the Central Bureau.<sup>51</sup>

In another telegram of the same date, the four men also urged a significant realignment of the army's formal leadership. Because at that time the army had no political commissar, the Central Bureau rear echelon leaders had recently suggested that Zhou occupy this post along with his other duties. Now Zhou, Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang made the counterproposal that the position of Soviet Government chairman should be abolished and that Mao should instead become the general political commissar of the First Front Army. They further proposed that military operational matters should be the joint responsibility of

51. See below, "The Question of the Direction of Attack at Present," July 25, 1932.

the army's commander-in-chief and of the political commissar, while the Military Affairs Commission would be responsible for strategic planning. On July 29, Zhou followed up with another telegram stressing that Mao could not do the jobs both of government chairman and army commissar, and that he should be appointed to the military post.<sup>52</sup>

This matter was among many military-related issues still pending when the First Army arrived in Xingguo. Soon thereafter, the Central Bureau met to discuss military plans. Available accounts note simply that after some "controversy," participants accepted Mao's proposal that the First Front Army move northeast to disrupt enemy forces in staging areas in the Le'an-Yihuang area on the northern edge of the Central Soviet Area, after which enemy forces in the nearby Nanfeng-Nancheng area would be dealt with, clearing the way (if things worked out well) for eventual attacks on Gan valley cities. Given the current political context, the "controversy" presumably involved the fact that first priority in this plan went to attacking enemy troops in rural garrison sites, rather than driving directly for large cities.

Either this conference or a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission held on August 8 also took action to formalize the current de facto situation regarding the command structure for the Red Army forces that would be involved in the coming fighting. One measure taken was to approve Mao's appointment as the army's political commissar. Another was to form a new organization known as the Supreme Military Affairs Council (*Junshi zuigao huiyi*), which was to be responsible for operational and combat planning at the front. The new body consisted of the same people who had been in charge of the First Front Army on the last stage of its return trip to the Central Soviet Area: Zhou Enlai (chairman), Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang.

Almost immediately after these meetings, the First Front Army marched northeast to the Le'an-Yihuang-Nanfeng area. During the third week of August the army fought several successful battles in this region, and then moved further northeast toward Nancheng. When they reached the neighborhood of this *xian* city, however, they found it strongly defended by superior enemy forces. Accordingly, on August 27 Zhou telegraphed rear echelon Central Bureau leaders (Ren Bishi, Xiang Ying, Deng Fa, and Gu Zuolin) in Ruijin that they wished to abandon the attack on Nancheng in favor of returning to the Yihuang-Le'an area to refit, disperse for mass work, and raise funds while waiting for a better combat opportunity.<sup>53</sup>

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52. For the July 25, 1932, telegram, see below, "Proposal to Appoint Mao Zedong as General Political Commissar." For excerpts from Zhou's July 29 telegram supporting Mao's appointment, see *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 380. See also *Central Base History*, p. 357.

53. For documents relating to these battles, see below, "An Order to Wipe Out the Enemy in Le'an," August 15, 1932, and "The Situation of the Enemy in Yihuang and Le'an and Our Army's Battle Dispositions," August 15, 1932. Zhou's August 27 telegram is noted in *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 382.



This plan set off a protracted, month-long telegraphic argument between rear echelon and frontline cadres. To the rear echelon leaders, the frontliners' plan to disperse for mass mobilization and base-building work in the Yihuang-Le'an area revived the now repudiated "luring deep" strategy associated with Mao. By stressing patient preparatory work and ripostes to enemy attacks after they were launched, this method reflected "waitism," "guerrillaism," and other overly passive and defensive attitudes, which were antithetical to the aggressive, active attack policies being promoted by the Central Committee. Moreover, by positioning troops in and focusing efforts on the Yihuang-Le'an-Nanfeng area on the northeast edge of the Central Soviet Area, frontline leaders were continuing to ignore the Central Committee's insistence that priority be given to attacks on Ji'an and other Gan valley cities lying beyond the northwest edge of the base.<sup>54</sup>

Despite rear echelon objections, frontline cadres kept their troops in a defensive posture, positioned to respond to attacks in the northwest corner of the base, through most of the month of September. On September 25, they also proposed a plenary session of the Central Bureau to resolve both this and the whole range of other outstanding issues.<sup>55</sup>

On September 26, the leaders of the rear echelon renewed their demand for immediate attacks on enemy troops massing north of the base, and rejected the idea of a plenary meeting on the grounds that Xiang Ying and Deng Fa were attending another meeting in Fujian. Frontline leaders responded by ordering their troops to continue preparations for meeting the imminent enemy attack as planned, including dispersing forces for mass work and "reddening the area." In a separate telegram they also reiterated their call for a full meeting after Xiang and Deng returned from Fujian.<sup>56</sup>

The frontline leaders' order to the army to continue as planned appears absolutely to have incensed the rear echelon leaders, who responded over the next few days with a stream of hectoring telegrams to frontline leaders collectively and to Zhou Enlai individually. But they did finally accept the need for a show-down meeting of both factions. This pivotal meeting, known to Party historians as the Ningdu Conference, occurred during the first ten days of October at a site somewhere in Ningdu *xian*.<sup>57</sup>

54. For the exchanges of telegrams, see *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 382–89.

55. See below, "Report on the Present Military Operations," September 23, 1932, and "We Propose a Plenum of the Central Bureau at the Front to Discuss Problems of Military Operations," September 25, 1932.

56. See below, "Order for Our Troops to Work in the North for a Period of Time Before the Enemy's Big Offensive," September 26, 1932, and "Opinions Regarding the Operations of the Front Army and the Place for Holding the Plenum of the Central Bureau," September 26, 1932.

57. Most older sources from outside the People's Republic place the conference in August 1932, but recent Chinese sources clearly indicate that the time was early October (probably from October 3 to 8, in the village of Xiaoyuan). See "Guanyu Ningdu huiyi de

As might be expected under the circumstances, the Ningdu Conference appears to have been remarkably confrontational and vituperative. Although billed as a meeting to "sum up" and draw conclusions about the bureau's activities during the previous several months, the meeting actually became primarily an evaluation of and referendum on the involvement of Mao in those activities. This evaluation involved harsh, explicit, and personal criticism of Mao's work and policies, including those related to the siege of Ganzhou, the raid on Zhangzhou, the centrally mandated attacks on Gan valley cities, and the recent campaign on the northern fringes of the base. Various generalized criticisms that the Central Committee had heretofore made of the policies of unidentified "right opportunists" in the Base Area were also now applied specifically to Mao.

Documentation on the meeting is extremely sparse, and many details about the conference remain uncertain. Party histories published in China state, for example, that Mao strongly defended himself at the conference and that Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang all resisted efforts to strip him of his military role. They also state, however, that in the end "a majority" of the Central Bureau agreed that Mao had not adequately acknowledged his errors. Given that there were eight members on the bureau, it is not clear how to reconcile these two statements, except to assume that though most participants agreed that Mao deserved criticism, they split over its severity and consequences.<sup>58</sup>

This interpretation is supported by the fact that debate also occurred over Mao's postconference role. Rear echelon leaders insisted that he be sent away from the front, removed from the position of First Front Army political commissar that then constituted his only formal military-related appointment, and confined to the rear-area administrative work as Soviet Government chairman that had originally been assigned to him at the First Soviet Congress almost a year earlier. Thereafter, Zhou Enlai would assume full control of frontline military operations.

jige shishi chukao" (Preliminary Study on Several Historical Facts Regarding the Ningdu Conference), in *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao zhuanji yanjiu ji—di er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi* (2) (Collection of Specialized Research on Party History Materials—the Period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War [Vol. 2]) ed. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui zhengji yanjiushi (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1988), pp. 326–32. See also Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong zhuan 1893–1949* (Biography of Mao Zedong, 1893–1949) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), p. 296 (hereafter Jin, *Mao Zedong*).

58. Jin, *Mao Zedong*, p. 196, states that no minutes of the conference survive. The only presently available contemporary document on the conference is "Suqu zhongyang ju Ningdu huiyi jingguo jianbao" (A Synopsis of the Proceedings of the Ningdu Conference of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas), dated October 21, 1932, in *Central Committee Documents* (1932), pp. 528–31. This document is a key source used in most recent accounts of the meeting, including *Central Base History*, pp. 364–67; *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 370–72; and *Nianpu*, pp. 389–90. For a non-Communist account which argues that Mao was completely isolated at the conference, see Kuo, *Analytical History*, Vol. 2, pp. 440–48.

Zhou, who seems sincerely to have respected Mao's experience and acumen in the military area, instead sought a compromise that would restrict Mao's access to command but still utilize his skills in the difficult task of defeating the next government encirclement campaign. He proposed two possible arrangements which would have kept Mao at the front: under the first, Zhou would take formal charge of operations, but Mao would remain around to "assist" him; under the second, Mao would be left in charge of handling combat operations, but only under Zhou's direct supervision.<sup>59</sup>

At the end of the conference, participants settled on a face-saving procedure which in principle accepted Zhou's first proposal, while indefinitely postponing its implementation. After agreeing that Mao could "remain at the front to assist," they also accepted Mao's request for temporary sick leave, from which he could "return to the front when required." This arrangement was, however, almost immediately undone on receipt of new Politburo instructions.

At least some of the telegrams from Mao and his allies had requested that they be retransmitted to the Central Committee, and presumably the rear echelon leaders had also passed on their own assessment of the situation to national leaders. On October 6, the Politburo discussed the issue, repudiated Mao's views, and called for public criticism of him and for his return to soviet government work. These instructions were immediately telegraphed to Ruijin, but did not reach the Central Bureau members in Ningdu until just after the conclusion of the conference.<sup>60</sup> Though Mao had already left to begin his sick leave, the remaining bureau members reconvened and agreed that Zhou Enlai would replace Mao as political commissar of the First Front Army, and that Mao would return full-time to his work as Soviet Government chairman.<sup>61</sup>

While thus banned from the front, Mao did not immediately settle down to administrative work in Ruijin. Instead, he went to Changting in Fujian, where his wife He Zizhen had just been delivered of her second child in the Fuyin Hospital

59. Zhou Enlai's support for Mao at the conference irritated rear echelon leaders to such an extent that on November 12 they telegraphed the Central Committee complaining that Zhou had been too weakly critical and "compromising" (*tiaohe*) in his attitude. When Zhou heard this, he sent a rebuttal which said that his attitude had been "moderate" (*wenhe*), not "compromising," and that the criticism of Mao had been excessive. He vainly urged that Mao be transferred back to a frontline post. These telegrams are mentioned and briefly excerpted in secondary sources such as *Central Base History*, pp. 367-68.

60. Texts of the Politburo meeting minutes and telegram of October 6 are not included in *Central Committee Documents*, but they are briefly discussed and excerpted in *Nianpu*, p. 389, and Jin, *Mao Zedong*, pp. 297-98.

61. The announcement that Mao was leaving his army post was dated October 12, 1932. The fact that an army document dated October 14 still bears his name is probably an indication that the document was written earlier and issued on the 14th. See below, "Campaign Plans for the First Front Army of the Red Army."

run by Dr. Fu Lianzhang (Nelson Fu).<sup>62</sup> Mao was diagnosed with tuberculosis while at the hospital, and he subsequently spent three or four months convalescing in an attached sanatorium before returning to Ruijin sometime in late January or early February 1933.

Unfortunately for Mao, his return closely coincided with the arrival in Ruijin of key members of the Central Committee, who had finally been forced out of Shanghai by unrelenting government pressure. Led by Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian),<sup>63</sup> a twenty-five-year-old Soviet-trained cadre who had become secretary general of the Party in September 1932 after Wang Ming left for Moscow, the Shanghai cadres came to Ruijin determined to put an end to what they saw as a long history of equivocation, foot-dragging, and outright disobedience to their policies by Central Soviet Area leaders.

Mao had already been clearly identified as the most consequential opponent of a wide range of current Central Committee policies, and between the Southern Jiangxi Conference in November 1931 and the Ningdu Conference in October 1932 he had been almost completely excluded from direct personal participation in the Base Area's Party and army decision-making processes. Nevertheless, during years of living, working, and fighting in the region, Mao had developed numerous personal connections with cadres scattered at all levels and localities throughout the Central Soviet Area. Though many of Mao's ideas on base-building and military defense policy had been controversial at the time of their introduction, and were still not without their local opponents, they were also by now well-known concepts whose direct and indirect influence had percolated widely through the base area apparatus.

It was with the aim of eradicating this widespread but diffuse and indirect influence of Mao and his policies that Bo Gu and his associates soon after their arrival in Ruijin launched a campaign to root out followers of what was termed the "Luo Ming Line." Luo Ming<sup>64</sup> was then the acting secretary of the Fujian

62. Fu Lianzhang (1894–1968), *zi* Rixin, was a native of Changting in Fujian. He graduated in 1916 from a medical school established there by missionaries, who bestowed on him the name Nelson Fu by which he is known in the writings of Edgar Snow and others. He first encountered the Communists when Ye Ting and He Long passed through on their retreat from Nanchang in 1927, and in 1928 he joined Mao and his comrades on the Jinggangshan. He followed the Red Army to Ruijin, and in 1932 founded the Central Hospital and Medical School, located in Changting, not far from the Soviet capital. Fu himself was already suffering from tuberculosis at this time.

63. Qin Bangxian (1907–1946), commonly known by his pseudonym Bo Gu, was born in Zhejiang of a family originally from Jiangsu. His father, who died when he was ten, was a *xian* magistrate. Qin Bangxian joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925, and in 1926 he was sent to Moscow to study at Sun Yatsen University. He returned to China in the autumn of 1930 together with Pavel Mif and the leader of the "Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks," Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming), with whom he remained closely allied.

64. Luo Ming (1904–1987) was a native of Guangdong. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and travelled to Moscow in 1928 to attend the Sixth Congress. On his return he became secretary of the Fujian Provincial Committee. In 1932, he was on the Executive Committee of the Fujian Soviet Government.

Provincial Committee (and in charge of Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Province). Following the withdrawal of the First Front Army from Fujian after Mao's Zhangzhou raid, the revolutionary movement in this area had come under heavy pressure from opposing military forces. In October 1932, when Luo and Mao happened to be present simultaneously in the Fuyin Hospital in Changting, Mao advised Luo to consider expanding local guerrilla operations as one way to stem the enemy depredations. Luo and the Party cadres under his jurisdiction followed Mao's advice, reportedly with considerable success.

In late January 1933, Luo discussed his activities with the Central Committee leaders as they passed through Fujian on their way to Ruijin. Luo and one of the *xian* committee secretaries subordinate to him also wrote several separate reports on military operations and plans in western Fujian, all of which stressed the importance of expanding local guerrilla units, the need to amalgamate unsuccessful Party and government organs, and the need for greater local autonomy and retention of local funds to improve flexibility and local support.<sup>65</sup>

All of these views were unacceptable to Central Committee leaders, who wished to promote greater centralization rather than decentralization of political and financial operations, and who sought rapid expansion of the political apparatus and the regular Red Army, not consolidation of Party branches and diversion of personnel into localistic guerrilla forces. Luo's personal contacts with Mao, Mao's extensive prior association with the Fujian Party apparatus, and the explicit emphasis in the Fujian reports on the sort of guerrilla tactics long stressed by Mao, all made Luo Ming and his "line" excellent surrogates for Mao and his policies.

On February 15, 1933, therefore, the Central Bureau issued a "Resolution on Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Province," which marked the opening shot in a campaign against the Luo Ming Line.<sup>66</sup> During the remainder of February and March, Luo Ming himself, many other Party cadres in Fujian, and Fujianese cadres serving elsewhere were sharply criticized and removed from office. The force of the attacks, taking place as they did in close proximity to the fierce and violent campaigns against counterrevolutionaries that had recently swept both Fujian and Jiangxi, led many local cadres to fear that Luo Ming and his followers were also being stigmatized as counterrevolutionaries.

The anti-Luo Ming Line campaign was not confined to Fujian. Beginning in March and April a similar campaign began in Jiangxi with attacks on four individuals—Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zetan, Xie Weijun, and Gu Bo—who were purported to be the chief Jiangxi followers of the Luo Ming Line. All of the four were also regarded, and have been regarded subsequently, as supporters of Mao

65. Luo Ming's "Some Opinions about Our Current Work," dated January 21, 1933, is translated in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 596–601.

66. A translation of the February 15 document is available in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 601–02.

Zedong and his policies.<sup>67</sup> The struggle against them culminated at a work conference in late April, during which the hitherto implicit tensions between the urban-oriented Shanghai cadres and the veteran rural base-builders became momentarily explicit in a bout of mutual name-calling. Shanghai cadres spoke contemptuously of ideologically ignorant "hillbillies," and noted that "there is no Marxism-Leninism in the mountain valleys (*shan'gou*)," while the four cadres under attack referred to the mostly Russian-trained Shanghai cadres as "masters of foreign houses" (*yang fangzi xiansheng*) who were guilty of unrealistic dogmatism.

All four "Jiangxi Luo Ming Line Followers" were eventually removed from their posts. The campaign, which continued sporadically through the summer and fall, soon expanded into a purge of many lower-level officials throughout the Base Area.

With these campaigns in Jiangxi and Fujian, the national Party leaders and their supporters succeeded in demonstrating both their general commitment to establishing tight control over the Central Soviet Area and their specific intention to exclude Mao from any significant policy-making influence. Events in 1932 had shown that even though Mao himself was removed from most formal Party and army leadership positions, he was still able to take advantage of institutional ambiguities and networks of personal connections to promote his policies. By purging or otherwise intimidating lower-level cadres who were either personally acquainted with Mao or sympathetic to his policies, the "Returned Students" further isolated Mao and ensured that his formidable energies would remain confined to limited administrative spheres, which would challenge neither their personal power nor their conception of how to conduct the revolutionary struggle.

### Land Investigation and Base-Area Administration

During the two-year period from the Ningdu Conference in 1932 down to the beginning of the Long March in 1934, Mao apparently played only a sporadic,

67. For a discussion of Deng Xiaoping's links with Mao in the 1930s, see Roger Thompson, *Mao Zedong. Report from Xunwu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 27–35. Deng's daughter, after discussing the affair of the "Luo Ming Line" and Mao's remarks about it in 1972, concludes, "The struggle in the 1930s put Deng in the Maoist faction. That Mao Zedong would remember that fact for forty years was not anticipated by Deng Xiaoping at the time." See Deng Maomao, *Deng Xiaoping, My Father* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), pp. 210–17. That the attacks against Mao Zetan (1905–1935), Mao's younger brother, were aimed at Mao Zedong himself is obvious. Xie Weijun (1907–1935), a Hunan native and a veteran of the Jinggangshan, had accompanied Mao on his investigation of Mukou Village in November 1930 (see Volume III, pp. 691–93). Gu Bo (1906–1935), a native of Xunwu in Jiangxi Province, had given much assistance to Mao in his Xunwu Investigation (see Volume III, pp. 296–418). Regarding Gu's links to Mao, see Thompson, *Report from Xunwu*, pp. 9–30 *passim*. Gu also assisted Mao in repressing the AB Corps in 1930–1931.

minority role in the military and political decision-making involved in the long losing struggle to defend the Central Soviet Area against the Guomindang government's determined suppression efforts. Mao was far from idle, however. Instead, he threw himself energetically into government administration, particularly into the complicated task of consolidating and extending fundamental socioeconomic reforms (such as the agrarian revolution) to which the Communists had committed themselves, and into the vital and varied work of ensuring that the Base Area could mobilize the resources needed to continue the war and cope with the debilitating enemy blockade.

As the documentary record in this and the previous volume abundantly indicates, Mao was by this point already quite familiar with administrative work and with many of the specific problem areas that occupied his attention at this time. For example, during and soon after the First National Soviet Congress in November 1931, in his capacity as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government, Mao affixed his signature to a large number of laws and regulations which established the basic administrative structure and provided policy guidelines and operating procedures for the new government's expanding bureaucratic apparatus.<sup>68</sup>

One set of problems in which Mao had particular interest and experience was those associated with the land revolution. Volume III contains a number of the "rural investigations" in which he examined various aspects of the rural economy and the impact of the Communist-led agrarian revolution on the lives of different types of rural households.<sup>69</sup>

Growing knowledge of the complexities of rural class composition in the Jiangxi-Fujian base areas gained from these investigations eventually led Mao to recognize the need to devise methods for land redistribution that would not only equalize the distribution of land by amount, but would also take adequate account of the greater non-land resources (labor power, tools and draft animals, access to investment capital) and the higher quality of land habitually possessed by the wealthier strata of rural households. With these considerations in mind, he developed land policies that called for redistribution on a per capita basis rather than on the basis of available labor power, and that used techniques known as "draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" and "draw on the fat to make

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68. Many of the basic laws were not in any meaningful sense the expression of Mao's own ideas. Most had been drafted earlier in Shanghai at the direction of the Central Committee—often more or less copied from corresponding legislation produced in the Soviet Union—and promulgated in final form with minimal modification at the National Soviet Congress or soon afterward. For the sake of completeness, we have included in this volume all such materials that bear Mao's signature, but we have placed them in a separate Appendix at the end of the volume.

69. See in Volume III, "Xunwu Investigation," pp. 296–418; "Xingguo Investigation," pp. 594–655; "Investigations in Dongtang and Other Places," pp. 658–66; and "Investigation in Mukou Village," pp. 691–93.

up for the lean" to ensure that the land households ended up tilling was of roughly equivalent quality regardless of their original wealth.<sup>70</sup>

In early 1931, Mao continued to concern himself with the ramifications of the ongoing interaction between the Party's agrarian policies and rural society. In particular, he was concerned to find during his own continuing rural investigations evidence that the potential gains of the agrarian revolution were being undermined by a combination of endemic civil war; the contention and chaos inherent in land redistribution; and an overly simplistic, extractive, and punitive approach by cadres to complex socioeconomic relationships.

As noted in Volume III, Mao had earlier come into conflict over land policy with the Li Lisan-led national leadership and some local Jiangxi cadres, both of which groups in 1930 advocated policies that were later judged to have been too favorable to rich peasants, such as distributing land on a labor-power rather than a per capita basis. For his part, Mao articulated in June 1930 views "On the Rich Peasant Problem" which were among the harshest then to be found among Party members.<sup>71</sup>

After the installation of the Returned Student leadership in January 1931, however, Mao's land policies came under fire for being too lenient, rather than too harsh, on rich peasants and landlords. Perhaps because he had recognized the important role that rich peasants played in the rural economy, and the advantages to be gained by giving them a "way out" (*chulu*) rather than putting their backs totally against the wall, Mao's land policy had allowed rich peasants and landlords to receive allotments of redistributed land just like other peasants. During this period he stressed the need to base rural policy on careful empirical investigation, summing up this point in the well-known statement: "He who has not made an investigation has no right to speak." Mao also emphasized the need to provide some stability and incentive to peasants made uncertain and confused by the upheaval of land redistribution, and argued that overly harsh and extractive policies toward relatively well-off elements of rural society such as rich peasants could further disrupt rather than stimulate the rural economy.<sup>72</sup>

This approach the new Party leadership attacked as being a "non-class" policy, which by not sufficiently discriminating against the exploiting classes potentially left them room to make a comeback. Instead, following the recent views of Stalin and the Comintern on this subject, the Central Committee adopted in early

70. For Mao's formulation of the principle of "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean," see paragraph 17 of the resolution of June 1930, "On the Problem of the Rich Peasants," and Article 9 of the Land Law of August 1930, in Volume III, pp. 445 and 504.

71. For this document, see Volume III, pp. 433-49.

72. See below, "Letter from the General Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to the Soviet Government of Jiangxi Province," February 27, 1931, as well as "Circular of the General Political Department on Investigating the Situation Regarding Land and Population," April 2, 1931, and "The Problem of Opposing Rich Peasants," 1931.



1931 a policy which emphasized that during land redistribution former landlords were to be allocated no land at all, and rich peasants were to receive only poor quality land. Mao's methods of carefully calibrating and equalizing land quality in the distribution process through "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" and "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean" were firmly rejected. The Central Committee's views were expressed in the Central Soviet Area by its representatives on the Central Bureau in a series of resolutions during 1931, and were formalized as government policy in the Land Law passed at the First National Soviet Congress in November of that year.<sup>73</sup>

In fact, at the time land redistribution in the Central Soviet Area had initially occurred both local conditions and Party policies had been in a state of flux, so that the approaches used and the thoroughness of the redistribution process had varied considerably from place to place. Inevitably, therefore, mistakes had been made. Moreover, whether the land redistribution in a given area had been guided by the land policies of the Li Lisan Line or by the subsequent policies favored by Mao, in the eyes of the new Party leadership it had still been potentially tainted by undue leniency toward landlords and rich peasants.

For these reasons, after the soviet congress "leftist" Party leaders began calling on soviet governments at various levels to carry out "land investigations" (*tudi jiancha*) to review local conditions to see if landlords and rich peasants still possessed land and other property that they should not be allowed to have. A Central Bureau decision of February 8, 1932, stipulated that the Soviet Government must carry out a "Land Investigation Movement" (*chatian yundong*) throughout the Central Soviet Area, and the term thereafter came into common use. The movement was given no special priority, however, and with many localities having already gone through two or more separate land reforms, most peasants and local cadres alike appear to have paid little attention to the calls for yet another iteration of this sort of complex and divisive process.

Following the arrival of the Central Committee leaders in the Central Soviet Area in early 1933, however, they ordered that the movement be dramatically widened and intensified. In theory, this revamped Land Investigation Movement was not to reopen the entire land redistribution process or to subject the entire rural population to yet another reallocation of land. Instead, its aim was to investigate class: to reexamine the determinations of each person's class status that had been made at the time of land redistribu-

73. Among Central Bureau resolutions were the land resolution passed by base area leaders at the Qingtang Conference of April 17, 1931, and the political resolution of the Southern Jiangxi Conference. For the Qingtang Conference resolution, see *Central Base History*, pp. 338-39; the relevant portions of the texts of the Central Committee letter and the Southern Jiangxi Conference resolution are in *Central Committee Documents* (1931), pp. 453-54, 460-61. For a translation of the "Land Law" passed by the First National Soviet Congress, see the Appendix to this volume.

tion, to identify any landlords and rich peasants who had been mistakenly classified as ordinary peasants, and to reapportion their land and other property so that their holdings accorded with the provisions of the current Land Law. It was expected that in addition to discovering significant amounts of land and property that could be distributed, the movement would also collect money and grain that could be used to help pay government expenses, and uncover hidden counterrevolutionaries who were security risks. With this latter expectation in mind, the Land Investigation Movement was closely linked to a new upsurge of the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries which also occurred during this period.<sup>74</sup>

In mid-February 1933, Bo Gu personally put Mao in charge of the campaign, in the latter's capacity as Soviet Government head. As Party historians point out, this put Mao in the embarrassing position of being told to carry out a campaign whose main purpose was to repudiate his own past policies. They also assert that although he adhered to Party discipline and carried out the Land Investigation Movement during the following months, he did his best to introduce it carefully and gradually, so as to minimize what he thought would be the disruptive consequences of the campaign.

In view of the differences between Mao's recent policies toward land redistribution and the harsher measures promoted by the Central Committee, as well as the clashes between Mao and the national Party leaders on many other issues, the argument that Mao did not enthusiastically support the Land Investigation Movement is plausible. On the other hand, given Mao's own past history of active involvement in the campaign to suppress the AB Corps and other supposed counterrevolutionaries in local Party, army, and soviet organs, and his own increasing recognition of the resistance to the revolution exhibited by most rich peasants, it is also likely that Mao was not quite as adamantly and wholeheartedly opposed to the Land Investigation Movement as Party historians sometimes suggest.

Mao started with a small-scale pilot program in March 1933 in Ruijin's Yeping Township, which was designed to experiment with methods for determining class status and analyzing how to draw boundaries between classes. On the basis of the information thus obtained, the Soviet Government and the Central Bureau then issued on June 1-2 separate documents formally calling for a thorough

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74. One recent specialized study of the Land Investigation Movement is Wen Rui and Xie Jianshe, *Zhongyang suqu tudi geming yanjiu* (Research on the Land Revolution in the Central Soviet Area) (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 1991), ch. 6. See also *Central Base History*, pp. 411-29. Older English-language accounts, based primarily on documents from the Chen Cheng Collection, are Hsiao Tso-liang, *The Land Revolution in China 1930-1934: A Study of Documents* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), ch. 4, and Hsu King-yi, *Political Mobilization and Economic Extraction: Chinese Communist Agrarian Policies During the Kiangsi Period* (New York: Garland, 1980), ch. 6.

Land Investigation Movement to root out landlords and rich peasants who had been wrongly classified as middle or poor peasants.<sup>75</sup>

To provide appropriate guidance for the local cadres who would actually have to carry out the movement, several conferences of land reform workers and poor peasants' association representatives from different groups of *xian* in the Base Area were held in June and July.<sup>76</sup> In the reports that Mao delivered to the first of these conferences, he pointed out that the incompleteness of the land revolution had allowed some landlords and rich peasants in the Base Area to maintain their economic base and given them resources with which to continue to engage in counterrevolutionary activities, including the infiltration of soviets, mass organs, and local military forces. The Land Investigation Movement was designed to deal with these problems by detailed redetermination of class status in order to uncover the camouflaged enemies.

Mao emphasized the need to conduct the analysis with great care and to develop elaborate review processes to avoid harmful mislabeling. Drawing upon years of accumulated experience in building rural bases, he urged that the Central Soviet Area not be conceived of as a single homogeneous swathe of territory. Instead, he argued, distinctions should be made between three main categories, corresponding to three broad stages in the development of the revolution: "areas in which the struggle has penetrated deeply," "areas in which the struggle has lagged relatively far behind," and "areas in which new development is taking place." Because different conditions prevailed in each of these phases of the revolutionary process, he felt that policies applied in the corresponding areas should also be different. Mao was very concerned about the difficulty of drawing a clear and coherent demarcation line between middle and rich peasants (that is, in essence, between those considered the friends and those considered the enemies of the revolution), and clearly recognized the movement's potential to stir up fear and resentment among those who found themselves uncomfortably close to the dividing line.<sup>77</sup>

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75. See below, "Carrying Out a Broad and Thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement," June 1, 1933. For the Central Bureau resolution of June 2, see *Central Committee Documents* (1933), pp. 206–10.

76. The meetings included a conference of Land Investigation Movement workers from eight *xian* (June 17–22), a congress of poor peasant league representatives from the same eight *xian* (June 25–July 1), a conference of Land Investigation Movement workers from the remaining nine *xian* in Jiangxi Province (July 21–24), and a congress of poor peasant league representatives from these nine *xian* (July 25–28).

77. For documents produced by the first of these conferences, see below, "Opening Speech at the Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials from Eight *Xian* Regarding the Land Investigation Movement," June 17, 1933; "Report at the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Officials at and above the District Level in Eight *Xian*," June 18–19, 1933; and "Conclusions Adopted by the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Officials at and above the District Level from Eight *Xian*," June 21, 1933.

Mao's worries in these regards proved well-founded. In the prevailing radical climate of the time, the Land Investigation Movement did spawn numerous excesses and errors. Between July and September, more than thirteen thousand households were reclassified as "landlords" or "rich peasants"; both statistical information and anecdotal evidence made it evident at the time as well as in retrospect that many of these were in fact households of very modest means. Substantial numbers, in fact, were clearly "middle peasants," and some were in practical terms best categorized as "poor peasants"; many of these cases involved individuals or families whose unusual career trajectories or financial profiles fell foul of the complex, often mechanically interpreted, regulations that had been issued to guide the movement.

While the reclassification of thousands of households provided a windfall of property and cash for redistribution or government use, the costs in terms of loss of popular support and social upheaval almost certainly outweighed what was gained. At a time when the Soviet Government was trying to raise production and to enhance public security, the Land Investigation Movement disrupted agricultural life and created a new group of disgruntled and desperate people who had little choice but to turn against the revolution. It also met with considerable overt resistance and half-hearted implementation on the part of local cadres.

During the late summer and fall of 1933, Mao wrote two lengthy documents that pointed out some of these problems and suggested how to redress them. In "A Preliminary Summing Up of the Land Investigation Movement" and "Decision Regarding Certain Questions in the Agrarian Struggle," Mao complained particularly about the harm being done to middle peasants and provided a number of household case studies to illustrate a range of tricky issues and how they should be handled.<sup>78</sup> Reviewing the land investigation work of one district soviet, Mao noted eight households which had been wrongly classified as middle or rich peasants when they should have been regarded as landlords, and only two households which had been treated too harshly.<sup>79</sup>

For a time, government and Party pressure to carry out the movement eased, but in early 1934 it revived again, accompanying a new round of criticism of Mao and his policies that took place during and after the Party's Fifth Plenum and the Second National Soviet Congress. Again Mao was labeled a "right opportunist" who had followed a "rich peasant line." On March 15, the Council of People's Commissars (from the chairmanship of which Mao had recently been removed, to be replaced by Zhang Wentian) issued orders for a reinvigorated

78. See below, "A Preliminary Summing Up of the Land Investigation Movement," August 1933, and "Decision Regarding Certain Questions in the Agrarian Struggle," October 10, 1933.

79. See below, "Letter to the Huangbai District Soviet in Ruijin Concerning the Land Investigation Movement," July 13, 1933.

Land Investigation Movement, clearly pointing to Mao when it criticized the past practice of using the pretext of correcting "leftist" tendencies as an excuse for effective obstruction of the campaign. As before, the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries was reintensified along with the Land Investigation Movement. The movement continued in this way with minimal involvement by Mao until June, when the shrinking territory and worsening military situation of the Central Soviet Area made it impossible to maintain such campaigns any longer.

The Land Investigation Movement represented only one portion of the wide range of activities in which Mao was involved in his capacity as head of the Soviet Government's Central Executive Committee. Like the Land Investigation Movement, many of the most notable of Mao's other areas of responsibility were also connected in one way or another with the major overarching tasks of improving the economic productivity and internal security of the Base Area in the face of the continuing government army encirclement campaigns and their tightening economic blockade.

Following Mao's removal from direct involvement in Red Army planning and operations at the Ningdu Conference, the defense of the Base Area had continued under the aegis of other Party and army leaders. In the immediate aftermath of the conference, the Central Bureau remained divided into two groups by location and task: the frontline cadres (Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang) continued to accompany and command the day-to-day movements of the main Red Army force, while the rear echelon cadres (Xiang Ying et al.) generally resided in Ruijin and concerned themselves primarily with planning, supervision, and communications.

Between November 1932 and early January 1933, the Red Army had moved to the northeast to conduct operations in eastern Jiangxi and northern Fujian, which opened communications into northeastern Jiangxi and added new territory to the Base Area on the flank of what had previously been the main axis of advance by government forces. Meanwhile, government armies which had been employed in eradicating other base areas began to deploy into positions around the Central Soviet Area. In January, as forces elsewhere around the perimeter held fast to prevent escape, the primary striking force of the government's Fourth Encirclement Campaign began moving south on the most direct route toward the base area capital of Ruijin.

The opening of this campaign roughly coincided with the arrival in the Base Area of the Central Committee leaders from Shanghai. In line with their overall approach favoring aggressive attacks and conventional warfare tactics, the Central Committee leaders unveiled a "new plan" that called for the main Red Army force to concentrate in order to seize two *xian* towns situated squarely along the enemy's main line of advance. After a series of vain protests against meeting the enemy head on in positional warfare, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De basically ignored Central Committee directives. Instead, in February and March, they led the Red

Army in a mobile campaign that utilized many of the army's familiar staging areas and tactics to isolate enemy units, defeat them in detail, and force the termination of the enemy campaign.<sup>80</sup>

Several units destroyed in this campaign had been among Chiang Kaishek's best divisions. This humiliation, together with the signing of the Tanggu Truce in May 1933, which eased some of the military tension with Japan in northeastern China and allowed some transfer of troops south, incited Chiang to assemble still larger forces and prepare more carefully to launch yet another Communist suppression campaign. A new headquarters was established, a series of conferences and training sessions were held during the summer, and a special office was established to oversee the extensive military construction work required by the "blockhouse strategy" that was to be a central feature of the new campaign.

The blockhouse strategy was actually a complex of different measures designed to negate the Red Army's advantages in mobility, flexibility, and local knowledge. It emphasized slow, methodical advance, with all units on a given front advancing a short distance in tandem so that none were left isolated and exposed, then fortifying each newly acquired patch of territory. Along with this frontline military strategy went a program of military, political, and educational reform designed to mobilize and control the local populace in the occupied areas, so as to deny the Communist Party its major source of supporters and army recruits. As put into full-scale and systematic practice with the start of the main encirclement campaign in the fall of 1933, the blockhouse strategy proved extremely effective in sparing enemy units from the catastrophic surprise attacks they had suffered in the past.

As the Central Soviet Area was being geographically and militarily squeezed by the new campaign, it was also being economically strangled by a stringent blockade. The Base Area produced a surplus of rice and ample supplies of most other staple foodstuffs, so the blockade posed no danger of actual starvation to the populace. But this region was tied into a wide array of market relationships, and by cutting the flow of trade into and out of the region down to a trickle, the blockade did cause significant economic dislocation. On the import side, the most notable effect was the great shortage of salt, a vital dietary element not

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80. The timing and circumstances of the defeat of the Fourth Encirclement Campaign were such that both Returned Student leaders at the time and historians of "Maoist" orthodoxy writing later could claim that victory was achieved by their respective strategic approaches. The facts that the decisive battles took place after Mao's removal from military office, and were fought on the edge of, rather than deep in, the Base Area, were cited to show that in the hands of committed practitioners the Returned Students' "forward and offensive" policy worked, and that Mao's "luring deep" strategy was unnecessary. The facts that the campaign took place in the area that the frontline leaders had identified as key before the Ningdu Conference, and that Zhou Enlai and Zhu De used mobile tactics similar to those used in previous campaigns have allowed later Party historians to claim that Mao had laid the foundation for a successful campaign before his ouster and that his disciples followed his advice.

produced locally, and of factory-made cloth; on the export side, the biggest problems were the large income loss from foregone sales and the collapse in market prices of rice and other export products.

Mao's administrative duties kept him deeply involved in efforts to mobilize the resources of the Central Soviet Area to sustain the war effort and overcome the problems caused by the unrelenting enemy pressure. Part of this activity was in direct support of the military struggle, part indirectly supported the war by mobilizing and managing needed resources, and part was aimed at creating a better long-term economic infrastructure for the region and its population.

The most important and time-consuming of the military support activities was Red Army recruitment. As the long, enervating war dragged on, the Communists found it increasing difficult even to replace their battle losses, let alone to expand the Red Army to the size needed to face the huge government armies in the direct conventional warfare advocated by the Central Committee leaders. Consequently, many documents bearing Mao's name during this three-year period, both before and after his removal from the highest decision-making circles, deal with or contain references to recruitment campaigns to expand the regular Red Army, to measures taken to encourage or aid soldiers (such as providing land allotments for soldiers, aid to military dependents, or restrictions on the freedom of soldiers' wives to divorce and remarry), or to the issue of desertion.<sup>81</sup>

In addition to recruitment and retention of soldiers, the Soviet Government under Mao's direction also spent a great deal of time and energy mobilizing the base area population for a variety of other military support activities. Load-carrying, clothes-washing, sandal-making, message-carrying, and a range of internal security functions were all responsibilities of organized groups of base area inhabitants, mostly women, children, and the aged.<sup>82</sup>

Fund-raising and improving the overall economic productivity of the base were other important areas of responsibility for the Soviet Government. In the early days of base-building, the bulk of the funds needed to support the revolutionary movement had come from extortion or seizures of funds and property from landlords and merchants both inside and outside of Communist-controlled

81. For examples, see below, "Putting into Effect Methods for Carrying Out the Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Red Army," February 1, 1932; "On the Revolutionary Masses Lending Grain to Provide for the Red Army," March 1, 1933; "On Redistributing the People's Food Supply to Help Provide for the Military," March 4, 1933; "Appeal to the Masses in the Four *Xian* of Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng to Save 50,000 *Dan* of Grain and Sell It to the Red Army," June 1933; and "On the Question of Red Army Deserters," December 15, 1933.

82. For examples, see below, "On Emergency War Mobilization," October 13, 1932; "Conscript the Rich Peasants and Organize Forced Labor Brigades," November 25, 1932; "On Mobilization for War and Methods of Work," November 29, 1932; "Order Regarding Emergency Mobilization to Smash the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression'," October 18, 1933; and "Report on Emergency Mobilization," January 29, 1934.

territory. Over time, however, the wealthier elements of the base areas' population either fled or were thoroughly expropriated, while the Central Soviet Area became increasingly hemmed in by government armies and their economic blockade. Under these circumstances, Communist leaders were forced to raise funds from the remaining, largely peasant population. Some money was raised through the Land Investigation Movement, and through the rather sporadic and uneven imposition of income and other taxes, but a major source of new revenue was the issuance of government bonds. Peasants were strongly encouraged (and sometimes coerced) to buy bonds and bond-purchase was thoroughly integrated into a variety of other political and economic campaigns.<sup>83</sup>

"Economic construction" (*jingji jianshe*) activities were conjoined with direct fund-raising as part of the broader effort to maintain productivity in the face of the economic distortions caused by the blockade. Mao personally emphasized the importance of making such production-raising and infrastructure-building activities an integral part of the war effort, but as he indicated at an economic construction work conference held in August 1933, his opinion was not universally shared. Some cadres, he noted, felt that most large-scale projects to enhance economic productivity were infeasible under the confused and demanding circumstances then prevailing, and that they should therefore be postponed until the civil war was ended. On the contrary, Mao replied, without some sense that their livelihoods were secure and potentially improving, the people of the base would be dispirited and abandon their support for the revolution.<sup>84</sup>

Mao did, however, fully recognize the need to keep economic construction activities related in some way to support of the overall war effort, and this was in fact the case with the bulk of the projects undertaken in this field. Efforts to improve agricultural and handicraft goods production (by, for example, opening new land, developing waterworks, pooling tools and animals, developing cooperatives, and setting up banks and other credit agencies), to promote imports (mostly via smuggling) and manage their distribution and pricing within the Base Area, and to develop state enterprises (such as printing plants, arsenals, and banks) all in one way or another contributed to maintaining the government's capacity to fight the war and enabling it to reach the population effectively.

In addition to the work of "economic construction," as head of the Soviet Government Mao was also responsible for overseeing a wide range of central government agencies, as well as the operations of similar offices at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy in the several provinces and numerous *xian* into

83. For examples, see below, "Promoting the Sale of the Second Issue of Revolutionary War Bonds," October 21, 1932; "Resolution by the Central Executive Committee on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds," July 22, 1933; "On the Method of Selling Treasury Bonds," August 28, 1933; and "Correct Commandism in Selling Government Bonds," September 23, 1933.

84. For a discussion of these issues, see below, "Smashing the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' and the Tasks of Economic Construction," August 12, 1933.



which the Base Area was divided. In addition, *xian* soviet governments had their own subordinate soviet governments at the district and township level, each of which contained branches of many of the same agencies that existed at higher levels of the hierarchy. Many of the laws and regulations contained in this volume are concerned with specifying the functions of these various administrative offices, and the relationships among them.

Though Mao may have had little or no involvement in drafting many of the basic laws of the Soviet Republic promulgated at the time of the First National Soviet Congress, he was clearly concerned with overseeing the activities of local governments. It is notable in this regard that, whereas in his previous "rural investigations" Mao's primary focus had been on the class structure and economic activity of rural society, in the Changgang and Caixi investigations conducted in November 1933 Mao devoted much of his attention to examining the details of local government work and the participation of the population in government-instigated political and economic campaigns. In early 1934, he further developed the ideas he had formed on the basis of these investigations in a text on improving the work of township government.<sup>85</sup>

As earlier Western works have pointed out, Communist leaders considered local soviet governments important vehicles through which to mobilize and maintain popular support. In the context of the besieged Central Soviet Area, much of the work of the soviets necessarily involved popular mobilization to support the war effort, not only by providing resources but also by helping out with internal security, aid to families of Red Army soldiers, and a wide range of other tasks. In addition, the soviets served as agencies through which to carry out various political and social initiatives from the top down. For most such activities, the hierarchical, vertically integrated structure of the soviet system was well suited.

At the same time, however, the soviets were supposed to be focal points for the development and exercise of popular political participation. In a series of directives, Mao denounced the practice whereby a small group of leaders at the local level took all the decisions themselves without consulting the people at all, or submitted a list of candidates to a mass meeting, which the electors were obliged to accept or reject *en bloc*. The voters, he declared, must be given the opportunity to consider the candidates one by one, and those whom the masses rejected should be replaced by more suitable individuals.<sup>86</sup>

85. See below, "Investigation of Changgang Township," November 18, 1933; "Investigation of Caixi Township," November 26, 1933; and "On the Work of the Township Soviets," April 10, 1934.

86. See below, "An Important Instruction Regarding the Building of Soviets," December 15, 1931; "Concerning Alteration and Increase of the Ratio of Soviet Delegates to Local Residents," January 28, 1932; "On the Problem of Continuing the Reform of Local Soviet Governments," September 20, 1932; "On the Inspection of the Election Movement at All Levels," December 1, 1932; "Instructions on the Current Election Movement," August 9, 1933; and "This Year's Elections," September 6, 1933.

## The Collapse of the Central Soviet Area

Given the pressures and uncertainties imposed by the encirclement campaigns and the blockade, the political institution-building and economic construction work achieved under Mao's overall administrative supervision was impressive. Nevertheless, the long-term impact of these political and economic activities was ultimately dependent upon the ability of the Red Army to overcome the military threat from the government armies surrounding the base. In the fall of 1933, as the Guomindang forces of more than 500,000 soldiers gathered for the Fifth Encirclement Campaign finally began to inch forward and gradually tighten their long coils of blockhouses around the Central Soviet Area, the Red Army's capacity to resist the developing offensive was increasingly called into question.

As with most earlier campaigns, the government army's main line of attack was from north to south, with forces on the remaining three sides of the encirclement assigned either to passive holding actions to keep the Red Army hemmed in or to subsidiary attacks on other nearby base areas (such as Hunan-Jiangxi) to prevent assistance from reaching the Central Soviet Area. More than thirty divisions—many of them elite units commanded by Chiang Kaishek's close associates—were assigned to the government's main North Route Army, with well over half of them concentrated in the Nancheng-Nanfeng sector on the northeastern edge of the base, where the Xu River valley, running roughly north and south, provided a convenient access route leading directly toward the Soviet Republic's capital in Ruijin.

To resist the offensive, the main Red Army force in the base area could by this time muster about 70,000 soldiers, supplemented by around 50,000 guerrillas and other "local forces." Though these figures, which reflected the achievements of the summer's intensive drives to "expand the Red Army," marked a considerable improvement over the 30,000 to 50,000 regular Red Army soldiers who had been available to wage previous campaigns, they were still tiny by comparison with the number of government troops arrayed against them. Moreover, the Red Army forces were now committed to confronting the enemy with conventional warfare methods, which put more of a premium on numbers and weapons than on speed and mobility. In addition, they were exhausted by months of nearly continuous operations and divided both physically and politically.

Rather than resting the Red Army after the Fourth Encirclement Campaign, Bo Gu and his associates had tried to exploit the army's victories by launching several follow-up attacks between late March and June 1933 against *xian* towns and government troops on the northern edge of the Base Area. These battles, all of which were unsuccessful, were costly both in casualties and in the energy expended, neither of which could be easily replaced.

During the same period the Returned Student leaders engaged in organizational reshuffling and strategic planning designed to increase their military control. As part of this effort, on May 8, the Military Affairs Commission was

separated more fully from the Red Army's operational leadership. The commission offices, which hitherto had usually been located together with Red Army headquarters at or near the front, were removed to Ruijin. Although Zhu De (now generally considered to be Mao's ally) remained as concurrently Red Army commander and chairman of the commission, Xiang Ying and Bo Gu also joined the commission, and it was specified that whenever Zhu was at the front (which during this period was essentially all the time), Xiang would serve as acting chairman. These changes gave the Returned Students effective control over the commission and an additional institutional base from which to issue orders to frontline leaders such as Zhu and Zhou Enlai.

On June 13, Party leaders complemented these changes with a new strategic directive calling for what was termed "separate warfare" (*fenli zuozhan*). Acknowledging the difficulty of attacking the enemy's strong northern forces, the directive divided the main Red Army into separate Eastern and Central armies, which would operate in Fujian and Jiangxi, respectively. While the Central Army tied down enemy forces in Jiangxi, the Eastern Army would first drive into western Fujian to neutralize the Nineteenth Route Army, then turn back northwest to attack the flank of the Jiangxi enemy.

Despite objections from Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who opposed both the general idea of dividing the army and the specific plan for attacking the Nineteenth Route Army (a force of ambiguous and shifting loyalties not controlled by Chiang Kaishek), the application of this plan began on July 1 with the designation of Peng Dehuai's Third Army Group and some attached forces as the Eastern Army. During the three-month period between this date and the beginning of the enemy's Fifth Encirclement Campaign at the end of September, Peng's forces ranged widely throughout western and central Fujian.

Amid ongoing bickering among frontline and rear echelon leaders over how to employ the force, the Eastern Army won significant victories, but moved too frequently and quickly to consolidate and incorporate into the base any of the territory through which it passed. The rigors of this extended campaign, coming on the heels of the difficult struggle against the Fourth Encirclement Campaign and occurring amidst the oppressive heat of a South China summer and the illness it brought, also led to an upsurge of casualties more numerous than the relative trickle of new recruits coming in. Moreover, left behind in Jiangxi, the Central Army was further weakened while trying alone and in vain to stem the buildup of enemy troops and fortifications along the northern front of the Base Area.

Thus, rather than being rested, prepared, and united to meet the new campaign, the Red Army was debilitated, discouraged, and divided. To complicate matters still further, at this moment the already-fragmented base area military leadership received a controversial and opinionated addition in the person of the

Soviet military advisor Otto Braun.<sup>87</sup> Braun came to Jiangxi at the invitation of Bo Gu, who had become acquainted with him when both worked in Shanghai in the fall of 1932. Soon after his arrival in Ruijin in late September 1933, Braun began to exert considerable influence on military affairs.

Technically, Braun was only an advisor, but Party historians assert that because Bo and most of the other Returned Students had little or no military experience, in practice they allowed Braun to make military decisions and direct the movement of Red Army troops. Braun was billeted in a small house in the Ruijin suburb of Shazhouba, from which during the following months he spent most of his time directing resistance to the government offensive, poring over the crude maps available, and issuing a stream of orders through his two interpreters.<sup>88</sup>

Braun's training in the Soviet Union may have inclined him toward a style of conventional warfare fought along regular front lines. In any case, the Returned Student leaders, with their emphasis on aggressive expansion, assaults on major cities, and well-ordered, centralized chains of command, found this style congenial. For some frontline military and political leaders such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, however, the approach of Braun and the Returned Students seemed inflexible and ill-suited to the strengths and circumstances of the Red Army. The political dominance of the Returned Student leadership ensured that the military struggle against the Fifth Encirclement Campaign would employ these methods, but residual resistance from recalcitrant leaders meant that friction over military affairs would also continue.

One such divergence of opinion occurred in the opening stages of the Fifth Campaign. As noted above, topography, disposition of forces, and the history of past campaigns together indicated that the main government attack would thrust south along the Xu River valley in eastern Jiangxi. Perforce, this line of advance would proceed through a series of small, walled *xian* towns—Nancheng, Nanfeng, Guangchang—that were strung out at intervals along the upper reaches of the valley. At some distance from the river in the more mountainous country to its east and west were other *xian* towns—Lichuan and Yihuang—that were strategically placed to guard the flanks of the valley. Together, as commanders

87. Otto Braun (1900–1974), born in Munich, was known in China as Li De (“Li the German”). He joined the German Communist Party after the First World War, and was active in the party’s intelligence services, as well as in setting up paramilitary groups. Arrested in 1926, he was rescued in 1928 from prison in Berlin, and fled to the Soviet Union, where he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. In 1932, he was sent to China by Soviet military intelligence, and worked first in Harbin and Shanghai in the context of Anti-Japanese War before going to Ruijin. For an annotated translation of Braun’s own curriculum vitae, see the article by Frederick S. Litten to appear in *Twentieth Century China*, November 1997. Braun’s reminiscences can be found in Otto Braun, *Chinesische Aufzeichnungen* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1973); the English version is entitled *A Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) (hereafter Braun, *Comintern Agent*).

88. *Mao in the Central Soviet*, p. 492, and Wu Xiuquan, *Wode licheng* (1908–1949) [My Career (1908–1949)] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), pp. 69–71. Wu was Braun’s main interpreter during this period.

on both sides realized, this complex of towns and terrain constituted the "door" into the heart of the Base Area, and it was in this region that the decisive battles of the Fifth Campaign were fought.

As government forces sat poised to jump off on the main attack up the valley, they prudently moved first in late September to protect their eastern flank by seizing the Communist-held town of Lichuan. As most of the Red Army troops available to defend the area had left to accompany the Eastern Army's campaign in Fujian, the town fell quickly. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who had been watching the enemy buildup with increasing alarm, had for some time vainly urged Xiang Ying to order the Eastern Army back to the Base Area to help blunt the impending offensive by staging preemptive attacks on the enemy's northern staging areas. By the time the orders were finally issued, however, Lichuan was on the verge of being taken and the initiative had been lost.

Zhou then telegraphed Xiang that the best policy at this point would be to use mobile tactics by feinting an attack on Lichuan (which was now in fact too heavily fortified to recapture) to occupy the enemy, and then driving into their rear areas. But Otto Braun insisted that Lichuan must be recaptured, and to this end both the Central and Eastern armies were forced to stage a series of abortive attacks in October and November against various heavily defended towns, fortified lines, and communications points in the region.

Designed to recapture territory and disrupt the government offensive, these unsuccessful attacks instead only weakened the Red Army, eased the enemy's future advance, and led to recriminations and scapegoating within base area military circles. Although Mao himself seems not to have been involved directly in any of these operations, Bo Gu and his associates nonetheless blamed the loss of Lichuan on the influence of residual "guerrillism" and "flightism," and associated this and other failings with practices of the Mao-inspired "Luo Ming Line," which was then still under heavy attack. An experienced cadre named Xiao Jingguang,<sup>89</sup> who had commanded both the Fujian-Jiangxi Military Region (with headquarters in Lichuan) and a Red Army unit involved in one of the disastrous attacks, was blamed for both failures; he was cashiered, tried as a Luo Ming Line exemplar, and sentenced to five years in prison.<sup>90</sup>

The capture and fortification of Lichuan and its surrounding area had cleared the way for the start of the government army's main Xu valley offensive. Just as this was getting underway, however, events in the neighboring province of Fujian distracted Chiang Kaishek and his generals, and led to a major troop rede-

89. Xiao Jingguang (1903-1989) was a native of Changsha. In 1921, he went to study in the Soviet Union, where he joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. Returning to China in 1924, he participated in the Northern Expedition. From 1927 to 1930, he attended the Leningrad Military Academy.

90. Though Mao was eventually able to have him quietly released and assigned to teach at the Red Army University, Xiao was not fully rehabilitated until after the Zunyi Conference.

ployment that brought a temporary halt to the anti-Communist campaign. The Fujian rebellion (or Fujian Incident, as this disturbance is called in Chinese sources) also presented the base area leadership with a significant, but complicated and controversial, opportunity to obtain new allies at a time when they were hard pressed to manage on their own.

Simply put, the Fujian Incident consisted of an unsuccessful attempt by a group of politicians and military officers to establish a new government independent of the Guomindang government of Chiang Kaishek in Nanjing. The principal officers of the Nineteenth Route Army, then stationed in Fujian—Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai, and Jiang Guangnai—had been mutually associated since the mid-1920s and had become progressively disgruntled with Chiang Kaishek's leadership.<sup>91</sup> After the army became famous for stoutly resisting the Japanese in Shanghai in January 1932, Chiang sought to lessen the danger that the force might pose to his own régime by reassigning it to Communist-suppression duty in Fujian, work which if pursued diligently might weaken both this maverick army and his even more dangerous Red Army antagonists.

Once in Fujian, however, the Nineteenth Route Army leaders devoted themselves primarily to carving out a secure military base and an increasingly independent political régime of their own. By cooperating with a number of Fujian-based politicians (themselves loosely associated within political groups such as the Third Party and the Social Democratic Party) who sought to carry out socioeconomic and political reforms more radical than those of the Nanjing government, and by appealing to opponents of Chiang Kaishek outside of Fujian, Chen Mingshu and his associates had come by late 1933 to constitute a serious threat to Chiang and his government.<sup>92</sup>

91. Chen Mingshu (1890–1965), *zi* Zhenru, was a native of Guangdong and had been governor of that province from 1929 to 1931. In 1931, he was named commander-in-chief of the anti-Communist forces in Jiangxi. When the Nineteenth Route Army gained international fame in 1932 by its resistance to the Japanese in Shanghai, attention was focused on Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai, who were in charge of the combat operations, but Chen, as overall commander, also saw his reputation enhanced. Cai Tingkai (1892–1968) was also a native of Guangdong, as was Jiang Guangnai (1888–1967), *zi* Jingran. Chen Mingshu, who returned to China from a trip to Europe in early 1933, was the prime mover in the Fujian rebellion.

92. The most comprehensive English-language account of the activities of the Fujian leaders is Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), ch. 3 (hereafter Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*). Accounts focusing on Communist involvement include William F. Dorill, "The Fujian Rebellion and the CCP: A Case of Maoist Revision," *China Quarterly* 37 (January–March 1969), pp. 31–53; Frederick S. Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," *Republican China*, Vol. 14, no. 1 (November 1988), pp. 57–74; Kuo, *Analytical History*, Vol. 2, pp. 553–58, 574–76; Braun, *Comintern Agent*, pp. 61–66; and "'Fujian shibian' qianhou, wo dang yu shijiu lujun jianli hezuo guanxi de jingguo" (The Process of Establishing Cooperative Relations Between Our Party and the Nineteenth Route Army at the Time of the "Fujian Incident"), in *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao zhuanji yanjiu ji—di er ci guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi*, (2) (Collection of Specialized Research on Party History Materials—the Period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War [Vol. 2]), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui zhengji yanjiushi, pp. 235–52 (hereafter "'Fujian shibian' qianhou").

One of the anti-government groups to which the Fujian leaders reached out was the Communist Party. Though Nineteenth Route Army troops had entered areas of western Fujian contested by the Communists, they had been more assiduous in suppressing local warlords and militias than in seeking conflict with the Red Army. In mid-September 1933, the Fujian leaders went beyond passive avoidance of conflict by advocating an alliance with Communist forces in the Central Soviet Area.

This initiative of the Fujian leaders took the form of a response to the Communist Party's proclamation of January 1933 offering to conclude an agreement with any armed force prepared to oppose Japanese aggression, on three conditions: (1) Immediately stop attacking the soviet areas; (2) Immediately guarantee the masses' democratic rights; (3) Immediately arm the popular masses to create a volunteer army to defend China.<sup>93</sup> This proposal was frequently reiterated during the ensuing months, as Japan's invasion of China continued to unfold, and the threat of Guomindang "Encirclement and Suppression" made the Communists feel more and more the need to seek allies.<sup>94</sup>

Although the criteria of the Communist offer of an operational agreement were arguably applicable to the Nineteenth Route Army and its leaders, their overture to Ruijin was only one of many they made during this period to potential anti-Chiang allies across a broad political spectrum, as part of efforts to line up support for their planned new government. The Central Committee invited the Fujian leaders to send representatives to Ruijin for negotiations, while at the same time the Nineteenth Route Army and Red Army forces entered into a de facto armistice. In early October, Fujian plenipotentiaries arrived in Ruijin bearing a letter for Zhu De and Mao. Though Zhu and Mao apparently saw the visitors during their stay, and were certainly apprised of what was going on, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying<sup>95</sup> actually supervised the talks, while Pan Hannian<sup>96</sup> undertook most of the face-to-face negotiation.

93. For the first statement of this position, see below, "Proclamation of the Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army," January 17, 1933.

94. See below, in particular, "Oppose Japanese Imperialism's Occupation of Rehe and Attack on Beiping and Tianjin," March 3, 1933; the proclamation of June 1, 1933, denouncing the Tanggu Truce; and "Circular Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Recent Dalian Conference for Selling Out the Country," July 1933.

95. Ye Jianying (1897-1986) was a native of Guangdong, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 after participating in the Northern Expedition. In December 1927, he was one of the leaders of the Guangzhou Uprising (Canton Commune). From 1928 to 1930, he studied at the University of the Far East in Moscow. On returning to China, after a brief period in Shanghai, he went to the Central Soviet Area in 1931 and became chief of staff of the First Front Army.

96. Pan Hannian (1906-1977), alternative name Jianxing, pen name Xiaokai, was a native of Jiangsu. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 in Shanghai. In 1933, he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Party's Central Bureau.

On October 26, the two sides reached a preliminary agreement calling for resistance to Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kaishek's government, a ceasefire between Red Army and Fujianese forces, exchange of emissaries, re-establishment of commerce between the base and the Fujian coast, and release of political prisoners and freedom of operation for "all revolutionary groups" in Fujian. Pan Hannian went secretly to Fuzhou to act as liaison with the Fujian leaders; subsequently, the ceasefire went into effect, the blockade was relaxed, and limited steps were taken to release prisoners and otherwise carry out the provisions of the preliminary agreement.<sup>97</sup>

On November 20, Fujianese leaders proclaimed the establishment of a People's Revolutionary Government, called on Chiang Kaishek to resign, urged anti-Chiang leaders in Guangdong and Guangxi to support the new government, and strongly reaffirmed their opposition to imperialism. However, virtually no powerful national figures publicly supported the Fujian leaders, and Chiang Kaishek rapidly shifted numerous elite divisions away from the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and into positions along the northern Fujian border. By January 1, 1934—far earlier than Fujianese leaders had thought possible—a full-scale government invasion of Fujian was underway.

The question of whether or not to aid the Fujian forces proved vexing and controversial for base area leaders. The quandary was whether the balance of ideological and concrete risks and rewards tilted toward active military support of the Fujian leaders or toward a policy of standing aside "to watch the tigers fight." On the one hand, many base area leaders felt that they deeply needed help to repel overwhelmingly superior enemy forces, and to break the economic blockade of the base. Now they were presented with such help, in the shape of a political/military force of some substance that had a modicum of commitment to socioeconomic reform, had at least rhetorically met the Party's preconditions for cooperation, and had already begun to provide such concrete benefits to the base as a ceasefire and trade resumption.

On the other hand, the Nineteenth Route Army's relations with the Red Army had been ambiguous. Moreover, the new government in Fujian was a heterogeneous congeries of politicians that had also sought support from a variety of conservative warlords and other anti-Communists. Their commitment to reform thus seemed more cynical than sincere. Almost from the start, the new government had also displayed deep factional fissures, debilitating indecisiveness, and a surprising lack of planning for dealing with the consequences of their challenge to Chiang's government. Their assistance thus seemed likely to be ineffectual.

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97. The text of the October 26 Preliminary Agreement is translated in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 605–6. On November 27 in Changting, the two sides signed an additional agreement specifying military demarcation lines and respective zones of operation for the Red Army and the Nineteenth Route Army. See "Fujian shibian' qianhou," p. 242, and *Central Base History*, pp. 484–85.



Finally, the reforms advertised by the Fujian leaders were products of radical subgroups within the new government (the Third Party and the Social Democratic Party) that base area leaders had long insisted were subversive rivals rather than potential allies. In fact, these parties had been prime targets of the divisive and deadly campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries in Communist-controlled areas of Fujian. To join with them now would be a politically unpalatable reversal of policy and an implicit admission of past error.

As with most issues during this period, intra-Party deliberations on this case were manifestly complicated by factional and other animosities, but the positions taken by individual leaders are uncommonly obscure. This is particularly the case regarding Mao, who was apparently by this time once again assuming a substantial—if largely informal—role in high-level decision-making following the long hiatus imposed by the Ningdu Conference. Though retrospective comments on the Fujian Incident by Mao and others portray this as another example of a clear two-line struggle between Returned Students such as Bo Gu, who mistakenly opposed cooperation, and Mao and others who correctly supported it,<sup>98</sup> this may well be a misleading view both of the debate as a whole and of Mao's particular position in it. Unfortunately, the information currently available is not sufficient to reach a firm conclusion on the matter.<sup>99</sup>

It is clear, at least, that differences of opinion led the base area leadership into a lengthy period of vacillation on the question of how to react to Chiang Kaishek's invasion of Fujian and consequent postponement of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. All agreed that it made sense to take some action to profit from the lull in the enemy advance, but how? One view, urged by Comintern military advisor Manfred

98. The April 20, 1945, "Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on Certain Historical Questions" states that the "erroneous 'left' line . . . was applied in the Fujian Incident." (Saich, *Rise to Power*, p. 1168.)

99. Several sources assert that Mao either opposed or was very cautious about cooperation with the Fujian government. See Braun, *Comintern Agent*, p. 63; Gong Chu, *Wo yu hongjun* (I and the Red Army) (Hong Kong: South Wind, 1954), p. 364; Kuo, *Analytical History*, Vol. 2, p. 575 (citing information from ex-Communist Chen Jan [Ran]); and Litten, "The CCP and the Fujian Rebellion," p. 62 (citing 1935 Russian reports from Comintern China advisers Arthur Ewert and Manfred Stern). All but the last of these are accounts by individuals who are definitely hostile to Mao. Still, the agreement among so many diverse sources is striking. This view is also consistent with the December message Mao and Zhu De sent to the Fujian leaders (translated below), and with Mao's steadfast promotion of the campaigns to suppress counterrevolutionaries, which might have disinclined him to embrace radical elements within the Fujian government. Retrospectively, on the other hand, in Chapter 5, section 8 of "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Mao asserted that, at the time of the Fujian Incident, "the main forces of the Red Army should without a doubt have moved into the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi region, with Zhejiang as the center, and swept over the length and breadth of the area between Hangzhou, Suzhou, Nanjing, Wuhu, Nanchang, and Fuzhou, turning our strategic defensive into a strategic offensive, menacing the enemy's vital centers and seeking battle in the vast areas where there were no blockhouses." Whether at the time Mao actually advocated so bold an alternative strategy it is impossible to say.

Stern from Shanghai, involved moving the main Red Army to the northwestern edge of the base and then breaking out of the encirclement to strike into northern Jiangxi. The other, apparently advanced by Peng Dehuai, was a revival of proposals widely bruited about several years earlier (by Mao among others), which called for a drive to link up with the Communist base area still surviving in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area and then using this territory as a steppingstone for a further drive toward the center of Guomindang power in Jiangnan.

Given the circumstances, both of these ideas were hopelessly grandiose. The second plan, however, would involve moving the Red Army directly across the flank and rear of the government troops then invading Fujian, thus disrupting their attack and indirectly relieving the Fujian government. Nonetheless, Stern (and perhaps Braun as well) insisted that the western breakout plan be attempted instead, and Bo Gu acquiesced. Execution of the plan was half-hearted at best and apparently no serious breakout was actually attempted, but it did lead to the movement of part of the Red Army westward. Frontline leaders Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were opposed to splitting the Red Army in this way and conveyed their objections bluntly and vociferously to Bo, Braun, and Xiang Ying, especially after the weakened Red Army force remaining in the Jiangxi-Fujian border area suffered heavy battle casualties.<sup>100</sup>

These events probably contributed to a reorganization of the military command structure that also took place during this period. As noted, the existing, friction-laden division of command between frontline and rear echelon leaders had been reluctantly tolerated when the Red Army relied on mobile warfare. Now, with the enemy's blockhouse strategy restricting movement and forcing more use of positional warfare, the need for divided leadership was less apparent, while its potential for encouraging misunderstanding or willful disobedience remained onerous. To resolve the issue, Bo Gu and Otto Braun visited the frontline headquarters of Zhu De and Zhou Enlai where, as Braun blandly commented later, "We quickly agreed that the integration of both headquarters would be the best solution." This "integration," completed by early January 1934, involved the complete abolition of the frontline army headquarters and the relocation of Zhu and Zhou to the offices of the Military Commission in Ruijin.<sup>101</sup>

As Party leaders were trying to get their own house in order, they were also giving mixed signals to the Fujian leaders. While themselves deliberating indecisively, Party leaders publicly criticized the Fujian People's Government for similar inaction, accusing it of failing either to prepare a credible military response to Chiang's invasion or to take meaningful steps to carry out their agreement with the Communists. The first of these criticisms came in a published Central Committee comment on December 5; it was followed on December 20 by a

100. Jin Chongji, *Zhu De zhuan* (Biography of Zhu De) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), p. 318 (hereafter Jin, *Zhu De*); "Fujian shibian' qianhou," pp. 249–50; Braun, *Comintern Agent*, pp. 63–65; and *Central Base Area*, pp. 487–92.

101. Braun, *Comintern Agent*, pp. 46–47, and *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, pp. 256–58.

telegram from Mao and Zhu De demanding immediate compliance with the preliminary agreement, decisive military action against Chiang, and firm mass mobilization as conditions for Communist military aid.<sup>102</sup>

Soon thereafter Communist actions briefly suggested that military aid was in fact underway. On January 9, a Fujian representative arrived in Ruijin to request such aid, and base area leaders dispatched a cadre to Fujian as a "military liaison officer." Meanwhile, Communist troops slowly advanced deeper into Fujian; as they marched, they requested that the Nineteenth Route Army cooperate with them in attacks on Chiang's forces.<sup>103</sup>

But these moves were too little, too late. Under Chiang's attack, Fujianese resistance collapsed in a welter of factional squabbles, defections, and frantic retreats. As their fortunes sank, critical Communist rhetoric once more assailed them. A second Mao-Zhu telegram, sent on January 13 when the Fujianese forces were already near defeat, reiterated earlier points, couched now as "urgent recommendations" rather than "demands," but studiously avoided direct mention of Red Army aid. By January 22, the rebellion was over; most of its leaders defected to the Nanjing side or fled to Hong Kong, while the Nineteenth Route Army was abolished and the bulk of its troops were absorbed into the government army.<sup>104</sup>

In the end, the Communists gained little from the Fujian Incident except a brief respite from enemy attack. After the rebellion was crushed, the respite ended and government armies again began their inexorable advance. Now, however, instead of the quiescent Nineteenth Route Army on their eastern flank, the Red Army had to contend with several of Chiang's divisions which had participated in the Fujian invasion and were now simply turned around and used to attack the flank of the base.

Though the base area leaders had not gained any military advantage from the lull in the fighting, it did give them more leisure to participate in two major meetings that had been in the planning stages for some time. One of these was the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which was held on January 15-18, 1934; the other was the Second National Soviet Congress, which convened from January 22 to February 1.

In 1945 the Mao-sponsored Central Committee resolution "On Certain Historical Questions" characterized the Fifth Plenum as having marked "the peak of development of the third 'left' line." It is certainly clear that the meeting was dominated by Bo Gu and the Returned Student leadership, and that it reiterated

102. The text of the Central Committee commentary is available in *Central Committee Documents* (1933), pp. 449-53. For the Mao telegram, see below, "The First Telegram Sent by the Interim Central Government to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army."

103. "'Fujian shibian' qianhou," p. 250.

104. Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, pp. 133-37. For the Mao-Zhu telegram, see below, "Second Telegram from the Interim Central Government to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian."

the general evaluation of the contemporary situation and the overall policy approach that had first been articulated at the Fourth Plenum in early 1931. The resolution, based on Bo Gu's keynote report to the plenum, probably looking ahead to the imminent convocation of the National Soviet Congress, tried to emphasize unity and concord as much as possible; in particular, the resolution was notable for its generality and relative lack of pointed criticism of Party and government affairs in the Central Soviet Area.<sup>105</sup>

At the same time, however, even the scanty information available about the plenum indicates the extent of the intra-Party conflict that continued to simmer beneath the surface. Only three reports were presented at the meeting, and there were no reports or resolutions dealing with such important (and contentious) areas as military affairs and land work. More significantly, Party historians state that although Zhou Enlai participated in the actual meeting, he was deliberately excluded from the important report-drafting and other preparatory work leading up to the plenum. No reason is given for this exclusion, but if it indeed happened it may have been related to bad feeling over issues such as aid to the Nineteenth Route Army and the military command reorganization.<sup>106</sup>

But the most notable absentee from the plenum and its surrounding activities was Mao. Some Party histories imply that Mao was not allowed to participate. This seems unlikely in the light both of past practice and of the fact that the plenum reelected Mao to Politburo membership. It is more likely that, as hostile sources state, he voluntarily chose not to participate. Otto Braun's remembrance of the circumstances is instructive:

Even before the Central Committee Plenum he [Mao] introduced a note of discord into the apparent harmony by stating that his poor health would not permit his participation. He actually did stay away. Po Ku [Bo Gu] remarked sarcastically that Mao was once again suffering from a "diplomatic disorder" because he was offended that Lo Fu [Luo Fu, that is, Zhang Wentian] rather than he was to give the report "On the Chinese Soviet Movement and its Task," and that his demand to be admitted into the Politburo's Standing Committee had not been granted.<sup>107</sup>

Braun and other sources both friendly and hostile to Mao indicate that there was considerable criticism of Mao at the Fifth Plenum. Almost certainly, by the time the plenum was convened, the main decisions to be ratified at the upcoming soviet congress and carried out soon thereafter had already been taken. Mao would therefore have been aware that, although he would remain titular head of

105. For the 1945 resolution, see Saich, *Rise to Power*, p. 1168. Bo Gu's resolution is translated in *Ibid.*, pp. 609–22.

106. *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, p. 259, and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, p. 465. As statements that Zhou did not help prepare for the plenum have the convenient effect of minimizing Zhou's connection with a meeting now deemed to have perpetuated an erroneous Party line, they should be viewed with caution.

107. Braun, *Comintern Agent*, p. 49.

the Soviet Government, Zhang Wentian had been chosen to replace him as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. As a result, Mao would have less direct control over the government's major administrative departments and become little more than a figurehead. This being the case, he chose not to participate.

Zhang Wentian was a Returned Student who had accompanied Bo Gu to Ruijin in early 1933. Nevertheless, according to Party historians, Zhang eventually came to question the way Bo and Braun were handling the defense of the base, and he gradually established friendly relations with Mao. By assigning Zhang to head the Council of People's Commissars, it is said that Bo was cleverly seeking to kill two birds with one stone: pushing Zhang into a more marginal office where his disagreement would be less troublesome, while also diluting Mao's power by having him share government power with someone who still maintained a foot in both camps.<sup>108</sup>

Little of this was visible at the Second National Soviet Congress which, like the First Congress in 1931, was primarily an exercise in public celebration of achievements, summing-up of progress, and outlining of agreed-upon future goals, rather than an occasion for the airing of conflict and debating alternative policies. The reports to the congress, including Mao's lengthy report on the work of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars (delivered on January 24 and 25 and discussed for several days thereafter), were in this vein.

Mao's report began by comprehensively surveying (complete with statistics and charts) all areas of the government's base-building work, including soviet administration and elections, land affairs, labor work, various aspects of "economic construction," and support for the Red Army. This he followed with a rather generalized listing of remaining errors and deficiencies and a call for their rectification, all set in the context of the need for continuing effort to prevail over the government encirclement campaign. After the delegates had engaged in two days of small-group discussions of this report, the congress reconvened in general session to hear Mao's commentary on the discussion, including some refutation of erroneous statements made in the small groups. More spontaneous and presumably less collective a product than the formal report, this speech provided Mao with the opportunity to personalize his presentation with examples drawn from his own research and experience. Although the thrust of the points made did not depart significantly from the line presented in the report, there were some nuances which are worthy of mention.<sup>109</sup>

Most notable was perhaps the relatively sober and realistic tone of both the report and the conclusion. In the summer of 1930, during the high tide of the Li Lisan Line, Mao had predicted the rapid victory of revolution not only in China, but in the whole world.<sup>110</sup> Similar utterances, couched in slightly less chiliastic

108. *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 514–15.

109. For the texts of Mao's report and the subsequent commentary, see below, "Report to the Second National Soviet Congress," January 24–35, 1934, and "Conclusions Regarding the Report of the Central Executive," January 27, 1934.

110. See, in particular, the text of June 25, 1930, Volume III, pp. 457–59.

terms, dating from the years 1931–1933, can also be found in the present volume. By the time of the Second Congress in January 1934, however, though Mao still evoked the possibility of ultimate victory, and even mentioned China's prominent place in the world revolution, he did so in much soberer terms. In his conclusions, he criticized both the view that the Fifth Encirclement had been "thoroughly smashed," and the opposite error of underestimating the Red Army's achievements. While declaring that "a solid foundation" for smashing the Guomindang offensive had been laid, he did not claim that victory would be easy. Whether Mao expressed himself in these terms primarily because his own advice had not been followed, or on the basis of his analysis of the facts, is a moot point.

The confident, optimistic mood that prevailed, at least on the surface, throughout most of the congress was abruptly shaken near the end by news that government forces freed up by the collapse of the Fujian régime had begun a new assault on the northern "door" to the Base Area. The congress came to a hurried conclusion and the several hundred delegates rapidly returned to their respective duties, fully aware of the magnitude of the struggle that still lay before them.

Thereafter both external and internal pressures on the Central Soviet Area and its leadership increased rapidly. Throughout February and March, as armies on other fronts advanced slowly or held their opposing forces in place, the government's main Xu valley offensive pushed steadily southward against stubborn Red Army resistance. By early April, Chiang's generals had assembled an overwhelming force behind the long lines of "tortoise shells" (as Red Army soldiers colloquially termed the enemy blockhouses) that now curved around the Red Army defenses guarding the approaches to the *xian* city of Guangchang.

Beyond Guangchang lay the base's "great rear area," on whose economic and human resources depended the effectiveness of the Red Army and, ultimately, the viability of the entire Central Soviet Area. Recognizing the importance of the location, Otto Braun and other military decision-makers chose this as the time and place to wage the campaign's decisive battle. On April 10, full-scale combat broke out north of Guangchang. Braun and Bo Gu had recently reestablished the Red Army frontline headquarters just outside the city, and they and Zhu De now moved there from Ruijin to direct operations. Nonetheless, government troops succeeded in taking the city after eighteen days of fierce combat, in which the Red Army lost nearly one-fifth of the total forces committed to the battle.<sup>111</sup>

This defeat made the loss of the heart of the base virtually inevitable. Though government armies took weeks to consolidate their victory, by early summer they were once again pressing south. At the same time, the concentration of Red Army units for the Guangchang battle weakened defenses elsewhere, so that

111. In Braun's memoirs, many passages of which seem aimed at refuting subsequent Chinese criticisms of him and his military acumen, he stresses that the decision to make a stand at Guangchang was made in meetings attended by all major Party and army leaders, including Mao. See Braun, *Comintern Agent*, pp. 67–70; Jin Chongji, *Zhu De zhuan*, pp. 321–22; and *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 495–98.

enemy armies on other fronts began to make more rapid progress as well.

The fall of Guangchang also intensified rancor within the base area leadership. Chinese accounts place primary blame on the arrogant stubbornness of Braun and Bo Gu, and provide anecdotes detailing how one leader after another—Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian—angrily but vainly castigated them for their inflexibility. For his part, Braun attributes the conflict to a combination of behind-the-scenes instigation by Mao and overeager accommodation to him by Bo Gu and other Party leaders.

Whatever basis these charges and countercharges may have had, the fact remained that the Red Army and the Base Area as a whole were caught in an increasingly untenable situation that even much more flexible policies and harmonious personal relations could at this point have done little to reverse. Following the Guangchang defeat, Party leaders intensively thought, talked, and wrote about the problems they faced in dealing with the enemy's blockhouse strategy, but could agree on no new defensive strategy that might work better than the obviously ineffectual tactics of "short, swift thrusts" that Braun had articulated some months earlier.<sup>112</sup>

By the time Guangchang fell, the combination of years of heavy fighting, conflict generated by Communist reforms and political campaigns, and the stringent economic blockade had already significantly disrupted the lives of base area inhabitants. As the size and resource base of the Central Soviet Area shrank, and Soviet Government extractions of grain, money, and Red Army recruits increased during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, the level of disgruntlement and fear further intensified. By 1934, what had been a relative trickle of refugees leaving the Base Area had swollen to a steady stream that now included not only formerly well-off families whom the revolution had impoverished and persecuted, but also an increasing number of ordinary peasants forced out by the property destruction and economic hardship accompanying the war.

An upsurge of "counterrevolutionary" activities also occurred as people sought to adjust their behavior to the growing cost and danger of association with what increasingly appeared to be a collapsing régime. Elite-led militias and sworn brotherhoods had never completely vanished from the base, and with the

112. "Short, swift thrusts" was a concept that sought to avoid costly assaults on blockhouses by waiting until enemy troops left the fortifications to move to new positions, at which time they could be fought in the open. In practice the idea did not work well: it proved difficult to time the attacks properly, the enemy advanced over such short distances that they could retreat easily to their previous blockhouses when attacked, and the enemy's massive aerial and artillery firepower often decimated the Red Army troops when they themselves got caught in the open.

Zhou Enlai also spent time thinking about military strategy during this period and wrote several articles on the subject in contemporary base area journals. Braun asserts that Mao was still vainly urging the employment of the "luring deep" strategy. See Braun, *Comintern Agent*, pp. 67–70, 265–69; Chi-hsi Hu, "Hua Fu, the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, and the Tsunyi Conference," *China Quarterly* 43 (July–Sept. 1970), pp. 31–46; and Lin Biao, "Short, Swift Thrusts," in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 627–35.

Red Army now preoccupied with defense against the encirclement, their depredations steadily increased. Desertion from and avoidance of service in the Red Army also became a serious problem, as did official corruption. Finally, people began in various ways to hedge their bets and cadres to see subversion around every corner, as the likelihood of a return of the Guomindang régime became greater.

It was in this context that during the spring and summer of 1934 efforts began to reradicalize the Land Investigation Movement and the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries. By early 1934, the Returned Students had become very unhappy at reports that large numbers of putative "landlords" and "rich peasants"—all of whom were considered likely to be counterrevolutionaries—were using the complex explanations and procedural safeguards contained in Mao's land investigation documents, such as "Decision on Certain Problems in the Agrarian Struggle," to have themselves and their families reclassified into safer categories such as middle peasant. Though the original classifications of many of these people had no doubt been dubious, this was not a popular point to raise at a time when the fate of the revolution seemed to hang in the balance.

One of the first tasks given to Zhang Wentian after he replaced Mao as head of the Council of People's Commissars was to reorient the Land Investigation Movement to eliminate such manipulation of the program. This so-called "second phase" of the Land Investigation Movement has frequently been seen as part of the ongoing factional struggle between Mao and the Returned Students. It is possible that this was the case, but as there is little available evidence of what Mao's views on the subject were at this time, and as Mao's divergence from the Returned Students on the original rationale and need for a Land Investigation Movement as a whole was less pronounced than is sometimes asserted, the issue must remain unresolved at present.<sup>113</sup>

During the spring and summer of 1934 Mao himself was once again apparently very much "out of the loop" politically, and during much of this period he was also physically isolated from the base area's main Ruijin-based institutions and leaders. Mao once again excused his extended absences as "recuperation from illness," and there was indeed a physiological component to this claim: in September, Dr. Nelson Fu treated him for acute malaria (a disease from which he had suffered in 1929), and during preceding months he was very probably still recovering from his tuberculosis as well.

Mao's illness was also political, however, and as had become a pattern under such circumstances, he reacted by isolating himself. As Braun recalled, during this period, Mao "refrained from further protest and withdrew almost completely from meetings." In late April, while the battle for the northern "door" at Guangchang was underway, he left Ruijin and went to Huichang *xian* at the opposite end of the base in southernmost Jiangxi, returning only when summoned to Ruijin to attend a Politburo meeting in late June. Then in

113. For discussion of the "second phase" of the Land Investigation Movement, see Wen Rui and Xie Jianshe, *Zhongyang suqu tudi geming yanjiu*, pp. 130–42.



July, aerial bombardment forced many base area facilities to leave the Ruijin suburb of Shazhouba, and in the ensuing move Party, army, and government offices went to different locations. As head of government, Mao moved with He Zizhen and a few bodyguards to a temple on a hill called Yunshishan in Gaowei Township, 19 kilometers from Ruijin City. There they lived in near-complete isolation from other top leaders until mid-September, when Mao went to visit Yudu *xian*. He remained in Yudu until he joined up with the Red Army expeditionary force as it passed through the *xian* on October 18 at the start of the Long March.<sup>114</sup>

Judging from available descriptions, Mao's lengthy excursions to Huichang and Yudu involved a mixture of investigation, troubleshooting, and proselytization. The town of Wenzhuba in Huichang and the *xian* town in Yudu were the administrative centers of Guangdong-Jiangxi Province and Southern Jiangxi Province, respectively, and Mao involved himself deeply in the work of both of these units. He attended and addressed meetings of cadres, dispensed advice on military tactics and other policy matters, investigated local conditions, and wrote reports to Zhou Enlai and others detailing his observations and recommendations.<sup>115</sup>

This flurry of activity reflected Mao's long-standing general interest in immersing himself in the details of local society and his more recent and specific interest in studying the work of local government administration in the Central Soviet Area. At the same time, it no doubt served as a way for Mao to preserve a feeling of being actively involved in base area work at a time when he was almost completely excluded from high-level decision-making circles.

Meanwhile, as prospects for a successful defense dwindled, top leaders had begun to consider at least temporarily leaving the Base Area.<sup>116</sup> In May 1934, such a proposal was approved at a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat. Mao was not in Ruijin at this time, did not participate in making the decision, and was not informed of it when he visited Ruijin in June. The Comintern was informed, however, and soon telegraphed its assent to the breakout.

Because the departure was to be a carefully planned strategic retreat rather than an emergency flight, it was necessary to continue stoutly defending the base while preparations were made. Because the enemy was now energetically advancing on several fronts, Braun decided to disperse the Red Army to block all

114. Braun's comment is in *Comintern Agent*, p. 76. Mao's itinerary during this period is based on information in *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 426–36, *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 500–46, and Jin, *Mao Zedong*, pp. 326–31. He Zizhen remained at Yunshishan when Mao went to Yudu, but rejoined him just before the start of the Long March.

115. *Nianpu* and other sources mention several items that Mao wrote during this period, but they are not publicly available.

116. This was not a new idea: abandoning the base had been proposed by some at the start of the Second Encirclement Campaign in 1931, plans for Red Army excursions connected to the Fujian Incident in 1933 would have had the same practical effect if they had been carried out, and Braun reportedly also included this among strategies he outlined in discussions in early 1934.

of these pressure points. Given the disparity in size between the Red Army and government forces, this policy of "dividing the troops into six routes" kept Red Army units on each front so weak that they had no choice but to employ positional defense, and the struggle turned into an exhausting summer-long war of attrition.<sup>117</sup>

As the fighting dragged on, in early summer Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, and Otto Braun were chosen as an informal "Group of Three" to manage the work of gathering provisions and money, configuring military units, and deciding who would remain behind after the main body left. Much of this work was disguised as normal administrative planning; news of the impending departure was kept a closely held secret, in order to frustrate spies, facilitate collection of grain and taxes, and avoid deepening the unrest that was now a serious problem within the shrinking base. Allegedly, not even the full Politburo was informed until the end of the summer.<sup>118</sup>

In early July, Chiang Kaishek's forces launched an all-out offensive at many points around the shrinking circumference of the base. To distract the enemy, gain more time to complete departure preparations, and explore escape routes and options, base area leaders ordered two relatively peripheral Red Army forces in the Central Soviet and the Hunan-Jiangxi base area to set out on expeditions that took them well away from their current operational areas. On July 7, the Seventh Army Group was designated as the "Go North to Resist Japan Vanguard" and left Ruijin to fight its way through Fujian to link up with surviving Red Army units in the remnants of the Fujian-Zhejiang-Anhui-Jiangxi Soviet Area.<sup>119</sup> About a month later the Sixth Army Group was also ordered to leave the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area to drive deep into southern Hunan.

Back in the Central Soviet, local cadres launched last-minute campaigns to collect grain and taxes, recruit thousands of new soldiers, and prepare the large quantities of clothing and other resources needed to sustain the main Red Army force after its departure. An important consideration in calculating the amount of supplies needed was the size and composition of the expeditionary force, which in turn depended to some extent upon the purpose and duration of the trip. If the breakout was a temporary move intended primarily to gain maneuvering room

117. Mao's later criticism of the Returned Student leadership was given additional force by vivid memories of the severe battering the Red Army received during this demoralizing positional defense of territory whose ultimate abandonment had already been decided.

118. Many sources agree that the departure decision was made at a May meeting, but none give a precise date. Mao was in Huichang in southern Jiangxi from late April until late June. Some sources say he learned of the plan to leave by late August; others say he learned in September. See *Zhou Enlai nianpu*, pp. 261–62; *Nianpu*, pp. 426–29; *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 547–48; *Braun, Comintern Agent*, pp. 72–78; and Gregor Benton, *Mountain Fires: The Red Army's Three-Year War in South China, 1934–1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 13–20.

119. In conjunction with this move, on July 15 Mao and other leaders issued a "Proclamation on the Northward March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Fight Japan" (see below). The Seventh Army Group joined the Red Army remnants in the four-province border area, but they were soon largely destroyed by government troops.

and operational flexibility, then the expedition could be a light, mobile force composed primarily of soldiers and their equipment. A permanent move, on the other hand, would necessitate a larger, more cumbersome force that included many noncombatants and large quantities of materiel.

According to Braun, argument on this issue took place among the few high-level leaders who knew of the impending move, with Braun himself favoring a relatively small force of soldiers coupled with efforts to maintain a residual base to which the expedition might return, and Zhou Enlai advocating a presumably permanent breakout by the largest possible force. Eventually Bo Gu mediated a compromise that was closer to Zhou's views than Braun's.

Even a large, "heavy" force, however, could not include all of the personnel then in the base. Primitive roads, the ongoing need to forage for provisions, and the certainty of enemy pursuit all limited the size of the expedition. In addition, some troops had to remain at the front to keep the enemy at bay while the expedition assembled and moved out. The ferocious recent fighting and the inevitable upsurge of disease during the sweltering summer had also packed base area hospitals with numerous sick and wounded who could not travel. Finally, it was desirable in any case to keep a core of cadres and guerrillas behind to maintain at least a modicum of revolutionary activity in the region.

Not surprisingly, determination of which cadres would go was a complicated and contentious matter. Because of efforts to keep preparations secret, the selection process was controlled by a tiny group of individuals, and many cadres did not learn of their assignments until just prior to the breakout. Though Party historians often assert that there was an anti-Mao bias in the choice of people to remain behind, both the overall situation and the selection criteria were considerably more complex than a simple factional interpretation would suggest.<sup>120</sup>

By early October departure preparations were well advanced, and government arrest of cadres in the Central Committee's remaining Shanghai branch office had also raised fears that word of the planned breakout might leak out. Therefore the decision was made to depart several weeks earlier than originally planned. In mid-October, designated units—most of whose soldiers were still ignorant of the breakout—and individuals assembled in Yudu *xian*. There, much to their surprise and delight, they were issued large quantities of food and other supplies, and gained the first clear inkling that a major new campaign was about to begin.

120. Responsibility for selection lay with the "Group of Three," aided by a few other high Party leaders. As for selection criteria, it should be noted that it was obviously useful to have experienced, locally knowledgeable cadres stay behind, and such people were much more numerous among those who had participated with Mao in years of rural base-building than they were in the ranks of the urban-oriented Returned Students. Moreover, it is easy to find examples (beginning with Mao himself) of people chosen to make the march who a factional analysis would suggest should have been left behind, and others (most notably Xiang Ying) chosen to stay when they should have been among those leaving. See *Mao in the Central Soviet*, p. 549, and Benton, *Mountain Fires*, pp. 20–25.

On October 10 the approximately 86,000-person expeditionary force began to leave the base.<sup>121</sup> Though they met little resistance at first, poor maps, the difficulty of coordinating such a large force, and the massive burden of supplies and equipment being carried by the support columns all hindered progress. By late November, enemy units caught up with the slow-moving expeditionary force near the crossings of the Xiang River in northwestern Guangxi Province. The Red Army advance guard easily crossed the river, but as they waited impatiently for the heavy-laden support columns, enemy air and ground attacks ravaged the main body and rearguard. The result was a devastating and demoralizing defeat. No precise casualty count has ever been determined, but it is generally accepted that half or fewer of the people who had left Jiangxi remained when the force moved away from the Xiang River. Equally traumatic was the huge loss of equipment and supplies that had occurred. The losses made the force considerably more mobile, but also rendered it less able to fulfill the implied goal of settling somewhere to create a new version of the now-vanished Central Soviet Area.

The magnitude of the losses also helped precipitate open intra-Party conflict, first at an informal "emergency meeting" of high cadres held on December 12 in the small southwestern Hunan town of Tongdao, and then at a more formal Politburo meeting convened on December 18 in Liping in Guizhou. At both meetings the main topic was the pressing question of what the expedition's route of march and destination should be, but the meetings also began to raise the question of who to blame for the collapse of the Central Soviet Area and the difficulties met during the breakout march.

Though the Group of Three had hoped that the expedition could join up with other Red Army units to build a base in northwestern Hunan, enemy troops now blocked access to this area. At the Tongdao and Liping conferences, Otto Braun and Bo Gu suggested that it was still possible to maintain the original plan, while Mao advocated driving on into lightly defended Guizhou and establishing a temporary new base there near the town of Zunyi. In the end the majority of conference participants (including Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and, significantly, Zhou Enlai) agreed with Mao, marking the first time in well over two years that his views had prevailed on a major issue involving military operations or strategy.

Such limited reinvolvement in decision-making, however, was not all Mao had in mind. The expedition had readily marched away from the Central Soviet Area, but the long, agonizing collapse of the base, exacerbated by the persistent

121. Left behind under the leadership of Chen Yi and Xiang Ying were around 15,000 or so able-bodied troops, along with another 10,000 or more ill and wounded soldiers. Most were soon captured, killed or abandoned the fight; the few survivors led harried, hunted lives roaming through the region's rugged mountains, exposed to the elements, short of food, and largely cut off from the cowed population. See Benton, *Mountain Fires*.

and painful intra-Party conflict that had accompanied it, could not so easily be put behind or out of mind. What had happened had to be explained and responsibility for it determined. These habitual Party rituals of analysis and assessment were given extra impetus by Mao's shrewd recognition of opportunity and strong sense of personal grievance. The convenient near-coincidence between Mao's removal from most decision-making and the decline in the Base Area's fortunes absolved him from responsibility and freed him to criticize those who had presided over the defeat, while the successive humiliations he had suffered gave him the motivation and emotional commitment to strive for a full measure of revenge.

At Liping Mao had secured agreement that when the expedition reached Zunyi a larger and more wide-ranging meeting would be held to "sum up" the experiences of the struggle against the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. It was plain that Mao would use this meeting to push for public ratification of the informal critique of his opponents and revival of his own power that was already under way. It was thus with mounting tension and anticipation that Mao and his associates passed the last days of the tumultuous year of 1934, marching slowly across the Guizhou countryside toward Zunyi and the pivotal confrontation that awaited them there.

## *Note on Sources and Conventions*

This edition of Mao Zedong's writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists, but those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups.

*Scope.* This is a complete edition, in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete, because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao's death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (*neibu*), of a number of important texts.

Although the *Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi* (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao's writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, *Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period), and *Jiandang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuzuo ji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong during the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924–1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989, led first to the postponement of publication, and then to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of *Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6–1920.11* (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912–November 1920).

Prior to June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao's birth. These are the *Mao Zedong wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921–1942, appeared in December 1993, and three more, covering the period 1942–September 1949 came out in August 1966; and a six-volume edition of

Mao's military writings, *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993.

*Sources.* Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao's writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials.

The twenty volumes of the *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s still constitute the most important single collection of Mao's pre-1949 writings available outside China. (For details on this, and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the *Selected Works* of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao's works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao's ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong on Rural Surveys), published in 1982, and *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong), which appeared in 1983.

As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals of the 1920s and 1930s, and individual texts published in China for restricted circulation. Particularly important, for the period covered by this volume, is the series *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* (Materials on Jiangxi Party History), published in Jiangxi Province, which contains the texts of many orders and letters signed by Mao that are not available elsewhere.

Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered footnote at the beginning of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.)

Other things being equal, we have commonly referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to the *Mao Zedong ji* and the *Bujuan* whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our

translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao's writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his *Selected Works*.

*Variants.* While there are some differences between the various versions of texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor. Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undertaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of the *Mao Zedong xuanji*, translated into English as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. This problem did not arise in our Volume I, because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the *Selected Works* is the "Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society," written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" of February 1927, and Volume III included four texts of this kind. The present volume also contains four such items: a report of August 12, 1933, on economic work; a directive of October 10, 1933, on how to analyze classes; and brief extracts from Mao's report and conclusions presented to the Second Soviet Congress in January 1934.

Much ink has been spent regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic, or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong's thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological orthodoxy under the People's Republic, the *Selected Works* version is, of course, the ultimate standard.

In any case, the purpose of this edition is not to lay down which was the "real" Mao, but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life, and the revised texts which were produced in the 1950s under Mao's close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this edition, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner:

1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question.
2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in the *Xuanji* are printed in italics.
3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao, or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. The *Mao Zedong ji* indicates meticulously *all* changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction *yu* by the more colloquial *he*, both meaning "and"). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared



to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgement is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out of account variants we regarded as trivial.

In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear *before* the arrow reproduce enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that appear *after* the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in the *Xuanji*. Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages have often been substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes.

Because the official translation of the *Selected Works* has been available for four decades, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting-point whenever it corresponds to the original Chinese text, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate. In those few instances where other materials in this book had already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions.

As indicated above in the Introduction, the laws adopted by the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931–1934 were not drafted by Mao and did not necessarily reflect his views. Nevertheless, because they bore his signature and thus constitute part of the record of his political career, we have thought it appropriate to include them in this volume. To save space, they have been relegated to an Appendix printed in smaller type. Other translations of this legislation exist, the most recent one being that edited by W.E. Butler, *The Legal System of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931–1934* (Dobbs Ferry NY: Transnational Publishers, 1983). This volume also contains a number of essays about the legal system of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and its relation to the law of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It includes, however, only twenty of the forty texts which appear in our Appendix, and most of the materials are translated from the Russian version edited by L. Gudoshnikov published in Moscow in 1977.

*Annotation.* So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao's argument in each case, we have assumed little knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes, and to save space in this very long volume we have omitted the biographies of figures such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai. We have also ruled out, with rare exceptions, annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel.

To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao's contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, a number of references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the volume.

In most biographical notes dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born in the 1870s and 1880s, this is obviously unlikely, but in many instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. Sometimes a Chinese source ends with the word "deceased" (*yigu*), without giving the date of death. Here we have inserted a question mark after the hyphen, and have mentioned the fact in the note. It should not be assumed that all those born in the 1890s or 1900s for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are in fact very much alive as of 1997.

As noted in Volume III, the geography of the areas in Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces where the forces of the Red Army were operating figures extensively in the texts of Mao's writings for the whole period from 1928 to 1934. Many of the orders translated here chronicle the progress of the Red Army from day to day, and even from hour to hour. To annotate all of the place names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer, and on the reader. We have therefore provided notes regarding geography, or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. In order to facilitate the understanding of the text, we have, however, included two maps, one of South-central China, and the other showing, on a larger scale, the principal localities in the base areas mentioned by Mao. These appear immediately after the present "Note on Sources and Conventions," and have been slightly revised, as compared with the versions in Volume III, to make them more readable.

The introductions, including that to the present volume, should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their *own* way through Mao's writings of the early period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate reflection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation.

*Use of Chinese terms.* On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions into accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, *zi* (courtesy name) and *hao* (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the *ming* or given name of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence of the text. The English word

"style" is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for *zi* or for *hao*, it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second or provincial-level, and third or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively *juren* and *jinshi*. We have also preferred *xian* to "county" for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy, and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of "county," there is the problem that *xian* is also often translated "district" (as in the expression "district magistrate"), and "district" itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word *li* rather than to translate "Chinese league" (or simply "league"), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers.

This volume once again contains two of the investigations of rural areas which Mao attached such importance, and other texts containing concrete descriptions of local areas. For obvious reasons, Mao employed in these texts many different units of measurement, which it has seemed on the whole preferable to leave untranslated, in order to avoid ambiguity. Each such unit is explained and defined at the point of its first occurrence. To make it easier to find the relevant footnotes, they have been included in the index, under the Chinese name of the unit in question.

Monetary units are, if possible, the source of even greater confusion than units of weight or volume. Generally speaking, the Chinese term for "dollar," *yuan*, has been left untranslated. It was, however, used in the 1920s and 1930s in two different senses: to designate 1 *yuan* silver coins, and the corresponding banknotes, and to refer to 10-cent or 20-cent silver coins totaling 1 *yuan*. This fractional currency did not enjoy its full face value, but was discounted by varying amounts depending on the time and place. To avoid ambiguity, whole-*yuan* coins or banknotes were commonly referred to as *da yang*, or "big foreign [dollars]," while the smaller coins and notes were called *xiao yang* or "small foreign [dollars]." As in Volumes II and III of this edition, we have translated *da yang* as "big foreign dollars." *Xiao yang*, in contexts where Mao explicitly discusses the relation between the two units, is translated "small foreign dollars." Where *yuan* appears without any further indications, it can be assumed that it almost certainly stands for fractional silver currency with a face value of one dollar. More information about monetary units is contained in the notes to the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations. (See also Appendix A to Roger Thompson's *Report from Xunwu*.)


*Presentation.* As already indicated, we have tried to turn Mao's Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasized words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to

each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in bold. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao's, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions, because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question, or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure, and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote.


Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao's own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao's original in form as well as in substance.

## *About the Maps*

As explained above, in the Note on Sources and Conventions, the two maps which appear here have been included in order to aid the reader in following Mao's often minutely detailed account of the geography of battles and of political events. The different symbols employed indicate the importance of the towns in question. On Map No. 1, the solid squares designate provincial capitals; the hollow squares represent other major centers. Since Map No. 2 does not include any provincial capitals, solid squares are used there for the biggest cities shown. On both maps, the larger round dots correspond to *xian* administrative centers. The small dots are used for lesser localities prominently mentioned in the materials included in this volume. Since the aim of the maps is to illustrate the text, rather than to achieve cartographic precision, the location of the various dots may not always be mathematically exact.



Map No. 1. South-central China



Map No. 2. Southern Jiangxi Base Areas

**Volume IV**  
**The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic**  
**1931-1934**

**MAO'S**  
**ROAD TO POWER**  
*Revolutionary Writings*  
*1912-1949*









# Order to Attack Tan Daoyuan<sup>1</sup>

## Order No. VI<sup>2</sup> of the First Front Army of the Red Army

(Headquarters at Nanlin, 10:00 P.M., January 1, [1931])

1. The main force of Tan Daoyuan's enemy division (the division consists of six regiments) is at Yuantou. In the area around Shangchao and Xiachao, its advance party (roughly two regiments) has reached Shupi; Rebel Xu Kexiang's<sup>3</sup> troops (two regiments) are still at Luokou, and Rebel Mao Bingwen's<sup>4</sup> vanguard (four regiments) reached Ningdu *xian* already on the 30th.<sup>5</sup>

2. The Front Army has decided to use its main force to wipe out this division.

3. The Second Route Army [of the Red Army] is responsible for the attack on the areas north of Guanling, Xialu, and Fengling.<sup>6</sup> Its main force will take a shortcut through Youzhapi and occupy the areas in the upland north of Liaofang, before advancing to launch a fierce attack against the enemy in the Yuantou and Shangchao areas. They are to arrive at the designated areas and begin the attack at exactly 12:00 noon tomorrow (the 2nd).

The Third Route Army is responsible for an attack on the areas west of Shupi, and for occupying the 400-meter upland area at the western edge of Butou (using the sketch map of the vicinity of Xiaobu surveyed and drawn by the Third Army the second time and by the Third Army Group the first time). It will also launch

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Our sources for this text are *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 17, pp. 120–21, and *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 196–97. The version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 347–48, contains a number of wrong or missing characters.

1. Tan Daoyuan commanded the Nationalist army's Fiftieth Division.

2. This and several of the following documents are designated literally as *shengzi* ("victory word") orders. For the sake of simplicity, we have used V to stand for victory.

3. Xu Kexiang commanded the Nationalist army's Twenty-fourth Division.

4. Mao Bingwen commanded the Nationalist army's Eighth Division. Xu and Mao are here called respectively "Xu *ni* Kexiang" and "Mao *ni* Bingwen," meaning "Rebel (or Traitor) Xu," etc. Such abuse was regularly employed by both sides in the civil war, and appears frequently in this volume.

5. It is unclear why the total of regiments listed (eight) is greater than the total number (six) listed for the entire division. The places mentioned in this document are mostly in southeastern Yongfeng and northern Ningdu *xian*.

6. The three place-names just listed, which appear in this form in the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* version, have been combined into two in the *Junshi wenji*. On the assumption that the editors in Jiangxi were probably more familiar with the local geography, we have followed them here.

an attack on the enemy at Shupi from the Yangshenwo line. They are to arrive at the designated areas and begin the attack at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow (the 2nd), luring the enemy's attention toward the main front at Shupi.

The Twelfth Army will carry out an attack on the areas west of Dayuanli. It should return to Dayuanli from its present location via Bayunting and Shangchayuan and then move forward to attack in the direction of Xiachao. (One section must attack along the western edge of Dayuanli and in the uplands of Yangshizhai. It is to arrive at the designated areas and begin the attack at 12:00 noon tomorrow.)

4. General Headquarters will advance tomorrow to Xishan to exercise command.

Points for attention:

a. This particular campaign is of crucial importance to the general situation; all officers and soldiers must not begrudge any sacrifice whatsoever to achieve the goal of final victory.

b. The Third Army will make special efforts in building fortifications to support the position at the front.

c. After victory is won, attention must be paid to collecting the enemy's flags and radios. Radios must not be destroyed; the entire device must be collected, and radio maintenance personnel and operators must be gathered together. It must be forbidden to distribute monies taken from enemy soldiers' management offices, and to burn paper money—all of it must be handed over to General Headquarters.

d. At the conclusion of the campaign, each army is responsible for taking care of its respective captives and wounded soldiers.

e. Each army is responsible for handling its own small baggage and medical teams.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

# ***Order to Pursue and Attack the Enemy Division of Tan Daoyuan***

*Order No. V2 of the First Front Army of the Red Army*

(Xiaobu, 10:00 P.M., January 2, 1931)

1. The enemy division under Tan, hearing of the crushing defeat of Zhang's division,<sup>1</sup> began to flee early this morning at 5:00. One section of the division retreated in defeat toward Nanbeikeng via Yuantou and Zhongcun.<sup>2</sup> Its rear guard was intercepted by our Second Route Army, and we captured large numbers of its guns. Another section of the division (its main force) fled toward Dongshao via Nantuan. As we look at this situation, the enemy forces seem to be in retreat all along the line. (The case is the same with other enemy forces.)

2. The Front Army has decided to pursue and attack the enemy troops in Dongshao early tomorrow morning, and then to wipe out in succession Xu [Kexiang]'s division (two regiments) and Mao [Bingwen]'s division (two brigades) of the forces of Rebel Zhu Shaojiang,<sup>3</sup> so as to establish political prestige.

3. The Twelfth Army is responsible for launching a frontal attack. It is to arrive near Dongshao Market via Nantuan and Linchi before 10:00 tomorrow morning, and advance to attack the enemy troops in Dongshao. It should occupy positions north of Linchi and south of Shawcizui. The Third Army Group is responsible for the left flank; it must arrive near Pitou before 10:00 tomorrow morning and advance to attack the enemy troops in Dongshao.

The Third Army is responsible for the right flank. It should advance as far as Tianying by 10:00 tomorrow morning, and use its main force to pin down the enemy's reinforcements from Luokou (Xu's division). In addition, part of its forces should carry out a flanking movement to the upland east of Dongshao Market and north of Shanxiaping, and attack the enemy in Dongshao.

The Fourth Army serves as a general reserve force and is to be deployed in Longtan west of Dongshao. (The Fourth Army should depart tomorrow morning at 12:00 and then follow behind the Twelfth Army.)

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 198–200.

1. Tan and Zhang are respectively Tan Daoyuan and Zhang Huizhan. Regarding the defeat of the latter's Eighteenth Division, see Volume III, pp. 731–32.

2. These and other places mentioned in the text are in southeastern Yongfeng and northern Ningdu *xian*.

3. Zhu Shaojiang commanded the Nationalists' Sixth Route Army.

The Political Guards Regiment will remain stationed in Matian and should send out separate guerrilla detachments tomorrow morning to Luokou, Dongshanba, and Pingtian to wage guerrilla warfare.

4. The small baggage of the Third Army Group is to be carried behind the Third Army. The small baggage of the Third Army is also to be carried behind the Third Army. The small baggage of the Fourth and Twelfth armies (under the direction of a small baggage officer to be appointed by the Twelfth Army) is to be carried behind the Fourth Army. (Baggage may not be carried among the regular troops.)

5. General Headquarters, along with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, will follow the Fourth Army to the location of the general reserve force in Longtan to exercise command.

Supplementary notes:

a. The route for the Third Army Group's baggage carriers is from Yuantou to Pitou via Zengfang, Shiaoia, Dongmaoao, Zhangjiaqian, Yangtan, Luyuan, Fengshanxia, Xintan, Baishui, and Chenjia.

The route for the Twelfth Army's baggage carriers is from Xiachao to Dongshao via Nantuan, Jiaobian, Aobei, Wangjiakeng, and Longtan.

b. Each army's bandage unit [*bengdai suo*]<sup>4</sup> may choose its own location. The hospital is located in Yangcheng. All divisions will hire people for delivery work.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

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4. This was probably the equivalent of an aid station in Western armies.

# ***Order to Carry Out Decentralized Fund-raising Activities After Smashing the First “Encirclement and Suppression”***

*Order No. V4*

(Headquarters at Xiaobu, 8:00 A.M., January 16, 1931)

1. Both Mao [Bingwen]'s division and Xu [Kexiang]'s division of the enemy's Sixth Route Army have retreated to the vicinity of Nanfeng City. The remnants of both Tan Daoyuan's division and Lu Xiaochen's division,<sup>1</sup> which had been stationed in Fuzhou, are preparing to move within the next few days (probably toward Le'an). Both Cai's division and Dai's division<sup>2</sup> of the Nineteenth Route Army have moved to take up positions along the line of Xingguo, Yinfu, and Jiangkou. The Gong division of the Ninth Route Army<sup>3</sup> has retreated to the Ji'an-Taihe line.<sup>4</sup> Luo Lin's division<sup>5</sup> is now moving toward Yongfeng, and Zhu Yaohua's brigade has retreated to Jishui.<sup>6</sup> All the aforementioned enemy troops seem now to be forming a bow-shaped line of defense against us along the line of Nanfeng, Le'an, Yongfeng, Jishui, Taihe, and Xingguo.

Most of the forces of Hu Zuyu's brigade have remained in Yiyang without moving. Zhao's regiment is moving toward Fuzhou via the Jiujiang-Nanchang railroad. Han's division and Sun's brigade are in Xiajiang, and Liu's brigade is in the area around the Jiujiang-Nanchang railroad and Gaogan.<sup>7</sup>

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 201–03.

1. Lu Xiaochen commanded the Nationalist army's New Thirteenth Division.

2. The references are to Cai Tingkai's Sixtieth and Dai Ji's Sixty-first divisions.

3. The reference is to the Twenty-eighth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army, commanded by Gong Bingfan.

4. The preceding sentence is missing from the version of this order in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 209–10.

5. The Nationalist army's Seventy-seventh Division.

6. This brigade is not listed in Communist-compiled Nationalist army orders of battle for troops directly participating in the First Encirclement Campaign, nor does it appear in the official Nationalist account of these campaigns, *Jiaofei zhanshi* (History of the Bandit-Suppression Wars) (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 1967), Vol. 1 (hereafter *Bandit Suppression*).

7. This and the following paragraph refer to a variety of Nationalist units operating well away from the area of active combat in the encirclement campaign; none were directly involved.



One brigade of Wang Jinyu's forces already arrived at Pingxiang on the 11th. Several brigades of Rebel Liu Hedong arrived at Jiangle and Taining on the 10th, and one brigade followed and arrived at Shunchang on the 11th. The troops of Rebel Zhang Zimin have arrived at Jianning.

2. The First Front Army has decided to continue actively to raise money within the next few days and to build up an adequate supply of provisions, so as to be ready to wipe out the enemy's forces according to the original plan.

3. Except for one division assigned to stay in Dongshao to help the local people in their work, most forces of the Third Army Group should immediately press on toward the enemy troops in the town of Nanfeng in order to screen the fund-raising activities of our Fourth and Twelfth armies. If the enemy troops retreat, we should send troops into Nanfeng so as to expand our fund-raising areas. Liaison must be established with our Fourth Army troops in the areas around Guangchang and Huangpi.<sup>8</sup> By the 31st of this month, 30,000 *yuan* in big foreign dollars<sup>9</sup> should be raised.

4. The Fourth and Twelfth armies should carry out as many separate fund-raising activities as possible in the original areas. They should raise 100,000 *yuan* (40,000 in addition to the originally assigned target of 60,000) by the 31st. Communication should be established during the period of fund-raising.

5. The troops of the Third Army originally sent to Liangcun should remain in Liangcun to work, and all matters should be reported promptly to Headquarters.

The Third Army should send the Eighth Division to the area around Shima to work in Nankeng, Beikeng, Zhongcun, and Tengtian (and to establish communication with the independent battalion in Le'an). It should subsequently advance toward Le'an and Yongfeng (carefully investigating the enemy's situation in Le'an and Yongfeng). The Eighth Division should raise 10,000 *yuan* by the 31st, and should promptly report all matters to Headquarters. The rest of the Third Army troops should remain where they are and intensify training.

6. The Thirty-fifth Division should make efforts to cooperate with the masses in harassing and intimidating the enemy in Xingguo.

7. The Red Guards in all areas should make every effort to launch attacks on the White areas so as to create a situation of overall advance.

8. Along with the Revolutionary Military Commission, General Headquarters remains in Xiaobu.

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8. The *Junshi wenji* version of this text says "Pitou" instead of "Huangpi," but the latter is more plausible in geographical context.

9. The Chinese term is *dayang*, literally "big foreign-style currency." It was used to refer either to actual silver dollars, or to one-*yuan* notes. Both of these were more valuable than coins or paper money in smaller denominations nominally for the same amount. For a more detailed discussion see above, the paragraph on monetary units in the "Note on Sources and Conventions."

Supplementary notes:

- a. After any army unit has moved, a detailed report must be made to Headquarters as to the time of the move and the location reached.
- b. Each unit must make at least one report per day to Headquarters.
- c. During the fund-raising period, raising funds is the primary goal, but some attention must still be devoted to internal training.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

***The Tasks of the  
General Political Department, and the  
Relation Between Political Departments and  
Commissars in the Red Army***

*Order No. 6 of the Revolutionary Military Commission*

(February 17, 1931)

At present, the central task of the revolution is to launch a revolutionary war and stop the warfare among the warlords. To carry out such a task, it is absolutely necessary to create a Red Army of iron and to win over the broad masses of the people. Consequently, it has become an urgent task for us to strengthen political education in the Red Army and make sure that commanders and soldiers alike clearly recognize their tasks and resolutely carry them out, and at the same time to intensify our propaganda and organizational work among the masses and mobilize the masses within the war zone to rise up in struggle. These tasks are to be carried out by the commissars and political departments of the Red Army. To coordinate these various tasks of the Red Army units in different places requires the establishment of a General Political Department. Now that the Red Army has expanded rapidly all over the country, there is an urgent need to centralize and strengthen political guidance for all its units. It is to meet this need that a General Political Department has been established within this commission, with Mao Zedong as its director. Because of practical necessity, the General Political Department of this commission will, for the time being, serve concurrently as the General Political Department of the First Front Army.

The General Political Department commands all political departments in the Red Army and guides the political work of all political commissars. Orders from the General Political Department must absolutely be obeyed by subordinate political departments. Similarly, as regards political work, commissars must accept and submit to [the guidance of the General Political Department]. All political departments in the Red Army are to make frequent reports to the General Political Department through the next higher level. Political commissars, apart from

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 253–54, where it is reproduced from the collection *Chifei wenxian huibian* (A Collection of Red Bandit Documents), published by the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission in 1934.

reporting to the political committee at the next higher level, should at the same time send reports on political work to the political department at the next higher level. Within the Red Army, in organizational terms, political departments and political commissars each have separate organizational systems, but in terms of the actual work, the subordinate political department follows the direction of the superior political department and at the same time follows the guidance of the political commissar of the same rank; the lower level political commissar follows the direction of the higher level commissar and, at the same time, submits to the direction of the higher level political department with respect to political work.

It is expected that this order will be thoroughly carried out as soon as it is received.

Chairman	Xiang Ying
Vice-Chairmen	Zhu De Mao Zedong

***Order No. V6 of the  
First Front Army of the Red Army  
to Continue to Move Eastward and Intensify  
Efforts at Fund-raising***

(Xiaobu, February 21, 1931)

1. According to recent newspaper accounts, since He Yingqin's arrival in Jiangxi, his troops have not yet moved, and the so-called conference for "suppressing bandits" will not be held until Sun Lianzhong arrives in Jiangxi.<sup>1</sup> At present Jiang [Guangnai]'s division and Cai [Tingkai]'s division remain near Xingguo. According to a secret report, the headquarters of Dai Ji's division is in Tiancun (a small passageway leading from Xingguo into Jiangxi, about 60 *li* from Xingguo), and Qu Shounian's brigade has moved into the area near the town of Kuidu.<sup>2</sup>

Gong [Bingfan]'s division and Luo [Lin]'s division remain near the town of Ji'an, and the First Brigade is in Shuidong.

Mao [Bingwen]'s division and Xu [Kexiang]'s division remain near Nanfeng, Hu Zuyu<sup>3</sup> is in Yihuang, and Lu Xiaochen is in Chongren, with one of his battalions in Le'an. Tan Daoyuan's division has retreated to Zhangshu; most of Han Deqin's troops are in Nanchang; Hao Mengling's division is in Xiushui and Wuning; Guo Huazong's division is in Wanzai.<sup>4</sup>

One section of Xu Tingyao's forces is in the vicinity of Yiyang and Shangrao, and Ruan Zhaochang remains in Leping.<sup>5</sup>

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 213–15, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1981.

1. He Yingqin was a close associate of Chiang Kaishek, who had sent He to Jiangxi in February 1931 to take over anti-Communist military operations following defeat in the First Encirclement Campaign. Sun Lianzhong commanded the Nationalist Twenty-sixth Army.

2. Dai Ji (1895–1973), a native of Anhui, was at this time commander of the Sixty-first Division of the Nineteenth Route Army. Qu Shounian (1902–1957), a native of Guangdong, had been commander of the 120th Brigade of the Guomindang Sixtieth Division since 1929. Later in 1931 he became commander of the Seventy-eighth Division of the Nineteenth Route Army.

3. Hu Zuyu commanded the Nationalist army's Fifth Division.

4. Han Deqin, Hao Mengling, and Guo Huazong commanded the Nationalist army's Fifty-second, Fifty-fourth, and Forty-third divisions, respectively.

5. Ruan Zhaochang commanded the Nationalist army's Fifty-fifth Division.

2. Judging from present circumstances, it looks as if the enemy troops of Zhou Zhiqun<sup>6</sup> in Ninghua and their outpost in Yikou are waiting for Sun Lianzhong's troops to arrive before they can slowly move against us. In order, on the one hand, to lure the enemy to advance rashly and strive to consolidate a supply of two months' provisions, and, on the other hand, to turn the tide by seizing this opportunity to wipe out the invading enemy troops quickly, we have decided to move our main forces eastward for a period of fifteen days, starting tomorrow (the 22nd).

3. The Third Army Group should begin to move tomorrow (the 22nd), with one division occupying Huangpi and pushing forward into Yihuang while raising money at the same time, and one division moving near Baishe, north of Ganzhu Market, to keep a close watch over Nanfeng and to shield the fund-raising efforts. In addition, the existing power lines between Baishe and Toupi should be used to communicate with the Fourth Army troops in Toupi. The rest of the troops are to be located in the vicinity of Luokou and Kuzhu,<sup>7</sup> with Luokou as the command center. Work there should continue until March 6, and at least 20,000 *yuan* is to be raised.

The Fourth Army, with its command center in Guangchang, should send one division to the vicinity of Kangdu Market, on the Fujian border, making fund-raising efforts in the zone along the highway,<sup>8</sup> for 30 *li* on either side of the road (within a 120-*li* radius of Guangchang). Another division should be sent via the highway to Shuinan Market,<sup>9</sup> and by boat across the narrows toward Jianning, selecting an appropriate place within a 120-*li* radius of Guangchang as its command center, and raising funds within 30 *li* on either side of the road. The rest may be stationed in the vicinity of Guangchang and Toupi. The move must be made on the 24th, the work must be carried out until March 6, and at least 120,000 *yuan* must be raised.

Keeping the town of Ningdu as its command center, the Twelfth Army should station the Thirty-fourth Division at the *xian* town of Shicheng and the Sixty-fourth Division at Gucun, working toward Dayouping, [X]pi, Pingshan, and Huangcun. The move is to be made on the 24th, the work is to be continued until

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6. Zhou Zhiqun commanded the Nationalist army's Fourteenth Independent Brigade.

7. This and other texts of 1931 consistently refer to Kuzhu ("bitter bamboo"), though there is also a locality called Guzhu ("ancient bamboo") near Luokou.

8. Taking *dadao* ("great road") to mean simply one of the few passable roads in this area of Jiangxi at the time. Kangdu was a small market town located not far from a pass across the Wuyi Mountains separating Jiangxi and Fujian. Though not located near any main road marked on current maps, the frequent comings and goings of Red Army troops through this region suggest that there was some sort of significant local transport route running through Kangdu during this period.

9. A road now leads from Guangchang to Shuinan, on the Jiangxi-Fujian border, and then continues across the mountains into Fujian, toward Jianning. During the 1930s, the main road may have stopped at Shuinan.

March 6, and 20,000 *yuan* is to be raised. In addition, the work teams in Shicheng are to send people to keep a close watch on Ninghua.

The Third Army (minus the Seventh and Eighth divisions) is to move toward Dajinzhu on the 23rd, join with the Eighth Division in Zhaoxie on the 24th, and attack Le'an, seizing the opportunity to wipe out the enemy in Le'an and take the town of Le'an. After this task is accomplished, one section should work toward Niutian and raise money. At least 40,000 *yuan* must be raised by March 6.

4. The West Route Army (the Seventh Division and the Thirty-fifth Division) should continue to work on its original task and cooperate with the Red Guard Army in wiping out the reactionary landlord armed forces in the vicinity and striking blows against the enemy's policy of maintaining guards to keep watch.

5. The Red Guards Regiment is to begin its move on the 23rd, station itself at Shima, wage guerrilla warfare toward Xingtian,<sup>10</sup> assist in the work of that area, and make efforts to wipe out the landlord armed forces in the vicinity.

6. After this period of work is over in each section, all forces should assemble in their original location and await further orders.

7. On arrival at its assigned destination, each section should immediately prepare a seven-day work schedule and send a detailed report. The work of fund-raising is the first priority, followed by wiping out the reactionary armed forces, organizing Red guerrilla forces, distributing grain, and making propaganda.

8. Along with the Revolutionary Military Commission, General Headquarters will move to Huangpi on the 22nd.

#### Supplementary notes:

1. When each section assembles, enough salt for one month and enough rice for seven days should be carried for future use.

2. The power lines between Xiaobu and Dongshao should be removed immediately, and another line between Huangpi and Luokou should be installed. The Liaison Team of the General Corps is responsible for installing the line from Huangpi to Matian, and the Liaison Team of the Third Army Group is responsible for installing the line from Luokou to Matian. The existing telegraph cables should be used to set up the line going from Fourth Army Headquarters in Toupai to Baishe Market (the First Division of the Third Army Group).

3. Upon arrival at its destination, each work unit should conduct a survey of routes in the vicinity (roads, houses, transportation, rivers, bridges, etc.) and draw route maps, copies of which should be sent to this headquarters.

4. During this period of work, if there is an advance by a certain enemy unit, the troops facing that enemy unit should offer steady resistance to hamper its

10. This is probably a misprint for Tengtian, a major town northwest of Shima in Yongfeng *xian*.

advance and to shield the concentration of our main forces, and must immediately notify the neighboring forces.

5. The troops going to Shicheng should be sure to buy as much Western medicine as possible (especially iodine tincture and tablets, alcohol, gauze, etc.) and telephone lines as well. The troops going to Le'an should pay attention to collecting enemy documents and classified books and maps, cipher codes, and so on.



***Letter from the General Political Department  
of the Central Revolutionary Military  
Commission to the Soviet Government of  
Jiangxi Province***

***The System of Private Ownership of Land  
During the Democratic Revolution***

(February 27, 1931)<sup>1</sup>

To Comrade Zeng Shan, with the request that he pass it on to other comrades in the soviet:

Spring has arrived, but very few peasants have begun to plow the fields. This matter merits our attention. Why have very few peasants begun plowing? To some extent, of course, the reason lies in force of habit, for the plowing season has always been put off. According to our investigations, there are, however, several other reasons: (1) the fact that land distribution has not been finally settled, (2) the shortage of draft animals, and (3) the threat from pacification

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 18, pp. 43–45. It also appears in *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 256–58, with a different title, and without the indication that it was originally a letter to Zeng Shan (a supporter of Mao then serving as chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet). We have followed the first version as regards the presentation of the text, but have corrected it on the basis of the *Mao Zedong wenji* in one place where a phrase is missing. A Chinese study of Mao's activities during the Jiangxi Soviet period states that Mao wrote this document after visiting and talking with a peasant family in the Huangpi area in the course of seeking information on how best to carry out the policies outlined in the Central Bureau's February 8, 1931, document entitled, "The Land Problem and the Anti-Rich Peasant Strategy" (Yu Boliu and Chen Gang, *Mao Zedong zai zhongyang suqu* [Mao Zedong in the Central Soviet Area] [n.p.: Zhongguo shidian, 1993], pp. 243–44 [hereafter, *Mao in the Central Soviet*]).

1. The version of this text in the *Mao Zedong wenji* is dated February 28, 1931, but in the *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 334, an equally authoritative source, it is stated that Mao wrote the letter on the 27th, which is also the date given in the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*.

bandits<sup>2</sup> on the borders between Red and White areas, which makes it difficult to plow the fields.

As for land distribution's not having been finally settled, this is a big problem in the Red area at present. In the past the land belonged to the soviet and there was a strong sense that the peasants had only the right to use it. In addition, the land was divided up over and over again, four or five times, thus making the peasants feel that the land was not their own and that they had no right to do as they wished with it. Consequently, they did not settle down to plowing the fields. This situation is very bad. The provincial soviets should notify governments everywhere at every level that each government should issue announcements urging the peasants to plow and plant. The announcements should make clear that the land already distributed in the past (applying the policies of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce [*chouduo bushao*] and drawing on the fat to make up for the lean [*choufei bushou*]<sup>3</sup>) is to count as settled, and those who have received land are in charge of the land distributed to them. This land is their private property, and others have no right to encroach on it. In the future a family's land is that family's fixed property, with no additions upon births or confiscation upon deaths. The family is at liberty to rent, lend, mortgage, or sell it at will. After paying land taxes to the government, everything produced from the land belongs to the peasants. What they do not consume they are completely free to sell. Money thus obtained may be used for daily expenses, and what they do not spend they can save, to invest either in improving the land or in doing business. The government may not find excuses to impose fines, and organizations of the popular masses may not levy enforced contributions. It is an utterly false rumor that the peasants' savings and surplus grain all go to the soviet for public use. If a peasant family is short on labor power and is unable to cultivate all of their land, or has no labor power at all and is unable to till their own land, they are permitted to rent it out. After renting, the amount [of harvest shared] is negotiated in each locality, according to the principle that neither party should lose out. In addition, people are free to do business in the Red areas, and all such earnings belong to the individual. All of the aforementioned regulations are appropriate to the process of democratic revolution.<sup>4</sup> Communism cannot be built in a day. The revolution in the Soviet Union, too, went through many stages before it reached its present socialist victory. It is to be hoped that all responsible comrades at the various levels of

2. The reference is to local military forces in the service of the landlords. Mao here refers to them as *jing fei*, literally "pacification bandits," just as the Guomindang called the Red forces *gong fei* or "Communist bandits."

3. These policies, which are characteristic of Mao's approach to land reform in the 1930s, were first adopted in the Land Law of August 1930, translated in Volume III of this edition. See there especially p. 504 and n. 3.

4. *Minquan geming*.

soviets and organizations of the popular masses have understood this. During the implementation of the aforementioned methods,<sup>5</sup> the AB Corps<sup>6</sup> and other reactionary groups may use every chance to spread rumors, saying that communism has failed and that the landlord system will be restored. Responsible comrades at all levels of government should refute this, basing themselves on the idea of democratic revolution. They should explain that the only good way truly to advance toward communism is to carry out the policies required by the present period of democratic revolution, that the landlord system is absolutely not being restored, and that what those reactionary groups are saying is completely false.

As for the shortage of draft animals, first of all, we should promote mutual aid in plowing and planting; those who have more oxen in the nearby villages should help those who have fewer oxen with their plowing. But this assistance is not totally free. Apart from cases where those who have more oxen volunteer to plow without charging any rent, we should allow the renting of oxen. Only by officially permitting the renting of oxen can we solve the problem of the shortage of draft animals. Second, in those townships and districts where there is such a great shortage of oxen that it is simply impossible to start plowing, the governments at the *xian*, district, and township levels should find a way to effect redistribution by encouraging those districts and townships with many oxen to lend or sell them. Here the governments at the *xian* and district levels should undertake a survey of the number of oxen in their *xian* or district, for only after they have done this can they carry out a proper redistribution. Third, it is forbidden to kill oxen. At the moment, there is a shortage of oxen on the one hand, and on the other hand oxen are being killed at every fair. This goes against the interests of the poor peasants, and must be forbidden. Fourth, the circulation and exchange of ordinary agricultural and industrial commodities between the Red region and the White region should be completely free. Except in special circumstances (such as a famine) there should be no prohibition [of such circulation], and no restrictions on prices (no restrictions on prices of any kind should be allowed within the Red area itself). At present, however, because there is such a big shortage of draft animals in the Red region, and its impact is very great, traffic of oxen from the Red region to places outside should be temporarily forbidden.

As far as the problem of living along the border between the Red and the White regions, the peasants suffer the threats of the local pacification bandits to such an extent that they are afraid to plow the land, and much land is even left uncultivated. The only way to solve this problem is to lead the armed forces of the workers and peasants to launch a fierce attack on the armed forces of the landlords, so that the Red region will continue to expand, and it will be possible

5. This phrase is missing in the text as printed in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*.

6. For discussion of the AB Corps, see the Introduction.

to plow and plant those places where cultivation was impossible in the past.

We hope that you will discuss and carry out the suggestions put forward above, and that you will write back to us.

Head of the General Political Department  
of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission      Mao Zedong

# ***On Making the News Bulletin on Current Affairs Widely Available<sup>1</sup>***

(March 12–14, 1931)

## **1. Circular Order of the General Political Department**

The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is an important tool for boosting the fighting spirit and breaking down the conservative viewpoint of the masses in the soviet areas, and can play an even greater role in pushing forward the mass struggle in the newly won areas. Therefore, our Headquarters has decided to ask the Red Army and local governments to become universally involved in its publication. In order to address this need, a pamphlet regarding the significance of the publication of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* and its content and method of compilation has been composed and is attached below, to be distributed to each area. After receiving this circular order and pamphlet, the political departments at various levels of the Red Army and the cultural departments of the local soviets at various levels should immediately make plans to get started on the *News Bulletin*. The *Red Army Newspaper* (*Hongjun bao*) published by our Headquarters can provide some of the materials for the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, and from now on, in addition to distributing copies to the Red Army, 220 copies of each issue (once every three days) will be sent to the Cultural Department of the [Jiangxi] Provincial Soviet, which will in turn distribute them to the *xian* and district soviets. There should be approximately one copy per district soviet, and if a *xian* or district soviet fails to receive one, it is important that the Provincial Soviet be notified in writing.

(March 14)

## **2. How to Run the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs***

a. The Red areas run the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* to boost the fighting spirit and break down the conservative viewpoint of the masses.

There are no newspapers to read in the countryside, in small towns, and in small cities. As far as the struggling masses are concerned, with regard to lack of

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* (Selected Writings of Mao Zedong on Journalism) (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1983), pp. 26–33, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

1. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* (*Shishi jianbao*) was published by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission's General Political Department, which Mao then headed.

information and a narrow scope of knowledge, there is not much difference between the situation before and after the revolution. The masses remain like the frog jumping around in its own well. Comrades, this kind of situation is no good. This sort of situation leads the masses to dampen their enthusiasm for struggle, and leads the masses in the direction of conservatism. This is in conflict with the task of expanding the scope of struggle and winning a nationwide victory. It is the responsibility of the soviets and the mass organizations to strive to eliminate this situation. Representatives' conferences, mass rallies, lecture tours, group visits, and so on, are certainly good methods to eliminate it—all the more so is the publication of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*.

b. The newly gained areas use the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* to promote mass struggle.

In areas that have been newly won over, the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* has an even greater role to play. When the Red Army takes over a new area, the masses are led to rise up in struggle—toppling local bullies, distributing land, distributing grain, abolishing debts, organizing guerrilla forces, establishing soviets. When the masses of people in these areas rise up and engage in these struggles, they are fighting all right, but at the same time they often harbor a kind of doubt: Are we not isolated? May we not fail in our struggle? It is precisely when the revolutionary masses have such doubts that the hidden reactionary elements begin to spread rumors for the purpose of intimidation. What the revolutionary masses long for at such times is aid from the revolutionary Red Army, whether nearby or far away. Just at this moment, the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* comes out to answer such questions of theirs. I remember in March of last year (1930), when the Red Army took over Dayu, an issue of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* came out and was posted on the pavilion of a big wooden bridge, attracting crowds of people who came in a steady stream to read it. Many people followed the text with their eyes while reading aloud under their breath, and the whole bridge was filled with a celebratory air. Dayu is one example. In the past there have been several other examples of the Red Army's achieving great results using this method as a tool to mobilize the masses. Unfortunately, however, it has not been done widely, and certainly not frequently, and this is a serious shortcoming.

### 3. Contents of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* and Methods of Compilation

a. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is not printed but handwritten, not in small characters but in large characters, not in a small format but in a large format.

b. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* does not carry articles, only news. The news it carries includes (i) news about mass struggle (struggle against local tyrants, distribution of land, capturing elements of the AB Corps, organization of poor peasant unions, wiping out landlords' armed forces, developing Red areas, news about ten cows in village A dying of rinderpest, or about there

being no salt and no vegetables in village B, etc.); (ii) activities of the soviets (a representatives' meeting convened, an important notice posted, etc.); (iii) activities of the Red Army (a victory won in battle, helping the masses distribute land, etc. But military secrets such as the numbers of personnel and guns, organizational structure, military actions, and military unit designations of the Red Army may not be carried, to prevent the leaking of secrets); (iv) the situation of the ruling class (fighting among the warlords, etc.)

c. On the other hand, not all discussion is to be omitted. One or two sentences of comment can be stuck into a news item to help the readers understand the significance of the matter. But there should not be too much of this; three sentences of commentary attached to one news item seems excessive. The commentary should have force to it; wishy-washy commentary is better left out. Not every news item should have commentary. Much of the news has obvious significance and can be readily understood, so that adding comments would be gilding the lily.<sup>2</sup> Only in news items in which the significance is not obvious should a sentence or two of commentary be added.

d. It is most interesting to read news that is arranged in an order going from the near to the far: news from the local town, local district, local *xian*, local province, the nation, and outside the country.

e. Local editions of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* should be entirely in the local dialect. In cases where the news is copied from other newspapers, items in which other than common terminology is used should be completely rewritten. The Red Army's *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, even where it is not possible to use the local dialect, should use extremely simple and clear standard Chinese.<sup>3</sup>

f. Materials for the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* having to do with local and nearby affairs are easy to obtain; those having to do with more remote areas and national and international matters are to be gathered from the *Red Army Newspaper*, published by the General Political Department, or from other newspapers.

g. All texts and materials should have the character of agitation [*gudong-xing*].<sup>4</sup>

h. However, out-and-out lying is strictly forbidden, as in reporting that the Red Army has captured ten thousand rifles when only one thousand were captured, or that there are only one thousand White army soldiers when there are actually ten thousand. This kind of reporting, which is too far from the facts, has

2. The Chinese expression Mao uses is "painting legs on the snake."

3. *Putonghua*.

4. Mao here employs Lenin's distinction between "propaganda," a relatively complex form of political argument, which includes an analysis of the reasons for the sufferings of those addressed, and "agitation," consisting of strong and simple appeals to the emotions. Since this newspaper is designed for readers of a low educational level, it falls into the second category. The term "agitation" occurs repeatedly throughout this volume.

a harmful effect. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* will not make its living by telling lies.

i. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is to come out every three days, ten times a month. Where the struggle is particularly intense, it may come out daily.

j. Editorial Methods. The culture department of the local *xian* soviet will assign someone specially to compile one issue every three days. The news included will be about the local *xian*, neighboring *xian*, the nation, and the world, but not every issue need contain all these types of news. Some issues may have more news about the local *xian*, some issues more about neighboring *xian*. Crucial are these two sections of news, about the local *xian* and the neighboring *xian*, because they are most popular among the masses. One or two items of provincial and national news per issue is enough, as is one or two items of international news every few issues. This kind of news item cannot be altogether absent, or else it would be impossible to lead the masses to participate in the broader struggle. So it should definitely be included, but there must not be too much of it. If there is too much of it, first of all it takes up too much space and cuts into the space for important news about the local and neighboring areas. Second, such news is less interesting, and difficult for the masses to understand. After the *xian* soviet culture department's *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* editor has compiled an issue, copies will be made according to the number of district soviets, and each district soviet will make a copy and send it to the district soviet cultural commissioner. When the district soviet cultural commissioner receives the manuscript from the *xian* soviet culture department, he will add to it local district news. This section of news is of primary importance in the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, because without it the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* would be without its core content, and would thus be unable to gain the attention of the masses and to achieve its intended effect. After the district soviet cultural commissioner has added local district news, he will make copies of the entire manuscript according to the number of township soviets in the district and send a copy to each township soviet. When the township soviet cultural commissioner receives the manuscript from the district soviet, he adds to it news of the local township. This section of news is also important, its main role being to stimulate interest in reading the paper. Not until this point can the entire compilation process be considered complete. On the basis of one copy per village in the township, the text will be copied in large characters on large sheets of paper, with punctuation and annotations in red, plus the date of issue, and people will be dispatched to post them in conspicuous places in every village for the masses to read. Not until this point can it be called a newspaper. What is written by the culture department at the *xian* and district levels does not constitute a newspaper, but rather a draft of a newspaper. This method is very effective: if there are a thousand villages in a hundred townships in one *xian*, the masses in the thousand villages and hundred townships in the whole *xian* will manage to see an issue of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* every three days.



This kind of newspaper can also serve as material for the literacy movement: the leader of the village literacy group can guide those who are illiterate through it so that they will have read the paper and learned some characters at the same time, which makes it a very fine method indeed.

k. General Distribution of the Volume of News. As an example, if one issue of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* contains eight news items, then the *xian* soviet's draft will contain four items (two from the local *xian*, one from a neighboring *xian*, and one of national or international news), the district soviet will add three items, and the township soviet will add one more to make a total of eight. Each news item should contain no more than forty words, and each issue no more than four hundred words.

l. When the Red Army is dispersed to do mass work, the main purpose of compiling the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is to have the masses read it. This is a powerful weapon with which to mobilize the masses. We cannot continue as before, where some people completely neglected this method and paid no attention to compiling the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, or some compiled one issue and failed to do the next one, or just did a bit of work on it sporadically. None of this is correct. When the Red Army is dispersed to carry out mass work, the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* must be compiled in a systematic way for the masses to read. It is also important at the same time to post some copies of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* in the various dining areas in the camps for the soldiers to read. When the Red Army is assembled and stationed in a particular locale, the main purpose of compiling the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is for the soldiers to read it, but it is also necessary at the same time to post several extra copies for the local masses to read.

m. In compiling the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, when the Red Army is dispersed to carry out mass work, it is the responsibility of the Army's Political Department to make a first draft and to send it to each division. The Political Department or political commissar of each division adds to it local news and news about the activities of the division and sends it to each regiment. The political commissar of each regiment adds local news and news about the activities of the regiment and sends it to each company. (The above are all drafts.) The company political commissar then assigns a company secretary, a sergeant first class, and others who can write to make copies, one for each village, in large characters on large sheets of paper, with red punctuation marks and annotations and date of issue, and sends propaganda workers to post them in conspicuous places in each village for the masses to read. One copy will be saved and posted at the same time in the army camp, and the company literacy movement committee will direct the literacy groups in leading the soldiers in each literacy group to read it. When the Red Army is assembled and stationed somewhere for training, the main purpose of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is for the soldiers to read it, so that when the propaganda section of the Political Department of the army is compiling it, in addition to news

about the local struggle and national and international news (one or two items), and news about neighboring armies (one or two items), it is most important that news about their own army be included (one to three items). After this is compiled, it is sent to each division. The division adds news about the division (one or two items) and sends it to each regiment. Each regiment, in turn, adds news about the regiment (one or two items), and the political commissar of the regiment directs the propaganda teams and company secretaries in making copies in large characters on large paper, according to the number of companies, one copy to be distributed to each company, and in leading the soldiers to read it. Each issue of the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* should contain no more than ten items of news and no more than four hundred words.

n. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* compiled by the Red Army should contain relatively little national and international news—only about three-tenths of the whole thing. There should be more news about the army in question, and about local and neighboring areas—about seven-tenths of the whole. Only in this way can we arouse the interest of the soldiers and the masses in reading the paper, and achieve the intended effect.

o. The news carried in the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*, especially with regard to the local and nearby areas, must be closely related to the lives of the masses. For example, rinderpest, crop failures, famine, salt shortages, the Pacification Corps, the Red Guards, the AB Corps spreading rumors, and meetings of the Communist Party—all these issues are closely related to the lives of the masses, and they surely would like to read about them. Unimportant events are not to be covered in the paper.

p. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* must be written in large characters on large sheets of paper—mimeographing will not do. All the publications that are currently coming out, from the *Red Army Newspaper*, published by the General Political Department, to the papers published by the provincial, *xian*, and even district soviets, and the papers published by the various armies and divisions, are all coming out in a format with small print. Although their intention is to provide something for the masses and soldiers to read, in fact they can be understood only by cadres (and even many low-level worker and peasant cadres cannot understand them). Therefore, these newspapers certainly cannot replace the *News Bulletin on Current Affairs*. The *News Bulletin on Current Affairs* is written in oversized characters in dark black ink, sparsely arranged in seven or eight lines; it's bright and clear to read, and when you finish reading it you feel just fine. This is truly reading material for the masses.

# *The Military Preparatory Work That Must Be Done to Achieve Victory in the Second Phase of Operations<sup>1</sup>*

*Red Letter Order No. 1 of the First Front Army  
of the Red Army*

(March 17, 1931)

Having achieved great victories in the battles in Longgang and Dongshao during the first period, we have already beaten back the White armies that came to attack the revolutionary forces. Now the enemy seeks to launch even more cruel attacks on the revolution, in an effort to seize the leadership of the counterrevolution, to put up a last-ditch struggle before the collapse of the ruling class, and to maintain his life which is about to expire. Two more of Wang Jinyu's divisions have recently been deployed (one division has arrived near Ji'an and Jishui, and Guo Huazong's division is still in Gaoan) to join the five divisions of Hao Mengling (now moving towards Jishui), Hu Zuyu (in Yihuang), Han Deqin (in Xin'gan), Liu Hedong (in Jianning), Luo Zhuoying<sup>2</sup> (in Pingxiang), and the two divisions of Gong [Bingfan] and Luo [Lin] originally in Ji'an. They all appear to

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 206–11, where it is reproduced from a volume entitled *Junshi wenxian* (Military Documents) published in 1942. This version is basically the same as that which appears in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 217–23, but is slightly more complete and accurate.

1. Communist documents written during this period use a variety of terms to refer to the successive anti-Communist military operations that the Nationalists labelled the "encirclement and suppression" [*weijiao*] campaigns. Although documents written in the later stages of the Jiangxi Soviet period (especially in 1933–1934) quite often use the Nationalist term "encirclement and suppression" enclosed in quotation marks, earlier documents such as this one more commonly use terms such as "phase," "battle," or "war" to refer to the campaigns. Thus, the term "Second Phase of Operations" in this title refers to the Second Encirclement Campaign.

2. Luo Zhuoying (1896–1961), a native of Guangdong, was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Eleventh Division. His forces are not listed in Communist-compiled Nationalist orders of battle for the Second Encirclement Campaign, but did participate in the Third Encirclement Campaign later in 1931. This is confirmed in *Bandit Suppression*, Vol. 1.

be actively preparing for an offensive against us, so the second stage of the war is about to begin.

This time, however, we are in a much better position than we were last time to win victory in the military operations. The conflict between Chiang and Zhang<sup>3</sup> is intensifying, and economic panic throughout the country can hardly go on for long without leading to an inevitable eruption of renewed fighting among the warlords, all of which is very unfavorable to them. For our part, we have already achieved a nationwide victory as a response to the counterrevolutionaries' attack on us. In the battle at Longgang especially, not only did the enemy forces lose two divisions, but the morale of their troops was further shaken and their soldiers began to lean toward the revolution. Not only have we been replenished with many guns and much ammunition, but our local armed forces have obtained four thousand more rifles. Among the 100,000 or so people we have recently won over in Guangchang, Ningdu, Yongfeng, Le'an, Nanfeng, and Sandu-Qibao,<sup>4</sup> there is a considerable amount of armed organization, and already five routes<sup>5</sup> of Red Guard armies have been organized, ten guerrilla areas have been designated, and concrete methods have been decided upon for the local armed forces to cooperate with the Red Army in fighting (discussed at the Red Area military affairs conference<sup>6</sup>). The complete settlement of the Futian Incident makes for the renewed concentration of revolutionary forces in Hexi.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, we have added a vital new force—the Seventh Army (it has been reported that this army has arrived at Lingxian and Suichuan), much to the enemy's surprise.<sup>8</sup> Their arrival is bound to hamper the enemy's plans to attack us. All of these conditions guarantee us an even greater victory this time.

To make sure that we achieve this even greater victory, we should review the characteristics of our fighting in the past, and make even better preparations for the battle this time. In addition to the comprehensive directives on political

3. I.e., between Chiang Kaishek and Zhang Xueliang.

4. Sandu and Qibao were communities in an area of eastern Xingguo *xian* which had until recently been a center of anti-Communist resistance.

5. The term "route" (*lu*) here is used not in the sense of "road," but as a term of geographical jurisdiction, as in the East, West, South, North, and Central route action committees organized by the Party in central Jiangxi in 1929–1930.

6. The reference is to an ad hoc conference called jointly by the First Front Army and the local armed forces in the Central Soviet Area to discuss the situation following victory against the First Encirclement Campaign.

7. "Hexi" refers to the area west of the Gan River. For discussion of the Futian Incident, see the Introduction.

8. The Red Seventh Army had left its place of origin in Guangxi and had arrived in the area west of the Gan River in early 1931. During the first half of the year it operated in this region in conjunction with local Red Army forces from the area around the Jinggangshan base area, and with the Red Twentieth Army, which had fled to this region following its involvement in the Futian Incident in December 1930.

propaganda and agitation work already given by the General Political Department, we hereby list the military preparatory work as follows:

### **I. General Shortcomings of the Previous Combat<sup>9</sup>**

#### ***A. Before the Combat***

1. There was no advance planning in the areas in which fighting was anticipated, so that the sketch map used for the attack on Longgang was based on a survey of nothing but the closest vicinity, the routes were chosen at the last minute, and the local people were mobilized at the last minute as well.

2. Many departments and units (staff officer departments, aides-de-camp units, and the office of the military area command) failed to convene special meetings to discuss preparatory work for the battle, so that when the fighting started they were completely disorganized, or in too much of a rush, or unable to figure out what to do. In some cases all personnel had been sent out and no one was left to be sent out later, or work had begun but the equipment had been left behind (for example, staff officers forgetting to bring carbon paper and pencils, and medical officers forgetting to bring the necessary medicines).

3. Because of inadequate preparation for the laying in of provisions, some troops had nothing to eat for two days during the battle.

#### ***B. During the Combat***

1. Modifications of the battle plan made by higher authorities were conveyed in a vague manner, making it impossible to grasp the intention when battle commands were received from higher authorities.

2. In terms of giving direction, there was some inability to command the troops, some lack of flexibility, and some failure to pay attention to the overall situation on the battlefield.

3. Liaison between higher and lower levels of authority and between neighboring troops was very poor (very few reports and circulars).

4. In most cases during battle provisions for the troops were poorly managed.

5. Because deployment of personnel in the various military units was un-planned and unscientific, both on the battlefield and in the rear, people were running around in all directions, unable to accomplish their tasks.

#### ***C. After the Combat***

1. Our pursuing troops were disorganized. Troops pursuing the enemy had not been given the task by higher command officers, and in some cases pursuing troops retreated to camp on their own initiative, without receiving orders from the supreme command (for instance, during the battle at Dongshao).

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9. Another reference to the First Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.

2. There was no planned assignment of special personnel to different military units to take charge of battlefield cleanup.

3. None of the military units sent people out to collect classified papers and confidential documents, telegram cipher codes, special equipment, and technical personnel.

4. At the conclusion of the battle, the direction, route, and condition of enemy retreat were reported either very late or not at all; reports on statistics of what was captured and of casualties, and on the replenishment and consolidation of the troops were extremely slow in coming.

5. After the battle, the booty, the captives, and the wounded were handled too slowly, and this greatly hampered the pursuit. At the same time, not much attention was paid to taking care of the wounded, and they went without anything to eat for quite a long time.

6. Unable to get a full meal immediately, to restore the soldiers' morale, or even to feed the horses and clean the guns. . . .<sup>10</sup>

7. No special personnel were assigned to take charge of managing captives, so that the captives had nothing to eat all day. At the battle in Longgang, they were resentful toward us.

## II. Preparatory Work to Be Done Now

### A. Agitation<sup>11</sup>

1. In addition to carrying out political agitation work according to the directives of the General Political Department, each section should hold separate pledge-taking rallies as well.

2. Before departure for battle, troops should be assembled and given agitation speeches.

### B. Meetings

Using various types of meetings to do preparatory work for battle and to discuss points for attention during battle and cleanup work after battle is the best way to accomplish the task. Therefore, all military units should immediately convene the following types of meetings:

1. Meetings to be convened at the army or divisional level:

a. Convening staff officers' meetings to discuss points for attention for the troops during battle, staff work, methods of liaison with various units, logistical service in the rear, as well as ways to gather classified papers and documents after battle, and also current training principles in the various military units.

10. This ellipsis, and that at the end of paragraph IIB1c below, appear in the available Chinese text.

11. Regarding the difference between propaganda and agitation see above, the note to the text of March 12-14, 1931.

- b. Convening meetings of aides-de-camp to discuss the division of labor among personnel who do odd jobs, ways to handle large baggage, provision of material assistance, temporary issues at the front, including the treatment and repatriation of captives, as well as ways of handling booty, the recruitment of stretcher-bearers, and the problem of provision and delivery of drinking water.
  - c. Convening meetings of medical officers to discuss the matters of rescuing and transferring wounded soldiers, establishing bandage units, and ways to obtain drugs, Western medicine, nurses, and so on, after battle. . . .
  - d. Convening meetings of officers above the level of deputy regiment commander and regiment commander to review past shortcomings in training and wartime command, and to discuss the necessary preparations and points for attention for the present battle, as well as current training.
2. Meetings to be convened at the regimental level:
- a. Convening one meeting, with the whole regiment as a unit, to be attended by officers above the level of platoon leader and deputy platoon leader, to review past shortcomings in fighting and discuss necessary preparations and points for attention for the current battle.
  - b. Convening one meeting, with the whole regiment as a unit, to be attended by aides-de-camp, special task leaders, and those in charge of provisions, such as staff sergeants for military supply and others, to discuss wartime supplies and provision of material assistance and the supply of provisions for the wounded and captives after battle.
3. Meetings to be convened at the company level:
- a. Convening one company affairs meeting, with the whole company as a unit, to be attended by officers above the level of deputy squad leader, to review past shortcomings in fighting and discuss the necessary preparations and points for attention for the present battle.
  - b. Convening a soldiers' meeting of the entire company to report on the political task and its significance in the current battle, and to discuss the necessary efforts to be made.

### ***C. Training***

- 1. Step up training according to the new drilling methods and conduct separate shooting exercises (army and division commanders must all attend the drill).
- 2. Carry out and evaluate field combat exercises, and conduct mock military maneuvers once between regiments and once between divisions.
- 3. Morning exercises every day must include the activities of racing to the top of the hill, pursuit, target practice, and quick assembly. Recreation periods

must be devoted entirely to bayonet practice, surveying, games, the long jump, and so on. During evening roll call, military evaluations must be made.

4. Soldiers performing miscellaneous duties (especially porters) must be assigned someone to teach them how to do such things as form ranks, march, take breaks, and make stops (close to the side of the road), so as not to impede the army's forward march, and add to the fighting ranks.

5. Stretcher-bearers and military nurses must conduct joint exercises in rescue and transfer operations.

6. All military personnel must know how to take cover against air raids while on the march, in bivouac, or in battle, so that they can quickly hide themselves when encountering enemy airplanes (for details see Order No. 1 issued by the Front Army in Changsha).

7. As much as possible, cooks should avoid fatigue, and they should be trained to improve their cooking skills.

8. Methods of cleaning and protecting weapons should be explained, and soldiers must be urged to utilize them.

#### ***D. Provisions***

All military units must prepare a supply of rice for ten days and money for one month.

Upon receipt of this order, all military units must immediately hold meetings and make detailed plans for their subordinate units to carry out each measure. It is also necessary that all progress be reported to this headquarters for review.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

March 17, 1931, according to the Western calendar



# ***The Significance of the Second Campaign, the Current Situation Between the Enemy and Ourselves, and Preparatory Work in Striving for a Second Victory***

***Circular Order No. 4 of the General Political Department of the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission***

**(March 20, 1931)**

To Political Commissars and Heads of Political Departments at All Levels of the Red Army, and Local Governments at All Levels:

## **I. The Central Significance of Striving for Victory in the Second Campaign Lies in Changing the Situation Between the Enemy and Ourselves**

Since the fighting among the warlords came to a temporary halt and the enemy started to attack the revolution, the enemy has been in a kind of offensive position, whereas we have been, by and large, in a defensive position all along. In the battle at Longgang,<sup>1</sup> although we achieved a great victory, we were still unable to transform this offensive-defensive situation. Consequently, transforming the offensive-defensive situation between the enemy and ourselves has become the central task of the Second Campaign. If we want to transform the offensive-defensive situation between the enemy and ourselves, we must deal a severe blow to the enemy during his second offensive, and achieve an even greater victory than in the battle at Longgang. This is essential, for only thus can we rout the enemy and make him withdraw to defend the key cities. Only by making the enemy retreat to defend the key cities can we force him to give up the offensive for the defensive, and thereby resolve thoroughly the problem of consolidating the soviet areas. We must make the enemy withdraw to defend the key cities, for only thus can we take another step forward in expanding the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 225–31, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1981.

1. This refers to one of the main engagements during the First Encirclement Campaign, fought at Longgang on December 30, 1930. See, in Volume III, pp. 729–32, Mao's order to launch the attack, and his communiqué regarding the victory achieved there.

development of the soviet areas. Only if the enemy is routed, if the soviet areas are truly consolidated, and above all if they are extensively developed, can the Red Army take a step forward in expanding its numbers and improving its quality. Only under circumstances where the soviet areas are effectively consolidated and extensively developed, and the Red Army progresses both by increasing its numbers and by improving its quality, will we be able to exert a great influence on the political situation in the whole country. On the one hand, this will hasten the eruption of struggles for leadership among the various factions within the ruling class, weakening the power of each of these factions, promoting the further development of a state of anarchy among the various factions, and make use of the favorable conditions inherent in the objective situation of the revolution. On the other hand, this will promote an upsurge in the fighting spirit of the workers, peasants, ordinary soldiers, and poor people in the areas under reactionary rule, deepen the practical struggle, expand the scope of the struggle, expand the existing Red areas and Red armies, create new Red areas and Red armies, and bring about the expanded development of the revolution throughout the country. From this we will proceed to seize initial victory in one or several provinces, and this will then develop into victory in the whole country.<sup>2</sup> If we are unable to win a greater victory in the present campaign, we will not be able to transform the offensive-defensive situation between the enemy and ourselves. That would run counter to the task outlined above. Therefore, we must make every effort to strive for a great victory in the Second Campaign. Whoever fails to make every effort to fight for this victory is committing a crime against the revolution.

## II. The Current Situation Between the Enemy and Ourselves and the Conditions for Our Victory in the Second Campaign

After the battles at Longgang and Dongshao,<sup>3</sup> the political situation was such that, as regards the rule of the reactionaries, the crisis of wars among the warlords continued to develop day by day. The recent resolution of the problem of the [military] establishment in Shanxi,<sup>4</sup> Zhang Xueliang's efforts to rope in the

2. This sentence is absent from the text in *Mao Zedong ji*, and has been supplied from the version in a Red Guard publication, *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui. Diyi ge guonei geming zhanzheng shiqi (1928-1937.6)* (Long Live Mao Zedong Thought. Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War [1928-June 1937]), issued in February 1967 at People's University in Beijing, p. 138.

3. Regarding the battle at Dongshao on January 1-3, 1931, see above, the Introduction, and the first two texts in this volume.

4. The reference is probably to the shifting alignments between Yan Xishan, based in Shanxi, Feng Yuxiang, who played a dominant role in north China, and other warlords, who formed an alliance against Chiang Kaishek in early 1930, but were defeated in September 1930 when Zhang Xueliang refused to join their coalition.

old warlord forces,<sup>5</sup> the convening of the financial conference of the seven northern provinces,<sup>6</sup> Chiang Kaishek doing his utmost to recruit Huang Shaoxiong to resolve the problem of Guangdong and Guangxi,<sup>7</sup> calling together the army officers at headquarters to hold discussions and unite, sending emissaries to various provinces to win over the petty warlords, the unresolvable clashes between petty warlords in Sichuan, Yunnan, and other provinces—these are all proofs that conflict between Chiang and Zhang is unavoidable. Another aspect of the situation is that Chiang Kaishek's First Offensive against the soviet areas and the Red Army was a complete failure on a national scale. The First [Red] Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area saw victories and no defeats. Recently, when attacking Huangmei and other places, Chiang Kaishek sent a force of seven divisions, but there was nothing to be done. The Second Army Group, led by He Long and others, was active along the border between western Hunan and Hubei, and although Chiang Kaishek also sent a force of four divisions to attack them, he was quite unable to best them. As for the activities of the Tenth Army in northeastern Jiangxi and the Sixteenth Army in the Hunan-Hubei border area, the Sixteenth Army destroyed a whole enemy regiment in Tongcheng,<sup>8</sup> and captured 1000 guns. Although there was a defeat at Longyan in western Fujian, the Red army has now progressed toward Tingzhou and scored a victory. The Guangxi Seventh Army, straddling the three provinces of Guangxi, Hunan, and Hubei, recently went as far as Chongyi,<sup>9</sup> and within a few days will be able to join us. As for our First Front Army's great victory in the First Campaign, its impact has extended to the whole country, terrifying the reactionaries and causing extreme excitement among the workers and peasants everywhere. According to what people coming from Shanghai in the last few days have said, the workers in Shanghai have rallied to celebrate this victory enthusiastically. As for the Jiangxi Red areas, apart from a few towns that have been occupied by the enemy, where part of the masses in the vicinity have

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5. In September 1930, Chiang Kaishek had appointed Zhang Xueliang as deputy commander-in-chief of China's armed forces, and Zhang had been ceremonially installed in that post on October 9, 1930, in Shenyang (then known as Mukden), where his father, Zhang Zuolin, had long held sway. The reference is presumably to his efforts to rebuild his father's power base in the Northeast.

6. Though it is uncertain which conference is meant here, the reference is clearly to the ongoing efforts of the minister of finance, Song Ziwen, to unify the financial system in order to strengthen political control over local military rulers.

7. Huang Shaoxiong (more commonly known as Huang Shaohong) was, with Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, one of the three leading members of the Guangxi clique. In 1929, and again in 1930, the Guangxi forces invaded Guangdong, but were repulsed. After his armies had been defeated by Guangdong forces in the summer of 1930, Huang left Guangxi in late 1930 and went to Nanjing. There he called on Chiang Kaishek, who offered him the post of rehabilitation commissioner for Guangxi.

8. Tongcheng is located in southern Hubei near the borders with Hunan and Jiangxi.

9. Chongyi is a locality in the extreme southwestern corner of Jiangxi.

defected, there are places where further development is occurring, especially in Guangchang, Shicheng, Ningdu, Sandu, Qibao, and even in Yongfeng, Le'an, and Nanfeng, where several hundred thousands of the masses recently won over are all participating in the struggle under the Red flag. As for Ninggang, Ganxian, and Ji'an, they are all fighting constantly and tirelessly against the enemy. Thus all the facts stated above demonstrate on the one hand the conflicting tactics of the warlords, and on the other hand the indomitable spirit of the revolutionary forces. This has forced Chiang Kaishek to intensify his suppression of the revolutionary forces in the southern provinces, and especially his attempt to mount a second offensive against the First Front Army.

As regards Chiang Kaishek's forces in Jiangxi, although to the units originally under the command of Gong, Luo, Jiang, Cai, Mao, Xu, Hu, and others<sup>10</sup> have been added those of Wang Jinyu and Sun Lianzhong,<sup>11</sup> so that their numbers have increased, it takes a substantial military force to maintain transport and communications in the rear area, and troops must be assigned to deal with the arrival in Jiangxi of the Red Army's Seventh Army. Thus for practical purposes the military force at his disposal should not exceed nine divisions, or about the same as last time. Moreover, the morale of the badly defeated soldiers of Zhang and Tan<sup>12</sup> is even shakier than before, and it is more difficult than before to send forces into the Red areas. So in fact the enemy has numerous weaknesses to begin with. On our side, although numerically we are inferior to the enemy, we enjoy one extremely favorable condition, which is the united morale of the army, and everyone is eagerly concentrating on going into battle. Second, following the battle of Longgang, the strength of our armies was augmented (in terms of weapons, political and military training, etc.). Third, we increased the local armed forces, armed the broad masses, and unified the command of the local armed forces. Fourth, the resolution of the Futian Incident won back the masses who had been deceived. Fifth, we have taken Sandu and Qibao, the most reactionary region, expanded the mass struggle in localities such as Ningdu, Shicheng, Guangchang, Nanfeng, and Yongfeng, destroyed a portion of the landlord armed forces, and consolidated the rear. Sixth, when the Seventh Army of the Red Army came to Jiangxi, they stimulated the excitement of the masses,

10. The reference is to Gong Bingfan, Luo Lin, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Mao Bingwen, Xu Kexiang, and Hu Zuyu.

11. Wang Jinyu (1884-1951), a native of Shandong, had received his military training in Japan, and had held the rank of major general since 1922. In 1930, he had been chairman of the Anhui Provincial Government for a brief period. In 1931, he was appointed to the command of the Fifth Route Army in the Second "Encirclement and Suppression." Sun Lianzhong (1893-1990), a native of Hebei, had served as an army commander under Feng Yuxiang. In 1931 he was also transferred to Jiangxi, where he took command of the Twenty-sixth Route Army, and served concurrently as "commissioner for purifying the villages" (i.e., for eliminating the Communists).

12. The reference is to the troops of Zhang Huizan, who had been captured and killed after the battle at Longgang, and to Tan Daoyuan's division, which was also defeated during the First Encirclement and Suppression.

thereby boosting the Second Campaign. Therefore, victory in the Second Campaign will certainly be ours, provided only that we are all resolute, and use every effort to fight for victory.

### III. The Second Campaign, Which Is Currently Pressing in upon Us, and Our Preparatory Work

At present, the enemy has already started to maneuver. The enemy in Nanfeng has increased by one regiment. Wang Jinyu has already gone to Nancheng to set up a Commissioner's Office.<sup>13</sup> It is said that Wang's troops have reached Nancheng. Hao Mengling's forces<sup>14</sup> have reached Jishui; there have been troop reinforcements in Ji'an, where they are still trying hard to press people into service. The outbreak of the Second Campaign is drawing nearer day by day. Intensifying all the preparatory work for the Second Campaign is a necessary condition in striving for a second victory. Other than work related to military training, where orders have already been issued by the staff office, this [General Political] Department specially divides up the political aspect of the preparatory work between the Red Army and the localities as follows:

First, the Red Army's preparatory work:

1. Taking the army as the unit, convene meetings of personnel engaged in political work. Apart from political commissars and political department section heads and above, heads of propaganda teams and chairmen of soldiers' associations should all attend the meetings. The main content of the meeting is to be a report on the political situation, the significance of the Second Campaign, and propaganda and agitation in the army. After planning and reporting, there should be a thorough discussion about paying attention to rectifying all sorts of incorrect views, and specific measures for carrying out propaganda and agitation.

2. Taking the division as a unit, convene a mass meeting of common soldiers, the main purpose of which is to report on the political situation and the significance of the Second Campaign. Extensive agitation should be carried out regarding victory in the Second Campaign. As regards the speakers, in addition to the division commanders and division political commissars, army commanders, army political commissars, and heads of army political departments should all attend the meetings.

3. Guide the soldiers in holding soldiers' meetings, mainly to discuss various issues in striving for a second victory, so that they may increase their understanding of political issues and take the initiative in carrying out concrete preparations.

13. Wang Jinyu had been "commissioner for suppressing the Communists and purifying the villages" [*jiaogong qingxiang duban*] in the Hunan-Jiangxi border area in 1928, but as noted above, in 1931 these functions were to be exercised by Sun Lianzhong. Perhaps Sun had asked for his assistance in setting up the office.

14. Hao Mengling (1898–1937) was a native of Hebei. At this time he was deputy commander of the Guomindang Ninth Army.

4. Within each army, after assembling the main troops, hold rallies to take a mass pledge. In addition to the troops, the local masses should also be invited to participate. The main idea is to rouse the soldiers and masses and bolster their fighting spirit. The content and technique of the speeches at such rallies must be succinct and inspiring. A few slogans should be inserted into the speeches to drum up excitement at the rally. In addition, the soldiers should be encouraged in a systematic way to put forward suggestions about the conduct of operations, for example on the law regarding complicity,<sup>15</sup> which can then be adopted at the rally.

5. At all meetings, including mass meetings, soldiers' meetings, and pledge rallies, the military aspect of things should be addressed (for example, points of attention in battle, reports on experience in battle, each unit's outstanding merits and shortcomings, etc.).

6. Organize and encourage the masses in the vicinity of the battle area to participate in various fighting operations or activities to support the Red Army. For example, enforcing "Red martial law" (*chise jieyan*),<sup>16</sup> sending groups to convey greetings and appreciation to the Red Army, forming stretcher brigades, seeing off the Red Army to the battle, and serving them tea and rice gruel.

7. The political department should immediately begin preparing arrangements and materials for propaganda work among prisoners of war. Make sure that each prisoner gets one good piece of propaganda.

Second, preparatory work for the local government and the masses of workers and peasants:

1. Taking the *xian* as a unit, convene a joint conference of chairmen of governments at all levels, commanders of guerrilla units, and those in charge of mass organizations to inform them of the political situation and the significance of the Second Campaign, and to plan battle preparations for the time when the White army invades, including strengthening the walls and clearing the fields.<sup>17</sup>

15. *Lianzuo*, the term which we have translated "complicity," meant in imperial times the responsibility of friends and family members for the guilt of a criminal. Here it presumably refers to regulations for punishing soldiers who have joined in acts of desertion or insubordination, even if they were not the instigators. The words "for example on the law regarding complicity" do not appear in the *Mao Zedong ji*, and have been taken from the Red Guard version of this text.

16. None of the dictionary definitions of *jieyan* ("enforce martial law," "impose a curfew," "cordon off an area") precisely convey a sense of the actions to which it referred in practice. Basically, it meant systematically imposing a state of heightened vigilance and oversight throughout an area in order to prevent enemy infiltrators, spies, and internal counterrevolutionaries from carrying on their activities. To achieve this state, a sympathetic populace was asked to organize systems of sentries, roadside checkpoints, movement passes, and other inspection and counter-infiltration measures.

17. On "strengthening the walls and clearing the fields" (*jianbi qingye*), see below, note 2 to the text of July 4, 1931.

2. Taking the district as a unit, hold mass meetings, mainly for the purpose of rousing the masses to participate actively in the battle.

3. Choose comrades with a knack for speaking and a fairly correct viewpoint and organize them into delegations to visit the Red Army and encourage the Red Army soldiers to fight. On such visits they should at least be provided with slogans of encouragement to the Red Army written in large characters on red banners, with clear indications as to which army is to receive them and which local worker-peasant or mass organization they are from. At the same time there should be propaganda leaflets to distribute among the Red Army soldiers, and it is even better where possible to bring gifts in appreciation of services rendered.

4. Plan propaganda work for areas where the enemy is expected to pass through. Put up posters of slogans directed at the enemy soldiers in every village and every township, and spread around a large number of clear and simple leaflets (composed of a couple of slogans, for example). But the number of separate slogans should not be large; the same most important slogans should be written everywhere.

5. Each township and village should organize a soldiers' movement committee to work on the movement [to win over] White army soldiers.

6. Mobilize the masses to prepare for the task of cheering on the captured White army soldiers. For example, wherever prisoners pass by, the local government should have meals served to them, have pigs slaughtered for them to eat, have tea and rice gruel served along the way, and have people shout slogans cheering the new comrades. The masses will deliver food and drink to the prisoners, and do propaganda and agitation work on them at the same time.

7. The local armed forces must be involved in the preparatory work of political propaganda in the Red Army.

Slogans designated for morning and evening roll call in the Red Army and local guerrilla forces during the Second Campaign:

- a. Charge forward bravely!
- b. Kill the enemy at the risk of our own lives!
- c. Support the Communist Party!
- d. Support the soviets!
- e. Capture He Yingqin alive!
- f. Down with Chiang Kaishek!
- g. Long live the victory of the Second Campaign!
- h. Long live the liberation of the workers and peasants!

Slogans designated for propaganda and agitation directed at the White army:

- a. Our brothers in the White armies are of worker and peasant origins, they should not take up arms against the workers and peasants!
- b. The only way for the White army soldiers to win their back pay is to rebel!
- c. The White army brothers must kill their counterrevolutionary officers, select their own officers, and establish Red Army [units]!

- d. The White army soldiers will not go to the front to fight, nor will they serve as cannon fodder for the warlords!
- e. The White army soldiers are of worker and peasant origins; they should not massacre the workers and peasants for the warlords!
- f. Welcome the White army soldiers and low-ranking officers to attack the local bullies and divide up the land!
- g. Give special treatment to White army prisoners!
- h. Treat the sick and wounded White army soldiers!
- i. Welcome the White army brothers and low-ranking officers to join the Red Army!
- j. Poor people don't fight poor people!
- k. Soldiers don't fight soldiers!
- l. The White army is the army of the warlords; the Red Army is the army of the workers and peasants!

Chairman

Mao Zedong

March 20, 1931, according to the Western calendar



# *Order to Move the Troops for Reorganization, Training, and Fund-Raising*

(March 23, 1931)<sup>1</sup>

1. According to reports from various sources: Wang Jinyu's Forty-seventh Division, the Forty-third Division (Guo Huazong), and Hao Mengling's division are stationed along a front from Yongfeng to Jishui and Shuidong; Han Deqin is in Xin'gan; Gong Bingfan has moved to Taihe; Luo Lin appears to be staying in Ji'an. It is said that of Sun Lianzhong's troops, the Twenty-fifth Division (Sun) and the Twenty-seventh Division (Gao Shuxun) have arrived in the area around Le'an, Gongfang, and Daifang (and that they have a cavalry division). Hu Zuyu's entire division has moved to the vicinity of Nanfeng. Mao [Bingwen]'s and Xu [Kexiang]'s two divisions remain in Nanfeng. Lu Xiaochen's division is located north of Le'an and Dongpo. Cai [Tingkai]'s and Dai [Ji]'s two divisions are still near Xingguo. Liu Heding is still in Jianning, and Zhou Zhiqun is in Ninghua (see the bulletin issued by the Staff Office for details of other enemy activities).

2. The First Front Army has decided to move for the purposes of reorganization, training, and fund-raising. Details of the deployment are as follows.

3. The Third Army Group should leave one of its divisions in Xiaotian to keep a close watch on and remain on the alert against the enemy in Nanfeng and Le'an, and the rest of it should immediately move to the area around Ningdu, Hechuan, Beilaicun, Ge'ao, Chengjiang, Meijiao, Shanliao, and Gulonggang for work and training. Command headquarters should be located in Laicun.

4. The Third Army should position itself to work in the vicinity of Tengtian, and keep watch on the enemy in Yongfeng and Jishui. If the enemy advances, it should retreat in the direction of Shaxi, as its main task is to carry out its own reorganization and training.

5. The Fourth Army should immediately move to the area around Guangchang, Yiqian, Shicheng, and Zhantian, to work on reorganization and

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 213–15. It also appears in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 233–35, with a slightly different title and presentation.

1. This order was issued on the afternoon of the date indicated from Shantang Village, Ningdu *xian*; it was Order No. V8 of the First Front Army.

training. Its headquarters should be located between Toupai and Ningdu. It should also remain on the alert against the enemy in Ningdu and Nanfeng.

6. The entire Twelfth Army should start to move on the 25th, setting up its headquarters in Dabodi and spreading its troops throughout the area around Dabodi, Ruijin, Jiubao, Rentianshi, and Huangshiguan to raise funds. Its work in Laicun will be taken over by the Third Army Group.

7. The Thirty-fifth Army should move on the 26th to the vicinity of Qingtang for training and reorganization.

8. The Red Security Regiment should immediately move to the vicinity of Ningdu (in the direction of Qingtang, a few miles from town) for reorganization and training.

9. The mission and position of the Western Route Army remain unchanged.

10. The Southern Route Army should immediately be disbanded. The Sixty-fourth Division retains its unit number and goes to No. 12 new working area for reorganization and training. All the other units may remain where they are to carry out their own missions.

11. General Headquarters, along with the Central Revolutionary Military Committee, will command its directly subordinate units to move to Qingtang on the 25th.

Supplementary notes:

a. The following is a map of the lines of communication [*jiaotong xian*] within the vicinity of Qingtang (the rest remains unchanged).<sup>2</sup>

b. A telephone line between Qingtang and Laicun will be set up by the communications team of General Headquarters, with the cooperation of its counterpart in the Third Army Group.

c. Each army should choose staff members with outstanding abilities from units stationed in its vicinity for the task of surveying and map-making.

d. Each army should, on its own initiative, distribute one *yuan* for pocket money on April 1.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

2. According to a note to the Chinese edition, this map is missing from the copy of this document now in the archives in Beijing.

# ***A Propaganda Outline for Seeking Victory in the Second Campaign***

*Bulletin No. 1 of the Propaganda Department of the  
Central Bureau of the Soviet Region*

(1931)

Governments at all levels, all political departments, and all revolutionary organizations:

This propaganda outline<sup>1</sup> is the most important material that can be used to arouse the masses before the Second Campaign. To strive for victory in the second great battle, every unit must expand, in accordance with this outline, the movement of propaganda and agitation by written and oral means, by mass rallies, and by organizing propaganda teams. Every organ must absolutely not neglect this work. Furthermore, every organ should duplicate this propaganda as soon as possible, and distribute it among the masses of workers and peasants.

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, p. 237.

1. The reference is presumably to the following document, listing eight conditions for victory in the Second Campaign.

## *Eight Conditions for a Great Victory in the Second Campaign*

*Work Yet More Energetically to Prepare for  
an Even Greater Victory in the Second Campaign*<sup>1</sup>

(1931)

### **I. Chaotic Warfare among the Warlords Is Bound to Break Out**

A. No sooner had the warfare among Chiang, Yan [Xishan], and Feng [Yuxiang] come to an end than Zhang Xueliang rushed to Nanjing to find out what had actually happened. After returning to Tianjin, he redesignated the remnants of Yan Xishan's routed troops as the Fifth Army and organized Feng Yuxiang's troops into several divisions. He forced the National Government in Nanjing to give him a fund of 516,000 *yuan* to be distributed among these numerous troops. It is quite clear that he wanted them to collaborate with him in fighting Chiang Kaishek. Zhang Xueliang also bought over Shi Yousan and Sun Lianzhong.<sup>2</sup> He even urged Sun to collude with Han Fuqu and Ma Hongkui<sup>3</sup> in an attempt to turn Shandong into a base for the entire great alliance against Chiang. Of course, Chiang Kaishek was not to be outdone. By using both hard and soft tactics, he also attempted to draw over or bribe others to his side. He threatened Sun Lianzhong, Han Fuqu, and others, and sowed discord that led to the disintegration of the Shanxi Army and the secession of Sun Lianzhong from Feng's army. He even finished off some miscellaneous troops in Shandong and Hunan, for fear that these unreliable troops would be lured away by Zhang Xueliang. All the troops under Chiang Kaishek's direct control have been de-

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 18, pp. 90-95. It also appears in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 239-46.

1. Compare this document with the text "Eight Great Conditions for Victory," dated December 22, 1930, which Mao issued under similar circumstances just as the First Encirclement Campaign was beginning (see Volume III, pp. 714-21).

2. The Chinese text here has Jianzhong, but this is probably a misprint for Lianzhong, the name of a Guomindang general that occurs twice below in the same paragraph.

3. Han Fuqu (1890-1938), a native of Hebei, was a warlord who served as military governor of Shandong from 1930 to 1938. Ma Hongkui (1892-1970), *zi* Shaoyun, a native of Gansu, was a onetime subordinate of Feng Yuxiang who defected from Feng's service to ally with Han against Feng during this period.

ployed in the northern part of Jiangsu and Anhui, as well as regions such as Henan and Shaanxi. Thus both sides, Chiang Kaishek and Zhang Xueliang, have rolled up their sleeves and are actively preparing for another big war among the warlords, which will kill even more people.

B. As war is bound to break out between Chiang and Zhang, Chiang Kaishek is seeking a huge loan from the United States and Canada for his military expenses; but the other imperialist countries like England and France are so jealous that they could not help stepping in, suggesting that the loan be provided by all of them, and that no country on its own should make a loan to China. From this we can see that the clashes among the imperialists in China are getting fiercer than ever. Inevitably, the chaotic warfare among their running dogs, all these warlords, has become more intense.

C. At a time when Chiang Kaishek is waging a big war against Zhang Xueliang, he fears that our revolutionary movement will develop in his rear. This is really something he cannot accept, for he is aware that the day when the revolutionary movement develops will be the day of doom for the reactionary ruling class. That is why he has transferred troops to attack various soviet areas and the Red Army. He was attempting to diminish our revolutionary forces by threats, so that he could boast in front of his bosses, the imperialists, the despotic gentry, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie that he, Chiang Kaishek, was able to repress the revolutionary forces, consolidate his counterrevolutionary leading position, and fight a big war with Zhang Xueliang without any worries at all. Unexpectedly, however, Zhang Huizan and his men were all taken prisoner by us, half of Tan Daoyuan's division was wiped out by us, and the first stage in Chiang Kaishek's plan ended in total failure. Then he was compelled to transfer two brigades of Han Deqin from Shandong and one division of Guo Huazhong from Hubei, and since Fat Lu<sup>4</sup> was really useless, he also sent He Yingqin to Jiangxi to take command. Furthermore, he shortened by more than a month the time he had set for solving the bandit-suppression problem, which was initially supposed to be finished by the end of April. All this shows that Chiang Kaishek desperately wants to frighten us, so that he can move his troops back to deal with Zhang Xueliang. Nevertheless, the warfare between Chiang and Zhang is intensifying day by day, and everyone in the armies involved in so-called bandit-suppression is so afraid to be Zhang Huizan the second that no one dares to move forward. Meanwhile, we stay here, as stable as Mount Tai, waiting for the opportunity to eliminate them one by one (as the old saying goes, "waiting at our ease for an exhausted enemy"). In addition, with the help of the armed masses, we are extremely well-informed and quite familiar with the local surroundings, while the enemy has no such advantages. With all these favorable conditions, it is certain that we will be able to win every battle.

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4. Lu Diping.

## **II. The Expansion of the Red Army in the Whole Country**

A. This time, Chiang Kaishek is relatively determined to fight to the end with the revolutionary forces all over the country. He has sent his troops not only to southwestern Jiangxi, but also to southern Hubei, eastern and western Hunan, northeastern Jiangxi, and western Fujian. But what has been the result of the battle? Take a look even at the news reported in the newspapers run by the reactionaries (of course such news should be taken with a grain of salt). After the two factions in Guo Rudong's troops, which were sent by Chiang Kaishek to northeastern Hubei to attack the Red Army, rebelled and joined the Red Army, the Red Army's First Army started its active operations along the borders of Anhui, Hubei, and Henan. In western Hunan, the Second and Sixth armies of the Red Army have already defeated the troops led by Xu Yuanquan and He Jian several times. The revolutionary forces have expanded from Gong'an and Qianjiang to Shihe; in southern Hubei and eastern Hunan, the Sixteenth Army of the Red Army moved part of its troops to [attack and take] Gaoan, a bit more than 120 *li* from Nanchang (on January 24); in northeastern Jiangxi, the Tenth Army of the Red Army, after attacking and taking Shangrao (on January 7), proceeded to encircle and attack Yuijiang; the Seventh Army of the Red Army reached Jianghua in southern Hunan and Lianshan *xian* in northern Guangdong; the Red Army in western Fujian recaptured Yongding (on January 1) and attacked Pinghe; the Independent Division of the Western Route Army attacked Suichuan. It would have been better for the Guomindang had they never sent their troops to attack our Red Army. They are simply helping the development of the Red Army by sending their troops to attack the Red Army, because they have supplied the Red Army with a lot of guns and bullets.

B. We captured Zhang Huizan alive, and the Red Army is constantly developing everywhere. As a result, the reactionary ruling class is trembling with fright even more, while the masses of the workers and peasants throughout China are even more delighted and making greater efforts. Even the proletariat of the whole world and the revolutionary masses in the colonies are also applauding and cheering for us, celebrating the new development of the Chinese revolution. Day by day, therefore, the reactionary ruling class is more and more panic-stricken, while our revolution is advancing more and more rapidly. Our new spirit overwhelms the enemy, and consequently our victory is even more assured.

## **III. The Resolution of the Futian Incident Has Made Our Forces More United and More Consolidated**

A. When we fought our first big campaign not long after the Futian Incident, many comrades, who were utilized by the liquidationists of the AB Corps, could not understand what had happened. Now things are different. Many bad phenomena which appeared in the wake of the Futian Incident have gradually disap-

peared. The provincial executive committee in Yongyang has already been dissolved.<sup>5</sup> Those who were deceived have awakened. Thus we may be able to deal with the invading enemy with all our strength. Of course, our strength has further increased.

B. Although we wiped out a large number of AB Corps members during the First Great Campaign, yet there still must be many of them hiding in our ranks, working as spies for the White army, creating rumors, sabotaging and disrupting the revolutionary forces. Right now, we have ferreted out some more AB Corps members who escaped our scrutiny last time. And those who were deceived into the AB Corps have understood their wrongdoing and given themselves up. At this point, it is safe to say that the bad elements, the counterrevolutionary AB Corps members inside our ranks, have all been cleaned out. As a result, our revolutionary forces are more consolidated. As compared to the time when we won a great victory in the First Campaign, our forces are more united and consolidated and, therefore, we have tremendous power to defeat the enemy, and we are even more certain of winning a great victory in the Second Campaign.

#### **IV. Our Armed Forces Have Been Augmented**

A. We wiped out Zhang Huizan and defeated Tan Daoyuan, confiscating eight thousand rifles, thousands of machine guns, mortars and hand-held machine guns, and more than one million bullets. With all these arms supplied by the enemy, we can surround some more regiments of the enemy soldiers.

#### **V. The Local Armed Forces Have Been Augmented**

A. After winning a great victory in the First Campaign, we distributed three to four thousand guns to the local masses. With these guns, their power has been much greater. They have also got some guns from their daily operations to harass the enemy and attack the troops engaged in bandit suppression. Through these operations, they have become more courageous, they have attained more experience, they have learned more military techniques, and, naturally, their strength to help the Red Army will be even greater.

B. With the local armed forces strengthened, more operations can be undertaken to wipe out the enemy troops engaged in suppression activities and to harass the other enemies. In order to maintain his communications, the enemy will have to advance gradually and entrench himself at every step by deploying

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5. The "provincial executive committee" referred to here was a group of Jiangxi Party and local Red Army leaders who had been involved in the Futian Incident in December 1930, and subsequently fled to Yongyang (a town southwest of Ji'an city on the western side of the Gan River), where they set up this short-lived committee in opposition to the Mao-dominated Party and army organs on the eastern side of the river.

troops along the way. Thus we can bring about the dispersal of the enemy forces and give the enemy more worries, so that it will be easier for us to wipe out the enemy. Consequently, even though the enemy wants to increase his forces along every route, in fact he is not able to send many more troops to the battle-front, because they have to leave a lot of troops behind to make sure that communications in their rear area are secure. From this, we will benefit very much. Naturally, this is also a condition which helps to guarantee us victory.

## **VI. The Terror of the Enemy Has Escalated**

A. The enemy troops, when they came to the Red areas, could neither find anyone to serve as their guide nor buy things to eat, and at the same time they were constantly harassed by our local armed forces wherever they went, so they had already been seized with terror. Now, having heard further that the entire division of Zhang Huizan has been eliminated, and that Tan Daoyuan also suffered a crushing defeat despite his quick retreat, their terror has become even more extreme.

B. The White army soldiers who were invading the Red areas on suppression operations saw our slogans and leaflets urging them to struggle against the local bullies and divide up the land, and telling them that the Red Army is the army of the workers and peasants, within which everyone is equal and free. At the same time, they also witnessed the White army burning, killing, looting, and plundering in villages of the Red areas. Therefore, they have all gradually come to understand the revolution as well as the Red Army. As soon as the two divisions led by Jiang and Cai arrived in Xingguo, twenty-three soldiers defected to the Red Army with their guns. We can see from this that many of the White army soldiers are not willing to fight the Red Army. Furthermore, the prisoners we took from Zhang Huizan's division did a lot of propaganda work for us after they returned, spreading the word that we gave special treatment to them, and that we did not search their pockets but instead gave every one of them three *yuan*. As a result, the morale of the White army has become shakier, and their soldiers do not have the courage to fight the Red Army. They are even inclined to come and hand over their guns to the Red Army, and some of them have also come to pick up the three *yuan*. From this it can be seen that our strength has become more and more powerful and consolidated, and that our courage to fight is increasing daily. The enemy, on the other hand, is increasingly terrified, and his morale is declining day by day. This is yet another favorable condition guaranteeing us victory.

## **VII. The Initiative of the Masses Has Further Increased, and There Are Also Geographical Advantages**

A. During the first attack launched by the White army, the masses were very active in helping the Red Army and did a lot to harass the enemy, but because



the local forces were poorly armed and did not have much experience in many domains, and because, in addition, many AB Corps members and rich peasants played tricks from within, their power was not displayed to the full extent. Having gone through the First Campaign triumphantly, they have become braver, their armament has increased, and they have accumulated a wealth of experience in every respect. As a result, they are more active and courageous in their operations to attack the enemy troops engaged in suppression and in their operations to harass the enemy; even their strategy is subtler. At this moment, the masses in various regions are so enthusiastically involved in these operations day and night that the enemy is trembling with fear, building up defense works everywhere, and never daring to relax his guard. As a result, the enemy troops are utterly exhausted, and their will to fight is severely affected.

B. The fighting spirit of our Red masses in their struggle to support the soviets has been very intrepid from the beginning. All the atrocious crimes that the White bandits have committed after they came to the Red areas, such as plundering grain, burning houses, and killing anyone they meet, have made the masses angrier and bolder, impatient to wipe out the entire enemy at one stroke. We have the broad masses, but the enemy does not. Our masses are daily becoming more enthusiastic and more heroic, whereas the enemy soldiers are more inclined to waver every day. The more the enemy soldiers come to the Red areas, the more perplexed and frightened they become. All this makes it inevitable that the enemy will be defeated.

C. We are thoroughly familiar with all the routes within the Red areas. We also have the masses to deliver messages or act as guides. We know every single move of the enemy, and it is very easy for us to surround them. The enemy are not familiar with the terrain, and there is no one who is willing to act as their guide; besides, they are not able to send in their spies. Hence, they have no way to find out where our main force is, but can only come and flounder around blindly in our Red areas. We can wait at strategically crucial positions for the opportunity to attack them off guard. Thus we can surround and disarm them. That was exactly the method we used to capture Zhang Huizan alive. We are going to use this method again to capture two more division commanders alive in the days to come.

What are called topographical advantages and the support of the people already constitute the conditions for victory, but in addition, we have many other advantages and points of superiority. Can it possibly be argued that we will not win?

### VIII. Our Economy Is More Abundant

A. From the beginning we realized that this would be a protracted war, so long ago we hid away the locally stored grain, cooking oil, and salt in secret storehouses. Thus there will not be any food for the enemy if they dare to come, but we can feed ourselves freely and will lack for nothing. The Red Army itself

has put aside the funds for the expenses of several months. All the brave officers and soldiers in the Red Army have also donated their private money to the collectivity, and voluntarily asked that their food allowance be reduced; they have moreover collected in the regimental organizations and [X][X]<sup>6</sup> more funds for the expenses of several extra months. Therefore, there will not be any problem for us in waging a protracted war with the enemy. The enemy, on the other hand, will not be able to cope. Once they come into the Red area, they will not be able to find anything at all in the way of food. They will have to send everything here from their faraway rear area and that is extremely difficult. The mountain roads are hard to travel on, and if the escorts for the supplies are small, we can intercept them. What about sending a big escort? They do not have that many soldiers. Under such circumstances, as soon as the troops led by Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] arrived in Xingguo, they were able to have one meal of rice and one meal of gruel every day. Once they move a bit more into the Red areas, they will surely have nothing to eat. This is also one of the reasons why the enemy cannot avoid defeat, while we are sure to be victorious.

Although we have all these conditions for victory, we absolutely cannot be so satisfied with things that we take the enemy lightly. On the contrary, we must step up our preparations and strive with all our might to eliminate more enemies, catch more division commanders, and capture Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Xu Kexiang, Mao Bingwen, Luo Lin, and Gong Bingfan alive. We must completely destroy the enemy's plans of attack; we must attack the enemy, pursue the enemy, and drive the enemy back to Nanchang and Jiujiang. Thus the soviets can be consolidated and develop and expand steadily, opening up a new revolutionary situation. We must launch revolutionary warfare on a larger scale, put an end to the chaotic warfare among the warlords, and strive for the victory of the soviet revolution in one or several provinces and finally in the whole country.

Printed by the General Political Department,  
Chinese Soviet Central Revolutionary Military Commission

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6. These characters, which are missing in both versions of this document, presumably stand for military units of another level, such as "battalion organizations."

# *Opposing the First Great “Encirclement and Suppression”*

*(To the Tune “Fisherman’s Pride”)*<sup>1</sup>

(Spring 1931)<sup>2</sup>

The trees all glisten red beneath the frosty skies,  
The wrath of the heavenly troops<sup>3</sup> soars to the Milky Way.  
Longgang shrouded in mist, the countless peaks obscured,  
All shout together,  
“Up ahead, they have captured Zhang Huizan!”<sup>4</sup>

Two hundred thousand of their troops enter Jiangxi once more,<sup>5</sup>  
Wind and dust billowing to mid-sky.

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Our source for this poem is *Mao Zedong shici duilian jizhu* (Annotated Edition of Mao Zedong’s Poems and Couplets) (Changsha: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1991), pp. 38–40 (hereafter *Shici duilian*).

1. As indicated in Volumes II and III of this series, much of Mao’s poetry makes use of the convention of “tune title” (*cipai*), a label traditionally attached to this form of classical poetry. The conventional “tune title” relates to technical matters of meter and rhyme, and has nothing to do with the theme of the poem in question.

2. This poem was written after the defeat of the Guomindang’s First Encirclement and Suppression Campaign against the Red Army, which took place from December 27, 1930, to January 1, 1931, and just before the second such campaign was launched in April 1931. It is another of the poems first published together in the May 1962 issue of *People’s Literature*. (For the author’s note accompanying them, see the note to Mao’s Autumn 1929 poem, “The War Between Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi Warlords,” Volume III, p. 190.)

3. As in his July 1930 poem, “From Tingzhou to Changsha,” Mao employs here the term *tianbing*, traditionally used to mean the emperor’s army, or the army “with Heaven on its side.”

4. Zhang Huizan was the field commander of the main Guomindang force in this campaign. His own division was located at Longgang.

5. In the First Encirclement Campaign, Chiang Kaishek had sent a hundred thousand troops against the Communists; in the Second Campaign, the Guomindang forces numbered two hundred thousand.

Myriads of workers and peasants are called on to arise,  
And to strive as one man,  
At the foot of Imperfect Mountain is a riot of red flags.<sup>6</sup>

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6. The name of this mountain is commonly given in transcription as Buzhoushan. The meaning of *buzhou* is "imperfect." The *Shanhaijing* (Classic of Mountains and Seas), an ancient and semi-mythological work with which Mao was familiar, also describes it as a mountain in a remote area that was *buhe*, or "not whole." Since this imperfection may have contributed to the mountain's collapse, it seems appropriate to translate the name. (For a reference by Mao to the *Shanhaijing*, see Volume I of this edition, p. 45.) Mao wrote the following note with reference to the last line of the poem:

As for the story of Gonggong butting his head against Imperfect Mountain:

*Huainanzi*, "On Astronomy," says, "In ancient times, Gonggong vied with Zhuanxu to be emperor, and in a rage struck his head against Imperfect Mountain, thereby breaking the pillars of the heavens and snapping the ties of the earth. The heavens tilted toward the northwest, and this caused the sun, moon, and stars to shift in that direction too; the earth sank in the southeast, and this caused water and dust to gather there."

*Guoyu*, "Chronicle of Zhou," says, "In ancient times, Gonggong departed from this Way; he gave himself over to pleasure, lost himself in debauchery, tried to change the course of a hundred rivers, to tear down high places and silt up low places, and thus caused great harm under heaven. Great Heaven no longer blessed him, the common people did not support him, disasters and chaos broke out together, and thus Gonggong was destroyed." (Wei Zhao's commentary reads: "Palace Officer Jia [i.e., Jia Kui] of the Latter Han dynasty] says, 'Gonggong was a feudal lord, a descendant of the Emperor Yan [i.e., Shen Nong], of the Jiang clan. When Zhuanxu was on the decline, Gonggong attacked other lords, and vied with Gaoxing for the throne.'")

"Annals of the Three Emperors," Sima Zhen's supplement to the *Records of the Historian*, says, "Toward the end of her (i.e., Nüwa's) reign, there was among the feudal lords a certain Gonggong, who relied on cunning and punishment for his strength, ruling as a tyrant instead of a king. [Attempting to] overcome wood [Nüwa's element, as the sister of Fu Xi] with water [his own element], he engaged in battle with Zhurong. Enraged upon being defeated, he smashed Imperfect Mountain by butting his head against it, thereby breaking the pillars of the heavens and snapping the ties of the earth."

Mao's commentary: The versions are at variance with one another. I choose "On Astronomy" in *Huainanzi*, where Gonggong is a victorious hero. Just look: "... in a rage [he] struck his head against Imperfect Mountain, thereby breaking the pillars of the heavens and snapping the ties of the earth. The heavens tilted toward the northwest, and this caused the sun, moon, and stars to shift in that direction too; the earth sank in the southeast, and this caused water and dust to gather there." Did he die or didn't he? It doesn't say. It looks as if he didn't die—Gonggong was actually victorious.

# ***Circular of the General Political Department on Investigating the Situation Regarding Land and Population***

(April 2, 1931)

To all political departments of the Red Army  
and local governments at all levels:

We have now drawn up two kinds of investigation forms, one for population and one for land. The main purpose of these two forms is to compile statistics regarding the ratio between population and land for each class, so that we may answer the many questions we now face more concretely by relying on hard facts.

In the past, the investigation of the actual facts was often neglected in many localities, and people simply relied on their own imaginations in determining work plans and directing the work of lower levels. As a result, the plans were not feasible and the direction was erroneous.

These two forms we now have can solve many of our problems, provided we are able to fill them out correctly, on the basis of statistics derived from careful and penetrating attention to reality. This is particularly true with regard to many of the concrete problems we face at present in the course of land redistribution. We sincerely hope that Red Army political departments will pay attention to filling them out wherever they go, and that the local organs of political power will fill them out township by township. We particularly hope that every responsible person in the Red Army and in government will conduct such investigations and collect such statistics everywhere and at all times.

In the last analysis, how can we ensure that the materials we obtain from investigations are authentic and accurate?

First, a deep understanding of this work must be established. Only when the importance of this work is clearly understood will great efforts be made to pay attention to it.

Second, people doing the investigating must not shy away from trouble. In

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We have translated this document from *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 266–68. The version in the 1982 edition of Mao's rural surveys, *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982) indicates that it was taken from a mimeographed circular held in the Party Archives. It is also reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 255–57, under a title consisting of the two slogans that appear at the end.

investigating a given township, they must find the ledgers of statistics on population and land used in distributing the land, as well as members of the township's land committee who actually carried out the land redistribution, and people familiar with conditions in the township. First, the class status of every family member, and the class to which every *mu* of land belonged (whether to landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, or poor peasant. . . .<sup>1</sup>) must be clearly established. Clear methods of calculation must then be used to work out the actual figures, and the forms must be filled in accordingly.

Third, comrades sent out by the government at higher levels to provide guidance, and comrades in charge of political departments must explain in detail the content of these two forms and the points for attention during investigation to the comrades carrying out this work. In particular, it must be clearly explained that the criterion for identifying rich peasants is that a substantial proportion of their income is derived from the exploitation of others. Those who practice usury or make loans on a small scale should still be classified as middle peasants. Those who were originally farm laborers, but subsequently (before the revolution) rented land for farming, should still be classified as poor peasants. Only those households in which nobody farms and instead they rely for a living on independent work (such as tailoring, carpentry, etc.) can be called independent workers. Those who make their living partly by farming and partly by engaging in handicrafts should be classified as poor peasants, middle peasants, or rich peasants, depending on their economic status. The distinction between someone with an independent profession and a vagabond is that the person with an independent profession is engaged in a relatively honest calling (such as doctor, teacher, etc.). Vagabonds have no fixed profession, their lifestyle is also unstable, and they do mostly bad things.

If the above points are not clearly understood when carrying out investigations, one is operating in the dark. This will surely lead to mistakes in determining class status, and the statistics will lose their true value.

Since these two forms, regarding land and population, are closely related, they must be filled in at the same time. Individuals and organizations alike, once they have completed the forms, should seal them and mail them directly to the General Political Department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.

Our slogans are:

1. He who has not made an investigation has no right to speak.
2. He who has not made a correct investigation likewise has no right to speak.

Director of the General Political Department of  
the Central Revolutionary Military Commission Mao Zedong

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1. Suspension points in original.

# ***Decision Regarding Acceptance of the Letter from the International and of the Resolution Adopted by the Fourth Plenum***

## ***Resolution No. 1 of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas<sup>1</sup>***

(April 1931)

Having heard the report on the Lisan Line and the Fourth Plenum, the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Bureau fully agrees with the letter from the International and the resolution of the Fourth Plenum. It is the unanimous opinion of the Enlarged Meeting that the Lisan Line is an anti-Marxist-Leninist, anti-Comintern adventurist line. Since the resolution of the Politburo on June 11, it [i.e., the Li Lisan Line] has completely controlled the Central Committee and the entire Party. In the soviet areas, however, the Lisan Line has played a leading role since the Soviet Conference.<sup>2</sup> When the International gave the Chinese Party a correct

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 247–55, which reproduces the text found in *Zhongyang geming genjudi shiliao xuanbian* (Selected Historical Materials Regarding the Central Revolutionary Base), Vol. 2 (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 299–307 (hereafter, *Zhongyang genjudi shiliao*).

1. This is one of several resolutions passed at an important Party conference, which began on April 17, 1931, in the town of Qingtang in Ningdu *xian*. Called in large measure to hear about and endorse important policy changes brought about by the new Fourth Plenum national Party leadership, the conference also discussed political and military issues raised by the ongoing fallout from the Futian Incident and the imminent Second Encirclement Campaign. (For details regarding this meeting, see the Introduction.) Mao played an active role at the Qingtang conference, and although this resolution is not attributed to him in sources published in China, it is pointed out that the conference expressed a strongly positive judgment regarding his military line during the preceding period (see, for example, *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 340). This point is made very clearly in this resolution, which therefore seems of sufficient relevance to Mao's thought and actions to justify its inclusion here.

2. The reference is to the conference of representatives from the soviet areas convened by Li Lisan in Shanghai at the end of May 1930, which Mao had refused to attend (see the Introduction to Volume III).

line in the July resolution, the Third Plenum, which was convened for the purpose of accepting the International's line, not only failed to accomplish this task of liberating the Party from the Lisan Line and converting it to the line of the International, but instead compromised with the Lisan Line and prevented the International's line from being carried out within the Party.

The Enlarged Meeting has specially pointed out the great significance of the Fourth Plenum. It has severely criticized the Central Bureau's erroneous line during the period described above and sharply denounced the disrespect shown by the Central Committee of the time toward the International's instructions and representatives. The Enlarged Meeting has completely accepted the line of the International, effected a thorough change in the Party's political line, and correctly indicated the Party's current tasks. At the same time, the Fourth Plenum restructured the Central Committee and its Politburo, expelling the comrades most responsible for the Lisan Line from the Politburo and the Central Committee and admitting new comrades who actively support the International's line to the Central Committee and the Politburo. The Fourth Plenum and the Central Committee established after its meeting have dealt another severe blow to the anti-International and anti-Party Rightists led by Luo Zhanlong and others,<sup>3</sup> and are capable of overcoming the Rightists. The Enlarged Meeting expresses its complete agreement with all the resolutions taken and work done by the Fourth Plenum and the Central Committee established after the Plenum.

It is the unanimous opinion of the Enlarged Meeting that the line pursued by the Front Committee of the Fourth Army before the Tingzhou Meeting<sup>4</sup> was generally correct and constituted an application of the correct line of the Chinese Party's Sixth Congress. The Front Committee of the Fourth Army is resolutely struggling for workers' and peasants' political power and has firmly opposed the vagabond line, which rejects political power. The Front Committee is resolutely carrying out the land revolution in order to win over the masses, and has waged an unyielding struggle against all kinds of opportunism in the course of the land

3. Luo Zhanlong (1896–1994), born Luo Aojie, zi Zhongyan, was a native of Liuyang in Hunan. A friend of Mao's from their student days in Changsha, he was one of the founders of the New People's Study Society (see, in Volume I, pp. 164–66, the poem Mao addressed to him in 1918). He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, and worked for many years afterward in the labor movement. In late 1930, he became deeply involved (as part of the group associated with He Mengxiang) in the intra-Party factional struggle surrounding the removal of Li Lisan from Party leadership. Luo, He, and their supporters then struggled unsuccessfully against the "Returned Student" faction at the Fourth Plenum in January 1931, after which they withdrew and tried to set up their own alternate Central Committee. For these actions, Luo and others were expelled from the Party soon thereafter.

4. I.e., before the conference convened by Mao at Nanyang in Tingzhou xian in mid-June 1930, at which he was obliged to accept some organizational and policy changes imposed by Li Lisan. See Volume III, Introduction, p. liii, and "On the Problem of the Rich Peasants," June 1930, pp. 433–49.



revolution. In the course of these struggles, the Front Committee of the Fourth Army has contributed much valuable experience with regard to the land question. The Front Committee acquired a correct understanding of the Red Army and established the whole Red Army system, including the establishment of such things as Party leadership, the system of political commissars, soldiers' committees, the military supply system and the line for fund-raising, and especially the line for mass work. In addition, the Front Committee has been aware of the importance of arming the local masses, and has correctly carried out the policy toward the cities. To accomplish these tasks resolutely, the Front Committee has waged a firm and protracted struggle against adventurism, opportunism, flightism, and the vagabond line. The vagabond line launched its formal attack at the Seventh Conference of the Fourth Army Group, played a leading role, and dominated the Front Committee.<sup>5</sup> The correct line of the Party was defeated for a time. After severe battles during the Eighth Conference and, in particular, the Ninth Conference,<sup>6</sup> the leadership of the vagabond line proved bankrupt in practice. Only then were conclusions drawn in the struggle between the correct line and the vagabond line. The reason the Front Committee was able correctly and firmly to fight for the implementation of the line laid down by the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Party lay in the ability of the Front Committee to analyze correctly the political situations during each period. In particular, it was only the clear recognition of the true nature of the struggle in semicolonial China, and of the role of peasant warfare, which assured the possibility for the soviets to exist and develop, and only by drawing on experience from actual struggles in the soviet movement could policies be applied correctly, and right and left opportunism opposed. But beginning with the Tingzhou Meeting (at this time the Fourth Army combined with the Third Army to form the Front Committee of the First Army Group), the Front Committee accepted the Lisan Line and gave up the task of strengthening the soviet areas. Instead, it adopted an adventurist line, making rash advances toward the big cities. Nevertheless, in spite of the influence of the Lisan Line, the Front Committee did not stray from its own correct line as far as some particular issues were concerned, such as the land question, local armed forces, and the mass work of the Red Army. But after the attack on Changsha (at this time the First Army Group combined with the Third Army

5. The Seventh Conference of Party Representatives from the Fourth Army was convened by Mao on June 22, 1929, at Longyan in Fujian. Immediately afterward, he was obliged to withdraw from active leadership until November because of illness. The current Chinese assessment of the conference is that it played "a certain positive role," but failed to recognize the extent of "roving rebel ideology" in the army (*Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao* [A Summary Account of Chinese Communist Party Meetings] [Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1991], pp. 88–90 [hereafter, *Party Meetings*]). See also the Introduction to Volume III, p. xlv.

6. The famous Gutian Conference of December 1929, at which the Gutian Resolution drafted by Mao was adopted (for a translation of this, see Volume III, pp. 195–230).

Group to form the General Front Committee), facts proved that the Lisan Line was incorrect and would not work. Consequently, the General Front Committee first began to have doubts about the Lisan Line, then opposed it, and finally reverted to the correct line. This change formally took place at the Luofang Conference in Xinyu.<sup>7</sup> This change has already been clearly stated in Party documents. This result came about only through the many serious struggles at the meetings in Yuanzhou, Xiajiang, and Taipingyu. Finally, at the Huangpi Conference in Ningdu, it was pointed out in more specific terms that there were two lines within the Party, and that only by overturning the incorrect one (the Lisan Line) and implementing the correct one could the revolution move forward along the road to victory.<sup>8</sup>

During the period of the Lisan Line, the Front Committee of the Third Army Group adopted the Lisan Line in its entirety. Nonetheless, under the leadership of its previous Army Committee and its subsequent Third Army Group Front Committee, the Third Army Group fought many an heroic battle, including those in Changsha, Yuezhou, Ping[jiang], Liu[yang], and Daye, creating indeed a most glorious chapter in the Red Army's history.<sup>9</sup> In the past, the Third Army Group neglected certain issues such as winning over the masses, carrying out land reform, and establishing soviet political power, and the Red Army's strategy was mobile guerrilla warfare. As far as the whole of the political line was concerned, the Third Army Group's first attack on Changsha constituted an application of the Lisan Line. The Third Army group was, however, able to occupy Changsha and achieve a victory of such great political significance because the Front Committee of the Third Army Group had correctly estimated the balance of forces between the local enemy and our troops in Changsha (the Front Committee mistakenly estimated the balance of forces among the various classes in the whole country on the basis of the Lisan Line), and also because of the courageous struggles of the Third Army Group. As for the second attack on Changsha, it was even more obviously an instance of adventurism. But the battles for Changsha clearly proved that the Lisan Line could not be carried out. It proclaimed the complete bankruptcy of the Lisan Line, causing the General Front

7. The conference convened by Mao at Luofang, in Xinyu *xian*, from October 25 to November 1, 1930, finally took the decision to stop trying to seize large or medium-sized cities, and to return to the base area to oppose the Guomindang's forthcoming "encirclement and suppression" campaigns (*Party Meetings*, pp. 120–22). See the resolution of October 26, 1930, drafted by Mao, translated in Volume III, pp. 574–89.

8. This conference of high-ranking Red Army leaders occurred in December 1930 (probably late in the month, though sources differ on this point) in the town of this name in northern Ningdu *xian*. In addition to repudiating the Li Lisan Line, the conference discussed the developing First Encirclement Campaign, and prompted Mao's essay, "Eight Great Conditions for Victory" of December 22, 1930, translated in Volume III, pp. 714–21.

9. The references are to battles during the army's campaigns in the Changsha area and in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area during the summer of 1930.

Committee to change its line and quickly bringing the Third Army Group back to the correct line under the leadership of the General Front Committee. Even though Party committees all over the country were not able immediately to comprehend the lessons of the battle for Changsha and counter the Lisan Line, the General Front Committee, after changing its line, correctly established the strategy for smashing the attack of the enemy, namely, luring the enemy deep and firmly opposing adventurism. The result was the great victories of Longgang and Dongshao.

The Party's line in Jiangxi can be explained by dividing it roughly into three periods:

First is the period before the February 7th Conference of 1930. This is a period during which the opportunist line continued to dominate, the main point being that no soviet régime was established. Even two or three years after the Red Area was founded, the land was still not redistributed, and the Party and other revolutionary bodies were filled with landlords and rich peasants. Even though the land revolution had already been launched, it was not possible to provide correct leadership for the peasant struggles and build a foundation for the revolution.

Second is the period between the February 7th Conference (the joint meeting of the Front Committee of the Fourth Army, the western Jiangxi Special Committee, and the committees of the Fifth and Sixth armies) and the Second Plenum (the Second Plenum of the Southwestern Jiangxi Special Committee).<sup>10</sup> This was a period during which opportunism was corrected and the land revolution was resolutely carried out. Only in this way were the broad masses in southwestern Jiangxi mobilized to launch several valiant attacks on Ji[an] and create the present soviet areas. The February 7th Conference "called on all revolutionary comrades within the Party to arise, overthrow the opportunist political leadership, eliminate the landlords and rich peasants from the Party, and see to it that the Party is rapidly bolshevized."<sup>11</sup> The defect during this period, however, is that opportunists were not resolutely and thoroughly purged from the organization, and moreover that during the latter half of this period, the influence of the Lisan Line was accepted in political matters, thereby causing the soviet areas to neglect the work of consolidation.

10. The period referred to here is between February and August 1930. The February 7th Conference (also known as the Pitou Conference) brought to dominance in the Party and soviet government organs of southwestern Jiangxi a group of cadres sympathetic to policies favored by Mao and antagonistic toward many of those promoted by the Li Lisan leadership. The Second Plenum of the Southwestern Jiangxi Special Committee, which began on August 5, 1930, was marked by a reorganization of the local leadership and a resurgence of Li Lisan-style policies.

11. This is a quotation from the statement drafted by Mao and adopted at the Pitou Conference which was issued on February 16, 1930. The full text is translated in Volume III, pp. 268-71.

Third is the period between the Second Plenum<sup>12</sup> and the Futian Incident. The Second Plenum was actually a meeting led by the Lisan Line and was in fact an attack on the Party manipulated by the AB Corps. After the Second Plenum, the Lisan Line totally ruled the Party in Jiangxi, so that the principle of equal redistribution of land was called into question, all local armed forces were concentrated into the Twentieth Army and the Thirty-fifth Army, the task of consolidating the soviet areas was abandoned, and rash attacks were launched on central cities and on Jiangxi as well. To criticism from the First Front Army's Front Committee, the response was, "Enlarging and deepening at the same time is peasant consciousness pure and simple" and "Attacking Ji'an first and Jiujiang next will waste the revolutionary high tide in China."<sup>13</sup> Such was the madness of the Lisan Line, and as a result it became a banner for the AB Corps and brought about the counterrevolutionary Futian Incident.

The Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas was founded under the conciliatory line adopted by the Third Plenum, so its line was naturally one of conciliation with the Lisan Line.<sup>14</sup> In terms of the overall arrangement of its work, the Central Bureau assuredly did not firmly carry out the International's instructions on the work in the soviet areas. Still less did it criticize or rectify any mistakes that the Party had made in its previous work under the influence of the Lisan Line, although it did correctly solve many individual problems (such as the problem of the local armed forces, the relationship between labor unions and the soviets, the CY issue in the Red Army,<sup>15</sup> and so on). The Central Bureau's evaluation of the current situation is wrong. It has not in any way pointed out that the counterrevolution's attack on the revolution, and particularly on the Red Army and the soviet areas, is the central problem in the political life of China today. Instead it declares that the warlords attack the Red Army only for the purpose of preparing for chaotic warfare among themselves (see Circular No. 8). Such an erroneous assessment may lead to slackness in carrying out our main task—smashing the enemy's attack—and may engender an attitude of

12. The reference is not to the Second Plenum of the Central Committee, but to that of the Southwestern Jiangxi Special Committee in August 1930. See, in particular, in Volume III, "The Mistakes in the Land Struggle in Jiangxi" of November 14, 1930, and the notes thereto, pp. 680–83.

13. These two sentences from a report of the Special Committee to the Central Committee are quoted at the end of Mao's report of November 14, 1930, cited in the previous note.

14. The Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas was set up on January 15, 1931, at Xiaobu in Ningdu *xian*. The members, appointed by the Central Committee, included Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, and others, with Zhou Enlai as the secretary. Before Zhou took up the post, Xiang Ying served as acting secretary.

15. The reference is to the Communist Youth League, designated, as was frequently the case in this period, by the English initials of the first two words of its name. The issue was no doubt that of whether or not the Youth League should have separate organizations within Red Army units at various levels. In 1928–1929, Mao's view had been that, while it was important to address the special needs of young soldiers, this could be done by the Party. (See Volume III, pp. 59–60 and 211–12.) Presumably, Mao's view on this point remained the same, but others must have raised the issue once again.

waiting around for the warlords to begin fighting among themselves. Only because the General Front Committee had already made a correct evaluation in the past were such bad consequences prevented from happening.

The Central Bureau's conclusion regarding the Futian Incident was wrong as well.<sup>16</sup> The Central Bureau's circular says, "It cannot be affirmed that the Futian Incident was a rebellion by the liquidationists of the AB Corps." It also says, "The Futian Incident evolved out of unprincipled factional disputes within the Party." This is to obscure the counterrevolutionary nature of the Futian Incident, to fail to recognize that the Futian Incident was led by the AB Corps and was a counterrevolutionary revolt in which some supporters of the Lisan Line were involved, and to interpret this incident instead as "a factional struggle within the Party." Such an interpretation is very wrong in that it is divorced from a class stand, and such an explanation means a slackening in the struggle against the AB Corps, enabling the AB Corps to continue its activities and the expansion of its organization in the context of such an incorrect conclusion. For this reason, the decision made by the Central Bureau is not only erroneous but also extremely dangerous.

In the Central Bureau's resolution on the land question, the distinction between the correct line and the erroneous line is blurred. The Central Bureau has not clearly recognized the current democratic phase of the revolution, nor has it recognized the fact that, given the land relationships currently existing in China, the Party should resolutely lead the equal distribution of all land. The Central Bureau's resolution wavers on equal distribution. For example, to say that "equal distribution is an illusion of the petty bourgeoisie" means a failure to recognize that equal distribution of land is the most thorough way to destroy feudal relationships. It would be an illusion only if, after equal distribution, the peasants were to believe that equal distribution means that the gap between rich and poor had been eliminated, or that socialism had already come about. The Party should cautiously criticize such illusions. To make a generalization that equal distribution is an illusion is to weaken the resolution on the equal distribution of land, and can be used to oppose the land revolution. Moreover, it was very uncircumspect of the Central Bureau to have decided to use a distribution method based primarily on labor power and secondarily on number of household members, without going through detailed investigation or study beforehand, and without making use of experience accumulated in past struggles. What is more, the Central Bureau failed to grasp that the Chinese land revolution has taken the form of harsh peasant warfare, and that only through equal distribution based on the number of household members can the masses be rapidly won over. In addition, with regard to the question of opposing the rich peasants, the Central Bureau has failed to make a distinction between policies against the rich peasants

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16. These comments concern the statements of the Xiang Ying-dominated Central Bureau during January–March 1931. For more details, see the Introduction to this volume.

before and after the insurrection.<sup>17</sup> Before the insurrection, the main thing was not only to oppose the leadership of rich peasants in terms of politics, but also, in economic terms, to abolish all debts owed to rich peasants and to confiscate their land. Since the insurrection (now, for example), the main thing is to purge the influence of the rich peasants in terms of politics, to drive the rich peasants from the soviets, to strengthen the leadership of the farm laborers and poor peasants, and to put the rich peasants politically into a position of being ruled. It is not, on the contrary, to be as in the Central Bureau's announcement that says, "Disarm the rich peasants economically and eliminate semicolonial exploitation by the rich peasants" (once the land has been distributed, semicolonial exploitation has already been eliminated). Not only are the erroneous instructions of the Central Bureau unable to rectify all the Left-deviationist mistakes of the past with regard to the question of the rich peasants, but they actually foster these mistakes. Finally, the Central Bureau failed to make profound use of the rich experiences previously accumulated in the process of carrying out the land revolution and failed to take seriously the process of theoretical struggles over the land question in the past. All of this constitutes one important reason why the Central Bureau committed the mistakes described above.

Finally, the Central Bureau has not paid enough attention to various problems such as reforming the soviets, creating a truly iron-hard Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, establishing soviet bases, and making preparations and carrying out propaganda for convening the First National Soviet Congress. All of this is a result of the conciliatory line.

The disastrous effects of the application of the Lisan Line in the soviet areas are obvious: the size of the soviet areas was considerably diminished and the local armed forces were absorbed into the Red Army. From the standpoint of certain actions, the Party and the soviets were divorced from the masses; the Party and the soviets became organizationally looser; the AB Corps and other counterrevolutionary factions got a chance to expand and were even able to sneak into the Party and the soviets. The Red Army has also suffered considerable damage in the past because of overly vigorous expansion.<sup>18</sup>

In its evaluation of the current situation, the Enlarged Meeting completely agrees with the Central Committee's "Resolution Against the Warlords' Attack

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17. "Insurrection" here is a general reference to Communist-influenced local peasant uprisings.

18. There was considerable controversy during this period over what the mutual relationship and respective roles of the regular Red Army forces and local guerrilla units should be. Some wanted to use local units primarily as sources of recruits for regular army units, and wished to expand the main Red Army as rapidly as possible, in part to generate forces large enough to seize large cities. Others feared that stripping communities of their locally recruited guerrillas would leave many areas vulnerable to attacks by elite-led militias and to uprisings by internal counterrevolutionaries. It proved difficult to maintain a proper balance between these competing demands.

on the Red Army and the Soviet Areas,"<sup>19</sup> as well as its several orders to the Red Army. The Enlarged Meeting unanimously agrees that the recent development of the revolution has led reactionary rule to unite to attack the revolution, and the Red Army and the soviet areas in particular. On the other hand, the Guomindang is carrying out a policy of deception. For example, [they use] such things as the "National Assembly," "amnesty," and "restricting and reforming" to fool the masses, and they organize counterrevolutionary organizations in the soviet areas such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganization Clique, the North Pole Society,<sup>20</sup> and so on, in an attempt to sabotage the soviets and the Red Army from within. But at the same time it must be pointed out that even though the ruling class is united in its attacks on the revolution, its internal contradictions not only exist but continue to develop. The uneven development of the revolutionary forces in China gives rise to a difference in the degree of threat that the various revolutionary forces pose toward the various kinds of warlords, so that when they are attacking the Red Army, it is still possible for warfare to break out among the warlords. Moreover, Hu Hanmin was recently detained by Chiang Kaishek,<sup>21</sup> and preparation for warfare among the northern warlords has become extremely intense. This proves the sharpness of the contradictions within the ruling class, and that there are active preparations for large-scale warfare among the warlords.

19. This resolution had been issued on January 20, 1931; the text is available in *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 7 (1931), pp. 50–54.

20. The Social Democratic Party (*Shehui minzhu dang*) was a leftist but non-Communist organization which was centered in Fujian. The Reorganization Clique was the term used to refer to the followers of Wang Jingwei within the Nationalist Party. Both of these parties, along with the AB Corps and the Third Party, were prominent among the targets of the Party's campaigns to eliminate counterrevolutionaries. The North Pole Society was another such organization, though much less important.

21. Hu Hanmin (1879–1936), *zi* Zhantang, *hao* Bugui shizhu, was a native of Guangdong. In 1905, while a student in Japan, he was one of the founding members of the Tongmenghui, and from that time forward he was a close and trusted associate of Sun Yatsen. Following the reorganization of the Guomindang in 1924, Hu Hanmin became a member of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council. Following Sun Yatsen's death in March 1925, Hu was considered one of the three main candidates for his succession. Accused of complicity in the assassination of Liao Zhongkai in August 1925, he was forced to retire from active political life for a time, but in April 1927 he became chairman of the Guomindang government in Nanjing. In October 1928, he was appointed president of the Legislative Yuan. After the collapse of the 1930 revolt against Nanjing led by Feng Yuxiang, Wang Jingwei, and Yan Xishan, Hu opposed Chiang Kaishek's proposal to adopt a provisional constitution, arguing that, in accordance with Sun Yatsen's ideas, a single-party dictatorship and a period of political tutelage were necessary before a constitutional government could be established. Hu resigned the presidency of the Legislative Yuan on February 28, 1931, and was placed under house arrest by Chiang. As a result, four senior Guomindang members issued a statement on April 30 impeaching Chiang for the illegal arrest of Hu, and in May, an opposition national government was founded in Guangdong. The conflict was only resolved in the context of the national crisis created by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931.

Although the Nanjing government has sent massive military forces to attack the Red Army and the soviet areas, the Red Army has ample capacity to counter this kind of attack, because the White Army is not in good condition, its officers and soldiers are not at one, the soldiers lead a miserable life, and among the various minor warlords attacking the Red Army there is disharmony and even conflict. As for the Red Army, there is complete unanimity from top to bottom, or "ten thousand people of one mind." In addition, there is support from the broad masses of workers and peasants, so that the Red Army is not at all fighting in isolation. Therefore, in the fierce struggle between the Red Army and the White army, the Red Army and the broad masses of workers and peasants, under the correct leadership of the Communist Party, will be able to win a second great victory and defeat the attack by the imperialist Guomindang. Our first great victory at Longgang and Dongshao is proof of this.

Our main tasks under the circumstances which exist at present are:

1. Mobilize all forces and correctly coordinate the worker and peasant masses and the local armed forces with the main force of the Red Army; make use of all advantageous strategies and tactics to break through the enemy's encirclement and attack. In the process of breaking through the enemy's attack, we must achieve the goal of making the Jiangxi soviet areas into a base for a nationwide soviet, convene a national soviet congress in that base, and establish a temporary central government. Preparatory work and the call for the national soviet congress should begin immediately.

2. Immediately establish a concrete plan for training a true iron Workers' and Peasants' Red Army; rectify shortcomings and mistakes in our previous work; remold military and political cadres; promote as many workers as possible to shoulder leadership positions; improve the military training of soldiers; establish iron discipline; purge the AB Corps and other reactionary elements from the Red Army, and block all possibility of any reactionary elements worming their way back into the Red Army.

3. Continue to transform the soviet régime, not only purging the descendants of landlords and despotic gentry, rich peasants, vagabonds, and the like, but also setting up an agenda for routine work of the soviet. To gain deeper trust from the masses in our work, both the phenomenon of the Party taking on the work of the government and the unhealthy phenomenon of "the Party as legislative organ and government as executive organ" should be eliminated at once, and a consistent working system between upper and lower levels of government should be established. The government should immediately issue an election law as well as economic policies and regulations.

4. As for the land question, it is established that there will be equal distribution based on number of household members. In places where equal distribution was not properly carried out, the principles of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce and drawing on the fat to make up for the lean must be applied. In places where redistribution has already been properly carried out, private ownership



of the land should be confirmed; it is not permissible to cause disruption and make further redistributions. Members of landlords' families and appendages of the feudal system, such as exploiting elements among Daoist priests, monks, geomancers, and so on, are not eligible to receive land, but they are permitted to rent land (the specific procedures will be laid down in new resolutions); merchants (excluding poor people in villages and small towns whose main way of making a living is farming but who have some business on the side) are not permitted to receive land. As for the houses of landlords and their families, they are to be confiscated without exception and reallocated to the masses of poor peasants, but these elements may be permitted to move into the poorer houses that have been vacated.

5. Reinforce the leadership of the proletariat, establish a sound class-based labor union and agenda for labor union work, lead the class struggle correctly, and implement the government labor law. Within the soviet areas at present, the work of the farm laborers' union is an important part of the labor union movement. Independent laborers may not join the labor union, but if an independent laborer retains his status as a poor peasant after having been allocated some land, he may join the poor peasant league in the same way as other poor peasants.

6. Intensify efforts to root out counterrevolutionaries so as to wipe out thoroughly all counterrevolutionary factions.

7. Within the soviet areas, intensify anti-imperialist work and propaganda, in particular that opposing imperialist attacks on the soviet areas and the Red Army, and opposing imperialist wars, especially the war being prepared against the Soviet Union, and establish and organize the League Against Imperialism.

8. Firmly carry out the work of remodeling the Party, purge class-alien elements, thoroughly remold cadres, and create new, genuine worker and peasant cadres to assume a leadership role.

9. Strengthen work in the White areas, particularly revolutionary work inside the White armies, in an effort to lead the revolutionary movement in the White areas, throw the enemy's rear defense into disorder, and bring about the disintegration of the enemy armies.

The Enlarged Meeting pointed out that only by correctly carrying out the struggle on both fronts can the Party correctly accomplish these tasks. The main dangers confronting the Party at present are still Right-deviationist opportunism and Right-deviationist sentiments such as depression, pessimism, hopelessness, concessions to the class enemy, and so on. These opportunist sentiments are especially liable to be fostered because of the enemy's attack and the sharpening of the class struggle within the soviet areas. Consequently, the Party must do its utmost to oppose Right opportunism, but at the same time it must never relax in the slightest the struggle against the Lisan Line, and must purge all vestiges of the Lisan Line, particularly the Lisan Line in our practical work. Correctly carrying out the struggle between the two lines and firmly implementing the line of the International and the resolution of the Fourth Plenum will undoubtedly lead to great new victories.

## *Order for the Troops to Assemble Before the Battle*

(April 19, 1931)<sup>1</sup>

1. The tide of the Chinese revolution rises higher every day, and will lead inevitably to concerted attacks by the counterrevolutionaries, especially against the Red Army and the soviet areas. With the political and economic crises throughout the country and the progress of the revolution, however, the contradictions within the camp of the counterrevolutionaries become ever sharper, to the point where they are almost ready to explode into warfare. At present the Chinese Red Army should, with the highest possible resolve, concentrate its forces, break the enemy's siege together with the armed forces of the masses, strive for victory in the Second Offensive, establish a consolidated soviet régime, and expand outward.

2. From the movements of the enemy armies at present, it seems that Ningdu is their target as they advance gradually toward us, entrenching themselves at every step. The information gathered to date can be summarized as follows:

Of the Nineteenth Route Army, Cai [Tingkai]'s forces reached the line from Longgangtou to Jiangbeidong on April 8. So far there has been no news about further movements.

Of the Fifth Route Army, one division commanded by Wang Jinyu has already arrived in Xin'an and Toupí; Guo Huazong arrived in Shuinan on April 15; Hao Menglin's division arrived in Baisha on April 14; Gong Bingfan's forces are in the area around Gupo and Futian.

Of Sun Lianzhong's Twenty-sixth Route Army, Gao Shuxun's division has reached Wangxianxu in Le'an, but most of its forces are in Yihuang.

Of the Sixth Route Army, Zhu Shaoliang's advance unit has reached Guangchang City, and the rest are between Guangchang and Nanfeng.

Wherever the enemy troops go, the local revolutionary masses suffer severe devastation. More than ten thousand people have fled from Shuinan, and more than twenty thousand from Xingguo. All of these masses have fervent hopes for our army's offensive. The armed masses in various areas, acting in concert with our Thirty-fifth Division and using guerrilla tactics, have blocked all routes for the advance of the enemy armies.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 216–18. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 257–59.

1. This order to the First Front Army was issued at 5:00 P.M. from headquarters in Qingtang, Ningdu xian.

Our troops on the west side of the [Gan] river, the Seventh and the Twelfth armies, as well as the independent division of eastern Hunan, are currently engaged in fierce combat against the enemy in the vicinity of Taihe.

3. In accordance with the order from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, our Front Army is determined to advance with the utmost speed so as to destroy first of all the enemy armies under Wang Jinyu. Then it will accomplish our army's mission by breaking through the enemy's encirclement, fighting the enemy troops in their rear area, and wiping them out one by one.

4. The assembly areas for our Front Army are as follows:

The Third Army should set out tomorrow morning (April 20), passing through Gulonggang and Liangchun and assembling in Longgangxu on April 22.

The Fourth Army should set out at the same time, passing through Anfuxu, Huangpi, and Hanxia, and assembling in Shanggu on April 23. The Third Army should set out on the same day, passing through Jiangkou, Nankeng, and Longgang, and assembling in Shitoukeng (to the north of Longgang) on April 23.

The Twelfth Army should set out at the same time, passing through Jiangkou and Nankeng behind the unit directly subordinated to the General Headquarters and assembling in Huilong near Shanggu.

The General Headquarters of our Front Army and its directly subordinate unit will join the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and follow behind the Third Army, assembling in Longgang on April 23.

For the time being, all operations of the Thirty-fifth Army, advancing or halting, are subject to the command of the Third Army.

The Thirty-fifth Division and the Seventh Division have been given other tasks.

5. The Third Army Group and the Fourth and Third armies should each dispatch one company as an advance unit to march ahead and fix bridges and roads so that the main forces may pass smoothly.

6. By the time the Third Army Group reaches Longgang (on April 22), the Twelfth Army as well as other troops advancing on the same route should have arrived in Junbu, and the Fourth Army should have arrived in Hanxia. On that day, all army units should send out liaison officers reciprocally in order to establish contact with each other.

Points for attention:

- a. All army units are to purchase rice along the way for meals; it is forbidden to consume the rice carried along with them.
- b. This order is issued exclusively to units at the divisional level and above.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

# ***Order to Mobilize the Troops to Help the Masses Plant and Plow the Fields***

(May 5, 1931)

1. The enemy has been attacking the soviet areas and the Red Army for quite a long time. He is using, on a large scale, such despicable and vicious tricks as taking away the grain and pulling up the rice plants, so that our peasant friends will, in the immediate future, have nothing to eat, will be unable to plow and plant, and will have no hope of any harvest at all in the autumn. We must mobilize immediately, and smash this policy of theirs, so that every field and every piece of land in the soviet areas will be plowed and planted in good time, for this is a necessary condition for the work we must do to secure victory in the second great campaign.<sup>1</sup>

2. Most of the masses in the soviet areas are mobilized during the fighting to perform such tasks as standing sentry, spying, and transportation, and if all their fields cannot be planted on time, this will certainly have an influence on the battles and on the food supply from the autumn harvest. When it does not interfere with our combat and with the maintenance of security, the entire Red Army should immediately send a large group of comrades who are good at planting rice and plowing the fields to help our peasant friends with their planting and plowing wherever they are located. We must finish planting all the fields in the soviet areas in the shortest possible time, because this will be beneficial for the fighting and for the food supply in autumn.

3. For the Red Army to help the peasants to plant the rice and plow the fields is a duty that must absolutely be carried out. Do not eat meals provided by our peasant friends or accept any kind of reward. Moreover, we should be very polite and should never treat our peasant friends rudely.

4. If there are places where harassment by the White bandits makes planting impossible, we should send out some troops on guerrilla missions to guarantee the completion of the planting.

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Our source for this text is the version in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 219–20, which has been reproduced from *Junshi wenxian*, distributed in 1942.

1. I.e., in resisting the Second Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.

5. To guard against temporary shortages of food before the harvest, we should start early to prepare for the planting of all kinds of vegetables, melons, beans, and so on, in case of famine.

6. Fighters and commanders at every level should regard this job as one of the important tasks of the campaign. If we can carry out the plowing and planting in good time, this will be one of the first victories in the second campaign. We sincerely hope that everyone will be mobilized and devote every effort to this work. It should, however, never interfere with combat.

7. While helping with this work, we should cooperate and coordinate our efforts with the township soviets and the village soviets, for only in this way can we guarantee that we are not helping rich peasant households.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

## *Order to Wipe Out the Enemy Troops That Are Attacking Donggu*

(May 13, 1931)<sup>1</sup>

A. With regard to various aspects of the enemy's situation, apart from the intelligence reports printed and distributed by Headquarters to each military unit, we have obtained the following new information today:

1. The Forty-seventh Division, directly under Wang Jinyu's forces, is advancing toward Donggu via three separate routes. Its left route vanguard has reached Dayuankeng and dispatched guerrilla forces to Yuantou to engage in guerrilla fighting. Its middle route has reached the Zanlongkeng<sup>2</sup>-to-Wanshougong line via Jiucunling. Its right route has reached Shankeng via Guanyinyan, and is confronting one unit of our Third Army Group.
2. One brigade of Guo Huazong's forces in Shuinan long ago reached Xiamashi, advanced further today to the vicinity of Shangfang, and looks like it will continue to Donggu. Another brigade (two regiments) of Guo Huazong's forces arrived from Baisha at Nanping (fifty *li* from Donggu) some time ago, but as of today its movements are unclear. Another of his units (two regiments) advanced from Baisha to Baifu yesterday, and seems ready to advance toward Shatantou.
3. It is rumored that enemy troops have also arrived in Zhongdong and Qiaotoujiang. They appear to belong to the forces of Rebel Gong [Bingfan], but their strength is unknown.
4. The main forces under Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] are stationed along the line from Longgangtou to Xingguo City. Their three regiments that advanced to Fangtai remain in the original position.

B. In order to crush each separate enemy unit, consolidate the soviet areas, and expand outward, this Front Army has resolved to wipe out first the enemy troops attacking Donggu, and then, on the heels of that victory, to strike at the whole of Wang Jinyu's forces and make every effort to annihilate them, so as to reverse the offensive and defensive positions between them and us, and accomplish this army's current tasks.

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 221–24, which indicates that it is based on a mimeographed document in the Party Archives.

1. This order was issued at 10:15 P.M. from First Front Army Headquarters.

2. The editors of the *Junshi wenji* indicate that this should probably be Fulongkeng.

C. Based on the operations of this Front Army, each unit should be assigned the following tasks:

First, suppose the enemy army uses Wang Jinyu's Forty-seventh Division as its main force, in coordination with a unit from Guo Huazong's forces, and those of Gong Bingfan, to attack our troops simultaneously from five different routes at dawn tomorrow (the 14th). In that case, our Front Army should first wipe out the enemy forces on our right wing (geographically the river that runs from Donggu to Futian constitutes the boundary, and the enemy on this side consists of one or two of Guo Huazong's brigades and the brigade of Wang Jinyu's troops that has reached Dayuankeng), and then use all our might to deal with the enemy coming at us from Shentanqian, Sancai, and Qiaotoujiang (four of Wang Jinyu's regiments and four of Gong Bingfan's regiments). For this reason, our Twelfth Army should use two divisions to occupy the Dashannao, Gaoling, Wujiashi, and Fengkeng line as the front line; our Fourth Army and one division of the Twelfth Army should launch an attack from Dashannao via Zhukeng to encircle the enemy from the rear; and the whole of our Third Army (including the Thirty-fifth Army) should launch a raid from Donggu via Jiangkou on the enemy advancing from Dayuankeng, thus constituting our army's left wing. The Third Army Group should occupy the front position with one unit so as to pin down the enemy in Futian and Chongxian. The main forces are positioned in the vicinity of Donggu and constitute the general reserves. The command post of Headquarters is in Guoduling.

In the second case, suppose the enemy army advances only toward our left wing positions, and not in the direction of Futian or of Shuinan and Baisha. In that case, aside from keeping an eye on the enemy in Chongxian with one unit, the Third Army Group should use all its strength to launch a raid from the left wing on the enemy advancing in the direction of Dongkou. The Fourth Army and the Twelfth Army should launch a raid from the right wing on the enemy forces advancing from Jiucunling and Guanyinyan. The Third Army is to carry out a frontal assault. Which of these two battle plans to adopt should be decided on the basis of changes in the enemy's situation, and further orders will be issued.

D. The Seventh Division should be stationed at the three points of Fengbian, Chenggang, and Fangtai (the vicinity). The 103rd Regiment of the Thirty-fifth Division, positioned near Chongxian, should make every effort to stop Jiang and Cai from advancing. The 104th Regiment of our Thirty-fifth Division should be positioned near Tantou in order to check the enemy in the direction of Baisha and Baifu.

E. In accordance with the deployment described above, all army units should have careful plans for securing shelter from enemy aircraft, transportation arrangements, purchase of food supplies, dispatching spies, and liaison with the rear.

#### Addendum:

1. If the enemy does not enter Donggu tomorrow but rather advances to the Sancai, Shentanqian, and Shangfang line, the battle should take place on the day after tomorrow.

2. Tomorrow morning each unit should have breakfast at 5:00 and prepare a lunch (tomorrow there will be three meals, and meal expenses should be reinstated at a tenth of a big foreign dollar). For the time being, work such as planting the fields, gathering firewood, and collecting bamboo shoots is to be halted.

3. All units should be prepared tomorrow against enemy air raids.

4. All units should have guides ready at once.

5. The Fourth Army should dispatch guerrilla forces to the vicinity of Luofang to engage in guerrilla fighting, their main task being to find out about the enemy's situation in Nanping.

6. All army commanders and political commissars of the First Army Group, together with the Third Army Group's chief of staff and political department head should appear tomorrow before 6:00 A.M. in front of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to receive orders in person.

7. The Twelfth Army must immediately send forces tomorrow morning to build fortifications in the positions around Dashannao and Gaoling, but must avoid discovery by enemy aircraft.

8. This order may be read only by responsible persons with the rank of division commander and division political commissar or above. No others are allowed to read it.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong



# ***Orders to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Attack Futian and to Eliminate the Two Divisions of Wang Jinyu and Gong Bingfan<sup>1</sup>***

(May 14, 1931)<sup>2</sup>

1. There is a circular today from the Staff Office on the situation of the enemy.

2. The Front Army has decided to wipe out first the two enemy divisions of Wang Jinyu and Gong Bingfan, and then go on to launch an attack in the direction of Futian from the left the day after tomorrow (the 16th).

3. As the left column, the Third Army Group (including the Thirty-fifth Army) is to advance toward the vicinity of Jiangshutou tomorrow (the 15th) and camp there overnight, taking strict measures to sever communications. It is to move on toward Futian via Gupo the day after tomorrow (the 16th), and attack Futian by 1:00 P.M. on that day.

4. As the central (frontal) column, the Third Army (minus the Thirty-fifth Army) is to move at dawn tomorrow (the 15th) toward Luokeng, Zhangjiabei, Taojinkeng, and neighboring towns and occupy frontal positions around Baiyunshan, Genggu, Shitang, Yaozi, and Dalong. By 8:00 A.M. on the 16th, it is to start moving forward and attack the line from Qiaotou to the river. After this is accomplished, some of the troops should pursue the fleeing enemy and others should assist the Fourth Army's frontal force in attacking the enemy at Guanyingya from the flank.

5. The Fourth Army (together with the Sixty-fourth Division) also serves as a central column (frontal) army. The entire army should move toward the area of Donggu and halt near there tomorrow, with one division occupying frontal positions at Sancai and Shenwan, while the Sixty-fourth Division should situate itself on the northernmost part of Wodushan. On the 16th, it will divide into two routes, one to attack Guanyingya and the other to attack Jiucengling and further advance toward the enemy in Futian. A full-scale attack is to be launched at 2:00 P.M. on the 16th.

6. The Twelfth Army (minus the Sixty-fourth Division), serving as the right

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 225–27. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 261–62.

1. Wang Jinyu commanded the Nationalist Fifth Army's Forty-seventh Division, and Gong Bingfan commanded its Twenty-eighth Division.

2. This order was issued at 8:00 P.M. from the headquarters of the First Front Army.

column, should use some troops to occupy the main positions in the vicinity of Taishannao tomorrow (the 15th) and to check the enemy coming from the three directions of Shangfang, Luofang, and Tantou. On the following day (the 16th), when the left column and the central column have accomplished their tasks and the enemy has been defeated along the whole front and is in retreat, the opportunity should be seized to pursue him in the direction of Shuinan. If by the day after tomorrow the enemy from the right route (Shangfang and Tantou, etc.) does not come, you will be the general reserve force for the Front Army.

7. The 104th Regiment is also to be under the orders of the Fourth Army. It should rally its troops tomorrow (the 15th), and by 8:00 A.M. the day after tomorrow (the 16th) it should be waiting for the opportunity to attack the enemy stationed in Taipingkeng according to the needs of the other routes of the army. As soon as the enemy retreats, it should work together with the Front Army to pursue the enemy in the direction of Futian along both sides of the river, in order to take positions north of the river at Futian and intercept the enemy troops fleeing toward Futian by crossing the river.

8. The field hospital should be moved to Donggu on the 15th (all wounded soldiers should be brought here and further transferred to the hospitals in the rear).

9. The General Headquarters, following the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, will remain here (Dunshang) tomorrow (the 15th), but will advance toward Futian following the Front Army via Sancai and Guanyingya.

**Additional notes:**

- a. All troops should bring with them enough rice for five days.
- b. After the battle, all prisoners should be sent to Donggu.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

## *Order to Attack the Enemy at Zhongcun and Nantuan<sup>1</sup>*

(May 21, 1931)<sup>2</sup>

1. According to the report from the Third Army Group, there is a brigade of our enemy, Gao Shuxun's<sup>3</sup> force, in Zhongcun. Its advance party encountered the outpost of our Sixth Division [yesterday] afternoon. They seemed to be screening the movements of the main forces behind them.

2. The Front Army has decided to attack this enemy tomorrow (the 22nd), and to seize the opportunity of proceeding down to Nantuan to wipe out the main forces of Gao's division.

3. The Third Regiment, as the left wing (it will also be the left wing when attacking Nantuan the next day), will attack the northeast extremity of Zhongcun, moving to attack on the north end of Zhongcun via the three routes of Dipanyuan, Zhangjialing, and Xiyuanlong. It should reach the base where the attack will be prepared at 6:30. The Fourth Army, as the right wing, will advance toward the southern end of Zhongcun along Sishijiunao, toward the line of Jiaokeng, Luohuashan, Niukeng, Longshang. It must set out from around Longfang by 3:00 A.M. tomorrow and reach the preparatory base by 6:30 A.M. (While attacking Nantuan the next day, it will be the frontal force.) The Third Army, as the main reserves, should set out from its present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow, via Longkeng, Dajiangkou, Puhua'an, Muzinao, Sanzikeng, Haoyuan, and Qiaoxiakeng, and enter Yuantou together with the Fourth Army to camp for the night in order to prepare to be the right wing during the attack on Nantuan the next day (the 23rd). (It should pay close attention to movements in Nantuan and spy on the enemy's situation.)

The Twelfth Army, as the main reserves, should move out behind the Third Army at 3:30 A.M. tomorrow and take up a position around Haoyuan and Qiaoxiakeng behind the camp of the Fourth Army. It will be the right wing behind the Third Army when attacking Nantuan. The line from Podong, Laizhu-

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 228–29. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 263–64.

1. Nantuan is a town in northern Ningdu *xian*; the places mentioned in this document are located in northern Ningdu and southeastern Yongfeng *xian*.

2. This order was issued at 7:30 P.M. from the headquarters of the First Front Army in Yaofang, Yongfeng *xian*.

3. Gao Shuxun commanded the Nationalist Twenty-sixth Army's Twenty-seventh Division.

ting, Zhongcun, and Songshuyan will be the dividing line in the battle; north of the line will be the Third Regiment's responsibility and south of the line (including the line itself) will be the Fourth Army's.

4. In case the enemy at Zhongcun retreats to Nantuan or Yuantou, the Third Army Group should do its best to enter into Nantuan to camp for the night, whereas the Third Army, the Twelfth Army, and the Fourth Army should all go into Yuantou and its neighboring areas for the night in preparation for attacking Nantuan the day after tomorrow.

5. The Headquarters and its subordinate troops will follow the Army Committee to move into the vicinity of Dongkeng to take command. Tomorrow it will receive reports on the streets of Zhongcun, while the day after tomorrow the command post will be at Shangchao and Xiachao when attacking Nantuan.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

# *Order to Occupy Nanfeng Before the Enemy*<sup>1</sup>

(May 24, 1931)<sup>2</sup>

1. According to reports, the remnants of Sun Lianzhong's troops have already left Dongshao on the 23rd and fled toward Yihuang. Zhu Shaojiang's three divisions<sup>3</sup> have also passed through Guangchang and escaped in the direction of Nanfeng.

2. The Front Army has decided to take a shortcut and occupy Nanfeng before the enemy gets there. If the enemy (Mao [Bingwen], Xu [Kexiang], and Hu [Zuyu]) is still to our rear, and on the right of us, we shall intercept him.

3. The Third Army Group, as the left column, should leave its present location tomorrow (the 25th) for the three-and-a-half-day march to Nanfeng via Wucun, Qiacun, and Sankeng, with the purpose of occupying Nanfeng City as soon as possible. Upon arriving [in the vicinity of] Nanfeng [City], it should take up a position near Shishanjie,<sup>4</sup> wait for orders for the next moves, and also dispatch a division of troops as its advance party to reach Nanfeng [City] within three days. It must get to the outskirts of Nanfeng City by the 27th, attack the city, occupy it as the opportunity presents itself, and protect the advance of our main forces.

4. The First Army Group, as the right column, will move out from its current locations (Matian, Nantuan, and Shangchao) at 4:00 A.M. tomorrow, for the three-and-a-half-day march to Nanfeng via Luokou, Yanfang, Kuzhu, Ganzhu, Fenglin, and Modao Ferry, in the order: Third Army, Fourth Army, General Headquarters' subordinate troops, and Twelfth Army. When it reaches the vicinity of Nanfeng City, it should camp in the region of Yaochao and await orders for the next move.

The Third Army should also dispatch one division as an advance party to

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 230–33.

1. This order directs Red Army forces to march from northern Ningdu *xian* through parts of Guangchang and Nanfeng *xian*; the bulk of the place-names mentioned in the text are in these *xian*.

2. This order was issued at 11:00 P.M. from headquarters in Nantuan, Ningdu *xian*.

3. Zhu Shaojiang was commander of the Nationalist Sixth Army. The three divisions in question were the Eighth, Twenty-fourth, and Fifth; their commanders are mentioned in the following paragraph.

4. Shishanjie was a town to the west of Nanfeng City.

make the three-day march to the vicinity of Nanfeng City, so as to arrive there on the 27th and cover the advance of our main force.

5. The Thirty-fifth Army should arrive at Dongshao on the 26th to await further orders. Its responsibility is to escort and protect all the bulky baggage from all the units until the 28th and then to wait for further commands.

6. All schools and the Red Guard regiments attached to the battalions (except for the Fourth Company) will revert to the control of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and move toward Hexi.<sup>5</sup>

7. When each army reaches its bivouac site, it should maintain liaison with the other armies. The advance troops should pay special attention to spying on the enemy and immediately report to Headquarters (the daily itineraries are to be announced separately).

8. Headquarters will follow the armies of the right wing, marching behind the Fourth Army but in front of the Twelfth Army.

It is so ordered.

Points for attention:

The advance parties from all routes must reach the city of Nanfeng before the enemy does. They are to occupy it, to deploy guards, and to make contact with each other until the main forces arrive. They must not give this city up. The advance parties will receive orders from the division commanders and political commissars who get there first. For instance, if the three bandits, Mao, Xu, and Hu, have already occupied the city, then the advance parties should attack them together.

Itineraries for the Advance of the First Front Army of the Red Army  
from the Vicinity of Nantuan  
(May 1931 at Nantuan)

Route	Sections of the Army	May 25	May 26	May 27	May 28
Army of the Left	Advance Party (one division of the Third Army Group)	From Dongshao to Qiacun (70) <sup>6</sup>	Jingxishan (65)	Occupy or attack Nanfeng City (30)	Occupy Nanfeng City
	Main Force (Third Army Group less one division)	From Nantuan to Wucun and Wuxi (40-50)	Qiacun (40)	Sankeng (45)	Shisanjie (40)

5. "Hexi" literally means "west of the river," but it seems more likely to be a place-name in this context.

6. This and all similar figures indicate distances in *li*.

Army of the Right	Advance Party (one division of the Third Army)	From Matian via Luokou to Kuzhu (70)	From Kuzhu to Fenglin via Ganzhu, Luofang, and Baishe (90)	Via Xiayang, occupy Nanfeng City; if the enemy has already arrived, attack him (40)	Occupy Nanfeng City
	Third Army (less one division)	From Matian via Luokou and Yanfang to the vicinity of Naoyuan (55)	From Naoyuan via Kuzhu to Ganzhu (65)	Via Luofang, Baishe, and Fenglin to the vicinity of Modao Ford (70)	Via Xiayang to the vicinity of Yaopu (20)
	Fourth Army	From Nantuan to Yanfang via Luokou (50)	From Yanfang via Kuzhu to Ganzhu (70)	Same as above (70)	Same as above
	Units subordinated to Headquarters	From Buyuan to Yanfang via Nantuan and Luokou (55)	Same as above	Via Luofang and Baishe to the vicinity of Fenglin (50)	Via Modao Ford and Xiayang to Yaopu (40)
	Twelfth Army	From Shangchao and Xiachao to Yanfang via Nantuan and Luokou (55)	Same as above	To Fenglin (50)	Same as above

*Note:* Unless it is absolutely necessary, no army is allowed to change this schedule arbitrarily. If it proves impossible to get to the destination laid down in time, this must be immediately reported to Headquarters and the other armies must be informed.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

# *Minutes of the First Eight Meetings of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army*

(May 25–June 10, 1931)

## **First Meeting of the General Front Committee**

May 25, 1931, 8:00 P.M., at the Luokou-Yanfang Headquarters<sup>1</sup>

Participants: [Mao] Zedong, Zhu De, Lin Biao

Nonvoting Participants: [Luo] Ronghuan<sup>2</sup> and [Guo] Huayu<sup>3</sup>

1. Available information regarding the situation of the enemy: According to radio reports, Mao Bingwen's radio station broadcast a report this evening from Toupi, but we do not know whether or not they will move out from there. Hu [Zuyu]'s and Xu [Kexiang]'s positions are not clear. Some peasants from Yanfang have reported that enemy sentries had been posted in front of the mountain. Mao [Bingwen]'s and Xu's units started to retreat from Luokou on the morning of the 23rd but had not completely pulled out until the afternoon of the 24th. It is estimated that the enemies may concentrate today along the line from Guangchang to Toupi, and the enemies at Toupi may concentrate tomorrow at Guangchang City.

2. Questions regarding our operations: It appears that the enemies at Toupi (one division of Mao's troops) will retreat. If we attack them with our First Army

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Our source for these materials is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 265–80, where they are reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979. A version that differs in some respects can be found in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 18, pp. 113–27.

1. Luokou is a town in northern Ningdu *xian*. The town of Toupi (also written Toupo or Toubei), prominently mentioned in the text, is not far to the southeast in western Guangchang *xian*. The first several of the meetings whose minutes are recorded here were held in various places in the Ningdu-Guangchang area.

2. Luo Ronghuan (1902–1963), a native of Hengshan in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1927, fought on the Jinggangshan, and served in the Fourth Army as a political commissar at various levels.

3. Guo Huaruo (1904– ), a native of Fuzhou in Fujian, joined the Communist Party in 1925 while at the Whampoa Academy. After studying in the Soviet Union in 1927–1928, he rose to become chief of staff first of the Fourth Red Army and then of the First Front Army. He is here referred to by his alternative name of Huayu.



Group, we can drive them away. But our Third Army Group is still at Wucun. If we capture Toupi and pursue the enemy to Guangchang, the Third Army Group is 100 *li* away and cannot arrive in time to provide assistance, so it will not be easy to wipe out the enemy. Therefore, it is necessary to combine the two army groups and attack Mao, Xu, and Hu with all our forces, and it has been decided that tomorrow (the 26th) the entire Front Army will move to Kuzhu and concentrate there.

## Second Meeting of the General Front Committee

May 26, 1931, 8:00 P.M., at the Headquarters in Kuzhu Market

Participants: [Mao Ze]dong, [Zhu] De, Lin [Biao], [Peng De]huai, and [Huang Gong]lue.<sup>4</sup>

Nonvoting Participants: [Cai Hui]wen,<sup>5</sup> [Luo Rong]huan, [Luo Bing]hui,<sup>6</sup> and [Guo] Hua[ruo]

1. Available information regarding the situation of the enemy: According to the peasants' reports, the enemies at Toupi have already retreated, and there are three divisions of enemy troops at Guangchang. There is no news from the radio. We estimate that the whole of the enemy forces could all converge at Guangchang City, and it appears they may retreat to Nanfeng via Qianshan.

2. Questions regarding our operations: In the current situation in which the enemy is still in Guangchang City, if we followed our original plans to go to Nanfeng City, the enemy would be behind us, and this would be inconvenient for our operations. Therefore, we should first seize Guangchang City, driving Mao, Xu and Hu to retreat, and thus obtaining a more favorable position for victory in the second battle.<sup>7</sup> Thereafter, we should pursue all our enemies furiously, forcing them to give up Nanfeng City, so as to facilitate our fund-raising activities in the future. Tomorrow the Third Army will move quickly toward Nanfeng via

4. Huang Gonglue (1898–1931), a native of Xiangxiang in Hunan, was a warlord military officer and Whampoa graduate who joined the Communist Party in 1927. After serving with Peng Dehuai in the Fifth Army, he became commander of the Sixth Army in early 1930 and commander of the Third Army in late 1930.

5. Cai Huiwen (1908–1936), a native of Youxian in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1926, fought on the Jinggangshan, and served as a political commissar in the Fourth Army and, after June 1930, in the Third Army.

6. Luo Binghui (1897–1946), a native of Yiliang in Yunnan, was a warlord and Nationalist army officer. While serving as a militia leader in Ji'an in 1929 he joined the Communist Party and later led his troops off to join the Red Army; in 1931 he was commander of the Twelfth Red Army.

7. I.e., the Second Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.

Ganzhu. Provided that Lu Xiaochen<sup>8</sup> has not concentrated his whole division (three regiments) together and prepared to defend it resolutely, the Third Army could very well seize Nanfeng City, so that Mao, Xu, and Hu, when they are defeated and forced to retreat, will have no alternative but to return to Fuzhou. Thus, several more *xian* towns will be available to us for fund-raising. The rest of the troops will be divided into two routes to attack Guangchang, the Fourth Army constituting the left wing and the Twelfth Army the right, while the Third Army Group will be the general reserve force. The Fourth and Twelfth Armies should dispatch one regiment each to move forward tonight at 1:00 A.M. as the advance force, lest the enemies escape.

3. Questions regarding the rear: The rear hospital is set up in Xiaobu. At Luokou, there is a transit station for wounded soldiers, under the responsibility of the Eastern Branch Committee. At Kuzhu, the wounded soldiers will be taken care of by their respective clinics. The bulky baggage and the staff will be transported to Kuzhu to await further orders.

### Third Meeting of the General Front Committee

May 28, 1931, 8:00 P.M., while resting in Guangchang City

Participants: [Mao Ze]dong, [Zhu] De, [Peng De]huai, [Lin] Biao, and Lin [Ye]<sup>9</sup>  
 Nonvoting Participants: [Guo] Hua[ruo], [Yuan Guo]ping,<sup>10</sup> [Luo Rong]huan, and [Luo Bing]hui

1. The results of the attack on the city: We began to attack the city on the 27th. Not until 9:00 in the evening of that day did we break through the fortifications. By then, the enemy units under Hu and Xu had already entirely retreated from Nanfeng. Though we suffered four hundred casualties dead and wounded, and captured very few guns, the wounding of the commander of an enemy division, Hu Zuyu, and the seizure of the city of Guangchang (Hu is severely wounded and may die) have created a more favorable situation for the whole battle.

2. Available information regarding the enemy: Already day before yesterday (the 26th) Mao Bingwen crossed the river and retreated to Nanfeng. Hu and Xu

8. Lu Xiaochen commanded the Nationalist army's Thirteenth Division.

9. The version of this document contained in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol.18, p. 115, identifies the participant named "Lin" as Lin Ye. Lin (1902–1934), a native of Longyan in Fujian, was a Whampoa graduate who joined the Red Army in mid-1929 and became Twelfth Army chief of staff in mid-1930.

10. Yuan Guoping (1905–1941), a native of Shaodong in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1925; by 1929 he was a member of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Special Committee, and in 1930 he became head of the Political Department of the Third Army Group.

began to retreat yesterday morning, and by last night at 9:00 they had withdrawn completely. Hu Zuyu was wounded by our side, and we estimate that the enemy must necessarily retreat and defend Nanfeng.

3. Questions regarding our operations: At present, it is too late to catch up with Hu and Xu and attack Nanfeng (the bridges have already been destroyed by the enemy and are now being rebuilt). Strategically and topographically speaking, we should first pursue Liu Heding to seize the city of Jianning<sup>11</sup> before he does, so as to facilitate our future fund-raising. Consequently, the Fourth Army should stay at Guangchang today temporarily to take care of the wounded and reorganize the troops. It should only dispatch the Tenth Division to pursue and attack Hu and Xu, on the principle of not confronting them but pursuing them to the vicinity of Qianshan. The rest of the army should go to attack Jianning. The Third Army Group must immediately cross the river and advance toward Jianning. On the first day they should reach the vicinity of Shuinan (50 *li* from Guangchang), and on the next day (the 29th) they should move to within 15 to 20 *li* from Lixin and camp there in preparation for the attack on Jianning City on the third day. The Twelfth Army should follow the General Headquarters and march behind the Third Army Group. After Jianning is occupied, the Fourth and the Twelfth Armies and the Third Army Group should divide up to raise funds in Jianning, Taining, and Lichuan. If Mao, Xu, and Hu leave Nanfeng City, then we can occupy the four *xian* of Nanfeng, Yihuang, Lichuan, and Jianning and raise funds.

4. Arrangements in the rear: The Fourth Army should send people to be responsible for the wounded, and the local governments should provide assistance in the form of stretchers to transport the wounded to the Xiaobu Hospital via Kuzhu.

5. The question of food allowances and pocket money: When raising funds, those units that attack the local bullies will still get 1 *jiao* a day as their food allowances; units that do not have the opportunity to attack the local bullies (because they are harassing the enemy troops at Xingguo or are located at the rear hospital . . .) should get 1.5 *jiao* as soon as funds are available.

As soon as funds have been raised, the troops can get pocket money twice in June, 1 *yuan* each time.

The Conference of the General Front Committee has decided that we will get a day of rest at Lixin tomorrow (May 30th) and that the Third Army Group will dispatch one division to wage guerrilla warfare in the direction of Jianning.

#### Fourth Meeting of the General Front Committee

May 30, 1931, 8:00 P.M., at the Headquarters in Lixin

Participants: [Mao Ze]dong, [Zhu] De, [Peng De]huai, and Tan [Zhenlin]

11. Jianning is a *xian* in Fujian adjacent to Guangchang.

Nonvoting Participants: [Guo] Hua[ruo], [Yuan Guo]ping, [Zuo] Quan,<sup>12</sup> and [Luo Bing]hui.

1. Questions regarding our operations: There are probably four regiments of Liu Heding's<sup>13</sup> troops in Jianning City. They cannot have imagined that our main forces would get here so incredibly fast. But today the enemy has not yet moved forward. Given that the entire enemy front line has failed, we can estimate that if Liu Heding does not retreat, he will have to defend the city. Since we need to plan for raising funds for the third phase battle<sup>14</sup> and for the overall combat situation, we very much need to seize Jianning City, for only thus can we expand to the three *xian* of [Jianning,] Lichuan, and Taining to raise funds. Consequently it has been decided that if the enemy does not leave the city, we will use the Third Army Group as the assault force to attack the city. We will plan for an assault lasting seven days. We need to dig tunnels and blow them up with gunpowder. (Gunpowder should be collected by the unit of the Twelfth Army in Lixin. It must collect at least 300 *jin* within three days and take it to the front for use on the fourth day.) The Twelfth Army (except for the Thirty-fourth Division) is the reserve force for attack on the city. It should follow the Headquarters, moving toward Jianning behind the Third Army Group at 8:00 tomorrow morning. The Thirty-fourth Division should stay in Lixin with the division headquarters and one regiment deployed near Lixin, and one regiment stationed in Guiyang. One company should also be sent forward to Shuinan and Guangchang for liaison, and another regiment should be stationed between Lixin and Kangdu to maintain contact with the Fourth Army. Their duties are (1) to establish the work, (2) to raise funds (each regiment needs to raise 1,000 *yuan* a day), (3) to maintain communications with the rear, and (4) to purchase 300 *jin* of saltpetre<sup>15</sup> within three days, and on the fourth day ship them to the front.

2. The question of establishing a staff office: The chief of staff, Zhu Yunqing, has died in a hospital in the rear.<sup>16</sup> His former position is now filled temporarily by Comrade Guo Huaruo. Comrade Zuo Quan is now the acting chief of staff. We must circulate an order informing all departments concerning this.

12. Zuo Quan (1905–1941), was a native of Liling in Hunan. A Whampoa graduate, he joined the Communist Party in 1925, then studied in the Soviet Union for several years. In mid-1930, he returned to China and came to the Central Soviet Area, serving at the Red Army academy and commanding the New Twelfth Army in Fujian before becoming head of the Revolutionary Military Commission's staff office in May 1931.

13. Liu Heding commanded the Fifty-sixth Division of the Nationalist Sixth Army.

14. I.e., resisting the upcoming Third Encirclement and Suppression Campaign.

15. For making gunpowder.

16. Zhu Yunqing (1903–1931), native of Meixian in Guangdong, was a Whampoa graduate who joined the Communist Party in 1925. He held various positions in the Fourth Army during the Jinggangshan struggle, and afterward was successively chief of staff of the Fourth Army, First Army Group, and First Front Army. He died in Donggu.

3. The question of adding members to the subcommittee of the General [Front] Committee: Four members of the subcommittee of the General [Front] Committee, Liu Bojian, Liu Nankui, He Jinrong, and Li Zhuoran, have left here.<sup>17</sup> Three members should be added to the subcommittee. It has been decided that Zuo Quan, Yang Lisan, and Lin Deqing will be added, with Wang Guozhong still serving as the acting secretary.<sup>18</sup>

#### **Fifth Meeting of the General Front Committee**

May 31, 1931, at 9:00 P.M., at the Headquarters of the Third Army Group outside the western gate of Jianning City

Participants: [Mao Ze]dong, [Zhu] De, [Peng De]huai, and Lin [Biao]

Nonvoting Participants: [Yuan Guo]ping and [Guo] Hua[ruo]

1. Estimates regarding the enemy's situation: The reason why Liu Heding met us in battle this time was that he did not know our main force had arrived. Similarly, when we dispatched the Third Army directly to Nanfeng on the 27th, He Yingqin and Zhu Shaoliang thought that our main force was still attacking Nanfeng, and only one unit was attacking Guangchang. Therefore, they changed their original plan of keeping the three divisions of Mao, Xu, and Hu to defend Guangchang and bringing Liu Heding's main force and Zhou Zhiquan<sup>19</sup> to hurry to the relief of Guangchang. Instead, they asked Mao, Xu, and Hu to withdraw to Nanfeng and kept Liu and Zhou in the original positions to keep watch. Thus we have obtained final victory in the second phase of the battle. This time we have repulsed Liu Heding's four regiments, probably wiping out over three regiments, and captured more than two thousand guns, as well as enough Western medical supplies to supply the entire army for half a year and one radio. All this was completely beyond the enemy's expectations. Under these circumstances, and taking into account also the seriousness of the Guangdong problem, we should advance and occupy Lichuan with a major force and attack in the direction of

17. Liu Bojian (1895–1935), a native of Pingchang in Sichuan, studied in France, where he joined the Communist Party in 1921. After two periods of study in the Soviet Union, he went to the Central Soviet Area in late 1930 and served on the staff of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission until becoming political commissar of the Fifth Army Group at the end of the year. No biographical information is available regarding Liu Nankui and He Jinrong. Li Zhuoran (1899–1989), a native of Xiangxiang in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1923. After guerrilla work on the Jiangxi-Hunan border, he joined the Fifth Army and rose to division commander; in 1931 he commanded the First Division of the Third Army Group.

18. Yang Lisan (1900–1954), a native of Changsha in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1927, and fought in the Red Army on the Jinggangshan. By late 1930 he was a staff officer in the First Front Army's General Headquarters. We have not located biographical information on Lin Deqing or Wang Guozhong.

19. Zhou Zhiquan commanded the Nationalist army's New Fourteenth Brigade.

Nancheng, to coerce the enemy into giving up Nanfeng, and even Yihuang, and Nancheng. Thus we can get Jianning, Lichuan, Nanfeng, Nancheng, Yihuang, and such *xian* seats as Le'an, Yongfeng, and Jishui. The West Route Army to the west of the [Gan] River should move toward Xiajiang and occupy it. Considering that Liu has been defeated by our Sixteenth Army, and Han Deqin<sup>20</sup> captured by our Seventh Army (see the enemy's radio report), it will not be easy for Luo Lin's lone army<sup>21</sup> to defend Ji'an by itself. During the first stage of our work, it is therefore possible that Ji'an can be seized.

2. Decisions regarding our operations: In order to reorganize the troops, to hold meetings to deal with matters after the battle, and to allow the soldiers to recuperate, starting from tomorrow (June 1), we will rest here for two days. On June 3, the Third Army Group will send its Sixth Division to work and raise funds in Taining. The remainder will enter Lichuan. The Twelfth Army will still be stationed along the line from Jianning to Guiyang to raise funds, work, and deal with matters in the rear of Jianning (such as wounded soldiers, booty, and so on). After the Thirty-fifth Division reaches Jianning, the Twelfth Army should send troops into Jianning to take over the Sixth Division's work. If the enemy leaves Nanfeng, we should deploy the Third Army Group in Lichuan, Xizi, Xiaoshi, and so on, that is, in the general area to the east of the river between Lichuan and Nancheng. The Fourth Army should be deployed between the river from Nancheng to Lichuan, and the river from Nancheng to Nanfeng<sup>22</sup> (including Nanfeng City). The Third Army should raise funds in the area to the west of the river from Nancheng to Nanfeng. The Twelfth Army [should take up a position] along the line from Jianning to Taining.<sup>23</sup>

The Third Army Group should reorganize its forces and appoint additional cadres tomorrow and hold an activists' meeting the day after tomorrow. The Twelfth Army should hold its activists' meeting tomorrow and make reports. The tasks for work in the locality are (1) to distribute land, (2) to organize Red Guard regiments and guerrilla bands, (3) to establish political power, and (4) to establish the Party. The tasks concerning the army itself are (1) to raise funds, (2) to intensify political, military, and Party training, and (3) to expand the Red Army.

3. The problem of collecting Western medicines: The most valuable booty we have obtained this time is a large quantity of Western medicines. In addition to the 15 to 16 *dan* of medicines captured by Headquarters from the medical units of two regiments, the dispensaries of two other medical units from divi-

20. Han Deqin commanded the Nationalist Fifty-second Division.

21. Actually, Luo Lin did not command an entire army, but only the Nationalist Fifth Army's Seventy-seventh Division.

22. The Litan River flows northward from Lichuan to Nancheng; the Xu River flows from Nanfeng to Nancheng.

23. These two cities are located across the border in Fujian Province.

sional and army hospitals have also been captured and are now being guarded by troops sent from the Third Army Group. All of these will be collected tomorrow (probably enough for a half-year's supplies). Except for whatever is needed for the wounded soldiers here, the rest should be inventoried, clearly recorded, and handed over to Headquarters, which will in turn dispatch specialists to transport them to the Eastern Branch Committee<sup>24</sup> for storage and later distribution to the various hospitals.

4. The problem of wounded soldiers: It is estimated that in the course of this last battle, the casualties of the Third Army Group were no more than three hundred soldiers. The Twelfth Army had about thirty wounded. They are being taken care of for the time being by the army hospitals set up by the Twelfth Army's medical department (under these circumstances, they can get at least one month's treatment). When the army hospital of the Third Army Group arrives, they will be responsible for all the wounded. All those who are injured so severely that they will not be able to recover within a month should be transferred to the rear whenever it is convenient to transport them.

5. The question of prisoners of war: In view of the present urgent need to expand the Red Army, none of the captives should be let go and all of them should be recruited into the Red Army. The number is approximately 3,000. Apart from the 1,500 to be kept by the Third Army Group, the other 1,500 will be recruited into the Fourth and Twelfth Armies. These captives should be immediately assigned to various divisions for training. In the course of training, the undesirable ones will be picked out and sent away.

6. The question of weapons and booty: On this occasion, something more than two thousand guns, as well as other booty, has been captured. All of it will be transported to the rear under the responsibility of the Twelfth Army, but the troops should keep what they themselves need. Each company should carry ninety guns with it, regardless of how many men it has.

7. The question of the organization of the artillery: This time we have captured two mountain cannons. One will be kept by the Third Army Group. With the one they already have, a mountain cannon company can be formed. The other one will be sent to the rear, and with the addition of the two obtained in Jiuyuanling and Baisha, a mountain cannon company can be formed in the First Army Group.

8. The question of a radio team: For the sake of convenience in allocating staff and equipment, and uniformity of training, the radio team of the Front Army should be set up as an independent system. It has been decided to set up a radio team for the Front Army headquarters, under which there will be four subdivisions. The personnel, telegraph machines, and so on will be evenly dis-

24. The text of this document in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 18, p. 118, does not specifically mention an "Eastern Branch Committee"; instead, it says the "Regional Committee" (*qu wei*). We have no way of determining which of these versions is correct.

tributed. The headquarters radio station is, however, of foremost importance; next comes the one belonging to the Third Army Group; then the rear unit; and then the one attached to the Seventh Army west of the [Gan] River. As for the specifics of the distribution and acquisition of personnel and equipment, and the plans for the second radio training class, they will be drafted and put forward by the staff office.

9. The question of the base hospitals: Because of the lack of specialized staff to take responsibility for management and supervision, the base hospitals have been very inadequate. Especially since the AB Corps developed in a big way, our wounded comrades have been afraid of going to the base hospital for treatment.<sup>25</sup> From now on, in order to facilitate supervision and management, each army should run its own base hospitals. The general hospital will only accept the seriously wounded (those who cannot recover within a month) and those with difficult illnesses. All medication should, however, be distributed or allocated by the general hospital. Two months from now, after most of the wounded and sick soldiers in the branch hospitals have been discharged, all the personnel of the branch hospitals, apart from those who return to their original armies, must be investigated thoroughly by the general hospital. Those who are free from any suspicion of involvement in the AB Corps will be allocated to the various armies.

10. The question of discipline on the battlefield: During this last battle, a company leader and a political commissar from the Third Army Group were suspected of being Reorganization Clique [members]. They retreated from the front without orders, let the defeated enemy escape, and held unauthorized meetings to elect a regimental commander and a political commissar. Another conspirator had concocted rumors on the battlefield and thereby weakened the army's morale. We plan to execute him by firing squad after trial. Another commander of a special task regiment (*tewu tuan*) from the Twelfth Army took his troops with him to search [X] mountain without an order. Later, when he was ordered to be transferred [to another assignment], he did so only after the time limit set and thus was unable to fulfill his duties. Another regimental commander did not obey orders when fighting at Shaxi; he hesitated and did not advance, and therefore merits dismissal. Yet another platoon leader concocted rumors at the front and likewise merits dismissal. In order to maintain the Red Army's iron discipline and to facilitate the accomplishments of our political tasks in battle, such people who have violated discipline in time of battle need to be severely punished. The means of punishment should be proposed and approved by the Front Committee of the Third Army Group and the Military Committee of the Twelfth Army. In addition, they should submit reports to the General Headquar-

25. Several well-publicized cases of suspected AB Corps activity among hospital cadres were under investigation around this time, and this probably accounts for the comments here. See Chen, "The Futian Incident," p. 25.



ters, and when the Third Army Group and the Twelfth Army enforce discipline, they should call together all commanders and fighters and proclaim the facts to them.

### Sixth Meeting of the General Front Committee

June 2, 1931, 9:00 P.M., at the Headquarters outside of Jianning City

Participants: [Mao Ze]dong, [Zhu] De, [Peng De]huai, Lin [Biao], [Yuan Guo]ping, [Deng] Ping,<sup>26</sup> [Guo] Hua[ruo], [Zuo] Qian, and Yang [Lisan]

1. Questions regarding our operations: At present, Hao's and Guo's divisions have retreated to Yongfeng and Jishui, Sun Lianzhong has retreated to Yihuang, and Jiang and Cai withdrew from Xingguo to Ganzhou on the 30th. Zhu, Mao, Hu, and Xu's divisions are still in Nanfeng.<sup>27</sup> The armies opposed to Chiang [Kaishhek] from Guangdong and Guangxi are eager to move into Hunan. Chiang is obliged to deal with Guangdong and Guangxi first, and therefore it is possible that he will assume a defensive role toward us. Consequently, our actions during the first stage should still follow the original plan and consist in raising funds to the north, mobilizing the masses, enlarging the soviet areas, and seeking to capture such *xian* seats as Nanfeng, Nancheng, and Yihuang. The goal of this stage is to see that these tasks are carried out more satisfactorily. Therefore, if the enemy retreats from Nanfeng, the entire Third Army Group should move into Lichuan and threaten Nancheng, the Fourth Army should enter and occupy Nanfeng City, and the Third Army should enter and occupy Yihuang and the area to the west of Nanfeng. The Twelfth Army should remain at Taining and Jianning. If the enemy defends Nanfeng, Nancheng, Fuzhou [Linchuan], and even Yihuang, the Third Army Group should keep one division in Taining and the rest in Lichuan. As for the division that is stationed in Taining, it should deploy one regiment between Tai[ning] and Li[chuan], one regiment between Tai[ning] and Jian[ning], and the rest in the city. In the first stage, the Third Army Group does not want Hengcun, but only the Tai[ning]-Li[chuan] road. It should enter the area between Lichuan and Xiaoshi with one of its divisions, build a bridge, and wage guerrilla war in the direction of Xiaoshi. One division should be deployed at Lichuan City and one at Hufang, with one remaining in

26. The characters for this and the previous Ping are different, so there is no possibility of confusion in Chinese. Deng Ping (1908–1935), a native of Fushun in Sichuan, joined the revolution in 1927 and fought with the Red Fifth Army; by 1930 he was Third Army Group chief of staff and concurrently Fifth Army commander.

27. These references are to troops of the four separate Nationalist armies engaged in the Second Encirclement Campaign: Fifth Route Army forces of Hao Mengling and Guo Huazong; Twenty-sixth Route Army forces of Sun Lianzhong; Nineteenth Route Army forces of Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai; and Sixth Route Army forces of Zhu Shaoliang, Mao Bingwen, Hu Zuyu, and Xu Kexiang.

Taining. Its main headquarters should be at Lichuan City. If the enemy defends Nanfeng and Nancheng and refuses to advance, then the Third Army Group should keep to the right, toward Guanze, Shaowu, and Taining; the Twelfth Army's affiliated troops should be stationed to the northwest of Jianning City; the Thirty-fourth Division in the country to the west; the Thirty-sixth Division in the country to the east; and the Fourth Army between Nanfeng, Lichuan, and Jianning. If the enemy advances, we will refrain from fighting, but keep to the right (we will, however, fight again when we have concentrated our forces). Until the enemy retreats, the Third Army should be deployed within the right angle of Nanfeng-Baishe and Nanfeng-Dongpi, to block the routes of Zhu and Sun<sup>28</sup> and to carry out fund-raising work in this area. The Headquarters is with the Fourth Army. It has been decided that the Thirty-fifth Army will move to Ruijin to receive important supplies from western Fujian, to keep transportation open between Fujian and Jiangxi, and to wipe out the bandit Wu Wensun.<sup>29</sup> The 103rd and 105th regiments of the Thirty-fifth Division will be sent back to Jianning and return to the administrative system of the Twelfth Army.

In the second stage, the areas in which the various armies will operate are as follows:

Third Army Group—Dayu, Suichuan, Shangyou, Chongyi, Taihe (west of the [Gan] River), and Wan'an (west of the [Gan] River)

Fourth Army Group—Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, and Xinfeng

Third Army—Yudu, Taihe (east of the river), Nankang, and Ganxian

Twelfth Army—Jianning, Ninghua, Tingzhou, Ruijin, Shicheng, and Guangchang

Right now, the Twelfth Army may dispatch a regiment to the new area to make work arrangements. After the enemy retreats from Nanfeng, the Third Army Group may send a division to the new areas to prepare for work. Similarly, the Third and Fourth armies may each send a portion of their troops to the new territories at the appropriate time to make preparations.

The work of the three stages remains, as decided before, to move northward during the first stage, eastward during the second, and westward during the third.

The work of the first stage will not take longer than two months at most. There are four items of work directed toward the outside: (1) to establish guerrilla bands quickly, (2) to distribute the land quickly, (3) to set up soviets, and (4) to establish the Party and the [Youth] League. Internally, there are three

28. The reference is to halting the advance of the forces of Zhu Shaoliang and Sun Lianzhong, mentioned above at the beginning of this paragraph.

29. As no Nationalist army high-level unit commander of this name is listed as having participated in the Second Encirclement Campaign, Wu Wensun is probably a petty local Fujianese warlord.

tasks: (1) to raise 1,000,000 *yuan* for the expenses of the third stage in the war, in addition to funds for our food; (2) to strengthen military training, technical training, political training, and Party and League training; and (3) to increase the numbers of the Red Army by 30,000.

The central task of the work during the entire three stages is to prepare for the military operations during the third stage, with southern Jiangxi as the heart of the action.

2. Questions regarding the telegram from the Central Bureau:<sup>30</sup>

- a. Because of the need to expand the work here, Comrade Mao will not go to Longgang for the time being.
- b. Comrade Zuo Quan is the chief of staff. He is sent to the rear as the special commissioner of the General Headquarters. His commissions are (1) to deal with all wounded soldiers, Western medicine, the base hospital, prisoners of war, weapons, and so on, and (2) to direct the organization, training, and operations of the local armed forces.

3. Questions regarding mistakes made in the line for mass work:

- a. On a former occasion, the Fourth Army burned down a whole street when burning a local bully's house in Shuinan. Compensation is to be paid for this by the Twelfth Army on the Fourth Army's behalf, and the political department of the Fourth Army will issue a proclamation.
- b. The Fourth Division arbitrarily confiscated the "Sui'an Chinese and Western Hospital" in Jiancheng. We must investigate, punish, and issue warnings. In future, we must not confiscate Western medical dispensaries or hospitals. We should pay them in cash for Western medicine when we buy it.

4. Problems regarding Western medicine: Apart from the portion retained and used by the Third Army Group, the Western medicine obtained this time and handed over to General Headquarters amounts to 25 *dan*. Of it, two-thirds of each of the drugs important for treating wounds, such as iodine tablets, iodoform,<sup>31</sup> and alcohol, should be kept at the Headquarters clinic, and one-third sent to the rear and handed over to the Central Bureau. Within ten days to half a month, the essential drugs should be distributed to the branch hospitals, under the responsibility of Comrade Zuo Quan.

5. The question of weapons: Each company should carry at least ninety guns with it, even if it does not have enough people [to use them].

30. The reference is presumably to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, and not the Central Bureau in Shanghai.

31. The Chinese here reads *sidianfang*. *Dianfang* is the common Chinese name for iodoform (CHI<sub>3</sub>). It is not clear why Mao has placed the number *si* ("four") in front of this compound, but he is probably referring to iodoform, which was in common use as an antiseptic in the 1930s.

### Seventh Meeting of the General Front Committee

June 4, [1931], at Kangduyu

Participants: Mao [Zedong], Zhu [De], Lin [Biao]

Nonvoting Participants: Luo [Ronghuan] and Guo [Huaruo]

Questions regarding the deployment of the various units:

Fourth Army: Whether the enemy retreats from Nanfeng or not, you should still follow the deployment plan below, but only three days after the Third Army Group reaches Lichuan (i.e., you should move on the 9th).

One division for Shanghang, Xiping, Xialiu, Dongping, and Zhaosa.

One division for Xiaqiao, Dongtan, Zhongxian, and Longan.

One division for Dayangkeng, Shigoucun, Shuangtian, and Hetian.

One division for Hengcun, Zhangcun, Xichengqiao, Guishang, Guixia, Shucheng, and Zhouping.

The army headquarters should be located at Dayangkeng.

One division of the Third Army should be deployed along the line of Shishan Market, Dangkou, and Dongpi, and another along the line of Yanhe, Yubaishe, Jiyaoshi, and Sankeng.

The unit directly subordinate to the army and one other regiment should be deployed along the line of Dapaishang, Yangmeizhai, and Sanxiyu.

After the Fourth Army goes into action, its headquarters should move to Xichengqiao.

### Eighth Meeting of the General Front Committee

June 10, [1931], in the evening, at the General Political Department

Participants: Mao [Zedong], Zhu [De], Zhou [Yili]<sup>32</sup>

Nonvoting Participants: Yang [Lisan] and Guo [Huaruo]

#### 1. The current political situation and its assessment:

The economy of the Guomindang government is suffering a crisis, and the finances of the various provinces still cannot be unified. Guangdong and Guangxi have set up a military government. Wang, Li, and Bai have arrived in Guangzhou,<sup>33</sup> and have sent the Guangxi Army to Guilin, obviously with the

32. Zhou Yili (1897–1935), a native of Changsha in Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1924. After serving on the Hunan Party Committee and the Henan Party Committee, in 1930 he joined the Central Committee's Yangzi River Bureau and was sent as an emissary to the First Front Army headed by Mao. In May 1931, he became a commissar in that army.

33. Wang refers to Wang Jingwei, the former leader of the "Left Guomindang" in the 1926–1927 period. Li and Bai are Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, two major military leaders of the Guangxi clique, who had participated in 1930 in the alliance against Chiang Kaishek organized by Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang. All three of these men were involved in the establishment of a new anti-Chiang National Government in Guangzhou on June 1, 1931, of which Wang was named premier. As indicated above in the note on Hu

intention of attacking Hunan. He Jian hurried back to Changsha to deploy his troops. Zhang [X]<sup>34</sup> could not get any money, returned to Beijing, and again called together all the leaders of the northwestern armies for a meeting. Wang Jinyu and Ran Zhaochang have both found some excuse to go to Beijing. In the meantime, under present circumstances, the First Army has not failed, and the White army pursuing our Second Army Group will also have to stop because of the problem of Guangdong and Guangxi. The warlord armies in Jiangxi, in particular, have been completely defeated. Chiang Kaishek has concealed the news of the Red Army's victory. All this proves that the chaotic fighting among the warlords will not stop because of the Red Army's victory and will certainly break out very quickly in Hunan in the vicinity of Chang[sha] and Heng[yang]. Under these conditions, the Red Army will assuredly soon expand greatly everywhere. On the other hand, there is a possibility that Chiang Kaishek may give up Shaanxi, Henan, and Shandong to shorten his lines of defense. In the future, he might retreat and defend various points such as Xuzhou, Wushengguan, Changsha, and Nanchang (in Jiangxi he would retire to Nanchang, Fuzhou, and Ji'an), and even if Chiang is defeated, he will never surrender. But even if he compromises with the north and moves some troops southward, he still cannot finish off either Zhang Xueliang and the Guangxi clique or the revolutionary forces. Therefore, at present it is only by moving northward that we can encourage Guangdong and Guangxi to come out and fight. It will be two months before our main force will have been deployed in southern Jiangxi. At present, the Red Guard regiments and the Eighth Division should work toward southern Jiangxi. The rest of the armies should each send a small portion of troops to work in the new territory a month from now.

## 2. The division of labor in the Front Committee:

Organization—Zhou Yili.

Propaganda—Comrade Gu Bo<sup>35</sup> will be transferred from the rear.

Secretary General—Guo Huayu.

## 3. The question of setting up a Management Office:

In order to coordinate and inspect the military supplies at the front, a Manage-

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Hanmin to the resolution of April 1931 endorsing the line of the International, this separatist régime survived until the Japanese aggression of September 1931 required all Chinese political leaders to give priority to national unity and survival.

34. The reference is presumably to Zhang Xueliang; the missing character may be an epithet rather than a name.

35. Gu Bo (1906–1935), a native of Xunwu in Jiangxi, joined the Communist Party in 1925, and was active in Party organizing work in Xunwu until leaving to work with the Fourth Army after helping Mao conduct the "Xunwu Investigation" in 1930. In 1931 he was serving in the secretariat of the First Front Army's General Front Committee.

ment Office has been set up in the Front Army. Comrade Yang Lisan will concurrently be the head of this department, and Comrade Li Jinwen<sup>36</sup> will be military supplies officer.

4. The allowances for the month of June will be double the amount of those in the second half of May:

Starting from June 15, the Red Army troops in the rear will get 1 *jiao* 5 *fen* each for their food, and those at the front, 1 *jiao*; as for pocket money, each person will get 1 *yuan* on June 15th and another *yuan* on July 1st. The letter-carriers and a small number of people running errands will get 2 *jiao* for food per person.

5. The problem of transferring money:

All armies should dispatch a special team to escort the money all the way to the Management Department of the Central Revolutionary Army Committee at Junbu.

Orders will be issued regarding the above three items.

6. The question of work in the Eastern Route:

Le'an should consider Zhaoxi and Wangxian as its main work area.

Yihuang should consider Dongpi, Dangkou, and Xinfeng City as its main work area.

Nanfeng should consider Sanxi, Sankeng, Fenglin, Dudianqian, and Kangdu as its main work area.

Guangchang should consider Baishui, Shuinan, Toupai, Ganzhu, Fufeng, and Qianshan as its main work area.

The 105th Regiment should work at Guangchang.

7. The question of propaganda:

- a. Running the *Red Army Newspaper*
- b. Reviewing the old slogans and issuing new ones
- c. Formulating the morning and evening roll-call slogans
- d. Drafting the outlines for propaganda (the political situation and our tasks)

8. The problem of convening an enlarged conference of the Front Committee:

A conference will be called on the 20th to include the Front Committee secretary of the Third Army Group, Comrade Lin Biao of the Fourth Army, Comrade [Cai] Huiwen of the Third Army, Comrade [Tan] Zhenlin of the Twelfth Army, and Comrades [Xie] Weijun and Long Pulin<sup>37</sup> of the Eastern Branch Committee.<sup>38</sup> As soon as these individuals have returned, they should be

36. Biographical information on this individual has not been located.

37. Xie Weijun (1907–1935), a native of Laiyang in Hunan, joined the Party in 1926, fought on the Jinggangshan, and served as a political commissar in the Fourth Army. In 1931, he headed the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee's Eastern Route Subcommittee. No biographical information on Long Pulin has been located.

38. The balance of this paragraph, which is omitted from the version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, has been taken from the text as it appears in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 18, p. 127.

sent out to conduct an inspection; afterward, they should come to the conference to discuss the conference agenda, fund-raising, and mass work (during this work they should order these two booklets). Units should be moved only after the conference.

9. The problem of political communications:

Several dozen copies of the main points of important documents, some publishable resolutions, and some important political news should be reproduced at irregular intervals.

10. The work in Fujian:

The main direction in which the work of the Red Army is developing in western Fujian should not be toward Zhangzhou and the East River, but rather toward places such as Tingzhou, Liancheng, Guihua, Ninghua, and Qingliu *xian*, for only thus can it be linked to southeastern Jiangxi and the Twelfth Army enlarged. (The General Front Committee will send a letter to western Fujian.)

# ***General Order No. 14 of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviets***

(June 20, 1931)

This commission previously decided to call together a National Congress of Soviet Deputies on August 1 and establish a central government. Now, because of the long time required for the election of representatives by various localities, as well as the difficulties of transportation, the deputies from all localities will not be able to arrive on time. It has therefore been decided to change the date on which the National Congress of Soviet Deputies will take place to the anniversary of the October Revolution (November 7 according to the Western calendar). The election of deputies of the various localities should be completed before October 15, and they should then wait for the notification to attend. This general order is specially promulgated [to convey this information]. It is hoped that all [soviet] governments, all units of the Red Army, and all revolutionary organizations will take note and act accordingly. It is also important to relay the order to the revolutionary masses as a whole. It is so ordered.

Chairman  
Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong  
Zhu De  
Xiang Ying

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, p. 281, where it is reproduced from the 1981 edition of the documentary collection *Liu da yilai*.



# *Minutes of the Third Day of the First Enlarged Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army*

## *Summary*

(June 22, 1931)

2:00 P.M. on the 22nd

The number of those present is the same as before.<sup>1</sup>

Chairman Wang Jiaxiang

He declares the resumption of the meeting.

### 1. The problem of predicting the location of the third phase of the war.<sup>2</sup>

Mao: Last time, we talked about the fact that the third phase of war might start with an attack on us from Nanfeng. If that is the case, we shall be in a favorable situation and can lure the enemy deep into Ningdu, Huangpi, Xiaobu, and even Shicheng and then attack them. The situation would be unfavorable for us if the enemy came from four places—Xingguo, Baisha, Shuinan, and Nanfeng—perhaps even with the addition of a column from Le'an and another column from Futian and Donggu. It would be unusual for the enemy to concentrate on only one route by the time they get to Donggu and Longgang. If our prediction is that the enemy will come by two routes, we should endeavor to work hard to penetrate more deeply [into the masses] in the areas of southern Jiangxi. If Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] also come to fight us, we should attack them before they finish building fortifications. This time, we are able to attack them. Then we should deploy our forces on the Yudu battlefield and be sure to break through to Qifang. The entire Third Army should be employed to

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, no. 19, pp. 36–38. This version is preferable to that in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 283–85, which has a number of missing characters.

1. This meeting was held in Kangduxu. According to a note by the editors of *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, p. 36, the participants in the meeting were Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhou Yili, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Xie Weijun, Tan Zhenlin, Cai Huiwen, Guo Huaruo, and Ouyang Jian. It is also stated that the meeting began on June 20, with the "first three days" devoted to discussion of the Second "Encirclement and Suppression."

2. I.e., during the Third Encirclement Campaign, which would begin a few days after this meeting, catching the Red Army leaders off guard.

roul Jiang and Cai, thus creating a balance of power between the Nanjing government and the Guangdong government. Consequently, the actions of Jiang and Cai have a direct bearing on our choice of an area to do battle, and we must discuss this.<sup>3</sup>

Peng: The White armies have thoroughly learned, in the course of two defeats, that they are not capable of carrying out an encirclement, so this time they will certainly concentrate their forces more to carry out a pincer attack. It is not to our advantage if the enemies strengthen and further combine their forces. We should abandon Donggu and Longgang, and if Jiang and Cai advance from the direction of Xingguo and take Xingguo and Ningdu as their targets, we should arrange to have the battlefield at Yudu. Chiang Kaishek, acting in accordance with his scheme for establishing his prestige, must pursue the goal of beating us, but he no longer dreams of "exterminating" the Red Army. Therefore, when the enemy concentrates and advances by one route, let them penetrate deeply. When several columns are seeking to encircle us, we should attack before they get too close.

Mao: If the enemy advances from Nanfeng, they will have boats for transportation only north of Guangchang. Therefore, the enemy can enter Guangchang only before August 15 and can move further only after the new grain has been harvested.<sup>4</sup> Before July, we should try hard to raise funds, and we may ignore them in August. The main point is to arrange for consolidated soviet areas in Yu[du], Rui[jin], Shi[cheng], and [Chang]ting *xian* to serve as battlegrounds.

Lin: I agree with most of what has been said. The enemy may advance along three routes next time, but they will nevertheless be the same old routes. Their force on the central route will be strengthened. It is to the enemy's advantage to fight a speedy war, and we should prolong it. Jiang and Cai, because they aim to deal with Chiang Kaishek and keep their present position garrisoned, will not find it advantageous to leave Ganzhou and come via Ji'an. We should now

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3. The divisions of Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai were major units of the Nineteenth Route Army, then stationed in the area around Ji'an on the eastern edge of the soviet areas. From this location astride the Gan River, these divisions could easily move either east toward the Communist base around Donggu, or south along the river and then hook to the east toward Xingguo and Ningdu in the heart of the soviet areas. As discussion in this meeting indicates, Party leaders were anxious to determine which route the units would take. In addition, though part of the anti-Communist forces, Nineteenth Route Army officers were not particularly loyal to Chiang Kaishek; in 1933, they abortively attempted to establish an independent régime in Fujian (see the Introduction). Comments by Mao and others reflect their recognition of the ambiguous loyalties of the army commanders.

4. There was a large waterborne traffic in grain from the upper reaches of this river system down toward markets in the city of Fuzhou (Linchuan). Perhaps Mao is suggesting that with the harvest in full swing, all available boats would be tied up transporting grain. Alternatively, porters to aid in land movement further south might have been unavailable because of the need for harvest workers.

intensify our efforts to deploy forces in this area. Naturally, in the future fighting, we may attack whenever conditions are favorable to us.

Ouyang:<sup>5</sup> Jiang and Cai moved very slowly in the second phase of the fighting, and the newspapers in Ganzhou were full of anti-Chiang [Kaishek] sentiments (before the 29th). Jiang and Cai seem to have a slight tendency not to follow the orders of Chiang Kaishek.

Zhu: In the future, it will still be better to fight Zhu Shaoliang,<sup>6</sup> and the battlefield should have Longgang as the central point of concentration. The broad masses are close to us and they<sup>7</sup> cannot come very fast.

Cai: On the whole, I agree with you. Moreover, the enemy will certainly put his main force on the route from Nanfeng to Guangchang. The elements in Jiang's and Cai's forces opposed to Chiang Kaishek may be somewhat more numerous. No matter where the battle zones are, it is necessary to try to seize Yubei,<sup>8</sup> for the purpose of consolidating the Red areas and establishing liaison with Xing[guo], Yu[du], and Ning[du]. In the past, a lot of troops were used to attack Chengjiang<sup>9</sup> and Laicun, but were still unable to take them. Now with only two divisions of the Third Army sent to launch a surprise attack, it will be difficult to make arrangements.

Zhou: The enemy's third attack will certainly be launched from at least three directions, and arrangements should be made for the battlefield to be located in the area of Xing[guo], Yu[du], Ning[du], and Rui[jin].

Ouyang: In the third offensive, Chiang will certainly not launch an attack from all sides, and at most will have one or two routes, one from Nanfeng and another from Ji[an] or Yong[feng]. There are many anti-Chiang elements in the forces of Jiang and Cai, and so they will not easily come along. If they do not oppose Chiang, there will be a rear area. If they do not oppose Chiang this time, they will not retreat to Ganzhou. They have only two divisions that they dare move toward Guangdong, and they will certainly not attack Guangdong. The battlefield must be between Ningdu and Ruijin.

Chairman: We can only make a decision in broad outline, so as to prepare for the task. Now the work in Yongfeng must be consolidated at once. All fortified villages (*tuwei*) in the area of Yubei in southern Jiangxi should be destroyed and

5. Ouyang Jian (1902–1932), a native of Huarong in Hunan, joined the Communist Party during the Northern Expedition; by 1930 he was a political commissar in the Thirty-fifth Division.

6. Commander of the Nationalist Sixth Route Army.

7. I.e., the enemy forces, hampered in their advance by the refusal of the population to provide information.

8. Yubei is a contraction for "northern Yudu," commonly used in Communist Party documents during this period. Some lineages and militias in the area strongly assisted the Red Army.

9. Chengjiang (also readable as Dengjiang) is a small town in eastern Xingguo *xian*; Laicun is a larger town in southwestern Ningdu *xian*.

taken over by us.<sup>10</sup> In the Red areas, we must guard against infiltration by the AB Corps and enemy spies. In principle, hospitals should be moved, but they should stay where they are for the time being.

Mao: The enemy in Nanfeng now appears to be retreating. If the enemy withdraws from Nanfeng, one division of the Third Army should advance to work in the area of Lita, north of Nanfeng. The Twelfth Division should be moved to work in Xinfeng City. The Third Army should not increase the number of troops working in southern Jiangxi and indeed should decrease them, because the duration of the fighting will certainly be rather long.

2. The issue of the Red Army School. (Omitted)

3. The lessons of the second phase of the war.<sup>11</sup>

To be discussed at the Tingzhou Conference.

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10. The reference is to the fortified strongholds often constructed by lineages and communities in southeastern China, and frequently used as bases during this period by local elite militias and other anti-Communist local forces.

11. I.e., of the Second Encirclement Campaign.

# *Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army*

(June 22, 1931)

June 22, 8:00 P.M., at the Headquarters in Kangdu.

Participants: Mao [Zedong], Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Lin [Biao], Tan [Zhenlin], and Zhou [Yili]

Nonvoting Participants: Wang Jiaxiang, [Cai] Huiwen, Geng Kai,<sup>1</sup> and [Guo] Huayu<sup>2</sup>

## 1. The deployment of troops:

After concentrating its forces, the Fourth Army (minus one division) should immediately advance, taking shortcuts, attack Shaxian with full strength, and then rapidly disperse to raise funds. Afterward it should be divided between the two *xian* of Guihua and Yong'an. The amount of funds to be raised is 400,000 *yuan*. The time for moving from Shaxian to Gui[hua] and Yong'an depends on the situation of the enemy in Nanfeng. If the enemy has retreated, the move may be slower.<sup>3</sup>

The Third Army Group should first of all approach Jiangle with full strength, drive away Zhou Zhiqun, occupy the two *xian* of Jiangle and Shunchang, and raise 600,000 *yuan* of funds.

The Twelfth Army should be dispersed in Ninghua, Qingliu, and Tingzhou to raise 150,000 *yuan*, and send people to Tingzhou to make quilts and clothes, buy Western medicine, and open communications with western Fujian. If the enemies in Nanfeng retreat, two divisions of the Third Army should enter and occupy Nanfeng, advancing only as far as Litayu. If the enemy does not retreat, only one division should be left behind on the Xing[guo]-Yu[du] border. If Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] oppose Chiang, we need not press toward Ganzhou.

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Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 39–40. It also appears, in slightly less complete form, in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 287–89.

1. Geng Kai (?–1933), a native of Henan, participated in the Nanchang Uprising and the struggle on the Jinggangshan. In 1931, he was commander of the Twelfth Division of the Fourth Red Army.

2. Guo Huayu was another name for Guo Huaruo.

3. Places mentioned in this and subsequent paragraphs are mostly *xian* in Fujian to the east and southeast of Jianning.

## 2. Evaluation of the situation and guidelines for our operations:

At present, it is already a fact that Chiang Kaishek is preparing to launch a third attack against the revolution. Since Chiang has compromised with the North, Zhang Xueliang will naturally want to take temporary advantage of this opportunity to take over the whole front in Shandong, and Feng [Yuxiang] and Yan [Xishan] still pose problems. Chiang must naturally take a defensive position toward Guangdong and attack the Red Army first. But if the Guangdong Army goes to attack Changsha, and at the same time the Red Army is attacking Fuzhou [Linchuan],<sup>4</sup> then Chiang naturally might attack Guangdong first. Consequently, we should not continue to press toward Fuzhou now. Even if the enemy withdraws from Nanfeng, we shall still employ only a minority of our forces to enter Nanfeng, and not send a large force to put pressure on Fuzhou. Our troops should operate only on the frontiers of Chiang Kaishek's territory and will not go to the territory of the Guangdong Government. In this way, Chiang will be compelled to go on the defensive against the Red Army and deal with the Guangdong Government.

## 3. The problem of discipline in attacking Qifang:<sup>5</sup>

If the enemy does not withdraw from Nanfeng, the Third Army will still attack Qifang according to the original plan. But cadres' meetings must be held, and the troops must be assembled to deliver speeches and explain discipline. Absolutely no mass Red Guards should go. After arrival at Qifang, a peace meeting should be convened and a peace agreement should be established. The first article of this should state that the two sides must not attack each other, but everyone should fight the local bullies together. The second article should provide that the Red Guards of Xingguo have a duty to help the peasants of Qifang attack the reactionaries. Cattle must not be returned, because the circumstances of such return are not clear. The people captured by both sides should be repatriated, and the matter of those who have already been killed should be dropped.

## 4. The deployment of the Twelfth Division of the Fourth Army:

One regiment is [to be deployed] on the line from Hetian to Kangdu; one regiment on the line from Xichengqiao to Shigouxu; one regiment to remain in Jianning with the General Headquarters; the Twelfth Army will dispatch a company to Lixin to maintain communications (with Guangchang); and one regiment [is to be deployed] in Anyuansi.

## 5. The Fujian-Jiangxi Special Border Area:

4. This is the town of Fuzhou, or Linchuan, in Jiangxi, not the city in Fujian.

5. Qifang was an area in southern Xingguo *xian*, near the borders with Yudu and Ganzhou, which was one of the largest and most persistent of the anti-Communist "White spots" remaining in the soviet areas in southern Jiangxi. Because many of the participants in anti-Communist activities were in fact lineage "braves" and other members of the peasant populace acting at the behest of their local elite leaders, Party cadres here outline procedures to subdue the area while at the same time trying to minimize violence and gain mass support.

Comrade Zhou Yili is the secretary, with authority over [Chang]ting, Lian[cheng], Shi[cheng], and Rui[jin]; Zhou and Li Jingquan are the secretaries of the two *xian* of [Chang]ting and Rui[jin]. Zhou, Li Jingquan, the secretary of the Changting-Ruijin Two-*xian xian* Committee Deng Fa, and two people from West Fujian's Twelfth Army should organize a committee.

6. The question of Nanfeng:

Concerning the question of Nanfeng, it was right to arrest Hu Zhusheng,<sup>6</sup> but technically it was not done well. No leader of the masses was first found, or rather a leader was obtained [who turned out to be an] AB Corps [member], and then afterward that AB Corps leader was attacked. If there were no [trustworthy] leaders in Nanfeng, and Hu Zhusheng had to be arrested, the issue of arms for Nanfeng should have been resolved first. The detention should have been made in extreme secrecy, and he should have been taken away at night. Everyone should not have been made aware that he was being interrogated, nor should the fact that certain people were members of the AB Corps have been talked about at random. Now we must first find a method to get back the weapons. The Political Department of the Third Army and one division of the Third Army should immediately go to the Nanfeng area and proclaim the crimes of Hu Zhusheng, redistribute the land, set up poor peasant leagues, find good [i.e., trustworthy] Party armed forces, and employ all possible means to collect the weapons.

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6. Hu Zhusheng (1897–1931), a native of Nanfeng in Jiangxi, was a one-time bandit and militia leader who in 1929 led his force to enlist in the Red Army's Jiangxi local forces. In 1930, he became a member of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government. Later Hu abused his power by executing several hundred (presumably innocent) local Party cadres in the name of "suppressing the AB Corps," and was executed for his excesses in June 1931. Though details of his downfall are not known, the passage translated here indicates that it was a messy business.

***Proclamation of the Headquarters  
of the First Front Army of the  
Chinese Workers' and Peasants'  
Red Army: Execute Huang Meizhuang<sup>1</sup>***

(June 1931)

The warlords and the Guomindang have on two separate occasions dispatched a total of 400,000 troops and made every possible use of all counter-revolutionary forces in society (for example, organizing the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, and other reactionary groups) in an attempt to destroy the soviet areas and the Red Army. But they have all been utterly routed by the First Front Army of the Red Army, which has defeated and dispersed more than 200,000 White Army soldiers. Zhang Huizan and Hu Zuyu were, respectively, beheaded and shot to death by the Red Army. This great revolutionary victory has struck terror into the hearts of the warlords and imperialists throughout the country. In an attempt to rescue the Guomindang from its demise, Chiang Kaishek recently sent a batch of his running dogs to the Red areas and, using customary warlord tricks, tried to come to an understanding with the main responsible officers of the Red Army and undermine the unity of the Red Army. The running dogs sent by Chiang Kaishek have all been arrested and executed. A few days ago he sent Huang Meizhuang over, hoping to use feudal relationships to dismantle the Red Army's battle formations. Now the said renegade Huang has already been captured, openly tried, and sentenced to death<sup>2</sup> by execution. In view of the fact that the said renegade Huang Meizhuang is a willing reactionary, who has gone so far as to take orders from Chiang Kaishek to come and sabotage the Red Army, he is indeed guilty of the most heinous crimes. Now, having by due means been found guilty, the criminal Huang Meizhuang will be bound and taken to the execution ground for

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 291–92, where it is reproduced from a contemporary document to be found in the Chen Cheng Collection.

1. Huang Meizhuang, a native of Xiangxiang in Hunan, was the half-brother of Third Army Group commander Huang Gonglue.

2. It is indicated in the available Chinese text that twenty-one characters are missing here.



decapitation, in order to eliminate counterrevolution and make the bandits tremble with fear. It is so proclaimed.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
General Political Commissar	Mao Zedong
Posted on June [X], <sup>3</sup> 1931 (by the Western calendar)	

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3. The Chinese text shows one character missing here, indicating a date between the first and the tenth of the month.

## *Letter to Zhou Yili, Tan Zhenlin, and Others*

(June 28, 1931)

To Comrade Yili, for transmission to the Border Area Working Committee, and Comrade Zhenlin, to be transmitted to the Army Committee of the Twelfth Army:

The working districts of the Twelfth Army have been divided up inappropriately this time. Qingliu and Liancheng should be assigned to the Twelfth Army as a working district for the second phase. The central task of the Twelfth Army should not be to raise funds, but rather to establish and deepen the work in the three *xian* of Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting. The Twelfth Army will take on the task of these three *xian*, the Thirty-fifth Army will take on the one *xian* of Ruijin, and the Third Army will take on the two *xian* of Yudu and Huichang. Within a time limit of two months (July and August), all are to finish redistributing the land and to establish local armed forces, temporary local governments, and temporary party headquarters. Truly resolving these four problems will unite into one area the six *xian* of Yu[du], Rui[jin], Shi[cheng], Ning[hua], Hui[chang], and [Chang]ting. This is our central task. For the Twelfth Army to complete the work in three *xian* within two months will not be easy. After the first campaign, the Twelfth Army did the work in all of Shicheng *xian* and the southern half of Ning[du] *xian* in four months. Now southern Ningdu is a half-Red area and Shicheng is an all-Red area. This is what was accomplished in the past, and now to complete the work of three *xian* in two months would assuredly be difficult. It can definitely be done only if the working period is extended. If activities are extended into the two *xian* of Qing[liu] and Lian[cheng], and the Twelfth Army's main force, the Thirty-fourth Division, is deployed in those two *xian*, then the work of the Twelfth Army will again be totally ineffectual. Therefore, the Kangdu resolution<sup>1</sup> must be modified so that the Thirty-fourth Division

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We have translated this letter from *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 234–36, where it is taken from a handwritten copy held in the Central Archives. It also appears in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 40–42.

1. The Provisional General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army held its ninth meeting in Kangdu, Nanfeng *xian*, on June 20–22, 1931 (see above, the minutes of the session at 8:00 P.M. on June 22). After a discussion of the situation and the

is rapidly transferred back to take on the whole of Ninghua *xian*, the Thirty-fifth Division takes on the whole of Shicheng *xian*, the Thirty-sixth Division takes on all of Changting *xian*, and the units directly under army command operate among the three *xian*. It is expected that such arrangements will be resolutely made.

Viewing the situation as a whole, the plan put forward earlier of having the Third Army Group go to Erchong<sup>2</sup> and the Fourth Army to Ning'an<sup>3</sup> would not only objectively aid Chiang Kaishek in attacking Guangdong and Guangxi, which is Chiang's heart's desire, but would also rapidly draw Guangdong and Guangxi into action against the Communists. It would amount to our own obstruction of the anti-Chiang line of vision of Guangdong and Guangxi, and make them focus their attention on us. This would inevitably promote a process of compromise between Chiang and Guangdong to deal with the Communists. We should not be so foolish. Going north of Nanfeng is not only impossible given the present circumstances, but it is also inappropriate in the light of overall strategy. The reasons are (1) that there is no possibility of consolidating political power and (2) that the threat from the Yangzi would be too great. The west, south, and north are all impossible, so only the east is a good area. First, as Chiang's sphere of influence, it does not have the disadvantage of posing a direct threat to Guangdong and Guangxi. Second, it is a remote area where we would not encounter danger, or at least less than would be the case if we were to go to Nanfeng and Yihuang. Third, it is crisscrossed by mountains, with no rivers and streams as barriers, and therefore most suitable for creating new battlefields. Fourth, there are funds to be raised, and there would be no need to worry about provisions within the army.<sup>4</sup> Fifth, the masses are numerous<sup>5</sup> and can offer

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tactics for opposing the Third Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, a resolution was adopted according to which the Third Army Group should proceed toward Jiangle, take Jiangle and Shunchang *xian*, and raise 600,000 *yuan*; the Twelfth Army would divide its forces to work in Ninghua, Qingliu, and Tingzhou and raise 150,000 *yuan*; the Fourth Army (minus one division) would speedily advance toward Shaxian, Guihua, and Yong'an and raise 400,000 *yuan*; and the two divisions of the Third Army would advance and take Nanfeng, going only as far as Litaxu. If the enemy did not retreat, they would leave only one division on the Xingguo-Yudu border.

2. The editors of *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* note that "Erchong" "probably refers to" Shangyou and Chongyi in Jiangxi. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* version, however, gives the two places as "Yihuang and Chongren." Given the location of these various places and the area of operations of the major Red Army units at this time, the latter version is more plausible.

3. The editors of *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* indicate that this "probably refers to" Dingnan and Anyuan. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text has "Xunwu and Anyuan" instead. As Xunwu's former name was Changning, the latter version is more likely correct in this case.

4. Here instead of "within the army," the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text reads "within the year."

5. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text reads "excellent" here instead of "numerous."

recruits to expand the Red Army. Because of these conditions, we should make plans for long-term work in this area.<sup>6</sup> The Third Army Group should take Jianning, Taining, and Jiangle as working areas and Shunchang, Shaowu, and Guangze as fundraising areas. The Fourth Army should take Guihua, Qingliu, and Liancheng as working areas, and Shaxian, Yong'an, and Youxi as fund-raising areas, and raise funds in the three *xian* to achieve self-sufficiency. The Thirty-fifth Army has Ruijin as its working area, [from which] it is to raise funds to support itself. The Third Army will take Yudu and Huichang as its working area and raise funds to support itself. The central working area for the Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division is Guangchang, and is to be linked up with Jianning and Shicheng. In all so-called working areas, land is to be redistributed and political power established. In fund-raising areas, local tyrants are attacked and propaganda is conducted, but land is not redistributed and political power is not established. The working period is tentatively set for two months, and may be extended to a period of six months.<sup>7</sup> If the enemy comes, forces will be gathered to fight nearby. If the enemy does not come, we continue to work in this area. Working in Ninghua, Changting, and Shicheng, the Twelfth Army should make every effort to avoid the kind of failure that occurred in Shicheng in the second phase<sup>8</sup> and recently in the work in Jianning (the guerrilla forces in Shicheng were full of vagrants and rich peasants and they all defected). A thorough transformation needs to be effected, and opportunism in mass work resolutely opposed. If the work in the three *xian* remains the way it has been in Shicheng and Jianning in the past, the Army Committee and the three<sup>9</sup> division committees will bear a heavy responsibility.

General Front Committee Mao Zedong  
June 28, 10:00 P.M., in Jianning

The working period for Shicheng given in the letter as three months must be shortened by a month because of the pressures of enemy attacks.

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6. These comments about the advantages of expansion to the east into Fujian are interesting in light of Mao's later raid into Fujian in 1932 (see discussion in the Introduction).

7. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text has "three months" instead of "six months" here.

8. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text reads "first phase" here instead of "second phase." The references are to the encirclement campaigns.

9. The *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* text has "two" instead of "three" here.

# ***Letter to the Twelfth Army, the Thirty-fifth Army, and the Border Area Working Committee***

(June 30, 1931)

To the Army Committee of the Twelfth Army and Comrade [Zhou] Yili, as well as the Border Area Working Committee and the Army Committee of the Thirty-fifth Army:

We don't know whether or not you have received the letter dated the 21st, sent from the two points of Shicheng and Ruijin. According to today's radio news, He Yingqin has come to Fuzhou from Nanchang to supervise the fighting. He Yingqin has been appointed frontline commander-in-chief. Chiang Kaishek has sent him an urgent telegram, and Commander-in-Chief He has quickly transmitted it to the Third Army Group and to all units belonging to the First and Second Route armies.

In addition, Hao Mengling's radio report contains the information that his army was ordered to follow the Fifty-fourth Division (on the 28th) and leave Yongfeng to go up toward Tengtian and Shaxi, and so on. Judging from the situation on every hand, there is now no doubt at all that the enemy troops are carrying out a very swift offensive against us. These conditions absolutely do not allow us at the moment to do any preparatory work, and we should probably be ready for combat within the next month. Telegraphed orders have been sent to the Fourth and Third armies to leave for Shunchang and Shaxian and to be immediately deployed in Jiangle and Guihua to raise funds. The period for raising funds is ten days. Naturally, the enemy's situation should be taken into consideration. If the enemy does not advance, we will not concentrate our forces. The period for concentration is five days, and the location is in Ninghua and Shicheng. Yesterday's letter stated that fund-raising is not the main task of the Twelfth Army, but that mass work in the three *xian* of Ninghua, Shicheng, and Changting is its main task. Now it appears that both fund-raising and mass work are main tasks, and moreover that if a great deal of mass work is arranged, it can only help to raise funds and will surely not hinder fund-raising. Probably, by the

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Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 42–44. It also appears, in slightly less complete form, in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 295–97.

time this letter reaches Ninghua, the Thirty-fourth Division will already have been raising funds in Qingliu for about five days, and will have raised a good deal. You should send them a letter telling them to wind up fund-raising in Qingliu rapidly, and to return to Ninghua. Ninghua should be established as a key place for raising funds on the one hand, and mobilizing the masses in a big way and carrying out land redistribution on the other. One regiment of the Thirty-fifth Army should be in Anyuan, and the other regiment and the division headquarters should leave for Shicheng. The work in Baishui should be given up temporarily, as Shicheng is very important. The units directly under the army stay within the boundaries of Ninghua and the Thirty-sixth Division is in Changting (attention should be given to the work in the border areas between Shi[cheng], Rui[jin], [Chang]ting, and Ning[hua]). In this way there will be parts of the main forces in both *xian*, Ninghua and Shicheng, and fund-raising and mass work can both be carried out. To realize this objective, the Thirty-fourth Division should withdraw from Qingliu and Liancheng to Ninghua and do so quickly, so as not to hinder the work in Ninghua. Even if fund-raising is very promising in Qingliu, not more than a week or ten days should go by before withdrawing, for in a week to ten days quite a lot of money can be raised. Under the present circumstances, work in the three *xian* of Ning[hua], Shi[cheng], and Changting can be planned to last only a month (when a month has elapsed, this can be extended if the situation of the enemy permits). Thus, during the month of July, much work and good work can be done in the three *xian*, the central point being the redistribution of the land. If some of the land cannot be redistributed because of the vastness of the area, key places should be selected for redistribution, such as, in Ninghua, the five localities of Anyuan, Niusha, the *xian* town, Shoukou, and Shiniu; in Shicheng, the six localities of Songshan, the *xian* town, Pingshan, Yangang, and Dayouyu<sup>1</sup>; and in Changting, the *xian* town, Guanqian, and Gucheng; and the border areas between the four *xian*. Each place needs to have a person with clear class consciousness and strong leadership ability to provide guidance. For example, the three comrades [Tan] Zhenlin, [Luo] Binghui, and Tan Zheng<sup>2</sup> should not be together, but rather each of them should be in charge of leading one place and at the same time supervising one or two other places. Every ten days, the organs of the Army Committee should get together and hold a meeting, and Comrade Zhenlin may go out and survey all the locations himself or he may stay in one place. We must know that there are very few responsible persons at the two levels of regiment and company who are capable of independently leading mass work without making mistakes, and even at the level of division commanders and political commissars, it would be diffi-

1. It is not clear why the text refers to six localities when in fact only five are listed.

2. Tan Zheng (1907– ), a native of Xiangxiang in Hunan, joined the Party in 1926, fought in the Jinggangshan base, and later served as a commissar in the Fourth and Twelfth armies.

cult to say that they all have clear class consciousness and strong leadership ability. The past failures in the work of various divisions constitute proof of this. Upon receiving this letter, you must make new dispositions according to the above principles. The Thirty-fifth Army, working in Ruijin, should pay attention to the four places of Jiubao, Yanba, Wuyangwei, and Xigang; should carry out real land redistribution within one month; and should not occupy Huichang. Even though the city of Xigang belongs within the borders of Huichang, it touches on the area between western Ruijin and eastern Yudu and commands a key position on the border between them. If mass work there gets under way, it will have a great influence on the surrounding area of the three *xian*. Therefore, the Thirty-fifth Army should put the work in Xigang City within the scope of its own activity, and see to it that the work quickly yields results. Comrade [Li] Jingquan and Comrade Shaoliang<sup>3</sup> should go personally to survey the various locations, because the lower ranking cadres of the Thirty-fifth Army are even less able to do mass work.

Enclosed is the second issue of the *Red Army Newsletter*, which may be used as teaching material in the politics classes for soldiers.

General Front Committee  
Evening of June 30th, in Jianning

Mao Zedong

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3. The surname of the individual referred to as "Shaoliang" has not been determined.

## *Letter to Tan Zhenlin and the Twelfth Army*

(July 1, 1931)

To Comrade [Tan] Zhenlin and the Army Committee of the Twelfth Army:

The letter of the 29th from Ninghua has been received today (the 1st). The activities of the Thirty-sixth Division and Comrade [Zhou] Yili are not mentioned, so we do not know whether or not they have already gone to Changting. Your current dispositions are centered around fund-raising, so no one at all has been sent to the Shicheng area. Your present dispositions may be carried out for a month, or for a short period of from a week to ten days. After a week to ten days are up, the troops of the Thirty-fourth Division deployed in Qingliu and Liancheng should be swiftly withdrawn to Ninghua and redeployed on the line from Zhongsha to Changting and on the border between the two *xian* of Ninghua and Shicheng. Once the work is under way in many places, the 104th Regiment should still remain on the line of Dushang, Anyuan, and Zhongsha, but the work needs to be advanced toward the Jiangxi border region, so as to be linked with the Red areas of Jiangxi, the 103rd Regiment, and the headquarters of the Thirty-fifth Division. After ten days, you must go to Shicheng to make arrangements and to begin work in three key places. If Baishui cannot be dealt with, it should be temporarily abandoned and not be worked on until phase two. Working districts have been divided up again, and you are in charge only of the three *xian* of Ning[hua], Shi[cheng], and Chang[ting]. Truly good work in these three *xian* cannot be done without long-term, strenuous efforts. Ruijin is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Thirty-fifth Army; Guangchang is the exclusive responsibility of the Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division (under the direct leadership of the Eastern Jiangxi Special Committee); they are not in your charge. The places in Jianning where work has already begun will be temporarily under your guidance, and the replenishment of the expanded Red Army there should also be your responsibility, but the places where work has not been initiated should belong to the Third Army Group. In the future, in terms of the overall situation, Jianning should belong to the Third Army Group.

The General Front Committee  
Jianning, at 1:00 P.M. on July 1

Mao Zedong

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Our source for this letter is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 44–45. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 197–98.



# Opposing the Second Great "Encirclement and Suppression"

(To the Tune "Fisherman's Pride")

(Summer 1931)<sup>1</sup>

Atop White Cloud Mountain,<sup>2</sup> clouds about to rise,  
Beneath White Cloud Mountain, the sound of frenzied shouts,  
Withered trees and rotting trunks<sup>3</sup> join in the effort.  
A forest of rifles presses forward,  
The Flying General<sup>4</sup> sweeps down from the void.  
Driving forward seven hundred *li* in fifteen days,<sup>5</sup>  
From the azure expanse of the Gan River to the jade-like mountains of Fujian,  
We have swept away an army thousands strong like rolling up a mat.  
Someone weeps,  
Lamenting in vain his step-by-step strategy.<sup>6</sup>

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Our source for this poem is *Shici duilian*, pp. 41–43.

1. This poem was written after the defeat of the Guomindang's Second Encirclement and Suppression Campaign against the Red Army, which took place in May 1931. It is the last of the poems first published together in the May 1962 issue of *People's Literature*. (For the author's note accompanying them, see the note to Mao's Autumn 1929 poem, "The War Between Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi Warlords," Volume III, p. 190.)

2. The Red Army forces (about 30,000 strong) were based on White Cloud Mountain when this campaign was launched. The mountain is situated in southeastern Ji'an *xian*, Jiangxi Province, where the three *xian* of Ji'an, Taihe, and Xingguo come together. The Guomindang troops mounted their attack from below.

3. This metaphor, which Mao had already used earlier (see Volume II, "Telegram to Mr. Xiao Hengshan," February 20, 1923), comes from the biography of Zou Yang in the *Records of the Historian*. The meaning is that even the old and infirm among the population have joined in the struggle against the White forces. Some commentators take "withered trees and rotting trunks" to refer to Chiang Kaishek's forces, but that is illogical, since the whole of this stanza evokes the Red Army and its supporters.

4. Li Guang, the famous Han dynasty general who fought against the Xiongnu, was dubbed by his adversaries "the Flying General of Han." Mao is undoubtedly referring here to the Red Army forces.

5. Beginning with an attack by the Red Army on the Guomindang troops at Futian along the Gan River on May 16, this struggle lasted until May 30 when the fighting reached the border between Jiangxi and Fujian provinces.

6. He Yingqin, the Guomindang commander of the Second Encirclement Campaign, had based his strategy on advancing step by step and consolidating his position.

# ***The Question of the Soviet Area Central Bureau's Special Emergency Circular About "Mobilizing" and Preparing for the Third Campaign<sup>1</sup>***

(July 4, 1931)

Ever since the big victory of the Red Army in the Second Campaign, the new development of the revolution is posing a greater threat to the ruling class, and the entire ruling class regards "suppressing the Reds" as its common central political slogan. The Nanjing government in particular has mobilized all its forces for a desperate attack against the revolution, with the aim of waging a last-ditch struggle. Recently, it has sent reinforcements to strengthen its troops in Jiangxi, made concessions to the northern warlords, and adopted a defensive posture toward Guangdong. Chiang Kaishek has even come to Nanchang himself. All of this is for no other purpose than to launch another desperate attack on our Red Army. Now the enemy is moving toward us step by step! The Third Campaign will soon break out. In this campaign, the conditions for our victory—good masses, a good Red Army, and good terrain—are even more amply present than in the Second Campaign. The weaknesses of the enemy, on the other hand—the contradictions among the warlords, the contradictions between the soldiers and the officers, the opposition of the masses, the lack of familiarity with the terrain, the difficulty in the transportation of food, and so on—have substantially increased as compared to the Second Campaign. Consequently, so long as we apply the tactics correctly and work hard, we are even more assured of securing victory in the Third Campaign. Now that the Red Army is right in the midst of preparing to resist the attack, the Party branches at all levels should immediately mobilize, expand propaganda and agitation regarding the Third Campaign, arouse the broad masses, and intensify the work of preparation for the

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 46–48.

1. According to historical sources recently published in China, Mao had been able in the late spring of 1931 to appoint a sufficient number of his supporters to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas to obtain a majority on that body. (He lost control of the bureau again in November.) Even though he is not credited with authorship of the Emergency Circular referred to here, that document can therefore be assumed to have reflected his views, and the present commentary on it also appears relevant.

Third Campaign: (1) Call a mass meeting at once, speed up the propaganda and agitation for victory in the Third Campaign, and also put up many posters and fliers (the Central Bureau has issued an outline for propaganda aimed at winning victory in the Third Campaign), as well as mobilizing the masses in a planned and concrete way to carry out practical work in preparation for the Third Campaign. (2) The local armed forces in every locality should rapidly be consolidated to the highest possible extent, in order to contribute to the immediate establishment of newly organized independent divisions, and to the reorganization of the guerrillas in each locality. We should strengthen their political and military training, eliminate the rich peasants and vagabonds from the local armed forces, and employ expeditious means to eliminate the AB Corps from our ranks. We should draw fully on our experience in the second campaign to make all kinds of preparations and take all kinds of precautions to meet and harass the enemy. (3) We should intensify our fierce attacks on the AB Corps and use the correct line of the Party to carry out thoroughly the work of eliminating the counterrevolutionaries. We must make sure that the AB Corps and all counterrevolutionary elements are purged from every Party branch and administrative organ at all levels, as well as from all armed organizations and mass organizations. In this way we can strengthen the Red areas and shatter the plots of the reactionaries in the Red areas. (4) Immediately impose martial law [*jieyan*] in the Red areas. This should be done with particular strictness in the border regions, keeping close watch, checking passers-by, and checking passes. There must not be the slightest carelessness; we must guard strictly against the penetration of enemy spies and the evasion of reactionary elements such as AB Corps members who may pass information to the enemy. (5) Organizations such as the Red Guards, the communication teams, the espionage teams, and the transportation teams must be reorganized once again; their leadership and supervision must be strengthened and constantly exercised; their command should be unified; and they should prepare to mobilize and go into action in the shortest possible time. (6) The work of strengthening the walls and clearing the fields<sup>2</sup> should be carried out without delay, starting with all the districts in the border area. During the second campaign, some of the regions did this work very badly, and now we should make use of our past experiences to remedy our shortcomings and really do it. In the

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2. "Strengthening the walls and clearing the fields" (*jianbi qingye*) was a traditional expression meaning to prepare for combat by strengthening town walls, evacuating non-combatants, and hiding provisions and livestock. Imperial-era officials used the term to describe preparations to resist rural rebels (see Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980], pp. 41–47), but during this period Mao and some other Communist cadres in the Jiangxi base areas inverted the meaning to refer to efforts to prepare the rural populace for the incursion of government armies. The use of the term was distinctive enough to catch the attention of the Central Committee, which later made pejorative reference to it in its criticisms of Mao-style "luring deep" tactics.

past we neglected completely the preparation of secret work in the border region. Once the enemy came, all our work collapsed. During the war, we were unable to carry out secret work in order to lead the forces of the masses to cooperate with the Red Army in wiping out the enemy. This must be corrected. (7) In the Second Campaign, we did a very bad job in clearing the battlefield after the battles. It was so bad that many of the weapons were not collected quickly, and some were even lost or fell into the hands of the reactionary elements. This time we should make use of our experiences and lessons in the Second Campaign. There must be good preparation and organization beforehand, so that when each battle is over, in the places where the Red Army is in charge of cleaning up, we should at once lead the masses to help the Red Army with it. If the Red Army has moved further to the front, the governments at various levels should at once lead the masses by district, by ridge, and by section to search the mountains in an organized way, to scoop up from the rivers, and to collect and pick up all the weapons such as cannons, mortars, machineguns, rifles, pistols, all bullets, shells, electrical wires, radios, as well as all the unidentified things (special care should be given to radios and the unidentified things). All these things should be sent to the government to be registered, and sent to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. Of the fruits of victory in this campaign, not a single bullet should be allowed to fall into the hands of the reactionary elements. This is a very important piece of work and we must prepare it very well beforehand. In this campaign we must mobilize the masses to comfort and take good care of the wounded and sick of the Red Army. In addition, the government at each level should be responsible for sending stretchers as quickly as possible to take them to the hospitals of the Red Army.

As regards the work toward the captives of the White army, we should mobilize the masses and encourage them to conduct propaganda and agitation toward the captives, and tell them to give the captives tea to drink and food to eat and not to harbor feelings of distaste toward them. As for the dead bodies on the battlefield, they must be buried very quickly.

Comrades! The Third Campaign will soon start, and it will be an extremely cruel war, which will have an enormous impact on the development of the Chinese revolution. We must summon up the Bolshevik spirit of hard struggle, use the experience of the past few campaigns, and work tirelessly and ten times harder in order to achieve a great victory in the Third Campaign!

## *Letter of Instruction from Zhu De and Mao Zedong to Geng Kai<sup>1</sup> and Longjun<sup>2</sup>*

(July 12, 1931, 6:00 A.M. at Jianfeng)

To Comrade Geng Kai and for transmission to Comrade Longjun:

1. The enemy forces from the direction of Jianning arrived yesterday (the 11th) at Paqian (5 *li* from Xicun) and are building fortifications there. The forces coming from Lichuan have arrived at Jiangjunmiao by way of Qiujiiai and may possibly launch an attack in the direction of Jianning today (the 12th). A letter from the Thirty-fifth Regiment explains that its forces have made clear the situation of this particular enemy unit and are sabotaging its operations and then slowly retreating.

2. We have received both letters from Shuinan, and we quite agree with your dispositions. The enemy entered Qianshan and Shizui yesterday, and you should strengthen your preparations so as to delay the enemy's advance.

3. The enemy is advancing along the whole front, maintaining the pattern of all moving forward simultaneously, so their actions will not be to advance rapidly and boldly.<sup>3</sup>

4. Comrade Longjun should be the one to investigate the grain supply in the three locations of Shicheng, Guangchang, and Ningdu, to see if there is enough food to supply the entire force<sup>4</sup> for several weeks if gathered together. He should also be the one to set up communication stations quickly along the Shicheng and Gulonggang line, with the standard that a letter be able to reach its destination within twenty-four hours.

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We have translated this letter from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 50–51.

1. Regarding Geng Kai, see the relevant note to "Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the General Front Committee," June 22, 1931.

2. No person with this name (probably a given name, with the surname omitted) has been identified; the reference may be to a subordinate officer in the Twelfth Division.

3. As this passage indicates, Nationalist army forces had by this time begun trying to carry out some elements of what would later take full form as the "blockhouse strategy" of slow, careful advance against the base areas.

4. The Chinese term here is *dadui*, which normally corresponds, in military terminology, to "battalion" or "regiment." It was, however, commonly used in 1929–1930 in the Red Army instead of *lian* to mean "company." In the present context it is not clear how many troops are to be fed, so we have preferred the less specific term "force."

5. We will do our utmost to arrive in Shicheng in time for rest, training, and consolidation, and will attack the enemy when the opportunity presents itself. Today we are still located here.

Zhu De     Mao Zedong

***Letter from Zhu De and Mao Zedong  
to Regimental Commander Zhu<sup>1</sup> and Political  
Commissar Liu<sup>2</sup>***

(July 12, 1931, 6:00 A.M., at Jianfeng)

Regimental Commander Zhu and Political Commissar Liu:

1. Your letters of the 10th and 11th and one squad of messengers have all arrived.

2. You should wait until the enemy has entered the city of Jianning and find out the strength of their forces and to which division they belong before slowly withdrawing in the direction of Tangfang. At all times seek out detailed information about the enemy and report it to General Headquarters as well as Division Headquarters. The 104th Regiment in Anyuansi should also be notified so that they know what is going on in Jianning.

3. Today (the 12th), the Twelfth Division is engaged in guerrilla fighting from the Shuinan-Changqiao-Guangchang line toward Qianshan and Shizui.

4. Already yesterday (the 11th), enemy forces arrived in Qianshan and Shizui, and a small number of enemy troops arrived at Shuangjiangkou, 15 *li* from Jing'an.

5. On the 12th and the 13th, letters can be transmitted by way of Jianfeng, and on the 14th and 16th by way of Baishui.

6. The enemy is still advancing very slowly. You should sabotage the enemy's movements, cover the concentration of the main forces, and obtain more information.

Zhu De    Mao Zedong

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Our source for this letter is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 51–52.

1. We have not determined the identity of this individual.

2. The reference is to Liu Yalou (1911–1965), a native of Fujian who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1929. He had been political commissar of the Thirty-fifth Regiment of the Fourth Red Army since late 1930.

## ***Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Prepare to Eliminate the Enemy Attacking from Laicun***

(Issued on July 24, 1931, at 11:00 P.M., from  
Headquarters at Niujiaotang, Yinkeng, in Yudu)

I. Up until today, the enemy's situation is as follows:

A. Chen Mingshu's troops (Jiang, Cai, Han, Luo) are fighting against our Fifth Independent Division along the Futian, Shuinan, and Baisha line.<sup>1</sup>

B. Sun Lianzhong's troops (Hao, Tang, Guo, Li) are fighting against our Ninth Division along the Shaxi and Dajinzhu line.<sup>2</sup>

C. Zhu Shaoliang and Xu Kexiang are in Nanfeng, Zhou Hunyuan is in Ganzhu and Guangchang, Mao Bingwen is in Baishui and Xingpi, maintaining communication lines between Chen, Luo, Zhao, and Wei.<sup>3</sup>

D. Zhao Guantao's division has entered Kanchaigang, Ningdu City, Tiantou, and so on; Wei Lihuang has entered Ruijin.<sup>4</sup>

E. The two divisions under Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying entered Ningdu on the 19th, and on the 22nd divided into two routes.<sup>5</sup> One route advanced to Qingtang and the other to Youshuping. On the 23rd, the enemy in Qingtang advanced to Gulonggang, and the enemy in Youshuping advanced to Laicun, each of these two routes consisting of one division. Tomorrow (the 25th) the enemy in Gulonggang will advance toward Qiaotou, and the enemy in Laicun will certainly advance toward Ping'anzhai.

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 66-67.

1. Chen Mingshu was the commander of the Right Wing Army Group of Nationalist army forces assembled for the Third Encirclement Campaign. The other officers named were commanders of First Army units subordinate to Chen.

2. Sun Lianzhong at this time commanded the Second Army under Chen Mingshu; some of the other officers mentioned were Sun's subordinates, and others subordinate to the Third Route Army of Shangguan Yunxiang (also part of Chen Mingshu's forces). This order seems to have conflated these various units.

3. Zhu Shaoliang commanded the Third Army in the Nationalist army's Left Wing Army Group (under the general command of He Yingqin); the other officers mentioned were his subordinate division commanders.

4. Zhao Guantao commanded the Nationalist army's Sixth Division; Wei Lihuang commanded the Tenth Division.

5. Chen Cheng commanded the Second Route Army (and concurrently that army's Fourteenth Division) under the Left Wing Army Group; Luo Zhuoying commanded the Eleventh Division within Chen's army.



II. Given that the enemy is deeply mired in panic and fatigue, this front army has determined first to wipe out the enemy attacking from Laicun, and then to turn in the direction of Qiaotou to eliminate the second section of the enemy's troops.

III. Our army's offensive dispositions toward the enemy in Laicun are as follows:

A. Under the command of Peng Dehuai, the troops of our right wing (the Third Army Group and the Fourth Army) should set out tomorrow (the 25th), wait until the enemy in Laicun has moved to the vicinity of Gewa, and then use the Third Army Group to attack the enemy's rear from the Laowuchang line and the Fourth Army to attack the enemy's left flank from the Lipowa and Datian line. To prevent enemy forces in Sanliao from coming to the aid of Gewa, a force of one regiment of the Third Army Group should guard Longshan so that enemy troops cannot pass, and a small unit must also be dispatched and located around Liuminba so as to make every effort to block any enemy attempts to cross the river.

B. The Central Army (the Twelfth Army) sets out on the 25th, and after establishing contact with the left wing of the Fourth Army, it will arrive at Gewa by way of Qiaobei to take up position and launch a frontal attack on the enemy forces.

C. The left wing troops (the Seventh Army, the Thirty-fifth Army, and the Seventh and Eighth divisions of the Third Army) are under the command of Li Mingrui.<sup>6</sup> With the Seventh Army located at Meiwu, the Eighth Division should be stationed at Pibalong to pin down the enemy troops in the direction of Gulonggang so that they will be unable to provide reinforcements. The Thirty-fifth Army is to be located at Ping'anzhai to assist all units, and the Seventh Division is to be located around Zhongzhou to pin down the enemy in Gulonggang.

IV. General Headquarters is near Ping'anzhai and Qiaobei.<sup>7</sup>

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

6. Li Mingrui (1894–1932), a native of Beiliu in Guangxi, was an officer in the National Revolutionary Army who had joined the Communist Party in 1930 and became head of the Red Seventh Army. This force relocated to the Hunan-Jiangxi border area in late 1930, and fought in this region until being ordered east of the Gan River to join the First Front Army in July 1931.

7. These are locations in northern Yudu *xian*. It was in this area (probably in Ping'anzhai) at about this time (one source says on July 23) that the Twentieth Red Army, which had been centrally involved in the Futian Incident, was disbanded, disbanded and its officer corps violently purged under circumstances mentioned in the Introduction. Possibly the Thirty-fifth Army, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, was also purged at about this time. The heading for the present document gives the village of Niujiaotang, in the Yinkeng area of Yudu, as the site of the First Front Army Headquarters on July 24. A present-day map of the area shows that the town of Yinkeng itself is about five kilometers from Ping'anzhai; about two kilometers from Ping'anzhai is a small village named Niujiaowan. The first two characters of this name are identical with the "Niujiaotang" mentioned in the heading, and the two names may very well in fact refer to the same place. In any event, this document places Mao in close proximity to the Twentieth Army at the time of its dissolution.

## *Regarding the Dispositions for Attacking Longgang*

(July 30, 1931, in Chengxubei)<sup>1</sup>

1. On July 31, the Fourth Army should take up quarters in Shipoyu, the Twelfth Army in Xiaoyaoling, and the Third Army in Laoyingpan. On August 1, rest for one day.

On July 31, the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will arrive in the area between Chayuangang and Shacun. On August 1, they will arrive in Huzhuaping.

On July 31, the General Headquarters will take up quarters in Changjingkou, and on August 1, it will enter Xiaoyaoling.

2. On August 2, the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will leave Huzhuaping for the south of Qiaotoukou and Shancai and spend the night there according to circumstances.

The Fourth and Twelfth armies should advance from Shipoxu to a place 4 or 5 *li* south of Qiaotoukou, and take up quarters to the south of Qiaotoukou and in the area of Taojinwan and Luokeng as opportunity offers.

The Third Army should advance from Laoyingpan to Dalong and spend the night there.

If there are enemies in Donggu, all armies should take up quarters along the line from Qiaotoukou to Dalong and attack Donggu on August 3.

3. After Donggu has been taken, the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army should take up quarters in the area of Qincaikeng; the Fourth Army should take up quarters in Nanlong, the Twelfth Army in Huangsha, the Third Army in Donggu, and the General Headquarters in Aoshang.

4. Prepare to attack Longgang on August 3 or August 4.

5. The night from July 31 to August 1, from 7:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M., is the time for telecommunications. As for locations, the Fourth Army is at Ping'anzhai and the Third Army is at Yinkeng.<sup>2</sup>

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, p. 68.

1. Chengxubei, now known as Chenggangbei, is located in Gaoxing Township, Xingguo *xian*. The bulk of the places mentioned in this document are located in northwestern Xingguo and adjacent areas of Taihe and Ji'an *xian*.

2. The content of this final paragraph is puzzling, in that it refers to locations in northern Yudu which the Red Army had occupied prior to its move to the Ji'an-Taihe-Xingguo *xian* border area where the activity discussed in the rest of this and the following document takes place.

## *Order to Take Futian and Xin'an<sup>1</sup>*

(July 31, 1931)

1. According to the report of the Twelfth Army, the enemy troops that invaded Baishi from Donggu have already entered Chongxian today. Furthermore, according to the report of the Chunhua District Committee, there are in all three regiments of enemy troops in Futian, Beitou, and Xin'an. Whether the forces of Jiang and Cai<sup>2</sup> in Donggu will all move toward Chongxian and Longgang, and the enemy's movements at present, are still not clear.

2. In the context of the attempt by this Front Army to circle around behind the enemy and hit at his rear lines, so as to shock and frighten the enemy and then destroy his main force, we have decided to take Futian and Xin'an first.

3. On July 31 (today) every unit of the First Army Group should move to the following places under cover of night: the Fourth Army to Shipoxu, the Twelfth Army to the area around Xiaoyaoling, General Headquarters to Tianduan, and the Third Army to Laoyingpuan. The Thirty-fifth Army in Xingguo City, the Third Army Group, and the Seventh Army should go somewhere between Chayuan and Shacun (after marching about 30 li) and select a place to rest.

4. On the night of August 1, the Fourth Army should move to Gupingyu (between Daijiafang and Shibeiyu, located in a Red area); the Twelfth Army and General Headquarters should advance to Shibeiyu; the Third Army should advance to a place somewhere between Xiaoyaoling and Shibeiyu; and the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army should move to the region of Wanxi, Guanxi, Tongshan, Dongyuan, Gaolong, and Matian.

5. On the night of August 2, every unit of the First and Third Army Groups should set out from its location. The First Army Group will be responsible for attacking Futian; the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will be responsible for attacking Xin'an. Both should begin their assault at 2:00 at night (i.e., on the morning of August 3).

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 240–41, where it is reproduced from *Junshi wenxian*, issued in 1942.

1. These and the other places mentioned in this document are mostly located in the border area where Xingguo, Ji'an, and Taihe *xian* meet.

2. The reference is to Jiang Guannai, the commander of the Guomindang First Army Group, who was at this time in Shanghai recuperating from illness, and Cai Tingkai, the commander of the Sixtieth Division, who was acting commander of the First Army Group.

6. The daily marching time of every army should be from 6:30 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. From 5:10 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. is the time for rest and sleeping.<sup>3</sup> No one is allowed to violate this rule.

7. During the attack on Futian and Xin'an, General Headquarters will be located in front of the Third Army.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

## ***Order to Oppose the Third “Encirclement and Suppression”***

(July 1931)

The enemy has launched a massive offensive against our basic soviet area. We must defeat this enemy by all possible means. We should use all of our resolution, tenacity, and perseverance to defeat this enemy. If we do so, we shall certainly defeat this enemy in the end. Final victory is ours. Long live the heroic and dauntless Red Army!

Mao Zedong

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, p. 299, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

# *Order to Wipe Out the Enemy Advancing from Chongxian to Gaoxingxu<sup>1</sup>*

(August 3, 1931)

1. The units from the forces of Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] advancing on Chongxian amount to approximately three regiments. Their advance pickets<sup>2</sup> are in Da'ao, which is on the way to Gaoxing (the pickets in Da'ao have already marched to Guodoujian Mountain and can be seen from Dunqiu). At 8:00 A.M. today our Thirty-fifth Army made contact with them. According to reports, the enemy appears disposed to march toward Gaoxing. His goal is to take Xingguo.

Jiang Dingwen and Zhao Guantao<sup>3</sup> have arrived at Banjing and Quyang, and it appears that they are going to attack Yudu. There are no enemy troops in Gulonggang, Sanliao, Qingtang, Jiangkou, Nankeng, Junfu, and Liaocun. In Huangbei there is an independent brigade from Zhao's division. The three divisions from the region of Longgang, under the command of Chen Cheng, Luo Zhuoying, and Han Deqin, arrived at Futian on August 1. Along the stretch between Longgang and Shaxi there is only one brigade (three regiments) of Hao [Mengling]'s division, and some remnants (about six regiments) of Tang [Fengzhen]<sup>4</sup> and Guo [Huazong]'s two divisions.

Along the line from Donggu to Chongxian are the two divisions of Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] (in all, ten regiments; the rest are in Futian, Xin'an, and Ji'an), Li Yunjie's division<sup>5</sup> (six regiments), and one brigade of Hao's division (three regiments), making a total of around nineteen regiments. Their aim is to reach Xingguo. One part of their forces has occupied Donggu in

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 242–43, where it is reproduced from *Junshi wenxian*, issued in 1942.

1. This order was issued at Laoyingban, a town on the Xingguo-Taihe border. The places referred to are mostly in northern Xingguo and Ningdu *xian*.

2. The word (*shao*) rendered "pickets" here is more commonly translated as "sentries," but in a context referring to troops on the march rather than in camp, "pickets" or "scouts" seem more appropriate terms.

3. Jiang Dingwen commanded the Nationalist army's Ninth Division; Zhao Guantao commanded the Sixth Division.

4. Mao and Zhu were mistaken here; Tang Fengzhen had commanded the division in question (the Nationalist army's Forty-seventh Division) during the Second Encirclement Campaign, but it was now commanded by Shangguan Yunxiang.

5. Li Yunjie commanded the Nationalist army's Twenty-third Division.

order to assist the enemy troops in Futian to resist the Red Army forces, which have already arrived in the vicinity of Futian.

2. Our Front Army is determined to destroy the enemy forces advancing from Chongxian to Gaoxing tomorrow (the 4th).

3. The dispositions for the attack tomorrow (the 4th) are as follows:

After the enemy has entered Gaoxingxu, the Third Army will launch its attack from the right from its present location (Xinxu). The Twelfth Army will attack from the left from its present location (Fenglin and Kucun—between Chongxian and Changjingkou). The Fourth Army will make a frontal assault on the enemy from its present location (Changjingkou). The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will form two columns, starting from their present locations. One column should advance from Xiaoyaoling to the vicinity of Changjingkou. The other should take the narrow path on the left of Daxiaoyaoling from Shibeiyu (the road taken by the Twelfth Army today is very good, it divides into two near the Shibeiyu wooden bridge) to the vicinity of Fenglin and Kucun. The task of the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army is to serve as the general reserve forces, and they will participate in the attack on the enemy as required by circumstances.

4. Today and tomorrow General Headquarters will be located at Huangtiao.

Supplementary notes:

a. If the enemy troops do not enter Gaoxing, our forces will take no action tomorrow.

b. The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army should set out at 10:00 P.M. this evening and arrive at their destination by dawn.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

## *Order to Destroy the Enemy in Longgang<sup>1</sup>*

(August 8, 1931, 2:00 P.M., at General Headquarters in Yuexi)

1. Regarding the overall deployment of the enemy, see Chiang Kaishek's order of August 2, which has been recorded elsewhere. In Longgang are the Fourth Regiment of the enemy's Fifth Division and two regiments of the Fifty-fourth Division (which did not fight us yesterday), plus the defeated soldiers of the Forty-seventh and Fifty-fourth divisions, amounting roughly to two regiments, which fought us yesterday, making a total of eight enemy regiments remaining. The troops of Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai] in Chongxian and Fangtai, the troops of Zhao Guantao in Xingguo and Jiangbeidong, and the troops of Sun Lianzhong in Qingtang and Gulonggang are all advancing toward us, but will be unable to reach Longgang by tomorrow (the 9th).

2. Our forces are determined to go all out to annihilate the enemy in Longgang.

3. Deployment for the attack on Longgang is as follows:

The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will constitute the left wing; they will take up quarters at Lanshi tonight and will be responsible for the attack on the northwest corner of Longgang. The Third Army will constitute the right wing; it will take up quarters tonight at Xiaobie and will be responsible for the attack on the northeast corner of Longgang. The Fourth Army, which will constitute the center, will spend tonight at Biaohu and will be responsible for the attack on the southern corner of Longgang. The Twelfth Army will be positioned behind the Fourth Army as the general reserve unit and will take up quarters tonight in the vicinity of Biaohu.

All armies are to launch a general attack at 4:00 tomorrow morning (the 9th); the battle must be completed before 12:00 noon.

4. After the battle has been decided, the various armies will be lodged in the following areas:

The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army will be in the area of Shanggu, Xiagu, and Quejiaping.

The Third Army will be at Xiaobie.

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We have translated this text from *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 245–47, where the source is given as a manuscript in Mao's own hand preserved in the Central Archives. It can also be found in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 75–76.

1. Longgang is a town in southern Yongfeng xian.



The Fourth Army will be in the area of Shuixi, Gaoche, Dajiaokeng, Xiache, and Zhongtangpo.

No troops will be stationed in the area of Longgangxu, Biaohu, Zhangjiache, and Fanfu.

5. General Headquarters will be at Biaohu tomorrow morning during the battle. After the battle and through the night it will be at the District Government of Longgangyu (at the southern end of Yuchang) and will move to Shilukeng by late morning.

6.<sup>2</sup> At 7:00 P.M.<sup>3</sup> tomorrow, the commanders and political commissars of each army, as well as the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the army group, are to report to General Headquarters at the district government for a meeting.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

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2. In the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* version, paragraph 6 of this order reads as follows:

6. Wounded soldiers, captives, and firearms should all be transported and dealt with by each army separately. The hospital for wounded soldiers shall be established in the vicinity of Konggang, Junbuxiduan (15 li from Junbu). Firearms shall be collected in Pitou (between Junbu and Hanxia).

In consequence, the present paragraph 6 is renumbered 7. According to a note to the text in the *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, this passage does not appear in the available copy in Mao's own hand. We have therefore omitted it here.

3. The version in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* has 6:00 instead of 7:00.

***Order from the Central Military  
Commission to the Red Army and the  
Local Armed Forces in Xing[guo], Yu[du],  
Gan[xian], Wan[an], and Tai[he]***

(August 12, 1931)

Our tactics in dealing with the enemy's third offensive are as follows:

We will firmly carry out [the approach of] avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, attacking the enemy's rear so that the main forces of the enemy become useless and do not have enough supplies, thereby exhausting the enemy and weakening his entire army. Then we will take advantage of his fatigue and launch a sudden attack. In this way our victory in the third campaign is assured.

Beginning on August 4, our armies first divided and then gathered together their forces and proceeded to the enemy's rear. On August 6 and 7 we wiped out the enemy divisions of Shangguan Yunxiang<sup>1</sup> and Hao Mengling in the area of Liantang, Chenggang, and Liangcun. The main forces of the Red Army have already been safely concentrated in the vicinity of Junbu and are continuing to carry out our overall strategy.

During this process, in order to facilitate the carrying out of our tactics, we ordered the Thirty-fifth Army and the Thirty-fifth Division to make every effort to pin down the enemy by guerrilla actions, in cooperation with the armed forces of the various localities. They led the divisions of Jiang Dingwen and Zhao Guantao to the east bank of the Gan River—Daliao and Liangkou. They led the divisions of Chen Cheng and Luo Zhuoying to Wan'an. The three divisions of Cai Tingkai, Shen Guanghan,<sup>2</sup> and Han Deqin are stranded between Chongxian and Donggu, could not participate in the campaign because of the lack of food supplies, and even sent a force of one division to harvest the rice of the masses in the Chongxian area. In sum, the main forces of the enemy came a long way for the attack, their troops have been walking for two months and several thousand *li*, and thus far they have not encountered the main forces of the Red Army. On the other hand, their units in the rear are constantly exposed to sudden attacks by our

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Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 80–84.

1. Shangguan Yunxiang commanded the Nationalist army's Forty-seventh Division.

2. Shen Guanghan commanded the Nationalist army's Sixty-first Division, formerly commanded by Dai Ji.

forces whose job is to pin down the enemy. Above all, the wavering of the White army soldiers has become more apparent since the beginning of the Third Campaign. Marching in the hot summer, more than half of the soldiers have fallen ill. They have come to feel that it is very difficult for the White army soldiers to fight in the Red region, and the officers as well as the soldiers are all disheartened. From today's perspective, we feel that the first step in carrying out our plan was completely successful.

Beginning on August 9, however, the enemy became aware of our intentions. Only then did they learn that the main forces of the Red Army had already moved from the west to east, and that those left behind to the northwest of Xing[guo] City were not such a big force as they had originally thought. Therefore, the first of the plans the enemy used against us had failed. Starting from the 9th, the enemy will change to another plan. The main content of this plan is to reassemble troops to attack the main forces of the Red Army.

Until yesterday (August 11th), the positions of the enemy forces were as follows:

Fourteenth Division: Chen Cheng; Futian  
 Eleventh Division: Luo Zhuoying; in motion, position unclear  
 Sixty-first Division: Shen Guanghan; Gaoling  
 Eighth Division: Mao Bingwen; unclear  
 Twenty-seventh Division: Sun Lianzhong; unclear  
 Sixtieth Division: Cai Tingkai; Liangcun  
 Ninth Division: Jiang Dingwen; Xingguo  
 Sixth Division: Zhao Guantao; between Xingguo and Gaoxing  
 Forty-fifth Division:<sup>3</sup> Wei Lihuang; Ningdu  
 Fifth Division: Zhou Hunyuan; Longgang  
 Twenty-eighth Division: Gong Bingfan; Taihe  
 Seventy-eighth Division: Lu Xiaochen; Ji'an  
 Fifty-third Division: Li Baoping; Ji'an  
 Twenty-fourth Division: Xu Kexiang; Guangchang  
 Forty-third Division: Guo Huazong; Futian

Looking at the situation from the enemy's perspective, the enemy will aim at Junfu—the location of the Red Army—and turn around and continue to drive toward the east.

Chen Cheng's division will be ordered back to Wan'an for concentration—it will attack the rear of the Red Army from Baisha.

Jiang Dingwen's division will be ordered back to Xingguo, via Liangcun and Juncun, to concentrate its forces [and move to] Gulonggang, Caijiang, and Nankeng.

3. As pointed out in a note to the text as printed in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Wei's command at this time was the Tenth Division.

Cai Tingkai's division will be ordered back from the area of Donggu and Chongxian to concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Chenggang, [and move to] Liangcun and Yuexi.

During this period, in the actions of the main forces of the Red Army, we should, without the slightest doubt, continue to apply our overall tactics, striving to wipe out the weak units in the enemy's rear as well as the military depots in his rear, so that the enemy will suffer great difficulties in supply. At present, the line of communications between Chen Cheng's division and the rear must be via Ji'an and Futian; the communication lines of the divisions of Jiang Dingwen and Cai Tingkai must be via Ganzhou and Xingguo. Consequently, the overall operation of our Red Army should aim at the complete destruction of the enemy's old base of operations and at preventing the establishment of a new base of operations. Only this will be a fatal blow to the enemy, and it is the major premise for defeating the enemy.

The local forces left behind in Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan['an], and Tai[he] should operate according to our overall tactics. Their tasks should be as follows: strive to destroy the three water and land communication lines between Ji'an and Futian, Ji'an and Ganzhou, and Ganzhou and Xingguo; use guerrilla methods and resolute actions to destroy the enemy's new base of military operations, so that the enemy armies become extremely exhausted, extremely hungry, extremely sick, and extremely enfeebled; then launch a relentless attack. Only thus can we win complete victory in the third campaign.

On the basis of the above decisions, the operations and tasks of the forces in Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan['an], and Tai[he] should be as follows:

1. The Fourth Independent Division should cooperate with the local armed forces and the units under the provincial [committee], follow Cai Tingkai's division closely, and actively launch continuous surprise attacks against the enemy's rear. In general, its actions are:

- a. Make surprise attacks on the enemy's supplies and gear in his rear and the soldiers guarding them;
- b. Launch night raids on the enemy's camps and disrupt them, so that the enemy will not be able to have any rest day or night;
- c. Destroy the enemy's communication lines in the rear—in particular, find a way to destroy the enemy's radio;
- d. Take over the weapons of the scattered enemy troops in the rear.

2. The Fifth Independent Division should cooperate with the local armed forces in Chunhua and operate actively in the rear of Chen Cheng's division, striving to pin down this enemy with guerrilla methods. In general, its actions are:

- a. Make surprise attacks on the enemy's garrison forces in the rear (it should be under the command of the Thirty-fifth Division at times when these two join forces);
- b. Destroy the enemy's supply depots;

c. Destroy the enemy's telegraphic communications.

3. In cooperation with the local armed forces in Tiancun and Bailu, the Thirty-fifth Army should operate actively in the area stretching from Longkou, Liangkou, and Nantangxu to Dahujiang, striving to destroy the rear communications of Jiang Dingwen's and Cai Tingkai's divisions. In general, its actions are:

a. Cut communications on the Gan River along the area from Liangkou to Dahujiang;

b. Cut communications by land along the area from Longkou and Daotan<sup>4</sup> to Nantang;

c. Actively launch surprise attacks on the enemy forces in the rear and their supply depots;

d. Strive to strike a heavy blow against the landlord armed forces that are taking advantage of this opportunity and annihilate them completely;

e. Strive to destroy the enemy's telegraph and telephone lines, as well as the enemy's communication units.

4. The 101st Regiment should cooperate with the local armed forces in Gaoxing, Cayuangang, and Juncun and operate in the area to the west of Gaoxing. Its tasks:

a. First of all, wipe out the militia bandits [*tuanfei*] in the Langchuan area and get rid of the obstacles to communication with Taihe;

b. Wipe out the militia bandits in the Hengtang<sup>5</sup> and Wusu area, so that the shores of the Gan River in the Gan[xian] and Wan[an] area will be entirely sealed off by us.

The carrying out of the aforementioned tasks is one of the tasks of the Red Army in the third campaign as a whole. The armed forces left behind in Xing[guo], Yu[du], Gan[xian], Wan[an], and Tai[he] should strive to accomplish these tasks under the direct command of the Central Military Commission. They must not, for the sake of their departmental demands, sabotage the overall operational plan of the Red Army. This constitutes the guarantee that the Red Army will triumph over the enemy.

During the critical period in the Third Campaign, the various local armed forces should mobilize all their strength to take part in the campaign and actively harass the enemy. They cannot simply post some sentries to protect their own townships, and leave it at that. Obviously, the action of the local armed forces should be under a unified organ of command. For this reason, we should have the following rule: In every locality where there are Red Army forces, the commander of this Red Army unit will be concurrently the commander of the local armed forces, and the local armed forces must accept his leadership. Only thus

4. According to a note to the Chinese text, "Daotan" is a typographical error for "Chutan," a locality in Gan xian.

5. According to a note to the Chinese text, "Hengtang" is a typographical error for "Huangtang," a place located between Xingguo and Wan'an xian.

will we be able to wipe out the enemy in a planned manner. If there are no Red Army troops stationed in a locality, the local armed forces should unite with the armed forces in the neighboring townships to elect a commander who will unify the command and decide on the operation of the armed forces in these townships. We must be aware that only through unified command and cooperative actions can victory be secured.

It is of particular importance that the Red Army and the local armed forces should not only unite for the purpose of actively wiping out the enemy troops and the armed forces of the landlords. At the same time, they must take their stand in favor of the general task of setting up revolutionary bases and assist in mass work in the locality, in order to consolidate the victory they have already achieved. Therefore, the actions of the armed forces should be intimately linked with the masses in the locality, and military operations that are isolated from the masses are absolutely not allowed. We must not neglect this point in the slightest degree, for only in this way will we be able to set up stable revolutionary bases.

Central Military Commission

## ***Order to Reduce Our Baggage and Number of Horses***

(August 17, 1931)

In the course of the Third Campaign, the enemy used a great deal of highly mobile forces to move its troops and attack the Red Army. We have already won victory in the first and second stages. Now we must prepare to fight a prolonged war against the enemy and prepare to march often at night. This requires that we enhance the mobility of the Red Army and surpass the enemy not merely ten times but a hundred times, in order to achieve complete victory in the Third Campaign. Consequently, every military unit must strive to carry out the following two items:

1. Cut down on clumsy and heavy baggage. The elimination of clumsy and heavy baggage and large items of baggage that are seldom used must be completed by tomorrow. It should be gathered together at every army headquarters and be stored at isolated, remote, and safe places (the locations will be given in another circular). The weight of the remaining loads must not exceed 40 *jin* per load.

2. During the current operations, the horses in every unit are really an extremely great encumbrance to the advance of the army. To obstruct the march of the army is to hamper the carrying out of our strategy. Moreover, every army often acquires horses after the battle at its own whim, and this not only hampers the progress of the army but fosters cowardliness and corruption among the fighters. This is absolutely wrong. In the past, the Thirty-fourth Division of the Twelfth Army once made the decision that there should not be a single horse in a company and the result was very good. Now, in order to enhance the mobility of the Red Army, we must resolutely order a reduction in the number of horses. If it is laid down that the number of horses must be reduced, the company should not have a single horse, the regiment may keep two, the division may keep two, and the army may keep seven (for the army commander, army political commissar, head of the army political department, chief of staff, director of the logistics department, adjutant general, and director of the medical department). Of those units with special needs, such as the radio department, communications department, and machine gun company, the number of horses they can

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 248–49, where it is reprinted from *Junshi wenxian*, distributed in 1942.

have should be approved by the army commander and army political commissar on the basis of their need. Moreover, when horses are retained, bad ones must be eliminated. Those that are excluded from this decision must be gathered together (including the grooms) by every army by tomorrow (the 18th) and be sent to Guantian, where they will be handed over to the Southern Jiangxi Special Committee for use in transporting the wounded, weapons, and food supplies.

It is required that every army carry out earnestly the above two items.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong



# ***The Problem of Opposing Rich Peasants***

## ***Notice No. 2 of the Central Revolutionary Military Committee***

(1931)

### **I. The rationale for opposing the rich peasants**

First, the rich peasants are the semi-landlords and the capitalists of the countryside, and are an exploiting class. They support the feudal forces and also want to become capitalists; their interests are diametrically opposed to those of the masses of workers, farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. If we want to protect the interests of the workers, farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, we must oppose the rich peasants.

Second, the rich peasants are an exploiting class. They often collude with the reactionary forces to sabotage the revolution. If we want to consolidate the soviet régime and ensure the success of land redistribution, we must definitely oppose the rich peasants.

Third, the road the rich peasants are taking is the capitalist road. We are moving towards the socialist road. Their road and ours are completely opposite, so that if we want to make the revolution advance to the socialist road, we must intensify our struggle against the rich peasants.

### **II. Mistakes in opposing the rich peasants**

If we examine the opposition to the rich peasants in the past, four major mistakes were made.

First, instead of taking opposing exploitation as the criterion, opposition to the rich peasants was seen exclusively as a means to raise funds. Not exploitation, but money, was presented as the criterion. The financial criterion of not attacking those who had less than a hundred *yuan*, but only those with over a hundred *yuan* was exploited by vagabond leaders, and in a few places they even went so far as to attack those who had only upwards of twenty *yuan*, or anyone who could

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 259–62, where it is reproduced from *Chifei jimi wenjian huibian* (A Collection of Red Bandit Secret Documents), no. 5, compiled by the Guomindang armed forces in September 1931.

afford to raise an old sow. This caused a state of panic among the masses, who felt that the revolution must be about making everyone poor, instead of making everyone better off and improving their lives.

Second, they encroached on the interests of the middle peasants. Because of the existence of the first mistake, there also arose the second mistake of encroaching upon the interests of the middle peasants. Middle peasants are those who can get enough to eat and live on by farming the land, who are not exploited by others, and do not themselves exploit others. Not only must we refrain from encroaching upon these people, but rather we should closely unite with them and all oppose the rich peasants together. For the only way out for the middle peasants is to make revolution under the leadership of the proletariat, and we, for our part, can only strengthen the revolutionary forces and make the revolution advance rapidly by uniting with the middle peasants.

Third, the redistribution of the rich peasants' land was not done thoroughly. In very many places, distribution of the land followed the principle of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, but not that of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. The rich peasants monopolized the good farmland, and the forests, dwellings, ponds, and so on were not thoroughly distributed either. As a consequence, the rich peasants were in a privileged position economically, and also seized political leadership. The soviet governments and revolutionary organizations were dominated by rich peasants, and the rich peasants have taken further advantage of their political and economic power to exploit and oppress the masses of poor peasants.

Fourth, the masses were not mobilized. Because opposition to the rich peasants was merely to raise funds for the government, equal land distribution was not thoroughly carried out either, and the masses were not made to recognize that rich peasants are counterrevolutionary. Everyone started opposing the rich peasants in various ways, and the government consequently became divorced from the masses and isolated.

### **III. The correct way to oppose the rich peasants**

A. The political aspect. First, consolidate the leadership of the proletariat. In the soviet government, the Red Army, the Red Guards, and all revolutionary organizations, rich peasants should not be allowed to participate as committee members in the soviet government or as deputies to soviet congresses. Leaders among workers, farm laborers, and poor peasants, and the most active elements among the middle peasants should be elected to discuss and handle all matters, and poor peasant associations should be organized to unite the broad masses of poor peasants into a strong alliance with the middle peasants to oppose the rich peasants. Where middle peasants' interests have been encroached upon in the past, either by fining them or having their money donated to the poor peasants, they must be fully compensated. The vagabond leaders' policy of random imposition of fines, not based on class and divorced from the masses, must also be

opposed. If such things happen again, people should be allowed to file charges with higher authorities. Second, suppress the reaction of the rich peasants. The rich peasants are an exploiting class, and so will inevitably oppose and sabotage the revolution by various means. Therefore, it is especially necessary to watch out for reactionary moves on the part of rich peasants throughout the soviet territory, and whenever their counterrevolutionary organizations such as the AB Corps and others are discovered to be colluding with the White bandits to oppose and sabotage the revolution and so on, the government must severely punish them as counterrevolutionary criminals. Rich peasants may be allowed to exist or run their business only if they obey every law issued by the soviet and refrain from all counterrevolutionary conspiracies and activities.

B. The economic aspect. First, oppose exploitation by the rich peasants. The goal of opposing the rich peasants at present is not at all to wipe out the rich peasants; rather it is to oppose firmly all economic exploitation by the rich peasants, because exploitation by the rich peasants adds to the suffering of us workers, poor peasants, and so on. Rich peasants may be permitted to hire farm laborers, as long as they treat their hired hands in accordance with the Labor Protection Law. Harsh treatment and oppression are prohibited. Doing business is also permitted, but monopolizing purchase or sale and usury are forbidden. More specific regulations such as these are best worked out by the *xian* government, preferably through a representative assembly of the *xian*, according to actual local conditions. This sort of policy is not meant to eliminate capitalists altogether, but rather to oppose harsh exploitation by capitalists and promote lively development of the economy in society. As for the fact that it is sometimes necessary to solicit donations from the rich peasants, it is to meet the needs of the revolution. The rich peasants can afford to give the amount for which they should be responsible. But it's not the case that the economy of the rich peasants should be eliminated altogether at this point. Speaking of the peasants' land, it must be divided completely equally. Second, carry out the economic policies. What is described above in terms of limiting exploitation by rich peasants is still only a passive measure. It is not enough to oppose the rich peasants only in a passive way; it is also necessary to oppose the rich peasants by carrying out economic policies according to social conditions. For example, the government can lead the people in operating credit cooperatives to provide low interest loans to the impoverished masses, operating production cooperatives to develop manufacturing, and operating commercial cooperatives to minimize exploitation by merchants and rich peasants, and so on. These organizations can actively resist exploitation by the rich peasants, provide the broad masses of poor people with a certain measure of liberation, and prepare for the development of the economy in society in the direction of socialism.

#### IV. Preventing abuses

The purpose of pointing out above the mistakes made in opposing the rich peasants and of stating that now is not the time to eliminate the rich peasants is

certainly not to have people ease up in opposing the rich peasants. On the contrary, it is to have everyone understand the strategy of opposing the rich peasants and oppose the rich peasants even more intensely. As we rectify our strategy, we must prevent the rich peasants who are hiding under cover in the revolutionary ranks as well as supporters of the rich peasants from moderating our work in opposing the rich peasants. Even more must the rich peasants be forbidden from opposing the government under any pretext. It is so proclaimed.

Chairman	Xiang Ying
Vice-Chairmen	Mao Zedong Zhu De

# ***General Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Cut Down on Expenditures***

(August 22, 1931, at Headquarters)

I. Our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has already achieved initial victory in the Third Campaign, but at present we must still be prepared for one to two months of hard struggle. Only if we wipe out the enemy by means of a long-term strategy and seize complete victory in the Third Campaign will we be able to accomplish the tasks of founding the Soviet Base Area and establishing the Central Soviet Government. In this spirit, the Management Department of this Front Army called the Fifth Managers' Meeting, and laid down specific methods for economizing at present. Having been approved by this commander-in-chief and general political commissar,<sup>1</sup> they should be carried out immediately.

II. Various expenditures at present are stipulated as follows:

A. Allowance for food remains at 1 *jiao*; same for hospitals in the rear.

B. Allowance for feed for the horses remains at 1 *jiao*, but it must be distributed according to the newly stipulated number of horses.

C. Office expenditures:

Company, 4 *yuan* per month

Same as company for management department, medical team, communications team, radio team, new recruit company, training team, doctor's office, espionage department, supply department, and security team; same as company for regiment and battalion

Division, 6 *yuan* (includes office)

Division political department, 6 *yuan*

Army headquarters, 10 *yuan* (includes office)

Army political department, 10 *yuan*

General Headquarters,<sup>2</sup> 15 *yuan* (includes office)

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We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, pp. 91–92.

1. I.e., the undersigned (Zhu De and Mao Zedong).

2. Both *zong zhihuibu*, the Chinese term used here, and *zong silingbu*, the term used two lines farther down, are commonly translated "General Headquarters." In view of the order in which the information is presented here, it can be assumed that this entry refers to the headquarters of a front army or army group, while the subsequent entry means the headquarters of the entire Red Army.

General Political Department, 15 *yuan*

General Headquarters, 20 *yuan* (includes office)

General Political Department, 20 *yuan*

D. Porters' wages:

1. For each day of work, 1 *jiao* 5 *fen* in big foreign dollars.
2. For each day of rest, 1 *jiao* in big foreign dollars.
3. When returning home, food expenses are to be calculated according to length of trip at 10 *fen* per day; in addition, wages are paid at 1 *jiao* per day.

E. Treatment fees for the ill:

1. Army and division level doctors' offices are responsible for transporting all sick troops; food and treatment expenses are all to be given out by the doctors' offices.
2. Those recuperating within the ranks do not receive expenses for treatment.
3. Those entrusted to the government for treatment are to be given per day 1 *yuan* in big foreign dollars plus 1 *yuan* for food.
4. Those sent to hospitals in the rear for treatment do not receive any money at all for food.

F. Pay for wounded soldiers:

Light wounds, 4 *yuan*

Heavy wounds, 6 *yuan*

G. Pay for captives:

Three *yuan* per person.

H. Expenses for entertaining visitors:

Three *fen* per meal. Those not on public business may not receive such money.

I. Guides receive the same pay as temporary porters, with certain exceptions under special circumstances.

III. Cutting down on expenses is one of the important issues in striving for victory in the Third Campaign. To ensure that the above stipulations on the various items of expenditure are carried out accordingly, officers in charge at every level must exercise conscientious supervision. It is particularly necessary to maintain the management organs as an independent system. According to recent investigation in the various armies, in some cases expenditures are disbursed by division headquarters and not the supply department; in some cases lower levels of government create disturbances in the the supply department; some military supply departments are only commanded by division commanders and political commissars and cannot work under the management system (Thirty-fifth Division); there are instances where military supply personnel are moved around without informing the management department (Third Division); there are cases of conflict between managers on the one hand and army commanders and political commissars on the other over authorization procedures (Thirty-fifth Army);

and there are also instances where guards or long-term porters are forcibly transferred without gaining consent of the management organ. . . . All these instances reflect a failure to understand clearly the significance of independent management and thus indirectly obstruct the task of winning a complete victory in the Third Campaign. This should be rigorously corrected. We are also sending the past two general orders of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee and the Revolutionary Military Commission, which are to be strictly carried out. This is a general order.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

## *Order to Shift Positions and Intercept the Enemy Forces<sup>1</sup>*

(September 11, 1931)

1. It has been reported that the enemy troops of Han Deqin again retreated to Xing[guo] City during the night of the 9th; the main force, consisting of Jiang [Guangnai]'s and Cai [Tingkai]'s two divisions, is still in the vicinity of Gaoxingxu; the remnant forces of Jiang Dingwen are in Changjingkou; the enemy guerrilla troops arrived in Qigang and Longping on the 10th and withdrew the same night; and the enemy guerrilla forces that entered Liuke that day also retreated in the afternoon. Near Laoyingpan there is our Fourth Independent Division, and in Laoyingpan is our Provincial Soviet Government and one company of the Fourth Army that collects bullets. The Ninth Division of the Third Army is occupying positions near Liuke and will retreat to Chenggong'ao at 2:00 P.M. tomorrow (the 12th) to occupy [other] positions successfully.

2. The Front Army has decided to shift positions to intercept the enemy forces and to start the maneuver tomorrow (the 12th), dispatching the Third Army as a covering unit to provide cover in the vicinity of Laoyingpan. The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army should set out from their present position (around Juncun) tomorrow morning at 4:00 A.M. and go through Gaowan, Xiapingxi, Shangpingxi, Dongkeng, Shibapai, and Huanglongping to Langchuan<sup>2</sup> (45 li), and arrange quarters in the areas of Chayuan in Langchuan (half of the lodgings should be appropriately allocated [here]) and Xiayuan.

The Fourth Army and the Thirty-fifth Army will depart from their present locations (Xiaozhanggong, Changyao, Lixi, etc.) tomorrow morning at 4:00 A.M. for Fuzu by way of Xiaozhanggong. They may split into two routes, one to go via Tianziyin and the other via Diaoyutai, both arriving in Shihuiwei<sup>3</sup> and Chayuan in Langchuan (half of the lodgings should be appropriately allocated [here]) and arrange quarters there. If the General Attached Unit has excess lodging places, some of them should be allocated to the Fourth Army.

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 250–51.

1. Places mentioned in this document are mostly in western Xingguo and eastern Taihe xian.

2. Langchuan is the name of a township (*xiang*) in southwestern Taihe xian.

3. A note to the text in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* states that Shihuiwei is a misprint for Shifengwei. This is the name of a village in Taihe xian near the border with Xingguo.



The General Attached Unit is commanded by Yang, the chief of the Adjutants' Section; it will set out from its present location (Fuzu) tomorrow morning at 5:00 A.M. and go through Longshang and Diaoyutai to Shihuiyao in Langchuan and arrange quarters. (Lodgings in Shihuiyao will be allocated by Yang, the chief of the Adjutants' Section of General Headquarters. After the General Attached Unit has been provided for, the rest will belong to the Fourth Army.)

The Third Army's regiment of new recruits will transfer tomorrow to Baikeshu in Langchuan.

3. Upon arriving at its place of encampment, the Third Army Group must send people to Xiaozhuang to reconnoiter points for crossing the river and to build bridges, and prepare to proceed the day after tomorrow to Tianduan through Xiaozhuang.

4. General Headquarters will be at Shihuiyao tomorrow night. All units upon arrival at their places of encampment must immediately send dispatchers to the General Headquarters to take orders.

5. All armies should temporarily leave their political departments behind to take care of the wounded and wait to rejoin their units in the area of Longgangtou as soon as transport conditions have been restored.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

## *Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Move to the East*

(September 12, 1931, 8:00 P.M., at  
General Headquarters in Shihuiyao)<sup>1</sup>

1. Remnants of the enemy forces of Jiang Dingwen are still in Changjingkou; Jiang [Guangnai]'s division, as well as that of Cai [Tingkai], are still in the Gaoxingxu area. Han Deqin's forces are still in the city of Xingguo and do not dare to take further action because they are not clear about the situation of our armies. As for the enemy troops that attacked and harassed Huangtuwa yesterday, one source says it was a guard detachment [*shouwang dui*];<sup>2</sup> another source says that there are still some enemy scouts today, [but] the enemy troops which attacked Liuke have already retreated to Sanke. The Seventh Division of our Third Army has already set out to take the stronghold in Huangtuwa; the Eighth and Ninth Divisions are in Laoyingpan and the Fourth Independent Division is in Shenggangwa. They are covering the movement of our main forces.

2. The Front Army has decided to move eastward to the right of the enemy by way of Laoyingpan and Tianduan, and it has decided on the following itinerary:

General Headquarters, its directly attached unit, and the Fourth Army (including the Thirty-fifth Army and the Thirty-fifth Division) should have their breakfast at 4:00 tomorrow morning (the 13th), leave their present location at 5:00, and arrive at the Yankeng, Shizibei, Yantan, and Fengshuiwa area (60 *li*) by way of Shihuiyao, Shen'gangwa, and Laoyingpan and encamp there (because the houses in Chongxian have all been burned down by the enemy). The day after tomorrow, the Fourth Army should choose its own convenient way to get to Liantang. General Headquarters and its directly attached unit will arrive at Hejiangkou tomorrow and at Shuitouzhuang the day after tomorrow.

The Seventh Army of the Third Army Group should have breakfast at 4:00 tomorrow morning, set out from the present location at 5:00, and take the road to

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We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, p. 112.

1. Shihuiyao is a small hamlet in Taihe *xian*'s Langchuan township, near the Xingguo border. Places mentioned in this document are mostly in Taihe and Xingguo.

2. Guard detachments were anti-Communist militia forces common in the several *xian* around Ji'an; often they were formed by local elites and other people who had been displaced from the soviet areas.

the left of Chayuan, Shihuiwei, and Shihuiyao (the road on the right of this line will be taken by the Fourth Army). After passing through Santiansi (Guodong), Niugudong, Wangkeng, Dazhuang, and Xiaozhuang, it should arrive at the area of Tianduan, Jiankou, Jiaoshi, and Shanggai (70 *li*) and encamp there. Day after tomorrow, it should choose its own route and arrive at Longgangtou.

3. Each unit should send one company of soldiers to the tail of its main forces to take care of those soldiers who have fallen behind.

4. During the march, General Headquarters will be in front of its directly attached unit and will encamp tomorrow evening at Hejiangkou. It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

# ***Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Set Out for Longgangtou for Consolidation and Replacing Losses after Wiping Out Han Deqin's Troops***

(September 18, 1931, 11:00 P.M., at General Headquarters  
in Liuduyou)<sup>1</sup>

1. In this battle at Fangshiling, our Front Army wiped out Han Deqin's entire force.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the enemy units of Jiang [Guangnai], Cai [Tingkai], Zhao [Guantao], and Zhou [Hunyuan] are withdrawing from the soviet areas one after the other. After the Third Campaign has achieved a complete victory, our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army should deal with the tasks of consolidation and replacing losses and continuing to move forward.

2. This Front Army has decided that the first step will be to move to the Longgangtou area. We have now laid down the following plan for moving forward and resting during these three days:

<b>Date</b>	<b>September 20</b>	<b>September 21</b>	<b>September 22</b>	
<b>Unit</b>	<b>Destination</b>			<b>Notes</b>
General Headquarters and directly attached unit	Shuitou-zhuang	Rest at former location	Rest at former location	

(continued)

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 19, p. 116.

1. A village in Ji'an *xian* near Donggu.

2. The battle at Fangshiling, 15 *li* south of Donggu in Ji'an *xian*, was one of the last engagements in the Third Encirclement Campaign. Not only was most of Han Deqin's Fifty-second Division destroyed, but Han Deqin himself was captured (though he was not recognized and later escaped).

Date	September 20	September 21	September 22	
Unit	Destination		Notes	
Third Army Group	Beikeng, Longtankou, Shanggai, Niantan	Changxin	Rest at former location	The Seventh Army will still be under the command of the Third Army Group
Third Army	Fengbian, Baishi	Guantian	Rest at former location	
Fourth Army	Longgangtou, Yangcun	Rest at former location	Rest at former location	The Thirty-fifth Army and the Thirty-fifth Division will still be under the command of the Fourth Army
Fourth Independent Division	Changgang	Shuitouzhuang	Rest	Minus the Second Company

3. The Third and Fourth independent divisions are responsible for pursuing rebels such as Zhao Guantao and Zhou Hunyuan, and Xiao Ke<sup>3</sup> will be the commander. A few days later, the Fourth Independent Division will leave the Second Company of the Tenth Regiment behind, putting it under the command of the Fifth Independent Division, which will continue its work in Yong[feng], Ji[an], and Tai[he]. The balance [of the division] will be led back to the Huangpi area by Division Commander Long to work there.

4. Movements after the 23rd will be the subject of another order.  
It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

3. Xiao Ke (1908– ), a native of Hunan, joined the Party in 1926, fought on the Jinggangshan, and held various posts in the Fourth Army before being made commander of the Fifth Independent Division of the First Front Army.

## *Order to Proceed to Fujian to Work and Collect Revenue*

(September 23, 1931)

I. Following our complete victory in the Third Campaign, the White army is already retreating along the whole front. The Sixtieth and Sixty-first divisions of Cai Tingkai's forces withdrew from the town of Xingguo on September 19 and set out for Ganzhou. Chen Cheng's Fourteenth Division, Luo Zhuoying's Eleventh Division, Wei Lihuang's Tenth Division, and Qu Shounian's Seventy-eighth Division are all in Ji'an. The Seventy-seventh Division of Luo Lin's forces is planning to leave for Changsha at once. The remnant forces of Jiang Dingwen's Ninth Division have fled to the other side of the river opposite Ji'an. Zhou Hunyuan's Fifth Division, Zhao Guantao's Sixth Division, and Li Wenyan's Fifty-third Division are all retreating toward Ji'an. The Twenty-fifth and Twenty-seventh divisions of Sun Lianzhong's forces are in the Ningdu area. Li Yunjie's Twenty-third Division is in Toubai. Xu Kexiang's Twenty-fourth Division and the remnant forces of Mao Bingwen's Eighth Division are in Guangchang, under the leadership of Zhu Shaoliang. The Forty-ninth Division of Zhang Zhen's forces from Fujian is in the area of Nanyan and Baisha.

II. The Front Army has resolved to go to Fujian to work and collect revenue and has moreover decided that we should set out on September 25 from the present location (the area of Liantang, Longgangtou, Changxin, and Shuitouzhuang) and arrive and concentrate our forces in the town of Tingzhou after seven daily stages (the fifth day will be a day of rest).

III. The itinerary for the advance of each of the armies is as follows:

A. The Third Army Group and the Seventh Army constitute the right wing. They should set out on the 25th from the present location (Changxin), by way of Jiangbeidong, Qiaotou, and Yinkeng, cross the river at Quyang, continue their march via Xiaba, Sanzai, Wencun, Gangmianyu, Yangjiaoxu, and Hekengkou, and arrive at Ruijin City. This trip should be divided into four daily stages. On the fifth day (the 29th) they should rest for one day in Ruijin City. On the 30th they should set out again from Ruijin City, and by way of Gucheng, arrive at Changting after two days' march for the concentration of forces.

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 253–56, where it is reproduced from *Junshi wenxian*, issued in 1942.

B. The Fourth Army constitutes the central column and should set out on the same day (the 25th) from Longgangtuo, advancing after the unit directly attached to Headquarters. After passing through Shuitouzhuang, Shuibei, Bazishang, Xinxuzi, Pibalong, Ping'anzhai, Datianxu, and Huangwuqian, it should cross the river at Changsha.<sup>1</sup> The crossing must be completed on the morning of the third day (the 27th), and it should then march by way of Liuminba, Shangtian, Dutouxu, and Guancang to Huangbaixu in four daily stages. On the fifth day (the 29th) it should rest for one day in Huangbaixu. On the 30th it should set off again from Huangbaixu, by way of Yunjixu, Helongshi, and Liudongnao, arriving at Changting City in two days for the concentration of forces.

C. The Third Army constitutes the left wing. It should set out on the 25th from its present location (Liantang) and reach Changsha by way of Guantian, Zhongzhou, Gulonggang, Sanliao, Chengjiangyu, Yangmeitou, and Huangwuqian. It should cross the river after the Fourth Army and then proceed by way of Ruilinzhai, Yangkeng, Shanhexu, and Yuanxicun, arriving at Rentianshi in four days. On the fifth day (the 29th) it should take a day's rest in Rentianshi. On the 30th it should set out once again from Rentianshi, and by way of Jiugongpai, Hubei, Baixia, Yangang, Huang,<sup>2</sup> and Luobaiping, arrive at the city of Changting in two days for concentration.

D. General Headquarters and its directly attached unit should set out at 4:00 in the morning on the 25th from its present location (Shuitouzhuang). It should advance ahead of the Fourth Army, along the itinerary of the Fourth Army. After it has crossed the river at Changsha on the second day (the 26th), it must choose a suitable place to camp on the southern bank of the river. On the third day, it should arrive in the vicinity of Guancangxia and on the fourth day it should arrive at Ruijin City and encamp there. Thereafter, it should follow the itinerary of the Third Army Group to Changting.

IV. While crossing the river at Quyang and Liuminba, each army should appoint someone as river crossing commander to exercise command in matters related to the crossing. Special attention must be paid to keeping a close watch on the air (send out air raid watchers, set up a number of machine guns to defend against air raids). The directly attached unit of General Headquarters must complete the crossing at Changsha (that is, at the place opposite Liuminba) on the 26th. The Fourth Army must begin crossing the river rapidly at daybreak on the 27th, and the crossing must be completed by noon on the 27th. The Third Army should cross the river after the Fourth Army at the same place (Changsha).

V. The temporary hospitals left behind by every army should all be put under the command of the Rear General Hospital of the Red Army (Director Dai Jimin,

1. The Changsha referred to here is not the capital of Hunan Province, but a small town on the Mei, a river running between Yudu and Ruijin *xian*, which the Red Army was obliged to cross in proceeding eastward toward Fujian.

2. A character is missing here from the available Chinese text.

Political Commissar He Cheng).<sup>3</sup> Every army must deal independently with the large baggage stored in the rear and in the local areas.

VI. General Headquarters will arrive at Ping'anzhai on the first day, in the vicinity of Liuminba on the second day, at Guancangxia on the third day, and at Ruijin City on the fourth day. Thereafter, its location will be determined separately. Every day, on reaching its place of encampment, each army should send a report to Headquarters.

Supplementary Notes:

- a. For the detailed itinerary of every army, see the attached map, but this must be kept absolutely secret and must not be transmitted below the divisional level.
- b. Each army can lay down its own itineraries for the advance to Ruijin City, Huangbaixu, and Rentianshi, but these should not be transmitted below the regimental level.
- c. The area to the right of the right wing army should be further divided into parallel routes for the advance by the Third Army Group and the Seventh Army themselves. The area on the left of the left wing army should be further divided into parallel routes for the advance by the Third Army itself.
- d. Each army should choose a location in the vicinity of the crossing point for anti-aircraft defenses. At least eight machine guns should be set up, and if the enemy's planes fly low (below 800 meters) to disrupt our crossing, the river crossing commanders in charge of each crossing, or the commander of each army (the commander-in-chief) should give the order to fire at them.
- e. During the march, each army should assign capable staff officers to investigate the roads we have passed through on the way, and the houses, mountains, rivers, topography, and so on near the route. Whenever you stop and camp, you must investigate the social situations at the place of encampment and the roads that extend in all directions. After reaching the place for concentrating our forces, the results of these investigations must be reported to the staff office of General Headquarters.

In all, there are six orders and five supplementary notes.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

3. He Cheng (1901– ), a native of Santai (Shehong) in Sichuan, joined the Party in 1925, participated in the Guangzhou Uprising in 1927, and then did medical work in Guangdong base areas before coming to the Jiangxi base areas in early 1931. No biographical information has been located on Dai Jimin.



# ***A Letter to Our Brothers the Soldiers of the White Army on the Forcible Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialism***

(September 25, 1931)

Soldiers, Our Brothers!

Do not the warlords of the Guomindang constantly tell you that it is your responsibility to “defend the country and protect the people”? But look, now the troops of Japanese imperialism have already occupied all the most important cities of Manchuria; they are slaughtering the toiling masses of workers and peasants in Manchuria, as well as the soldiers, with guns, cannons, and bombs, and have already begun to treat Manchuria purely as their colony. Let us ask: How are the Guomindang warlords carrying out their responsibility of “defending the country and protecting the people”? What are they saying to you now?

Confronted by such atrocities on the part of Japanese imperialism, the Guomindang warlords tell you “not to resist”; they tell you “reasonable people should submit to violence”; they ask you to stretch out your necks and let the Japanese imperialist bandits massacre you; they ask you meekly to become the “slaves without a country” of Japanese imperialism. From this you see that the Guomindang warlords can only toady and capitulate to imperialism and act as the running dogs of imperialism. They are capable neither of “defending the country” nor of “protecting the people”!

And yet, in order to enlarge their own spheres of influence and exploit and butcher the Chinese people on a still larger scale, the Guomindang warlords have, year after year, carried on chaotic military struggles among themselves. For the sake of these wars among the warlords, they are very brave about forcing you to the battlefields to murder your own brothers and destroy the lives and property of the popular masses. They exact vexatious taxes and levies, they impress men and requisition horses, and they suck the last drop of blood from the toiling and impoverished popular masses. They slaughter the revolutionary workers and peasants. They force the people to grow opium to poison the

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This letter first appeared in the volume *Suweigi Zhongguo* (Soviet China), published in Moscow in 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 13–16, where it is reproduced from that source.

masses. They have created unprecedented disasters (flood, drought, and famine) in all of China. In exploiting and massacring the popular masses, they have consistently displayed enormous resolution and courage!

Especially when the workers and peasant masses of our soviet area rose up spontaneously—when they drove out all the imperialists, overthrew the rule of the Guomindang, confiscated all the land of the landlord class, put into practice the system of the eight-hour day, created the workers' and peasants' own armed force, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and established the Soviet Government of the Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers—all the Guomindang warlords were mortally offended and manifested their resolution and courage. Once, twice, three times they attacked us with the aid of the imperialists; they used airplanes, bombs, poison gas, artillery, and machine guns to slaughter the people of the soviet area. Although their attacks have all been defeated by our brave efforts and those of the popular masses, if we do not exterminate them, they will certainly never leave us alone. They are also extraordinarily brave when it comes to attacking the people's soviet political power and the people's Red Army!

Soldiers, our brothers! You have already had enough of the deception and oppression from these warlords! Just consider: When you come right down to it, why are you risking your lives for these warlords? Can you say it is for the sake of feeding your families and eking out a living? In reality, you yourselves often do not receive a copper of pay. You yourselves have neither enough to eat nor warm clothing to wear. How can you feed your families? Your superior officers treat you like cattle, like cannon fodder; they want you to risk your lives in killing your own worker and peasant brothers so they can rise in rank and enrich themselves!

Soldiers, our brothers! You must think of another way out! There is another way out for you—this way out is revolution! You have rifles and guns in your hands. First kill your reactionary superior officers; then unite with the workers, peasants, and all the toiling and impoverished masses of your area to overthrow the fucking Guomindang government.<sup>1</sup> Confiscate the land of the landlord class and distribute it to the poor peasants; seize the grain and houses of the rich, make them public property, and turn them over to the poor to eat and live in; let the workers work only eight hours a day; then organize yourselves to run your own affairs. Thus you will have created a government of the workers and peasants, that is, a soviet government. You will have become the armed force of the workers and peasants—the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. If there is a soviet government and a Red Army near your garrison area, then when you have either captured alive or killed your reactionary superior officers, present yourselves there to join the Red Army. Only the Soviet Government and only the Red Army can protect the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, overthrow

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1. *Guomindang diao zhengfu.*

the Guomindang, overthrow imperialism, and really defend the country and protect the people!

Soldiers, our brothers! Unite! Turn your guns around. Fight for the overthrow of imperialism and the Guomindang, which exploit, oppress, and slaughter the toiling and impoverished Chinese masses. Fight for the establishment of the workers', peasants', and soldiers' own Soviet Government and Red Army! We, your brothers, the hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers, truly welcome you to our ranks!

Down with imperialism and the Guomindang!

Establish the Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet Government!

Long live the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army!

Long live the victory of the soviet revolution in China!

Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Commander of the First Army Group	Zhu De
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Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Mao Zedong
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Commander of the Second Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	He Long
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Commander of the Third Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Peng Dehuai
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Commander of the Third Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Huang Gonglue
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## *Eulogy for Comrade Huang Gonglue<sup>1</sup>*

(1931)

You died not in the Guangzhou Uprising, you died not in the Pingjiang Uprising, but now you have unexpectedly sacrificed your life, how unbearable that the great *peng*<sup>2</sup> has fallen from the sky.

You achieved merit in the revolutionary war, you achieved merit in the guerilla war, all your life long how bravely you fought, setting an example for generations to come.

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Our source for this couplet is *Shici duilian*, p. 165.

1. Huang Gonglue (1898–1931), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He participated in the Guangzhou Uprising of December 1927, and in the Pingjiang Uprising of 1928. In June 1930, Huang's Sixth Army, which had already set up a base area on the western bank of the Gan River, became part of the First Army Group under the command of Zhu De and Mao Zedong. Huang was killed in action on September 15, 1931.

2. The mythical bird called a *peng* (usually translated as "roc") appears in the opening passage of chapter 1 of *Zhuangzi* (translated in Angus Graham, *Chuang-tzu. The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book Chuang-tzu* [London: Allen & Unwin, 1981], pp. 43–44). Mao had used the same image in his poem "From Tingzhou to Changsha" of July 1930, translated in Volume III of this edition, p. 460. Although that poem also contained lines in praise of Huang Gonglue, the *peng* appears there as a symbol for the enemy forces of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang. Here it stands, on the contrary, for a revolutionary hero. No doubt Mao perceived this creature as a metaphor for a powerful protean force which could be either good or evil depending on the context.

## ***Order to Gather Experience About Attacking Fortified Village Blockhouses***

(October 14, 1931)

1. The fortified village blockhouses [*tu weizi paolou*]<sup>1</sup> are the last strongholds of the local bullies. If these strongholds are not destroyed, many of the peasant masses will still not dare to stand up. In order to eliminate the confrontation between the Red and the White, win over the broad masses, and be able to capture the local bullies so as to raise revenue, the fortified village blockhouses must be totally wiped out.

2. In the past, in our assaults on blockhouses in the course of attacks on fortified villages, we always used infantry charges and the threat of the artillery. In reality, this is far from sufficient. We suffered heavy casualties, and yet the blockhouses in the fortified villages were not taken. We did not have the slightest idea how to use the strength of the engineering troops to dig tunnels, dig trenches, bury land mines, blow up the walls, and then charge in, or use a large amount of explosives to destroy them completely.

3. From the experience of recent battles to take the blockhouse of fortified villages, the Red Army has learned many lessons and mastered many skills. It has shattered many famous fortifications with assurance, and eliminated the last strongholds of the enemy.

4. Many fortified village blockhouses of the local tyrants are being built right now in the countryside. The warlords have already built very strong fortresses in the cities to resist the attacks of the Red Army. The tactics of the Red Army for attacking cities and strongholds should be learned and perfected in the struggles to attack the fortified village blockhouses.

5. After receiving this order, every army must call a meeting and carefully discuss, summarize, and report to General Headquarters the concrete experience, military dispositions, and work methods, such as the methods to dig tunnels, the tools used, the type and quantity of explosives, the power of the explosion, and

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 257–58.

1. In many parts of South China, including southern Jiangxi, western Fujian, and northern Guangdong, generations of interlineage feuds, banditry, and other social unrest had led not only to construction of strong mountain redoubts within which people could flee in times of emergency, but also to the formation of large, often circular and multistoried, fortress-settlements within which people passed their everyday lives.

the achievements of the commanding officers who were directly engaged in attacking fortified village blockhouses in every army, division, and regiment. Afterward, these reports will be discussed by the staff office of General Headquarters, and the effective and well-tried methods will be compiled into a textbook on building strongholds and attacking cities for use in training the Red Army. This is urgently needed at present. The reports should be prepared and sent to General Headquarters within ten days following receipt of this order, and there must be no delay in doing this. It is so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

# *The Economic Policy of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

*Adopted by the First National Congress of Chinese  
Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers*

(December 1, 1931)

For the purpose of opposing imperialism, promoting the development of the land revolution, and strengthening the revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants, the First National Congress of Chinese Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers establishes the following stipulations as the basis for the economic policy of the soviets at the present time.

## **I. Industry**

A. To ensure the total independence of the Soviet Government, all economic lifelines now in the hands of imperialism are to be nationalized—concessions, customs houses, banks, railways, navigation, mines, factories, and so on. For the present, certain foreign enterprises will be permitted to sign new leases and contracts and continue production. They must, however, observe all decrees issued by the soviets and bring into effect the eight-hour day and all other regulations. If any owner of these enterprises violates any of these conditions and stages a production slowdown, closes down an enterprise, interferes with the internal affairs of the Soviet Government, or supports the counterrevolution, [the enterprise] must immediately be confiscated and revert to state ownership.

B. As for the [policy] of the soviets toward enterprises and handicraft manufactures of Chinese capitalists, they will remain in the hands of the former owners and not be nationalized for the time being. But such production will be supervised by the workers through a factory committee or labor union committee. If an owner slows down production, violates soviet law, or participates in counterrevolutionary activities, such as deliberately sabotaging or stopping production, his enterprise must immediately be confiscated and, in accordance with the concrete circumstances, turned over to and managed by the labor cooperative of the workers or the Soviet Government.

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 53–55, where it has been taken from a text published in Ruijin in 1931.

3. Every effort will be made to promote the development of industry, and the soviets will pay special attention to ensuring the growth of all enterprises that supply the Red Army (factories, workshops, handicrafts, household industries. . .)

## II. Commerce

A. The soviets should guarantee freedom of commerce and must not interfere in everyday commodity market relations. The soviets must, however, strictly prohibit merchants from opportunistically raising prices and should disband chambers of commerce and prohibit large and small merchants from monopolizing prices in the name of the chambers of commerce. If merchants should stage a slowdown or an economic blockade, thereby threatening the supply to the masses of major daily necessities, or because of the needs of the Red Army, the Soviet Government should stipulate a maximum price for necessities, but this sort of method should be used only when necessary and free trade should be restored as soon as possible.

B. In trading with non-soviet areas, it is not at all possible to exercise a "monopoly of external trade." At the same time, the Soviet Government should carry out supervision of this trade, in order to ensure the supply of necessities in the soviet areas. For the export of silver currency, permission of the soviet in the area in question is required.

C. For the sake of commerce in the Soviet as a whole, to safeguard the interests of the poor laboring people, and to improve the supply of necessities for the toiling masses, the Soviet Government must make the utmost effort to organize and develop consumer cooperatives. The soviets should provide the cooperatives with financial assistance, exempt them from taxation, and apportion some of the confiscated houses and shops for their use. In addition, to ensure supplies for the poor toiling masses, the Soviet Government should foster public storehouses and store up grain to facilitate low-priced supply and relief.

## III. Finance and Taxation

A. All systems of taxation and all excessive taxes and levies introduced by the Guomindang warlord government are to be abolished. The soviets will adopt a new system of progressive taxation so that the burden will be shifted to the capitalist class. The Soviet Government should exempt from taxation the Red Army, the workers, and the families of the impoverished rural and urban masses. In cases of unexpected disaster, taxation should also be waived or reduced.

B. Abolish all oral or written contracts of bondage or usury concluded in the past; abolish all debts to the usurers incurred by peasants and the urban poor; strictly prohibit any form of bondage based on taxation in advance or debt owed. All attempts to restore relations of bond service or usury are to be prevented and prohibited through revolutionary law. All articles pawned by the urban and rural



poor are to be returned completely free of charge to their former owners, and pawnshops are to be handed over to the soviets.

C. Old currency now in use in soviet areas may continue to circulate at present, and distinctions in quotations on the market should be eliminated. The Soviet should, however, check on this currency so as to supervise its circulation; the Soviet should issue soviet money of its own and have the old bills exchanged so that it may begin to stamp the old currency as effective for recirculation. All currency coming from the outside must be exchanged for currency with the soviet stamp or currency issued by the Soviet itself.

D. To unify the currency system and aid the poor toiling masses as a whole, the Soviet should establish a Workers' and Peasants' Bank and set up branches in each soviet area. This bank is authorized to issue currency. The Workers' and Peasants' Bank provides loans to all those operating peasant household industries, to cooperatives, and to small businessmen, so as to develop their economy. This bank should be responsible for exchanging old currency and its branches should function as tax collectors.

E. The Soviet should send its representatives to all local<sup>1</sup> and large private banks and cash shops, to supervise their transactions and prohibit these banks from issuing any kind of currency. The Soviet must strictly forbid all attempts of bankers to use local banks for counterrevolutionary activities.

#### IV. Municipal Administration

A. The Soviet should make certain adjustments so as to reduce the rents of the<sup>2</sup> and urban poor and confiscate the houses and wealth of the landlords, despotic gentry, warlords, bureaucrats, and politicians. The houses should be handed over to the workers, coolies, and apprentices to live in. The wealth should be divided among the urban poor or appropriated by the Soviet for public services. The city soviets should use every possible means to improve housing conditions for the poor.

Members of the Standing Committee of the  
Presidium of the First National Congress of  
Chinese Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and  
Soldiers

Xiang Ying, Zhou  
Yili, Zeng Shan,  
Zhang Dingcheng,  
Chen Zhengren,  
Zhu De, Deng Fa

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee  
of the Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

1. The Chinese is *nuzhu*, literally "aboriginal," but here it probably means simply "local."

2. There appears to be a character missing here before the conjunction *yw* (and), presumably that for "rural."

## ***Order for the Arrest of Gu Shunzhang, a Traitor to the Revolution***

***A General Order Issued by the Council of People's  
Commissars of the Provisional Central Soviet  
Government (Unnumbered)***

(December 10, 1931)

To all soviet governments at the various levels of province, *xian*, district, and township, and to all Red Army and Red Guard units, as well as to the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in all soviet areas;

To the workers, peasants, and all the exploited masses in areas under White rule:

After he was arrested in Hankou on April 25 of this year by a search and arrest team of the counterrevolutionary Guomindang, the traitor to the workers' and peasants' revolution Gu Shunzhang (also known as Li Ming; original name Gu Fengmin; alias The All-Transforming Magician; about twenty-seven or twenty-eight years of age; a native of Wusong, Shanghai; extremely short in stature, with bulging eyes and a prominent nose) immediately capitulated to the reactionary régime. He informed the enemy regarding the Chinese Communist Party's liaison office in Wuhan, the Western Hubei joint *xian* soviet governments, and the Wuhan branch office of the Red Army's Second Army Group. As a result, all of them were discovered and arrested. In addition, more than ten revolutionary fighters were taken and subsequently all of them were slaughtered by the Wuhan reactionary government. What is more, there was a riverboat worker who was sympathetic to the revolution, and Gu Shunzhang was the only person who knew this secret. Gu gave this man away too and landed him in the prison of the counterrevolutionaries. Having paid these dues and guarantees in blood, Gu Shunzhang promptly sent several telegrams to Nanjing requesting a personal interview with Chiang Kaishek. After arriving in Nanjing, in addition to informing the Guomindang counterrevolutionaries about the organizations and

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This order was first published in *Hongqi zhoubao*, no. 27, December 17, 1931. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 57-60, where it is reproduced from that source.

activities of the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and all the revolutionary groups of workers, peasants, and toiling masses, he identified Comrade Yun Daiying,<sup>1</sup> member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and nationwide leader of revolutionary youth, and others, who had already been sentenced to prison by the Nanjing government, and they were immediately shot by the counterrevolutionaries. At the same time he gave to the counterrevolutionaries the addresses he had learned when he was in Shanghai of five of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee members and responsible comrades, including Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai, and Li Wei-han.<sup>2</sup> Telegraphic orders were promptly sent to the Shanghai Public Security Bureau to discover and arrest these people together with the imperialist police. Fortunately, these comrades had just left Shanghai at the time and so escaped the danger. Then Gu Shunzhang proceeded to have his family members work, on the basis of the clues he had, to track down the organs and responsible personages of the Chinese Communist Party and other revolutionary organizations and groups in Shanghai. Unfortunately, Comrade Xiang Zhongfa,<sup>3</sup> the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, was arrested and subsequently executed as a result of this scheme of his, thus becoming Gu Shunzhang's greatest contribution in betraying the revolution and surrendering to the counterrevolution. Since then, Gu Shunzhang has gone on to become an important member of the KK organization, an organization that carries out clandestine assassinations for Chiang

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1. Yun Daiying (1895–1931), a native of Wuchang in Hubei, joined the Party in 1921 and became one of its leading intellectuals and organizers during the 1920s. After falling out of favor with the Li Lisan leadership, he was working underground in Shanghai when arrested in April 1930. After his identity was betrayed by Gu Shunzhang, Yun was executed in April 1931.

2. Qu Qiubai (1899–1935), a native of Changzhou in Jiangsu, joined the Communist Party in 1922 while studying in the Soviet Union. After returning to China he rose to become Party leader in August 1927, but was stripped of his position as secretary at the Sixth Congress in June 1928. He remained in the Soviet Union until 1930, when he returned to China and participated in the removal of Li Lisan from power at the Third Plenum. He then worked underground in Shanghai. Li Wei-han (1896–1984), a native of Changsha in Hunan, joined the Party in 1922, rose to be a Politburo member by 1927, and became head of the Jiangsu provincial Party organization before leaving for the Soviet Union in July 1931.

3. Xiang Zhongfa (1880–1931), a native of Hubei, was a factory worker, and then a sailor in his youth. He joined the Communist Party in 1922, and thereafter engaged in labor organizing work. Elected to the Central Committee at the Fifth Congress in 1927, he also attended the August 7 Emergency Conference. At the end of 1927, Xiang went to the Soviet Union, where he became deeply involved in intra-Party factionalism, and was elected to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow in 1928, he was appointed general secretary. Returning to China to work in Shanghai, he retained this post both during the period of Li Lisan's dominance and subsequently as part of the Pavel Mif-dominated Returned Students group. He was, as indicated here, betrayed by Gu Shunzhang's family, arrested on June 22, 1931, and executed on June 24.

Kaishek. Along with Chen Guofu, Chen Lifu,<sup>4</sup> Xu Enceng,<sup>5</sup> and Yang Hu,<sup>6</sup> he is one of Chiang Kaishek's murderous assistants.

Recently, as a result of the victories that the Red Army has won in various soviet areas, the establishment of the Provisional Central Soviet Government, and the upsurge of the struggle by the workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses against the Guomindang and imperialism in areas under White rule, the Chinese Communist Party and the revolutionary mass organizations and groups, although faced with extreme difficulties under the White Terror, have, with the support of the broad masses of the people, become more consolidated and more tightly organized in leading the workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses to rally for struggle under the banner of the soviets. Therefore, the traitor Gu Shunzhang will never have his way in his venomous scheme to destroy the revolutionary organizations and physically exterminate the revolutionary leaders. In consequence, he has changed his strategy and is slandering our responsible revolutionary comrades and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as murderous criminals in a vain attempt to destroy the prestige of the Chinese Communist Party and its responsible personages in the eyes of the masses. Even more shamelessly, Gu Shunzhang himself wrote a letter published in a newspaper calling for the arrest of the responsible comrades Zhou Enlai and others and saying that since his defection he had never betrayed anyone in the Communist Party, but had simply shut himself up behind closed doors to read. This shameless denial can never cover up the bloody damage that his ferocious and cruel schemes have wreaked upon the revolution. This is something that every member of the revolutionary masses can see. As for the public notice of a reward for capture, any revolutionary fighter and member of the masses of workers and peasants who joins the revolution automatically has his name entered on the counterrevolutionaries' most wanted list, so who needs the traitor Gu Shunzhang to publish such a call in the newspapers?

Class hatred has reached the stage of life-and-death struggle. Those for whom the Guomindang wants to issue counterrevolutionary wanted circulars are precisely the people the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses wish to support. Conversely, ferocious and cruel traitors such as Gu Shunzhang, protected by the Guomindang counterrevolutionaries, are precisely those the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling

4. Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, brothers, were well-known high-level Nationalist Party politicians and advisors to Chiang Kaishek. Together they were leaders of the so-called "CC Clique" within the Guomindang and the Nationalist government.

5. Xu Enceng (1898-1985) was a native of Zhejiang. He had joined the CC Clique in 1927, and in 1931 was chief of the investigation section in the Organization Department of the Guomindang.

6. Yang Hu (1889-?), a native of Anhui, participated in the Northern Expedition as a division commander. In 1926, he was head of the secret service of the National Revolutionary Army. He returned to Beijing in 1949, and died of illness shortly thereafter.

people wish to exterminate. Only people such as landlords, the bourgeoisie, Guomindang warlords, and bureaucrats can be relied upon by the counterrevolutionaries, but they are coming to the end of their road right now. The participants in and supporters of the revolution are the extremely broad masses of the workers, peasants, urban poor, and the whole of the oppressed masses, and the triumphant Soviet Government and Chinese Communist Party are now leading them in the struggle to seize nationwide victory for the revolution. The revolutionary tide is surging higher and higher, and Chiang Kaishek's army, two or three hundred thousand strong, has been once, twice, thrice defeated by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, as if crushing dry weeds and smashing rotten wood. How could a traitor such as Gu Shunzhang and Chiang Kaishek's murderous KK organization destroy the revolution? On the contrary, they will eventually be drowned in the great waves of the revolution.

For this reason, the Provisional Central Soviet Government issues this general order to soviet governments at all levels, and to the Red Army and Red Guards in various areas, and also gives public notice to the workers, peasants, and other poor and toiling masses throughout the country to guard carefully against the counterrevolutionary plots and devices of the Guomindang and to make a concerted effort to take the traitor Gu Shunzhang. If this traitor is encountered in the soviet areas, he should be captured and sent to the revolutionary court for trial. If this traitor is encountered in areas under White rule, every revolutionary fighter, every worker, peasant, or poor person, is responsible for exterminating him. To capture and exterminate the traitor Gu Shunzhang is the conscious and glorious duty of every revolutionary fighter and of the worker and peasant masses. The localities<sup>7</sup> which the landlords, capitalists, and counterrevolutionary lackeys are trying to buy with their offers of reward cannot be employed to insult our exploited and oppressed masses.

All workers, peasants, and other poor, toiling people!

Let's consolidate our battle line and make a concerted effort to capture the traitor Gu Shunzhang!

Develop the revolutionary struggle and thoroughly destroy Chiang Kaishek's murderous KK organization!

Chairman of the Council of People's  
Commissars

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

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7. *Difang*. It is not clear whether this expression here has its usual sense of "locality" or "place," or whether it means something vaguer, such as "those things."

***Letter to the Popular Masses of the  
Whole Country Concerning the Betrayal  
of the Interests of the Chinese Nation  
by the Guomindang***

(December 11, 1931)

Dear workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary students:

The counterrevolutionary Guomindang government is once again engaged in shameless new acts of betraying China and of selling out the interests of the nation and the popular masses. According to the newspapers, the Guomindang government has already recognized the establishment of a neutral zone in Jinzhou, proposed the organization of an international settlement in Tianjin, and recognized all the previous secret treaties selling out the country and forfeiting our sovereignty.<sup>1</sup> Brothers and sisters, do you all know what this means? It means handing over to the Japanese tens of thousands of [square] *li* of territory in Manchuria and tens of millions of people to be trampled underfoot. It means handing over Tianjin and Jinzhou to international imperialism to be ravaged; it means weighing down the four hundred million people of China with heavy iron chains, handcuffs, and shackles, and subjecting generation after generation of our descendants to endless exploitation and oppression at the hands of Japan and the international imperialists, turning them into slaves without a country. Brothers! Sisters! These are unprecedented and appalling acts of betrayal! Yet the reactionary ruling classes continue to boast unblushingly, uttering empty shouts about "revolutionary diplomacy," "final preparation," and "marching north to recover

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This letter appeared in 1933 in the volume *Suweiai Zhongguo*, published in Moscow. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 61–64, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. The references here are to the aftermath of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which began with the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. After the Japanese occupation began, a substantial force of Nationalist army troops remained in the city of Jinzhou in southern Liaoning Province throughout the fall of 1931. Meanwhile, two waves of Japanese-instigated "riots" broke out in Tianjin, as well as various Chinese student protests. The unrest provided a pretext for the Japanese to expand their movement south toward Tianjin, pressuring Nationalist forces to abandon Jinzhou and provide further concessions to Japanese interests in Tianjin.

lost territory." This is truly the most shameless and brazen business on earth.

Brothers! Sisters! Can we allow ourselves to be slaughtered and carved up like sheep by the reactionary rulers in collaboration with imperialism at their discretion? Can we look on while our land is forcibly seized by Japanese imperialism? Are we to put up with the kind of cruel oppression, slaughter, and humiliation that slaves in the colonies endure? Can we remain silent when we see our own brothers whipped, cruelly massacred, and slaughtered by the imperialists? Can we remain unmoved as we watch our own sisters dallied with, humiliated, and raped? No, no, ten thousand times no! Well then, we must all rise in unison to resist, to resist the invasion of the Japanese imperialists and the other international imperialists, to resist the shameless capitulation of the Guomindang rulers to imperialism and their betrayal of China! Go on strike, workers, students, soldiers!<sup>2</sup> Seize the weapons of the reactionaries to arm ourselves, and let us all exert ourselves to drive the Japanese imperialists out of the country and overthrow the running dog of imperialism—the Guomindang!

Brothers! Sisters! Can we still harbor any illusions or hopes at all with regard to Guomindang rule? The rule of the Guomindang has created uninterrupted famine for years on end; it has inflicted hunger, cold, and homelessness on countless members of the popular masses who are hovering between life and death; it has brought about unemployment for several million workers, who wander the streets without a means of subsistence; it has resulted year after year in warfare among the warlords, leaving the bodies of tens of thousands of soldiers exposed in the wilderness and their widows and orphans homeless and destitute; and it has resulted in countless secret treaties of national betrayal and humiliation, and in countless massacres, thereby placing China forever under the iron feet of imperialism, unable to free herself! Can we tolerate even for a minute longer reactionary rule such as this, of which the crimes mount to heaven? No, no, ten thousand times no! So what should we do? We must all rise up together and overthrow this reactionary Guomindang rule! Get organized, unite, muster our strength, ready our weapons, and carry out an armed uprising to overthrow Guomindang rule and set up the people's own government! Under the leadership of our own government, carry out an anti-imperialist war of national liberation!

Brothers! Sisters! Once we have overthrown the reactionary rule and organized our own government to wage revolutionary war, can we defeat Japan and international imperialism? Can we smash the well trained and amply provisioned imperialist troops? Yes, yes, ten thousand times yes! If the worker and peasant masses of Russia, exhausted from four years of warfare, relying on their own

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2. *Bagong, bake, bacao*, literally "cease work, cease attending classes, cease drill." The first two of these terms are the standard Chinese expressions for strikes by workers and students; the third, which is not so common, obviously refers to soldiers. Here we have supplied the subjects, implicit in the terms; when the same phrase occurs again, in the first of the rallying cries at the end of this text, we have translated more literally.

strength and on Bolshevik leadership, could defeat the Allied armies of fourteen imperialist powers, why couldn't we? The unity of the masses, tens of millions strong, is mightier than all the planes and cannons of the imperialists, how much more so with the proletariat of the entire world, the oppressed slaves in the colonies, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, making up one sixth of the world, standing on our side. Arise, overthrow the reactionary rule of the Guomindang, establish our own political power, and wage a bloody war to the death against imperialism!

Brothers! Sisters! The Provisional Central Revolutionary Soviet Government hereby declares to you: the Soviet Government is the only revolutionary government that opposes imperialism to the end; our aim is to achieve the complete independence and liberation of the Chinese nation; we oppose all unequal treaties, open or secret, between the reactionary government of China and imperialism; we oppose secret diplomacy; we advocate driving out from China all imperialist land, sea, and air forces; we advocate confiscation of all banks, mines, railways, and enterprises run by imperialism in China; we refuse to recognize all foreign debts; we consider the Guomindang government in Nanjing, like that in Guangdong, to be a traitorous government of the landlord and capitalist classes that has no right whatsoever to represent the toiling masses of China. All negotiations and treaties between them and imperialism are considered by the Soviet Government to be null and void. As for the Manchurian Incident,<sup>3</sup> we advocate immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; abrogation of all former treaties between China and Japan; confiscation of all Japanese imperialist banks, mines, railways, and enterprises in China; taking back all concessions; abolition of consular jurisdiction; and the signing of new, equal treaties on the basis of respect for the independence and freedom of Soviet China. Otherwise, a determined war of national liberation will be waged against Japanese imperialism. But in order to pursue the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and to fight and win a war of national liberation, it is necessary first to overthrow the counterrevolutionary Guomindang government, which is selling out the interests of the Chinese nation, and to establish the rule of a democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, in the form of a soviet, in the whole country.

Brothers! Sisters! Imperialist aggression daily becomes fiercer, Guomindang betrayal daily becomes more shameless, and the misery of the toiling and impoverished masses daily becomes more acute! Arise, toiling and impoverished masses of the whole country! Unite, organize, and arm yourselves to wage the final decisive battle against imperialism and the Guomindang! Come and range yourselves under the banner of the soviets, destroy counterrevolutionary Guomindang rule with a soviet revolution of the workers and peasants, overthrow the semicolonial ruling system that imperialism has set up in China, and

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3. I.e., the Japanese occupation of Manchuria.



secure the freedom and liberation of the Chinese nation and of China's popular masses!

Go on strike, boycott classes, and reject military training in opposition to imperialism and to the suppression and massacre of the anti-imperialist movement by the Guomindang!

Let the popular masses arm themselves and drive out Japanese imperialism!

Nullify all negotiations and secret treaties between the Guomindang and imperialism!

Overthrow the counterrevolutionary rule of the Guomindang!

Down with imperialism!

Support the Provisional Central Revolutionary Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic—the government of the Chinese people!

Support the Red Army—the military force of the Chinese popular masses themselves and the only military force that opposes imperialism to the end!

Long live the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation!

Long live Soviet China!

Chairman of the Provisional Central  
Revolutionary Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Zhang Guotao  
Xiang Ying

# *Directive No. 6 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

## *Provisional Procedure for Handling Counterrevolutionary Cases and Establishing Judicial Organs*

(Passed by an Extraordinary Session of the Central Executive Committee, December 13, 1931)

Since the third victory of the revolutionary war and the establishment of the Provisional Central Government, soviet political power has been further consolidated. At this time in the soviet areas there is a task that urgently must be done, which is to establish revolutionary order so as to safeguard the rights of the masses.

When counterrevolutionary organizations such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganizationists, and all other counterrevolutionary factions were being exposed in the past, soviet governments at all levels everywhere resolutely carried out arrests and interrogations and dealt with many counterrevolutionary elements, dealing death blows to these counterrevolutionaries and thereby consolidating soviet political power. The main direction of this type of work has been completely correct.

Everyone must be aware, however, that past work in eliminating counterrevolutionaries has not been without mistakes. The Provisional Central Government seriously points out to soviet governments at all levels everywhere that in various respects the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries was previously done incorrectly in many localities. For example, people were arrested on the strength of confessions by a certain counterrevolutionary element or by a few of them, without sufficient evidence or undertaking investigation work. During interrogation there was willful insistence on using corporal punishment, so that incidents of beating a confession out of someone were a frequent occurrence. In punishing offenders there was failure to make distinctions in class status and between leaders and followers, so that those who should have been lightly punished were instead punished severely. (For example, worker and peasant ele-

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Our source for this text is *Zhongyang genjudi shiliao* Vol. 3, pp. 656-59.

ments who were followers were not released.) These mistakes were discovered on numerous occasions in many places in the soviet areas. A portion of these mistakes were made through the conspiratorial activities of counterrevolutionary elements hidden within the soviet governments. Ever since these mistakes were made, this has caused the worker and peasant masses in many places to develop suspicions toward the soviet governments' work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries. The fact that the rights of the revolutionary masses cannot be completely ensured under the soviet governments, that it has not been possible to establish an excellent revolutionary order under the soviets, and that at the same time it has not been possible to eliminate thoroughly counterrevolutionary organizations and activities—all this is extremely wrong.

The Provisional Central Government hereby notifies soviet governments everywhere at all levels that they must resolutely and rapidly establish revolutionary order, so that the basic rights and all appropriate legal rights of the revolutionary masses are absolutely ensured. At the same time, counterrevolutionary organizations and activities are to be thoroughly destroyed, and the following provisional procedures are stipulated.

1. Investigations, arrests, and preliminary interrogations in all counterrevolutionary cases are to be carried out by the State Political Security Bureau. After the preliminary interrogation is done, the State Political Security Bureau, acting as prosecutor, brings the case to a state judicial organ (a court or a judicial department), and that organ interrogates and passes verdict.

2. The authority to carry out interrogations (except for preliminary interrogations handled by the State Political Security Bureau) and sentencing (from verdicts of not guilty to death sentences) in all counterrevolutionary cases rests with state judicial organs. Judicial organs at the *xian* level have no authority to pass the death sentence, but under unusual circumstances, those who obtain special permission from the provincial judicial organs may be excepted: after judicial organs of the Central Area and nearby provinces have meted out the death penalty, the defendant must appeal to the central judicial organs within fourteen days.

3. Where there is no organ of the State Political Security Bureau (that is, the State Political Security Bureau itself, a provincial branch office, a *xian* branch office, or a special agent of the Political Security Bureau), if the local soviet government discovers counterrevolutionary material it must report to the local organ of the State Political Security Bureau and may not on its own authority carry out arrests and interrogations.

4. At the *xian* and district levels where only a committee on eliminating counterrevolutionaries has been established and there is yet no branch of the State Political Security Bureau or its special agents, and where the régime has at least a six month history, if counterrevolutionary materials are discovered in such a soviet government, consent must be obtained from a branch of the State Political Security Bureau (located where the provincial soviet is) before arrests

may be made. Only under extraordinary circumstances (such as cases in which counterrevolutionaries have already begun to organize rebellion or where the area is cut off from the provincial soviet by a White area or on the borders between Red and White areas where it is easy to flee or there is urgent danger of enemy attack) in which there is no time to report or it is impossible to report to a provincial branch of the State Political Security Bureau and ample evidence of everything has been obtained is it permissible for the district or *xian* government and its committee on the elimination of counterrevolutionaries to authorize decisions to make arrests.

5. In newly developed areas, which is to say in places where the revolutionary government has been in existence for less than six months, when the struggle between the local revolutionary masses and the despotic gentry, landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists is extremely intense, *xian*-level organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and specially designated district-level organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries (special agents of State Political Security Bureau branches or committees for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries) have the authority to make decisions regarding the arrest and interrogation of counterrevolutionary elements, contingent upon the prior consent of the *xian* or district executive committee. After interrogation, [these elements] should be handed over to the judicial organs at the same level of government for final interrogation, and after interrogation is completed, a written verdict is drawn up and reported to the provincial judicial organ for the purpose of making a final judgment. In cases of despotic gentry, landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists, however, whose crimes are clear and evident and whose execution is demanded by the local masses of workers and peasants, the local government may rapidly carry out the execution without having to obtain permission from the provincial government.

6. When the movement is just beginning and organs of revolutionary political power have not yet been established, the local revolutionary masses have the authority to arrest and execute despotic gentry, landlords, and all counterrevolutionary elements on their own initiative. Once the revolutionary government is established, on the other hand, matters are to be handled according to stipulation no. 5.

7. Whether in new or old areas, in dealing with members of counterrevolutionary organizations (such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganizationist Faction, . . . etc.), distinctions of class status and between leaders and followers must be made. That is to say, counterrevolutionary elements of despotic gentry, landlord, rich peasant, and capitalist origins and ring-leaders, should be harshly punished (sentenced to death, and so on), whereas elements whose backgrounds are those of workers, peasants, poor people, and the laboring masses but who joined counterrevolutionary organizations, and those who are followers, should be punished leniently (released to make a fresh start, and so on).

8. With regard to interrogation methods, in order to eliminate counterrevolutionary organizations thoroughly and pronounce judgment correctly in counterrevolutionary cases, we must resolutely eliminate corporal punishment and instead adopt effective measures of various kinds, such as gathering and verifying evidence.

9. Before courts are established, local judicial organs are to set up tribunals in the governments at the three levels of province, *xian*, and district as provisional judicial organs to settle all criminal and civil cases, in addition to handling counterrevolutionary cases according to the above-listed principles.

After receiving this order, soviet governments at all levels should strictly observe it and carry it out. Any violation of the principles stipulated in this order shall be severely punished. It is so ordered.

## *An Important Instruction Regarding the Building of Soviets*

(December 15, 1931)

In the past, the organization of soviets at all levels has been full of imperfections. First, the administrative areas have been too extensive, making it inconvenient to carry out administrative functions. Second, there have been too many levels of government, causing a cumbersome chain of command and inefficient communications. Third, and of particular importance, election procedures have been incomplete and imperfect. Governments at all levels have been elected either through the use of a simple mass rally or by holding meetings of deputies or a joint conference of chairmen, without regard to normal electoral procedures. This is particularly true of the basic-level soviet organizations—village and town soviets have not yet been truly established. Fourth, the division of labor and work methods within the governments at all levels have been mostly inappropriate. All of these are things that do not accord with the Soviet Constitution and the various specific rules and regulations of the Central Government.

The Provisional Central Government hereby declares: the government of every locality and every *xian* location must redivide its administrative areas and reorganize the governments at all levels in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the temporary rules and regulations issued by the Central [Executive Committee].<sup>1</sup> Of primary importance is to delimit anew districts and townships, in accordance with the provisions of the temporary rules and regulations for the division of administrative areas (the village and the small group should be abolished as administrative areas); then to elect township soviets and city soviets in accordance with the rules and regulations for elections (these are the basic soviet organizations); and finally to reconstruct everything from the township soviet to the provincial soviet, in accordance with the provisional rules and regulations for the organization of local governments. This is an extremely important task, and local governments at all levels must approach it most resolutely, expend tremendous efforts, and proceed to carry it out painstakingly and

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This instruction was first published in *Hongse zhonghua*, no. 2, December 18, 1931. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 65–66, which reproduces the text from that source, with occasional reference to the reprint of *Hongse zhonghua*, where a few characters that could not be deciphered on the copy available to the Tokyo editors can be read.

1. See below, in the Appendix, the "Temporary Organizational Regulations for Local Soviet Governments" of November 1931.

judiciously, for only thus can we avoid having the newly delimited administrative areas develop defects like those of the old administrative areas and avoid having the newly reorganized governments at all levels more or less the same as the old governments. To eradicate such ills, the provincial government in every province must expend its utmost efforts to direct this movement for building local soviets. In addition to issuing various detailed written documents and instructions, meetings should also be called at the provincial level as well as in existing localities of all the principal responsible people in each *xian* and district government. A suitable location should then be selected to gather those who bear the principal responsibilities in all township governments for a meeting, to which the provincial and *xian* governments should send people to offer guidance. At these meetings, the significance of the movement to build local soviets, and the concrete methods for carrying it out, will be clearly and thoroughly discussed. In addition, when administrative areas are actually being divided up and governments are being reelected, the leadership should send people to each *xian* to inspect, where they may sort out puzzling difficulties and correct mistakes at any time. Guidance by the *xian* to the district, and by the district to the township, should be handled in a similar manner to ensure that this campaign for building soviets achieves very good results.

From December 20, 1931, to March 31, 1932, is the period designated for the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian, and Ruijin *xian*, directly subordinate [to the Central Government], to carry out the campaign for building soviets in accordance with the new laws. The soviets of these two provinces and of Ruijin *xian* must immediately produce a suitable work plan on the basis of this timetable, so that the delimitation of administrative areas and the election of soviets at all levels (most of the time and effort should be devoted to the delimitation and election at the township level) can be accomplished step by step and very well within a hundred days, and the facts regarding the process can be regularly reported to the Central Government, so as to facilitate timely guidance by the Central Government. All other provinces are to begin carrying out this instruction on the day it is received. It is so ordered.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao







# ***Concerning Alteration and Increase of the Ratio of Soviet Deputies to Local Residents***

## ***Directive No. 8 of the Central Executive Committee***

(January 28, 1932)

At present the Chinese revolution is still in the midst of a fierce struggle, and if the Soviet Government is to promulgate various types of regulations, it should first consider whether or not they are well suited to the conditions of the present struggle and base the promulgation of various types of regulations upon this principle. Therefore, the ratio of soviet deputies to local residents as set out in the election by-laws should also be based on this principle, and it will not do to set the ratio of deputies to residents too mechanically. In order to fit in with the environment of the present revolutionary struggle and to ensure the leading position of the proletariat in soviet organs, the ratio of voting residents to deputies in the current election must be slightly altered and amended in relation to the election by-laws promulgated in the past. Following are the new standards and regulations with regard to the ratio of residents to deputies:

1. Township soviets: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of fifty poor peasants, middle peasants, and independent laborers; one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of thirteen workers, coolies, and farm laborers; in cases where the number of people is fewer than stipulated, one regular deputy may still be elected.

2. Soviets in towns directly subordinate to the *xian*: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of eighty poor city people as well as poor peasants, middle peasants, and independent laborers in the surrounding areas under its jurisdiction; one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of twenty workers, coolies, and farm laborers. In cases where the number of people is fewer than stipulated, one regular deputy may still be elected.

3. City soviets directly subordinate to the province: one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of four hundred urban poor people and poor and middle peasants from the vicinity; one regular deputy to be elected from among every group of one hundred workers, coolies, and farm laborers. In cases

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 21-23.

where the number of people is fewer than stipulated, one regular deputy may still be elected.

4. The district soviet congress is made up of deputies from the various township soviets and deputies from the local armed forces. Every group of two hundred residents may elect one regular deputy to the district congress. But as for the class status of the deputies, farm laborers, coolies, and workers should make up a total of 20 percent of the congress.

5. The *xian* soviet congress is made up of deputies elected by the district congress and town soviets, as well as deputies from the local armed forces and the Red Army. One regular deputy to the *xian* soviet congress is to be elected from among every group of 1,200 residents in each township. As for the class status of the deputies, workers, coolies, and farm laborers should make up a total of 25 percent, and soldiers, 30 percent. In each town, one regular deputy to the *xian* congress is to be elected from among every group of four hundred residents. As for class status, workers, farm laborers, and coolies should make up a total of 50 percent.

6. The provincial soviet congress is made up of deputies elected by *xian* soviet congresses and soviet congresses of cities directly subordinate to the province, as well as deputies from the Red Army and local armed forces. One regular deputy is to be elected from among every group of five thousand rural residents. As for class status, workers, coolies, and farm laborers should make up a total of 25 percent, and soldiers, 10 percent. One regular deputy is to be elected from among every group of two thousand residents in each city. As for class status of the deputies, farm laborers, workers, and coolies should make up a total of 50 percent.

At all levels of soviets, the ratio of alternate deputies to regular deputies shall be one to five. That is, for every five regular deputies elected, one alternate deputy may be elected in addition. In cases where there are fewer than five regular deputies, one alternate deputy may still be elected. When attending soviet conferences or congress meetings, alternate deputies have the right to speak but not to vote. When a regular deputy is absent, an alternate deputy is promoted to take his place.

Supplementary Note 1. Where deputies to soviet congresses at the three levels of province, *xian*, and district are concerned, the criteria for worker, coolie, farm laborer, and Red Army deputies should be determined before deputies are elected. Rural and urban soviets as well as congresses at the two levels of district and *xian* must all pay attention to the components from the workers, coolies, farm laborers, and Red Army.

Supplementary Note 2. Election procedures for local armed forces and the Red Army are stipulated separately under local armed forces and Red Army rules and regulations.

The above regulations are to make up for the shortcomings in the election

bylaws. Aside from changes in the ratios of residents to deputies, all other procedures should follow the regulations in the election bylaws. Upon receipt of this directive, soviet governments at all levels are to hold the current round of elections according to the instructions in this directive. It is so ordered.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

***Resolution Concerning Verdicts  
of the Provisional Supreme Court in  
the Trial of Important Criminals  
Such as AB Corps Members,  
Reorganizationists, and War Criminals***

(February 1932)

All three original court verdicts should be approved as a whole, but the following points should be revised.

1. Cao Shuxiang was originally sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but the Executive Committee regards this as too lenient. This is because she was the political commissar of the No. 4 branch of the Red Army Hospital, yet openly joined the AB Corps to undermine the soviet régime and the Red Army, thus betraying the trust of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Moreover, Cao Shuxiang studied in the Soviet Union for three years, and during her stay there she sided politically with all sorts of bad elements. When she came back to work in the Soviet Area, she joined the AB Corps; clearly it was not a mere coincidence that she joined this counterrevolutionary organization. Therefore, her prison term should be increased by a year and three months, to make a total of three years and three months. With regard to the length of time for which she is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands.

2. According to the verdict, Kong Fanshu was to be sentenced to three years in prison. Because he did a considerable amount of work in the revolutionary war, and he was wounded and consequently disabled, the court deducted a year and six months from his sentence. But he held the office of general commander in the AB Corps, and despite the fact that he did a considerable amount of revolutionary work his sentence is too light. His prison sentence should be increased by three months, to make a total of a year and nine months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands.

3. The original verdict for Li Xincheng is two years in prison. Because he

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This resolution was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 12, March 2, 1932, together with the texts of the three verdicts under discussion. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 93-94, which reproduces this version.

fought bravely in every battle and was wounded several times, his sentence should be reduced by six months, making it a year and six months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands.

4. The original verdict for Wei Baigang is five years in prison. This punishment is too harsh for his crime, so his sentence should be reduced by six months, making it four years and six months. With regard to the length of time for which he is denied the right to vote, the original verdict stands.

The above-mentioned counterrevolutionary criminals should be notified of the reduction or lengthening of their prison terms as stated in this resolution.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# Letter from Mao Zedong to Yuan Guoping

(March 6, 1932)

Comrade Yuan Guoping:<sup>1</sup>

1. Your first letter from Jiangkou has reached us. Since the masses in Sandu are as you described them in your letter, Gulonggang and other places must be even better than Sandu.<sup>2</sup> We should work even harder to win them over and must not, on the contrary, slacken our efforts or relax our self-discipline because of the consciousness of the masses.

2. This time in your work you must be ever-vigilant about all your strategies and work methods and never allow them to stray from the general task of "winning over the masses and creating soviet areas." It is not right to abandon our political slogans and yield to the ideology of the backward masses. To be sure, there are times when, **for the purpose of winning over the masses,**<sup>3</sup> our work may be divided into several steps, but we must in no wise stray from our basic task. On the contrary, we must carry out our general task of "winning over the masses and creating soviet areas" in a more realistic way. The instructions on strategy and working methods contained in issue no. 3 of *General [X]*<sup>4</sup> *Correspondence* are on the whole correct, but you are expected to apply them in a flexible way, not to be rigidly tied to them exactly as they are written. Our estimation of the masses in Sandu and Qibao was somewhat different from what you said in your letter, so the tactics and methods of our work should not be applied mechanically. For example, take the method—it is in no sense a tactic or a line—of attacking big landlords before attacking small landlords. When we take into consideration the conditions in Sandu, mechanical

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Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 95–97, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

1. For biographical information about Yuan Guoping, see the relevant note to the "Minutes of the First Eight Meetings of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army," May 25–June 10, 1931.

2. Sandu, a settlement in Xingguo *xian*, along with nearby Qibao and Gulonggang, comprised an area whose population had been very resistant to the revolutionary movement.

3. Emphasized in original with dots next to the characters.

4. The missing character here must be *zheng* (political); the full title of the periodical mentioned could then be rendered as *Correspondence from* (or *Bulletin of*) *the General Political Department*.

application of the method would lead to opportunism. Furthermore, the process of going from peasant associations to soviets and poor peasant leagues should not be delayed too long. Great efforts should first be made to mobilize rapidly the masses of poor peasants, farm laborers, and middle peasants for the struggle. During the struggle, develop the attack against big landlords rapidly to the phase of attacking small landlords and rich peasants, that is, redistribution of property and land and abolition of debts. As soon as a majority of the impoverished masses has risen up, all small landlords and rich peasants remaining in the peasant associations for the purpose of speculation should immediately be expelled and the organ of political power of the masses—the soviets—and the class organization of the masses—the poor peasant leagues—should immediately be established. In a word, strategies and work methods are formulated in the light of actual conditions. You should make a very realistic analysis of the local conditions and the sentiments and demands of the local masses in the course of their struggle, in order to decide on more realistic strategies and methods. Only thus can you attain greater practical results.

When members of the Red masses first enter a White village, retaliation and adventurism are bound to occur. You must at the same time watch out for similar incidents in other areas as well. Army discipline must not be relaxed in the slightest. If the masses want to organize small guerrilla detachments to distribute the possessions of the despotic gentry among the masses, then in order to organize small guerrilla detachments, they will establish preliminary mass bodies, such as peasant associations, and even set up provisional organs of political power—revolutionary committees—all this with a view to organizing small guerrilla detachments to attack the fortified villages feared by the masses. Why do I say this? Because under circumstances such as those in Sandu and Qibao (to say nothing of situations worse than those in Sandu and Qibao, such as the town of Yongfeng where the Third Army is now working, or the vicinity of Nanfeng where the Fifty-eighth Army is now working, or Anyuansi<sup>5</sup> where the Fourth Army is now working, or the border areas between Shicheng and Ninghua where the Twelfth Army is now working), there is no security for the various organizations, such as mass bodies and organs of political power, nor for all the benefits derived from redistribution of land and the abolition of debts. As soon as the Red Army withdraws, the armed forces of the landlords return, all organizations collapse, and all benefits are nullified. At such times, only small guerrilla detachments that have been organized and trained by us and have fought the local despots and divided up and distributed their belongings, and who have pitted themselves irreconcilably against the despotic gentry and the landlords, are able to withdraw with the Red Army to the Red border areas and wait for a chance to launch a second attack. Only this is something to

5. The place referred to here appears to be the town (and surrounding township) of Anyuan, in northwestern Ninghua *xian* in Fujian, bordering Shicheng *xian* in Jiangxi.



rely on, a way to prevent the work this time from ending up in vain. Not to mention earlier events, but just looking at things after the battle of Changsha, does not all of the first-stage work in Ping[xiang], Li[líng], You[xian], and in the Yuanshui Valley, and in the Wujiang Valley, teach us the same lesson, that we failed to grasp the central task in our work—the organization of guerrilla detachments who do not participate in production?<sup>6</sup> Is it not as though all the work that our comrades have done, through innumerable trials and tribulations, such as the redistribution of land, the abolition of debts, the establishment of soviets, and the organization of Red Guard units (which do participate in production), has been in vain? Because in all four of your letters you have not mentioned the organization of guerrilla detachments, it is discussed here in detail. But this is not to say that you should not make plans to establish and consolidate political power in Sandu and Qibao. The circumstances and conditions in Sandu and Qibao at the moment are very different from those in places like the town of Yongfeng, the town of Nanfeng, and Anyuansi, and there is no doubt whatsoever that you should make plans to establish and consolidate political power. You should plan to mobilize all of the masses thoroughly, annihilate the armed forces of the landlords completely, organize class organizations of the masses and organs of political power, and carry out redistribution of the land. **You must, however, make plans for a situation in which the enemy advances rapidly, the Red Army has to be concentrated, and the armed forces of the landlord class have not yet been eliminated;** if you have planned for such a situation, you will know that the organization of small local guerrilla detachments that do not participate in production and that fight the local despots is truly the central task of all of your work. Not only will taking the organization of guerrilla detachments as the central task not cause neglect of other tasks; quite the contrary, **it will tightly link all other tasks together.** In the past, the political departments of various armies and the great majority of the comrades who are engaged in political work did not understand the central task of organizing guerrilla detachments under special circumstances, and most of the work they did was not in accord with the circumstances and conditions, so on the whole they wasted much effort and achieved few practical results. For this reason, what is said in this letter not only constitutes instructions for the work your army is doing in Sandu and Qibao, but is also something to which the whole front army as well as all independent divisions and all local guerrillas should pay equal attention, and which they should put into practice to the letter.

Director of the General Political  
Department

Mao Zedong

March 6, at Huangpi

6. The references here appear to be to organizing activities in *xian* in northwestern Jiangxi and northeastern Hunan in the aftermath of the attacks on Changsha in the summer of 1930.

# *Letter to Western Fujian Concerning the Work in Shanghang and Wuping*

(March 9, 1932)

To the Executive Committee of the Western Fujian Soviet Government

Dear Comrades:

Over the course of a few days, Shanghang and Wuping have been completely occupied by our Red Army's Twelfth Army in cooperation with the broad masses of workers and peasants, and Zhong Shaokui's bandit regiment has been totally defeated and has fled to Guangdong.<sup>1</sup> This is a great victory, won at a time when the democratic revolutionary war has just begun to develop, which is of great significance both to the development and the triumph of the soviets throughout the country. The Red Army now has Ganzhou under siege,<sup>2</sup> so the taking of the two *xian*, Shanghang and Wuping, is not only a threat to the Guangdong warlords, but especially of great help to the capture of Ganzhou.

The capture of the two *xian*, Shanghang and Wuping, has not only expanded and consolidated the soviet area in western Fujian, but also formed closer ties between Fujian and Jiangxi; this is especially true of the capture of the town of Shanghang, as it is the largest key city in western Fujian, giving it an important position politically, economically, and militarily. Thus the occupation of Shanghang and Wuping is not of a temporary nature, but, instead, they will be consolidated and turned into a solid Red area in western Fujian and the town of Shanghang made into a Red key city. This is a very weighty task for you, a task which you must make every effort to fulfill.

The Council of People's Commissars hereby issues the following directives for the work in Shanghang and Wuping:

1. Correctly carry out the Land Law, the Labor Law, the economic policies, and so on, adopted by the National Soviet Congress. This is the primary prerequisite and basis for the consolidation of the Red régimes in the two *xian* of

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This letter was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 13, March 9, 1932. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 99–105, which reproduces this version.

1. Wuping was captured on February 23, 1932, and Shanghang was captured on the 26th.

2. For information on the siege of Ganzhou, see the Introduction.

Shanghang and Wuping. Under this condition, arouse the vast numbers of workers and coolies in the towns, farm laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants in the countryside, and other toiling masses to participate actively in the struggle of the land revolution and in the Soviet Government. Only when they have attained concrete benefits can they be expected to give active support to soviet power, and the soviet régimes in the two *xian* can only be consolidated provided that there is a basis formed by the broad masses of workers, peasants, and other toilers.

2. In order to mobilize the masses of urban workers, the most basic provisions of the Labor Law, such as the eight-hour working day, wage raises, specification of a minimum wage, improved treatment, the practice of collective contracts and labor contracts, and so on, must be really put into effect. The government should serve as the defender of the interests of the workers and must secure the immediate realization of these minimum benefits. At the same time, it should provide material assistance to the workers and help with the procedure when they organize trade unions. There are, however, certain things which must be pointed out and prevented, corresponding to errors that often occurred in work in the past. (a) As regards putting the Labor Law into effect and protecting the interests of the workers, only a vague and general statement is issued, but the law is not enforced in practice and no concrete measures are adopted. Nor does the government examine or find out whether or not the workers have gained anything. It contents itself with an announcement or an order, thus adopting a negative attitude toward supporting the workers' interests. (b) As regards protecting the workers' interests, the government does not in most cases make a study of facts or of the circumstances of the actual struggle of the masses. It merely resorts to administrative orders to force the capitalists to comply with the law, it does not put its main effort into mobilizing the masses for the struggle. As a result, the masses cannot understand what is going on and remain temporarily passive in the struggle. (c) In the enforcement of the Labor Law, more often than not the local economic situation or the actual living conditions and needs of the workers are not investigated, so as to work out proper and practical measures. Instead, there is reliance on compulsion to go beyond the limits allowed by the actual local economic conditions. The result is that many capitalists are made unable to bear the burden and have to close down their businesses, thus undermining the present economic policy of the soviets and greatly affecting the economy in the soviet areas. Unemployment rises and, furthermore, a great many workers begin doubting and become dispirited in the struggle and even make secret compromises with and concessions to the capitalists, thereby dampening enthusiasm for the struggle and obscuring class consciousness on the part of the workers. This is extremely harmful. At the same time, restraint on the workers' struggle or inactivity in the protection of the workers' interests on the pretext of maintaining the economy of the soviet areas and executing economic policy must be rejected still more resolutely. In short, the Labor Law is to be enforced

in keeping with the resolute protection of the workers' interests and economic policy, especially by evoking the workers' enthusiasm for class struggle and support for soviet political power.

3. To confiscate and redistribute the land in the countryside, the Land Law must be enforced to the letter; the major issue is to follow clear-cut class lines and never let the fruits of the land revolution be usurped for a time by the rich peasants. Here an erroneous concept that existed in the past about the redistribution of land must be rectified, that is, the belief that it is inevitable at the outset of the land revolution that the rich peasants will usurp the benefits and there has to be a second or even a third distribution to solve the problem, so that distribution of land is very careless at the beginning. This is very wrong. We can only say that, during the land revolution, the rich peasants will definitely try to usurp the benefits of the land revolution; just because of that, we have all the more reason to rouse the masses in a resolute way to frustrate the attempts of the rich peasants and prevent the benefits of the land revolution from being usurped by the rich peasants by following a clear-cut class line. This mistake was a common occurrence in the newly developed areas in Jiangxi, mostly because, in the land distribution, the main effort was not to mobilize the masses and instead distribution was done simply through giving orders, thus affording an opportunity for usurpation by the rich peasants. It is true that the swift redistribution of land in the newly developed areas is for the purpose of rapidly mobilizing and winning over the basic masses and consolidating the area; if the rich peasants usurp the benefits of the land redistribution, the new area cannot be consolidated effectively. Swift redistribution is only possible when the basic masses in the countryside are roused in the struggle for land redistribution, and only then can the attempts of the rich peasants be frustrated and the benefits of the land revolution not be usurped by the rich peasants. New areas can be powerfully consolidated only on the basis of the active struggle of the numerous farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Therefore, when distributing the land, a mass meeting should be called at which the Land Law of the Central Government is announced, for the purpose of mobilizing the masses. The land distribution committee should absorb into its membership many farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants. Members must be elected by the masses, and their backgrounds made publicly known at mass meetings and subject to examination. Every time a land distribution plan is made, a mass meeting should be called where the plan is made known to the people. The plan must be approved by the mass meeting before the land is actually redistributed. When proclaiming the Land Law and electing members of the land redistribution committee, the most important thing is to announce that rich peasants may be given only poor land and that rich peasants are not entitled to membership on the land committee, so as to attract the attention and participation of the masses in the struggle to defeat the attempts of the rich peasants, to repel the rich peasants, and to stop them from sneaking in and taking power in the redistribution of land. During land distribu-

tion in new areas in the past, the Red Army took care of everything, and in most cases the soviet governments did not send personnel to assume leadership or even ignored the whole matter, leaving the entire responsibility to the Red Army alone. On one hand, this hampered the Red Army in carrying out other tasks, and at the same time, because the Red Army had other tasks to carry out, it was unable to concentrate all its efforts on distribution under the circumstances, so naturally the land was distributed in a casual manner. Although the Red Army did have a serious problem with formalism in land redistribution in the past, responsibility for the mistakes lies mainly with the local governments, because they disregarded their responsibility and failed to assume leadership. This time when land is confiscated and redistributed in Shanghang and Wuping, the government of western Fujian must exercise active leadership and carry it through correctly in accordance with the above instructions and in line with your many past experiences in land distribution.

4. You must pay serious attention to the problem of middle peasants. In the past, the middle peasants were rejected in many places or attacked under the camouflage of attacking the rich peasants. This was nothing less than undermining the alliance with the middle peasants and was extremely harmful to the consolidation of soviet political power and the future triumph of the revolution. Do not repeat the same mistake of the past this time in your work in Shanghang and Wuping. First, on the problem of land and with respect to equal distribution, you must strictly and correctly follow Article 5 of the Land Law, a principle concerning the middle peasants ( . . . [equal distribution] is practiced only when the majority of the peasants are willing and directly supportive; if most of the middle peasants are reluctant, they may choose not to participate). Second, the middle peasants should under no circumstances be encroached upon when funds are collected. This is most likely to happen in fund collection in the newly developed areas. The funds we collect should not come out of the pockets of the middle peasants. Third, the more enthusiastic of the middle peasants should be absorbed in a positive way in the land distribution, and especially participation in the exercise of political power. Strict precautions must be taken against the exclusion of the middle peasants from election and government. In a word, consolidating the alliance with the middle peasants is one of the major bases for the victory of the land revolution and the soviet régime. Encroachment upon the middle peasants must be firmly opposed and considerable concessions should be made to them on a number of issues (such as the equal distribution of land).

5. Apart from the problem of the workers and the implementation of the many principles and methods prescribed in the letter of the General Political Department with regard to the work in Ganzhou, the work in the towns of Shanghang and Wuping should:

First, follow the economic policy adopted by the National Soviet Congress, the tax laws promulgated by the Central Government, regulations for investment, and regulations for loans; correctly carry them out using the experience of

Tingzhou; and translate these documents into bulletins so as to make them publicly known.

Second, try hard to maintain commerce and never undermine it on account of fund collection. Funds to be collected should be classified and small capital and part of middle capital should be exempted.<sup>3</sup> Shops run by reactionary leaders should be confiscated and their crimes and the reasons for the confiscation announced in detail to the public, the purpose being to foil reactionary attempts to spread rumors by making clear that it is the possessions of the reactionaries, not shops, that have been confiscated.

Third, declare officially that all houses belonging to the reactionary organs are confiscated by the Soviet Government and then reallocated to various organs and mass organizations. Random occupation of houses at will by various organs and organizations is prohibited. Confiscation of houses and possessions should all be declared by the government. Some of the houses may be allotted to the workers as dormitories and some rented out at low rates to ordinary poor people. Of the possessions confiscated, cash goes to the government, and apart from that, part should go as aid to the Red Army and the masses in disaster areas and the rest should be distributed as much as possible among the urban poor. Transportation of all confiscated items to the old soviet areas without distribution among the local people must be opposed. The anarchistic phenomenon of free confiscation and free disposition by various organs and mass organizations must be redressed.

Fourth, preserve unequivocally schools and objects of culture, and even send personnel to superintend and protect them. No vandalism is permitted.

Fifth, on discovering any shops that issue their own paper bills, compel them to convert the bills into cash immediately and have the bills recalled for destruction. The government should send personnel for supervision when necessary and prohibit future issuance of such bills. Cash should be well guarded so that it will not be smuggled out of the area in large amounts by reactionaries and businessmen, and the economy of the Soviet Area will not be affected.

6. The collection of funds is to be concentrated in one unified organ, which is made up of personnel from the western Fujian government and the Political Department of the Twelfth Army. All [other] bodies and organs are strictly prohibited from attacking the local bullies, so that a basis for unified finances can be established. Most of the cash collected should be used to aid the Red Army in developing the revolutionary war. Any willful waste because economic resources are plentiful is strictly forbidden; cases of such waste are to be severely punished.

7. As regards the problem of eliminating counterrevolution, a Committee for Eliminating Counterrevolution should be organized in accordance with Directive

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3. The evident meaning here is that small- and some medium-sized merchants should be exempted.

No. 6 of the Central Government, and all principles in relation to the elimination of counterrevolution should be adhered to in order to carry on the work correctly. Preparations should also be made for setting up a tribunal and political security bureau to maintain revolutionary order, as well as to administer justice in economic matters.

8. It is very important to establish provisional political power. Once the revolutionary committee is set up, it must put into immediate effect all laws and decrees promulgated by the National Soviet Congress and the Central Government, in order to carry out the land revolution and the political program, suppress reactionary activities, mobilize the broad masses of the workers and peasants, and set up formal organs of political power. These are its major tasks. Revolutionary committees must be elected at mass meetings. The Government of Western Fujian should spare no effort in leading and supervising the work of the revolutionary committees of various places. The Government of Western Fujian should establish Shanghang as a city soviet directly under its jurisdiction. When considerable progress has been made in the confiscation and redistribution of land and in the elimination of the reactionaries, the establishment of the official government should be set in active motion. First urban and rural soviets must truly build up the system of representative conferences so as to lay a solid foundation for the organization of the *xian* soviets of Shanghang and Wuping. All formal organs of political power must be set up in accordance with the regulations and directives promulgated by the Central Government. Revolutionary committees must become organs that lead the masses in the struggle and strictly guard against the development of formalism, as well as the infiltration of reactionaries and rich peasants.

9. Local armed forces must be organized in a planned way. You are expected to discuss the matter with the headquarters of the military district and work out practical plans for the organization of the local armed forces to defend the Shanghang and Wuping Soviet Area.

10. The Western Fujian [Government] has always been dependent in its work on the Red Army in the areas newly developed by the Red Army and does not exercise effective leadership or exert itself to carry on work and fortify the area. Take Liancheng and Ninghua, for example. They were occupied by the Twelfth Army for a long time, but the Western Fujian Government did not make a point of assuming leadership and as a result the newly developed area could not be consolidated and was even lost when the Red Army left and the reactionaries occupied it. This was a grave mistake. This past mistake is not to be repeated in the work in Shanghang and Wuping. You should mobilize and immediately draft a large number of working personnel from the old soviet areas to work in these two *xian*. The responsible comrades of the Western Fujian Government should go to Shanghang in person to supervise all the work there. Now every effort must be made to consolidate Shanghang and Wuping, which is the most realistic and paramount task at present. No other work is more important than this. For this

reason, we have decided to postpone the convening of the Congress of Fujian Peasants in order to fortify Shanghang and Wuping. It is hoped that you will issue a general order to notify the governments at all levels, and will moreover take this opportunity to step up the work of election and reorganization at the lower levels.

At present, to reinforce the work in Shanghang and Wuping, the working comrades whom western Fujian sent to the Central Government and who have received training can be sent back to you immediately, and then assigned to help with the work in Shanghang and Wuping.

Comrades! Of all the tasks you have at present, consolidating Shanghang and Wuping is the most central. You must go all out to fulfill this task, turning the two *xian* of Shanghang and Wuping into the solidest of soviet territories and making the town of Shanghang a Red key city.

Finally, you are expected to reprint this letter and relay it to the Political Department of the Twelfth Army and the comrades working in Shanghang and Wuping.

It is hoped that the recent situation in Shanghang and Wuping, as well as future work there, will be frequently reported to the Central Government in a timely fashion.

Chairman of the Council of  
People's Commissars

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



# ***Directive of the Provisional Central Government to the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets of Fujian Province***

(March 17, 1932)

To all comrades, delegates to the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets!

Dear Comrades!

The opening ceremony of your provincial Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets has taken place on the first and most glorious day of the world proletarian revolution—the commemoration of the Paris Commune.<sup>2</sup> The congress is of great significance because it is being held at a time when the revolutionary situation in the world and in China has developed to a highly critical point, and especially when, in the course of the current development of the revolutionary war, the Twelfth Army of the Red Army has won repeated victories in Shanghang and Wuping. At the same time, this illustrates the historic importance of the great revolutionary mission assumed by your congress. In addition to having sent some representatives to participate in the congress and provide help and guidance in its work, the Central Executive Committee hereby issues the following written instructions:

1. At present, the revolutionary situations both in the world and in China

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This directive was first published in *Hongse zhonghua*, no. 15, March 23, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 107–13, which reproduces this version. The date of March 17 given here is taken from the index volume to the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*.

1. The congress referred to here was held in Changting on March 18–22, 1932. This gathering, which convened shortly after the conclusion of a congress of cadres of the Fujian-Guangdong Party organizations, is said to have been dominated by the “leftist” Fourth Plenum policies; Ren Bishi, a representative of this leadership on the Central Bureau, attended both congresses and presented the important political reports at both.

2. The Paris Commune was actually established on March 18, 1871. Mao had written an article about its significance on March 18, 1926, which is translated in Volume II of this edition, pp. 365–68.

have advanced to a new and most critical era. This new and critical situation is manifested in the consolidation and flourishing of socialism in the Soviet Union, in the sudden decline of imperialism in the world, in the extreme sharpening of the contradictions between the two systems of socialism and capitalism, and in the intensified desire of the imperialists to launch an attack on the Soviet Union. It is manifested in the intensification of imperialism's internal contradictions, which has heightened the danger of the outbreak of an imperialist war, and at the same time brings the world revolutionary crisis ever closer to maturity. Because of the sharpening of this crisis, Japanese imperialism's occupation by armed force of China's Three Northeastern Provinces erupted last September and found its continuation in the forcible occupation of Shanghai.<sup>3</sup> It is manifested not only in the Japanese imperialists' carving up of China and suppression of the Chinese revolution, so as to save themselves from their own crisis, but also in the eruption of sharp contradictions among the imperialists, who vie with each other to carve up China and redivide the whole world. Therefore, ever since the outbreak of this incident, the conflict between Japan and the United States in particular has intensified to an extreme degree, and in their preparations and mobilization for war, the imperialist countries are in a most critical situation of refurbishing their weapons, ready to fight at any moment. Not for a moment, however, have the imperialists forgotten the attack on the Soviet Union, and their constant designs to turn this war into a war of invasion against the Soviet Union.

In China, the revolutionary situation is manifested in the internal disintegration of the reactionary Guomindang and its government since being defeated in their three attacks against the revolution,<sup>4</sup> and in the increasing collapse of reactionary rule. Since the outbreak of the incident of the Three Northeastern Provinces, they have been even more shamelessly engaged in selling out China and opposing the anti-imperialist movement on behalf of the imperialists themselves. The reactionary rule of the Guomindang has become ever more bankrupt throughout the country, and the authority of this reactionary rule has been utterly smashed in the course of the revolutionary struggles of the masses. Now, after having sold out the Three Northeastern Provinces, the Guomindang and its government have gone on to sell out Shanghai. Lately they have been seeking further to provoke a major war among the imperialists, so as to speed up the process of having imperialism solve its problem of carving up China and to sell out the whole of China, sacrificing the lives of hundreds of millions of workers, peasants, and toiling masses to the airplanes and artillery of imperialism's great war. Countless numbers of people in the Three Northeastern Provinces and Shanghai have already been sacrificed to the Japanese imperialists' airplanes and

3. The references here are to Japan's occupation of Manchuria beginning in September 1931, and the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops that took place in Shanghai in January 1932.

4. I.e., the encirclement campaigns.

cannons, yet the Guomindang and its government are fleeing to Luoyang, in preparation for handing over the area along the Yangzi River to the imperialists to use as a battlefield. The Guomindang warlords are ever more dependent upon the various imperialists, and when major war breaks out, they will undoubtedly be used by the various imperialists as tools in seizing China and slaughtering the Chinese people. At the same time, under such circumstances the Guomindang and its government will be brought to final bankruptcy and will surely be sent to its grave by the workers' and peasants' revolution.

As for the revolutionary movement throughout the country, since the three great victories in the revolutionary war and the establishment of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China, the local soviet governments and the Red Army have continued to win great victories and undergo great development. There is a rising anti-imperialist tide throughout the country against the Japanese imperialists' invasion of China and slaughtering of the Chinese people, which, despite the Guomindang's shameless selling out of China, has emerged with vigorous force. This anti-imperialist movement has now developed to the point where the masses in many places have taken the initiative to arm themselves and fight directly against Japanese imperialism, and to the point of destroying the Guomindang party offices and government organs and openly shouting the slogan, "Down with the Guomindang." In particular, the White army soldiers in Shanghai recently rose up of their own accord to refuse orders from the Guomindang and are now directly resisting the Japanese troops at the front. Now the struggle of the workers throughout the country has gradually come under the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement. The rapid revolutionization of White army soldiers has led them not only to take the initiative in fighting against the Japanese, but constantly to mutiny and rebel and go over to the Red Army. All this shows that the Chinese revolutionary movement and, in particular, the anti-imperialist movement of the national revolution are surging ahead, and that they will certainly join forces under the soviet flag in the national-revolutionary war to drive the imperialists out of China, overthrow Guomindang rule, and win victory for the soviets throughout the whole of China.

2. At present we are in a new historical period, a time of war and revolution; consequently, our task is actively to carry on the revolutionary war, to lead the national-revolutionary struggle of the whole country by means of revolutionary war, and to oppose the invasion of China and the massacres by Japanese imperialism. The popular masses of China will annihilate the reactionary rule of the Guomindang by means of revolutionary war and will put an end to the imperialist world war with the national revolutionary war. This period is extremely favorable for the development of the soviet revolution. Now the revolutionary war, which is expanding outward in a big way, has already undergone great development and scored many new victories. At present our concrete task is, following on from these victories, to make even greater efforts to mobilize the myriad worker and peasant masses to join in the revolutionary war and to expand the revolutionary

war into other important cities in the vicinity, so as to win final victory in one or several provinces. This is also the most important central task of your congress.

3. In order to fulfill this task, your congress must make the development of the revolutionary war the focus of all its work. You must first of all discuss some specific guiding principles for mobilizing the masses. This work of mobilization must consist above all in developing the struggle and entering deeply into the struggle. To raise the workers' and peasants' activism in the struggle, we must first of all conscientiously apply the labor law, the land law, and other such measures, and your congress must adopt some concrete measures for implementing them. Only in connection with the reality of struggle is it possible to mobilize the masses of workers and peasants of Fujian province in their thousands and tens of thousands to take an active part in the revolutionary war.

4. In order to develop the revolutionary war, it is absolutely necessary to expand and strengthen the Red Army, for it is the main force in developing the revolutionary war. Your congress must discuss in concrete terms plans for expanding the Red Army, as well as concrete measures for applying the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army. You must also get rid of the localist idea that formerly prevailed in western Fujian according to which only the local armed forces need to be enlarged and the Red Army does not have to be expanded, for this idea is extremely harmful to the tasks of augmenting the military forces of the revolutionary war and developing the revolutionary war.

5. In order to carry forward the revolutionary war and to win initial victory for the soviets in Jiangxi, offensive tactics must be adopted for actively expanding our revolutionary war into other areas. Such offensive tactics absolutely do not imply making rash advances and an adventurist policy of giving up the base areas that have already been consolidated. On the contrary, it means consolidating and extending the victories we have won. Your congress must decide the direction in which to advance, and the main direction is the north because it is in conformity with the overall plan for further development charted by the Central Committee with a view to winning initial victory in Jiangxi and some neighboring provinces. We must, however, also progress outwards in other directions so as to expand the soviet areas. In order to fulfill the goal of advancing northward, the central task is to consolidate our position in Shanghang and Wuping. Your congress must discuss how to mobilize large numbers of cadres and the concrete measures to be taken in carrying out the work specified in the Central Government's letter to the government of western Fujian. To consolidate our position in Shanghang and Wuping does not mean merely to strengthen the contact between Guangdong and Jiangxi;<sup>5</sup> it also means in particular to strengthen and consolidate our outward expansion and advance the forces and the base areas of the revolutionary war. We must resolutely oppose adventurism,

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5. Shanghang and Wuping provided a geographical bridge between southeastern Jiangxi and northeastern Guangdong.

which does not seek to consolidate the base areas; we must also oppose conservatism, which does not seek actively to expand outward. At present, conservatism is extremely harmful to fulfilling the task of expanding the revolutionary war outward in a big way, and your congress must oppose this tendency more resolutely.

6. In order to strengthen the forces making for the development of the revolutionary war, it is necessary to consolidate and develop its economic strength. Your congress must discuss in great detail realistic measures for developing the economy and raising production in the soviet areas, and also discuss concrete measures for carrying out economic policy. As for financial problems, your congress must resolutely put forward concrete and unified financial policies, in accordance with the financial regulations promulgated by the Central Government. How to practice economy, in order to help develop the revolutionary war, must be discussed even more earnestly. Your congress must resolutely oppose the serious phenomenon of unbridled waste of funds by governments at all levels so common in the past and adopt methods for punishing any waste of funds in the future.

7. To strengthen the forces making for the development of the revolutionary war, the organization and training of local armed forces must be strengthened so that their effective role in the revolutionary war can be enhanced. In the past, the local armed forces in western Fujian were not very sound, but it was by no means the case that, as everyone said, "the local armed forces in western Fujian are useless" or that "people in western Fujian have no fighting capacity." Your congress must resolutely oppose such mistaken ideas. The local armed forces and the masses of workers and peasants in the vast area of western Fujian have not only carried out a long-term struggle against the enemy, but have also created a big soviet area. They truly have tremendous capacity for revolutionary struggle. In the past the local armed forces did not possess strong fighting capacity chiefly because of mistakes in line. When adventurism prevailed in western Fujian, the local armed forces suffered great defeats. Later, in the first, second, and third [encirclement] campaigns, they made serious mistakes of conservatism in military affairs and did not know how to apply the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Sometimes, they did not estimate correctly the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves and launched stubborn attacks on the enemy (for example, the several attacks on Hulei and Kanshi and other places).<sup>6</sup> As a result, the local armed forces suffered partial military defeats, the morale of the soldiers fell, and their fighting capacity was weakened. Besides, not enough attention was paid to military leadership and to political training, and this is another important factor. Your congress must discuss in great detail how to rectify the local armed forces, how to strengthen political and military work, and how to use the method of

6. Hulei and Kanshi are market towns and township seats in Yongding *xian* in western Fujian.

guerrilla tactics so as to enhance the role of the local armed forces in the revolutionary war.

8. To strengthen and develop leadership in the revolutionary war it is necessary to establish a powerful and capable soviet government at every level. As regards the establishment of soviets, your congress should base itself on the regulations and decisions promulgated by the Central Government and seriously discuss methods for carrying them out. Here we must particularly draw your attention to the establishment of a system of soviets in the cities and townships, for this is the foundation of the soviet organization and the most powerful basic organization by which the soviets lead and mobilize the masses. The congress must oppose the previous formalism of the soviets and the phenomenon of cutting oneself off from the masses. All these things are great obstacles to the fulfillment of the task of establishing a powerful soviet with a capacity for carrying out the work, and your congress must take specific measures to check on the work of the soviets at all levels.

9. Over the past few years, the soviets in western Fujian, in the course of great revolutionary struggles against the enemy, have achieved many great successes and victories in carrying out the task of agrarian revolution, in creating a big soviet area, and in implementing the land program. At the same time, its past work has been marked by quite a few mistakes and shortcomings. Your congress must check on the work done in the past, for only thus will it be possible to make use of the precious experience accumulated in the struggle and correct all these mistakes and shortcomings.

10. In the past, western Fujian suffered many defeats because of the erroneous line of adventurism. Subsequently, after the adventurist line had been changed, many of our base areas suffered devastation and suppression during the enemy's first, second, and third offensives, because they committed errors in military tactics, or were even destroyed. Some of them have never been recovered from the enemy. Also, because of the mistaken attitude toward the leadership of the local armed forces, some border areas even suffered devastation at the hands of militia bandits. If a number of our cadres in the soviet areas do not have a correct understanding of the root cause of what has happened, it is because, under the influence of the erroneous conclusions of the former work line, they underestimate the conditions at present which are favorable for the development of the revolution, and on the contrary, have feelings of disappointment and hopelessness. This is an extremely serious mistake. We must recognize that the present revolutionary situation is extremely favorable for the development of the revolution, and that now is precisely the time for us to lead the masses of the people to develop our revolutionary war outward. Such [pessimistic] feelings are extremely harmful, and we must not allow them to exist and to develop. Your congress must conduct a pitiless struggle against them. In this respect, there is an even greater need for your congress to transform its own working method in strict accord with the work line laid out by the All-Soviet Congress and the

Central Government. The work in all of Fujian province will [thus] certainly proceed smoothly and quickly take a turn for the better. Consequently, the soviet area in Fujian will surely achieve greater development and greater victories.

The above instructions are for your reference in discussing all the problems at the congress. The Central Executive Committee firmly believes that the congress will come to a completely successful conclusion and that it will be able to carry out all the urgent revolutionary tasks now facing us. Finally, let us loudly proclaim:

Long live the successful First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets of Fujian Province!

Long live the victory of the soviets!

Long live the Chinese Soviet Republic!

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

# *Only by Marching Directly on Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Can We Make the Enemy Move<sup>1</sup>*

(March 30, 1932)

Comrade Enlai:

1. I received your telegram. From a political perspective, we must advance directly on Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, for it is only in this way that we can force the enemy to move, provoke battle, and open up the situation. If we remain in the vicinity of Longyan to raise revenue, it will continue to be a conservative situation and it will be very difficult to take the next step.

2. According to our investigation, Zhangzhou is difficult to defend but easy to attack. Therefore, whether or not our First Army Group and Seventh Division<sup>2</sup> are able to attack Zhang Zhen<sup>3</sup> in Longyan, they should all proceed directly to Zhangzhou.

3. It requires only five days for enemy troops in Guangdong to come to Longyan from Dapu and threaten our rear, but it requires fifteen days for the Fifth Army Group to get to Longyan from Xinfeng. Consequently, it will definitely be too late if we wait till we have learned that the enemy troops in Guangdong have entered Fujian before making any movement.

4. The First Army Group has already arrived at Xinqiao to the east of Changting [City] for a rest. In order to confuse the enemy's spies, they will wait until the Seventh Division joins them before proceeding eastward. The Fifth Army Group may enter Fujian afterward, but should arrive at Longyan no later than April 20 and await orders. The Thirteenth Army must also enter Fujian, take up a position in Kanshi in Longyan *xian*,<sup>4</sup> and protect our rear. At present, when the First Army Group is moving forward, the rear is completely empty. I hope

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 263–64.

1. This and the several subsequent documents were written by Mao during the early stages of his raid on Zhangzhou in Fujian. For more details, see the Introduction.

2. The Seventh Division referred to here was the Seventh Independent Division of local troops raised by the Western Fujian Military Region.

3. Zhang Zhen commanded the Nationalist army's Forty-ninth Division.

4. Kanshi is currently in Yongding *xian*.



that you will urge the Seventh Division to come to Changting without delay. If the Seventh Division does not join forces with it, the First Army Group will be too weak to advance to Zhangzhou.

5. I will go to Jiuxian<sup>5</sup> tomorrow to see Tan [Zhenlin] and Zhang [Dingcheng].

Zedong

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5. A place in northern Shanghang *xian*.

***The Forces That Are Going Directly to Attack  
Zhangzhou and Quanzhou  
Should Act More Quickly  
and Be More Concentrated***

(April 2, 1932)

Comrade Enlai:

1. I arrived in Shanghang yesterday to discuss our deployment for dealing with the enemy. I plan to leave for Baisha on April 7 and meet with Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen.

2. Since one enemy unit has entered Fujian, our troops that are going directly to attack Zhangzhou and Quanzhou must act more quickly and be more concentrated. Otherwise, the enemy will seize the initiative and our troops will be caught in a dilemma. The entire Fifth Army Group must set out immediately, take the shortest way to get to Yunmenling in Huichang by a forced march via Xiangkeng in Wubei,<sup>1</sup> Guanzhuang, and Baisha, and arrive in Longyan on April 14.

3. It is better for the Central Bureau and the Military Commission to move to Changting.

4. Regarding the operations of the Third Army Group, we are all awaiting telegraphic instructions.

Zedong

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 365–66.

1. Wubei is a contraction for “northern Wuping.” The other places mentioned in this list of names are in Shanghang *xian*.

# ***The Reasons Why the Battle at Longyan Was Victorious, and Future Work in [Longyan and Yongding]***

(April 11, 1932)

Comrade Enlai:

1. We have been victorious at Longyan, and I am sending someone to tell you about this. After our withdrawal from Ganzhou, there must be a battle when we enter Zhangzhou. If we can wipe out the greater part of Zhang Zhen's forces, it would mean that we have cut off one wing of the enemy troops in Guangdong.

2. The reasons for yesterday's victory are:

- a. We had one day's rest in Baisha and rallied our forces.
- b. We ignored Kanchi and launched a direct attack on Longyan.
- c. We camped in Dachi, did not go to Xiaochi, and hit the enemy when he was not prepared.

It is a pity, however, that we did not win a complete victory. The Forty-fifth Division was too slow in finishing off the enemy's vanguard troops. Otherwise, there was a chance that we could have captured all eight of the enemy's regiments and his brigade headquarters.

3. We will stay here for two days. After joining forces with the Ninth Division, we will advance directly to Zhangzhou.

4. In terms of the work in Longyan and Yongding, we should focus on promptly creating battlefields. Consequently, we must strengthen leadership. In addition, because the main forces of the Red Army are at the front, it seems appropriate that the General Political Department should move to Longyan, and the General Management Department should be moved quickly to Longyan to manage transportation and communications and to make uniforms.

5. Apart from the assignment of taking [Shang]hang and Wu[ping], the Twelfth Army should also gather intelligence about the enemy in Dapu and Pinghe. This is very important. I have already asked Tan Zhenlin to take personal command of a radio station and one regiment of men, lead them to Yongding,

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 267–68.

make guerrilla attacks on [Da]pu and [Ping]he, and keep us informed.

6. It is said that Huang Renhuan<sup>1</sup> has entered southern Jiangxi and the units that have reached Xunwu seem to belong to this force. It appears that the border between Guangdong and Fujian is being guarded by Huang Zhiwen.<sup>2</sup> At the moment, the enemy in Guangdong has adopted an offensive attitude toward Jiangxi and a defensive attitude toward Fujian. But our entry into Zhangzhou could certainly lure this enemy into action.

Zedong

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1. Huang Renhuan commanded the Independent First Division of the Guangdong-Guangxi Army's Third Army.

2. Huang Zhiwen commanded the Guangdong-Guangxi Third Army's Eighth Division.

# *Manifesto of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Declaring War on Japan*

(April 15, 1932)

After the Japanese imperialists occupied China's Three Northeastern Provinces by armed force on September 18 of last year, they continued to deploy large numbers of naval, ground, and air forces and occupied Shanghai and Jiading. They harassed many cities along the Yangzi River and the seacoast, massacring the Chinese people and burning Chinese buildings with their air and artillery bombardments. Both in the northeast and in the vast areas of Wusong and Shanghai, countless numbers of people were killed.<sup>1</sup> At present this slaughter and destruction are still going on. The reactionary Guomindang government and the various warlord factions under its leadership, up to their old tricks of capitulation to imperialism, handed over one after the other the Three Northeastern Provinces and the areas of Wusong and Shanghai to the Japanese imperialists, allowing them to massacre the Chinese people at will. Now, furthermore, under the guise of negotiating for peace, they are actually selling out the whole of China, promoting the carving up of China by the various imperialists. As for the nationwide anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, they have done their utmost to suppress it by dissolving anti-Japanese mass organizations, putting down anti-Japanese strikes, murdering the anti-Japanese masses, forcing the soldiers and people's volunteers to withdraw from Songjiang and Shanghai where they were fighting the Japanese on their own initiative, and firing machine guns at the brave soldiers of the Nineteenth Route Army who refused to withdraw to other places, all of which was done to show loyalty to imperialism. Actually, the Guomindang government and its warlords are not only unable but have long been unwilling truly to fight against Japanese imperialism and to carry on the national revolutionary war. All they can do is rely on one group of imperialists to fight another group of imperialists so as to provoke a world war in which the imperialist bandits will be able to solve their problem of carving up

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This manifesto was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 18, April 21, 1932, and we have translated it from that source.

1. The references are to the combat between Japanese and Chinese forces (most notably the Nineteenth Route Army mentioned in the text below) in and around Shanghai in January 1932.

China. The Chinese Soviet Area long ago shook off the yoke of imperialism; however, the Guomindang warlords would rather give away the Three North-eastern Provinces, Shanghai, and even the whole country to the imperialists. On the other hand, they have launched one attack after another against the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army who are wholeheartedly engaged in the national revolutionary war, hoping that in this way they can abolish the soviet régime and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. All this shows that the duplicity of the Guomindang government and its various warlords is nothing but a cover for their underhand dealings to sell out China and humiliate the Chinese nation. They are actually tools for imperialism to use directly to suppress the Chinese national revolutionary movement, and an obstacle to the conduct of the Chinese national revolutionary war. Now, the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China officially declares war on Japan, and is leading the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the broad popular masses of oppressed people all over China to drive Japanese imperialism out of China and oppose the carving up of China by the various imperialist powers, so as to win complete liberation and independence for the Chinese nation. The Soviet Central Government announces to the workers, peasants, soldiers, and oppressed popular masses of the whole country: In order to carry on a genuine national revolutionary war, and fight directly against the Japanese imperialists, it is necessary first to overthrow the reactionary Guomindang government that has helped suppress the national revolutionary movement and has been an obstacle to the development of the national revolutionary war. Only by doing so is it possible for us to fight directly against the Japanese imperialists with a free hand and to cause the national revolutionary war to develop greatly in every part of the country. The Soviet Central Government solemnly declares: If the Guomindang warlords had not concentrated all their armed forces to attack the soviet areas and the Red Army, the toiling masses of workers and peasants in the soviet areas and the Red Army would long ago have stood with the brave anti-Japanese soldiers and volunteers who fought directly against Japan. Therefore, unless Guomindang rule is overthrown, there can be no genuine national revolutionary war. At present, the Soviet Provisional Central Government is leading the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the whole country and the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in the soviet areas in their revolutionary war to seize major cities with a view to undermining Guomindang rule. This is truly carrying on a genuine national revolutionary war and is a prerequisite for fighting directly against Japanese imperialism. We call upon the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and all the toiling masses living in areas under White rule to rise up and organize themselves into an Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army of the popular masses, arm themselves with the weapons seized from the Guomindang warlords, directly wage war on Japan, and set up military commissions to guide such actions and operations in the various localities. Soldiers in the White armies should rise in rebellion, overthrow their reactionary officers, fight on their own against the

Japanese, and organize themselves into the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It should be recognized that only the Soviet Government can truly lead the national revolutionary war of the whole country, wage war directly against Japan, and oppose the imperialists' partition of China. Only the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is truly the armed force of the popular masses carrying on the national revolutionary war. Only the world proletariat, the oppressed nations, and the Soviet Union are international forces with which we can truly unite in the fight against imperialism. The Soviet Provisional Central Government calls upon the workers, peasants, soldiers, and all the toiling masses all over the country to unite under the Red flag of the soviet régime, take an active part in the prosecution of the revolutionary war, and arm themselves in the White areas everywhere, so as to overthrow the reactionary Guomindang rule throughout China, establish a soviet régime of the Chinese masses, build the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, unite with the proletariat and the oppressed nations of the world and with the Soviet Union to drive Japanese imperialism out of China through a national revolutionary war, oppose the partition of China by the imperialists, and fight to the end for the true independence and emancipation of the Chinese people.

Chairman of the  
Provisional Central  
Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic    Mao Zedong

# *Directive of the Provisional Central Government on Mobilizing for the Declaration of War Against Japan*

(April 15, 1932)

Ever since Japanese imperialism occupied China's Three Northeastern Provinces and invaded Shanghai, the Soviet Central Government has repeatedly pointed out in all of its declarations that the aim of Japanese imperialism is to colonize the Three Northeastern Provinces completely, and the Shanghai Incident will come to represent a concrete demonstration of the partitioning of China by the imperialist bandits. The Guomindang government and the warlords under its leadership will only capitulate even more shamelessly to imperialism, sell out China to them, and suppress the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movements of the popular masses of the whole country. They will absolutely not take any real actions to resist Japan and to strive for the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation. The development of the Shanghai Incident has now proved that the appraisal of the situation made by the Central Government is absolutely correct. A Manchurian puppet government has already been established in the Three Northeastern Provinces, and is the most obedient running dog of Japanese imperialism. The Shanghai peace negotiations and the investigation delegations of the League of Nations<sup>1</sup> are nothing but meetings and organizations to divide up the spoils from the carving up of Shanghai and of China by the imperialist bandits. Some of the Guomindang warlords who were previously obliged, under pressure from the soldiers who rose up on their own initiative to fight Japan, to make a pretense of resisting Japan, have now shown their true colors: Ma Zhanshan<sup>2</sup> has become minister for military affairs of the Manchurian govern-

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This directive was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 18, April 21, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 115-19, which reproduces that text.

1. A reference to the Lytton Commission. For Mao's subsequent assessment of its work, see below, "Circular Telegram Opposing the Report of the International Investigation Team," October 6, 1932.

2. Ma Zhansan was a warlord general in Heilongjiang who initially resisted the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, but found himself isolated and unsupported by other Chinese units. He then temporarily collaborated with the Japanese out of necessity in February-March 1932, as a result of which he was named minister of war in the newly established state of Manchukuo. On April 1, 1932 (not long after the present document was written), however, Ma found an opportunity to redefect to the Chinese, after which he steadily resisted the Japanese.



ment, and warlords such as Jiang and Cai<sup>3</sup> are taking part in the Shanghai peace negotiations aimed at the partition of Shanghai by the imperialists. The Guomindang government is even readier to accept at any time the instructions of the League of Nations and let China be exploited. The propaganda about what they call "long-term resistance against Japan" is used on the one hand to deceive the anti-Japanese popular masses of the whole country, and on the other hand in an attempt to win support from other imperialist factions (in particular from the U.S. imperialists), thereby provoking a world war during which the imperialist bandits would have an excellent opportunity to solve the problem of carving up China. The greatest efforts made by the Guomindang government and its various factions of warlords over the past few months have been in compliance with the wishes of the imperialists. They have dissolved the anti-Japanese organizations in every part of the country, put down the anti-Japanese strikes, slaughtered the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist masses, fired machine guns at the brave soldiers who fought the Japanese invaders on their own initiative, strictly forbidden the activities of the popular masses and the volunteer army, and in particular deployed large numbers of armed forces to launch one attack after another on the soviet areas and the Red Army. All this shows that the Guomindang government and its various factions of warlords are nothing but tools that the imperialists will use for the direct suppression of China's national revolutionary movement. Not only will they never conduct any national revolutionary war against the Japanese imperialists, but they are a fundamental obstacle to the pursuit of the national revolutionary war.

Only the toiling masses of workers and peasants throughout China are a genuine anti-imperialist force; only the soviets and the Red Army are truly capable of waging a national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism. Now the oppressed popular masses throughout China are suffering under the iron heel of Japanese imperialism. They will not yield to the humiliations they have been suffering at the hands of the Guomindang government, and have risen in anger for the revolutionary struggle against Japan and the Guomindang. In order to lead the toiling masses of workers and peasants in the whole country to fulfill the revolutionary task of driving Japanese imperialism out of China, the Soviet Central Government officially declares war on Japan. It has pointed out to the oppressed popular masses of all China that the soviet areas long ago shook off the yoke of imperialism, but the Guomindang warlords now under the control and guidance of the imperialists are acting on their instructions and will never give up their attacks on the soviet areas and the Red Army. If it were not for the attacks launched by the Guomindang government, the toiling masses of

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3. The reference is probably to Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai. If so, Mao's information must have been out of date, since by this time Jiang and Cai had already become national heroes as a result of the stubborn resistance opposed by their Nineteenth Route Army to the Japanese attack of January 28, 1932, against Shanghai.

workers and peasants in the soviet areas and the Red Army would long ago have united with the soldiers and volunteers who fought heroically against Japan and would have been standing shoulder to shoulder with them waging war directly against Japan. Therefore, the Soviet Provisional Central Government is now leading the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the whole country and the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in the soviet areas actively to pursue the revolutionary war, to expand outward to seize key cities, and thus to undermine Guomintang rule. This is really carrying out in practice the national revolutionary war; it is a prerequisite for fighting directly against Japan. The Soviet Provisional Central Government now calls on the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the whole country and on all the toiling masses to unite closely under the Red flag of the soviets, take an active part in the revolutionary war, arm themselves in the areas under White rule, organize the anti-Japanese volunteers of the popular masses, seize weapons from the Guomintang, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie, fight the Japanese directly, and set up revolutionary military commissions to guide their actions. The White soldiers must rise in rebellion, overthrow their reactionary officers, fight the Japanese voluntarily, establish a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, overthrow Guomintang rule throughout the country, and establish a soviet régime of the popular masses in the whole country. Thus it will be possible to drive Japanese imperialism out of China by means of national revolutionary war, oppose the partition of China by the imperialists, and fight to the end for the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation.

Consequently, aside from issuing a circular telegram to make known these views and this program of action relating to the proclamation of war against Japan, the Soviet Central Government issues to the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the soviet governments at all levels the following instructions:

1. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission, military commissions in all soviet areas, headquarters of the military commands in each district, and the Red Guard departments (i.e., military departments) of each *xian* should give mobilization speeches to all the Red fighters regarding the declaration of war against Japan, to help each one of them understand that taking an active part in the revolutionary war to annihilate the troops of the Guomintang warlords that are attacking the soviet areas, moving out to seize key cities, and destroying Guomintang rule are truly the prerequisites for carrying out the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. The more vigorously the revolutionary civil war develops, the more rapidly the Guomintang warlords will collapse, and the sooner the time will come for us to fight directly against the Japanese. The Red fighters in the whole of the soviet areas should prepare for the coming of a national revolutionary war much broader in scope than any we have yet experienced. Mobilizing for the declaration of war against Japan is by no means a task that should be performed only when we open fire directly against Japanese imperialism. Moreover, the brave soldiers and the volunteer army of the popular masses in the areas under White rule along the coast have long ceased to be

under the control of the Guomintang warlords, and they have spontaneously begun fighting against Japan. They are in urgent need of the support and guidance of the soviets and the Red Army. Consequently, mobilizing for the declaration of war against Japan can absolutely not be separated from actively pushing the revolutionary war into other parts of the country. On the contrary, mobilizing to develop the revolutionary war should be seen as a blow against Japanese imperialism, and as strong support for the anti-Japanese masses and the brave soldiers in the White areas. Military mobilization should make it clear to every Red fighter that he should not leave the ranks unless he is wounded or sick; those who desert will be punished, and ridiculed by the masses. The local armed forces should impose military discipline like that in the Red Army. Military training should be intensified for the Red Guard Army, whose members are not released from production. The Military Commission should proclaim Red martial law throughout the soviet areas and check on it. Production in munitions factories should continue to increase; grain supply stations and transportation stations should be set up along vital communication lines; a certain portion of grain should be stored in case there might be a rice famine; funds should be saved for fighting a protracted campaign; defense works should be established along the boundaries of the developing areas and be further pushed outward; money should be raised to renew the equipment of the armed forces (government taxes are, of course, used chiefly to support the Red Army) so as to enable the Red Army, our main armed force, to continue performing its combat tasks. A number of guerrilla detachments should be organized and move out from the soviet areas to other places. In localities that are close to the key cities or are directly controlled by the imperialists, the guerrilla units should lead the popular masses in organizing an anti-Japanese volunteer army to conduct guerrilla warfare.

2. The General Political Department of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the political departments at all levels of the Red Army should carry out political mobilization. They should conduct extensive propaganda among the Red fighters regarding the declaration of war against Japan, and constantly unmask in *Red Star* and other periodicals edited by the Red Army the facts about how the Japanese and all other imperialists invade and occupy China, partition China, and slaughter and oppress the Chinese nation, as well as about how the Guomintang has sold out China and humiliated the Chinese nation. Thus we can rouse the enthusiasm and courage of all the Red fighters for the declaration of war against Japan, as well as stimulating their determination to push the revolutionary war into other parts of the country to annihilate the Guomintang warlords and their rule. Pamphlets and illustrated magazines of all kinds should be compiled, putting forward propaganda and agitation slogans that are closely related to the present struggle. Special attention should be paid to political work in the places recently reached by the Red Army, especially in places close to key cities.

3. When the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army expands into places close to areas controlled by Japanese imperialism, its primary task is to annihilate the Guomindang forces that are in collusion with the imperialists. If we do not annihilate the Guomindang forces that are attacking us, we will simply give them an excellent opportunity to annihilate us in cooperation with the armed forces of the imperialists. This would certainly disrupt the measures for carrying on the national revolutionary war against Japan, and would not really help to drive the Japanese imperialists out of China. When the Red guerrilla forces expand into places that are close to the sphere of influence of Japanese imperialism, they should lead the popular masses to organize anti-Japanese volunteer armies, arm themselves, and conduct mobile guerrilla warfare, fighting directly against Japan, thereby drawing the White soldiers to fight spontaneously against Japan. A revolutionary military commission should be organized jointly to lead this action, so that they may detach themselves from the rule of the Guomindang warlords and overthrow it.

4. Soviet governments at all levels in every soviet area should immediately carry out mass mobilization regarding the declaration of war against Japan. First they should intensify the mobilization of the toiling masses of workers and peasants to join the Red Army voluntarily, expand the revolutionary war into other places, and prepare to fight Japanese imperialism directly. They should mobilize the toiling masses as a whole to take part voluntarily in all kinds of work in the rear for the revolutionary war and, first of all, to join the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers who are not released from production. They should see to it that all the toiling masses throughout the soviet areas, both men and women, will have an ardent desire to receive some military training and prepare to fight against Japan. They should strive to mobilize people to carry out the work of strengthening the bases in the soviet areas, intensify the enforcement of Red martial law, step up local self-defense, save funds and grain to help the Red Army, and also store public grain for it. They should mobilize the masses to do a good job of the spring and autumn plowing and sowing so as to get in a good harvest for the year, reorganize the Red postal service, repair roads and bridges to facilitate communications in the soviet area, begin at once to collect the progressive tax on commerce, and make plans to levy a land tax to provide a source for government revenue. They should also mobilize the workers, peasants, and toiling masses to produce more daily necessities for the Red Army (for example, by making bedding and clothing, shoes, caps, and munitions); organize teams of stretcher bearers, transport detachments, clothes-washing groups, and gift-giving detachments, to help the Red Army men and encourage them to continue to fight; apply the rules and regulations on giving preferential treatment to the Red Army; help the families of the Red Army men plow their fields; and cultivate the public fields that belong to the Red Army.

5. This directive will be issued to all units and organizations at the lower levels in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and in local armed forces, and to

municipal and township soviets. Specific mobilization plans should be made in accordance with these instructions. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission should promulgate its own mobilization plans.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
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Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
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# *Views Regarding the Central Task in the Future, and the Work in New Red Areas, as Well as in the White Areas*

(April 22, 1932)

Enlai:

1. In the battle of Nanjing,<sup>1</sup> Zhang Zhen's forces were in large part wiped out, and we achieved our goal of cutting off one wing of the enemy troops in Guangdong. This will not only help to consolidate western Fujian, develop guerrilla warfare in southern Fujian, and assist the Red Army in the East River area. It will also have great influence on the overall situation because of our occupation of the port of Zhangzhou. There is the possibility of inciting the Guangdong armies to move and provoking battle. Therefore, achieving victory over the enemy in Guangdong has become the central task for the future.

2. It is possible that the enemy in Guangdong will enter Fujian from Yongding, Pinghe, or Zhaoan. Our Eastern Route Army should, in the shortest possible time, develop the guerrilla warfare in southern Fujian toward the north, to the whole of the four *xian* of Shanghang, Wuping, Longyan, and Yongding. It should raise revenue in excess of 1,000,000 *yuan* and be prepared to wipe out the enemy forces that enter Fujian, so that we will be able to enter Jiangxi and advance northward as soon as possible.

3. The exploitation in southern Fujian is remarkably severe. The workers, peasants, and small businessmen all cherish deep hatred for the landlords and warlords, and when the Red Army entered Zhangzhou, the residents rushed out like mad to see and support them.

4. I have already met with Deng Zimin.<sup>2</sup> According to him, there is a Red guerrilla region in Longxiyu, 80 *li* from Zhangzhou, where the five *xian* of

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 269–70.

1. The reference is not to the Guomindang capital, but to Nanjing *xian* in Fujian, a locality traversed by the Red Army in the course of its attack on Zhangzhou. See above, the document dated March 30, 1932.

2. The editors of the *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* note that they cannot identify this individual and suggest that Mao has conflated two names: those of Deng Zihui, a founder of the western Fujian revolutionary movement who was then working in Xiamen, and Cai Xiemin, who was then secretary of the Zhangzhou *xian* Party committee.

Nanjing, Pinghe, Yunxiao, Zhangpu, and Longxi intersect. The masses number about 40,000. In Nanxiang in Zhangzhou, there is a Red guerrilla detachment of sixty. It has now been decided to take Longxiyu as the center, expand the guerrilla warfare toward the five *xian* of Nanjing, Pinghe, Yunxiao, Zhangpu, and Longxi, create a small Red Army, and establish a small soviet area. The guiding principles for the work in the other White areas are open propaganda; secret organization; and distribute grain, but do not establish political power, and do not distribute the land. As to whether temporary organs of political power should be set up in Zhangzhou, wait for a few days to see the circumstances of the mass struggle and the requirements of the situation before deciding whether to put out a call. The anti-Japanese declaration should be publicized immediately.<sup>3</sup>

Zedong

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3. The reference is to the declaration of war against Japan, dated April 15, 1932, translated above.

# *Views Regarding the Political Appraisal, Military Strategy, and the Tasks of the Eastern and Western Route Armies*

(May 3, 1932)

To the Central Bureau:

I have taken cognizance of your telegram. The political appraisal and military strategy of the Center are wholly erroneous.<sup>1</sup>

First, after the three campaigns and the Japanese attack, the ruling forces in China, particularly the Chiang Kaishek faction, have been dealt a great blow and can only strike defensive blows against us. The same is true of the Guangdong forces. We must absolutely not exaggerate the strength of the enemy or believe that he is still capable of inflicting damage as severe as that caused to the Central Soviet Area in the three campaigns last year. Nor, as regards strategy, should we summon up our own mistakes and take an erroneous road.

Second, after the three campaigns, our overall military strategy should absolutely never repeat the defensive strategy of fighting on interior lines. On the contrary, we should adopt the offensive strategy of fighting on exterior lines. Our task is to take key cities and achieve victory in one province. It seems that destroying the enemy is the prerequisite for this. Given the present situation both

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 271–72, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Mao sent this telegram from Zhangzhou in reply to a Central Bureau communication which relayed the Central Committee's April 14, 1932, missive entitled "Letter from Central to the Party Organs of the Various Soviet Areas Regarding Opposing the Imperialist Attack on the Soviet Union and the Partition of China." After stressing the seriousness of the imperialist threat to the Soviet Union and China and calling for countermeasures such as expanding the Red Army and expanding and linking up the soviet areas, the letter concluded that "right opportunism" within the Party was still a significant obstacle to carrying out these measures. Among the manifestations of this "right opportunism," the letter cited ignoring the continuing danger to the Soviet Union and to the revolution; ignoring the leadership of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle; and failing to understand the necessity for energetic operations (*jiji xingdong*) by the Red Army, falling instead into a "vulgar conservatism" which in certain circumstances had led to advocacy of "dispersing the Red Army and organizing it into guerrilla detachments." The text of the Central Committee letter is available in *Central Committee Documents*, Vol. 8 (1932), pp. 193–201.



on our side and on that of the enemy, as well as the condition of our supplies and logistics, we must leap out of the enemy's encirclement and wage offensive war on exterior lines. Only thus can we achieve our goal. To propose using last year's strategy under present circumstances is right opportunism.<sup>2</sup> The operations of both the Eastern Route Army and the Western Route Army on the present occasion have been absolutely correct. The aim of the Eastern Route Army's deep penetration into Zhangzhou was absolutely not primarily for the purpose of raising revenue, nor does the separation of the Western Route Army violate the principle of concentration. We have escaped from the enemy's encirclement and smashed both his eastern and western fronts. As a result, his northern and southern fronts are under severe threat from us, and he has no alternative but to change his goal of marching to the Central Soviet Area and [instead] move toward our Eastern and Western Route armies. In the future our Western Route Army should adopt a completely active stance, employ all sorts of methods to make the enemy move, concentrate its forces to hit the enemy's weak points, destroy the enemy one by one, and achieve overall victory. The task of the Eastern Route Army in the future is to strike resolutely at the enemy troops in Guangdong. It should immediately concentrate the Fourteenth Army, the Eighth Division of the Third Army, and the Thirty-sixth Division of the Twelfth Army at Qiuyan. There are very great differences between a campaign in the White areas and one in the Red areas, and there are also great differences between fighting the armies in Guangdong and fighting Zhang Zhen. As regards the enemy in Nanjing [*xian* in Fujian], because we were in a White area and did not have enough forces to allocate, we could not send any troops to besiege the enemy from the left and we were unable to wipe out Zhang Zhen's remnant forces. It is absolutely necessary to concentrate the Fourteenth Army, the Eighth Division, and the Thirty-sixth Division. There are plenty of local armed forces to allocate in Jiangxi.

Zedong

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2. In this passage Mao appears to be abandoning the "luring deep" strategy for which he had previously argued so vehemently.

# *An Open Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Agreement to Sell Out Shanghai*

(May 9, 1932)

The counterrevolutionary Guomindang government is currently engaged in an impudent and undisguised deal in which it surrenders itself to imperialism and betrays the national interests of the country. On May 5, the Guomindang government signed a so-called cease-fire agreement with the Japanese and all the other imperialists.<sup>1</sup> This agreement has totally sold out Shanghai, the center of the proletariat in China. In accordance with the agreement, Japan is allowed to station countless navy, army, and air force troops in Shanghai on a long-term basis, whereas China is not allowed to station any troops within the vicinity of Shanghai. In reality, this agreement has indefinitely extended the concession territory in Shanghai; it represents a concrete step to turn Shanghai into an open city under the control of a condominium.

Such shameless surrender and overt betrayal of the country have more deeply exposed the Guomindang's true nature as a hidden agent working for imperialist schemes to carve up the territory of China and as a scavenger clearing the way for the imperialist invasions into China. At the same time, the Guomindang government is mustering all its forces under the command of the imperialists, not only attacking the soviet areas, which have been liberated and have thrown off the yoke of imperialism for a long time, but also attempting to undermine and halt the national revolutionary war against imperialism launched by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The negotiation and signing of the agreement in Shanghai have even more clearly revealed two things: first, that the League of Nations is the organizer of the plot to divide up China; and second, that all imperialists are equally the accomplices of the Japanese imperialists and initiators of the partition of China.

The Provisional Soviet Central Government declares before the toiling masses of all China: On behalf of the suffering masses all over the country, it repudiates the negotiations and secret agreements between the counterrevolutionary

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 121–22.

1. This truce ended the fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops that had begun in January 1932.

Guomindang government and the Japanese, as well as all the other imperialists; denounces the cease-fire agreement signed by the traitorous Guomindang government on May 5; and calls upon the suffering masses throughout China to arise resolutely and wage a national-revolutionary war against the Japanese and all other imperialists as well as their running dog and scavenger—the Guomindang government—to safeguard the territorial integrity of China and strive for China's complete independence and liberation.

The Provisional Soviet Central Government also calls upon the toiling masses all over China to rise up in struggle, arm themselves, support the triumphant counterattack by the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, overthrow the counterrevolutionary government of the Guomindang, and fight the national-revolutionary war resolutely to the end. Struggle for the liberation and independence of China! Struggle for an independent and free Soviet China!

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic  
Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong  
Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

May 9 at Ruijin, Jiangxi

# *Decision of the Central Executive Committee Approving the Various Resolutions Adopted at the First Soviet Congress of Jiangxi Province*

(June 3, 1932)

The resolutions adopted at the First Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies of Jiangxi Province<sup>1</sup> concerning the work report of the government, the labor law, the land law, problems of local armed forces, the economy and finances of Jiangxi Province, expansion of the Red Army, culture and education, and the resolution to support the declaration of war on Japan made by the Provisional Central Government are all in keeping with the spirit of the laws and decrees, as well as the resolutions promulgated by the All-Soviet Congress and the Executive Committee of the Party Central Committee, and may be approved. However, the new Executive Committee of the Jiangxi Party Committee should in its work carry out these resolutions to the letter and make every effort to avoid the mistaken attitude of governments at all levels in the past, which was to regard resolutions adopted at congresses as one thing and day-to-day work as another, thus turning such resolutions into historical relics and mere objects of research. Therefore, this government specially directs the attention of the new Executive Committee of the Jiangxi Soviet to this matter. It is best that the new Executive Committee of the Jiangxi Soviet at once turn the resolutions of the Jiangxi Soviet Congress into concrete work plans and carry them out to the letter, so that the resolutions of the provincial Soviet Congress do not become mere scraps of paper.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 37–38.

1. This congress convened on May 1, 1932, in Xingguo *xian*. Zeng Shan was elected as the government's chairman.

# ***The Central Government's Telegram to the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies***

(June 9, 1932)

To the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, in care of the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Soviet.<sup>1</sup>

Dear Comrade Delegates:

Because of the difficulties of travel and transportation, the Central Soviet is unable to send representatives to attend your congress and can only give the congress this simple directive via wireless.

1. At the moment, the imperialists are madly conducting a war against the Soviet Union and carving up China; the Chinese revolution is advancing, especially with the several unprecedented victories by the Soviet Red Army.<sup>2</sup> The imperialists have escalated from covert intervention to overt and direct violent suppression of the Chinese Revolution.

2. The rule of the Guomindang is collapsing; it continues to betray China and serve as the imperialists' scavenger in the attempt to resuscitate their expiring life. It is furiously launching new attacks against the soviet areas and the Red Army all over the country. The present period is one in which revolution and counterrevolution are waging a life-and-death struggle; it is a period in which the civil war has advanced to the stage of total war with the armed forces of the imperialists.

3. At the moment, the balance of strength between classes in the country has changed—much to the benefit of the development of the soviet revolution. At

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This telegram was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 22, June 9, 1932. The text is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 123–25, and we have translated it from that source.

1. The Hunan-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Area was located in the Jinggangshan region on the border between the two provinces; Yongxin *xian* constituted the core of the base. The First Congress of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet took place in Lianhua *xian* on October 17–25, 1931; a second congress took place in Yongxin *xian* on August 1–7, 1932. Given the date on the present document, it appears directed toward the soon-to-be-held second congress, rather than being a retrospective commentary on the first.

2. "Soviet Red Army" here refers to the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area, not to the army of the Soviet Union.

present, the soviet is adopting a policy of aggressive offensives, using attacks by revolutionary forces to annihilate the attacks by the imperialists and the Guomindang; it is mobilizing and arming the masses to the maximum degree; it is carrying out fully the Central Government's mobilization order for war against Japan and struggling to win victory first in Jiangxi and its neighboring provinces.

4. Your congress is to carry out all the tasks required by this mission, to define more specific action plans, to mobilize and prepare the masses and Red fighting soldiers to struggle against imperialism and for the overthrow of the rule of the Guomindang, and to plan even more specifically for the sovietization of the western banks of the Gan River and, in cooperation with the Red Army and Jiangxi Province, for concrete action to seize Ganzhou, Ji'an, and Nanchang.

5. The congress should come to a very specific decision about trying to expand the Red Army and implementing the policies of special treatment for the Red Army. The congress should make a full decision on how to lead the strengthening and development of guerrilla warfare, the expansion of the soviet areas, and the strengthening of all efforts and struggles in the White areas.

6. Strengthen the masses' initiatives for struggle. You must carry out thoroughly the political program of the soviet. Fully enforce the labor laws and conduct land investigation to check on whether or not the land laws have been fully applied. Carry out land construction and raise production in a planned manner.

7. Strengthen the congresses of deputies in cities and townships to create a real democratic system and attract the majority of masses to take part in the government and in carrying out its tasks.

8. As regards the problem of purging counterrevolutionaries, while correctly executing Directive No. 6,<sup>3</sup> the further mistake of abandoning the purge must be avoided at the same time. However, worker and peasant elements who were enticed or deceived into joining various organizations (such as opium-smoking groups, romance societies, etc.), as opposed to joining knowingly, must not be handled in the same manner as those elements who joined the AB Corps voluntarily or with prior knowledge. A distinction should be made. They should not be prosecuted as having officially joined counterrevolutionary organizations. Only in this way can the masses who were deceived into joining subversive organizations unknowingly be won over, and the counterrevolutionaries prevented from conspiring to blackmail them into joining their conspiracies.

9. The past error of encouraging the masses to go to the White areas to loot and take rice must be strictly corrected. This damages the credibility of the soviet and increases the hostility of the masses in the White areas, causing them to be put to use by the counterrevolutionaries. Local workers and peasants in the White areas should be encouraged to seize the rice owned by landlords residing in the White areas, so that part of it may be used to help the Red Army and part of it may

3. The document referred to appears to be "Directive No. 6 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic," dated December 13, 1931, translated above.

be used to assist the masses in the ravaged soviet areas where there is a rice shortage. But propaganda must still be conducted among the masses in the White areas.

10. In the past, in opposing the rich peasants, the provincial soviets made a distinction between the situation before and after the revolution.<sup>4</sup> This is extremely wrong, and the congress must reject any such theory. In the past, the masses did not enthusiastically engage in production mainly because of the abuses in levying fines without distinguishing among classes and in collecting donations. This was not caused by the struggle to oppose exploitation by rich peasants.

11. Correctly carry out economic policies to open up financial resources. Establish the economic foundation for developing the revolutionary war. On the one hand, develop the economy, rectify tax collection, and organize guerrilla forces. [On the other,] when raising money in the White areas, at the same time raise the [slogan] of "economize in all expenditures to fund the revolutionary war" to punish severely corruption and waste. Achieve a true unification of finances to solve the problem of raising money for the regular Red Army and enable it to devote itself fully to the revolutionary war.

12. In order to carry out these tasks thoroughly, a system of work inspection must be put into effect to root out bureaucratism, embezzlement, corruption, and passive work stoppage. It was wrong for the Provincial Soviet not to establish a Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Department in the past. Governments at all levels must establish such departments according to the rules issued by the Provincial Soviet Congress. Veteran members of the Communist Party with the most experience in struggle and the most enthusiasm for work should be selected to staff them. Moreover, call on the majority of workers, peasants, and mass organizations to participate in this effort.

13. The congress must thoroughly examine the previous work of the Provincial Soviet and governments at all levels, and ruthlessly expose all the mistakes in their work. Only by so doing can you correctly implement all the resolutions and orders of the soviet congress and the Central Government and fulfill the tasks the congress should set. In conclusion, we wish your congress success.

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government  
of the Chinese Soviets

Mao [Zedong]

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang [Ying]

Zhang [Guotao]

4. That is, before and after the initial rural uprisings that led to soviet power being established in an area.

# ***On the Organization and Work of the Committee for Upholding Women's Rights and Improving Women's Lives***

*Announcement by the Interim Central Government  
Directive No. 6 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(June 20, 1932)

Women make up half of the working masses. For working women to participate actively in the work of the revolution has a tremendous effect on the revolution. If women join guerrilla forces, the volunteer army, the Red Guards, and the Young Pioneers, this will demonstrate women's revolutionary initiatives for all types of struggle. If we do not pay attention to women's problems and fail to protect the rights to which women are entitled, it may weaken women's enthusiasm for participating in the revolutionary struggle, and this will be a loss for the revolution. Especially in a revolutionary war which is increasingly expanding outward, most working men tend to join the Red Army and participate in the efforts at the front; this requires even more that women take over the work and the responsibilities of consolidation and security in the rear. If we resolutely apply the laws protecting and liberating women, lead and encourage working women to take an active part in the revolutionary war, and also link up closely and cooperate well with the women's movement, this will speed the victory of the revolution.

Soviet governments at all levels should recognize women's effective role in the revolutionary war; in the past, soviet governments seldom paid any attention to women's rights, and even displayed a tendency to slight women, which may be gleaned from the following facts:

1. During the last election, some places deprived working women of the right to vote, thereby preventing working women from participating in the work of the soviets. This constitutes a violation of the election principles of the soviets and a violation of working women's constitutional rights. What a grave error this is!
2. Under soviet governments, peasant women receive redistributed land just

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as men do, so they can achieve economic independence. However, in many places, when women have divorced their husbands, women do not get to take the land and houses with them, while government officials, instead of paying attention to these problems, fail to protect the rights women should enjoy, and even interfere with women's right to own property. For example, they prohibit divorced women from taking away clothes. In particular, there is inequality in pay between male and female workers. For instance, female workers in cooperatives in Xingguo are paid even less than apprentices. In Nanyang district in Fujian, men and women do the same type of work in rice processing, but women's wages are 50 percent lower than men's. This constitutes a most intolerable error of discriminating against proletarian women!

3. On the issue of marriage, the regulations in the Marriage Law have not been followed, and there are many cases of buying and selling in marriage, forced marriages, and child brides. Even physical and verbal abuse of women is still common everywhere. It is even the case that many governments resort to oppressive and interventionist measures on the issue of marriage, to the point that in places like Xingguo, Longsha, and Shangsho, women cannot gain marital freedom and are even imprisoned and tortured by the local government and are totally unable to fight back. There have been cases of poisoning husbands to death in order to gain marital freedom, a measure to which women used to resort in the past during the feudal period. This not only is a disgrace under soviet governments, but also proves that these governments resist the laws of the Central Government and continue the old feudal practice of oppressing women!

4. The labor laws contain specific provisions for protecting the rights of women, but they are not enforced, especially those provisions protecting women before and after childbirth.

5. Governments at all levels have hitherto been unable to lead the masses actively in carrying out resolutely and thoroughly the provisions for giving preferential treatment to Red Army families. In particular, there has been no proposal that women who have joined the Red Army (the volunteer army, for example) should enjoy the same sort of preferential treatment as do men who have joined the Red Army. This shows a negligent attitude toward women's interests.

6. In the past, women's average political and cultural levels were slightly lower than those of men. The soviet governments' protection of women, in some cases, focuses exclusively on the solution of marriage problems. In most cases, the soviet governments solve such problems from an oppressive and scornful perspective or simply ignore them altogether. And most governments go slow or even abandon political and cultural work directed at women.

In light of the situation described above, we should thoroughly correct the previous mistakes and shortcomings in our work to protect women. Governments at all levels should follow this order to establish committees for improving the living conditions of women at every level and carry out the following types of efforts:

1. As for organizational relations and style of work, the Committee for Improving the Lives of Women is a specialized committee among the organizations of government dealing with improving the lives of women. It is different from [committees on] land, labor, culture, and so on. It is not an administrative part of government. All of its plans and proposals must be reported to the presidium of the government at the same level for discussion and approval. After a decision is made, it is to be applied by the government at that level in the form of an administrative order. But the Committee for Improving the Lives of Women cannot, on its own initiative, order governments at subordinate levels to carry out such decisions; it can only provide working instructions for superior and subordinate committees. In order to guide and supervise the work of the committee, the presidiums at each level of government should often send representatives to attend the committee's meetings. For example, when a presidium discusses issues related to women, the chairman of the committee may be invited to attend the meeting. Or when the committee has made plans and suggestions for improving women's lives, the committee may request permission from the presidium to attend the meeting and make reports and explanations. For another example, when different departments of the government discuss women's issues, the committee may also send representatives to attend the meetings of these departments, participate in the discussions, and express their views.

2. In accordance with the organizational principles promulgated by the Central Government, the tasks and work of the Committee for Improving the Lives of Women consist of investigating and surveying the conditions of women's lives, studying and designing means of improving the lives of women, inspecting lower-level governments' execution of all laws and regulations relating to women, and reporting and making specific proposals to governments at the same level.

3. As for the relationship between the Committee for Improving the Lives of Women and the Congress of Working Women, the committee may call meetings of the Congress of Working Women and, at these meetings of women's deputies, learn about their family situations, their needs, and their views on the government; it receives the opinions and demands with respect to women's own interests and gathers materials about women. In addition, it may collect materials about women through the various types of mass organizations.

The Committee for Improving the Lives of Women may, when necessary, ask mass organizations to send representatives to attend its meetings. The committee should attend the Congress of Women Workers to report on laws protecting women issued by the Soviet Government and on the rights women should enjoy.

4. Men and women are absolutely equal under the Soviet Government. Not only do working women have, politically, the right to vote and be elected, but they should be recruited to participate in all the work of the government and its agencies, so that the majority of women may be united around the Soviet Government and actively seek respect for all of their rights. At the moment, the

priority is to correct the erroneous tendency on the part of government officials at all levels to look down upon women and to neglect the protection of women's rights, and to wage a resolute struggle against resistance to the application of the laws related to women. [This means], for example, electing women to the position of township deputies, selecting women cadres to participate in all kinds of committees formed by the township government (dealing with the work of departments such as land redistribution and land investigation), and paying special attention to the education and training [of women] on the job.

5. Raise the consciousness of working women and their understanding of the Soviet Government and revolution. The liberation of working women and the victory of the entire class are inseparable. Women can gain real liberation only with class victory. Therefore, women should be helped to understand that, in order to struggle for their own interests and protect their vested interests, they should struggle for the Soviet Government. Call on them to support the Red Army; to encourage their husbands, brothers, and sons to join the Red Army; and to oppose desertion, organize laundry teams and rescue teams, perform sentry and inspection duties, join local armed forces, and actively study and participate in the work of the Soviet Government and mass groups. Thus, [they] will fight for the consolidation of the Soviet Government, for the development of the revolutionary war, and for the victory of the revolution first in Jiangxi and the neighboring provinces.

6. In order to raise the political and cultural levels of women, cultural departments at all levels should set up half-day schools for women, organize reading classes for women, and run temporary training classes in families and field mobile literacy classes. Teachers may be chosen from government and mass organization officials and school teachers. Lower-level Committees for Improving the Lives of Women and the cultural departments at equivalent levels should be urged to undertake cultural efforts related to women, as well as plan to train women cadres and recruit women to work in all government agencies. In the Congress of Working Women or women's schools and clubs, political education should be carried out to call on women to participate actively in the soviet movement and the revolutionary war.

7. The Committee for Improving the Lives of Women at each level should discuss, with the labor department at the same level, how to put into effect, in the immediate future, all the laws and regulations in the labor laws that protect the interests of women workers. In particular, the same protection given to men workers should be provided for women before and after childbirth—by providing them with social security benefits. Men and women should receive equal pay for equal work.

8. Working women who have resolutely and courageously joined the Red Army should enjoy all rights included in the rules and regulations for preferential treatment of Red Army personnel.

9. Governments at all levels should uncompromisingly enforce all articles of the Marriage Law. In particular, it must be ensured that when women divorce

they have the right to dispose of their land and houses. Mercenary marriages, forced marriages, child brides, physical and verbal abuse of women, and all similar oppressive practices toward women must be strictly prohibited. If government officials at any level again commit the mistakes of repressing women and abandoning the protection of women's rights, they should be penalized without mercy. The Committees for Improving the Lives of Women at every level should pay even greater attention to mobilizing women to fight for the support and implementation of soviet laws for the protection of women; in the course of improving the lives of women, the committees should further strengthen women's initiatives for struggle and their active participation in all the struggles of the soviets.

10. In order to improve the lives of women, it is extremely important for governments at all levels to establish the organization and operation of the Committee for Improving the Lives of Women.

a. Governments at all levels should form Committees for Improving the Lives of Women as soon as possible and supervise the work of the committees at each level. They should also determine specific work plans. The Central Council of People's Commissars previously ordered governments at all levels to establish such committees before May. But this order has not yet been carried out; the superior government's order has been neglected. It is hereby again mandated that governments at all levels completely establish Committees for Improving the Lives of Women before July 15.

b. The two survey forms distributed in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces by the Central Committee for Improving the Lives of Women should be filled out, tallied, and returned to the Central Committee before July 15.

c. Committees for Improving the Lives of Women must present monthly working reports to the next higher level of government on the lives of women, as well as suggestions and specific solutions on the lives of women.

d. The provincial soviets of Jiangxi and Fujian provinces have already formed Committees for Improving the Lives of Women. They should immediately decide on specific and practical working plans for a given time period; they should immediately urge lower-level governments to form Committees for Improving the Lives of Women. They should pay special attention to the supervision and direction of major *xian* and to carrying out the work there. They should make a working report to the Central Government before July 15. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear*

## *Directive No. 14 of the Central Executive Committee*

(July 7, 1932)

Just now, the civil war is proceeding on an even wider scale. Besides commanding and organizing the Guomindang warlords to mobilize more than eighty divisions in conducting a huge "Encirclement and Suppression" against soviet areas and the Red Army in seven or eight provinces throughout the country, the imperialists are preparing at any time a direct and open attack on the Chinese soviets and the Red Army. The Japanese imperialists have used military force to occupy the Three Northeastern Provinces and to attack Shanghai. This already constitutes a most concrete manifestation of partitioning China by force and intervening directly in the Chinese revolution. With the unanimous agreement and sponsorship of the various imperialist robbers, a "truce agreement" was signed at the so-called Shanghai Peace Conference with the aim of jointly carving up Shanghai and China more quickly and completely, so that they can concentrate all their energy on dealing with the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union. In the face of this agreement, the Guomindang warlord government further exposed its role in selling out China and serving as scavengers for the imperialists. Thus, on the one hand, it signed the agreement to sell out Shanghai and China. On the other hand, via the Shanghai-Ningbo Railway, it transferred the soldiers of the Fifth Army and the Nineteenth Route Army, who had been bravely fighting the Japanese, to Fujian and Wuhan to attack the soviet areas that had freed themselves from the chains of imperialism, and to attack the armed force which is truly opposing the imperialists, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Central Soviet Government long ago declared a national revolutionary war against Japan. It has encouraged and led the workers, peasants, and poor toiling masses of the whole country and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on the front of the anti-imperialist struggle. It has repudiated all the agreements and secret treaties by which the Guomindang counterrevolutionaries have sold out China to the imperialists. It has developed the anti-Japanese people's armed forces on a large scale and is actively preparing to fight the imperialists directly to strive for China's independence, liberation, and unification.

At present, the Central Soviet Government is leading the broad masses in the

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soviet areas and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the whole country to launch an all-out offensive, to respond to the new attacks from the imperialists and the Guomindang with a revolutionary offensive, to rout and annihilate the attacking forces of the Guomindang, to destroy the Guomindang's rule, and to strive for the initial victory of the revolution in Jiangxi and neighboring provinces. This will deal a direct blow to the imperialists and create favorable conditions for the victory of the national revolutionary war. The continuous victories in the two soviet areas, Hubei-Henan-Anhui and West Hunan-Hubei, have already created an even more favorable situation for threatening and encircling Wuhan. The return of the Red Army of the Central Soviet Area from Zhangzhou, its movement toward the west, the aggressive action by the Tenth and Sixteenth armies of the Red Army, and the victory by the Third Army Group west of the [Gan] River, have all facilitated the destruction of the enemy in Guangdong and Jiangxi. The task of seizing key cities along the reaches of the Gan River and seeking victory first in Jiangxi looms before us with greater urgency. The decisive battle along the reaches of the Gan River has already begun in the past few days. War mobilization for the entire soviet area and work in the rear have thus become more important and urgent than at any time in the past. The expansion and deepening of mobilization for war and the consolidation and strengthening of the work in the rear are of decisive significance for the victory of the revolutionary war at the front. Therefore, the Central Government hereby issues this special order to direct the soviet governments at all levels and all armed organizations of workers and peasants immediately to execute the following tasks, so that every worker and peasant under the Soviet Government not only understands the significance of this war for his own future, but also displays, throughout the entire process of class war, concrete actions of his own to ensure the beginning and continuation of the victory of the revolutionary war. Only thus can the previously existing phenomena of "fighting at the front having nothing to do with the rear" (*qianxian dazhang, houfang wuguan*) and of muddling along and the pursuit of temporary tranquility be changed.

1. In order that the Red Army may get sufficient replenishment of its military manpower as the war develops, and that these recruits may be transported to the front in a continuous and organized manner, the Central Government deems it necessary during the current period of voluntary service to establish immediately Red Army reinforcement regiments. Specific methods for establishing Red Army reinforcement regiments are hereby stipulated as follows:

a. Within the existing soviet areas, each *xian* or several *xian* are to organize a Red Army reinforcement regiment. All soldiers from among the workers and peasants who are added to the main forces of the Red Army must go through concentrated training in such reinforcement regiments so that they may be sent to the front in a body. Only those recruited at the front or in newly liberated areas, and new soldiers added to independent divisions and regiments, may dispense with training in reinforcement regiments.

b. Every month each reinforcement regiment may form five companies at most, with a minimum of two companies. In areas where the reinforcement regiment is unable to add two companies to the Red Army, a reinforcement regiment should be formed jointly with neighboring *xian*. In the Central Soviet Area, the command headquarters of each military district may determine, according to the monthly quota given to it by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, how many reinforcement regiments to form in each military district and how many companies per month each reinforcement regiment should contribute to the Red Army. The Military Commission separately makes such determinations for other soviet areas. Each reinforcement regiment must deliver trained fresh soldiers to the front once every month or every two weeks; it must also continue to train soldiers newly recruited from among the workers and peasants.

c. The immediate commander of the Red Army reinforcement regiment is the local *xian* soviet and its military department. But the reinforcement regiment must set up connections with the supreme military agency in its local area (such as the command post of the military district, the command post of the branch military district, the headquarters of the garrison, and the rear administrative office of the Military Commission); such military organs must also provide assistance and guidance to the reinforcement regiment.

d. As for the cadres of the reinforcement regiment, the Red Army Military Academy and the schools attached to each army and to the command posts of individual military districts should find a way to provide them. The personnel assigned by each army to different areas to work on receiving new Red Army soldiers should all participate in the work of the reinforcement regiments. The former reception stations should all be abolished without exception. Local soviet governments are responsible for providing political commissars and political officers.

e. The rifles and ammunition needed by the reinforcement regiments for training in a given area will be separately obtained through the military depots of the rear administrative office of the Military Commission and local governments. They will be distributed according to plans set by the command post of each military district. When soldiers who have already undergone such training are sent to the front, these rifles and ammunition should not be taken with them, so that they may be used for training new soldiers.

f. As for the supply of uniforms for the reinforcement regiments, in Jiangxi the Central Government orders the rear administrative office of the Military Commission and the military depots to provide them; then the command post of the military districts will allocate to each *xian* its needs according to a fixed time schedule. In Fujian, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Northeast Jiangxi, and West Hunan-Hubei, such uniforms will be provided by the command post of the respective military district. In Hunan-Henan-Anhui, the branch of the Military Commission is to find its own

supplies of uniforms. As for the cost of food and incidental expenses, it will be met entirely by the soviet government of each *xian*. Budgets in the Central Soviet Area will be determined by the command post of each military district and approved by the Central Government. In other soviet areas, they will be established and approved by each branch of the Military Commission and the command posts of military districts.

g. The duration of training is set, as a general rule, at two weeks. The content of the training is to be fixed and announced by each branch of the Military Commission and the command post of each military district.

h. Red Army reinforcement regiments in each locality must develop extremely close ties with local Red Army Support Committees and seek their assistance in order to coordinate their action.

i. The reinforcement regiments in all areas must, in general, be formed within seven months.

2. At present, when the revolutionary armed forces must be developed very rapidly and when the guerrilla movement is everywhere in the process of unfolding on a broad and active basis, the source of reinforcements for the main forces of the Red Army should not be limited exclusively to the reinforcement regiments and to expansion right at the front. The greatest possible efforts should also be made to cause the independent divisions, independent regiments, guerrilla units, and other armed organizations to concentrate and regroup into the main forces of the Red Army. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the various branches of the Military Commission of each army, and the command post of each military district must, in their plans for expanding the Red Army, specify their plans and schedules for expanding independent divisions into armies or regrouping certain independent divisions or regiments into the main forces of the Red Army. They should also decide on the establishment of new independent divisions and regiments.

3. To enable all citizens in the soviet areas with voting rights to exercise their rights to arm themselves to strengthen and develop the soviets, and to fulfill their duties of serving in the Red Army and fighting at the front, each soviet area should immediately and extensively develop and organize urban and rural Red Guard armies.<sup>1</sup> The Central Government hereby issues the following regulations on the principles of organizing Red Guard armies:

a. Propaganda should be made to the effect that all citizens in soviet areas who have voting rights and who are between the ages of eighteen and forty have a duty to serve in the Red Guard armies. Local soviet governments should not, however, organize every toiling man and woman over the age of

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1. The term "army" (*jun*) here and throughout the following paragraphs dealing with Red Guard organizations is used in a loose sense, roughly synonymous with "unit." Red Guard "armies" were often very small forces of a few dozen or so people, and are not to be confused with the much larger regular military units also referred to as "armies."



eighteen into a Red Guard army. Rather, they should, through extensive propaganda, cause them to join voluntarily. This is the main principle for establishing Red Guard armies at this time.

b. The general principle of the Red Guard armies is that their members are not divorced from productive activity. In the countryside, all toiling men and women over the age of eighteen can join voluntarily. In the cities, workers should constitute the backbone and [the Red Guards] should include the broad masses of the poor. In large cities, workers' Red Guard armies should be formed separately. Toiling men and women over the age of forty, if they voluntarily join a Red Guard army, may be grouped into reserve detachments of the Red Guard armies to serve on guard duty in the rear.

c. Red Guard armies are part of the system directly under the military district. Their basic organizational unit is the township; they are subordinated to the military affairs department of the district, and the *xian* military affairs department exercises unified command over them. Apart from establishing Red Guard armies generally in all the townships, the military department of each district should also form a model Red Guard battalion for each district. Three or four companies may be organized in large districts, and one or two companies in small districts. Model battalions and model Young Pioneer units can gather together a considerable number of the better weapons in their districts.

d. All toiling young men and women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three who have already joined the Young Pioneers do not need to join the Red Guards at the same time, as they are already receiving military training and performing military duties. But the Young Pioneers should regularly send batches of their most active members to the Red Guards. Moreover, when they participate in military missions at the front and in the rear, the Young Pioneers must be placed under the command of the Red Army and the Red Guards.

4. In order to provide coordination with the main forces of the Red Army in combat, the local armed forces of each *xian* should carry out attacks along the entire front. They should actively develop the guerrilla movement and new soviet areas in the areas under White rule and in the enemy's rear. This requires, aside from expanding and establishing new independent regiments, the expansion and formation to the greatest possible extent of guerrilla organizations. The principal task of guerrilla detachments should be to act energetically in White areas and the rear of the enemy forces. To erode and sabotage the enemy's foundation and military force, to organize peasant uprisings, to call for and organize mutinies of White Army soldiers, to generate new guerrilla detachments everywhere, to develop new soviet areas, to sabotage the enemy's communications, to seize the enemy's impedimenta, to launch surprise attacks on enemy forces, to collect supplies for the Red Army—all these are necessary conditions for strengthening and expanding the soviet areas, carrying out an

offensive on the entire front, and contributing to the victory of the main forces of the Red Army. As regards the organization of guerrilla detachments, attention should be paid to the following points:

a. Each *xian* should, in accordance with the circumstances of the struggle in the locality in question, determine the number of guerrilla detachments it should establish. Even *xian* in the heart of the Red Area must each establish at least four or five guerrilla detachments to operate on the borders of *xian* located on the periphery of the Red Area.

b. The number of people in each guerrilla detachment should not be set mechanically; it should be determined according to the objective environment of the areas in which the units are to operate and according to the strength they themselves are capable of mobilizing. Sometimes the number may be as large as that of one to two companies; sometimes, it may be as small as a dozen or so.

c. As regards class composition, a guerrilla detachment must comprise the most courageous and active worker and peasant elements. The leaders especially must be vanguard elements who struggle resolutely among the masses, for only thus can the guerrilla detachment be consolidated politically so as to provide a powerful guarantee when it goes to operate independently in an area under White rule.

d. When guerrilla detachments operate in the White areas, they must be separated from the production process; when they return to the soviet areas for regrouping and training, it is best that they return to production. When the detachments go on another mission to other places, a portion of their members should be changed and some new members added, so that the workers and peasants of the entire soviet area may all be trained in the operations of the guerrilla detachments.

e. Local garrison companies, model battalions of the Red Guards, and model Young Pioneers should all adopt the operational tactics of the guerrilla detachments and organize guerrilla detachments that are divorced from the productive process to operate actively in White areas and the rear of the enemy in turns.

f. The command post of each military district and especially the military affairs departments of local soviets should formulate concrete plans and guidelines for the guerrilla teams being sent out, in accordance with the actual conditions in the localities in question at the time in question.

5. Local soviet governments and all local armed organizations should mobilize the masses in a big way to join all kinds of organizations that participate in the war, such as stretcher-bearers' teams, transportation teams, guide teams, scout teams, sabotage teams, laundry teams, relief teams, rescue teams, and so on. They must provide the necessary material assistance to these organizations. They should lead these organizations to the front to participate in practical work. The military department of every *xian* and every district should plan the number

of teams and number of people of these organizations to be formed by every district or township. The command post of each military district and branch district should set the number needed by the front and other battle fronts and require that each local government be responsible for dispatching such organizations to the front.

6. In order that food and all military supplies be speedily transported to the front, and in order that the Red Army may move around conveniently without being hampered by roads and rivers, soviet governments at all levels should lead the masses in a planned way to repair bridges and roads on key transportation routes speedily, and assist military depots in carrying out all their work. In particular, in soviet areas and border regions near rivers, it is even more important to have a plan to collect boats to be used for military transportation at any moment. The post offices along military transportation routes should be constantly prepared, in accordance with changes in the military transportation routes, to strengthen the postal service along such routes, in such ways as increasing the number of letter carriers and delivery frequency, so that the military mail may be delivered most rapidly and without loss. At the same time, governments at all levels should provide maximum help in increasing the number of postal workers, and in transferring them.

7. In order to raise sufficient funds for the war and enable the Red Army to devote all of its energies to decisive battles, the Central Government has especially decided, on the one hand, to raise the rates of the progressive tax on business income, to set new rates for the land tax, to collect rents in cities and towns, and to instruct local soviet governments to raise money in the process of developing new soviet areas, so that the heaviest burden of all taxes may be placed on the class with the most property. On the other hand, the Central Government has decided to raise money through selling 600,000 *yuan* in short-term "revolutionary war" bonds in the whole of the Soviet Area, so that the broad masses of the workers and peasants may be mobilized economically to help the Red Army and to guarantee funds for the revolutionary war, so that no difficulties and obstacles are encountered. At the same time, in order to facilitate financial liquidity within the borders of the Soviet Area, for the convenience of payment for commercial transactions and collection of state taxes, the Central Government has especially decided to issue a considerable amount of state paper currency backed by sufficient funds beginning this month. Soviet governments at all levels should extensively mobilize the masses and make them understand that the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the entire Soviet Area must ensure, not only politically but economically, that there are sufficient supplies and war funds for the Red Army, so that the war may proceed victoriously, and we may take the key cities rapidly and achieve initial victory in Jiangxi. Therefore, the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the entire Soviet Area should, on the one hand, strictly supervise the merchant bosses and rich peasants; not relax even slightly their government tax burdens; and guard against their machi-

nations and all their plots, resistance, and manipulations to hide capital, report smaller sums on larger incomes, manufacture rumors, create trouble, sabotage production, and sabotage the finances of the Soviet. When such facts are uncovered, soviet governments should take firm measures to mete out severe punishment. Soviet governments at all levels must strictly ban business organizations such as "brokerage houses" and remnants of other old-style guilds that still survive within the soviet areas. Only soviet governments can call gatherings of businessmen to announce the government's laws, regulations, orders, and decisions applicable to them. On the other hand, the broad masses of impoverished workers and peasants should manifest a great deal of enthusiasm and activism in paying their very small amounts of land taxes (farm laborers and unemployed workers are exempt from taxes; poor peasants whose lives are difficult are exempt from taxes or pay a reduced tax), and especially in purchasing government bonds and using paper currency. They should hasten to do so as quickly as possible. Moreover, they should use the method of revolutionary competition to carry this out and to encourage one another. As regards all such efforts at mass mobilization, soviet governments at every level must rely on help from labor unions, unions of farm laborers, poor peasant leagues, mutual assistance associations, and all the revolutionary mass organizations. They must ensure that the sale of 600,000 *yuan* in government bonds exceeds the preset amount within a fixed period. The circulation of paper currency can be smoothly carried out amid a very high level of confidence on the part of the masses. All taxes can also be paid on time under the supervision, guidance, and encouragement of the masses. As regards raising money through developing new soviet areas, soviet governments at all levels and command posts of military districts should rely even more on the class line, devise careful plans, and appoint special personnel to take charge of this.

8. In order to replenish adequately the food supplies of the masses in the soviet areas and of the Red Army, assure the economic development of the countryside, increase the government's tax revenues, raise sufficient funds for war, and increase the income from the public land owned by the Red Army and the land of families of Red Army soldiers, soviet governments at all levels must carry out an extensive campaign to assure the autumn harvest and plant additional miscellaneous grains.<sup>2</sup> The following points should be noted regarding the concrete work of this campaign:

a. Soviet governments at all levels, especially district and township soviets, should lead the masses to plan various methods to protect the autumn harvest. First, they must strictly enforce Red martial law and form Red Guard armies everywhere to perform security duties, so that bandits and the landlord militia (*mintuan*) can be prevented from invading the townships to loot the rice harvest when the autumn rice crops are about to ripen or after they are

2. *Za liang*, i.e., cereals other than the main crops of rice and wheat.

harvested. In particular, along the borders of the soviet areas, rigorous measures must be taken to guard against the Guomindang White army's destroying the rice paddies of the soviet areas and sabotaging the autumn harvest. The success of such defensive efforts must rely on the mobilization of the masses of entire townships and districts. On one hand, the most effective guerrilla units should be organized to operate in White areas and in the enemy's rear, and to conduct guerrilla actions in areas where bandits and landlord militia are stationed. It must be recognized that the basic method for protecting the autumn harvest in the soviet areas consists in the active outward expansion of the Red Army, in smashing the enemy's attacks, in winning over the masses of the bandits and members of the militia, and in annihilating the bandits and the landlord militia. On the other hand, the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers of each district and township must, under the unified military command of the *xian* and district soviets, establish close contact with one another. When they suffer invasions by bandits, enemy police, or the White army, the Red Guard armies of an entire district and township, even the most effective model battalions of an entire *xian*, should be able to coordinate their actions and launch raids in all directions, so that they may provide a joint defense to fulfill the task of protecting the autumn harvest.

b. In order that peasants may reap the benefit of a timely harvest when the autumn crops are ripe, local soviet governments should mobilize and encourage the majority of the masses to form harvest teams and grain-cutting teams, so that when they have finished their harvest, they may go to help those peasant households with less manpower or adopt the method of mutual assistance to do so. As regards the families of Red Army soldiers and especially the public land owned by the Red Army, they should mobilize the masses even more to form "shock brigades" and "assault teams" and, using the method of revolutionary competition, go first to help these people bring in the harvest or to do it for them. The government should depend on the activism of the majority of peasants to carry out this mobilization. Moreover, they should use the farm laborers' unions and poor peasant leagues as the backbone of this mobilization.

c. When guerrilla units go to the White areas to carry out operations, they should also mobilize the masses in the White areas to launch an autumn harvest campaign. The most practical method is to identify clearly in advance the rice paddies of the despotic gentry in the White areas when the autumn crops are ripe, and then use the guerrilla detachments to support the masses in harvesting these rice paddies. Most of the harvested rice is to be given to the local masses in order to promote their class struggle. This not only protects the autumn harvest in the soviet areas, but also effaces the boundary marking the opposition between Red and White, expanding the influence and the territory of the soviets.

d. In the course of the autumn harvest, local soviet governments should

make even more efforts to increase the growth of miscellaneous cereals, to provide sufficient food supplies for the soviet areas. They should investigate and prepare the miscellaneous cereals suitable for cultivation in the land of each township and district, and then encourage and provide incentives for peasants to grow them. After the autumn harvest this year, it must be strictly prohibited to grow opium again anywhere throughout the entire Soviet Area. This requires, first of all, an extensive effort of propaganda and explanation directed at the masses.<sup>3</sup>

e. In the course of the autumn harvest, local soviet governments should pay attention to pooling together the government's rice harvest and run public granaries. They should conduct a campaign among the masses for saving grain and preparing to sell newly harvested rice at low prices to the Red Army. They should also promote a reduction in the production of rice wines and rice flours and an increase in the reserves of dried rice to prepare for next year.

9. Soviet governments at all levels should lead mass organizations to launch a movement of economizing on all expenditures in order to generate enough funds for war expenses. All those government expenditures that can be saved, such as meals for guests, office expenses, the cost of kerosene, and other incidental expenses must be reduced as much as possible; in particular, more paper and envelopes can be saved. Although all these saved items are small in themselves, they comprise a considerable sum when added together. Moreover, it is possible in this way to cultivate a soviet workstyle of greater industriousness and thrift in the soviet areas—and this is absolutely necessary. Those in the soviets who are engaged in embezzlement and corruption must be subjected to severe disciplinary punishment once they are discovered, in governments at any level. Whoever tries to cover up, protect, or slacken the investigation and exposure of such elements will be similarly denounced by the revolution. At the same time, one must be aware that economizing on expenditures does not mean, in any sense, a reduction in workload. On the contrary, the efficiency of our work should be further increased in the spirit of hard work.

10. In order to develop the economy of the soviet areas, soviet governments at all levels should pay attention to promoting, restoring, and aiding productive enterprises. At present, local governments should plan to bring recovery to many old productive enterprises in the soviet areas, such as the paper and lumber

3. Several *xian* in the Central Soviet Area, including Xingguo, Ningdu, and Yudu, had considerable areas of poppy cultivation in the 1910s and 1920s, and efforts to protect these crops against incursions by army troops engaged in "opium poppy eradication campaigns" (actually thinly disguised extortion and taxation programs) had on occasion led to violent popular resistance. In Xingguo and perhaps elsewhere as well, local Party leaders had used poppy-growers' resentment against this extortion as one of many peasant grievances that they exploited in their first efforts to mobilize popular support. Part of the "explanation" referred to here, therefore, probably involved telling growers why the Party in turn was now prohibiting this lucrative cash crop.

industries in western Fujian, tea-oil in Jiangxi, grass cloth in Ningdu, camphor in Ruijin, coal mines in Anyuan and Huichang, and coal deposits spread around in many places. Moreover, after investigation and approval by the Central Government, these facilities may be either leased to businessmen for them to invest in and manage or turned over to workers' cooperatives to run. The government may also make loans to peasants for them to manage these facilities, or they can be managed by the Soviet Government itself. Soviet governments at all levels should treat the promotion and planning of these productive enterprises as one of the central tasks in strengthening and developing the soviet areas. This is of extremely great significance and plays a crucial role in economic mobilization for war. In order to prevent and frustrate speculation and monopoly on the part of businessmen, and especially to resist the enemy's economic embargo and the counterrevolutionaries' troublemaking within the soviet areas, soviet governments at all levels should provide special assistance to the cooperatives formed by the toiling masses, especially the organization and development of consumer cooperatives. In several key localities in each soviet area (such as Ruijin, Tingzhou, Baisha, Xingguo, Yunmenling, Ningdu, and Yudu), local governments should help the toiling masses to organize consumer cooperatives on a relatively large scale and provide them considerable financial assistance, so that in a war environment they will be able to counter businessmen's manipulation with low-priced goods and meet the needs of the masses.

11. Local soviet governments and all local armed organizations must strictly enforce Red martial law and protect transportation lines. They must closely watch and check up on the activities of all the class-alien elements and suspicious persons in the soviet areas, in order to prevent the counterrevolutionaries from raising their heads and to strengthen the rear in the war. If any township or *xian* is negligent in enforcing Red martial law or adopts a negative attitude toward work with businessmen, that township or *xian* thereby fails to fulfill its responsibility for carrying out work in the rear. That township or *xian* offers counterrevolutionary factions and counterrevolutionary elements a more favorable opportunity to operate there. The Central Government strictly demands that the soviet governments at all levels punish, with the penalties prescribed by soviet law, those who are passive or negligent regarding such work. In order that all mobilization efforts and work in the rear described above be carried out under conditions of better organization and more centralized leadership, the Central Executive Committee hereby decides to form the Committee for Labor and War under the Council of People's Commissars. The Committee for Labor and War plans for and manages all economic, military, and labor mobilizations. It also has the power to give directions to the various ministries and committees of the government, military districts, and local governments on the issue of war mobilization. Soviet governments at all levels and all armed organizations should regularly report to the Committee for Labor and War their plans for mobilization and work in the rear and the extent to which these plans have been put into effect, so

that the committee may conduct frequent investigations and provide timely guidance. At the same time, all armed organizations of these governments must still report to their commanding organs to maintain the original administrative and command systems.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying
	Zhang Guotao



## *The Question of the Direction of Attack at Present<sup>1</sup>*

(July 25, 1932, 11:00 P.M.)

To the Central Bureau:

1. The enemy's position along the Gan River: So far as the Guangdong enemy is concerned, apart from Zhang Meixin's division, which has gone back to Shaoguan for reconsolidation, and Ye Zhao's two regiments, which remain in Ganzhou, the eight regiments of the Seventeenth Division are still concentrated in Nanxiong and Dayu. It is said, moreover, that part of these forces will move to Xincheng and Nankang. The Fifty-second Division is in Xincheng, the Fourteenth Division is in Nankang and Shangyou, and the Twenty-eighth Division is partly in Ganzhou and partly in Wan'an. The Forty-third Division is in Suichuan, one of Cheng Guangzhong's brigades is in Cengqian, and below Taihe are the Fifty-ninth and Ninetieth divisions.<sup>2</sup>

2. After careful consideration, we think that the enemy troops in the upper reaches of the Gan River south of Ganzhou are closely linked with one another, and whatever the point at which we choose to cross the river and attack the enemy in Ganzhou, we will risk being cut off by the enemy. If we attack Xincheng and Nankang, this will incite the enemy in Ningdu and Ganzhou to launch a concerted attack by converging columns, or they may confront us on the other side of the river, thus creating an even more disadvantageous situation.

3. Consequently, we have decided to move toward the lower reaches of the Gan River and take Wan'an first, in an effort to cross the river and wipe out the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 273–74.

1. This telegram was written jointly by Mao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang in response to a request by the Central Bureau that the First Front Army, which was then in southernmost Jiangxi en route back to the Central Soviet Area after the raid on Zhangzhou, split into two parts (one on each side of the upper reaches of the Gan River) and attack north toward Ganzhou.

2. The Nationalist army units mentioned in this paragraph are as follows: Zhang Meixin commanded the Fourth, Ye Zhao the Second, and Chen Guangzhong the Sixty-third divisions; the Fifty-second Division was commanded by Li Ming, the Fourteenth by Huo Kuizhang, the Twenty-eighth by Wang Mao, the Forty-third by Liu Shaoguang, the Fifty-ninth by Chen Shiji, and the Ninetieth by Wu Qiwei. The provenance of the Seventeenth Division is unclear.

main force of four divisions, under Chen Cheng, Luo Zhuoying, and others, and to take Ji'an and other cities.<sup>3</sup> If the enemy cross the river to the eastern side, it will be even better for the decisive battle. This operation must, however, be extremely swift and secret. We will not concentrate our forces and commence operations until we have made the decision. We hope that you will send a secret telegram to the Central Committee.

4. Please inform us regarding the mistakes and shortcomings in our previous operations.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

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3. Chen Cheng commanded the Second Route Army of the Nationalist Army's "Bandit-Suppression Headquarters"; Luo Zhuoying then commanded the Eleventh Division subordinate to Chen.

# ***Proposal to Appoint Mao Zedong as General Political Commissar<sup>1</sup>***

*Letter to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas  
of the Chinese Communist Party*

(July 25, 1932)

To the Central Bureau:

We are of the opinion that in order to facilitate battle command at the front, it would be appropriate to eliminate the office of chairman of the government and establish instead the position of general political commissar, and to have Mao [Zedong] fill said position. Battle command would be in the hands of the commander-in-chief and the general political commissar, battle plans and decisions would be made by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Central Bureau representatives would make decisions as regards guiding principles for action, and meetings would be limited to those of the Military Commission. We await a speedy response as to how you view such an approach.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

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Our source for this letter is *Zhou Enlai shuxin xuanji* (Selected Letters of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian chubanshe, 1988), p. 79.

1. For information as to the context of this telegram, see the discussion of the circumstances leading up to the Ningdu Conference in the Introduction.

***Resolution of the Central Executive Committee  
Approving the Decision of the Provisional  
Supreme Court in the Case of the  
Counterrevolutionary Crimes of Ji and Huang***

(August 10, 1932)

The Provisional Supreme Court has requested approval of its decision of August 3-4, 1932, to sentence the counterrevolutionaries Ji Zhentong, Huang Zhongyue, Xiao Shijun, Zhang Shaoyi, Zhu Guanfu, Gao Dafu, Li Pinqing, and Liu Zuohua to death by firing squad; and [to sentence] Cai Peiyu to five years in prison and deprivation of his political rights for another five years after his prison sentence is served. The Central Executive Committee believes that it is necessary for the Provisional Supreme Court, from its perspective of safeguarding the victory of the soviet revolution, strengthening the discipline of the Red Army, and consolidating the revolutionary front, to sentence to death Ji, Huang, and six other traitors to the revolution. As the class struggle intensifies, as the revolutionary movement rises daily, and as the Red Army continues to win great victories in the country, at a time when the imperialist Guomindang, in order to forestall its imminent demise, is exerting every effort to attack the revolution, especially the soviets and the Red Army, the reactionary régime of landlords and the bourgeoisie, in addition to mobilizing the largest possible forces of the reactionary régime's army to launch, under the command of the imperialists, the Fourth Encirclement Campaign against the Soviet Red Army, will push forward even more the organization of all the reactionary forces in the soviet areas to sabotage the Soviet and the Red Army from within, and serve as an internal attacking force. At the same time, precisely because at the moment the class struggle has reached the stage of a life-and-death decisive battle, the class-alien elements within the revolutionary ranks, for reasons of their class interests, are changing from wavering to openly betraying the revolution. Ji, Huang, and company are from the landlord and bourgeois classes. Although they joined the revolutionary forces, they betrayed the revolution as soon as the class struggle reached its critical stage. This comes as no surprise. On the basis of the

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This resolution was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 32, September 6, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 75-76, which reproduces this text.

evidence of the counterrevolutionary acts committed by Ji, Huang, and company, they deserve the death penalty. However, Ji, Huang, and company all participated in the Ningdu Uprising and they earned considerable revolutionary merits.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the Central Executive Committee is of the opinion that although Ji and Huang are the chief conspirators in this case, both of them were leaders of the Ningdu Uprising and their sentences should be reduced to spare their lives. Zhu Guanfu, Gao Dafu, and Zhang Shaoyi all participated in the Ningdu Uprising and were not chief conspirators in this case; their sentences may be reduced to jail terms. Therefore, the Central Executive Committee has reached the following resolutions on the case:

1. Ji Zhentong's sentence is reduced from death to ten years in prison, starting on May 8, 1932.
2. Huang Zhongyue's sentence is reduced from death to ten years in prison, starting on May 5, 1932.
3. Zhu Guanfu's sentence is reduced from death to eight years in prison, starting on May 19, 1932.
4. Zhang Shaoyi's sentence is reduced from death to eight years in prison, starting on May 8, 1932.
5. Gao Dafu's sentence is reduced from death to eight years in prison, starting on May 17, 1932.

All of them will have their political rights revoked for five years after serving out their sentences.

The sentences of Liu Zuohua, Li Pinqing, Xiao Shijun, and Cai Peiyu are to be carried out as originally ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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1. The Ningdu Uprising (*Ningdu qiyi*) occurred in December 1931, when a group of officers in the Nationalist Twenty-sixth Army, which was stationed in Ningdu *xian* in the Central Soviet Area, mutinied and led the entire force over to join the Red Army.

## *Order to Wipe Out the Enemy in Le'an*

(August 15, 1932, 11:00 A.M.)

1. The enemy troops defending Le'an City consist of one brigade of the Twenty-seventh Division.<sup>1</sup> Their force amounts in all to two regiments, and they have built some fortifications on a height near the city.

2. The goal of our army is to wipe out this enemy quickly and take Le'an City. We plan to launch an attack on the enemy defending the city tomorrow (the 16th).

3. Comrade Lin Biao is appointed as commander-in-chief of this attack on the city and Comrade Nie Rongzhen as political commissar. The First Army Group, the Fifth Independent Division, the Intelligence Battalion, and all other units that may subsequently participate in this attack on the city come under their command.

4. The Fifth Army Group is the general reserve force. Its position tomorrow (the 16th) should be near Nancun.

5. The Third Army Group should arrive on the line from Xuzhuang to Yinshuiping on the 16th and reach Shuikou on the 17th. On the 18th they should arrive at Pailugang, to keep watch on the enemy in Yihuang and Chongren and provide support in the attack on the city.

6. The military depot and hospital will be located in Zhaoxie.

7. Every army should choose an appropriate place to set up its field hospital.

8. The General Management Department and the logistic departments of every army are all under the command of Department Head Fan.<sup>2</sup> They should advance as far as Wangxian tomorrow (the 16th) and await further orders.

9. General Headquarters will be in Wangxian tomorrow (the 16th).

Commander-in-Chief  
Political Commissar

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 275–76, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Commanded by Sun Lianzhong. Sun earlier commanded the Twenty-sixth Army, but it had mutinied in December 1931 and gone over to join the Red Army.

2. The reference is to Fan Shude (1907– ), a native of Wuji in Henan. Fan, who joined the Party in 1925, served as a supply and transport officer with the Red Army on the Jinggangshan and after, and was at this time head of the Management Office [*Jingli bu*] of the Military Affairs Commission.

## *The Situation of the Enemy in Yihuang and Le'an and Our Army's Battle Dispositions*

(August 15, 1932)

To the Central Bureau and for transmission to the Central Committee:

1. Regarding the guiding principles of our northward operation, see the previous telegram. The First Front Army of the Red Army has already arrived in the vicinity of Zhaoxie and Dongshao on the 15th.

2. The situation of the enemy: One division of Sun Lianzhong's forces is divided between Yihuang and Le'an. One division is stationed in Chongren and Fuzhou. Mao Bingwen's division of the forces under Zhu Shaoliang is in Nanfeng. Li Yunjie's division is in Nancheng. Xu Kexiang's division is in Qizhong. One brigade of Wu Qiwei's division is in Yongfeng, one is in Jishui and Ji'an, and another is in Zhangshu and Xin'gan. Chen Cheng's Eleventh Division is in Ji'an; the Fourteenth Division has gone back to Taihe. The Fifty-ninth Division is in Xiajiang and Anfu, the Forty-third Division is in Suichuan and Taihe, and the Twenty-eighth Division is in Wan'an and on the western bank of the Gan River. There is also a report that the Fifty-second Division is going back to Ji'an. The five divisions of Zhao Guantao's forces are in northeast Jiangxi; in the northwest are Tan Daoyuan's forces and five divisions of the Hunan army. The eight divisions of the Hunan army in southern Jiangxi and Guangdong have not moved as yet.

3. Our army has decided to take swift, resolute, and secret action, attacking first Le'an and Yihuang and wiping out the greater part of Sun Lianzhong's forces. Taking advantage of this victory, we will attack Nanfeng and Nancheng and wipe out Zhu Shaoliang's forces. Thus we will open up one side of eastern Jiangxi and seek to consolidate our position as we strike westward at the reinforcements of the Chen and Wu divisions, so as to put us in a more advantageous position for taking the key cities in the lower reaches of the Gan River and creating the conditions for seizing Nanchang.

4. Now our deployment is already complete and the battle will begin tomorrow morning. We hope that, with one victory after another, our goals will be achieved, and moreover that our operations can be coordinated with those of the Red Army in the whole country.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 277–78, where it has been reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

## *Order to Attack the Forces of Chen Cheng*

(August 29, 1932)

1. A summary of intelligence from all quarters: Under the command of Chen Cheng, the enemy's Fourteenth Division, Ninetieth Division, and one brigade of the Fifty-second Division (or the whole of the Eleventh Division) are advancing toward Le'an. Yesterday (the 28th) its vanguard, the Fourteenth and Ninetieth divisions, were approximately one day's march away from Le'an. Liu Shaoxian's [Forty-third] Division arrived at Badu on the 28th and Zhou Hunyuan's Fifth Division reached Fuzhou and Chongren. Furthermore, according to the confession of an enemy clerk who had recently come from Fuzhou and was captured near Nancheng by our First Army Group, the enemy's First Division, that of Hu Zongnan, has been transferred from Henan to Jiangxi and has already reached Nanchang. It is said that it might set out for Fuzhou. The enemy troops now stationed in Fuzhou include the remnants of Sun Lianzhong's forces. In Nancheng, the three enemy divisions of Li Yunjie, Mao Bingwen, and Xu Kexiang are still holding out.

In assessing the enemy's attempt to do battle with us, because we are going to attack Nancheng to the east and work in the vicinity of Nancheng, the enemy will first try to regain lost strongholds such as Le'an and Yihuang in order to stop our attempt to move northward. Afterward, he will concentrate his forces from all sides to fight our main forces. For this reason, it is quite possible that Chen Cheng's forces may attack and occupy Le'an at any time. After taking Le'an, the enemy will adopt a posture of anticipating a decisive battle against our main forces within the borders of Yihuang. Zhou's division in Chongren, and even Hu's division, and the three divisions under Li, Mao, and Xu in Nancheng will make a concerted attack by converging columns (at present, the balance of forces is twenty divisions versus thirty-six or even forty-two regiments).<sup>1</sup> If our armies give up Le'an and Yihuang and concentrate their main forces in the direction of Nanfeng, there can be no doubt that the enemy will continue to advance toward Nanfeng and achieve his goal of fighting a decisive engagement against our main forces.

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 279–82, where it is reproduced from the original document in the Central Archives.

1. Presumably this means that the Nationalist army had twenty divisions (each with a minimum of two regiments, and usually with three or more), while the Red Army could muster thirty-six to forty-two regiments.



2. In order to shatter the enemy's offense, so that the soviet area in eastern Jiangxi will continue to develop, we are resolved, first of all, to strike a blow at one wing of the enemy, namely Chen Cheng's forces, which have just arrived from the east after a long journey. Taking advantage of this victory, we will attack the enemy troops that are going to join forces in Chongren, after which we will wait for the appropriate opportunity to forge ahead, seeking to achieve continual victories in the revolutionary war.

The starting point of this campaign will be in the vicinity of Yihuang city, but we anticipate that the decisive battle will take place in the area of Fenggangyu and Yuantou. It is quite possible, however, that we may use one unit to lure the enemy's main forces in the direction of Yihuang, while we concentrate our main forces to attack Chen Cheng's rear from the mountainous route in Huangpi.

3. On the basis of the objective stated above, our Front Army should begin, starting on August 30, to concentrate its forces in an appropriate deployment. This concentration should be completed in three days (September 1). The plan of concentration is as follows:

UNIT	ITINERARY	PLACES OF CONCENTRATION
First Army Group	1. Along the line of Xinfengjie, Shangyou, Zigui, Yongxingqiao, and Erdu. 2. March and concentrate along the line of Lita, Yongxingqiao, and Erdu.	Around Erdu and Xingfang
Third Army Group	Get to Lutang by way of Yihuang after crossing the bridge.	Around Lutang and Yihuang City
Fifth Army Group	March along the line of Shengang, Dangkou, Wudou, and Hekou.	Hekou and the area nearby
Headquarters	March along the line of Yongxingqiao and Erdu.	Nanhou near Xingfang

*Note:* The First Army Group in Erdu, the Fifth Army Group in Hekou. They must send some people beforehand to select the points for crossing the river and also to build bridges as far as possible.

4. The tasks each unit should carry out during the period of concentration are as follows:

a. The forces of the Third Army Group that are stationed in Yihuang city should send a detachment to Longgudu, in the direction of Fuzhou, and the area to the north of Guancangqian in the direction of Chongren, to conduct guerrilla warfare.

b. The Twelfth Army should cross the river after the Third Army. Its task is to keep watch on the operations of the three divisions under Li, Mao, and Xu in Nancheng. Consequently, the strength of this army should be sufficient to keep a close watch on the roads that connect Nancheng to Nanfeng (the Xinfengjie and Litayu highway) and Nancheng to Yihuang (one reaches Yihuang by way of Maopai and Tanfang, the other reaches Yihuang by way of Lisanpi and Junshan). Hence, the headquarters of the Twelfth Army and its directly attached unit, together with one regiment of the Thirty-Sixth Division, should be stationed in Lisanpi and conduct guerrilla warfare in the two directions of Mayuan, and of Maopai and Lixi, in order to pin down the enemy in Nancheng. The Thirty-sixth Division (minus one regiment) will be stationed in Luojiafang (ranging upward to the Lisanpi highway) and will be responsible for conducting guerrilla warfare in the direction of Zhuliang and Xinfengjie, in order to obstruct the activity of the enemy troops in Nancheng directed toward Nanfeng.

c. The Sixty-fourth Division (minus one regiment) will go at once to Fenggangyu. Its main forces will move as close as possible to Le'an and do their utmost to spy out the enemy's dispositions in Le'an. They should send one unit to conduct guerrilla warfare in the direction of Chongren and to observe the enemy there.

The regiment of this division that has been left behind in Nanfeng will be temporarily under the command of Tan [Zheng], the head of the Political Department of the Twelfth Army. It should cross to the west bank of the river at once and be stationed along the line from Lita to Xinfengjie, to keep a watch over the enemy in Nancheng.

d. The Sixty-fifth Division should be stationed toward Le'an, to observe the operations of Chen Cheng's troops. If the enemy takes Le'an, it should pin down the operations of this enemy to the south of Le'an by means of guerrilla warfare. If the enemy advances from Le'an toward Yihuang, it should make surprise attacks and harass the enemy's rear.

5. As regards the surveillance of the route to be taken by each army group and the building of bridges, everything should be carried out according to plan, so as to overcome the difficulties while on the march.

6. Along the way specialists must be sent out to take care of those who have fallen behind. Those who are seriously ill may be sent to the hospital in the military depot in Huangpi for rest and treatment.

7. On arriving at its place of concentration, each army group must im-

mediately set up a telephone to facilitate liaison. This task is divided into the following sections:

The First Army Group is responsible for the section from Lutang to Xingfang.

The Third Army Group is responsible for the section from Yihuang to Lutang.

The Fifth Army Group is responsible for the section from Hekou to Xingfang.

8. General Headquarters will arrive at Yongxingqiao and encamp there.

Commander-in-Chief

Zhu De

General Political Commissar

Mao Zedong

## *Order of the General Headquarters of the First Front Army of the Red Army*

*(Issued at the General Headquarters in Yongxingqiao<sup>1</sup>  
at 3:00 P.M. on August 31, 1932)*

1. Enemy units under Wu Qiwei's command, about four regiments, reached Dianqian this morning and are poised to encircle Yongxingqiao in coordination with the main enemy forces.

2. Our Front Army is to use the First and Fifth Army groups as the main attacking force to carry out the mission of destroying the enemy at Dianqian. The Third Army Group is responsible for monitoring the enemy in Yihuang and Chongren.

3. Comrades Lin [Biao] and Nie [Rongzhen] of the First Army Group are appointed commanders-in-chief at the front. The action of the Fifth Army Group tomorrow is to be under their command.

4. The headquarters of the Fifth Army Group is to command the Thirteenth Army, move from Pingshang and Xia'nancunzi, and follow the Fourth Army Group this afternoon (the Fourth Army Group is to advance immediately from Guyuancun to the front at Xia'nancun), passing through Binkou and Binyuan to reach and take up quarters in Xujia and Leyuan. Moreover, it is to send officers to the headquarters of the First Army Group in Chongwudu to receive tomorrow's attack orders.

5. The Fifteenth Army is to advance immediately from Yongxingqiao, through Luyuan, to take quarters in Yangfang; it is also to dispatch a force of one regiment at once to Zengjiayan to take over the defence of the Third Army Group. The rest of its forces must build up positions on the high ground in front of Yangfang in order to launch an active attack tomorrow. Moreover, it must report to the headquarters of the First Army Group via wireless on enemy deployment, as well as the battle situation at different stages. It is also to receive orders directly from headquarters.

6. General Headquarters is set up tonight in Xia'nancun (Nancun in local parlance).

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Chief Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 77–78, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

1. A place in east-central Yihuang *xian*, 15 to 20 kilometers southeast of the *xian* capital.

## ***Order That the Troops Must March with Light Packs***

(September 5, 1932)

It appears that the most valuable thing for an army in combat is swiftness. In order to achieve this objective, it must march with light packs, and the weight of the packs carried by every fighter must be reduced as much as possible. Therefore, it is hereby stipulated that the number of bullets each fighter carries may not exceed 150 rounds at most. The surplus ammunition should all be gathered together by the management department of each army group and stored together in an appropriate place. Suitable people should also be assigned to look after it and to be prepared to replenish supplies. As for the personal belongings every person carries with him, we must also adhere to the rules previously laid down. Commanders at every level should conscientiously take responsibility for checking on this. The surplus and whatever is not required must all be sent to the rear. We must ensure that our operations are swift and conserve our fighting capacity, so as to be prepared to deal with the continuous cruel struggle.

Zhu De  
Mao Zedong

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, p. 283, where it is reproduced from the original in the Central Archives.

## *Opinion on Smashing the Enemy's Encirclement of and Attack on the Soviet Area in Western Hubei*

(September 1932)

To the Central Bureau, for urgent forwarding to the West Hunan-Hubei Sub-Bureau and to the Central Committee:

We think that since the enemy is using large numbers of troops to surround tightly the soviet area in western Hubei, the Third Red Army should concentrate all its forces, flexibly choose the enemy's weak point, attack this side of his forces first and wipe it out, and use the local armed forces and the guerrilla actions of the masses to immobilize the other fronts. Only in this way can the enemy be defeated one by one. If, because you are worried that the enemy may invade the soviet area, you divert part of your forces to guard against this, you will not only fail in your resistance because the forces will be insufficient, but you will also reduce the forces employed in the decisive battle, and the losses will be even greater. It was disadvantageous last time to divide the Third Army into two units during operations.<sup>1</sup> Especially under the present conditions of civil war, it is even more disadvantageous for the Red Army to fight a prolonged battle of several days against the enemy, but to fail to destroy him. At present, the central area is only 40 or 50 *li* [across]. The Seventh Division and the Eighth and Ninth divisions should find a way to take advantage of the dark of night and small roads to avoid combat and steal out of the enemy's heavy encirclement right away, then concentrate their forces, choose an appropriate spot, and be prepared to hit the enemy when the opportunity offers. They can also develop new soviet areas. On both the internal and external fronts of the soviet's core

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 284–85, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. The date is given as the first ten days of September 1932.

1. The Third Red Army in West Hunan-Hubei came into existence in March 1931, when, as part of a larger reorganization of Red Army forces throughout the country, the Central Committee ordered this redesignation for a force previously known as the Second Army Group. In July 1932, Nationalist army forces began a major encirclement campaign against the West Hunan-Hubei base area, and the Third Army divided its forces in an unsuccessful attempt to resist the enemy attack. By October the entire base area had been lost, though part of the Third Army escaped.

area, guerrilla and mobile warfare should be expanded and developed to resist and harass the enemy. The Eighth and Ninth divisions should not be called back, as stipulated in the plan of the sub-bureau, nor should the Seventh Division be sent to another *xian*.<sup>2</sup> Dispersion, as well as prolonged and obstinate fighting, provide the enemy with the best opportunities to smash us one by one and to launch attacks on us by converging columns. Do you agree or not? Please reply by telegram.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang  
at the front

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2. Reference here is to various component units of the Red Third Army.

# ***Order No. 25 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government***

(September 17, 1932)

At present, the revolutionary war is victoriously and rapidly advancing. Every member of the worker and peasant masses should go to the front to participate actively in the war effort, in order to smash thoroughly the Fourth Encirclement Campaign of the imperialists and the Guomindang and win victory first in Jiangxi. Providing military transport is one way of participating in the war effort; it truly helps and facilitates the task of the Red Army in its battles at the front. The work by governments at all levels to mobilize the masses to organize teams of stretcher-bearers and transport teams to go to the front is inadequate. They have failed to do a very good job of propaganda and agitation, so as to encourage every worker and peasant comrade to go and participate enthusiastically. There are even instances of desertion, which have adversely affected military supplies and caused the loss of captured goods. Another negative phenomenon is that, in the past, those who went anywhere to provide transport demanded wages. This turns the whole thing into a form of hired labor, and not only causes military expenditures to rise, but also leads to losing sight of the significance of the participation of the worker and peasant masses in the war. It must be corrected at once. Moreover, propaganda must be directed toward the worker and peasant masses in a big way, so that they may enthusiastically and voluntarily join the teams of stretcher-bearers and transport workers and go to work at the front. The following are the stipulated methods for the direction, transfer, and treatment of members of teams of stretcher-bearers and transport workers:

1. Long-term members of stretcher-bearers' and transport teams serve one to three months and must all work together with the army. Each person receives 15 cents a day in silver as a fee for straw sandals, payable once every five days. They are also given leftover meals, but no other types of expenses are to be paid to them.

2. Short-term members of stretcher-bearers' and transport teams are those

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, No. 34, September 20, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 79-80, where it is reproduced from that source.



people whom local governments mobilize into service for a short duration; they perform the duties of carrying the wounded and sick and captured goods in nearby areas. Those who serve for less than twenty days do not receive the straw sandals fees paid on a daily basis, but get appropriate sums of money for straw sandals needed for the duration of their service. Those hired on a temporary basis by local governments may be paid appropriate sums of money for straw sandals according to the actual requirements of local conditions.

3. The duration of service for teams of convicts is to be determined by their original sentences. When they are on the move following the army, they may be paid 5 cents a day for straw sandals. When they are stationed in one place with the army, they do not get money for straw sandals, but may be given leftover meals. They do not get any other expense money.

4. Each *xian* soviet is to be responsible for organizing the long-term teams of stretcher-bearers and teams of convicts. These teams are to be sent by the military depots to the various armies to work with them, as determined by the Military Commission. The rear units, military depots, and hospitals are not to retain the use of the members of these long-term stretcher-bearers' and transport teams.

6.<sup>1</sup> In order to transport rapidly the captured goods and other materials from the front, each military district and government should, in the future, in addition to mobilizing the masses on a temporary basis, transfer Red Guard units from their areas to carry out this work. This will not only reduce the difficulty of mobilization on short notice and help to transport all captured goods back to our areas without losses, but also amount to leading the Red Guards truly to participate in the war effort.

7. Provincial and *xian* soviets should constantly supervise and command different local governments to carry out this effort. As for the time and place of concentration, as well as the number of people to be mobilized, the instructions of the General Political Department are to be followed.

Governments at all levels, all military depots, and administrations in the rear must fully comply with and carry out the above decisions and methods. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Proposal as to How the Fourth Front Army<sup>1</sup> Can Smash the Fourth “Encirclement and Suppression”***

(September 1932)

To the Central Bureau, for urgent forwarding to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Sub-Bureau:

We have taken cognizance of your telegram.

1. This time the enemy has concentrated his forces and launched a concerted attack on our Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area by converging columns, and the entire situation is quite different from that of last year.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the strategy and tactics very much resemble those in last year's three “Encirclement and Suppression” [campaigns] against the Central Soviet Area, when all the participating divisions advanced methodically together, and the enemy also benefited from the tactics of resolutely defending strong points, moving steadily, and striking sure blows.

2. Consequently, we suggest that at present, the Fourth Front Army should adopt appropriate tactics for luring the enemy deep into places where we have a foundation in mass work and where the topography will favor us and conceal the target of our main forces. It should carry out rigorously the tactic of having the masses strengthen the walls and clear the fields [*jianbi qingye*],<sup>3</sup> and make widespread use of our guerrilla detachments for actions such as harassing the enemy from all directions, checking the enemy, carrying out surprise attacks, and cutting the enemy's communication lines. In this way we can wear out and disperse the enemy's strength; it is not advantageous to hold a certain strong point obstinately, for this will facilitate the enemy's concerted attacks by converging col-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 286–87, where it is reproduced from a printed document. The date is given as the middle ten days of September 1932.

1. The Fourth Front Army was the main Red Army force operating in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area. It should not be confused with the Fourth Army, which operated in the Central Base Area.

2. This campaign began in August 1932, as one of several launched by Nationalist forces to eradicate smaller communist base areas preparatory to launching another full-scale assault on the Central Soviet Area.

3. On the use of this term, see above, the relevant note to the text of July 4, 1931.

umns. Thus, in the course of mobile warfare, we should single out the enemy's weak units and, after striking a fierce blow at a small part of the enemy's forces and wiping it out, immediately move in another direction. By means of speed, daring, secrecy, and mobility, defeat the enemy one by one, in order to shatter completely the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression."

3. On the basis of the current situation and the strength and flexibility of the Fourth Front Army, you can make use of the strategic and tactical experience of these three campaigns.<sup>4</sup>

4. The two victories of the Sixteenth Red Army at Tongshan and Xianning,<sup>5</sup> and the beginnings of a victory by the First Front Army this time in its movement northward, are all operations to cooperate with and assist the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area. Under the advantageous condition of striking the enemy at one point, the West Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area should send one division to operate to the west of the Beijing-Hankou railway line.

Members of the Central Bureau  
at the front

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

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4. I.e., the encirclement campaigns against the Central Soviet Area.

5. The reference is to operations in southeastern Hubei by a Red Army force operating in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area. The Sixteenth Army had been established in August 1930.

# *Opinion Regarding Strategic and Tactical Problems of the Red Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Area*

(September 1932)

To the Central Bureau, for transmittal to the Central Committee and the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area:

1. Under the conditions created by the enemy's concentrated attacks by converging columns and deep penetration into the soviet area, the Red Army in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area fought three fierce battles in a little more than a month, but merely defeated the enemy and was unable to wipe out one column of his forces. Moreover, we suffered great losses, for which it is not easy to find replacements, and as a result, we had to give up voluntarily Xinji and Qiliping. This is because strategically we still have not fully grasped the circumstances of the civil war at present, in which the Red Army still needs to try its best to avoid suffering excessive losses and should strive to seize the opportunity of wiping out one unit of the enemy, in order to smash the enemy one by one. After one fierce combat, we should do our utmost to obtain a considerable amount of time for rest and replenishment of our forces, in order to avoid being too exhausted, since this would cause the fighting capacity of the Red Army to be reduced. If the enemy pursues us closely, we should use guerrilla warfare to exhaust and harass him, in order to create advantageous conditions for wiping him out. If we rigidly and tenaciously defend a particular place and are too eager to fight, we will, on the contrary, end by bringing about disadvantageous conditions in which we suffer great losses and are unable to destroy the enemy. If the enemy continues to advance, we will, in the end, lose the place we have been tenaciously defending.

2. It is correct at present to move our troops to western Anhui. We call upon you to pay attention to the use of this strategy. You should try your best to achieve a victory in which one part of the enemy is destroyed, in order to attain the goal of crushing the enemy one by one and shattering his "Encirclement and Suppression."

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 288–89, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. The date is given as the second ten days of September 1932.

3. The number of sick and wounded soldiers totals almost ten thousand, and the reactionaries are disrupting the hospitals. You should ask the Central Committee to make a great effort to send its own doctors there. Paying attention to the exhaustion of the soldiers during combat and marching will reduce the likelihood of infectious disease. Rotten-foot illness [*lanjiao bing*]<sup>1</sup> results entirely from marching off at dawn, not washing feet on the battlefield, and infection by mosquitoes. Frequent washing and wiping them dry afterward will reduce the infection.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang  
At the front

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1. Presumably some sort of "trench foot" or fungal infection.

# *On the Problem of Continuing the Reform of Local Soviet Governments*

*Directive No. 15 of the Central Executive Committee*

(September 20, 1932)

During the present rapid development of the revolutionary war, the central task of the soviets is to lead and advance the revolutionary war. All our tasks should be centered on the war. A fundamental condition for winning complete victory in the war is to sacrifice everything for the sake of complete victory and of perfecting and consolidating the leadership of the soviets. Although local soviets have already undergone thorough reform and have gained partial progress in their work, the weakness and numerous mistakes of local soviets have been discovered in the fulfillment of their central task of leading and developing the revolutionary war, the leadership of local soviets. First, they fail to regard the war as the central task. As a result, many local soviets do not actively pursue the expansion of the Red Army and do not actively mobilize the masses to go to the front to participate in the war. Some local soviets fail to lead local armed forces in launching determined attacks against the enemy. For example, the revolutionary committee of Longyan and the *xian* soviet of Changting not only failed to lead the masses to wage a resolute struggle against the enemy, but retreated in cowardly fashion and ran away, causing the soviet areas considerable losses. They failed to pay attention to the political leadership of guerrilla forces and created serious problems of conflicts between the Red and White areas. They even failed to make a determined effort to expand the soviet areas and consolidate new soviet areas. These facts fully demonstrate that some local soviets are flawed and fail to carry out their tasks resolutely. This is of enormous danger to the development and victory of the revolutionary war!

From the perspective of our soviet governments themselves, some of them still have class-alien elements hidden within and, in some of their work, have fully demonstrated a non-class line. This non-class line often reveals itself on the land issue and the question of labor protection. The phenomenon of official corruption is growing within some local soviet governments. The problem of

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This directive was first published in *Hongse zhonghua*, no. 35, September 27, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 131–33, where it is reproduced from that source.

embezzlement is still very serious. The work style of the government is often isolated from the masses. The command style is widely used to force the masses to do things. The rules on favorable treatment for the Red Army have not been fully applied, and this obstructs the work of expanding the Red Army. Women's rights have been neglected; the marriage laws have not been concretely enforced, thereby hindering women from taking part in the work of the revolution. Local governments treat the orders of superior governments with neglect and a perfunctory attitude. The regular meetings of city and township soviets have yet to be institutionalized. Some township soviets even shut their doors and remain completely idle. Most of the work has only empty titles but no substance. Such serious problems and mistakes indicate that local soviets are flawed and cannot effectively fulfill the task of leading the revolutionary war.

In order to strengthen the Soviet Government's leadership of the revolutionary war and eliminate all the mistakes and flaws in the work of the soviets, it is therefore decided that local soviet governments should continue to undergo reelection and reform. All elements that do not belong to our class and all elements who are negligent about the work of the revolutionary war are to be purged through reelections. Corrupt officials and bureaucrats are to be purged as well. New activist cadres are to be recruited to form strong and effective soviet governments, which will genuinely perform the task of leading the revolutionary war.

In terms of the procedure for this election, governments at all levels in the soviet areas in Fujian and Jiangxi provinces will not conduct reelections at the same time. Instead, reelections will be held individually at the *xian* level. This is because the present period is one of rapid development of the revolution. If reelections were to be held at the same time in all areas, the governments in these areas would have devoted all their energies to the work of reelection, which would halt the work of leading and developing the revolutionary war, to the detriment of the revolutionary war. But the main criterion of reelection should be performance of the government at a given level in leading the revolutionary war; this criterion decides whether the reelection is to be partial or complete. Here are the names of the *xian* that are to hold partial or complete reelections:

1. *Xian* to hold complete reelections: in Jiangxi Province, Nanguang, Shicheng, Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Yudu, and Yongfeng *xian*; in Fujian Province, Changting, Ninghua, Xinquan, and Wuping *xian*. In Longyan, the *xian* soviet government is to be formally established.

2. *Xian* to hold partial reelections: in Jiangxi Province, Xingguo, Shengli, Ningdu, Gonglu, Ganxian, Le'an, and Wantai *xian*; in Fujian, Yongding and Shanghang *xian*, and Ruijin *xian*, which is directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government.

In this reelection, the development of the revolutionary war should be used to mobilize the masses to participate in the reelection campaign and review and criticize the work of the soviets. This reelection campaign should be used as a

real campaign to mobilize the masses to expand the Red Army and join the work at the front. Corrections should be made to the previous election campaigns that were peaceful reelections and irrelevant to the war.

In this reelection, governments at all levels should pay special attention to recruiting activists among workers to participate in the *xian* congress of deputies and executive committees of districts and *xian*, in order to enhance the presence of workers in the soviets at all levels.

Soviet governments at all levels, after receiving these instructions, should immediately make preparations for reelection. The deadline for reelections is to be set by the provincial soviets of Jiangxi and Fujian, and by the *xian* soviet of Ruijin. The procedures for reelection remain the same as specified in the election laws. It is so ordered.

To soviet governments at all levels.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



# *Directive of the Central Executive Committee Concerning the Problem of Expanding the Red Army*

(No. 15, September 20, 1932)<sup>1</sup>

1. The current development of the revolutionary war—at a time when the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army continues to win great victories throughout the country, and when in addition there is a high tide of workers' strikes all over the country and a great unfolding of the anti-imperialist movement and the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war in the Northeast—has entered a stage of life-and-death struggle against the counterrevolutionaries, bringing straight to the fore the historical phase of vast armed clashes between the Chinese masses of workers and peasants on one hand and imperialism on the other.

The imperialist Guomindang's huge new Fourth Encirclement Attack<sup>2</sup> against the soviet areas throughout the country and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has been continuously routed or destroyed by our heroic Red Army on all fronts, and has met with continuous defeat. To salvage their moribund rule, the Guomindang warlords on the one hand are gathering their greatest military forces to make a last-ditch defense of key cities, and at the same time are mobilizing large formations of several divisions or more to fight to the death against the Red Army in an attempt to avoid being routed and destroyed.

Given such a fierce, large-scale revolutionary war, in order to smash the enemy's Fourth Encirclement Attack thoroughly, succeed in taking key cities quickly, and accomplish the current fighting task of winning initial victory in

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We have translated this text from *Zhongyang genjudi shiliao*, Vol. 2, pp. 636–43.

1. Our Chinese sources provide no explanation of why there should be two directives of the Central Executive Committee on entirely different subjects, both dated September 20 and both bearing the same number. Only the present document, on expanding the Red Army, is mentioned in the *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 385, but we have no reason to doubt the authenticity of the preceding text.

2. This text uses the term *weigong* (encircle and attack) instead of *weijiao* (encircle and suppress) for the Guomindang's anti-Communist campaigns, but the meaning is obviously the same.

Jiangxi, it is necessary for us to destroy the enemy's large concentrations of military power with the strongest armed force. To this end, not only must millions of worker and peasant masses be called to arms, but what is most important is to strengthen the main armed force of the revolutionary war—the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. At the time of the civil war in the Soviet Union, Lenin once said during a certain campaign: "Estimating the enemy's military power, to accomplish the task we have taken on, by next spring we should have a million Red Army soldiers, and later there should be three million." On the basis of our estimate of the present development of the revolutionary war, we must not only be able to destroy the enemy's large formations of military forces rapidly and efficiently; we must also be prepared at all times to engage directly in widespread armed combat with imperialism. For this reason, both objectively and subjectively, in order to accomplish the task at hand it is necessary for our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to rapidly become strong, going along according to the development and demands of the revolutionary war. Vigorously expanding the Red Army is at present a most fundamental condition for our thoroughly smashing the enemy's armed forces, accomplishing all tasks, and striving for soviet victory throughout China.

2. Recent investigation of results in expanding the Red Army in various locations has been truly disappointing and shows the local soviet governments' lack of enthusiasm for expanding the Red Army. Jiangxi was able to reach only half of its originally planned goal, and Fujian fell much further short. This proves that governments at all levels failed to recognize the current situation of the revolutionary war and their own central tasks. This accounts for the passivity toward the work of expanding the Red Army and the failure to make expanding the Red Army one of their primary working tasks.

It must first be pointed out that soviet governments at all levels shifted the work of expanding the Red Army onto committees to support the Red Army, while they themselves took a position of bearing no responsibility at all for it. At the same time they did not use political mobilization to encourage the broad masses of workers and peasants to join the Red Army enthusiastically. They failed to lead the masses of workers and peasants and to carry out effectively the regulations on preferential treatment for Red Army [families] so as to encourage the masses of workers and peasants to join the Red Army eagerly. In actuality, coercion and giving orders have taken the place of propaganda and agitation work, forms of covert seduction (such as giving gifts as enticement) have even taken the place of political mobilization, and the quality of people is not taken into consideration. As a result the small, the weak, the old, and even class-alien elements have been sent into the Red Army to fill the ranks. The work of expanding the Red Army is not steady, but rather an on-again off-again phenomenon. This is an extreme case of performing one's duties in a perfunctory manner. Not only is it impossible to expand the Red Army this way, but this obstructs the expansion of the Red Army and saps the strength of the Red Army.

Most serious is that many district and township governments do not actively urge deserting soldiers to return to ranks or lead the masses to oppose desertion but rather assign these people to local jobs. In various parts of Fujian letters have even been written telling Red Army soldiers to return home. This actually amounts to openly and directly sabotaging the Red Army. Some local governments are actually not as actively engaged in expanding the main force, or the Red Army, as they are in expanding local armed forces. All of these are obstacles to the expansion of the Red Army. The fact that the provincial and *xian* governments have not done their utmost or used the most concrete methods to correct these mistakes made by the lower levels of government and offer guidance is a manifestation of passivity toward expanding the Red Army.

3. The development and demands of the revolution absolutely will not allow these errors to continue developing. The Central Soviet demands that governments at all levels rapidly rectify these serious errors with the most resolute determination, and strive and struggle to realize the current tasks of the soviets. All work methods that obstruct the expansion of the Red Army are to be fundamentally eliminated and abandoned. Wherever there is deliberate or unwitting sabotage of Red Army expansion and weakening of Red Army power, the leaders of the government at that level should be punished according to revolutionary discipline.

4. Now is a period of revolutionary war, and all of our work should serve the war effort, all forces should be pooled toward developing and strengthening the revolutionary war, all sacrifices made to strive for revolutionary victory. Therefore, expanding the Red Army is a most fundamental task for the soviet government in actually leading and developing the revolutionary war and completing its current task. This task should have first priority on the work schedule and become one of the regular tasks.

a. Expanding the Red Army is done primarily through political mobilization. The broadest possible masses of workers and peasants should be stimulated through the unfolding and victory of the war and the unfolding and deepening of all class struggles to develop enthusiasm for taking part in the war and to join the Red Army voluntarily and eagerly.

b. The masses should be led effectively to carry out the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army, frequently visiting and taking care of Red Army families. Being a Red Army soldier should become a matter of honor among the masses in order to encourage the worker and peasant masses so that they join the Red Army without any worries whatsoever about their families.

c. Propaganda and agitation are to be used to arouse the enthusiasm of the worker and peasant masses and inspire the masses to join the Red Army. Coercion and giving orders are absolutely to be abolished.

d. Meetings of all organizations (such as meetings of the electorate, township deputy meetings, Red Guard armies, Young Pioneers, labor unions, poor peasant leagues, etc.) are to be used to carry out the regular

work of expanding the Red Army. In particular, political propaganda and education should make the worker and peasant masses realize on a deeper political level the great significance of joining the Red Army and expanding the Red Army, thus firmly correcting the tendency to turn "expand the Red Army" into a mere slogan for meetings.

e. People's class status and quality should be investigated in detail so that class-alien elements, those who lack enthusiasm, and those in poor physical health are not sent in to make up the numbers. Those who become Red Army soldiers must be the healthiest and most enthusiastic elements among the worker and peasant masses. Only in this way can the Red Army be qualitatively strengthened.

f. A movement against desertion should be launched among the masses so that they feel that "to desert is to go slow in the revolution" and "to desert is to aid the enemy." The ire and scorn of the masses should be aroused toward desertion, and it should even be punished by the masses (making deserters' names public, for example, or forbidding them to participate in all groups and organizations, etc.) so that deserters cannot "hang around in a carefree manner" at home without shame. The general practice of desertion must be eliminated through a movement against desertion.

5. All of these are simply the mistakes made in expanding the Red Army. The more the revolutionary war develops victoriously in a forward direction, however, the more our all-out armed battle to the death against the imperialist Guomindang expands and intensifies. Moreover, to win victory for the soviets throughout China in this decisive class battle and liberation for the Chinese people and the worker and peasant masses, the entire worker and peasant masses must be called upon and furnished with arms, and the greatest revolutionary military force of the worker and peasant masses must be established. In particular, the main force in the revolutionary war must be strengthened as the war develops. Only in this way may the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army meet the needs of this revolutionary war and win total victory in the war.

6. In its Directive No. 14,<sup>3</sup> the Central Soviet formally raised the point that by widely establishing Red Guard armies and intensifying education and training in bearing arms among the entire masses of workers and peasants, "all can exercise the right to arm themselves to strengthen and develop the soviets and to fulfill their duties of serving in the Red Army and fighting at the front" (see Directive No. 14). At the same time, "in order that the Red Army may get sufficient replenishment of its military manpower as the war develops and that these recruits may be transported to the front, it is necessary, during the current period of voluntary service, to establish immediately Red Army reinforcement regiments." "Each *xian* is to establish a Red Army reinforcement regiment" (see Directive No.

3. For this directive, see above, "On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear," July 7, 1932.

14). The implementation of all of this work has everywhere been extremely formalistic and perfunctory. In Jiangxi attention has been paid only to the organization and training of the Red Guard armies' model battalion, and the work of the Red Guard armies as a whole has been sorely neglected. In Fujian, practically nothing at all has been done to carry out the establishment and training of the Red Guard armies. This is proof that the various military areas and governments at various levels have not understood the significance of arming the whole of the masses of workers and peasants and the role of accumulating military force to reinforce the front lines. Therefore, the general practice of using the Red Guard armies purely as armed forces to consolidate the soviet areas and coordinate with the actions of the Red Army, failure to do actively the work of expanding the Red Army within the Red Guard armies, and separating the expansion of the Red Army from the Red Guard armies instead of linking the two, are grave mistakes. As for the work of the reinforcement units, many have not yet been set up, and the ones that have been established cannot fulfill their role because they have not achieved much in the way of expanding the Red Army. Sources for Red Army soldiers should be: (1) the broad masses of toiling workers and peasants in the soviet areas, and (2) the worker masses in the White areas, the large numbers of peasants and disaster victims who suffer exploitation by the Guomindang warlords and the landlords, soldiers in the anti-imperialist, anti-Guomindang volunteer armies, and all the laboring masses, as well as revolutionary soldiers in the White army. But because the soviets in various places have not actively promoted the development of soviet areas or set up the work in the White areas, the guerrilla forces have become troops to guard the soviet areas and do not penetrate deeply into the White areas to develop guerrilla warfare, lead and develop the workers' and peasants' struggles in the White areas, and create new soviet areas. In actuality, many contrary actions have occurred that violate and sabotage soviet discipline and credibility, obstruct the expansion of the soviet areas and winning over the masses in the White areas, and create a severe situation of opposition between Red and White. This means that it is impossible to draw the worker and peasant masses in the White areas into the Red Army to expand it. At the same time, with regard to the work of Red Army expansion within the soviet areas, aside from passivity and mistakes in work on the part of the soviets, there is also the fact that an organization responsible for expanding the Red Army has not been clearly designated. The Red Army support committees are not in fact true mass organizations and organs of the movement to support the Red Army and for expansion of the Red Army, but are simply run by a few staff workers specially there to expand the Red Army, and because in the work there are no fixed relationships and organizational foundations, this gives rise to a sort of foundationless, floating situation. In this way, Red Army expansion relies solely upon a kind of extremely simple propaganda and agitation. This kind of agitation work is not regular either and is heavily laced with a commandist style. This naturally causes a situation in which reinforcements from the rear

are unable to keep up with the needs of the front. That Red Army expansion is unable to keep up with objective developments is the largest loss in our revolutionary development.

Even though at present military service is still voluntary rather than compulsory, of course mobilizing the worker and peasant masses to join the Red Army still relies upon our carrying out all sorts of political mobilization (compulsory military service also requires some political mobilization, but it has a coercive component to it). Given the present development and demands of the revolutionary war, however, past methods of expanding the Red Army are no longer suitable to address the current needs. It must be understood in particular that the front makes use of troops, and it would do great harm to ensuring complete victory in the war if the rear could not amass a steady supply of troops to keep sending to the front. Therefore, in addition to Directive No. 14, the Central Government has established the following regulations:

1. Although at present military service is voluntary, propaganda about compulsory military service should begin immediately, to prepare for the future transition and to make the broad masses of workers and peasants realize that to be a Red Army soldier is not only an obligation but also a right enjoyed only by the worker and peasant class, and that all exploiters have been stripped of such rights.

2. During the present period of revolutionary war, the Red Army is the field army doing battle at the front, and the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers are not only the armed forces of the broad masses but are also the garrison army and supplementary force for consolidating the soviet areas and supplying reinforcements to the Red Army. This means that the Red Army actually makes use of troops, and the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers are where the amassing of troops takes place.

3. According to Directive No. 14, as for the Red Guard armies, all members of the worker-peasant laboring masses (men and women) aged eighteen to forty should join them (those who join the Young Pioneers need not join the Red Guard armies). But at present propaganda methods are to be used so as to get those with the right to vote to join voluntarily. It is desirable through this work, however, to have all members of the worker-peasant masses between the ages of eighteen and forty join up, thereby establishing a foundation for the eventual institution of compulsory military service.

4. The Red Guard armies are to be set up as follows: one army per *xian*, one division for every three districts, one regiment per district, one battalion per township, between two and five companies in each battalion, three platoons in each company, between three and five squads in each platoon, and from ten to fifteen people in each squad. In the cities, a separate Workers' Red Guard Army is to be established, with workers as the main force. There are some places at present, however, where because the history of the struggle is relatively short and Red Guard armies have not yet been established, this arrangement may be brought into existence gradually, so as to guard strictly against unwillingness and

simply using orders to coerce the masses.

5. The Red Guard armies fall under the jurisdiction of the various military districts. The position of army commander is to be filled by the head of the military department at the *xian* level and the position of political commissar is to be filled by the Communist Party branch secretary at the *xian* level. The position of division commander is to be filled by having the military department [of the division] apply to the military district to appoint the head of the military department of a given district to serve concurrently. The position of political commissar is to be filled by having the Communist Party *xian* committee appoint a district branch secretary to serve concurrently, with the military district's political department providing supplementary personnel. The head of the district military department serves concurrently as regimental commander, and the Communist Party district branch secretary serves concurrently as the [regiment's] political commissar. As for commanders of battalions, companies, and platoons, the district military departments submit reports to the *xian* military departments for them to make appointments. Company political instructors are designated by the *xian* [Party] committees from among Communist Party members in the city and township branches.

6. Red Guard army model battalions are to be set up in every district, and one model division is to be established in each *xian*, so as to have unified command, which not only is for concentrating forces to coordinate actions with the Red Army at any time and consolidating and developing the soviet areas, but also for providing a place to train lower level Red Guard army cadres and preparing an organization of activists who will join the reinforcement troops and go directly to join the Red Army.

7. The Red Guard armies' weapons are mostly various types of old-style weapons. A certain number of guns may be distributed as appropriate in the model battalions.

8. Red Guard army training should involve a fixed regimen of military drills and political education classes, which the military district is responsible for supervising, and the military department of each *xian* plans and regulates. Especially with regard to political education, it is necessary to take strict measures to correct the mistakes of the past in which only military exercises were undertaken and there were no political education classes. In the curriculum, attention should be paid to practical applications of military [concepts], and all formalistic tricks should be scrapped. As for politics, the past tendency toward spouting empty, vague, unrealistic nonsense should be corrected by being simple and straightforward and easy for the troops to understand. Attention should be paid in particular to the key political questions of the day.

9. Each military district is responsible for operating a large political training unit and training courses that will frequently train and foster middle-level cadres in the Red Guard armies, the guerrilla forces, independent regiments, and so on. Among the cadres in particular, large numbers of worker cadres must be drawn in so

as to strengthen the leadership of the working class in the Red Guard armies.

10. Soviet governments at all levels should strengthen their leadership of the military departments. District and township soviets should, in turn, help Red Guard Army political committees at their respective levels carry out political education, frequently reporting all orders and resolutions of the soviet governments and all political issues (materials are various government documents, *Hongse zhonghua*, and so on). The Red Guard armies should function as schools for the education of the masses.

11. As for the Red Guard Army organization in newly developed soviet areas, it may proceed and be expanded according to the degree of consolidation of the given area.

12. The work of expanding the Red Army should be carried out by mobilizing the masses in various mass groupings, such as voters' meetings, unions, poor peasant leagues, associations against imperialism, associations for mutual assistance, associations to support the soviets, and so on, to join the Red Army. The Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers in particular are the primary grounds from which to mobilize and recruit. Therefore, when frequently training the Red Guard armies, attention should be paid to inspiring the masses from a political standpoint to join the Red Army and encouraging the most active members to join the Red Army (women, however, cannot officially join the Red Army [as soldiers], but may shoulder such tasks as nursing and caretaking and so on).

13. In the past it had been stipulated that reinforcement units were to serve as holding and transfer organs for new soldiers going into the Red Army, and new troops from the rear had to undergo short-term training in a reinforcement unit before joining the Red Army. The organization as stipulated made it so that two *xian* were combined in setting up reinforcement units, so that in management and training this was a rather inconvenient arrangement. Therefore it is now being changed to one reinforcement unit in each *xian*, and the unit can be as small as a company or as large as a regiment. Reinforcement teams are standing organizations, prepared to meet the needs of the front at any time.

14. All border area governments and guerrilla forces should resolutely engage in work that involves the masses of the White areas, to instigate mass struggles and expand the soviet areas. As for engaging in work among White army soldiers, at present White army troops are becoming every day more revolutionized. Especially because the surroundings are being influenced by the soviets and the Red Army, it is becoming easier to work within the White army to undermine the enemy's military forces and win over revolutionary soldiers within the White army. The guerrilla forces in particular should penetrate into the White areas, develop the war, and win over the masses in the White areas. In this way, large numbers of worker and peasant masses are drawn from the White areas into the Red Army.

15. The worker-peasant inspection department is charged with investigating within a short period of time the implementation of the regulations on preferen-



tial treatment for the Red Army and organizing large numbers of shock forces to launch an assault movement on those who refuse to carry out preferential treatment for the Red Army [soldiers and their families].

All the above items must be strictly observed and carried out by all levels of government and all armies, and at the same time, more concrete plans for implementation should be resolved according to the above stipulations. In particular, within the shortest possible time the military district is to convene meetings of the heads of each *xian* military department to discuss implementation of plans and regular training work. It is so ordered.

# *Report on the Present Military Operations<sup>1</sup>*

(September 23, 1932)

To the Central Bureau and for transmittal to the Central Committee:

1. The enemy's situation at present: after the Eighteenth Army disposed of Zhang Ying's Fifty-ninth Division,<sup>2</sup> the Eleventh Division returned to Ji'an. The Fourteenth Division is in Jishui and Xin'gan, the Forty-third Division is in Yongfeng, and the Ninety-fifth Division<sup>3</sup> is in Le'an. In Yihuang there are the Twenty-fifth Division and one brigade of the Fifth Division.<sup>4</sup> In Fuzhou there are the remnants of Sun Lianzhong's forces and another brigade of the Fifth Division. In Nanfeng and Nancheng there are still the three divisions under Mao, Xu, and Li;<sup>5</sup> one brigade is in Lita and Xinfeng. It is not clear where the Fifty-second Division is stationed; probably it is in the vicinity of Ji'an, Jishui, and Anfu. In the area above Taihe on the Gan River is the Guangdong Army. Zhou Zhiqun's forces<sup>6</sup> are still scattered in Jianning, Taining, Shaowu, and Guangze in northern

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 290–92, where it has been reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This and subsequent documents dated September 26–30 present the views of Mao and his "frontline" associates (Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang) on the strategic and tactical military issues involved in efforts to counteract the buildup of Nationalist troops preparatory to launching the Fourth Encirclement Campaign. As noted in the Introduction, disagreements over these issues between frontline and rear echelon Central Bureau members provided the immediate rationale for convening the Central Bureau plenary session that became known as the Ningdu Conference. We have been unable to locate full texts of any of the rear echelon Central Bureau members' responses to the documents translated herein, though portions of these responses are quoted in *Mao Zedong nianpu* and other sources.

2. In September 1932, because the Fifty-ninth Division of the Eighteenth Army had suffered heavy casualties in the "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign against the Communists, its commander, Zhang Ying, was relieved of his post and what remained of his division was reorganized into three regiments, which were incorporated into other units.

3. A note to the Chinese text indicates that the "Ninety-third Division" should probably read "Ninetieth Division." The Fourteenth Division was commanded by Huo Kuizhang and the Forty-third Division by Liu Shaoxian.

4. The Fifth Division was commanded by Zhou Hunyuan; the Twenty-fifth Division has not been located in existing orders of battle.

5. Mao Bingwen, Xu Kexiang, and Li Yunjie, commanding the Eighth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-third divisions, respectively.

6. The New Fourth Brigade.

Fujian. Generally speaking, they are moving forward very slowly, but the enemy forces in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian are advancing relatively fast.

2. The best operation that the Red Army can undertake at present is to launch an attack on the enemy immediately, unfolding toward northern Fujian, develop the situation, promote morale, and provide direct assistance to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and the West Hunan-Hubei [soviet areas]. In launching an attack we must, however, be assured of victory and of being able to wipe out a portion of the enemy forces, in order to smash the enemy one by one. These are the only correct tactics. Otherwise, if we are impatient in seeking battle and meet with reverses, this will lead to even more serious mistakes.

3. At present, because the enemy is firmly defending his urban strongholds in the White region, there are still broad areas in the vicinity of the cities along the line Jishui-Yongfeng-Le'an-Yihuang-Nancheng-Nanfeng-Lichuan that have not yet been made Red. In addition, because of the difficult conditions created by our past mistakes in strategy, our forces which will take the cities and strike at the enemy's reinforcements must constantly be alert to the possibility that the enemy may launch a concerted attack by converging columns. Moreover, many Red Army men have left their units because of illness, and there is no time to fill up the ranks by recruiting. It is also not easy to attack and destroy the three relatively strong enemy divisions that are operating close to each other. Therefore, if we attack the two cities of Le'an and Yihuang once again, within two or three days the enemy in the east, west, and north can concentrate at least five divisions of troops to reinforce his concerted attack. At the same time, Wu Qiwei and Zhou Hunyuan can certainly not be defeated as easily as Gao Shuxun.<sup>7</sup> If we attack Litayu, since the enemy is relatively weak, he will withdraw his forces to Nanfeng City, where the fortifications are very strong and he can hold them while waiting for larger reinforcements. When that time comes, the reinforcements will be too numerous, and we will be unable to attack the enemy from any direction. If we attack Yongfeng City, we will be moving even closer to large numbers of the enemy's reinforcements.

4. Consequently, we believe that under the current unfavorable situation for an immediate battle, the general orientation for our operations at present should be to take Nanfeng, turn the area on both sides of the Nanfeng River Red, particularly the part from Nanfeng to Le'an, promote changes in the enemy's situation, and prepare to attack and destroy the current main enemy forces in the course of mobile warfare. The concrete deployment should consist in placing a large force of troops in the area from the west of Nanfeng to the vicinity of Le'an and placing one unit of troops southeast of Nanfeng to work for the expansion of the Soviet Area. After this work has been going on for a time, small forces should constantly be sent to Nanfeng to carry out guerrilla attacks, to provoke

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7. Referring to commanders of the Nationalist army's Ninetieth, Fifth, and Twenty-seventh divisions, respectively.

the enemy to send troops to reinforce Nanfeng so we can prepare to attack the reinforcements. At the same time, we should seize an opportunity to link up with the soviet area in northern Fujian. Though this deployment is not aimed at an immediate attack on the enemy, these are still active and offensive tactics, for turning this area Red and closing in on these cities will surely change the enemy's situation. It will also provide the Red Army with favorable mass conditions for wiping out the enemy and taking key cities.

5. During this operation we must assume that there will be a change in the enemy's situation. When the time is favorable for us to attack, we must naturally concentrate our forces flexibly for the battle. At the same time, in the course of our work, we should never show the slightest negligence regarding the enemy's offensive deployment and [the need for us to mount] surprise attacks by small units at appropriate times.

6. We have decided to set out the day after tomorrow. If the Central Bureau has any new opinions, we hope you will inform us immediately by telegram.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

# *On Commemorating the First Anniversary of the Central Government*

*Order No. 9 of the Central Executive Committee*

(September 24, 1932)

November 7th this year is the first anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China, as well as the fifteenth anniversary of the victory of the Russian Revolution. In the past year, the situation of the revolution both at home and abroad has developed greatly. The enormous success of socialist construction in the Soviet Union has further quickened the collapse of the capitalist world and the development of world revolution. The imperialists' war against the Soviet Union and their partitioning of China have, during the past year, reached a stage of unprecedented intensity. The soviet movement in China has achieved unprecedented victories and development throughout the country since the establishment of a unified leadership organ for the whole country—the Provisional Central Government. Under the leadership of the Central Government, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army throughout the country continues to win unprecedented victories in the revolutionary war; it has wiped out ten or twenty divisions of the Guomindang forces, expanded the largest soviet area, and created a new era of the national revolutionary war in the whole country. The Soviet has become a banner of liberation for the working people of the country.

During this great anniversary, the imperialists and the Guomindang, in an attempt to save their dying rule, have concentrated all their energies in launching a Fourth "Attack and Encirclement" against the soviets and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. They have already been routed and annihilated on all fronts by our heroic Red Army and suffered a most disastrous defeat. The Soviet Central Government calls on working people all over the country to fight a heroic battle and thoroughly smash the imperialists' and the Guomindang's Fourth Attack and Encirclement, in order to seek victory first in Jiangxi and directly wage war against the Japanese, thereby celebrating this great anniversary. At the same time, to participate in and strengthen the revolutionary war, a review of the work of governments at all levels is to be conducted during this

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 35, September 27, 1932. We have translated it from the text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 135–37.

year's anniversary. The Central Executive Committee has decided to hold the following events on the date of the first anniversary:

1. A three-day holiday is declared for November<sup>1</sup> 6, 7, and 8, for all government agencies, military units, factories, and retail shops.

2. A military parade is to be held on November 7. Except for military units at the front, which cannot hold one due to the war, the rest of the units will hold the parade under the supervision of the supreme commander. The model battalions of the Red Guards of all *xian* are to hold parades at the locations of the *xian* soviets. In Ruijin *xian*, which is directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government, the Central Government is to review the model battalion of the entire *xian*.

3. On November 6, each *xian* is to call a general assembly of voters. The governments of all districts and townships are to make reports on behalf of the Central Government to the voters on the work of the past year (a written report will be issued by the Central Government). On November 8, all district and township governments are to report to the voters on their work so that the voters of the soviets may, on that day, review the work of the soviets, and all the voters' views and criticisms of the soviets may be accepted.

4. At the end of October, all provinces and *xian* are to make work reports to the Central Government and review the past year's work of the soviets at all levels, in particular their work in leading and organizing for the war.

Governments at all levels and all military districts must comply with and carry out the above; they must prepare for the above work while actively developing the revolutionary war. It is so ordered.

To military affairs committees, governments at all levels, and all military districts.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice Chairmen	Xiang Ying
	Zhang Guotao

September 24, 1932, by the Western calendar

1. The text as printed in *Hongse Zhonghua* reads "tenth month" (October) here, but the context makes clear that the month of November is intended.

# *We Propose a Plenum of the Central Bureau at the Front to Discuss Problems of Military Operations*

(September 25, 1932)

To the Central Bureau:

We have taken cognizance of your telegram.<sup>1</sup>

1. If we can fight an immediate campaign now, it will indeed assist the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and West Hunan-Hubei [soviet areas] directly and will moreover open up the situation for a northward development. We have thought about this many times. Nevertheless, given the situation of the enemy and the strength of the front army at present, there is no certainty of winning if we attack [Le'an] City and the enemy's reinforcements. If, because we are eager to fight, we act rashly, the result will be to waste time without achieving success, to fatigue our troops to no good purpose, and to practice more haste, less speed. In the end, this will create more unfavorable prospects.

2. On the basis of our past experience, if we attack Le'an and do so in haste, it is unlikely that we will prevail. Such a move will undoubtedly bring strong reinforcements from the enemy's western column, and, under attack from both within and without, we will find ourselves in a very unfavorable situation. If you make a feint on Nancheng from Lichuan, then since there is a big river separating them, the feigned attack will have no effect, and we will be unable to strike at the reinforcements. There is only one opportunity now. In Yihuang there are only Sun Lianzhong's forces, and it is said that the Fifth Division has set out for Guixi. If this is true, we will be able to pin down the enemy forces on both the east and the west. To storm Yihuang and wipe out Sun Lianzhong's forces is the first step, but we must not make any movement before the enemy's situation is

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 293–95, which reproduces a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This refers to a September 25 telegram from Xiang Ying and the other "rear echelon" Central Bureau leaders, portions of which are quoted in the *Nianpu* and (in slightly longer form) the *Junshi wenji*. The Central Bureau telegram disagreed with the idea of dispersing the Red Army to "Redden" the rural areas around Nanfeng and Le'an, on the grounds that it would further delay decisive attacks on the gathering enemy forces and would expose the dispersed Red Army units to dangerous enemy attacks. They called instead for an immediate attack on the Nationalist Ninetieth Division around Le'an.

confirmed. Thus we will have to extend our period of waiting in the Soviet Area, and if the information is not confirmed we are sure to waste our time.

3. We consider that, in order to break out of the present difficult situation, we must recognize in particular that the enemy is just now engaged in deploying his forces for an offensive against the Central Soviet Area on an even greater scale, and a cruel war will soon be upon us. We must lose no opportunities to seize and turn Red places in the north; get close to Yi[huang], Le['an], and Nanfeng; change the situation on the enemy's side; and strive to create conditions favorable for a decisive battle to destroy the enemy. As regards the concrete arrangements, we advocate even more strongly that during the first period we should turn Red the area to the west of Nanfeng and the south of Yi[huang] and Le['an]. Furthermore, we should make preparations for war, beating back attacks from the east and the west at any time, or from the units in Yi[huang], Le['an], and [Nan]feng which launch surprise attacks. Only in this way can we cooperate victoriously with the offensive of the Red Army in the whole country. This is, of course, an active offensive.

4. If the Central Bureau agrees with this deployment, please reply immediately by telegram, so that we will be able to set out tomorrow morning. If it is necessary to wait for the right opportunity to attack Yihuang, we will have to wait here without making any movement, for it will be a more serious mistake if we march as close to Yihuang as possible but are unable to strike.

5. No matter which operation the Central Bureau agrees to, we suggest that a plenum of the Central Bureau be called immediately at the front, and that everyone must be present. This will not only be able to solve the problem of current operations, but it should also discuss issues such as accepting the instructions of the Central Committee; orientation of the Red Army's operations and the directions in which they will progress; and mobilization of the local masses and work in the White areas, especially such items as the concrete measures for expanding the Red Army and taking key cities. The best date for holding it will be the 30th. In three days, you can get to Xiaotang in northern Ningdu.

6. What do you think of this? We await your telegraphic reply.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang



# *Opinions Regarding the Operations of the Front Army and the Place for Holding the Plenum of the Central Bureau*

(September 26, 1932)

To the Central Bureau:

We have perused your telegram of yesterday.<sup>1</sup>

1. Wu Qiwei's enemy division in Le'an cannot be compared with Gao Shuxun's one brigade. Last time, we spent two days in an attack on Le'an.<sup>2</sup> If we attack Le'an and it does not surrender within three days, the enemy's reinforcement troops from the west are sure to come, we will find ourselves exposed to attacks from within and without, and our situation will become more unfavorable. The Sixteenth Army has now withdrawn from Shanggao and has begun to expand in the direction of Pingxiang. The Eighth Army cannot be reached by telegraph, and a coordinated operation will not enable them to pin down the main forces along the Gan River.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, we are not certain of being able to take Le'an. Moreover, even if, by summoning up all our strength, we can wipe out Wu Qiwei, we will be unable, with the Red Army forces currently available, to continue to attack the enemy's powerful reinforcements. We particularly request the Central Bureau to take note of this.

2. Now the Front Army has set off toward the border region.<sup>4</sup> We are waiting until we have clarified the situation of the enemy in Yihuang. If only Sun Lianzhong's forces are there and the greater part of the Fifth Division in Fuzhou has moved to Guixi, then we will resolutely attack Yihuang to open up the situation. If there are strong enemy forces in Yihuang and it is not convenient to attack it, then the only course will be to carry out the original plan, deploy our

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 296-97, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. See above, the note to the telegram of September 25.

2. The reference is to a battle waged at Le'an by the First Front Army on August 16 and 17, 1932.

3. These references to the Sixteenth and Eighth armies are to Red Army forces operating in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi base area well to the northwest of the Central Soviet Area.

4. "Border region" in this context probably means the Jiangxi-Fujian border area, though it is possible that it might refer instead to the boundary between the soviet and non-soviet areas in this part of Jiangxi.

troops for battle on a field located between Yi[huang] and Le['an], and win over the masses in order to prod the enemy into action.

3. As regards the plenum of the Central Bureau, it remains preferable to hold it at the front after Comrade Xiang [Ying] and Comrade Deng [Fa] have returned,<sup>5</sup> because, as we pointed out in our previous telegram, there are many things that must be discussed and settled. It is best to settle on a date before October 10.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

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5. As noted in the Introduction, the rear echelon Central Bureau leaders had initially responded that the plenary meeting requested by Mao and his associates was infeasible because Xiang Ying and Deng Fa were absent attending a meeting in Fujian.

## ***Order for Our Troops to Work in the North for a Period of Time Before the Enemy's Big Offensive***

(September 26, 1932)

I. The strategy of the imperialists, the Guomindang, and the warlords in their Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" directed against the whole Soviet Area and the Red Army is manifested in the following way in their operations: to use a superior force to launch an active and violent attack on our Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, the West Hunan-Hubei Soviet Area, and the Red Army in these areas. As far as the Central Soviet Area is concerned, at the moment their strategy is to defend their fortresses firmly; blockade, besiege, and exhaust; launch guerrilla missions to attack and harass us near their fortresses; and repress the masses. Meanwhile, they are very actively preparing the reactionary forces of the whole country so that they will be able to launch a big offensive soon against the Central Soviet Area. During this period of time, they are actively carrying out a campaign of devastation in the Northeast Jiangxi and Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi [soviet areas], so that they do not have to worry about their rear while launching a large-scale attack upon the Central Soviet Area.

II. Under the present circumstances, in which the enemy is firmly defending his strong points, launching guerrilla missions to attack and harass the Central Soviet Area, and rapidly disposing his forces for a large-scale offensive, our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the Central Soviet Area has decided, in order to create a victorious offensive and to shatter the advantageous conditions for the reactionaries' large-scale offensive, on a strategy of carrying out work to win over the masses, expand the Soviet Area, and educate and train ourselves, for a period of time (ten days constitutes one period) in the area extending from here northward. The task of this operation is to wipe out the enemy's fragmented guerrilla forces; eliminate the reactionary armed forces in this region; win over and make Red the areas and masses near the enemy's fortresses in the north; and consolidate, expand, and establish guerrillas in these areas. Furthermore, by way of preparation for battle, we can, at any time, hit and wipe out the enemy's offensive forces, so that eventually we will be able to create more favorable

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 298–304, where it is reproduced from a volume issued in 1942.

conditions for fighting a decisive campaign against the enemy in the north, wipe out his main forces, take key cities, and realize the victory of the revolution first in Jiangxi.

III. In order to carry out this task and turn it into reality, there must be concrete preparatory work, especially work to prepare the battlefield. In terms of the military requirements, more active preparation is needed. At present, the detailed provisions [for this work] are as follows:

#### A. Deciding the Battlefield Location in Advance

To prearrange a battlefield for our army at present, two requirements must be met:


1. In order to carry out resolutely the task of marching victoriously to the north, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate the landlord armed forces in the White areas of Yi[huang], Le['an], and Nanfeng that are obstructing the northward progress of our troops, so that our troops will be able to approach these cities firmly, take enemy fortresses confidently, wipe out the reinforcements, and advance northward victoriously.

2. When the enemy carries out a general offensive against the Central Soviet Area and the Red Army, we must confidently shatter the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" in the vicinity of Yi[huang], Le['an], and Nanfeng. That is, we must vigorously attack and pursue him, and, taking advantage of the victory, we must take Fuzhou and Ji'an and open up the situation in Jiangxi. Consequently, we are resolved to arrange the current battlefield in the area between Yi[huang], Le['an], and Nanfeng in accordance with the shape of the battle.

#### B. Organization of Battlefield Arrangements

1. As regards the arrangements for the work of our army, every army should be divided up taking the division as the unit. One division should be assigned the role of covering unit, and each division should be assigned to an appropriate region for work and training. The disposition should be carried out as shown in the following diagram.

2. Strong troops must be assigned the duty of serving as the covering forces (they must have relatively able combat commanders). They should advance about a day's or half a day's march ahead of the work units and should first occupy strong positions (building the necessary defense works). Their main task is to guarantee the security of the work units in the rear. Apart from sending out a security force and providing a small detachment to carry out forward guerrilla missions, the main force of this unit should be concentrated in an appropriate location and devote itself to training. If conditions permit, small work units can be sent out to places near the camp to conduct mass work. While sending out



**Diagram of the Deployment of X Army**

small guerrilla detachments on guerrilla missions in the direction of the enemy, their covering role must never be weakened. After receiving urgent information about the enemy, the covering troops of each army should not only inform all the units of their own army promptly, but also inform directly every unit of the neighboring armies.

3. Small work units. Every division (or army headquarters) should send out its own workers directly. Sometimes they should be accompanied by the necessary security forces, to provide direct protection for the security of the work unit.

Every division (except for the small work units) should try its best to concentrate for training. If for various reasons the entire division is unable to concentrate, but instead each regiment has to camp in a separate location, it is better if the camp site of every regiment can be arranged in layers around the enemy (the distance between regiments must not exceed 10 *li*). If the topography does not permit this and the troops have to be arranged in a straight line or in an echelon formation, the distance between regiments must not exceed 5 *li*.

4. On the basis of experience in past campaigns and the need to reinforce various types of training to combat its own weaknesses, each army group should establish its own military training plan.

Every command organ above the rank of division should frequently send out inspectors to go to the lower levels to carry out inspections, supervising very strictly the performance of the assigned tasks. They should also report the results of the inspections to higher levels.

5. Staff travelling group. The staff travelling groups should be organized taking the army group as the basis. Their tasks are to conduct investigations about military geography, as well as various kinds of combat surveillance; to report the results of their work in written form, with diagrams, about every place they have visited; and to prepare reports to their immediate commanders and to the staff office at the next higher level. (A detailed work plan should also be prepared.) The following is a list of the things this staff travelling group should investigate and record:

a. Social Investigations

The number of the population and the names of revolutionary leaders in the countryside

The number of houses

The supply situation

Special products

Class relationships in the locality

Whether or not there is a record of any kind of struggle

Whether or not there are any reactionary political organizations

b. Geographical Investigations

The state of the roads in every direction

The state of the rivers and valleys in the nearby area

The number of bridges and boats

Forests

Topography

c. Military Investigations

Landlord armed forces in the nearby area

Local armed forces

The situation of the enemy and of militia bandits<sup>1</sup> at the front

6. Every army group, if the enemy is concentrating his forces to launch an attack upon us (not including attacks and harassment by the enemy's small

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1. The reference is to landlord militias (*mintuan*). On a related topic, see above, the note to the text of February 27, 1931, regarding "pacification bandits."

guerrilla detachments), should, with covering forces and in a planned way, rapidly concentrate in the designated localities (Dongpi, Xinfengshi, Ganzhu) and prepare for battle.

### C. Operations of the Main Forces During the Work Period

For purposes of arranging the battlefield, it is best that during the work period our main forces should concentrate in the appropriate places in the work area to carry out the training.

### D. Troop Dispersal and Concentration

#### 1. Division of the combat zones (see the attached diagram<sup>2</sup>)

When work has just begun, on the basis of the needs of our forces for military communications, we should first start working along our communication lines and then push outward to nearby areas. In terms of the major communication lines (as shown in the diagram), based on the designated districts, each army group and each army should distribute its forces appropriately and then report to General Headquarters.

- a. The center of the First Army Group is Dongpi. Its work zone includes the area to the east of Shuikou and Dengxianqiao, the area to the north of Kuzhuping, Dongpi, and Zhufang, as well as the area to the west of Wuliqidu<sup>3</sup> and Shuinan (see the attached diagram).
- b. The center of the Third Army Group is Xinfengshi. It should conduct its work in the area to the east of Shuinan, Zhufang, and Wuliqidu (excluding Zhufang and Shuinan), and the northeast of Xinfengshi. It includes Zhufang, Ganfang, Sanxi, Yangfang, Dangkou, Shen'gang, and so on (see the attached diagram).
- c. The center of the Fifth Army Group is in Ganzhu, and it stretches to Luofang, Baishe, and Yaobo in the east, and Qiacun and Shaping in the west (see the attached diagram).
- d. The center of the Twenty-second Army is in Nancun. It stretches to Shuikou and Kuzhuping in the east, to Dengxianqiao and Luoshanjin in the north, to Zengtian in the west, and farther westward to Shuinan, and connects with the Soviet Area in the south (see the attached diagram).<sup>4</sup>

2. The plan for concentrating the Front Army is laid down in a separate document.

2. According to a note to the Chinese text, no such diagram is included in the source from which the editors of the *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* have taken this order.

3. The name "Wuliqidu" literally means "Five six seven *du*," where *du* is a common imperial-era geographical unit for tax collection purposes. We have found no single settlement with this name; probably it refers to an area that formerly encompassed the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh *du* in one of the *xian* in this region.

4. The places mentioned in the several preceding paragraphs cover a broad swathe of territory in southern Le'an, Yihuang, and Nanfeng, and northern Guangchang *xian*.

IV. During the work period, all the units should successively post pickets in order to facilitate close communications with one another. This is especially [to be done by] the covering troops who are at the very front. When the guerrilla detachments they send out obtain information about the enemy, they should inform each other immediately by telephone (telephone wires should be laid across promptly).

V. During the work period, the general military medical department should set up a temporary hospital in Shuikou to receive and treat the wounded and sick of the work troops.

Before dispersing the troops, every army group should give the soldiers a detailed explanation about hygiene in the army, including such matters as the isolation of contagious diseases and paying attention to the poisoning of drinking water.

VI. After entering the work area, every unit should carry out a detailed investigation of the supply situation in its locality and report to General Headquarters by telegram. If there are insufficient supplies, a way must be found to get them from outside the work area, so as to avoid a panic regarding famine in the work area.

VII. During the work period, General Headquarters will be located in Wucun.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong



# ***Opinion Regarding the Need to Select the Enemy's Weak Point in Hubei-Henan-Anhui and to Destroy One of His Units***

(September 30, 1932)

To the Central Bureau, for rapid transmittal to Hubei-Henan-Anhui and also to the Central Committee:<sup>1</sup>

1. According to intelligence received in the past few days, the enemy's Fourteenth Division has entered Yuanjiao and Changshanchong and has already thrust himself between Yanzihe and Xijieling. The Second Division of the First Army has arrived at Gujiahe in Luotian and is approaching Xijieling. Zhang Yinxian's forces have arrived at Minjiahe, but the Thirty-first Division is in Songfu. Hao Mengling has arrived at Xiaojiao and is drawing close to it. Wang Jun has arrived at Huoshan, and his vanguard is in Mafu. Liang Guanying is also in Huoshan, Shangguan Yunxiang is in Yingshan, the Thirteenth Division is at Hekou in Huang'an, Chen Yaohan is in Hutouao, Dai Minquan is in Zhanglaofu, the Fourth Division is in Jinjiazhai, the Eighty-ninth Division is in Xinji, and Zhang Fang is in Shangcheng.

2. The First Division is still in Wuhan, and the Forty-eighth Division is in Baotawan in western Hubei. We have not yet ascertained what enemy forces are headed for Huangguangqian.

3. Based on this, it appears that the enemy is using the two columns of the Fourteenth Army and the First Army as the spearhead; the Thirtieth Army, the Third Army, and the Twentieth Route Army as the interception and attack force; and the Fourth Division and the Eighty-ninth Division as the working force. In addition, Shangguan Yunxiang's forces have been organized as a fifth column.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 305-07, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This document was written in response to a request of September 24 from Zhang Guotao, then a prominent leader in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area, for information about enemy dispositions. Much of the information Mao and his associates provided concerned Nationalist Army troop movements in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui area. It is unclear why Zhang sought information from the faraway Central Soviet Area about troops in his own vicinity; perhaps Zhang's forces were too harried and isolated to have the relatively rich intelligence information available to Mao.

It looks as though the enemy is trying to force our Fourth Front Army to fight a decisive battle near the Yangzi River.

4. We think that, in fighting a decisive battle against the enemy, we must have a guarantee [that we can] wipe out and shatter one front of the enemy, so as to change the current unfavorable situation and prepare our strength for future campaigns. We must take into consideration the fact that under present conditions in the soviet areas, the Red Army's speed of recruitment still cannot catch up with the enemy's desire to continue seeking opportunities to fight. Under these conditions, if we only defeat the enemy and are unable to destroy him, if we are unable to capture weapons and ammunition and unable to take captives, if we are unable to continue to fight, it will be very hard to change the present situation. Even with the assistance of other soviet areas, it will not be easy to wipe out the enemy, and it will not be easy to make the enemy troops that are attacking Hubei-Henan-Anhui move away. Right now circumstances in the Central Soviet Area are such that the enemy troops are firmly defending their strong points and actively preparing for a large-scale offensive. If we attack, then at least three divisions of reinforcements will come to their aid, and it will be very difficult for us to create conditions for wiping them out in the course of mobile warfare.

5. Consequently, Hubei-Henan-Anhui must now select one of the enemy's weak points and begin by wiping out one unit of his forces. If there is no guarantee [that this can be done], and yet the Soviet Area is able to survive, we should not be eager to seek battle, but exhaust the enemy and wait until we can create the conditions for fighting a decisive battle that will offer greater guarantees.

6. Such are our opinions. Please consider this and reply by telegram.

Zhou Mao Zhu Wang

## ***Circular Telegram Opposing the Report of the International Investigation Team***

(October 6, 1932)

Workers, peasants, soldiers, and all the exploited masses of the whole country!

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic long ago proclaimed to the popular masses of the whole country that the League of Nations is a league of robbers through which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry, which the League has sent to China, is to plan the partition of China and the suppression of all revolutionary movements under the banner of the Chinese soviets.

Now the report by the commission of enquiry of the league of imperialist robbers—the Lytton Commission of Enquiry—has already been published. This is an admirable document about the dismemberment of China shown to the Chinese popular masses by the imperialists, and yet the Guomindang, which is selling out and dishonoring the country, and also its government, are completely in agreement and have accepted it!

The Lytton Report openly and most shamelessly announces a new plan for partitioning China. It openly declares that the Japanese and all other imperialists should not only occupy Manchuria, but also partition all of China. It explicitly proclaims that it is justified for Japanese imperialism to occupy Manchuria and perpetrate a bloodbath in Shanghai. It calls on all the various imperialists to join forces to divide up China and destroy the revolutionary movement in China. First of all, it wants to attack even more cruelly the national-revolutionary war and the land revolution in China organized by the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, as well as the anti-Japanese war fought by Manchuria's volunteer army, the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movement, and the boycott movement in the whole country. It shamelessly proposes that Manchuria be treated as an "autonomous state," and that an international force of military police be stationed there, to make of it a base for attack against the Soviet Union by international imperialism, from which to launch active attacks against the Soviet Union. At the same time, it uses terms such as "sovereignty belongs to China" in an attempt to strip the Chinese popular masses of their anti-imperialist

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 139–41, where it is reproduced from materials published in China in 1932.

arms and benumb the masses of China. Finally, it repeatedly orders the Guomindang to attack the Red Army even more actively, surrender to the imperialists even more loyally, sell out the national interest, make greater efforts to suppress the anti-imperialist and boycott movements, and slaughter the Chinese popular masses even more ruthlessly!

The Lytton Report is a contract of servitude by which imperialism reduces the Chinese nation to slavery! The Soviet Government calls on the popular masses of the whole country to arm themselves and, under the leadership of the Soviet Government, to wage a national-revolutionary war to tear to shreds the Lytton Report and to oppose all the new projects of the imperialists for dismembering China, attacking the soviet areas, suppressing the Chinese revolution, and attacking the Soviet Union! Let us drive Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms out of China, in order to obtain the complete liberation and independence of the Chinese nation! Let us defend the Soviet Union with arms in our hands and establish a social alliance between the toiling popular masses of China and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government proclaims to the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the whole country, and to all the oppressed popular masses, that if we really want to wage a national-revolutionary war and oppose the partition of China by the imperialists, we must first overthrow the reactionary rule of the Guomindang, these scavengers who pick up the scraps of the imperialist dismemberment of China and who are suppressing the national war! The Guomindang and its government accept, with total loyalty, the imperialists' report on the partition of China and recognize it as the basis for negotiations. The different factions within the Guomindang and its government have expressed verbally some dissatisfaction about certain points in the report in their discussions and studies of it. This is no more than a smoke screen to cover up their selling out China, a cheap trick to deceive the popular masses. The Guomindang prefers to give away the Three Northeastern Provinces, Shanghai, and the whole of China to the imperialists; at the same time, under the direction of and with the assistance of the imperialists, it has mobilized a million troops to attack the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which is truly leading the revolutionary popular masses of the whole country to fight a national-revolutionary war. It is attempting to destroy the Soviet Government of the masses, which truly opposes imperialism, and to prevent the Red Army from joining the heroic anti-imperialist soldiers and the members of the volunteer army to fight imperialism directly. At the same time, it is helping the imperialists to slaughter and betray the volunteer army of Manchuria, to suppress the anti-imperialist movement in the whole country, to stop the boycott movement and strikes by workers, and to massacre workers, peasants, and the impoverished masses as its gesture of loyalty to imperialism. Only by overthrowing the rule of the Guomindang, which is betraying the nation's interests, can we successfully carry out the national-revolutionary war. The Soviet Government is leading the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the whole country and

the impoverished masses of the soviet areas to fight a cruel war against imperialism and the Guomindang. It will victoriously smash the fourth attack by the Guomindang and use the revolutionary war to destroy the reactionary rule of the Guomindang! Popular masses of the whole country, arm yourselves! Oppose the Guomindang's fourth attack against the soviet areas, overthrow the rule of the Guomindang, which is a running dog of imperialism, and support the Red Army and the Soviet régime! Only the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the genuine armed force of the popular masses fighting the national war!

Fighters of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the whole country! Workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the soviet areas! Vigorously conduct the revolutionary war and resolutely attack imperialism and the Guomindang to smash the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression"! Workers, peasants, soldiers, and all the impoverished masses in the White areas! Arm yourselves through your own efforts, organize a volunteer army, go on strike, carry out boycott movements, and actively fight imperialism and the Guomindang. Let all the revolutionary popular masses arise as one, under the Red banner of the soviets, to wage national-revolutionary war, oppose the imperialists' partition of China, overthrow the rule of the Guomindang, drive Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms out of China, establish the soviet government of the popular masses of all China, and achieve the independence and liberation of the Chinese people!

Chairman, Provisional	
Central Government of the	
Soviet Republic of China	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying
	Zhang Guotao

October 6, 1932, at Ruijin, Jiangxi

## *On Emergency War Mobilization*

*Order No. 12 of the Central Executive Committee*

(October 13, 1932)

The ever more rapid development of the revolution throughout the country, and especially the unprecedented great victories and expansion achieved by the soviets and the Red Army all over the country, have caused the imperialist Guomindang's Fourth Encirclement Campaign to suffer repeated disastrous defeats in the [soviet] areas of Hubei-Henan-Anhui, West Hunan-Hubei, Northeast Jiangxi, and Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi. In particular, because the Red Army of the Central Soviet Area has victoriously expanded toward the north, the Guomindang warlords, under severe prodding from the imperialists, are devoting all their energies to launching a massive attack against the Central Soviet Area, as well as intensifying their offense against the Northeast Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, and West Henan soviet areas. Because of the victories of the revolution, the reactionary ruling class is attempting to use all its might to wage a final struggle. It is a critical moment in the decisive battle between revolution and counterrevolution.

This class war is more intense and critical than any previous war. It requires mobilizing all the workers, peasants, and working masses, and arming them quickly to strengthen the Red Army. This requires the use of all forces, all economic resources, and all sacrifices to prepare for war to smash the enemy's massive attack. We must, through victory in this war, gain such key cities as Ji[\*an], Gan[zhou], Fu[zhou], and Nan[chang], so as to win victory first in Jiangxi and several neighboring provinces.

In order to lead the worker and peasant masses, and armed organizations throughout the country, to smash thoroughly the massive attack against the Central Soviet Area launched by the imperialist Guomindang, the Central Government is calling for an emergency general mobilization for war, especially of all units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and all the workers, peasants, and toiling masses, in response to the nationwide Fourth Encirclement Campaign. The most aggressive and swiftest action must be taken, and the most extensive and adequate war mobilization must be made to launch a firm counterattack and

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 36, October 16, 1932. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 143-48, where it is reproduced from this source.

safeguard the complete victory of this war. Therefore, governments at all levels, all Red Army units, and all military districts must resolutely and quickly carry out the following emergency mobilization measures:

1. Conduct an emergency mobilization of all workers, peasants, and toiling masses. Display the most vigorous revolutionary enthusiasm and concrete action in struggling hard for victory in the war. To this end, governments at all levels must immediately conduct effective political mobilization of the worker and peasant masses in the entire soviet areas, so that every worker and peasant may understand the significance of this war in terms of his own future, understand the key role of the soviets in the victory of the whole country, and be aware of the increase of the revolutionary forces in the whole country and the hopeless struggles of the counterrevolution. The workers' and peasants' enthusiasm for war and class resolve must be fostered, and they must be encouraged to prepare actively for and to participate in all the concrete tasks in the war at the front and in the rear, and to go and fight to smash the enemy's massive attack. This is the basic condition for our victory in the class war. Consequently:

- a. All staff of provincial soviet governments must immediately go down to the grassroots levels to convene meetings, particularly municipal and township congresses and voters' meetings, and to conduct political mobilization, so that every staff member, every worker, and every peasant may understand the significance of this war, so that all of them will be mobilized to participate in all the mobilization efforts of this war.

- b. The supreme military commands of the Red Army units must call meetings of soldiers and officers according to their own conditions and conduct the general mobilization of all fighters.

- c. Military districts and military departments at all levels must individually hold meetings for members of local armed forces, such as the Red Guards, guerrilla forces, and Young Pioneers.

- d. Under this general mobilization order, all mass organizations must individually call meetings of their members and make speeches to arouse them.

2. In accordance with the orientation laid down, all Red Army units must launch the most vigorous and swift offensive actions, first smashing the enemy's attacks, using our victorious attacks to shatter the enemy's massive offensive, in order to seize key cities, and win victory first in Jiangxi. In particular, the Red Army in the entire country should act jointly and in coordination.

3. To expand the Red Army vigorously is to increase the main force of the revolutionary war. This is one of the principal conditions for smashing the enemy's massive attack. Governments at all levels must, in the month of October, use their greatest strength and fastest speed to mobilize the largest possible number of activist workers and peasants to strengthen the Red Army in terms of both quantity and quality. They must firmly carry out Directive No. 15 of the

Central Executive Committee. At the same time, they must exceed the specified number [of new recruits] by 100 percent. In the future, they should frequently carry out the work of expanding the Red Army, continually supply the front with large numbers [of recruits], and form regular reinforcement units for the Red Army. Governments at all levels are also ordered to mobilize and encourage the soldiers on home leave to return to their own units in October, launching the most extensive campaign among the masses for [soldiers to] return to their own units.

4. Resolutely carry out Directive No. 15 and quickly mobilize all men between the ages of eighteen and forty throughout the soviet areas to join the Red Guards voluntarily. Every one of them must prepare a weapon of his own; increase the production of homemade rifles, guns, and spears; and store up sufficient ammunition (similarly, extensive Young Pioneers units must be formed). They are to be formed into units according to specified establishment criteria. This task must be completed before the holiday of the October Revolution. In particular, political education and military combat training must be intensified. Governments at all levels, all military districts and departments must take specific responsibility for the execution of this task, so that the Red Guards may indeed be capable of defending our territory, supporting the Red Army in its actions, and striking at and destroying the enemy that is attacking us. Model battalions and model units of the Young Pioneers must be kept ready for transfer in order to be able to concentrate for combat.

5. Organize strong and effective guerrilla detachments. Existing guerrilla units in various areas must be subject to a round of strict examination, the undesirable elements in these units should be purged immediately, and the leadership of the guerrilla detachments strengthened and replaced. Every guerrilla detachment must be rotated for a one-week training session in October in order to enhance political education and military training and enable every member of the guerrilla detachment to understand his responsibility and task. Every *xian* must have at least one or two extremely effective guerrilla detachments to develop the most extensive guerrilla warfare in nearby White areas and the enemy's rear, as well as to launch mass struggles, expand the soviet areas, and become the armed organizers and propagandists of the soviets, turning themselves into one of the most important forces of the revolutionary war by pinning down and striking at the enemy and by supporting the Red Army in combat. All the serious problems that afflicted the guerrilla detachments in the past must be eliminated. Every *xian* must finish the organization and rectification [of guerrilla forces] in October and dispatch all of them on missions according to the directions and tasks set in the plans of the Committee on Labor and War.

6. In seeking to facilitate the destruction of the enemy and achieve victory first in Jiangxi, an important precondition for winning victory in the war and obtaining victory first in Jiangxi is the active development of surrounding soviet areas, especially the ones in the north, east, and northeast. Governments at all



levels and all the local armed forces should immediately mobilize to develop the soviet areas in these directions, to win over the majority of the workers and peasants, and to create even more extensive soviet areas, which will surround each central city and the cities the enemy uses as his bases, as well as establish close links between Northeast Jiangxi and West Henan. This will enable us to carry out work among the soldiers of the White army surrounding the soviet areas in a more planned way; it will enable us to demoralize the enemy troops, win over the revolutionary soldiers and masses, and establish the work in the vicinity of central cities. Each *xian* and provincial government must assemble and transfer a large number of cadres in October to establish governments in these new areas, launch the land revolution, and conduct work in the White areas and among the soldiers of the White army. At the same time, the governments should deepen the class struggle in each border region, strengthen these regions, and expand outward.

7. Land taxes, commercial taxes, and rents must be levied and collected at once to open up financial resources and adequately stockpile economic resources, food, and all military supplies for war. Preparations must be made for a long war with the enemy, so that the Red Army and all workers and peasants will not be subject to the enemy blockade or face supply difficulties. We should continue to economize even more on all expenditures and food to enhance our preparations for war. This is of decisive significance for victory or defeat in this war.

8. Call on all workers and peasants to stock up on food and salt and reduce the consumption of food; call on them to devote great efforts to growing miscellaneous cereals and vegetables in order to supply the Red Army during war. We should cultivate the political enthusiasm of the workers and peasants of all the soviet areas for the revolutionary war and their support for the Red Army, so that they will make adequate preparations and provisions in terms of economic resources and food and remain ready to lend and donate them to the Red Army at any time in order to win victory in the war.

9. We must resolutely wipe out the attacking enemy to defend our soviet areas from destruction by the enemy. If the enemy wants to advance into the soviet areas, we should firmly lead workers, peasants, and armed forces to attack and destroy the enemy; moreover, we should cut off the enemy's food and communication and subject him to harassment day and night. We should remove and hide all supplies so that the enemy will not be able to survive within the borders of the soviet areas even for a minute. All local governments should lead local armed forces, workers, and peasants to make preparations actively and utilize the experience gained from the previous three campaigns, so as to gain more effective results and victories.

10. A Red martial law status of the highest degree is to be imposed in the entire Soviet Area. The Red Guards are responsible for setting up all sentry posts; this system is to be established within ten days to prevent enemy spies from infiltrating into the Soviet Area. All travelers and their baggage are to be

checked thoroughly. All suspicious elements must be brought to the government for exhaustive questioning. Governments at all levels must first conduct detailed investigations and registration before they issue passes. No passes may be issued carelessly. The previous method of stamping a seal on a person's hand is to be abolished. All mass organizations must obtain passes from the government. Non-governmental military agencies are not allowed to issue passes. Passes for travel to the White areas must be issued by district governments. A household registration check must be run at once in the entire Soviet Area. In particular, all suspicious individuals in the cities must be subject to intense examination and monitoring. Governments at all levels must have the participation and assistance of the labor unions, the Young Pioneers, and all mass groups in carrying out this task.

11. Intensify the work of purging counterrevolutionaries. The State Security Bureau is to be ordered to direct its branch bureaus to devise a careful plan to implement this task. At the same time, the government will take harsh measures to deal with all counterrevolutionary activities. In particular, the forces of landlords and the local gentry must be eliminated thoroughly and immediately in Shicheng, Ningdu, Guangchang, Yihuang, Ninghua, Huichang, Xunwu, Yudu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, and Longyan *xian*. We should direct workers and peasants to keep a close watch on all landlords, rich peasants, and counterrevolutionary suspects. In the war zones, these elements must be taken into custody. All counterrevolutionary factions must be purged; all counterrevolutionary activities must be quashed in order to establish a stronger rear.

12. Actively improve key transportation lines to facilitate military transportation and movement. Establish strong and effective military supply depots. As for the transportation duties of military supply depots in the future, local governments are responsible for the transportation and protection of supplies within 30 *li* on each side of the depots. The Red Guard units along these lines become armed forces for the protection and guarding of the supplies in transit. As for methods of transportation, the previous use of the names of different organizations is to be corrected. [Responsibility] is to be placed under a unified Red Guard army. It is to be ordered that every member of the Red Guards must have a weapon and a shoulder-pole; there must be one pair of stretchers for every five of them. Thus, when war comes, all of them can use their weapons to attack the enemy; when the front and military supply depots need teams of stretcher-bearers or transportation teams, all the Red Guards will be turned into transportation teams and teams of stretcher-bearers. Only this kind of rapid mobilization can meet the emergency needs of the war.

13. All governments must mobilize the masses to dismantle in October all the earthworks built by the enemy inside the Soviet Area during the previous three campaigns that have not been destroyed, as well as the walls surrounding cities and towns.

14. During the war, governments at all levels must resolutely lead the masses and their armed forces to fight the enemy mercilessly. If anyone is found to be

cowardly, runs away, or fails to lead the masses to fight resolutely, the offender will be punished by revolutionary discipline. Officials of district and township governments directly join the Red Guards and take over leadership positions. At the provincial and *xian* levels, staff and officials of the agencies and groups at the same level should be united and formed into one unit of the Red Guards; they should often undergo military training and militarize all their daily activities. This is to strengthen even more concretely the leadership of governments at all levels over local armed forces.

The situation of the war is becoming more pressing. We must devote all our energies to the mobilization of the workers and peasants of the entire Soviet Area. We must use the fastest speed to make full preparations for war. We must be ready to make all sacrifices to win victory in the war. We must subordinate all other tasks to that of the war. This time, victory will certainly belong to us. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying
	Zhang Guotao

## ***Order No. 29 of the Central Council of People's Commissars***

(October 13, 1932)

In order to adapt to the development of the revolutionary war, we must perfect the work of governments and military departments at all levels, so as to lead local armed forces to take an active part in the war. The positions of the heads of the military departments must be filled by individuals who possess rich military command skills and capabilities. The Council of People's Commissars has reached a special decision to establish the position of head of the military department in local governments at every level. The previous method of selection and election to the position is to be changed. The head of the military department is to be directly appointed by the headquarters of the military districts and the garrison command of Ruijin. The current heads of military departments of all *xian* will be individually subjected to review by the headquarters of the military districts and the garrison commands before they are reappointed or replaced. This order serves as notification, and everyone is expected to obey it. It is so ordered.

To soviet governments at all levels, headquarters of all military districts, and the garrison command at Ruijin.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 36, October 16, 1932, and we have translated it from that source.

## ***Order No. 30 of the Central Council of People's Commissars***

(October 13, 1932)

The former commander-in-chief of the Ruijin Garrison Command, Liu Bocheng, has been transferred to work at the front.<sup>1</sup> Ye Jianying,<sup>2</sup> president of the Red Army Academy, is appointed to fill the vacancy. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 36, October 16, 1932, and we have translated it from that source.

1. Liu Bocheng (1892–1986), a native of Kaixian in Sichuan, joined the Party in 1926. In 1928, he went to study in the Soviet Union, and after his return in autumn 1930 worked in the Central Military Commission and the Central Committee's Yangzi Valley Bureau. At the end of 1931 he went to Ruijin and took charge of the Red Army Academy; in 1932, he became concurrently head of the Ruijin Garrison Command. In October 1932, he became chief of staff of the Central Military Affairs Commission.

2. Ye Jianying (1897–1986), a native of Meixian in Guangdong, joined the Party in 1927 and participated in the Guangzhou Uprising. He went to the Soviet Union in late 1928 and worked in the Central Military Commission in Shanghai following his return in 1930. In spring 1931, he went to the Central Soviet Area as chief of staff of the Military Affairs Commission. In October 1932, he replaced Liu Bocheng as military academy head and Ruijin Garrison head.

# ***Campaign Plans for the First Front Army of the Red Army***

(Issued on October 14, 1932, in Guangchang)

## **I. Assessment of the Situation**

Generally speaking, the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" being conducted against the soviet areas in the entire country by the reactionary ruling class of the imperialist Guomindang warlords is a plan that, taking advantage of the difficulties in communication and deficiencies in coordination between individual soviet areas, gradually shifts its concentrated forces to achieve breakthroughs individually. We can see that, although the enemy's shifting attacks against the West Hunan-Hubei, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, and Northeast Jiangxi soviet areas failed to produce the expected results, the plan indicated above has already become very clear. The enemy's deployment for attacking Hubei-Henan-Anhui is to defend several key points while pressing onward with several powerful parallel columns on various fronts to drive deeply into the soviet areas and seek out our main forces to do battle. Then, he uses his forces specialized in political warfare to push forward gradually. This deployment is the result of the enemy's repeatedly getting defeated and annihilated one by one by the Red Army in every soviet area. It is highly possible that the enemy will make use of this plan while rapidly deploying a massive attack against the Central Soviet Area. Moreover, he is now about to transfer units to increase his strength in Jiangxi. Before the enemy finishes this deployment against the Central Soviet Area, however, he will mostly defend key positions in all areas and use small forces to harass the soviet areas to prevent our main forces from launching offensives. He will attempt to use a situation of encirclement to support his economic blockade and pursue his "encirclement and suppression" plan of cordoning off and pressing against the soviet areas.

## **II. Program for the Campaign**

In order to coordinate our action with the Red Army units in other soviet areas and support each other, and in order to take advantage of the time before the enemy completes the deployment indicated above to rout the enemy on one side

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 81–86, which reproduces it from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

and establish contact with the Red Army units in the Northeast, this front army is to destroy enemy units speedily and simultaneously in Jianning, Taining, and Lichuan, when the enemy least expects it, and occupy his positions. The forces that will occupy Taining are to send one unit of considerable force, immediately after they occupy Taining, to [Shao]wu<sup>1</sup> to establish contact with the Red Army units in Chong'an. After they accomplish their missions, these forces are to return to their original units. After accomplishing the above missions, all the remaining units should turn Red the areas where they are stationed and collect the materials needed by the Red Army so as to create favorable conditions for future campaigns. But the main forces must be concentrated; they should always be kept battle-ready and concentrated.

While the above missions are being carried out, if the enemy launches a parallel attack across Nancheng and Nanfeng (or even stretching to Guangchang) against Lichuan, our army is to concentrate toward Jianning and attack his right flank. If the enemy attacks the Soviet Area in parallel from north to south, our army is also to concentrate toward Jianning and fight him in the area between Guang[chang], Shi[cheng], and Ning[hua].

Other units that fight along the borders of the Soviet Area should all operate toward the enemy's rear, especially its rear along key transportation lines. Everywhere, they should develop guerrilla warfare, mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants, disintegrate the enemy forces, and reduce and destroy the enemy's capability to attack the Soviet Area. The core teams of these units must concentrate their operations against the enemy's key transportation links.

### III. The Positions of Individual Units Before Beginning Their Advance<sup>2</sup>

- A. First Army Group—Toupi
- B. Third Army Group—Guangchang
- C. Fifth Army Group—Ganzhu
- D. Twenty-second Army—Bakouqiao
- E. General Headquarters—Guangchang

### IV. Distinctions Between Columns and the Routes They Should Take

A. The Twenty-second Army is to be the right column; its objective is to destroy the enemy units in Meikoupu and Taining. Moreover, it is to send some forces directly to [Shao]wu to establish contact with the Red Army units in Chong'an. It is to advance on the route to Jianfeng, Guifang, Junkou, and Meikoupu, and onward toward Taining.

1. The first character of this name is replaced by an X in the Chinese text we follow here, but on the basis of the geographic context, the reference is almost certainly to Shaowu.

2. In general terms, the deployments and movements outlined in this and the following section call for Red Army forces stationed in the northeastern part of the Central Soviet Area to advance further to the northeast into Fujian.

B. The First Army Group is to be the central column; its objective is to destroy the enemy units in Jianning and Lixin and send some forces to Kangdu and toward Nanfeng to protect Jianning. One of its routes should run through Guangchang, Shuinan, and Lixin to Jianning; the other should be Baishui, Jianfeng, Guifang, Huangnipu, and Shuangxikou, and onward to Jianning.

C. The Third Army Group is to be the left column; its objective is to destroy the enemy units in Lichuan. Its route should be Qianshan, Kangdu, Xichengqiao, Hengcun, and thence to Lichuan.

D. The Fifth Army Group is the general reserve force of the campaign. Its objective is to assist the First Army Group and the Twenty-second Army in destroying the enemy units in Jianning and Taining. Its route is to be Qianshan, Fufang, [X]yang, Jianning, and [X]guaxia; it must reach the areas west of Meikoupu on the 19th to support the operations of the Twenty-second Army.

E. General Headquarters is to follow the First Army Group; its route is to be via Shuinan and Lixin. After the occupation of Jianning, it should be in Anren, in northern Jianning.

#### V. Carrying Out the Advance of the Various Columns

All columns are to begin their advances from their current positions on October 16. The following table summarizes the plan regarding their parallel advances each day and their locations as each column advances toward the battle zone:

**Table Showing the Plan for the Parallel Advance Toward the Battle Zones by the Columns of This Front Army**

Date	Units and Locations					Notes
	Left Column	Central column	Right Column	Central Column		
16th	As on the 17th	Guangchang-Baishui line	Kefang	Guangchang	Qianshan City, Ningjiayuan	One part of the central column is in Guangchang and on the line east of Guangchang; the other part is on the Baishui-Yingqian line
17th	Xichengyan	Yang-Kefang line	Junkou	Changqiao	Jianning	If there is insufficient housing for the central column in Fayang
18th	Lichuan	Jianning	Meikoupu	Ma'anqiao		
19th	Lichuan	Jianning	Taining	Meikou		
20th	At work place	At work place	Anren	Anren		
21st	As above	As above	Anren	Anren		



## VI. Temporarily Designated Line of Depots

The line of depots remains the same for the moment, but the stage extending from Guangchang to Jianning should use the same route taken by the General Headquarters. Preparations should be made for the following two lines of depots in the future:

- A. City of Anyuan, Shicheng, Guhou, Quyang to the Office for Rear Administration; and
- B. City of Anyuan, Ninghua, Yan'gangyu, Rentian to Ruijin.

## VII. Things to Be Noticed in Turning Red the Areas Where the Red Army Is Located and in the Collection of Materials

A. In addition to fulfilling the principal mission of this campaign, one part of our forces should be used to make Red the areas where our forces are stationed and collect the materials needed by the Red Army, while the main forces should be concentrated to prepare for battle.

B. The areas where the main forces of each army group are to be concentrated and the areas where they are to be dispersed are indicated on Map No. 2.<sup>3</sup> The explanation is as follows:

1. The First Army Group is to send work units to Kangdu, Fufang, Fayang, Guifang, and Anyuan City, with its main forces concentrated near Jianning.
2. The Third Army Group is to send work units to Lichuan [City] and areas in northeastern and northwestern Lichuan, with its main forces concentrated near Yuheng.
3. The Fifth Army Group is to send work units to Guangchang, Junkou, and Zhushuxia, with its main forces concentrated near Meikoupu.
4. The Twenty-second Army is to send work units to areas of northeastern and southeastern Taining, with its main forces concentrated near Taining [City].

C. In addition to routine reconnaissance, each army group should have plans for sending out reconnaissance units to make contact with the enemy and facilitate our timely concentration.

D. Army groups should have plans to develop guerrilla units and help them grow fully to become the main factors in strengthening the local soviet areas.

E. The collection of materials should be carried out according to the principle of not hindering the development of class struggle.

### Supplementary notes:

- a. Each army group must conduct careful reconnaissance of the areas of its

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3. This map does not appear in the only available text of this document.

operations, especially the enemy situation and terrain, as well as annihilate the White army and *mintuan* bandits along the way.

b. Each army group must pay attention to air defense, especially by concealing our army's objectives. Order No. 1 of the campaign on the right wing has been sent to Lin [Biao], commander-in-chief, and Nie [Rongzhen], chief political commissar, of the First Army Group.

Commander-in-Chief	Zhu De
Chief Political Commissar	Mao Zedong
Acting Chief Political Commissar	Zhou Enlai

## *Promoting the Sale of the Second Issue of Revolutionary War Bonds*

*Directive No. 17 of the Central Executive Committee*

(October 21, 1932)

Because of the development of the revolution, especially the victorious expansion of the Soviet and the Red Army, the enemy is devoting all its might to intensifying the massive attack against the Central Soviet Area. In addition to proclaiming an emergency war mobilization order to lead the workers and peasants of the entire Soviet Area to smash completely the enemy's massive attack and win victory first in Jiangxi, the Central Government is specially issuing the second batch of short-term revolutionary war bonds of 1.2 million *yuan* to augment the war funds;<sup>1</sup> this is to safeguard, even more sufficiently, the complete victory of this war, to prepare fully the war economy, and particularly to mobilize all workers and peasants to complete these preparations more rapidly. Upon receiving this order, governments at all levels must, according to past experience, immediately discuss sales plans and carry them out within a set period. The following are the specific methods of issuance:

1. Quotas for the Distribution of the Bonds

a. 150,000 *yuan* is to come from business establishments:

Tingzhou City—70,000. Ninghua—5,000. Ruijin—20,000. Huichang—8,000. Yunmenling—18,000. Guangchang—6,000. Ningdu—5,000. Xingguo—8,000. Yudu—3,000. Shicheng—3,000. Anyuan—2,000. Xunwu—2,000.

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 38, November 1, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 153–58, which reproduces the text from that source.

1. The first bond issue took place in July 1932 and consisted of 500,000 *yuan* of short-term bonds with a six-month maturity. Sales of the first series of bonds apparently went well, perhaps aided in part by the fact that the bonds could be used to pay taxes at any time, even before they matured. As it turned out, most of the bonds were promptly turned in for tax payments, leaving the government with a severe cash flow problem. Purchasers of bonds in the second issue referred to in this document were required to hold them to maturity before using them to pay taxes, and they therefore proved much harder to sell. See the discussion in Hsu Kingyi, *Political Mobilization and Economic Extraction*, pp. 285–89.

b. 986,000 *yuan* is to come from individual *xian*:

In Fujian: Changting—60,000. Shanghang—60,000. Longyan—20,000. Yongding—15,000. Xinquan—15,000. Ninghua—10,000. Tingzhou City—4,000. Wuping—1,000.

In Jiangxi: Ruijin—120,000. Xingguo—120,000. Ningdu—80,000. Huichang—64,000. Ganxian—60,000. Shengli—60,000. Gonglue—50,000. Yudu—50,000. Guangchang—40,000. Shicheng—40,000. Yongfeng—30,000. Anyuan—15,000. Xunwu—15,000. Le'an—10,000. Yihuang—5,000. Xinfeng—2,000. Wantai—40,000.

c. 60,000 *yuan* is to come from the Red Army:

From the Front—40,000. The Rear Office—10,000. The Red Army Academy—2,000. Jiangxi Military District—5,000. Fujian Military District—3,000.

d. 4,000 *yuan* is to come from Party and other political organizations:

The General Executive Office<sup>2</sup>—2,700. Headquarters of the Young Pioneers—500. Organs of the Central Government—400. The Lenin Teachers' College—300. The Central Bureau—100.

## 2. Dates of Issuance and Collection

The amount of the first batch is 306,000.

The Central Government sends the bonds out on October 26.

Sale of the bonds begins in all areas on November 1.

Collection of the proceeds is to be completed by November 15.

Longyan is to produce 20,000; Yongding, 15,000; Wuping, 1,000; Le'an, 10,000; Yihuang, 5,000; Guangchang, 46,000; Ningdu, 85,000; Anyuan, 17,000; Xunwu, 17,000; and Huichang and Yunmenling, 90,000 in all.

The amount of the second batch is 360,000.

The bonds are sent out on October 30.

Sale begins on November 1.

Collection of the proceeds is to be completed by November 15.

Ruijin is to produce 140,000; Yudu, 53,000; Tingzhou City, 74,000; Ninghua, 15,000; Shanghang, 60,000; Xinquan, 15,000; and the Fujian Military District, 3,000.

The amount of the third batch is 310,000.

The bonds are sent out on November 5.

Sale begins on November 12.

Collection of the proceeds is to be completed by the end of November.

Xingguo is to produce 128,000; Ganxian, 60,000; Gonglue, 50,000; Wantai, 40,000; Yongfeng, 30,000; and Xinfeng, 2,000.

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2. The exact nature and function of this entity (whose name in Chinese is *Quanzong zhixing ju*) is not clear.

The amount of the fourth batch is 184,000.<sup>3</sup>

The bonds are sent out on November 8.

Sale begins on November 12.

Collection of the proceeds is to be completed by the end of November.

Changting is to produce 60,000; Shicheng, 41,000; Shengli, 60,000; the Rear Office, 10,000; the Jiangxi Military District, 5,000; the Red Army Academy, 5,000; and Party and political organizations, 4,000.

The amount of the fifth batch is 40,000.

The bonds are sent out on November 12.

Sale begins on November 20.

Collection of the proceeds is to be completed by December 1.

The Red Army at the front, 40,000.

### 3. Locations for Depositing Funds

- a. All cities, *xian*, and military districts in Fujian deposit their collected funds in the Fujian branch of the state bank.
- b. In Jiangxi, Ruijin, Shicheng, Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Yudu, Shengli, Ningdu, Guangchang, the Jiangxi Military District, and Party and political organizations turn their funds in directly to the Central State Bank.
- c. In Jiangxi, Xingguo, Ganxian, Gonglue, Yongfeng, Yihuang, Wantai, Le'an, and Xinfeng deposit their funds with the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet.
- d. Red Army units at the front deposit their funds at the General Management Department.<sup>4</sup>

### 4. Methods of Mobilizing the Masses

- a. Use the method of propaganda and agitation to encourage workers and peasants to buy bonds voluntarily. Coercive orders must not be used. But quotas can be assigned in advance to rich peasants and large and medium merchants, and they may be ordered to purchase the bonds.
- b. Districts, cities, and townships are to call meetings of township deputies, report on and discuss the methods of selling the bonds, and encourage the masses to buy them. Municipal and township governments and deputies are to call meetings of voters to explain the importance of the government's sale of bonds and the obligations of citizens. In particular, political agitation should be carried out regarding participation in the revolutionary war, so that the masses will voluntarily buy the bonds.
- c. Use the method of revolutionary competition. *Xian*, districts, townships, villages, and organizations can compete with each other. Whoever purchases the most and turns in the funds the fastest is the winner. Governments at the next higher level will issue prize banners and honorary prizes.

3. The numbers which follow, as given in the Chinese text, in fact add up to 185,000.

4. The General Management Department (*zong jingli bu*) was the overall logistical support and staff organ in high-level Red Army units.

- d. In villages and towns, the deputies and the municipal and township governments are responsible for handing over the funds collected to higher levels.
- e. Governments at all levels are to determine the specific methods of implementation according to the above provisions (e.g., the methods of quota distribution, agitation, and collection). In general, whether or not the issuance of public bonds can be accomplished according to the above provisions depends above all on our work of mobilization and agitation among the masses. Whoever can actively mobilize the masses will be able to fulfill the task. The previous wrong work style of not mobilizing the masses and relying entirely on commands must be strictly corrected.

The issuance of the second issue of public bonds is entirely for the sake of meeting the needs of smashing the enemy's massive attack. It is now after the autumn harvest. Workers, peasants, the toiling masses, and the inhabitants [in general] are more active economically, and in particular, since the sale of the first issue of public bonds, the masses more easily give credit to the bonds. Governments at all levels must, on the basis of past experience, do their utmost to carry out agitation among the masses and firmly correct the previous wrong practice of assigning quotas by command without carrying out propaganda or agitation. No matter what, every place must finish sales before the deadline and turn in the collected funds on time to fulfill the task of the war. Should the previous practices of working perfunctorily and slacking once again make their appearance, those who engage in such actions will be punished in accordance with revolutionary discipline. It is so ordered.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# *Directive Letter from the Central Executive Committee to the Presidium of the Fujian Provincial Soviet*

(October 31, 1932)

The Presidium of the Fujian Provincial Soviet:

Having heard Comrade Deng Fa's report on his attendance at the meeting of the presidium of your provincial soviet,<sup>1</sup> the Central Executive Committee believes that, since the enlarged meeting, you have continued to make the previous mistakes of formalism in terms of leadership style and actual work. You continue to fail to grasp the current political situation and treat war mobilization as the central priority, which is to be used to plan all our tasks and concretely guide and advance the work of subordinate governments. Therefore, you have achieved only very minor results in terms of carrying out the resolutions of the enlarged meeting and changing your actual work (only Shanghang *xian* has made changes in its work); moreover, such results are very insignificant. This situation is, indeed, the most serious problem now for the provincial soviet. We hope that you will use the utmost efforts and determination to change this style immediately. You must absolutely not merely cry change or write a lot about change in resolutions while continuing the old ways in carrying out the actual work. If you are unable to make thorough changes in your actual work, it will greatly endanger the implementation of the tasks of the Soviet itself and the work of actively mobilizing for victory in the revolutionary war. You must regard leading war mobilization as the pivot of all tasks. You must follow the Central Executive Committee's instructions on emergency mobilization; you must fully execute the work specified by the Committee on Labor and War in its plans of emergency war mobilization. Grasp each

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Our source for this text is *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 40, November 14, 1932. The same version is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 87–89, but the Japanese editors have left a number of characters blank because they could not decipher what was apparently a rather illegible photocopy. The 1982 Beijing reprint of the newspaper that we have used is not always clear either, but we have been able to restore some of the missing characters and correct a few wrong readings.

1. This was presumably the meeting attended by Deng Fa and Xiang Ying which caused a delay in the convening of the Ningdu Conference referred to above; see "Opinions Regarding the Operations of the Front Army," September 26, 1932. Accounts of the Western Fujian revolutionary movement mention a provincial soviet government meeting on September 26–28 attended by Xiang Ying (though no mention is made of Deng Fa).

and every actual operation and specify concrete methods to guide and supervise subordinate governments in carrying them out. This is to guide the work of governments at all levels toward practical [results], so that governments at all levels may be made better able to shoulder the current great tasks of struggle and safeguard the complete victory of the revolutionary war.

In the resolution by this joint conference of the military departments of the districts of Changting, it is resolved to form a garrison company each in Tongfang and Liuyuan, with the exclusive task of defending against the militia bandits and providing security for the governments in those areas. This solution will only help the growth of conservative ideas, and cannot mobilize the masses actively to use the offensive line to develop and strengthen the Soviet Area. Such duties should be performed by model battalions and model teams of the Young Pioneers.

You should immediately correct this method of theirs. At the same time, it is written in the resolution that three units of Red Guards will be formed before the October Revolution holiday. This decision is possible in terms of the work of fully mobilizing the masses. But any decision must be conditioned upon realistic possibilities. Otherwise, resolutions become empty words. The most serious problem in the province of Fujian as a whole is writing wonderful things into resolutions that cannot be accomplished in reality. The result is that a resolution is a resolution, while the work remains the same. Therefore, our view is that, in order to fit work to reality, you should continue to comply with Directive No. 15 and form a model division in one army first. [Forming] a division requires, however, the real mobilization of the masses. It is to be formed to full strength before the October Revolution holiday; it is to be trained intensely and kept ready to be transferred at all times later. This is one of the most important tasks for strengthening southeastern Changting and developing outward, and it must not be neglected in the slightest.

For now you should devote your utmost efforts to the task of winning over and establishing [power in] Liancheng. You must select a large number of cadres and send them to Liancheng to redistribute land, form a government, and win over the local masses under the banner of the Soviet in order to consolidate the local government. In particular, your province must devote a great deal of energy to the consolidation of southeastern Changting. This is the most important task in terms of actually smashing the enemy's Fourth Encirclement Campaign.

The Central Executive Committee has not yet received the full texts of individual resolutions reached at the enlarged meeting of your provincial executive committee, so we are unable to respond right away. When we receive the full texts in the future and bring them up for review at our meetings, we will give you detailed instructions. We hope you will immediately send us all the resolutions of the enlarged meeting. A salute for war mobilization!

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



# ***A Work Report to the Whole Electorate by the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviets on Its First Anniversary***

(November 7, 1932)

Comrades of the Whole Electorate:

Today is the first anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviets. As prescribed by the First National Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies, the Provisional Central Government is making a brief report to the entire electorate on its work in the past year and the execution of its policies. We also welcome opinions and suggestions of all voters regarding the past work and future political direction of their own political power, namely, the Soviet power.

Before reporting on our work, we will first say a few words about the political situation and its development during the past year. Then we will report on the political orientation which the Central Government adopted in the light of these circumstances and how these policies were carried out.

Comrades! The political changes and development in the past year have been advancing more rapidly in all respects than in the previous year. The following are the major characteristics:

1. In the world today, the socialist Soviet Union is even more consolidated and prosperous, while the capitalist world is constantly declining. The opposition between the two systems has never been so sharp.

2. The tide of the world revolution is rising daily. The proletariat in all countries is daily placing itself under the leadership of the Communist Party, while the fascist dictatorships in the imperialist countries are spreading daily, forming the phenomenon of two polar extremes.

3. The danger of an imperialist war, and especially of a war directed against the Soviet Union, is becoming very acute.

Because the international situation is developing dramatically, imperialism is ever more eager to divide up China, the Soviet Central Government has

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been established, and the situation in China is becoming ever more acute. Therefore, in the course of the present year:

1. With the continuing and victorious development of the Soviet Government, the Guomindang government is weakening and disintegrating. The opposition between these two hostile régimes has reached an extremely fierce stage.

2. The national economy of the whole country is on the verge of total collapse. The White areas under the reign of the imperialist Guomindang have suffered great floods, droughts, and plagues. The armed massacres of the Japanese imperialists have inflicted unprecedented disasters and sacrifices on tens of thousands of worker and peasant masses.

3. The revolutionary crises throughout the country are growing daily and becoming more acute. The high tide of the anti-imperialist movement has developed into a national-revolutionary war against Japan. The volunteer armies in the Three Northeastern Provinces alone boast a total of 500,000 men. The soviet movement in particular, under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, has achieved unprecedented new development in the past year and has become the banner of national liberation for the workers and peasants of all China.

4. Therefore, in attacking the Chinese revolution, the imperialists have turned from covertly assisting the Guomindang warlords to overt armed repression. Japan has occupied the Three Northeastern Provinces and attacked Shanghai, and most recently has made an active assault on Rehe. Imperialists of all nations are actively carving up China. They organize and direct the Guomindang warlords to attack the Chinese soviets and Red Army. The danger of direct imperialist assaults on the Chinese revolution is increasing day by day.

5. The Guomindang and the warlords have openly capitulated to imperialism. In addition to selling out the Three Northeastern Provinces and signing an agreement to sell out Shanghai, they are just now engaged in betraying Rehe and the whole of China. Accepting completely the directives of the imperialists, they have concentrated all their forces to wage four large-scale "Encirclement Attacks" against the soviets and the Red Army. They are now actively engaged in preparations for another massive offensive against the Central [Soviet] Area.

As for the political situation during the past year, because of the victorious unfolding of the revolution, the balance of class forces has undergone a dramatic change. That is to say, revolutionary power has been increasing and strengthening daily, while the reactionary forces have been weakening and disintegrating. We have reached a most critical historical moment in which revolution is waging a life-or-death struggle with counterrevolution.

In the midst of these political changes and developments, the Central Government has grasped these changes and developments to lead and organize the worker and peasant masses of the whole country, to develop the revolutionary war, to win new victories for the soviet revolution, and to fight for the national liberation of the workers and peasants of the whole country.

At the beginning of this year, we adopted an overall policy of taking key cities and achieving initial victory in Jiangxi, in order to lead the national-revolutionary war against the Japanese and the Guomindang in the country as a whole. In February, the Red Army launched active offensives in Jiangxi and occupied Shanghang, Wuping, and Ninghua. Moreover, on April 5, we formally declared war on Japan. Leading and organizing the worker-peasant masses of the whole country, we will wage a national-revolutionary war to expel all imperialists from China, guarantee China's territorial integrity, and fight for the genuine independence and liberation of the Chinese nation. At the same time, to achieve this goal, we must first of all overthrow the tool of imperialist domination, the Guomindang régime. We must also expand outward actively and seize key cities, as prerequisites for engaging the Japanese. Therefore we led the Red Army in occupying Zhangzhou and Nanjing, and eliminated the armies of warlord Zhang Zhen. When the Guomindang signed the agreement to sell out Shanghai, the Central Soviet [Government] made a public declaration opposing and negating this agreement, and called on the worker-peasant masses all over the country to arm themselves and wage a national-revolutionary war against the imperialist Guomindang.

At this time, after the Red Army of Hubei-Henan-Anhui occupied Huang'an xian, it seized Huangchuan in southeastern Henan, and Liuan and Huoshan in western Anhui, and the West Hubei-Hunan Red Army occupied the whole of central Hubei, greatly expanding the size of the soviet areas. A new soviet area was set up in Shanxi and Gansu. Thus, because of the victories and development of the Soviet Red Army, the imperialist Guomindang quickly signed an agreement to sell out Shanghai, concentrated the reactionary forces all over the country, and maneuvered over eighty divisions of warlord troops to attack the [Chinese] Soviet Red Army throughout the country. They first attacked the soviet areas in West Hunan-Hubei and on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border. At that time the Central Government was leading the Red Army and the worker-peasant masses all over the country to attack actively and on all fronts, in order to smash the four "Encirclement Attacks" by the imperialist Guomindang. Under the leadership of the Central Government, the soviet areas and the Red Army all over the country won ten unprecedented victories one after the other in Hubei-Henan-Anhui. They eradicated the attacking Sichuan army in West Hunan-Hubei and won great victories in Northeast Jiangxi, the Hunan-Hubei border, and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border. On its way back from Zhangzhou, the Red Army of the Central Area routed the long-renowned tough Seventeenth and Eighteenth regiments of the Guangdong warlords. This dealt a heavy blow to the enemies from Guangdong who were invading the Soviet Area. The Red Army wiped out a total of ten divisions of the White army, routed more than twenty divisions, and captured some 50,000 guns and countless other army supplies. This was really an unprecedented great victory. Later, the Central Base Area Red Army turned north, wiped out the whole of Gao Shuxun's division, and occupied the three towns of Yi[huang],

Le[an], and Nan[feng]. It advanced close to Fuzhou and threatened Nanchang. The consecutive Red Army victories in the north sent the Guomindang into a desperate struggle to save itself from destruction, and presently they are going all out trying to launch a general offensive against the Central Area and the two flanks—Northeast Jiangxi and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi [area].

Comrades! Because of the victories of the revolution, the counter-revolutionaries are trying to rescue their moribund rule by concentrating their strength in launching increasingly large attacks on the revolution.

Comrades! This is the crucial moment when revolution and counterrevolution are engaged with one another in a life-and-death class struggle.

At present, the Provisional Central Government is resolutely leading the worker and peasant masses of the whole country to smash the massive offensive by the imperialist Guomindang. We have issued emergency mobilization orders to soviet areas and to the Red Army throughout the country, mobilizing all the worker and peasant masses in the soviet areas and all the Red Army soldiers to carry out a better-coordinated offensive strategy. We will break through one enemy flank first, actively develop soviet areas all around, and win over the broad masses of workers and peasants who live there. We will vigorously expand the Red Army, and expand and strengthen the armed forces of the worker-peasant masses, the Red Guard armies. We will consolidate and go deeply into the present soviet territory, store up sufficient money and food, mobilize all possible forces, prepare all economic resources and provisions, eliminate more enemies through victorious attacks, thoroughly smash the massive offensive of the enemy, and achieve initial victory in Jiangxi. This is the urgent task before us. This is what all our worker-peasant masses should strive and struggle for, in order to win a complete class victory.

Now we turn to a report on the action of the Central Government in carrying out all laws and decrees in the past year. Both the promulgation and implementation of these laws and decrees are intended to provide substantial guarantees for the class interests of the workers and peasants and to win victory for the soviets all over China, in order to achieve the total liberation of the worker and peasant classes.

A. By thoroughly carrying out the Land Law, investigating the redistribution of land everywhere, strictly overseeing and advising governments at all levels on how to apply the land laws, and sending people directly from the Center on several occasions to make actual investigations, the Central Government has ensured that the benefits of the agrarian revolution are being enjoyed by poor and middle peasants and farm laborers, not usurped by rich peasants. In most places land has indeed been confiscated from the despotic landlords and the evil gentry and their families, and rich peasants have had their land confiscated and been given pieces of poor land, so that the poor and middle peasants and farm laborers have received actual benefits. In some places, however, because of deficiencies in the local governments, the land law has not yet been swiftly, thoroughly, and completely applied. This is a serious shortcoming.

B. As regards the application of the Labor Law, the first point to discuss is that governments at all levels demonstrate a tendency to slow down the work in carrying out this law. The Central Government has engaged in many resolute struggles against these tendencies, but even though an investigation system has been established, the work done has not been very realistic or thorough. At present, in the cities a substantial part of the Labor Law has been carried out—the eight-hour day, the break system, collective bargaining, and so on. There is still, however, a lot that has not been carried out. Especially in the countryside, the Labor Law has not yet been concretely applied. This is detrimental to the safeguarding of the workers' interests. We should openly recognize that this is a mistake, which should be corrected immediately.

C. There have been considerable achievements in carrying out economic policies during the past year. The resumption of commerce has, in particular, enabled importation of the daily necessities of the worker-peasant masses to continue uninterrupted in spite of the enemy's embargo. In order to increase production, industry and trade investment regulations have been issued, but the soviets still do not export as many products as they import, mainly because of the enemy blockade and the flight of the capitalists. In carrying out economic policies, however, governments at all levels have made another sort of mistake, which is that in some places undue concessions have been made to the capitalists, thereby harming the interests of the masses of workers.

In addition, a National Bank has been founded to issue paper currency and coins, forming the basis of a unified monetary system to coordinate financial activities. At the same time, loan regulations have also been issued for the convenience of the worker-peasant masses who need temporary loans.

Tax regulations have been issued and all the numerous heavy taxes of the Guomindang and warlords have been completely abolished. Progressive taxation has been put into practice, to place the heavier tax burden on the capitalists, the rich peasants, and the wealthy. Red Army soldiers, workers, farm laborers, and coolies are exempt from taxation. The impoverished masses are either exempt from taxation or enjoy a reduction in taxes.

D. Carrying out the Regulations on Preferential Treatment of Red Army Soldiers: the Central Government has decided on concrete measures for putting into effect preferential treatment as stipulated in the regulations. In the vast majority of cases land has been set aside for Red Army soldiers who are from outside areas, and the masses have been led to organize cultivation teams to help the Red Army families till their land. The post office has put into practice the policy of delivering free of charge Red Army soldiers' letters to their families. A Red Army pension policy has been promulgated, and pension committees have been organized. In addition, to encourage and give preferential treatment to worker-peasant masses and government employees who lead or participate in the war effort, pension regulations on war casualties for Red Guards and government employees have also been promulgated. It has, however, been discovered on investigation that many ad-

ministrative bodies have not carried the policies through and have slowed down the process. Especially lacking is their ability to lead the masses very well in helping Red Army soldiers' families, which is an extremely serious problem. In some places (Changting in Fujian, for example) it has even happened that government employees not only fail to carry out the regulations on preferential treatment for Red Army soldiers, but actually turn around and demand that the masses give preferential treatment to them. This action is completely illegal. Besides severely punishing these elements who go slow or violate the law, the Central Government calls on all worker-peasant comrades to fight these selfish elements and to supervise vigilantly local governments in resolutely carrying out this action.

E. Establishing a correct line toward and a legal process for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries: There have been great achievements in the past year. The past errors of ignoring class distinctions and priorities have been rectified, corporal punishment has been completely abolished, and a structure for the State Security Bureau has been established to carry out the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries. The Central Committee has established a Provisional Supreme Court and various levels of judicial departments, and formulated principles on the execution of counterrevolutionaries and on how to handle counterrevolutionary cases. In this process, however, cases have been discovered in which counterrevolutionaries were pardoned or released. Although the Central Committee has since tried hard to correct it, this sort of mistake still exists to some extent at all levels of government. Now that the enemy is launching massive attacks, counterrevolutionaries are bound to use this opportunity to become more active. Especially in the face of the Guomindang effort to unite all reactionary forces in their offensive, the problem of eliminating counterrevolutionaries has become increasingly important to safeguarding our victory. All voter comrades should unite as one to help the government eliminate all counterrevolutionary factions—the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Trotskyite-Chen Duxiu Liquidationists, the Third Party, the Reorganization Clique, and so on—and their activities, and eliminate all feudal and superstitious organizations and activities used by the counterrevolutionaries—the Big Sword Society, the One Heart Society, the Idlers' Society, the Boy Scouts, the Red Spear Society, and so on.

F. To protect the rights of women, the Central Government first issued the Marriage Law to eliminate totally the old feudal marriage system, carry out freedom of marriage, and guarantee all the rights of women in divorce and marriage. In carrying out this law, in practice many government leaders have completely violated the law and instead have upheld the feudal marriage system. Many worker and peasant comrades still do not understand that instituting the freedom of marriage means eliminating feudal remnants totally, and protecting the rights of women, and therefore much squabbling has occurred. In order to protect the rights of women, the Central Government will severely punish all governments and their officials who violate the Marriage Law. But it hopes that

all worker-peasant comrades will necessarily come to realize that the old practices of husbands beating wives, mercenary marriages, and maltreatment of child brides are part of the feudal system. Our revolution can succeed only if the feudal forces are totally eliminated and imperialism is overthrown, so everyone should unite in supporting the execution of this law. In order to carry out concretely the protection of women's rights, the Central Committee has declared and established various levels of Committees for the Improvement of Women's Lives to take charge of this task.

G. To consolidate and strengthen the mainstay of the revolutionary war—the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army—a political commissar system has been set up and a set of regulations for political work has been issued. A large-scale Red Army Academy has been founded, which has trained quite a number of new cadres and enhanced the military techniques of the Red Army. The Red Army is being expanded and methods for expansion of the army have been decided upon (Directive No. 15). In the past, however, governments at all levels have not considered the expansion of the Red Army an important item on their agendas, and have not used political propaganda and agitation to rouse the masses to join the army actively and voluntarily, but have rather used coercion and giving orders. Some administrative bodies in particular have lacked thoroughness in carrying out the regulations on preferential treatment. All of this is tantamount to impeding the work of expanding the Red Army. The Central Government has recently been making forceful efforts to rectify these mistakes. At present, expanding the Red Army is an essential condition for guaranteeing complete victory in war. Especially in order to eliminate more of the attacking enemies, greater efforts must be made to expand the Red Army.

Comrades! To gain complete victory in the war, everyone must enthusiastically join the Red Army!

In order to arm all the masses of workers and peasants, the Central Government has specially issued the organizational principles, training methods, and tasks of the Red Guard Army. The Red Guard Army and Young Pioneers have been established, with several hundred thousand members. Only by arming the whole of the worker-peasant masses can we form the greatest class military force, which will be able to destroy any enemy completely.

H. In accordance with our economic policies, we have decided on a financial system and policy orientation. Financial regulations have been formally issued, and finances are to be unified, in order to root out strictly the old phenomenon of independent accounting systems. As regards deciding on a fiscal year and establishing a system for budget proposal and approval, some *xian* in the Central Area have already had success in this work, and some have not yet eliminated [bad practices]. As regards punishing corruption and waste in particular, some governments are still unable to carry this out. The greatest achievements are having rectified the old financial policy of just robbing the local bullies, the rectification of tax collection, and establishing a financial basis, especially in terms of supply-

ing the Red Army, thereby greatly reducing the Red Army's fund-raising burden, enabling the Red Army to concentrate all its resources on developing and waging the revolutionary war.

The primary use for funds is to develop the war front and to supplement expenditure on the revolutionary war. The first issue of 600,000 [yuan] of revolutionary war bonds was quickly sold, with the support of the broad masses of workers and peasants. This was truly a great help in advancing the war effort. Recently, the second round of bonds has been put on sale, for the purpose of thoroughly smashing the enemy's massive assault. Comrades! To purchase bonds eagerly is to participate actively in the war effort!

I. In establishing an educational administrative system, formalizing the primary school system, founding primary schools in each township, actively training primary school teachers, and founding the Lenin Teachers' College, there have been considerable achievements. As far as adult education and a literacy campaign are concerned, however, substantial forces have not yet been gathered to carry them out, and they have not been developed widely. This is a very great shortcoming.

J. As for the establishment and reorganization of transportation and communications, regulations on road and bridge repairs have been issued and various levels of government have been supervised in carrying them out. Considerable achievements have been recorded in this respect, especially in terms of military transportation. In addition, the postal system in the Central Area has been unified and a standardized postal system has been established, which is a great help to military and worker-peasant communications.

In addition, in order to develop the economy of the soviet areas and support the interests of the worker and peasant masses, regulations on cooperatives have been promulgated to aid and lead the cooperative movement everywhere. At the same time, we have directed this year's spring plowing and increased production in the countryside. We have led governments at all levels in helping to solve various problems involved in spring plowing, such as the problem of draft cattle, seeds, and farm tools. It has been decided that a tree-planting movement will take place every spring. To guarantee the health of the workers and peasants, regulations on inoculations have been issued and anti-epidemic campaigns have been launched in various locations. Where the enemy inflicted extensive damage during the three campaigns last year,<sup>1</sup> the Central Committee has made use of some funds for relief to the local masses, and at the same time led the Red Army and governments at all levels in rescue campaigns to donate draft cattle, funds, and clothes.

Comrades! This is a general account of what the Central Government has done over the past year in its administrative role. The main shortcoming is that not all tasks could be thoroughly carried out, and that not all work was done

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1. I.e., during the first three "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns.



thoroughly. We hope that all comrade voters will criticize and make suggestions regarding our past administrative work, that they will enthusiastically participate in all the government's administrative functions, and that they will supervise and assist governments at all levels to carry out thoroughly all programs and laws!

This year, the Central Government has put a lot of effort and attention into building the soviets.

1. It has issued regulations governing the division of administrative areas, in order to facilitate leadership of the present struggle.

2. It has established a system of urban and township soviet deputies' conferences, and laid the basis for worker-peasant soviets at the lower levels.

3. Based on the principle of the workers' and peasants' dictatorship, it has laid down principles and methods for soviet elections, correcting the previous erroneous election process in which class origin was disregarded.

4. It has prescribed organization and work methods for local soviets.

5. In order to establish strong and capable soviets and to formulate the basic principles of soviet organization and its tasks, the Central Government proclaimed soon after its founding that a reelection and reformation of the local soviets should be carried out, from the bottom to the top. A significant number of worker-peasant masses were mobilized to participate in the soviet elections, and the broad masses of workers and peasants were called in to participate in government affairs and in urban and township deputies' conferences. Class-alien elements hiding within the government were expelled, and elements who engaged in slowdowns and corruption were expelled from the soviets. But because mobilization at all levels of government was insufficient, we have not fully achieved our purpose. Recently it has been further proclaimed that we will continue to reform the local governments, the criterion being to make them better in leading the war and in carrying out policies.

6. It has established an inspection system and a system to check on work progress, to carry out the inspection of the work of the local soviets. In actuality, however, to date they have not yet been fully established.

7. In order to supervise government employees and to prevent bureaucratic corruption, and to strengthen the inspection work of the workers and peasants, prosecution bureaus have been established at all levels and the organization and work of the task forces has been determined. This job and these organizations have not, however, been able to attract the participation of various mass organizations and worker-peasant activists, and therefore they have not had any real influence.

8. It has established urban people's police stations to check on registered household members, but this work has just begun in a few cities and most of them have not actually been established.

9. It has proclaimed and carried out the organization of labor reform camps.

10. It has issued guidelines for the organization and tasks of various depart-

ments and established an administrative system and work [assignments] for the various departments.

11. It has held soviet staff training courses to train soviet cadres.

12. Because the organization is as yet incomplete, the various commissariats of the Central Government are not yet able to carry out fully the tasks of each commissariat and the work of the administrative system at all levels.

Of course there has been much progress to date in the organization and work of the soviets, but there remain as well many shortcomings and imperfections. In the current efforts to smash the massive enemy assault, we must build strong and capable soviets to lead the worker-peasant masses in expanding the war and defeating the enemy attacks. This requires that all voter comrades participate actively in reforming the soviets and perfecting the organization and work of the soviets.

The last point to discuss is the Central Government's direction of and relationship with the local soviet governments in localities throughout the country.

Because at present the various soviet areas in the country are not all connected with one another, and there are communications difficulties plus barriers formed by White regions, all this adds to the difficulty of the conditions in which the Central Government carries out its work of directing the soviet areas all over the country. Consequently the presence of the Central Government is felt only in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces and in Ruijin *xian*, which is under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government. As for other places such as the Hunan-Jiangxi border area and the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi border area, even though they are relatively close, traffic blockades sometimes make it impossible to communicate by mail. As for the Hubei-Henan-Anhui border area, Northeast Jiangxi, Qiongya in Guangdong, the East River, and the Left and Right Rivers in Guangxi, they are of course even further away, making direct communication often impossible, so that aside from exerting political leadership, giving guidance about the work is difficult. The Central Government is making every effort to lead the soviet areas all over the country to expand actively and to seize the key cities that stand in the way of linking up the soviet areas—Ganzhou, Ji'an, Nanchang, and Fuzhou—aiming at complete victory first in Jiangxi, and then merging the soviet areas all over the country into one enormous piece of territory!

The Central Government regularly leads and supervises work in Jiangxi, Fujian, and Ruijin, but we do not feel that this is sufficient. Further efforts must be made.

Comrade voters! Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, this year the primary political orientation established and carried out by the Central Soviet [Government] has been to develop the revolutionary war, to safeguard past victories with more soviet victories, and to fight for the national liberation of the Chinese workers and peasants. Therefore, the main component in all our work has been the war effort. At the same time, all the shortcomings and weaknesses in the work are manifested in the inability of the work to adapt to the

developments and needs of the revolution. This is a tremendous inadequacy. It is our hope that all comrade voters will examine these shortcomings and help the Soviet Government overcome them. This will make the soviets stronger and more capable of completing their great historic task.

Comrades! This year, the revolution has made great progress. In particular, the soviet movement under the Central Government has attained unprecedented growth nationwide. The Red Army has won unprecedented victories. In response, the counterrevolutionaries greatly stepped up their attacks on the revolution, pushing the class struggle to the stage of a life-and-death struggle.

Comrade voters! Seeing the victorious development of the worker-peasant revolution, the counterrevolutionaries go all out to suppress and resist the revolution. The despotic gentry, landlords, and capitalists are attempting daily to seize back their land, to go on collecting rent, to reduce wages, and to lengthen working hours, all to restore their exploitation of the toiling masses of workers and peasants. The Guomindang warlords are going all out to attack the soviets and the Red Army, because the soviets constitute the political power of the workers and peasants and because the Red Army is their army. Representing the imperialists, the despotic gentry, the landlords, and the capitalists, the Guomindang warlords constitute an enemy who is attacking the toiling masses of workers and peasants. This is a class struggle to the death.

Comrades! The imperialists and the Guomindang are the deadly enemies of our class! If we do not overthrow imperialism and the rule of the Guomindang, we have no way to guarantee the victory of agrarian revolution or to win total victory for our class.

Comrades! We will use war as a means to shatter the Fourth Encirclement Attack by the imperialists and the Guomindang, to win victory first in Jiangxi, and to send the Guomindang to its grave! Drive imperialism out of China!

Comrade voters! The Central Government has issued an emergency war mobilization order! The Red Army is actively attacking the enemy at the front, has defeated the enemy on one flank, and has occupied the four towns of Lichuan, Jianning, Taining, and Shaowu! Let all mobilize as one!

Rush to join the Red Army! Strengthen the Red Army forces to eliminate the invading enemies!

All male and female comrades, worker and peasant comrades, join the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers! Take up arms and attack the enemy!

Actively expand outward, enlarge the soviet areas, and strengthen the forces of revolutionary war!

Actively attack the enemy and do not allow the enemy to harass the soviet areas!

Buy bonds enthusiastically! Pay land taxes quickly! Store up grain! Solidify the war economy!

Quickly destroy all city walls and former enemy fortresses!

Actively carry out the task of eliminating counterrevolutionaries! Eliminate all activity of reactionary factions!

Tighten the Red martial law! Don't let a single enemy spy into the Soviet Area!

Comrades! As we celebrate the first anniversary of the establishment of the Central Government, the war is at a truly critical moment. Let victory in the war serve to commemorate the glorious holiday of the October Revolution and to support the Soviet Government!

Comrade voters! The present situation is most favorable to the development of our revolution. Our soviet areas are expanding! The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is growing stronger! The masses of workers and peasants are increasing in number! The enemy's force is weakened! We have the prerequisites for victory. Our slogan is, "Everything for war, away with all hesitation, concentrate all our forces, prepare for any sacrifice, this time we will certainly win."

The Provisional Chinese Soviet Central Government

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

## *Order No. 34 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(November 12, 1932)

A large-scale revolutionary war is now being successfully waged. The reorganization and perfection of hospitals and military depots is of vital importance to the revolutionary war, so the Council of People's Commissars has taken the following special decisions:

1. As for Young Pioneers in places where there are hospitals, male members should serve as nurse's aides and female members should shoulder the task of doing the hospital laundry; the Young Pioneers detachments in places near the various hospitals should be prepared at all times to send members to work in the hospitals.

2. As for Young Pioneers detachments in places that are rather far from hospitals, they should also be ready at all times to send members to the hospitals to work as nurses' aides and to do the laundry.

3. Local Red Guard armies are responsible for providing the various hospitals with cooks as needed.

4. Transportation and security for the various military depots is to be entirely the responsibility of the Red Guard armies along the routes, taking turns in relay transportation.

5. All Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers who take on hospital or military depot work should have their various other chores accordingly reduced or eliminated altogether by higher-level organizations.

All items listed above are to be carried out as ordered, without fail. This order is issued to:

Soviet governments at all levels

All Red Army units

Headquarters of all military regions

Garrison Headquarters in Rui[jin] and [Chang]ting

General Headquarters of the Young Pioneers

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 40, November 14, 1932. We have translated it from that source; several characters are missing from the version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 105-06.

# ***Conscript the Rich Peasants and Organize Forced Labor Brigades***

*Order No. 35 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(November 25, 1932)

Now is a tense period in the revolutionary war and there are many pressing tasks. In order to reduce the burden of war work on the worker and peasant masses, a special decision has been made to conscript rich peasants into forced labor brigades to perform various tasks within the Soviet Area, under surveillance by the Red Guard armies—urban fortification demolition, road-building, inland transportation, and so on. This kind of forced labor group is composed of rich peasants conscripted by force. They are to be treated differently from ordinary transportation teams in every way. The following measures are to be taken:

1. All local governments must organize into forced labor brigades every rich peasant who is able to work. While they are working, the Red Guard Army is to be dispatched to oversee them (one Red Guard Army soldier should be sent to oversee every five forced laborers). They should be sent immediately to tear down city walls and earthen fortifications, destroy all enemy defense works previously built within soviet territory, and repair roads and bridges. They should also take care of transportation along the routes between military depots within the Soviet Area and a part of the work of carrying heavy and bulky items.

2. As for provisions for the forced labor brigades, they are to bring their own food. However, if doing transportation work involving more than a two-day journey, the government can provide them with rice and they can use their own funds for the rest of their provisions.

The various local governments are expected to carry out the above decisions immediately and conscientiously.

It is so ordered.

To soviet governments at all levels.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 42, November 28, 1932. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 159–60.

# *Plant More Miscellaneous Grains and Eradicate Narcotic Crops*

## *Proclamation No. 13 of the Provisional Central Government*

(November 25, 1932)

At present, in order that the revolutionary war may continue on its victorious offensive and long-term struggle, and in order that we may thoroughly defeat the enemy's all-out attacks and achieve still greater victories, we must be fully prepared. Grain is a particularly important item, not only in terms of provisions for the Red Army, but also as it directly affects the daily lives of the worker and peasant masses. Therefore, to boost the sources of grain and to ensure that the Red Army and the broad masses of workers and peasants in the Soviet Area do not experience any difficulties from grain shortage, the Provisional Central Government has made the following special resolutions:

1. Plant more miscellaneous cereals and vegetables. This is the best time to plant miscellaneous cereals. All workers and peasants should do their best to plant miscellaneous cereals and vegetables, to make up for rice shortages.

2. Cultivation of the poppy is prohibited.<sup>1</sup> Opium is the most detrimental of all drugs. Evil gentry and landlords use it as a tool to benumb the workers and peasants, and it should be absolutely banned in the Soviet Area. Planting of the poppy also interferes with the cultivation of miscellaneous cereals and with next spring's plowing. It reduces food sources and hinders the revolutionary war. Therefore, within our entire Soviet Area, this year there must be absolutely no more poppy cultivation allowed, and miscellaneous cereals should be planted instead.

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1. The text speaks of "cultivating opium" (*zhong yapi'an*), but, as technically speaking it is not "opium" itself that is cultivated but rather the poppies from which opium is made, we have altered the text accordingly. As mentioned in a previous note (see above, "On Mobilization for War and Work in the Rear," July 7, 1932), opium poppies are known to have been grown in several *xian* in the heart of the Central Soviet Area—including Xingguo, Ningdu, and Yudu—and previous efforts by warlord and Nationalist governments to interfere with the growing had met with local popular resistance.

The above resolutions are issued entirely in the interests of the revolutionary war and in the interests of the masses of workers and peasants, and should be strictly followed by everyone without exception. Recently some rich peasants are said to be sabotaging our policies by instigating the masses to plant poppy, so as to reduce grain production in the Soviet Area and poison the workers and peasants. This kind of calculated undermining of the revolution is absolutely intolerable in the Soviet Area. All local governments, revolutionary organizations, and every worker and peasant should keep strict surveillance over the rich peasants who instigate the masses to plant poppy, who deliberately subvert the revolution. They will be severely punished for their crimes. We earnestly entreat all levels of governments, all mass organizations, all workers and peasants to realize the situation and conscientiously carry out this order.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



# *On Mobilization for War and Methods of Work*

## *Emergency Decision of the Council of People's Commissars*

(November 29, 1932)

The results of the recent investigation into the execution of the emergency mobilization order in all areas are extremely disappointing. Following upon the letter from the Committee for Labor and War sent to all locations, in which [problems] were enumerated one by one, the Council of People's Commissars more solemnly points out that the main reason for the occurrence of this phenomenon is errors in political understanding.

1. Most commonly it is underestimating the seriousness of the enemy's massive attack and—in a reflection of the most backward ideology prevalent among the masses, that of being content with temporary peace and tranquility—going about business as usual, banking on the fact that the enemy has not appeared yet. This naturally makes it impossible to carry out urgent tasks.

2. In border areas, going into a panic when harassed by the enemy. This is a failure to recognize that the current situation is favorable to the revolution, a lack of self-confidence in the revolution, a defeatist attitude, which impedes the carrying out of mobilization work.

3. Erroneous understanding of offensive strategy, thinking that this is the task of the Red Army alone, and that one can sit around waiting for Red Army victories. In border areas even more dependence on the Red Army is displayed, and people do not take any initiative to go out and attack the enemy. With this kind of passive stance, it is impossible to carry out actively an offensive strategy in its various aspects, and all emergency mobilization work is inevitably abandoned.

The Council of People's Commissars calls on governments at all levels and local military leadership organizations to wage resolutely a relentless struggle against these political errors; to oppose underestimation of the enemy's massive attack, and especially the backward ideology of being content with temporary peace and tranquility, and banking on the fact that the enemy has not yet arrived; and to oppose resolutely the stance of panicking at enemy attacks and the conser-

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vative wait-and-see attitude. All of this is most harmful to the progress of emergency mobilization work for smashing the enemy's all-out offensive.

The Council of People's Commissars solemnly urges governments at all levels and local military leadership organizations to become deeply aware that at present the enemy is actively building truck routes, organizing military depots, establishing and expanding landlord armed forces, expanding anti-Communist leagues and anti-Communist volunteer armies all around the soviet areas, collecting military funds on a large scale, and adding large numbers of troops. In particular, he is escalating his attacks on the soviet areas of Northeastern Jiangxi, the Hunan-Hupei-Jiangxi border area, and the Hunan-Jiangxi border area. This is an indication that the enemy is planning even more carefully for a general offensive against the Central Soviet Area, and is preparing a long-term effort. It must be deeply understood that this counterattack against the enemy's general offensive is a long-term struggle that will be the toughest and most brutal struggle we have ever had, that it is a crucial moment in the decisive class struggle, and that we must use all our strength to fight for victory in this battle.

At the same time it should be pointed out that, although the enemy is stronger militarily in this offensive as a result of direct imperialist aid, he is much weaker politically and is facing much more serious internal problems than in the previous three campaigns. The enemy troops attacking the soviet areas are full of discontent and hesitancy. At the same time, we are aided by the progress of national revolution and the expansion and strengthening of the [Chinese] Soviet Red Army. We can mobilize all resources to make sacrifices in the interest of the war. We can win total victory in this campaign and achieve victory first in Jiangxi.

In investigating the work of mobilization, we have discovered another serious phenomenon, which is a workstyle divorced from the masses, marked by a failure to rouse the masses politically and mobilize them organizationally, and by relying entirely upon coercion of the masses and giving orders to the masses. At the same time, the development of this style is closely related to the political errors mentioned above:

1. Because of failure to recognize the seriousness of the enemy's general offensive, naturally it is also impossible to recognize the importance of mobilizing the broad masses of workers and peasants, and there is failure to carry out broad political mobilization work on the basis of mobilization of the masses.

2. The bureaucratic leadership style of leading organs at all levels toward subordinates is merely to give orders or send down resolutions and plans, without giving any guidance or supervision as to concrete methods for carrying them out, or the various measures for mobilizing the masses. Either people are simply ordered to do things or they are subjected to punishment and threats. This in turn leads to the common occurrence of the phenomenon of coercing the masses and ordering them around at the lower levels.

3. There is a manifestation of an undisciplined and disorganized workstyle, in which neither assemblies of voters, nor conferences of deputies, nor any of the mass organizations are used to arouse the masses and strengthen the mobilization of the masses. This inevitably leads to coercing the masses and ordering them around.

4. With a bureaucratic workstyle, it is naturally impossible to do the painstaking work of mobilizing the masses and, for the sake of convenience, coercion and giving orders are used instead.

These phenomena are quite widespread in the emergency mobilization. Most obvious is the failure to respond to the Central Committee's emergency mobilization directive to summon assemblies of voters, deputies' conferences, or meetings of the Red Guard armies, Young Pioneers, and all mass organizations, to make detailed reports and explanations, and to carry out thoroughly the work of political mobilization. Until now, the vast majority of the masses still do not understand the enemy's all-out offensive, and this naturally makes it impossible to realize all mobilization efforts on the basis of mass initiative. For example, in expanding the Red Army, it has been impossible to achieve what had been planned, and it has been impossible to cause young men and women of the worker and peasant masses to join the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers enthusiastically and voluntarily. Instead drills have been forced on them as a form of punishment. Especially in collecting land taxes and issuing government bonds, not enough political propaganda has been done beforehand so that each worker and peasant element would understand why land tax was being collected and the reasons for purchasing government bonds. When collecting [taxes] and issuing [bonds], in turn, there has been failure to call various kinds of meetings and to use urban and township deputies to encourage the masses to pay land taxes and buy more bonds voluntarily. When doubts have arisen among the masses, detailed explanations have not been offered. Instead, methods for coercing the rich peasants and capitalists have been applied to the masses of workers and peasants, and this has led to a serious phenomenon of alienation from the masses. All of this has actually added to the difficulties in collecting land taxes and issuing government bonds, and affected the rest of the mobilization work. What a serious problem this is!

This style of coercion and issuing orders is not only manifest in the emergency mobilization, but also permeates all types of work in the soviets. What fosters the development of this sort of workstyle is that various leading organs are guilty of severe bureaucratism in their leadership. In receiving and carrying out orders from above, they either pass on the order as is or just leave it in the envelope unopened. There are no meetings to work out concrete measures of application based on detailed discussion of the local situation as a way of guiding the work at the lower level. As for the results of application, there is never any investigation and there is no concern for what is accomplished, only for going through the motions. Application is carried out completely on the basis of simply

issuing commands. Whatever the time, whatever the task, work is done by force of habit and meetings are held in a routine fashion. This is bureaucratism through and through.

Bureaucratism alienates the masses, damages relations between the soviets and the masses, and poses an enormous threat to the victory and development of the soviets. Just going through the motions or paying lip service, coercion, and issuing orders are major manifestations of bureaucratism, which absolutely must not be allowed to exist in soviet governments. This sort of bureaucratism has infested soviet governments:

1. because of contamination by semifeudal Chinese society and the bureaucratism of the Guomindang;
2. because of the scattered nature of the peasantry, and their lack of proletarian organization and discipline; and
3. because of a lack of the spirit of hard struggle and merely seeking short-term advantages, which causes bureaucratism to infest soviet organizations and to flourish there day by day.

The Council of People's Commissars calls upon soviet organizations at all levels and the broad masses of workers and peasants to wage a unified and most determined struggle against bureaucratism, in order to eliminate bureaucratism in the soviet organs and drive out hopelessly corrupt bureaucratic elements. In order to consolidate the workers' and peasants' soviet political power, and at the same time create a new soviet work style, it will be necessary to do the following:

1. All work should be based on the mobilization of the masses. Whoever rejects mass mobilization work has inevitably alienated himself from the masses.
2. The application of legal decrees and resolutions should not be based only upon giving orders. For the most part, it is better to rely upon raising the class consciousness and enthusiasm of the masses to support the application of legal decrees.
3. Mobilization of the masses should depend on thorough political propaganda and agitation.
4. As for ways in which to mobilize the masses, various sorts of soviet organizations should be called into play to rouse the masses, as well as all mass organizations. Urban and township deputies' conferences and voters' assemblies are tools to rouse the masses directly. The workers' unions are pillars in mobilizing the masses.
5. Every decision should be realistic and feasible. To be opposed are all empty, broad decisions that are not concrete, and holding meetings in a routine fashion without any preparation or any results whatsoever.
6. In carrying out orders, attention should be paid to ways of rousing the masses. At the same time, attention should be given to the opinions of the masses, as reference in deciding upon methods of implementation.
7. Upon receipt of directives and decisions from above, meetings should immediately be held to engage in detailed discussion and determine concrete measures for carrying them out.

8. In carrying out orders, one's own work should be frequently examined as to whether or not goals have been achieved and whether there are mistakes or improprieties.

9. All work should be divided appropriately according to work relationships. Not only all departments and all comrades should do this, but even when giving directions to lower levels, work should be assigned according to the situation.

10. In giving guidance to lower levels, it should be specific, concrete, and include numerous directives regarding methods.

11. Documents should not be issued lightly; rather give direction through inspection more often. Inspection personnel should not view the flowers from horseback or stand on the sidelines and criticize. Rather, they are to investigate the work responsibly, and help their subordinates solve problems in their work.

12. Organize work teams to give direct assistance to lower levels in their work. The responsibility of the work team is to get the work in that place done well, not to criticize others without lifting a finger. The work team's method of work is to concentrate its strength to improve the work in one place and then move on to the next place. There should be a division of labor, with each person in charge of one task, and getting the job done well in one place at a time.

13. Meetings should not be held lightly. There should be preparation before meetings, and results, and things must actually get done.

14. In holding mass meetings, thorough preparations must be made beforehand. In every case, political agitation should suit the demands of the masses and be tied to their own interests. Speeches should be simple and clear and have a rousing effect.

The soviet workstyle is oriented toward the masses; is realistic, organized, and disciplined; and involves the ability to endure hard struggle. All methods divorced from the masses represent the style of bureaucratism.

The Council of People's Commissars calls on soviet organizations at all levels to mobilize in an urgent fashion, to oppose all misunderstandings of and lax behavior with regard to the enemy's all-out attack, to purge all soviet organizations of bureaucratism, and to strive toward the creation of a soviet workstyle and the rapid accomplishment of all tasks prescribed by the emergency mobilization order.

All soviet organizations—from the province all the way to the township—must, immediately upon receipt of this resolution, hold meetings to examine and evaluate their own work, with a self-critical spirit expose all errors in the work, lay down concrete measures for carrying out [the resolution], and report the results of the discussion to the Central Committee.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

# *On the Inspection of the Election Movement at All Levels*

## *Resolution of the Central Executive Committee*

(December 1, 1932)

It has been almost two months since the Central Committee announced on September 20 that governments at all levels are to carry out reelections of the various governments in accordance with election regulations.<sup>1</sup> Results of examination of the reelections are as follows:

1. Not a single *xian* has completed the election process according to Directive No. 16.

2. The election campaign at all levels has been peaceful, without the use of struggle to rouse the masses to participate in the elections.

3. The election campaign has been kept separate from the current urgent military tasks. Either all war mobilization has been dropped for the elections, or the reelection campaign has been postponed because of being occupied with the work of mobilization for battle. (For example, in Wantai the reelection was put off until after bonds had been issued.)

4. There has been failure to observe election regulations, making do by appointing deputies without going through election by voters. Class-alien elements and those who have turned over a new leaf have even been appointed to serve as deputies (for example, at the Huichang *xian* congress of deputies).

5. On the provincial and *xian* levels, perfunctoriness and passivity have been manifested toward the election campaign.

Judging by the situation as described above, this election campaign has been a complete failure. It is a clear indication that governments at all levels have failed to recognize from a political standpoint that the reelections and strong local soviet governments constitute an important foundation in leading the masses of workers and peasants to smash the enemy's all-out offensive. In addition, it even

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This text first appeared in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 43, December 5, 1932. We have translated it from that version, because a number of characters are missing in the version reprinted in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 169–72.

1. See above, "On the Problem of Continuing the Reform of Local Soviet Governments," September 20, 1932.

more blatantly reveals the bureaucratism of soviet governments at all levels in carrying out instructions and orders.

The Central Executive Committee holds that strong local soviet governments will create a powerful lever for leading the masses of workers and peasants to smash the enemy's all-out attack. At the same time, on the basis of the fact that in the past during the first, second, and third stages of the war<sup>2</sup> there were class-alien elements hidden in soviet organizations and serious incidents occurred such as people turning traitor, it has been decided to carry out strict surveillance of this election campaign. Any [election] that does not conform to the following regulations<sup>3</sup> shall be declared invalid and a new election shall be held.

1. Elections held without mobilizing the broad masses to participate in voting assemblies.

2. Those elected are not approved or supported by the majority of voters. (For example, in many places recently, a list of names was put forward prior to the election, which was first approved by the higher authorities before it was presented to the voting body. This usurpation of power goes against the voters' sentiments.)

3. Those elected are not the most revolutionary or most active members of the worker-peasant masses. (For example, deserters or those who are not enthusiastic in doing all sorts of day-to-day work.)

As for reelections and the regulations in Directive No. 16, where reelections are in order but have not taken place, they should be conducted immediately. Especially to make this reelection campaign a broad movement to mobilize the masses, to carry out the emergency war mobilization, and to fortify leadership organizations to smash the enemy's all-out attack, it is necessary to carry out the following work in the elections.

1. In elections in the cities and the townships, extensive political mobilization work should be undertaken among the masses. Its content is as follows:

a. Appeal to the masses on the basis that in order to ensure the thorough application of the labor laws and land laws, everyone must actively participate in the election campaign, to establish a strong government that is truly capable of enforcing all laws.

b. Make the worker-peasant masses understand that the Soviet Government is their own government, and that if bad people are elected to do the work, they cannot work for the common good.

c. Suffrage is the right of the workers and peasants. Those who have the right to vote may attain many rights and privileges. Rich peasants, landlords, and capitalists have been deprived of the right to vote, which is why the landlords get no land, the rich peasants get poor land, and the capitalists have no status. People should not give up their rights.

2. I.e., the first three campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression."

3. The wording here is clearly faulty: the intended meaning is "any election that does not conform to regulations in the following respects should be declared invalid."

2. From the standpoint of political mobilization, first it should be announced to the masses in every village and every street, the labor unions, poor peasant leagues, and so on, that all organizations are to hold meetings to discuss the question of elections, so that each member of the masses knows that this town or this village needs to advance and understands the importance of the elections. When the time comes, everyone will participate in the elections on his own initiative.

3. Using the right to supervise elections, the masses should be mobilized to struggle against undercover rich peasants and class-alien elements and to participate actively in the elections.

4. Elections should be carried out not only in strict compliance with the procedures set out in the election statutes, but also in the spirit of examining the work, especially by mobilizing the masses to criticize the past work of the deputies and governments in terms of examining all laws for guaranteeing the interests of the worker-peasant masses, to oppose bureaucratism, and to choose carefully the people they wish to represent them.

5. Make use of the election campaign and election assemblies to make reports on, or hold discussions of, the Central Committee's emergency mobilization decree, awaken the enthusiasm of the masses, and engage in war mobilization.

6.<sup>4</sup> In the perspective of carrying out thoroughly the Labor Law and the Land Law and establishing a strong and powerful government, make the masses realize that the enemy's all-out offensive is aimed at toppling the Soviet Government and putting the landlords and capitalists back in power to oppress the workers and peasants. Raise the class consciousness of the masses and their determination to fight the enemy, and struggle to the end to defend the benefits gained through agrarian revolution and protect the Soviet Government.

7. Congresses of deputies at the district and *xian* levels must be based on the successful outcome of the urban and township election campaigns. District and *xian* deputies' congresses should do away with all formalism, and take as their content the examination of past work and discussion of all laws and of ways to execute the emergency war mobilization. Resolutions should not be long, but rather realistic and concrete.

8. Committee members should not be elected lightly. Special attention should be given to electing more workers, farm laborers, coolies, women, and poor and middle peasant cadres. At the same time, there should be rectification of the mistake of looking at class background only formalistically and not paying attention to combining class background with an investigation of work capability and credibility among the masses.

9. After the district and *xian* elections, all other staff members should be subjected to strict scrutiny in terms of class background and day-to-day work.

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4. Here twenty-three characters are missing in the *Mao Zedong ji* version.



Class-alien elements and those who engage in work slowdowns should immediately be replaced.

The Central Committee instructs provincial and *xian* governments to carry out rigorously the above resolution. In addition, the various inspectors and work teams are in charge of supervising the election campaign everywhere, and the election campaign and the strengthening of local soviets should be viewed as an inseparable part of the execution of the emergency mobilization order.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *In Commemoration of the Guangzhou Uprising and of the First Anniversary of the Ningdu Uprising*

*Order No. 36 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(December 2, 1932)

December 11 is the fifth anniversary of the Guangzhou Uprising.<sup>1</sup> The Guangzhou Uprising ushered in a new stage in the Chinese soviet revolution and created the first soviet in China. The 14th is the anniversary of the Ningdu Uprising.<sup>2</sup> This uprising was the first great Chinese soldiers' insurrection. It shook the reactionary rule of the imperialist Guomindang, further accelerated the disintegration of the Guomindang warlords, and opened the way to new victories for the soviets. Because it is close in time to the Guangzhou Uprising, the Council of People's Commissars hereby proclaims December 11 a one-day holiday to commemorate the Guangzhou Uprising and at the same time to commemorate the anniversary of the Ningdu Uprising. Solemn commemoration and demonstration meetings will be held in an intensified effort to mobilize for war. It is especially important in the course of this commemorative event to expend the greatest amount of effort to establish the work in the White regions and the White army, try to win over revolutionary soldiers in the White army surrounding the Soviet Area, and disintegrate the military units in the enemy's general offensive, in order to wipe out completely the massive offensive of the imperialist Guomindang and to attain initial victory for the soviets in Jiangxi and neighboring provinces. It is so ordered.

[To] soviet governments at all levels.

[To] Red Army troops at all levels.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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1. The Guangzhou Uprising of December 1927 (commonly known in English-language sources as the "Canton Commune") was the last of several major risings launched by the Communist Party in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Communist-Nationalist United Front in the latter half of 1927. For Mao's own comments on how news of this episode influenced him on the Jinggangshan, see Volume III, p. 83.

2. As previously noted, the Ningdu Uprising involved the mutiny of the Nationalist Twenty-sixth Army and its defection to join the Red Army in December 1931.

## ***A Secret Order on the Problem of Organizing Local Armed Forces***

(December 20, 1932)

A. In order to wipe out more enemy troops in this campaign, completely shatter the large-scale offensive of the enemy, and strive to win victory first in Jiangxi, we must make the greatest efforts to strengthen the local armed forces and bring into full play the role of the local armed forces in the campaign. This is a necessary condition for us to win complete victory in this campaign.

B. In order to smash the enemy's collective strategy as well as the ten tactics it uses in the offensive, local armed forces must cooperate forcefully in the operations of the Red Army main forces, so that every attempt of the enemy ends in failure. At the same time, we must strengthen the organization and power of the local armed forces in particular, so that they will be able to carry out their tasks effectively.

C. Although the current organization of local armed forces is exactly modeled on that of the regular Red Army, because the weapons of local armed forces are mainly naked blades, and also because of the lack of military cadres, while the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers represent even more the masses in arms, they have not yet established a regular military lifestyle. They suffer more difficulties than the Red Army as far as training and supplies are concerned, and moreover, in the course of operations, they merely assist the Red Army main forces in the campaign and their tactics are mainly guerrilla tactics. All these factors determine that the organizational system of the local armed forces must be drawn up to fit these conditions. The major principle is that although small in stature, they should be capable and bold, so as to promote swiftness in operation and forcefulness in attack. Therefore, the old organizational system is much too cumbersome and is not suited to carrying out the assignments.

D. The main thing in guerrilla tactics is to make surprise attacks on the enemy, and hand-to-hand fighting is the main form of combat. As for the weapons of our local armed forces, they are very well adapted to this kind of tactics and this kind of fighting, and we should take full advantage of this favorable condition. Recently, however, most of the armed forces that are no longer engaged in production want only rifles and look down upon spears. This is incor-

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 308–11, where it is reproduced from a mimeographed copy in the Central Archives.

rect. It is assuredly very important to increase our firepower, but the great majority of the rifles in the hands of the local armed forces do not have bayonets. Hence, when making a surprise attack on the enemy and engaging in hand-to-hand combat, not only is the capacity to wipe out the enemy reduced, but at times we have to withdraw under the threat of hand-to-hand fighting by the enemy, to the point where it even affects the carrying out of assignments.

E. As regards the weapons of the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers, spears constitute the backbone, but everywhere, when the units were being organized, the small number of rifles would be concentrated in one particular model battalion or one model unit of the Young Pioneers. This prevented cooperation between firepower and the naked blade, thus weakening the combat capacity of the armed forces of the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers as a whole, especially the model battalions of the Red Guards and the model Young Pioneers units.

F. In light of the special conditions and tasks of the local armed forces, we have now laid down the following new principles concerning the organization of local armed forces:

1. Independent regiments may be organized like the Red Army, but in terms of the allocation of weapons, two-thirds should consist of firearms and one-third of naked blades (spears). They should be mixed together in the platoons.

2. Guerrilla detachments should adopt the five squad system as their basic pattern of organization. These should comprise three squads with firearms and two squads with naked blades (spears). No platoons should be set up; they should all come under the direct command of the detachment headquarters and appoint two vice detachment leaders. Guerrilla detachments, when advancing into battle, should continue to imitate the Red Army in their organizational systems.

3. The model teams of the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers should adopt the organizational system of three platoons and six squads, each squad consisting of eleven men. Three companies of model Red Guards and one company of model Young Pioneers will make up one battalion. Each district has one battalion, and three battalions make up one regiment (three districts together will organize one regiment). Each *xian* will have from three to five regiments, making up one division.

4. The Red Guard armies should adopt the system in which three squads make up one platoon, and four platoons make up one company. Three of the platoons are the combat platoons, and one platoon is the first aid platoon (it should consist of middle-aged women). During a battle, the combat platoons will fight at the front, and the first aid platoon will be responsible for first aid during the fighting and services in the rear. Four companies will make up a battalion, three battalions will make up a regiment, three regiments will make

up a division, and three to five divisions will make up an army. Each township should organize at least one company, two or three townships should organize one battalion, every district should organize a regiment, every three regiments will make up a division, and each *xian* will establish an army.

5. Because the Young Pioneers are the semi-military organization of the young masses, they should be organized according to the system originally laid down.

6. In guerrilla detachments and model battalions, each squad should be divided into two sections. Each section should have one section head. During a battle, it can become a combat group, and this will make it easy to attack and withdraw.

7. As regards the allocation of weapons to model teams of the Red Guard armies and Young Pioneers, each squad should be allocated three rifles, one each for the squad head and the [two] group heads, and the members should have eight spears. Company heads, political commissars, and platoon heads each should have a rifle; each company will have twenty-three rifles and forty-eight spears.

8. The allocation of weapons to the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers should be the same as to the model battalions. Nevertheless, instead of rifles they should use fowling pieces and homemade cannons. But homemade cannons can be put together to make up one platoon and put under the direct command of the battalion headquarters.

9. The length of the spear should be uniformly fixed at 5 feet [*chi*] 2 inches [*cun*].<sup>1</sup> Every Red Guard soldier and every member of the Young Pioneers should be equipped with one kind of weapon or another.

10. Apart from the general organizational principles, if there are still some rifles left, each squad in the model battalion may have two to four more rifles, and the number of rifles in each company may be increased to thirty-five to forty-seven.

11. The political commissar system should be established uniformly in the course of this reorganization. In the Red Guards and the model Young Pioneers, each company should establish a political commissar and a political instructor, and every battalion, regiment, and division should establish a political commissar. If a company is on a mission alone, a political commissar should be appointed temporarily. All the commanders and political commissars should be appointed by the military districts, military subdistricts, military affairs departments, and their political departments.

G. The time limit for completing the reorganization is set at January 20, 1933.

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1. A Chinese "foot" (*chi*) was about one-third of a meter; there were 10 "inches" (*cun*) to a foot.

H. During the reorganization, if the guerrilla detachments and independent regiments are still out on missions, you should wait until they have come back to the Soviet Area before carrying out the reorganization. Those that have not set out should be reorganized at once.

I. Insofar as the reorganization of the model battalion is concerned, the number may be either increased or reduced, taking the number of people in the past as the basis. Reorganization should not be carried out by mixing everyone together, so as to avoid delay.

J. You should mobilize the masses to gather together promptly all kinds of weapons (such as spears and gunpowder). Meanwhile, after the reorganization, all training must pay attention to practical education and exercises in battle. The various forms of formalistic education and training not related to combat practiced in the past must be completely eliminated, and the education plan decided by the Committee on Labor and War must be thoroughly carried out.

We expect that governments, military districts, military subdistricts, and military affairs departments at every level will strictly abide by and carry out all of the aforementioned points.

It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

## ***Directive No. 8 of the Council of People's Commissars***

(December 27, 1932)

In order to centralize finances and at any time have a clear picture of finances in the whole Soviet Area and to facilitate overall financial planning and allocation, the Financial Section of the Council of People's Commissars has decided to establish a national treasury on January 1 of next year. To put into effect a unified system of accounting, hand over all income in its entirety to the National Treasury and its branches to be controlled by the Center—all this is an important foundation for the centralization of finances. Organizations and Red Army troops at all levels, as well as all local armed forces, must deeply understand the important role of a centralized economy both politically and militarily, and starting from January 1, are to manage [finances] according to the National Treasury regulations and accounting procedures issued by the Council of People's Commissars' Financial Section. The following regulations are also made.

1. Each organ and army unit in making any expenditure must prepare a budget and report to its own superiors according to each given system. It is strictly forbidden to transfer funds to a treasury branch or to take out a temporary loan without obtaining a check from the Council of People's Commissars Financial Section. Violators will be dealt with as sabotaging the centralization of finances.

2. The various local independent guerrilla regiments and all local armed forces should become financially self-sufficient. However, funds raised by local armed forces should be returned to the Red Army for planned distribution.

3. If some local armed forces cannot become financially self-sufficient because of temporary difficulties, they should propose budgets to the military districts who would then provide funds. Under no circumstances may they independently take money from treasury branches.

4. Financial departments at all levels should instruct and oversee their subordinates in a more planned fashion. All sorts of revenue should be increased, and new financial resources should be tapped. Revenue collection should not be

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This directive and the next two documents were first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 46, January 7, 1933. They are reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 175–80. The editors of the Tokyo edition were unable to decipher several characters; the reprint of *Hongse zhonghua* available to us is also unclear in places. Our translation is based on a collation of these two sources.

slackened because expenditure can be defrayed by applying to a higher level. Violators will be dealt with as if engaging in a work slowdown.

5. Budgets at all levels must be reported on schedule. All expenditures should be kept within the range for each item as approved by the superior authorities. Unless there is a special reason separately reported and approved at a higher level, those who exceed budgets without permission are responsible for it themselves.

All organizations and military units must strictly follow and carry out all above regulations. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



# *Tighten Exit Regulations*

## *Order No. 37 of the Central Council of People's Commissars*

(December 27, 1932)

We are in a critical period, as the imperialist Guomindang is launching a massive offensive against the Central Soviet Area. Therefore we should be particularly vigilant about people leaving the Soviet Area. Without rigorous screening, it is strictly impermissible to allow people to leave the Soviet Area at will, in order to exclude the possibility that the despotic gentry, landlords, and all reactionaries may leave freely to engage in counterrevolutionary activities. To consolidate the Soviet Area and protect the interests of the worker-peasant masses, the Provisional Central Government has made the following regulations to govern exit from the Soviet Area:

1. Anyone leaving the Soviet Area must have both an exit passport from the State Political Security Bureau and a government travel permit to be allowed to leave. Those holding a passport only and not the travel permit, and especially those with only the permit and not a passport, should be denied exit.

2. The State Political Security Bureau and its provincial and *xian* branches (district special commissioners are not empowered to issue passports) should strictly screen those who apply to leave and issue passports only to those whom they recognize as having a real need to leave. It is also necessary to document clearly the exit route on the passport.

3. Provincial, *xian*, and district governments (township governments are not empowered to issue travel permits) may issue exit travel permits according to the route set out on the passport to those who have a passport from the Political Security Bureau and apply for an exit travel permit; otherwise they may not be issued. Particularly when the district government issues the exit travel permit, it is necessary to investigate thoroughly, to make sure that the applicant is a resident of the district or that the route of the person leaving makes it necessary to pass through the district, and that the person is not deliberately coming into the district for the sole purpose of obtaining a permit. Only then may [a permit] be issued.

It is expected that governments in all locations, security bureaus at all levels,

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Regarding the source of this text, see the note to the previous document.

all military organizations, and all inspection units will strictly adhere to the above principles, so as to tighten Red martial law, which is of critical importance. It is so ordered.

To:

Soviet governments at all levels

State Political Security Bureaus at all levels

All military organizations

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

## ***Advance the Date of Spring Plowing and Concentrate Our Forces to Smash the Enemy's Big Offensive***

*Directive No. 18 of the Central Executive Committee*

(December 28, 1932)

The revolutionary war has reached an extremely crucial moment. The imperialist Guomindang is going all out in its big offensive against the Central Soviet Area. This ruthless class struggle in which they try to save their moribund régime is now developing fiercely. This war is the enemy's desperate struggle, which will become more intense and will last longer than the first, second, and third wars. In order to smash the enemy's offensive thoroughly and win greater victories, we have to mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants and use all our forces to wage a determined, long, and hard struggle against the enemy. But it is almost time for spring plowing, and the war will reach its fiercest phase during spring plowing season. Therefore, to make it possible for the broad masses of workers and peasants to plow and sow in peace, to complete the work of spring plowing rapidly, and to have the peace of mind to concentrate all energies on eliminating the attacking enemy without any other worries, the Central Government has decided to move up spring plowing throughout the Soviet Area. Moreover, ways should be found to accelerate our production and work speed, so as to achieve a great increase in the grain output of the Soviet Area in the shortest possible time, to consolidate Red Army supplies and improve the daily lives of the worker-peasant masses, and to guarantee final victory in the revolutionary war. Therefore, this decision is of extremely weighty importance and governments at all levels absolutely must cooperate with all mass organizations, such as farm laborers' unions, poor peasant leagues, and so on, to make the greatest possible effort to mobilize the masses as a whole to carry out the decision according to the following methods:

1. All land should be plowed and all dams repaired by the end of January.
2. Sowing and transplanting should be done at least one month earlier than the usual schedule.

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For the source of this document, see above, the note to the text of December 27, 1932, "Directive No. 8 of the Council of People's Commissars."

3. Every family should immediately prepare sufficient fertilizers and select the best seeds. Not only can this greatly increase production, but it is also conducive to rapid sowing and transplanting.

4. The masses everywhere should carry out mutual aid in plowing and sowing. There should be mutual aid in labor power, seeds, draft cattle, and tools, in order to carry out the work of spring plowing rapidly.

5. We should mobilize the masses to plow and sow first the common land owned by the Red Army and land of Red Army soldiers' families. Not an inch of land should lie waste.

Governments at all levels should work out more specific measures based on the above points and adjust them to suit local situations. Government bodies should also call on farm laborers' unions, poor peasant leagues, and the electorates' conferences to do extensive propaganda work. There should also be rules of revolutionary competition and a reward system. Whichever village or person finishes first in plowing, dam repairing, fertilizer and seed collection, sowing, and transplanting should be given a prize by *xian* and district governments. In some places where the land problem is not yet solved, land should be distributed immediately in order to facilitate spring plowing. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao







# ***On Renaming Ningdu Xian as Bosheng Xian and Holding a Memorial Meeting in Honor of Comrade Zhao Bosheng***

*Order No. 15 of the Central Executive Committee*

(January 13, 1933)

Comrade Zhao Bosheng,<sup>1</sup> the Deputy Commander of the Fifth Army Group and the Commander of the Thirteenth Army, was the leader of the Ningdu Army Uprising and the creator of the Fifth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Recently our Red Army has won successive great victories at Nan-Fu<sup>2</sup> and Jinxi, wiping out and putting to flight the main forces of the enemy's all-out offensive against the Central Area—the Ninetieth Division of the Reorganizationist warlords and the Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh divisions of the warlords of Chiang's clique—closing in on Fu[zhou]-Nancheng, ushering in this year's great victory in crushing the enemy's all-out offensive. Sadly, Comrade Zhao Bosheng sacrificed his life during this battle at Nancheng, where he directed all the soldiers in a courageous and resolute fight against the enemy, and eventually, with a small military force, put to flight Warlord Chiang Kaishhek's basic troops, the entire Fourteenth Division, thus accomplishing the total victory of our main Red Army forces near Fuzhou. To honor Comrade Zhao Bosheng's glorious achievements in leading the Ningdu Uprising and valiantly sacrificing his life for the revolution, the Provisional Central Government has decided to rename Ningdu *xian* as Bosheng *xian*.

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 47, January 14, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 181–82, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. Zhao Bosheng (1897–1933), a native of Hebei, joined Feng Yuxiang's forces after graduating from the Baoding Military Academy. By 1931, when he secretly joined the Party, he was chief of staff of the Guomindang Twenty-sixth Army. After leading this army to join the Communists in the Ningdu Mutiny in December 1931, he became commander of the Thirteenth Red Army in August 1932. On January 8, 1933, he was killed in combat in Nancheng *xian*.

2. The geographical reference here is somewhat obscure, but given the context of Red Army operations, comments in this document, and the Chinese characters used, this expression probably is a contraction for Nan[cheng]-Fu[zhou], two *xian* neighboring Jinxi *xian* on the northern edges of the Central Soviet Area.



and, as part of this year's memorial to Li and Lu,<sup>3</sup> hold a memorial service for the entire Soviet Area (on the 21st) and announce the establishment of Bosheng *xian*. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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3. We have been unable to locate information about the annual memorial to Li and Lu, or to identify these individuals.

***Proclamation of the Provisional Central  
Government and the Revolutionary Military  
Commission of the Workers' and Peasants'  
Red Army***

(January 17, 1933)

To the popular masses of all China! Japanese imperialism, openly aided by British and French imperialism and the League of Nations, has begun its invasion of northern China. This is a further step of invasion and plunder on the part of the imperialist bandits in completely carving up China and enslaving the whole of China. Such invasions and plunder have led to wholesale slaughter of peaceful citizens, destruction of cities and villages, and the increase of misery and famine. The tragic conditions of Shanghai and Manchuria are being cruelly replicated on most of China's soil.

Because of nonresistance and capitulation on the part of Guomindang warlords such as Chiang Kaishek, Zhang Xueliang, and others, and because of their oppression, dismissal, and slaughter of anti-Japanese soldiers, large numbers of Chinese soldiers have been killed by the guns and cannons of the imperialists. The Guomindang warlords have helped Japan and the other imperialists further their invasion and slaughter, and at the same time they have used all their forces to suppress the anti-imperialist struggle, the movement to boycott imported merchandise, and the organization of a volunteer army.

As one of the reasons to explain their criminal behavior and traitorous schemes, the Guomindang government and its politicians cited the existence of the Chinese Soviet as having caused their inability to mobilize all their strength to carry out national defense, and as having caused Chiang Kaishek's unwillingness to do battle against the Japanese warlords and instead his deployment of a vast army of nearly one million soldiers to attack the Chinese workers and peasants, who have already established their own Chinese Soviet Government.

But the Chinese popular masses want to defend themselves. Many troops and hundreds of thousands of Guomindang soldiers oppose the slaughter of their own brothers and sisters, and advocate armed resistance against Japanese imperialism. They have begun to understand that only through a national revolutionary war of

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 48, January 28, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 183-85.

the armed masses can the Japanese imperialist invasion be victoriously resisted. The Chinese Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission denounce the Guomindang's explanations as ridiculous lies. They are attempting to use these ridiculous lies to cover up their own traitorous acts in front of the popular masses of the whole country.

The Chinese Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission once more remind the Chinese popular masses that last April we had already called upon the popular masses of the entire nation to join us in the armed struggle against the Japanese imperialists. But Chiang Kaishek's response to this appeal was to mobilize all his armies to attack the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and not to resist Japanese imperialism.

The Chinese Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army proclaim before the Chinese masses: Under the following conditions, the Chinese Workers' and Peasant's Red Army is prepared to sign agreements with any armed forces to fight against the Japanese imperialist invasion: (1) Immediately stop attacking the soviet areas; (2) Immediately guarantee the masses' democratic rights (freedom of assembly, of association, of speech, to strike, to publish, etc.); (3) Arm the popular masses immediately to create an armed volunteer army to defend China and to strive for China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

We appeal to the Chinese popular masses and soldiers to support this call to carry out a unified national revolutionary war; to win independence, unity, and territorial integrity for China; to combine the struggle against Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms with the struggle against the treason and surrender of the running dogs of imperialism, the Guomindang warlords; and to launch an armed national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism and all imperialisms.

Chairman, Provisional Central  
Government of the Chinese

Soviets

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

Chairman, Revolutionary Military  
Commission of the Chinese

Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Zhu De

# *On the Revolutionary Masses Lending Grain to Provide for the Red Army*

*Order No. 20 of the Central Executive Committee*

(March 1, 1933)

Based on reports from the various local governments of the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian and requests submitted by various revolutionary groups all over, the Central Government has determined that the imperialist Guomindang is now carrying out a large-scale attack against the masses of the soviet areas, burning, killing, and looting. Already the entire *xian* of Longyan has been destroyed; innumerable masses have lost their lives; more than 20,000 *Dan* of grain have been looted by the White army in Yongding's Xi'nan District; and in the last three battles, thousands were killed by the White army, tens of thousands of houses were burned down, hundreds of thousands of *Dan* of grain as well as tens of thousands of pigs and cattle were looted. Presently hundreds of thousands of Chiang Kaishhek's and Chen Jitang's White army troops have already renewed their mad attack on the Soviet Area, burning, killing, and looting. Our brave Red Army is fighting a ruthless battle with the White army everywhere but they lack grain. Only if the revolutionary masses everywhere are willing to economize on their own food and lend grain to the Red Army can the evil White army be completely destroyed, the large-scale attack of the imperialist Guomindang be crushed, and the masses of the soviet areas be spared total devastation.

Based on the opinion of the masses as described above, the Central Government has decided to accept this request from the masses and has laid down the following regulations for voluntary grain-lending by the revolutionary masses:

1. Every peasant family has grain. To lend grain is much easier than to lend money, and this goal is especially easier to realize at this time when the masses are highly motivated to fight against the cruelty of the White army and their revolutionary enthusiasm is heightened. All local governments should assist the mass bodies to carry out this movement. Each and every *xian* must complete within three months the task of having the masses lend grain, as the war will become even more intense during this time.

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 58, March 6, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 187-90, which reproduces that version.

2. The completion of this grain-lending movement will certainly depend on excellent propaganda and agitation work. The wording of the propaganda should be very popular, and the propaganda should be presented in various forms, such as modern plays, speeches in costume, posters, pictorials, and so on, to make the masses who have not yet offered to lend grain understand, making it a big movement to mobilize all the peasant masses to volunteer in lending grain. In relation to those members of the masses who have not yet offered voluntarily, it must be strictly forbidden to dispense with propaganda and instead resort to methods of coercion or commandism. If methods of forced contribution are used, not only will the soviets be alienated from the masses, but the amount of grain lent will certainly be less than if propaganda were used.

3. As to the distribution of the amount of grain lent, it must be determined according to actual local conditions and the ability of the masses to lend grain, and absolutely not be handled in a uniform way. In the old soviet areas, distribution should be according to rice production. In areas where abundant rice is produced, more should be lent; where less rice is produced, less should be lent. In the new soviet areas, it should be determined by the extent of the public's understanding of revolution and the intensity of the struggle. In areas where struggle has been intensified, more rice should be lent; otherwise, less should be lent. In border areas, it should be determined based upon whether or not devastation and looting by counterrevolutionaries has been suffered. In areas where severe devastation has been suffered, it should not be lent; in border areas where harm has been lighter, the amount of rice borrowed will be determined accordingly. Only in this way will the masses understand that to lend grain to the government is truly protecting their own interests, so that they will lend eagerly, not causing problems during the process of this task and producing unfavorable impressions.

4. Upon receiving this order, governments at all levels should, on the basis of the methods for lending grain [as described above], immediately call together joint meetings of chairmen of all townships, plan the distribution, and send people to the various districts and townships to hold meetings of deputies, poor peasant league [meetings], farm laborers' union [meetings], voters' assemblies, and so on, to make propaganda and explain to the local masses the enthusiasm of the masses in other areas in voluntarily lending grain and their methods of grain-lending, and to organize competitions to encourage all to lend grain enthusiastically.

5. The grain borrowed should be handled according to the following geographic areas:

a. In Jiangxi

- i. Grain borrowed from Bosheng, Shicheng, Yudu, Huichang, Ruijin, Shengli, Xingguo, and other *xian*, and from southern Yongfeng, will be concentrated at the district government. Except for a portion of the grain that should be distributed to the local hospitals, govern-

ments, troops, and other national institutions as funds, the rest should be carefully stored and distributed upon future orders from the Central Government.

- ii. In Gonglu, Wantai, northern Yongfeng, Ganxian, Yihuang, Le'an, Nanguang, Anyuan, and Xunwu, aside from each *xian* government's deliberating and giving the portion required for the local Red armies (those on government payroll), government [offices], hospitals, and various organs and subsidized mass organizations, what is left may be sold at market prices.

b. In Fujian

- i. In Changding and Ninghua, [grain] is to be gathered together and stored at the district government and handled according to further orders from the Central Government. On the other hand in Shanghang, Xinquan, and Wuping, aside from what is supplied to local Red armies, government organizations, and subsidized mass organizations (given at cost), the rest is to be sold at [market] prices.
- ii. For all grain sold at appraised prices, the money must be handed over to a treasury branch and a branch treasury receipt in quintuplicate must be obtained. Governments at all levels are prohibited from touching this money in any way. Any cases of misuse of grain money, false reporting of grain prices, or corruption and embezzlement should be severely punished.

6. To supply themselves with rice to eat, all local governments, hospitals, troops, and mass organizations must first use money to purchase this grain at the appropriate price; no credit or borrowing is permitted.

7. Financial offices at all levels, upon receiving grain-borrowing receipts issued by the Central Commissariat of Finance, must set up separate grain-borrowing account books in which to keep item-by-item records of the amount of grain borrowed from the masses, the number of grain-borrowing receipts given out to the masses, the amounts of grain distributed to each organization, the amounts of grain sold, and prices, to facilitate clearing accounts. As for the portion of the monies earned from grain sales that is handed over to the branches, the branch treasuries should take this money and set it up as a separate account called "the masses' grain-lending funds"—it is not to be mixed in with special income or Red Army general grain funds.

8. All masses who lend grain will obtain as proof a grain-loan receipt issued by the Central People's Commissariat of Finance.

9. Those who have obtained a grain-loan receipt may use it against the land tax for the second half of 1933. Those who are tax exempt<sup>1</sup> or have surplus

1. The Chinese text here reads *wanshui*, "late tax." This does not seem to make sense, and we assume that the character *wan*, "late," is a misprint for *mian*, "excuse from," or in this context "tax exempt," which it resembles.

credit after having paid the tax may, at the appropriate time, receive a cash refund from the district government.

10. Grain-loan receipts should carry the seal of the chairman of the village soviet and are good for tax payment only within the district. Receipts without the village soviet chairman's seal and those from another district are considered to be invalid.

11. Grain-loan receipts are to be distributed by the *xian* Financial Offices according to the situation in terms of the masses and the grain situation of the various districts. The districts, in turn, make further distributions according to the situation in each village. Governments at all levels should settle accounts based on the number of receipts received. Extra receipts, where no grain was given, are to be returned and no shortfall is permitted.

12. When the masses lend grain, a receipt should be given as the grain is handed over. Those who hand in grain without getting a receipt may lodge a complaint at a higher level of government and request severe treatment [of the lower level government officials]. Grain collected in the Three *Sheng* of Rice Campaign,<sup>2</sup> begun all over since January of this year, may be incorporated into this grain-lending, and receipts should be given as well.

13. Rich peasants will be solicited for cash contributions but no more grain loans.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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2. The Three *Sheng* of Rice Campaign was part of the Soviet Government's extensive effort to collect grain from the Base Area's population to aid in the war effort. The aim of this campaign was for each person to supply 3 *sheng* of rice for use by the Red Army. The campaign continued into 1934, though with uncertain results. (The *sheng* was a traditional unit of capacity, equal to .1 *dou*, or .01 *dan*.)

# *Oppose Japanese Imperialism's Occupation of Rehe and Attack on Beiping and Tianjin*

## *A Proclamation of the Provisional Central Government*

(March 3, 1933)

To the entire Chinese people!

The Japanese imperialists' 75-millimeter<sup>2</sup> cannons and their gigantic fighter planes and bombs are presently carrying out inhuman bombing and slaughter inside the borders of Rehe! The Japanese imperialists' eight divisions and two brigades, under cover of hundreds of airplanes, are attacking Chengde from three separate routes! The Guomindang generals still adopt a shameless stance of nonresistance, retreating at every turn, having abandoned Kailu, Beipiao, and Zhaoyang, allowing millions of peace-loving residents and soldiers who are actively resisting Japan to be trampled, devastated, and slaughtered under the iron hoofs of Japanese imperialism!<sup>3</sup>

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Our source for this proclamation is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 191–93, where it is reproduced from *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 59, March 9, 1933. This text is in large part identical with that dated March 4, which appears on pp. 199–201 of *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, under the title “Another Call to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country to Get Armed and Oppose Imperialism.” This latter proclamation is reproduced from *Suweiai Zhongguo* (Moscow: Foreign Workers’ Publishing House, 1933). As might be expected, the Moscow publication has removed the sharp personal attacks, which appear below, on the “counter-revolutionary chieftain” Chiang Kaishek. The other variants are not sufficiently important to justify printing two translations of this document in the present volume.

1. Frequently referred to in Western sources as Jehol.

2. We take the character *sheng* to be an abbreviation of *shengdimitu*, a transcription used at this time for “centimeter,” and we further assume that Mao and his colleagues have here confused centimeters with millimeters. The reference is almost certainly to 75-millimeter cannon, similar to the “French seventy-fives” used in the First World War, since such guns were standard equipment for all Japanese divisions at this time.

3. After seizing control of the important Shanhaiguan pass in early January 1933, Japanese troops launched a full-scale invasion of Rehe Province on February 23. Although large Chinese military forces were in the area, their resistance was ineffectual and the entire province was occupied by the Japanese in little over a week. Faced with this debacle, Chiang Kaishek made a brief visit to northern China, and forced General Zhang Xueliang to retire from his command of Chinese troops in the Northeast, but then returned to Jiangxi to direct the continuation of anti-Communist operations.



Popular masses of all China! The greater part of Rehe Province has fallen into the hands of the Japanese imperialists, and all of northern China is in a situation where its very existence is at stake. The tragic fate of colonial slaves directly threatens the toiling popular masses of all China!

Popular masses of all China! The imperialists' bandit wars to invade and enslave China are being madly pursued. Only one road lies before us: that is, to arm ourselves and carry out a revolutionary war of national liberation. Only the armed forces of the popular masses in their millions can defeat Japan's and all other imperialists' bandit wars to invade and carve up China, and can win the independence, liberation, and territorial integrity of the Chinese nation! The Chinese Soviet Provisional Central Government has called upon all the Chinese people several times to join the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the toiling masses of the soviet areas in a victorious national revolutionary war. Moreover, in its latest proclamation it has clearly declared in front of the people of the whole country that the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, under certain conditions, is willing to sign combat agreements with all armed forces that are truly resisting Japan.

But the Guomindang warlord politicians have most shamelessly gone down on their knees and sold out China to the imperialists, carried out nonresistance and surrender, ceded the Three Northeastern Provinces, sold out Wusong and Shanghai, slaughtered the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist worker-peasant masses and revolutionary soldiers, and prohibited all boycott movements and the organizing of the anti-Japanese volunteer forces. Now, just as the Japanese imperialists are attacking Rehe with all their might, they have even openly advocated giving up Rehe, Beiping, and Tianjin, shamelessly proclaiming in words that it is out of strategic necessity, while at the same time turning a military force of dozens of divisions toward fighting against the Chinese worker and peasant masses, the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and the Red Army! The Soviet Government has declared its willingness to sign combat agreements with all military forces that truly resist the Japanese. The Guomindang's response to this proclamation was to retreat every step of the way before the Japanese imperialists' iron hoofs, not to send a single soldier to Rehe to resist Japan, but instead, to send the greater portion of its forces to Jiangxi, where, under the personal command of the counterrevolutionary chieftain Chiang Kaishek, they are wildly attacking the soviet areas! Precisely because the Soviet Government called for and organized a nationwide anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese movement, the traitorous Guomindang has acted even more brutally, using every possible means to burn, kill, and rob, to engage in military adventures and use economic blockades, trying to block the further development of the soviet movement and wipe out the main anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese forces!

The Guomindang warlords and politicians intend to take the Soviet Government's proclamation of its willingness to sign combat agreements with all anti-Japanese armed forces as a sign of weakness on the part of the Soviet

Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. This, however, actually shows their own stupidity and foolishness. The battles of the last two days have already taught these traitorous warlords some severe lessons: the Fifty-second Division and the Fifty-ninth Division have surrendered all their weapons, the commanders and the entire staff of these two divisions have been captured, and the Fifth Army has been completely routed.<sup>4</sup> The soviet movement has received the support of the masses in their millions, and the Guomindang warlords' military adventures and economic blockades will only intensify the resistance of the toiling masses throughout the country, and, moreover, create favorable conditions for the further successful development of the soviet movement!

Because the Chinese Soviet Government is preparing to engage the Japanese imperialists' armies directly in battle and push them out of China, it must remove all reactionary armies and armed forces that block us from fighting against Japan! Once again, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army declare their willingness to sign combat agreements with all military forces that truly resist the Japanese, but will deal the severest blows to all armies and armed forces that attack the soviet areas, until they have been thoroughly eliminated! We appeal to our brothers, the soldiers in the White army! Rise up and fight against your traitorous officers, turn your guns around, and join the Red Army in fighting against the Japanese imperialists and driving them out of China!

Popular masses of all China! Soldiers in the White army, our brothers! The Soviet Provisional Central Government calls upon you to rise up and wage an armed national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism and against the rule of the traitorous Guomindang, against the attack on the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the soviet areas! Support our call to arms, rebel against your traitorous officers, and rise up on your own initiative to join the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in resisting the aggression of the Japanese imperialist bandits! Oppose the use of a single soldier, a single private, a single gun, or a single bullet to attack the soviet areas! We demand that all the armed forces of the whole country be sent to North China to resist the onslaught of Japanese imperialism! Unfold the national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism and all imperialisms! Down with the running dog of imperialism, the Guomindang!

Chairman, Chinese Soviet Provisional Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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4. The reference here is to Red Army assaults on Nationalist army units that occurred to the west of Huangpi in southwestern Yihuang *xian* on February 27–28. (Note that the Huangpi mentioned here is not to be confused with the important Red Army staging area of the same name located in northern Ningdu *xian*.)

## ***On Redistributing the People's Food Supply to Help Provide for the Military***

*Order No. 39 of the Council of People's Commissars  
of the Provisional Central Government*

(March 4, 1933)

According to recent reports from various localities, in many places in various *xian* within the soviet areas it has been forbidden to transport rice. Boundaries have been drawn between *xian* A and *xian* B, famine has occurred in many places, and the price of rice has soared, to the point that even those with money cannot buy it. This is an extremely serious phenomenon. It appears that within the soviet areas the grain situation varies; there is a surplus in some places and a shortage in other places. Places in the border areas have been looted by the enemy, leading to rice shortages. Where the Red Army is stationed and near hospitals the shortage of rice is even more severe. Mutual redistribution and adjustment among the various districts and *xian* does not affect merely the daily provisions for the popular masses in general; it is a matter of great importance. The fact that it affects the provisions for the Red Army and the hospitals in the rear, and is therefore a condition that cannot be missing even for a day in order to withstand the enemy's Fourth Attack, is of particularly great moment.

There are only three causes that impede the flow of food supplies: (1) The popular masses whose grain supply is insufficient are afraid that if they let too much out from their own locality, they will have to pay higher prices for rice in May and June. (2) The popular masses who have a surplus of grain want to save it for later so that they may get a high price for it. (3) The rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants manipulate the market to seek profits, and even deliberately cause trouble and sabotage the revolutionary war. Without investigating, the various local governments began to carry out the ban [on transporting grain]. They could not know that as for the fear of eating expensive rice in their own area in May and June, in other places the eating of expensive rice had begun long before. In Yongding, 1 *yuan* buys 3 *sheng*; in Shanghang, 1 *yuan* buys 4 *sheng*;

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 58, March 6, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 195–97, which reproduces that version.

in Dingzhou, 7 *sheng*; in Ruijin, it has even reached 8 *sheng*. In other places with rice shortages, it is more expensive from one day to the next. The workers of the city, having no land to till, have to work as laborers. They have to buy expensive rice with the small wages they earn to feed the young and old in their families. The entire Red Army is fighting with all its might against the enemies at the front, relying on rice supplied from the rear. All local governments should give these explanations to the masses in their localities. It is essential that the whole Soviet Area have food to eat, especially that the Red Army have food to eat. The only way out is to join hearts and energies together to smash the enemy. Those who have a surplus of grain should be told not to think only of high prices. Other places are suffering from hunger, and provisions for the troops are lacking at the front, so people cannot sit back and remain indifferent. [They] need to know that if the whole [of the Soviet Area] is not in good shape, and the Red Army is not victorious, your own interests cannot be served either. As for rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants, they hate it when the government purchases rice for the army and they hate it when the cooperatives redistribute food for the popular masses, so they either stock up intentionally, or manipulate behind the scenes, or even create rumors in a big way to stir up the masses. These are all counterrevolutionary acts and the local governments should lead the revolutionary masses in punishing them severely. It must be made known that the interests of the whole and the interests of the war are the most important interests of all. The governments and popular masses everywhere should be profoundly aware of this.

The Central Government has decided on a plan to redistribute food and has established a Grain Redistribution Bureau. All local governments should lead the masses in quickly organizing grain cooperatives and diligently carry out [the work], under the leadership and with the assistance of the Grain Redistribution Bureau. In addition to rice, salt also needs to be dealt with, to counteract hoarding and manipulation by the rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants, to guard against the severe blockade by the Guomindang, to redistribute the people's provisions in all locations, and to supply military provisions at the front. Local governments in all localities must know that last year the harvest in the Central Soviet Area was not abundant, so this year the problem of famine in the spring will inevitably be severe, and that leading the masses to solve this serious problem is a momentous task of the Soviet Government. From the provincial soviets down to the township and village representative committees, there must be detailed discussions, comprehensive plans, widespread propaganda, and diligent actions. Only thus can this task be accomplished. This is an issue of immediate concern to the masses and a key to smashing the enemy's Fourth Encirclement Attack. If the Soviet Government is to become a government that truly represents the interests of the masses, and if the Soviet Government is to become a government that is capable of leading the war, then this problem may not be neglected in the slightest.

Aside from being announced by the Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, this order is being sent to all localities and all levels of government to be carried out accordingly. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *Tingzhou Should Not Be Easily Given Up*

(March 5, 1933)

Zhu, Zhou:

Yesterday evening, we held discussions with the Central Bureau and with [Ye] Jianying and made the following decisions:

1. The enemy's Seventy-eighth Division and the right column of Zhang Yan's brigade will arrive at Liancheng.<sup>1</sup> They are attempting to attack Tingzhou to threaten the capital,<sup>2</sup> and to cooperate with the operation of the enemy forces in Jiangxi, while at the same time cooperating in the large scale offensive by their left column from the three *xian* of [Long]yan, Yong[ding], and [Shang]hang against our Soviet Area, in an effort to destroy it.

2. Tingzhou is our basic stronghold in the southeast and should never be easily given up. We now appoint Li Shaojiu as the commander of the garrison troops in Ting[zhou] and Rui[jin], with the responsibility for the defense of these two places. If the enemy advances, you should call on the broad masses and on the armed forces in Ting and Rui to exhaust him and stop him, and never let this enemy pin down the operations of our front army.

3. Reorganize the independent regiment in Ning[hua] and Shi[cheng] and other armed forces into the Eleventh Independent Division and use it to threaten and pin down this enemy from the northeast. Then rapidly reorganize it into the Nineteenth Army and concentrate at least two thousand guns for use in a forceful attack on the enemy troops that are still advancing on Yan, Yong, and Hang. No matter what happens in Ting[zhou] and Lian[cheng], our Nineteenth Army must fight resolutely in the zone of Chadi, Taiba, Baisha, Jiuxian, and Xinquan, and strive for a great victory.

Mao            Xiang

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 312–13, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The Nationalist army's Seventy-eighth Division was commanded by Wang Shounian. Zhang Yan's brigade was the Ninth Brigade of the Nationalist army's Sixty-first Division.

2. Tingzhou was the imperial-era name for Changting. The capital of the Chinese Soviet Republic was Ruijin.

## *On the Problem of Eliminating Internal Counterrevolutionaries*

*Order No. 21 of the Central Executive Committee  
of the Provisional Central Government*

(March 15, 1933)

At the same time that the imperialist Guomindang warlords are carrying out the Fourth Encirclement Attack against the soviet areas in the whole country and are now launching a large-scale attack on the Central Soviet Area, the war between revolution and counterrevolution has entered a period of life-and-death struggle. Aside from his military strength, the enemy has also organized, in a planned fashion, counterrevolutionary activity inside the soviet areas, using the landlords, rich peasants, and merchants in the soviet areas to organize various counterrevolutionary groups (the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Trotskyite faction, and feudal superstitious groups such as the "Single-minded Society" and the "Lazyman's Association," etc.<sup>1</sup>) to deceive a minority of the backward masses and take every opportunity to cause trouble. At the same time they have dispatched spies into the soviet areas to obtain military intelligence. According to recently discovered facts, in Tingzhou during a mass meeting some people shouted counterrevolutionary slogans and a *xian* Guomindang party organization was uncovered; in the three localities of Ruijin, Tingzhou, and Hetian, similar reactionary posters appeared; in Shicheng, in the home of the head of the Propaganda Department, four rifles were found; counterrevolutionary activities organized by the enemy in Nanguang *xian* interfered with all mass work and war mobilization work; unscrupulous merchants near Huichang are carrying out a plan to destroy the soviet national currency; at Ruijin and Tingzhou, unscrupulous merchants are withdrawing cash from the banks in a planned fashion; unscrupu-

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 62, March 18, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 203–5.

1. We have not been able to identify these organizations. They were probably small local associations, and may even have been purely imaginary. It is suggested in some sources that the protagonists of the campaign against counterrevolutionaries taking place at this time invented names of nonexistent societies corresponding to their perception of the victims' behavior.

lous merchants everywhere are manipulating the prices of goods and at the same time are exporting large sums of cash; and among some local armed forces, counter-revolutionary activities have also been discovered. All of the evidence which has recently come to light clearly proves that the enemy is organizing a counterrevolution within the soviet areas according to a plan, a venomous scheme to sabotage the soviets and the revolutionary war politically, economically, and in other ways.

Our soviet governments in various places have, however, been seriously lacking in vigilance, to the point of taking lightly or even actually tolerating this kind of serious counterrevolutionary activity. The Central Government now solemnly calls to the attention of governments at all levels and their respective organizations for eliminating counterrevolutionaries that this sort of negligent or tolerant attitude of the past toward counterrevolutionary activity is not to be permitted for a moment longer. Governments everywhere and their organizations for eliminating counterrevolutionaries must immediately correct this kind of mistake and, on the basis of the actual conditions in each locality, take immediate action against counterrevolution. Within each district and township, and especially within each city, as soon as it is discovered that counterrevolutionaries are hiding or are active, resolute and rapid measures must be adopted to repress them severely. When the atmosphere is tense, temporary martial law should be declared, and the soviet governments and all revolutionary organizations should carry out both military and mass methods of protection. In order to repress counterrevolution severely, important counterrevolutionary elements should be resolutely and swiftly arrested and executed and their crimes be universally proclaimed before the local masses. Governments everywhere and at all levels, especially city governments and district and township governments, should proclaim to the broad masses the facts about the activities of the counterrevolutionaries inside the soviet areas and their plotting with the White army outside to attack; and mobilize all the revolutionary masses to keep close surveillance over the merchants, rich peasants, and landlords, and to gather information from all quarters on counterrevolutionary organizations and activities. The organs of soviet governments for eliminating counterrevolutionaries should maintain close contacts with such revolutionary mass groups as the labor unions, farm laborers' unions, and poor peasant leagues. Only when the broad masses, under government leadership, all rise up to take enthusiastic action, can counterrevolutionary organizations and activities be completely eliminated.

The judicial sections of the various *xian* of the border areas should take swift action against criminals who have already been arrested. As for elements who are obviously guilty and against whom there is clear evidence of their crimes, first of all the class-alien elements among them should be sentenced to death and immediately executed. It is not necessary to follow Article 26 of the Temporary Organizational and Judicial Regulations of the Commissariat for Justice<sup>2</sup> requiring that

2. For the text of these regulations, dated June 9, 1932, see below, the Appendix to this volume.



permission from the next higher level is needed before the death sentence may be carried out. The execution may be carried out first and then reported for the record to the higher level. As for the central areas, in the same way, the accumulated cases should be handled swiftly; it is not permitted to let them pile up as before, thereby slowing down the process of eliminating counterrevolution. Even in the central areas, whenever the situation is especially urgent, the death sentence should first be executed, and then reported to the higher level. This is a necessary measure we must adopt when the enemy is mounting a large-scale offensive and may not be considered in the same light as a normal situation.

Landlord and rich peasant elements in the areas under enemy attack and in border areas should be dealt with individually. Those against whom there is evidence of reactionary acts should be immediately arrested and severely punished, so that they are not permitted any room whatsoever in which to operate. As for the rest of them who are ordinary landlord and rich peasant elements against whom no evidence of counterrevolution has been discovered, the local governments should mobilize the masses to keep close surveillance over their movements, but they should not be arrested indiscriminately lest a bad impression be created and further difficulties be created in dealing with them afterward.

The Central Government firmly believes that in relation to the counter-revolutionaries' current attack from within and without against the revolution, we are in a position to smash them thoroughly and achieve total victory. We have the broad masses of people and a staunch Red Army, and we have sound and powerful organs of political power. We should use these powerful organs of political power (both central and local) to lead the millions upon millions of worker and peasant masses and the Red Army to deal a fatal blow to the internal and external enemies who are attacking us. We have precious experience from the past in eliminating counterrevolution. We should make use of all this experience to suppress rigorously and destroy completely the counterrevolutionary elements within the soviet areas. Upon receiving this order, governments at all levels should immediately determine, according to the specific local situation, the concrete measures to be used in carrying it out and report the results of its application to the appropriate level. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

March 15, 1933, by the Western calendar

***On Mobilizing the Masses to Help Government Staff Members in Their Work of Cultivating the Land, Relieving Government Staff Members of Worries About Their Families, and Increasing the Government's Capacity for Work***

*Order No. 18 of the Provisional Central Government  
Central Executive Committee*

(April 14, 1933)

In their current arduous struggles in the civil war, the Soviet Government staff have not been paid according to their labor and are unable to help their families financially. Their spirit of hard work and sacrifice is worthy of praise.

But the situation in many places tells us that many active and competent poor workers or peasants cannot come to work for the government because they are the main laborers for their family production and are tied up with such family labor. There are even some local governments that, in the absence of such good workers, cannot help but choose some less enthusiastic and less competent people to work there, simply because these people are not the main laborers of their family production and are not tied up in work for their family. Thus, the criteria for choosing personnel have nothing to do with their zeal toward revolution and their competence in the work, and they are chosen just because they are not busy at home. This phenomenon is unacceptable. There is yet another phenomenon which is even worse. In some places, during the elections, some good people, because of family burdens, do not wish to be elected, while those bad elements step forward and, consequently, rich peasants and vagabonds have flocked to enter the soviet organs. This exists in some places. As to those of good class status, enthusiastic about revolution and also competent in work, when they undertake government work, because of the unresolved problem of their family labor, they cannot relax and concentrate on their work. This is an even more prevalent situation (especially at the district and township levels).

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 207–8, where it is reproduced from a contemporary Guomindang compilation of Communist documents.

In order to make the soviet governments more enthusiastic and competent and better able to lead the broad masses to win revolutionary victory in these circumstances of arduous struggle, the Central Executive Committee has resolved, on the basis of the situation mentioned above: If any staff member of the various levels of the soviet governments, during the time he serves in the government, is found, after investigation, to have no labor power, or insufficient labor power in his family, the local governments should mobilize the masses to farm for him or to help his family farm (those who do not have any labor shortage are not included here), so that his family will not suffer unduly because of his absence. As regards the practical method to be employed, Article 4 of the Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army<sup>1</sup> can be applied here (where there is no labor power at all in the families, people should be sent to take care of all the work of cultivation, irrigation, and harvesting; where there is a shortage of labor power, help should be given according to their needs). Thus these staff members will be relieved from their family burdens and will be able to keep their minds on their work for the government. With the help of these measures, we can attract a large number of those who are of good class status, enthusiastic toward revolution, and competent in their jobs to work at all levels in the soviet governments, to strengthen the efficiency of the governments. To this end we have issued the present directive, and we expect governments at all levels to carry it out accordingly. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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1. See below, the Appendix to this volume, for the text of these regulations.

***Proclamation by the Provisional  
Central Government and  
Revolutionary Military Commission of the  
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army***

(April 15, 1933)

To the popular masses of all China!

On May First we extend a sincere revolutionary salute to all of China's toiling masses, all workers, peasants, and urban poor people who moan under the bloody rule of the imperialist Guomindang, the soldiers who have been forced to oppress and oppose the Chinese workers and peasants, the revolutionary students and youth who have participated in the anti-imperialist struggle, and the hundreds and thousands of revolutionary prisoners who have suffered from imprisonment and mistreatment in the Guomindang's prisons!

The continuing invasion by the Japanese imperialists, the unprecedented aggravation of the crisis created by the complete partition of China, and the deepening of the crisis of the whole nation make it imperative for us to make a further appeal to all people and toiling masses who struggle for China's welfare.

What is characteristic of the present situation is that the Japanese imperialists are driving straight into the [Bei]ping and Han[kou] areas without any hindrance whatsoever. At the same time, the British imperialists are invading Xinjiang and preparing to occupy western China through their Tibetan and other puppets. During the secret negotiations between the Japanese government and the Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek also did some business with the imperialist bandits. Tang Youren, secretary of the Guomindang Central Political Committee,<sup>1</sup> represented the Nanjing Government and Chiang Kaishek in secret negotiations in Shanghai with the Japanese representative,

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This document was first published in *Douzheng*, no. 40, April 21, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 209–12.

1. Tang Youren (1893–1935), a native of Liuyang in Hunan, was a son of the well-known late-Qing revolutionary Tang Caichang. A protégé of the Nationalist leader Wang Jingwei, Tang was widely felt to be pro-Japanese. On December 25, 1935 he was assassinated, an event which some attributed to his pro-Japanese stance, and others to his alliance with Wang at a time when Chiang Kaishek's forces were striving for political dominance.

Yoshizawa.<sup>2</sup> Chiang Kaishek, butcher of the Chinese workers and peasants, criminal who invited Japan to occupy Shandong in 1929 and slaughtered the defenders of Shanghai in 1932 behind the scenes, has now abandoned the northern fronts and once more promoted Tang Yulin, the traitor who paved the way for the Japanese imperialists to invade Rehe.<sup>3</sup> Chiang Kaishek went to the North but did not do battle against the Japanese imperialists; instead, he went to recognize the estate of his friend, the traitor Zhang Xueliang.

The southwestern government and the Fujian warlords,<sup>4</sup> in a similar fashion, do not oppose Japan or any other imperialists. Their recent propaganda about "going north to fight against the Japanese" is utter trickery to deceive the masses. Actually they are trying to expand their own territories and attack the soviet areas and the Red Army.

Why did Chiang Kaishek go back to Jiangxi? Why did he abandon the northern troops, leaving them unarmed to face the Japanese cannons and airplanes with their bare hands?<sup>5</sup> Why did the Guomindang and its government gather a vast number of troops and use all of its airplanes and military technology to fight against the workers and peasants of Jiangxi? Because they are negotiating with Japan and all the imperialists to sell out China altogether as their own private property. Because they hope that Japan and the other imperialists will let them be the puppet rulers in several provinces, just as in "Manchukuo." Because they want to slaughter the Chinese masses to maintain rule by the imperialists and the Chinese landlord and capitalist classes.

To cover up its own surrender and betrayal, the Guomindang has created the rumor that the Japanese imperialists have aided the Red Army with money and ammunition, and slandered the Chinese Soviet Government by saying that it negotiated with the Japanese warlords. Such shameless, base rumors have long ago been crushed by a great deal of ironclad evidence.

The Chinese Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are the only régime and armed forces of the masses to oppose the invasions of

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2. The reference is to Yoshizawa Kenkichi (1874-1965), who had been Japanese minister in Beijing in 1923-1924 and continued to reside in China. There is some evidence that, in 1933, he was seeking to promote a local settlement in Manchuria. See the article by Madeleine Chi on Cao Rulin in Akira Iriye (ed.), *The Chinese and the Japanese* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 153, 156.

3. General Tang Yulin (1871-1937), a native of Liaoning, was a one-time bandit who had joined and become prominent in the warlord forces of Zhang Zuolin and Zhang's successor Zhang Xueliang; he was chairman of Rehe Province at the time of the Japanese invasion. Tang was notoriously corrupt (he had amassed a fortune through the opium trade); he and his troops fled precipitously as soon as the Japanese invaded the province.

4. These references are to Chiang Kaishek's opponents in Guangdong-Guangxi and in Fujian.

5. Reference here is to the brief trip that Chiang made to northern China in the wake of the Japanese invasion of Rehe, after which despite intense public criticism he returned to Jiangxi to continue with the anti-Communist campaigns.

all imperialists. In a series of valiant battles, the Chinese Soviet Red Army has proven itself unwilling to compromise with any imperialist. We have been in constant contact with the workers and peasants in Japan, because they too are carrying out a courageous struggle in opposition to Japanese imperialism, and they too have been robbed, oppressed, mistreated, and slaughtered by the ruling class. But the Japanese imperialists and the warlords are, in fact, our common enemies.

We are in the midst of a struggle for the benefit of the toiling masses of all of China, a struggle for the independence and unity of China, and the integrity of her territory. At present we need to do battle against Japan and the other imperialists. We will overthrow whoever opposes this war.

We are firmly convinced that the struggle of the workers, peasants, the soldiers of China, and the Red Army's courageous defense can stop the imperialists, Chiang Kaishhek, and the bankrupt Guomindang from realizing their plan of carving up China.

Over the last three months, the workers and peasants of Jiangxi and their Red Army have defeated nine divisions and more of enemy forces. In several battles, they have captured more than thirty thousand soldiers and guns, in addition to a large amount of military supplies and other weapons. Approximately ten thousand soldiers of the Guomindang army have already voluntarily joined the Jiangxi Red Army. The Red armies in Hunan, Hubei, Henan, Sichuan, and other provinces are also growing rapidly. From the statements made by the divisional commanders and staff of the Fifty-second and Fifty-ninth divisions, which were recently captured in Jiangxi, it is utterly plain how thoroughly the Guomindang army has disintegrated. They curse the Guomindang and Chiang Kaishek, repent their own past crimes of opposing the Chinese workers and peasants, and call upon the soldiers and officers of the White army to cease invading the soviet areas and instead to turn their guns around to attack the Guomindang traitors who betray their own country. Traitors such as Chiang Kaishek, Wang Jingwei, and others, in view of the recent great victories of the Red Army, the vacillation of frontline soldiers, and the wrath of the masses of the entire country, intend, furthermore, to use empty propaganda such as "Exterminating the Communists means fighting the Japanese," and "Until the Communists are eliminated, it is forbidden to talk about fighting the Japanese" to halt the revolutionization of vast numbers of soldiers and the broad masses, and to cover up their own betrayal and surrender. But such deception and threats will not succeed. On the contrary, they will only serve to expose their crimes even more.

Based on the present situation and our victories, we must repeat the proposal we made in January of this year, to smash thoroughly the Guomindang's slanderous charge that the Red Army and the workers and peasants of the soviet areas have interfered with effective resistance against Japanese imperialism. We believe that as long as our original proposal is followed, active resistance to the

invasion of Japanese imperialism will immediately be possible. Therefore, we once again proclaim our proposal to the entire country:

Under the following conditions, the Chinese Red Army is prepared to sign, with any armed force whatsoever, combat agreements to resist the invasion of Japanese imperialism:

1. Immediately cease attacks against the soviet areas.
2. Immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the popular masses (freedom of assembly, of association, of speech, of publication, and of demonstration, release of political prisoners, etc.).
3. Immediately arm the popular masses, create a volunteer army to defend China, and strive for the independence, unification, and territorial integrity of China.

Every worker, peasant, and soldier will understand that without the conditions listed above, it is impossible to wage a victorious battle against imperialism. The Guomindang's policies are bankrupt, have led to the carving up of China and the deeper enslavement of the Chinese popular masses, and have continued adding to the misery, hunger, and slaughter of the popular masses.

We call upon all laborers and soldiers to redouble their efforts among the broad masses and within the armies and the volunteer army, so that they will accept our policy of national revolution. We call upon all the toiling masses to support us in defending the rights of China and of the nation.<sup>6</sup>

Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Zhu De

# ***Inspecting for and Banning of Privately Owned Firearms, and Prohibiting the Unauthorized Wearing of Military Uniforms***

*Order No. 42 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(April 15, 1933)

Firearms are important weapons of war and should be concentrated within the Red Army and local organs of armed workers and peasants, to be used for attacking the enemy and engaging in warfare; private individuals may not carry them at will. As for the enemies of the worker and peasant classes—landlords, rich peasants, capitalists, and all counterrevolutionary elements—it is even more strictly forbidden for them to have weapons in their hands. Moreover, counterrevolutionary elements are to be strictly prevented from infiltrating our armed forces—independent Red Army divisions and regiments or the Red Guards and Young Pioneers—to pilfer arms. This is an essential prerequisite for guaranteeing the victory of the revolution.

Military uniforms are to be worn by the Red Army, and to avoid confusion, those who are not part of the Red Army may not wear the uniform of the Red Army at will.

We have found through investigation that in the victories of the first, second, and third wars,<sup>1</sup> a large number of firearms were dispersed into the villages and not all of them were retrieved. At the same time, although we have totally destroyed the various local landlords' armed forces that existed in the past, inevitably a small number of firearms has been hidden away by counterrevolutionary elements. It is difficult to prevent these firearms that have been dispersed from falling into the hands of counterrevolutionaries. It is a fact that recently an investigation of landlords and rich peasants in the *xian* of [Chang]ting, Hui[chang], Shi[cheng], and so on, turned up quite a lot of firearms. Further-

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 71, April 20, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol 4, pp. 107–9.

1. Once again, the first, second, and third campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" are meant.



more, the discovery during the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries of armed conspiracies on the part of such counterrevolutionary organizations as the assassination brigades (in Huichang), the extermination brigades (in Yudu), the secret watch brigades (in Xunwu and Wantai), and so on, fully demonstrate the gravity of this problem. As the present class struggle becomes most intense, we not only must thoroughly eliminate the enemy who is attacking from without, we must also completely disperse the armed forces of the counterrevolutionary factions that are operating within the soviet districts and suppress all counterrevolutionary schemes, in order to defend the soviet areas and strengthen their development and victory. Firearms are the most important of all weapons, and it should be guaranteed that they are in the hands of the armed forces of the workers and peasants. Undertaking an investigation and banning privately owned firearms, and carrying out the registration of firearms constitute important tasks in ensuring the victory of the revolution.

Recently a great many Red Army uniforms have been dispersed among the masses, especially through deserters who have gone home wearing their uniforms. This makes it hard to distinguish between those in the Red Army and those who are not, and causes a large financial loss for the government. Furthermore, it directly affects the expenditures of the revolutionary war, so it is imperative that an investigation and a ban be carried out immediately.

Accordingly, the following measures have been decided upon:

1. Undertake an inspection for firearms, and except for the official armed forces—independent Red Army divisions and regiments, guerrilla brigades, defense forces, the Red Guards, and the Young Pioneers—private individuals may not carry or conceal firearms.

2. All personnel of *xian* level organs and above and special agents of the State Security Bureau who must carry firearms for work-related reasons are restricted to handguns and rifles only, and with the signature of the person in charge of that organ, shall register and obtain a firearm permit from that level of the State Security Bureau. In the border areas, at the district and township levels, personnel who need to carry firearms for reasons related to the circumstances or to their work are to obtain permits through validation and registration by the directly related *xian* organs.

3. From now on, any private individual who is found to possess firearms without a permit will be charged with the crime of privately concealing military weapons.

4. Except for fighters who have been taken away from production to be on active duty with the armed forces, government personnel on active duty, and disabled Red Army fighters who have gone home, all of whom may wear the Red Army uniform, the Red Guards, Young Pioneers, popular mass organizations, and private individuals are all forbidden to wear the Red Army uniform. Both military and government personnel should turn in their uniforms when they leave active duty.

5. For the Central [Soviet] Area the month of May is designated as the period of inspection for firearms and uniforms. In other soviet areas inspection shall be completed within twenty days of receipt of this document.

6. Those who voluntarily turn in [firearms and uniforms] during the inspection period will not be prosecuted. Otherwise, following discovery, they will be charged with the crime of privately concealing military weapons and uniforms. After the time limit, however, those who voluntarily come forward will be given lighter punishment.

7. The organs of inspection shall be put into operation by the *xian* and district military affairs offices in coordination with the security bureaus.

8. The Red Guards and Young Pioneers and the various popular mass organs must be mobilized to participate in the inspection. Moreover, the masses must be mobilized and encouraged to report regularly to the government and the security bureaus on those who privately conceal weapons.

It is important that government organs at all levels and State Security Bureau organs at all levels coordinate actions in determining and carrying out concrete measures regarding the above, and that the circumstances of inspection and registration be reported to the appropriate levels. It is so ordered.

Chairman  
Vice-Chairmen

Mao Zedong  
Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

April 15, 1933, by the Western calendar

## ***Resolution of the Central Executive Committee Concerning Committees for Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries***

(April 15, 1933)

Recent investigation shows that many townships and districts in which formal political authority has already been established for more than a year, and even some very old districts, not only have judicial departments and state political security bureaus, but also committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries. Such reduplication of organs and splitting up of authority surely violates organizational principles and affects the carrying out of the work. Add to this the fact that in the past there was no clear directive specifying which organ is to supervise the committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries, to the point that in a number of places the committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries have run their own affairs independently of any other organ, and as a result a number of serious incidents have occurred. The Central Executive Committee, in order to establish organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and make it possible to administer the task of eliminating counterrevolutionaries effectively within the environment of the civil war, specifically resolves as follows:

1. All committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries organized by *xian* or district standing committees belonging to newly formed soviet areas and the provisional governments in those places, as the provisional organs for eliminating counterrevolutionaries, have the duty to suppress and pass judgement on counterrevolutionary activities and schemes of the bad gentry, landlords, rich peasants, capitalists, and all reactionaries in that area, and to wipe out the counterrevolutionary forces in that area, in order to consolidate the position of the provisional political authorities. Their duties and powers include the responsibilities of both a judicial organ and a political security bureau.

2. Organizationally, the *xian* and district committees on eliminating counterrevolutionaries come under the jurisdiction of their respective revolutionary committees and are subject to their direction and supervision. In their work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries, they should be under the direction of the state political security bureau at the next higher level, but if the respective

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Our source for this resolution is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 111–12, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1981.

provisional political authorities have not yet established contact with the provincial or *xian* political security bureau, the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries should be directed by a security bureau at the level of a Red Army command or above. Where there is no Red Army or the Red Army has already left, they should be completely under the direction of the *xian* or district revolutionary committee.

3. The *xian* committee for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, under the direction of the *xian* revolutionary committee, has the authority to arrest, prosecute, and pass judgment on counterrevolutionaries and on ordinary criminals directly, and to carry out sentences on them (from execution to release). The district and city elimination committees must have approval from the *xian* elimination committee before they can carry out executions, but if after the crimes of local bad gentry, landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists have been publicly revealed, the worker and peasant masses have demanded that they be executed, or in emergency situations that do not permit reporting across long distances, the district and city elimination committees may carry out the execution first and then report the case to the *xian* elimination committee for the record.

4. All *xian* and districts, whether in central or border areas, in which formal political authority has already been established, must set up judicial departments and state political security bureaus to carry out the work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries and to deal with criminal cases involving ordinary civilians, and abolish committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries.

In accordance with the above resolution, all *xian* and district committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries presently existing within the older soviet areas are to be eliminated, and their work is to be divided up and distributed among the judicial departments and the security bureaus. The committees for eliminating counterrevolutionaries in all new areas must also carry out the requisite changes in duties, organization, and work tasks in accordance with this resolution.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

## ***Letter on the Summer Planting Movement to Those in Charge of the Soviets at All Levels***

(April 22, 1933)

To the presidiums of the provincial, *xian*, and district soviets, heads of land departments, and chairmen of township soviets, and to all deputies, comrades:

Spring plowing has been completed. Although good results have been achieved in some places, the results in quite a number of places have been very poor. A serious situation is that government presidiums ignore spring planting, land departments neglect their work, and especially that the mobilization method is divorced from the masses. Now the time for summer plowing has already arrived, and very shortly it will be time for the autumn harvest. If you still fail to exert yourselves and do not immediately correct the errors made during spring planting, and if everyone does not summon up a fighting spirit to deal with the summer plowing, then the plan to increase the harvest by 20 percent to benefit the masses and for the sake of the revolutionary war will be severely affected. Therefore, the Central Land Department has specially compiled and sent out to you an outline of the summer planting movement (i.e., *How to Lead the Summer Planting Movement*, put out by *Hongse zhonghua*). This outline points out the serious significance of summer planting, the objectives of summer planting, the central tasks of summer planting, and the way to mobilize the masses during summer planting. It specifically points to the example of Wuyang District in Ruijin—there they really did accomplish “organized mobilization,” aroused the peasant masses to unprecedented heights in their enthusiasm for labor, and achieved great results in spring planting. Upon receiving this outline, you should immediately convene various kinds of necessary meetings (*xian* soviet chairmen and land department heads are to convene meetings of all district chairmen and land department heads, district soviets and their land departments are to convene meetings of all township soviet chairmen and heads of the poor peasant leagues, township soviets are to convene separate meetings of deputies’ assemblies, poor peasant leagues, women’s conferences, Red Guards, Young Pioneers, Children’s Brigades, and of the popular masses in the villages) to explain the essential points of the outline, to discuss methods for carrying it out locally, and to wage

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This letter was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 77, May 8, 1933. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 215–16, which reproduces it from that version.

the revolutionary battle of summer planting immediately throughout all the Red villages. The provincial soviets need not convene a meeting of the *xian* soviets, but should provide concrete and spirited leadership in accordance with this outline. Once a month the province should inspect the work of the *xian*, and the *xian* should inspect the work of the districts. The districts should inspect the work of the townships once every two weeks. Within the month of May the Central Land Bureau will send people out into every *xian* to make the first inspection of your summer planting results. Completion of the task of summer planting depends first of all upon your correct and forceful leadership. Comrades, let everyone struggle for the complete victory of the summer planting!

Chairman of the Provisional Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
Acting People's Commissar for the Land	Hu Hai

## *Directive on Establishing the Commissariat for the National Economy*

### *Directive No. 10 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government*

(April 28, 1933)

Raising production in all fields in the soviet areas, expanding both internal and external trade, developing the national economy of the soviet areas, and breaking the enemy's economic blockade, all have significance of the highest order in the current environment of intensifying civil war. It is for this reason that the Central Executive Committee has issued Order No. 19, adding to the Central Government a Commissariat for the National Economy, and adding departments of the national economy at the provincial and *xian* levels, to correct the past error of neglecting economic construction on the part of governments at all levels, and rapidly to mount an attack on the economic front. Since the imperialist Guomindang's Fourth "Encirclement and Attack" against the soviet areas and the Red Army, and the concurrent imposition of the vicious economic blockade, because of the correct leadership of the Communist Party and of the soviets, and the active advance of the Red Army and the popular masses, we have already achieved a very great victory. But all levels of government must understand that the war between ourselves and the imperialist Guomindang will be a long and difficult war. That is, to smash completely the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" and to seize victory first in one or several provinces will still require extremely great efforts. Using victory in economic construction to improve the lives of the worker and peasant masses, arousing the revolutionary fervor of the masses to even greater heights, and at the same time guaranteeing that the needs of the Red Army are met by the entire war mobilization—all this is of decisive significance in the fight for victory.

Adhering to the above principles, all levels of government must grasp hold of several central tasks of the present economic construction, including realistically

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This directive was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 77, May 8, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 215–16, where it is reproduced from that source.

proceeding with the development of agricultural and industrial production, the regulation of food supplies, enlarging cooperatives, setting up offices of external trade, developing state-owned enterprises, and so on. To carry out these tasks, the Council of People's Commissars has specifically put together provisional organizational guidelines for departments for the national economy at all levels. Within these guidelines it is specified that the most important organs of departments of the people's economy be set up—a planning department and a department of surveys and statistics. It is likewise specified that prior to the establishment of various specialized administrative organs—departments of agriculture, industry, transportation, domestic and foreign trade, and so on—the administrative tasks of these organs should all be turned over for management to the departments of the national economy. As soon as the various levels of government receive this directive and these guidelines, they should immediately set up the various organs as specified and turn over those tasks formerly administered by the departments of finance, including those of the bureaus of food supply regulation, of cooperatives, of the offices of external trade, and so on, to the departments of the national economy. The state printing shops, which used to be administered by the departments of education, will also be turned over for the time being to the departments of the national economy. The manufacturing and business sections of the labor reformatories, which in the past were administered by the departments of justice and by the provincial and *xian* judicial departments, should be turned over to and administered by the departments of the national economy. Of the communications administration of the departments of internal affairs, however, only the office of transportation should be turned over to the departments of the national economy. The administration of other matters, such as postal and telegraph services and roads, should remain unchanged in the hands of the departments of internal affairs. The former provincial and *xian* levels of the departments of food supplies should both be brought under the food supplies office of the departments of the national economy. Within the departments of the national economy at all levels there should be established committees on the national economy, to be the organs for planning and construction. With the establishment of the organs of the departments of the national economy, the duties of their personnel should be reported promptly to be recorded by the Central Commissariat for the National Economy of the Council of People's Commissars. As for regional planning and concrete guidance in matters of the national economy, these should be presented for approval to the central Commissariat for the People's Economy of the Council of People's Commissars at the earliest appropriate date. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

April 28, 1933, by the Western calendar



## *On Limiting Special Express Mail*

### *General Order No. 8 of the Council of People's Commissars*

(May 11, 1933)

In order to limit special express mail, the Central Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Council of People's Commissars has issued an order specifying that "any public or private letters or documents that are not strictly urgent in nature are not to be sent by special express mail." Recent investigations within Party organs and Red armed forces units have continued to reveal a good deal of irresponsible use of special express mail. For example, a comrade in the Fifth Branch District lost a fountain pen and sent a special express letter to inquire about it, requesting, furthermore, that the reply be sent by special express as well. In Yihuang *xian*, a comrade in the Soviet Military Affairs Bureau sent a special express letter to a comrade in the Fujian Military District seeking repayment of a personal loan. The Daxiba district committee also sent an inquiry by special express mail to a representative of the Huangbai district to ask about mailing funds, and so on. Such irresponsible uses of special express mail does harm to the work of the postal service, to express communications that are genuinely urgent, and especially to communication of reports on the military situation, and are a waste of public funds. This situation must not be allowed to continue. The Council of People's Commissars specifically and strictly repeats the order to all organs and all units of the armed forces to prohibit their personnel from doing such things, and also specifies the following restrictive measures:

1. Special express mail of military organs shall be limited to urgent reports on the disposition of the enemy and to the sending of emergency orders and reports. All other items may not be sent by special express mail. In addition, the seal of the commanding officer must appear on the communication.

2. Restrictions applicable to the Party, governments, and mass organizations:

- a. Only *xian* level organs are permitted to send special express mail. District and township organs may not use special express mail.
- b. The content of special express mail must be truly urgent in nature, that

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 90, July 2, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 217–18, which reproduces this version.

is, the nature of the communication must be such that if not received within a very short time it will have a serious adverse affect on the overall work.

c. For Party organs, the Party secretary, or for government organs, the government chairman (in the case of the central government, the department head, and for mass organizations, the responsible person or committee chairman), must place his seal on the envelope of any special express mail.

3. The security bureau, which is charged with the responsibility of inspection, upon discovering a violation of the above stipulations, in addition to immediately changing the communication to regular mail status, shall also report the sender to the responsible organ at the next higher level to mete out proper punishment to the said sender.

Organs at all levels and all armed forces units are expected to observe strictly the above regulations and to refrain from violating them again. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

May 11, 1933, by the Western calendar

# ***Letter from the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the White Troops of Fujian and Guangdong***

(May 28, 1933)

To the White troops of Guangdong and Fujian:

The Guomindang Nanjing Government, the arch-criminal that has sold out the country, has already signed a secret treaty with Japan that not only gives up Rehe and Chahar in Manchuria, but also makes the withdrawal of all armed forces from Beiping and Tianjin a condition for the beginning of peace negotiations.<sup>1</sup> The whole of North China is now under the iron boot of Japanese imperialism. The anger of all the people of China against the Guomindang Nanjing Government has already reached an extreme. The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission have time and again proposed to the armed forces that are attacking the soviet areas throughout China the following three conditions for concluding a combat agreement in order to oppose the invasion by Japanese imperialism: (1) Immediately stop attacking the soviet territories; (2) Immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the people (freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication, and to strike); and (3) Immediately arm a volunteer army of the popular masses to defend China and to fight for the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of China. Even though this appeal of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission has received the support of the popular masses throughout all China, the

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This letter was first published in *Douzheng*, no. 43, May 31, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 113–14, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. Reference here is to the negotiations leading to what became known as the Tanggu Truce. In April–May 1933, as fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops following the latter's invasion of Rehe continued, and threatened to engulf Beiping and Tianjin, Chiang Kaishek embarked on diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire. A basic agreement was reached on May 23, though the final formal signing of the Tanggu Truce occurred only on May 31, several days after the current document was issued. The agreement provided for a large "demilitarized zone" covering the territory from the Great Wall south to a line just north of Beiping. Chinese troops were withdrawn from this zone; it and areas to the north, including Rehe and Chahar, remained under effective Japanese control.

Guomindang warlords not only will not give up their plans to attack the soviet areas and join with us to oppose Japanese imperialism, they have even taken yet another step in surrendering to Japanese imperialism, selling out all of North China in order to intensify their attacks on the soviet areas. Against these attacks, our ever-victorious and glorious Red Army and the worker and peasant masses have inflicted powerful [X][X]<sup>2</sup> against the main forces of the traitorous arch-criminal Chiang Kaishek, completely wiping out Chiang Kaishek's First Column, and shattering all of Chiang Kaishek's main armed units. In order that the glorious Workers' and Peasants' Red Army may go north to resist Japan and wipe out all the armies of the Japanese imperialists that are occupying North China, the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission believe that it is necessary to eliminate the main power of Chiang Kaishek, the Guomindang arch-criminal who signed the secret treaty with Japan and sold out the whole of North China, in order to clear the road for going north to resist the Japanese. In this desperate crisis in which the survival or extinction of the Chinese nation is at stake, the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission once again suggest to all the armed forces of Guangdong and Fujian that they accept the three conditions listed above and sign a combat agreement, and oppose Japanese imperialism and the Nanjing government headed by the arch-criminal of the Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek, who has sold out North China. The Soviet Government of China and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are the anti-imperialist government and the anti-imperialist armed forces of all the Chinese people. Within our soviet districts we have already completely eliminated the power of the imperialists. All anti-imperialist forces are our allies. Any Fujian or Guangdong warlord who thinks he can use the fraudulent propaganda of resisting Japan and suppressing the Communists to attack the bases of the Chinese revolution, who is a scavenger splitting China apart for the imperialists, we shall meet head-on with armed force until he has been totally eliminated so that soviet political authority may rule throughout China. Brothers of the Guangdong and Fujian White armies, rise up and join with the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to do battle with the Japanese imperialists, and to overthrow all the Guomindang warlords who have sold out China!

Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission and Commander-in-Chief of the All-China Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Mao Zedong      Zhu De
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2. The two characters missing from the available Chinese text obviously correspond to "blows" or some such term.

## *Dabodi*<sup>1</sup>

(To the Tune "Bodhisattva Stranger")

(Summer 1933)

Red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet,  
Who is dancing in the void, twirling this colored sash?  
After the rain, the sun slants back,<sup>2</sup>  
Passes and mountains are dotted with patches of azure.  
That year a fierce battle raged here,  
Bullet holes have scored the village walls.  
Thus adorned, these passes and mountains,  
Today seem fairer still.

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Our source for this text is *Shici duilian*, pp. 44–45.

1. Dabodi is in Ruijin *xian*, Jiangxi Province. (In his report of March 20, 1929, describing the battle, translated in Volume III, Mao said it was in Ningdu; it is in fact on the boundary of these two *xian*.) It was there that on February 11, 1929, the Red Army troops led by Mao and Zhu De achieved their first major victory against the Guomindang armies after leaving the Jinggangshan. Mao wrote this poem when revisiting the place in 1933.

2. This line appears to be derived from one by Wen Tingyun (812–866), a poet of the Tang dynasty.

***Proclamation of the Central Government  
of the Chinese Soviet Republic  
Opposing the Guomindang Sellout  
of Beiping and Tianjin***

(June 1, 1933)

To the popular masses of the whole of China!

The Guomindang Nanjing government of the arch-criminal Chiang Kaishek, after abandoning Manchuria, Rehe, and Shanghai, has now again signed a "North China Truce Agreement" with the Japanese bandits, selling out Beiping, Tianjin, and North China to the Japanese imperialists!<sup>1</sup>

The contents of the so-called "North China Truce Agreement" are: (1) Chinese troops are to be withdrawn south of Beiping and Tianjin, marking the territory south of the Great Wall as a buffer zone (i.e., a so-called "neutral zone"). (2) The Chinese side recognizes "Manchukuo."<sup>2</sup> (3) All volunteer army activities and the development of anti-Manchukuo forces are to be halted, and whenever possible, the volunteer armies and all anti-Japanese armies are to be disarmed. (4) The Chinese side guarantees that all anti-Japanese movements will be stopped. The "North China Truce Agreement" was the final decision of the Lushan Conference of the Guomindang traitors, and on May 31 at Tanggu it was signed jointly by the representatives of Japanese imperialism and by those warlord executioners who are adept at selling out China and who held a banquet to celebrate their victory. Outside the city of Beijing,<sup>3</sup> in Manchuria, in Rehe and Chahar, in the Beiping-Tianjin zone, the Japanese imperialists are right now continuing to use their cannons and airplanes to bombard and slaughter the anti-Japanese volunteer army, the revolutionary troops, and thousands upon

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This proclamation was first published in *Douzheng*, no. 44, June 10, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 115-18. A virtually identical text, issued on May 30, 1933, the day before the conclusion of the Tanggu Truce, was published in *Hongse Zhonghua* no. 83, June 4, 1933, and is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 219-22. Since the variants are not of sufficient interest to justify the inclusion of both documents in this edition, we have chosen the second one, revised after Mao and his comrades had learned of the signature of the Sino-Japanese agreement.

1. Regarding these negotiations, see above, the note to the text of May 28, 1933.

2. Here and elsewhere in this volume we have retained the spelling officially used at the time for *Manzhouguo*, or "Manchu State."

3. Here the Chinese text has "Beijing" rather than "[Be]iping."

thousands of peaceful residents, to create the "peace and order" of colonial slaves under the rule of Japanese imperialism.

Popular masses of all China! Beiping, Tianjin, and North China have now finally been sold out by the reactionary Guomindang. This is indeed the substance of the Guomindang's "long-term resistance." This is indeed the reality of the Guomindang's "both resist and negotiate." This is indeed the "fixed policy" of the Guomindang Central Committee.<sup>4</sup> The thoroughly evil Guomindang of the arch-criminal Chiang Kaishek has thus shamelessly and brazenly offered up the several tens of millions of square miles and ten million people of the whole of Manchuria, Rehe, and the Beiping-Tianjin area to Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, he is right now thinking of selling out the huge territory of Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and so on to British imperialism!

Popular masses of all China! We are the masters of the Chinese nation. We absolutely will not allow Japanese imperialism and all the other imperialisms to plunder a single inch of our soil, nor will we allow the Guomindang running dogs of the imperialists to sell out China so shamelessly and brazenly! We must join together, take up arms, and expand the people's revolutionary war. With the strength of four hundred million people, we shall overthrow the imperialists and the imperialists' running dogs, the Guomindang warlords, and first of all, the Guomindang Nanjing government of the arch-criminal Chiang Kaishek. Only a bloody battle by the popular masses of all China can take back the lands already lost and achieve the independence, liberation, and territorial integrity of the Chinese people!

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission have time and again proposed to the armed forces that are attacking the Chinese soviet areas throughout China the following three conditions for signing a combat agreement in order to oppose the Japanese imperialist aggression: (1) Immediately stop attacking the soviet territories. (2) Immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the popular masses. (3) Immediately arm the popular masses and form a volunteer army to defend China and to fight for the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of China. But the response of the Guomindang to this proclamation of the Soviet Government has been a new surrender and sellout to the Japanese imperialists, forcing the anti-Japanese troops in the Northeast to withdraw, dissolving the armed forces of the Northeast volunteer army, suppressing all the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movements of the popular masses of all China, organizing new forces to attack our soviet districts, and also sending large numbers of airplanes to bomb the toiling popular masses and peace-loving residents of the soviet districts. At the same time, it has shamelessly manufactured rumors, saying that the reason the Guomindang cannot send troops to resist Japan is because of the existence of the soviet political power, and because the Chinese Workers' and

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4. The terms in quotation marks refer to various publicly announced policies of Chiang Kaishek's Nanjing government in its dealings with Japan.

Peasants' Red Army is an "obstacle to the war of resistance against Japan." They say that "China does not have the power to resist Japan," and therefore it has "no choice but reluctantly to accept a truce." At present, every worker, every peasant, every soldier, every student, and every revolutionary can see with his own eyes who is the obstacle to the war of resistance against Japan, who is selling out the country, who is the running dog of imperialism! Unless the Guomindang is overthrown, China will surely perish and the Chinese popular masses will be subjugated forever as the slaves of imperialism!

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls upon the popular masses of all China, the Northeast volunteer army, the soldiers of the Northeast who are resisting Japan, the revolutionary students, the intellectuals, members of the professions, and all revolutionaries throughout all of China to join together, to take up arms, and to proceed with the national revolutionary war. Let them pay no heed to all the oppression and slaughter by the imperialist patrols and Guomindang military police and violate the Guomindang order to cease hostilities and withdraw in order to oppose the Japanese imperialist aggression against China, in order to oppose the selling out of China by the Guomindang government, and in order to fight for the independence and liberation of the Chinese people! The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic is right now engaged in a bloody battle to shatter totally the Fourth Encirclement Campaign of the imperialists and the Guomindang against the soviet districts, to set up a vast Chinese revolutionary base, and to build a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army a million strong. It is preparing to assemble its troops at the Yangzi River to do battle directly with the Japanese and with all imperialists. The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic with its Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, in the long-term battle against the imperialists and against the Guomindang, has already proven for all the popular masses of China to see that it alone is the people's own anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist political power, that it alone is capable of leading all the people of China in overthrowing the Japanese imperialists and all imperialists, in overthrowing the Guomindang Nanjing government of Chiang Kaishek that has sold out China and all the Guomindang warlords who have sold out China. Popular masses of all China! Unite, take up arms, and with the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic expand the national revolutionary war, to take back the lost territory in the Northeast, to defend China, and to struggle for the independence and liberation of the Chinese people!

The Provisional Central Government  
of the Chinese Soviet Republic

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



## ***Carry Out a Broad and Thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement***

### ***Directive No. 11 of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government***

(June 1, 1933)

Up until now, the land question has not been thoroughly resolved in various soviet areas, especially in many districts within the Central Soviet Area. Such districts cover approximately 80 percent of the total area of the Central Soviet Area, with masses numbering more than two million, include fifteen whole *xian*, namely, Ruijin (excluding Wuyang District), Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, Yudu (excluding Xinpo District), Le'an, Yihuang, Guangchang, Shicheng, Jianning, Lichuan, Ninghua, Changting, and Wuping. There are other localities where the land question has not been thoroughly resolved either, such as most of Bosheng, Shengli, and Yongfeng *xian*; some parts of Gonglue, Wantai, Shanghang, Yongding, and Xinquan *xian*; and two districts, Juncun and Huangtang, in Xingguo *xian*. The peasant masses in these localities have not been mobilized on the broadest possible scale; the remnant feudal forces have not been finally crushed; there are large numbers of class-alien elements who are still hiding and engaging in covert action within the Soviet Government, the mass organizations, and the local armed forces; and a large number of secret counterrevolutionary organizations are active everywhere to sabotage the revolution. As a direct result, the war mobilization effort, as well as cultural and economic construction in these localities all lag behind the more advanced districts (almost the whole of Xingguo *xian*; parts of Shengli, Ganxian, Wantai, Gonglue, Yongfeng, and Shanghang *xian*; the districts of Huangpi and Anfu in Bosheng *xian*; Wuyang District in Ruijin *xian*; and Xi'nan District in Yongding *xian*). It is an urgent task that does not admit of the slightest delay for the soviets everywhere to carry out a widespread and thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement in this whole broad area, and to develop an extremely intense class

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 87, June 20, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3. pp. 223–26, which reproduces the text from that source.

struggle among the masses, who number more than two million, so as to launch a final attack on the feudal forces and wipe them out once and for all. As for the concrete measures to carry out the Land Investigation Movement, the Council of People's Commissars has reached the following decisions:

1. Instruct the chairmen of governments at all levels to do their utmost in providing leadership to the Land Investigation Movement as a whole.

2. Instruct the Land Commissariat, the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate, the Commissariat for Justice, and the State Political Security Bureau and its agents in each region to exert all their efforts to direct the Land Investigation Movement, to resolve the land question completely, to reconstruct the local soviets, and to purge the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside. Agencies of the Central Government, such as the People's Commissariat for Land, the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate, the People's Commissariat for Justice, and the State Political Security Bureau, should do their best to guide their subordinate institutions in fulfilling these tasks.

3. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Finance in the Central Government to guide the financial departments at all levels, waging an attack on the feudal and semifeudal forces by imposing fines on the landlords and collecting donations from the rich peasants, while increasing the national revenue at the same time. Instruct the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs in the Central Government to guide the departments of military affairs at all levels during the Land Investigation Movement, reorganizing and expanding the local armed forces and mobilizing the masses to join the Red Army. Instruct the People's Commissariat for the National Economy in the Central Government to guide the economic departments at all levels throughout the movement, restoring and developing agricultural production and handicraft industries, promoting cooperatives, and regulating the exchange of products and consumer goods. Instruct the People's Commissariat of Education in the Central Government to guide the departments of education at all levels, providing various kinds of concise and popular textbooks and pamphlets to all cadres and masses engaged in the Land Investigation Movement for the sake of unfolding the movement and conducting cultural education on a mass scale along with the development of this movement.

4. Both the provincial and *xian* governments should gather cadres from the areas where the Land Investigation Movement is under way and from all the other advanced and fairly advanced areas to attend short-term Land Investigation Movement training classes. The *xian* soviet should call together the leaders of the district soviets every month for a meeting, and every ten days, the district soviet should call together the chairmen of the township soviets and the heads of the poor peasant league for a meeting to examine the progress of the Land Investigation Movement.

5. First of all, it is necessary for the Central Government to call a conference of the principal leaders at and above the level of district, as well as a meeting of the heads of the poor peasant league, from the eight *xian* of Ruijin, Huichang,

Bosheng, Yudu, Shengli, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting, in order to launch the Land Investigation Movement in these eight *xian*.

6. In the course of the Land Investigation Movement, we must firmly apply a class line; establish the leadership of the working class in the countryside; rely on the poor peasants; form a solid alliance with the middle peasants; carry out a resolute attack against the feudal and semifeudal forces; root out all the landlords and rich peasants who pass themselves off as "middle peasants" or "poor peasants"; deprive the landlord class of its land and property and the rich peasants of their land, surplus draft animals, tools, and houses; and distribute good land to the workers and poor and middle peasants who were not given enough land in the past or have not been given any land at all, and relatively inferior land to the rich peasants.

7. In the course of the Land Investigation Movement it is important to involve the majority of the masses in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism. First of all, by means of widespread propaganda and agitation, an investigation should be conducted on the class status of all landlords and rich peasants. On the basis of this class status, the land and property of the landlords and rich peasants should be confiscated. All this should be done with approval from, and with the involvement of, as many of the masses as possible. It is advisable that everything collected through confiscation, except cash, should be allocated to the poorest among the masses and in particular to impoverished family members of Red Army men. It is also advisable that the greater part of the property should be distributed to the masses from whose villages these things were taken.

8. The poor peasant league is an extremely important mass organization in the Land Investigation Movement. The soviet governments at the district and township levels must do their utmost to guide this organization, purge bad elements within it, and induce a majority of activists to join it. The workers' small group within the poor peasant league should be an active leader of this organization.

9. During the Land Investigation Movement, a great deal of attention should be paid to the backward and especially the most backward districts, townships, and villages. In promoting the Land Investigation Movement in the backward districts and townships, and especially in the large villages, the impoverished masses of the village in question must be incited to stand up for themselves and struggle against the landlords and rich peasants. It is important, however, to do everything possible to avoid all erroneous actions that might provoke local struggle among the various clans.

10. During the Land Investigation Movement, all counterrevolutionary secret organizations and activities must be eliminated, and all rumors and sabotage instigated by the landlords and rich peasants must be prevented or exposed.

11. During the Land Investigation Movement, the local soviet should be reformed. All the class-alien elements and other bad elements should be driven out from the local soviet and a large number of revolutionary activists should be invited into the soviet.

12. All those in the soviets at all levels who, directly or indirectly, stand in the way of the Land Investigation Movement must be punished in a severe or extremely severe manner.

Only by carrying out the above decisions resolutely can we wage a wide and deep class struggle in the countryside, unleash the activism of the broadest masses, completely wipe out all feudal and semifeudal forces in the countryside, and accomplish the task of the Land Investigation Movement. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Summons to a Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials at and Above the District Level, and to a Congress of Poor Peasant League Representatives from Eight Xian***

## ***Central Government Circular***

(June 1, 1933)

To comrades of the presidiums of the district and *xian* soviets and chairmen of the township soviets in the eight *xian* of Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting:

The land question is still an extremely serious question in many areas where the struggle is lagging behind. In order to launch a wide and deep Land Investigation Movement before the Second National Congress of the Soviets, thoroughly resolve the land question in the course of the Land Investigation Movement, eliminate counterrevolution, and transform the soviets and mass organizations, the Central Government has decided to begin by convening an "Eight-*xian* Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials at and above the District Level" and an "Eight-*xian* Congress of Representatives of the Poor Peasant League" from Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting.

### **A. The Conference of Responsible Soviet Officials at and Above the District Level in Eight *Xian***

1. The meeting place: Yeping, Yunji District, Ruijin *xian*.
2. The dates of the conference: everyone is to arrive by June 16; the conference begins on June 17 and ends on June 20.
3. Participants:  
District level: the chairman, the director of the land department, the director of the worker-peasant procuratorate, and the special commissioner of the security bureau

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 85, June 14, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 227–31, which reproduces the text from that source.

*Xian* level: the chairman, the director of the land department, the director of the worker-peasant procuratorate, and the head of the security bureau  
 Provincial level: the vice chairman, the director of the land department, the director of the worker-peasant procuratorate, the head of the security bureau

4. Those who are coming to the conference may entrust someone else with their responsibilities temporarily.

5. Those who are supposed to attend the conference, as designated above, must not absent themselves on any pretext.

6. Those who are coming to the conference should prepare the following reports, and bring them to the conference (the list of items is omitted).

In order to gather materials for these reports, the district soviets should, as soon as this circular is received, immediately call together the chairmen of all the townships and the heads of the poor peasant league in the district for a meeting at which the materials will be collected. There is no need for the *xian* soviets to call a meeting of the district soviets; it suffices that they collect materials from the various departments and the mass organizations at the *xian* level. The provincial soviet should likewise collect materials from the various departments and the mass organizations at the provincial level. Everyone who is coming to the meeting must bring all the aforementioned reports with him. All those without reports will be regarded as guilty of negligence in their work. The reports must be truthful and may not be fabricated. Those who are found guilty of making false reports to save face will be punished when this is discovered.

7. For those who are coming to the conference, their travelling expenses going and coming will be paid by the financial departments at all levels, while their food during the conference will be provided by the Central Government.

8. Those who are coming to the conference should bring their bowls, chopsticks, and coverlets.

## **B. The Congress of Representatives of the Poor Peasant League in Eight *Xian***

1. The meeting place: Yeping, Yunji District, Ruijin *xian*.

2. The dates of the congress: everyone is to arrive by June 24; the congress begins on June 25 and ends on July 1.

3. Participants: the poor peasant league in each township should elect one delegate. If the poor peasant league has more than three hundred members, they should elect two delegates.

4. The election of the delegates and their departure:

a. As soon as this circular reaches each district, the district soviet should call a meeting of the chairmen of all the township soviets and the heads of the poor peasant league, and report to them on the great revolutionary significance of the present call by the Central Government for a congress of representatives of the poor peasant league in eight *xian*, as well as on the methods

for electing delegates and carrying out propaganda among the masses.

b. The chairman of the township soviet and the head of the poor peasant league in each township should return to their own townships immediately and summon the members of the league to a general meeting, explaining the significance of this call by the Central Government for a congress of the poor peasant league, and then conducting the election of delegates.

c. As regards the qualifications for the delegates, they must be poor peasants and farm laborers who have generally taken part in the struggle against the landlords and rich peasants all along and are enthusiastically involved in various activities. The head, or the secretary, of the poor peasant league may be elected as a delegate if he meets these qualifications. In the event that neither the director nor the secretary meets the qualifications, then another member of the league must be elected. The delegate must definitely be elected at a general meeting of the league members. It is not permissible to choose someone at random as a delegate, still less to elect someone who is a passive element, or even a class-alien element.

d. When the delegates have been selected from all the townships, they gather at the district soviet. Then, the acting chairman of the district soviet calls them together for a meeting to organize a delegation. An extremely competent person should be chosen from among the delegates to act as head of the delegation. The delegates should also hear a report about the importance of their trip to this meeting called by the Central Government and receive their traveling funds. Led by the head of the delegation, they then set off, arriving in Ruijin on June 24.

5. Each delegate should bring a brief report, containing the following information: (a) the population of the township in question; (b) the number of members of the poor peasant league and their class status; (c) the date when the league was founded; (d) whether or not the league has branches in the villages; and (e) how many subdivisions it has.

6. The traveling expenses of the delegates will be paid by the district soviets, while their food during the congress will be provided by the Central Government.

7. The delegates should bring their own bowls, chopsticks, and coverlets.

8. After the departure of these delegates, the propaganda should start. Township soviets should select, from each township's representative assembly or poor peasant league, five revolutionary activists to form a "Propaganda Team for the Land Investigation Movement." After the delegation of the poor peasant league has set off, the members of this propaganda team should go forwards and backwards to every village and household and hold mass meetings, telling people that the reason why the Central Government is calling this congress of the poor peasant league in eight *xian* is to launch a great movement to investigate land and classes, and that a certain person from this township has already been elected to attend the congress, and so have delegates from every township and district in

this *xian*. The masses should be prepared, and keep an eye on those landlords and rich peasants who have received some land by fraudulently claiming to be middle peasants or poor peasants. As soon as the delegates are back, the investigation will get into full swing, and all the feudal forces will be entirely wiped out, for only then can the impoverished masses enjoy the greatest benefits. But Land Investigation is by no means a redivision of the land. It is rather a movement of the masses themselves to ferret out those landlords and rich peasants who have passed themselves off as middle peasants and poor peasants. Only after they are found out and overthrown can the impoverished masses be liberated. In addition, we farm laborers and poor peasants are determined to unite with all the real middle peasants, and the rights of the middle peasants will be completely protected by the soviet. The role of this kind of propaganda is simply to inform the broad masses that the delegates of their own townships, and the delegates from other districts and townships, are going to attend the congress called by the Central Government, in order that a great class investigation movement may be launched throughout the nine hundred townships in these eight *xian*, so that a powerful atmosphere of class investigation will have been built up in every township even before the delegates are back. Meetings in the villages may be held after sunset, and the chairman of the township must take the leading responsibility.

Responsible comrades of Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting *xian*, in the *xian*, district, and township soviets, if we want these two big meetings to achieve complete success, we must attend to the following points: (1) everyone who comes to the meetings brings a reliable report; (2) all the delegates of the poor peasant league are revolutionary activists, not passive or compromising elements; (3) everyone who is supposed to attend the meetings gets there, and gets there on the day stipulated; and (4) propaganda for the Land Investigation Movement is carried out universally in every township. You must all make the greatest efforts to achieve these four things. If these four points are not handled well, this may make it impossible for the congress to be completely successful. If that happens, you will be blamed. Be advised of this.

Chairman of the Central  
Government

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



# ***Appeal of the Central Government to the Masses in the Four Xian of Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng to Save 50,000 Dan of Grain and Sell It to the Red Army***

(June 1933)<sup>1</sup>

1. Since Chiang Kaishek's White army suffered several defeats in battles on the northern front and the Red Army won several great victories in the course of the Fourth Revolutionary War,<sup>2</sup> the Guomindang warlords have been mustering their remaining forces for a new attack. At the same time, the other warlords, including Chen Jitang in Guangdong, Cai Tingkai in Fujian, and He Jian in Hunan, are all taking the field at the same time to attack the soviet areas. The Red Army is fighting a bloody war against the enemy in order to smash the joint attack from all these enemy troops. On the other hand, the Guomindang is colluding with the Japanese imperialists in their occupation of Beijing and Tianjin. The Red Army must get ready for direct warfare against the imperialists, and defeat both the imperialists and the Guomindang. At this crucial moment, however, the Red Army is facing a serious shortage of grain. In some units of the Red Army, soldiers only have millet gruel for their meals all the time. Even the people from different departments of the Central Government have to take the millet gruel as half of their daily food. As the rice is not only very expensive, but also hard to buy, it has really become a knotty problem for the Red Army. In addition, some ordinary people, especially the family members of the Red Army, who are extremely poor, have nothing to eat. This situation is also very grave.

2. But is there really no grain in the soviet areas? No, that is not the case. There is quite a lot of grain in the soviet areas. Not to mention *xian* like Gonglue and Wantai, where grain is always abundant, *xian* such as Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng, and Shicheng have surplus grain every year. Even though they had poor harvests last year, they still had a lot of surplus grain. Why can't the Red Army buy any grain in these *xian* right now? First of all, this is because the rich

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Our source for this document is the text as printed in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 83, June 4, 1933, which is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 233–35.

1. As indicated by the date of publication, this document was produced at the beginning of June 1933, but the precise date on which it was issued is not known.

2. I.e., the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign.

peasants and unscrupulous merchants are playing some dirty tricks. They are deliberately making things difficult for the Red Army either by hiding away the grain or forcing up the current price for grain. Secondly, the masses who have plenty of grain are unaware of the Red Army's difficulties and are just waiting for the right time to sell their grain for a higher price. There are also many among the masses who have just enough grain for themselves, but not much surplus. They, too, are unaware of the Red Army's difficulties, so they are not saving any of their grain to sell to the Red Army. For these two reasons, there has been no grain for sale on the market recently. Comrades, you do not know about the Red Army's difficulties only because the soviets at different levels have not informed you. Now, the Central Government intends to purchase 50,000 *Dan* of millet in Ruijin, Huichang, Bosheng and Shicheng *xian* to help the Red Army at the front. The Central Government would like to place the responsibility for this task on the shoulders of the *xian*, district, and township soviets, as well as the one million masses in these four *xian*. The specific allocation is as follows: 16,000 *Dan* from Ruijin, 15,000 *Dan* from Huichang, 12,000 *Dan* from Bosheng, and 10,000 *Dan* from Shicheng.<sup>3</sup> This time, nevertheless, we are not borrowing grain from you, we are buying grain. According to our previous experience of borrowing grain from the masses, we know that people offered to lend a lot of grain to the Red Army. Many of them even returned to us the receipt for the grain they had lent. All this shows that the masses maintained the highest revolutionary enthusiasm, and that they really regarded the Red Army as being as precious as their own lives. As soon as they learned that the Red Army needed to borrow grain, they immediately lent it. But, comrades, all the grain the Red Army had borrowed in the past has been consumed. The Central Government now wants to buy more from you, 50,000 *Dan* in all, at the current market price. The grain should be delivered in batches during the month of June. The procedure is that people may put all their surplus grain and some of that which they have saved on sale; those who do not have any surplus grain may try to save some grain and sell it to us. Only those who have a shortage of grain themselves and depend on the help of their relatives and friends are truly unable to sell any grain. Comrades, everyone is expecting the Red Army to be victorious in battle. At this moment, the Red Army is fighting at the front with a shortage of grain. Can we be indifferent to this? All of us can eat more miscellaneous grain and vegetables, so that we can save some grain and sell it to the Red Army. As the old saying goes, "many a little makes a mickle." We are persuaded that it should not be very difficult for the one million people in these four *xian* to save 40,000 or 50,000 *Dan* of grain. Comrades, so long as the Red Army at the front has enough to eat and is victorious in battle, we the people in the rear area should feel proud and happy even if we eat a bit less.

3. These amounts add up to 53,000. Probably the figure of 50,000 used in the title of this appeal, and repeated below, was intended as an approximation.

3. In another respect, there is a grain problem to which all of our broad popular masses must pay attention. This problem is that a portion of the impoverished masses are also short of grain. We of the majority can absolutely not just let these people, especially the family members of the Red Army, suffer from hunger. The problem posed by their difficulties must be resolved by all of us. The method for solving this problem lies in mutual aid among the masses. First of all, let them buy grain at a reduced price; secondly, let them borrow grain in summer and return it in autumn. In the interest of our class, everyone absolutely cannot just care about himself alone and never show any concern for others. The townships that have more grain must help those that have less; the villages that have more grain must help those that have less. In a village, the people who have more grain must absolutely help those who have less. Apart from selling 50,000 *Dan* of grain to the Red Army, everyone must also help the impoverished masses to solve their food problems. This is truly the only feasible way to manifest class brotherhood and mutual aid.

Let the one million people in the four *xian* act together!

Sell 50,000 *Dan* of grain to the Red Army!

"Reduce prices" and "lend grain" to help the impoverished masses!

Don't let the Red Army eat millet gruel!

Don't let the impoverished masses suffer hunger!

Help the Red Army with your grain to smash the enemy's Fourth Encirclement!

Long live the victory of the Red Army!

Chairman of the Central Government      Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen      Xiang Ying  
                                  Zhang Guotao

## *An Open Telegram Repudiating the Traitorous Agreement Signed by the Guomindang*

(June 10, 1933)

Revolutionary Masses of the Whole Country!

On May 31, the Guomindang government signed an agreement on the truce in North China with the Japanese imperialists.<sup>1</sup> This agreement completely sells out to the imperialists a broad area and tens of millions of popular masses in North China. But this is merely that portion of a secret and traitorous treaty which has been made public by the Guomindang. Although Wang Jingwei and other arch-traitors shamelessly said that the agreement was exclusively military and not political, in reality, the part of the secret treaty for selling out the country which the Guomindang government has not made public is of even graver import. On the basis of the information that our government has obtained, the contents of this secret treaty can be roughly summarized as follows: (1) Chinese troops will retreat to the south of the Beijing-Tianjin line, and the area to the south of the Great Wall will be established as a buffer zone. (2) The Chinese side recognizes "Manchukuo" and "Mongolia."<sup>2</sup> (3) All activities of the volunteer army will be stopped and their arms, as well as the arms of any other anti-Japanese troops, will be confiscated whenever possible. (4) The Chinese side pledges that it will halt all kinds of anti-Japanese activity. On behalf of the masses of all China, the Provisional Central Soviet Government declares that we absolutely refuse to recognize this secret treaty, or the agreement on the truce in North China, because the treaty and the agreement have already completely sold out to the Japanese imperialists the vast lands of Manchuria, Mongolia, and North China, as well as the national interests of the whole country. Moreover, there is no doubt that the Guomindang government is going to satisfy the demands of British, American, and other imperialists by selling out Tibet, Xikang, and even the land and rights in the Yangzi and Pearl River basins, thus carrying out the traitorous line of so-called "equal opportunity" and "equal benefit." The Provisional Central Soviet Government of China also calls on the popular masses

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1. The Tanggu Truce.

2. I.e., the Japanese-dominated political entities in Manchuria and inner Mongolia.

throughout China to rise up as one and oppose the traitorous treaty and agreement signed by the Guomindang. By our unyielding revolutionary struggles—workers' strikes, students' strikes, shopkeepers' strikes, mass demonstrations—and by organizing armed units of the popular masses themselves, we can oppose this secret treaty and this agreement, and prevent a single article of them from being carried out. The popular masses of the whole country must understand that, if we do not oppose the treaty and the agreement, our four hundred million popular masses will all become the beasts of burden and slaves on whom the imperialists can wantonly trample forever. The popular masses of the whole country must understand that only when we arm ourselves, overthrow the Guomindang government which is selling out the country, fight directly against the imperialists, and drive the Japanese and all the other imperialists out of China, can we liberate ourselves and avoid the fate of being slaves and beasts of burden. The Provisional Central Soviet Government declares that it is prepared to do everything within its power, spiritually, materially, and militarily, to help the popular masses of the whole country in their struggle against the Japanese imperialists and the traitorous Guomindang government. Moreover, it once more proclaims to all the armed forces under the Guomindang government throughout the whole country: On the three conditions that you (1) stop your attacks on the soviet areas immediately; (2) guarantee the freedom of assembly, association, speech, and press of the popular masses; and (3) immediately arm the popular masses and organize an armed volunteer army, the Central Soviet Government is willing to reach an agreement on military operations with any armed force of the Guomindang to fight the Japanese imperialists. At the same time, the Central Soviet Government also wishes to point out that even though all the traitorous Guomindang warlords, such as Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, and Chen Jitang,<sup>3</sup> are now loudly calling for resistance to Japan and opposition to the cease-fire agreement, this is nothing but a trick to deceive the popular masses. In reality, part of them are already uniting with Chiang Kaishek for a desperate and hopeless attack on the Red Army and the soviets. Another part of them are nothing but the running dogs of the Japanese. Their loud clamors about resisting Japan and opposing the truce agreement are merely a method for tricking the popular masses in order to facilitate the pursuit of their treachery. Apart from colluding with the imperialists to repress the revolutionary popular masses and the revolutionary soldiers and their efforts to attack the Red Army and the soviets, they have no other plans. Revolutionary popular masses and soldiers throughout the coun-

3. Chen Jitang (1890–1954), a native of Fangcheng in Guangdong, was an officer in and later commander of the famous Fourth ("Ironsides") Army of Guangdong soldiers which fought during the Northern Expedition. By 1929 he had risen to be the chief military leader in Guangdong; by 1931 he had also joined with dissident Guomindang leaders such as Hu Hanmin to establish an anti-Chiang Kaishek opposition government in Guangdong.

try! Only when the armed forces of the popular masses themselves unite both with the anti-Japanese soldiers and with the popular masses can a true national revolutionary war be waged, and Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms be overthrown. Moreover, the overthrow of the traitorous Guomindang is the prerequisite for victory in such a war. The Central Soviet Government of China calls upon the popular masses and the revolutionary soldiers of the whole country to gather under the soviet banner, unite with the Red Army, and fight side by side to overthrow the rule of the Guomindang, the arch-criminal who has sold out China; ensure the independence and territorial integrity of China; and strive for the thorough liberation of the Chinese nation!

Chairman of the Provisional Central  
Government of the Chinese Soviets

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# *On the Solution to the Grain Problem of the Masses*

*Order No. 42 of the Central Council  
of People's Commissars*

(June 16, 1933)

Recently, there has been a shortage of grain and the price of rice is increasing day by day. There are a few places where you cannot buy rice even if you have money. Under such circumstances, some people are consuming their rice as little as they possibly can. Every day, they only eat some vegetables and miscellaneous grain, or even tree leaves and grass roots. This has really become a very grave phenomenon. The reason lies in the fact that the rich peasants hide grain away and the merchants monopolize the sale of grain, deliberately creating difficulties for the masses of impoverished workers and peasants. There are those among the masses who have some surplus grain, but still stick to their own old conceptions, according to which everyone looks out for himself, and are waiting for the right time to sell their grain at a higher price. They do not show the least concern for those impoverished workers and peasants whose bellies are wracked with hunger. This is entirely because they do not understand the great significance of mutual aid within our class. There are also some among the masses who do not have any surplus grain and have been unable to save any grain, which could be either sold to the impoverished masses who are lacking in grain, especially to the dependents of Red Army men, or lent to them in accordance with the method of borrowing in summer and returning in autumn.<sup>1</sup>

Now, there is more than a month to go before the new grain reaches the market. During such a long period, a lot of grain is needed to provide relief to those masses and family members of Red Army men who do not have enough grain. In order to solve this problem, governments at all levels must use all their efforts to carry out the following measures:

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 241–42, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

1. That is, borrowing during the time of scarcity before the crops come in, and returning in the time of plenty after the autumn harvest.

1. Governments at the provincial level should hold various kinds of meetings to discuss the problem enthusiastically and in detail, working out, on the basis of the real situation in each *xian*, some distinctive, systematic, and concrete plans, which will then be handed over to governments at lower levels for further discussion and execution.

2. *Xian* governments should call meetings of representatives from all the districts and townships, in the light both of the resolution of the provincial soviet and the experience of the previous movement, during which we urged the masses to lend grain and to sell the grain they had saved to the Red Army. (The meeting can take place in two different places if the distances are great, or there are too many delegates.) The chairman of every township, and the representatives of the poor peasant league, the labor union, and the women's association must attend the meeting. The significance of mutual aid within our class should be explained to these representatives and activists, so that they can launch a broad and enthusiastic movement of propaganda and agitation upon returning to their own districts or townships. By getting all the masses involved in our efforts, and by enhancing the spirit of class brotherhood and mutual aid among them, they can resolve the current great problem of the grain shortage. In some places where the shortage of grain is taking its toll most seriously, we can use eucalyptus (wild mountain ginger), okra, crown daisy chrysanthemum, ramie leaves, kudzu vine, brake, and other plants as our subsidiary food.

3. The government at the levels of district and township must absolutely carry out all the decisions regarding this problem made by the provincial and *xian* governments. It must lead those townships that have more rice to help those that have less, villages that have more rice to help those that have less, and people that have more rice to help those that have less. Thus they will cause the soviet masses, inspired by the ideal of mutual aid within our class, to smash the monopoly of the rich peasants and grain merchants and to survive the difficulties while the new crop is not yet ripe and the old one is all consumed.

Governments at all levels are expected to start their efforts to carry out this work as soon as they receive this order. No negligence is permitted. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
Commissar for the National Economy	Lin Boqu



# Opening Speech at the Conference of Responsible Officials from Eight *xian* Regarding the Land Investigation Movement

(June 17, 1933)

It has been more than a month since the Council of People's Commissars decided to convene the meeting on the Land Investigation Movement among the leaders at and above the level of district in eight *xian*. Since then, abundant preparations have taken place, and the meeting formally started on the seventeenth of this month.

At 9:00 in the morning, more than four hundred soviet cadres squeezed into the meeting hall (the big auditorium of the Central Government) after a burst of clear and melodious bell ringing. Ah, what a magnificent hall! Embroidered silk banners and flags were hanging all around the meeting hall, and the walls were almost covered by the bright red posters. Long benches were arranged in well laid out rows. In front of the benches, there was the magnificent rostrum.

After the meeting was declared open, the vigorous sound of the "Internationale" began to resound in the hall. Then, everyone rose and stood in silence for three minutes, paying their sorrowful but solemn tribute to those heroic Red soldiers who have already left us. At the same time, the election of the presidium took place. The result was the unanimous election of eleven people—Mao Zedong, Liang Botai, Deng Fa, Hu Hai, Gao Zili, A Jin, Liu Jusheng, Hu Jiajun, Qiu Shigui, Yang Shizhu, and Guan Jiming—to the presidium.<sup>1</sup>

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Our source for this document is the report published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 87, June 20, 1933. As usual, the newspaper's introduction and conclusion to Mao's remarks are set in smaller type.

1. Liang Botai (1899–1935), a native of Xinchang in Zhejiang, joined the Party in late 1922 while in the Soviet Union, where he remained until 1931. In 1932 he was acting editor-in-chief of *Red China*; in 1933 he was acting Commissar for Justice.

Hu Hai (1901–1935), a native of Ji'an in Jiangxi, joined the Party in 1927; thereafter he served as a local cadre in the Donggu base, as a cadre on the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet, member of the Central Executive Committee and, by early 1933, acting Land Commissar.

Gao Zili (1900–1950), a native of Pingxiang in Jiangxi, joined the Party in 1926. In the late 1920s and early 1930s he served as political commissar in several Red armies; in 1933 he was head of the Rear Office of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission.

A Jin probably refers to Chen Ajin (1898–1934), a native of Jiangsu, who joined the Party in 1926. After three years in the Soviet Union, he returned to China in 1930 and engaged in political work in the Red Army. At this time, he was political commissar of the Sixth Division of the Third Army Group. He was killed in combat in August 1934.

Biographical information about Liu Jusheng and Hu Jiajun has not been located.

Qiu Shigui (1902–1987), a native of Ruijin in Jiangxi, joined the Party in 1930; in 1933 he was chairman of the Wuyang District Soviet in Ruijin.

Yang Shizhu (1905–1982), a native of Ruijin in Jiangxi, joined the Party in 1931; in 1933 he was chairman of the Ruijin *xian* soviet government.

Biographical information about Guan Jiming has not been located.

As the thunderous noise that had greeted the election of the presidium began to die out, everyone listened attentively to the speeches from the rostrum which had just begun. Comrade Kai Feng, the delegate from the Central Bureau of the Chinese Communist Youth League,<sup>2</sup> took the floor first. In his speech, he started by recounting the victory of land reform. Then he pointed out that the landlords and rich peasants were striving by every means to steal the fruits of the land reform. Finally, he pointed out the tasks of the Land Investigation Movement: (1) Confiscate completely the land of the landlords and rich peasants, and distribute only poor land to the rich peasants. (2) Develop production in the Soviet Region during the Land Investigation Movement. His speech ended amid a round of loud applause.

After that, Chairman Mao, the representative of the Central Government, rose to speak. The major idea of his address was to the effect that although, within a broad area, land distribution had already shown considerable achievements, there were still many places where the issue was far from thoroughly resolved. As regards the Central Soviet Area, the issue had still not been thoroughly resolved in four-fifths of its total area. For example, in No. 4 Township of Yunji District, since the beginning of the Land Investigation Movement this February, another twenty-seven landlords and rich peasants, along with more than 1,000 *Dan* of grain, had been found. Out of the fifteen districts in Ruijin *xian*, the chairmen of the soviets in eleven districts did not have good class status. Among them, seven or eight were either landlords or rich peasants. Last year, more than 10,000 *Dan* of grain were found in Changting *xian*, while more than fifty guns were found in Luokou District, Huichang *xian*. All this proved that the class struggle in the countryside has not gone deep enough. Naturally, therefore, it was almost impossible for us to achieve very good success in our various kinds of work. The primary significance of this meeting lay in the fact that the Central Government expected the responsible leaders of the soviets at all levels to pay special attention to this problem in the days to come, mobilizing the broad masses of farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants to enter deeply into the Land Investigation Movement and to overthrow the landlords and rich peasants once and for all.

When Chairman Mao's speech was over, delegates from the Executive Bureau of the National Labor Union, the People's Commissariat for the Land, the State Political Security Bureau, the People's Commissariat of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, the Military Committee, and Wuyang District Soviet spoke, one after the other, on the Land Investigation Movement from the different perspectives of their own units. What was particularly important is that the delegate from the State Political Security Bureau emphasized the following four points, which deserve our special attention during the move-

2. The Chinese reads *Zhong shao gong*, which is a shortened version of "Chinese Young Communist Party." This term was commonly used at the time to designate the Communist Youth League.

ment: (1) Get rid of bureaucratism and commandism in the Land Investigation Movement. (2) Class investigation is inseparable from land investigation in this movement. (3) Oppose all compromise with the landlords and rich peasants. (4) Pay attention to searching for counterrevolutionaries during the movement. It was already noon when the delegates from all the departments finished their speeches. Once the agenda and the regulations for the meeting had been adopted, the opening ceremony of the meeting came to an end.

As there were too many people present at the meeting, it was often very difficult to discuss questions during the meeting. Consequently, the meeting did not continue in plenary session in the afternoon. Instead, all the soviet leaders at and above the district level present at the meeting in the morning were divided into two groups, conducting their discussions separately. As for the division into small groups, it took place according to the division of responsibility of each department within a *xian*; for instance, all the directors of the departments of the worker-peasant procuratorate in Shicheng *xian* belonged to the same group, while all the chairmen, all the directors of the land departments, and all the special agents of the security bureaus formed groups in a similar way. Thus, there were four groups per *xian*, making a total of thirty-two groups for eight *xian*. Each group discussion was led by someone from the steering committee. There were four steering committees in all, namely, the Steering Committee for Chairmen, the Steering Committee for the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, the Steering Committee for the Land, and the Steering Committee for Political Security. All these committees are under the leadership of the presidium. Every morning and evening, members of these committees meet together, reporting the details of the group discussions they have attended and discussing ways of providing guidance. This is what happened on the first day of the meeting.

# ***Report at the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Officials at and Above the District Level from Eight Xian***

(June 18–19, 1933)

## **I. The Land Investigation Movement Is the Central and Major Task in a Broad Area**

All our experiences in the past have proved: only after the land question is correctly resolved, and the flame of class struggle in the countryside rises to its highest point under resolute class slogans, can we mobilize the broad masses of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat to participate in the revolutionary war and in all aspects of building the soviets; build a solid revolutionary base; increase the power of the soviet movement; and achieve greater development and greater victories.

According to the experience we have obtained from the development of the agrarian revolution, the development of class struggle in the countryside has, broadly speaking, the following stages: (1) the stage of confiscating and redistributing the land, (2) the stage of land investigation, and (3) the stage of land construction. In accordance with these three stages of the land struggle, there exist, broadly speaking, three kinds of zones in any soviet area. They are (1) areas in which the struggle has penetrated deeply, (2) areas in which the struggle has lagged relatively far behind, and (3) areas in which new development is taking place.

In areas in which new development is taking place, the development of the land struggle is still at the stage of land confiscation and redistribution. The central question here is to overturn the political power of the landlord class by military force; to establish provisional revolutionary political power (a revolutionary committee); to establish local armed forces of the workers and peasants; to establish revolutionary mass organizations; to confiscate the land and property of the landlord class and the land of the rich peasants; to distribute land to the

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farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants and to give poor land to the rich peasants; to abolish debts; and to burn land deeds and loan contracts. The struggle during this stage includes the beginning of a direct confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution, as well as the entire period during which the revolutionaries defeat the counterrevolutionaries and carry through the disposal of their land and property.

In areas in which the struggle has penetrated deeply, a stable soviet political power has already been established, local armed forces and revolutionary mass organizations have been developed on a large scale, the feudal and semifeudal forces of the landlords and rich peasants have been completely overcome, the land has been completely redistributed, and, as regards the land question, the struggle of the peasant masses has already entered a new stage of improving the land and developing production. Consequently, the main problem in such places is that of land construction.

In areas in which the struggle has lagged behind, its stage of development lies between the two stages just mentioned. It has moved from the period of provisional political power to that of regular political power, but has not yet reached the period in which political power is completely consolidated. In an area like this, open counterrevolutionary struggles by the landlords and rich peasants have already been defeated by the revolutionary masses during the first phase, but since then, many landlord and rich peasant elements have suddenly changed their identities, replacing their counterrevolutionary masks with revolutionary masks. They, too, approve of the revolution and of land redistribution. They call themselves poor peasants who should receive land just like the other poor peasants. They become very active, and relying on their historical advantages—"it is they who know how to speak, it is they who know how to write"—they take advantage of the opportunities to steal the fruits of land reform during the first stage. Facts from innumerable localities have shown that they controlled the provisional political power, sneaked into the local armed forces, manipulated the revolutionary organizations, and received more and better land than the poorer peasants. It was only with the coming of the second period, when higher levels of government exercised supervision, mass struggle developed further, the revolutionary committee was changed into a soviet, and the mass organizations and local armed forces took their first steps toward reform and development, that such fake revolutionaries were partly eliminated. In many places, the land has been redistributed a second time, and even a third or fourth time, and part of the land stolen by the landlords and rich peasants has been dealt with. But many class-alien elements are still lurking in the soviet mass organizations and local armed forces, "wearing red ribbons and addressing people as comrade," concocting rumors, holding secret meetings, and denouncing the masses for their "left opportunism," "indiscriminate attacks on the local bullies," and "using public authority to seek personal revenge." Or, they "talk enthusiastically at meetings, but do nothing after the meeting." When the struggle was very fierce, they set up

secret counterrevolutionary organizations, such as the Guomindang, the Social Democratic Party, the AB Corps, the New Communist Party, and others of every description, sabotaging the revolution and plotting to murder revolutionary activists. In sum, the landlord and rich peasant classes are trying by every possible means to suppress the struggle of the masses, in an attempt to maintain their privileges in the domains of political power, land, and property, and to preserve the remnants of their feudal power. In districts like this, there is a grave struggle between the revolutionary masses and the landlords and rich peasants, but this struggle is not like the open struggle that took place between the Red and White flags during the first period. It is rather a struggle between the revolutionary masses of the peasantry and the landlord and rich peasant elements whose faces are covered by false masks. Such a struggle presents a special difficulty because, unlike the open counterrevolutionaries, the hidden counterrevolutionaries cannot be recognized at a glance by the peasants. Besides, given the various kinds of deep-rooted feudal relationships in the countryside, such as the relations between nationalities,<sup>1</sup> it will not be an easy task to raise the class consciousness of the peasants to the extent that they all realize that, in the end, it will be essential to eliminate the feudal remnants. To achieve this will definitely require that the Communist Party and the Soviet Government explain it to the peasants very patiently. Much arduous work must be done, and a correct class line and a correct method of mass work will be required. Here the central question is the question of land investigation and the investigation of classes. Without resolving this question, the revolutionary activism of the peasant masses cannot be brought into full play; the remnant feudal forces cannot be completely crushed; the soviets cannot be consolidated to the highest degree; and many major tasks, such as expanding the Red Army, raising funds for the Red Army, expanding local armed forces, carrying forward land construction and economic construction, and promoting culture and education, cannot be accomplished with the greatest success. Consequently, the Land Investigation Movement is the most essential and important task within these areas.

Speaking of the Central Soviet Area, such districts in which the struggle is lagging behind cover a large part of the entire Soviet Area. The land question has not been thoroughly resolved in many areas, including the whole of thirteen *xian*, namely, Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, Le'an, Yihuang, Guangchang, Shicheng, Jianning, Lichuan, Ninghua, Changting, and Wuping; most of Ruijin, Yudu, Bosheng, Shengli, and Yongfeng; some parts of Gonglu, Wantai, Gan-

1. Aside from a few hundred She minority people, there were hardly any non-Han people living in the Central Soviet Area. There were, however, large numbers of Hakkas, people of Han Chinese origin but distinctive customs and dialect. It is possible that Mao was referring to distinctions between Hakka and non-Hakka inhabitants when he spoke of "nationalities" here. Given the omnipresence of lineages in this area, it is also possible that *minzu* (nationality) was written when *jiazu* (lineage) was meant.

xian, Shanghang, Yongding, and Xinquan; and even two districts, Juncun and Huangtang, of Xingguo.

The peasant masses in these areas have not been mobilized as broadly as possible; the feudal forces have not been finally put down; a large number of class-alien elements are still hiding and working under cover in the Soviet Government, the mass organizations, and the local armed forces; and many secret counterrevolutionary organizations are still engaging in clandestine activity everywhere to sabotage the revolution. This is the reason why war mobilization and economic and cultural construction in these areas are lagging far behind the advanced areas (almost the entire *xian* of Xingguo; part of Shengli, Ganxian, Wantai, Gonglue, Yongfeng, and Shanghang; Huangpi District in Bosheng; Wuyang District in Ruijin; Xinpo District in Yudu; and Xi'nan District in Yongding). In fact, these areas cover nearly 80 percent of the total surface of the Central Area, and the masses number more than two million. To develop a universal and thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement in this vast area, to kindle the flame of class struggle to its highest point among the masses, who number more than two million, and to wage a final war against the feudal forces and overthrow them completely, are tasks which the Communist Party and the Soviet Government can no longer delay even for an instant.

## **II. The First Step of the Land Investigation Movement— Organizational Mobilization on a Large Scale**

How, then, shall we conduct the Land Investigation Movement?

First of all comes organizational mobilization.

The whole of the experience that we have gained from leading the mass struggles in the Soviet Area tells us that only when the Communist Party, the soviets, and the revolutionary mass organizations are all three united and act in unison under the leadership of the Party can the objectives of each of our struggles be accomplished with complete success. The Land Investigation Movement is a cruel and fierce class struggle; it is a great revolutionary movement of the masses; it is the foundation for improving the work of the Party, the soviets, and the mass organizations; it is the most essential link in our work at present. Only if the entire Party and all the soviets and labor unions mobilize all their forces to participate in the movement can we launch, develop, and carry through this movement. As regards the mobilization of the Party, the Central Bureau has already issued its correct instructions. As for mobilizing the soviets, we must first of all reject the old view according to which the Land Investigation Movement belongs solely to the work of the Commissariat for the Land. Not only have the Commissariats for Finance, Military Affairs, the National Economy, and Education believed that they had nothing whatsoever to do with the Land Investigation Movement; the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate and the Commissariat for Justice, as well as the Political Security Bureau, thought that they were not really much related to this movement. Even the Presidium did not take

charge of the Land Investigation Movement. This is totally wrong. It must be made plain that no department in the whole of the soviets may distance itself from the Land Investigation Movement and pay no attention to it. First, the presidium of governments at all levels must do its utmost to take the lead in the whole movement. Secondly, the land departments, worker-peasant procuratorates, and justice departments, as well as the state political security bureaus and their special agents, are the organs of the government at various levels for leading the Land Investigation Movement and carrying out the work. If we want to resolve the land question completely, reform the soviets at the three levels of township, district, and *xian*, and liquidate the counterrevolutionaries in the countryside in the course of the Land Investigation Movement, these government departments must put forth their utmost efforts. Departments of finance should be concerned to strike a blow at the remnant feudal forces by imposing fines on landlords and collecting donations from rich peasants, thus increasing the revenue of the country at the same time. Departments of military affairs should focus on reorganizing and expanding the local armed forces during the Land Investigation Movement, and mobilize activists among the masses to join the Red Army. Departments of the national economy should pay attention, as the Land Investigation Movement develops, to advancing the restoration and development of agricultural and handicraft production, as well as to developing cooperatives and adjusting the exchange of products and consumer goods. It is not true that departments of education have nothing to do. In order to promote the Land Investigation Movement, they should provide some simple and popular textbooks and pamphlets and distribute these to all the cadres and masses who are involved in land investigation. As the Land Investigation Movement develops, they should also undertake to promote cultural education for the masses. Since the majority of the members of the labor unions in the soviet areas are living in the countryside and have close links to the land, and the Land Investigation Movement is a great and fierce class struggle, the proletariat must be its staunchest leader. Consequently, under the guidance of the Executive Bureau of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, all unions, including agricultural unions, handicraft unions, and others, must mobilize their best cadres and all their members in the countryside to participate in the Land Investigation Movement. The most important thing is for them to play a role in promoting and encouraging the poor peasant league, and offer positive and firm proposals for land investigation, class investigation, and the reform of the government. In a word, the Land Investigation Movement is no ordinary or trivial job. It is not a task that can be completely accomplished in a month or even in half a year. For this reason, there must be a large-scale mobilization conducted jointly by the Party, the Youth League, the government, and the unions.

Here the problem of the education of cadres needs to be addressed. First of all, responsible cadres from the lower levels must be called together for a meeting at which they will be given a full explanation of some major problems in the



Land Investigation Movement. In the past, most of the staff at different levels have not understood that this movement was an urgent task. They did not understand how to distinguish class status in reality. They did not understand the line and the methods for winning over the masses and unleashing a struggle. Thus there was no way they could launch this movement. Second, such an education should also be provided to all those cadres summoned from lower levels in the locality and cadres transferred from other, more advanced districts. It is advisable to put on for them a short-term training course regarding the Land Investigation Movement. Provincial and *xian* governments should run several such courses regarding the Land Investigation Movement. The classes may last from one to two weeks, and the lectures should concentrate on a few key problems of the Land Investigation Movement. Within the land departments, worker-peasant procuratorates, and political security bureaus at the provincial, *xian*, and district levels, each such unit should form a group of staff members (most of them at the district level do not withdraw from production). Each department should give this group of its staff members a complete education on the work of land investigation. Third, there is another kind of education which should be conducted in the course of action, which consists in the provincial and *xian* governments sending out their staff members to carry out inspections. Every five or seven days, they should call together the staff members they have sent out and those from the district level, along with the chairmen of township soviets and heads of the poor peasant league for a meeting, to review the course of their work. Without this final method, the first two methods cannot secure the greatest possible success in our work.

### III. Conduct the Land Investigation Movement According to the Different Conditions in the Development of the Class Struggle in the Countryside

As we have stated in the first section, there are three kinds of districts existing in the soviet areas:

- (1) areas in which the struggle has penetrated deeply;
- (2) areas in which the struggle is lagging behind;
- (3) areas in which new development is taking place.

This is the case not only within a province, but also within some *xian* in border regions. For example, the three kinds of areas exist simultaneously in Yongfeng. In most parts of the border regions, there are two kinds of areas in a single *xian*, the fairly backward and those in which new development is under way. As for the hinterland, though of course there are some *xian* that, generally speaking, are entirely backward, one can also find some fairly advanced districts within them. In Huichang, for example, though most of its districts are backward, yet Xijiang District is fairly advanced. Ruijin illustrates a different case. Wuyang District can be regarded as an area in which the struggle is deepening;

eight districts, including Taohuang, Huangpi, Shaxin, Ruilin, Jiubao, Yunji, Dutou, and the City [of Ruijin], are fairly advanced areas; the remaining six districts are backward areas. Nevertheless, in whatever district of whatever *xian*, so long as a soviet has been established in the area and the district has gone through the phase of land confiscation and redistribution, there will probably be some relatively advanced and some relatively backward townships in any such district. Similarly, in any township, there will be relatively advanced and relatively backward villages. Within a single township, is there any such phenomenon of unbalanced development? Yes, there is, in many places. There are many places where the small villages (small hamlets) are advanced, while the big villages (big hamlets) are backward. There are some places where, because of different historical conditions, individual big villages are advanced, while on the contrary individual small villages are backward. Such things also exist. These circumstances determine the orientation of our work. They incite us, when we launch the Land Investigation Movement in a given *xian*, district, or township, or even in a village, to concentrate our attention on the backward areas and exert the greatest efforts there. To regard [such a geographical unit] as a single entity and devote an equal amount of energy to everything is wrong. For in this case, in the light of the fact that it is difficult to win over the masses and start the struggle in the backward areas, we just say "we cannot get in there" and we shift the direction of our work to areas where development is easy. If we put the difficult places entirely to one side and ignore them, that is even more erroneous. The natural progression in our work, if we are speaking for example of a township, is that we can, and indeed should, start from a village which is easy to mobilize, but the center of gravity of our work plan should still be situated in those backward villages. In order to do away with the backward condition in a certain village (into which "we cannot penetrate" for the time being), we may start with the easy ones first, and then use them to influence those backward ones, so as finally to launch the struggle in the backward villages. It is absolutely right to do this. But in dealing with a *xian* or a district, we cannot proceed in this way. In planning the Land Investigation Movement for a *xian* or a district, we must, from the very beginning, exert all our strength to make a concentrated effort on those backward areas, while devoting a lesser effort to those fairly advanced ones.

The unbalanced condition in the progress of the movement also teaches us another method: mobilizing cadres from the advanced areas to go to the backward ones to lead the Land Investigation Movement. Of course, it is important to mobilize the cadres from the most advanced districts such as Xingguo to go to the backward areas, but it is equally urgent to mobilize the cadres from all the relatively advanced areas to go to the backward areas. All the advanced or fairly advanced areas should take the responsibility of guiding the backward areas, while all the backward areas should learn from the advanced areas. Only in this way can we cause the Land Investigation Movement to unfold rapidly.

## ***Conclusions Adopted by the Land Investigation Movement Meeting Attended by Responsible Soviet Leaders at and Above the District Level from Eight Xian***

(June 21, 1933)

From June 17 to June 21, 1933, the meeting regarding the Land Investigation Movement, called by the Central Government and attended by responsible soviet leaders at and above the level of district in the eight *xian* of Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting, listened to the report on the Land Investigation Movement by Comrade Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Central Government. After five days of detailed discussions, the delegates arrived at a deep understanding of the great significance of the Land Investigation Movement. They recognized that, in the course of the great victory of the soviet movement, the masses in their millions have established their own régime, confiscated the land of the landlord class and distributed it to the peasant masses, and restrained the capitalists from exploiting the workers. Thanks to the triumph of the revolution, the broad masses raised their own enthusiasm to such an extent that they took part in the revolutionary war and in soviet construction, achieving great successes in both. They defeated the repeated assaults of the enemy, expanded the soviet areas, and gave an impetus to the vigorous development of the soviet movement. All this is the result of the correct leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and the active support of such leadership by the broad masses. But that in no sense means that there are no more serious problems within the soviet areas. Precisely because of the impetuous development of the soviet movement, all the class enemies, both inside and outside the soviet areas, are frenziedly carrying out their desperate struggles and resistance. Outside the soviet areas, the enemies have resorted to military assaults. Inside the soviet areas, their attacks take another form, in which the landlords, the rich peasants, and all the class-alien elements cover up their real counterrevolutionary features. Taking advantage of the fact that the land problem has not been thoroughly resolved in many districts within the soviet areas, and many of these elements retain a

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certain economic basis, because the land and property of many landlords have not yet been confiscated completely and many rich peasants have received good land, a number of such elements have sneaked into the soviet institutions, the mass organizations, and the local armed forces. They then carry out various kinds of plots and sabotage, such as misusing the authority of the soviets; suppressing the development of the mass struggle; deceiving, bribing, and threatening a portion of the masses; disseminating rumors; setting up secret organizations; and slandering and making false charges against the active staff members of the soviets. Things like these occur frequently in many localities within the soviet areas. The eight *xian* meeting considers that this is a serious problem. In order to wipe out the remnant feudal forces once and for all, to resolve the land question thoroughly, and to consolidate the soviet régime into something as strong as iron, it is necessary to launch a broad and deep Land Investigation Movement. The eight *xian* meeting considers that the Land Investigation Movement is indeed a cruel and fierce class struggle and a great revolutionary movement of the masses, and that it is the most essential link in our work at this moment. Consequently, the Land Investigation Movement must involve organized mobilization on a broad scale, it must resolutely apply the class line, and it must carry out patient and ample mass work. The eight *xian* meeting unanimously supports the Central Government's directive on the Land Investigation Movement and is, moreover, in full agreement regarding the following conclusions.

### I. On Organizational Mobilization

A. All the departments of the government must act in unison. Not only must the Commissariat for the Land, the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, the Commissariat for Justice, and the Political Security Bureau assume the principal responsibility for leading the Land Investigation Movement, but the commissariats for Finance, Military Affairs, the National Economy, and Education must also carry out whatever tasks are necessary during the movement. The chairman and the Presidium of the government must assume the leadership of the entire movement. The former view, according to which the Land Investigation Movement was merely the work of the Commissariat for the Land, is wrong.

B. A Land Investigation Committee must be set up at the three levels of the *xian*, the district, and the township. Under the control of the government at these levels, the committee is responsible for the overall leadership of the Land Investigation Movement. Apart from responsible officials of the government, this committee should also include representatives of the mass organizations, and so on.

C. The *xian* soviet should immediately put forward a plan for the Land Investigation Movement in the whole *xian* during July. Afterward, they should put forward a plan for the next month's Land Investigation Movement at the end of every month.

D. The district soviet should call the chairmen of township soviets and the

heads of the poor peasant league together for a meeting to plan the work in the whole district for the first seven days. Thereafter, a plan should be drawn up and the work reviewed every seven days. But the townships that are too far away may go to the meeting called by the district soviet only every fourteen days. Those that are not far away must go to the meeting every seven days, in order to spur on the rapid development of the Land Investigation Movement.

E. As regards the mode of mobilization at the level of the township, attention must be paid to the following: (a) the assembly of deputies of the township; (b) the labor union; (c) the poor peasant league; (d) the women's representative assembly; (e) the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers; (f) other revolutionary organizations; and (g) the mass meetings of the villages and hamlets. We must work through these institutions, organizations, and mass meetings, for only thus can the greatest force be mobilized to participate in the Land Investigation Movement. Any other method of limited scope, which seeks the easy way and is not interested in going to the majority of the masses, is wrong.

F. The *xian* soviet should run a training class for the Land Investigation Movement. The class should include one student from each township, and the students will graduate after ten days. During the second term, one student is also recruited from each township. The students to receive training should be chosen from among the most active elements in the township assembly of soviet deputies, the poor peasant league, and the labor union. They should be sent back to their own townships to lead the Land Investigation Movement. But those who come from advanced districts or townships should be sent to work in the backward districts and townships. The training classes should run two terms a month during the three months of July, August, and September.

The provincial soviet should select activists from the advanced *xian* and districts to run the training classes and send them to the backward *xian* and districts to lead the Land Investigation Movement.

G. In order to carry out the Land Investigation Movement forcefully, the organization of all the departments of the government must immediately be strengthened, primarily by getting rid of concurrent posts, abolishing the practice of transferring personnel lightly, and increasing the number of personnel in necessary jobs.

H. A committee in charge of confiscation and redistribution should be set up at the township level. Elected by the poor peasant league and operating under the authority of the township soviet, the committee is responsible for confiscating the land and property of the landlords and rich peasants.

## **II. On Carrying Out the Correct Class Line in the Course of the Land Investigation Movement**

A. Rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, and let the farm laborers play the leading role. In this way we can eliminate the landlord class

completely, crack down on the theft of the benefits of land reform by the rich peasants, and weaken the economic strength of the rich peasants. This corresponds to the correct class line and tactics of struggle, which should be resolutely carried out during the Land Investigation Movement. As for uniting with the middle peasants, we must start from the premise of not violating the interests of the middle peasants. The land of the middle peasants (including the well-to-do middle peasants) must not be distributed without the consent of the individual concerned. At the beginning of the land investigation, the policy of the soviets of uniting with the middle peasants and not infringing on their interests must be widely proclaimed. In the course of the land investigation, we must be highly cautious in dealing with those ambiguous elements whose status is situated between the middle peasants and the rich peasants, so that we do not fall into error. In distributing the land and property that have been confiscated, we must make sure that individual impoverished elements among the middle peasants do not feel left out. As for enabling the farm laborers to play the leading role, the main thing is to get all the farm laborers to join the poor peasant league and then set up a farm laborers' small group within it. Through them, we can unite with the activists among the poor peasants, develop the poor peasant league, and propel the Land Investigation Movement forward. When the confiscated land and property are distributed, the farm laborers should be the first to receive a share.

B. An important aspect of carrying out the class line is the correct analysis of class status on the basis of the actual social relationships. All the mistakes we have made on this issue in the past must be speedily corrected. All practical problems relating to class status must be resolved in accordance with the standard that has been laid down this time (see "How to Analyze Classes"<sup>1</sup>). It is necessary to explain this standard everywhere to the masses, and above all, we must teach our cadres to understand it fully.

C. The aim of land investigation is "the investigation of class," not a redistribution of the land. The view that what land investigation means is "sticking up signs [in the fields]" is wrong. A redistribution of the land is allowed only in a few individual localities where the majority of the masses raise such a demand, after the relentless struggle of class investigation has been completed. Such a strict distinction does not serve merely to stabilize the peasants' ownership of the land, thereby sparing them the panic caused by [the feeling that] "land redistribution is not settled." It is also called for because to achieve victory in the "class investigation" struggle, we must concentrate all our forces (and, in particular, unite with the middle peasants) in order to beat back the resistance by the landlords and rich peasants, and at such a time, there must be no turmoil in the ranks of the peasants themselves.

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1. The directive "How to Analyze Classes," which Mao drafted in June 1933, did indeed constitute the standard not only at this time but (in various guises) for the next two decades. It appears below under the date of October 10, 1933, on which it was officially adopted and issued by the soviet authorities in revised form.

D. We must avoid any disputes that might arise between clans and localities and unite all the forces that can be united in order to develop the struggle against the landlords and rich peasants. To this end, it is an important tactic in the Land Investigation Movement to arouse the impoverished masses of a given village and a given surname to investigate the landlords and rich peasants who are living in the same village and have the same surname. Similarly, the struggle against superstition (though it is necessary) should be conducted only after the "class investigation" struggle is over.

### III. On Mass Work

First of all, we must rectify the neglect of the importance of winning over the majority of the masses, which prevailed in many areas in the past, and get rid of the work methods of bureaucratism and commandism. It must be understood that only through patient and arduous work in arousing and winning over the masses can we win the support of a majority of the masses, unleash their activism to the highest degree, and reach our goal of eliminating the feudal remnants completely. Such mass work is the only guarantee for carrying out the class line, and it should be fully manifested in the concrete actions of the Land Investigation Movement enumerated below.

A. The beginning of the Land Investigation Movement must be preceded by widespread propaganda in every village and hamlet. This propaganda should explain to the masses why the Land Investigation Movement is necessary, stressing that land investigation is an investigation of class, not a redistribution of the land, and that the investigation of class will not affect the middle peasants. It is particularly important to analyze clearly for the masses what constitutes a landlord, a rich peasant, and a middle peasant. Each village and hamlet should not limit itself to a single mass meeting. The most backward villages and houses especially must hold several. We must make sure that our propaganda regarding the Land Investigation Movement reaches every single one of the revolutionary masses. To achieve this goal, we must, first of all, give a clear explanation to all the activists in the deputies' assembly of the township, the labor union, the poor peasant league, the assembly of representatives of working women, and other mass organizations, and then, through them, carry our widespread and thoroughgoing propaganda to the broad masses.

B. After collecting the reports about the status of the landlords and rich peasants, when we conduct the concrete investigation, we should call into action the activists from the township assembly, the poor peasant league, and the labor union, rather than having only the few members of the Land Investigation Committee alone, to investigate every aspect. Thus they can expose to the masses, with authentic evidence, all the various complicated methods of exploitation and wrongdoing employed by the landlords and rich peasants. At the same time, they can demonstrate that the false reports regarding the middle peasants have no foundation.

C. Once the poor peasant league has approved the reports regarding the class status of the landlords and rich peasants based on the investigations, it must then submit them to the township soviet for approval, and then to the district soviet for its endorsement. During these procedures, it is important to watch out for any obstruction and resistance from the landlords and rich peasants who are still hiding in the poor peasant league and the soviets. Severe blows must be dealt to them. At the same time, it is also important to make sure that no wrong status is imposed on a genuine middle peasant by mistake. As for the action of confiscation and disposal, it can be carried out only after a mass meeting is held in the village in which the man whose land and property are being confiscated resides. Only after a meeting at which detailed explanations are given to the masses, and their agreement is secured, can the confiscation be carried out. In the past, people in many areas just tried to do things in the easiest way and paid no attention to such approval by a mass meeting. As a result, the masses were often dissatisfied, and some serious disputes even broke out between clans or localities. Such mistakes should not be committed again.

D. All confiscated property, except cash or things equivalent to cash (such as jewelry), which should be turned over to the financial department of the government, must be distributed among the impoverished masses. In the past, in many localities, the erroneous policy of turning confiscated property over to the government was followed. Henceforth, this must be thoroughly corrected. In distributing property, we must take care to give more to the villages from which it was originally collected, so that the masses of these villages are satisfied. With the consent of the masses the grain that is confiscated during or shortly after the autumn harvest may be stored temporarily, and then distributed to the impoverished masses next spring or summer. But the grain must be distributed promptly to the masses whenever they demand it. As for the confiscated land, apart from the portion reserved for public welfare land and public land for the Red Army, all the rest must be distributed to those who did not receive any land, or did not receive enough land, last time. The distribution of land and property must be carried out promptly and must not be delayed for a long time after confiscation. When the distribution of land and property is under way, a mass meeting should be called and lists should be posted, so that the results of the distribution can be known to everyone.

E. To win over the backward villages, especially the big villages, is a major task in many areas. For this reason, we need to pay particular attention to the following points: (1) Arouse the impoverished masses in a given village to check on the landlords and rich peasants in their own village. (2) Hold several "talking about classes" meetings. (3) Look for activists (it will be fine even if we find only one) and give them a very good training. Through them, establish links with the masses in that locality, develop the poor peasant league, and promote class struggle in that locality. (4) In some areas where the situation is particularly serious, it is necessary first of all to arrest the reactionaries who are standing in



the way of the struggle, put them on trial at a public meeting, and, with the consent of the masses, sentence them to death. After that, we may further develop the mass struggle. (5) In places where there used to be some disputes between two clans with different surnames, a "Joint Pledge of Unity" must be signed by both sides at a meeting attended by the representatives of the masses from these two clans, stating their mutual recognition of the mistakes they had made in the past and their mutual determination to turn their attention from the clan struggle of the past to the class struggle. All the aforementioned are the necessary methods for winning over the backward villages, especially the big ones. In these matters, we must oppose any flinching from, or capitulation toward, the backward big villages; we must oppose the method of commandism, which separates us from the masses; we must oppose any opportunist capitulation toward the reactionaries; we must oppose clan struggles and local struggles. This is the only way for us to win over the revolutionary masses in all the backward villages, and wipe out the feudal remnants in these villages.

F. The poor peasant league is an organization that will play a very great role in the Land Investigation Movement. In the past, it has existed in some places more in name than in reality, and it must be really organized there immediately. Once the league has been organized, we must unite all the activists within it, win over the backward elements, and resolutely eliminate all the class-alien elements and other vicious elements who have sneaked into the organization. We must do our utmost to avoid disbanding and reorganizing the entire poor peasant league. All those commandist methods, which call for the disbandment of the poor peasant league on the pretext of one or two failures in organizing a meeting, are totally wrong. We must summon the activists to the meetings by use of excellent propaganda and agitation. The meeting should proceed as scheduled even if only a few people show up. This is the way to expand the membership. The poor peasant league should include all the masses of workers in the countryside who are willing to join it. A workers' small group can be set up within the league, and it should play a role in the leadership. Middle peasants may not be admitted to the poor peasant league as members, but when meetings are held, they should be invited to attend as auditors. Especially when decisions regarding class status are to be approved, they should be invited to come as auditors. The former three-person secretarial group of the poor peasant league should be changed into a five-person committee, which should elect one person as the director. At lower levels, the league should be divided into small groups according to the proximity of the members' residences, with five to fifteen members in each group. During the most crucial period of the Land Investigation Movement, the poor peasant league should hold meetings every few days. Once the Land Investigation Movement has drawn to a close, the league may have its meetings on the normal basis. The frequency of meetings should, however, be decided with a view to the mood of the masses of members who attend, and any recourse to orders or constraint will be detrimental. Before each meeting, the chairman of the township soviet should

guide the committee of the poor peasant league in the careful preparation of an agenda for the meeting. Holding meetings without preparation is an extremely bad habit. In the course of the Land Investigation Movement, district soviets should call the directors of the poor peasant league together for a meeting every week or two to discuss questions such as methods for consolidating the organization of the poor peasant league and leading the struggle. An interim congress of delegates from the poor peasant league in the entire district can also be held whenever necessary.

#### IV. On the Transformation of the Soviets

A. It is an important task for us at present to transform all the imperfect soviet organs, and turn them into soviets that are fully capable of representing the interests of the workers and peasants and have abundant working capacity.

B. The task of transforming the local soviet organs can be divided into the two aspects of cleaning out all the bad elements from the soviets and drawing the active revolutionary elements into them. As regards cleaning out the bad elements, the Department of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate at the *xian* and district levels must take the main responsibility. The method is to set up an accusation committee at the township level, in the context of the development of the "class investigation" struggle, to put forward accusations. The township accusation committee should be composed of two people from the labor union, five from the poor peasant league, two from the women's association, one from the light cavalry detachment of the Youth League, and one from the Young Pioneers. Two of them should be appointed as directors, and the committee is under the leadership of the district Department of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate. The chief target of the accusations should be the class-alien elements who have sneaked into the township deputies' assembly, and those elements who have already completely betrayed the interests of the workers and peasants and capitulated to, or compromised with, the landlords and rich peasants. The method for making accusations is as follows: First, put the names of these elements on a list, collect the evidence regarding the evils they have done, and inform the masses of the whole township, soliciting their opinions. Second, after collecting the opinions of the masses, the accusation committee draws conclusions. Third, [these conclusions] are presented to the deputies' assembly of the township for discussion, and when they have been approved, [the elements in question] are expelled. Fourth, the matter is reported to the Department of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate of the district soviet and, with the approval of the presidium of the district soviet, the expulsion is reported to the masses of the whole township in the name of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate. In the course of the accusation campaign, the shock brigade of the Department of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, its correspondents, and its letter boxes for accusations must be used to the full extent. As for those elements whose crimes are most serious, they should

be tried first at mass meetings and then turned over to the Commissariat for Justice to be punished in accordance with the law. The significance of the accusations and public trials lies on the one hand in getting rid of the bad elements who are now in the soviets, and on the other hand, in educating the broad masses and making them understand that the bad elements in the soviets must be eliminated. Thus they will all willingly supervise and support the soviet, so that bad elements like these will never appear again in the soviets in the future. Accusation and public trials should not extend to those who were not very active in the past or those who merely made some minor mistakes. Such elements should be won over chiefly by the methods of criticism and agitation. Before each public trial, detailed propaganda should be made among the masses, explaining all the evil deeds the defendant has committed, so as to prevent the defendant from deceiving some of the backward elements and instigating a disturbance in the meeting place for the public trial. In localities where there are struggles among clans, households, and villages, public trials should not be held lightly. Only where these non-class struggles have ceased to occur, and the masses believe that a public trial is necessary, can such a trial be held.

Accusations against bad elements in a district or *xian* soviet should take place under the leadership of the department of the worker-peasant procuratorate at the same level. The process of accusation should be conducted by an accusation committee organized from representatives selected by the mass organizations and by the middle and lower ranking personnel working at the same level of the government (from the head of a section to an ordinary cook). The accusation committee at the district level should also include activists from different townships, one person from each township. The procedure and the content of the accusation are more or less the same as what has been previously stated with reference to the township. In the soviet accusation campaign, which develops in the wake of the development of the Land Investigation Movement, the presidium of the government and the worker-peasant procuratorate at higher levels should lead the lower levels in a planned way. They should constantly review the work of the lower levels in the accusation campaign to see whether or not there are any mistakes and correct their mistakes in timely fashion. At the same time, they should gather some concrete experience of accusation work, and educate the presidiums of the governments, the departments of the worker-peasant procuratorate, and the accusation committees at these lower levels.

C. As for drawing activists into the soviets, the first thing to be done at the township level is to call a meeting of the voters and to elect the bravest and most resolute elements from the land investigation struggle to join the township deputies' assembly, replacing those bad elements who have been eliminated from it. Such an election should be well prepared in advance. In this by-election, alternate deputies, numbering from three or four to a dozen or so, can be elected. This is even more necessary in localities where a great number of new activists have emerged, for thus we can gradually let them replace those backward depu-

ties who are not holding their posts with much credit. Second, we should draw large numbers of new activists into the various committees under the township soviet, such as the land development committee, the committee for hills and forests, the committee for water conservancy, and the education committee, so that all these committees can really be established and set to work. Third, in this fall's all-soviet general election, we must do our best to make sure that the majority of the activists in the land investigation struggle are elected to the township soviets.

At the district level, in those district soviets where, in the past, there were only a few bad elements in the district executive committee, the remaining good elements can take over the positions left by those bad elements who have been eliminated. At the same time, however, activist elements from the township soviets should be drawn into the work of the district soviet. In isolated localities, where in the past the majority of the members on the district executive committee were bad elements, the *xian* soviet should send some people, in the midst of the Land Investigation Movement, to take the lead in calling a provisional district deputies' assembly and electing a new district soviet.

There are two ways to supplement the personnel of the *xian* soviet. One is that the good members of the *xian* executive committee may replace the bad members. The other is that good elements may be promoted from the district and township soviets to participate in the work [of the *xian* soviet].

## V. On the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries

A. The government at all levels and the whole system of the State Political Security Bureau must pay the greatest attention to the activities conducted by counterrevolutionary organizations set up by the landlords and rich peasants who are still hidden everywhere, and by isolated individuals, and eliminate them completely during the Land Investigation Movement. The political security bureaus especially, at the three levels of the province, the *xian*, and the district, as well as their special agents, must mobilize all their forces to carry out this work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries and rectify the erroneous viewpoint, which used to prevail in many places, of not taking counterrevolutionary activities seriously.

B. In the course of the Land Investigation Movement, the elimination of counterrevolutionaries follows in large measure the class investigation struggle of the masses. It guides the masses to report information, to search for clues about counterrevolution, and finally to arrest these counterrevolutionary elements. During the period of the Land Investigation Movement, the agents of the security bureau at the district level are granted the authority to make arrests. Those who are arrested will be turned over to the district Department of Justice for trial after a preliminary hearing by the special agents. In the case of an important criminal, a circuit court must be formed in the village where he re-

sides. He will be tried publicly in front of the masses and, with the consent of the masses, he will be shot on the spot. In this way, the hatred and vigilance of the masses against the counterrevolutionaries will be aroused. Having made an arrest, we should not, as happened in some places in the past, simply dispose of the matter by sending the criminal to the *xian* soviet, thus ignoring the anger of the broad masses toward the counterrevolutionaries and failing to use this opportunity to remind the masses of the need to maintain constant vigilance against the counterrevolutionaries. In order to reach our goal of eliminating the counterrevolutionaries, we must greatly improve the techniques that we have employed in the past for intelligence gathering, arrest, interrogation, and prison management.

#### **VI. On Taking the Offensive Against the Landlords and Rich Peasants by Collecting Fines and Contributions from Them**

In order to uproot completely the economic foundations of the landlord class and weaken the economic strength of the rich peasants, it is absolutely necessary to take the offensive against them by imposing fines on the landlords and collecting donations from the rich peasants. Judging from the fact that many, perhaps most, of the landlords and rich peasants have not yet been identified in many areas of the eight *xian*, it seems very likely that 800,000 *yuan* can be raised during the three months of July, August, and September in these eight *xian*. The financial departments at the *xian* and district levels must do their utmost to deal with this matter. The principal method is to direct the township soviets to mobilize the farm laborers' union, the poor peasant league, and other mass organizations; to investigate the property of each landlord and rich peasant family; and to fix an appropriate sum of fines and donations for each landlord or rich peasant, strictly pressing them for payment, and so on. In this work, however, they must be careful not to extend their actions to the middle peasants. Even between the rich peasants and the landlords, a certain distinction in the degree of severity should be maintained. That is to say that the landlords should be eliminated, while the rich peasants should only be weakened.

#### **VII. The Relationship Between the Land Investigation Movement, War Mobilization, and Economic and Cultural Construction**

A. Amidst the victory of the Land Investigation Movement, it is entirely possible that a Red Army of eighty thousand men can be created from these eight *xian*. Moreover, it will not take very long. We must simply carry out a broad and thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement during the three months of July, August, and September. Once the masses in these eight *xian* are mobilized on the broadest possible scale, it is entirely possible that, within six to ten months, these eight *xian* will send eighty thousand new soldiers to the front. Consequently, the

success of such a task largely depends on the launching, as well as the further deepening, of the Land Investigation Movement. The fundamental reason why these eight *xian* did not achieve much success in expanding the Red Army is that they had not devoted great effort to the Land Investigation Movement, but had concentrated on the expansion of the Red Army alone. We must have a deep understanding of this point.

B. In the midst of the victory of the Land Investigation Movement, all kinds of cooperatives are being developed everywhere in the eight *xian*, especially consumer cooperatives, grain adjustment cooperatives, cooperatives for manufacturing necessary tools (mainly farming tools), and cooperatives to offer loans to the impoverished masses. Thus we can ward off the profiteers' cruel exploitation of the broad masses and develop the economy of the entire Soviet Area, so that it can vanquish the enemy's economic blockade. This is one of our important tasks at present. To wage this economic war rapidly and on a broad scale requires the tremendous well-organized forces of the soviet and the masses, as well as a large amount of capital. Consequently, we have made a proposal to the Central Government, urging it to issue three million *yuan* of "economic construction" bonds, which could be paid for in grain, in order to proceed rapidly with this task. Similarly, the accomplishment of this work depends on the victory of the Land Investigation Movement. There is no way to finish this work completely if we do not devote great efforts to the Land Investigation Movement and rouse the majority of the masses to plunge into economic construction with enthusiasm.

C. Two big events, the autumn harvest and autumn plowing, are drawing near. They are of fundamental importance both to the life of the masses and to the revolutionary war. Therefore, we must strive for complete victory in the autumn harvest and the autumn plowing this year, in the course of the Land Investigation Movement.

D. Similarly, broad development of the cultural and educational movement can only be realized amid the victory of the Land Investigation Movement. Once the majority of the masses all arise enthusiastically, it will be by no means difficult to carry out such cultural and educational construction as setting up a club for every thousand people, an elementary school for every five hundred people, and an evening school for every hundred people, and offering literacy classes for most of the people who are sixteen or above. A telling example of this has occurred in Xingguo, where nearly the whole *xian* has generally achieved such success.

### VIII. Facing the Attack of the Enemy

During the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," which the enemy has launched against the Central Soviet Region, although our heroic Red Army has largely destroyed Chiang Kaishek's main force on the northern front, the enemy

is still very much engaged in his new assault upon us. Though the level of disintegration and collapse in the enemy's forces is increasing day by day, and he has countless difficulties, he has still not forgotten to keep attacking us. Right now, the enemy troops from Guangdong have already reached Xunwu and Anyuan, while the enemy's troops from Fujian are still occupying the area stretching from Shanghang and Liancheng to Qingliu. This constitutes a big threat to the eight *xian* and their neighboring area. In order to wipe out completely the main forces of these enemy troops and drive the remnants away, the Red Army will fight heroically, but we will rely even more on the struggles of the broad masses. Thus, apart from the Land Investigation Movement, we are facing another urgent fighting task. In the face of the enemy who is pressing on, step by step, toward us, not only can we not slacken the Land Investigation Movement, but on the contrary, we should redouble our efforts to carry on the movement. In the course of the Land Investigation Movement, we must quickly mobilize the masses in their millions to arise and arm themselves, so that we may be able to eliminate the enemy's spies, who will respond to the enemy's attack from inside our organizations, as well as the remnant force of the landlords and rich peasants, and build the soviets into something as solid as iron. Only then will our triumph over the enemy be fully guaranteed.

#### **IX. Support the Second All-Soviet Congress with the Victory of the Land Investigation Movement**

The Land Investigation Movement must be fully accomplished before the Second All-Soviet Congress takes place on December 11. For this reason, it is particularly necessary for us to intensify our work during the three months of July, August, and September. A meeting will be held in October to review the Land Investigation Movement in these eight *xian*. Actually, however, some concrete achievements should have been made by August when the Central Government sends its staff to inspect each of the eight *xian*. In order to step up the development of the Land Investigation Movement, the eight *xian* have voluntarily drawn up an agreement regarding a competition in the movement, and they are determined to strive for the complete fulfillment of this agreement.

#### **X. Severely Punish Those Who Sabotage or Oppose the Land Investigation Movement**

During the fierce struggle of the Land Investigation Movement, those class-alien elements and other extremely bad elements who have sneaked into the soviets will necessarily emerge to sabotage and oppose the movement. All such elements must be severely punished in accordance with the decrees that the Central Government has issued on the Land Investigation Movement. At a time when this meeting was being convened under the direct leadership of the Central

Government, when all the people who came to the meeting were unanimously expressing their support for the Central Government's guiding principles for the Land Investigation Movement and warmly discussing how to proceed with the work, Huang Yanban,<sup>2</sup> the director of the land department in Hekou District, Ninghua *xian*, made statements fundamentally opposed to the Land Investigation Movement. In spite of severe criticism and attacks directed against him both in the small group discussion and at the plenary session, he still refused to admit his mistakes. It is the opinion of this meeting that Huang Yanban has held completely to a stand which assists our class enemies in their resistance against the land investigation struggle by the broad masses, and that he has disgraced the position he holds in the Soviet. We propose that the Central Government remove him from his position as director of the land department in Hekou District and place him under the surveillance of the Ninghua *xian* Soviet. Only after such extremely bad elements are purged can we put our revolutionary ranks in good order, overcome the sabotage and resistance by all the class enemies, and accomplish the great revolutionary task of the Land Investigation Movement.

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2. We have been unable to find information about this individual.



# ***Mass Work in the Land Investigation Movement***

(June 1933)

The Land Investigation Movement is a violent and ruthless class struggle. A correct execution of the class line cannot be guaranteed, and the goal of cracking down on the remaining feudal forces cannot be achieved, unless the masses are mobilized on the broadest scale to take part in our struggle and turn it into a mass movement. All the bureaucratic methods in our work that tend to separate us from the masses are our ultimate enemies during the Land Investigation Movement. The focus of the mass work in the Land Investigation Movement is on talking about class, approval of class status, confiscation and redistribution, and correct leadership over the labor union and the poor peasant league.

## **I. Talking About Class (Making Propaganda)**

A. The tactics for the Land Investigation Movement are to place the workers in the leading position, rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, weaken the rich peasants, and wipe out the landlords. The essential purpose of our propaganda is simply to provide a very clear explanation of these tactics to the masses.

B. In order to explain these tactics it is necessary to define clearly the meaning of terms like landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant and worker. In this explanation we must demonstrate that the landlord is a feudal exploiter and the rich peasant is a semifeudal exploiter. Consequently, only by adopting a policy of eliminating the landlords but merely weakening the rich peasants can we ensure that the benefits of the agrarian revolution will go entirely to the middle peasants, poor peasants, and workers.

C. The rich peasants are, however, different from the landlords. The rich peasants take part in labor themselves, while the landlords do not. That is why we have a policy of eliminating the landlords, but a policy of weakening the rich peasants. Therefore, the tendency to wipe out the rich peasants is wrong, and we should not treat those with rich peasant status like landlords.

D. The tactic toward the middle peasants—uniting with the middle peasants—is

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the most crucial tactic in the agrarian revolution. The success or failure of the agrarian revolution will be influenced by whether the middle peasants support or oppose it. For this reason, it is imperative to explain these tactics again and again to the masses, making clear that it is absolutely impermissible to violate the interests of the middle peasants. In order to unite with the middle peasants and not violate their interests, we should put forward the term "well-to-do middle peasant," explain it, and use it to clarify forcefully the points of difference between the rich peasant and the middle peasant, thereby reassuring the well-to-do middle peasants. It is important to expose the deception that the landlords and rich peasants have practiced on the middle peasants, thus enabling the middle peasants to free themselves from the evil influence of the landlords and rich peasants and unite around the poor peasants in a common struggle against the landlords.

E. Every deceptive slogan of the landlords and rich peasants must be exposed and explained widely to the masses. We must be on guard against attempts by the landlords and rich peasants to trick and disrupt the middle and poor peasants by employing the backward localist concepts of the clans.

F. It must be explained that the Land Investigation Movement is the weapon to crush the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression." This is because once the remaining feudal forces are cleaned up and the enemy's troublemakers hiding inside the soviet areas are ferreted out, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the broad masses will be increased, and it will be much easier for us to carry on work such as the expansion of the Red Army and economic construction.

G. Concrete slogans must be put forward on the basis of the actual circumstances of a given locality. In a backward village, for instance, we must discover the reason for its backwardness, and put forward a concrete slogan to rouse the masses. Suppose that in a certain locality there is a reactionary landlord who is threatening the masses, so the masses dare not stand up to involve themselves actively in the struggle. In this case we must put forward the slogan of capturing this landlord. Again, suppose that in another area the personnel of the local government have made a serious mistake by divorcing themselves from the masses, thus creating dissatisfaction among the masses. To launch the masses into the struggle in this case, there must be propaganda that begins with unmasking these people's mistakes.

H. What has been mentioned above is the content of propaganda. Now let us talk about the method of propaganda. The propaganda regarding land investigation should be addressed to all the cadres at the township level (the deputies of the township soviet and the leaders of all the mass organizations), so that they first understand, and then through them propaganda is conducted among the masses. Secondly, the matter should be made clear to the masses of the members of the labor union and the poor peasant league at their meetings. Thirdly, it should be explained in a speech at a mass meeting of the village, so that every single member of the masses understands it.

I. The propagandists should be selected mainly from among the active cadres at the township level. They should make proper arrangements to attend and deliver speeches at mass meetings. In addition, it is necessary to organize propaganda teams. After training, they may be sent among the masses to address them.

J. The methods of propaganda are: (1) making speeches, (2) putting up notices, (3) writing slogans, (4) distributing leaflets, (5) performing new plays, (6) writing articles in the wall newspapers, and so on.

## II. Investigating Classes

A. The Land Investigation Movement is actually an investigation of classes, not an investigation of land *mu* by *mu*. The investigation of land *mu* by *mu* will definitely arouse panic among the masses and is absolutely wrong.

B. Class investigation means investigating the classes of the landlords and the rich peasants, investigating the exploiters, investigating these people who have concealed themselves among the peasants, but in reality are not peasants. It is these few people, and definitely not the classes of the middle peasants, poor peasants, and workers, that are to be investigated. So we cannot conduct our investigation from house to house. Such a method will arouse panic among the masses and is absolutely wrong.

C. Before the class investigation gets under way, there must be a phase of propaganda, namely, the phase of discussing the notion of class. To launch the investigation without open and widespread discussion of class will arouse panic among the masses and is absolutely wrong.

D. It is imperative to urge the members of the labor union and the poor peasant league, as well as a majority of the other masses, to participate in the class investigation, and ask them to report promptly the results of their investigation to the poor peasant league and the Land Investigation Committee. It is not right that only a few people should be involved in the investigation, because an investigation conducted by a few people will arouse panic among the masses and is absolutely wrong.

E. The class investigation must be carried on until a clear result is obtained. Whether you are investigating a landlord or a rich peasant, you must lay bare every fact regarding his exploitation and his personal life in the past, for only thus can he be made to plead guilty, thereby satisfying the masses. If we jump to a conclusion after performing only a rough investigation, it is easy for us to make mistakes. The suspect will not admit his guilt, the masses will not be satisfied, and as a result the Land Investigation Movement will be hampered. As for the class status of those middle peasant elements, it is even more important to carry out the investigation carefully, so that no middle peasant is turned into a rich peasant and no rich peasant is turned into a landlord.

F. The materials resulting from the class investigation into one family should be entered on a copy of the "Investigation Form Regarding Class Status." It

should be made available to everyone for their comments, and it should also be preserved for checking in the future. It is not proper merely to state the result orally or to note it in the mind or to write a couple of lines about it in the notebook, for thus it can easily be lost.

### III. Approval of Class Status<sup>1</sup>

A. The approval of class status means to determine class status. As it is a life-and-death decision for the person in question, we must be extremely cautious about it. Every case must be thoroughly investigated before being presented for approval.

B. In the process of approval, the first step involves the poor peasant league, which should call a meeting. Only after a general discussion and a majority vote by a show of hands can the decision be regarded as approved by the poor peasant league. If there is still some disagreement, the matter should be postponed until the next meeting for discussion and must not be approved on this first occasion.

C. The second step involves the township Land Investigation Committee. It must examine the views of the poor peasant league, and then approve it, if it is correct, or amend it, if it is wrong. If the committee still has some doubts about it, it must conduct another investigation.

D. The third step involves the district land department. If this department is unable to make a decision, it should turn the case over to the district Land Investigation Committee. If that committee is unable to make a decision, it should hand the matter over to the *xian* land department.

E. The fourth step involves a mass meeting in the village. A mass meeting must definitely be convened in the village of the person concerned, at which the masses are informed of the facts regarding his exploitation and his life and it is ascertained whether the masses agree or not. If the masses agree, the proposal is approved; if they do not agree, the case should be investigated again, and approval must absolutely not be rigidly insisted on. Otherwise, the masses might be dissatisfied. That would be commandism, which must be resolutely opposed.

F. None of the above-mentioned four steps can be left out, especially the approval by the mass meeting, which is particularly important. In many localities, confiscation starts even before the decision is approved by the masses. This is wrong.

G. In the event that a wrong decision has been made in the past, such as turning a middle peasant into a rich peasant or a rich peasant into a landlord or a landlord into a rich peasant, the original decision must be reversed. The past mistake as well as the reasons for correcting it now must be explained at the mass meeting, until the masses are satisfied.

1. The Chinese expression used here, *tongguo jieji*, means literally "approval of class," but as will be seen from the text which follows, it refers to the process of formally assigning to people the correct *jieji chengfen*, or class status labels.

H. Once a wrong decision is reversed, if the person concerned is a middle peasant, he must be compensated for the land and property that had been taken away from him. Even if the land has already been distributed to others, it should be returned to him. If the person concerned is a rich peasant, we should compensate him with whatever we have right now. If we do not have anything at hand at this moment, we have to find a way to compensate his loss in the future. Such a compensation policy is very effective in winning over the masses. It is utterly wrong to leave a mistake uncorrected without attempting to do anything about it.

#### IV. Confiscation and Distribution

A. It must be emphasized that the land and property of the landlords and the land, surplus draft cattle, farm tools, and houses of the rich peasants can be confiscated only after approval is granted by the masses at the mass meeting of the village. It is absolutely prohibited to carry out confiscation without such approval, or to carry out confiscation at night.

B. All the property confiscated from the landlords, except the cash and valuable articles, which should be turned over to the financial department of the government, should be distributed to the masses. This is a good method for raising the masses' enthusiasm for the struggle.

C. Advantage should be taken of the occasion when a mass meeting is being held in the village to approve class status to elect a provisional confiscation and distribution committee. Confiscation should take place immediately, and distribution should be carried out on the spot. No delay should occur in confiscation or distribution. It is not permitted to take the things collected to the government first and then discuss distribution.

D. Things confiscated from a village should be distributed within the same village. They should not be divided evenly throughout the township (big landlords are an exception to this).

E. Things should be distributed first to Red Army dependents, farm laborers, workers, and other impoverished elements from among the masses. Distribution should not be carried out equally without regard for social strata.

F. Pigs and chickens collected through confiscation should be cooked and shared by everyone at the mass meeting. They cannot be eaten merely by a few people from among the personnel.<sup>2</sup>

G. Government personnel should set an example by not seeking to have things distributed to them. If one of them is truly in need of some object, he must obtain the approval of the masses at the mass meeting. The personnel must be prevented from picking up things at will.

H. The draft cattle and major agricultural implements collected through confiscation may, with the approval of the masses, be placed under the charge of the

2. "Personnel" refers here to government cadres.

beneficiaries of land distribution, who may organize a farm cattle cooperative and share the use of these cattle and tools.

I. It is wrong to delay the division of the land collected through confiscation. After part of the land is reserved as the public land for the Red Army and social welfare, the rest should be distributed immediately. It should go first to those who did not receive enough land or did not receive any land at all in the past, and then, if any is left, it should be divided evenly in each village. Hills and forests, fish ponds, houses, and latrines should also be distributed to the masses immediately.

J. Each time when things are being distributed and the masses' enthusiasm for the struggle is at its highest peak, we should take advantage of such occasions, bringing forward slogans about expanding the Red Army and developing the cooperatives, and leading the masses to join enthusiastically in the revolutionary war and in the building of the soviets.

## **V. The Labor Union and the Poor Peasant League**

A. All our major tasks, namely the discussion of classes, the investigation of classes, and the approval of class status, confiscation, and distribution, can only be accomplished with the greatest success by mobilizing the labor union and the poor peasant league. The labor union is expected to be the leader for the class struggle in the countryside, while the poor peasant league is expected to be the pillar of the struggle.

B. Develop the Land Investigation Movement correctly, relying on the labor union to instruct its own members to join the poor peasant league and play a positive role inside the league.

C. It is necessary to expand the poor peasant league and turn it into an organization that the broad masses of the poor peasants join of their own free will.

D. The bad elements hiding in the poor peasant league must be cleaned out.

E. During the Land Investigation Movement, the poor peasant league should diligently convene meetings and pay close attention to the movement as its central task.

F. The middle peasants should be rallied around the poor peasant league and drawn to the league's meetings as auditors.

G. In the course of leading the land investigation struggle, neither the labor union nor the poor peasant league can violate any of the above-mentioned principles.

Only if the broad masses are mobilized in accordance with the previously stated tactics and methods can the Land Investigation Movement achieve satisfactory results. Every instance in which we do not make propaganda, or the propaganda is not properly, conscientiously, and universally carried out; every instance in which class investigation, class status approval, confiscation, and distribution are not carried out on the basis of the class line and the mass line or

do not win the support and approval of the masses, will make it impossible for the Land Investigation Movement to achieve anything. On the contrary, this will make the masses dissatisfied, and the progress of the Land Investigation Movement will be impeded. Thus, to oppose the "left" opportunism of attacking the middle peasants and eliminating the rich peasants, to oppose the right opportunism of shielding the landlords and rich peasants, and to oppose the bureaucratic leadership style and work methods during the Land Investigation Movement are necessary conditions for carrying out the movement correctly.

## *On the Problem of Launching Food Cooperatives*

*Order No. 21 of the Central Council  
of People's Commissars*

(July 4, 1933)

The Central Soviet Area was originally a place where much rice was produced, but it has deteriorated this year to such an extent that summer famine has appeared in parts of the area. Some workers and peasants do not have enough to eat, and they are suffering a great many difficulties. This is a matter that merits serious attention. The cause of this situation is that, in their desperate struggle, the reactionary rulers of imperialism and the Guomindang are not only making use of all the political and military forces, but have also adopted the policy of economic blockade against us, so that the supply of manufactured goods is reduced and the prices are rising. In order to buy the necessary manufactured goods, the masses have no recourse but to sell their newly harvested grain at an extremely low price. Then the generally unscrupulous merchants and rich peasants are taking the advantage of this opportunity to manipulate the market price by pushing the price of new grain to a shockingly low level, and by buying large amounts of grain at the cheapest price. They are either hoarding and profiteering or smuggling the grain out of the area, thus making the people in some parts of this area suffer a food shortage during the two seasons of harvest. When the people suffering a food shortage have to pay a high price to buy rice to eat, the unscrupulous merchants and rich peasants again take advantage of the opportunity to manipulate the market price by raising the grain price to a very high level. In some areas, it is not easy to buy grain even at a high price. This is the main cause of the summer famine this year. In addition, because of the natural disasters last year, the harvest was not good. The troops of the White army have carried out robbery, looting, destruction, and burning in the border areas. Moreover, our government did not pay enough attention to planning the storage of grain and exported the grain without any limit. These are the other causes of the

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food shortage this year. Our government has already taken many measures to end this unhealthy situation, such as setting up coordinating and trading bureaus in various areas and getting prepared to store away large amounts of food for the urgent needs of the people. The most important method for resolving the difficulties in food supply for the masses of workers and peasants is for everyone to get together to organize food cooperatives. The method is as follows. The poor toiling worker and peasant masses themselves form a stock company. Shares of the stocks can be purchased with money and/or with grain (with the amount of the money payment deducted). After the harvest, when the members of the food cooperatives need money, they can sell grain to the food cooperatives at a price slightly higher than the market price. The food cooperatives can store away a small portion of the grain they have bought for the urgent needs of the members during two seasons of harvest next year. The food cooperatives can then gradually ship the remaining large portion of the grain to the areas where the price is high, or export the grain. Such activities of continuous buying and selling can not only expand the capital, but also bring more profits to the members of the food cooperatives. We can use this method to regulate the market price so as to make sure that the food prices in the soviet districts in an average year will not go too high or too low. At the same time, we can use this method to guarantee that the peasants will not suffer the difficulty of food shortage, that the people can get rid of the cruel exploitation by the unscrupulous merchants, and that we may improve the well-being of the workers and peasants to the maximum. The poor workers and peasants should mobilize immediately and join the food cooperatives upon mutual invitation. All the revolutionary mass organizations should try their utmost to help carry out this work. The leading comrades of the government at various levels are even more under an obligation to assume the responsibilities of carrying out broad and deep propaganda work about the significance and functions of the food cooperatives, and of leading and helping the people to establish at least one food cooperative in each village. Efforts should be made now for people to sign up and form registers and to elect people to take charge, according to the "Rules of the Food Cooperatives" issued by the Central Government. On the other hand, granaries should be built and all the preparatory work should be completed before the autumn harvest, so that the food cooperatives can begin to work immediately when newly harvested grain appears on the market. This is important work, which can guarantee the food supply for the people, consolidate the political power of the soviets, and facilitate the rapid and smooth development of the revolutionary war, so we must not neglect it in the slightest degree. We hereby issue this notice.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution by the Central Government Concerning the Movement to Commemorate "August First"***

(July 11, 1933)

August 1 is the day for the commemoration of the international struggle against imperialist war, and at the same time the day for the commemoration of the Nanchang Uprising in China.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army came into being with the Nanchang Uprising and has grown increasingly strong in the course of the struggle. This year, August First arrives at a time when the danger of a new bandit war by the imperialists and a new war against the Soviet Union is extremely acute; a time when the Japanese imperialists are invading China on a large scale and the Chinese Guomindang is openly selling out the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, and North China; and a time when the movement against imperialism and the Guomindang in the whole country is surging extremely high, and the soviet movement and the revolutionary war are achieving unprecedented great victories. Thus, August First is this year of unusual significance for the revolutionary struggle. In order to commemorate the establishment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and to reward and give favored treatment to the soldiers of the Red Army, the Central Executive Committee hereby adopts the following resolution:

1. The Central Executive Committee approves the recommendation by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission designating August First each year as the day for commemorating the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. On August First this year, military banners will be conferred on all the regiments of the Red Army. At the same time, medals will be awarded to the responsible comrades who led the Nanchang Uprising and to the commanders and fighters in the Red Army who have performed exceptional feats.

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1. In July 1929, the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International had designated August 1 as a "day of international demonstrations against imperialist war." (See Jane Degras, *The Communist International 1919-1943. Documents*, Vol. III [London: Oxford University Press, 1965], pp. 64-67) (hereafter Degras, *Communist International*, III). The following year, Mao and his army had marked this occasion, and the anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, by occupying a railroad station across the river from Nanchang. (See Volume III of this edition, p. 471.)

2. The Central Executive Committee instructs the commissar for internal affairs to make cards for the preferential treatment of the families of Red Army soldiers, and to issue them to such families.

3. Under the leadership of the land departments of district and township soviets, management committees for the public land of the Red Army shall be organized to manage the harvest from the public lands of the Red Army and other affairs such as the storage of the harvested grain. Under the joint jurisdiction of the Land Department of the district soviet and the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, committees on favorable treatment for Red Army families shall be organized under the township soviets to manage all the affairs concerning the favorable treatment of Red Army families.

Chairman of the Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Circular Telegram Opposing the Guomindang's Recent Dalian Conference for Selling Out the Country***

(July 1933)

Revolutionary Masses of the Whole Country!

About a week ago, the Guomindang government of the landlords and bourgeoisie, as the most loyal and obedient running dog of imperialism, even more insidiously and shamelessly than before convened the Dalian Conference.<sup>1</sup> On the afternoon of July 5, they signed a new Dalian Agreement with the headquarters of the Japanese Military Police. This agreement is more concrete and more shameless than the North China Truce Agreement, which was signed on May 30!<sup>2</sup>

At the banquet celebrating the success of selling out our country, where wine cups and dishes were lying about in disorder, and amidst warm congratulations by the deputy commander-in-chief of the Guangdong Army of Japanese imperialism, the traitorous representatives of the Guomindang government, such as Lei Shouyun,<sup>3</sup> holding glasses filled with champagne, went so far as to shake hands with the representatives of Manchukuo, which, we seem to recall, was formerly called a "puppet" by the Guomindang. While celebrating the formation of their new alliance, they had finally swallowed the traitorous treaty to sell out the interests of the Chinese nation and affixed

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1. At the Dalian (Dairen) Conference on July 3, 1933, Chinese negotiators from the Peiping Political Affairs Council agreed to Japanese demands that Japanese puppet forces be accepted into the Chinese police force charged with keeping order in the demilitarized zone between Japanese and Chinese forces established by the Tanggu Truce of May 31. See Parks Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991), p. 112 (hereafter, Coble, *Facing Japan*).

2. As noted above, the Tanggu Truce was in fact concluded on May 31.

3. The third character of this name, as printed in *Hongse Zhonghua*, is wrong; it should read Lei Shourong. Lei (1879–??), a native of Hubei, was a graduate of the infantry division of a Japanese military academy, who had occupied important posts in the general staff of the Beijing warlord government in the 1920s. According to the account of the Dalian Conference published in *Dongfang zazhi*, Vol. 30, no. 15 (August 1, 1933), p. 65, he and the other Chinese negotiators refused to sign a written agreement, but did agree informally on July 6 to terms similar to those indicated here by Mao.

their signatures. The main content of this new traitorous agreement is as follows: (1) The Guomindang government formally recognizes Manchukuo and nominally incorporates the troops of Manchukuo that are stationed in the area around Luan[zhou] and [Lin]yu. (2) Japan will set up supervisory troops in various *xian* such as Miyun and Luanzhou. (3) The Lu[gouqiao]-[Lin]yu section of the Bei[jing]-[Liao]ning railroad will be under joint jurisdiction.<sup>4</sup>

In this agreement, the Guomindang has, in fact, not only formally recognized Manchukuo, but also, even more shamefully, formed a puppet alliance with Manchukuo and pledged loyalty to the death to their common master—Japanese imperialism. Recent events tell us that the Guomindang government has already agreed to the demands of Manchukuo, changing the method of sending mails to Europe through Vladivostok via Siberia. These iron facts make plain that the Guomindang's talk in public about Manchukuo as a "puppet" is a lie. It is nothing but shameless deceptive propaganda. As a matter of fact, the Guomindang itself is also a loyal puppet of Japanese imperialism; it is absolutely the brother running dog of Manchukuo.

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviets, on behalf of the popular masses of the whole country, strongly opposes the shameful agreement for selling out the country signed at the Dalian Conference by the Guomindang, and absolutely repudiates every single clause in this traitorous agreement. We also call on the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and all revolutionaries in the whole country, to stand together in opposing the recent Dalian Conference of the Guomindang for selling out the country, and in carrying out a firm revolutionary struggle against it. Let the workers, merchants, students, and functionaries strike, organize mass demonstrations, and form military units to oppose the Dalian Agreement and prevent it from being carried out. The people of the whole country must clearly realize that, with the puppet alliance between the Guomindang and Manchukuo, the Japanese imperialist bandits will surely expand their activities of invasion in China to an even greater extent, from actively attacking Chahar and Suiyuan provinces to taking over the provinces along the southeast coast, thus jointly carving up China with the other international imperialists. At the same time, the Japanese bandits—the military police of international imperialism in the East—will continue their recent frenzied activities of provocation against the Soviet Union. They will certainly openly initiate military adventures of intervention against the brotherly ally of the Chinese popular masses—the Soviet Union.

Revolutionary popular masses of the whole country! Only the soviets can

4. Luanzhou (now called Luan *xian*) is located on the Luan River, not far from the point where it flows into the Bohai Sea. The section of what was earlier called the Beijing-Liaoning railroad referred to here extended from the Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) junction in the southern suburbs of Beijing to Linyu, the station where the railroad crosses the Great Wall at Shanhaiguan.

save China. Only the anti-Japanese Red Army, which is just now speeding up the smashing of the imperialist Guomindang's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," constitutes the armed forces of China's revolutionary popular masses themselves! In order to strive for the independence, liberation, and territorial integrity of the Chinese nation, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls on the popular masses of the whole country and the revolutionary soldiers in the White army to unite closely under the banner of the soviets to expand the national-revolutionary war, overthrow imperialism and the Guomindang, and bury them in the graveyard of history.

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

## ***Letter to the Huangbai District Soviet in Ruijin Concerning the Land Investigation Movement***

(July 13, 1933)

Comrades of the Huangbai District Soviet:

With the help of the work teams from the Land Commissariat of the Central Government, you have mobilized the broad masses of workers and peasants in the twelve townships of the Huangbai District to participate enthusiastically in the movement of investigating land and class origins. During this fierce class struggle, more than 270 households of landlords and rich peasants who had been regarded as middle and poor peasants in the past have now been discovered. Some landlords who were regarded as rich peasants had land distributed to them, and even good land. Compared with 122 households of landlords and rich peasants dealt with in the past three years by the district soviet, the present figure accounts for 70 percent of the total number. During this struggle to investigate land and class origins, a great deal of land and property has been confiscated and distributed to the impoverished peasants. The activities of the reactionaries have been suppressed, while the revolutionary enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the whole soviet area has been raised to new heights. Some class-alien elements and other extremely bad elements who had sneaked into the soviet have been purged, while a large number of worker and peasant activists have been recruited into the soviet. Township soviets and district soviets have been reelected, and the political power of the soviet has been greatly consolidated. This is a great victory of the movement to investigate land and class origins in Huangbai District. The Land Investigation Movement in Huangbai District is not, however, complete. There are still some residual feudal forces and reactionaries are still active. In particular, there are a number of class-alien and bad elements in Shangduan Township, Xinzhuang Township, and Lantian Township who are still working either openly or clandestinely to deceive and stir up a portion of the masses. Some are even trying to reverse the verdicts. You must pay very great attention to such activities, and you should mobilize the masses in these areas as widely as possible to expose the plots of the reactionaries. You

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should continue to ferret out the remnants of landlord and rich peasant elements, suppress the reactionaries in Shangduan Township, and prevent them from attempting any counterattack and reversing the verdicts. You must untiringly and resolutely lead the people in this struggle and strive to achieve a final victory in the Land Investigation Movement.

We have made a detailed examination of your table of investigation results regarding class origins, and the class status of most households is correctly determined. There are, however, a few cases in which wrong decisions have been made. For instance, some households that should have been classified as landlords you have regarded as rich peasants or even as middle peasants. One household, which should have been classified as a rich peasant, you have regarded as a usurer. There is yet another household for which the entry regarding manpower is not clear. We hope that you can make another investigation and decide the matter. Now, in order to draw your attention to the necessity of having a cautious and unequivocal attitude in determining class status, we here especially list and analyze ten households whose class status you have incorrectly determined.

1. Zhou Zongren (of Shangduan Township). There are three people in the family and none of them work. (Twenty years ago, Zhou himself worked as a long-term farm laborer for twelve years.) Zhou has 50 *Dan*<sup>1</sup> of land, which is completely rented out, and he has collected rent of 25 *Dan* of grain each year for seven years. Zhou also has two pieces of hilly land which can produce a return of several hundred *mao*.<sup>2</sup> He has mortgaged out 4 *Dan* of land, with a deposit of one hundred foreign dollars. (You have classified him as a middle peasant.)

2. Xie Mingsi (of Shangduan Township). He is the only family member and he does not work. He has 39 *Dan* of land, which is completely rented out. Every year, he collects 16 *Dan* in rent, and he has been doing so for twenty years. He also has one house, which he has rented for 1 *Dan*, and he has been collecting this amount for more than twenty years. He has made loans in the amount of 104 *yuan*. In the past, Xie oppressed the people in the village and forced them to fight against the Red Army. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

3. Zhu Demeng (of Xin Zhuang Township). There are two people in the family and neither of them works. Zhu has 41 *Dan* of land, all of which is rented out. He has mortgaged out 6 *Dan* of land and has also made loans in the amount of 30

1. When land is measured in terms of its notional yield, it is most commonly the character *dan* (also read *shi*), representing a unit of volume, which is used. Here Mao employs throughout the unit of weight, pronounced in the same way and transcribed *Dan* in our series to avoid confusion. No great importance should be attached to this fact, since, as pointed out in Volume III, the two characters are sometimes used interchangeably, but for the sake of consistency, we have capitalized the term here.

2. Most, but not all, of the amounts of money mentioned in this text are given in *mao*, equivalent to 0.1 *yuan*. Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, all of these figures have been converted to *yuan*.



*yuan*, which have been outstanding for eight to nine years. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

4. Zhong Tongqi (of Shanhe Township). There are two people in the family and neither of them works. Zhong has 85.5 *Dan* of land. He has often hired farm laborers on a long-term and short-term basis to cultivate 46.5 *Dan* of his land and has rented out 39 *Dan*. He has also lent 1 *Dan* of new grain. He administers two ancestral temples. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

5. Liu Fangluo (of Fuxi Township). There are three people in the family and they do not work. Liu has 54 *Dan* of land. He has borrowed 10 *Dan* of land, for which he pays a rent of 2 *Dan* 90 *jin*, and he has rented out 35 *Dan* of his own land, for which he receives a yearly rent of 14 *Dan*, and has been doing so for eight years. He has hired long-term and short-term farm laborers to cultivate 29 *Dan*. He has borrowed 159 *yuan*. He has managed an ancestral hall for eight years. In the past, he was very powerful in the village and oppressed the people. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

According to the information recorded in your table of investigation results, all the above five households are not middle peasants or rich peasants, but landlords (small landlords), in terms of their relationship to the land and their relationships of exploitation. No one in the families of Zhou Zongren, Xie Mingsi, and Zhu Demeng works. Their land is completely rented out, and they depend exclusively on collecting rent for a living. They are typical landlords, and your decision that Zhou Zongren is a middle peasant, and Xie Mingsi and Zhu Demeng are rich peasants, is completely wrong. The members of Zhong Tongqi's and Liu Fangluo's families do not work either, and for the most part they rely on exploitation for a living. The difference between them and the previous three families is that they have rented out part of their land and hired long-term farm laborers to cultivate another part of their land. But they are likewise small landlords and not rich peasants. As manpower in the Chinese countryside is extremely cheap, many among the landlord class have utilized part of their land and old-style farm tools by hiring farm laborers to come to their houses and cultivate the land, thus treating the farm laborers most cruelly and exploiting them as if they were feudal slaves. In the meantime, they have also rented out part of their land to exploit other peasants. Here they are different from rich peasants because they do not participate in labor, while rich peasants do participate in labor themselves. You have neglected this difference and therefore you made the wrong decisions.

6. Xiao Xujiao (of Yuankeng Township). There were four people in the family and Xiao himself performed some supplementary labor (he was killed during the revolution). This household has 62 *Dan* of land and hired a long-term farm laborer to cultivate 38 *Dan*. (They had hired long-term farm laborers for two generations, until the revolution.) They rented out 24 *Dan* of land (for thirty-six years). They have three hills of Chinese catalpa, which produce 40 *Dan* of Chinese catalpa every year. They have made loans in the amount of 21 *yuan*.

Xiao has also administered two ancestral temples, from which he received 20 *Dan* of grain a year for thirty-five years. In the past, he oppressed people. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

7. Liu Jihe (of Huling Township). There are three people in the family and Liu himself does supplementary work. He has 65 *Dan* of land and has hired long- and short-term farm laborers to cultivate 32 *Dan* of land. He has rented out 33 *Dan* of land and collected rents of 15 *Dan* of grain. He has three hills, which yield over 30 *yuan*. He has one pond, which yields over 20 *yuan*. He has rented out six houses, for which he collected a rent of 6 *Dan* of mature grain each year. He has rented out one toilet, for which he collects a rent of 30 *jin* of grain. He owes a debt of 10 *yuan*. He also administers four ancestral temples, for which he receives a rent of 89 *Dan* 20 *jin* of grain. He is very powerful in the village. (You have classified him as a rich peasant.)

The aforementioned two households both rented out part of their land and at the same time hired long-term farm laborers to cultivate the remaining part of their land. They have been almost completely dependent on exploitation for a living. In all these respects, they are similar to the previously discussed families of Zhong Tongqi and Liu Fangluo. What makes them different is that the man himself does some supplementary work. It is, however, only supplementary work, and they should still be classified as landlords. You were wrong to designate them as rich peasants. For a rich peasant is one who actually participates in agricultural production; he who merely does a little light supplementary work cannot be called a rich peasant. This type of small landlord, who does a little light supplementary work but relies mainly on exploitation for a living, is by no means rare in China.

8. Chen Zehong (of Yuankeng Township). There are five people in all in the family, one of whom works. They own 61 *Dan* of land and have borrowed 10 *Dan* of land, for which they pay a rent of 3 *Dan* of grain. They cultivate the land themselves, together with a long-term farm laborer. They have two hills of Chinese catalpa, from which the annual yield is 40 *Dan* of catalpa. They have hired one long-term farm laborer each year for ten years. They have also mortgaged out 3.5 *Dan* for three years. They have made a loan of 50 *yuan* for about twenty years. They have rented out one house, for which they have collected an annual rent of 4 *yuan* for thirty-four years. They have administered an ancestral hall from which they have received 18 *Dan* of grain annually for thirty-five years. In the past, he oppressed people in the village. (You have classified him as a middle peasant.)

Chen Zehong has regularly hired a long-term farm laborer, while at the same time practising usury and administering an ancestral temple. For his living expenses, he relies mainly on exploitation. At the same time, he himself actually participates in agricultural production. This is a typical Chinese rich peasant and it is wrong for you to classify him as a middle peasant.

9. Zhong Guofang (of Bodi Township). There are nine people in the family,

of whom three members work. They have 112 *Dan* of land and three hills of Chinese catalpa. They have made loans for a total of 320 *yuan* for more than ten years. They have also rented out two houses for an annual rent of 2 *yuan*. Because the payments have not been made [on the loans], the principle and compound interest have increased to over 700 *yuan*. (You have classified him as a usurer.)

Those who rely solely, or for the most part, on exploitation through usury for their living are called usurers. The policy of the soviets toward the usurers is to confiscate all their property and to eliminate them. Zhong Guofang has 112 *Dan* of land, which he and his family cultivate entirely by themselves and which constitute the principal source of their livelihood. We absolutely cannot, because he also engages in usury, classify him as a usurer and adopt a policy of confiscation toward him. Such an ultra-leftist view, which writes off his own participation in labor, is incorrect. The correct decision is to classify him as a rich peasant. Their land and extra cattle, farm tools, and houses should be confiscated, but they should still be given some relatively poor land for cultivation. Then why shouldn't we treat this Zhong as a well-to-do middle peasant? Because his exploitation by practising usury is as high as 1,000 *yuan*, and such exploitation is constant. A well-to-do middle peasant may also be involved in certain exploitation, but it is not constant and the amount must be small.

10. Liu Qichang (of Bodi Township). There are four people in the family. Liu himself does supplementary work on the land and he is also a pig dealer. He has 36 *Dan* of land and has borrowed 44 *Dan*, for which he pays a rent of 15 *Dan*. They have two hills, which produce 20 *Dan* of Chinese catalpa each year. Liu has hired a long-term farm laborer for eighteen years. He has also mortgaged out 2 *Dan* of land, for one *luo* of grain. He administers one ancestral hall, from which he receives 15 *Dan* of grain every year. (You have classified him as a landlord.)

We have some doubts about the decision that this man is a landlord. Judging from the information in the table, his household has grown grain on 80 *Dan* of land and has cultivated two hills. If Liu has hired only one long-term farm laborer to participate in cultivation, this is insufficient, so probably Liu himself does a substantial amount of work. If he does a substantial amount of work, then he should be classified as a rich peasant. You should not adopt the policy of eliminating him, but should treat him as though he had rich peasant class status. Moreover, although there are some cases in which landlords have borrowed land from others and hired farm workers to cultivate it, there are only a few such landlords and most landlords do not borrow land from others. On the other hand, it is common for rich peasants to borrow land like this man, whose borrowed land accounts for the greater part of his land. Consequently, you should investigate and clarify once again the circumstances regarding his own work, before you can make a correct decision—whether in the end he should be classified as a landlord or a rich peasant. If it is verified that Liu himself only does a small amount of supplementary work, then your present decision is correct.

# *Outline of the Organization and Work of the Poor Peasant League*

(July 15, 1933)

Generally speaking, the poor peasant league has played a great role in the agrarian revolution. It has not only united the broad masses of farm laborers and poor peasants, but has also gathered the middle peasants round itself. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the soviets, it has constituted an enormous revolutionary force in overthrowing the feudal and semifeudal forces in the countryside, taking the land away from the landlord class, and actively promoting production on the land. The poor peasant league has also played a great role in such important work as war mobilization, economic mobilization, and cultural construction. These great revolutionary achievements of the poor peasant league are indeed praiseworthy. In view of the present situation, however, the poor peasant league has not made such great achievements in all the localities. Moreover, even if there have been these achievements, this does not mean that many shortcomings and mistakes in the organization and work of the poor peasant league can be ignored. On the contrary, it is only when we recognize the poor peasant league's past achievements, and at the same time its present shortcomings and mistakes, as well as the fact that its achievements in some places are insufficient, and consequently strive to correct certain shortcomings and mistakes in the organization and work of the poor peasant league, that we can make even greater achievements in the future, and carry out well the role that the poor peasant league should play in the soviet movement.

According to the materials sent from many localities, there are many places where the organization and work of the poor peasant league are imperfect. In some localities it is even the case that the poor peasant league has only an empty name and does no actual work. To summarize these materials, we can distinguish two different situations: (1) In some areas there is no township poor peasant league, but village poor peasant leagues under which there are small groups. In some other places there is no village poor peasant league, but only township poor peasant leagues, under which groups have been set up. In a few localities there are both township and village poor peasant leagues, with small groups under the latter. Within a township poor peasant league or village poor peasant league

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We have translated this text from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 283-89, where it is reproduced from a contemporary text.

there is an executive committee which is divided into three working departments of chairman, organization, and propaganda. The executive committee is responsible for providing guidance to small groups. Meetings are held according to a fixed schedule. In some cases there are general meetings once every ten days and small group meetings once every five days. In other cases there are general meetings once a week and small group meetings once every five days. No matter whether one is a farm laborer, coolie, or poor peasant, he needs a recommendation by three members in order to join the poor peasant league. Otherwise he is not allowed to join. Thus many farm laborers, coolies, and poor peasants are excluded from the poor peasant league and the membership can hardly grow. This in turn reduces the role played by the poor peasant league. (2) A different and even worse situation prevails in some places, where they simply announce that everyone is a member of the poor peasant league except landlords, rich peasants, and middle peasants. Then as soon as a chairman of the poor peasant league has been appointed by a branch of the Chinese Communist Party or by a township soviet, the poor peasant league is considered to have been organized. The chairman of the poor peasant league does not know how many members the league has, nor does he know what work to carry out, and he does not call a meeting for three or four months or even six months to a year, and merely hangs up an empty signboard. In reality, this is the same as having no poor peasant league. It is even more difficult for such a poor peasant league to accomplish its task and play its role in the countryside. Among the poor peasant leagues in the first situation, some have taken over the functions of the government, such as the cases in Longgang Township in Wuyang District of Ruijin, and in Xinzhuang and Bocun townships of Huangbai District. The poor peasant league in the second situation carries out no regular work, but is disorganized and plays no role at all. Both of these two phenomena are no good. But in many places in the soviet areas there are poor peasant leagues which are developing soundly both in their organization and in their work, with large numbers of members and an intense spirit of struggle. They can actively conduct discussions about all kinds of questions of the revolutionary struggle while not interfering with the jurisdiction of the township soviet. They are not only much different from the poor peasant leagues in the second situation (which have only an empty name); they are also more progressive than the poor peasant leagues in the first situation (which have some defects). They are indeed the model poor peasant leagues in the soviet areas, and merit study by the poor peasant league in other places. In order to summarize the past experiences of the struggle, unify the organization, generally regularize the work, and accomplish the important tasks of the poor peasant league at the present stage of the revolution, the Central Government hereby issues this "Outline of the Organization and Work of the Poor Peasant League," on the basis of the experiences of the agrarian struggle and the suggestion made by the meeting of representatives of the poor peasant league in the eight *xian* of Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua,

We hope that the broad masses of poor peasants in the whole countryside will unite as one and take action under this outline.

1. The poor peasant league is not an organization made up purely of a single class, but a mass organization of poor peasants within the jurisdiction of the township soviet. At the same time, workers in the countryside must join the poor peasant league and form a workers' small group to play an active leading role in the league and unite the broad masses of poor peasants under the leadership of the proletariat, turning the league into the most reliable pillar of the political power of the soviets.

2. The poor peasant league performs the functions of supporting the government and carrying out all the decrees of the government, but it should not replace the government in its work. The poor peasant league should express its own opinions and make suggestions to the government on matters concerning the interests and rights of the workers and poor peasants.

3. The poor peasant league should pay particular attention to the interests and rights of the middle peasants, and induce the middle peasants to rally round the poor peasant league, in order to establish a solid alliance between the poor peasant league and the middle peasants. This alliance can become a strong link in uniting the middle peasants with the proletariat, and help in the pursuit of the struggle to eliminate the landlord class and to oppose rich peasants.

4. Only under the leadership of the Communist Party and the soviets can the poor peasant league correctly accomplish all its tasks, and avoid being influenced by the rich peasants or dominated by all sorts of backward peasant consciousness, such as the ideas of absolute egalitarianism and localism. In places where the poor peasant league has not yet been organized, the agricultural workers' union or the activists among poor peasants should take the initiative. The unions of agricultural workers and craftsmen should try to pass motions at their own congresses about having their membership join the poor peasant league in a body, so as to bring about a constant leading role for the proletariat in the poor peasant league.

5. When the poor peasant league is initially organized, it should only recruit the activists among the poor peasants and then gradually become a mass organization of all the poor peasants. In order to attract all the poor peasant masses to join the poor peasant league (of course, those bad elements who sabotage the agrarian struggle and shield landlords and rich peasants are not allowed to join the poor peasant league even if they are poor peasants), old members of the poor peasant league should often take the responsibility of doing propaganda work in order to expand the membership of the league. They should actively look for poor peasants and agricultural workers to join the poor peasant league. The league should not require any formalities of recommendation, but open its doors wide to all the workers and poor peasants. It should inform them and guide them in joining the poor peasant league. In principle, joining the poor peasant league should be voluntary, and all the workers and peasants, men and women, old and

young, can apply to join. The method of assigning memberships to each household is wrong. In order that landlords and rich peasants may be strictly prevented from sneaking into the poor peasant league, the class status of all new members, whether they have been recruited by the old members or joined the poor peasant league voluntarily, should be investigated, according to the criteria for analyzing classes. If someone is found who does not have the right class status, he should be immediately expelled, so as to make sure that landlords and rich peasants cannot sneak into the poor peasant league.

6. During the land struggle or the Land Investigation Movement, if a poor peasant league, because it is disorganized and useless, or has fallen into the hands of a few landlords and rich peasants and plays an adverse role, is dissolved and reorganized, using commandist methods, this is cutting oneself off from the masses, and is completely wrong. The correct method in such circumstances is to unite the activists in the poor peasant league and strengthen their education, and then to launch a fierce struggle within the league to expose the deceptive schemes of the landlords and rich peasants, to help the masses of members get rid of the influence of landlord and rich peasant elements, and to eliminate from the poor peasant league landlord and rich peasant elements and a few extremely bad elements who are beyond education, so as to enhance the combat strength of the poor peasant league and to achieve a complete victory in the agrarian struggle and the Land Investigation Movement. If there are middle peasants who have joined the poor peasant league, they should not simply be expelled like landlords and rich peasants. There must be a clear explanation to them of why it is unnecessary for them to join the poor peasant league. After they leave the league, middle peasants can still come to listen when the poor peasant league is having a meeting. All the middle peasants should be welcome to listen at the meetings of the poor peasant league.

7. Since the poor peasant league is not purely an organization of a single class, it does not need a tight organizational form like that of a labor union. It does not need definite regulations, nor does it require payment of dues. (If money is needed for expenses, a donation may be launched among the members with the approval of the general meeting.) Still less does it need a systematic organization at the provincial, *xian*, and district levels; it simply organizes the poor peasants with the township as a unit. Below the level of the township poor peasant league, it is divided into small groups. These may be organized with a hamlet (that is, a small village) as the unit. The members of the poor peasant league in one hamlet are organized into one small group. If one hamlet has only a few families and therefore only a few members, then a small group may be organized around two or three neighboring hamlets. If a hamlet has several dozen or more families and therefore many members, then several small groups may be organized within one hamlet.

8. For the sake of convenience in advancing the work of the poor peasant league, three people (the most active elements) should be elected by the general

meeting to form a committee. A poor peasant league in a relatively large township, or one with many members, may elect five people to form a committee. The committee selects a chairman to take charge of the overall work. Apart from that, no separate working departments should be established. The poor peasant league should practice revolutionary democracy on a broad scale. All the members must be summoned to meetings to discuss important matters that arise. Only routine matters can be discussed solely by the committee. Or the committee may summon the leaders of the small groups to participate in the discussion.

9. The general meeting of the poor peasant league and the meetings of the committee and the small groups need not follow a fixed schedule mechanically, in order to avoid formalism, which would reduce the interest of the masses of the members. Whenever important matters arise, a meeting should be held immediately. When the class struggle in the countryside is particularly intense, as at the time of land reform and of the Land Investigation Movement, a general meeting should be held once every three, four, five, or six days, and committee and small group meetings should be held once every two or three days.

10. The work of the poor peasant league consists in paying constant attention to the interests of workers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, and in the struggle for consolidating and promoting the political power of the soviets. The important work of the poor peasant league is listed below:

- a. Holding discussions on the matters concerning the confiscation and redistribution of land, houses, farm tools, and property of the despotic gentry and landlords, and the confiscation and distribution of land and surplus cattle, farm tools, and houses of rich peasants. In discussing these matters, the central question is how to deal with the resistance from landlords and rich peasants, and how to ensure that the benefits of the agrarian revolution go entirely to the workers and the poor and middle peasants. Here special attention should be paid to not violating the interests of middle peasants and uniting closely with the middle peasants. Attention must also be paid to wiping out thoroughly the feudal forces in the countryside and preventing landlords and rich peasants from passing themselves off as poor and middle peasants in order to steal land benefits. We must see to it that not one landlord is left with a single inch of land and not one rich peasant steals a single plot of good land.

- b. Holding discussions on agricultural production, such as how to carry out the campaigns for spring and summer plowing and for autumn harvesting and plowing, as well as on the problems that arise in the course of production campaigns in various seasons, including how to increase labor power, accumulate more manure, improve seeding, build irrigation works, redistribute farm cattle, add more farm tools, eliminate insect pests, open up wasteland, and plant trees and protect mountain forests.

- c. Holding discussions on problems of economic mobilization. In addition to the aforementioned matters of agricultural production, the main thing is to



discuss how to develop cooperatives, such as food cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, credit cooperatives, production cooperatives, and cooperatives for draft oxen, and how to help the national economy develop on a large scale, so as to resist the cruel exploitation by the merchants and smash the economic blockade by the enemy, while further improving the well-being of the masses and providing the revolutionary war with abundant strength.

d. Holding discussions on problems of famine and disaster relief, such as providing mutual help in food, cattle, and farm tools during famine and natural disasters and providing relief to the victims in the areas harassed and wrecked by the enemy troops.

e. Holding discussions on questions concerning the health of the masses, such as initiating general campaigns of paying attention to hygiene, emphasizing frequent cleaning and sweeping, and reducing the incidence of sickness and disease, so as to protect the health of the masses.

f. Holding discussions on the problem of giving favorable treatment to the Red Army, such as cultivating and harvesting on the public land of the Red Army and storage of grain; helping the families of the Red Army to cultivate their land; and carrying out the regulations for providing favorable treatment to the Red Army.

g. Holding discussions on problems of mobilization for war. Here the first thing to do is to expand the Red Army, the second thing is to raise funds for supporting the Red Army, the third thing is to send greetings and regards to the Red Army, and the fourth thing is to expand the Red Guards and Young Pioneers. All these are extremely important questions regarding mobilization for war.

h. Holding discussions on questions regarding participation in the election campaigns of the soviets and in the accusation movement,<sup>1</sup> such as how to make sure that the activists among the workers and poor peasants will be chosen in elections and the best middle peasants will be attracted to work in the soviet. When class-alien elements have sneaked into the soviet, or when there is corruption and slackness in the work, the poor peasant league should participate in the accusation movement called for by the Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate and in launching self-criticism among the working personnel in the soviet, so as to perfect the work of the soviet.

i. Holding discussions on the problem of carrying out fully all the laws, regulations, resolutions, and orders issued by the soviets in the township in question.

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1. Regarding the accusation movement, see below the relevant note to the directive of August 9, 1933.

j. Holding discussions on all important problems that arise at any moment. The poor peasant league must constantly pay attention to the discussion of the aforementioned problems and actively make suggestions to the government. Under the leadership of the government, they should resolutely participate in the struggles on all the revolutionary fronts and fully accomplish various revolutionary tasks. Only thus can the poor peasant league continue to have its own regular work, truly work for the interests of the workers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, and not become an organization in name only.

11. In order to consolidate further the leadership of the rural proletariat over the broad masses of peasants, the committee of the poor peasant league (a few selected poor peasant activists may also be invited to participate) may propose a joint meeting with the leading organs of the agricultural workers' union and the handicraft workers' union. Such meetings are to be summoned by the labor unions. Joint meetings may be held to discuss such matters as organizing a committee to support the Red Army, forming an alliance to oppose imperialism and support the Soviet Union, organizing revolutionary mutual aid associations, as well as certain commemorative meetings and demonstrations. Once unanimous agreement is reached, joint efforts should be undertaken to realize these goals.

Chairman of the Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

## *A New Situation and New Tasks*

(July 29, 1933)

Relying on the correct offensive line of the Party and on the active leadership of the soviets, relying on the heroic struggle of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and on the warm support of the masses, relying on the daily struggles by the worker and peasant masses in the White areas and on the unprecedentedly vigorous development of the mass movement against imperialism and the Guomindang, we have basically broken up the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" after the campaigns at Dongpi and Huangpi.<sup>1</sup> During the Dongpi and Huangpi campaigns, the brave Red Army achieved an unprecedentedly glorious and great victory and delivered a fatal blow to the strongest pillar of the landlords and the bourgeoisie—Chiang Kaishek, the chief of the Guomindang warlords. In his tearful and distraught handwritten instruction, Chiang Kaishek sadly admitted that this corresponded to the "secret anguish that had haunted them all their lives" (Chiang Kaishek's letter to Chen Cheng). This is an unprecedentedly disastrous defeat and collapse of their troops, so now that they have suffered this grave defeat, the Guomindang troops have finally become powerless, although they have since made several attempts to launch counterattacks.

The reasons why the Guomindang warlords suffered this disastrous defeat and are incapable of launching counterattacks are as follows: First, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is becoming increasingly staunch and strong and brave and skillful in battle. In the course of the great victory of the Huangpi and Dongpi campaigns, the Red Army also gained many replacements and further strengthened itself. The Soviet Area has been greatly consolidated and expanded. The morale of most of the Guomindang soldiers is fundamentally shaken and they are unwilling to attack the Red Army. Even many of the counterrevolutionary officers of the Guomindang are scared out of their wits. When

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This article first appeared in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 97, July 29, 1933, where it carries the signature of Mao Zedong, and we have dated it accordingly. We have translated the article from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 299–301, which reproduces this version.

1. The reference is to the battles at Huangpi in February 1933 and at Dongpi in March 1933. The opening phrase regarding the Party's correct line must be seen either as ironic, or as a reflection of Mao's weakened position in the summer of 1933. In fact, the Red Army, at that time still under the control of Mao's ally Zhu De, supported to some extent by Zhou Enlai, had achieved the victories at Huangpi and Dongpi in large measure by going against the so-called "Forward and Offensive Line" of the Moscow-imposed leadership, though there is some dispute about this point. See the Introduction to this volume.

they speak of the Red Army, it is a matter of "changing color when talking about the tiger." Therefore, although Chiang Kaishek has several times sought to launch counterattacks, in the end he has been powerless to do so. Second, China's national crisis continues to deepen and intensify. At a time when the Japanese imperialists are occupying Rehe and the area east of the Luan [River]<sup>2</sup> and pressing on toward Beiping and Tianjin, and the Guomindang is continuing its shameless capitulation, the anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang tide of revolution by the toiling popular masses of all China has risen to its highest point. This has forced the Guomindang on the one hand to sign a treaty of capitulation with Japanese imperialism, finally selling out North China, Beiping, and Tianjin, and on the other hand to enforce rigorously an unprecedented White terror in order to suppress the revolutionary masses, who are roaring with anger and opposing imperialism and the Guomindang. Third, because of the overall collapse of the national economy, thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants all over the country have sunk into an unprecedented great calamity. Their living standard is declining from that of animals and slaves right down to starvation level. Suffering death, destitution, and homelessness, they are sunk in a sea of misery. As a result, strikes by the workers all over the country and peasant uprisings have burst out on a great scale. Their struggles have developed from that for improvement of daily life to anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang political struggles. These revolutionary struggles have tied up our enemies to a very great extent, causing them to fall into a state of fear and panic. Meanwhile, because of the decline in customs revenue and the fact that the worker and peasant masses in the broad soviet areas throughout the country have been removed from the scope of their exploitation, the Guomindang is becoming financially bankrupt!

Facing this serious defeat, and in a situation where there is no way out, the only "strategem" of the Guomindang warlords is to capitulate to the imperialists even more despicably and shamelessly, and to seek large amounts of loans and arms from the international imperialists in order to organize a Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Soviet Area and the Red Army. The signing of the North China Truce Agreement and the visits by Song Ziwen<sup>3</sup> to Europe

2. The Luan River, mentioned above in a note to the circular telegram of July 1933 opposing the Dalian Conference, corresponds roughly to the western boundary of the buffer zone established by the Tanggu Truce. Thus "east of the Luan" refers to the area between the river and the Great Wall. In this particular instance, the original text in *Hongse Zhonghua* has the character "Luo" instead of "Luan," which it closely resembles. This is clearly a printer's error, for in similar references below, the character "Luan" once more appears.

3. Song Ziwen (1894-1972), better known as T. V. Soong, was born in Shanghai into the well-known Soong family; two of his sisters married Chiang Kaishek and Sun Yatsen. T. V. Soong specialized in economic affairs, and served for many years in Chiang Kaishek's government as finance minister and in other finance-related posts. Soong spent most of the spring and summer of 1933 in London, Geneva and the U.S., attending conferences, obtaining loans for China, and trying to encourage foreign support for China against Japan.

and America are means for carrying out their sinister scheme. Now a new deal has been made between the Guomindang and the imperialists in which the Guomindang has presented more than 4,000,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory and many other unannounced gifts to the imperialists in exchange for millions in loans and large amounts of arms. Taking advantage of these loans and supplies of arms, and acting as commanded and organized by the various imperialists, the Guomindang is now assembling its troops in North China and many newly recruited soldiers are being trained to produce and use gas shells! They are concentrating all their forces to organize a Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and madly launch a desperate attack which is doomed to fail against the Red Army in the Soviet Area.

We are, therefore, facing a new revolutionary situation. Our task in the face of this situation is to mobilize and concentrate all our forces to smash the imperialist Guomindang's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." This is a great historical turning point. The two régimes—the soviet régime of the workers and peasants and the Guomindang régime of the landlords and the bourgeoisie—will come to see, in an imminent war on an even larger scale, only one future: the ever more victorious development of our soviet régime and the increasing doom and collapse of the Guomindang régime.

In order to achieve a great victory, leading to the complete smashing of the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," we must first of all increase our own strength, concentrate all our forces, increase our confidence in victory, and contribute everything we have to the war! Here we must first ensure that the number of Red Army soldiers will continue to grow. During the three months of August, September, and October of this year, we must first see to it that the Red Army is expanded by fifty thousand. At the same time, the political education and military techniques of the Red soldiers must be greatly enhanced, and the organizations of Red Guards and Young Pioneers must be expanded and strengthened. Secondly, adequate provisions for the Red Army and the supply of daily necessities for the masses must be guaranteed. Here our main fighting tasks at the moment are as follows: Carry out a broad Land Investigation Movement to deepen class struggle in the countryside and in the cities, and consolidate soviet political power resolutely; develop the national economy in a planned way, set up mass cooperatives everywhere, issue economic construction bonds, coordinate the supply of grain and expand external trade, break up the economic blockade by the enemy, and create the material conditions for the revolutionary war.

Finally, in order to carry out urgent war mobilization smoothly and to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" by the enemy completely, we must oppose all tendencies to underestimate the current new revolutionary situation, and we must oppose all the psychological war weariness. We must particularly oppose those opportunists who are panic-stricken and who favor retreat and flight in face of the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" by the enemy. But

at the same time, we must also oppose those leftists who indulge in empty talk and have a fatalistic belief in victory. These right and left opportunists are the most ferocious enemies of our war mobilization, for they are actually helping our class enemy.

Worker and peasant masses throughout the soviet areas and Red fighters! Comrades! At present, we stand before a new revolutionary situation. We must be prepared to make every sacrifice and take on a great historical mission! Comrades! The Fifth Campaign, even crueler and fiercer, lies ahead of us. When we completely smash this Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," initial victory of the revolution in Jiangxi and several neighboring provinces will be just ahead!

# *Proclamation of the Provisional Central Government on the Convening of the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies*

(August 1, 1933)

Workers, peasants, and Red fighters in all the soviet areas throughout the country:

Workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers in the White areas throughout the country:

From the First National Congress of Soviet Deputies down to the present, it has already been a full two years. These two years have been two years of imperialism's wildly intensified attacks on the Soviet Union and on the Chinese revolution. They have been two years of the most cruel massacres and blockades by imperialism and the Guomindang against the soviet areas, two years of shameless Guomindang surrender and selling out of China to the Japanese and to all the imperialists. Yet they have also been two years of great and glorious victories obtained through the bitter struggle of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army under the correct leadership of the Soviet Central Government. In these two years of struggle, we have enlarged and consolidated soviet political power, and we have obtained infinitely rich and precious experience. In order to bring together our leadership of the soviet movement throughout all of China, in order to take another step forward in the development and consolidation of soviet political power, and in order to sum up these two years of soviet experience, the Soviet Central Government has specifically decided to convene the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies at the Red capital in Ruijin, on the sixth anniversary of the Guangzhou Uprising (December 11, 1933).

During the past two years, the crisis of the Chinese nation has become more and more profound. The intensified imperialist aggression and the increased selling out of the country by the Guomindang have resulted in several million

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This proclamation was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 101, August 13, 1933. We have followed this version rather than the reprint in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 303-6, because a few characters are missing from the latter version.

square miles of sovereign territory and several tens of millions of people of the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, and the Beiping-Tianjin area falling totally beneath the iron heel of Japanese imperialism. That China has been partitioned in this way by imperialism today is the result of the consistent surrender and sell-out by the Guomindang, which has recently intensified. The cruel fate of the complete colonization of China has enveloped the whole of the Chinese people.

During the past two years, the general collapse of the Chinese national economy has become even more profound. The bankruptcy of a large part of the national industry, the final collapse of the agricultural economy, and the widespread disasters of flood and drought throughout China have already forced the great majority of the workers and peasants onto the road of joblessness, starvation, and death. But the exploitation of the Guomindang warlords is constantly increasing. In Sichuan, the Guomindang warlords have already collected advance grain tax payments down to the year 1971, and there are more than 1,700 fees and miscellaneous taxes. Throughout the nation, landlords and despotic gentry are exploiting the peasants even more cruelly, capitalists are intensifying their attacks on the workers, and the clashes and chaotic wars of the Guomindang warlords are further accelerating the collapse of the Chinese economy. The sufferings of the workers and peasants of the whole country have truly reached an indescribable level!

Dear Comrades! The Chinese workers and peasants cannot and will not endure this any longer. Today the flames of revolution are burning fiercely throughout the whole country, spreading the heroic struggle against the imperialist Guomindang—from demonstrations, strikes, and uprisings to guerrilla warfare and large-scale revolutionary war. And in the last two years, the great victories of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Soviets and Red Army, the enormous growth of the soviet areas, and the vigorous expansion of the heroic Red Army from several tens of thousands to several hundreds of thousands are more than ever the most powerful levers for developing the revolutionary situation in China.

Two roads now lie before the popular masses of all China: the colonialist road of the imperialist Guomindang and the soviet road! Under the rule of the imperialist Guomindang, China can only be turned entirely into a colony of imperialism. Under the political power of the soviets, the forces of imperialism have already been completely overthrown. The Central Soviet Government, representing the revolutionary masses of all China, has already formally declared war on Japan. In addition, on the one hand, it is leading the heroic Red Army in vigorously expanding the national revolutionary war to overthrow the Guomindang warlords who are preventing the Red Army from going north to resist Japan. On the other hand, it has already called repeatedly on the White armed forces throughout the country to stop attacking the soviet areas and to conclude an agreement with the Red Army to fight together against Japan. Under the rule of the imperialist Guomindang, the worker and peasant masses and the



soldiers are being cruelly exploited and oppressed by the despotic gentry, the landlords, the capitalist class, and the Guomindang warlords, to the point of bankruptcy and joblessness, sinking into starvation and death. But under the political power of the soviets, the feudal and semifeudal exploitation of the despotic gentry and landlords has already been totally eliminated. The toiling peasants and Red fighters have all received shares of land, the working class has received the protection of the Labor Law, the economic reconstruction of the soviets is in the process of developing vigorously, and the life of the worker and peasant masses has been greatly improved. Under the rule of the imperialist Guomindang, the actions of the worker and peasant masses are met with arrest, imprisonment, and massacre. All freedoms of speech, assembly, and belief, especially the freedom to resist Japan and oppose imperialism, have been taken away. The organs of political power are totally in the hands of the landlord and capitalist minority. But under soviet political power, workers and peasants have obtained their own complete political freedom and have taken away the political power of the exploiting classes (the capitalists, landlords, and rich peasants). For the first time in Chinese history, the workers and peasants are in control of their own state, the workers and peasants have become the ruling class, and the working class is the leading force. All of this makes plain once again that the only road that can save China is the soviet road, and that the victory of the Soviet Revolution is the victory of the popular masses of the whole country over imperialism and China's landlords and bourgeoisie. It is precisely for this reason that the Guomindang and all the counterrevolutionary political cliques, directly commanded and organized by the imperialists, have mobilized all their forces in a hopeless attack against the soviet areas and against the Red Army. Even though the enemy's first, second, third, and fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns have already been totally smashed by the iron fist of the heroic Red Army, the imperialist Guomindang, in one last struggle, is now actively preparing an even more brutal large-scale Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," in an attempt to wipe out the soviets and the Red Army completely. This "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang is a necessary and important step in the fight of the imperialist Guomindang to put China on the colonial road. The popular masses of all China should, for their part, concentrate all their forces to smash this "Encirclement and Suppression" and fight for the victory of Soviet China.

The Chinese Central Soviet Government calls upon the workers, peasants, toiling masses, and revolutionary soldiers of the whole country to rise up and oppose imperialist aggression and the Guomindang sell-out of the country, to oppose the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang against the Soviet Red Army, to smash this "Encirclement and Suppression," to overthrow the rule of the landlord and bourgeois Guomindang, to support the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies, to elect deputies and send them to the National Soviet Congress, and to fight for the soviet way out for China.

Relying on the activism of the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses of all China, relying on our ever-victorious heroic Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and upon the resolute Chinese proletariat and the correct leadership of its vanguard, the Communist Party, victory will certainly be ours!

Popular masses of all China, rise up eagerly and fight for a New Soviet China!

Long live the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies!

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

# *Telegram of the Central Government Congratulating the Eastern Red Army<sup>1</sup> on Its Great Victory*

(August 8, 1933)

To the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the army fighting in the East, and to be transmitted to all the comrade commanders:

On the eastern front, you gallant heroes have utterly routed the enemy's tenacious Nineteenth Route Army. This victory, demonstrating that our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has already become even more powerful and even more invincible, poses an extremely great threat to the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang and is an initial victory in smashing the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." We were extremely delighted to hear this news. In this present period of historical change that will decide the victory and defeat of revolution and counterrevolution, the Central Soviet Government is already organizing and leading the Red Army and the millions of workers, peasants, and toiling masses nationwide to break through the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" in the struggle to achieve a Soviet China. We are confident that you gallant heroes, in the context of this overall task, will certainly rouse yourselves with even greater courage to move forward and eliminate even more of the enemy, and achieve even greater and more glorious victories.

Chairman of the Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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This telegram was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 101, August 13, 1933. We have taken this version as our source because in it, several characters which are missing from the text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, p. 307, can be deciphered.

1. The Eastern Army (*Dongfang jun*) was one of two subgroups (the other being the Central Army [*Zhongyang jun*]) formed when the Red Army was temporarily split during the summer of 1933. The Eastern Army was made up of the Third Army Group and the Nineteenth Division, with Peng Dehuai as its commander and Teng Daiyuan as its political commissar. In early July 1933, it was ordered to attack eastward from the Central Base Area into Fujian, with the aims of expanding Communist-controlled territory and distracting Guomindang forces from preparations for their impending encirclement campaign.

# *Instructions on the Current Election Movement*

## *Directive No. 22 of the Central Executive Committee*

(August 9, 1933)

The Central Executive Committee has decided to convene the Second National Congress of Soviet Deputies on December 11 of this year (the day for commemorating the Guangzhou uprising), and to complete the elections to township and city soviets and to Congresses of Soviet Deputies at the district, *xian*, and provincial levels in the Central Soviet Area between September and November. The elections this time will completely reelect everyone from the township and city soviets to the Central Executive Committee. This is a great undertaking and a great movement in which the workers, peasants, and toiling masses themselves participate in and consolidate the régime. On the one hand, this election movement is being carried out at a time when the revolutionary war against the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" has achieved complete victory, and the Red Army and the workers, peasants, and toiling masses of the Central Soviet Area and the various soviet areas, under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Government, have achieved great successes in eliminating the enemy forces, expanding the Red Army and local armed forces, deepening the Land Investigation Movement, putting the labor law into effect, promoting economic construction and cultural construction, and enlarging the soviet territories. In the White areas, in the course of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Rehe, and North China, Japan's expansion of its gangster war, and the Guomindang's complete surrender to imperialism by signing the agreement for selling out the country, the revolutionary tide of opposition to the imperialist Guomindang by the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers has reached an even higher stage. But on the other hand, the Guomindang, after the severe defeat of its Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," has been even more barefacedly capitulating to the imperialists and selling out China. They have signed secret treaties with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and other imperialist countries, and borrowed large sums of money to buy large quantities of munitions for their Fifth Encirclement and Attack on the soviet

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 129-38, where it is reproduced from a contemporary pamphlet.

areas. With the utmost resolve, the Central Government is leading the broad masses and the Red Army to seek new and greater victories in smashing the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." It is under such circumstances that our various soviet areas are conducting general elections this time. Consequently, the current elections are entrusted with a great historical task. We must link these elections closely to the present main political tasks; we must, in the course of the elections, perfect the organization and the work at all levels of the soviets. At the Second National Soviet Congress, we must sum up the experience of the struggle during the past two years and discuss new tactics; we must strengthen the leadership of the Chinese revolution by the soviets, smash the new enemy offensive, and achieve the initial victory of the revolution in Jiangxi and neighboring provinces. To realize these goals, we must, through widespread work of propaganda and agitation, create a tide of enthusiasm among the broad masses for the election movement and make every worker and peasant understand the great significance of these elections. We must secure the participation of the majority of voters. At the same time, if we wish to achieve complete success in the current elections, we must carefully review the experiences of past elections, assimilating the successes of past elections, and avoiding the shortcomings and mistakes of past elections. Only thus can we make these elections the most successful ever.

### **I. Summary of the Experiences of Past Elections**

It must be pointed out first of all that soviet elections before the First National Soviet Congress were very different from those after the First National Soviet Congress. The most obvious point about the elections before the First National Soviet Congress is that there was no explicit election law. There was no clear distinction between those residents who had the right to vote and those who did not. In terms of methods, elections were often carried out in the form of mass rallies. The majority of the masses did not fully understand that elections were a key link in managing their own lives, so the majority of voters were not persuaded to come and participate in the election. After the First National Soviet Congress, the situations in the two elections were markedly different from that of the past, because of the leadership of the Central Government and the further development of the class struggle. The detailed rules and regulations regarding elections had been established, and voters and nonvoters were beginning to be strictly distinguished. The form of voters' assemblies began to be used to carry out elections under the leadership of election commissions. The voters' understanding of the significance of elections was enhanced, and as a result, the number of those who voted increased. In the second election after the first National Soviet Congress, the number of people who participated increased further as compared to the first election, and in some places (Xingguo and northeast Jiangxi), over 90 percent of the electorate voted. At the electoral assemblies in

many localities (especially in the second election), heated criticism of the lists of candidates by the voters was unleashed. Many proposals by the voters on issues concerning their actual lives were collected. On this basis, the composition of the soviets underwent great changes as compared to the situation that had existed before. If there were quite a few class-alien elements and opportunists who had sneaked into the soviets in the past, after the two elections since the First National Soviet Congress these elements have in large part been eliminated. On the contrary, many progressive elements of workers and peasants have been elected to the soviets, laying a strong and solid foundation for the great soviet edifice. It is particularly worthy of note here that the augmentation and strengthening of the worker component has made of the workers the proletarian backbone of the soviets. A system of regular representative conferences at the township and city soviet levels has been established. All these undeniable achievements demonstrate that great progress has been made in elections since the First National Soviet Congress.

Nevertheless, the two elections since the First National Soviet Congress have not been without shortcomings and mistakes. Only if we can evaluate the successes correctly, and understand the mistakes clearly, can we carry out the current elections more smoothly, so it will be even more apparent how distinctive they are and what an improvement they represent in comparison with the two previous elections. The main shortcomings and mistakes of the two previous elections were as follows: (1) The masses were not fully mobilized. The key reason for this was that the chairmen and presidiums of many local governments did not have a thorough understanding of the vital significance of elections, so they failed to discuss the issue of how to lead the elections or to emphasize the importance of the work of propaganda and agitation regarding elections. As a result, the numbers of people who voted in many areas, except in some localities, were even short of a majority. (2) During the elections, many places were unable to unleash lively criticism and struggle, or to incite the masses to discuss proposals, as was the case in the second election in Xingguo. In a few localities, the reelections were entirely peaceful. In form, a few deputies and responsible persons were replaced, but in substance, there was no great change as compared to the past. (3) In most places, the struggles of the Land Investigation Movement and checking on the Labor Law were not closely linked to the election movement. They did not know that the Land Investigation Movement, the accusation movement launched by the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate,<sup>1</sup> and the investigation regarding the application of the Labor Law carried out by the Commissariat for Labor should be under way prior to the elections. As a

1. The "accusation movement" (*jianju yundong*) was carried out in the Central Base Area from 1932 to 1934. It aimed on the one hand to denounce and rectify bureaucratic abuses by employees of the Soviet Government, and on the other hand to identify, accuse, and root out counterrevolutionary and class-alien elements who had infiltrated the revolutionary ranks. The explanation which follows stresses rather the second of these two dimensions.

result it was, on the one hand, impossible to launch class struggle in a big way in the countryside and the cities, thereby arousing the enthusiasm of workers and peasants for voting and supervising the elections, and causing countless resolute activists to spring out and contribute to the elections. On the other hand, some passive and reluctant elements, corrupt elements, and even class-alien elements who had slipped through previous investigations could still manage to sneak into the soviet régime through elections. (4) Many places did not work hard enough to attract worker activists and get them elected. Although the quantity and quality of workers elected improved to a certain degree, they have yet to reach the desired level. (5) Many places gave very inadequate attention to electing women workers and peasant women to work in the soviets. Consequently, apart from the achievements in places such as Xingguo, in many localities the number of working women elected to township soviets remained small, and some township soviets still do not have even one woman deputy. In the governments above the district level, there were, generally speaking, even fewer women elected as committee members. (6) Mistakes in election methods: First, the unit in which the election meeting was held was too big. Most places held meetings with a township as a unit, so it was not easy for voters to come to the meetings. Workers and peasants went to the same meetings, so it was hard for the workers to elect those they wanted. Second, the list of candidates was put forward for discussion and vote as a whole. As the candidates were not proposed, discussed, and voted on one by one, the genuine feelings of the voters could not be expressed fully and bad elements could easily be elected through deception. This mistake occurred in many places. Third, the election commissions in many places played no role, and only the soviet chairmen and a few others still led the elections. Fourth, a few places simply violated the election decrees by not holding election meetings and having township deputies appointed by the responsible persons of district and township governments. This method is absolutely wrong. All these past experiences, whether they were successes or shortcomings and mistakes, are lessons for our current elections. The purpose of summarizing past experiences is to learn from the successes of the past and absolutely to prevent the reoccurrence of the past shortcomings and mistakes in the current elections.

## II. Guiding Principles for the Current Elections

The Soviet Government is a government of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. This is the basic principle of the revolutionary political régime at the present stage. This principle is manifested first of all in the soviet elections: On the one hand, all exploiting elements are deprived of the right to vote. On the other hand, as many workers, peasants, and poor people as possible should be drawn into active participation in the elections. Under the guidance of this principle, the Central Executive Committee, apart from promulgating a new electoral law, hereby issues the following special instructions concerning the current elections, taking account of past experience:

A. The Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar for the Land are instructed to concentrate their efforts during this period on guiding various levels of the government to step up work on the Land Investigation Movement. The landlord and rich peasant elements in various areas who pretended to be middle peasants and poor peasants and stole the right to vote should be cleaned out completely, so that this time the right to vote rests entirely on the shoulders of the workers and peasants. In the land investigation struggle, the activism of the peasant masses should be aroused, and large numbers of mass cadres should be trained and assigned to the elections. The People's Commissariat for Labor should seize this occasion to guide the labor departments at various levels to focus their efforts on investigating the application of the labor law. Develop the workers' struggle against the capitalists, protect the daily interests of the workers, and encourage the workers to participate actively in the elections and play leading roles in the election movement. The worker-peasant procuratorate should seize this opportunity to promote the accusation movement among soviet staff members. It should launch the ideological struggle systematically and rapidly, using the weapon of self-criticism to combat manifestations of embezzlement and corruption, opposing various forms of passive resistance against the Land Investigation Movement and the movement for checking on the application of the Labor Law, and rejecting the bureaucratic style of work in elections. It is especially imperative to expel class-alien elements (those with bad family origins and poor work performance) hidden within the soviet, so that they cannot play an adverse leading role in the election work.

B. The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Education should focus their attention on guiding the departments of internal affairs and education at all levels to carry out propaganda and agitation work for this election immediately. Not only should electoral propaganda teams be organized, but clubs, literacy classes, night schools, elementary schools, Lenin rooms, and wall posters of all sorts in rural and urban areas should be mobilized to work for the current elections. As regards the materials and methods of propaganda, the People's Commissariat for Education and the departments of education at the provincial and *xian* levels are instructed to ensure ample supplies. At the same time, the official government newspaper, *Hongse zhonghua* (Red China), is instructed to report systematically on the current election movement, and should be turned into a powerful propagandist and organizer in the current election movement.<sup>2</sup>

C. Concerning the actual carrying out of election work, special attention must be paid to the following points, which must all be put into practice.

2. As will be seen from the source notes to many of the texts for the summer of 1933, *Hongse Zhonghua* was already playing this role. Apart from the texts signed by Mao, which are translated in this volume, the newspaper contained a large number of news reports and contributions by other Party leaders.



1. Concerning the elections of township and city soviets:

Township and city soviets are the basic organizations of the Soviet Government, so the elections of township and city soviets are the basic elections.

Regarding these elections, particularly important points are the following:

a. As laid down in the "Provisional Soviet Election Law," representatives from district and city soviets and the various mass organizations at district and city levels shall organize "election commissions," with responsibility for the leadership of all election work. The election commissions must work effectively and should not be permitted to become nominal organizations like the ones that existed in many places in the past.

b. The main method of mobilization in the election movement is to hold joint meetings of various mass organizations and meetings of individual mass organizations at the district and township levels to discuss the content of the election law and the arrangements for the elections. Here, it is most important to mobilize the labor union, the poor peasants' league, and the conferences of women workers' and peasants' deputies.<sup>3</sup>

c. The election commission should make full advance preparations before putting forward a list of candidates. Before the election, the opinions of all the mass organizations concerning the list of candidates should be gathered, and the election commission should make the list public, to enable voters to give full consideration to the various candidates. At the time of the election, the candidates should be put forward, discussed, and voted on one by one according to the name list. The voters should be able to express their opinions in the fullest way and give full play to the revolutionary democratic spirit. It is absolutely forbidden to order the adoption of the list of candidates arbitrarily. If some voters express objections to certain candidates, the opinions of the masses should be noted at once, and if a majority of the voters object, the original proposal should be withdrawn immediately and other appropriate candidates should be suggested, or the masses may suggest candidates themselves.

d. The ratio between worker and peasant deputies in township and city soviets is already specified in the Election Law. It should be pointed out here that the component of working women deputies should be at least 25 percent of all those elected. In areas whose township and city soviets had no women deputies at all in the past, this point deserves special attention.

e. In compiling the lists of candidates in the elections of township and city soviets, not only should care be taken not to allow a single class-alien element (a person who has both poor family origins and poor work performance) to slip in, but attention should also be given to the political perfor-

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3. Regarding the conferences of women workers' and peasants' deputies, see the relevant note to the text of April 10, 1934.

mance and work competence of every candidate. All those elements who are not enthusiastic about their work; who are conciliatory toward landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists; who have shown signs of corruption in the past; whose work style is heavily impregnated with bureaucratism—all those who manifest such errors may not be elected. (The criterion is recent behavior; those who have committed these mistakes in the past but have changed recently may still be elected.) Although political behavior is the main criterion, considerable attention should also be paid to the aspect of competence in work. In the past some places took note only of class status and ignored competence, but it is also incorrect to introduce those with excessively weak abilities into the government.

f. Before convening election meetings, the draft resolutions proposed by the voters should be properly prepared and widely announced, so that the voters may prepare their opinions fully after reading the draft resolutions. When the draft resolutions have been revised and adopted by the masses of the voters at the election meetings and become formal resolutions, the content of these resolutions should adequately reflect the opinions of the masses in that locality about their own lives, the orders and policies of the government, and the revolutionary war.

g. After all the deputies at the township and city soviet levels have been selected, the old township and city soviets are responsible for convening the first plenary sessions of the deputies to the new congresses of township and city soviets, and for the election of the presidiums and the heads of the various sections of the city soviets and the chairmen and vice-chairmen of township soviets. At the same time, the meetings of township soviets shall elect deputies to attend the congresses of deputies of the district soviets, and city soviets shall elect deputies to attend the congresses of deputies of *xian* soviets. (The city soviets that come under a district should still elect deputies to participate in the congresses of the district soviets.)

2. Concerning the election and the work of congresses of soviet deputies at the district, *xian*, and provincial levels:

a. The congresses of soviet deputies at the three levels of district, *xian*, and province shall be convened by the executive committees at these three levels. Before the congresses meet, the soviets at all levels should prepare their work reports and put them forward for adoption at meetings of the presidium at the relevant level, so that the reports may be submitted to the congresses of deputies. The items on the agendas of the congresses should be made public half a month before the congresses, so that the deputies can prepare their opinions well in advance. The agenda of a congress ought to include issues such as the following: (i) the work report of the government at the next higher level; (ii) the work report of the government at its own level; (iii) the work of war mobilization; (iv) the work of economic construction; (v) a sum-

mary of the Land Investigation Movement; (vi) important construction undertakings in the locality; (vii) the election of the executive committee; and (viii) the election of deputies to attend the congress of deputies of the soviet at the next higher level. These items for discussion may be increased or diminished as appropriate in light of the local situation.

b. The resolutions of a congress should be drafted and copied or printed one week before the convening of the congress, so that they may become formal resolutions after the deputies have discussed and adopted them at the congress.

c. As regards the list of candidates for election to the executive committee, the old executive committee and the presidium of the congress should make a very thorough investigation to ensure that the most active and resolute elements in the Land Investigation Movement and various other struggles are elected to the executive committee, and that not a single class-alien element or element whose behavior is marked by embezzlement, corruption, slacking, or a bureaucratic work style is elected as an executive committee member. At the time of electing executive committee members, special attention should be given to worker activists, and large numbers of such elements should be elected to the executive committee to strengthen the leading force of the proletariat in the soviet. At the same time, careful attention should also be paid to the poor peasant and middle peasant activists, and they should also be included. Moreover, you must not forget to elect working women to work in the soviets. Working women should constitute at least 20 percent of those elected to executive committees. In preparing the lists of candidates, apart from paying attention to class status, competence in work should also be taken into account. We absolutely cannot draw up the lists carelessly, considering only class status and paying no attention to capacity for doing the work.

Once executive committee members are elected, their names should be reported to the executive committee at the next higher level for review and approval.

d. As for the making of work reports by the governments to the voters and to the congresses of deputies, this must truly be carried out in the course of the current election movement. In the past, except for a few localities, such reports were not made in most places and that was wrong. Applying this method can provide an opportunity for testing the policies and work of the government among the masses and can further raise the voters' enthusiasm for elections. The method of putting it into practice is as follows: One week before the elections to township and city soviets, meetings of voters should be held with hamlets or villages as the unit to deliver reports that summarize the work of township and city soviets in the past, especially in the recent past.

They should encourage the masses of voters to criticize and discuss these reports, and welcome specific new suggestions by the voters that may contribute to the orientation of the government's future work. District governments must report to plenary meetings of the congresses of all township and city soviets on their work and invite the broad masses to come and listen. The congresses of deputies of township and city soviets should hold detailed discussions of the work reports of the district soviets, and forward the conclusions of the discussion to the district governments. *Xian* governments may send representatives to district congresses to deliver work reports. Provincial governments may send representatives to *xian* congresses to deliver work reports. The Central Government should make work reports to provincial congresses. At the same time, at the congresses of deputies at various levels, the executive committees of the respective levels must submit similar reports. These reports must be thoroughly discussed, and the results of discussions should be reported to the relevant higher level governments. The opinions of the masses regarding the work of the government should be reported all the way up to the Central Government, so that the highest organ of the soviets may know the sentiments and demands of the masses. The various levels of the government should designate specific persons to draft their own work reports in advance. The Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs should produce a report outline and send it to the various levels of the government, which are then required to draft their own reports in accordance with this outline, and to deliver their reports to the representative congresses and the voter assemblies at the same and lower levels.

e. Provincial, *xian*, and district soviets must dispatch people to inspect and check the election work and the meetings of the soviet congresses in *xian*, districts, and townships, respectively. The exceptionally good and bad examples may be collected rapidly to be used to guide the election work in other places.

f. The People's Commissariat for Justice should notify the justice departments at all levels to reexamine and decide the cases in which the worker and peasant elements have confessed their crimes and made a new start, and there are no specific rules and regulations as to the time limit during which they are deprived of the right to vote, in an effort to avoid the situation of excluding these worker and peasant elements from the elections.

The soviet elections are an important link in the operations of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. The current elections have an even greater historic mission. Governments at every level must effectively carry out the current elections in accordance with all the instructions of this directive and the stipulations of the "Provisional Soviet Election Law." The current elections

must achieve complete victory. The complete victory of these elections will contribute to the smashing of the imperialist Guomindang's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the unfolding of the soviet movement throughout the whole territory of China. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the Tasks of Economic Construction***

## ***Report to the Conference on Economic Construction of the Seventeen Southern Xian***

(August 12, 1933)

Comrades, we are holding two conferences on economic construction this time—one for the seventeen southern *xian* and one for the eleven northern *xian*.<sup>1</sup> Such conferences solely for the purpose of economic construction have never been held before, and today is the first time. The present situation is as follows: the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" has been completely smashed by us, and the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" will soon follow; the great storms of worldwide revolution and war are approaching us; the imperialists are madly preparing a great war and an anti-Soviet war; the imperialists are madly oppressing China, while Japan has already occupied four and a half provinces of China and is still pursuing its gangster war toward the region of Inner Mongolia; the Guomindang, after the crushing defeat of its Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," is now making arrangements for a new Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"; the revolutionary struggle and revolutionary war in China have assumed a new form and are moving forward with great strides. If at such a time we hold conferences here on economic construction, this indicates clearly what it is that we want to discuss and the purposes of our economic construction. My report today will explain this point. It is divided into two sections.

### **I. The Smashing of the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the New Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"**

A. First of all, I shall talk about the victories we achieved in smashing the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression."

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This report was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 102, August 16, 1933. Our source is this text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 323–37, which shows the variants in Part II, Sections B and C.

1. The economic construction conference for the Central Soviet Area's seventeen southern *xian* was held August 12–15, 1933, in Yeping in the Ruijin *xian* city suburbs, and was attended by over 400 people. The corresponding conference for the eleven northern *xian* convened on August 20 in Bosheng *xian*.

We must state the following:

1. The enemy troops have been destroyed in great numbers. The Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" was thoroughly smashed. To sum up, in the course of a year, the Red Army of the Central [Soviet] Area and the soviet areas of Hubei-Henan-Anhui, Sichuan, West Hunan-Hubei, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, and Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi together destroyed a total of over fifteen divisions of enemy troops. The victory was even greater than the smashing of the enemy's Third "Encirclement and Suppression" in the past, and the enemy's armed forces suffered an extremely severe blow. All the middle- and lower-ranking officers of the enemy forces are thoroughly frightened of the Red Army and dare not fight with it. At the same time, wavering and sympathy for the revolution among the White soldiers are increasing daily.
2. The Red Army has been strengthened and expanded. The Red Army has already become an invincible iron army. Extremely great progress has been made in transforming the establishment of the Red Army, raising the level of military technology, and strengthening it politically. The expansion of the Red Army has led to the doubling of its size in comparison with the past. We have already built a large-scale, battle-ready army.
3. The soviet areas have been further consolidated. During the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," the class consciousness of the masses of workers and peasants and their enthusiasm in supporting the revolutionary war were further heightened. The deepening of the Land Investigation Movement and the development of the workers' struggle dealt a heavy blow to the remnant feudal forces inside the soviet areas. The cultural and educational movement among the masses advanced still further. The movement for economic construction entered a new situation in its development. Soviet work was further improved, its prestige among the masses was raised even more, and the soviet banner was imprinted in the hearts of the toiling masses of the whole country.
4. The territory of the Soviets has been enlarged. The Central Soviet Area of Fujian and Jiangxi has been established, a new soviet area of several hundred square *li* in Sichuan has been opened up, and Comrade He Long has developed a big soviet area in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan region.
5. The revolutionary movement in the Guomindang-ruled areas has also developed to a very great extent. The forcible occupation of four and a half Chinese provinces by Japanese imperialism, and the Guomindang's surrender to imperialism in signing the agreement between China and Japan for selling out the country, have caused the movement of the broad masses against the imperialist Guomindang to develop on a large scale. The Guomindang's oppression and massacres; the bankruptcy of agriculture, industry, and commerce; and the even crueller exploitation of workers and peasants by the capitalists and landlords have greatly promoted

the development of strike struggles on the part of the workers, antitax and antilevy struggles by the peasants and victims of natural catastrophes, rural uprisings, and guerrilla warfare.

B. Comrades, we have already won tremendous victories. But on what did we rely to win these victories?

I think that everyone knows that we have relied (1) on the heroic and skillful fighting of the Red Army, (2) on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the soviet areas and in the White areas, and (3) on the leadership of the Communist Party's correct line. Only thanks to these three important conditions could the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" be shattered and the great victories mentioned above be achieved. These victories have dealt an extremely heavy blow to the imperialist Guomindang. On the one hand, the revolutionary forces have been further strengthened, advancing boldly in an irresistible current. On the other hand, the reactionary forces have been further weakened and are increasingly aware that an imminent threat to their existence lies just ahead. Thus they have no alternative but to make arrangements once again for an attack on an even larger scale, in an attempt to salvage their doomed rule.

C. Therefore, the enemy is madly planning his Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."

In order to prepare for this "Encirclement and Suppression," the Guomindang cannot do otherwise than to capitulate further to the imperialists. After selling out the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, and North China, Chiang Kaishek has again signed secret agreements for selling out the country with various imperialist powers such as the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. He has borrowed large sums of money and munitions, redeployed troops, trained new soldiers, and curried favor with various factions of warlords (but wars and conflicts among the warlords are inevitable), and is now actively engaged in making arrangements for the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the soviets and the Red Army.

## **II. Smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the Tasks of Soviet Economic Construction**

A. Strive to create every favorable condition, and to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."

The Chinese revolution is now at a crucial juncture. Will the imperialists destroy China? Or will the revolutionary war eliminate the Guomindang, drive out the imperialists, and turn China into a Soviet China? The imperialist Guomindang has chosen the road of China's destruction. They have already adopted the method of launching a Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," and in the course of this "Encirclement and Suppression" they want to carve up China completely or hand it over to a condominium, turning the several hundred mil-



lion Chinese into beasts of burden and slaves, turning them into Indians and Koreans,<sup>2</sup> and turning China into an out-and-out imperialist colony. This is an extremely grave peril which is hanging over our heads. Comrades, can we let them do this? No, we cannot. We must seek a revolutionary way out. Our way out is to defeat the imperialist Guomindang, free China from their rule, and turn it into a free, independent soviet republic of the workers, peasants, and soldiers. The important turning point for this purpose is to smash their Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" thoroughly. Winning such a victory still depends on the Red Army, the masses, and the resolute carrying out of the Communist Party's offensive line. But we must exert our utmost efforts to secure more adequate conditions than those of the past. Only by doing so can we smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and win greater victories than in the past.

To achieve victory this time, we must do a great deal of work. We must boldly expand the Red Army. Within a period of six to ten months, we must succeed in expanding the army by 200,000 new soldiers, recruited in the Central Soviet Area and the neighboring soviet areas, and send them to the front, thus further strengthening the Red Army units at the various fronts so that they can assume the task of attacking Chiang Kaishek's White armies of several hundred thousands. The Land Investigation Movement should be promoted widely and in depth, and an intense class struggle must be developed in the countryside to resolve the land question thoroughly and to eliminate the remnant feudal forces decisively, thus enabling the broad masses of peasants to participate in the revolutionary war with great enthusiasm and joy. The Labor Law should be carried out everywhere, in order to stimulate the struggles of workers and to raise still further the enthusiasm of the masses of the workers for the revolutionary war. Through the mechanism of this year's election movement, the soviets at all levels should be reelected. The new form of reelection should be adopted from the township soviet to the Central Government, in order to solidify the entire soviet régime so that it is as tough as iron and will be better able to assume the responsibility of organizing and directing the great cause of revolutionary war. Attention should be paid to the work in border regions and newly developed regions, so that favorable conditions may be created for the rapid development of the revolutionary war toward key cities. The cultural movement of the masses should be promoted, in order to raise the cultural and political level of the masses and provide a powerful spiritual tool for the revolutionary war. Apart from all this, there is an extremely important item of work upon which we should focus our discussions this time. This is the work in the field of economic construction. We must vigorously promote the movement for economic construction and regard the task of economic construction as one of the most basic conditions for smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"—an indispensable material

2. I.e., into colonial subjects like the Indians, under British rule, and the Koreans, under Japanese rule.

condition for the revolutionary war. It is for this purpose that the present conference on economic construction has been called together.

B. The great task of economic construction lies before us!<sup>3</sup>

The growing intensity of the revolutionary war makes it imperative that the soviets<sup>4</sup> mobilize the masses, immediately launch a movement of economic construction, and carry out all necessary<sup>5</sup> tasks of economic construction. Why? Solely in order to win victory in the revolutionary war;<sup>6</sup> in order to secure the material conditions that will guarantee food and other supplies to the Red Army; in order to improve the lives of the masses,<sup>7</sup> and thereby further arouse their enthusiasm for participating in the revolutionary war; in order to organize the broad masses on the economic front and educate them, thus providing new mass strength for the war; and in order to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance in the course of economic construction, thereby consolidating the *soviet political power*<sup>8</sup> of the dictatorship<sup>9</sup> of the workers and peasants, and to strengthen the leadership of the proletariat. *Victory in the revolutionary war as a whole, and first of all complete victory in the war to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression,"* require<sup>10</sup> further efforts to promote the work of economic construction. This point should be recognized and understood *at once* by everyone engaged in soviet<sup>11</sup> work. In the past some comrades believed that, as they were already too busy with the revolutionary war, there was no way they could have the leisure to engage in economic construction work. Anyone who talked about economic construction would be labeled a right deviationist. At the same time it was believed that there was no possibility of economic construction in an environment of revolutionary war, that economic construction was only feasible after the final victory in the war, and that economic construction could only proceed in a peaceful and quiet environment, *so there was no point in talking about it now*. Comrades, are these opinions correct? No, they are wrong. The comrades who made such statements failed to understand that without economic construc-

3. The portion of this report included in the *Selected Works* begins here. There are no subdivisions in the revised version; this heading for section II B is replaced by the new title for the whole speech: "Pay Attention to Economic Work."

4. The term "soviet" does not appear in the *Selected Works* version of this or any other text of the 1930s. Here "the soviets mobilize . . ." has been replaced by "we mobilize . . ."

5. Necessary → Necessary and possible

6. Solely in order to win victory in the revolutionary war → All our present efforts should be directed toward gaining victory in the revolutionary war and, first and foremost, toward gaining complete victory in the fight to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression . . ."

7. Masses → Masses of the people

8. As in all texts with variants, passages set in italics here have been deleted from the *Selected Works* version.

9. Dictatorship → Democratic dictatorship

10. Require → All these objectives require . . .

11. Soviet → Revolutionary

tion, the material conditions for war<sup>12</sup> cannot be *completely* guaranteed, and that a protracted war will result in exhaustion and shortages. Just consider! The enemy is carrying out an economic blockade, and unscrupulous merchants and reactionaries are sabotaging our finance and commerce. *If we do not overcome these difficulties, will not the revolutionary war be very greatly affected?*<sup>13</sup> *For the enemy's blockade and manipulation by unscrupulous merchants* have hindered the external trade of our soviet regions enormously. Salt is very expensive and sometimes unobtainable. Rice is *abundant and cheap* in autumn and extremely expensive in spring and summer. This situation directly affects the lives of the workers and peasants and makes *further* improvement impossible. Will it not affect our basic line of the alliance between the workers and the peasants? If the workers and peasants become dissatisfied with their lives, will this not affect our efforts to expand the Red Army and mobilize the masses to participate in the revolutionary war? Therefore, the view that soviet economic construction should not be pursued in the midst of revolution<sup>14</sup> is utterly wrong. Those who hold this view also often talk about subordinating everything to the war, but they fail to understand that to abandon economic construction *in the interests of the war* does not mean subordinating everything to the war, but in fact weakens the war effort. *It is precisely in the interests of the war that various kinds of necessary economic construction work must be carried out, because economic construction is an extremely essential and indispensable condition for the revolutionary war.* Only by extending the work on the economic front and developing the economy of the soviet<sup>15</sup> areas can we provide an adequate material basis for the revolutionary war, proceed *even more* smoothly with our military offensive, and strike a forceful blow at the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression." Only in this way can we obtain the strength to expand the Red Army *to a million men*, and to extend our battlefield to points thousands of *li* away, so that our *iron* Red Army can attack Nanchang and Jiujiang without any hesitation.<sup>16</sup> Thus our Red Army fighters, relieved of much of the task of provisioning themselves, can give their undivided attention to fighting. This is also the only way to satisfy to some extent the material needs of the broad masses, so that they will join the Red Army or undertake other revolutionary tasks with even greater enthusiasm. Only acting in this way can be called subordinating everything to the war effort. *Otherwise, not only will the interests of the war not be served, but the war will be deprived of a decisive condition for victory. Such opportunist views are entirely wrong.* Among those currently engaged in soviet<sup>17</sup> work in various

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12. War → Revolutionary war

13. In the revised text, this sentence has been placed after the one that follows.

14. Revolution → Revolutionary war

15. Soviet → Red

16. Here the words "in the future, when circumstances are favorable" have been added to the revised text.

17. Soviet → Revolutionary

places, there are many who do not yet understand the importance of economic construction in the revolutionary war and have not yet truly taken upon their own shoulders the tasks of economic construction. As a result, these comrades have not exerted their full strength in carrying out the call of the Central Government, or multiplied their efforts a hundredfold to promote the movement on the economic front. For example, the presidiums of many governments have placed little emphasis on the discussion of the issue of economic construction. The departments of the people's economy are not yet well organized, and some of them are still without a director or have appointed relatively incompetent people to be in charge of the work. The development of cooperatives is still in its initial stage. The work of regulating food supplies has also been started only in a few places. Everywhere, there has as yet been no propaganda regarding the task of economic construction among the broad masses—and this is extremely vital. An atmosphere of enthusiasm has not yet been created among the masses in support of the struggle for economic construction. This situation results entirely from a failure to recognize the importance of economic construction. *The present conference should begin by sternly opposing such erroneous opinions and eradicating these wrong opportunist views of ignoring economic construction.* Through the comrades' discussions at this conference and the reports you will make when you return to your posts, we must create an atmosphere of enthusiasm among all soviet personnel<sup>18</sup> and the broad masses of workers and peasants. Everyone should realize the place of economic construction in the revolutionary war, so they will all *unanimously* strive to sell from 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 yuan of economic construction bonds. Develop the cooperative movement and call upon a million people to join the cooperatives, among whom 500,000 should enter consumers' cooperatives and 500,000 should enter food cooperatives. Granaries should be set up everywhere, as well as storehouses for famine relief. Each *xian* capital should establish a grain redistribution subbureau, and important districts and market centers should all set up Grain Redistribution Bureau branches, so that on the one hand, our grain may be transported from places with a surplus to places with a deficiency inside the soviet areas,<sup>19</sup> so that it will not pile up in one place and become unobtainable in another, and its price will not be too low in one place and too high in another. On the other hand, we should send our grain surplus out of the soviet areas<sup>20</sup> in a planned way (not in unlimited quantities), *selling it for a high price*, without suffering exploitation by unscrupulous merchants, and bring in necessities from the White areas, without paying in big foreign dollars (*xian yang*). We must make great efforts to promote agricultural and handicraft production, and<sup>21</sup> to increase the harvest next year.

18. Soviet personnel → Government personnel

19. Soviet areas → Red areas

20. Soviet areas → Our areas

21. Here the words: "... produce more farm implements and lime, so as ..." are inserted in the *Selected Works* version.

The output of all kinds of local products, such as tungsten ore, timber, camphor, paper, tobacco, linen, dried mushrooms, and peppermint oil, should be restored to former levels, and they should be exported to the White areas in large quantities. *For example, tungsten ore is an extremely promising industry. Because of the demand of the imperialist military industries for tungsten ore, it offers great prospects for export. We should prepare thousands and tens of thousands of people to develop tungsten ore mines. To promote agricultural production, the manufacture of farm tools and lime is very essential.* Again judging from the volume of export and import trade, the largest item of export from the soviet areas<sup>22</sup> is grain. Each year, the *Central Soviet Area* has about 3,000,000 *Dan* of unhusked rice to export. The three million masses export 1 *Dan* of grain per person in exchange for necessities; it definitely cannot be less than this. Who is handling this trade? It is handled entirely by the merchants, who exploit us cruelly in the process. Last year, the peasants of Wan'an and Taihe sold the merchants unhusked rice at a price of 0.5 *yuan* per *Dan*, and the merchants transported the grain to Zhangzhou to sell at a price of 4 *yuan* per *Dan*, an eightfold profit.<sup>23</sup> Another instance is that every year, the three million masses need to consume nearly 9,000,000 *yuan* worth of salt and wear almost 6,000,000 *yuan* worth of clothes. Needless to say, the import of these 15,000,000 *yuan* worth of salt and clothes has been monopolized in the past by the merchants. Our Soviets<sup>24</sup> did not take charge of this. The exploitation carried out by the merchants in thus serving as intermediaries is really extremely great. For example, the merchants go to buy salt in Jiayingzhou<sup>25</sup> at a price of 1 *yuan* for 7 *jin* and then they ship it to the soviet<sup>26</sup> areas and sell it at a price of 1 *yuan* for 12 *liang*. Isn't this horrendous exploitation? The soviets<sup>27</sup> cannot afford to ignore such a state of affairs any longer, and from now on we must certainly take charge ourselves. Our External Trade Bureau should make the utmost efforts in this regard. How shall we use the 3,000,000 *yuan* from economic construction bonds? We propose to use it as follows: one million given to the Red Army as combat expenses and two millions lent to the cooperatives, the Grain Redistribution Bureau, and the External Trade Bureau as capital. A small portion of this last item should be used for production, and the larger portion should be spent on the promotion of export and import trade. Our aim is not only to develop production, but also to obtain high<sup>28</sup> prices for our exports. *At the same time*, salt and cloth should be bought from the White areas at low prices and distributed among

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22. Soviet areas → Our areas

23. Eightfold → Sevenfold

24. Our Soviets → We

25. Jiayingzhou → Meixian. (Mao here uses the name of this locality in Qing times; it was changed to Meixian in 1912.)

26. The soviet → Our

27. Soviets → We

28. High → Fair

the masses of the Soviet areas. This will break the enemy's blockade, check the merchants' exploitation, and make the economy of the Soviet areas develop day after day, thus greatly enhancing the livelihood of the masses, greatly increasing the financial receipts of the Soviets, and firmly laying the material foundation of the revolutionary war. This is a great task, a great class struggle, and an inseparable part of the revolutionary war. But we must ask ourselves: can this work of economic construction<sup>29</sup> be carried out in the midst of fierce fighting? I think only opportunists will say that it cannot be done.<sup>30</sup> We are not talking about building a railroad to Longyan, or even, for the time being, about building a highway to Zhangzhou. We are not saying that there should be a complete monopoly of the sale of grain, nor that the government should handle all the salt and cloth trade, which is worth 15,000,000 *yuan*, and that no merchants should meddle. We have not said these things nor done these things. What we have said and done is to promote agricultural and handicraft production, the export of grain and tungsten ore, and the import of edible salt and cloth. For the time being, this should be started with 2,000,000 *yuan* of capital in addition to the shares of the masses. Is this something we should not do, cannot do, or are incapable of doing? We have already started to do these tasks and have achieved successes. This year's autumn harvest has increased from 20 to 25 percent over that of last year, thus exceeding our original estimate of a 20 percent increase. As regards handicraft industries, the manufacture of farm tools and lime is in the process of recovery. Production of tungsten ore is in the process of recovery. Production of tobacco, paper, and timber has also begun to show some vigor. There has been considerable success this year in the regulation of food supplies. A start has been made on importing salt. These initial successes provide the basis for our firm belief in future development. The opportunists<sup>31</sup> say that economic construction can only begin after the war is over, and that now it is impossible. Isn't this obviously wrong?

Thus, it is clear that at the present stage, economic construction revolves around the central task of revolutionary war. Revolutionary war is the key task at present, and economic construction serves it, revolves around it, is secondary to it, and is not itself the center. The view that economic construction is the central task among all our present tasks is likewise an opportunist view. The revolutionary war demands that the soviets carry out necessary economic construction undertakings. To conduct economic construction apart from the revolutionary war is an erroneous way of thinking. Only after the end of the civil war can and should economic construction become the central task of all tasks. Attempting to carry out, in the course of the civil war, economic construction that should exist in a peaceful future, but is not feasible at present, is wishful thinking. Our work

29. Work of economic construction → Task

30. Only opportunists will say it cannot be done → It can be done

31. The opportunists → People

at present is the work urgently demanded by the war. Every item of this work is done for the sake of the war and is not a peaceful undertaking unrelated to the war. If there are any among our comrades who have this kind of wrong view, they should correct it immediately.

### III. Questions Regarding the Style of Leadership in Economic Construction

Without a correct leadership style and correct work methods, it will be impossible to launch a movement on the economic front rapidly. This is also a significant issue that should be resolved at this conference, because upon returning home comrades must start to work at once and must, moreover, guide many staff members of the *provincial, xian, and district soviets* who will work side by side with them. In particular, comrades at the *basic soviet* levels of township and city, and comrades working in cooperatives, grain bureaus, trade bureaus, and purchasing offices are responsible for the actual work. They are the ones who personally engage in the actual work of mobilizing the masses to organize cooperatives, redistributing and transporting grain, and managing export and import trade. If their leadership style is wrong, if, *when they carry out the work*, they are unable to adopt various correct and effective methods, that will have an immediate impact on the success of the work, we will be unable to obtain the support of the broad masses for our *various slogans* and various tasks, and we will not be able to complete the whole of the Central Government's plan for economic construction in the autumn and winter of this year and the spring and summer of next year. For these reasons, I want to direct the attention of comrades to the following points:

A. The masses should be mobilized by organizational means. In the first place, comrades on government presidiums and in departments of the people's economy and of finance at all levels should regularly put on the agenda items of work such as issuing bonds, developing cooperatives, regulating food supplies, and developing production and trade, and proceed to discuss, *resolve*, supervise, and check up on these matters. Next, mass organizations should be brought into action, the main organizations in this respect being the labor unions and the poor peasant league. The labor unions should mobilize all their members to get involved on the economic front. The poor peasant league is a powerful base for mobilizing the masses to develop cooperatives and buy bonds. *Soviet* governments at the district and township levels should provide it with vigorous leadership. Then, propaganda on economic construction may be carried out by holding mass meetings in villages and hamlets. In propaganda, the relationship between the revolutionary war and economic construction should be evoked very clearly, and improving the lives of the masses and increasing our strength for the struggle should be discussed in very practical terms. The masses should be called upon to purchase 3,000,000 *yuan* of bonds, to develop cooperatives with a membership of

one million, to regulate food supplies, to consolidate finances, and to promote trade. We should call upon the masses to fight for these slogans and heighten their zeal. Unless we use such organizational means to mobilize the masses and conduct propaganda among them, that is to say, unless the presidiums and the departments of the people's economy and of finance have firmly grasped the work of economic construction, discussed it, and checked up on it, and unless they have paid attention to bringing the mass organizations into action and calling mass meetings for the purpose of propaganda, it will be impossible to attain our objectives.

B. The style of mobilizing the masses should not be bureaucratic. The bureaucratic style of leadership should not exist in any kind of revolutionary work, and this applies also to the work of economic construction. The ugly evil of bureaucracy must be thrown into the night-soil bucket. No comrade likes it. What every comrade should like is a *Bolshevik workstyle*, that is to say, a workstyle oriented toward the masses,<sup>32</sup> a style that is *most capable of helping us approach the masses* and is liked and accepted by every worker and peasant. One kind of bureaucratism is an *opportunist and negative form* of going slow manifested in paying no attention or going through the motions perfunctorily. *This is a very bad phenomenon*, and we must carry out a severe struggle against it. Another is commandism, which on the surface shows no signs of going slow but rather gives the appearance of working hard. In reality, to develop cooperatives under commandism is impossible. Even those that outwardly appear to develop for a time cannot be consolidated. In the end, people will lose confidence in them, and this will hamper their development. To push the sale of bonds in a commandist way, regardless of whether the masses understand the matter or not and whether they can afford the quantity that they buy, until an arbitrary quota they have set for themselves is reached, will in the end arouse dissatisfaction among the masses, so that the bonds do not sell well. We must definitely reject commandism, and we should work hard to make propaganda to persuade the masses. The development of cooperatives, the sale of bonds, and all kinds of economic mobilization work should be conducted in light of concrete conditions and the concrete manifestations of the sentiments of the masses.

C. The unfolding of the economic construction movement requires large numbers of working cadres. This is not a matter for dozens or hundreds of people, but a matter for thousands and tens of thousands of people. They should be organized, trained, and sent to the economic construction front. They are the commanders on the economic battlefield, and the broad masses are the fighters. The opportunists<sup>33</sup> often sigh that there are no cadres. Comrades, are there really no cadres? Numerous cadres have emerged from the masses in their millions tempered in the agrarian struggles, the economic struggles, and the revolutionary

32. *Qunzhonghua de fangshi*, literally "a massified style."

33. The opportunists → Some people



war in the soviet areas. How can one say that there are no cadres? Once you throw off these opportunist<sup>34</sup> views, the cadres will be standing before you.

D. Finally, I want to say once again that economic construction is inseparable, not only from the general task of the war, but from other tasks as well. Only with the deepening of the Land Investigation Movement can the class struggle in the countryside be further developed,<sup>35</sup> the enthusiasm of the peasants be aroused, and large numbers of peasants be enabled to move rapidly to the economic construction front. Only the resolute application of the Labor Law can improve the living standards of the masses of workers and peasants, enable the masses of workers to participate actively and speedily in the cause of economic construction, and strengthen their role in the leadership of the peasants. Only if there is correct leadership in the election movement and in the accusation movement which accompanies the Land Investigation Movement can our soviet<sup>36</sup> organs be further strengthened, so that they can provide more effective leadership for the revolutionary war and for work in all fields, including economic work. Raising the political and cultural levels of the masses through cultural and educational work is also of extremely great importance for the development of the national economy. That we should not neglect the work of expanding the Red Army even for a single day goes without saying. Everyone understands that without the victories of the Red Army the economic blockade would be still tighter. On the other hand, the development of the national economy and the improvement of the lives of the masses will undoubtedly further strengthen and enlarge the tide in favor of<sup>37</sup> the Red Army and cause the broad masses to march in great numbers<sup>38</sup> to the front. To sum up, if we fulfill all the above-mentioned conditions, including this extremely important new condition of economic construction, and make all these conditions serve the war,<sup>39</sup> then victory in the war against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" will certainly be ours. (Warm applause.)

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34. Opportunist → Erroneous

35. Can the class struggle in the countryside be further developed → Can we abolish feudal and semifeudal land ownership completely.

36. Soviet → Government

37. Tide in favor of → Work of

38. In great numbers → Eagerly

39. War → Revolutionary war

# *The Capture of Ji'an*

(August 13, 1933)

The matter at hand was the attack on Ji'an. Ji'an had been attacked eight times and this was now the ninth time.

The date was October 4, 1930.<sup>1</sup>

On that day, before the moon had completely set, our troops had already moved in. Gunfire was heard from the direction of the Zhenjun Mountains, which were in the northwest corner of the city.<sup>2</sup> Next, shooting began in the Luozi Mountains to the north of the city. Our Fourth Army was advancing in these two directions. Contact was also made on Shen'gang Ridge, to the south and southwest of the city; here the units were from our Third Army. We encircled Ji'an. The red flags that were not visible at night all appeared together as soon as the red sun emerged in the east. The intense sounds of rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire were even noisier than the setting off of firecrackers to celebrate the New Year. Many red flags appeared on the second line. They were those of the countless Red Guards and Young Pioneers, all of whom were lying prostrate, because the enemy's mortar shells were flying over their heads. There was the sound of something or other astir in the sky, and in less than a minute, the enemy's red-tailed planes appeared. Several big bombs fell in the vicinity of our General Headquarters, but no one was hurt. In order to seize the positions on the Zhenjun Mountains, fierce fighting was underway there. Part of the troops in the Luozi Mountains broke into the city through the enemy's weak points. Unfortunately, they retreated again. The reason was that the enemy transferred some troops from the southwestern positions and launched a counterattack against us. The fighting lasted a whole day. Our Twelfth Army arrived and reinforced the positions to the west of the city. It was getting dark and there was a lull in the

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This article was first published in *Hongxingbao* (Red Star), August 13, 1933. On this occasion, Mao used the pen name "Ziren," which he had often employed in the 1920s (see Volume II of this edition, p. 155, note 5). We have taken as our source the text as reproduced in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. I, pp. 325-29.

1. As noted in Volume III, the capture of Ji'an recounted in this essay took place following the Red Army's retreat from its abortive attacks on Nanchang and Changsha during the summer of 1930, and shortly before Guomindang armies launched the first of the encirclement campaigns.

2. As there are no significant hills or mountains within the actual built-up area of the city of Ji'an, this phrase should be interpreted to refer broadly to the general northwest vicinity of the city.

battle. We were preparing for a night battle to finish off the enemy and break into the city.

The enemy chieftain was called Deng Ying.<sup>3</sup> When our Red Third Army failed to capture Ji'an for the eighth time, the Nanjing dog government issued an order commending him, stating that he had rendered the greatest of services to "bandit suppression." Thereupon, he became swollen with arrogance and believed that he, big brother Deng, far surpassed not only Yang Chisheng, Yang Ruqian, and Li Wenbin,<sup>4</sup> but also chieftains such as Zhu Peide,<sup>5</sup> and even had two or three times the power and prestige of Zhang Huizan, at that time commander-in-chief of "bandit suppression,"<sup>6</sup> and Fatty Lu, who held the command of the Nanchang garrison.<sup>7</sup> He drank spirits, gambled, and in front of the local bullies, bad gentry, capitalists, pastors, and Catholic priests beat his chest and boasted that he was a hero. These local bullies, bad gentry, capitalists, pastors, and Catholic priests even believed what he said. On the one hand, there were Warlord Deng's bold speeches, and on the other hand, they had actually seen the solidity of the defenses of Ji'an City—the fortresses, trenches, and wire entanglements. With all these precious things to restrain the iron fists of the Red Army, they must have thought they could definitely survive for a few more days! To their surprise, the Red Army suddenly launched a large-scale encirclement and fierce offensive. On this day of the 4th, all the lily-livered warlords, capitalists, local bullies, bad gentry, pastors, and Catholic priests were frightened to death, and there were people everywhere running around chaotically in the streets. When someone said they were coming from the south gate, they fled toward the north gate, and when someone said they were coming from the north gate, they fled toward the south gate. When part of the Red Army forces from the Luozi Mountains actually fought their way in, the whole city was in even greater turmoil. On that day, the masses of the workers in the city were seized by a special kind of excitement. Many of them clenched their fists, waiting for the moment to beat up the reactionaries. Warlord Deng issued an order forbidding anyone to go to the river banks, including even the capitalists, local bullies, bad gentry, pastors, and Catholic priests. Armed soldiers were standing on the banks of the river, and all the ships were gathered together in one place near the dock.

3. Deng Ying was, in 1930, the commander of the Thirteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army. For Mao's order of October 3, 1930, launching the assault on Ji'an narrated here, see Volume III of this edition, pp. 546–47.

4. Yang Chisheng and Yang Ruqian were division commanders; Li Wenbin was a brigade commander.

5. At this time, Zhu Peide was the commander of the Guomindang First Route Army.

6. Zhang Huizan was, in October 1930, commander-in-chief of the "bandit suppression" campaign in Jiangxi. On December 30, 1930, he was captured by the Red Army, and on January 28, 1931, he was executed (see Volume III of this edition, p. 471, note 4, and pp. 731–32).

7. The reference is to Lu Diping, who in 1930 was also the chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Government.

Even if a local bully knelt down in front of Warlord Deng, begging to be allowed to flee on a ship, he could not succeed. Petty Warlord Deng Ying really made a show of facing life and death together with the city of Ji'an.

In the pitch dark night, the Red Army launched new attacks and broke into the city from the direction of the Zhenjun Mountains. Then Warlord Deng himself led some of his troops to slip away by river. Others who could not escape handed over their guns. Not a single village bully, bad member of the gentry, capitalist, pastor, or Catholic priest got away. From that moment on, Ji'an City had fallen into the hands of the Red Army and the Soviets. Then on the next day, a big contingent of the masses entered the city bearing red flags, and the organs of the Communist Party and the local soviet also entered the city. The workers and countless members of the impoverished masses of the city rushed into the streets to give the Red Army a warm welcome. At this time, local bullies, bad gentry, pastors, Catholic priests, and reactionary capitalists were being captured in large numbers. Capturing them was like capturing pigs and sheep. They were led in lines here and chained in strings there. Immediately afterward, there were many days of incessant mass rallies! Expand the Red Army! Mass rallies of workers' representatives! Mass rallies of the soviets! Mass rallies of the Communist Party! Let the masses from various *xian* come to visit Red Ji'an! All these thunderous and spectacular activities turned Ji'an City into a new world.

According to the views of the responsible comrades of the Red Army, the lessons from the capture of Ji'an this time are as follows: (1) The capture of Ji'an was only possible after rejecting the positions of the Lisan Line<sup>8</sup> (which opposed the attack on Ji'an and advocated an attack on Jiujiang; they held that to attack Ji'an before attacking Jiujiang would ruin the high tide of the Chinese revolution). The occupation of Ji'an this time had great political significance. Not only did it have an extremely great impact throughout the whole country, it also had direct significance for the Futian Incident, in which the uprising by the AB Corps was put down and victory was achieved in the first revolutionary war.<sup>9</sup> For the capture of Ji'an dealt the first political blow to the AB Corps, and at the same time, the forty-day occupation of Ji'an caused great psychological and material losses to the enemy's offensive.<sup>10</sup> (2) There were military deficiencies during the

8. Regarding the Li Lisan Line and Mao's attitude to it, see Volume III of this edition.

9. I.e., in the fight against the first "Encirclement and Suppression." Party documents from the 1928-30 period reveal that Ji'an was considered to be a major headquarters of AB Corps activity. One persistent (but almost certainly erroneous) tradition has it that during the Red Army's occupation of Ji'an evidence was uncovered implicating the father of Li Wenlin, an important regional Party leader and factional opponent of Mao, in AB Corps activity, a discovery which helped precipitate events leading to the Futian Incident. See Averill, "Origins of the Futian Incident," p. 103 and *passim*; Ch'en, "Futian Incident," p. 11.

10. For Mao's contemporary analysis of the situation during the occupation of Ji'an, see the Resolution of October 26, 1930, in Volume III of this edition, pp. 574-89.

battle of Ji'an this time. For example, the forces were not fully concentrated before launching the attacks. At that time, only the Fourth and Twentieth armies were concentrated. The Third Army had not yet entirely caught up, and the Twelfth Army was one day's march away, so they successively entered positions around the city of Ji'an only subsequently. Had the attack been delayed for one day, all the forces of the Army Group would have been concentrated there to carry out the encirclement and attack simultaneously. Then we could have avoided the situation in which part of the Fourth Army moved into the city, and the enemy was still able to transfer some troops from the western part of the city and stage counterattacks to drive our forces inside the city out of it, so that we could not capture all of Deng Ying's troops during the daylight hours on the 4th. This is one point. Next, the plan to launch an attack on the night of the 3rd was also inappropriate, because it was a positional war, the enemy had strong fortifications, and the Red Army was not familiar with the terrain. So there should have been a period of probing and scouting, for only thus could manpower be deployed appropriately and points of attack selected. Then we could have avoided the situation in which the troops were moved into positions that were later found to be inappropriate but could not be changed. New arrangements could not be made till the night of the 4th, and this was also a reason why the city could not be entered during the daytime and Deng Ying's entire force could not be wiped out. Besides, the Third Army Group was not deployed at the Xia River in Ji'an, but was positioned at the Qing River far away from Ji'an, thus making it possible for Deng Ying to escape by boat. These military defects and errors were the result of underestimating the enemy, and believing that the enemy only had four regiments and that we would not have to use much of our force. This erroneous viewpoint allowed the enemy's whole force to escape. This is a good lesson.

## *Order of the Central Government on Rectifying the Work of the Commissariat for Finance*

(August 25, 1933)

At present, when the Red Army is winning, the soviet areas are expanding, and the revolutionary movement is galloping forward fiercely, the principle of the financial policy of the soviets should be (1) to place all the burden on the exploiting classes, which mainly refers here to the imposition of fines on landlords in the White and soviet areas, to the donations solicited from rich peasants, and to the appropriate taxes collected from businessmen on the condition that such taxes will not hurt the development of the economy in the soviet areas; (2) to make great efforts to carry out economic construction, develop the national economy, break the enemy's economic blockade, and restrict the exploitation by merchants, in order to increase the financial revenues of the soviets; and (3) to rely on the revolutionary enthusiasm of workers and peasants to collect appropriate land taxes and augment the revenues of the state. This is the fundamental principle of soviet financial policy.

Under this principle, the financial institutions of the soviets should use revolutionary means, sound organization, and careful plans to expand financial revenues to meet the needs of the development of the revolutionary war. All conservative concepts divorced from political tasks and a state of unplanned chaos are both extremely harmful.

Under the supervision of the Council of People's Commissars, the previous work of the soviet financial institutions has yielded considerable results in terms of providing for the needs of the war and establishing an accounting system. As regards the principles of financial policy, however, we have not adhered to the correct orientation. This is mainly manifested in the failure to make the utmost efforts to collect funds from the exploiters and to increase financial revenues by developing the national economy; instead, all the efforts were exclusively devoted to changing the rent and tax systems and issuing paper currency and public debt. At the same time, there was an underestimation of the development of the revolution, which caused our finance to lack a planned character; this impeded the administration of finance on a large scale. In terms of leadership style,

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[previous mistakes included], for example, the failure to rely on urban and township soviets and organizations of workers and peasants when we were raising money and to mobilize the broad masses through them. Instead, we relied only on a few staff members above the level of the district, to such an extent that the tasks could not be completely carried out. Such bureaucratic leadership style is rather deeply embedded in the financial institutions of the soviets. As regards the problem of the cadres, no attention was paid to the promotion of a large number of financial personnel, while no care was taken to criticize and clean out those corrupt elements. All this is the consequence of the failure to apply the correct class line and an opportunistic assessment of the situation of the revolution. And the commissar for finance, Comrade Deng Zihui,<sup>1</sup> should bear the greatest responsibility.

The Council of People's Commissars believes that this situation must not be allowed to continue to exist. It directs Comrade Lin Boqu, the newly-appointed commissar for finance, to carry out a fundamental rectification. He should start by launching a campaign of self-criticism in the whole financial system to correct the wrong understanding of our financial policy, to establish a financial plan appropriate for the development of the war, to change the leadership style, to promote and train a large number of financial personnel, and to cleanse the financial system of its internal problems of embezzlement and corruption, so that the entire soviet financial system may be developed quickly, and so that soviet finance may meet the needs of the development of the revolution, provide sufficient financial support for the revolutionary war, and thoroughly smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialists and the Guomindang. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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1. Deng Zihui (1896-1972), a native of Longyan in Fujian, joined the Party in 1926. One of the founders of the revolutionary movement in Western Fujian, Deng had been head of the Western Fujian Soviet Government and a provincial inspector before becoming head of the Central Soviet Government's Commissariat for Finance in mid-1932. Deng was being attacked in the "Anti-Luo Ming Line" struggles then underway in the Soviet Area, and Mao's criticism of him in this document was probably made grudgingly under the pressures of this campaign.

# *On the Method of Selling Treasury Bonds*

*Order of the Council of People's Commissars*

(August 28, 1933)

The sale of 3,000,000 *yuan* worth of economic construction bonds has already begun in various parts of Ruijin. According to the recent experience in Ruijin, although Yunji District and other places adopted the correct method and made great progress, serious mistakes were made in other districts. The chief manifestation of this lies in the failure of the presidiums of the district soviets to place on their agenda for discussion and review the work of promoting the sale of treasury bonds, and in their treatment of the work of selling bonds as a matter simply for the Commissariat for Finance, without promoting the mobilization of the mass organizations at the district level. As a result, an extremely serious phenomenon of imposing uniform quotas occurred in many townships. The treasury bonds were simply handed over to the township soviets, without going through discussion and acceptance by the labor union, the poor peasant league, or meetings of women's representatives or other mass bodies, and without giving reports at the meetings of the deputies of the township soviets, still less calling a mass meeting to explain clearly the importance of treasury bonds. The township soviets then distributed the quota of bonds to each township deputy, who then distributed the quota uniformly among the masses, in total disregard of whether the masses understood or not; without exception, equal quotas were imposed. In a few places, middle peasants were forced to purchase these bonds; if they refused to buy, they were accused of being rich peasants. Consequently, resentment was aroused among the masses in many places, thus obstructing the sale of treasury bonds. In Yunji District, however, it was completely different. This was because the method used by the district soviet of Yunji in mobilizing various townships was very correct; it provided very detailed explanations to the cadres at the township level and let these cadres conduct excellent propaganda to the masses. As a result, very great success was achieved. The whole district assumed the responsibility of selling 40,700 *yuan* in treasury bonds; it sold 25,000 *yuan* in less than three weeks. Of its townships, Yangxi did the best job. This township

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has already finished selling the 4,600 *yuan* in treasury bonds for which it was responsible. The glorious examples of Yunji District and Yangxi Township are worthy of emulation by the entire Soviet Area. In order that the sale of treasury bonds may this time be satisfactorily carried out, the Central Government has especially made the following points on the issue of the methods of mobilization in selling treasury bonds; governments at all levels must act completely in accordance with them.

1. The provincial soviets must firmly grasp the work of selling treasury bonds in the provinces; they must discuss, promote, and examine the work. They must collect from one of the *xian* in the vicinity of the provincial soviets the experience of selling treasury bonds and compile good and bad examples of mobilization methods into documents to be quickly made available for instruction for the entire province and every *xian*.

2. The *xian* soviets must step up the work of selling treasury bonds in the *xian*; they must discuss, promote, and examine the work. Similarly, they must collect experience from the districts near the locations of the *xian* soviets and compile good and bad examples into documents for the instruction of all the districts.

The presidiums of the *xian* soviets must call meetings of the chairmen of the district soviets of the *xian* and the heads of the finance departments to promote the sale of treasury bonds. *Xian* which have not yet received treasury bonds should also call such meetings in advance, so that the districts may start the work of mobilization beforehand. Do not wait for the arrival of treasury bonds and then call meetings to discuss the matter in haste. After the sale of treasury bonds is completed, the *xian* should also call meetings of district chairmen to conduct a review and correct their mistakes.

3. The district soviets are the key in the sale of treasury bonds. They should call meetings to be attended by the chairmen of the township soviets, directors of the poor peasant league, and the leaders of other mass organizations to tell them the significance of the issuance of treasury bonds and the methods of mobilizing the masses. At the same time, they should send people to individual townships to assist the township soviets to call meetings of the township deputies, the poor peasant league, the labor union, and other mass groups to give them detailed explanations. They must send the cadres at the township level to individual villages and households to call mass meetings and explain to the masses in detail the meaning of the economic development bonds. If the masses remain unclear after one meeting, cadres must go to the villages and households to call a second meeting. If there are still places where people do not understand, a third meeting must be called there. In general, we must help the masses to understand completely and eagerly purchase treasury bonds for their own interest and for the victory of the war.

4. The presidiums of the governments at all levels and chairmen of township soviets must strictly guard against the mistake of imposing uniform quotas. They must understand that imposing uniform quotas is unadulterated bureaucratism and an extremely wrong method, which obstructs the sale of treasury bonds. On

the one hand, this method easily enables counterrevolutionary elements to spread rumor and deception. On the other, it prevents the workers and peasants from expressing their revolutionary fervor. If incidents of imposing uniform quotas are discovered in the future, higher-level governments must immediately correct them; those who fail to make the corrections must be punished.

5. Opposing the imposition of uniform quotas means to encourage the masses to buy treasury bonds voluntarily. Those who have bought a lot of bonds should have their names listed in front of the township soviets with public commendations as models. Those who refuse to buy the bonds must not be forced to buy. The representatives of the township soviets, representatives of the women's deputies, and members of the labor union and the poor peasant league should be sent to persuade and encourage them to buy. We may let those who have already bought treasury bonds go to persuade those who have not bought any. We may organize in every village individuals who have bought a lot of bonds into a propaganda team to conduct propaganda on the sale of treasury bonds.

6. The Central Government has already issued announcements on propaganda work; upon receiving the announcements, township governments should immediately assign people to post them in all villages and households. The Central Government has also issued a propaganda outline on the economic development bonds. The staff and officials of district and township soviets and propaganda teams should conduct propaganda and mobilization work among the masses according to the provisions of this outline.

7. The masses are free to decide whether to pay for the treasury bonds with cash or rice. The price of rice is set according to the local market price; all townships are to be informed about this rule.

8. All district soviets should direct individual townships to make up competition rules for selling the treasury bonds. The competition rules should not specify only the amount; they must spell out a ban on the bureaucratic use of coercive quotas. The time period for completing the competition rules should not be set too short (of course, it should not be set too long either) because too short a period of time does not allow for the use of the method of full mobilization.

The above eight provisions must be heeded during this issuance of treasury bonds. The provincial and *xian* soviets must send people to each *xian* and district to conduct inspections, to find out whether this instruction of the Central Government has been fully carried out. The *xian* soviets must also take care to write brief summaries on the *xian*'s districts that have achieved the best results in selling treasury bonds and send them to *Red China* for publication to promote the sale of treasury bonds in the entire soviet area. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***On the Issuance of 3,000,000 Yuan in Economic Construction Bonds***

*Announcement No. 26 of the  
Provisional Central Government*

(August 28, 1933)

In order to develop production and cooperatives, readjust grain supplies, expand exports and imports so as to break the enemy's blockade, restrain exploitation by merchants, further improve the lives of the worker and peasant masses, and provide adequate material conditions for the revolutionary war, the Central Government hereby decides to accept the request of the congress of the poor peasant league and of local governments at all levels to issue 3,000,000 *yuan* in economic construction bonds. It also decides to adopt the regulations on economic construction bonds as legal guarantees for these bonds.

The issuance of these bonds depends entirely, however, on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the worker and peasant masses; they must be purchased voluntarily and willingly by the masses and quotas must absolutely not be imposed. Governments at all levels, especially municipal, district, and township soviets, must convene meetings of local mass organizations and give clear explanations. Township soviets must explain clearly to all the deputies at their congresses of deputies. Mass meetings of individual villages and hamlets must be convened through the various mass organizations and township deputies to explain the significance of the issuance of these bonds to every worker and peasant comrade. When the masses buy the bonds, it is up to them to decide how much to buy; the method of imposing uniform quotas is totally unacceptable. In addition to getting the worker and peasant masses to buy as much as possible, other residents of the soviet areas may also buy the bonds without any limit. All the popular masses in our soviet areas should, in their own interest and for the victory of the revolutionary war, come forward and buy the bonds, and help the government sell the bonds in order to finish the sale of these bonds within a short period of time and rapidly achieve the goal of developing the national economy. If counterrevolu-

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 143–44, where it has been reproduced from the Chen Cheng collection.

tionary elements create rumors and make trouble to sabotage the credit of the bonds and obstruct their sale, the worker and peasant masses should, under the leadership of the government, take revolutionary measures to suppress these counterrevolutionaries and safeguard the smooth progress of the work of economic construction. This is hereby proclaimed.

**Appendix: Regulations on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds<sup>1</sup>**

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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<sup>1</sup>. This document, which appears above under the date of July 22, 1933, is omitted here.

## *Unfold a Mass Movement to Support a National Currency*

(August 28, 1933)

A national currency is a tool for developing the national economy and facilitating business transactions among the masses. The government has a fixed plan and adequate guarantees with regard to the amount of national currency in circulation and its strength and stability. Recently in some places there have arisen the phenomena of mistrusting the national paper currency and silver coins or devaluing the paper currency. The reason these phenomena have appeared is that because of the vigorous development of the revolutionary war, the imperialist Guomindang has adopted a policy of economic blockade, and has gone so far as to produce counterfeit silver coins to pass off in the soviet areas to undermine confidence in the soviet currency. At the same time, because of the deepening class struggle in the soviet areas, unscrupulous merchants, rich peasants, and remnants of the landlords are striving desperately to cause trouble internally in an attempt to sabotage the money market. On the one hand they hoard cash to prevent it from circulating, and on the other hand they fabricate rumors, refuse to use paper currency and silver coins, and openly or surreptitiously raise prices and reduce the value of paper currency. These are the heinous plots and schemes of the counterrevolutionaries within and without to sabotage the revolution. The Central Government has ordered the presidiums, finance departments, judicial departments, and political security bureaus of all local governments to mobilize in unison to carry out the following measures immediately, so as to smash the plots of the reactionaries to sabotage the economy of the soviet areas.

1. Carry out widespread propaganda and explanation among the masses. In addition to proclamations issued by the Central Government, provincial and *xian* governments are also to issue proclamations urging the masses to use the national currency universally and rousing the masses to unite and deal with the counterrevolutionaries. Governments at all levels must call together conferences of all local organs and mass organizations, organize and send out propaganda teams to explain that people can have faith in the soviet paper and silver currency, explain the important political, military, financial, and economic significance of having paper currency in circulation at present, and put forth slogans

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This article was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 106, August 28, 1933, and we have translated it from that source. The article is signed simply "Dong," but according to the *Nianpu*, vol. 1, p. 410, it is by Mao.

such as "Support the Soviet Paper Currency," and "Revolutionary Masses Use Revolutionary Paper Currency," and have the masses request that the soviets severely punish those elements who willfully sabotage the currency. This is the way to call upon the masses to create a big movement to support the national currency.

2. Call together meetings of merchants and vendors to explain that the soviet currency is backed by the entire national income, that it can be converted when cash is needed for export, the distinction between soviet silver coins and the counterfeit copper coins manufactured by the enemy, measures for punishing those who do not use the national currency, and so on, so that they may understand fully. After the meetings it is necessary to send people to investigate, and if there are still those engaged in sabotage, severe measures must be taken to punish several ringleaders, especially among the unscrupulous merchants, landlords, and rich peasants, who should without delay be arrested, fined, or even be subject to confiscation or execution by shooting.

3. All organs and armed forces without exception must use the [national] paper currency and silver coins, and send all cash collected, no matter how much or how little, to branch treasuries to be transmitted to nearby exchange stations or banks so that the paper currency may be exchanged for ready cash.

In this way a movement to support the soviet national currency will unfold among the broad masses!

# *A Preliminary Summing Up of the Land Investigation Movement*

(August 1933)

## **I. A Great Victory**

The Land Investigation Movement has already unfolded extensively under the call of the Party and the Central Government. If one were to say that in the past the Land Investigation Movement was only at the beginning stages, then in the one month of work during July, after the eight *xian* meeting on land investigation in June, it has exceeded the results achieved during the past six months since last winter. Generally speaking, in the eight *xian* that participated in the meeting, the Land Investigation Movement has taken on a new form; it has already become a broad mass movement. Ruijin and Bosheng have achieved the greatest results, with more than two thousand and several hundred households of landlords and rich peasants discovered in the two *xian* taken together. The *xian* of Shengli, Yudu, Huichang, Tingdong,<sup>1</sup> Changting, Shicheng, and Ninghua have also achieved some initial results. In all districts and townships that have some land investigation results, a broad mass struggle has been launched. Many aspects of soviet and Party work that were previously in a stagnant condition have now come to life. A considerable number of bad elements within the soviets have been purged, and counterrevolutionary elements concealed in the countryside have been rigorously suppressed. In a word, the remnant feudal forces have suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the masses. Upon this basis, all sorts of work has further unfolded. In areas where land investigation has obtained results, enormous achievements have been made in expanding the Red Army and local armed forces; in selling economic development bonds and developing co-operatives; in autumn harvesting and planting and developing mutual labor co-operatives; and in institutions for cultural development, such as clubs, evening schools, and primary schools. All of our work has been proceeding more

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Our source for this document is *Hongqi zhoubao*, no. 61, October 30, 1933, pp. 45–61; it was first published in *Douzheng*, no. 24, August 29, 1933. The version in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 341–56, reproduces the same text, but contains a few wrong characters.

1. This *xian* was not among those which participated in the eight-*xian* meetings in June. From the Chinese characters for its name, which can be read "Eastern Ting," it seems likely that Tingdong was a newly created administrative area carved out of existing Changting *xian*.

smoothly than before. On the basis of enthusiasm on the part of the masses, a large number of active elements have turned themselves into cadres in various kinds of work. Many worker and peasant activists have joined the Party and been drawn into the work of the soviets. The best example is Rentian District in Ruijin. During a period of fifty-five days, the Land Investigation Movement in Rentian District, with the help of a Central Government work team, roused the masses of the entire district to action; radically destroyed the feudal remnants; uncovered more than three hundred households of landlords and rich peasants; shot twelve counterrevolutionary elements, called "big tigers" by the masses; and suppressed counterrevolutionary activities. Some elements among the soviet staff workers who had committed serious mistakes were exposed before the masses, and a number of class-alien elements who had wormed their way into the soviets were purged. In the whole district, 27,000 *Dan* of land have been uncovered. More than twenty thousand people of the toiling masses in the entire district have received an average of approximately 1.2 *Dan* of extra rice fields per person. Large amounts of property of the despotic gentry and landlords have been distributed to the masses. Thanks to the unprecedented rise in the enthusiasm of the masses, within fifty-five days the Red Army was expanded by more than seven hundred people who joined Ruijin's model division, and not a single one of them deserted. The amount of grain saved to sell to the Red Army amounted to more than 1,900 *Dan*, and no other district in the *xian* could match this one. At the request of the various townships, the whole district assumed responsibility for selling 40,000 *yuan* of economic development bonds. Already 7,500 *yuan* have been collected from fines imposed on landlords and donations from rich peasants, and another 10,000 *yuan* have been recognized and are in the process of being collected. Cooperatives have developed rapidly, and cultural and educational construction has also increased in the form of such institutions as clubs, literacy classes, and evening schools. The number of Party members has risen, the Party's leadership has been strengthened, and the work of the labor unions has also progressed. The entire district has taken on a new look, changing its position within fifty-five days from being one of Ruijin's backward districts to being a first-rate one on a par with Wuyang District. Let us now ask: why did Rentian District achieve such great results? We should point out then: it is because they recognized the importance of the task of land investigation; because in their mobilization methods, class line, and mass work they resolutely carried out the correct directives of the Central Bureau and the Central Government; and because they have done the work of real Bolsheviks. As far as recognizing responsibility is concerned, they have understood the close relationship between the Land Investigation Movement and the revolutionary war, and therefore they took this work seriously, firmly grasped the leadership of the Land Investigation Movement, and arranged the local work in a planned manner. As regards the approach to mobilization, they paid particular attention to the work in the seven most backward and relatively backward of the eleven townships in the



district. In these seven townships they mobilized the Party, the [Young Communist] League, the township soviets, the labor unions, the poor peasant league, and other mass organizations, and through them mobilized the broad masses. As for the class line, they resolutely carried out the tactic of relying upon the farm laborers and poor peasants and allying with the middle peasants, and they organized the poor peasant league on a broad scale. They explained that land investigation is not land redistribution, and that class investigation does not mean investigating the classes of middle peasants, poor peasants, or farm laborers, and on the whole did a thorough job of "taking class into account." When the landlords and rich peasants in Efeng Township intimidated middle peasants and caused panic among some of them, our comrades invited several middle peasants for individual conversations and through them spread the word to other middle peasants. The middle peasants of Efeng Township immediately became stable and then enthusiastically supported the soviet land investigation policy, going from being deceived by the landlords and rich peasants to uniting with the poor peasants and workers to attack the landlords and rich peasants. The comrades in Rentian District also made erroneous class designations in the case of some families, but they quickly corrected their mistakes. As for the work of leading the masses in struggle, they first conducted extensive propaganda, not by holding meetings for entire districts or townships, but rather by village meetings and hamlet meetings. In this way they got close to an even broader spectrum of the masses and conducted propaganda and agitation among them continually. Consequently, the masses of the entire district all understood that land and class investigations were their own responsibility and in their own interests. In addition, when they investigated class status, they stimulated a large number of people to conduct investigations, and detailed materials and evidence were collected about each class status for the masses to examine, so that no incidents arose involving dissatisfaction among the masses. Moreover, approving class status designations involved, first, analysis and decision by the land investigation committee, which were reported to the poor peasant league for discussion and approval, and then handed over to the district soviet for approval. After this, a meeting of the local masses would be called in the village of the person whose land had been confiscated, clear explanations would be given, approval would be indicated by a show of hands, and then confiscation would be carried out. In redistributing property and land, the personnel involved all understood that they should act in an exemplary way, taking nothing for themselves and giving everything to the masses. In villages where confiscation was carried out, more was distributed, and in other villages, less was distributed, thus fully satisfying the masses. Land was also redistributed quickly, and the phenomenon that occurred in other places of taking a very long time before land was distributed did not happen in Rentian District, so that the masses were rapidly mobilized. Their method of penetrating backward large villages was also correct. They did not fear these large villages, nor did they use reckless methods to deal with them. They concentrated their fire

power on large villages and conducted even more propaganda, starting by winning over local activists, uniting them and educating them, and then instigating the rest of the masses through them. They did the work in such villages with a great deal of patience. On the surface it appeared slow, but it was fast in reality. Within fifty-five days they had mobilized all the backward large villages in Rentian District without exception, and eliminated the backwardness of these villages in a very short period of time. A certain village in Bokeng Township could not be penetrated, as two notorious "big tigers" were always making trouble there. So they adopted a different method. First they caught these two unsavory characters and put them on trial by holding a travelling court on the spot. With the warm support of the masses they were shot, and this caused the mass struggle there to flare up like wildfire. They held ten mass trials and three travelling courts, all of which relied on an extensive mass line. More people attended from the local township, and other townships sent representatives from each village, a dozen or so from small townships and forty or fifty from big townships. Therefore, the results of each public trial and judgment spread immediately to each village and township of the entire district. This not only made the masses in every township and village feel that the person on trial that day ought to be punished or killed, but instantly reminded them that those elements engaged in evil activities in their own villages and townships should also be dealt with. Indeed, the Land Investigation Movement in Rentian District can be considered a model for the entire soviet area! The work in Ruijin's Jiubao District also achieved great results. First they made concentrated efforts in three townships by calling together for a three-day training course at the district soviet members of the land investigation committee of each *xian*, where they explained mobilization methods, the class line, and methods of winning over the masses. For the problem of confiscation and redistribution, they created an excellent method. Their method was that when they were about to confiscate a landlord's property, they would call upon the masses of the same village and hamlet to go together, and at a mass meeting select a confiscation and redistribution committee that would carry out the confiscation under the supervision of the masses. The confiscated items would be piled up in a large yard and immediately redistributed with the consent of the masses to those who should receive them. There was a different way of handling edible goods, which was to slaughter pigs and cook meals to let the masses have a feast together. This method achieved enormous results in Jiubao District. Their confiscation and redistribution committee was not organized on a permanent basis, but rather on an ad hoc basis, which made for even closer ties with the masses (confiscation and redistribution of land remained the responsibility of a permanent land committee). Nothing was carried to the district soviet, and there was no pooling together of [goods from] several households before redistribution took place, to avoid the problems of undue delay and of theft. Generally, Jiubao District was also correct on other questions of line and method, and therefore it was able to mobilize the broad masses to act

on their own initiative to investigate class status. They managed to make it so that not a single landlord or rich peasant went to the district soviet to protest his class status designation, which is completely the opposite of the situation during land investigation in the past. Previously there were always plenty of landlords and rich peasants whose status was investigated appearing at the soviets to make a fuss, claiming that their designation was wrong. Not only they themselves but sometimes even township representatives and those in charge of the poor peasant league would come forward to argue their cases and vouch for them. Of course, this time it's not that the landlords and rich peasants stopped making a fuss, but rather that they couldn't make trouble even if they wanted to. None of their clansmen or relatives took sides with them, so the landlords and rich peasants lost heart and were unable to stir up any trouble. This proved that the work of mobilizing the masses in Jiubao District was done very thoroughly. Otherwise, they could not have achieved this.

All these examples of glorious models (and there are many more such examples in other places) represent a Bolshevik response to the call of the Party and the Central Government, and prove the absolute correctness of the instructions of the Central Bureau and the Central Government. Wherever these instructions are fully carried out, the place in question will immediately win a great victory. But wherever these instructions are violated or disregarded, the work in such a place will commit mistakes, and there will be no results or very feeble results. Let me once again adduce facts to prove this.

## II. Some Places Have Abandoned Leadership over the Land Investigation Movement

As for the fighting tasks of the Land Investigation Movement, after the Central Bureau issued its resolution on land investigation<sup>2</sup> and after the Central Government issued its order on land investigation and called the eight *xian* meeting on land investigation, the unfolding of the Land Investigation Movement in various *xian* did not spread everywhere. For example, the results of land investigation in the entire province of Fujian match the results for only the single *xian* of Bosheng. The results in the *xian* of Shengli, Yudu, Huichang, and Shicheng match the results of only one or two of the best districts in Ruijin. In various places, many district land investigation committees have never held a single meeting, and even some *xian* land investigation committees have failed to attend to land investigation work in their whole *xian* (Huichang, Yudu, Shicheng, and Ninghua). In the case of many district and township land investigation committees, under the pretext of being too busy with other matters the district and township chairmen have not assumed responsibility, abandoning land investigation altogether. In all places where land investigation has produced results, the

2. The reference is to the resolution of the Central Bureau of June 2, 1933. For the text, see *Central Committee Documents*, 1933, pp. 206-10.

party's leadership over land investigation has clearly shown the Party's powerful leadership role. The majority of Party members and of the masses have done a great deal of heroic Bolshevik fighting work under the leadership of the Party branches and district committees. In all places where land investigation has produced no results or weak results, on the other hand, it has been demonstrated that the Party organ has neglected the Land Investigation Movement. For example, the Huichang *xian* committee did not hold a single discussion on the work of land investigation for about two months after the Central Bureau issued its Resolution on Land Investigation, and not until the end of July did it have one meeting to discuss land investigation. The Buxiao District committee in Ruijin completely ignored the Land Investigation Movement for a certain period of time. Although the Ruijin City urban district committee did meet once on land investigation, there was no impetus for the Party branches in the four surrounding areas to pay attention to leadership of the land investigation, and none of the Party branches had meetings on the Land Investigation Movement. In other places, such as Yudu, Shengli, Shicheng, and Ninghua, the *xian* committees and many district committees likewise failed to make a lot of effort to attend to land investigation work. The Party and the Central Government have said, "The Land Investigation Movement should become a class struggle that mobilizes the masses and penetrates the countryside and an effective method for thoroughly solving the land problem and eradicating feudal and semifeudal influences" (Resolution of the Central Bureau).<sup>3</sup> "It is an urgent task that does not admit of the slightest delay for the soviets everywhere to carry out the Land Investigation Movement" (Order of the Central Government).<sup>4</sup> "The Land Investigation Movement is the most essential link in our work at this moment" (conclusions of the eight *xian* meeting).<sup>5</sup> But many of our comrades are saying: "We are too busy, we have no time to take care of the Land Investigation Movement." The Party's resolution stated, "It is most harmful to adopt an indifferent attitude of bureaucratism and formalism toward the Land Investigation Movement." Yet these comrades continue to deal with the Land Investigation Movement in a bureaucratic and formalistic manner.

### III. Some Localities Even Capitulate to Landlords and Rich Peasants

In localities where the Land Investigation Movement has developed, there have been many instances of individual but serious mistakes. This is to say that, in the local Party organizations and soviets in these localities, one often encounters individual comrades who display opportunistic wavering in the face of such a fierce class struggle as the Land Investigation Movement. This is manifested

3. See par. 2 of the resolution of June 2, 1933, in *Central Committee Documents*, 1933, p. 207.

4. See above, the introductory paragraph to Order No. 11 of the Provisional Central Government, June 1, 1933.

5. See above, the introduction to the "Conclusions" of June 21, 1933.

principally in the fact that, when the Land Investigation Movement is developing fiercely, they are unable to divest themselves of clan and local ties, and shield landlord and rich peasant elements who have the same family names or live in the same villages. Or they analyze class status incorrectly, classifying landlords as rich peasants and rich peasants as middle peasants. Some comrades working in the Commissariat for Justice, in their extreme negligence, have accepted false charges brought against the activists in the Land Investigation Movement by landlords and rich peasants in the name of the masses. On the other hand, some of our comrades in the Security Bureau and the Commissariat for Justice have also failed to follow the masses in investigating the development of class struggle and in actively suppressing counterrevolution. Even when the masses asked them to arrest and execute the landlord and rich peasant elements who were resisting land investigation, they refused to accede to the demands of the masses. The Commissariat for Justice in Ruijin, which made many such mistakes, is an example.

#### **IV. The Tendency to Violate the Interests of the Middle Peasants Is an Extremely Grave Danger**

The "left" opportunist tendency also manifested itself in many localities during land investigation in July. It should be forcefully emphasized here that this was the tendency to violate the interests of middle peasants. And yet it was clearly stated long ago in the resolution of the Central Bureau: "We must pay special attention to our alliance with middle peasants; middle peasants make up the broadest basic masses in the soviet countryside after the revolution. All our policies and tactics must gain their endorsement and support. Every decision by the poor peasant league and the soviet must gain support from the middle peasantry at the mass meeting of any village or hamlet. We must heed every call of the middle peasantry. We must strike hard at any attempts to violate the interests of middle peasants."<sup>6</sup> In the conclusions of the eight *xian* meeting, it is pointed out: "The aim of land investigation is the investigation of class, not a redivision of land." "As for uniting with the middle peasants, we must start from the premise of not violating the interests of the middle peasants." "At the beginning of land investigation, the policy of the soviets of uniting with the middle peasants and not infringing their interests must be widely proclaimed. In the course of land investigation, we must be highly cautious in dealing with those ambiguous elements whose status is situated between the middle peasants and the rich peasants, so that we do not fall into error."<sup>7</sup> But comrades in many

6. See par. 3 of the Central Bureau resolution of June 2, 1933, *Central Committee Documents*, 1933, p. 209.

7. See above, section II of the "Conclusions" adopted by the eight *xian* meeting, June 21, 1933.

localities paid no heed at all to such instructions. Land investigation in Ruijin Urban District started with auditing the land of each household from the very beginning, thus causing panic among middle peasants. Some middle peasants even went to the soviet to ask that their class status be changed. They wanted to be reclassified as poor peasants, saying, "Middle peasants are in great danger; they become rich peasants if their designation is upgraded a little; once they change it to poor peasant, there is a greater distance between them and rich peasants." Aren't these cries of distress worthy of our attention? The comrades in Yanggu Township in Huangbai District said to the masses, "The investigation of class backgrounds does not investigate classes other than middle peasants, rich peasants, and landlords." The comrades of Daojing District put up signs [in front of middle peasant households] and conducted coercive investigations, forcing some middle peasants to flee in terror to the mountains. In some townships in Bosheng *xian*, similar signs were put up and investigations were conducted everywhere. The result was that middle peasants were similarly panic-stricken. Long ago, the conclusions of the eight *xian* meeting stated, "The view that what land investigation means is sticking up signs is wrong." But these comrades paid no attention at all to this. This practice of putting up signs and conducting investigations everywhere occurred in every *xian*; this was an extremely serious situation. They confused land investigation and land redistribution. It is true that signs should be put up during land redistribution. This involved counting every piece of land before redistribution was carried out. But if this method was applied to the Land Investigation Movement, that would confuse the target of struggle in the countryside. We pointed out in the past: "Land investigation must be strictly distinguished from land redistribution. Such a distinction not only stabilizes the peasants' ownership of the land and spares them the panic caused by anxieties about the uncertainties of land redistribution, but also contributes to the victory of the struggle to investigate class backgrounds. We must muster all the power we have, especially our unity with the middle peasants, to beat back the resistance from the landlords and rich peasants. At such moments, there must be no divisions within the ranks of the peasants themselves" (Conclusions of the Eight *xian* Meeting).<sup>8</sup> Such tactics are an important part of our comprehensive strategy for leading the land investigation struggle. They have, however, been neglected by many comrades. Such negligence cannot be tolerated for another moment. Those who purposefully commit such mistakes even after they are directed not to should be severely punished by the soviet at the next higher level above the locality in question. An ideological struggle should be waged within the Party and the [Youth] League to oppose the thinking and action of any members of the Party and the League who violate the interests of the middle peasants and the policy of uniting with the middle peasants. In those localities

8. See the "Conclusions" of June 21, 1933, Section II, par. 3. (Unlike the other citations in this document, the previous passage is part quotation, part summary.)

that have already made mistakes, such as confiscation of the land and property of middle peasants, the soviet workers should publicly admit their mistakes to the masses of middle peasants in the locality in question and return to them their land and property. Last year Xingguo returned land to many middle peasants and thereby satisfied the local middle peasant masses. This was a precious lesson.

#### **V. Closed-Doorism of the Poor Peasant League and Neglect of the Leadership Role of Farm Laborers Are Wrong**

"The poor peasant masses are the pillar of the Party and the proletariat in the countryside. They are firm supporters for carrying out the land revolution thoroughly." "Rely on the poor peasants." This is one of our important strategies in the Land Investigation Movement and in the land struggle as a whole. Moreover, the poor peasant league is an organization with an extremely important role to play in the Land Investigation Movement. The congress of the poor peasant league in eight *xian* has already pointed out that the previous tendency of the league toward closed-doorism was wrong. The system of introductions should be abolished, and the door should be opened widely to poor peasants and workers, so that every poor peasant, whether man or woman, old or young, can sign up and join the league. But many localities still adhere to the old practice and refuse to change. They continue to bar new applicants without introduction from joining the poor peasant league. In Daojing District of Ruijin, when poor peasants who had not joined came to attend the meetings of the poor peasant league, those in charge of the league even went so far as to refuse to allow them to participate. In Zhuzhaiji District of Bosheng *xian*, the poor peasant league did not admit a single person during the entire month of July. In all those districts and townships where land investigation has been successful, the poor peasant league has developed extensively. In the districts and townships that have made no progress or only slight progress, on the other hand, one of the symptoms was the state of closed-doorism of the poor peasant league. The great leading role of the farm laborers in the Land Investigation Movement was similarly not recognized by many comrades. The Party's resolution states, "The masses of farm laborers are the brothers of the urban proletariat in the countryside. They are the vanguard in the agrarian revolution. . . . Consequently, those who work in the soviet [governments] must establish close ties with labor unions and, through the labor unions, develop and organize the activism of the masses of the workers, so as to make of them the vanguard in the Land Investigation Movement."<sup>9</sup> But it is still only a minority of our comrades who act according to this instruction. The principal method here is to let rural workers join the poor peasant league and form independent small groups of workers within it, through which activist poor peasants

9. See par. 2 of the resolution of June 2, 1933, *Central Committee Documents*, 1933, p. 208.

may then be united and the poor peasant league developed, thus advancing the Land Investigation Movement. The experience of Shanhe Township of Huangbai District is invaluable. When our comrades failed twice to call a meeting of the poor peasant league, they convened a joint meeting of the rural labor union and the handicraft workers' union, stimulating several dozen workers to become activists. Every one of them led a poor peasant element to join the poor peasant league. The poor peasant league had a meeting the next day, everybody came as expected, and the Land Investigation Movement was launched in Shanhe Township. The experience of Shanhe Township should be applied to all rural areas. The higher leading organs in the labor unions here should provide subordinate branches with active guidance and treat the task of land investigation as one of the important missions of the labor unions.

## **VI. Incorrect Views on the Question of Rich Peasants**

Our comprehensive strategy for the struggle in the countryside is to rely on the poor peasants, ally firmly with the middle peasants, and let farm laborers play the role of the vanguard; unite all the revolutionary forces; destroy the landlord class; and oppose rich peasants. On the question of rich peasants, the Party has correctly said, "Landlords must be clearly distinguished from rich peasants. In the ruthless struggle to destroy landlords and their remnants, no attempt to destroy the rich peasants will be tolerated." In the land investigations during July, although no theory openly advocating the destruction of rich peasants was discovered, it was discovered that in many places the rich peasants were treated as landlords and had all their property confiscated. The source of this mistake was the nonrecognition of the labor of rich peasants. When we said, "Landlords are those who do not labor or engage in only secondary labor, but do have land to rent and engage in other types of exploitation," some places treated people who devoted a fairly substantial amount of labor to production as contributing only "secondary labor" and regarded them as landlords. Some places treated rich peasants who also made high-interest loans on the side as "usurers" and used the method of "destroying usurers" to deal with such rich peasants. Some places dug out old accounts and took into consideration things done years before the revolution. One person hired a long-term laborer five or six years, or even a dozen years, before the revolution, and he was treated as a rich peasant. And some well-to-do middle peasants who had hired long-term laborers for one or two years, but had not hired any laborers before or after that, were also placed in the same category as rich peasants. A more serious case occurred previously in a certain locality in Xingguo. There they adopted the method of distinguishing between landlords and rich peasants on the basis of the number of types of exploitation. Those who engaged in three types of exploitation were classified as landlords; those who engaged in two types of exploitation were treated as rich peasants. For example, if someone hired long-term laborers, collected rent, and



made loans, he was treated as a landlord regardless of how many members of his household engaged in labor. There was also the question of "reactionary rich peasants," which was turned into a muddle in many places. In Wuyang District, the household of one rich peasant who was also a merchant had seventeen mouths to feed. Because one member of his family had previously joined the AB Corps, he was executed two years ago. Two years later, the comrades there insisted on confiscating the property of the entire family. In many other localities, a number of similar incidents occurred, involving rich peasants who had committed not very serious counterrevolutionary acts before the uprising, such as their participation in "collecting 30 percent of the harvest as rent," and so on (Ruijin), and who had not engaged in counterrevolutionary activities for several years after the uprising. The majority of the masses did not demand that they be punished, but some of our comrades insisted on confiscating their property. Correctly speaking, our tactics for dealing with such elements should be different, depending on whether the area in question has been consolidated or not. In the border areas, there is no doubt that we should employ severe methods and suppress all counterrevolutionary elements, including rich peasants. In the central area, we should decide individually depending on circumstances. Those who committed serious counterrevolutionary acts before the uprising or continued to engage in counterrevolutionary activities after the uprising should naturally have their property resolutely confiscated. Otherwise, their property should not be confiscated. In some households, only the property of the perpetrator himself and those elements directly involved in his counterrevolutionary acts should be confiscated; the property of others should not be confiscated. This is the only correct way of handling the matter.

## **VII. The Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate Failed to Assume the Responsibilities It Should Have Assumed and Made Mistakes**

Many of our comrades in the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate did not recognize that the Land Investigation Movement offered the best opportunity for launching ideological struggle; opposing bureaucratism; opposing embezzlement, corruption, passivity and going slow; and purging class-alien elements from the soviets. They were grossly deficient in dealing with these tasks. In the face of this fierce class struggle, many of our comrades in the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate demonstrated their passivity and lack of firmness, their bureaucratism and formalism. Things even went so far that the head of the department of the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate in the municipal soviet of Ruijin covered up the extremely great acts of embezzlement (the private use of more than 1,000 *yuan* of government funds) committed by the head of the department of justice of the municipal soviet. The head of the department of the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate in Dutou District did nothing about the abandonment of the Land Investigation Movement by the chairman of the dis-

strict soviet; he did not criticize or expose the chairman. In the course of the accusation movement carried out by the Workers' and Peasants' Procuratorate, a wrong direction was taken in some places. Love was treated as dissolute behavior, seizures of landlords' assets were regarded as embezzlement, and individuals who committed such acts were publicly accused or even put on trial. In some places, people who made very slight mistakes were fired from their positions. They did not launch systematic self-criticism and ideological struggle; they dispensed with such arduous work and replaced it with a simplistic penchant for punishment.<sup>10</sup> Needless to say, those elements among the employees of the soviets who had been making serious mistakes for a long time should be resolutely eliminated, but it was excessive to hand out such punishment as dismissal when the seriousness of the mistake had not reached any such degree. As for the problem of class-alien elements, it was a widespread practice to take account only of class status and neglect performance. If a person was from a bad class background, it did not matter how long he had participated in the struggle or how correctly he had carried out the line and policies of the Party and the soviet in the past and at the present time; all such individuals were, without exception, labelled as class-alien elements and kicked out. It is perfectly true that we must resolutely purge those class-alien elements who have a bad class status and have also performed poorly (including landlords, rich peasants, slackers, and those who go slow in their work, or engage in embezzlement and corruption). But it was excessive to purge those who could not be characterized in this way.

### VIII. On the Art of Leadership in the Land Investigation Struggle

If we understand the task and the line, but do not possess the Bolshevik art of leading mass struggles, we will still not be able to promote the Land Investigation Movement. At the beginning of this article, we have already described many excellent examples of leading the struggle, such as Rentian District and other places. But in many other localities, quite a few mistakes have been committed in this respect. In some places, they did not know what methods to use to launch struggles in the backward large villages with a high concentration of landlords and rich peasants. For example, in larger villages, struggle can be launched in such a locality only by first arresting those despotic gentry and landlords whom the masses call "big tigers." But our comrades did not do this. Many localities were also unaware that they should employ the most excellent method of using the redistribution of confiscated assets to mobilize the masses for struggle. In Wazi Township of Daojing District in Ruijin, it was even the case that confiscated goods were distributed only to cadres and committee members of the poor peasant league involved in land investigation, but not to anyone else. The reason

10. *Chengbanzhuyi*, literally "punishmentism."

given was that those who were not themselves activists should not receive anything. In some places it took a long time to redistribute confiscated goods; sometimes a month passed after confiscation without the goods being redistributed to the masses. The speed of redistributing the confiscated land was even slower. Our comrades in quite a few localities did not know about mobilizing the various departments of the soviet and the various mass organizations. They did not know about mobilizing all the Party and League members to play the role of a leading nucleus in every mass organization, every village and hamlet. When they failed to make any progress in their work, they would say, "There's no way we can do anything here." In some localities, when the masses had already been mobilized for the struggle to investigate class backgrounds, and when many peasants came to report on landlords and rich peasants and to request that they be investigated and their property confiscated, our comrades were unable to seize this great upsurge immediately and lead the masses to launch the struggle and carry the work of investigating class backgrounds to every village. In some places, when the enthusiasm of the mass struggle stopped rising after a period of investigation and when stagnation began to set in, our comrades were unable to use various methods to encourage the masses and to make the struggle continue to rise, until they led the masses to destroy the last remnants of feudalism. In many localities, when the Land Investigation Movement had been carried out and the mass struggles had developed enthusiastically and vigorously, our comrades did not know how to channel such enthusiasm to other fronts—for example, when the masses had received goods and land at a mass meeting right then or on all other favorable occasions, by encouraging the masses to join the Red Army, to buy treasury bonds, and to join the cooperatives; by encouraging the masses to step up their work of autumn harvesting and autumn planting; by setting up clubs and reading classes and opening evening schools and primary schools. They let slip such excellent opportunities and waited for higher levels to urge them to undertake such work; only then did they start once again to carry out propaganda and agitation. Such tailist leadership that trails behind the enthusiasms of the mass struggle is most harmful to the work of the revolution.

On the other hand, in many other localities there arose a small number of very bad cases in which individuals acted recklessly. We have emphatically pointed out: Oppose the work style that neglects winning over a majority of the masses and uses only the commandist work style. Only by patiently and arduously doing the work of mobilizing and winning over the masses can the support of the majority of the masses be won and the goal of destroying feudal remnants be reached. This type of mass work is the only guarantee for carrying out the class line. At the beginning of the Land Investigation Movement, an extensive propaganda campaign must be conducted in all villages and hamlets, explaining to the masses the necessity of the Land Investigation Movement and assuring them that land investigation is not land redistribution and investigating classes is not investigating the classes of the middle peasants, poor peasants, or farm laborers. It is

especially important to analyse clearly for the masses what is meant by landlord, rich peasant, and middle peasant. The mass meetings in villages and hamlets should not be held only once. In particular, numerous such meetings should be held in those backward villages and hamlets. We should see to it that there is not a single member of the revolutionary masses who does not hear our propaganda. In order to reach this goal, we should first of all provide clear explanations to all the activists at congresses of the township soviets, the labor union, the poor peasant league, deputies of women workers and peasants, and other mass bodies. Through them, propaganda can be conducted among the broad masses. Investigating classes should not be the responsibility of a few; we should mobilize the majority of the people to conduct the investigations. Class status should be approved not only by the poor peasant league and the township and district soviets, but at mass meetings in the villages and hamlets of those whose property is being confiscated. Only after the masses have given their approval can confiscation be carried out. When goods are redistributed, they should be given to the masses in the villages and hamlets in question, in order that they may be satisfied. All this is for the purpose of winning over the majority of the masses. At all times and in every item of work, Party and soviet workers must never forget the majority of the masses. We want to cater to the needs of the masses, and this means catering to the needs of the majority of the masses. Our work should penetrate deeply among the masses, among the masses in every large or small village or hamlet, and in every large or small town. We must sternly oppose the erroneous method of closed-doorism and commandism on the part of a minority. But our comrades in many localities have entirely failed to obey this injunction. In many districts and townships in Ruijin, not a single lecture on class was given to the masses (there was no analysis of who should be classified as a landlord, rich peasant, or middle peasant). In many localities in Ruijin and other *xian*, it was discovered that investigation was conducted without carrying out any propaganda at all, thus enabling landlords and rich peasants to spread rumors to deceive the middle peasants, saying that there were many landlords and rich peasants in the township in question, or that there were several hundred households of landlords and rich peasants in the township who would be investigated (Ruijin). Our comrades, on the other hand, did not know how to use the method of clearly "talking about classes" to discredit such rumors. The landlords in Guangchang said, "The Land Investigation Movement is one in which the Central Government wants debtors who owed money in the past to repay their debts to the Central Government." Our comrades did not expose such nonsense immediately. In several townships of Daojing District, apart from the failure to conduct propaganda, only a few people in the land investigation committee were in charge of investigating classes. Not only was the approval of class designations not laid before mass meetings; it was not even submitted to the poor peasant league. They said, "The masses are unreliable, and they are incapable of analyzing classes. To present class status to mass meetings for approval will lead

to disputes; it is more reliable for them simply to be approved by the land investigation committee." This theory of the comrades of Daojing District is indeed the most absurd thing in the world! In quite a few localities, the confiscation of landlords' property was carried out not during the day but at night, the only justification being that they were afraid the landlords might slip away. When another place had a mass meeting, calling it a "meeting of the whole district," fewer than two hundred people attended. Three speakers took turns making speeches, from morning through afternoon, allowing the masses no time to take rest, drink tea, or eat, saying that they were afraid the masses might run away. This kind of reckless method also qualifies as absurd.

### **IX. Wage the Struggle Between Two Lines, Overcome Our Mistakes, and Win Complete Victory in the Land Investigation Movement**

There is no doubt that the Land Investigation Movement has been launched in a vast area. But when this movement is making progress, when we have correctly estimated the results we have gained so far and laid the foundation for the further development of the movement, we still need to watch out vigilantly for obstacles in the course of the movement. Only by opening fire in the struggle between two lines to remove these obstacles can the Land Investigation Movement be pushed forward at greater speed. It is the duty of every member of the Communist Party to launch the ideological struggle against rightist tendencies, to oppose underestimation of the significance of the Land Investigation Movement, to oppose compromise with and surrender to landlords and rich peasants, and to oppose tailist leadership trailing behind the struggles of the masses. At the same time, the attention of all the members of the Party must be called to the danger of violating the interests of the middle peasants; we must "strike severe blows at any attempts to violate the interests of the middle peasants" because this is an extremely serious danger that has clearly revealed itself in the current work of land investigation. The incorrect views about rich peasants will also undoubtedly affect the middle peasants. All reckless commandist actions constitute the greatest danger to our alliance with the middle peasants. Once we open fire in the struggle between two lines and clear all the obstacles on the road of the Land Investigation Movement, the movement will progress by leaps and bounds and its complete victory will be fully guaranteed.

# *Proletariat and Oppressed Peoples of the World, Unite!*

## *Telegram of the Central Government to the International Conference Against Imperialism and War<sup>1</sup>*

(August 30, 1933)

To the representatives to the International Conference Against Imperialism and War, to be communicated to the proletariat, the impoverished masses, and all the revolutionaries of the world:

The deepening panic of world capitalism and the end of the temporary stability of postwar capitalism have forced the imperialist bourgeoisie to launch an even more frenzied attack against the proletariat and toiling masses in their own countries, placing the entire burden of the economic crisis on their shoulders, and using the cruelest bloody fascist tactics against the organizations of the working class and all revolutionary activities. In Germany, Italy, Japan, and all the capitalist countries of the world, the mad tide of fascism is waging a life-and-death struggle at present with the revolutionary movement of the working class and toiling popular masses of the world.

In their external relations, the various imperialist countries are currently preparing for a cruel imperialist war to seek a way out of the economic crisis. Their attacks against the Soviet Union and their plundering of the colonies have intensified. First of all, the Japanese imperialists have waged a bandit war in China, occupying China's Three Northeastern Provinces and a huge area in Rehe, Chahar, and the region east of the Luan [River],<sup>2</sup> and placing the fifty million toiling popular

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This telegram was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 106, August 31, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 361–63.

1. As indicated above, in a note to the resolution of July 11, 1933, the Comintern had designated August 1 a “day of international demonstrations against imperialist war” as early as 1929. The “Conference Against Imperialism and War,” which met in Shanghai at the end of August 1933, was a further expression of the same impulse, and received coverage in the publications of the International.

2. The Luan River runs roughly from north to south in the eastern part of Hebei Province. The area between it and the Great Wall was part of the buffer zone established by the Tangu Truce and the Dalian Agreement. See above, the circular telegram opposing the Dalian conference of July 1933.

masses there under the iron heels of the Japanese imperialists. In western China, the British imperialists are making use of Tibetan forces to attack and occupy our Xikang and Sichuan provinces, and are preparing to turn western China completely into a British colony.<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere, the French and American imperialists are similarly vying with each other to divide up the territory of China and are fighting a desperate imperialist war to divide up anew their markets in China!

The evil imperialist bourgeoisie is the common enemy of the proletariat and toiling popular masses of the whole world. It allies itself with the evil White-terrorist Guomindang government in China; it supplies hundreds of millions of gold dollars<sup>4</sup> worth of rifles, guns, warplanes, and poison gas to arm the millions of troops of the Guomindang and attack the bases of the Chinese revolution and the soviet areas in China, in an attempt to destroy the revolutionary movement in China by bloody slaughter. They hope to turn China completely into an imperialist colony, in order to maintain their rule and continue their exploitation and enslavement of the proletariat of their own countries. With such aid from the imperialists, the Guomindang government is launching what is now already the fifth massive attack against the soviet areas in China.

The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic declares to the proletariat and toiling popular masses of the whole world: the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic is the representative of the oppressed popular masses of all China.

In the past, the Chinese Soviet Republic has been consolidated and developed in the war against imperialism. It will deliver a fatal blow to the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the soviet areas now being conducted by the imperialists through the medium of the Guomindang. It repudiates all of the secret treaties concluded by the imperialist powers with the Guomindang government of China. Moreover, it has just issued a call for mobilizing and arming the popular masses of all China to wage a national-revolutionary war against the imperialists' partition of China; overthrow completely the rule of the imperialists in China; establish a soviet political power for all of China; and maintain China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity. It is a powerful companion of the proletariat and toiling popular masses of the whole world in their struggle against imperialism.

Proletarians, toiling popular masses, and revolutionaries of the whole world! On behalf of the oppressed popular masses of all China, the Provisional Central

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3. Tibet had achieved *de facto* independence following the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, but in the eastern part of the Tibetan highlands fiercely independent chieftains continued to go their own way, contributing to a variable and contentious fracture zone separating territory controlled by Lhasa and territory under Chinese control. Britain sought to maintain Tibet in an ambiguous status in which it was nominally subject to but not occupied by China so that it could serve as a compliant buffer north of its colony India. Therefore, Britain gave Tibet limited arms and assistance in strengthening its army to resist a possible Chinese reinvasion.

4. The Chinese is *jin yuan*, which can mean either "gold dollars" or "U.S. dollars."

Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls upon you to stand together with us and overthrow the common enemy of the workers, the toiling popular masses, and the revolutionaries of the whole world—the world imperialist bourgeoisie! Furthermore, we ask you to use every method to stop the imperialists of different countries from sending rifles, guns, airplanes, and poison gas to China to be used to slaughter the Chinese people. Moreover, we ask that you call upon our brothers, the soldiers of your own countries, to oppose imperialist aggression against the colonies and to refuse to slaughter the toiling popular masses of China in the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie!

Proletariat and oppressed nations of the world, unite! Oppose the imperialist wars! Oppose the imperialists' partition of China! Down with world imperialism!

Chairman, Provisional  
Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao



# ***Telegram of Congratulations from the Central Government to the Opening Session of the International Conference Against Imperialism and War***

(August 1933)

To delegates at the International Conference Against Imperialism and War:

On behalf of the workers, peasants, and toiling masses all over China, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic warmly extends a proletarian revolutionary salute to all delegates at the conference! As heroic vanguards of the anti-imperialist front, you have not been deterred by the imperialists' and the Guomindang's White terror, nor by intimidation and obstruction from the fascists and the police and spy networks, and have courageously convened the International Conference Against Imperialism and War in a Shanghai that is under the joint control of international imperialism and has been bombed to ruins by Japanese gangsters. For this we express to you our boundless admiration and fervent hopes!

The opening of the conference means that the international working class and all toiling masses have achieved unprecedentedly great success in the international united front from below.<sup>1</sup> We firmly believe that the conference will certainly be able to lead anti-imperialist fighters of the entire world to take concrete steps against the undeclared war in the Far East which seeks to colonize

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We have translated this telegram from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 365–66, where it is reproduced from *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 107, September 3, 1933.

1. Following the collapse in the late 1920s of united fronts between the Communists and other political forces in many countries, including that between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, the International had put forward, beginning in 1929, the concept of a "united front from below." As the term suggests, this new tactic involved drawing workers and peasants into various forms of action under Communist leadership, while maintaining implacable hostility toward the socialist and other middle-of-the-road parties to which these people might belong. Although Mao frequently echoed the Comintern's rhetoric in denouncing moderate leftist forces in China, the "united front from below" had little practical application in the conditions under which he found himself in Jiangxi at this time. The turn back toward a "united front from above," beginning in 1935, was a very different matter, and constitutes one of the main themes in the materials translated in Volume V of our edition.

China completely, and to oppose the anti-soviet war of international imperialism which poses an imminent threat of a general crisis.

The toiling masses all over China fully understand the sharp opposition between the Lytton Commission and the International Conference Against Imperialism and War. Political experience tells us: the former is the planner and organizer of the international imperialist bandits' carving up of China and the latter, that is to say, you people, provides the most powerful assistance to the popular masses all over China in opposing the aggression of the imperialist bandits and struggling for China's independence, freedom, and liberation. We hope you will expose before our worker and peasant brothers of the whole world the truth about every brutal act, crime, and conspiracy committed by all the imperialists in China. At the same time we warmly welcome you to come and visit the soviet areas and chart the stark contrast between the revolutionary enthusiasm of the workers and peasants inside the soviet areas, the improvement in their lives, and all the construction undertaken by the Soviet Government, on the one hand, and the starvation, death, unemployment, and famine inside the areas ruled by the imperialist Guomindang on the other, and spread the word among the workers, peasants, and soldiers of the world to arouse their excitement and sympathy!

China is now in the midst of a fierce war between two roads—the colonial road and the soviet road. The imperialist Guomindang is frenziedly mounting the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the soviet Red Army in an effort to push China onto the road of complete colonization. We, on the other hand, are also concentrating all our strength to defeat the enemy's deadly massive attack in an effort to block the imperialist colonial road and fight for the road toward an independent and free Soviet China. We believe that the conference completely sympathizes with us, and therefore the success of the conference is also our success, and the victory of the conference is our victory as well. We are leading the workers, peasants, and Red Army of the whole country to support unanimously the smooth progress of the conference and to express warm and sincere wishes for a great advance by the conference!

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***On Launching a Land Investigation Movement***

## ***Notice No. 27 of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic***

(September 1, 1933)

In order to wipe out thoroughly the remnants of feudal forces, the Central Government has promulgated a special order on land investigation. It also convened a Land Investigation Movement meeting in June of this year to mobilize the broad masses to conduct a resolute Land Investigation Movement in every rural village. Great results have already been achieved in the past few months. There are still many places, however, in which this movement has not yet unfolded. In some places, landlords and rich peasants have been shielded; or there have been encroachments upon the interests of middle peasants; or no mass meetings have been called for propaganda purposes; or there has been confiscation without prior consent from the masses; or confiscated goods have not been distributed to the masses; or there has been lack of resoluteness in suppressing counterrevolutionaries. All of these are grave errors. In order to wipe out the remnants of feudal forces quickly and let the masses of middle peasants, poor peasants, and workers obtain all the benefits of the land revolution, the Central Government specially issues this announcement so that governments everywhere and the broad masses of workers and peasants will come to understand the situation and uphold the Central Government's order, wage resolute class struggle through the following methods, and strive for total victory in the Land Investigation Movement.

1. Governments and land investigation committees everywhere must firmly grasp leadership over land investigation, giving impetus to labor unions, poor peasants' associations, and all mass organizations to carry out the Land Investigation Movement in earnest. First of all, widespread propaganda should be directed toward the masses so that everyone understands the significance of the Land Investigation Movement and everyone personally takes part in land investigation and class status investigation.

2. Land investigation does not mean redistribution of land, and class status investigation does not mean investigation of middle peasants, poor peasants, or

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 9-11, where it is reproduced from a contemporary publication.

farm laborers. For this reason, investigation should not be done across the board by labeling every household and every *mu* of land, but rather all revolutionary masses should be mobilized specifically to investigate the landlord and rich peasant classes.

3. The poor peasant league is the central force of the Land Investigation Movement, and poor peasant leagues should be developed in a big way. Any poor peasant may register to join on his own initiative without being introduced by someone else. Workers in the countryside should all join poor peasant leagues so as to lead the development of the land investigation struggle. Middle peasants may attend meetings of the poor peasant league as observers.

4. The interests of the middle peasants must absolutely not be violated. Middle peasants must not be arbitrarily treated as rich peasants. Some middle peasant elements are rather well off, and although they may have engaged in a bit of petty exploitation in the past, they too must not be regarded as rich peasants. All middle peasant masses should unite around the poor peasant leagues and launch a unified attack upon the landlords and rich peasants.

5. Rich peasants make their living by working themselves and also by exploiting others. For this reason, only poor land may be given to them. Rich peasants should not be treated as middle peasants. On the other hand, rich peasants may not be treated as landlords either, and it is wrong to confiscate all property of rich peasant families.

6. Landlords do not engage in labor themselves or do only a very small amount of incidental work. They are the feudal exploiting class, so their land and property should be confiscated altogether. The able-bodied among the landlord class should be organized into labor teams, trained, and made to take part in labor for the state or the locality.

7. After the property of the landlord class is confiscated, everything except the cash should immediately and quickly be distributed to the poor masses of that village. Confiscated land, except for the portion set aside as common land, should be quickly distributed to the masses.

8. As for landlord and rich peasant elements who have wormed their way into the soviets and elements engaged in embezzlement and corruption, slacking off in their work, giving orders and coercion, and shielding landlords and rich peasants, the masses of workers and peasants should, under the leadership of the Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, struggle against these bad elements. Those whose mistakes are slight may rectify them, but serious offenders should be purged, so that soviet political power may be consolidated.

9. All elements who have participated in counterrevolutionary activity should be severely suppressed. Serious offenders are to be shot. The masses of workers and peasants should cooperate very well with the Soviet Security Bureau and Judicial Department so as to eliminate counterrevolutionaries thoroughly.

10. The work of the Land Investigation Movement should be effectively coordinated with other tasks such as expanding the Red Army, expanding the

Red Guards and Young Pioneers, selling government economic construction bonds, developing cooperatives, increasing agricultural and industrial production, developing trade with the outside, fully implementing the labor laws, developing the Lenin schools and the literacy movement, repairing roads and bridges, and carrying out the soviet election movement. Under the leadership of the local soviets, the broad masses of workers and peasants should unite as one and do their best to carry out all necessary tasks so as to smash the imperialist Guomindang's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" rapidly and strive for the victory of the revolution throughout China.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

## *This Year's Elections*

### *Report at the Conference of the Eighteen Southern Xian Regarding the Election Campaign*

(September 6, 1933)

Comrades, we have already held an election conference for the eighteen northern *xian* and now we are having an election conference of the eighteen southern *xian*.<sup>1</sup> Comrades, we hold elections every year. Are this year's elections any different from last year's? Yes, very much so. This year's elections are to build a stronger soviet—this extremely important class weapon. We should use this weapon to enhance still further the welfare of the masses, to smash the enemy's new "Encirclement and Suppression," to oppose the imperialist policy of partitioning China, and to expand the soviet movement to the whole of China. This, comrades, is the significance of this year's election. The purpose of my report is to explain this significance. I will give these explanations under a number of headings.

1. This year's election coincides with the year in which we have completely smashed the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" and in which we are continuing to win victories in smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."

In the past year, up until our victories at Donghuangpi,<sup>2</sup> we have completely

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This report was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 108, September 6, 1933. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 13–22, supplemented by the facsimile of *Hongse Zhonghua*, in which some additional characters can be deciphered.

1. There is some uncertainty about the timing of the conference of election workers for the eighteen northern *xian* in the Central Soviet Area mentioned here. The *Zhongyang geming genjudi cidian* (Dictionary of the Central Revolutionary Base Area) (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1993), p. 93, says that both this and the corresponding conference of eighteen southern *xian* took place from September 6 to 9, 1933, in Yeping, a suburb of the Ruijin *xian* city. Yet in this document dated September 6, Mao unambiguously states that the conference for the northern *xian* has already been held. In any event, Mao delivered this speech to the 300-plus delegates on the first day of the conference. Delegates came from the following *xian*: Ruijin, Xingguo, Shengli, Yudu, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ganxian, Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, Nankang (all in Jiangxi); and Shanghang, Changting, Tingdong, Wuping, Xinquan, and Ninghua (all in Fujian). According to *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 411, Mao also gave the closing speech on September 9, but the text of this is not available.

2. This is a contraction of Dongpi and Huangpi, sites of decisive battles in the Fourth Encirclement Campaign.

smashed the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression." We have expanded the Red Army, consolidated and developed the soviet area, and led and assisted the whole nation in the great revolutionary struggles against imperialists, the Guomindang, the landlords, and the capitalists. This year's revolutionary victories have surpassed those of last year. What about the counterrevolutionary side? It is becoming weaker and weaker. But the counterrevolutionaries are still struggling desperately for survival. The imperialists especially, faced with world revolution and war, are desperately stepping up their invasion of China. Japan has already created a Manchukuo under the cover of their artillery and is attempting to set up a Mongolian state [*Mengguguo*] as well. England wants to set up a Tibetan state [*Xizangguo*] in western China. France is invading Yunnan and Guizhou, and the United States wants to divide up the provinces along the Yangzi River. All these imperialists are ordering their running dog, the Guomindang, to turn China into a colony. The imperialist Guomindang is just now launching a large-scale Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." Our duty at present is to redouble our efforts to defeat the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and to oppose imperialist efforts to partition China. We are confronted with large-scale revolution and war. Led by the Communist Party, the soviets are the organizers and leaders of revolution and war. This year's soviet election takes place at a key moment in the smashing of the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." We have to elect powerful soviets to organize and lead the war. Such is the crucial significance of this year's elections. This is also the year in which the Second Soviet Congress will be convened. This year's Soviet Congress is going to elect a new Central Government, which will serve as the organizer and leader of revolution and war on the scale of the whole country. In order that the Second Soviet Congress may be able to shoulder its great historical responsibilities, this year's elections must be regarded as no ordinary matter.

2. In order to understand the importance of the elections, we must explain the function of the soviets.

The soviets of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants have a dual function. Both aspects are directly opposed to the role of the old ruling class government. The first aspect is that the soviet of the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship serves as a weapon against the counterrevolutionaries. It uses war to eliminate external counterrevolutionaries. We have been fighting against the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression," have launched a victorious offensive, and are carrying out the task of waging revolutionary war against the counterrevolutionary forces throughout the country. At the same time, it uses the courts to suppress internal counterrevolutionaries. This is how we have dealt with the AB Corps, the Reorganization Clique, the Social Democratic Party, and all landlords and capitalists within the Soviet Area. As soon as they engage in counterrevolutionary activities, we immediately suppress them. The revolutionary classes—the workers, the peasants, and the toiling masses—use this weapon of the soviets to deal with all the counterrevolutionaries, both internal and exter-

nal. This is the first function of the soviets. We must defeat these counterrevolutionaries, for only thus can our class become the ruling class and our government become the ruling government. All of you comrades have seen that we are now the rulers, because we have defeated the innumerable attacks of the enemy and suppressed all counterrevolutionary activities. Now let me speak of the second function. The soviet of the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship is the instrument by which the masses govern their own lives. The lives of our worker-peasant masses used to be completely controlled by the landlords and the bourgeoisie. Because they had power, they had freedom, but they allowed no freedom to us. Peasants had no land; workers had no labor laws to protect them. How is it today? Peasants have land and workers are protected by the Labor Law. Our own political power has given us freedom. Under our own régime, we are carrying out all sorts of necessary construction. We have total control over our own lives. We are truly free and equal; we are not subject to interference from any landlords or capitalists. On the contrary, we exercise autocracy and dictatorship over the landlords and capitalists and do not allow a single one of them to participate in our government. We establish all sorts of laws to rule them and do not give them the slightest bit of political freedom. This is the second aspect of the function of the soviets. All revolutionary struggles in the world have as their goal the seizure and consolidation of political power. The desperate struggles of the counterrevolutionaries against the revolutionary forces are also entirely for the sake of maintaining their own political power. The worker and peasant masses in the soviet areas have already seized power. We should always be on guard to defend and develop this power, so as to enable it to perform fully its vital roles of suppressing internal and external counterrevolutionary forces and enhancing the wellbeing of the workers and peasants. To enable the soviet to exercise these functions, we need to use the method of elections to draw into the soviets a large number of the most conscious, progressive, and active elements, and to weed out the incompetents among the old personnel. This is an extremely important matter. Many people have not yet realized clearly enough the weighty significance of political power and of the elections. Without being fully aware of this function, truly active participation in the elections is impossible. Without understanding this function, soviet personnel will not be able to lead the elections really well. Comrades, we will be carrying out the elections very soon. In order to make propaganda immediately among the masses about the functions of the soviets and of the elections, all soviet personnel must themselves have clearly understood this. Only this will make the present elections the best we have held and will mobilize the masses as one to fight for a powerful soviet of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants.

### 3. Favorable conditions in this year's elections.

Since we are faced at present with an extremely critical moment in the revolution and in the war, and the role of the soviets and of the elections is so important, can we carry out the task of this year's elections? Our answer is that we can.



We have many favorable conditions in this year's elections. First, despite the tremendous scale of the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," we have already won initial victories. In the past two months, we have won three great battles in a row. In the first battle, we occupied Liancheng and defeated the Nineteenth Route Army. In the second battle, we occupied Wujiang and defeated the Eightieth Division. In the third battle, we laid siege to Yanping, defeated the enemy's reinforcements, and seized more than six thousand guns in all.<sup>3</sup> We are having an election when the Red Army is winning great victories. Second, we are carrying out this year's election in a wider territory, for the Soviet Area has been expanded significantly in the course of our victory in the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression." This year we are having elections in ten soviet provinces: Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong-Jiangxi, Fujian-Jiangxi, Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hubei-Henan-Anhui, West Hunan-Hubei, and Sichuan.<sup>4</sup> The scale of the elections is greater. Third, in all these numerous soviet provinces, class struggle in the cities and in the countryside has penetrated more deeply than was the case last year. We have achieved numerous successes in the Land Investigation Movement, in carrying out the Labor Law, in the progress of culture and education, and in launching economic construction. The Land Investigation Movement in particular has ferreted out many concealed landlords and rich peasants and deprived them of their right to vote. A large number of bad elements hidden in the soviet organs have also been purged, thus laying a foundation for carrying out this year's elections more successfully. Fourth, we have had the experience of past elections, especially last year's elections, which have provided many valuable lessons for this year's elections. We must definitely continue to draw on the good results of past elections and enhance them. Shortcomings and mistakes that have occurred in past elections we should, on the other hand, completely avoid and reject. We should not commit similar mistakes again this year. The Central Government instruction regarding the elections has reached a correct conclusion about what constitutes the achievements and what constitutes the errors of past elections. Comrades should study the instruction carefully. Every soviet cadre should study it carefully. We should also explain it clearly to all the masses of the voters. Only by

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3. The battles referred to here involved the summer 1933 Fujian campaign of the Eastern Army [*Dongfang jun*], a Red Army force led by Peng Dehuai which had been constituted under the policy of "separate warfare" [*fenli zuozhan*] then advocated by the Returned Student leadership.

4. Because the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic at this time was somewhat fragmented, the preceding list includes, in addition to established provinces such as Jiangxi and Fujian, a number of base areas comprising portions of two or three provinces, which were treated as provinces for administrative purposes. The name of the last of the "ten provinces" poses a problem. In the text as published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, this reads quite clearly *sizhou*, the second character being that for Zhou [Dynasty]. The editors of the *Mao Zedong ji* have taken this to be a typographical error for Sichuan, where a base area existed under the leadership of Zhang Guotao, and we have followed them here.

correctly evaluating past lessons can we make sure that this election campaign proceeds smoothly.

#### 4. How to guide this year's elections.

Comrades, we have come to understand that this year's elections coincide with the efforts of the imperialists and of the Guomindang to carve up China and to carry out the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," thus greatly increasing the political task of this year's elections. We have also come to realize the great revolutionary function of the soviets. Furthermore, this year's elections are to be carried out under many favorable conditions. Therefore, we must guide these elections very well and strive with all our might to achieve complete victory in this election. The election regulations and the instruction regarding the elections promulgated by the Central Government have enumerated clearly the principles and methods of the elections, so there is no need for me to repeat all of this here. Today I will simply call our comrades' attention to a few important issues, urging the comrades to pay attention. These points are electoral propaganda and agitation, basic-level elections, voter registration, work reports, election units, candidate lists, mass meetings of voters, and the tasks of the election committees. Allow me to explain briefly these very important issues in this election, to which every comrade should pay attention.

First, about the election propaganda. The most extensive propaganda should be carried out in the three weeks prior to this year's elections. We must explain very clearly the relation between our efforts to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and to oppose the partition of China by the imperialists, and this year's elections. We must elucidate the revolutionary function of the soviets so that everyone understands it. We should also explain that this year's elections are taking place on a basis of victory. We must make the masses regard the elections as very important, and at the same time see to it that they have sufficient self-confidence to participate in the elections and will elect to the soviets many progressive elements, so that all those who are elected will take responsibility for important national affairs with the utmost courage. Such propaganda and agitation is a prerequisite for a successful election. Without such propaganda and agitation, the masses will still understand neither the current political situation, nor the function of the soviets, nor the basis for a victorious election. In that case, the masses will not be enthusiastic about participating in the elections, nor will those elected be full of courage. In the first elections last year, propaganda was relatively successful and consequently the results were relatively good. If the propaganda for the second elections is deficient, the results will necessarily be unsatisfactory. This year's propaganda must improve on that of last year's first elections, for only thus can we rouse the majority of the masses to participate in the electoral meetings.

Second, meetings of municipal and township deputies are the basic unit of the soviets. Therefore, elections in the towns and the countryside are the basic elections of the soviets. The municipal and township soviets constitute the level

closest to the masses. All the laws and decrees of the higher-level soviets regarding the expansion of the Red Army, the Land Investigation Movement, putting into practice the Labor Law, and economic and cultural construction can be effectively carried out only through the municipal and township soviets. Hence the elections to the municipal and township soviets are of the most fundamental importance. Moreover, if the All-Soviet Congress is to be successful, provincial soviet congresses must elect very good deputies; if the provincial soviet congresses are to be successful, the *xian* soviet congresses must elect very good deputies; if the *xian* soviet congresses are to be successful, district and municipal soviet congresses must elect very good deputies. And what is required to have a good district soviet congress? The meeting of delegates to the township soviet must elect very good deputies. If we look at things this way, do not the elections to municipal and township soviets affect the elections to the district soviets, the *xian* soviets, the provincial soviets, and even the national level? Therefore, the elections of the municipal and township soviets are the most basic and the most important elections. Comrades, on one side of our meeting place there is a monument to Red Army martyrs under construction. This monument has a stone foundation 1.5 *zhang*<sup>5</sup> thick. We want to build a solid monument, therefore we must begin by laying a solid foundation. We want to build a solid soviet, therefore we must lay a solid foundation, and that foundation is the soviets of municipal and township deputies. Third, if we want to establish strong municipal and township soviets, not only must we use the most extensive propaganda to make the majority of the masses participate in the election conferences; we should also make sure that all the voters who attend these conferences are genuine workers, peasants, or other people eligible to vote, that not one single disenfranchised person sneaks in, and that not one person who should be deprived of the right to vote steals in by passing himself off as a worker or peasant. This work is called voter registration. To draw a strict line between the franchised and disenfranchised is the basic starting point of soviet political power; it is also the most important article in the soviet constitution and electoral laws. Look at the base of that monument. Is it not made of stone? Consequently, the monument is solid. If you mixed in some mud or compost in the base, this monument would not be so solid. If we want to build a strong soviet, we must begin by seeing to it that not a single landlord, rich peasant, or capitalist steals the right to vote.

Fourth, last year's election units were too large, and this year we have made them smaller. Article 11 of the Election Law prescribes that workers hold their election meetings separately, that peasants vote in the small village units, and that poor masses in the cities vote in neighborhood units.<sup>6</sup> This change will have a great influence in achieving a completely successful result in the elections.

5. The *zhang* is a unit of length equal to 10 Chinese feet (*chi*), or approximately 3.3 meters.

6. See above, the Provisional Election Law of August 9, 1933.

Smaller units will not only ensure that a majority of the voters, or even all of them, attend the electoral meeting, but will make it easier for voters to choose among the candidates and will lead to more and better nominations. It will also be easier to deprive certain candidates of their mandate later on. For these reasons, our comrades must be careful not to enlarge this year's electoral units again.

Fifth, regarding the work reports of the municipal and township soviets to the voters, the Central Commissariat for Internal Affairs has already drawn up an outline. In accordance with this outline, the district soviets are to guide the township soviets in calling mass meetings in all the villages and making reports there. In last year's elections, this reporting system was not carried out in many localities. This year, it should definitely be put into practice, because making reports to the masses actually provides an opportunity for testing the government's work among the masses, and this can raise the enthusiasm of the voters for the elections to new heights. On all those days when governments at the district level and higher have the occasion to attend meetings of deputies at the lower levels, they should always make a work report.

Sixth, lists of candidates. Careful preparation of a list of candidates is an important key link in a successful election. It is stated in the instruction of the Central Government that comments on the lists of candidates by all mass organizations should be collected before the election. The comments should, moreover, be made public so the voters can give due consideration to all the candidates. As regards the list of candidates, attention should be paid first of all to class status. Not only must we, in accordance with the election law, see to it that the appropriate number of workers and peasants are elected; we must also, as laid down in the instructions regarding the elections, make sure that at least 25 percent of those elected are working women. Our next priority is political performance. All those who fall into the categories of corrupt individuals, negative elements, slackers, or those who compromise with the landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists must not be elected. Each and every person elected should be one who works actively and has the right kind of thinking. Then, we need to pay a certain amount of attention to capacity to do the work. Those whose abilities are excessively low should not be taken into the government. We should also make sure that all those soviet workers now in office, including deputies, committee members, chairmen, and so on, who have committed egregious errors such as corruption, negative attitudes, slacking, and shielding landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists, and have not redressed these errors, are not reelected. On the other hand, those comrades who have worked hard and have correct thinking can, without the slightest doubt, be reelected. Some people think that every election should bring in new people and reject all the old people. This is completely wrong.

Seventh, the election meeting. Although the election takes only one day, we need to spend several weeks preparing for it, because the numerous important tasks mentioned above require several weeks' preparation if they are to be done properly. We absolutely cannot wait until the last moment, putting things off

from day to day, until we find ourselves, two or three days before the elections, desperately trying to do everything at once. The eighteen northern *xian* have now set the municipal and township elections for the period from September 1 to October 5. Every district should carry out the actual election during the last ten days of this period, and use the weeks before September 25 for activities such as intensive election propaganda, voter registration, work reports, and compiling lists of candidates. Only this will ensure a satisfactory outcome on election day. The eighteen southern *xian* can postpone their elections for one month. The municipal and township election date can be set for late October, so that September and October can be used to make full preparations. Then, when election day comes, we must do our best to mobilize voters to attend the meeting. This year we must mobilize the overwhelming majority of voters to attend the election meeting and make sure that the election is successfully carried out in one meeting. Try to avoid calling a second meeting because of failure to get enough voters to meet the requirements of the election law. Next, when the list of candidates is put forward for discussion and decision, we should mobilize the masses to air their opinions. As happened at last year's Xingguo election meeting, there should be animated criticisms, and if the masses do not approve, another candidate's name should be put forward. Forcing the masses to endorse the candidates on the list is absolutely forbidden. If bad elements make trouble by preparing a list of candidates and coercing the masses to pass it, we will most certainly punish them severely once the facts are discovered. Finally, after the election, we should also discuss the proposals put forth by the masses, collect the masses' comments, and send them to the soviet as guidelines for the administrative work of the new government.

Eighth, we should designate a special committee to be in charge of all the above-mentioned work. This would be the election committee of the municipal and district soviets. According to Article 46 of the Election Law, election committee members consist of representatives from the government and all mass organizations. They must also be approved by the *xian* soviet. The election committee is in charge of all work related to the election. Last year, most of the election committees did not carry out their duties, and once again it was only government personnel that provided guidance for the elections. As a result, leadership in the election campaign in many localities was not exercised very carefully, and there were instances where bad elements in the government manipulated the election. In order to rid ourselves of these defects, we must definitely organize election committees this year. They should be organized jointly by the government and the mass organizations.

Comrades, I have talked for a long time. I have covered all the important points concerning the significance of the elections and the work involved in the elections. There are items I have not covered, such as the need for *xian* soviets to provide planned guidance to the district congresses of soviet delegates, the need for provincial soviets to provide planned guidance to the *xian* congresses of

soviet delegates, the need for the Central Government to provide planned guidance to provincial congresses of soviet delegates, and a few other matters relating to the elections. The election law and the instructions regarding the elections have, however, given detailed explanations on all these items, and I will say no more about them here. I hope that you comrades will inform the many comrades in the *xian* and district soviets on the major points I have covered when you go back. They should be laid before conferences of the presidium for detailed discussion. Comrades, this year's elections are no ordinary elections. They are elections of great historical significance, and they are also a very fierce class struggle. We have to devote our minds entirely to these elections. Apart from the many tasks directly related to the elections discussed above, we should seize the opportunity offered by these elections to unfold the struggle of land investigation and class investigation, and the accusation movement within the soviets. Only through the movements for investigating classes and for making accusations can we discover elements who have stolen the right to vote, and purge bad elements who have sneaked into the soviets, so as to ensure even greater success in these elections. This is even more indispensable in the eighteen *xian* in the south, since we have two more months to carry out the Land Investigation Movement. Moreover, places where the administrative districts have not yet been defined should do so quickly. If we do all these things, we are firmly persuaded that this year's elections will achieve a complete victory. At present, proletarians and oppressed nations all over the world are hoping to see the Chinese soviet movement triumph. All the toiling masses of China have their eyes fixed on the soviet banner. They know that only the soviets can save China. In the last few days, a congress against imperialist war has been taking place in Shanghai, attended by representatives from countries all over the world.<sup>7</sup> They, too, are warmly wishing for the victory of the Chinese soviets. Comrades, we should respond to all of these sincere hopes. What shall we respond with? Let us respond to them by the success of the elections in the whole of the soviet areas and by our Second National Soviet Congress. Our slogans are:

Win complete victory in the elections!

Smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"!

Oppose the partition of China by the imperialists!

Long live soviet China!

7. See above, "Telegram of Congratulations from the Central Government on the Opening of the International Conference Against Imperialism and War."

# *Manifesto to the Workers, Peasants, and Toiling Popular Masses Throughout the World*

(September 6, 1933)

Dear brothers and sisters, comrades, and friends!

We are the Chinese workers, peasants, urban and rural poor, revolutionary soldiers, and intellectuals. We do not wish to be forever slaves and beasts of burden for the imperialists and the Chinese landlords and capitalists, and we have begun to create for ourselves a new life of freedom. We are leading our country's 450 million people in a struggle for liberation. Using our own strength, we have begun to create within a sixth of China's territory (in many places in Jiangxi, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Anhui, Henan, Shaanxi, and other provinces) the only genuine régime of the popular masses—the soviet régime—and the only genuine army of the popular masses—the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army are fighting to improve fundamentally the political and economic conditions of the Chinese workers, peasants, and toiling popular masses. The Chinese Soviet Government and the Red Army want to begin by achieving one end, which is to enable workers, peasants, poor people, revolutionary soldiers, and intellectuals to do freely what they wish to do and to decide their own destinies, so as to be transformed from those leading lives like beasts suffering from hunger and cold, with no places to live and no jobs, altogether illiterate, into those leading lives of real people, with food, clothing, places to live, jobs, and basic literacy. To achieve this the Soviet Government has given them land, housing, and employment; set up numerous free schools, literacy classes, libraries, and clubs for adults and children; and opened many free hospitals and convalescent homes for the sick and the aged.

Yet that handful of parasites who rule China—foreign imperialists, Chinese warlords, bureaucrats, landlords, capitalists, and usurers—never want us to be able to live like human beings at all.

Precisely because we have begun to create a new life of freedom for ourselves, however, and because we work only eight hours a day at higher wages, and because we who had little or no land before have received some land, and

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We have translated this manifesto from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 23–28, where it is reproduced in its entirety from Wang Ming's preface to *Suwei'ai Zhongguo*, published in Moscow in 1933.

because the women here have been liberated, Chiang Kaishek, Wang Jingwei, and all those Guomindang wild beasts curse us as "Red bandits" and "Communist bandits." And they have launched large-scale "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns against us not just once or twice but incessantly.

At a time when the Japanese imperialists are madly slaughtering our compatriots and occupying one province after another in northern and northeastern China, and the American, British, and French imperialists are going all out to carve up China, we have repeatedly proclaimed to the people and armies of the whole country: the various imperialists are trying to partition China completely, and all the Chinese popular masses should rise up as one to defend our motherland!

We have openly declared time and again to all armed forces: Any army may sign **combat agreements**<sup>1</sup> with us so that together we may take up arms against Japan and other imperialists to protect the existence of our people and win national liberation, provided only that they endorse our three very simple conditions (necessary truly to organize and arm the people so as to carry out a sacred war of national defense against Japan and other imperialists): (1) Immediately stop attacking the soviet areas; (2) give the people the minimum democratic rights—that is, freedom of speech, publication, assembly, organization, demonstration, strike, and so on; and (3) allow people the freedom to organize extensively and arm volunteer forces against Japan.

From beginning to end, Chiang Kaishek, Wang Jingwei, and all the Guomindang traitors selling out their country have had only one reply to these proposals of ours: **Intensify and expand their cruel attacks on the soviet areas!**

The Guomindang has now started the Sixth "Encirclement and Suppression"<sup>2</sup> against our free Soviet China! In this "Encirclement and Suppression" they have concentrated over 442,000 troops of the Nanjing and Guangdong armies around our Central Soviet Area alone (Jiangxi, Fujian, Hunan, and Guangdong). These armies are equipped, in addition, with very up-to-date and good weapons such as artillery, tanks, airplanes, and poison gases.

Where did the Guomindang warlords and politicians get so many new weapons and the money to keep the soldiers? They got them from American, British, Japanese, French, and German imperialists.

1. Passages set in bold in this document are emphasized by the use of dots both in the *Mao Zedong ji* and Moscow versions of the Chinese text.

2. Mao and his comrades in Jiangxi counted, like the Guomindang, only five "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns, the fifth and last being the one which began at this time and ended in the defeat of the Red Army and the Long March. From afar, Wang Ming and other observers in Moscow somehow turned these into six. The point is illustrated by the variants between the texts of Mao's report of January 1934 to the Second Soviet Congress published in China and in the Soviet Union. (See below, the translation of this text.) In the present instance, the sole source is one printed in Moscow, which refers here to the sixth campaign; undoubtedly this should read fifth.



**These imperialists use the weapons you have made, and the blood money they squeeze out of you to eliminate us, the Chinese people who are fighting for our own national and social liberation!**

We, like you, still remember very clearly how the British, American, and Japanese armies not long ago bombarded our Guangzhou Commune and Changsha Soviet. French bombers raided our Longzhou Soviet in Guangxi.

This time, in the Guomindang's Sixth "Encirclement and Suppression," the imperialists' role as its organizer could not have been more clearly exposed. The American imperialists, aside from giving the Nanjing government a so-called "cotton and wheat loan" of \$50,000,000 and a so-called "aviation loan" of \$40,000,000, also gave the Nanjing army 150 military airplanes and dozens of shipments of artillery guns, tanks, machine guns, chemical weapons, and bullets, plus hundreds of pilots and all sorts of specialists in military techniques.<sup>3</sup> Lampson, the English minister to China, went personally on an inspection tour to Sichuan and gave Liu Xiang<sup>4</sup> £20,000,000 and large quantities of arms so that he could attack our Red Army's Fourth Army stationed there.<sup>5</sup> Although the English, American, and Japanese imperialists have sharp conflicts of interest over the carving up of China, they are united in their actions against Soviet China. They each give orders to their respective running dogs—the warlords of the Nanjing faction, the Guangdong faction, and the Northern faction—to "encircle and suppress" in concert the people in our soviet areas, who have already achieved liberation. The fascist German government has sent seventy military experts (including former Defense Minister Seeckt) to Nanjing. Chiang Kaishek has organized this group of people into a special department within his General Headquarters in Nanchang to command military operations against the Red Army.<sup>6</sup> Just at that time, the League of Nations sent a so-called "Technical

3. China's deficiency in aerial defense was highlighted in the fighting that broke out with Japanese forces in Shanghai in January 1932. In addition to airplane purchases, China sought aid in training; in mid-1932, an American aviation mission led by Colonel John H. Jouett arrived in China to train pilots, remaining until 1935. See William M. Leary, Jr., "Wings for China: The Jouett Mission, 1932-1935," *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. 38, no. 4 (Nov. 1969), 447-62.

4. Liu Xiang (1890-1938) was a prominent Sichuan warlord.

5. Sir Miles Lampson's visit to Sichuan occurred in 1933. Contemporary Japanese and Chinese as well as left-leaning foreigners variously (and somewhat contradictorily) suggested that the trip was connected to continuing volatility along the disputed Tibet-China border (in which Britain was thought to be sympathetic to Tibetan interests), and to British interest in arming Sichuanese warlords against the Communists (though presumably the same military aid could also be used to bolster Chinese arms in the China-Tibet frontier zone.) See Victor Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets* (N.Y.: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1934), pp. 185-86.

6. General Hans von Seeckt, who had recreated the German Army in the aftermath of Versailles, came to China in May 1933 and gave extensive advice on China's overall military development to Chiang Kaishek and his government. A German military mission had been in China since 1930, and the former principal advisor had proposed a strategy for the conduct of the Third Encirclement Campaign in 1931 which Chiang did not in fact

Committee" to Nanjing, which was actually to help Chiang Kaishek plan and execute attacks on the Chinese soviets and Red Army.<sup>7</sup>

Brothers and sisters, comrades and friends!

Look! The pilots and experts on military technique from so-called "democratic" America and other countries are waging the cruellest air battles and chemical warfare within the territory of Soviet China, under the command of fascist German generals and Chinese Guomintang warlords, using airplanes, poison gas, tanks, and artillery made in America, England, France, and Germany. They are slaughtering huge numbers of workers, peasants, soldiers, poor people, intellectuals, and others, so as to destroy the free Chinese Soviet Republic and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Brothers and sisters, comrades and friends!

To defend their own Soviet Republic, thousands upon thousands of toilers, men, women, old, and young, have not spared their own flesh and blood, their minds, and their lives in bravely beating back five consecutive "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns of the Guomintang, who were much more numerous and better armed than they. At present, however, this young Chinese Soviet Republic is in serious danger.

At this crucial moment, we entreat you:

**Help us resist the butchers who wish to force us back into dark and subhuman lives, and who wish to slaughter us!**

To force us back as slaves and beasts of burden into our previous subhuman lives, the international imperialists are determined to drown the Chinese soviet revolution in a sea of blood. The British, American, Japanese, and French imperialist robbers have concentrated their war fleets, airplanes, marines, and so on around Soviet China, and on all of China's large cities, river ports, and sea ports. They have made up their minds to massacre us first and then launch a new internecine imperialist world war, and to inflict the utmost sacrifice and suffering upon mankind all over the world!

The highest organization of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Central Executive Committee, calls upon you most solemnly to join with us in waging a courageous mass struggle.

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adopt. Von Seeckt, who formally became Adviser-General to the National Government in 1934, was treated by Chiang with much greater respect. Nonetheless, the importance of these advisors to the eventual success of the Communist-suppression campaigns, which has been stressed in many accounts, has undoubtedly been exaggerated. See William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 110-26.

7. Numerous League of Nations advisory groups came to China during the 1930s, including a number in 1933, and it is unclear which of these is being referred to here. During T. V. Soong's visit to Geneva in the summer of 1933 he successfully requested that the League appoint a technical representative to the Nationalist government's National Economic Council, a body with which the League had a long history of close cooperation. Perhaps this is what is being mentioned here.

Oppose imperialism's intervention in Soviet China!

Oppose imperialism's carving up of China! Oppose the imperialists' slaughter of the Chinese people in preparation for their new imperialist world war!

Oppose the American, British, Japanese, French, and German imperialists' murdering the toiling masses of Soviet China with poison gas, airplanes, tanks, and artillery! Oppose the shipment of all arms into China! Demand the immediate withdrawal of American pilots and military technical experts and of German generals and advisers! Demand the immediate withdrawal of all American, English, Japanese, French, and Italian naval, air, and ground troops!

Long live the international sympathy of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world!

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army	Zhu De

Ruijin, Jiangxi. September 6, 1933

## *On Educational Work*

### *Instruction No. 17 of the Central Council of People's Commissars*

(September 15, 1933)

Culture and education occupy an extremely important position in the soviet movement as a whole. They are an indispensable force in the current war mobilization to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." It should become one of our most important tasks in the struggle to intensify educational work in order to raise the political and cultural level of the broad masses, to promote class consciousness among the masses, and to raise a new generation of revolutionary successors.

It is obvious that educational work is currently lagging behind other soviet work. It is still not really able to adapt itself to the demands of the victorious progress of the revolutionary war. This is because, in the past, the work of the Commissariat for Education was marred by many mistakes and shortcomings, and some soviet organs and responsible comrades neglected educational work, did not recognize the importance of education in the current civil war, or even held the opportunist view that it is impossible to carry out educational work in a wartime environment. This phenomenon should absolutely not be allowed to exist any more.

First of all, we should point out that the greatest defect of educational work in the past is that, to this day, we do not have a clearly defined educational policy. This problem was raised in Instruction No. 1 of the Central Commissariat for Education, but it was far from adequate and not altogether appropriate. The past performance and documents of the Commissariat for Education have displayed a lack of attention to establishing a compulsory educational system. They did not effectively coordinate the development of compulsory education with social education. They did not bring to the fore the task of carrying out communist education on a broad basis. They confined education within the narrow limits of bourgeois democratic revolution against feudalism and superstition. At the same

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 29-31, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed document.

time, we must point out that the extremely important cultural and educational work of eradicating illiteracy has not yet been carried out in a planned way, and that we have committed "leftist" opportunist errors in using bourgeois intellectuals. These have been extremely serious weaknesses in the work of the Commissariat for Education in the past.

We should establish a system of universal compulsory education that conforms to the needs of the current revolutionary war. We need to create a new generation of revolutionary successors in the spirit of communism, carry out extensive propaganda regarding the revolutionary theories of Marxism-Leninism, and begin immediately to launch a planned and organized campaign to wipe out illiteracy. We should try our best to eradicate in the shortest possible time the most vicious legacy of the rule of the despotic gentry, landlords, and capitalists—illiteracy. We should establish the Lenin Normal School<sup>1</sup> and various other training schools to educate our cadres. These measures would ensure the training of a strong army of educators, which is necessary to expand popular education and to eradicate illiteracy. We should also pay full attention to and organize social educational organizations like dramatic societies of workers and peasants, blue-clad troupes,<sup>2</sup> clubs, libraries, and reading rooms. This is, in fact, the main task of our current educational policy.

Besides accelerating the training of large numbers of educational cadres with worker-peasant backgrounds, we have to utilize a portion of bourgeois intellectuals and experts in education who are willing to serve the soviets actively.

Universal compulsory education should be free and grade school teachers should be given preferential treatment whenever possible. The minimum the government should do is to provide primary school pupils with free textbooks and stationery, and teachers with free meals.

The Council of People's Commissars agrees completely with the proposal by the Central Commissariat for Education that a conference on culture and education be held jointly with the Central Bureau of the Youth League in October. This conference would have great significance for the future of culture and education in the soviet areas. In order to ensure the total success of this conference, the Central Commissariat for Education is instructed to make the fullest preparation.

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1. The Lenin Normal School was established in October 1932 in Ruijin with the mission of training elementary-school teachers. Two four-month classes (over 600 students in total) were enrolled before the school was replaced by other training courses in 1934.

2. The Chinese is *lanshan tuan*, which is a contraction of the term *lanshan jutuan* ("blue-clad theatrical troupes"). In March 1933 various *xian* and provinces in the soviet areas were asked to send young men and women to a training class for drama troupes which would travel through the countryside performing plays and skits. The name was bestowed on them because of the blue costumes they wore on stage. Except for the color blue, they bore no relation to the semi-militarized Blue Shirts (*lanyi she*) associated with Chiang Kaishek's government.

The Council of People's Commissars believes that the recent movement to assist education launched by the Youth League Central Bureau will become a powerful breakthrough on the cultural and educational fronts in the soviet areas. It will make it possible to overcome speedily the backward status of educational work and lead to rapid progress in that area.

In order to effect a speedy and thorough transformation in educational work and in order to complete the current central tasks in education successfully, we must wage merciless struggles against the tendency to ignore education and against all erroneous views and tendencies in educational work. Only after launching this ideological struggle can we truly develop cultural and educational construction in the soviet areas, which is urgently required for the sake of the war and must not be delayed for a moment. It is so ordered.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

## ***Correct Commandism in Selling Government Bonds***

### ***Letter from the Central Government to all Local Governments***

(September 23, 1933)

To the provincial soviets of Jiangxi, Fujian, Fujian-Jiangxi, and Guangdong-Jiangxi, the *xian* soviet of Ruijin, and to be transmitted to local soviet governments at all levels:

In the short time since they were first put on sale, public bonds for economic construction have already achieved very great results. Wherever mobilization methods were good, the broad masses have responded warmly in support of the bonds. Good examples of this are Yunji District in Ruijin and Caixi and Hongfang districts in Fujian. In many other places, however, serious commandist mistakes have occurred in allocation. The Council of People's Commissars has already promulgated its Instruction No. 16, and issued a notice and a propaganda outline pointing out that adequate mobilization work ensures the selling of bonds, and rigorously opposing commandism in the sale of bonds. A letter of instructions from the Central People's Commissariat for Finance to public bonds committees at all levels has pushed back to December the deadline for completion of bonds sales. Having targets for the amount of bonds sold be determined by actual local conditions is also for the sole purpose of avoiding coercive allocation and allowing enough time to reach the goal of mobilizing the masses to purchase bonds. Since the issuance of these various instructions, sales methods everywhere have already begun to change.

This change, however, is far from enough. Many places still go in for coercive allocation. A particularly serious case occurred in Yudu's Luofang District, where a middle peasant and district soviet chairman committed suicide because of pressure to buy bonds. More than four hundred people fled Xiaoxi District in Guangdong-Jiangxi [Province], also because of coercive allocation of bonds. Such shameful incidents that absolutely should never have happened actually

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Our source for this letter is *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 113, September 27, 1933. We have compared the reprint of this newspaper with the text in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 37–39. As in several other instances, each of these two versions supplies a few characters that are illegible in the other.

occurred under the leadership of the Yudu *xian* Soviet. Upon learning about this the Central [Government] immediately sent people to investigate, and will severely punish the Yudu *xian* Soviet. Upon receiving this letter, every provincial soviet must immediately direct all *xian* soviets to inspect the methods for mobilizing to sell public bonds in all districts and townships. They must also make use of the example of Yudu to issue a severe warning to all soviet staff members, and initiate rigorous self-criticism immediately, concentrating the fire against coercion and commandism in all work. Whether it be in expanding the Red Army, in the Land Investigation Movement, in election campaigns, in selling public bonds, or in developing cooperatives, not even the slightest coercion or commandist methods may be used. The commandist mistakes in Yudu occurred in a serious way in all aspects of work, but they manifested themselves most glaringly in the sale of public bonds. Soviets at all levels should gain great awareness through the lessons of Luofang and Xiaoxi districts.

To sell public bonds in a satisfactory manner, attention must be paid to time and quantity. In many cases the target date for completion of sales in agreements for competition among various places has been set at mid-October, which is too short a period of time. The September 15 Directive of the People's Commissariat for Finance<sup>1</sup> should be followed in granting appropriate time extensions. In cases of delayed harvesting and relatively slow sales of bonds, the deadline for completion of sales could be extended to mid-December, which would allow enough time to do thorough mobilization work. On the other hand, there must absolutely be no repetition of what happened in places such as Huichang where, taking advantage of such a postponement, public bonds were set aside and not promoted for sale and the work was neglected until in December the objective was reached by means of forced allocation. This is strictly forbidden. As for quantity, it must depend entirely on the actual local potential and on the degree of enthusiasm aroused among the masses. In some places the goals should be raised and in some they should be lowered; distribution may not be done in a mechanical fashion. Each *xian* soviet and district soviet must adjust the quantities of public bonds at all times according to the varying conditions in the different districts of the whole *xian* and the different villages of the whole district so that local situations are accommodated. It will not do to issue all the bonds at once and consider one's job done, for this only forces the lower levels onto the path of coercive allocation. This kind of bureaucratic style should be immediately rectified.

Chairman of the Central Government	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

September 23, 1933

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1. We have not been able to locate this document.



# *How to Analyze Classes<sup>1</sup>*

(October 10, 1933)

## **I. What Is a Landlord?**

A landlord is a person who owns land (*no matter how much*), does not engage in labor himself, or does so only to a very small extent, and lives entirely by exploitation.<sup>2</sup>

The collection of land rent (*including the collection of rent from school land*) is his main mode of exploitation of the peasants; in addition, he may also lend money, hire labor, or engage in industry or commerce. But his exaction of land rent from the peasants is his principal form of exploitation. The administration of ancestral temples<sup>3</sup> is also a type of exploitation through land rent. *Among the landlords, the exploitation by the small landlords is even more ruthless.* There are a few landlords who, although they are already bankrupt, still do not engage in labor, but live by swindling or plundering others or by receiving assistance from relatives and friends.<sup>4</sup> Such people should still be classified as landlords.

Warlords, bureaucrats, local bullies, and bad gentry are the political representatives of the landlord class and are particularly ferocious elements among the landlords.<sup>5</sup>

*The landlord class is the main enemy of the revolution; the policy of the soviets toward the landlords is to confiscate all their property and to eliminate the landlord class.*

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 265–68, which reproduces the text as first published in *Hongse Zhonghua* no. 89, June 29, 1933. Although it had thus appeared earlier, this directive was officially promulgated by the Central Soviet Government on October 10, 1933, at the same time as the longer decisions on the agrarian struggle translated below (see *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, pp. 412–13). We have therefore used that date, which appears at the end of the version in the *Mao Zedong ji*.

1. The title in the Chinese edition of the *Selected Works* is “How to Analyze Classes in the Rural Areas”; the English edition renders this as “How to Differentiate the Classes in the Rural Areas.”

2. Lives entirely by exploitation. → Lives by exploiting the peasants.

3. The administration of ancestral temples. → The administration of ancestral temples and the collection of rent from school land.

4. Receiving assistance from relatives or friends. → Receiving assistance from relatives or friends, and are better off than the average middle peasant.

5. Among the landlords. → Among the landlords. Relatively minor local bullies and bad gentry are also often to be found among the rich peasants.

Those persons who assist landlords in collecting rent and managing property, and who rely on landlord exploitation of the peasants for their livelihood,<sup>6</sup> shall be treated in the same way as landlords.

Those who rely solely or in large part on exploitation by usury for their livelihood<sup>7</sup> are called usurers.<sup>8</sup> *Although these people are not landlords, usury is feudal exploitation. All of their property should be confiscated and usurers should be eliminated.*

## II. What Is a Rich Peasant?

As a rule, rich peasants own land. Some, however, own only part of their land and rent the remainder. There are also some who have no land of their own at all and rent all their land (*the latter two kinds are the minority*). Rich peasants generally have rather more and better instruments of production and more liquid capital, and engage in labor themselves, but they always rely on exploitation for part of their livelihood or even, *in the case of some*, for the greater part of their livelihood.

The rich peasant's main form of exploitation is the hiring of labor (long-term laborers). In addition, he may let part of his land and practice exploitation through land rent or may lend money or engage in commerce or small-scale industry.<sup>9</sup> Most rich peasants also engage in the administration of ancestral temples. There are, however, some *Chinese* rich peasants who,<sup>10</sup> apart from their own labor, do not hire laborers, but exploit the peasants by means of land rent, loan interest, or in other ways.<sup>11</sup> Rich peasants regularly practice exploitation, and many derive their main income from this source.

*The policy of the soviets toward the rich peasants is to confiscate their land, but to confiscate only the surplus portion of their draft animals, farm implements, and houses, and yet to distribute to them land which is relatively hard to work.*

## III. What Is a Middle Peasant?

Many middle peasants own land. Some own part of their land and rent the rest. Others have no land of their own at all and rent the whole of their land. All of

6. For their livelihood, → As their main source of livelihood, and are better off than the average middle peasant.

7. Who rely solely or in large part on exploitation by usury for their livelihood → Who rely primarily on exploitation by usury for their livelihood, and who are better off than the average middle peasant.

8. Are called usurers → Are called usurers and are treated in the same way as landlords.

9. May lend money or engage in commerce or small-scale industry → May lend money or engage in industry and commerce

10. Rich peasants who, → Rich peasants who own a fair amount of good land, and who,

11. Or in other ways. → Or in other ways; in such circumstances, they should also be treated as rich peasants.

them have a fair number of farm implements. They rely solely or mostly on their own labor.

In general, they do not exploit others. Many are themselves exploited by others, by having to pay some amount<sup>12</sup> in land rent and in interest on loans. Generally speaking, however, middle peasants do not sell their own labor power. Another portion of the middle peasants (*including the well-to-do middle peasants*) does practice exploitation to some extent,<sup>13</sup> but this is not their regular or principal [source of income]. *All of these people are middle peasants.*

*The policy of the soviets toward middle peasants is to unite firmly with them. The land of the middle peasants may not be redistributed without the consent of the person concerned. Middle peasants with insufficient land should have land distributed to them in the same way as poor peasants and farm laborers.*

#### IV. What Is a Poor Peasant?

Among the poor peasants, there are some who own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements. Others own no land at all, but only a few odd farm implements. As a rule poor peasants have to rent the land they cultivate and are subjected to exploitation, having to pay land rent and interest on loans and to hire themselves out to some extent.<sup>14</sup> *(In general, a poor peasant must sell part of his labor power.) All such persons are poor peasants.*

*In the redistribution of land, poor peasants should gain the same benefits as middle peasants and farm laborers. None of the land and farm implements owned by them originally should be confiscated.*

#### V. What Is a Worker?

As a rule they<sup>15</sup> have no land or farm implements at all, though some do own a small portion of their land and farm implements. They make their living wholly or primarily by selling their labor power. *Such persons are workers (including farm laborers).*

*In the agrarian revolution, workers in the rural areas should receive the same share of land as poor peasants and middle peasants. The small amount of land and farm implements owned by some of them originally should not be confiscated. If a family member works in the city, he is a worker. If his family in the rural areas has land to let and money to make loans, and if his family does not*

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12. Some amount. → A small amount

13. To some extent, → To a slight extent,

14. To some extent. → To a small extent.

15. As a rule they → As a rule workers (including farm laborers)

*depend on the collection of rent and interest as the main source of income, its land should not be confiscated. In addition, his family should receive a share of land like that of ordinary peasants. If his family relies on the collection of land rent and loan interest as its main source of livelihood, its land should be confiscated. His wife and children should, however, be given land. He himself does not receive land, since he is in the city.*

# ***Decision Regarding Certain Questions in the Agrarian Struggle***

*Adopted by the Council of People's Commissars*

(October 10, 1933)

In the struggle for land redistribution and land investigation, many concrete questions have arisen. These questions are a result of either the absence of rules and regulations in past documents, or lack of clarity in such rules and regulations, or incorrect interpretation by soviet staff workers that led to errors in carrying them out. In order to correct and prevent the recurrence of such mistakes on these issues, the Council of People's Commissars, in addition to approving the various principles contained in "How to Analyze Classes" on the classification of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and workers, hereby makes the following decisions.

## **I. Labor and Supplementary Labor**

Under ordinary circumstances, a family in which one person spends one-third of his time each year engaged in essential labor is considered to have labor. Supplementary labor refers both to cases in which one person in a family engages in essential work for less than one-third of the time each year and to cases in which a person spends one-third of a year working but in other than essential work.

(Notes) Here, attention should be paid to the following:

1. Rich peasants themselves engage in labor, whereas landlords themselves do not labor or do only supplementary labor. Labor, therefore, is the main criterion in distinguishing between rich peasants and landlords.
2. The standard number of people determining whether a family has labor is one person. If one person works in a family with several members, the family is considered to have labor. Some people think that only when two people in a family or even the entire family works can the family be regarded as having labor, but this is incorrect.
3. The standard with regard to time for defining labor is one-third of a year, or four months. The distinction between labor and supplementary labor (or the

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 43–65, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed text.

distinction between rich peasants and landlords) depends on whether one spends four months or less than four months engaging in essential labor. Some people regard even engagement in essential work for half a year as supplementary labor. This is incorrect.

4. What is meant by "engaging in essential labor" is working in the main branches of production. Examples are plowing, sowing, weeding, and other important production tasks. But it is not restricted to agricultural production itself. For example, cutting firewood, carrying loads, and performing other important labor tasks all constitute essential labor.

5. What is meant by "nonessential" labor is various kinds of auxiliary work of secondary importance in production. Examples are helping with weeding, helping with growing vegetables, taking care of farm cattle, and so on.

6. Since labor is the primary criterion in distinguishing between rich peasants and landlords, those who hire long-term farm laborers to work the land, do not engage in other forms of exploitation such as land rental or monetary loans, and take charge of directing production but do not themselves engage in essential labor are still to be treated as landlords and may not be given land in the redistribution process.

7. The time criterion for determining landlord status takes the time of the uprising as a point of departure and is calculated from there. Those who have lived a landlord's life for three consecutive years are to be assigned landlord status.

Many mistakes have arisen in the course of the Land Investigation Movement concerning the question of labor and supplementary labor. Either labor has been regarded as merely supplementary labor, and the person has been judged a landlord, or a person who performed only supplementary labor has been regarded as engaged in labor, and been judged a rich peasant. All this has resulted from the fact that in the past there were no clear criteria for distinguishing between landlords and rich peasants. Following the above regulations can eliminate such mistakes.

The above regulations, however, apply to the "general situation." Different measures are required to handle particular circumstances. Two kinds of situation exist here. The first kind involves big landlord families who have members participating in production. For example, some people exploit heavily through land rental and monetary loans. They may take in over 100 *Dan* in rent or lend out more than 1,000 *yuan* in big foreign dollars but have few family members and low expenses. Thus, even though such a family may have someone engaged in essential labor for more than four months each year, it is still a landlord family, not a rich peasant family. On the other hand, in the case of a family with many members and heavy expenses, even if they take in rents of 100 *Dan* or interest on loans of 1,000 *yuan*, as long as someone in the family engages in essential labor, they are considered to be not landlords but, rather, rich peasants. The second kind of situation involves those who would be called landlords according to their circumstances with regard to exploitation but who may not be treated as landlords because of their living conditions. For example, some were

rich peasants or middle peasants in the past but suddenly lost their labor power several years before the uprising because of death or illness, and had no recourse but to rent out all their land or hire others to cultivate it, so that the whole family lived the life of a landlord. It is inappropriate to treat such people as landlords; they should be treated according to the individual's original status. As a further example, some people are still nominally landlords, but in actual fact their land rights already belong to others, their income from exploitation is minimal, they themselves do supplementary labor, and their living standard may be even lower than that of the peasants. Such people should be given poor land as rich peasants. In extreme cases and with the approval of the masses they may be given land as peasants. Another example is of some people who had been peasants in the past but encountered special opportunities two years before the uprising, suddenly got rich, and became landlords. Their land should certainly be confiscated, but because they were peasants two years before, with the approval of the masses they also may be given poor land as rich peasants.

During the Land Investigation Movement some places neglected the above-mentioned special circumstances and this too is incorrect.

## II. Well-to-Do Middle Peasants

Well-to-do middle peasants constitute a segment of the middle peasant population and they exploit others lightly. The portion of their income from exploitation may not exceed 15 percent of the total annual income of the whole family. Under certain circumstances, those whose income from exploitation is more than 15 percent of the total income but does not exceed 30 percent may still be classified as well-to-do middle peasants, provided that the masses do not object. Under the soviet régime the interests of well-to-do middle peasants should receive the same protection as those of ordinary middle peasants.

(Notes) Here, attention should be paid to the following:

1. Well-to-do middle peasants constitute a segment of the middle peasant population. Well-to-do middle peasants differ from other middle peasants in that they engage in minor exploitation of others, whereas the rest of the middle peasants generally are not involved in exploitation.

2. Well-to-do middle peasants differ from rich peasants in that their annual income from exploitation does not exceed 15 percent of the family's total annual income, and that of rich peasants does exceed 15 percent. Specifying this kind of distinction is necessary when it comes to actual designation of class status.

3. What is meant by slight exploitation on the part of well-to-do middle peasants is the hiring of children as shepherds and people to do odd jobs or hiring people on a monthly basis, lending small amounts of money, charging low fees for pawning and for schooling, or renting out small amounts of land, and so on. But all these forms of exploitation do not constitute an important component of the sources of income for the whole family, which means not more than 15

percent. The important source of income for the whole family, on the other hand, is their own labor.

4. Within the period of time close to the uprising, those who carried out the same amount of exploitation over the same period of time as rich peasants but for two years or less may still be considered well-to-do middle peasants.

5. Where it is stated that under certain circumstances, even though 15 percent is exceeded but 30 percent of total income is not, those people may still be classified as middle peasants provided that the masses do not object. What is meant by "certain circumstances" is a situation in which the portion of income derived from exploitation exceeds 15 percent but the family is large, there is little labor power, and the living standard is by no means comfortable. And then there are those affected by flood, drought, and other natural disasters, or who have met with illness and suffered deaths in the family, whose lives have become even more difficult. Under such circumstances, then, those whose income from exploitation does not exceed 30 percent may not be regarded as rich peasants and should be regarded as middle peasants. Without these circumstances present, those whose income from exploitation exceeds 15 percent of their total income are rich peasants and should not be considered well-to-do middle peasants. The correct evaluation of these circumstances rests upon the collective opinion of the local masses. Well-to-do middle peasants make up a considerable portion of the population in the countryside, and during the Land Investigation Movement many places have dealt with them as rich peasants. This is incorrect. Most incidents of infringement upon middle peasants that have arisen in various places are infringements upon this type of well-to-do middle peasant and should be corrected at once.

To give some examples:

1. A family with six mouths to feed and two people working. They have 50 *Dan* of fields and an actual harvest of 35 *Dan* of grain (the current price is 4 *yuan* per *Dan*, yielding a total of 140 *yuan*), cultivated entirely by the family itself. They have a five-room house and one ox, and a pond that generates 12 *yuan* a year in big foreign dollars. Production of miscellaneous grain and pig breeding yield approximately 100 *yuan*. They've been collecting for four years on 3 *Dan* of raw grain at 50 percent interest, which brings an annual income of 1.5 *Dan* (worth 6 *yuan*). For five years they have been collecting on 100 *yuan* of big foreign dollars (the equivalent of 1,800 *mao* in small foreign dollars)<sup>1</sup> at 25 percent interest, with an annual income of 25 *yuan*. Assessment: This family relies upon its own labor as the main source of livelihood, with over 250 *yuan*

1. Regarding the relation between whole-dollar silver coins or notes, and the fractional currency referred to as small foreign dollars, see above, the relevant section in the Note on Sources and Conventions. As indicated there, the rate of exchange between these two types of money varied according to time and place, but the figures given here imply a much steeper discount for 1 *mao* (10-cent) coins and notes than was common at the time. See also below, in the Caixi Investigation of November 26, 1933, Mao's own discussion of this issue.



from their own production. They exploit others through collection of interest on loans, but their annual interest income is only 29 *yuan*, which is less than 15 percent of the total income. There is a surplus after the entire family's expenses are paid and they are quite well off. Because the proportion of exploitation is not great, however, the family counts only as well-to-do middle peasants, not rich peasants.

2. A family with five mouths to feed and [the equivalent of] one and a half people working. They have 25 *Dan* of fields, with an actual harvest of 17 *Dan* of grain. For ten years they have rented, at 25 *Dan* per year, 75 *Dan* of fields that actually produce 42 *Dan* of grain. The production of miscellaneous grain and pig breeding generate 50 *yuan* a year. They have hired a shepherd boy for three years. For four years they have loaned 60 *yuan* in big foreign dollars at 30 percent interest, bringing in 18 *yuan* a year. They have a five-room house and one ox, plus a hillside orchard yielding 30 *Dan* of peaches a year. Assessment: This family relies for a living mainly on its own labor. Their annual exploitation of others is minimal, amounting to as little as 20 *yuan* or so (the total sum for hiring a shepherd boy and making a loan), yet they suffer exploitation by others of more than 25 *Dan* in rent and there is hardly any surplus after the whole family's expenses are paid. They can be counted only as ordinary middle peasants rather than as well-to-do middle peasants.

### III. The Time and Proportion of Exploitation by Rich Peasants

Starting from the time of the uprising and counting backward, anyone who within three consecutive years, apart from participating in production himself, relied on exploitation for a portion or the main portion of his whole family's source of income, and where exploitation exceeds 15 percent of the family's total annual income, is considered a rich peasant. Under certain circumstances, even if exploitation accounts for more than 15 percent of total income but does not exceed 30 percent and there is no objection from the masses, such a family is still not [considered to be] a rich peasant but rather a well-to-do middle peasant family.

(Notes) Here, attention should be paid to the following:

1. The uprising is to be the starting point in calculating duration of exploitation, and no other time may serve as a starting point for such determinations. Some people try to settle old scores by using as a basis for determining class status exploitation that was carried out in a much earlier period and where there was a gap [between that time and the uprising]. This is wrong.

2. The standard duration of exploitation for constituting rich peasant status is three consecutive years. If the duration of exploitation does not exceed three years, or if it is three years but there has been interruption (not consecutive), such a family is still classified as a well-to-do middle peasant family even though the proportion of exploitation in the equivalent period of time is the same as that of rich peasants.

3. The proportion of exploitation must exceed 15 percent of the whole family's total annual income to constitute rich peasant status. If the proportion of exploitation is less than 15 percent, even if the exploitation was three or more successive years in duration, the class status cannot be designated as rich peasant but rather as well-to-do middle peasant.

4. A family's total annual income refers to the sum of what they themselves produce and what derives from exploitation of others. For example, a certain family's income from its own production may be 400 *yuan* and its exploitation income may be 100 *yuan*, so the total sum when added together is 500 *yuan*. If the proportion of exploitation is 20 percent of total income, this is a rich peasant family.

5. What is meant by "certain circumstances" is a family with many members and little labor power that consequently is not particularly well off, or those whose lives become difficult because of natural or human disasters. Under such circumstances, where even though the proportion of exploitation exceeds 15 percent, it does not exceed 30 percent, and there is no objection from the masses, the family may still be classified as well-to-do middle peasants. The opinion of the masses is extremely important here, and weighing of such circumstances should be very careful. Well-to-do middle peasants should not be taken for rich peasants, for this would give rise to discontent among the middle peasants. At the same time, however, rich peasants should not be taken for well-to-do middle peasants, for this would cause dissatisfaction among poor peasants. Therefore, careful consideration should be given and the consent of the masses should be obtained.

Many disputes over these issues of duration and proportion of exploitation arose during the Land Investigation Movement. This was due to the absence of clear-cut criteria in the past for distinguishing between rich peasants and well-to-do middle peasants. Well-to-do middle peasants were sometimes treated as rich peasants, and rich peasants were treated as well-to-do middle peasants, so arguments frequently arose among them. Now the method of distinguishing between them has been specified so that this kind of problem may be avoided.

To give some examples:

1. A family with eleven mouths to feed and two people working. They have 160 *Dan* of fields of their own, yielding an actual harvest of 120 *Dan* of grain (worth 480 *yuan*). They have two parcels of hillside tea-oil fields, which bring in 30 *yuan* in big foreign dollars every year. They have one pond, producing 15 *yuan* a year in big foreign dollars. Production of miscellaneous grain, pig breeding, and so on generate approximately 50 *yuan* a year. Over a period of seven years they have regularly hired one long-term farm laborer, until the time of the revolution. The value of this exploitation of surplus labor amounted to approximately 70 *yuan* a year. They made a loan of 250 *yuan* at 30 percent interest, bringing in 75 *yuan* a year for five years, up until the revolution. They have a son who is a scholar and can write complaints and file lawsuits, and who bullies people by relying on influence. Assessment: This family has two laborers of its own, but hires a farm laborer and makes considerable loans. The income

from exploitation amounts to more than 15 percent of the family's total income. Although there are many family members, they have a good deal of extra money after expenses are paid. They are therefore rich peasants and should be given poor land. There is a bad gentry member of the family who himself should not be given any land at all.

2. A family with three mouths to feed and one person able to engage in essential work for four months. They have 60 *Dan* of fields, of which they cultivate 30 *Dan* themselves, bringing in an actual harvest of 18 *Dan* of grain. For five years they have rented out 30 *Dan* of fields, taking in 12 *Dan* of grain for rent. They regularly hire a short-term farm laborer for twenty days each year. They have one ox, which can bring in rental income of 2 *Dan* of grain a year. For three years they have made loans of 120 *yuan* in big foreign dollars at 30 percent interest, which brings in 36 *yuan* a year. Assessment: This family's income from exploitation exceeds that of their own production. Because there is one person engaging in essential work for four months, however, they are rich peasants and should be given poor land.

#### IV. Reactionary Rich Peasants

Rich peasants who have engaged in serious counterrevolutionary action before the uprising, and especially after the uprising, are called reactionary rich peasants. Reactionary rich peasants themselves and their relatives who participated in this sort of counterrevolutionary activities should have their land and property confiscated.

The above principles are also applicable to reactionary capitalists.

(Notes) Here, attention should be paid to the following:

1. Only rich peasants who engage in "major counterrevolutionary actions" are to be called reactionary rich peasants—for example, leading the landlord militia to massacre workers and peasants at the time of the uprising, stubbornly resisting the revolutionary government, and in particular directing others in organizing reactionary groups and organizations even after the uprising; or, individually engaging in major counterrevolutionary activities such as assassination, serving as an enemy spy, volunteering as a guide for the White army, fleeing to the White areas to assist the Guomindang, actively sabotaging the Land Investigation Movement and Economic Construction Movement, and so on. Such elements who are clearly proven and confirmed to be of rich peasant origin and to have engaged in major counterrevolutionary activities are to have their land and property confiscated. It is not permitted to confiscate the land and property of any others among the rich peasants, such as those who have taken counterrevolutionary actions but ones that are not major or in which they played no leading role.

2. Among the relatives of rich peasants, only elements who have participated in such serious counterrevolutionary actions are to have their land and property confiscated. The land and property of other elements are not to be confiscated.

3. Those who temporarily flee to the White areas with the aim of finding a living are not reactionary rich peasants, and their family property should not be confiscated. Those who do not wish to live in the soviet areas and run off to live in the White areas, however, and fail to return after a full year, should have their family property confiscated, even though they are not reactionary rich peasants.

4. The above stipulations are fully applicable to the definition and treatment of reactionary capitalists as well.

In the past, in many places the land and property of rich peasant elements who were not involved in major counterrevolutionary actions, and that of rich peasant elements in families who did not engage in any counterrevolutionary activities, were confiscated. This is wrong. One source of such a mistake is Article 3 of the Jiangxi Rules and Regulations on Confiscation and Redistribution of Land, which states that "confiscation shall involve the entire family of any rich peasant who joins counterrevolutionary organizations (such as the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, etc.)," and fails to distinguish between leaders and followers, participants and nonparticipants. On the question of relatives, it is true that the latter half of this article points out that "relatives of such persons who have not joined counterrevolutionary organizations, have taken no counterrevolutionary actions, and have severed their relationships with the counterrevolutionary elements in the family should have their land returned to them, provided that the local masses do not object," but it is still improper to begin by confiscating the whole family's property and only later return a portion of it. Therefore, this article should be amended according to the present stipulations. It is also wrong that in some places in the past the definition of a reactionary capitalist was broadened and confiscation was carried out in shops where it should not have been.

To give some examples:

A family with nine mouths to feed, one laborer, and one supplementary laborer. They have 160 *Dan* of land, 80 *Dan* of which they cultivate themselves and which yields an actual harvest of 45 *Dan* of grain. For ten years they have rented out 80 *Dan* of fields for 40 *Dan* of grain. There are five plots of hillside land that generate an income of 70 big foreign dollars a year. They regularly hire one long-term farm laborer. For three years they have had a debt of 425 big foreign dollars at 25 percent interest. For five years they have made loans of 380 big foreign dollars at 30 percent interest. One member of the family was a company commander in the Pacification and Protection Corps for two years and fought five battles against the Red Guard armies.<sup>2</sup> Another family member joined the AB Corps for half a year but was not an important element in it and has already made a confession to the government. The rest of the family members have not engaged in any obvious counter-

2. From October 1932, the units of local militia formerly called *chiweidui* or "Red Guard Detachments" had been renamed *chiweijun* or "Red Guard Army."

revolutionary activity. Assessment: This family's status is that of rich peasants. One person has engaged in serious counterrevolutionary work and is thus a reactionary rich peasant who should have his family property confiscated. The property of the rest of the family members should not be confiscated. The other person did join the AB Corps but was not an important element in it and has made a confession, so his property should not be confiscated either.

## **V. Donations from Rich Peasants**

In accordance with the policy of weakening the power of rich peasants, during the period of civil war, apart from carrying out basic measures such as distributing poor land to them, confiscating their extra housing, farm oxen, and agricultural tools, and levying higher progressive taxes on them, further donations should be solicited on an ad hoc basis from rich peasants. The total amount donated, however, should not exceed 40 percent of the rich peasant's total current liquid assets. The frequency of donations should also be restricted.

(Notes)

1. Two tendencies have arisen recently in dealing with donations from rich peasants. One is to shield rich peasants from having to make donations and the other is to have rich peasants donate all of their assets, which is no different from fining landlords. Both are incorrect. The latter even amounts to a tendency toward eliminating rich peasants, which runs the risk of having an influence upon the middle peasants. The present stipulations limit the maximum donation to 40 percent. Within the framework of these regulations on maximum limits, appropriate amounts may be solicited from rich peasants in each place on the basis of whether or not they made donations in the past and their present family circumstances.

2. Donations are of an ad hoc nature and are unlike a regular land tax, so the number of donations should be restricted. Donations should not be exacted too many times or without any limitations whatsoever.

3. The right to solicit donations from rich peasants rests solely with state financial organs and no other organs may solicit funds from them.

## **VI. The Land, Housing, Farm Oxen, and Farm Tools Rightly Owned by Rich Peasants**

As long as they obey soviet laws and ordinances, rich peasants themselves have the right to dispose of any land, housing, farm oxen, and farm tools that are confirmed to be legitimately theirs, without interference from others. Workers, peasants, and poor people may swap housing with rich peasants only under conditions that benefit production and only with the consent of the rich peasants.

(Notes)

1. In some places recently there have been instances of workers, peasants, and poor people swapping their own land, housing, farm oxen, and farm tools for

those that rightly belong to rich peasants. There have even been cases of swapping clothing and fertilizer. This is wrong, because there should be limits to "diminishing the power of rich peasants." The policy of "weakening" is already realized by distributing to them poorer land; confiscating their extra housing, farm oxen, and farm tools; levying higher progressive taxes on them; and demanding that they make some cash donation. Going beyond such limits constitutes a tendency toward eliminating the rich peasants, and this is inappropriate at the present revolutionary stage. Housing may be swapped only under conditions that benefit production and have the consent of the rich peasants.

2. After the land question is correctly resolved, if the poor land distributed to rich peasants has been improved and transformed into good land, it may no longer be swapped with others.

3. Farm oxen, farm tools, and housing acquired by rich peasants after the uprising may not be confiscated or swapped, even though they represent a surplus.

## VII. Volunteer Work by Rich Peasants

Rich peasants should take on more volunteer work for the state and the local [governments] than workers, peasants, and poor people, but it should not be allowed to interfere with rich peasants' production.

(Notes)

A distinction should be made between enjoining rich peasants to do volunteer work and enjoining landlords to do volunteer work. Able-bodied laborers of landlord origin should all be conscripted into forced labor teams and subjected to training so that they can participate in physical labor for the state and the local [governments] and transform their class character in the process of labor, thereby eliminating the landlords as a class. Rich peasants should take on more volunteer labor than workers, peasants, and poor people, but they may not be made to take on unlimited volunteer work to the extent that it interferes with production, as is done with landlords. For this reason it is inappropriate to put rich peasants and landlords in the same forced labor teams and make rich peasants leave production for long periods and take on volunteer work during busy farming seasons and under circumstances in which they have no extra labor power and have no way of making up for it. This does not apply, however, where there is no interference with production or the rich peasant has extra labor power or there are other ways to make up for it.

## VIII. Bankrupt Landlords

Landlords who had already lost all or the greater part of their [income from] exploitation of land and property before the uprising but who still do not engage in labor, and as their main source of income rely upon deception, plunder, or

assistance from relatives and friends, are called bankrupt landlords. Bankrupt landlords remain part of the landlord class and should not be given redistributed land. Landlords who have relied upon their own labor as their main source of livelihood for a full year after becoming bankrupt should be granted a change in status and the right to receive land in the redistribution.

Landlords who have depended upon their own labor for a portion of their livelihood may be treated as rich peasants once the proportion [of such income] has reached a third of their total annual living expenses.

(Notes)

Some people consider landlords who are partially bankrupt to be bankrupt landlords. This is wrong, because such landlords still have a portion of their estate which depends on exploitation; it is merely that the proportion of their income from exploitation has undergone a change.

Some people consider those who have engaged in essential labor for a full year after going bankrupt to be bankrupt landlords. This is even more incorrect, because a landlord who has engaged in essential labor for a full year after going bankrupt (before the uprising, that is) has already changed from being a landlord into being a worker, or a poor person, or a peasant.

Some people still treat as landlords those who have taken part in some labor after going bankrupt. This, too, is wrong, because those whose labor accounts for a third of their livelihood each year should already be given treatment as rich peasants.

## IX. Poor People

Apart from workers, peasants, independent producers, and people in the professions, those who rely upon their own labor to engage in one or several occupations, those who rely primarily upon their own labor power for a living, or those who rely upon extremely small amounts of capital to run their own enterprise in order to maintain a minimal existence are all called poor people. Land should be distributed to poor elements and to the unemployed in rural areas and in small cities and towns. Poor elements in cities who have no housing should be given housing in the city that belongs to landlords.

(Notes)

The proportion of poor people in cities is considerable, and there are some of them as well in rural areas and small cities and towns. Occupation is a very complicated matter with poor people. Some poor people's occupations change with the seasons and cannot be fixed. The life of poor people is very hard. They are often unable to make ends meet.

What is meant by poor elements who rely on very meager capital to run their own businesses is the peddler.

Doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists, writers, artists, and others who do not engage in exploitation are called members of the professions.

## X. Intellectuals

1. Intellectual may not be regarded as a class status in itself. The class status of an intellectual is determined by the class to which he belongs.

2. All intellectuals of landlord and bourgeois origins should be fully utilized in the service of the soviets, on condition that they obey the laws and ordinances of the soviets.

3. Intellectuals engaged in work that does not involve the exploitation of others, such as those who serve as teachers, editors, journalists, clerks, writers, artists, and so on fall into the category of mental workers. Such mental workers should enjoy the protection of soviet laws.

(Notes)

1. Recently intellectuals have been unconditionally rejected in many places. This is wrong. Making use of intellectuals with landlord and bourgeois origins to serve the soviets is a policy advantageous to the soviet revolution. While they are serving the soviets, ways should be found to solve their problems of daily living.

2. What is meant by stating that the class status of an intellectual is determined by the class to which he belongs is, for example, that intellectuals of landlord origins are landlords, intellectuals of rich peasant origins are rich peasants, and intellectuals of middle peasant origins are middle peasants. It is wrong to consider intellectual as a separate class status. What is even more incorrect is to regard the children of peasants who have had some schooling (so-called "graduates") as bad class elements.

3. It is also wrong to regard being a teacher and other such work as other than labor.

## XI. Lumpenproletarians

Workers, peasants, and other common people who just prior to the uprising lost their jobs and land due to exploitation and oppression by the landlords and the bourgeoisie and for three consecutive years have relied upon improper means for their main source of income are called lumpenproletarians (commonly known as vagabonds).

The soviet policy toward the lumpenproletarians is to win over the masses and oppose the leaders and other elements who submit to the exploiting classes and actively participate in counterrevolution. The primary method for winning over the ordinary masses of lumpenproletarians is to get them to return to production and to give them land and jobs, plus the right to vote, as is done with ordinary revolutionary masses. To be given land, however, it is necessary to live in the countryside and to be able to cultivate it oneself.

(Notes)

Here, attention should be paid to the following:



1. What is meant by relying upon improper means as the main source of income is engaging in theft, robbery, deception, begging, gambling, prostitution, and other unseemly activities. Some people label as vagabonds all elements who are employed or semiemployed but engage on the side in some improper work (not as their main source of livelihood). This is wrong. Going so far as to consider vagabonds those among the workers, peasants, and poor people who used to have certain bad habits (such as patronizing brothels, gambling, or smoking opium) is even more wrong.

2. In some places, elements who are leaders of the lumpenproletariat (so-called vagabond chiefs) and have actively participated in counterrevolution have not been punished, and, instead, land has been distributed to them. This is wrong. In some places, requests of ordinary lumpenproletarians for redistributed land have been rejected. This is also wrong.

## **XII. Religious Professionals**

Religious professionals are those who for three full years (immediately before the uprising) have had as their primary source of livelihood work in religious and superstitious endeavors such as that of ministers, priests, monks, Daoist priests, assistants at religious ceremonies, geomancers, fortune-tellers, diviners, and so on. Religious professionals do not have the right to vote and may not be given redistributed land.

### **(Notes)**

All those who engage in such religious and superstitious work but do not rely upon it as their primary source of livelihood, and those who have relied upon such work as their main source of livelihood for less than three years, may not be called religious professionals and should be treated differently according to their respective class status. They may not be summarily deprived of the right to vote or receive redistributed land. In other words, all those who do religious and superstitious work as sideline occupations, or who have engaged in such work as a primary occupation for less than three years, and are workers, peasants, or poor people should enjoy the right to vote and should be given redistributed land if they live in the countryside. If this is the case for these people themselves, naturally it is all the more so for their family members. Some people call those such as monks, Daoist priests, geomancers, fortune-tellers, and others vagabonds. This is wrong.

## **XIII. Elements of Landlord and Rich Peasant Origins among Red Army Soldiers and the Land**

Provided that they resolutely fight for the workers' and peasants' interests, elements of landlord and rich peasant origins among Red Army men, commanders and fighters alike, themselves and their family members have the right to receive redistributed land.

## (Notes)

1. Article 1 of the Rules and Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Red Army: "All Red Army soldiers whose families are within soviet territory must themselves and their relatives be treated just as the local poor peasants in redistribution of land, housing, hillside forests, and ponds." All Red Army soldiers are included here. Recently, however, in some places only social origin was taken into consideration, not political attitude, and land already redistributed to Red Army soldiers of landlord and rich peasant origin who have resolutely fought for the interests of the workers and peasants was taken away again. This is wrong.

2. "Members of Red Army soldiers' families" refers to fathers, mothers, wives, sons, daughters, and younger brothers and sisters under the age of sixteen. Others may not enjoy this right.

3. If Red Army soldiers of landlord and rich peasant origins are expelled from the army, their land is to be taken back.

**XIV. Workers of Rich Peasant or Landlord Family Origins**

The class status of workers of rich peasant and landlord family origins and their wives remains that of workers. Whether or not they should be given redistributed land is handled separately depending on whether they live in the countryside or in the city. Other members of the family are treated as landlords and rich peasants.

## (Notes)

1. Those in landlord and rich peasant families who sold their labor for a full year immediately before the uprising should be acknowledged as having working-class status. They themselves and their wives are to be treated as those with worker status, and the portion of property that rightfully belongs to them is not to be confiscated. If the worker and his wife live in the countryside, they should be given redistributed land. If he and his wife live in the city, they should not be given redistributed land. If the worker himself is in the city and his wife is in the countryside, he himself should not receive land, but his wife does get land. Other members of the family are to be treated as those with landlord or rich peasant status and may not enjoy the same rights as workers. If there are family members with other status, they are to be treated according to their own status. (For example, a family member in the countryside who has relied upon rent and interest on loans as his main source of livelihood for a full three years is a landlord. Someone who has sold his labor power for a full year is a worker. Or, someone who has for a full year run a small handicraft shop in a town that sells products of his own making is an independent producer. Each person's class status is determined by the nature of his source of livelihood within a certain period of time, and class status in turn determines the treatment received under soviet law.)

2. Among workers, independent producers, elementary school teachers, medical workers, and others in the countryside there are those who also have a small

plot of land, but because in the countryside they are unable to make a living they have had to go elsewhere to do so and have rented out their small plot of land but do not rely upon it as their main source of livelihood. Such people should be given redistributed land as ordinary peasants and must not be regarded as landlords.

#### **XV. Class Status after Marriage Between Landlords, Rich Peasants, and Capitalists, and Workers and Peasants**

1. The act of marriage cannot itself change one's class status.
2. Class status after marriage between landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists on the one hand, and workers, peasants, and poor people on the other is determined by whether the marriage took place before or after the uprising, by the original class status, and by the living conditions after the marriage.
3. As for all those who married before the uprising: daughters of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists married to workers, peasants, or poor people, if they have engaged in physical labor for a full year may be recognized as having the class status of workers, peasants, or poor people. The original class status of those who have not worked or have worked for less than a full year remains unchanged. Daughters of workers, peasants, and poor people married to landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists can be recognized as having landlord, rich peasant, or capitalist class status only if they have lived the life of landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists for a full five years. Their original class status remains unchanged if their living conditions have not been equivalent to those of landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists but instead to those of workers, peasants, or poor people (namely, relying on their own labor as the main source of livelihood), or if they have lived the equivalent lifestyle for less than five years.
4. As for all those who married after the uprising: The class status of daughters of workers, peasants, and poor people who married landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists remains unchanged. Daughters of landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists who marry workers, peasants, or poor people must engage in physical labor for five full years before they can be recognized as having the class status of workers, peasants, or poor people. If they do not work or have worked for less than five full years, their original status remains unchanged.
5. No matter when the marriage takes place and no matter what the class status of the two people, the class status of any children born to them follows that of the father.
6. Whether or not a person is entitled to receive land and enjoy civil rights depends on one's class status.
7. Daughters of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists married to workers, peasants, or poor people may not be grouped into labor teams. Those whose cash dowry is less than 50 *yuan* may not be fined or solicited for donations.
8. As for cases before the uprising in which sons and daughters of workers, peasants, and poor people were sold to landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists, and sons were recruited as sons-in-law for daughters between families of land-

lords, rich peasants, and capitalists on the one hand and those of workers, peasants, and poor people on the other, the class status and treatment of children who were sold and sons-in-law recruited into their wives' families should be in line with the stipulations of Articles 1 through 7.

9. As for cases before the uprising of adopting children between families of workers, peasants, and poor people on the one hand and families of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists on the other, for children under the age of ten the child's original class status remains unchanged regardless of age at the time of adoption. After the age of ten, the class status of children of workers, peasants, and poor people adopted by landlords, rich peasants, or capitalists who have lived the same lifestyle as their step-parents for a full five years becomes that of the step-parents. If their living conditions are not the same as those of their step-parents but are, rather, equivalent to those of their biological parents, their original class status remains unchanged. The class status of children of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists adopted by workers, peasants, or poor people who have lived for three full years a life equivalent to that of their step-parents is the same as that of their step-parents. If their living conditions are different from those of their step-parents but are, instead, equivalent to those of their biological parents, their original class status remains unchanged.

(Notes) Here the term "physical labor" includes housework.

#### **XVI. Landlords and Rich Peasants Who Are Also Merchants**

1. Landlords who are also merchants: Their land and any houses and property connected to the land are to be confiscated. Their commercial enterprise and any shops, housing, and property connected to the enterprise are not to be confiscated.

2. Rich peasants who are also merchants: Their land and any houses and property connected to the land are to be dealt with according to the status of rich peasants. Their enterprises and any shops, housing, and property connected to them are not to be confiscated.

3. Fines and solicitation of funds imposed on landlords and rich peasants who are also merchants should be restricted to the landlord and rich peasant portion [of their resources] and may not encroach upon the commercial portion.

4. Merchants are not to be incorporated into forced labor brigades.

#### **XVII. Being in Charge of Public Halls (*gongtang*)<sup>3</sup>**

Being in charge of public halls is a kind of exploitation. Distinctions should be made, however, between landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists who take

3. The term *gongtang*, which literally means "public hall," is a generic term used to refer to a wide variety of corporate entities, many of which in the part of China occupied by the Central Soviet Area involve the preservation and management of the land and other resources of corporate lineages. Mao earlier discussed the exploitative elite management of these types of organization in his "Xingguo Investigation" (see Volume III, pp. 611-14,

charge of public halls and workers, peasants, and poor people who do so.

(Note)

What is meant by "taking charge of public halls" is managing the land and property of various kinds of ancestral halls, temples, associations, and societies. Taking charge of public halls is undoubtedly a form of exploitation, particularly since the landlord class and rich peasants try to concentrate tremendous amounts of land and property under the name of public halls and turn them into a major method of exploitation. The act of taking care of this sort of public halls, which are controlled and manipulated by a small number of people and generate large amounts of income from exploitation, should certainly constitute a factor in the class status of the people doing the caretaking. The masses of workers, peasants, and poor people take turns looking after some small public halls, however, where the level of exploitation is very low, so this cannot become a factor in determining the class status of the caretaker. Some people think that anyone in charge of a public hall is a landlord, rich peasant, or capitalist. This is wrong.

### **XVIII. The Question of Livelihood for Certain Staff Workers**

In cases of staff workers in soviet organs and other revolutionary organizations who have not been given redistributed land and are undergoing particular hardship, they themselves and their family members may be given a certain amount of land or assisted with other means to resolve their difficulties.

(Notes)

The livelihood of ordinary soviet staff workers who have been given redistributed land has been settled by order of the Central Government (i.e., mobilizing the masses to cultivate their land). Only those who have not been given land are mentioned here. "Family members" refers to fathers, mothers, wives, sons, daughters, and younger brothers and sisters under the age of sixteen.

### **XIX. Land for Public Use**

When land in new areas is redistributed and land in old areas is discovered through investigation and reassigned, appropriate amounts of land should be set aside for public use, such as building bridges, ferries, tea pavilions, agricultural experimentation stations, and so on.

(Notes)

Expenses for public works such as repairing bridges, repairing ferries, paying ferry crews, repairing and maintaining tea pavilions, and so on are to be met by

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where *gongtang* is translated as "public domain"). The term is somewhat similar in usage to the term *gonghui* ("public association" or "trust"), examples of which are discussed at length in Mao's "Xunwu Investigation" (see Volume III, pp. 351-58).

setting aside appropriate amounts of land according to need and mobilizing the masses to cultivate it. In addition, *xian*, district, and township soviets must set aside a certain amount of land near the government organs (*xian* soviets may set aside 50 *Dan* to 150 *Dan* of land, district soviets may set aside 15 to 25 *Dan* of land, and township soviets may set aside 5 to 10 *Dan* of land) for the purpose of establishing agricultural experimentation stations. Before the agricultural experimentation stations open up, the land may be leased at the lowest possible rent to the peasants for cultivation.

## XX. The Question of Debts

1. All loans in cash or goods made to workers, peasants, and poor people by landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists prior to the uprising, except accounts for goods of stores and shops, should be abolished in terms of both capital and interest. All cash and goods of workers, peasants, and poor people deposited with landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists should be completely repaid in terms of both capital and interest.

2. Usurers are those who depend wholly or primarily upon exploitation by charging high interest as the main source of the family's livelihood. Usurers should be handled in the same manner as are those of landlord status.

3. Debts incurred after the uprising that are not in violation of the provisions of the Temporary Rules and Regulations on Credit and Loans promulgated by the Central Government should all be repaid.

(Notes)

Those who exploit by charging high interest on loans (the vast majority of loans in all Guomindang-ruled areas, whether in the cities or the countryside, exploit through high interest rates) but do not rely solely or mostly on charging high interest as the family's main source of livelihood cannot be called usurers and dealt with under the policy of total confiscation. Instead, they should be handled according to their respective class status. It is wrong to think that all those who engage in exploitation by charging high interest are "usurers." In cases of people who are simultaneously both lenders and borrowers, their "debts" and "credits" should be offset against each other to see the nature and extent of the balance, which together with other exploitative relations of the persons decides their class status.

Chairman of the Central  
Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

October 10, 1933, by the Western calendar

***Order No. 49 of the Council of People's  
Commissars of the Central Government of  
the Chinese Soviet Republic***

(October 10, 1933)

1. The decisions of this council on October 10, 1933, concerning certain issues in the agrarian struggle are hereby promulgated.

2. Any class status determined before October 10, 1933, in whatever locality that is not in line with these decisions should immediately be changed in accordance with these decisions. As regards changes that should be made in the disposal of land and property as a result of changes in class status, all land, houses, mountain forests, ponds, orchards, and so on, belonging to middle peasants, poor peasants, poor people, workers, and others that were redistributed in the past should somehow all be returned to the original owners. But property other than land, houses, mountain forests, ponds, and orchards should be returned to the original owners only insofar as this is possible (if there are still landlord properties that can be confiscated in the local areas, and so on). All land, houses, mountain forests, ponds, orchards, draft animals, farm tools, and so on, that should go to rich peasants, as well as the property of capitalists, may be returned to the original owners only within the limits of the possible.

3. Regarding sentences made by judicial organs of various localities before October 10, 1933, that are not in accord with these decisions, where they have already been carried out, the original sentences should remain unchanged; those that have not been carried out or are in the process of being carried out should be changed immediately in accordance with these decisions.

4. No one in any locality may demand changes in the class status determined before or after October 10, 1933, or in the disposal of property based on the determined class status, if these were in conformity with the present decisions and contain no errors.

Chairman    Mao Zedong

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 41-42.

## ***Order Regarding Emergency Mobilization to Smash the Fifth “Encirclement and Suppression”***

(October 18, 1933)

The large scale and decisive battle to smash the enemy's Fifth “Encirclement and Suppression” has already started! This battle is the most crucial key to our striving for greater victories!

The large-scale attack launched by the imperialist Guomindang has already suffered a heavy blow at its initial stage in Qingliu, Liancheng, Yangkou, Wujiang, Lichuan, and other places. In spite of this fact, they are still organizing another more frenzied and more desperate attack on us. This battle is a crucial juncture in the decisive war between the soviet road and the colonial road!

It is the most essential and most challenging task for our entire soviet régime at this moment to mobilize all our forces to fight for a way out for the soviets, and to achieve, with our hot blood, complete victory in this decisive battle. However, the Central Government has discovered, after reviewing the results of soviet work at various levels, that many local governments are still treating the battle mobilization very lightly. Recently, many areas have shown insufficient initiative in expanding the Red Army, expanding and training local armed forces, and mobilizing transportation teams to go to the battlefield. Many areas have not yet been able fully to link up all their work, such as the Land Investigation Movement, economic construction, cultural education, and the other tasks of the soviets, with mobilization for the revolutionary war, and thus truly arouse and lead the masses in our attempt to shatter the Fifth “Encirclement and Suppression” and win final victory in the battle. Because many local governments are taking a very casual or even indifferent attitude toward war mobilization, a series of grave incidents such as the following have just recently taken place: Some small units of the enemy troops on the northern front even had the audacity to go deep into the Yongfeng-Beikeng soviet area and make a surprise raid on the district government there; spies of the enemy troops on the southern front dared to find their way into the area around Junmenceng, gathering intelligence about our military operations, and our district and township governments were totally

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 123, November 2, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 99–102.



unaware of this before it happened. In Fujian Province, there were not enough preparations to assist the Red Army in their fight for victory in the battle of Liancheng in July this year. After the victory, the work of winning over the new areas in Liancheng, Qingliu, and Guihua moved at an extremely slow pace. In Fujian-Jiangxi Province, more than three hundred guns were intercepted and taken away by the enemy not long ago. No porters were available to carry away the large amount of captured equipment on the battlefield. The Red Army soldiers themselves had to carry the large quantities of guns that they had seized from the enemy in Lichuan recently. These areas have lowered their guard against the enemy and have maintained an indifferent and negligent attitude toward war mobilization. All this almost constitutes a criminal offense against the revolution, a phenomenon that cannot be allowed to continue any longer. It must be turned around immediately.

The governments at all levels must start to carry out the following measures right away, from the very day when they receive this order:

1. Governments at the provincial, *xian*, district, and township levels, as well as all Red Army units, must hold various kinds of meetings promptly, explaining the tense situation of the revolutionary war at this point in great detail during these meetings, especially the soviet electoral meetings, and throwing all our efforts into war mobilization. Similarly, all mass organizations must hold their own meetings, report on the situation of the war and their tasks, and make every single worker or peasant in the soviet area not only understand the significance of the battle to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," but also take part in war work eagerly and enthusiastically.

2. Before the decisive battle to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," governments at all levels, which still vividly remember the experiences and lessons of our last struggle to smash the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," must fulfill the Central Revolutionary Military Commission's plan for expansion of the Red Army. You must energetically call on the Red Young Pioneers to join the Red Army in whole battalions and companies, while persuading large quantities of individual activists to join the Red Army at the same time. It is necessary to carry forward the experience of Red May and continue to expand the Red Army forcefully at the glorious speed of Red May.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, it is also necessary to urge all those who have deserted the army to return to their units, by using Xingguo's good experience in its return-to-unit campaign.

3. It is essential to arouse large numbers of citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty to join the Red Guard armies voluntarily, and mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants to join the Young Pioneers. In particular,

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1. Although the international Labor Day holiday had been celebrated every year on May 1, in 1933 this date had been linked to Marx's birthday on May 5, and the anniversary of the Shanghai massacre of May 30, 1925, and the month as a whole designated "Red May" (*hong wuyue*). In this context, recruiting centers for the Red Army and the Communist Party had been set up on the location where the May Day celebrations were held. See, in particular, *Hongse Zhonghua*, nos. 70, 73, 75, and 81, for April 17 and 26 and May 2 and 20, 1933.

the organizations of the Model Battalion in the Red Guard armies and the Model Young Pioneer Team must be restored and expanded immediately. Apart from frequent training exercises, they should also receive intensified military and political training. The Model Battalion and the Model Young Pioneer Team must be completely established as early as possible in each area in which they have never been established before. Under the unified plan (based on the decision of military authorities), Red Young Pioneer teams may be mobilized to assist the Red Army in battle operations, whereas all guerrilla detachments must drive, nimbly and deeply, into the enemy's rear area in accordance with orders from the Military Affairs Commission, so that they can pin down and strike the enemy troops.

4. Material supply to the Red Army must be guaranteed. Our every move in economic construction must be closely linked up with the war. It is necessary to mobilize the broad masses in order to accomplish our job of sales promotion in economic construction by the end of December. The land tax should become effective in November, and it must be all collected within two months. Governments at all levels must step up fund-raising projects, especially fund-raising projects in new and frontier areas. The bureau of redistribution and the bureau of trade in every government must do whatever they can to guarantee provisions for the Red Army and make sure that Red Army operations will not be jeopardized again simply because they are hampered by the same grain shortage that they suffered during the spring and summer this year. We must mobilize the worker and peasant masses so that they are prepared to give economic support to the Red Army at any moment.

5. According to the Voluntary Labor Law issued by the Central Government, we must mobilize the broad masses to take over transport work. Every member of the Red Guard Army should carry one shoulder pole and one bed sheet, and every five of them should carry a stretcher. As soon as they receive orders from the government, they can get together immediately, providing transport service and supporting operations against the enemy. Whenever a transport line is damaged, it must be promptly repaired to facilitate the operations of the Red Army.

6. It is particularly important to intensify our work to eliminate counterrevolutionaries and enforce the Red martial law. All counterrevolutionary cases must be settled promptly within a few weeks and escape from prison must absolutely not be allowed to happen again. Sentries must be posted everywhere and checks on travel permits must be reinforced. In frontier areas it is even more important to guard against surprise attacks by the enemy's plainclothes units at any time, and to set up necessary warning signals in accordance with orders from the Military Affairs Commission.

7. We must make the greatest efforts to pay attention to our work in border areas and new areas, and send the most talented cadres to work in these areas. In new areas that have just recently been seized by the Red Army, we should try to establish provisional governments right away, distribute the land, organize local armed forces, and set up various kinds of revolutionary mass organizations.

8. Worker-peasant procuratorates at all levels must speed up accusations

against those elements who adopted passive and bureaucratic attitudes during the process of war mobilization. Departments of labor and education at all levels should link war mobilization as closely as possible with their respective work in implementing the Labor Law and promoting cultural education.

All soviet work must be subordinated to the war!

During such a tremendous, strenuous, and decisive battle at this moment, it is imperative not only relentlessly to put an end to any panic-stricken, shrinking, and escapist conceptions, but also firmly to oppose any underestimation of the enemy's attack and any neglect of war mobilization. The greatest efforts must be made to intensify all our work, so that we can mobilize the broad worker and peasant masses by means of intensive propaganda and agitation. We must gather all our forces, prepare to sacrifice everything, and fight for complete victory in our struggle to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"! Fight for a new Soviet China!

Governments at all levels must immediately conduct detailed briefings and discussions regarding this order, along with the order that the Military Affairs Committee issued on October 5, at various meetings, and work out the most specific ways to carry out these orders. It is necessary to mete out severe disciplinary punishment to anyone who assumes an inactive or slack role in the execution of these orders. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Work Report to the Electorate by the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on the Second Anniversary of Its Establishment***

(October 24, 1933)

Comrades of the Entire Electorate:

Today, it has been two years since the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was founded. On this day last year, we presented a simple report to you comrades. Now on this occasion of our second anniversary, we believe that we should give you comrades a brief report on our work since last year. And we are willing to accept your comments on our work in the past as well as your suggestions for our administrative principles in the future.

Comrades, under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Provisional Central Government's work is moving triumphantly in all respects, thanks to the initiative of the broad masses of workers and peasants and other poor people and to the heroic struggle of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The situation is totally different from last year. Now let us go through some points in turn.

## **I. Victory in the Revolutionary War and the Expansion and Reinforcement of the Red Army**

To smash the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" has been the central task for the revolutionary war since last year. Now, the war has ended in a complete triumph in all the soviet areas throughout the country. According to incomplete statistics, since last year we have wiped out more than a hundred thousand of the White army and seized their guns. The statistics for the period from January to June this year alone tell us that 41 regiments, 6 battalions, and 10 companies of the White army were eliminated; 8 divisions, 33 regiments, 19 battalions, and 9 companies of the White army were routed; more than 31,700 rifles and more than 1,000 machine guns and automatic rifles were seized; more

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This report was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 122, October 27, 1933. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 103–10, which reproduces the text from this version.

than 20 regimental, brigade, and division commanders were captured alive; 2 division commanders were killed; and countless officers and soldiers below the rank of brigade commander were either killed or wounded. It is just because we won such a glorious and great victory that the rule of the imperialist Guomindang has been shaken tremendously. They have no way out but to launch the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" as their last desperate struggle against us. Nevertheless, relying on the Party's offensive line, the heroic spirit of the Red Army, and the warm support from the masses of workers and peasants both in the soviet areas and in the White areas, we have dealt a sharp head-on blow to the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" from the very beginning. We have won battles in Liancheng, Yangkou, Wujiang, and, recently, Lichuan, confiscating more than eight thousand guns. As the masses of workers and peasants came forward bravely and joined the Red Army since last year, the size of the Red Army has doubled as compared to its original size last year, and it has been tempered, amid heroic and bloody battles, into a revolutionary iron army, strong and invincible. Meanwhile, the Red Guard armies, the Young Pioneers, and the guerrilla detachments in various areas have also been strengthened. The leadership by the Soviet Government of the masses of workers and peasants and of the Red Army to shatter the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression" through revolutionary war has become the key to all our revolutionary tasks. For this reason, all activities in our work and life must be subordinated to the revolutionary war. To strive for victory in this war is the primary responsibility of the soviets and of every single comrade among the workers and peasants as well.

## II. The Vigorous Expansion and Further Consolidation of the Soviet Area

Since this time last year, six or seven *xian*, including Jianning, Taining, Lichuan, Guangze, Zhixi, and Jinxi, have been turned into "Red areas" in the region that lies to the northeast of the Central Soviet Area. Thus, the different soviet areas scattered in Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi have been merged together to become a new Fujian-Jiangxi Province. Thanks to the recent victory of the Eastern Army, the vast area that stretches from the border at Longyan and Xinquan all the way through Liancheng, Qingliu, and Guihua in Fujian to the vicinity of Yanping in northern Fujian has become a part of the soviet domain. During the struggle to smash the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," the soviet area in Jiangxi has been extended to parts of several *xian*—Nanfeng, Yihuang, Chongren, Le'an, Yongfeng, and Xin'gan. The total area is several hundred *li* broad. As for the soviet areas beyond the Central Soviet Area, such as the soviet areas of Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, West Hunan-Hubei, and Hubei-Henan-Anhui, even though a few areas have been occupied by the enemy for the time being, some areas will be retrieved before long and some areas have already been further enlarged. The area

that has been enlarged most quickly and widely is the very soviet region newly created in northern Sichuan. In the wake of the heroic struggle by the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, more than ten *xian* have been turned into "Red areas" within less than a year, thus summoning the masses of the poor workers and peasants as well as the White army soldiers in all Sichuan Province to incline toward the soviet revolution. In addition, our soviet areas or guerrilla war zones are also scattered all over other provinces, such as Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Guangxi. Even in the Three Northeastern Provinces, which have been sold out to Japanese imperialism by the Guomindang, we have already set up our Red guerrilla zone. All the units of the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in these Three Northeastern Provinces are still fighting indomitably against Japanese imperialism.

Soviet territory has not only been expanded, but also further consolidated. For example, the previous tendency of not following a clear class line has now been generally rectified. Thanks to conscientious application of the Labor Law and promulgation of the new Labor Law, the economic life of most workers has been further improved, the workers' activism in taking part in the revolutionary war and soviet construction has been further heightened, and the labor unions of the working class have been organized and developed everywhere. The broad development of the Land Investigation Movement has dealt an extremely heavy blow to the remaining feudal forces in the soviet areas, greatly enhanced the revolutionary enthusiasm of the poor people in the countryside, and enlarged the poor peasant league on a wide scale. With the development of the activism of the workers and peasants, many worker and peasant cadres have been drawn into soviet work, whereas most of the evildoers who were formerly hidden inside the soviets were flushed out. The soviet has further perfected its methods of leadership and work, and has maintained a closer relationship with the broad masses. Having reduced the size of its administrative areas this year, the soviet really has a system that can enable it to approach the masses more easily.

On the basis of our former experience in the soviet electoral campaign as well as of our experience in soviet work in general, the central government issued new laws for elections and for the organization of local soviet institutions, which have made it possible for the election this year to unfold correctly and for local soviet institutions to perfect themselves. All this has not only turned the soviets into a political power through which the broad masses can manage affairs for themselves, but has adapted this power to the needs of the revolutionary war and enabled it to become both the organizer and leader of such a war.

The Red Army's great victory, and the expansion and consolidation of the soviet areas on the one hand; and on the other hand Japanese imperialism's forcible occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, and North China; the Guomindang government's complete surrender to the imperialists; and the economic crisis in all the areas ruled by the Guomindang—all these facts have influenced and mobilized the broad masses of the poor workers and peasants,

revolutionary soldiers, and revolutionary students throughout the territory controlled by the Guomindang to rise together in opposition against the Japanese and all the other imperialists, against the Guomindang government, and against the landlords and capitalists. Thus the revolutionary struggle has flourished throughout the vast land of China. All the exploited and oppressed masses throughout China warmly support the soviets and the Red Army, because only the soviets and the Red Army are a government and an army which are truly fighting for the freedom and independence of the nation, and only the soviets and the Red Army can save China.

### III. Economic and Cultural Construction of the Soviets

The cruel and protracted civil war requires the soviets to pay great attention to the business of economic construction. The soviets have already devoted extremely great efforts to advancing this aspect of our work. In this respect, the first major task is to develop agricultural production. Thanks to the correct leadership of the soviets and the increased zeal of the broad masses of toilers during the spring and summer plowing seasons this year, the autumn harvest increased on average by a factor of one and half as compared to last year, the production of miscellaneous grain increased even more, and draft animal cooperatives and mutual-aid associations have been set up in many places. Only through development of agricultural production can we guarantee the supply of provisions to the Red Army and the masses, and the exchange of industrial products with outside areas as well. The second major task in economic construction is to develop industrial production. The manufacturing of farm tools and lime is closely related to the development of agricultural production. The supply of many handicraft products for daily use depends on production in the soviet areas themselves. Items such as tobacco, paper, lumber, grass cloth, tungsten ore, and camphor used to be our major commodities for export in the past, but subsequently production of all of them has declined. Beginning this year, the soviet has been working on a plan to revive all these industries, and some of them have already achieved preliminary successes. The third major task in economic construction is to expand the import and export trade. Beginning this year, the government has set up the Bureau of External Trade and has started to work on this aspect. In order to accomplish all the aforementioned tasks of economic construction, we should develop cooperatives without further delay. Since the Central Government has strongly advocated the cooperative movement, consumer cooperatives and grain cooperatives have been surging forward in different areas. Various kinds of production cooperatives are also being planned and developed. Credit cooperatives, too, are beginning to be planned. The Central Government's decision to issue economic construction bonds for the sake of carrying out economic construction has received support from the broad masses. The total amount of the bonds issued in different areas is over 3,000,000 *yuan*,

and a figure of 5,000,000 *yuan* can probably be reached. The development of our enterprise of economic construction will surely create a solid material foundation for the revolutionary war and will bring about another step forward in the life of the broad masses of workers and peasants. Comrades, let us all strive together!

The revolutionary war and the cause of soviet construction require a general increase in the cultural level of the worker and peasant masses in the soviet areas, and indeed, it is only under the soviet régime that the worker and peasant masses enjoy the right or the possibility of receiving education. For the past year, the soviets have devoted great efforts to the cause of culture and education. Everywhere, elementary schools, evening schools, literacy campaigns, and club movements have developed broadly. The establishment of the [Karl] Marx Communist University, the Soviet University, and the Red Army University, and the expansion of the workers' and peasants' theatrical society and of the blue-clad troupes<sup>1</sup> all show that the soviet cause of cultural construction has already entered a new phase in its development. Recently, the Central Government has already proclaimed that Marxism and Communism should constitute the basic orientation for soviet culture and education. Just now, the Central Government is working out an educational system for elementary schools and is about to announce some concrete methods for social education. To allow all the toiling popular masses in the soviet areas to receive education, and to unfold the struggle on the cultural front, constitutes a major part of our task of soviet construction.

Comrades of the entire electorate! Thus far we have briefly reported on the developing situation of the revolution and the progress and achievements of the soviets in their work during the past year. Now, we would also like to point out to you comrades the deficiencies in the work of the soviets in the past, and the tasks for our work in the future. Under the correct leadership of the soviets, all you comrades of the electorate must make every effort to overcome these deficiencies and to fulfill these tasks. Only thus can we thoroughly smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," and win victory for the soviets in the whole country. What are our tasks? And where are the defects in our work?

The first task is to expand the Red Army. Comrades, although our Red Army has been expanded as compared to the past, it is still insufficient. To defeat the extremely numerous White armies during the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," we still need to expand our Red Army greatly. Every brave worker or peasant should volunteer to go to the front. In order to assist the Red Army in its battle operations and to protect our local areas, it is also necessary to expand the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers, expand the Model Battalion of the Red Guard armies and the Model Team of the Young Pioneers, and tighten up the work of posting sentries and checking permits in particular, so that not a single enemy spy is able to sneak into the soviet areas. Transport teams should be ready

1. On the blue-clad troupes, see the note to the text of September 15, 1933.



at any time to go to the battlefield, carrying wounded soldiers and transporting equipment seized from the enemy.

The second task is to unfold our work in the new soviet areas at a faster pace. It is true that many new soviet areas have been opened up since last year, but it still seems that the pace is too slow. One reason is that the Central Base Area has not sent more comrades from among the worker and peasant activists to work in the new soviet areas. In order to enlarge new soviet areas more vigorously during our battle to crush the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression," comrades in the Central Base Area should all be glad to work in the new soviet areas, while the comrades in the new soviet areas must redouble their efforts in their own work.

The third point is that the work of building the soviets has recorded tremendous achievements during the past year, but there are still many things that require us to work harder in the future. First of all, we need to protect the daily interests of the workers and carry out the Labor Law in a more universal and more correct manner. Then there is the Land Investigation Movement. We must exert our utmost efforts to launch a movement of land investigation and class investigation in areas where the residual feudal forces have not yet been rooted out, but we must not encroach upon the middle peasants, nor treat rich peasants like landlords. Third is economic construction. Next, we should work hard for the winter plowing this year and get everything ready for the spring plowing next year. We must develop the cooperatives to the point where they have one million members. General consumer cooperatives should be established at different levels, and they should begin to do business right away. The export and import trade must be carried on and developed, so as to break the enemy's blockade and relieve the shortage of salt. Bridges and roads need to be repaired for the sake of a smooth development of the economy. Three to five million *yuan* of economic construction bonds must be effectively sold, in order to raise the capital for all the items in our economic construction. Then comes cultural construction. We need to create a complete educational system for elementary schools and launch a campaign to eliminate illiteracy. Next we must intensify our work to wipe out counterrevolutionaries to such an extent that it is impossible for any counterrevolutionary in the soviet areas to create a disturbance from within during the enemy's attack. Lastly, we must speed up our fund-raising project, so that our funds for the war will be guaranteed.

In order to accomplish all the above-mentioned tasks promptly, it is imperative for us to get rid of all bureaucratism among soviet personnel. All the comrades of the electorate should pay attention, supervise the soviet personnel, and refuse to allow any bureaucrats to remain in the soviets. We must see to it that this year's election campaign achieves perfect success, and that large numbers of worker and peasant activists are selected, in the course of the elections, to work in the soviets, while the bureaucrats among the original personnel are rooted out. This is the only guarantee for accomplishing all the fighting tasks of the soviets.

Comrades of the entire electorate, each of these items of work is our fighting

task and an indispensable condition for crushing the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." In fact, on this very day when we are making this report to you, the enemy is attacking us with all his force. Each time we gather our strength to fight a decisive battle against these enemies, the war is extremely intense. So our work must achieve a high degree of intensity as well. The Central Government has already issued an order for emergency mobilization for war, calling upon all soviet personnel to do their jobs with a spirit of a real shock brigade and make sure that all of our soviet work fully meets the needs of the front. Every member of the masses making up our electorate must immediately mobilize in accord with the Central Government's call. Comrades, let us use this work to gain final victory! Let us first of all cause a great victory to appear before the Second National Soviet Congress takes place. Comrades, let us present this victory to the Second National Soviet Congress!

Vigorously expand the Red Army!

Vigorously enlarge the soviet areas!

Forge ahead militantly with the work of building the soviets!

Smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang!

Long live the Second National Soviet Congress!

Long live Soviet China!

Chairman of the  
Central Government

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Proclamation to the Popular Masses of the Whole Country About the “Direct Negotiations Between China and Japan”***

(November 11, 1933)

Popular Masses of the Whole Country!

Since it signed the North China Truce Agreement with the Japanese imperialists, an agreement that has sold out Manchuria and Mongolia, and especially since the “get-together party” between the three countries of China, Japan, and “Manchukuo,” at the meeting held in Dalian,<sup>1</sup> the Guomindang government in Nanjing has not only sold out Manchuria, Mongolia, and the so-called “neutral zone” east of the Luan [River],<sup>2</sup> but also directly mustered its armed forces and collaborated with the troops of the Japanese imperialists and “Manchukuo,” driving the soldiers who were resisting Japan in Northeast China out of Inner Mongolia, and, under the cloak of “bandit suppression,” slaughtering thousands upon thousands of the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army and the revolutionary soldiers and masses in Northeast China.<sup>3</sup> Chiang Kaishek, the arch-criminal of the Guomindang, openly issued to all of China the most shameless statements, such as, “Whoever prates about resisting the Japanese will be beheaded immediately,” and “In order

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This proclamation was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 126, November 17, 1933, and we have followed that source. The version in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 117–20, is generally accurate, but in it one important character is wrongly transcribed.

1. The reference is to the Tanggu Agreement of May 31, 1933, discussed in the proclamation of June 1, 1933, and to the Dalian conference of July 1933, denounced in a circular telegram of the same month. Both these documents are translated above.

2. Regarding the location and significance of the Luan River, see above, the note to the telegram of August 30, 1933.

3. Japanese and puppet troops had mounted widespread efforts to destroy the diverse anti-Japanese guerrilla resistance forces (generally referred to in Party documents as the “Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army” [*Kang-Ri yiyong jun*]) in Northeast China. In addition to the anti-Japanese guerrillas (among many units of which the Communist Party had significant influence), the northern warlord Feng Yuxiang and several of his former subordinates had joined forces in Chahar in late May 1933 to form a military force known as the People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army [*Minzhong kang-Ri tongmeng jun*]. Military action by this army threatened Japanese interests in the region, while Feng’s strong anti-Japanese pronouncements also undermined Chiang Kaishek’s domestic political situation and his delicate negotiations with the Japanese. In July 1933, therefore, Chiang’s forces blockaded

to suppress the Communists, resistance against the Japanese must end." Under his most cruel policy of White terror, he has repressed all anti-Japanese revolutionary movements, and withdrawn all his troops stationed in North China in a planned way. On the other hand, he has dispatched all his armed forces to launch the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Chinese Soviet Government and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the principal force in the resistance against the Japanese and other imperialists, in an attempt to demonstrate his loyalty to the imperialists and fulfill his predetermined plan for "direct negotiation between China and Japan."

Direct negotiations between China and Japan have been under way at heightened speed ever since the key leaders of the Guomindang held their third meeting on Lushan in September.<sup>4</sup> It is obvious that the content of these negotiations is not confined to the Guomindang's recognition of Manchuria and Mongolia as colonies of the Japanese imperialists. It necessarily represents another step by the Guomindang government in Nanjing toward surrendering and selling out the country, by recognizing North China as part of the Japanese sphere of influence, while Japan will help the Nanjing government with money and weapons, sustain its reactionary power, and promote its Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" as direct conditions of the reciprocal arrangement. Of course, there is no doubt that the saying that Japan is "willing to give up its diplomatic legal rights in China" is nothing but a cheap trick to deceive the popular masses.

Popular masses of the whole country! The Guomindang government in Nan-

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Feng's army and moved into positions which threatened an attack upon it from the south. In August, Japanese troops attacked Feng's army from the east. Feng's army was forced from the area, which came under Japanese control. The appearance of collusion in this affair between Chiang's forces and those of the Japanese was noted and widely criticized in China at the time. Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 122-31; Chong-sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), Ch. 6-7.

4. In 1933 Chiang Kaishek spent much of his time at the Nanchang military headquarters or at the military training institute in the nearby mountain resort of Lushan. As dissension both within the Nanjing régime and between it and national rivals in Fujian and Guangdong-Guangxi mounted in the wake of the Tanggu Truce, high Nanjing government officials several times gathered at Lushan for discussions. The third of these conferences occurred between September 5-9, 1933, and was attended by Chiang, Song Ziwen, Wang Jingwei and a number of other "party elders." Following up on an earlier Lushan conference in July which had endorsed Chiang's policy of concentrating on Communist-suppression while placating Japan, the September conference approved a resumption of negotiations between Huang Fu and Japanese representatives in North China. In the course of approving the negotiations, Song Ziwen's approach of using the United States and European powers as counterweights to Japan was rejected. On October 25, Song was ousted from his position as minister of finance; on November 7, Huang Fu publicly resumed negotiations with the Japanese. The close conjunction of these events led to rampant press speculation that major Chinese concessions were in the offing. Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 136-48.

jing has sold out the Three Northeastern Provinces and inner Mongolia as well. Now it is going to sell out all of North China! At the same time, moreover, the Guomindang government in Nanjing and the governments run by the other cliques in the Guomindang have also sold out Tibet, Xikang, and most of Xinjiang and Sichuan to the British imperialists. They have sold out nine islands in the South Seas, Yunnan, Guizhou, and other provinces to the French imperialists. They have sold very many political and economic privileges to the British imperialists. The loan of several hundred million *yuan* and the deadly weapons that the Guomindang has acquired recently from the countries of Europe and America all represent the price for its sellout of China.

Selling out all of China, capitulating to the imperialists, and serving as a scavenger in the imperialist competition to carve up the territory of China are indeed the consistent diplomatic policies of the Guomindang government. It is precisely for this reason that the Guomindang government is opposed to all revolutionary anti-Japanese anti-imperialist movements, and is launching its fifth insane and hopeless "Encirclement and Suppression" against China's only mass anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. It is precisely for this reason that the Guomindang government helps the imperialists to intensify the exploitation of the Chinese popular masses, bringing about the complete collapse of China's national economy, letting disastrous floods and drought take their toll all over China, making workers lose their jobs, peasants lose their land, and students lose their opportunities for education. Thus the great majority of the Chinese popular masses are living in a bitter inferno, freezing and starving to death!

Popular masses of the whole country! What the Guomindang wants us to follow is a road that will lead to turning China into a colony, and to the complete subjugation of the Chinese nation!

Let us all unite, arm ourselves, and launch a national revolutionary war against aggression by Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms. Down with all the Guomindang warlords who have betrayed and disgraced our country, especially the major tool of the imperialists, the Guomindang government in Nanjing headed by Chiang Kaishek. Fight a bloody war for the final liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese popular masses. This is the only way out for the revolutionary popular masses of the whole country at present!

The Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China once more declares to the popular masses of the whole country: we are ready to shed the last drop of our blood at any time in order to defeat the Japanese and all the other imperialists, to overthrow all the traitorous Guomindang warlords, and to safeguard the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of China. For the sake of the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of China the Central Soviet Government is just now gathering all its forces and is willing to make any necessary sacrifices in order to crush the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialists and the Guomindang. The struggle to smash this "Encircle-

ment and Suppression" is simply a struggle to prevent China from going down the colonial road, and a struggle to achieve an independent, free, new Soviet China!

To concentrate all the forces of the popular masses in the whole country for a decisive struggle against China's most vicious enemy, the Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic propose once again to armed forces all over the country that are currently engaged in the attack on the soviet areas to sign an operational agreement on fighting the Japanese and fighting Chiang based on the following three conditions: (1) stop the attack on the soviet areas immediately; (2) immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the masses (their freedom of assembly, organization, speech, press, and strike); and (3) immediately arm the popular masses and found the armed Volunteer Army without delay to protect China and strive for China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

It is the firm belief of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China that our proposal will certainly win full sympathy and warm support from the toiling popular masses of all China, and from all those who still have the slightest patriotic feelings all over the country. Such sympathy and support will not only ensure that the soviet road will achieve complete victory in its final struggle against the colonial road, but also liberate the Chinese nation and China's popular masses from under the iron heel of the imperialists once and for all!

Down with the Japanese and all the other imperialists!

Down with the Guomindang, the Nanjing government, and all other Guomindang governments, which are selling out China!

Fight for an independent, free, new Soviet China!

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic      Mao Zedong

Chairman of the Revolutionary  
Military Commission      Zhu De

# *Investigation of Changgang Township*

(November 18, 1933)<sup>1</sup>

All the work of the soviets is actually carried out at the level of township and municipal soviets. Everyone understands this, and yet many people do not understand how township and municipal soviets should go about their work. But without an understanding of the work of township and municipal soviets it is simply impossible truly to lead the work of the soviets, or to resolve the problem of "All soviet work serves the demands of the revolutionary war." At present we have encountered the following kind of situation among higher-level soviet staff workers: issuing many orders and resolutions without knowing the concrete content of the work of any township or municipal soviet. Comrades, this won't do! It is bureaucratism and an obstacle to soviet work!

Our tasks have been put forward and many plans, ranging from the expansion of the Red Army to the building of bridges and roads, have also been announced. The question is how to mobilize the masses to carry out these tasks and plans comprehensively and effectively. The extremely intense revolutionary war de-

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We have translated this document from *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 286–332. The edition of *Nongcun diaocha* published in Yan'an in 1941 is there taken as the primary source, but the text has been corrected in a number of places after comparison with other versions, including a mimeographed pamphlet produced in December 1933 and distributed at the Second Soviet Congress in January 1934. The version in the *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 125–74, provides exhaustive notes regarding the variants between the contemporary mimeographed text, to which the Japanese editors also had access, and later editions. It does not seem necessary to reproduce these here, but a few major points are noted below.

1. In the mimeographed version distributed in January 1934, this investigation appeared under a more general title: "Models for the Work of Township Soviets. 1. Changgang Township." The opening paragraphs constituted the introduction to the series as a whole, and the date "December 1933" appeared at the end of the fourth paragraph. The body of the investigation opened with the following indications:

"Changgang Township	(November 18, 1933)
Xie Changbao	Chairman, Tangbei Village
Li Qiuying	Deputy, Changgang Village
Wang Xianhuai	Head, Poor Peasant League, Xinxi Village

The materials below were collected by these three comrades."

The editors of *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, p. 361, note 83, attribute this passage to Mao himself. We have therefore taken November 18 as the date of this investigation, and December as the time when Mao wrote his introductory note.

mands that we resolve this question rapidly and universally. But the solution to this question cannot be imagined in one's head. It depends on collecting all sorts of fresh, concrete experience in the process of mobilizing the masses to carry out various tasks, on developing these experiences, and on expanding the scope of our mobilization of the masses, so they can adapt themselves to tasks and plans at a higher level.

At present, soviet organs in many places make the serious mistakes of performing their duties perfunctorily or resorting to coercion and commandism. Such soviets have very poor relations with the masses, thus greatly impeding the implementation of soviet tasks and plans. On the other hand, numerous comrades working in the lower-level soviets have created many excellent methods for mobilizing the masses in many places. They have become one with the masses and achieved great successes in their work. One responsibility of the soviet personnel at higher levels is to gather these good experiences, sort them out, and spread them to areas far and wide. Such work should be carried out immediately in every province and *xian*. The most effective method in combating bureaucratism is to show them living examples.

The Changgang experiences collected here,<sup>2</sup> because they are limited by time and by the materials provided by the reporters, provide only a rough summary of some of their main work.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, this summary is already sufficient to arouse our very serious attention, and to merit our sincere praise of their work as a "model of soviet work," for they achieved great results in their work because of their extremely close relations with the masses. Our objective is to develop this experience, collect more experience, provide concrete examples for all backward township and municipal soviets, and enable them to improve their work to the level of advanced township and municipal soviets, unite the masses in their millions around the Soviet Government, and strive to make all soviet work conform to the needs of smashing the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression."

December 15, 1933

2. In the contemporary mimeographed text, this paragraph begins: "The experiences in several townships (Changgang Township, Caixi Township, Shishui Township, etc.) collected here . . ." (see the note in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, p. 171). The investigation in Caixi is translated below; that in Shishui does not appear to have survived.

3. Upon arrival in Changgang (which was known as "a model township in a model *xian*"), Mao and members of the Central Government's Inspection Corps (*jiancha tuan*) first held preliminary discussions with representatives from Changgang and two other townships. The following day, Mao's group and the township cadres visited the township soviet government office, and went to Tangbei and other villages for discussions with local inhabitants. Shortly after Mao returned to Ruijin, the Changgang soviet government head and a district cooperative leader came to Ruijin to report further to him. See *Mao in the Central Soviet*, pp. 451–56.



### **The Demarcation of Political Districts and the Number of Households and Total Population**

Changgang Township belongs to Shangshe District of Xingguo *xian*, Jiangxi Province, and it was divided off from Langmu Township in the same district.

Rankings of work performance in Shangshe District: first are Changgang and Langmu; second is Yangdeng; third are Hefu, Xiushui, and Tangshi; and fourth are Rentian and Shangshe.

Changgang Township is divided into the four villages of Changgang, Tangbei, Xinxi, and Siwang.

#### ***Number of Households and Total Population***

1. The whole township has 437 families with 1,784 persons. Three hundred twenty persons have gone away to serve in the Red Army or to work, and 1,464 persons are in the township (including temporary laborers and staff members of district and township soviets). In the township population, there are 1,286 middle peasants and poor peasants; 102 workers, farm laborers, and coolies; and 76 landlords and rich peasants.<sup>4</sup>

2. Among those who left home to become Red Army soldiers or to work,

80 persons became Red Army soldiers from 1928 to 1932;

139 persons became Red Army soldiers in 1933;

7 persons are in the guerrilla camp;

34 persons have been sent to work above the *xian* level;

24 persons have been sent to work in hospitals in the rear; and

36 persons have been sent to serve as long-term laborers.

This makes a total of 320.

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4. The *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* has the figure of 77 for the number of landlords, but this must be a typographical error, for the 1941 Yan'an edition has 76, and otherwise the figures do not add up. The 1933 mimeographed pamphlet contains here, instead of the previous sentence, the following breakdown of the population by age and sex: From ages 1 to 15, there are 196 males and 185 females (among whom, there are 73 middle-peasant males and 12 middle-peasant females, and the rest are poor peasants). From ages 16 to 23, there are 21 males and 80 females (among whom, there are 4 middle-peasant males and 7 middle-peasant females, and the rest are poor peasants). From ages 24 to 45, there are 66 males and 146 females (among whom, there are 3 middle-peasant males and 3 middle-peasant females, and the rest are poor peasants). Above the age of 46, there are 22 males and 160 females (among whom, there are 11 middle-peasant males and 13 middle-peasant females). There are 102 workers, farm laborers, and coolies, 320 persons who left to become Red Army soldiers, and 760 landlords and rich peasants, making a total of 1,784. (See *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, p. 172. The figure of 760 for landlords and rich peasants is presumably a misprint for 76. The data regarding poor and middle peasants do not add up to the correct total, but may nonetheless be of interest.)

### 3. Landlords and rich peasants:

Originally there were 2 landlord families with 5 persons.

Originally there were 11 rich peasant families with 72 persons.

It was discovered during the land investigation in August that six landlord wives or daughters were married to workers and peasants.

Land in the amount of 36 *Dan* and 6 *dou* was taken back from these six people. No other rich peasants or landlords were found in the course of the investigations.

## Conferences of Deputies

### 1. *Circumstances of the Conferences*

The agenda of the meetings usually includes (1) opening the meeting, (2) reports, (3) discussions, (4) other business, and (5) closing the meeting. The agenda should be written on paper and put up on walls. The concrete issues to be discussed each time are simply written down on a piece of paper by the chairman himself and are not posted. "Reports": First, the chairman should report the reasons for the meeting in twenty or thirty sentences. Then a "participating comrade" from the district soviet should deliver a report. (Almost every time there are people from the district soviet attending the meetings. Mostly, five or six times out of ten, staff members of the departments come and participate in the meetings. The heads of departments come less frequently, two or three times out of ten. Chairmen and vice-chairmen come seldom, only once out of ten times.) The content of the report concerns the political situation and the situation regarding the work. Matters that have not been mentioned by the participating comrade may be added by the chairman or by the branch secretary. "Discussions" are all conducted on specific issues. For instance, a meeting held on November 8 discussed the following items:

a. Military mobilization. This was again subdivided into: (i) The expansion of the Red Army: The deputies of Changgang Village promised to contribute five persons, the deputies of Tangbei Village promised four persons, the deputies of Xinxi Village promised three persons, and the deputies of Siwang promised three persons, making a total of fifteen persons, to arrive by November 30. (ii) Preferential treatment of relatives of Red Army soldiers: It was decided to mobilize together model production teams and workers' mutual aid societies. (iii) The movement of returning to the army: This township had seven deserters. It was decided that the propaganda teams (at the township and village levels) and the shock teams (organized by the wives of Red Army soldiers) should carry out the work. (iv) Expressing gratitude toward the Red Army: Every village made the commitment to supply four towels, gunny and straw shoes, and cotton and straw shoes: Changgang promised to give 110 pairs, Tangbei promised 100 pairs, Xinxi promised 90 pairs, and Siwang promised 100 pairs.

b. Economic mobilization: This was further divided into (i) Government bonds: This township agreed to sell 5,456 *yuan*, and collected 822 *Dan* of millet with a value of 4,110 *yuan*. Then it received an additional 127 *yuan* in cash. This made a total of 4,237 *yuan*, but there was still a shortfall of 1,219 *yuan*. It was decided that every deputy should "demonstrate his spirit" in making propaganda, so as to obtain the entire sum by November 25. (ii) Cooperatives: In the past, consumers' cooperatives existed only at the district level, but now the township has organized a branch. Thus far they have collected only a little over 100 *yuan*, but the masses had already agreed to buy 350 *yuan* of shares. It was decided that every deputy should conduct propaganda in favor of collecting it, and the propaganda teams should also set to work. (iii) The movement for practicing thrift: It was decided that many varieties of vegetables should be grown to be stored for the spring lean season, and that millet and rice should be saved.

c. Building and repairing river dikes and roads. It was decided that within the ten days between November 20 to 30, a large road 6 *li* in length and 6 *chi*<sup>2</sup> in width should be built from Tongjiang to Beidong. After it is completed, another road 4 *chi* wide should be constructed. Five preparatory personnel should be elected, and after the roads have been completed, that one-*zhang*-wide river dike damaged by the floods should be repaired. As for that big wooden bridge, it should be repaired jointly with Langmu Township.

d. "Supporting the district soviet." In order to express the support of the masses of the whole township for the opening of the Third Soviet Congress of the whole district on November 12, it was decided to present a red horizontal banner made of 1.4 *chi* of red cloth, with four characters written on it. On the 12th, nine-tenths of the masses of the entire township were once again mobilized to go to the district soviet in columns and to set off firecrackers. (As a result, eight-tenths of the masses went and five or six thousand firecrackers were set off; all these firecrackers were bought by the masses themselves.)

The last two matters were discussed under the item of "Other Business." The various questions under discussion this time were all put forward for discussion by the voters in election meetings.

## 2. The Inspection System

Of the two conferences of deputies, one discussed issues and the other inspected work.

Before each inspection conference, the deputy on duty of each village convened inspection meetings of all deputies within his jurisdiction and reported the results of the meetings to the conference of deputies. After the reports, what had

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5. One *chi* or Chinese foot equals approximately 33 centimeters or 1.1 English feet.

not been done or done poorly and how to proceed and make adjustments were discussed.

This method was initially used by Langmu Township, and Changgang adopted this method after being divided off from Langmu. Later, Yangdeng Township also adopted it. Recently, the district soviet called a conference on the inspection of the work of the whole district, which asked all townships to practice the method.

### **3. *The Deputy on Duty***

The number of deputies in various villages:

Changgang Village: Over 500 persons (the number obtained during the land investigation), with 14 deputies.

Tangbei Village: Over 490 persons, with 14 deputies.

Xinxi Village: Over 300 persons, with 13 deputies.

Siwang Village: Over 400 persons, with 14 deputies.

The ranking of work performance of various villages: First is Changgang, second is Tangbei, third is Xinxi, and fourth is Siwang.

Each village has one "deputy on duty" and the responsibility is rotated, each person assuming it on each occasion for ten days. This began in September. Before September, they had the system of "the deputy in charge," in which one person was placed in exclusive charge. After it had been employed for two years, the system of the deputy in charge was found to have shortcomings: All responsibilities were concentrated in one person, and others had difficulty familiarizing themselves with the work. Rotation has eliminated this shortcoming. But the duty system (the ten-day duty system, in fact) has its own shortcomings as well. Weak deputies are not capable of leading a whole village.

### **4. *The Standing Committee***

Since the founding of the Soviet Government, there have been standing committees.

They are composed of five persons in all: a chairman, a vice-chairman, a documentation clerk, the branch secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the branch secretary of the Young Communist League. Whenever necessary, the deputy on duty participates.

### **5. *Deputies Leading Residents***

Deputies are responsible for a varying number of residents ranging from over twenty to over fifty persons. As an example, Deputy Li Qiuqing of Changgang Village is in charge of over fifty persons.

Each deputy has a registration book of residents. In the book, the residents are divided into male adults, female adults, male Young Pioneers (may become

permanent laborers), female Young Pioneers (may become temporary laborers), boys, and girls. The male adults are again divided into those who are in the Red Guard units (may become permanent laborers) and those who are not in the Red Guard units (may become temporary laborers). The female adults are also divided into those who are in the Red Guard units (may become temporary laborers) and those who are not in the Red Guard units (may give preferential treatment to the relatives of Red Army soldiers).

## **6. *The Replacement of Deputies***

In November last year before the demarcation of new administrative districts, Langmu Township (composed of seven villages and three thousand people) elected over seventy deputies and eleven alternate deputies, or a total number of over eighty persons. Among them, there were sixteen female deputies and sixty male deputies. By the time of reelection on November 1 of this year, there were five formerly elected male deputies. The majority of male deputies went away to join the Red Army and the minority were transferred to other jobs. In Red May, twenty-nine deputies went in one batch. Before each deputy left, the masses within the jurisdiction were gathered to elect a person called "acting deputy."

## **7. *The Political Performance of Deputies***

The best accounted for 60 percent.

The intermediate accounted for 35 percent.

The worst accounted for 5 percent (4 persons).

Of the four worst persons, two were men and two were women. They were very stupid and also inactive. They attended only four of ten meetings and did not listen, let alone speak, even if they were present. Their attitude toward the masses was "rude," and the masses disliked these four persons. In July, an election was held to replace them.

## **8. *Women Deputies***

Of the sixteen:

There were eight very good people, who sought work and did it well.

There were six fairly good people, who were not conscientious in seeking work, did the work given to them, but did not do it very well, and wanted others to help.

The two worst failed to do the work assigned to them.

The conference of deputies of Changgang Township has made many good innovations, such as the standing committee, deputies on duty, deputies leading residents, the inspection system, and so on. All these may be learned by other localities. The standing committee should, however, be renamed the presidium

(composed of seven persons in large townships and five persons in small townships). The deputy on duty should be changed to deputy in charge. The position should be taken up by the best deputies for one-month or two-month terms. To change every ten days is too often. The issues discussed at the meetings are very concrete, but the five empty items on the agenda should be eliminated. Why shouldn't the list of specific issues be put up? The inspection system of Changgang Township is excellent. The comprehensive and speedy implementation of the work depends on this method. The worst deputies should have been replaced long ago. It was too late to change them after eight months. It was appropriate to elect new deputies immediately when deputies were transferred to other jobs, but they should not be called "acting deputies."

## **The Current Elections**

### ***1. The Election Committee***

Nine persons: The branch secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the person in charge of women's affairs in the Chinese Communist Party, the head of the branch of the farm laborers' union, the head of the branch of the handicraft workers' union, the director and one other person from the poor peasant league, the brigade commander, and two township deputies. The branch secretary was the head and the committee was organized in September.

The *xian* soviet originally decided to hold the elections at the end of September. The date was changed twice, and on the second occasion it was decided to hold the elections at the beginning of November.

### ***2. Election Propaganda***

It should state the fact that in the past classes were not clearly differentiated, but now they are, so elections should be held. It should also mention that elections must be held in order to smash the "Encirclement and Suppression," inspect our work, and make it progress even faster.

### ***3. Voter Registration***

The four villages should have their own registration books. Deputies are responsible for registering the residents under their own jurisdiction and handing the registered name lists over to the election committee for announcement by posters. Those who have the right to vote are listed on one poster; those under sixteen who are not eligible to vote are listed on another poster; and landlords, rich peasants, and others who do not have the right to vote are listed on yet another poster. The former two posters are red, and the last poster is white. These three posters should be put up in the four villages and outside the gate of the township soviet. The September edition of the registration book of voters had already been completed, but the relatives of workers were not counted as work-

ers, and it was changed last month and published again. Doubts have arisen among the masses about the different criteria for electing worker's and peasant's deputies. Less than one-tenth of the people of the entire township have a correct understanding of the problem of "leadership by the workers."

#### **4. Electoral Units**

Each village of the four villages constitutes an electoral unit, and there is also a unit for workers.

#### **5. Work Reports**

The meetings of the electorate were held on two days (October 19 and 20). Meetings were convened in two villages on the first day and in the other two villages on the second day.

The chairman made reports at the two villages of Changgang and Gangbei, appearing on two different days. The vice-chairman (concurrently the branch secretary) made reports at the two villages of Xinxi and Siwang on both days as well. The reports dealt with military mobilization, economic construction, and other business—three items in all.

After the report, the list of candidates was elected. It was also proposed that the masses present criticize the work of the township soviet, but no one did so.

#### **6. The Lists of Candidates**

On October 19, the branch committee clerks met and there were people from every village (eleven persons in all). In accordance with the ratio of workers and peasants in the various villages, a candidate name list consisting of fifty-five persons, the exact number of deputies to be elected, was tentatively decided on. Then the list was handed down to meetings of the small groups of the Party, of the labor union, and of the poor peasant league in each village for discussion. At the mass meeting of the voters, Party members from various small groups then proposed the list and it was adopted by the meeting, thus dispensing with the formality of the preparation of the candidate name list by the electoral commission.

Once the list had been promulgated, a copy was posted in each of the four villages, as well as outside the gate of the township soviet.

The election was held four days after the announcement of the candidate list.

#### **7. The Election Meetings**

Time: November 4.

The workers held their meeting at the township soviet, and the attendance rate was 90 percent. The rest did not come because of illness. Peasants held meetings

in the four villages separately, and the attendance rate reached 93 percent. The meetings started in the morning. Voters wrote the character "arrived" on a form with their names on it. (The form, which was printed by the *xian* soviet, has twenty-four squares with twenty-four voters' names.) One person guarded the door. Children watched from outside and some also came inside. Landlords and rich peasants knew that they had no right to participate and none of them came.

The procedure: the report of the election committee, the report of the chairman of the township soviet, and the report of the comrade from the district soviet. The voters were asked whether or not they had any suggestions (none did). The candidates on the candidate list were introduced and voted on one by one, in accordance with the candidate list (no one was rejected), and the proposals were discussed. (Someone proposed that all those in the township who were between the ages of sixteen and forty-five and who were healthy should go to the front, and the proposal was adopted by the majority. In addition, the various proposals on "military affairs," "the economy," and "dikes and roads" discussed by the conference of deputies on November 8 were all put forward at the election general meetings.)

The election meeting started its proceedings at 10:00 when everyone was there, and was dismissed at 4:00; "the spirit was very good."

#### **8. Political Behavior of the Deputies**

Among the fifty-five deputies, thirty-six were among those most active, nineteen were of intermediate quality, and none of the worst were to be found.

Among all the deputies, former deputies who were reelected accounted for 60 percent (over thirty), and the newly elected made up 40 percent.

#### **9. The Conference of Deputies after the Election**

On the morning of the day following the election (November 5), the first deputies' conference was convened, electing the chairman, vice-chairman, clerk, and the deputies to attend the district conference (ten persons). Three comrades of the district soviet were present at this conference. The second conference was held on the fourth day (November 8) to discuss the proposals put forward at the election general meetings (as mentioned above).

The shortcomings of this election in Changgang Township: (1) The propaganda failed to point out that the soviet is the political power by which the masses manage their own affairs, and that the election of soviet deputies is the most important power of the masses. (2) The number of persons on the candidate name list was exactly the number of persons to be elected and not twice the number of people to be elected. Therefore, the masses did not criticize those on the candidate list. The election committee played no role on the issue of organizing the candidate list and only the Party was active. (3) The meetings at which



work reports were delivered did not go all out to mobilize the masses to criticize the work of the township soviet. Apart from these shortcomings, the rest was successful.

### **Committees below the Level of Township Soviets**

The committees below this level are mass organizations. They are found at two levels, villages and townships. Village committees are composed of five members and the head is also a committee member at the township level. Most township committees are composed of five members, for villages have their own committees. But there are also committees with seven, nine, or eleven members.

#### ***1. The Committee on the Expansion of the Red Army***

Seven members, among whom three persons are deputies. They discuss "expansion," "preferential treatment," "expressing thanks," and "welcoming."

The group for expressing thanks (made up of seven persons, of whom four are deputies, one man and three women; among the remaining three, one is a man and two are women) carries peanuts, beans, vegetables, and straw sandals to hospitals and to the *xian* town, and went once to Xiaobu in Huangpi to express thanks to the Red Army.

#### ***2. The Land Committee***

Seven members. Several meetings were held during the Land Investigation Movement in September to dispose of 36 *Dan* of land discovered in the previous month. No more meetings were held thereafter.

Should be changed into the management committee of the agricultural experimentation farm; the farm has an exhibition unit of agricultural produce on its site.

#### ***3. The Land Registration Committee***

Five members, one from each village, and the head, who resides in the office full-time. It was organized in July and worked for two months. Upon the completion of registration, the arrangement for providing meals for the director was cancelled.

Method: Registering by going to each village and asking the deputies. If the deputies do not know, visit the families in question and ask. The contents of the tables were not clear in August, so the registration was incomplete. After a delay of another month, the registration was finished.

#### ***4. The Mountain Forest Committee***

Five members, one from each village, plus the head. It is in charge of planting and conservation.

Some trees have been planted, but they are not growing well because of the poor condition of the mountains. Trees should be planted along rivers, near roads, and beside houses.

Large-scale tree-felling in private mountains must have the permission of the Mountain Forest Committee. Cutting of a few trees does not require permission. Precise limits have not been stipulated.

#### ***5. The Construction Committee***

Five members. It directs the two committees on "water conservancy" and "bridges."

#### ***6. The Water Conservancy Committee***

Five members, one from each village, plus the head.

#### ***7. The Bridge Committee***

Five members. Responsible for the repair of bridges and roads. It should be called the bridge and road committee.

#### ***8. The Committee on State-Owned Property***

Five members. It exists, but its work is unclear.

#### ***9. The Committee on the Management of Granaries***

Three members. Responsible for storing grain [contributed for] bonds and grain from the public land of the Red Army.

It is also in charge of storing grain for lean years. It has taken over the grain from the 36 *Dan* of confiscated land in preparation for lean years, in all over 10 *Dan*.

#### ***10. The Committee on Confiscation***

Three members, responsible for imposing fines and soliciting funds.

Since September, it has fined landlords 9 *yuan* and solicited donations of 225 *yuan* from rich peasants (of the 11 families, the maximum donation was over 40 *yuan* and the minimum donation was 10 *yuan*).

In the past, land, mountain forests, houses, draft animals, and farm tools of rich peasants were all confiscated, and they were only given some poor land and houses and no mountains. Now rich peasants have to borrow draft animals and farm tools from other people. In the past rich peasants were "fined" in cash and now there are also cases of fining them, and these can hardly be called donations.

Now the conditions in rich peasants' families are worse than those in families of farm laborers.

(It should be pointed out that the policy of Changgang Township toward rich peasants is wrong.)

#### ***11. The Land Investigation Committee***

Nine members. It no longer exists.

#### ***12. The Education Committee***

Nine members.

#### ***13. The Public Health Committee***

Five members. It was organized in April.

#### ***14. The Committee on Air Defense and Protection Against Poison Gas***

Five members. It was organized in October. It has held four or five meetings.

#### ***15. The Preparatory Committee***

It has been set up to convene the commemoration meeting.

The village committees of Changgang Township (many committees exist in the villages) have enabled the soviet to establish links with the broader masses. This is an excellent innovation in soviet work at a time when it is developing to a higher stage. Since villages have committees composed of five members, it is enough for many of the township committees to have only five members. Moreover, since four of the five members of each township committee are the directors of the four village committees, the work is thus organized in a network, and this greatly facilitates the work of the township deputies' conference. But the comrades of Changgang Township have regarded these committees as mass bodies similar to the trade unions and the poor peasant league, and do not understand that they are part of the soviet organizations. This is inappropriate. Among the committees, the Construction Committee should be abolished. The Land Committee, in areas such as Xingguo where the agrarian struggle has developed in depth, should be renamed the Agricultural Experimental Farm Committee. In addition, several other committees, dealing with topics such as "food," "residence registration," "workers' and peasants' inspectorate," and "Red martial law" should be added. These are already provided for in the "Organizational Law for Local Soviets" promulgated by the Central Government.<sup>6</sup>

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6. In fact, this law was issued on December 12, 1933. See below, the translation in the Appendix to this volume.

## Local Armed Forces

### 1. Organization

#### a. One Platoon of Male Red Guards

Ages twenty-four to forty-five. There are altogether sixty-six males in this age range in the whole township. Apart from about twenty persons in the whole township who are the chairman, two clerks, and the seriously sick and disabled and are not recruited, all the remaining forty-six persons are organized into the platoon.

One full platoon leader and one deputy platoon leader; six full and six deputy squad leaders; one flag.

#### b. One Company of Female Red Guards

The age range is the same as above. There are altogether 146 women in this age range in the whole township (more than twice as many as the men). Apart from 20-odd sick and disabled persons, all the remaining 120 women have been recruited. There are one full company commander, one deputy company commander, and one political commander; three full platoon leaders and three deputy platoon leaders; and nine full squad leaders and nine deputy squad leaders; they are all women. There is one flag.

#### c. One Detachment of Young Pioneers

Males and females are grouped together and their ages range from sixteen to twenty-three. There are 21 males and 80 females (four times the number of males) and 101 persons in total in the whole township. In all, 86 persons have been recruited, excluding 15 persons who are sick or disabled (with conditions such as arthritic feet).

There are one full detachment leader and one deputy detachment leader. Under the detachment, there are one male platoon and two female platoons, with their respective full platoon leaders and deputy platoon leaders.

### 2. Training

#### a. Drill

A village is a drill unit, which has exercises twice a month. The Red Guards and Young Pioneers are separated and males and females drill together.

Trainers: The woman deputy company commander of Changgang and the woman company commander of Tangbei. The trainers of the Young Pioneers are one woman and three men. The contents of the drills: Attention, at ease, left and right turns, filling in gaps, forward march, running (less for women), dispersing, and outside field exercises (3 or 4 *li* away).

Weapons: Most of the weapons are spears and there are a few wooden guns.

Political lessons: They start after the drills with the political commander as the speaker. The topics are the revolutionary situation, imperialism, the tasks of

the Red Guards, and so on. There are no specified teaching materials and the speaker has the "discretion to address any issues."

Time: In afternoons, approximately from 2:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. Drill takes two and a half hours and the [political] speech takes one and a half hours.

Attendance rate during the drill: About seven of every ten people come on average.

b. Joint Drills

The township is the unit for joint drills that take place on the 15th of each month.

Contents of the drill: Demonstrating various types of drilling and determining the best types. Reviewing the achievements of the drill exercises.

Political lessons: After the drill, the political commander addresses the political situation.

Time: Four hours in the afternoon. Now is the cold winter period and people are relatively idle, so the time may be changed to the morning.

## **Miscellaneous Duties**

### ***1. Transportation Work***

Men serve as permanent laborers. (Those who are over forty-five and are not recruited into the Red Guards serve as temporary laborers.)

Women work as temporary laborers (some may be selected to go to towns, in places such as Gaoxingyu and Chaling), and as nurses (some who are selected to form first aid platoons should make preparations and do no other work). They may wash clothes. (Organize wash teams by choosing over ten persons from each village who have no burden of small children to go to the reserve division and the training detachment in Jiqiwo. They have washed several times there and two or three times in Chaling.)

### ***2. Standing Guard at Night***

There are three sentry posts in Changgang, Tangbei, and Sigang altogether. One shift per night and five or six persons per shift. Both Red Guards and Young Pioneers should send some people to be guards in turn. Squad leaders or deputy squad leaders are in charge. One person is standing guard while others sleep. Asking passwords (Reply, "the common people" [*laobaixing*], then giving one's name, destination, and purpose of travel. In fact the masses do not know the passwords). Checking travel authorization slips (of persons from other townships passing through). No bad people have been captured so far.

### ***3. Checking During Daytime***

Three persons are on duty for a whole day; one is a Red Guard, one a Young Pioneer, and one a member of the Children's League. When someone passes, one

of them (the Children's League member) checks the travel authorization slip, and one interrogates him (either the Red Guard or the Young Pioneer). When necessary, they deliver letters. Four or five deserters have been caught at the Tangbei post and sent to the district. The common people have caught a person without a travel authorization slip (when he was passing through on a little trail in the mountains). The person was from another *xian* and was ferocious. They suspected him of being a spy and sent him to the *xian*.

#### **4. Air Defense**

The township Committee on Defense against Air Attack and Poison Gas guides the air defense of the masses. The following matters require attention:

Do not run in panic when planes come.

Dig anti-air raid shelters. Several families may dig one shelter. The work is being done and has not yet been completed.

Use towels to cover the nose in the presence of poison gas. Those who came back from field exercises say that one may use towel bags filled with charcoal ashes to cover the nose.

Each village has one signal gun post, with everything set up properly. Each post has two designated persons in charge. When one person is out, the other person must be at home and be ready to fire the signal gun.

All young and adult toiling masses should be organized into the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers and receive good military and political training, because protecting the localities on the one hand and getting ready to move to the front on the other hand are essential tasks of the soviet in the civil war. Changgang Township has also achieved successes in this regard.

### **The Livelihood of the Masses**

#### **1. This Year We Have Encountered a Famine**

Before the sowing season this spring, as many as 80 percent of the masses were short of grain and had to buy rice from places far away such as Donggu, Shacun, Futian, and Shuinan. These 80 percent of the people lacked a whole month of grain on average. One person needs 5 *Dan* of grain per annum and 4 *dou* of grain per month. Eighty percent of the total population of the entire township of 1,500 persons is 1,200 persons, who need 480 *Dan* of grain for a month. The grain shortage was overcome through buying from far-away places and no one went hungry.

#### **2. There Is Nothing to Fear for Next Year**

Although spring plowing this year was fine, the autumn harvest was not good because of an insect pest and was only equivalent to that of last year. But (i) The

autumn plowing is fine, and the harvest of sweet potatoes and beans has increased 40 percent over that of last year. (ii) During the winter plowing, additional vegetables, broad beans, snow peas, and rape were planted. (iii) After the autumn harvest last year, the masses sold large quantities of grain to merchants at the low price of 2,800 cash or less than one *yuan* per *Dan*. Though money was needed, they could have managed to sell less. This point was overlooked. At the meeting of the entire *xian* held this year, it has been discussed and decided that the price to merchants cannot be below 4 *yuan*, and that smaller quantities should be sold. (iv) The supplies of pigs, chicken, and ducks after the autumn harvest last year resulted in a lot of waste and supplies this year have been reduced. (v) On the first and second occasions of purchasing public bonds last year, buying 2 *yuan* of bonds required 2.5 *Dan* of grain. In the case of this year's economic construction bonds, only two *Dan* of grain are required to purchase 10 *yuan* of bonds. For all these reasons, it can be guaranteed that there will be no famine next spring.

### **3. There Is a Surplus of Oil**

Peanuts are growing better than last year. They can produce oil. Every family has been given a certain amount of tea-oil plants in the hills, and also has some tea-oil. There is plenty of oil and it is in surplus.

### **4. Beans Can Be Used to Exchange for Salt, but the Consumption of Edible Salt Has Declined**

The harvest of beans this year is good (rainfall this year has been even, while last year almost all crops were damaged by floods), and the price of beans is also good (last year a *Dan* was worth 9 *yuan* and this year it is worth 12 *yuan*), enough to exchange for 60 percent of the edible salt needed by the whole township. The remaining 40 percent may be obtained in exchange for the surplus oil (the oil surplus is 30 percent).

On average, each person, old or young, requires 4 *qian*<sup>7</sup> of salt a day (12 *liang* per month). In July this year, the consumption decreased by half to only 2 *qian* (6 *liang* per month), and the consumption in October was a little over 3 *qian* (about 10 *qian* per month). The masses have been using sour pickle water and say that it is more or less like using salt. (This is a crime of the Guomindang. The supply of salt depends on breaking the blockade.)

### **5. The Number of Poor Peasants Who Have Meat to Eat Has Doubled and the Number of Workers Who Have Meat to Eat Has Tripled**

Hog-supplying families are about 85 percent, and families unable to supply account for approximately 15 percent. On average, each household sells about 20

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7. A *qian* was one-tenth of a Chinese ounce (*liang*).

yuan worth of hogs per year and buys 12 yuan of pork, leaving a surplus of 8 yuan. Before the uprising, however, each family could buy only 10 yuan worth of pork per year. Taking account of class differences: Before the uprising, middle peasants bought about 12 yuan of pork, poor peasants bought 6 yuan, and workers purchased about 4 yuan. Now, almost all buy about 12 yuan of pork (some do not buy this much). In the past, not much meat was eaten on New Year's Day and the Spring Festival, let alone at the time of country fairs. Now, not to mention New Year's Day and the Spring Festival, everyone must buy some meat to eat each time there is a country fair.

***6. Most Chickens and Ducks Are Consumed by Families Themselves, Whereas in the Past Most of Them Were Sold***

***7. Living Standards Are Improving, so There Is Less Selling of Firewood Now***

There is plenty of firewood in the local area. In the past many people carried firewood to sell in the town. Now, this has declined by 30 percent, for many people no longer need to sell it.

***8. Clothing Has Doubled***

Taking all clothing together, each person on average needs to make one new suit of clothes for warm weather per year. As regards middle peasants, there has been no change in comparison with the past. The situation for poor peasants and workers has, however, improved a hundred percent. For example, now they make 2 yuan of clothes, whereas they could only afford 1 yuan previously.

***9. The Lives of Farm Laborers Have Improved***

There are about twenty-two families of farm laborers in the township, and 60 percent of them are living better than the poorest peasants, for they have received redistributed items. There are only two landlord families in this township, but many belongings of rich peasants (twelve families) have been confiscated and many of their possessions in the towns have been redistributed. Forty percent of the farm laborers are living at a standard similar to that of poor peasants.

***10. Middle Peasants Remain Where They Were***

Generally speaking, the living standards of middle peasants are more or less the same as in the past. (The soviets should pay attention to the improvement of the living standards of middle peasants.)



## 11. Market Prices<sup>8</sup>

### a. Agricultural Produce

Grain—at the autumn harvest before the uprising, 3 *yuan* per *Dan* (90 *jin*); at the autumn harvest after the uprising, 1 *yuan* per *Dan*; and at the autumn harvest last year, 1 *yuan* per *Dan*; 9 *yuan* this spring; 3 *yuan* at the autumn harvest this year; 4.7 *yuan* in November.

Peanuts—at the autumn harvest before the uprising, 3 *yuan* for 1 *Dan* (100 *jin*); 3 *yuan* at the autumn harvest after the uprising; 3 *yuan* at the autumn harvest last year; and 3.5 *yuan* at the autumn harvest this year.

Sweet potatoes—at the autumn harvest before the uprising, 1,000 cash per *Dan* (100 *jin*); 1,300 cash at the autumn harvest last year; 1,200 cash at the autumn harvest this year.

Beans—at the autumn harvest before the uprising, 7 *yuan* per *Dan* (100 *jin*); 10.5 *yuan* at the autumn harvest last year; 12 *yuan* at the autumn harvest this year.

Pigs—before the uprising, 650 cash per *jin*; 900 cash at the autumn harvest last year; 750 cash in the spring of this year; 860 cash at the autumn harvest this year.

Chicken—750 cash per *jin* before the uprising; 900 cash last year; 1,200 cash this year.

Ducks—500 cash per *jin* before the uprising; 700 cash last year; 750 cash this year.

Eggs—25 cash each before the uprising; 40 cash each both last year and this year.

Duck eggs—30 cash each before the uprising; 50 cash each both last year and this year.

Firewood—8 cash per *jin* before the uprising; 10 cash last year; 12 cash this year.

Wood oil—600 cash per *jin* before the uprising (1 *yuan* for 5.5 *jin*); 920 cash last year (1 *yuan* for 3.5 *jin*); from spring to autumn this year, 1 *yuan* for 3 *jin*; 1 *yuan* for 2 *jin* and 12 *liang*<sup>9</sup> in November, for the product may be exported.

Peanut oil—1 *yuan* for 7 *jin* before the uprising; 1 *yuan* for 3.5 *jin* last year; 1 *yuan* for 3 *jin* in November this year.

Small oranges—1 *yuan* for 28 *jin* before the uprising; 1 *yuan* for 19 *jin* last year; 1 *yuan* for 15 *jin* this year.

### b. Goods from Outside<sup>10</sup>

Salt—1 *yuan* for 7 *jin* before the uprising; 1 *yuan* per *jin* in March 1931; 1 *yuan* for 3 *jin* last year; in summer this year, 1 big foreign dollar or 2 *yuan* paper

8. This whole section on prices is missing from most of the editions of the Changang Township Investigation. It has been restored in the *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, on the basis of the December 1933 mimeographed text.

9. Mao is here following the older usage according to which there were 16 *liang* or ounces in one *jin* (catty or Chinese pound), instead of 10 *liang* per *jin*, as at present.

10. The Chinese is *waihuo*, which normally means "foreign goods," but here the reference is obviously to goods from outside the soviet areas.

notes per *jin*; 1 big foreign dollar for 1 *jin* and 12 *liang* in November and 1 *yuan* paper note for 1 *jin* and 4 *liang*.

Cotton cloth—150 cash per *chi* of medium grade blue cloth before the uprising; 250 cash last year; 300 cash this spring; 380 cash in November.

Matches—40 cash per box before the uprising; 70 cash last year; 180 cash this summer; 90 cash in November.

Kerosene—530 cash per *jin* before the uprising, 1,120 cash last year; 1,600 cash this year.

## 12. *The Rest and Labor of the Masses*

Each person on average has about five whole days in a month (based on the total sum of many meetings) for meeting activities, which are excellent rest time for them. Because many work away from their homes, the labor force in the fields has been reduced and the work burden of the masses remains the same as before the uprising, but the significance of labor is different.

The soviet is the organizer of the lives of the masses. Only by exerting all its efforts in resolving the problems of the masses and effectively improving their lives can the soviet gain the confidence of the masses and mobilize the broad masses to join the Red Army, assist the war, and fight to smash the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression." It should be made clear that the great achievements of Changgang Township in war mobilization are inseparable from their successes in improving the lives of the masses.

## The Redistribution of the Labor Force and the Problem of Draft Animals

### 1. *Model Farming Teams*

There is one team in each of the four villages, and the total number of people involved is about seventy. The teams are organized by Red Army families that have labor power. Each team has one team leader and several small groups under it. For example, Changgang Village's model team has over twenty persons, and is divided into three small groups that are made up of three to seven persons, according to whether they live near each other. Each small group is in charge of up to a dozen or so households in its neighborhood and gives frequent attention to ensuring good production by these households. They were organized at the rice harvesting time in August this year, and their role is to readjust and redistribute labor power.

Methods: Labor mutual aid associations help Red Army families to work the land (without asking to be paid), and model farming teams help the masses to plow the land (for payment). For instance, a member of a certain mutual aid association is about to help a Red Army family, but his own family land is also

waiting to be plowed. Then, the model team will send people to help him plow or assist the Red Army family on his behalf. He should pay for the work done for him by the members of the model farming team. This is a way of reapportioning labor forces. Therefore, model farming teams must establish close links with mutual aid associations.

## **2. Labor Mutual Aid Associations**

Each of the four villages has one labor mutual aid association. Excluding Red Army family members, all those with labor power, or 80 percent of the people, have joined. There are over 300 members in the whole township.

In the population of the whole township:

Fully able-bodied laborers constitute 10 percent (or 150 persons in the total population of the whole township).

Semi-able-bodied laborers constitute 20 percent (about 300 persons).

Supplementary laborers constitute 35 percent (about 525 persons).

Persons unable to work constitute 30 percent (about 450 persons).

The first two categories account for about 450 persons and most of them have joined the mutual aid associations.

In the whole township, 320 persons are away from home (including 226 persons who have become Red Army soldiers and 94 persons who are working away from home). Apart from a dozen or so persons who are semi-able-bodied laborers, all the rest are fully able-bodied laborers. If you compare them with the 150 fully able-bodied laborers who still remain in the township to work, the ratio is 68 percent to 32 percent. The organized reapportioning of labor power has become the central issue in production, and as a result, the masses warmly welcome labor mutual aid associations.

The work of the mutual aid association is to give preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers' families, to initiate mutual assistance among members, and to help lonely old people. All of these objectives have been realized completely. The land of Red Army soldiers' families has been farmed well in general. The methods are as follows:

Giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers' family members: On average, each family should offer twenty-five labor days a month in busy seasons to Red Army soldiers' families in this township. In ordinary seasons, each family must give about ten labor days per month on average. The masses who have more labor should give more, those who have less may offer less, and those who have no labor may offer no assistance. Women with small children may also help less. Generally speaking, in busy seasons a family with labor must offer thirteen or fourteen labor days. One laborer must offer six or seven labor days. Semi-able-bodied laborers may offer one or two labor days and do light work. If

one fails to offer what should be offered, one should pay those who have worked extra. For example, in busy seasons when Family A should assist Red Army families with seven labor days every month, but has only given five days, and Family B should offer seven labor days, but has given nine days, then Family A should pay Family B for two days of work.

Mutual assistance among members: They may offset the labor days offered by others with their own assistance. Those who have done less should pay those who have done more.

Helping lonely old people: they should only be given meals and not be paid for work.

Make overall production plans and rearrange manpower taking the village as the unit.

Settle accounts once at the end of each month to find the money for wages. (Some people have taken too much money and others have offered too few items as collateral; all of these matters can be clarified.)

Labor values: This year, the value of labor in harvesting rice has been classified into three levels: The highest is 800 cash (for tasks such as threshing rice), the next is 640 cash (for tasks such as cutting and carrying rice), and the lowest is 320 cash (for tasks such as picking up rice ears and planting beans). This was discussed and decided by the membership assembly in July (more than 700 people attended on this occasion). The price of labor for harvesting rice last year was 800 cash at the beginning and reached a high of 1,400 cash at the busiest time.

Reducing Wages: The farm laborers' union approves of this, for they lack more labor power after they have received redistributed land. People with abundant labor power do not oppose it either, for they must offer more labor days to provide preferential treatment to Red Army families.

The committee of a mutual aid association has five members, including one head, one in charge of organizational work, and one in charge of propaganda, and it is under the guidance of the autumn harvest and sowing committee of the township.

The great role of labor mutual aid associations in agricultural production has manifested itself very clearly in Changgang Township. They may be instituted everywhere to unify the planning of production on the basis of the will of the masses and within village units, especially in places that have provided more Red Army soldiers. Whenever necessary, it is possible to use a township or even a district as a unit to make plans, and Caixi District in Shanghang has done so.<sup>11</sup> Farming teams may combine to form mutual aid associations and achieve organizational uniformity. Here there is an important issue, namely mobilizing

11. It should be noted that these are not places in Changgang; Caixi Township in Shanghang *xian* in Fujian was the site of another of Mao's investigations, translated below.

women to participate in production. Out of a total of 733 young people and adults aged 16 to 45 in Changgang Township, 320 have gone away to become Red Army soldiers and to work. Among the 413 persons remaining in the township, only 87 persons are male, and women account for as many as 326 persons (a ratio of 1 to 4). So, most of the production in Changgang Township depends on women. Changgang Township has raised the slogan of "women learning to use plowshares," and women have already entered into the production front in large numbers. This demonstrates that organized reapportioning of manpower and encouraging women to participate in production are inseparable tasks. The large number of Red Army soldiers added in Changgang has not resulted in declining, but rather in increasing, production. This is because they have resolved this issue in an excellent fashion.

### 3. *Draft Animal Cooperatives*

They began to be organized in September. Every village is setting up one just now, but the work has not yet been completed, and they still do not have many members. They have a five-man committee.

On average, there are 25 head of cattle for 100 households, and the whole township has 110 cattle in total.

There is no family that has two cattle.

Among those families that have cattle, families with one ox make up 50 percent. (Most of them are calves worth something over 10 *yuan* a head.)

Two families sharing one ox constitute 15 percent.

Three and four families sharing one ox account for 30 percent.

Five or more families sharing one ox represent 5 percent. (There is a big water buffalo jointly owned by 7 families.)

Families with no cattle make up 25 percent or about 109 families among the 437 families in the whole township. The methods of resolving the issue of draft animal cooperatives have not been discussed yet.

What has been decided is that it is forbidden to kill cattle. Old and sick cattle that should be slaughtered should be reported to the township soviet and slaughtered only after the township soviet has sent people to examine the case and given permission to do so. No one dares to kill cattle willfully.

Under the present conditions of agricultural technology, the role of draft animals is second only to that of manpower. According to materials on the three localities of Shisui Township in Ruijin (families with no cattle account for 30 percent), Changgang Township in Xingguo (families with no cattle account for 25 percent), and Caixi Township in Shanghang (families with no cattle make up 20 percent), it is clear that families with no cattle at all represent 25 percent of the peasantry. This is an enormous problem, and the best solution is to lead the masses to organize draft animal cooperatives and to combine shares and buy cattle jointly. The method is that, under the principle of voluntarism (after accep-

tance by a mass meeting of the members), each family offers 2 to 3 *sheng* of grain for every *Dan* of land redistributed to it. For example, in Changgang Township, each person received 6.2 *Dan* of land, and 109 families have no cattle. If each family has 4 persons, these families comprise 436 persons and have received 2,703 *Dan* of redistributed land. If 3 *sheng* of grain are offered for every *Dan* of land, there will be 81 *Dan* of grain, and if every *Dan* is worth 5 *yuan*, this will amount to 405 *yuan*. Calculating on the assumption that an ox costs 20 *yuan*, they can buy 20 head of cattle. If one ox can plow 80 *Dan* of land, this will enable them to plow 1,600 *Dan* of land, thereby resolving more than half of the plowing problem for the 2,703 *Dan* of land. If 2 *sheng* of grain are offered again next year, the entire problem will be resolved. On the other hand, renting oxen can cost 5 *sheng* of grain a year for every *Dan* of land. This method has been put forward by the masses of Shisui Township, who are already applying it. We hope that all localities can apply this method. This can not only resolve a great difficulty for the poor peasants, but will also have even greater significance in increasing agricultural production.

### Promoting the Sale of Public Bonds

The Committee for the Issuance of Public Bonds consists of five persons, one from each village, in addition to the head.

The township chairman went to meetings in the *xian* and district and agreed to market 5,000 *yuan*. Later he agreed to market an additional 456 *yuan*, making a total of 5,456 *yuan*.

The township chairman called the representative conference in session after coming back, asking the deputies of various villages to make a commitment to market certain quantities of bonds in their own villages.

The deputies on duty in various villages held mass rallies in their own villages. Various deputies and propaganda teams conducted individual propaganda in advance among the masses. In the meantime, the masses were guided to participate in rallies that explained the importance of purchasing public bonds. On the spot various deputies and responsible persons of various organizations made commitments to purchase first, the masses followed, and registration started during the rallies.

The bonds were not sold out.

Various deputies and propaganda teams conducted household-by-household propaganda among those who bought nothing or too little. "So much this year!" said some people among the masses who did not understand. In that case, we should compare and explain to them the price of grain last year (when 2.5 *Dan* of grain were required to buy 2 *yuan* of bonds) and this year (when 10 *yuan* of bonds could be bought with only 2 *dan* of grain); the benefits of cooperatives (two dividend distributions of the shares bought would exceed the amount of capital, while those who did not buy shares would not have any dividends)

should be made known to them; and the enemy's boycott and the significance of economic construction should be explained to them.

Mass meetings of whole villages were once again held and more bonds were sold, but there were still some left.

More propaganda was carried out.

A third round of mass meetings of whole villages was held. Once again, more bonds were sold and there were still some left, but not many.

More propaganda was carried out.

A fourth round of mass meetings of whole villages was held and all bonds were sold out.

In all, 5,456 *yuan* were marketed, which means that each person in the total population of 1,464 persons in the entire township bought over 3.7 *yuan*. The highest purchase was 45 *yuan* (one person). Five or six families bought 30 *yuan*, and there were many families that bought 20 *yuan*. Very few families bought 1 or 2 *yuan*, only about ten families did so. No families purchased 5 *jiao*. There were a dozen or so households of lonely old people who did not buy any. "The masses were completely satisfied." It took fifteen days from the beginning until they were all sold.

The characteristic of the work of Changgang lies in the ability to use its whole strength to mobilize the masses and to persuade them with the greatest patience, thus fulfilling their tasks completely and doing so with the greatest speed. The promotion of the sale of public bonds is merely one example. The sale of 5,000 *yuan* of public bonds in Changgang was carried out entirely in the course of rallies. There was no soliciting from household to household at all. It depended entirely on propaganda and agitation, and there was no compulsory distribution. It only took 15 days from the beginning to the end of the sale through four rounds of individual propaganda and four village rallies. There are other townships that have volumes of sale five or six times less than that of Changgang Township, that have the used compulsory distribution method and still cannot complete the sale after three months. This is really a difference between heaven and earth!

### **The Cooperative Movement**

The movement started after the third war<sup>12</sup> in 1931, at Gulin Village, Liangmu Township (at that time Changgang Township belonged to Liangmu). The masses of this village collected over 80 *yuan* of shares at 5 *jiao* per share, started a business, and achieved results. In January 1933, they changed the name to the Liangmu Township Cooperative and did not increase shares. Their goods were cheaper than those on the market and were welcomed by the masses. In September, the cooperative did 300 *yuan* of business and gained profits. In September

12. I.e., the Third "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign.

last year, the district cooperative was established, collecting 800 shares from all over the district (at 5 *jiao* per share) and incorporating the Liangmu Township Cooperative.

Staff members: At the time of village cooperatives, there were a cooperative manager (Li Kuiying, who later became successively a manager of a township cooperative, a district cooperative, and a *xian* cooperative), a buyer (Li Qishang, who later became a buyer for a township cooperative, a district cooperative, and a *xian* cooperative), and an accountant and a shop assistant (Wang Rensen, who later was an accountant for a township cooperative and a district cooperative). They had meals at the cooperative but did not receive salaries. When the cooperative became a township cooperative, it was decided to pay each person 3 *yuan* of salary, but none of the three accepted it.

Goods were bought directly from Maodian.

At the time of village and township cooperatives, cooperative members and Red Army relatives purchased goods at a discount of 50 cash per 1,000 cash, or 5 percent. Nonmembers were not entitled to the discount, but the prices were still somewhat lower than those of the market, about 20 cash less per string of cash, or 2 percent less. In November this year, the district cooperative decided to reduce prices 20 cash per string for salt and cloth (because salt and cloth are expensive and are less profitable); other goods still have a discount of 50 cash. At present, for nonmembers, 100 *yuan* of business represents a gain of 2 *yuan*.

From September of last year to March of this year (half a year), the district cooperative made a profit of over 600 *yuan* from a capital of over 400 *yuan*. It has used 50 percent of the profit as a public accumulation fund; 10 percent as rewards for salesmen, management committee members, and auditing committee members; 10 percent as a cultural and educational fund (for clubs, schools, and buying paper and pens for children); and 30 percent as dividends. In order to increase dividends and encourage cooperative members, the educational fund was temporarily cancelled (it should be restored in the future) and the portion for dividends was increased to 40 percent; each person got one string of cash. At dividend-distributing time, accounts were settled and declared on the notice board of the *xian*. After the distribution of dividends, many more shares were added, and by July this year, there were altogether 2,000 shares, worth 1,000 *yuan*. The second distribution of shares took place in November. The dividend per share was 5 *jiao*, of which 3 *jiao* were actually distributed and 2 *jiao* reinvested in shares. It was decided that the value of each share should be increased to 1 *yuan* and that each person might not own more than 10 shares.

The management committee had eleven members and the auditing committee seven.

It has now been decided that townships should set up cooperative branches. The Changgang cooperative branch has accumulated over 260 shares (1 *yuan* per share) and is in operation now.



The general cooperative of the *xian* was established in August and has also started businesses.

The cooperative of Gulin Village is the first cooperative in the whole *xian* and is also the best managed, thus having the claim of being the model cooperative.

The grain cooperative of this township has collected over 220 shares (1 *yuan* per share), and more millet has been handed in (5 *yuan* per *Dan*), and gathered together in a granary in Changgang Village. It is not open for business yet, but has organized a management committee.

Every township and every district should learn from the consumers' cooperatives of Changgang Township and Shangshe District!

## The Cultural Movement

### 1. Elementary Schools

Four Lenin elementary schools, one for each village. Each school has its own principal and teachers.

Pupils: 55 in Changgang, 53 in Tangbei, 33 in Xinxi, and 46 in Siwang, totaling 186 and accounting for 65 percent of the total school-age children in the whole township. The remaining 35 percent fail to come not because their parents prevent them, but because they themselves prefer to play and refuse to go. The pupils have gone to "catch" them, and after being caught, some of them have been punished by being made to sweep the floor, others by being confined, and a few by being made to go hungry—these last are the ones who are "big and rough." Struggles arise spontaneously among the pupils and "their spirit is excellent." The time these mischievous children come to study is short and the time they stay away is much longer. Their parents watch them leaving home and "they sneak to the mountains to fight battles." (Some methods of punishment are inappropriate.)

All the schools are divided into three classes: A, B, and C.

The ages of pupils range from seven to thirteen. Some of them are also fourteen and fifteen, because they have been busy with production, and have attended school only for half days.

Those who live far away bring their lunches and those who live nearby go home for lunch.

Books, paper, pens, and ink are provided by the pupils themselves.

Teachers teach without pay, but labor mutual aid associations help them farm their land. A teacher is treated like a staff member who does not participate in production. Teachers themselves refuse to ask, but the representative conference has decided to give them preferential treatment. (Permanent personnel of the township soviet have preferential treatment and the deputies and responsible persons of mass organizations who are not free from production are not entitled to preferential treatment.) The pupils of Hefu and Xiushui townships "*dou*" (*dou*

means "to gather together") rice to give to the teachers to eat; every month, they *dou 2 dou*<sup>13</sup> of rice. Yangdeng Township has another method: For example, a certain village has an elementary school. The township soviet permits two persons to be selected from among the masses (they must be over fifty years of age and cannot be permanent laborers) to be permanent transporters (carrying things with their shoulders regularly), to engage in peddling and to earn money for the food of the teachers. The amount of food money is the same as that given to staff members of the township soviet. (If the people of the township soviet have 9 *fen* a day, teachers may also get 9 *fen* a day.) Moreover, the township soviet does not give any other duties to these two persons, who may commit themselves to the duties voluntarily.

Most of the teachers are not "steeped in letters."

## 2. Evening Schools

There are nine in the whole township: three in Changgang, two in Tangbei, one in Xinxi, and three in Siwang.

On average, each school has about 32 students, and 9 schools have about 300 students altogether, 30 percent of whom are males and 70 percent females. There are altogether 412 young people and adults between the ages of 16 and 45, and most of them attend evening schools. A few "old comrades" above the age of 45 have also come to study. The masses welcome them warmly and say "the evening schools are great."

All schools are divided into three classes, A, B, and C.

A few lamps are brought by the students themselves; four or five of them share one lamp. In most cases, evening schools supply one wooden oil lamp for from ten to twenty persons to study under, and each person contributes two or three copper pieces a month.

Books, paper, pens and ink are provided by the students themselves.

Teaching materials:

Class A: Reading newspapers, doing sums.

Class B: Adult textbooks.

Class C: Children's textbooks.

Every school has a principal and an instructor. The principal may not be literate, but should be warm-hearted. If students do not come, the "principal is requested to instruct them." Principals also come to study and many of them are

13. The first of these two characters, both pronounced *dou*, is the verb defined by Mao in the previous clause as "to gather together," and which might perhaps better be rendered in this context as "scare up" or "rustle up." The second *dou* is the unit of volume sometimes translated as "peck," which is equivalent to 0.1 *dan*.

"old comrades." Among nine principals of evening schools, there are five women. There are no women instructors. Of the nine evening school instructors, seven are deputies of the township soviet and all of them are volunteers.

### 3. *Literacy Classes*

Those who have the burden of small children, are "more elderly," have too few people in the family, and live far away from evening schools are organized into literacy classes.

Organization: A group with as few as three persons and as many as ten persons is formed on the basis of the locations of residences. It elects one group leader who knows a few words. Most of the group leaders are evening school students.

Teaching methods: At any time, any place, and with any number of people, at a time when relaxing in a cool place, drinking tea, and when there are one person, three persons, or five persons. At the beginning, the ground may be used to practice writing characters. Afterward, each person prepares his own exercise book and learns to write. They may start from writing the characters for "desk, chair, stool, pig, cow, chicken, and duck." Everyone's exercise book is collected by the group leader about every ten days and presented to the evening school instructors for correction. Those who "write more and better" should receive oral praise. If there are characters that group leaders do not know how to write, they should consult the evening school instructors. If the evening school instructors do not know, they should ask the daytime school teachers.

With this method, those who did not know how to read and write in the past can all read forty or fifty characters, and a few people know seventy or eighty.

This method was adopted from the summer of this year and the organization of literacy classes already started last year.

Literacy Boards: Each village has one nailed to a building beside a road. The board has pictures and characters on it. The contents change every two or three days. It may also be changed every day, or with four or five days in between. At any time, it may carry as few as two words or as many as three words, and there are always pictures. The teachers of daytime schools are responsible for the board. This method works very well.

### 4. *Clubs*

There are four clubs in the whole township, one for each village.

Under every club, there are many committees on "sports," "wall newspapers," "evening parties," and so on.

The wall newspapers of each village are located in the Lenin elementary school. Among ten articles, the pupils of the Lenin elementary school write eight and the masses write two.

All entertainment clubs have new plays.<sup>14</sup>

All township soviets must learn from the cultural and educational work of Changgang Township!

## **The Public Health Movement**

### ***1. Methods***

Residents should be grouped into public health classes according to the proximity of their residences. A class may be composed of four or five families, seven or eight families, or eleven or twelve families. Most classes consist of seven or eight families. All classes have a class leader.

Although it is laid down that a big clean-up should take place every five days, as a matter of fact, most of the big clean-ups are conducted every seven days and there are also some that are carried out every ten days. Supervision and prompting are necessary, for "without prompting, it is forgotten and requires more effort to do."

### ***2. The Work***

(i) Cleaning up: Ashes and manure should not be put in halls and bedrooms. Water ditches in front of and behind buildings should be cleared of sludge and the threshing ground should be swept clean. Public ditches and threshing grounds should be dredged and swept in turns. (ii) Food: Up to now, it has only been mentioned that it is forbidden to eat dead things. (ii) Clothes should be washed and neat. If people fail to carry out the above types of work, the children's league shall be mobilized to laugh at them. This applies especially to those whose clothes are dirty. Cultural plays also address the public health movement.

### ***3. Achievements***

Starting from April, the first time was "rather good." Efforts were lax after that. Nothing was done at all during the two months of May and June. The township soviet discovered this and criticized the director of the Public Health Committee. The Public Health Committee was reconvened (apart from the township public health committee, there are also village public health committees, all of them at the village and township levels composed of five persons), calling upon various villages to take part in competitions to "see which village is doing better." This started under supervision in July and great achievements have been made in four months. Things are much cleaner than in the past.

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14. The reference is presumably to the "cultural plays" mentioned in the next section.

#### 4. Public Opinion

"The Red Army and the Communist Party have thought about everything!" "The staff workers of the government really look after (meaning cherish) us!" But there are a few people who say, "If the window is opened, one will die because of the wind if one does not die from illness!" It is still necessary to conduct thorough propaganda.

Sickness is a great enemy in the soviet areas, because it weakens our revolutionary strength. As in Changgang Township, the public health movement should be mobilized among the broad masses. To reduce sickness and eventually to eliminate it is a duty of every township soviet.

#### Social Relief

The township committee of the mutual aid association has five members (including a head, a person responsible for propaganda and a person for organizational work).

There are no committees in villages, only a director.

Below this level, there are small groups.

There are 611 members. In the entire township, there are only about 20 families who have not joined the mutual aid association and most of them are lonely old people.

The monthly fee is one copper piece and everyone pays.

The work:

1. Expressing gratitude to the Red Army.

2. Donating to relieve disaster-stricken people and to support the opposition to imperialism. There have been two instances this year. One was when over seventy refugees from Xinfeng came to Xingguo City (at the time when it was [part of] Liangmu Township), and more than twenty strings of cash were donated. The other was assistance to the Northeastern Volunteer Army (also at the time when it was Liangmu Township; the population was then 2,900 and the membership was about 800), when over forty strings of cash were donated. The contributions ranged from five copper pieces to one hundred pieces, two hundred pieces, and one string.<sup>15</sup> Most of the donations, amounting to about 60 percent, were of a hundred copper pieces. Only a few people gave either five copper pieces or one string.

3. Funds have been raised to assist people whose houses have burned down, unemployed workers, and the sick without medicine in the township. In spring of this year, a family suffered a fire that burned down one and a half of their rooms and over six strings of cash were donated to them.

15. This sentence seems to imply that the "copper pieces" (*tong pian*) Mao refers to frequently in this text are, in fact, copper cash (*wen*), since a "string" consisted of 1,000 cash.

4. Alleviating famine. There were three or four people begging for food this summer in Liangmu Township (those who were formerly beggars are still very poor now). The district mutual aid association was requested to provide money and rice to help them. Each of them received at most 3 *sheng* of grain and at least 1 *sheng* on each occasion, and they were given grain three or four times this summer.

5. Providing relief to the families of Red Army men. There are families of Red Army men who suffer from difficulties because of sickness (none of them beg for food). One fund-raising this summer brought in over eleven strings of cash. Again in April, with money borrowed from the cooperative, several volunteers from the masses went to purchase rice and carried it to sell at Qiaotou and Jiangbeitong. The money earned, more than a hundred strings of cash, was used to provide relief to Red Army families suffering from illness. The masses who handled this matter refused to accept any payment at all, apart from their food.

Soviets in many places do not pay attention to social relief work and the mutual aid associations in many areas only know how to collect the monthly dues and do not know how to relieve the difficulties of the masses. Under such circumstances, the social relief work of the township soviet and the mutual aid association of Changgang is worthy of praise. Changgang Township has resolved every problem of the difficulties suffered by the masses in the most concrete and practical way.

## Women

Each village has one head of the congress of deputies of women workers and women peasants. The heads of every village, plus a woman instructor, form the presidium of the township congress of deputies of women workers and women peasants. In all, there are forty-three deputies in the whole township: twelve for Changgang, eleven for Tangbei, nine for Xinxijiu, and eleven for Siwang. Organizing began in November of last year, new elections took place in March this year, and the third elections were carried out in September. Meetings were held every seven days in all villages and all of them took place on time. On each occasion, there were only a few absentees (because of the burden of small children and other reasons). The representatives have separate responsibilities; each is in charge of five to ten families, in most cases six or seven families.

The first election, at the time when they were set up, was organized by deputies of the township soviet. Taking the village as the unit, all laboring women above the age of sixteen were called to the meeting. The average attendance rate on that occasion was 60 percent for each village. One deputy was elected from several families (varying numbers) according to the proximity of their residences. The number of deputies elected that time was smaller than the present figure. At that time, women still did not understand the role of the congress of women's deputies and were not altogether enthusiastic. After the deputies were

elected, a minority were still not very active. The congress of deputies did not have a presidium, only a single chairwoman, and the villages did not even have a head.

In March of this year, the second elections were held. The method was the same as before, but it was presided over by the chairwomen and the township soviet deputies from the various villages were present only to provide assistance. It stipulated the number of families under the responsibility of one woman deputy. It was also laid down that a presidium should be organized in the township and that each village should have a head.

At the third election in September, the method was changed. A mass meeting of all the women in the whole village was not held, but each woman deputy called an electoral meeting of the women in the families for which she was responsible. Once again, the township soviet deputies came to provide assistance.

The first and second election meetings only elected deputies and did not discuss any issues. The third election meeting discussed issues such as "expanding the Red Army," "expressing thanks to the Red Army," "giving preferential treatment to Red Army relatives," "women learning to use plowshares" and "women using silver vessels to buy public bonds." The problems discussed at the meetings held every seven days included marriage questions. It was said that "we need proper freedom, not the freedom of the vagabonds, and we should not talk about divorce as soon as we open our mouths." During the election movement this year, the women on the candidate list were discussed, but other issues closely related to women, such as "the problem of women's diseases," "the problem of children," and "the problem of women's education" were not discussed.

There is complete freedom of divorce in this township.

Husbands curse wives less frequently while, on the other hand, wives curse husbands more now. (Neither side should curse the other.)

There is still no parent who does not hit his or her children at all, but the beatings occur less frequently. (The beatings should be eliminated completely.)

Children are more intelligent now. For example, in the past, children seldom talked back when they were beaten and cursed, but they often do so now. (If parents do not beat and curse their children, children will not talk back to their parents.)

About 1 percent of the women have married three times in the four and a half years since the uprising. About 50 percent of the women had secret love affairs before the uprising. Since the uprising, this has fallen to 10 percent and it has further declined this year. One reason is that they have received land; the second reason is that they have freedom of divorce and marriage; and the third reason is that they are busy with revolutionary work.

Blouses have become shorter and have no "lace trimmings." Apart from "old ladies," all women's hair has been cut short. Some "old ladies" have also cut their hair. Elderly women who have not cut their hair constitute about 20 percent of all women.

Among the masses, incidents of fighting and cursing one another occurred now and then in the past (before the uprising), and there was even more quarreling. Now, fighting with each other has disappeared and quarreling has also declined. In the past quarreling, there was no one to explain things. Even if there were people trying to mediate, "one's heart remained troubled for a long time." Now, as soon as quarrels take place, a deputy comes to explain and "the trouble in one's heart is dispelled at once." Those who argue now are primarily those relatively old comrades who attend meetings less frequently and do not understand revolutionary work very well. When they are asked to provide preferential treatment to Red Army relatives, they sometimes argue. But those who understand and adopt a positive attitude constitute the majority (70 percent), and the minority who do not understand are mainly old ladies who "never want to attend meetings."

During the past year, there have been no instances at all of old ladies worshipping the spirits (arranging incense and providing food to implore the spirits and worship Buddha). But there are still one or two "spirit-callers" in every village. The reasons why superstitions could be so rapidly eradicated are, first, that the local bullies have been overthrown and the land has been redistributed. Second, the Children's League and the Young Pioneers have launched propaganda against superstition, and the Soviet Government has initiated the movement to save money that used to be spent on buying incense and candles. Third, the Children's League (very frequently) and the Young Pioneers have intervened directly (by destroying their incense and candles). (Persuasion should replace such intervention.) But some old ladies still believe in spirits in their hearts, even though they dare not openly worship the spirits. Many of them have no sons.

The great force of women in the revolutionary war has been clearly manifested in the soviet areas. Their heroic attitudes and great achievements are fully manifested in the various mass struggles such as the Land Investigation Movement, on the economic front (they are the main force in Changgang Township), on the cultural front (many women manage rural education), in military mobilization (through their participation in the movements to enlarge the Red Army and to express gratitude to the Red Army, and their work as temporary laborers), and in the organization of the soviet (the role of woman deputies in township soviets). In all these domains, the leadership and forward impetus of the congress of deputies of women workers and women peasants have constituted a crucial link. The congress of deputies of women workers and women peasants should first of all seize upon the issues that affect the interests of the masses of women immediately. Mobilization regarding these issues should follow and lead on to a general political mobilization. Many places have given very inadequate attention to this point and even Changgang Township has not paid full attention to it. Every township soviet should put the work of leading the congress of delegates of women workers and women peasants on its own agenda.



## Children

A township Children's League committee is composed of five members with one secretary. A village Children's League has one head.

Children from the ages of seven to fifteen may join the Children's League, and 80 percent of them have joined. Most of those who have not joined are aged seven (because they are too young) or aged fifteen (because they have joined the Young Pioneers, which should be joined at the age of sixteen, but some "taller" ones join earlier). There are more girls who have not joined.

Work: (1) Making propaganda for the movements to expand the Red Army and return to the ranks of the Red Army (only those who refuse to go after three or four propaganda attempts are laughed at, and there have never been any humiliation teams in this township).<sup>16</sup> (2) Competing to gather dog dung to put in "manure pits" and dig up weed mud to put in "fertilizer rooms." (3) Paying monthly fees of one copper piece to express thanks to the Red Army. (4) Launching the movement to practice thrift—eating less fruit, and buying 5 *jiao*, 1 *yuan*, or 2 or 3 *yuan* worth of public bonds. More children buy 5 *jiao* of bonds and 60 percent of the children have bought public bonds. (5) Playing games and doing exercises. Every Sunday they practice fighting battles on a playground and follow a set curriculum. (6) The majority are attending Lenin elementary schools. The discipline of the Children's League is very strict. Some naughty children do not obey their parents or teachers, and only obey the discipline of the Children's League, whose punishments include sweeping floors and confinement. They always "listen to reason and admit their mistakes." (More persuasion and less punishment should be used.)

In the past, children nine or ten years old looked after cattle for the landlords and now they no longer do so. In the past the total daily working time of children either at home or helping others was always over ten hours, the same as an adult. It can be said that they did not have any rest or education time. Now, most of the time during the day, they receive education, play games, and only spend one and a half hours in the morning looking after cattle and doing other work. During busy farm seasons, they work more time—asking leave from the teachers and assisting their parents. In the past, they suffered from their parents' beating and cursing, but now there are very few such cases.

## Opposing Imperialism

The township committee of the League for Opposing Imperialism and Supporting the Soviet Union is composed of three members (a director, a person respon-

16. Desertion was beginning to be a problem in the Red Army by this point, and efforts to get deserters to return to the ranks were being used in tandem with ongoing campaigns to obtain new recruits. See below, "On the Problem of Deserters from the Red Army," December 15, 1933.

sible for propaganda, and a person responsible for organizational work).

Villages do not have committees, they have one head.

At the lower levels, there are small groups.

There are altogether 558 league members in the whole township.

Monthly dues are one copper piece and all members give without exception.

It constantly carries out propaganda, and about 30 percent (of those above the age of seven) have a rough idea of the meaning of "opposing imperialism" and "supporting the Soviet Union."

It has some gifts to present to the Red Army.

The masses in many localities, and even some of the soviet workers, think that "opposing imperialism" means opposing the Guomindang and the local bullies, and that "supporting the Soviet Union" means supporting the Central Soviet Government. The leading organs of the League for Opposing Imperialism and Supporting the Soviet Union have by no means gone to carry out thoroughgoing and effective propaganda to explain the work. There have been successes in Changgang Township in this respect, but further progress is required.

### Workers

Carpenters: Thirty percent are unemployed, and only 70 percent of the workers have work to do. The wages are 550 per day.<sup>17</sup>

Tailors: Most of them are unemployed and the wages are 400 per day.

Bricklayers: Thirty percent of bricklayers are unemployed and the wages per day are 550.

Bamboo Products Handicraft Workers: Ten percent of them are unemployed and the wages are 400 per day.

Barbers: Have increased by 10 percent. All who go to have haircuts offer 8 *sheng* of grain a year.

Casual Laborers: The wages are 400 (0.2 *yuan*) for an ordinary day and 800 (0.4 *yuan*) for a busy day.

### The Poor Peasant League

The committee of a township poor peasant league is composed of three members (a director, a person responsible for propaganda, and a person responsible for organization). Village committees have five members. In July this year, the membership was 271 persons, and it increased to 386 in November.

In the past, "the poor peasant league met whenever there were matters to handle," but the improvement of its organization was neglected.

During the Land Investigation Movement this year (July), villages set up committees and recruited members.

17. The unit, which is not specified, must be the copper cash. This corresponds to the relation of 2,000 to 1 *yuan* given below in the entry regarding casual laborers.

Before July, as long as two months could pass without holding a meeting. Since July, village poor peasant leagues have had a meeting every five days, ten days, or half a month, depending on the work needs. The township association holds a meeting every month to discuss issues such as "reviewing class status," "every member saving 1 *jiao* per day," "recruiting members," "improving organization," "promoting production," and "fines and donations." Reports have been made to the members concerning the issues of the expansion of the Red Army, preferential treatment to Red Army relatives, economic construction, and so on. The resolutions of the township congress of deputies on these issues are "announced" at the meetings of the poor peasant league and no special discussions are conducted. (They should be discussed.)

No monthly dues.

Below the village, there are small groups.

In all places where the Land Investigation Movement has not developed in depth, the poor peasant league is of special importance and township soviets should exercise leadership over them. The poor peasant league should have village committees and hold meetings with villages as units. The meetings held with townships as units may be reduced, and the method of Changgang is correct.

### **Propaganda Teams**

The township has one propaganda team of seven people with one team leader. Every village has one propaganda small group; big villages (Changgang and Tangbei) have five members and small villages (Xinxi and Sigang) have three members. They all have a small group leader. Propaganda is conducted for the "expansion of the Red Army," "economic construction," "commemoration days," etc.

The methods of propaganda: (1) Individual propaganda is the most popular form. (2) Making propaganda at the meetings of the masses of the entire village called by the deputy on duty for the purpose of discussing work. (3) Making propaganda to the masses at district and *xian* rallies on commemoration days and making propaganda to the "troops" of other townships and other districts.

The township soviet calls all the five team leaders and small group leaders to "propaganda meetings" once every seven days. The district soviet calls all propaganda team leaders throughout the district to meetings at least twice a month and sometimes three times. On each occasion, the duration is at least four hours and participants go home for meals after the meeting.

The whole township has twenty-three team members. Women account for 60 percent. All members are "good at making speeches," but they may not necessarily know how to read and write.

Membership does not change; only when some members are transferred to other jobs are they replaced. They concentrate on studying propaganda materials and propaganda methods: "how to make the masses understand better."

They were organized beginning in February of this year.

## Shock Teams

The shock team of the township soviet has five members with one team leader. Among the villages, Changgang, Tangbei, and Xinxi have shock teams, and Siwang has none. They are organized by wives of Red Army soldiers.

If a certain village's work does not proceed well, the shock team of another village will go to check, help, and inform them of the methods of action of other villages. The township [team] also acts in the same way and goes to check and help villages that cannot carry out their work.

They have less work than propaganda teams and have apparently not played a big role.

The township soviet has called them to meet three or four times.

They were organized beginning in August.

The methods both of the propaganda team and of the shock team are excellent and all townships may organize them.

## Revolutionary Competitions

Methods of competition: Competitions started from the spring plowing movement this year, and there were three types of competitions over "earlier" plowing, "better" plowing, and "no waste land." The competition this time was a district-wide competition and it was decided by the chairmen of the various township soviets at a district soviet meeting. This township organizes competitions among all the villages and has convened a meeting of all the deputies on duty in the various villages to make plans. The deputies of every village participate in competitions among themselves and the deputies on duty convene meetings of various deputies to make plans. Not all families are required to make competition plans (but they may do so). The contracts should clearly write about the following items: The highest standards for a competition, the villages that will take part in the competition, the types and quantities of rewards (they are divided into first class, a red flag; second class, a hundred sheets of letter paper; and third class, fifty sheets of letter paper), the period of competition, and the responsible persons and witnesses. During the competition, the township representative conference holds a review meeting for the deputy on duty to report the situation and explain the extent of the actions of various villages. After the meeting, the chairman and others (the witnesses) go to inspect in various villages and check whether the deputies on duty have "embroidered" (lied in) their reports.

In April, there was another competition with the objective of carrying out "military mobilization." The competition had three items on "expanding the Red Army," "expressing gratitude toward the Red Army," and "giving preferential treatment to Red Army relatives." (There was no movement on returning to the ranks, because there were no deserters at that time. This item was added in May.)

On May 20, the township representative conference held a summary meeting on the two competitions on "spring plowing" and "military affairs." Xinxi received a red flag, Changgang one hundred sheets of letter paper, Tangbei fifty sheets, and Siwang nothing.

The two competitions on "military affairs" and "the economy" planned in July have not been summed up yet, but it is understood that Changgang Village has done the best.

In order to speed up the work, the method of revolutionary competitions should be adopted in every village. The township soviets are the leaders of competitions. But township soviets are only the "leaders," for each competition is primarily a competition of the masses and not simply a competition among the deputies of various villages. Therefore, the signing of every contract of competition should be reported at mass rallies in the villages and the consent of the masses obtained. The competition contracts should be pasted outside. Regarding competitions on production matters, the dozens of residents under the leadership of each deputy should be called to meetings to hear reports and give their consent. Such meetings should also be held to report the results of reviewing the achievements after a period of time with the aim of promoting the work. All competitions that have not shown results have failed to do so because the minority had pocketed competition contracts and failed to mobilize the broad masses. Each competition should end with a summary and the presentation of rewards. The two competitions in Changgang have basically done these things, so they have achieved real success.

# Investigation of Caixi Townships

(November 26, 1933)<sup>1</sup>

## The Demarcation of Administrative Districts

Upper Caixi and Lower Caixi, which are well known in the Central Soviet Area, belong to Caixi District of Shanghang *xian*, Fujian Province. Since the new division of administration areas, there have been eight townships in all in Caixi District: Upper Caixi, Lower Caixi, Lingbao, Tongkang, Zengkeng, Wencai, Dadi, and Xiawang.

Upper Caixi: There are 523 households, with a population of 2,318.

The township is divided into four villages: Leiwu (with a population of approximately 600), Yangxia (500), Zhongxing (500), and Shangwu (600).

The full-time personnel of the township soviet: a chairman and a documentation clerk.

As it is a big township, the documentation clerk is full-time, so as to assist in the work of the township soviet.

Lower Caixi: There are 503 households, with a population of 2,610.

The township is divided into four villages: Zhangkeng (with a population of approximately 600), Xiakeng (500), Fakeng (800), and Sunwu (700).

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We have translated this document from *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 333–54. As indicated in the source note to the preceding text, “Investigation of Changgang Township,” it originally appeared in a mimeographed pamphlet produced in December 1933 and distributed at the Second Soviet Congress. In this case, too, *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 197–98, contains notes regarding the variants between this contemporary version and later publications, but they are less numerous and much less significant than the variants in the Changgang investigation.

1. Like the previous text, this investigation was first published in the mimeographed pamphlet *Models for the Work of 25 Township Soviets* distributed in January 1934, where it was the second item. Before the heading “Administrative Divisions,” there appeared the following indications, which the editors of *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, p. 362, note 88, attribute to Mao himself:

Caixi Township	(November 26, 1933)
Zhuo Xinghua	Chairman, Upper Caixi
Que Shaoguang	Secretary, Upper Caixi
Wang Deqing	Deputy, Lower Caixi
The materials below have been compiled from oral reports by these three comrades.	

On the basis of Mao's note, we have dated this text November 26, 1933.

## Conferences of Deputies

### 1. Number of Deputies

Upper Caixi: Formerly fifty-three deputies. In this election, family members of workers were counted as having the class status of worker, which increased the total number of deputies to seventy-five (an increase of twenty-two; this township has many masonry workers). Of the fifty-three original deputies, thirteen are workers. Together with the newly added twenty-two people, there is a total of thirty-five worker deputies; the remaining forty are peasant deputies. There are 183 workers in the whole township, belonging to 163 households. Calculating an average of three people per household, the total is 489, making one deputy elected per 13 persons, resulting in the above-mentioned number of deputies.

Lower Caixi: Formerly seventy-three deputies, now ninety-one deputies. The increase of eighteen deputies is also because the proportion of family members of workers [participating] in this election increased.

### 2. The Delegation

There are deputies in every village, some villages having more than ten deputies, other villages more than twenty. In each of the four villages, deputies' meetings are held in which one person is elected as a member of the township soviet's "delegation," so that it is a delegation of four. Relatively minor tasks are dealt with by the chairman's calling a meeting of the delegation. Before each conference of deputies is convened, the delegation is gathered for a meeting to make preparations (either in the morning or the day before). The conference meets every five days or so. This practice was begun in 1931 (the term "delegation" should be changed to "deputies in charge").

### 3. Relations Between Deputies and Residents

Each deputy is in charge of more than ten residents, more than twenty, thirty, forty, or at most more than fifty residents. Worker deputies are responsible for fewer people and peasant deputies for more. This practice was begun in 1932.

### 4. The Political Performance of Deputies

Among the fifty-three deputies from Upper Caixi:

Over twenty were extremely active.

Over twenty were middling.

One was really bad.

This worst deputy attended only three out of ten meetings and was busy making his own living. He never applied himself to work he was assigned to do.

After repeated criticism, he was dismissed from the conference of deputies.

Among the seventy-three deputies from Lower Caixi, none were really bad.

### ***5. Transfer and By-Elections of Deputies***

The fifty-three deputies from Upper Caixi were elected in November of last year. By the time of the reelection on October 14 of this year, twenty-seven of them had joined the Red Army (they left in one batch in November of last year) and eleven had been transferred to work elsewhere, so that thirty-eight had left and fifteen remained. By-elections were held by village for replacement purposes. Worker deputies who had left were replaced by workers, and peasants were replaced by peasants. Where there had been alternate deputies, their places were filled by alternate deputies. This by-election was held in November of last year and none were held after that. By the time of the reelection in October of this year, forty-two deputies remained, as eleven more had been transferred away subsequently.

Of the seventy-three deputies from Lower Caixi, eleven joined the Red Army in Red May this year. A by-election was held by village. In July, another fifteen deputies joined the Red Army and another by-election was held by village. The places of the eighteen people who had been transferred away at one time or another were filled by alternate deputies.

### ***6. Women Deputies***

In the election of October last year, sixteen of the fifty-three deputies from Upper Caixi were women, amounting to 30 percent. Twenty-one of the seventy-three deputies from Lower Caixi were women, which also amounts to 30 percent. After the by-elections, thirty-three of the fifty-three deputies from Upper Caixi at the time of this October's election were women, which amounts to approximately 60 percent. Of the seventy-three deputies from Lower Caixi, forty-three were women, which is also 60 percent. In the latest election, forty-three of the seventy-five deputies from Upper Caixi are women, again 60 percent. Of the ninety-one representatives from Lower Caixi, fifty-nine are women, representing 65 percent.

The system of deputies in charge in the villages and the method of establishing solid relationships between deputies and residents represent great progress in soviet organization and leadership. Tremendous results have been achieved in Caixi Township, as in other townships such as Changgang and Shishui. A township's core is in the villages, so that organization and leadership of the village become matters very worthy of attention. By dividing the whole township into several villages, and relying on the firm leadership in each village provided by the villagers' own deputies in the township soviet, as well as the village committee and mass bodies, the popular masses of the entire village can be



organized under the soviet just like a network, carrying out all the tasks of the soviets. This is one of the clearest points of superiority of the soviet system over all other political systems in history. The methods employed by Changgang, Caixi, Shishui, and other townships should be spread throughout the soviet areas.

### The Current Elections

1. The election committee took the lead in organizing the elections.
2. Resident voters registered and three public notices were posted.
3. The list of candidates for Lower Caixi consisted of more than 160 people (of whom 91 were to be elected). One copy was posted in each village, each with over 160 names on it. Many people among the masses wrote comments under each candidate's name. Some wrote a couple of characters, some wrote five or six characters, some wrote a dozen or so characters, and children also made comments. The majority wrote "good" or "bad." There were also comments such as "agree" or "negative." One candidate's name had "bureaucrat" written under it. More than twenty of them were criticized in wall newspapers, all for seeking only to make a living and showing no concern for the interests of the masses, or for being indifferent toward their work. There were some poems, three of which complained that the township soviet failed to resolve properly the problems in the paper-making industry.
4. Meetings of the electorate were held by township and the township soviet gave a work report.
5. For workers, the whole township constitutes one unit; for peasants, the unit is the village (four of them).
6. At the election meetings, the attendance rate of the electorate was 80 percent. Approximately 20 percent—those who were ill or on sentry duty, those working in the cooperatives who were away buying merchandise, and women recovering from childbirth—were absent. Old people with canes attended as well.
7. Many meetings were held around the elections: trade unions, poor peasant associations, women's associations, mutual aid groups, and the Anti-Imperialist Alliance gathered their members for meetings, as did the Children's League and the Young Pioneers. Meetings of Communist Party and Youth League members were held first. There were posters and pamphlets, so that election propaganda this year was much more widespread than last year and most people understood the significance of the elections.

Last year, those under the age of sixteen clamored for the right to vote, taking the view that many of them were Red Army soldiers and had done a lot of work, so why shouldn't they have the right to vote? This year they have understood that it is a question of age, and have stopped making a fuss.

The propaganda team went to each village to do propaganda work, making speeches during the day and putting on performances at night.

8. At the election meetings people were encouraged to buy bonds. Within one day at the meeting, more than 1,500 *yuan* worth were sold in Lower Caixi, and 630 *yuan* worth were sold in Upper Caixi.

During the meeting of the electorate in Dadi Township, thirteen people were encouraged to join the Red Army. One of the two squads in the model battalion of the township's Red Guard Army went as well.

9. The election of new cadres: Among the seventy-five deputies from Upper Caixi, twenty-one of the fifty-three former deputies were reelected, and thirty-two of them lost. Fifty-four were elected for the first time. Among the ninety-one deputies from Lower Caixi, fifty out of the seventy-three former deputies were reelected, and twenty-three of them lost. Those elected for the first time numbered forty-one.

The elections in Upper and Lower Caixi could generally be termed a success. In their election propaganda, their organization of the list of candidates, their getting the masses to make comments on the list of candidates, their linking the elections with their other work, and their organizing to elect workers and women, they were fully carrying out the Central Government's Order on Elections, thereby becoming a model for the election campaign in the Soviet Area. With regard to mobilizing the electorate to raise motions at the election meetings for the newly elected deputies to discuss, on the other hand, they have not done anything to speak of. The model in this respect would have to be recognized as Changgang Township in Xingguo *xian*.

### Committees below the Level of Township Soviets

There are many committees below the level of township soviets. Some examples follow:

"Support the Red Army": Five committee members each in Upper and Lower Caixi. Each of the four villages has a committee, also with five committee members apiece.

"Preferential Treatment for Red Army Families": Five members each from Upper and Lower Caixi. Also five members from each village.

"Land Investigation": Eleven members from each of the two townships. Nothing at the village level.

"Elections": Seven members from each of the two townships. Nothing at the village level.

"Land": Eleven members from Upper Caixi, seven members from Lower Caixi. Nothing at the village level.

"Labor": This is the committee on labor cooperatives, with five people from each of the two townships. There is no committee at the village level, only small groups.

"Hills and Forests": Seven members from Upper Caixi and eleven members from Lower Caixi.

"Returning Deserters": Twelve members from each of the two townships.

There are no committees such as "spring plowing" and "summer plowing," and so forth. Only field cultivation teams were organized, with five people to a small group, ten people to a squad, thirty people to a medium group, and a hundred people to a big team. Upper and Lower Caixi each has a big team. Field cultivation teams are primarily for the purpose of giving preferential treatment to Red Army families.

The fact that the organization and leadership of the various committees below the level of township soviets have become an important part of the overall work of the soviets has been demonstrated once again in Caixi Township. The Central Government has incorporated the experiences from different places into the organizational regulations for local soviets. It is stipulated therein that a township soviet may organize more than twenty permanent or provisional committees, and may reduce or increase the number according to the actual situation in the work of each place. Soviets in municipal districts need to organize several committees that are different from those in the townships, based on the special characteristics of cities. The clear and unified establishment of such a system will draw the soviets much closer to the masses and enable all soviet work to be carried out with abundant force. One problem is that committees should be established for certain important tasks in the villages as well (all sorts of mass organizations with large memberships should likewise set up leading organs in the villages). This is because committees at the township level alone are not able to do their job carefully and thoroughly in any big township that has a population of a thousand or so. The establishment of these committees in the various villages can guarantee this point.

### **Expansion of the Red Army**

During the three months of August, September, and October:

Upper Caixi: Sixty people [were recruited]; two platoons of model battalions were mobilized.

In addition, eleven people returned to their units. Two or three more did not return to their units because of illness.

Lower Caixi: Sixty-five people [were recruited]. Fifty-two people were mobilized at one time into model battalions. Thirteen more people were individually mobilized on another occasion.

Another eleven people returned to their units. Fourteen more people have yet to return.

In the twelve townships of the entire district (before redivision), on August 15, 273 people were mobilized into model battalions. In the eight townships of the newly demarcated district, there are still more than fifty people who have not returned to their units.

Within the entire district, the expansion of the Red Army has been most

successful in the two townships of Upper and Lower Caixi. The main reason is that they have historically done a good job in giving preferential treatment to Red Army families and in providing aid and comfort to Red Army soldiers. Before Red May, each of the eight townships could collect an average of five hundred pairs of cloth shoes and straw sandals every month. Recently there has been a slight reduction because there was no cloth as a result of the blockade. Upper and Lower Caixi townships nonetheless achieved the following results: in Upper Caixi, more than five hundred pairs in August, more than a hundred pairs in September, and more than ninety pairs in October. In Lower Caixi, more than three hundred pairs in August, two hundred eighty pairs in September, three hundred pairs in October, and six hundred thirty pairs in November.

All these achievements result mainly from the Party and Youth League's branches mobilizing Party and League members to lead the conference of women workers and peasants: (1) Party and Youth League members met first, (2) the conference of women's deputies next met, and then there was (3) a meeting of the female masses.

The conference of women's deputies meets every ten days. A township has a presidium consisting of five members, with one of them designated as the director. The remaining four are from four villages; there is one from each village, who is in charge of that village.

As for the questions discussed at meetings of the conference of women deputies, all topics considered at township soviets are included. Aside from devoting much of their energies to providing support and comfort to the Red Army, promoting the sale of bonds, and developing production, they also often discuss their own interests such as the question of marriage, and explain the marriage laws to women.

Mobilizing large numbers of masses to join the Red Army depends on the following: (1) thoroughgoing political propaganda and agitation and elimination of all coercive methods; (2) full provision of preferential treatment for Red Army family members; and (3) organizing and training local armed forces in a sound fashion. What's more, as the experience of Changgang Township and [the two] Caixi township[s] has fully proved to us, giving preferential treatment to family members of Red Army soldiers is a basic task that enables the masses to feel happy about joining the Red Army, and to enjoy peace of mind while remaining in it. The total number of young and adult men (between the ages of sixteen and forty-five) in Changgang Township is 407 people. Three hundred and twenty of them have left to join the Red Army or work in other places, making up 79 percent. The total number of young and adult men (between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five) in Upper Caixi is 554 people. Four hundred and eighty-five of them have left to join the Red Army or work in other places, making up 88 percent. The total number of young and adult men in Lower Caixi is 756 people. Five hundred and twenty-six of them have left to join the Red Army or work in other places, making up 70 percent. The expansion of the Red Army in such

large numbers is certainly impossible to accomplish if the problem is not thoroughly resolved, starting from the economy and production. Only when political mobilization is accompanied by economic mobilization can there be a wave of enthusiasm to expand the Red Army and successful results such as those seen in Changgang, Upper Caixi, and Lower Caixi.

## **Economic Life**

### ***1. The Question of Labor Power***

Upper Caixi: Of the total population of 2,318 (at the time of the uprising), 554 are male laborers (between the ages of 16 and 55, same as below) and 581 are female laborers. Four hundred nineteen of them are in the Red Army and 88 of them have been assigned to work in other places (66 men, 22 women). Of the 554 men with labor power who are between the ages of 16 and 55, 485 have gone either to the Red Army or to work elsewhere (419 plus 66); only 69 of them remain in the villages. In relation to the 559 women laborers (581 minus 22), men make up only 11 percent of the total labor force. There are 358 households in the whole township that are families of Red Army soldiers.

Lower Caixi: Of the total population of 2,610, the combined number of men and women with labor power is 1,207 (765 males, 442 females). Four hundred and forty-two of them have become Red Army soldiers and 98 of them have been transferred to work elsewhere (91 men, 7 women). Of the 765 men with labor power, a total of 533 have left to join the Red Army or to work elsewhere and only 232 remain in the township. In relation to the 435 female laborers (442 minus 7), men also make up only 35 percent of the total labor force. There are 355 households in the whole township that are families of Red Army soldiers.

For this reason, cultivation is mainly done by women. In Upper Caixi this year there are approximately three hundred women who can drive oxen and more than sixty who can plow the fields. Before the uprising only one tenth, or around thirty of these three hundred women could drive oxen. This is the result of years of effort.

At the same time, the "older comrades" are in good spirits, and they are the ones doing most of the work in opening up the mountains. Some of them can even take part in plowing and harvesting. Children take part in production as well. For these reasons, production is developing. In addition to the participation of women, older people, and children in production, the development of production also depends upon coordinated redistribution of labor power. Within a particular village, households with extra labor power assist those with insufficient labor power. Within a given township, villages with a surplus help those with a shortage. Within a district, townships with a surplus help those with insufficiency. In this way, the work with regard to physical labor is done by redistributing labor power with the district as a unit. Party and Youth League

members also do "[Communist] Saturdays."<sup>2</sup> Production has thereby been even further developed.

The main method of redistributing labor power or rearranging the labor force is through labor cooperatives and farming teams. Their tasks are to help families of Red Army soldiers and to provide mutual assistance among the masses.

Helping Red Army soldiers' families: Bringing food (not prepared dishes) and farm implements, also when cultivating or harvesting.

Mutual assistance among the masses: Wages are fixed at 2 *mao* a day, the same for men and women, busy and slack periods. This has been the practice since 1930. Wages are 1.5 *mao* a day for Red Army family members helping other Red Army families. It is 2 *mao* a day for Red Army family members helping the masses. Wages are not paid to members of the masses for helping family members of Red Army soldiers.

Labor cooperatives take the whole situation into account and plan accordingly. A township's labor cooperative committee consists of five people, with the head doing the planning for the township. Each of the four villages has a committee member who does the planning for the village. All requests for laborers must be made through the village's committee member and may not be done privately, as doing so would create confusion in the redistribution of labor power. Wages may be determined by the "employer" and "employee" themselves, without going through committee members.

The labor cooperative in this township was founded in 1931. This is where the "labor mutual aid associations" now operating throughout the soviet areas originated.

Committee members have on hand a notebook in which to record those who have labor power, those who do not have labor power, and those who have insufficient labor power. When someone makes a request for laborers, they may be assigned immediately. If there is missing information, the farming team detachment leader should be consulted. (Each village has a detachment. Five people make up a small group; two small groups, or ten people, make up a squad; and a detachment consists of three or four squads.) Brigade leaders have notebooks on hand as well. "Advocate merging farming teams with labor cooperatives."

Conditions of production: After the uprising (1929 to 1931), production declined by approximately 20 percent. In 1932, it recovered by 10 percent. This year (1933) there has been a 20 percent increase as compared with last year (for miscellaneous crops such as sweet potatoes, beans, taro, potatoes, and so on, there has actually been a 50 percent increase from last year), or 10 percent more than before the uprising. After the uprising, a lot of fields in the whole area lay

2. This refers to volunteer labor done to assist families of Red Army soldiers, poor peasants, and farm laborers, and to cultivate the Red Army's public plots. The practice was modeled on that of the Soviet régime of Lenin's day.

waste. A small portion of these were cultivated last year. This year much was cultivated, more than 1,300 *Dan*. Even more hillsides were opened up than flat fields, the ratio of hillsides to fields being three to one. Because all the fields had been cultivated, they started opening up the hillsides. There is no field in which miscellaneous grains have not been planted. Sweet potato has been planted in all fields where it can be grown. Opening up the hillsides and mountains has reached the point where women comrades have started "vying with each other," each one wanting to take part in the work. This competition has had great impact. Before the uprising, food supply in the whole area was far from adequate (in addition to which many people were making noodles from bean and sweet potato starch). Last year it was adequate, and this year there is actually a surplus. Now there is no one in the whole area making starch noodles and fried dough,<sup>3</sup> and no one distilling liquor.

## 2. Consumer Cooperatives

There are fourteen consumer cooperatives in the eight townships of the district.

Two in Upper Caixi:

One cooking oil, salt, and meat cooperative: Original total stock value was 74 *yuan*. Later increased to 185 *yuan*, at 5 *jiao* a share. Set up in October 1930. Dividends were distributed once in July 1933, 5 *jiao* for each share. There is one full-time administrative staff member. Two people help out on market fair days.

One yard goods cooperative: Original total stock value was 144 *yuan*. Later increased to 255 *yuan*, 1 *yuan* a share. Set up at the same time as the previous one. Dividends were distributed once in September 1933, 1 *yuan* for each share. Two full-time staff members. One helper on market fair days.

Three in Lower Caixi:

One yard goods cooperative: Original total stock value was 120 *yuan*. Later increased to 240 *yuan* at 1 *yuan* per share. Set up in January 1930. Dividends were distributed once in February 1932, 1 *yuan* per share. Two full-time staff members.

One cooking oil, salt, and meat cooperative: Original total stock value was 35 *yuan*. Later increased to 157 *yuan* at 5 *jiao* per share. Set up in October 1929. Dividends were distributed once in March 1933, 5 *jiao* per share. Two full-time staff members. One helper during market fair days.

One bean curd, candy, and pork cooperative: Original total stock value was 125 *yuan*. Later increased to 180 *yuan* at 5 *jiao* per share. Set up in January 1931. Dividends were distributed in February 1933, 5 *jiao* per share. Three full-time administrative staff members.

Each month the cooperatives' accounts are checked twice (return home for a

3. The *Mao Zedong ji* text, p. 186, has here the Chinese term *guozi*, meaning "fried dough." The 1982 Beijing edition has instead *banzi*, normally signifying "stick" or "board," which presumably refers in this context to a piece of dough fried hard.

meal after the books are checked) and a full membership meeting is held once (no meal). Every three months at the membership meeting there is a reelection of administrative staff. Those who are transferred to work in *xian*- or district-level cooperatives, those in their prime who become Red Army soldiers (to be replaced by slightly older people), and those who are not reelected are all replaced immediately. In fact, however, more continue to serve and fewer are transferred or replaced. Only family members of Red Army soldiers who are having difficulties may buy on credit, for one market period, two market periods, or at most three market periods (one market period is five days). When repaying, rice, beans, and so on are acceptable. Debts not repaid by the market period are to be collected in full during July and October each year.

In Upper Caixi, 60 percent of all households have joined the consumer cooperatives. The figure in Lower Caixi is 90 percent.

When there is a shortage of goods, family members of Red Army soldiers buy first, then members of cooperatives, and then nonmembers.

As for price, family members of Red Army soldiers (with proper identification) get 5 percent off the market price. Members of cooperatives get no discount. The same applies to family members of Red Army soldiers coming to market from other townships or even other districts. There are also Red Army family members from Jiuxian, Nanyang, Guanzhuang, and other districts who come to buy. "Cooperatives are Number One"—public opinion.

As for private shops selling "nonlocal goods," all have died out in the district (gradually diminishing to this point) except for a pharmacy run by a man from Jiangxi. Only on market fair days are there a few private individuals peddling salt, but there are still private people selling native products such as bean-curd and so on.

### 3. Grain Cooperative

Originally called the Bureau of Grain Redistribution, set up starting in 1930 by collecting money for shares from the masses. The collection was not a general one; rather, relatively well-off families were solicited at 1 *yuan* per share in big foreign dollars. Each township organized one bureau of grain redistribution. There were eight bureaus in the whole district, with shares worth a total of 1,810 *yuan*.

Method of redistribution: Buying grain from the masses every year taking 2 *sheng* less than when bought by a private individual. For example, if a private buyer gets 1 *dou* 7 *sheng* per *yuan*, the bureau of redistribution will take only 1 *dou* 5 *sheng*. When selling, sell first to Red Army families and then to the masses who are undergoing hardship. Whether or not the member of the masses in question is undergoing hardship, however, must be investigated and approved by the township's conference of deputies. When selling, too, the price is not the current market price, but rather the purchase price with a slight adjustment for



consumption and loss. For example, if it was purchased at 1 *yuan* for 1 *dou* and 5 *sheng*, it would be sold at 1 *yuan* for 1 *dou* and 4.5 *sheng*, the 0.5 *sheng* being subtracted as loss. Family members of Red Army soldiers who have no money and the masses who are facing extreme hardship may borrow grain and return it in full after harvesting the crops, with no interest. Every year when the work of grain purchasing and grain selling is finished, the township soviet informs the masses, selects representatives, settles accounts with those in charge of the Bureau of Grain Redistribution, and issues a public notice. Every year after the autumn harvest the grain is collected and measured into the granary, which is sealed with a long paper strip issued by the township soviet. In spring and summer, it is not fixed whether grain will be available for sale once or twice, but rather to be decided by the masses. Whenever the masses have a need, the granary will be opened for sales. Generally speaking, the time for bringing out the grain every year is during the month of March, when fields are being plowed, and during the month of May, when the new crop is still in the blade and the old crop has been consumed.

In February of this year, the name was changed to the grain cooperative, but the organizational structure remained as before. Ever since the economic construction movement began this year, the grain cooperatives in all townships have expanded. Take the grain cooperative in Upper Caixi, for example. Its original total stock value was 215 *yuan*. Now with an increase of 203 *yuan*, the total is 418 *yuan*. In Lower Caixi, the original total stock value was 137 *yuan*, and now with an increase of 200 *yuan* the total is 337 *yuan*. Of the five committee members at the redistribution bureau, the head is full-time and his expenses for meals are covered.

In May of this year, the two townships of Shangcun and Zhangyun (now incorporated into Tongxian District) suffered famine (the two townships are full of bamboo-covered mountains, each person received only a plot of land yielding a *Dan* of grain, and the paper-making enterprise failed), and the bureau of grain redistribution in every township throughout the district made concerted efforts to provide relief. The price of grain at the time was 1 *yuan* for 8 *sheng*, but the Bureau of Grain Redistribution made loans to these two townships at last autumn's price of 1 *yuan* for 1 *dou* and 8 *sheng*, to be repaid after the autumn [harvest] according to the actual amount of the loan. A total of 36 *Dan* were loaned in the entire district. In addition, miscellaneous crops (sweet potatoes and so on) and cash were donated to provide relief. As a result, no one starved. None of the other townships in Caixi District suffered famine this year, thanks to the effectiveness of the adjustments by the Bureau of Grain Redistribution.

Lower Caixi also has a "grain selling cooperative" with a total stock value of 130 *yuan* at 5 *jiao* a share. It was set up specially so that Red Army units passing by, travelers, organizational staff, and masses who are disaster victims could purchase grain. None of the five committee members works full-time. On market fair days there is one person in charge for half a day. Usually management is

undertaken by the consumer cooperative. Aside from taking care of the expenses for wages and food for the workers handling the grain, profits are not shared out. Very few of the ordinary masses come to buy grain from this cooperative, only one or two out of a hundred. The price follows the current market price. Ever since the masses pooled funds to set up this cooperative, the Red Army, disaster victims, and others no longer go house to house getting grain from the masses.

#### 4. *Draft Animal Cooperatives*

In the whole district, only Upper and Lower Caixi townships have organized such a cooperative. Each has three oxen.

Approximately 20 percent of the families in the two townships have no oxen. No method for resolving this problem has yet been devised.

#### 5. *Daily Life*

Rice: Before the uprising, poor peasants and farm laborers on average ate rice only three months out of the year, and ate miscellaneous grains for the remaining nine months. During the season when the new crop was still in the blade and the old was all consumed they had to eat "goat hoofs,"<sup>4</sup> or even chaff. Now they have rice for six months, which combined with miscellaneous grains for six months makes enough for the whole year. This area produces very little rice to begin with, so that half of the grain supply has to be from miscellaneous grains anyway, and the production of miscellaneous grains is greater than it was before. In terms of each meal, before the uprising one could not get enough to eat, but now one can. Moreover, aside from feeding themselves, people can sell to the Red Army, pay off their land taxes, purchase public bonds, and barter for oil and salt. All in all, then, the food situation has improved 100 percent (comparing rice for three months with rice for six months).

Meat: Before the uprising, the average annual per capita consumption of meat among poor peasants and farm laborers was around 1 *yuan* (in big foreign dollars). It is now 2 *yuan*, an increase of 100 percent. Before the uprising only sixty families in a hundred raised pigs; now ninety-five out of a hundred families are raising pigs.

Clothing: Before the uprising each person on average could have one outfit of a shirt and trousers made every two years. Since the uprising, each person on average can have an outfit and a half made every year, which makes a 200 percent increase. This year the situation has changed again. Because of the blockade, cloth is expensive and each person on average can have only half an outfit made [per year], which restores the situation before the uprising. Before

4. The rhizome of a kind of grass which grows wild in the hills, so called because in form it resembles a goat's hoof. It was commonly used to allay hunger in times of famine.

the uprising an unlined outfit cost 18 *mao* (15 *mao* for material and 3 *mao* for labor). Last year an outfit cost 21 *mao* (17 *mao* for material and 4 *mao* for labor), equal to 1.5 *yuan* in big foreign dollars. This year an outfit costs 34 *mao* (30 *mao* for material and 4 *mao* for labor), equal to 2.4 *yuan* in big foreign dollars.<sup>5</sup> The counterrevolutionaries have driven up the price of our clothing to such an extent!

Salt: Before the uprising, the average monthly per capita consumption of salt was 1 *jin*. In November of this year, the monthly per capita consumption of salt is only 3 *liang* 2 *qian*. In other words, a family of five that consumed 5 *jin* of salt a month before the uprising consumed only 1 *jin* this November. Unless we overthrow the Guomindang there will be no salt to eat!

Oil: Before the uprising the average monthly per capita consumption of edible oil (wood-oil from Jiangxi and local lard) was 6 *liang*. Currently it has neither decreased nor increased. Because less wood-oil is coming from Jiangxi, however, what the masses are consuming is mostly lard.

## 6. Prices

Grain—before the uprising, 10 *yuan* per *Dan* (100 *jin*); in 1929, 2 *yuan* 5 *jiao*; in 1930, 5 *yuan*; in 1931, 6 *yuan* 2 *jiao*; in 1933, 10 *yuan* in May and 5 *yuan* in October.

Pork—before the uprising, 1 *yuan* for 2.5 *jin*, bone-in. Currently, still 1 *yuan* for 2.5 *jin*, boneless.

Fish—because of the blockade after the uprising, no fish fry have come from Jiujiang (via Wuping *xian*), the ponds are empty, and there is no market.

Chicken—same price before and after [the uprising], 8 *mao* per *jin*.

Duck—more or less the same before and after, 4 *mao* per *jin*.

Chicken eggs—more or less the same before and after, 1 *mao* buys three.

Duck eggs—more or less the same before and after, 1 *mao* buys three.

Lard—same price as for pork.

Lime—not used in the fields, rather for making paper. More or less the same before and after [the uprising], 1 *yuan* per *Dan* (80 *jin*).

Beans—before the uprising, each *Dan* (8 *dou*) was 10 *yuan*; in 1932, it was 20 *yuan*; this year it is 8 *yuan*.

Tobacco—before the uprising 1 *mao* bought 2 *liang*; now 1 *mao* buys 1 *liang* 6 *qian*.

Tea—more or less the same before and after, 1 *yuan* for 3.5 *jin*.

Vegetable Oil—before the uprising, 1 *yuan* for 3.5 *jin*; this spring, 2.5 *jin*; this winter, 1 *jin* 13 *liang*.

Paper—Before the uprising, a *qiu* (40 *jin*) of rough paper went for 4 *yuan* 5

5. In other words, one big foreign dollar was worth approximately 1.4 dollars in the fractional currency. For Mao's explicit comments on this relationship in Caixi, see below, the section of this investigation on prices.

*jiao*; in 1931, it was 6 *yuan*; in 1932, it was 5 *yuan*; in 1933, it was 1 *yuan* 5 *jiao*, so nobody makes paper anymore.

Lumber—cannot be shipped, so there is no market. Paper and lumber have been this area's largest exports, but today they have completely failed. The hateful Guomindang blockade!

Wood-oil—Before the uprising, 1 *yuan* bought 3.5 *jin* of wood-oil. No more of it is coming now, so people can only use lard.

Iron—price has doubled since before the uprising.

Cloth—Before the uprising, a bolt (2 *zhang* 3 *chi*) of cotton cloth went for 1 *yuan*. In 1932, a bolt went for 1 *yuan* 4 *mao*. This year a bolt is 2 *yuan* 2 *mao*.

Salt—Before the uprising, 1 *yuan* bought 10 *jin*. From 1930 to the spring of 1932, it still bought 10 *jin*. In the summer of that year, the price rose to [1 *yuan* for] 7 *jin*. In 1933, 1 *yuan* would buy a *jin*, but in November, 1 *yuan* would buy only 14 *liang*. Breaking the blockade is a tremendous problem.

Kerosene—Before the uprising, 50 percent of the households burned kerosene, and 1 *yuan* would buy 7 *jin* 14 *liang*. In 1933, 1 *yuan* would buy only 1 *jin* 5 *liang*. For this reason, no one burns it anymore, except in institutional offices. Everyone is burning the "pine torch" instead.

Firewood—Before the uprising, 1 *jin* cost 2 coppers. Last year it was 3 coppers, and this year it goes for 5 to 9 coppers.

*Maoyang*—the same before and after [the uprising]. Each *mao* is worth 16 coppers.

Silver dollars—*zayang* 13.5 *mao*, *guangyang* 14 *mao*, and the same with soviet paper [currency].<sup>6</sup> Now there is nothing but soviet paper currency and silver dollars cannot be seen anywhere. Once again it's the Guomindang making trouble!

6. As explained in the "Note on Sources and Conventions" at the beginning of this volume, and illustrated by the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations in Volume III, several different types of currency coexisted in the China of the 1930s. There were, on the one hand, silver coins and banknotes in the amount of one *yuan* or "dollar," commonly referred to as *dayang* or "big foreign [dollars]." There were also fractional silver coins and notes for 0.1 or 0.2 dollars, generally called *xiaoyang* or "small foreign [dollars]," which were worth less than their face value. The exchange rate between these two units is mentioned several times in the materials translated above, but this is Mao's only explicit discussion of the issue. Here he refers to the "small dollars" by the alternative name of *maoyang*, *mao* being the common term for ten cents or 0.1 dollars. As for the silver or "big" dollars, the terms *zayang* (miscellaneous foreign [dollars]) and *guangyang* (bright foreign [dollars]) are commonly regarded as synonymous, but apparently in Caixi District the former commanded a lower price in *mao* than the latter, to which the soviet paper currency was equivalent. If one "big" dollar was worth 13.5 or 14 one-*mao* coins, and each such coin was worth 16 of the copper coins with a face value of one "cent" or 0.01 dollars, the dollar was worth about 220 coppers. Such was roughly the level of depreciation of copper against silver at this time. (The coppers [*songpian*] referred to here should not be confused with the traditional copper "cash" [*wen*], frequently mentioned in this volume, which were of much lesser value.)

### 7. *The Economy and Public Bonds*

In the newly demarcated Caixi District, which has eight townships, among the 2,188 households with a total population of 8,782, 13,600 *yuan* worth of public bonds have been sold. There are still approximately 1,000 *yuan* worth that remain to be sold.

In Upper Caixi, which has 513 households with a population of 2,318, 4,000 *yuan* [worth of bonds] have been sold.

In Lower Caixi, which has 503 households with a population of 2610, 4,146 *yuan* [worth of bonds] have been sold.

Methods:

1. Mobilization at rallies of Party and Youth League members.
2. Mobilization at separate meetings of all organizations.
3. Mobilization at township soviet deputies' assemblies.
4. A mass rally held at the village level for the express purpose of conducting propaganda, without making sales.
5. A mass rally held at the township level where bonds were sold. Each of the two townships sold more than 1,500 *yuan* worth, but they were not sold out.
6. Household-by-household propaganda conducted by township representatives, the Committee for Promoting the Sale of Public Bonds (three people from each village), and the propaganda team (organized by the township, five people from each village).
7. At the voters' meeting, more than 600 *yuan* [worth] were sold in Upper Caixi and over 1,600 *yuan* were sold in Lower Caixi. To date, Upper Caixi has sold more than 2,000 *yuan* and over 1,000 *yuan* are left, and Lower Caixi has sold more than 3,000 *yuan* and approximately 900 *yuan* are left.
8. Subsequently, through door-to-door encouragement by deputies, sales promotion committee members, and the propaganda teams, the bonds were sold out and the amounts were acknowledged. But not all the public bonds have been received as yet.

Purchase was completely voluntary; no coercion was used. Not a single meeting took place in which economic construction was not discussed. Because of the establishment of the *xian* trade bureau there has been salt and cloth to buy, and the masses have realized even more the importance of the economy and public bonds.

We reiterate that only when economic construction is coordinated with political mobilization can a stronger wave of enthusiasm be created for expanding the Red Army and the broad masses be inspired to go to the front lines. In Caixi Township, even after young and middle-aged men left in droves to join the Red Army or to work elsewhere, production levels exceeded by 10 percent those of before the uprising. Having reclaimed all wasteland, they are opening up the mountains as well, and no plot of arable land remains unsown. The lives of the masses have been very greatly improved.

The labor cooperative (elsewhere called the labor mutual aid association), the consumer cooperative, and the grain cooperative have organized the economic life of the masses in the entire township, so that the economy has reached a very high level of organization and become the first glorious model for the entire Soviet Area. Such a great achievement on the economic front has inspired all the masses and caused the broad masses to take up arms and rush to the front lines for the defense and development of the Soviet Area without any worries and without turning back. Of the total population of 4,928 people in the two townships, 1,018 men (485 from Upper Caixi and 533 from Lower Caixi) have gone away to join the Red Army or to work, and 29 women have gone elsewhere to work. This ironclad evidence has afforded us a powerful weapon with which to smash all the opportunists' nonsensical statements, such as that economic construction is impossible during civil war, that the lives of the masses in the Soviet Area have seen no improvement, that the masses do not wish to join the Red Army, or that if the Red Army is expanded there will be no one to engage in production. We solemnly introduce to the entire peasant and worker masses the glorious achievements of Changgang Township, Caixi Township, and Shishui Township, and we call upon the thousands of townships throughout the Soviet Area to learn together from these townships, so that the several thousand townships may all become, like Changgang, Caixi, and Shishui, a solid advancing front striving for victory all over China.

## Culture and Education

### *Upper Caixi*

Daytime schools: a total of four, all under one principal, each with one teacher. The cost of the teacher's meals is covered by taking up a collection among the masses, calculated at 1 *jiao* 3 *fen* per person. There is a total of 141 pupils, most of whom are between the ages of six and ten. Most of those between the ages of eleven and fourteen go to the district soviet compulsory education physical labor school (formerly a training school for cadres who work with children). The whole township has more than 600 children between the ages of one and fifteen, of whom 323 are between the ages of six and fifteen. Of this number, 141 go to daytime schools, 37 go to the district soviet labor school, and there remain 145 who do not go to school.

Evening schools: a total of four, no principal. The teaching positions are held concurrently by the teachers at the daytime schools. There is a total of more than 120 students, most of whom are women. The monthly administration expense for each school, 5 *jiao*, is covered by funds collected from the masses.

Literacy classes: a total of 24 groups, 10 people in each group, a total of 240 people. Every five days the evening school teacher assigns five new characters to recognize. Each group has a group leader, and there are both men and women.

Those who cannot attend evening school because of old age, work, or being tied down by children are able to enter the literacy class.

Newspaper-reading group: located in the club, with one person in charge. On market fair days (once every five days), such publications as *Struggle* and *Red China*, "circulars" [from higher organs], "class analyses," and so on<sup>7</sup> are read aloud. At least fifty or sixty people are in the audience every time, and sometimes there are as many as eighty or ninety.

Character-learning boards: a total of six, placed at various intersections.

Club: one. Of the more than fifty people working at the club, more than thirty belong to the new performing troupe.

Wall-newspapers: four locations, one in each village, outside the gate of the daytime school. Most of the articles are written by the pupils and teachers; not more than one-tenth are written by the masses.

### *Lower Caixi*

Daytime schools: a total of five, all under one principal, with one teacher in each school. The teacher's food expenses are handled as in the case of Upper Caixi. There is a total of more than 150 pupils, and more than 60 go to the district school, making a total of more than 210.

Evening schools: a total of eight, no principal. Five of the teachers serve concurrently as teachers in the daytime schools, and three of them are from elsewhere.

There is an average of approximately 30 students in each school and a total of 240. The monthly administration fee is 5 *jiao*.

Club: one, with more than fifty staff members.

Literacy classes: a total of 26 groups, with a total of 260 students. The method of learning characters is the same as in Upper Caixi.

Character-learning boards: a total of five.

Wall-newspapers: five locations.

Newspaper-reading group: one location, which is also held every five days on market fair days.

7. *Struggle* (*Douzhen*) and *Red China* (*Hongse zhonghua*) were important Party periodicals that appear frequently among the sources for the texts in this volume. "Class analyses" undoubtedly refers to the important directive of October 10, 1933, "How to Analyze Classes," translated above, as well as to other materials on the same topic.

# *On The Problem of Deserters from the Red Army*

*Order No. 25 of the Central Executive Committee*

(December 15, 1933)

Desertion is a ferocious enemy of the Red Army and the revolutionary war; the struggle against desertion is an important effort to safeguard the combat capabilities of the Red Army. In the past, there were no unified methods for punishing deserters. For this reason, the present order is hereby promulgated:

1. Deserters who run away with their guns are to be shot on the spot upon capture.

2. Organizers of desertion (such as those who forge official seals and travel passes), and ringleaders of desertion by entire squads, platoons, or companies, are to be tried publicly and shot after capture, as befits such leading elements.

3. Those who have deserted several times, start rumors, and sabotage the Red Army and the movement of returning to the Red Army are to be sent after capture to a court of law, to be sentenced to punishments ranging from jail terms to death by firing squad.

4. All governments should strengthen propaganda and encouragement for those who run away individually because of inadequate political consciousness, and organize work for providing favorable treatment to their families, to induce them to return to their units of their own accord. Measures such as arrest and imprisonment must absolutely not be taken against them. If anyone arrests or imprisons such individuals, he will be found guilty of violating soviet laws.

5. As for deserters who stubbornly refuse to return to their units even after propaganda and persuasion, the government should, provided that it receives the support of the masses, make them compensate the state for its expenditure (uniforms and blankets), and the masses for their losses (labor power donated to benefit their families), and also deprive them of their voting rights.

6. Deserters must absolutely not be allowed to be hired as workers or employees of the various organs, units, and organizations in the rear. Leaders of units who hire deserters should be punished by demotion, dismissal, or even confinement.

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 136, December 20, 1933. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 121-22.



7. All those who refuse to carry out this order shall be found guilty of assisting deserters and of sabotaging the Red Army.

8. This order goes into effect from the day of its issuance.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
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Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao
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# *On Punishing Acts of Embezzlement and Waste*

## *Order No. 26 of the Central Executive Committee*

(December 15, 1933)

In order to punish severely acts of embezzlement and waste, the following methods of punishment are hereby stipulated:

1. All those employees of soviet organs, state-owned enterprises, and public bodies who use their positions to embezzle public funds for private gain will be dealt with according to the following provisions:

a. Those who embezzle more than 500 *yuan* of public funds will be sentenced to death.

b. Those who embezzle more than 300 but less than 500 *yuan* of public funds will be sentenced to two to five years in prison.

c. Those who embezzle more than 100 but less than 300 *yuan* of public funds will be sentenced to from six months to two years in prison.

d. Those who embezzle less than 100 *yuan* of public funds will be sentenced to less than six months of forced labor.

2. Anyone who has committed crimes covered by any one of the provisions of Article 1 will, in addition to the punishment laid down by the various provisions of Article 1, suffer the confiscation of all or part of his property, and must repay in full the amount of public funds he has embezzled.

3. Anyone who uses public funds for private gain will be deemed guilty of the crime of embezzlement and will be punished according to Articles 1 and 2.

4. Employees of soviet organs, state-owned enterprises, and public bodies who, because of their negligence and waste of public funds, cause the state financial losses will, depending on the degree of the waste, be punished by warnings, dismissal, or imprisonment of from one month to three years.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 140, January 4, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 123-24.

# ***The First Telegram from the Interim Central Government to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army<sup>1</sup>***

(December 20, 1933)

To the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the officers and soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army:

It is more than a month since representatives of the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army concluded, with your representatives, the draft agreement on opposing Japan and Chiang Kaishek. To date, however, we have not yet seen vigorous actions against Japan and Chiang on your part, or any concrete practical efforts to mobilize the masses for struggle and arm the popular masses to fight Japan and Chiang. On the other hand, Chiang Kaishek has already dispatched three columns to attack Fuzhou and Yanping; Japanese imperialism has also completed preparations already for occupying Fuzhou and Xiamen in response to Chiang Kaishek's military action. You and the broad popular masses of Fujian are in extreme danger. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army solemnly inform you that any passivity, hesitation, and indecision in face of this peril is an enormous crime against the Chinese revolution. Therefore, the Central Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army demand that, in conformity with the basic principles laid down in our draft agreement on opposing Japan and Chiang, you immediately take decisive action, concentrate all your armed forces, and launch a decisive battle against Chiang at once. At the same time, you must most resolutely mobilize and arm the broad popular masses in their struggle, organize a genuine people's revolutionary army and volunteer army, and truly give the

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This telegram was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 149, February 14, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 211–12, where it is reproduced from this source.

1. Although this is presented as the "first telegram" to the Fujian rebels, negotiations had, in fact, been going on between them and the Soviet authorities in Ruijin since September and October, and a preliminary agreement had been signed on October 26, 1933. (The text of this document, which is referred to below, can be found in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 605–6.) For further details, see above, the Introduction to this volume.

people democratic rights of expression, publishing, assembly, and association, so as to launch a mass struggle against Japan and Chiang. We believe that only by relying on the power of the popular masses in their millions can we win final victory. We, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, are prepared to unite with you at any time and to sign a joint military agreement with you to oppose and overthrow our common enemies—the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kaishek's Guomindang government in Nanjing. We hope you will quickly inform us of your decision.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De







## ***Second Telegram from the Interim Central Government to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the People's Revolutionary Army***

(January 13, 1934)

Li, Chen, Jiang, and the members of the People's Government:<sup>1</sup>

In light of the current situation, Fuzhou finds itself on the brink of crisis and the People's Government is already in peril. The Central Soviet Government, in accordance with the previous bilateral agreements, ventures, in the spirit of the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang united front, to make the following urgent recommendations to your esteemed government:

1. The People's Government should immediately carry out the promises made in its manifesto and in the agreement respecting the democratic rights of the people.

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This telegram was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 149, February 14, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 213–14, where it is reproduced from this source.

1. Regarding the Fujian rebellion, see the Introduction to this volume, and also the previous text, the "First Telegram to the People's Revolutionary Government" of December 20, 1933. Li is Li Jishen (1886–1959), *zi* Renchao, a native of Jiangsu. After occupying important military and political posts during the Northern Expedition, he came into conflict with Chiang Kaishek in 1929 and was detained until 1931. In 1933, he left Guangzhou for Hong Kong, and although he was made titular head of the Fujian government in November 1933, he was only a figurehead. In January 1934, he once again fled to Hong Kong. Chen is Chen Mingshu (1890–1965), *zi* Zhenru, a native of Guangdong. He received a military education, participated in the 1911 Revolution, and played an important role in the Northern Expedition. From 1929 to 1931, he was governor of Guangdong and in 1931 he was named commander-in-chief of the anti-Communist forces in Jiangxi, thus receiving direct control of the Nineteenth Route Army. Beginning in late 1931, he began organizing the Social Democratic Party, and in 1933, after making contact with many of Chiang Kaishek's critics, he launched the Fujian rebellion, of which he was the prime mover. Jiang Guangnai (1888–1967), *zi* Jingran, was a native of Guangdong. From 1923 to 1931 he served frequently under Chen Mingshu, and in 1930 he became the commander-in-chief of the Nineteenth Route Army, and thereafter, as illustrated by many of the texts in this volume, he participated in the campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Communists. In November 1933, he joined his former commander in launching the Fujian rebellion.



2. The People's Government should immediately arm the masses in Fuzhou and its surrounding areas, as well as in the various areas of Quan[zhou]-Zhang[zhou]; it should aid and support the broad masses in participating in the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang united front, so as to defend the Fuzhou and Quan[zhou]-Zhang[zhou] area.

3. Aid and support the masses in immediately organizing combat groups to engage in the anti-Japanese, anti-Chiang struggle. The development of such bodies should not be obstructed or prohibited under the pretext of the tense military situation.

4. Practical support should be given to mass armed organizations in the rear of Chiang and the enemy (such as various locations along the coast in Fujian and Zhejiang), and to activity directed against Japan and Chiang.

5. All those elements who are getting ready to surrender to Chiang Kaishek or seek protection from the imperialists should be resolutely purged from our own ranks.

6. Propaganda should be directed toward all officers and soldiers of the Nineteenth Route Army to the effect that the only way to fight Chiang and the Japanese is by cooperating with the Soviets and the Red Army to the end, and by adopting every effective measure and closely coordinated military actions.

Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese imperialists have obviously already begun to coordinate their actions, and have as their common objective the destruction of the Nineteenth Route Army. If your esteemed government genuinely desires to put into practice the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang propositions, the suggestions we have made above are the only way to prevent the current People's Government and the Nineteenth Route Army from falling into danger; they are also the final test as to whether or not your esteemed government is truly determined to fulfill the promises made in the manifesto and in the agreement for which it has taken responsibility. You must know that if an armed anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang front of the popular masses can really be established, even if Fuzhou were to fall, the rule of Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese imperialists could not long survive in peace, and there can be no doubt that this united front will progress daily in the whole country. Moreover, if your esteemed government is indeed willing to arm the popular masses and support the people of Fujian and those in Fuzhou first of all, in self-defense, then the current situation will unfold in a new direction, and Fuzhou may not be lost after all. The crucial moment is upon us. We hope that you will consider this matter and favor us with a response.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De

## ***Inscription on the Memorial to Red Army Martyrs'***

(January 15, 1934)

Many comrades have gloriously sacrificed their lives in the great battles against imperialism and for the agrarian revolution! The sacrifice of these comrades has demonstrated the indomitable heroism of the proletariat and laid the foundations of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Treading in the bloodstained footsteps of these comrades, the workers, peasants, and toiling masses of all China are marching forward to overthrow the rule of imperialism and the Guomindang, and fighting for the victory of the soviets throughout China.

Mao Zedong

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We have translated this inscription from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, p. 207.

1. This memorial was located in Ruijin.

# *To the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army and Volunteer Army*

(January 22, 1934)

To the dear comrades of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army and the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army:

The Second National Soviet Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, which is opening in Ruijin this month, expresses warm revolutionary salutations to you, the valiant fighters resisting Japan! The Congress expresses boundless sympathy to you for persistently waging a national revolutionary war against Japan. Since Japanese imperialism occupied Manchuria, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has already issued a proclamation declaring war on Japan and a mobilization order for military operations against Japan. Moreover, in a proclamation dated January [ ],<sup>1</sup> 1933, the soviets and the Red Army declared their willingness to enter into an operational agreement with any armed force to resist Japan and the Guomindang government on three conditions: a halt to attacks on the soviet areas and the Red Army, granting democratic rights to the people, and arming the popular masses to fight a national revolutionary war. The Guomindang government, however, in the face of the Japanese imperialist occupation of Manchuria and North China and the attacks on China from all the other imperialist powers, has adopted a consistent and thoroughgoing policy of nonresistance. Capitulating to imperialism, it has been suppressing the anti-imperialist movement of the popular masses, slaughtering or arresting the popular masses who oppose imperialism, and disarming members of the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army. It has mustered up the armies and resources of all China for its Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the soviet areas and the Red Army, in order to prevent the soviets and the Red Army from joining with you in a common fight against Japan and all the other imperialist powers, thus willingly paving the way for the complete carving up of China by imperialism. The Congress maintains that, to win independence and freedom for the Chinese nation

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This text was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, Special Issue no. 6, February 1, 1934, on the Second National Soviet Congress. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 203–4, where it is reproduced from this source.

1. For some reason, a blank space is left here for the day of the month in the text as published in *Hongse zhonghua* and reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*. The proclamation in question is translated above, and the correct date is January 17, 1933.

and complete victory in the national revolutionary war, it is necessary to overthrow the rule of the Guomindang government, which is selling out the national interests and humiliating the Chinese people. On behalf of the tens of millions of revolutionary masses and the Red Army in the soviet areas as well as the White areas, the Congress welcomes the delegates the People's Revolutionary Army has sent to the Congress and hails the conclusion of the agreement for joint military operations with the Central Soviet Government and the Red Army. The Congress also proposes to all the anti-Japanese volunteers to conclude, on the three conditions specified in the proclamation of the Central Soviet Government issued on January [ ], 1933, an operational agreement against Japan and the Guomindang. The Congress hopes that you will persist in the national revolutionary war against Japan, arm the popular masses even more widely, purge and expel the irresolute leaders who capitulate to imperialism, confiscate the property of all the traitors who are selling out the country and use it for military purposes, and confiscate the land and property of the landlord class and distribute them among the workers and peasants, thus combining the national revolutionary war with the agrarian revolution. The Congress is convinced that the Chinese soviet movement will definitely and swiftly smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of imperialism and the Guomindang, extend itself to the key cities, and achieve a higher level of cooperation with your actions, so that Japanese and all other imperialists will be completely driven out of China and a new free and independent Soviet China will be established. Long live the national liberation of China! Long live the new Soviet China!

Second National Soviet  
Congress Chairman

Mao Zedong

## *Solemn Opening Remarks*

### *Transcript of Chairman Mao's Remarks at the Second National Soviet Congress*

(January 22, 1934)

Comrades! On behalf of the Central Executive Committee, I hereby declare the Second National Soviet Congress in session. (Music)

Comrades! Today is the opening day of the Second National Soviet Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. On behalf of the Central Executive Committee, I offer a revolutionary salute to all the deputies.

Comrades! It has been two years and two months since the first National Soviet Congress. In the past two years, the course of events in the whole country has fully manifested and demonstrated the further wavering and collapse of the counterrevolutionary ruling class, and the enormous progress of the soviet movement and of the revolutionary struggle in the whole country.

China is a country that has suffered from the oppression and invasion of imperialism; it is a country victimized by the slaughter, oppression, and enslavement of the landlords, the bourgeoisie, and the Guomindang government. The vast territory of the entire country has been handed over to the imperialists by the Guomindang, placing the whole of China under the threat of imperialist partition and joint control, and leading China to the brink of extinction. Under these circumstances, the workers, peasants, and toiling masses of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, have united, armed themselves, and established their own government and state. Our first All-Soviet Congress declared the establishment of this state, which is our Chinese Soviet Republic. Since then throughout China the two régimes have stood in extremely sharp opposition to each other.

The development of the revolution during the past two years has caused the revolutionary situation throughout the country to progress further. The broad masses of the workers and peasants have united under the banner of the soviets to attack our enemy, the imperialist Guomindang. We have won tremendously great victories in these past two years. The imperialist Guomindang

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We have translated this document from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 215–17, where it is reproduced from *Hongse Zhonghua*, Special Issue no. 2, January 24, 1934, on the Second National Soviet Congress.

has begun to tremble before our victories. After three successive campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression," they have organized the Fourth, and even the Fifth, "Encirclement and Suppression." But we smashed the four "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns of the enemy, and have won an initial victory in crushing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." At present we are in the middle of fighting the decisive battle against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"; we are at the most critical moment.

During the past two years, the Red Army has achieved great victories in a bloody struggle throughout the whole country. During this period, many of our comrades have shed their last drop of blood and gloriously laid down their lives for the soviets. Many were slaughtered by the Guomindang while they were leading the revolutionary struggle in the areas controlled by the Guomindang, and in the White areas. These comrades include, among others, Huang Gongluc, Zhao Bosheng, Wei Baqun, Yun Daiying, Cai Hesen, Deng Zhongxia, Chen Yuandao, Lu Yi, Shen Zemin, Wang Liang, Hu Alin, Zhang Xilong, Wu Gaoqun, and Pang Bie. They gloriously sacrificed themselves at the front, on various battlefronts, under the enemy's bullets and butcher knives. I propose that we observe three minutes of silence to express our grief and veneration for these comrades. (The deputies all rise and observe three minutes of silence.)

The task of the Second National Soviet Congress is thoroughly to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"; it is to spread the soviet movement to all of China; it is to oppose the vicious plot of the imperialists and the Guomindang to bring about China's downfall. Our Congress bears great responsibilities. Our Congress should call on the workers, peasants, and toiling masses of all the soviet areas, and of the whole of China, to struggle for the expansion of the Red Army to an iron army one million strong; it should call on the masses of all the soviet areas, and of the whole of China, to arm themselves, concentrate all their strength, smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," and strive for the greatest and most complete victory of the revolution, and for the victory of the revolution throughout China.

Our Congress is the supreme organ of political power for the whole country. It has enormous strength for solving these problems. We are convinced that it will certainly be able to solve these problems, and that it will grasp these problems and solve them completely. Our Congress will cause the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" to be smashed completely and the revolution to spread across the whole country, expand the map of the soviet to all areas ruled by the Guomindang, and erect red flags all over China. Let us raise our voices and shout:

Long Live the Second National Soviet Congress!

Long Live a New Soviet China! (Thunderous applause)

# ***Report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Second National Soviet Congress***

(January 24–25, 1934)

## **I. The Current Situation and the Victory of the Soviet Movement<sup>1</sup>**

Two whole years have passed since the convening of the First National Soviet Congress. Developments in the situation over the past two years have thoroughly demonstrated the further wavering and collapse of the rule of the imperialist Guomindang and the vigorous development and victory of the soviet movement.

The period we are in today is actually the period of the further intensification of the Chinese revolutionary situation as well as the transitional period for the whole world to enter into a new, second era of war and revolution.

The confrontation between the socialist world and the capitalist world has now become extremely acute. On the one hand, the socialist economy of the Soviet Union has achieved final consolidation. Its first five-year plan was completed within only four years, and last year the second five-year plan made great achievements in its first year. The phenomenon of unemployment has long since been eliminated in the Soviet Union, and the standard of living and cultural level of all the toiling masses have been dramatically raised. The Soviet Union's

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Our source for this report is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 219–82, where it is reproduced from the official record of the Congress put out in March 1934 by the Council of People's Commissar's of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Ruijin, Jiangxi. This version includes a prefatory summary of the report, which we have omitted as it adds nothing to our understanding of the document. The report also appears in a volume entitled *Zhiyou suweiai nenggou jiu Zhongguo* (Only the Soviets Can Save China), published in Moscow in 1934 by the Publishing House for Foreign Workers in the Soviet Union, which contains a preface by Kang Sheng, this report, and Mao's "Conclusions" on this report (see following text). The Moscow version appears to have been more carefully edited, but it also contains some changes and additions reflecting the point of view of the International. For this reason, we have taken the Jiangxi version, which is probably closer to Mao's own text, as the basis for our translation, but significant differences between the two versions are pointed out in the notes.

1. The Moscow version of the report begins with the salutation, "Comrades!" after this heading.

national defense has been greatly consolidated. With the support of the revolutionary masses of the whole world, the Soviet Union's policy of peace has met with success everywhere, and even the most obstinate American imperialists had no choice but to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The capitalist world, on the other hand, is something else entirely, where the economic panic has reached an extreme. Throughout the capitalist world production is at an unprecedented low and unemployed workers number in the tens of millions.<sup>2</sup> Capitalism's temporary stability has come to an end and its overall crisis has entered a new phase. The various imperialist countries are in a mad frenzy preparing for war. As a result of the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese imperialists, the contradictions among various imperialists and between the Japanese and U.S. imperialists in particular have developed further on a new basis. The imperialist bandit wars for redividing the world are an extremely grave menace to the people of the world. The imperialists, however, are trying to alleviate their internal contradictions for the time being and to find a way out by sacrificing the Soviet Union and China. Preparations for war against the Soviet Union have not stopped for a moment, and the war to carve up China and attack the Chinese revolution is already clearly and flagrantly under way.

Nevertheless, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the oppressed nations of the world is also growing and expanding under the impact of the successes of the socialist construction of the Soviet Union and the threat of imperialist economic panic and war. Fierce class struggle and national revolutions are under way in all capitalist countries, colonies, and semicolonies. The flames of war and revolution in the whole world are pressing toward us.

The Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution. The deepening of the national crisis, the overall collapse of the national economy,<sup>3</sup> and the victory of the soviet movement have further promoted the development of the Chinese revolutionary situation, pushing it to an especially prominent position in the world revolution.

The focus of the current political situation in China is the widespread civil war, the life-and-death struggle between revolution and counterrevolution, and the sharp confrontation between the soviet régime of the workers and peasants and the Guomindang régime of the landlords and bourgeoisie.

On the one hand, the Guomindang landlords and bourgeoisie have completely surrendered to the imperialists, guiding the imperialists in their occupation of China's vast territory, monopolizing all significant political and economic rights in China, leading the national economy to a complete collapse, and bringing unprecedented misery to the lives of the laboring masses of workers and peasants. They are taking away all freedoms from the revolutionary masses,

2. The Moscow version of the report omits the passage here that begins "where the economic panic..." and ends with "... number in the tens of millions."

3. Here the Moscow text has "Guomindang economy" instead of "national economy."



suppressing all revolutionary activities, and carrying out a mad fascist terror. Under the direction of the imperialists, they are organizing all reactionary forces in launching desperate attacks on the soviet areas and the Red Army. All of this has a single objective: to fuse the interests of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie with those of the imperialists and to lead China onto the road of total colonization.

On the other hand, the soviet régime calls together, organizes, and leads the revolutionary masses of the entire country in waging a resolute national-revolutionary war. It organizes and leads the Red Army and the masses in the struggle for the defense and expansion of the soviet areas. Resolute offensives are launched to destroy the imperialist Guomindang's repeated "Encirclement and Suppression." The counterrevolutionary attempts of all exploiters within the soviet areas are severely suppressed. All land is given to peasants and Red Army soldiers. The workers work an eight-hour day and earn higher wages. There is relief for unemployment and a social security system is in effect. Complete freedom of assembly, association, speech, publication, and strike are granted to all the revolutionary masses. The broad worker and peasant masses are drawn into the administration of their own state organs; only exploiters are excluded from participation. The economic life of the popular masses is organized to enable the masses to move from a position of suffering their fill of hunger and cold under the rule of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the past to a position that is not only completely free from hunger and cold, but improves day by day. With regard to organizing the cultural life of the masses, the broad masses that did not have any educational opportunities under the rule of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the past are advancing to a position of being able to raise their cultural standards day by day. All of this also has a single objective: to overthrow the rule of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the whole country, expel the imperialists from China, liberate hundreds of millions of popular masses from the oppression and exploitation of the rule of the imperialists and the Guomindang, block the road to colonialism that would be the destruction of China, and establish a free and independent Soviet China with territorial integrity.

The increasingly sharp polarization between the two régimes cannot but intensify the increasingly fierce life-and-death struggle between them. The present time is actually the historical period in which victory and defeat are about to be determined by the struggle between the two sides. The counterrevolutionary Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" is advancing against us on a large scale, following on after the defeat of the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression."<sup>4</sup> The historical task of the soviet régime is to call together, organize, and lead all the revolutionary popular masses of all soviet areas and the whole of China to participate in this great final struggle, to mobilize the broad masses of

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4. The Moscow version has here "sixth" in place of "fifth" and "fifth" in place of "fourth."

workers and peasants to join the Red Army, to strengthen the political education and military skills of the Red Army, to expand local armed forces and guerrilla troops, to promote guerrilla warfare widely, to enhance the soviet régime's concentrated and unified leadership of the Red Army in various soviet areas, to improve the speed and quality of the work of the soviet régimes in all fields, to strengthen the work of the financial and economic organs of the soviet régime so as to ensure that the material needs of the revolutionary war are met, to unfold the class struggle of the workers by channeling the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses of workers to the struggle of defeating the enemy, to promote the agrarian struggle of the peasants by mobilizing the broad masses of peasants in fighting for the seizure and defense of the land, and to call upon all the toiling masses of workers and peasants in all soviet areas and throughout China to make all sacrifices and efforts for the war. This is the way to smash thoroughly the Fifth<sup>5</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialists and the Guomindang, to block the road toward the colonization of China, and to win initial soviet victories in one or several provinces, leading toward victory throughout the whole of China.<sup>6</sup>

## II. The Imperialist Offensives and the Soviet Government's Leadership of the Anti-Imperialist Movement

Over the past two years, since the founding of the Provisional Central Government, the biggest developments inside the country have been the imperialist offensives and the counterrevolutionaries' Fourth and Fifth<sup>7</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression" [campaigns] against the revolution.

The Japanese imperialist bandit war that began on September 18, 1931, resulted in the occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces and Rehe and the control of Beiping and Tianjin through barbarous massacres with planes and cannons. Preparations are further being made to launch murderous warfare on an even larger scale toward Inner Mongolia and all of North China. The British imperialists are attacking Sichuan from Tibet, and the French imperialists are preparing to invade Yunnan and Guizhou. Meanwhile, the American imperialists are attempting to put the Yangzi River basin and Fujian under their direct rule. All these imperialists are spreading their pernicious grasp and conspiracies over the vast territory of China for the purposes of enslaving the Chinese people, destroying the Chinese soviet régime, preparing to attack the Soviet Union, and at the same time preparing for a second world war among the imperialist gang-

5. The Moscow version reads "sixth" here.

6. In the Moscow version, this last part reads, simply, "to achieve victory of the soviet revolution throughout the whole of China."

7. The text in the Moscow version refers here to "the fourth, fifth, and sixth" campaigns.

sters themselves. But the Chinese landlord and bourgeois Guomindang, abiding by the principle of surrendering everything to the imperialists, has handed over several million square *li* of land, practiced shameful nonresistance against Japanese and all other imperialist attacks, and traded all the interests of the toiling popular masses for the political, economic, and military assistance of the imperialists in order to facilitate the concentration of their forces for attacks against the soviets and the Red Army.<sup>8</sup>

In this national crisis of unprecedented gravity, the anti-imperialist movement of the revolutionary masses of the whole country is developing most vigorously. The heroic fighting of hundreds of thousands of volunteer army soldiers in the Three Northeastern Provinces, the bloody battles of the soldiers of the Nineteenth Army in Shanghai,<sup>9</sup> and the anti-imperialist movement that has spread throughout the country have reached a high tide never seen before.

At present, before the revolutionary masses of all of China stand opposing actions of the two political régimes: the Guomindang has totally surrendered to the imperialists and makes every effort to oppress the anti-imperialist masses, whereas the soviets resolutely oppose the imperialists and make every effort to aid and lead the anti-imperialist movement.

Over the past two years the Soviet Provisional Central Government has repeatedly issued telegrams opposing the gangster war of the Japanese imperialists and the surrender and betrayal of the Guomindang. On April 14, 1932, the Provisional Central Government officially declared war against Japan and simultaneously issued an order of mobilization for war against Japan, calling upon the popular masses of the whole country to wage a national-revolutionary war against the imperialists who enslave China and the Guomindang that betrays China. The Provisional Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission have already issued a declaration calling upon all Guomindang troops attacking the soviet régime and the Red Army to (1) immediately cease attacking the soviet areas, (2) guarantee democratic rights for the popular masses (freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, strike, and so on), and (3) arm the popular masses and establish an anti-Japanese volunteer army. Under these three conditions, the Soviet Government is willing to conclude an agreement regarding military operations with any armed force to fight against the Japanese and all other imperialists. When the Guomindang signed the Tangu Agreement with Japan and recently made direct representations to Japan, the Provisional Central Government repeatedly declared to the whole country and the whole world that it represented the people of the whole country in the sternest condemnation of such policies and actions, which sell out the national interests. The Soviet Government aids the anti-Japanese struggle of the masses

8. The Moscow version of this text adds here a characterization of the soviets and the Red Army as "the only reliable force for the survival of the Chinese nation."

9. The Moscow text adds "and the masses of workers" here after "Nineteenth Army."

everywhere and contributed 16,000 *yuan* in support of the anti-Japanese strike movement by the workers of Huxi Textile Mill in Shanghai alone. In addition, the masses of the soviet areas have given donations and assistance to the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army of Northeast China and provided much moral and material support to other struggles against the imperialists.

Within soviet territory, imperialist privileges have long since been eliminated and imperialist influences eradicated. Pastors and priests have been driven out by the masses, the people's property seized by the churches has been taken back, and missionary schools have been abolished. Within China's borders, the only places free of imperialist rule are the soviet areas.

All these facts clearly show: the Soviet Government is the sole government opposing imperialism. The Soviet Government should point out to the masses of the whole country: it is the greatest responsibility of the soviets and of the whole people to defeat imperialism through direct wars of national defense. The fulfillment of this responsibility, moreover, depends entirely on the broad masses of people developing the anti-imperialist struggle. The first priority is to unite all forces in defeating the Guomindang, running dogs of the imperialists, for they are the largest obstacles to the struggle of the soviets and the masses against imperialism. The masses should be made to understand: it is only because of obstruction by the Guomindang—they lie across the area between the regions of imperialist offensives and the soviet territories and concentrate all their forces to attack the soviet territories, so that the Red Army has no way to engage in battle directly with the imperialists and the soviets and the Red Army are forced to clear the road with resolute attacks—that smashing the Guomindang "Encirclement and Suppression" is the first step.

But a direct and large-scale clash between the soviets and the imperialists grows closer every day. This demands that the soviets energetically strengthen their leadership of all anti-imperialist struggles—the soviets should become the organizer and leader of the anti-imperialist struggle of the popular masses of the whole country. Only by using all its might to make the masses understand the current crisis and the crimes of the Guomindang, and relying on the strengthened anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang awareness and organizational power of the broad masses can the Soviet Government smoothly carry out its own sacred task—overthrowing the rule of the imperialist Guomindang in China through a national-revolutionary war and a revolutionary civil war.

### **III. The "Encirclement and Suppression" of the Imperialist Guomindang and the Soviet Government's Struggle Against "Encirclement and Suppression"**

Because the Chinese soviet areas are revolutionary bases of opposition to imperialism in the whole country and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the main force opposing imperialism in all of China, and because of the

vigorous forward development of the soviet movement and the revolutionary war, the Guomindang, with direct assistance from the imperialists, has gathered all its forces and launched one, two, three, four, and even five desperate attacks against the soviets and the Red Army in an effort to destroy the Chinese revolutionary forces and carry out the task of clearing the way for the imperialists to carve up China.

Each attack by the imperialist Guomindang has, however, met with severe defeat. The Chinese soviets and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with the support of the people of the whole country and thanks to the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, have become an invincible force. At the same time, the victories of the soviets and the Red Army have further inspired the toiling masses of the whole country and made them realize that only the soviets and the Red Army are truly fighting for the nation's independence and freedom, and that only the soviets and the Red Army can save China.

The enemy began the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" right after the Guomindang had sold out the Three Northeastern Provinces and signed the Shanghai ceasefire agreement. Not only does the traitorous Guomindang fail to resist the Japanese imperialist invasion with a single soldier, and not only do they ignore the repeated declarations by the Soviet Central Government and the Red Army regarding their willingness to reach an agreement on military operations against the Japanese with any armed force genuinely resisting Japan, but on the contrary, the arch-traitor Chiang Kaishek of the Guomindang concentrated hundreds of thousands of troops to attack the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, as well as that of West Hunan-Hubei, and to force the Red Army to leave the area surrounding Wuhan. For our part, although because of having to avoid doing battle with an overwhelmingly strong enemy force and because of certain of our own subjective tactical errors, the Red Fourth Front Army was forced to withdraw from the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, and embark on a famous expedition, the Red Fourth Army has created broad new soviet bases around Nanjiang, Xuanhan, and Suiding in Sichuan. The Red Fourth Front Army's expedition has led to the development of broad revolutionary mass struggle in the vast remote areas of northwest China, spreading the seeds of the soviets to places where the revolutionary situation is relatively backward. Within less than a year, the Red Fourth Front Army, through valiant and skillful fighting, has already established soviet régimes in more than ten *xian*.<sup>10</sup> All this has made Chiang Kaishek and the warlords of Sichuan begin to tremble before the great

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10. Here the Moscow version continues as follows: "... increased more than tenfold the ranks of the Red Army, called upon the laboring masses of workers and peasants as well as the White army soldiers of the whole of Sichuan Province to lean toward the soviet revolution, and established new, powerful bases of soviet revolution in China's northeastern region. The Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area is the second largest soviet area in the Chinese Soviet Republic, and has many advantages with regard to geography, natural resources, strategy, and social conditions. The Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area forms a

triumphs of the Red Fourth Front Army. At the same time, not only has the Second Army Group of the Red Army that retreated from the Honghu base<sup>11</sup> not suffered heavy losses, but it has been taking vigorous action in coordination with the Red Fourth Front Army through the areas of Sichuan, Hubei, and Hunan, and has won new victories. Even in the area around Honghu, there are still guerrilla forces. In the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, not only have our bases not suffered very great losses, but they have rather achieved a stable position and spread guerrilla warfare toward the surrounding areas.<sup>12</sup>

The Central Soviet Area is the site of the Central Soviet Government, the headquarters of the soviet movement in the whole country, and also the main target of enemy attack.<sup>13</sup> The enemy has gathered most of his military forces and waged a tenacious battle against us, dispatching the so-called "Central Army," the warlord armies of Jiang [Guangnai] and Cai [Tingkai], the warlord armies of Guangdong and Guangxi, and the warlord armies of Hunan to encircle the Central Soviet Area and its various neighboring soviet areas from all four sides. After a year of arduous struggle, however, we have won unprecedented victories. The biggest victory was achieved in the first half of 1933. Within that half year alone, the Red Army of the Central Soviet Area destroyed twenty-four divisions, six battalions, and two companies of the White army; routed three divisions, twelve regiments, five battalions, and two companies of the White army; and captured approximately twenty thousand rifles and around a thousand machine guns and handguns. Especially in the battles of Dongpi and Huangpi, the enemy's toughest basic column was destroyed, thus bringing about the final defeat of the enemy's Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression."<sup>14</sup>

In the midst of the great victory of smashing the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," the Red Army not only expanded in numbers, but its quality was also strengthened. The combat skills and political resolve of the Red Army commanders and soldiers have improved greatly as compared with the case before the Fourth Campaign. The territory of the soviets has expanded. Apart from the large soviet area in Sichuan, large soviet areas have been expanded in

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bridge for the development of the soviet revolution between the northern and southern banks of the Yangzi River and the northern and southern parts of China. The Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area has a tremendous role and significance in the great battle to win a new soviet China."

11. Honghu is a lake on the extreme southern edge of Hubei, on the border with Hunan. The reference is to a base area which spanned the two provinces at the time of the Second "Encirclement and Suppression."

12. The Moscow version has this last sentence as follows: "In the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, although our bases have suffered partial losses, the Red Army troops and guerrilla forces remaining have valiantly spread guerrilla warfare toward the surrounding areas."

13. Here the Moscow version has "... and consequently, it is the main target of attack by imperialism and Chiang Kaishek."

14. Fifth in the Moscow version.

northwestern Fujian and eastern Jiangxi, increasing the population by close to a million, and a new Fujian-Jiangxi Province has been set up. The old soviet areas have been further consolidated; this is manifested in improved work by the soviets. The revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses of workers and peasants has been heightened, the class struggle has developed in rural and urban areas, and the remnant reactionary forces in the soviet areas have been strictly suppressed. At the same time, this victory has had a tremendous impact on the Guomindang regions. Under the influence of this victory, the masses of workers and peasants in the broad White regions have heightened their determination to struggle. Among all the Guomindang forces taking part in "Encirclement and Suppression," not only is vacillation prevalent among the soldiers, but feelings of panic have even arisen within the ranks of the leadership. Things have reached the point where Chiang Kaishek was forced to make public the desperate order that "All those without exception who refuse to suppress the bandits and ask to fight the Japanese shall be summarily executed."

The achievement of these victories is, however, certainly no accident. It depended on the correctness of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party, the consolidation of the Soviet Government's leadership, and the proper carrying out of its policies. It also depended on the valiant and skillful fighting of the Red Army, the enthusiastic support of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the soviet areas, and the growing daily struggle and unfolding of the anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang movement of the masses of workers and peasants in the White areas. It further depended on the sympathy and aid of the proletariat and oppressed masses in colonies all over the world. All these are fundamental conditions for defeating the enemy, and victory could certainly not have been won without these conditions.

After their thorough defeat in the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," the Guomindang warlords' only way out is to surrender even more shamelessly to the imperialists, obtain quantities of loans and military equipment from the imperialists, hire large numbers of foreign advisors, gather together all old forces in existence, and organize new forces (train new soldiers, new pilots, Blue Shirts, officer corps, and so on). In sum, by concentrating all counterrevolutionary forces to carry out, under the command of the imperialists, a Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the soviets and the Red Army.

The struggle of the soviets against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" is, exactly as pointed out by the Party Central Committee, "at once a struggle to block the way out for crisis-ridden imperialism and a struggle to win a free and independent Soviet China." The process of smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" will determine whether China is "carved up and jointly ruled by the imperialists and becomes completely a colony, or is a free and independent Soviet China possessing territorial integrity."

The soviets should call upon all the masses participating in the struggle in the soviet areas and the White areas to understand clearly the importance of this

struggle. Complete victory in this struggle can be won only by uniting all revolutionary forces under the direction of the soviets with a spirit that is a hundred times more active and a hundred times more resolute.

The soviets should instruct all the masses participating in the struggle as follows: especially after smashing the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," we possess all the basic conditions for defeating the current "Encirclement and Suppression." The correct leadership of the Party and the soviets, the strength and expansion of the Red Army, and the enthusiasm for struggle of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the soviet areas and White areas all constitute the basis for us to defeat the enemy.

Because of our efforts and the increasing internal contradictions within the ruling classes, the new, massive attacks of the imperialists and the Guomindang have met with severe blows from us. The enemy's original plan has failed, forcing him to launch desperate attacks against us from new positions and with new plans. We are faced with the final and decisive battle of the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." Although the blockhouse policy and the economic blockade policy of the Guomindang warlords are extremely brutal, they are not, after all, insurmountable obstacles to our victory. Quite the contrary, these policies of the enemy indicate their own weakness.<sup>15</sup> Let us raise our military skills, strengthen our work among the masses and the soldiers, improve our military tactics, concentrate all our forces to overcome these difficulties, and victory will be ours.

We must point out: the enemy's difficulties are far greater than ours. Vacillation among the White soldiers; hatred and resentment on the part of the workers, peasants, and the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie under enemy rule; infighting and disintegration among the various factions of warlords in the ruling class; contradictions and conflicts among the various imperialists assisting the Guomindang; and the financial and economic bankruptcy of the Guomindang—all of these constitute the objective conditions for the revolution to triumph.

It should be pointed out here: at a time when the imperialist Guomindang is carrying out the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," a People's Revolutionary Government<sup>16</sup> has appeared in Fujian. The appearance of this People's Revolutionary Government manifests further splits in the Guomindang system. The great victory of the soviet movement and the bankruptcy of the Guomindang before the people of the whole country have forced a part of the Chinese reactionary ruling classes to adopt new methods in their attempt to find a third road other than the Guomindang road and the soviet road, in order to preserve the reactionary ruling classes from their doom. This attempt, however, is in vain. Because if such organizations as the People's Revolutionary Government do not

15. In the Moscow text, this sentence is omitted.

16. Quotation marks appear around the term "People's Revolutionary Government" in the Moscow edition.



proceed from the genuine interests of the toiling masses of workers and peasants, do not carry out many basic policies such as those that have already been carried out by the soviets,<sup>17</sup> do not firmly recognize the Soviet Government's three conditions that were announced as early as April of last year, and sign and carry out anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang agreements with the Soviet Government, but rather confine themselves to deception and empty talk, then the broad revolutionary masses will not take a different attitude toward the People's Revolutionary Government from the one they hold toward the Guomindang government, and the inevitable tragic defeat of the People's Revolutionary Government is altogether predictable. The soviets, on the other hand, amidst the daily increasing faith in them among the nation's popular masses and the daily increasing bankruptcy of the deceptions perpetrated by the Guomindang and all other reactionary factions, will resolutely crush the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," thereby blocking the road to the colonization of China by the imperialists and, from an initial victory in one or several provinces, attain victory in the whole country, thus verifying the saying: "Only the soviets can save China!"

#### **IV. Methods for Carrying Out the Various Basic Soviet Policies During the Past Two Years**

When it comes to talking about the various basic policies of the soviets, we must first ask what are the points of departure of these policies. To answer this question, we must understand the environment in which the soviets found themselves in the past and find themselves at present, and the tasks produced by such environments.

In the past, the soviets were born and developed amidst guerrilla warfare. They sprang up in many very small places. These places were each independent and not allied with one another. Surrounding each soviet area was the enemy's world, and the enemy at every moment wreaked destruction and oppression on the soviet areas. Yet they were able to triumph over these enemies, and it was through defeating the enemy's countless oppressions that they grew and developed. This was the environment of the soviets.

The present environment of the soviets is different from that of the past in many respects. They have vast territories, broad masses, and a strong Red Army. They have brought together many scattered forces (although they have not yet been completely consolidated). They have already become organized as a state, which is our Chinese Soviet Republic. This state has already formed its local and central organs and set up a Provisional Central Government. This government is a centralized organ of power that relies upon the broad masses and upon the

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17. In the Moscow version, "Chinese people" is substituted for "toiling masses of workers and peasants," and the words from "do not carry out" to "carried out by the soviets" are omitted.

armed forces of the masses—the Red Army. This government is a government of the workers and peasants, which exercises the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. It offers broad democracy to the workers and peasants, and permits absolutely no participation by elements of the landlord and capitalist classes. It is a dictatorship, a dictatorship that already wields tremendous power.<sup>18</sup> This dictatorship has expanded its influence throughout the whole country and enjoys great prestige among the broad popular masses. Its situation is very different from that during the previous era of guerrilla warfare. Warfare, however, is still a fact of daily life and has become more widespread and violent. This is because the confrontation between this dictatorship and the dictatorship of the Guomindang landlord and bourgeois classes sharpens day by day. Now is the time when victory hangs in the balance between the two sides, and we are faced by a large-scale "Encirclement and Suppression" on the part of the imperialist Guomindang. Such is the present environment of the soviets.

This environment has determined their tasks, which is to say that they must use all their might to mobilize the masses, organize the masses, and arm the masses, and must incessantly attack their enemies so as to smash the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression" directed against them. Their task is to wage a revolutionary war, bringing together all forces in carrying out the revolutionary war and using the revolutionary war to defeat the enemy. They must also defeat the powerful imperialist rule, because the imperialists are the supporters and commanders of the enemy's dictatorship. Their purpose in overthrowing the imperialists and the Guomindang is<sup>19</sup> to unify China, carry out a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and make it possible for this revolution to be transformed into a socialist revolution in the future. This is the basic task of the soviets.

From this we can understand why, given this kind of environment and these tasks, the soviets are carrying out the various basic policies. The soviets must carry out these policies to consolidate the already triumphant democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants; to expand this dictatorship throughout the whole country; and to mobilize, organize, and arm the workers, peasants, and toiling masses in all the soviet areas and throughout all of China, in order to overthrow the rule of the imperialists and the Guomindang by means of a resolute revolutionary war, consolidate and develop this dictatorship, and make prep-

18. Here the Moscow version adds after "tremendous power," "over the warlords, bureaucrats, landlords, despotic gentry, and bourgeoisie, who constitute an extremely small proportion of the people."

19. From this point to the end of the paragraph, the Moscow version reads as follows: "... to liberate the Chinese people; to liberate China's four hundred million people from enslavement and trampling by the Japanese and other imperialists; to enable hundreds of millions of toiling Chinese to escape the oppression of the warlords, bureaucrats, evil gentry, landlords, and bourgeoisie; and to make it possible in the future for the Chinese masses to emulate the Soviet Union's workers and peasants in successfully establishing, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, a bright, happy new way of life for humanity in a socialist society. This is the basic task of the soviets."

arations for the transformation of the current bourgeois-democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants into a future socialist dictatorship of the proletariat. This is the point of departure for all soviet policies.

Acting on the instructions of the First National Soviet Congress, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have, over the past two years, adhered to the general orientation of these policies and achieved extremely great results. Experience has already proved to the whole of China's revolutionary popular masses: only the policies of the Soviet Government are policies that serve the political power and interests of the popular masses, that resolutely oppose the counterrevolutionary policies of the imperialist Guomindang, and that [can] overthrow the rule of the imperialist Guomindang in the whole country, save the whole nation from destruction, and liberate the whole of the toiling popular masses from untold misery.

Needless to say, in a China where there is a sharp confrontation between two régimes, every concrete administrative action of the soviets must immediately gain the support of the broad popular masses. The popular masses who have suffered their fill of oppression and exploitation under the reactionary policies of the imperialist Guomindang are attracted to each concrete administrative action of the soviets like metal filings to a magnet. This situation has caused extreme panic among the reactionary ruling classes, who have therefore not hesitated to fabricate all sorts of shameless rumors to slander the soviet administration. Iron-clad facts have, however, provided a forceful reply to such shameless rumor-mongering. Every Chinese who has eyes in his head, except for the mad, unscrupulous Guomindang landlords and capitalists, cannot but recognize the immeasurably wide gap between the Soviet Government's policies and those of the Guomindang government!

***A. Let Us First Discuss the Arming of the Masses and the Building Up of the Red Army by the Soviets.***

In order to oppose the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression" and to wage revolutionary war,<sup>20</sup> the first tasks of the soviets are to arm the masses, organize a strong and solid iron Red Army, organize local armed forces and guerrilla troops, and organize supplies and transportation for conducting the war. Over the past two years, in the firm struggle against the enemy's Fourth and Fifth<sup>21</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression" [campaigns], the soviets have achieved great success through efforts on these fronts.

First of all, the establishment of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission unified the leadership of the Red Army throughout the country, enabling Red Army units of the various soviet areas and various fronts to begin to coordi-

20. The Moscow version adds here "and to safeguard the Chinese people and state. . ."

21. As usual, the Moscow version adds "Sixth" here.

nate their actions and cooperate with each other under the guidance of unified strategic thinking. This is an important turning point from scattered guerrilla action to regular, large-scale movements of Red Army forces. Over the last two years the Revolutionary Military Commission has led the Red Army throughout the country, and mainly in the Central Soviet Area, in carrying out a glorious, victorious war, having smashed the enemy's four<sup>22</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression" [campaigns] and won a first-stage victory in the struggle against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."<sup>23</sup>

The Red Army has expanded rapidly over the last two years. It is several times larger than it was two years ago. Success in this regard is due to the enthusiastic participation by the broad masses of workers and peasants in the revolutionary war, improvement in the methods of mobilization, and the application of the laws and orders of the soviets granting preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers. During the Red May of 1933 alone, nearly twenty thousand new soldiers were added in a few *xian* of the Central Soviet Area. In many places the masses of workers and peasants poured into the Red Army like tidewater. Facts have proven erroneous all the opportunist statements, such as the notion that the masses are not willing to join the Red Army or the idea that it is impossible to expand the Red Army in new soviet areas or remote areas. The correctness of the mobilization methods and the thorough implementation of soviet laws and orders giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers have, however, been crucial to the speedy completion of the mobilization plans. Important components of the mobilization methods are dispensing with all coercive orders, carrying out thoroughgoing propaganda and persuasion, and punishing class-alien elements who undermine the expansion of the Red Army and lead desertions. Necessary and important steps in guaranteeing that Red Army soldiers will enthusiastically rush to the front lines and in consolidating their determination for battle at the front are to raise the social position of Red Army soldiers to the most prestigious status, to provide for all possible and necessary psychological and material needs of Red Army soldiers, to distribute land to Red Army soldiers from other regions and mobilize the masses to cultivate the land on their behalf, to tend the land well for the dependents of every Red Army soldier, to give Red Army soldiers' dependents a 5 percent discount in the consumers' cooperatives, to operate special shops with daily necessities for dependents of Red Army soldiers, to offer 10 percent of the profits of state-run enterprises and cooperatives to dependents of Red Army soldiers, to call upon the masses to make donations for relief of dependents of Red Army soldiers who are sick and have difficulties, to call upon the masses to provide psychological and material comfort to Red Army soldiers

22. The Moscow version has "five" here.

23. The following sentence, referring to the victory of the Sichuan forces (under Zhang Guotao), appears at the end of this paragraph in the Moscow edition: "Moreover, under the leadership of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the Sichuan Red Army has already achieved a great and glorious new victory."

and their dependents, and to carry out actually and thoroughly all laws, decrees, and methods for granting preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers and their dependents. There are many models for these tasks all over the soviet areas. The broad masses of workers and peasants in these places regard as their own sacred duty taking up arms to defend the soviet areas and developing the soviet areas, and large numbers of them constantly rush to the front. For example, in Changgang Township in Jiangxi, among the total of 407 young and adult males between the ages of 16 and 45, 320 left to join the Red Army and to work, and 87 stayed in the township. The ratio of those leaving to those remaining behind is thus 80 to 20. In Fujian's Upper Caixi Township, among the total of 554 young and adult males, 485 left to join the Red Army or to work, and only 67 stayed in the township, making the ratio of those leaving to those staying 88 to 12.<sup>24</sup> With such large numbers of able-bodied males in these townships having heroically gone to the front, what about village production and family life? Not only have they not been adversely affected, but they have instead undergone expansion and improvement. What is the reason for this? It is because labor mutual aid teams, field cultivation teams, and various other measures have regulated labor power in the countryside in an organized and planned way, thereby solving all difficulties and problems of Red Army dependents. I think such glorious lessons are worth learning throughout the soviet areas.

The iron-hard consolidation of the Red Army should be closely linked to the expansion of the Red Army, and during the last two years considerable success has likewise been achieved in this aspect of our work. The present Red Army has already embarked on the road to becoming an iron regular revolutionary armed force. This is manifested in the following ways: (1) The composition has been improved, ensuring that only the workers, peasants, and toiling masses have the glorious right to bear arms and that class-alien elements who have wormed their way into the Red Army are resolutely expelled. (2) Worker cadres have increased in number and the political commissar system has been universally instituted, so that control of the Red Army is in the hands of reliable commanders. (3) Political education has made progress, thus strengthening the determination of Red soldiers to fight to the end for the soviets, raising discipline as related to class consciousness, and furthering close ties between the Red Army and the broad popular masses. (4) Military skills have been raised. Even though at present the Red Army still lacks the use of the latest-model weapons and practice in handling them, general military skills have made great strides in comparison with the past. (5) The authorized strength of the units has been changed, thereby enhancing the organizational strength of the Red Army. All this has very greatly increased the fighting power of the Red Army, making it an invincible soviet armed force.

24. See above, the translations of Mao's investigations of these two townships, dated November 18 and November 26, 1933, respectively.

Extensive expansion of the Red Guards, Young Pioneers, and guerrilla forces is an extremely important task in the soviets' arming of the masses to carry out the revolutionary war. The Red Guards and Young Pioneers are ready-made reserve armies for the Red Army at the front lines, and are local armed forces for the defense of the soviet areas. They also constitute a bridge in the process of transforming the present voluntary recruitment system to a future compulsory conscription system. The guerrilla troops, for their part, are the creators of the new soviet areas and constitute an indispensable detachment of the Red Army's main forces. Over the last two years, such forces have been developed in all soviet areas. Their military and political training have also been considerably strengthened. Their joining the Red Army, defense of the local areas, attacks on and harassment of the enemy, and the great achievements they have demonstrated in the successive battles to smash "Encirclement and Suppression" have all caused a tremendous shock to the enemy and become huge obstacles to the enemy's invasion of the soviet areas. Their effect has been particularly manifest in the Central Soviet Area and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Soviet Area. An important task of the soviets is to spread this system to all newly opened soviet areas, to expand their organizations in a big way, and to strengthen their training, so as to turn these troops into the Red Army's most reliable brothers in the revolutionary war.

Replenishing provisions and supplies for the Red Army, organizing military transportation linking the front lines with the rear, and organizing a military medical system are, likewise, tasks of decisive significance for the revolutionary war. Given a situation in which we still have not taken several central cities, and the enemy maintains his economic blockade, carrying out this task is extremely difficult. Over the past two years, however, by relying on the enthusiasm of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the soviet areas and White regions, we have laid a considerable foundation for these tasks as well. In this regard we have already secured supplies and provisions and their transportation to the Red Army over a long period of time in the past, and this must be considered a tremendous achievement. But the present decisive battle to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and the even wider war in the future demand that we make greater efforts to increase our strength in this respect and guarantee more ample provisions.

Revolutionary war on an even larger scale lies ahead of us. The soviet policy of arming the masses has further demonstrated its paramount importance. The basic fighting task of the soviets is to arm the masses without a moment's slackening and to realize as quickly as possible through effective work the creation of a million-man-strong iron Red Army.

The basic task of the soviets is to wage revolutionary war and to mobilize all forces of the popular masses to carry out the war. Around this basic task, the soviets have numerous urgent tasks. They should pursue a policy of extensive democracy for the broad popular masses. They should resolutely suppress counterrevolutionaries within the ranks. They should arouse class struggle among the workers, develop the agrarian revolution of the peasants, and heighten the activism of the worker and

peasant masses under the principle of a workers' and peasants' alliance led by the working class. They should pursue correct financial and economic policies to ensure that the material needs of the revolutionary war are met. They should carry out a cultural revolution to arm the minds of the masses of workers and peasants. These and many other basic policies are all aimed at one goal: overthrowing the rule of the imperialist Guomindang by means of revolutionary war, consolidating and developing the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, and preparing for the transition to the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

### ***B. Let Us Now Discuss the Soviet Democratic System.***

The soviet, a democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, is the political power of the popular masses themselves and relies directly on the popular masses. It can play its role only when it maintains the highest degree of closeness in its ties with the masses. The soviet is endowed with tremendous power. It has already become the organizer and leader of the revolutionary war, and it is also the organizer and leader of the lives of the masses. The greatness of its power cannot be matched by any form of state<sup>25</sup> in history. Its power, however, rests entirely on the popular masses, and it cannot be separated from the popular masses even for a moment. The soviet political power must use force to deal with all class enemies, but toward its own class—the workers, peasants, and toiling masses<sup>26</sup>—it may not use any force whatsoever. What it manifests is nothing but the broadest democratic ideology.

The broadest democracy of the soviets is manifested first and foremost in its own election. The soviets grant to all the exploited and oppressed masses full rights to vote and to be elected; moreover, women's rights are exactly the same as those of men. This is the first time in history<sup>27</sup> that the workers, peasants, and toiling masses have attained such rights. To summarize the experience of soviet elections in various places over the past two years, generally speaking the achievements have been great. First, concerning voter registration: A strict distinction was made between residents with the right to vote and those without the right to vote by use of the red and white wall poster method. The policy of carrying out the elections at meetings of the electorate, which all exploiting elements are forbidden to attend, replaced the previous method of holding the elections at mass meetings. Second, concerning the balance of class composition: To guarantee that the proletariat will be the mainstay of leadership<sup>28</sup> within the

25. In the Moscow text, the word "capitalist" appears before the word "state."

26. Here the Moscow edition refers not simply to "workers, peasants, and toiling masses," but to "the majority of the popular masses, made up of the workers, the peasants, the poor, office workers and staff members, and revolutionary intellectuals."

27. The Moscow text reads "Chinese history" here in place of "history."

28. For "mainstay of leadership" (*lingdao gupan*), the Moscow text has "leading cadres" (*lingdao ganbu*).

soviet régime, we applied the method under which thirteen workers and their dependents elected one representative, and fifty peasants or poor people elected one representative, and the same composition is used to organize conferences of deputies at the city and township level. At all levels of deputies' congresses and executive committees from the district to the central level, an appropriate ratio of workers' and peasants' deputies was established. This has guaranteed the alliance between workers and peasants in the organization of the soviet régime, and ensured that the workers occupy the leading position. Third, concerning electoral units: To ensure that the majority of voters participate in the elections, and to enable workers to elect the appropriate deputies to the soviets, the new election law proclaimed by the Central Executive Committee in September 1933 stipulates that each township soviet or city soviet be divided into several electoral units for the purpose of carrying out elections. That is, elections are held with the village as a unit among the peasantry, and workers carry out elections as a separate unit. This makes it very convenient for the masses to participate in elections. Fourth, concerning the number of people participating in elections: The development of the soviet election movement has to a great extent made clear to the masses of voters the relevance of elections to their own lives. Many of the masses who did not actively participate in elections in the past have now become active. In the two elections held in 1932 and the election held in the latter half of 1933, many places had over 80 percent voter participation, and in some places the only people who did not participate in election meetings were the sick, those in labor, and those on guard duty. Fifth, concerning name-lists of candidates: In the elections held in the latter half of 1933, a system of candidates' name-lists was adopted, which allowed voters to be prepared prior to the elections as to whether or not to vote for certain candidates. Sixth, concerning the election of women: In most of the city and township soviets at present, over 25 percent of the representatives elected are women. In some places, such as Upper Caixi Township in Shanghang, forty-three of the seventy-five representatives are women, which makes 60 percent. Among the ninety-one representatives in Lower Caixi Township, fifty-nine are women, making up 66 percent. The broad masses of working women are taking part in managing the nation. Seventh, concerning work reports, that is, township and city soviets convening voters' meetings prior to elections to report on the work of the soviets and guide the voters in criticizing such reports: This method was more widely applied in the elections held in the latter half of 1933 than in the previous year. All of these constitute basic steps enabling the masses to exercise their right to manage the state organs. Thus there are satisfactory methods for soviet elections, which guarantee a foundation for consolidating soviet political power.

Next, soviet democracy manifests itself in city and township conferences of deputies. The system of city and township deputies' conferences constitutes the organizational basis of the soviets and the organ through which the soviets maintain close relations with the broad masses. Progress over the past two years



has further perfected this system of ours. Its most outstanding characteristics are the following: (1) For the purposes of forging close relations between township and city soviet deputies and local residents, facilitating the solicitation of residents' opinions, and facilitating leadership work, all residents are to be appropriately assigned to be under the leadership of the various deputies, according to the proximity of living quarters between deputies and residents (generally, thirty to seventy residents are placed under the leadership of one deputy), thereby causing the various deputies to develop permanent relationships with the residents under their leadership. In this way, the popular masses and the soviets are organizationally joined together. (2) Among township and city soviet deputies, a deputy in charge is to be elected out of every three to seven deputies, based on the proximity of their living quarters. This person's tasks are, under the guidance of the township or city soviet presidium, to assign and direct the work of the various deputies under his leadership, to transmit notices from the presidium to each deputy, to hold meetings of residents under his leadership, and to resolve minor problems among the residents under his leadership. In each village, there must also be a deputy in overall charge to take responsibility for leading the work of the whole village. This fosters close links between the city and township presidiums and the deputies, and provides strong leadership for the work in villages. (3) Under the township soviets and city soviets, various sorts of standing committees and provisional committees are to be organized—for example, committees on preferential treatment for the Red Army, water conservancy committees, education committees, grain and food committees, public health committees, and so on. There may be as many as dozens of them, and large numbers of activists among the masses may be drawn in to participate in the work of these committees. Not only do townships have committees, but there should also be certain necessary committees in the villages. In this way, the work of the soviets forms a network and the broad masses become directly involved in the work of the soviets. (4) It is now stipulated that township soviet and city soviet elections be held once every six months (district soviets also have one every six months, but *xian* and provincial soviets have one every year). In this way, the fresh opinions of the popular masses easily emerge and are transmitted to the soviets. (5) Representatives who have committed serious errors in the interim between two elections may be removed by a proposal from ten or more voters and the approval of more than half the total number of voters, or expelled by the resolution of a deputies' conference. This makes it impossible for bad elements to linger for long periods in soviet organs. All of these things are characteristics of the current practice of city and township soviets in many places throughout the soviet areas. Everyone can see that the democracy of the soviet régime has developed to a level that is truly unprecedented in any political system in history. And the soviet relies upon this system to unite with the broad popular masses, thereby becoming the organ most able to develop the creativity of the masses and the organ most able to mobilize the popular masses to cope with civil war

and revolutionary construction. This is also something that no government throughout history has been able to accomplish.<sup>29</sup> All organs of soviet political power above the district level are constructed entirely upon the foundation of city and township soviets, and are formed by assemblies and executive committees of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies at all levels. Government personnel are elected to their positions and those who prove unqualified are dismissed in accordance with the public will. Discussion and resolution of all problems are based on the people's will, and therefore the soviet régime is a genuine régime of the broad popular masses.

Next, soviet democracy is also manifested in the granting to all the revolutionary popular masses of full freedoms of assembly, association, speech, publication, and going on strike. At a time when in the areas under Guomindang rule the revolutionary popular masses are being stripped of all freedoms and rights and a mad fascist reign of terror is under way, every revolutionary person under the Soviet Government has the right to express his own opinions; moreover, the soviets provide all possible material facilities (meeting places, paper, printing houses, and so on). The soviets unflinchingly make every effort to lead all assemblies, associations, and publications of opinion that are undertaken to oppose the imperialist Guomindang. The only thing the soviets prohibit is the freedom of all those exploiting elements to oppose the revolution.

In addition, to consolidate the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, the soviets must encourage the broad popular masses to supervise and criticize their own work. Every revolutionary member of the popular masses has the right to expose the mistakes and shortcomings of soviet staff members. At a time when corrupt Guomindang officials are spread out over the whole country and the people are angry but dare not speak out, such phenomena are absolutely forbidden under the soviet system. If elements among soviet staff workers are discovered who practice corruption and embezzlement, are passive and go slow in their work, or who act in a bureaucratic manner, the popular masses may at once expose such people's mistakes, and the soviets will immediately punish them and certainly not show any indulgence. This kind of full democratic spirit is also possible only under the soviet system.

Finally, the soviet democratic spirit can also be observed in the demarcation of administrative districts. The soviets have abolished the old bureaucratic administrative districts, which were large and inappropriate, and have made the soviet areas of jurisdiction smaller at all levels, from the province down to the township. What is the significance of this? It is to keep the soviets in close contact with the popular masses, to enable the soviets to be fully informed of the demands of the popular masses because the areas of jurisdiction are not too large, to allow the opinions of the popular masses to be reflected rapidly to the

29. In the version published in Moscow, the words "except for the Soviet Union" appear between "no government throughout history" and "has been able to accomplish."

soviets and quickly discussed and resolved, and to make extremely convenient the mobilization of the popular masses for war and for soviet construction. The Guomindang warlords use the system of large provinces, large *xian*, and large districts and townships from the feudal era. This only serves to cut oneself off from the popular masses, and the Soviet Government has no use for it. It should be pointed out here that the demarcation of villages is an important matter because the most convenient method of carrying out the work of the soviets below the township soviet level is to mobilize the masses using the village as a unit. Only by relying upon appropriate demarcation of villages, the establishment in the villages of organizations of the popular masses, and strong leadership of the whole village by village deputies and deputies in charge will the work of township soviets be able to attain the best results.

***C. Next, Let Us Discuss the Attitude of the Soviets Toward the Landlords and the Bourgeoisie.***

The soviets have realized the world's most successful democratic system, which enables the broad popular masses to participate directly, grants the broad popular masses all democratic rights, and absolutely does not use or need to use any kind of force against the popular masses.

Toward the landlords and the bourgeoisie, that is to say toward all those exploiting elements who have been overthrown by the revolutionary popular masses, the soviets have, on the other hand, a different kind of attitude.

Because they are exploiters and because they were the rulers in the past, the landlords and the bourgeoisie harbor extremely deep hatred toward the soviets. Because, although they have been overthrown, they have not yet been eliminated, and they still have solid and deep-rooted social foundations and superior knowledge and skills. Thus, even though they have been overthrown, they constantly attempt to stage a comeback, and to overthrow the soviet régime and restore the former system of exploitation. Especially during a period of civil war, when the enemy repeatedly launches military offensives against the soviet areas, these overthrown exploiters constantly strive to carry out counterrevolutionary actions in concert with the attacking enemy. For this reason, the soviet régime cannot refrain from carrying out harsh punishment and repression against these elements in every possible respect.

The first item in the soviet policy of punishing exploiting elements is to exclude them from political power. Landlords, the bourgeoisie, and all other enemies of the revolution are completely stripped of the right to vote and of the right to serve in the Red Army and local armed forces.<sup>30</sup> But these elements

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30. In the Moscow version, this sentence begins: "It is stipulated in the Soviet Constitution that . . ." The balance is as in this version.

always try by hook and by crook to sneak into the soviet organs, into the Red Army, and into local armed forces. Especially in newly established soviet areas, where mass struggle has not developed fully, it has been easier for these elements to seize opportunities to worm their way in. Past experience has fully demonstrated that to wage a brutal and merciless struggle against the activities of these class-alien elements to worm their way into the revolutionary régime is a very important task of the soviets.

The second item is to strip away freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association from all landlords and members of the bourgeoisie. The soviets grant such freedoms only to the revolutionary popular masses and not to any elements of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. Because landlord and bourgeois elements will inevitably use such freedoms as their counterrevolutionary instruments, it is absolutely necessary to deprive these elements of such freedoms. One of the important reasons that the soviets have been moving toward consolidation day after day also lies in having deprived these class enemies of their freedoms and reduced their opportunities for action.

The third item is to use revolutionary force and revolutionary courts to suppress all counterrevolutionary activities. Based on the task of arming the masses, the soviets have established a mighty Red Army and widespread local armed forces. These constitute iron strength upon which the soviets directly depend. Only by relying upon them can the soviets defeat the military power of the imperialist Guomindang and suppress counterrevolutionary activities within the soviet areas. The soviets have, however, another important weapon for suppressing counterrevolutionaries in conjunction with this one, which is the soviet courts. Relying directly upon armed force and relying upon the activities of the State Political Security Bureau and the class struggles of the broad popular masses, the soviet courts see to it that all counterrevolutionary attempts within the soviet areas are firmly suppressed. Over the past several years, serious counterrevolutionary activities have occurred in all the various soviet areas. For example, the AB Corps in the Central Soviet Area, the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area, and elsewhere; the Social Democratic Party in Fujian; the Reorganizationists in places such as West Hunan-Hubei, Henan-Hubei-Anhui, Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, and Fujian-Jiangxi; the Liquidationists of Trotsky and Chen Duxiu in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi; and others have all attempted to carry out, or even succeeded in carrying out, their counterrevolutionary uprisings. In the end, however, they all met with stern repression by the soviet courts, their rebellious plots were overcome, and the soviet régime was consolidated. In this respect, the Political Security Bureau and the soviet courts have already accumulated rich experience and corrected the mistake of failure to carry out a clear-cut class line, which occurred in the past in many places. There has also been progress lately in the massification [*qunzhonghua*] of the soviet courts, which means that their suppression of counterrevolutionaries should be linked with the struggles of the

broad masses to eliminate counterrevolution. The widespread use of the circuit courts<sup>31</sup> is proof of this.

In sum, the soviets exercise an extremely extensive revolutionary democracy toward the broad popular masses. At the same time, however, it is in the midst of such democracy that their tremendous power is constituted—power built upon the firm faith and conscious needs of the hundreds of millions of worker and peasant masses. Putting such power to use, the soviets have formed their own dictatorship, organized the revolutionary war, organized the soviet courts, and carried out fierce attacks against class enemies on all fronts. The soviet courts, for their part, have played a great role in suppressing counterrevolutionary activities within the soviet territories.

If one compares the soviet courts under the workers' and peasants' dictatorship with the Guomindang courts under the dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, on the other hand, an extraordinary picture emerges.

The purpose of the soviet courts is to suppress the landlords and the bourgeoisie, and so they generally go lightly in dealing with crimes of worker and peasant elements. The purpose of the Guomindang courts is to suppress the worker and peasant classes, and so they generally go lightly in dealing with crimes of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. The role of the courts is entirely determined by the class nature of the political régime.

On the one hand, the soviet courts sternly suppress the activities of counterrevolutionary elements, and the soviets should certainly not show any leniency whatsoever toward such elements. But on the other hand, all inhumane treatment of criminals already under arrest is forbidden. The Central Soviet Government has already issued a clear order to abolish corporal punishment. This, too, represents a tremendous, historic reform. The Guomindang courts, on the other hand, remain to this day permeated by cruel and inhumane medieval tortures.

Toward criminals other than those given the death penalty, soviet prisons practice persuasionism,<sup>32</sup> which means using the communist spirit and labor discipline to educate criminals and transform their intrinsic criminal nature. Guomindang prisons, on the other hand, go in for out-and-out barbarous feudal killing by maltreatment and cruel fascist punishment, and constitute a hell on earth for the toiling masses and revolutionaries.

Destroying counterrevolutionary conspiracies of hostile classes, establishing revolutionary order within the soviet territories, and eliminating all remnants of barbarity and feudalism in the administration of justice are the goals of the

31. The *xunhui fating*, here translated "circuit courts," were presumably the equivalent of the institution of the same name which existed in the Chinese People's Republic from 1949 to 1954. These courts, which were placed under the authority of the local *xian* government, visited the various towns and townships in the *xian* to try cases.

32. *Ganhuaazhuyi*, literally "transform-the-feelings-ism," means to help a misguided or erring person to change by persuasion or example.

soviet courts. Each of the reforms of the soviets in this arena similarly has its own historical significance.

#### *D. Next, Let Us Discuss Soviet Labor Policies.*

On the basis of the class nature of their régime, and the great task of arming the toiling masses to overthrow the imperialist Guomindang by means of revolutionary warfare, the soviets must resolutely arouse the workers' class struggle, guarantee the workers' daily interests, develop the workers' revolutionary activism, organize such activism on the part of the workers for use in the great revolutionary war, and turn the workers into active leaders of the revolutionary war and cornerstones of the consolidation and development of the soviet régime. This is the point of departure of soviet labor policies.

Under the soviet labor policies, the interests of workers are thoroughly protected. Comparing this with the Guomindang's rule in the past and with the Guomindang areas at the present, there is truly a difference like that between heaven and hell.

In the period when the soviet areas were still under Guomindang rule, workers functioned as slaves of their employers. No worker could ever forget the long hours, the low pay, the brutal treatment, and the fact that there was no legal protection whatsoever for the worker's position. All of this not only continues to exist in the Guomindang areas at present, but has been exacerbated many times over. Lately the situation in the White areas is that the workers' actual wages have gone down by more than 50 percent, and cutting back work hours, reducing the workforce, and closing plants have become the capitalists' commonplace methods for attacking the workers. As a consequence, unemployment has become widespread. Among industrial workers alone the number of unemployed has reached over 60 percent. In all areas under Guomindang rule, to go on strike is a criminal act. In March 1933, the Guomindang made a public declaration in Hankou that strikers would be punished by death. In all disputes between workers and capitalists, the Guomindang invariably stands by the capitalists to oppress the workers.<sup>33</sup>

Under the soviet régime, workers are the masters. Leading the broad masses of peasants, the workers have shouldered the great responsibility of consolidating and developing the soviet régime. Therefore, the principle of the soviet labor policies is to protect the interests of the working class and to consolidate and develop the soviet régime. In line with this principle, a Labor Law was promulgated in December of 1931. In 1933, it was revised and promulgated once again. The Labor Law as revised on this occasion is applicable to both the cities and the countryside and both large and small enterprises.

33. Here the Moscow version adds a one-line paragraph reading as follows: "These crimes, however, have been completely eliminated in the soviet areas."

In the soviet areas at present the eight-hour workday has been generally instituted, and labor contracts and collective contracts have been concluded. Labor inspection units and inspectors have been introduced widely in cities and in many villages, with the aim of checking whether or not employers have taken any actions that violate the soviet Labor Law. Punishment of employers who violate the law is the province of the specially established labor court. To prevent the capitalists from controlling labor and to protect unemployed workers,<sup>34</sup> the soviets have monopolized the right to job referral and all capitalists wishing to hire workers must go to employment agencies set up by the soviets. The establishment of relief agencies for the unemployed is also becoming daily more widespread, and concrete relief is generally available to unemployed workers. Workers in rural areas have also been given redistributed land. A social insurance system has been set up and a social insurance bureau has been established in each city in the soviet areas. None of this is available in any way to workers under the Guomindang régime. On the other hand, the soviet régime considers the application of these policies to be its own greatest responsibility.

Because the soviets have firmly carried out their own policies, the lives of workers in the soviet areas have seen tremendous improvement.

This is true, first of all, with regard to wages. Actual wages in various places in the soviet areas have generally risen in comparison with the period before the revolution. The example of Tingzhou is shown below [on page 681].

According to this table, compared to the period before the revolution,<sup>35</sup> the wages of workers in the city of Tingzhou went up by a minimum of 32 percent (carpenters) and a maximum of what amounts to 1,450 percent, or an increase of 14.5 times (textile workers). This sort of startling increase fully reflects how startlingly low wages were in the Guomindang era. Of course, the wages of workers in Tingzhou in particular are somewhat higher than wages in other cities in the soviet areas (and the workers' meals are included), but wages in other cities have also risen. For example, in the most recent period, the pay for construction workers in the city of Ruijin has risen from 25 *fen* per day before the revolution to 45 *fen* per day, an 80 percent increase.

Not only in the cities, but in rural areas, wages have risen as well. A comparison, for various periods, of pay for odd-job work in Tiancun District, Ganxian is given below [on page 682].

This table contains data for a single rural area, but in other rural areas as well, wages have generally risen. As for wages in state-run enterprises, over the past two years in various enterprises under the direct jurisdiction of the center wages have generally risen by 20 percent, the highest increase being 40 percent.

Generally speaking, wages have been paid on time. Because of supervision by

34. Here the Moscow version reads "a sector of unemployed workers produced by protracted 'Encirclement and Suppression' on the part of the imperialist Guomindang."

35. The Moscow version says "before the war."

Trade	Period	Highest Wages*			Lowest Wages			Median Wages	
		before revolution	present	comparison	before revolution	present	comparison	before revolution	after revolution
Confectionery	monthly	10	32	+22	2	22	+20	No data	30
Paper-making	monthly	10	35	+25	3	31	+28		33
Oil	monthly	6	18	+12	3	12	+ 9		15
Pharmaceutical	monthly	6	30	+24	2	26	+24		28
Tobacco	monthly	7	36	+29	3.5	30	+26.5		28
Printing	monthly	15	36	+21	5	28	+23		34
Metal	monthly	6	18	+12		14			16
Carpenters	daily	.60	.80	+ .20					
Boatmen	from Ting-zhou to Shanghai	14	46	+32					
Dyers	monthly	5.5	20	+14.5	2	18	+16		19
Oil-paper	monthly	5	21	+16	2	17	+15		19
Liquor	monthly	6	20	+14	3	18	+15		
Textile	monthly	10	35	+25	2	31	+29		32

\*All values are in *yuan*.



	Highest Daily Wages*				Median Daily Wages				Lowest Daily Wages			
	before revolu- tion	before May 1, 1931	present	increase from before revolu- tion	before revolu- tion	before May 1, 1931	present	increase from before revolu- tion	before revolu- tion	before May 1, 1931	present	increase from before revolu- tion
Handicrafts	30	30	35	+ 5	22	25	30	+ 8	10	15	20	+10
Paper-making	40	40	45	+ 5	22	24	30	+ 8	14	11	25	+11
Agriculture	28	30	32	+ 4	10	15	20	+10	3	6	10	+ 7
Coolies	45	67.5	96	+51	26	39	50	+24	10		20	+10

\*All figures are in *fén* (cents).

the soviets, cases of employers delaying the payment of wages are rare. Even the small number of obstinate capitalists, having been sanctioned by the labor courts, no longer dare to make trouble for the workers.

As for the legally stipulated working period, over the last two years the eight-hour day has been widely instituted in all cities in the soviet areas. Working hours for farm laborers in the countryside are generally shorter than for adults.<sup>36</sup>

Protective measures for women and minors such as equal pay for equal work, maternity leave before and after childbirth, and prohibition against the use of child labor under the age of fourteen have also been generally applied.

As for protection of apprentices, generally the number of years for apprenticeship has been reduced, treatment of apprentices has been improved, and feudal oppression of apprentices has been eliminated. The lives of apprentices have been considerably improved and their pay has risen. (For example, in Jiangxi apprentices get an allowance of at least 15 *yuan* a year and some get as much as 3 *yuan* a month.)

As for general conditions, in cities and in state-run enterprises in particular, workers' health and hygiene and their meals have been greatly improved. Generally speaking, workers' meals in various cities cost over 6 *yuan* a month. Meals for workers in the countryside are at least on a par with those of the employers.

Workers in the soviet areas have organized strong class labor unions. Such unions are pillars of the soviet régime and strongholds for the defense of the workers' interests. At the same time, they become schools in which the broad masses of workers may study communism. The soviets have provided legal guarantees for the rights of the unions, and as a result union membership has greatly developed. According to statistics of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the number of trade union members currently in the soviet areas, calculated on the basis of those in the Central Soviet Area and its several neighboring soviet areas alone, is 229,000 persons, whose distribution is as follows: 110,000 in the Central Soviet Area, 23,000 in the Hunan-Jiangxi area, 40,000 in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, 25,000 in Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, 6,000 in Fujian-Jiangxi, and 5,000 in Northern Fujian.<sup>37</sup> According to materials of the Central Soviet Area, there are only 3,676 workers who have not joined labor unions, which is less than 5 percent of the total of all workers. In other words, 95 percent of all workers have joined labor unions. In some places, such as Xingguo, as many as 98 percent have joined unions. One might ask whether such a thing can be dreamed of in the Guomindang areas. Not only in China, but throughout the world, except for the Soviet Union, where is there such a situation in any imperialist country?

36. As it stands in the Ruijin edition, this sentence makes little sense. The Moscow version reads here instead: "In the countryside, too, the time actually worked by hired laborers rarely exceeds eight hours a day, and working hours for hired laborers between sixteen and eighteen years of age are generally shorter than for adults."

37. These figures, which are the same in both versions of the Chinese text, add up to 209,000 rather than 229,000. We have no basis for explaining this discrepancy.

In sum, for the last two years the soviet Labor Law has already been in effect in all cities of the soviet areas, and its main provisions have also been carried out in the countryside. During these two years, although many capitalists and rich peasants have resisted the Labor Law, active struggle by the masses of workers and strict supervision by the soviets have rendered such resistance ineffectual. At the same time, those independent producers, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farm laborers who occasionally violate the Labor Law should be sincerely warned and advised so that they may understand and of their own accord support the Labor Law. Because of all this, the workers' lives have greatly improved, the revolutionary activism of the workers has been greatly encouraged, and the workers have played their tremendous role in the revolutionary war and in soviet construction.

According to statistics from the twelve *xian* in the Central Soviet Area of Gonglu, Wantai, Longgang, Xingguo, Shengli, Xijiang, Yudu, Xunwu, Shanghang, Ninghua, Changting, and Xinqian, among the 70,580 labor union members, 19,960 persons now serve in the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, a figure equivalent to 28 percent of the total membership. Those who work in the soviets and other revolutionary organizations number 6,752, or 10 percent of the total membership. Most of them hold responsible positions in the soviet organs. These two groups make a total of 26,712 people, which amounts to 38 percent of the total membership. There are at present 43,868 labor union members who still live at home. The labor union members living at home from these twelve *xian* have been paid back the second batch of public bonds worth 43,855 *yuan*, and they have recently purchased economic construction bonds worth 197,803 *yuan*, with each member living at home having purchased on average 4.5 *yuan* [worth]. Among members living at home there are currently 12,435 Party or League members, making up 28 percent of the total number of union members living at home. These statistics prove the enthusiasm of the masses of workers in joining the Red Army, in participating in and supporting the revolutionary war, and in cherishing the Chinese Communist Party. All of this, on the other hand, stems from the fact that the soviets have protected the interests of the workers and developed their enthusiasm. Those who say that the workers have gained nothing since the revolution and that the activism of the workers has not been aroused can only be said to be talking nonsense.

#### ***E. Now, Let Us Discuss the Agrarian Revolution in the Soviet Areas.***

The soviets and the Red Army of China were born and developed out of the agrarian revolution. The broad masses of peasants under brutal oppression and exploitation by the landlord class and the Guomindang warlords can be liberated only through the agrarian revolution. The principle of the soviet land policies is to overthrow completely all feudal and semifeudal exploitation and oppression by the landlord class and the Guomindang warlords.

In all Guomindang areas, past and present, the land rents are frightful (60 to 80 percent), interest rates are frightful (30 to 100 percent), and taxes and levies are frightful (as many as over 1,700 kinds in the whole country). As a result, the land is concentrated in the hands of the landlord class and the rich peasants, and the vast majority of peasants have lost their land and been thrown into the tragic state of being hard-pressed either to live or die. Because of the ruthless plunder of the land, peasants have lost their ability to fend off disasters. Consequently, the calamities of flood and drought occur throughout the country. In 1931, as many as 809 *xian* and 44 million people were hit by natural disasters. Because of layer upon layer of plunder, the peasants lack the ability to produce more, and much arable land has gone barren, a lot of it becoming virtually wasteland. At the same time, what little the peasants do manage to produce is overwhelmed by the imperialists' dumping of agricultural products. Because of this, the Chinese rural economy has fallen into a state of total bankruptcy. It is on such a basis that the flames of the agrarian revolution have exploded with force in the countryside.

The power of the agrarian revolution in the soviet areas has made a clean sweep of all feudal remnants. Hundreds of millions of peasant masses have suddenly awakened from a prolonged period of darkness, seized all the land and property of the landlord class, confiscated the good land of the rich peasants, abolished usurious interest rates, done away with exorbitant taxes and levies, defeated all enemies of the revolution, and set up their own political power. The peasant masses have for the first time come out of hell and attained the status of masters. This is the fundamental difference between the situation in the countryside under the soviet régime and the Guomindang régime.

The First All-Soviet Congress promulgated a Land Law, which provided a correct basis for the solution of the land problem throughout the country. Because class struggle in the countryside has become ever sharper, many disputes have arisen over the question of class analysis. Based on past experience in the land struggle, the Council of People's Commissars issued a "Decision Regarding Certain Questions in the Agrarian Struggle," which provided correct solutions to many problems, such as those of the landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and vagrants, so the struggle in the countryside will develop more effectively.<sup>38</sup> Many issues concerning land distribution methods, such as distances, poor and rich land, green crops, mountains and forests, ponds, and so on, urgently await the gathering of experiences from various places so as to make the necessary decisions. This is crucial to the leadership of land redistribution in new areas.

To destroy thoroughly the remnant feudal forces and to see to it that the fruits of the agrarian revolution fall entirely into the hands of farm laborers, poor peasants, and middle peasants, the Central Government initiated a broad and

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38. See above, the document of October 10, 1933, bearing this title.

thoroughgoing Land Investigation Movement. On the basis of statistics for the three months of July, August, and September 1933, in the three Central Soviet Area provinces of Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong, a total of 6,988 landlord families and 6,638 rich peasant families were discovered. From the landlords and rich peasants thus discovered, 307,539<sup>39</sup> *Dan* of land was taken, and cash confiscated from landlords and donations from rich peasants amounted to a total of 606,916 *yuan*. The revolutionary activism of the peasant masses has been heightened, and farm laborers' unions and poor peasant leagues have become pillars of the soviets in the countryside. The fact that such great results were achieved in the space of three months proves that rural class struggle still requires full attention from the soviets and also demonstrates completely that the Land Investigation Movement is a powerful method of continuing to develop the rural struggle and completely eliminating feudal remnants.

The class line in the agrarian struggle is to rely on farm laborers and poor peasants, unite with middle peasants, exploit<sup>40</sup> rich peasants, and eliminate landlords. Correct application of this line is the key to securing the victorious development of the land struggle and the basis for every one of the concrete policies of the soviets toward the countryside. Therefore, the Soviet Government should severely punish the erroneous tendencies of encroaching on the interests of middle peasants (mainly those of the prosperous middle peasants) and eliminating rich peasants. At the same time, the attitude toward the mistakes of attempting to compromise with landlords and rich peasants should not be relaxed, for only by opposing all of these mistakes can the land struggle get onto the correct path.

Mass work in the agrarian struggle has gained a great deal of experience over the last two years. Its main points may be summarized as follows: (1) In both the movement for land redistribution and the Land Investigation Movement, all efforts must be made to mobilize the broad masses of poor peasants, middle peasants, and the masses of rural workers to struggle on their own initiative against the landlords and rich peasants. Both land redistribution and land investigation work must have the consent of the masses. All decisions on how to handle a certain class must be made through a mass meeting. Where a few soviet staff members on their own carry out land redistribution and investigation of class status, there is the danger of lowering the enthusiasm for struggle on the part of the masses. (2) Aside from land, most of the property confiscated from the landlord class and the surplus draft animals, farm implements, and houses of the rich peasants must be distributed to the poor masses. If this is not done and they are assigned instead for use by a few individuals, it will likewise lower the morale of the masses and facilitate resistance on the part of exploiting elements. (3) It is not good to let the matter of land redistribution remain unsettled for a long period of time; it should be properly redistributed within a rather short

39. The Moscow version has the figure 317,539 here.

40. Here the Moscow version has "restrict" instead of "exploit."

space of time and remain firmly in the hands of the peasants. In the future, unless by request of the majority of the local masses, the land should not be redistributed again rashly. Not doing things in this manner goes against the views of the peasants and will not only have an effect on the peasants' enthusiasm for the land and production, but will also be used by exploiting elements to obstruct the development of the agrarian struggle. (4) The objective of the Land Investigation Movement is to clarify and determine exploiting-class status, not to clarify and determine exploited-class status. Therefore, investigation should not be done household-by-household and *mu-by-mu*. Rather, the broadest masses should be mobilized to ferret out hidden landlords and rich peasants. (5) Strong measures should be taken against counterrevolutionary elements who disrupt land redistribution and land investigation. With the consent of the masses, they are to be treated by the harshest measures such as arrest, imprisonment, trial by the masses, and even execution. This is entirely necessary. If this is not done, the land struggle will be greatly hindered. (6) Great efforts should be made to develop class struggle but to avoid conflicts among localities and clans. The landlord class and rich peasants, for their part, make fervent attempts to substitute struggle between localities and clans for class struggle so as to obstruct the advance of the agrarian revolution. Soviet staff members should not be duped by the landlords and rich peasants. (7) The development of the land revolution depends upon raising the class consciousness and the degree of the organization of the basic masses in the countryside. For this reason, soviet staff workers must carry out extensive propaganda in depth in the countryside and must perfect the organization of the Poor Peasant League and unions of farm laborers.

The agrarian revolution has not only given land to the peasants, but should also enable them to develop the productive capacity of the land. Because of soviet leadership and the heightened enthusiasm for labor on the part of the peasants, agricultural production has recovered in vast portions of the soviet areas and in some places has been even further developed.

On this basis, the peasants' lives have greatly improved. Because the peasants have done away with exploitation by the landlords and the Guomindang, the fruits of their production remain in their own hands. For this reason the peasants' lives are at least twice as good as during the Guomindang period. In the past, the vast majority of peasants did not have enough to eat during much of a given year, and in hard times some even had to eat tree bark and grain bran. Now, on the other hand, not only is starvation generally nonexistent, but there is greater abundance each year. In the past, the vast majority of peasants could eat meat only a few times each year, but now there are more chances to eat meat. In the past, the vast majority of peasants were clothed in rags, but now there has been general improvement, in some cases by 100 percent, in other cases even 200 percent.

What kind of life and what kind of régime do the peasant masses desire? Let the peasant masses of all Guomindang areas answer this question for themselves.

### *F. Let Us Now Discuss the Financial Policies of the Soviets.*

The financial objectives of the soviets are to guarantee supplies and provisions for the revolutionary war and to ensure payment of all revolutionary expenses for the soviets. Given, however, that the Soviet Republic must meet enormous expenses for the revolutionary war and for revolutionary work, while it still occupies a relatively small area within the whole country, consisting moreover of economically rather backward places, and considering also the fact that it applies taxation policies beneficial to the broad masses, many outsiders cannot understand how the soviets get by financially. The Guomindang, on the other hand, occupies vast regions and voraciously feeds on the flesh and blood of the people, so why should it have fallen into bankruptcy?

There is nothing strange in this. Soviet financial policies and use of financial resources are fundamentally different from those of the Guomindang.

The soviets' financial policies are built upon the principle of the interests of the class and the revolution. Therefore, the financial resources of the soviets come from: (1) carrying out confiscation or imposing levies on all feudal exploiters, (2) taxation, and (3) developing the enterprises of the national economy.

What is meant by confiscation and levies from feudal exploiters is raising money from landlords and rich peasants in the soviet areas and the White areas. According to past experience, this source of income often occupies a prominent position. This is the opposite of the Guomindang's financial policies: the soviets impose the main financial burden on the exploiters, whereas the Guomindang places the main financial burden on the workers, peasants, and toiling masses.

Soviet taxation is unified and progressive. At present it is carried out through two simple components, a commercial tax and an agricultural tax. The basic principle of taxation is likewise to place the heavy burden on exploiters.

Commercial tax levies are divided into tariffs and business taxes. Tariffs are aimed at uniformly regulating the import and export of goods in light of the needs of the soviet areas. Therefore, the tariff rate runs from total exemption to as high as 100 percent. Within the borders of China, only the soviets have carried out an entirely independent tariff system without interference from any foreign government. All goods go throughout the entire Soviet Area after paying the tariff at border customs points, and there is no second levy of tariffs, thus doing away at one stroke with the Guomindang's abusive policy of *lijin*,<sup>41</sup> which involves layer upon layer of extortion.

The business tax is a commercial income tax (no industrial tax is levied at present). A unified progressive tax is levied according to the size of a merchant's capital and the amount of his profit. A small amount of capital and less profit is lightly taxed, and larger amounts of capital with more profit are heavily taxed.

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41. The transportation tax on goods moved within the country, commonly transcribed *likin* in English-language sources of the period.

Capital of under 100 *yuan*, cooperatives of the masses, and surplus goods sold directly by peasants themselves are all exempt from taxation.

Agricultural taxation relies upon the revolutionary enthusiasm of the peasants, which causes them to pay their taxes voluntarily, and it is likewise in principle a progressive method of taxation. Families with fewer members and less land are taxed lightly, and families with more members and more land are more heavily taxed. Poor and middle peasants are lightly taxed and rich peasants are taxed more heavily. Farm laborers and families of Red Army soldiers are exempt from paying taxes. Areas struck by natural disasters pay reduced taxes or are exempt from taxation, depending on the extent of damage suffered.

The unified, progressive taxation system adopted by the soviets is the most excellent tax system in the world, one that all capitalist countries dare not use or dare not use to its full extent. As for taxation under the Guomindang, it is one huge, muddled account. Its principle of taxation is to take it mainly from peasants and other members of the petty bourgeoisie. In addition to regular taxes, there are countless supplemental taxes. According to figures in the *Tianjin Dagong bao* of March 22, 1933, there is a total of as many as 1,756 categories of taxes in the Guomindang areas, land taxes in Sichuan have been collected in advance all the way up to 1987, and land tax in Shaanxi is twenty-five times more than it was before the Guomindang arrived. This is the Guomindang's "benevolence" toward the toiling masses!

To increase the revenue of the soviets by developing the national economy is an important part of soviet financial policies. Tangible results are already manifest in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Soviet Area and are starting to appear in the Central Soviet Area as well. It is the responsibility of soviet financial and economic organs to stress the pursuit of this aspect. It should be pointed out here that the principle of the state bank in issuing paper money should be to do so in accordance with the needs of economic development; purely fiscal needs must take second place. It is absolutely necessary to take full account of this aspect.

Thrift should be the guiding principle in government expenditures. All soviet personnel should be made to understand that corruption and waste are very great crimes. In the resolute struggle against corruption and waste, although there have been some achievements in the past, greater efforts should be made in the future. Saving every copper for the war and the revolutionary cause is the principle of the soviet accounting system. The soviets' use of financial resources must be strictly different from that of the Guomindang.

It is not that soviet finances are free of hardships. Expansion of the Red Army and development of the war have given rise to financial difficulties for the soviets. But solutions to these difficulties are contained within the difficulties themselves. The unfolding of our revolutionary war, improvement in our soviet work, expansion of our source of revenue into all Guomindang areas, placing the soviets' financial burdens on the shoulders of all exploiting elements, and in-



creasing the soviets' income through developing the national economy—all these are solutions to the difficulties.

*G. Next, Let Us Discuss Soviet Economic Policies<sup>42</sup>*

Only the Guomindang warlords who have *already* brought the areas under their own rule to the point of complete bankruptcy<sup>43</sup> have the utter shamelessness to spread the rumor, day in and day out, that the soviet areas<sup>44</sup> are in a state of total collapse. *It is true enough* that the imperialist Guomindang is<sup>45</sup> utterly bent on wrecking the soviet areas,<sup>46</sup> the soviet construction<sup>47</sup> now in progress there, and the welfare of the millions of workers and peasants who have achieved liberation. For this purpose the counterrevolutionaries<sup>48</sup> have pursued a ruthless policy of economic blockade in addition to organizing *all sorts of* armed forces for their military campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression." But, leading the broad masses and the Red Army, the Soviet Government has<sup>49</sup> not only smashed one enemy "Encirclement and Suppression" after another, but has *also* been doing all the essential work of economic construction within its power in order to defeat the enemy's vicious economic blockade. In this respect, too, the soviets<sup>50</sup> have scored one success after another.

*Because the soviets' central task is to win victory in the war against the imperialist Guomindang, and because the soviet areas are at present economically rather backward areas that are, on top of that, under the enemy's economic blockade,* the principle governing the soviets'<sup>51</sup> economic policy is to proceed with all the essential work of economic construction within our power and concentrate economic resources on the war effort, and at the same time to improve the life of the people as much as possible, consolidate the worker-peasant alliance in the economic field, and ensure proletarian leadership of the peasantry,<sup>52</sup> thus creating the prerequisites *and a favorable climate* for the future advance to socialist construction.

The focus of soviet<sup>53</sup> economic construction is to increase agricultural and

42. This section is included in the *Selected Works*, where it is titled "Our Economic Policy," and dated January 23, 1934. Variants between the original text and the version approved by Mao in 1951 are indicated below in the usual way.

43. To the point of complete bankruptcy → To the brink of bankruptcy

44. Soviet areas → Red areas

45. Imperialist Guomindang is → Imperialists and the Guomindang are

46. Soviet areas → Red areas

47. Soviet construction → Work of economic construction

48. The counterrevolutionaries → They

49. The Soviet Government has → We have

50. The soviets → We

51. The soviets' → Our

52. Here the revised text inserts: "and strive to secure leadership by the state sector of the economy over the private sector, . . ."

53. Soviet → Our

industrial production, expand trade with the outside, and develop the cooperative movement.

Agriculture in the soviet areas<sup>54</sup> is clearly making progress. As compared with 1932, the 1933 agricultural output was 15 percent higher in the Central Soviet Area<sup>55</sup> and 20 percent higher in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Soviet<sup>56</sup> Area.<sup>57</sup> For the first year or two after the uprising in a soviet area, agricultural production often shows signs of decline.<sup>58</sup> But it tends to pick up again as land redistribution is settled and with encouragement by the soviets and the greater enthusiasm for work on the part of the peasant masses.<sup>59</sup> Now in some places production has reached and even exceeded the pre-uprising<sup>60</sup> level. In other places, not only has land that lay waste during the course of the uprisings been eliminated,<sup>61</sup> but new land has been brought under cultivation. In many places mutual-aid groups and plowing teams have been organized to adjust the use of labor power in the countryside, and cooperatives have been organized to overcome the shortage of draught oxen. In addition, the broad masses of women are taking part in crash work on the production front.<sup>62</sup> None of this could have happened in the days of the Guomindang. With the land as the *private* property of the landlords in the Guomindang period, the peasants were neither willing to improve it nor did they possess the means to do so. Only since the soviets<sup>63</sup> have distributed the land to the peasants and encouraged and rewarded production has their labor enthusiasm blossomed forth and great success in production been achieved. It should be pointed out here that under the present conditions agricultural production occupies first place in soviet<sup>64</sup> economic construction; it is needed to solve both the most important problem of food, and the problem of providing raw materials (such as cotton, hemp, sugar cane, bamboo, and so on) to make clothes, sugar, paper, and other necessities. The care of forests and the increase of livestock are also an important part of agriculture. Within the framework of a small-scale peasant economy, it is permissible and indeed necessary to draw up suitable

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54. Soviet areas → Red areas

55. The Central Soviet Area → Southern Jiangxi and western Fujian

56. Soviet → Border

57. Here the revised version inserts: "The Sichuan-Shaanxi Border Area has had a good harvest." (The Moscow edition, by the way, reads, "The Sichuan Soviet Area has had an excellent harvest.")

58. The uprising in a soviet area. . . → A Red area is established, agricultural production often declines.

59. But it tends to pick up. . . → But it picks up again as the land is redistributed and ownership is settled and with our encouragement to production and the greater enthusiasm for work on the part of the peasant masses.

60. Pre-uprising → Prerevolutionary

61. Eliminated → Reclaimed

62. Crash work on the production front. → Production.

63. The soviets → We

64. Soviet → Our

plans for the output of certain important products and to mobilize the peasants to strive for their fulfillment (for example, the quantity of cotton production for each province). The soviets<sup>65</sup> should pay closer attention and devote greater efforts to this. The soviets must actively lead the peasants in solving such basic<sup>66</sup> problems in production as labor power, draft oxen, raw materials,<sup>67</sup> seed, irrigation, and so on. In this connection the fundamental problem<sup>68</sup> of agricultural production in the soviet areas is adjusting the use of labor power in an organized way and encouraging women to participate in production. Effective measures<sup>69</sup> to solve this problem<sup>70</sup> are organizing mutual-aid groups and plowing teams and *the soviets'* mobilizing and encouraging the whole rural population during the important spring and summer plowing seasons. Another big problem is that quite a large proportion (about 25 percent) of the peasants are short of draft oxen. The soviets should attend to organizing draft oxen cooperatives, encouraging all households without *draft* oxen to buy them for their common use through voluntary subscription to shares. Irrigation is the lifeblood of agriculture, and it too merits close attention from the soviets. The question of soviet<sup>71</sup> or collective agriculture, of course, cannot as yet be raised, but with the objective of promoting progress in agriculture,<sup>72</sup> it is urgently necessary to set up small experimental farms, agricultural research schools, and exhibitions of farm produce in every township and district.<sup>73</sup>

The enemy blockade has made it difficult for us to market goods outside our area. There has been a decline in production in many handicraft industries in the soviet areas,<sup>74</sup> notably tobacco-curing and paper-making. But the difficulties of sending goods out are not completely insurmountable. We have an extensive market of our own because of the mass demand in the soviet areas. For the purpose of trade with the outside, but mainly to supply our own needs, industry should be systematically developed.<sup>75</sup> In the past two years, and especially since the first half of 1933, many industries<sup>76</sup> have begun to recover because of the attention the soviets have started to pay them and the gradual development of

65. Here and in subsequent occurrences "the soviets" becomes "we" in the revised edition.

66. Basic → Difficult and essential

67. Raw materials → Fertilizer

68. Problem → Task

69. Effective measures → The necessary measures

70. This problem → The problem of labor power

71. Soviet → State

72. With the objective of promoting progress in agriculture → to stimulate the development of agriculture

73. In every township and district. → In various places.

74. Here and in all subsequent occurrences, Soviet areas → Red areas

75. Industry should be systematically developed. → Handicrafts and also certain industries should be systematically restored and developed.

76. Many industries → Many handicrafts and a few industries

producers' cooperatives by the masses. Here the important fields are tobacco, paper, tungsten ore, camphor, farm implements, and fertilizers (such as lime). Moreover, in our present circumstances, we should not neglect the manufacture of our own cotton cloth, medicines, and sugar. In the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area, some industries have been set up that were previously nonexistent, such as paper-making, cloth-making, and sugar-refining, and they are doing well. To relieve the shortage of table salt, people are extracting it from nitre. It takes proper planning to keep industry going. On the basis of a scattered handicraft industry, of course, comprehensive and detailed planning is impossible. But fairly detailed production plans are absolutely essential for certain important industries,<sup>77</sup> first and foremost for state and cooperative enterprises. Each and every soviet<sup>78</sup> and cooperative industrial enterprise must pay attention from the very beginning to making accurate estimates of raw material output and marketing prospects in both the White areas and the soviet areas.

At present it is particularly necessary for the soviets to organize external trading<sup>79</sup> according to plan and to handle certain essential commodities directly, for example, the import of table salt and cotton cloth, the export of grain and tungsten ore, and the adjustment of grain supply within the soviet areas. Such work was first undertaken in the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi area and was started in the Central Area in the spring of 1933. With the establishment of the Bureau of External Trade and other agencies, initial successes have been achieved in this connection.

*The development of the economy in the soviet areas is simultaneously being carried out in the three sectors of state enterprise, cooperative enterprise, and private enterprise. At present, state-run economic enterprise is limited to what is possible and what is essential. This aspect has now begun to develop in both industry and commerce, and they naturally have boundless prospects.*

As regards the private sector of the economy, the soviets shall not hamper it but rather shall promote and encourage it, as long as it does not transgress the limits set by soviet law.<sup>80</sup> For the development of private enterprise is essential to the interests of the soviets<sup>81</sup> at the present stage. Needless to say, private enterprise is now preponderant and will inevitably continue to occupy a dominant position for a considerable time. At present, *development of the private economy in the soviet areas generally takes the form of small capital.*<sup>82</sup>

Cooperative enterprise is growing very rapidly. According to the September 1933 figures for 17 *xian* in the 2 provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian, there are altogether 1,423 cooperatives of various kinds, with a total capital of 305,551

77. Industries → Enterprises

78. Soviet → State

79. External trading → Private external trading

80. Soviet law. → The law of the government.

81. Of the soviets → Of the state and the people

82. Takes the form of small capital. → Is small in scale.

yuan.<sup>83</sup> *Because of promotion at rallies for economic construction, in xian such as Ruijin and Xingguo, for example, within a month or more after the rallies the development figures caught up with those of the entire period before the rallies.* Large-scale development of cooperatives is now mainly in consumers' cooperatives and grain cooperatives, with producers' cooperatives coming next. Credit cooperatives are still just at the beginning stage. *The development of the cooperative movement will doubtless become pivotal in the economic development of the soviet areas.* When the cooperative and the state economies become coordinated<sup>84</sup> they will become a tremendous force in the economy, *and through a long process of struggle with the private economy gradually attain a leading and superior position, thereby creating the conditions for the economy in the soviet areas to evolve into a socialist economy.* Therefore, the greatest possible development of state enterprises and the extensive development of cooperative enterprise must go hand in hand with encouraging the development of private enterprise.

With the support of the masses, the Council of People's Commissars has<sup>85</sup> issued construction bonds to the value of 3,000,000 *yuan* in order to develop state enterprise and assist the cooperative movement. Such reliance on the strength of the masses is the only possible way to solve the problems of funds for economic construction at this time.<sup>86</sup>

At a time when the whole country is plunged in economic disaster, when hundreds of millions of people are suffering the terrible hardships of hunger and cold, the Soviet Government is staunchly pressing ahead with economic construction for the sake of the revolutionary war and in the interests of the popular masses,<sup>87</sup> regardless of all the difficulties. The situation is very clear: only by defeating the imperialist Guomindang<sup>88</sup> and by undertaking planned, organized economic construction can the soviets deliver the *popular masses in their hundreds of millions* throughout the country from unprecedented economic disaster.

#### ***H. Now Let Us Turn to Soviet Culture and Education.***

With a view to victory in the revolutionary war, consolidation and development of soviet political power, mobilizing all the forces of the popular masses to participate in the great revolutionary struggle, and creating a new revolutionary

83. Of 305,551 *yuan*. → Of over 300,000 *yuan*.

84. The revised version inserts here: "and grow over a long period of time"

85. Council of People's Commissars has → We have

86. The *Selected Works* inserts two short paragraphs here, taken from the section on financial problems. Apart from the replacement of "soviet" by "our" or "the border region," the text is largely identical with that of the third from last and next to last paragraphs of section F as translated above. It is therefore not repeated here.

87. Popular masses → Nation

88. The imperialist Guomindang → Imperialism and the Guomindang

generation,<sup>89</sup> the soviets must carry out cultural and educational reform to remove the spiritual shackles imposed on the masses of workers and peasants by the reactionary ruling class and create a new soviet culture of the workers and peasants.

Everyone knows that under Guomindang rule all cultural and educational organs are in the hands of the landlords and the bourgeoisie. Their educational policy is on the one hand to engage in reactionary militaristic propaganda, so as to wipe out all revolutionary thinking by the oppressed classes, and on the other hand to carry out a policy of keeping the people in ignorance, excluding the masses of workers and peasants from education. The reactionary Guomindang uses financial resources intended for education to finance military action against the revolution. Most schools have been closed and most students are out of school. Under Guomindang rule, as a consequence, the people have become benighted and ignorant. Over 80 percent of the total population of the country as a whole is illiterate. An extremely brutal White terror has been launched against revolutionary culture and thought. All left-wing<sup>90</sup> writers and social scientists and any revolutionary elements within the cultural and educational organs are subject to persecution by the Guomindang fascists. Turning all educational organs into dark hells is actually the educational policy of the Guomindang.

Anyone who comes to visit our soviet areas will immediately find this to be a brand new world of freedom and light.

Here all cultural and educational organs are in the hands of the workers, peasants, and toiling masses. The workers, peasants, and their children have priority in obtaining an education. The Soviet Government uses every means to raise the cultural level of the workers and peasants. For this purpose, it has provided all possible political and material assistance to the masses. For this reason, even though at present the soviet areas face extremely brutal civil war conditions and are mostly in places that used to be culturally very backward, they are already carrying out revolutionary cultural construction at a rapid pace.

According to figures for the three provinces of Jiangxi, Fujian, and Guangdong-Jiangxi, in 2,932 townships there are 3,052 Lenin primary schools with 89,710 pupils; 6,462 evening schools for continuing education with 94,517 students; 32,388 literacy groups (these figures were gathered only for the two provinces of Jiangxi and Guangdong-Jiangxi, leaving out Fujian) with 155,371 members; 1,656 clubs; and 49,668 staff members. These are partial figures for the Central Soviet Area.

The majority of school-age children in many parts of the soviet areas have entered Lenin primary schools. For example, out of a total of 20,969 school-age children in Xingguo (12,076 boys and 8,893 girls), 12,806 are in Lenin primary schools (8,825 boys and 3,981 girls) and 8,163 are not in school (3,251 boys and

89. Here instead of "generation" the Moscow text has "era."

90. Here the Moscow text has "progressive" instead of "left-wing."

4,912 girls), making a ratio of 60 to 40 between those attending school and those not attending school.<sup>91</sup> In many places in the soviet areas, the children spend most of their time receiving education and playing, and only a small amount of time doing jobs in the family. This is exactly the opposite of what happened during the Guomindang period. At the same time, children are organized into Red Children's Leagues, which also serve as schools where children can learn communism.

The demand of the masses of women for education has never been so intense. Of the 15,740 students at the evening school in Xingguo, 4,988, or 31 percent, are male, and 10,752, or 69 percent, are female. Of the 22,519 members of the literacy groups in Xingguo, 9,000, or 40 percent, are male, and 13,519, or 60 percent, are female. In places such as Xingguo, women have attained initial liberation from illiteracy, and as a result women's activities have become very vigorous. Not only are women receiving education themselves, they are also taking charge of education. Many women serve as heads of primary schools and night schools and have become members of education and literacy committees. Conferences of women worker and peasant representatives are common organizations in the soviet areas. They pay attention to the overall interests of the masses of working women, so that women's education is naturally part of their concern.

The number of literates among the masses is rapidly increasing. Ways to acquire literacy are through evening schools, the literacy movement, and literacy billboards. Evening schools have fixed locations, literacy groups meet in people's homes, and literacy billboards are along the sides of the roads. The leading organs of the literacy movement are the village literacy movement committees. In Xingguo, for example, the whole *xian* has general literacy movement committees in 130 townships, branches of literacy movement committees in 561 villages, and 3,387 literacy groups under these branches with 12,529<sup>92</sup> members having joined these small groups. This is an enormous mass movement for wiping out illiteracy. Such a movement should be extended to all cities and rural areas throughout the soviet areas.

The rapid development of the cultural movement among the masses in the soviet areas can be noted as well by observing the circulation of newspapers. The Central Soviet Area currently has thirty-four different newspapers, large and small. Among them, for example, the circulation of *Hongse zhonghua* (Red China) has increased from 3,000 to 40,000; that of *Qingnian shihua* (Truth for Young People) is 28,000; that of *Douzheng* (Struggle) is 27,100; and that of *Hongxing* (Red Star) is 17,300. All of this shows that the cultural level of the masses is being rapidly raised.

91. Here the Moscow version inserts: "Whereas in the Guomindang period, less than 10 percent of the children attended school."

92. The Moscow text gives this figure as 22,529.

In the soviet areas, revolutionary arts of the masses are also beginning to be created. The movements of worker and peasant performing companies and of blue-clad troupes,<sup>93</sup> and the club movement in the countryside, are all developing widely.

The Red physical education movement of the masses is also developing quickly. Even remote villages now have track and field races, and sports grounds have been built in many places.

The soviet areas still lack adequate establishments for specialized education. But in order to train leading cadres for the revolutionary struggle, we have already set up the Red Army University, the Soviet University, the [Karl] Marx Communist University, and various cadre education schools under the leadership of the Commissariat for Education. A component of the plans for education should doubtless be that intermediate and specialized education develop in conjunction with basic education so as to foster its development.

In order to train worker and peasant intellectuals<sup>94</sup> and develop culture and education, another point that soviet cultural policies cannot neglect is the use of intellectuals of landlord and bourgeois class origins to serve the soviets.

Wherein lie the general guidelines of soviet culture and education? They are in using the communist spirit to educate the broad masses of toiling people, in making culture and education serve the revolutionary war and the class struggle, and in linking education with physical labor.<sup>95</sup>

What are the central tasks of soviet cultural construction? They are the institution of universal and compulsory education, the development of broad social education, striving to eliminate illiteracy, and the creation of large numbers of high-level cadres to lead the struggle.

Everyone understands that all of these guidelines and tasks can be realized only under the leadership of the soviet régime, for they are manifestations of the extreme sharpness of the class struggle and represent the greatest victory in liberating the human spirit.

### *I. Let Us Now Discuss the Soviet Marriage System*

To liberate the masses of women from the barbaric feudal marriage system and to put into effect a marriage system of genuine equality between men and women, the Central Executive Committee promulgated the soviet regulations on marriage as early as November 1931.<sup>96</sup> Therein complete freedom of marriage and divorce is established; the system of arranged, forced, and mercenary mar-

93. Instead of "blue-clad troupes," the Moscow version has "worker and peasant song and dance troupes." Regarding these troupes, see above, the note to the text of September 15, 1933, "On Educational Work."

94. The Moscow edition has "revolutionary intellectuals" instead of "worker and peasant intellectuals."

95. The Moscow edition inserts here: "and in enabling the entire Chinese people to enjoy the blessings of civilization."

96. The text of these regulations is translated below in the Appendix to this volume.



riages is abolished; and the practice of raising child brides is prohibited. This decree has been generally applied over the past two years in all areas under soviet jurisdiction. All those who are not related by blood within five generations, are not mentally ill, and do not have dangerous contagious diseases, males at least twenty years of age and females at least eighteen years of age, are permitted to marry by mutual consent and through registration at the township or city soviet. Divorce is effective if requested by either party, man or woman, and upon registration at the township or city soviet.

This democratic marriage system has burst the feudal shackles that have bound human beings, especially women, for thousands of years and established a new pattern consistent with human nature. This, too, is one of the great victories in the history of humanity.

This victory came, however, as a consequence of the victory of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants, for in order to achieve the liberation of the marriage system for the toiling masses of workers and peasants, it is first necessary to overthrow the dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and to carry out the land revolution. Only when the laboring masses of men and women, and the women in particular, have political freedom in the first place and considerable economic freedom in the second place can freedom of marriage be finally guaranteed. Working women in the soviet areas have the right to vote just as men do, and they have been assigned land and work, so the new system can now be fully carried out.

Because for thousands of years marriage relations have been barbaric to an inhuman degree, women have suffered more oppression than have men. Therefore the current soviet marriage laws and regulations stress the protection of women and place more of the responsibilities arising from divorce on the shoulders of men.

Because children are the new revolutionary generation, and social custom in the past paid little attention to the protection of children, the marriage regulations have separate stipulations on the protection of children. In this regard special attention is given to recognition of the status of illegitimate children and to their protection.

The application of this marriage system has won support for the soviets from the broad masses of people, who have gained not only political and economic liberation, but also liberation with regard to relations between men and women.

With respect to the marriage system itself, the soviet areas and the Guomindang areas are also two completely opposite worlds.

### *J. Finally, On the Policy Toward Nationalities*

Winning over all oppressed national minorities in the areas around the soviets and augmenting the anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang revolutionary forces<sup>97</sup> are the starting points of the soviet policy on nationalities.

97. The Moscow edition inserts here: "and gaining freedom and liberation for all oppressed nationalities."

Many national minorities within the country, such as the Mongolian, Tibetan, Korean, Vietnamese, Miao, Li, and other peoples<sup>98</sup> have throughout history been exploited and ruled by Chinese feudal emperors and feudal warlords. The Guomindang has inherited this form of rule without any changes whatsoever. Its so-called "republic of five nationalities" is nothing but a sinister lie designed to deceive people, and Feng Yuxiang's massacre of the Gansu Muslims and Bai Chongxi's massacre of the Guangxi Miao people are indeed the most recent "rewards" granted by the Guomindang. In addition, the ruling class within the national minorities themselves, consisting of those such as princes, living buddhas, lamas, and headmen, have colluded with Chinese Guomindang warlords<sup>99</sup> and brought to the broad toiling masses of these nationalities even more severe oppression and exploitation. Or else they (in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, for example) have directly surrendered to the imperialists, leading the imperialists to colonize these areas rapidly and further to plunder the working masses.<sup>100</sup> Such is the reality of the lives of the national minorities in the past and at present.

The Soviet Government firmly opposes all domination and plunder of national minorities by imperialists and Guomindang warlords. Article 14 of the "Outline of the Constitution," promulgated by the First National Soviet Congress in November 1931, states:

The Soviet Government of China recognizes the right to self-determination of the national minorities within China's borders, to the point of each nationality seceding from China and establishing its own independent, free state. All peoples such as the Mongols, Muslims, Tibetans, Miao, Li, and Koreans who live within China's borders may, according to a decision based on each nationality's own will, join the Chinese Soviet Federation, secede from the Soviet Federation, or establish their own autonomous regions. At present, the Chinese soviet régime must do its utmost to assist these small and weak nationalities in freeing themselves from the oppressive rule of the imperialists, Guomindang warlords, princes, lamas, local headmen, and others, and enable them to achieve complete liberation. The soviet régime should develop among these nationalities their own national cultures and languages.<sup>101</sup>

This is a resounding reply to the barbarous colonial policies toward the nationalities carried out by the imperialists of the whole world (including the

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98. The Moscow edition lists in addition here "turbaned Muslims of Xinjiang and Muslims of Gansu."

99. The Moscow text has here "... colluded with British and Japanese imperialism and Guomindang warlords."

100. In the Moscow edition, this sentence reads as follows: "Or else they (princes, living buddhas, lamas, and headmen) have directly surrendered to the imperialists, leading the imperialists to colonize these areas (such as Tibet and Inner Mongolia) rapidly and further plunder the masses."

101. For the full text of the "Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic," adopted on November 7, 1931, including a slightly different translation of Article 14, see Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 552-56.

Chinese Guomindang). The broad masses of China's workers and peasants and their Soviet Government are not only themselves waging a resolute war of national revolution to throw off the imperialist yoke, but are also calling upon all small and weak nationalities in the country to free themselves at the same time from the yoke of the Chinese ruling class and imperialists, until these nationalities have attained complete separation and independence. Article 15 of the Outline of the Soviet Constitution states, once again:

The Chinese soviet régime offers the right of asylum within the soviet areas to all revolutionary fighters of the various Chinese nationalities, and of all the countries in the world, who suffer persecution by reactionary rulers because of revolutionary activity; it will, moreover, assist them in recovering their fighting strength all the way until total victory of the revolutionary movements of these nationalities and countries is achieved.

The truth of this soviet declaration has been proven by the residence in the soviet areas of many revolutionary Korean, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese comrades; the attendance of Korean delegates at the First National Soviet Congress; and the participation in this congress of several delegates from Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam.<sup>102</sup>

Common revolutionary interests have wholeheartedly united the Chinese working masses and the working masses of all national minorities.

National oppression is based on national exploitation. Overthrowing this system of national exploitation will replace national oppression with a free alliance among nationalities.

This is possible, however, only with total victory of the Chinese soviet régime. Helping the Chinese soviet régime to win victory throughout the country is likewise the responsibility of all national minorities.

***V. The Concrete Fighting Tasks of the Soviets in Thoroughly Smashing the Fifth<sup>103</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression" and Striving for the Victory of the Revolution Throughout the Country***

Having addressed the current situation, the soviet régime's struggles against imperialism and "Encirclement and Suppression" over the past two years, and the basic policies carried out by the soviets, it is time we drew a definite conclusion, which is that the soviet movement has taken great strides forward. The victories of the soviet movement over the past two years have clearly changed the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves. The enemy's vacillation and collapse have accelerated, whereas the soviet movement is developing vigor-

102. The Moscow edition adds "Java" here.

103. The Moscow edition has "Sixth."

ously. The revolutionary forces have grown in strength and the revolutionary positions have been further consolidated. The national war and the revolutionary civil war are going on in the vast areas of China, and the Red Army has become an invincible force. The foundation of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants has been established. Soviet construction work has achieved great results in all fields. The unified leadership of the Soviet Central Government has not only built a solid foundation in the soviet areas, but has also become the revolutionary banner of the broad masses in the areas under Guomindang rule. All these things have become the facts of life today and the undeniable, objective reality.

The advance of the revolution, however, demands that we take into account other circumstances, and that we examine with a thoroughgoing spirit of self-criticism the weaknesses on the revolutionary front. This is our unshirkable duty.

In taking into account our weaknesses, it must first of all be clearly understood that although the areas in which the soviets have achieved victory are vast, in relation to the country as a whole they are still quite small and are located in economically rather backward places. The counterrevolutionaries still retain their huge areas and still occupy all the important cities. As a consequence, the task of winning victory for the soviets throughout the country by striving for victory first in one or several provinces falls most seriously upon our shoulders.<sup>104</sup> The increasingly intensified life-and-death struggle between the two political régimes requires that we exert all our efforts to solve this problem and permits not even a trace of complacency to remain in our revolutionary ranks, nor even the slightest feeling of fatigue to manifest itself.

Second, although the anti-imperialist movement of the people of the whole country has been unfolding widely over the past two years and the Soviet Central Government has also achieved considerable success in leading the anti-imperialist movement, in view of the gravity of the current national crisis and the serious task of halting imperialist invasion and Guomindang surrender and betrayal, it is clear that the presently developing anti-imperialist fighting forces remain extremely inadequate. The soviets have not yet made use of very many methods to inspire the nationalist awareness and class consciousness of the broad masses, or to organize a people's anti-imperialist struggle. And even in the anti-imperialist struggles arising spontaneously among the masses, the direct assistance and leadership of the Soviet Government is still extremely inadequate. In the vast White areas, the soviets have not yet fully assumed their responsibility for organizing and leading the struggle of the workers against the bourgeoisie and the struggle of the peasants against the landlords. Even in the Guomindang areas surrounding the soviet areas, the greatest possible efforts have not been made to organize mass struggle so that conditions are created for transforming these areas swiftly into soviet areas, so that the Red Army fighting in these areas gets the benefit of

104. The Moscow edition omits here "by striving. . . several provinces."

more concerted actions on the part of the local masses, and especially to create a situation in which White army soldiers stage uprisings in resonance with the actions of the Red Army.

Third, although the Red Army is rapidly growing in numbers and improving in quality, it has nonetheless fallen far short of fulfilling the great tasks of defeating the entire military power of the imperialist Guomindang and winning national victory for the revolution. The work of expanding the Red Army in the rear is still unable to meet the demands of the front. The organization and training of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers are still very poor in many places. The organization and actions of guerrilla troops are generally inadequate. Many places have done a very poor job of giving preferential treatment to the families of Red Army soldiers. All this has limited the development of the revolutionary war to its past achievements and prevented us from making direct advances upon the heels of victory in breaking through each of the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns and achieving even greater victory.

Fourth, faced with the task of giving all for the war, we have still been unable to adjust all soviet work completely to the demands of the revolutionary war. Weaknesses exist whether we are talking about the land struggle, the workers' struggle,<sup>105</sup> economic construction, finance, the campaign to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, or culture and education. To point out these general weaknesses is to say that the revolutionary war demands that such work should achieve great successes with the greatest possible rapidity, yet the actual accomplishments are quite uneven in different places. Many localities have actually attained the standard of what is called the highest speed and the greatest possible achievements, and the work in these places has provided tremendous assistance to the revolutionary war. In other places, however, not only has the work been carried out very slowly, but even after a very long time, they have not been able to achieve the results that should have been attained. In some new areas and border areas in particular, the work is even worse. The main reason for this sort of situation is the existence within the soviet organs in these areas of some elements who fail to understand or even refuse to carry out soviet laws, orders, and policies. Some among these elements are serious opportunists and bureaucrats, and some are simply spies sent by the landlords and bourgeois. They do not advance the work of the soviets, but rather obstruct it. Instead of making the work of the soviets serve the war, they divorce it from the war. They refuse to promote mass struggle and instead have called a halt to it. In carrying out the work of the soviets, they have never mobilized the broad masses nor engaged in persuasion or education of the masses, but have made use of empty talk and empty shouting or even the bureaucratism of coercive orders. Instead of going to find out the situation at the grassroots level or going to educate new cadres or

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105. This item is omitted from the list in the Moscow edition. Perhaps it was thought that there were no workers in the soviet areas.

going to solicit opinions from the masses, all they do is opportunistically slander lower-level cadres as unfit and condemn the masses down there as lacking in revolutionary zeal. In these places, soviet democracy has not been fully developed, the broadest masses have not been drawn in to participate in soviet elections, and large numbers of activists from among the masses have not been drawn in to take part in soviet work. The system of city and township deputies' congresses has not yet been properly established in these places, and the soviets have yet to become the true political organs of the broad masses themselves. For these reasons, much of the work of the soviets in these places has failed to achieve the results it should have and cannot meet the urgent demands of the revolutionary war. It should be clearly pointed out that this is a most serious weakness in the work of the soviets.

The existence of all these weaknesses provides us with a profound warning: only by overcoming these weaknesses can the soviet movement adjust to all favorable objective conditions and develop on a larger scale and with a broader scope.

We already have great strength, which has become the foundation of our development. But the needs of the revolutionary situation go beyond our powers, which are inadequate and which must be augmented.

In order to smash thoroughly the "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang and win victory for the revolution throughout the country, the Second National Soviet Congress must call upon all revolutionary masses of the soviet areas and the whole of China to carry out resolutely the following concrete fighting tasks:

#### ***A. With Regard to Building Up the Red Army***

Further strengthen the leadership of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission over the Red Army throughout the nation so that the actions of the Red Army all over the country may be better coordinated and synchronized with each other under unified strategic thinking, and so that military organs in various places may be more able to carry out their own tasks fully under central leadership.

Spread widely and deeply among the broad toiling masses of workers and peasants in all soviet areas and all over China the slogan of expanding to create a million-man iron Red Army. Call upon the masses to struggle for realization of this minimal slogan within the shortest period of time. The masses should be made to realize that the decisive struggle for victory or defeat between the soviet régime and the Guomindang régime, and the direct and extensive confrontations between the soviet régime and imperialism that are before us depend upon our creation of a great Red Army millions of men strong. Therefore, the initial creation of a million-man Red Army is the sacred duty of the soviets and of every worker and peasant member of the masses. The Central Revolutionary

Military Commission and local soviets at all levels should be responsible for gathering the rich experiences of expanding the Red Army in various areas over the past two years, and especially since the Red May of last year. It should be emphatically pointed out that having thoroughgoing political agitation replace coercive methods; having ruthless class struggle and soviet laws and orders in this respect used to deal with class-alien elements and bad elements who undermine the expansion of the Red Army and take the lead in desertion; and having all soviet laws, orders, and measures for granting Red Army soldiers and their families preferential treatment fully implemented so as to raise the social status of Red Army soldiers, to provide more psychological comfort for Red Army soldiers and their families, and to resolve all material difficulties in the lives of Red Army soldiers and their families, are all important methods of expanding the Red Army. It should be pointed out as well that cultivating the land for Red Army families and supplying them with daily necessities are important parts of the work of preferential treatment. All elements with a passive attitude toward the work of giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers and their families and who feign compliance should be punished under soviet law.

Consolidation of the Red Army should be given priority in building up the Red Army, so that the Red Army may not only expand rapidly but grow stronger very fast as well. Political education of Red Army soldiers should be stepped up further so that every Red Army soldier will conscientiously fight to the end for a soviet new China, so that the Red Army becomes the propagator and organizer for the soviets and carries out the creation of new soviet areas, and so that there may develop closer ties between Red Army soldiers and the toiling masses of workers and peasants in the broad soviet areas and White areas. The conscientious discipline of the Red Army should be enhanced through political education, so they understand that this is an important weapon with which to ensure victory in the war. The political commissar system should be set up in all Red Army units, local units, and guerrilla detachments. More people with worker backgrounds should be promoted to positions as military and political commanders at all levels. Red Army schools should be made more capable of training large numbers of high-level and lower-level military and political cadres than they were in the past. Attention should be paid to checking family backgrounds in the Red Army, and heavy blows should be dealt to attempts by landlord and bourgeois elements to sneak into the Red Army and undermine it from within. The work of consolidating the Red Army and making it an iron army is equally as important as political work, and what the Red Army urgently needs at present is the raising of military skills. Faced with daily expansion of the scale of the war and the imperialist Guomindang army's constantly increasing use of new military techniques, the accomplishment of this task becomes of the utmost importance for us. The slogan of "learn and improve new military skills" should be deeply ingrained in every Red Army soldier, and Red Army schools should make their greatest efforts toward this goal.

The new organizational methods used for Red Guards and Young Pioneers should be introduced in all parts of the soviet areas, and all laboring youth and adult men and women should be armed. Every member of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers should be made to understand clearly the role and responsibilities of the Red Army reserve forces and local defense troops. Propaganda on the need for and role of conscription in the even larger-scale civil war in the future should be appropriately disseminated, starting now, among all toiling masses and members of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers. Great efforts should be made in carrying out all possible and necessary military and political training. Camping and exercise techniques should be introduced as much as possible within the Red Guards and Young Pioneers in all localities. With enemy attacks and attempts to stir up trouble by exploiting elements in the soviet areas, the Red Guards and Young Pioneers should be given extra responsibility for defending the local areas, and the occurrence in many places of relaxing the Red martial law should be quickly redressed. One of the best ways to expand the Red Army is to get whole companies and teams of model Red Guards and Young Pioneers to join the Red Army, and to reorganize these contingents as soon as they have been so mobilized. Red guerrilla forces in the new areas, border areas, and White areas are indispensable to Red Army fighting and play the role of one of its great detachments. Strengthening and expanding the existing guerrilla forces; multiplying new guerrilla forces as widely as possible; gathering the rich experience of past guerrilla warfare; greatly strengthening education and guidance as regards guerrilla tactics; moving hundreds and thousands of guerrilla detachments into White areas and into the enemy's sides and rear; attacking the enemy and developing mass struggle in those places; creating guerrilla areas and even new soviet areas, especially doing this work in all the soviet areas that are not yet connected with each other; and coordinating actions with those of the Red Army's main force are all the very urgent tasks of the soviets.

All measures should be used to safeguard the supply and transport of Red Army provisions. Soviet financial and economic organs and supply, transportation, and medical units in the military system should make efforts toward this common objective. Past shortcomings in the mobilization of transportation teams should be overcome so that the Red Army's movements and combat are not hampered by a shortage of transport personnel. All sacrifices and all efforts devoted to the war are the duty of every soviet staff worker and every revolutionary element.

### ***B. With Regard to Economic Construction***

In order to break down the enemy's blockade, resist the manipulation of unscrupulous merchants, secure the needs of the revolutionary war, and improve the lives of the masses of workers and peasants, the soviets must carry out in a planned way all sorts of necessary and possible economic construction.



First and foremost is the development of massive agricultural production in the soviet areas. The soviets should use all measures to raise enthusiasm for production on the part of the peasant masses. During various important phases of the farming season such as spring plowing, summer plowing, and the autumn harvest, every opportunity should be used to carry out a widespread universal movement to raise production and to mobilize all the rural masses to enter the production front together. To organize labor mutual aid associations and cultivation teams on a wide scale, regulate the rural labor force in a planned way, and mobilize the broad masses of women to take part in production are all important ways to expand production. The peasants should be guided and helped in solving specific and significant problems in agriculture such as farm cattle, farm tools, fertilizer, seeds, water conservancy, and pest control. Farm cattle cooperatives should be formed everywhere. In view of the experiences of last year's movement for spring and summer plowing, "completely eliminating wasteland" and "increasing this year's harvest by 20 percent" should become the battle slogans. Cotton-growing experience should be gathered, and cotton production developed in the soviet areas. A movement to plant trees should be launched, calling upon each person in the countryside to plant ten trees. The soviets should pay attention to the growth of animal husbandry. Regarding certain important agricultural sectors such as grain, cotton, and so on, the Central People's Commissariat for the National Economy and the various provincial departments of the national economy should draw up specific implementation plans. The Soviet Food and Grain Commissariat, Food and Grain Adjustment Bureau, and mass food and grain cooperatives should establish close working relations and strive toward totally guaranteeing food and grain supplies for the Red Army and the masses.

The recovery of the broad handicraft industry in the soviet areas and the establishment of a military essentials industry are important tasks of soviet economic construction. Soviet plans for the recovery and development of industry should be based on the needs of the war, the needs of the masses in the soviet areas, and the possibility of export to White areas. Tungsten ore, coal, iron, lime, farm tools, tobacco, paper, cloth, sugar, medicine, salt, camphor, timber, and so on should be the main sectors. Great efforts should be made to develop production cooperatives of the masses in these industries, and as much as possible, unemployed workers, independent laborers, and peasants should be organized into the production cooperatives. At the same time, investment by private capitalists should be allowed and encouraged, to expand production of these things in the soviet areas. The soviets should not attempt to monopolize all production enterprises at present, but to set up and develop some specially needed and specially beneficial state-owned enterprises is something that might be done and, indeed, should be done. Raising enthusiasm for work, promoting production competitions, and rewarding those who have made remarkable achievements on the production front are all important methods of increasing production.

Breaking down the enemy's economic blockade, developing the soviet areas' trade with the outside, and exchanging surplus goods produced in the soviet areas (rice, tungsten ore, timber, tobacco, paper, etc.) for industrial goods from the White areas (table salt, cloth, kerosene, etc.) are pivotal to developing the national economy. The Soviet Bureau of External Trade and the various commercial organs must be further strengthened. At the same time, rewarding private commerce allows them to make efforts for the import and export of various necessary commodities. The extensive development of consumer cooperatives and organization of the broad masses of workers and peasants into these cooperatives make it possible for the masses to purchase necessities from the White areas at reasonable prices and sell goods produced in the soviet areas at high prices. Thus they occupy an especially important position in soviet trade and economic construction as a whole. Soviet leadership of the Central General Association and the various provincial and *xian*<sup>106</sup> general associations of consumer cooperatives should be greatly strengthened. In places where provincial and *xian* general associations have not yet been established, they should be set up quickly.

The solution to the problem of capital in economic construction lies primarily in absorbing capital from the masses and organizing the masses into production, consumer, and credit cooperatives. Attention should be paid to the development of credit cooperatives, so that after usurious capital is overthrown they may take its place. Absorbing the capital of the masses into the building of state enterprises; developing external trade; aiding cooperative enterprises and other projects by means of public economic construction bonds, bank shares and deposits, and so on, are also important measures. Within the scope of soviet laws, private capitalists should be encouraged as much as possible to make investments so that capital in the soviet areas may be more flexible. Soviet banks should be given the fullest play possible. Based on the principle of the needs of the market, issuing appropriate amounts of paper currency, gathering savings deposits from the masses, making loans to profitable production enterprises, readjusting in a planned manner the entire finances of the soviet areas, and leading the mass cooperatives in struggle against speculative merchants are all tasks of the banks.

### *C. With Regard to Construction of the Soviets*

The establishment of the Soviet Central Government provided the nationwide soviet movement with an overall leading organization, which is of tremendous significance to the Chinese revolution. Over the past two years it has won great and glorious victories in leading the struggle against imperialism and the

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106. In the Moscow edition, *xian* is omitted here.

Guomindang. We must point out that the Central Government still has many imperfections and deficiencies in its own organization and work. In order to strengthen the Central Government's overall leadership of the soviet areas and the nationwide revolution, the work of the Central Executive Committee must be separated from that of the Council of People's Commissars, the organization and work of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee must be improved, and the staffs of the various people's commissariats must be further strengthened and their methods of work reformed. Additional people's commissariats must be established as necessary, such as the Commissariat for Food and Grain, and so on, so that in the face of further development of the revolutionary situation, the Central Government can fully play its role as overall driving force.

Provincial soviets are the highest leading organs of local political power and are the connecting links between the Central Government on the one hand and the various *xian* and district soviets on the other. The Central Government's leadership over the provincial soviets must be greatly strengthened, communication made closer between the Central Government and the provincial soviets (various provinces within the Central Area and various provinces outside the Central Area), and inspection of the work of the provincial soviets done strictly. Great efforts must be made to improve the working methods of the provincial soviets and to institute a system of collective discussion, precise division of labor, and individual responsibility. Inspection of the work of *xian* soviet areas must be intensified, and great efforts made to correct past manifestations of laxity and lack of focus in the work of some soviets.

Township and city soviets are the basic soviet organizations, and therefore the greatest efforts must be made to improve the work of township and city soviets. In all places where the system of deputies' congresses has not yet been set up, this system should be instituted. The work of deputies' conferences in the various localities must be further strengthened and their presidiums should be established, as well as many committees under them. In fact, the committee system should be introduced in the villages, and large numbers of worker and peasant activists drawn in to participate in the work of the committees. A system should be established whereby each deputy has a relationship with a certain number of residents. A system of responsibility should be set up in which each village has a deputy responsible for the work of the whole village, and he should be allowed to call meetings of the villages's deputies and residents to discuss the work of the village. Township and city soviets are the organs directly responsible for mobilizing the masses to carry out the work of the soviets. The heart of their work is how to mobilize the masses of the whole city and whole township most effectively and fully to struggle for the successful realization of every task and all work of the soviets. Township, city, and district soviets must pay the greatest attention to the

actual work in the villages and neighborhoods. They must carry out a system of periodic inspection of village and neighborhood work. Competitions in revolutionary work between various villages and neighborhoods are effective methods of achieving greater speed in the work. Practical and rapid improvements in township, city, and district soviets depend upon correct and concrete leadership by district and city soviets. District and city soviets should focus all their attention on improvements in the work of the various township, city, and district soviets. Ample explanation, frequent tours and check-ups, effective inspection, and tests among the masses are key leadership methods for district and city soviets. These same standards should be used in the *xian* soviets' inspection of the work of district soviets as well.

The provincial soviets must devote a great part of their attention to the newly developed soviet areas, and regard as their own important duty the work of establishing and strengthening revolutionary committees in the new areas. The organizational form and the content of the work of these revolutionary committees are different in many aspects from those of city and township soviets. All White areas that are transformed into soviet areas should go through the process of establishing revolutionary committees. Therefore, all provincial soviets and *xian* soviets in the new areas and border areas should pay a great deal of attention to perfecting the organization and work of the revolutionary committees and enabling them to shoulder the tasks of arming the masses, launching a mass struggle, and eliminating reactionary forces, and to proceed rapidly to the establishment of soviet political power. Although soviet democracy has been developing, it should be pointed out that it is still extremely inadequate in many respects. A harsh struggle against bureaucratism must be waged so as to get rid of all the trash that stands between the soviets and the masses. This trash is bureaucratism and commandism. Soviet staff members should carry out the work of the soviets through mobilizing and persuading the masses, not by means of coercion and orders. Soviet staff workers should pay attention to every request and suggestion of the masses, and should not take lightly such requests and suggestions. Soviet staff workers, and worker-peasant inspection committees in particular, should involve the broad masses in carrying out extensive criticism and struggle against bad elements within soviet organizations, to the point of harshly punishing them according to soviet laws so as to ensure good relations between the soviets and the masses. For the purpose of improving the composition of the soviets, it is necessary to carry out massification of soviet elections. The significance of elections must be explained to the masses, and the greatest possible number of voters drawn in to participate in the elections. All class-alien elements and all corrupt, wasteful, and bureaucratic elements must absolutely be barred from elections. Large numbers of worker and peasant activists should be elected to manage the affairs of state. Here, according

to the stipulations of the Election Law, an important link in improving the work of the soviets is to involve large numbers of worker cadres and strengthen the leading position of workers in soviet political power. For the purpose of massification of soviet work, the soviets must establish close ties with trade unions, poor peasant associations, representative conferences of women workers and peasants, cooperatives, and all other sorts of mass organizations, and carry out the work of the soviets by mobilizing the broad masses through these organizations.

With a view to striving for speed and quality in soviet work and making all soviet work serve the demands of the revolutionary war, it is necessary to make great efforts to eliminate laxity and a lackadaisical attitude on the part of soviet staff members, to enhance greatly the work enthusiasm of soviet staff workers, and to make each staff member conscientiously exert himself in working for the state, the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. At the same time, work discipline must be tightened. Harsh struggle should be waged against all elements such as those who are unenthusiastic about work and those who take lightly, neglect, or shirk their duties and treat soviet work as unimportant, to the point of firing them from their jobs. Corruption and waste must be opposed, for these phenomena are not only financially and economically harmful to the soviets, but also constitute factors that are liable to corrupt soviet staff workers and undermine their enthusiasm for work and high morale. It is necessary to put forward to every soviet staff worker the slogans "All work must serve the war" and "Strive for speed and quality in work." In this regard, the main people in charge in the soviets at all levels, and the worker-peasant inspection committees in particular, should conduct thoroughgoing persuasion and education work among soviet personnel.

Responsibility for thoroughly and faithfully carrying out soviet laws, orders, and policies should be shifted onto the shoulders of the entire soviet staff. Violations of soviet laws, orders, and policies, first and foremost violations by soviet personnel themselves, should be subject to severe penalties.

The Labor Law must be fully applied, and each article of the Labor Law explained to the broad masses of workers. The institution of the eight-hour day and the stipulation of a minimum wage are its central and minimal provisions to safeguard the workers' interests. Labor inspection units and labor courts must be made to play their full roles. Firm struggle must be waged against staff members who neglect the interests of workers and attempt to compromise with capitalists. Concrete and timely relief must be provided to unemployed workers, and unemployment relief committees must be organized wherever there are unemployed. A system of social security must be adopted and effectively administered wherever it is possible to do so. Due attention must be paid to the work of the Social Security Bureau, and past mistakes in some places with regard to the disbursement of insurance money must be avoided. To carry out these tasks fully, the

Soviet Commissariat for Labor should be strengthened and it should develop close relations with trade unions.

One of the central tasks of the soviets is to carry out fully the Land Law and all regulations and orders concerning the land struggle, and to unfold the broad agrarian revolution on a nationwide scale. The struggle to confiscate the land of the landlord class and big private owners should be initiated emphatically and forcefully in all areas that are newly incorporated into the soviet domain. Much past experience in methods of land redistribution should be gathered and generally applied in all new areas. The Land Investigation Movement should be unfolded wherever the issue of land has yet to be completely settled so as to eliminate rapidly the remnants of feudal forces in those places. A correct class line and adequate mass work are prerequisites for ensuring thorough victory of the land revolution.

To carry out soviet cultural and educational policies, unfold a cultural revolution on soviet territories, arm with communism the minds of the masses of workers and peasants, raise the cultural level of the masses, institute a system of compulsory education, and further mobilize the forces of the masses in the revolutionary war are, likewise, important tasks for the soviets.

The soviet policy of punishing exploiters and suppressing counterrevolutionaries must be resolutely carried out. The State Political Security Bureau and the soviet courts must heighten their vigilance and impose harsh punishment and suppression on exploiting class elements who violate soviet laws and all elements who engage in counterrevolutionary activities. In this regard, massification of the work of the Political Security Bureau and the soviet courts and mobilization of the broad masses to engage in the struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries are crucial.

The general direction of soviet work is to strive for speed and quality and to have all soviet work completely conform to the demands of the revolutionary war.

#### ***D. With Regard to Leading the Struggle Against Imperialism and Work in the White Areas***

In order to oppose resolutely imperialist aggression, promote vigorously the struggle of workers and peasants nationwide, and enlarge the soviet areas throughout the country, the Soviet Government must strengthen its leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle all over the country and the revolutionary struggle of workers and peasants in the Guomindang areas. Passivity in this regard amounts to indulging imperialism's gangster aggression, prolonging the life of Guomindang reactionary rule, and restricting the speed and scope of development of the soviet areas. The Soviet Central Government and the various provincial soviets must project their vision into the vast Guomindang areas. Not only

should they lead every spontaneous anti-imperialist movement of the masses, they should also make use of every concrete incidence of imperialist aggression and Guomindang surrender and betrayal of China to inspire the people's national awareness and class awareness among the broad masses of workers and peasants and the petty bourgeoisie, and call upon them to become organized and armed so as to fight for the expulsion of imperialism and the defense of China's territory. Particularly in areas under attack by the Japanese imperialists such as the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, Chahar, North China, and so on, people's armies and volunteer armies should be organized and the old volunteer armies should be guided to shake off the reactionary influence of the Guomindang and resolutely fight against Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Government must provide all possible moral and material support to every anti-imperialist strike of the workers and every anti-imperialist struggle of the peasants and petty bourgeoisie.

The soviets must use all possible means to organize, aid, and lead the workers' struggle against the bourgeoisie and the peasants' struggle against landlords<sup>107</sup> in the Guomindang areas. All soviet staff workers should understand that it is necessary to pay tremendous attention to the White areas if we are to extend the soviet movement throughout the country; to create the conditions for transforming into soviet areas the Guomindang areas, which are several times larger than the soviet areas; to create new soviet areas; and to be able to gain the support of the masses in the White areas during the struggle against the massive "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang. People must be sent out from the soviet areas to prepare all necessary material support and to organize and lead the mass struggle in the White areas. Passivity in this respect amounts to passivity toward expansion of the soviet areas and development of the revolutionary war. Particularly in Guomindang areas near soviet areas, the masses are under the greatest influence of the soviets and suffer the greatest oppression of Guomindang military slavery, state monopoly on table salt, and so on. The soviets, especially the various governments in provinces, border *xian*, and border areas, must make use of every sort of opportunity to establish links with these masses, organize their daily struggles, and develop them into guerrilla warfare and mass uprisings until the newly established soviet areas are joined together with the old soviet areas. Here the work on the borders between the soviet areas and the White areas should be viewed as extremely important. In these areas, the soviets (or revolutionary committees) and guerrilla forces must strictly adhere to basic soviet policies, and all arbitrary beating of local despots without distinguishing between classes is forbidden. Property confiscated from the landlord class and reactionaries must be distributed to the local masses in large quantities. Furthermore, excellent solutions must be applied, according to

107. The Moscow edition inserts here: "and all mass revolutionary people's struggles against imperialism and the Guomindang."

the class line and the mass line, to the problem of the opposition between Red and White, the problem of flight by the masses, the problem of the blockade on table salt, the problem of masses struck by disaster, and so on. The causes of the opposition between Red and White and flight by the masses must be eliminated. Improvement of the work in border areas is an important link in turning White areas into soviet areas. (End of speech, followed by thunderous applause.)<sup>108</sup>

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108. The Moscow edition inserts two final paragraphs here, as follows:

Comrades! We of the soviets and the Red Army are shouldering the heavy responsibility of saving the Chinese nation from doom. If we are to fulfill this responsibility, we must accomplish the tasks raised and stipulated by the Second National Soviet Congress. At the same time, as the comrades all know, the victory of the Chinese soviet revolution represents not only the liberation of China's 400 million people, but also the precursor to all the oppressed nations of the East throwing off the shackles of imperialism, a fatal blow to the plan by Japanese imperialism and other imperialisms to wage an imperialist world war in the Pacific, destruction of the plan by Japanese imperialism and other imperialisms to attack the Soviet Union from the eastern front. It will bring the moment of victory for the world proletarian revolution very much closer. How great and glorious is our task!

Comrades! Forge ahead! Final victory belongs to us! (End of speech, followed by thunderous applause. All representatives rise to welcome Comrade Mao Zedong and for the joyful singing of the *Internationale*.)



## ***Conclusions Regarding the Report of the Central Executive Committee<sup>1</sup>***

(January 27, 1934)

*Comrades! You have already been discussing for two days the report I gave on behalf of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. During the last two days, at yesterday's group discussions and today's plenary session, the comrades have expressed many opinions and recounted experiences and the lessons to be learned from them in every aspect of our work. On the whole it can be said that my report has been unanimously accepted. With regard to the present situation, the tasks to which this situation gives rise, various aspects of the application of soviet policies in the past two years, and the weaknesses that exist in our work, in yesterday's and today's discussions the comrades generally agreed with my report. It should be pointed out first of all that the remarks made by the comrades have been, on the whole, extremely correct.*

*I should, however, also point out in my conclusion that during the last two days' discussions, yesterday and today, and primarily during yesterday's group meetings, the remarks of some of the comrades contained incorrect views. Here the opinions have mainly to do with the Fifth<sup>2</sup> "Encirclement and Suppression." On this matter, most of the comrades have agreed with what I said in my report: that we have won preliminary victory with regard to the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," but that the decisive battle against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" still seriously confronts us, and that calling upon the broad masses, uniting all forces, and striving for victory in the final battle against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" are the most important tasks now facing us. Therefore, for comrades to have ventured an opinion during the discussion such as that "the Fifth 'Encirclement and Suppression' has already been thoroughly smashed" is obviously incorrect. There were other comrades who*

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As with the previous document, our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 283–94, where it is reproduced from *Hongse Zhonghua*, Special Issue no. 5, January 31, 1934, on the Second National Soviet Congress. It is likewise included in the volume produced in Moscow in 1934 entitled *Zhiyou suweiai nenggou jiu Zhongguo*.

1. In the revised version included in the *Selected Works*, the title of this text is "Be Concerned with the Well-being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work."

2. As in the previous text, the Moscow edition has "Sixth" here and throughout these conclusions.

said that "we are only in the process of preparing to smash the 'Fifth Encirclement and Suppression'," and such an opinion is incorrect as well. The first view overestimates our own victory, and casually cancels the soviets' serious task of finally smashing the "Encirclement and Suppression," whereas in fact Chiang Kaishek is gathering all his forces to mount a large-scale final offensive against us. This sort of estimate is, therefore, wrong and also very dangerous. The second view obscures the fact that for the last few months the Red Army has, through arduous battles, dealt rather heavy blows to the enemy and has already won a preliminary victory. This victory, combined with the great victory of smashing the Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," lays a solid foundation for our thoroughly smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." Underestimating one's own achievements is also very dangerous.

One comrade said of the<sup>3</sup> People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian Province that it is somewhat revolutionary and not totally counterrevolutionary. Such a view is also wrong. I have already pointed out in the report that the appearance of the People's Revolutionary Government is a part of the reactionary ruling class, and a new trick to deceive the people in an attempt to save themselves from their doom. They regard the soviet as their foe, but the label of the Guomindang, on the other hand, is too foul, so they fabricate a so-called People's Revolutionary Government and make an appeal for a third road. Fooling the people this way has no revolutionary significance whatsoever, as the current facts have already proved.

Another comrade said some wrong things at a group meeting. He claimed that the soviets had not actually expanded the Red Army, nor did they have any guerrilla forces, and that the peasants should still pay rent to the landlords. Such talk is, of course, utter nonsense, and I think merits no explanation. Yet another comrade said that all staff workers in Fujian are opportunists. This likewise deserves no explanation, as I believe that everyone knows it to be erroneous. We admit that opportunists who are out there making trouble do exist among some soviet staff members and that we should wage resolute struggle against such elements. Remarks like those of this comrade, however, constitute slander against the soviets.<sup>4</sup>

With regard to the question of marriage, I mentioned in the report that if either the man or the woman firmly requests a divorce, the Soviet Government should permit a divorce. It should be pointed out, however, that families of Red Army soldiers constitute an exception. In order to strengthen the Red Army soldiers' determination to fight, the Central Government has stipulated that when the wife of a Red Army soldier requests a divorce, she must obtain her husband's agreement. Only when she has not heard from her husband for two years may the wife unilaterally request a divorce. As for the question of mar-

3. The Moscow edition inserts here "so-called."

4. The preceding paragraph is omitted in the Moscow edition.

*riageable age, many comrades advocate lowering it. I think this suggestion is inappropriate. In the interests of the race and the class, marriageable age should not go below twenty for men and eighteen for women. It should be understood that early marriage has extremely harmful effects. Comrades! You need to have patience! (Audience bursts into laughter.) Under the rule of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the past, some poor workers and peasants were unable to marry even at the age of forty or fifty, so why is it impossible to wait now for even one or two years? (Audience again bursts into laughter.)*

*The above is part of my conclusion, but the main part of the conclusion is yet to follow.*

There is one very important question<sup>5</sup> that the comrades have failed to stress during the discussion, *which is the question of linking the lives of the people with the revolutionary war. This issue has not been emphasized in yesterday's or today's discussions, and I feel that this question should be clearly raised.*<sup>6</sup>

The central task of the soviets<sup>7</sup> is to mobilize the broad masses to take part in the revolutionary war, overthrow the imperialist Guomindang<sup>8</sup> by means of such war, spread the revolution throughout the country, and drive imperialism out of China. *Leading and organizing the revolutionary war is the central task of the soviets.* Anyone who does not attach enough importance to this task or is unclear about this task is not a good soviet<sup>9</sup> staff worker. *A good soviet staff worker should see this central task very penetratingly and clearly.* If we<sup>10</sup> really comprehend this task, *understand that developing the revolutionary war is our most basic and urgent task, and understand that the revolution must at all costs be spread throughout the country, then we<sup>11</sup> should in no way ignore or underestimate the question of the immediate interests, the well-being of the broad masses. Why is this so? It is because the war<sup>12</sup> is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses and by relying upon them. For this reason we must place the task of war before the broad masses. Only by mobilizing the masses on a huge scale to participate in and support the war can we win victory in it.*

If the soviets<sup>13</sup> only mobilize for war<sup>14</sup> and do nothing else, however, can

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5. There is one very important question → There are two questions

6. The revised edition inserts a separate line here: The first concerns the well-being of the masses.

7. The central task of the soviets → Our central task at present

8. The imperialist Guomindang → Imperialism and the Guomindang

9. Soviet → Revolutionary

10. We → Our comrades

11. We → They

12. The war → The revolutionary war

13. The soviets → We

14. Mobilize for war → Mobilize the people to carry on the war

victory in the war be won?<sup>15</sup> *My answer is, No, it cannot.*<sup>16</sup> If we want to win, a great deal more must be done. We must *enforce the soviets' basic decrees, protect the interests of the broad masses, lead the workers in their economic struggles, limit exploitation by the capitalists, lead the peasants' struggle for land and distribute the land to them, heighten the peasants' enthusiasm for labor and increase agricultural production, establish cooperatives,*<sup>17</sup> develop trade with outside areas, and [solve] the problems facing the masses. All the practical problems in the everyday life of the masses such as the problems of clothing, food, shelter, fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, illness and hygiene, and marriage are *important matters that should claim the soviets'*<sup>18</sup> attention. If the soviets attend to these problems, *discuss them, solve them, and satisfy the needs of the masses, they shall really become the organizers of the well-being of the masses, and the masses will truly rally round the soviets and give them their warm support. Comrades, at that time, will the soviets be able to call upon the people to take part in the war and ask the masses to sacrifice everything for it? My answer is, Yes, absolutely.*

Here are *some of the kinds of things we have found among our soviet organs*:<sup>19</sup> Some soviet staff members<sup>20</sup> talk only about expanding the Red Army, dispatching laborers,<sup>21</sup> collecting the land tax, and selling bonds. As for other things, they are neither discussed nor attended to, and are even ignored altogether. For example, there was a time when the Tingzhou Municipal Soviet Government concerned itself only with the expansion of the Red Army and with mobilization for the transport corps, and paid not the slightest attention to the well-being of the masses. The problems facing the people of Tingzhou were that they had no firewood, no salt was on sale because the capitalists were hoarding it, some people had no housing *while the houses of the local tyrants had not yet been distributed to the masses*, and rice was both scarce and dear. These were practical problems for the masses of Tingzhou and they eagerly looked to the Soviet Government for help in solving them. Yet the Tingzhou City Soviet<sup>22</sup> did not discuss any of these matters. That is why when the new Tingzhou City Soviet<sup>23</sup> was elected, a hundred or more deputies were unwilling to attend because several meetings had discussed only expansion of the Red Army and mobilization for the transport corps, entirely ignoring the well-being of the

15. Can victory in the war be won? → Can we succeed in defeating the enemy?

16. No, it cannot. → Of course it cannot.

17. The revised version inserts here: "safeguard the interests of the workers"

18. The soviets' → Our

19. Our soviet organs → Our staff workers

20. Some soviet staff members → They

21. Dispatching laborers → Enlarging the transport corps

22. Tingzhou City Soviet → Tingzhou Municipal Government

23. Tingzhou City Soviet → Council of workers' and peasants' deputies

masses, so that in the end even the council of deputies could not be convened. The result was that very little was achieved with regard to expanding the Red Army and mobilizing for transport. That was one kind of situation. *But comrades*,<sup>24</sup> you have probably *all* seen the pamphlets given you about two model township soviets.<sup>25</sup> There the situation is entirely different. A great number of people have joined the Red Army from Changgang Township in Jiangxi and Caixi Township in Fujian! In Changgang, 80 percent of the young men<sup>26</sup> have joined the Red Army, and in Caixi the figure is 88 percent. There has been a big sale of bonds as well, and 4,500 *yuan* worth were sold in Changgang Township, which has a population of 1,500. Much has also been achieved in *all* other fields of mobilization for war. What accounts for this? *Take a look at the attention they paid to the actual lives of the masses.* Here are some examples.<sup>27</sup> In Changgang when fire broke out in a poor peasant's house and destroyed one and a half rooms, the township soviet<sup>28</sup> appealed to the masses to contribute *six strings* of cash to help him. In another instance, three people were starving, so the township soviet and the mutual-aid association immediately came to their rescue by donating rice. During the food shortage last summer, the township soviet obtained rice from *Shuinan, Futian, and other places in Gonglue xian*, more than 200 *li* away, for the relief of the masses. Excellent work was done along these lines in Caixi as well. Such soviets are really models. They are absolutely different from the Tingzhou City Government with its *opportunistic and bureaucratic leadership*.<sup>29</sup> We should learn from Changgang and Caixi townships and oppose the bureaucratic leaders<sup>30</sup> in Tingzhou City!

I earnestly suggest to this congress that we pay close attention to the well-being of the masses, from the problems of land and labor to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil, and salt. The women *comrades* want to learn plowing and harrowing. Who can be found to teach them? The children want to go to school. Have *Lenin* primary schools been set up? The wooden bridge over there is too narrow and people may fall off. Should it not be repaired? Many people suffer from boils and other ailments. What will be done about it? All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on each soviet's<sup>31</sup> agenda. They should be discussed, resolved, acted on, and the results monitored. The broad masses should be made to realize that the soviets represent their interests and that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs. We should help them to

24. In the revised version, a new paragraph begins here.

25. Township soviets. → Townships.

26. Young men → Young men and women

27. Here are some examples. → A few examples will make the point clear.

28. Township soviet → Township government. In subsequent occurrences in this document, "soviet" is also changed to "government."

29. Leadership. → Methods of leadership.

30. Leaders → Leaders like those

31. Each soviet's → Our

proceed from all this to *support for the soviets* and an understanding of the higher tasks that the soviets have put forward, the tasks of the revolutionary war and spreading the revolution throughout the country so that they will respond to the political appeals of the soviets and fight to the end for soviet victory.<sup>32</sup> The masses in Changgang Township say, "*The soviets, the Red Army, and the Communist Party are really good! They have thought of everything on our behalf.*" What a model is the Changgang Township Soviet,<sup>33</sup> and how admirable it is! They have won the genuine affection of the broad masses, who support their call for war mobilization. *Just look! Eighty percent of the able-bodied males in Changgang Township have gone to the front!* Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do we want them to devote their strength to the war?<sup>34</sup> If so, we must be with them, arouse their enthusiasm and initiative, be concerned with their well-being, work earnestly and sincerely in their interests, and solve all their problems—the problems of salt, rice, housing, clothing, and *even* the problem of childbirth. If we do so, the broad masses will surely support the soviets and regard the soviets<sup>35</sup> as their very life, their most glorious banner. In the event of a Guomindang attack on the soviets<sup>36</sup> the broad masses will fight the Guomindang to the death. There can be no doubt about this, for is it not a plain fact that the First, Second, Third, and Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns have been smashed?

The Guomindang is now pursuing a policy of blockhouse warfare, feverishly constructing their "tortoise-shells" as though they were iron bastions. Comrades, are they really iron bastions? Not in the least! Think about the palaces of the feudal emperors over thousands of years. Were they not powerful with their walls and moats? Yet they fell one after another the moment the masses arose. The tsar of Russia was one of the world's most ferocious creatures,<sup>37</sup> yet when the proletariat and the peasantry rose up in revolution *and the broad masses broke out in rebellion*, was there anything left of him? No, nothing. What about his bastions of iron? They all crumbled. Comrades, what is a true bastion of iron? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the soviets.<sup>38</sup> That is the true iron bastion which no force can smash, no force whatsoever. The counterrevolution cannot smash us; on the contrary, we shall smash it. Rallying millions upon millions of people around the Soviet<sup>39</sup> Government and expanding *on a tremendous scale* our revolutionary war, we shall wipe out all counterrevolution and take over the whole of China!

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32. Soviet victory. → Victory of the revolution.

33. Soviet → Staff members

34. War? → Front?

35. The soviets → The revolution

36. Soviets → Red areas

37. Creatures → Rulers

38. Soviets. → Revolution.

39. Soviet → Revolutionary

*I shall now address the second important issue, which I feel should likewise be raised emphatically before the conference. This second question concerns methods of work. The soviets are the leaders and organizers of the revolutionary war as well as the leaders and organizers of the life of the masses. To organize the revolutionary war and to improve the life of the masses are our tasks and our goals. We must not only talk about such tasks and goals but carry them out in practice as well. In this respect we are faced with the serious problems of leadership style and methods of work. We must not only set tasks and clarify goals, but also solve the problem of how to carry out the tasks and reach the goals. If our aim<sup>40</sup> is to cross a river, it cannot be done without a bridge. Unless the bridge problem is solved, it is idle to speak of crossing the river. Unless the problem of work method is solved, talk about the task is useless. Unless attention is paid to giving leadership to the work of expanding the Red Army and particular care is devoted to methods, we could<sup>41</sup> recite the phrase "expand the Red Army" a thousand times, morning until night, day after day, the way monks keep chanting "Amitabha, Amitabha," and the result will still be Amitabha, with no Red Army to show for it (laughter). Has there been this kind of situation in our soviet work? Yes! In fact, quite a lot of it! Let's take a look at Ruijin and Fujian. In Ruijin, the crash campaign to expand the Red Army was worthy of our praise. Under the direct leadership of the Central Bureau and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, within a month and a half beginning on December 1 they recruited close to four thousand soldiers. Because they used correct methods, conducted a struggle against opportunism and bureaucratism, and waged a mass-based class struggle, they could accomplish such achievements and become the top winner in the crash campaign throughout the soviet areas to expand the Red Army. And Fujian, on the other hand? The results in more than ten xian in the whole province only matched those in the single xian of Ruijin, and even that result depended upon a change in work methods under the direct leadership of the Central Bureau over the last two weeks. With bureaucratic leadership like that in December, they could not even have matched the single xian of Ruijin. As for the case of Ruijin, four thousand were recruited over the last forty-five days, whereas during the month of August last year only thirty people came in. Bureaucratic leadership on one hand and conscientious, pragmatic leadership on the other have thus produced results that are as far from each other as the sky from the earth. To speak again of the December crash campaign in Ruijin, several districts such as City District, Xiaoxiao District, and Huangbai District barely achieved anything at all in the first half of the month because they were under bureaucratic leadership, but after the crash campaign team leader was replaced and the work methods were modified, in the second half of the month they not only fulfilled the whole month's quota but even*

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40. Aim → Task

41. We could → We will never succeed even though we

*exceeded it by a hundred percent. This is the way it was in expanding the Red Army. Let us now look at the sale of public bonds. When Ruijin had sold all its bonds and collected the whole 240,000 yuan, how was it in our xian of Yudu? Under opportunistic and bureaucratic leadership, they sold only 19,000 yuan, and of the 190,000 yuan worth of bonds they took on to sell, over a hundred thousand's worth are probably kept to this day in the trunks of those bureaucrats. In the one township of Changgang, 4,500 yuan worth were sold, with an average of each person buying 3.8 yuan worth. If all townships were to do as in Changgang, then twelve million's worth could be issued in the Central Area alone. But what if all did as in Yudu xian? Then even one million's worth could not be sold. Does this not show that the problems of leadership style and work methods have taught us a serious lesson? In other fields, such as the Land Investigation Movement or economic construction or culture and education or work in the new areas and the outlying districts, in all soviet work, if all that is done is to put forward the tasks without attending to leadership when carrying them out or attending to work methods, without initiating a movement against opportunism and against bureaucratism, without dispensing with empty talk and idle sloganeering and instead adopting practical and concrete methods, and without discarding commandist methods and adopting the method of patient persuasion, then no task whatsoever can be accomplished.*

*The comrades working in Xingguo and the broad masses there have done a first-rate job and deserve our solemn praise as model soviet workers. Similarly, the comrades working in northeastern Jiangxi and the broad masses there have created good results and are also models of soviet work. The comrades working in both these places have linked up the well-being of the masses with the revolutionary war, and are simultaneously solving [the problems of] work methods and of revolutionary tasks. They are working conscientiously, solving problems with minute care, and shouldering their revolutionary responsibilities in earnest; they are truly the organizers and leaders both of the revolutionary war and of the well-being of the masses. They are the most honorable leaders of soviet work. Elsewhere, too, people have made progress in their soviet work and likewise deserve praise from the conference, as in some parts of the xian of Shanghang, Changting, and Yongding in Fujian; in some parts of Xijiang and other xian in Guangdong-Jiangxi;<sup>42</sup> in some parts of the xian of Chaling, Yongxin, and Ji'an in Hunan-Jiangxi; in some parts of Yangxin in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi; in districts and townships of many other xian in Jiangxi; and in the xian of Ruijin, which is directly under [the Central Government].*

*We should point out, however, that soviet work in some places has not been satisfactory. With regard to the work in these places, we should heighten our revolutionary vigilance to the utmost in the spirit of self-criticism. For instance, in many places in Fujian-Jiangxi, Guangdong-Jiangxi, and Hunan-Hubei provinces, numerous weaknesses still exist in soviet work. Similarly, Fujian and*

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42. Guangdong-Jiangxi → Southern Jiangxi



*Hunan-Jiangxi lag far behind Jiangxi and Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi. In the leadership of the Fujian Provincial Soviet, for example, there is serious bureaucratism. The working personnel in many of these places have bad relations with the masses. They still do not understand that the revolutionary war should be closely linked to the well-being of the masses, or that they ought to make efforts to learn the art of leading the masses. They still do not understand that without good methods of work there is absolutely no way to accomplish one's tasks, or that all soviet work should be fully in concert with the revolutionary war. A thorough change should be made in the work of these areas after the Second All-Soviet Congress. The congress should sternly censure those people who know nothing of the situation at the lower levels and fail to understand the feelings of the masses, who can only engage in empty talk and meaningless sloganeering, and even resort to coercion and commandism in handling soviet work, particularly those who are seriously opportunistic and bureaucratic. Their viewpoints and methods are absolutely wrong and they are obstructive to soviet work and harmful to the revolutionary war. They should immediately transform themselves. In these places<sup>43</sup> there are undoubtedly many active cadres, excellent comrades who have sprung from the masses. These comrades have a responsibility to<sup>44</sup> carry out rigorous self-criticism with regard to those opportunists and bureaucrats, guide them and help them in quickly correcting their mistakes, and purge from the soviets those elements who obstinately refuse to change. We are in the midst of a great revolutionary war; we must break through the enemy's large-scale "Encirclement and Suppression" and spread the revolution to all parts of the country. All soviet staff workers have a tremendous responsibility. After this congress we must adopt effective measures to improve our work. The advanced areas should become even more advanced and the backward areas should catch up with the advanced ones. We must create thousands of townships like Changgang and scores of *xian* like Xingguo. They will be our forward positions.<sup>45</sup> From these positions that we have occupied we shall go forth to smash the enemy's "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns and overthrow the rule of the imperialist Guomindang<sup>46</sup> throughout the country, and to bring about victory of the revolution throughout all of China! (Loud applause.)*

*This brings to a close the conclusion regarding the report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars. Other issues I have addressed in the report and shall not repeat at this time. This is the end of my conclusion. (Thunderous applause.)<sup>47</sup>*

43. In these places → In all the places under our leadership

44. In the revised edition, the rest of this sentence reads as follows: "... help in places where our work is weak and to help comrades who are not yet able to work well."

45. Forward positions. → Strongholds.

46. The imperialist Guomindang → Imperialism and the Guomindang

47. Moscow edition inserts here: "All present rise to welcome Chairman Mao and sing the Internationale."

# *Report On Emergency Mobilization*

(January 29, 1934)

At 1:00 on the afternoon of the 29th, it was originally scheduled for Comrade Lin Boqu to make a report on soviet economic construction. Because it was learned, in an urgent dispatch on enemy movements, that Chiang Kaishek had launched a three-pronged attack against the Soviet Area, the presidium decided to shorten the duration of the meeting and designate Chairman Mao to make a report to the congress. Chairman Mao finished his report in about thirty minutes and enormous excitement swept over the congress. The report on economic construction was then given. The following is a summary of Chairman Mao's report:

In the last two days we have received news from the front that the counterrevolutionary Chiang Kaishek has already defeated the Nineteenth Route Army of Fujian. Those gentlemen of the so-called People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian have also fled. Now Chiang Kaishek is aggressively launching a massive attack against the Soviet Area. According to the information of the past two days, Chiang Kaishek's plan is to launch a massive attack against the Soviet Area along three routes, which are the eastern, central, and western routes. The eastern route force, starting from Shaxian in Fujian, is to attack our territories of Guihua, Qingliu, and Quanshang, in an attempt to occupy Shicheng and Ruijin; Jiang Dingwen is its commander-in-chief. The central route force, starting from Lichuan, is to advance toward our soviet area in Jianning. The battle [there] has been especially fierce during the last two days. Their objective is to occupy our territories of Jianning, Guangchang, and Bosheng. Chen Cheng is the commander-in-chief. The western route force is to start from Yongfeng and go through Xingtian and Shaxi, with an attack on our territory of Xingguo as its objective. Xue Yue is the commander-in-chief.

A correct estimate of the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against us has been reached in the reports and discussions of the past few days. We have won the initial victory in smashing the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." But the final decisive battle of the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" lies before us. This estimate of ours has been proved to be completely correct by the facts. The urgent task at the moment is to mobilize all

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This report was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, Special Issue no. 6, February 1, 1934, on the Second National Soviet Congress. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 205-8, where it is reproduced from this source.

available resources to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and rout the enemy's three-pronged attack completely. We have the support of the broad masses; we have a strong Red Army; we have the correct orientation laid down by the Second All-Soviet Congress. We hold in our hands the assurance of smashing the enemy's attack. But we must devote the greatest efforts to carrying out many urgent tasks. The first task is to expand the Red Army. We should continue the experience of the shock mobilization movement in December last year and in the first half of January, and learn from the glorious examples of *xian* like Ruijin, Xingguo, and Xijiang in the expansion of the Red Army. If we want to defeat the enemy's three-pronged attack, we must make every effort to expand the Red Army. Second, we must impose Red martial law.<sup>1</sup> The work of Red martial law is extremely important in the face of the enemy's massive attack. Third, we must put down counterrevolutionary activities. Landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists are certain to seize the occasion offered by the enemy's three-pronged attack to carry out their activities and attempt to act as the Guomindang's agents from within. We should raise our class vigilance and keep a close watch for conspiratorial activities by reactionary elements everywhere and at all times. Fourth, strengthen the walls and clear the fields<sup>2</sup> in areas the enemy is about to attack, so that the enemy will not get a single grain of rice to eat or find a single guide. Fifth, mobilize transportation teams to go to the front to carry the wounded and captured goods. Such teams should be ready at all times to move whenever they are needed. Sixth, collect food and ensure supplies for the Red Army. We should mobilize the masses to complete the sale of treasury bonds and collect the rice used to purchase the bonds; we should get the rice in lieu of the land tax to the soviets immediately. We should economize to help finance the war. Seventh, in order to smash the enemy's three-pronged attack, we must mobilize the entire personnel of the soviets, mobilize them for battle. In order to intensify our work, we should call on the broad masses of workers and peasants to unite closely around the Soviet Government and devote all their energy to helping fight the war, so as to smash thoroughly the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang! (Applause.) This time, the imperialist Guomindang is committing all its forces to the attack on us. We should exert every effort to respond to them. We must unite as one to deal with the enemy; we must conduct propaganda and agitation everywhere among the masses, and tell every male comrade, every female comrade, every old comrade, and every young comrade, so that they may understand their responsibilities and unite closely to smash the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"! (Applause.)

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1. Regarding the meaning of *chise jiefan*, here translated "Red martial law," see above, the relevant note to the text of March 20, 1931.

2. The traditional expression *jianbi qingye*, translated literally here, implies action to strengthen defense works, evacuate non-combatants, and hide provisions and livestock. Regarding the history of the term, and the Central Committee's criticism of Mao for his usage of it, see above, the relevant note to the text of July 4, 1931.

We have already smashed the enemy's First, Second, Third, and Fourth "Encirclement and Suppression," and won initial victory in the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." We have gained much experience. We have gone through many storms. We are not children without any experience and incapable of weathering storms. We should collect the experience of past victories, in order to struggle for the complete destruction of the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"! (Applause.)

We must sternly oppose any rightist opportunism of panic, pessimism, wavering, retreat, and flight in face of the enemy's attack! (Applause.)

We must oppose even more any "leftist" opportunism, which downplays the gravity of the war and neglects the work of mobilization! (Applause.)

We must unite as one and seek the complete victory of thoroughly smashing the enemy's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression"!

Make great efforts to expand the Red Army!

Intensify Red martial law!

Carry out strengthening the defenses and clearing the fields!

Mobilize transportation teams to go to the front!

Gather food and ensure supplies for the Red Army!

Let all the work of the soviets support the revolutionary war!

Strive for the victory of the new Soviet China!

Long live Soviet China!

Long live the Red Army!

Long live the ever-victorious Red Army!

Long live the Chinese Communist Party! (Thunderous applause.)

# *Decision by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

(January 1934)

The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic completely agrees with Comrade Zhang Wentian's report on the foreign policy of the soviets. It approves all the steps taken toward the Nineteenth Route Army of Fujian and the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian by the presidium of the previous Central Executive Committee and by the Council of People's Commissars. It has also approved the issuance of the following three important documents.<sup>1</sup>

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic      Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen      Xiang Ying  
                                 Zhang Guotao

January [ ], 1934<sup>2</sup>

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This document was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 149, February 14, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, p. 209, which reproduces this version.

1. The items in question were "Preliminary Agreement on Opposing Japan and Chiang [Kaishek]," October 26, 1933; "First Telegram from the Interim Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army," December 20, 1933; and "Second Telegram from the Interim Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and the People's Revolutionary Army," January 13, 1934. The first of these three documents was not negotiated or signed by Mao, and is therefore not included in this volume. It can be found in Saich, *Rise to Power*, pp. 605-6. The other two texts are translated above.

2. The date is left blank in the text as published in *Hongse Zhonghua*.

## *Closing Address at the Congress*

(February 1, 1934)

Comrades! After eleven days, our congress has reached a completely successful and victorious conclusion! (Applause.) We have already decided upon the policy and plans for the victory of the revolution in all China! (Applause.) The victory of the revolution in all China is in our hands! (Applause.) We will smash the "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang and overthrow the imperialist Guomindang. Our policy and plans have already been decided! (Applause.) The problem now is that we must carry out this policy and these plans 100 percent! We must have the courage to carry them out resolutely; we must have the courage to do it. We must raise the enthusiasm of the entire personnel of the soviets for their work. We must heighten the activism of the broad masses. Our responsibility is very great. We must assume the burden placed on us by the congress, which is a great revolutionary task. We must enthusiastically, resolutely, and courageously assume this burden and march forward. We must definitely carry this burden to our goal! (Applause.) Thoroughly smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," overthrow the imperialist Guomindang, and strive for the victory of the revolution in the whole country! Victory to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the whole country! Victory to the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants in the whole country! These are our goals. We must assume the burden entrusted to us by the congress and carry it to this destination. We will assuredly reach this destination and reach it quickly! (Applause.)

But when the burden of the revolution has been carried to this destination, will that be the end? Is the workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship our final goal? Comrades! It is not the end, nor is it the final goal. The burden of the revolution must be carried farther still. Today we are going to point out this destination. It is the socialist revolution of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must not only complete the democratic revolution, but also transform the revolution into the socialist revolution of the future! We must not only overthrow the rule of the imperialist Guomindang and destroy the landlord class. We must also start to prepare now, prepare so that in the future, when the appropriate time

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comes, we can destroy the capitalist system, destroy the system of exploitation of man by man, and in the end, as the Soviet Union is now doing, finally enter communism, apply the principle of from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs, and enter the freest, brightest, and greatest world. Only when that time comes will there be final liberation for mankind and final victory for mankind!

The Second National Soviet Congress comes to a close today. We must fulfill our responsibility; we must bravely carry forward the great task of the revolution and strive for our final victory!

Long live the soviets!

Long live the victory of the revolution!

Long live the victory of the revolution in all China!

Long live the victory of the revolution throughout the world!

Long live socialism!

Long live communism!

(Cheers and applause that shake the entire hall.)

## *Notice No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

(February 3, 1934)

The Second National Soviet Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic formally opened on January 21, 1934, in the Red capital of the Soviet Area. The congress drew to a completely successful conclusion after eleven spectacular days. The congress summed up the experience of the soviet movement in China during the past two years, pointed out the ultimate historical mission for which the soviets must struggle in the future, and discussed in concrete terms important problems such as building the Red Army, economic construction, and the construction of the soviets. It also passed the amended Soviet Constitution, and resolutions on the above important issues. Finally, the congress elected the following 175 persons to membership of the Central Executive Committee:

Bo Gu, Chen Shaoyu, He Kequan, Liu Shaoqi, Mao Zedong, Xiang Ying, Wu Liangping, Qu Qiubai, Zhou Yuelin, Jin Weiying, Huang Fagui, Xie Yuqin, Li Fuchun, Xie Mingren, Xiao Shibang, Lin Guosong, Huang Changjiao, Cai Chang, Zhong Baoyuan, Lou Mengxia, Zhang Jizhi, Xu Dazhi, Zeng Shan, Zhong Changtao, Liu Qiyao, Zhong Xunren, Li Zhuoran, Liu Guangchen, Xie Xiansi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Bocheng, He Chang, He Changgong, Teng Daiyuan, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Dong Zhentang, Liu Bojian, Huang Su, Cai Shufan, Nie Hongjun, Wang Ruchi, Wan Yongcheng, Chen Guang, Xun Huaizhou, Luo Ruiqing, Zhang Chunqing, Zhou Jianping, Zhou Kun, Yue Shaohua, Chen Ajin, Yuan Guoping, Ye Jianying, Chen Yi, Bi Shiti, Chen Hongshi, Xiao Ke, Kong Helong, Zhu Rui, Liu Chouxi, Xu Yan'gang, Chen Changhao, Xu Xiangqian, Zhang Guotao, Zhang Qinqiu, He Long, Guan Xiangying, Xia Xi, Song Baimin, Wang Weizhou, Luo Binghui, Hong Shui, Cai Gan, Zhang Ranhe, Yu Hongwen, Wang Shitai, Pan Shizhong, Jiang Asan, Zhang Guanyi, Gu Dacun, Zheng Zhenfen, Zhu Qi, Gao Junting, Zhan Yijin, Zheng Weisan, Wang Fengming, Cheng Fangwu, Guo Shushen, Zhang Desan, Zhu Weiheng, Gu Zuolin, Shao Shiping, Huang Dao, Zhu Zhaoxiang, Kong Shu'an, Liu Xiao, Zhong Shibin, Fu Caixiu,

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This notice was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 148, February 12, 1934. It is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 297-300, but that version contains a few wrong characters, so we have preferred to translate from *Hongse Zhonghua*.



Zhou Yikai, Liu Minghui, Xiong Xianbi, Liu Guozhu, Zhong Guixin, Luo Mai, Chen Xiangsheng, Lin Boqu, Liu Qunxian, Hu Hai, Fan Lechun, Zeng Hongyi, Wu Ziyuan, Zhang Taihe, Huang Yizhang, Zhang Dingcheng, Li Jianzhen, Wu Lanfu, Wu Bixian, Qiu Xianying, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, Wang Shengrong, Deng Fa, Chen Tanqiu, Pan Hannian, Huang Jiagao, Zhang Yunxian, Zhang Jinlou, Zhou Shaowen, He Zhenwu, Chen Shouchang, Huang Guangbao, Tan Yubao, Liu Shijie, Wang Zhen, Kuang Biao, Peng Renchang, Ren Bishi, Wu Defeng, Wang Xiuzhang, Xiong Guobing, Yu Hongyuan, Li Weihai, He Wei, Li Xiannian, Zeng Guanglan, Zhou Guangkun, Li Chengjia, Chen Ziqian, Fang Zhimin, Yu Hanchao, Huang Wansheng, Wang Jinxiang, Guan Ying, Tu Zhenrong, Guan Chunxiang, Wu Yuzhang, Zhu Diyu, Yang Qixin, Deng Zhenxun, He Shuheng, Gao Zili, Liang Botai, Xu Teli, Ruan Xiaoxian, Deng Yingchao, Dong Biwu, Zhao Yun, Wang Xianxuan, Luo Ziming, Yang Shizhu, and Lai Meiyu.

In addition, the following thirty-six persons were elected alternate members of the Central Executive Committee: Yang Binglong, Xie Zhenfu, Qiu Shifeng, Deng Yaosheng, Dong Changsheng, Liu Yi, Li Meiqun, Zou Zhongcai, Xu Shunheng, Xu Mingfu, Ye Degui, Deng Zihui, Zhu Rongsheng, Jia Yuan, Feng Xuefeng, Li Yimang, Li Kenong, Zhang Aiping, Luo Ronghuan, Li Xifan, Yan Liji, Yin Rengui, Liu Yanyu, Fang Jinghe, Xie Binghuang, Zhong Yijin, Huang Fuwu, Fang Zhenhua, Zou Dunhou, Liao Hanhua, Long Chunshan, Hua Xinxian, Zhou Guixiang, Kuang Zhuquan, Deng Ping, and Kang Keqing.

The Central Executive Committee is therefore composed of the 211 full and alternate members. It is the supreme organ of political power after the conclusion of the National Soviet Congress.

On February 3rd, the Central Executive Committee convened its first meeting and unanimously elected a seventeen-member presidium comprising the following members as the supreme organ of authority after the conclusion of the meeting: Mao Zedong, Xiang Ying, Zhang Guotao, Zhu De, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Lin Boqu, Deng Zhenxun, Zhu Diyu, Deng Fa, Fang Zhimin, Luo Mai, and Zhou Yuelin. It also designated Mao Zedong as the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, with Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao as vice-chairmen.

At the same time, it also elected Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu) as the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Under the Council of People's Commissars the following eleven commissariats were established as the central administrative organs:

Wang Jiaxiang is appointed people's commissar for foreign affairs;

Zhu De is appointed people's commissar for military affairs;

Deng Zhenxun is appointed people's commissar for labor;

Gao Zili is appointed people's commissar for the land;

Lin Boqu is appointed people's commissar for finance;

Wu Liangping is appointed people's commissar for the national economy;

Chen Tanqiu is appointed people's commissar for food;  
 Liang Botai is appointed people's commissar for judicial affairs;  
 Zeng Shan is appointed people's commissar for internal affairs;  
 Qu Qiubai is appointed people's commissar for education;  
 Xiang Ying is appointed people's commissar for the worker-peasant  
 procuratorate.

The meeting also elected Zhu De chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang vice-chairmen of the same commission. It appointed Yuan Xiaoxian director of the Central Auditing Committee. It also appointed Dong Biwu chief justice of the provisional supreme court.

The Central Executive Committee, in addition to accepting all the fighting tasks assigned to it by the Second National Soviet Congress, also calls on all those comrades working in the soviets to mobilize immediately, intensify their efforts, mobilize the largest number of workers and peasants possible, unite closely around the Soviet Government, concentrate all our forces, and wage a revolutionary war to struggle for the complete destruction of the imperialist Guomindang's Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" and for the victory of the soviets throughout China!

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Proclamation of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic Regarding the Fujian Incident***

(February 11, 1934)

Popular masses of all China!

The so-called People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian finally fell because of Chiang Kaishek's military intervention, as well as the capitulation and betrayal by the leaders of the People's Revolutionary Government.

After they suffered a serious blow from the Eastern Army of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army last year in Liancheng and northern Fujian, the leaders of the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian realized that temporary concessions to the soviets and the Red Army had become necessary conditions for them to maintain their strength and their rule. At the same time, the bankruptcy of the rule of the Guomindang, which is selling out the country and injuring the people, the daily increasing wrath against and resistance to the imperialist Guomindang by the thousands upon thousands of worker and peasant masses across the country, and their sympathy and support for the anti-imperialist and anti-Guomindang soviets and Red Army, gave the bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords of the Guomindang Provincial Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army at that time no alternative but to seek a new form of rule other than the old form of rule of the Guomindang, in order to maintain the rule of the landlord and bourgeois classes as a whole.

The bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords of the Provincial Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army first sent a special envoy, Xu Minghong, to the Central Soviet Government at that time, expressing their willingness to accept the three conditions announced by the Central Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission, to wit: (1) an immediate end to attacks against the soviet areas, (2) an immediate guarantee of such rights as freedom of speech, assembly, association, and strikes for the popular masses, and (3) the immediate arming of the popular masses and the immediate establishment of an

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armed volunteer army to defend China and fight for China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

The Soviet Government fully understood this attempt by the bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords of the Provincial Guomindang Government of Fujian. No empty words can deceive the leaders of the Soviet Government. On the other hand, the Soviet Government, in accordance with its own declaration, is willing to provide practical encouragement and assistance for any anti-imperialist and anti-Chiang effort. Therefore, at that time, when the representatives of the Fujian Provincial Government and the Nineteenth Route Army had acceded to all our demands and conditions, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, in accordance with its basic revolutionary stand, signed an initial agreement with them. At the very beginning, the leaders of the Soviet Government told the representatives of the Fujian Provincial Government and the Nineteenth Route Army that the Chinese nation could be saved from enslavement only by firmly mobilizing and supporting the broad masses in their revolutionary struggle against Japan, the imperialists, and Chiang, arming them, and granting them all democratic freedoms and rights. Any deceptive reformist propaganda could only serve as an auxiliary instrument of the imperialists and the Guomindang.

After the representatives of the Provincial Government of Fujian and the Nineteenth Route Army signed the initial agreement with the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, they declared that they had broken with the Guomindang and established their so-called People's Revolution. They announced a few items of a "leftist" reformist program and openly issued a proclamation opposing the Nanjing Guomindang government and Chiang Kaishek. But these were nothing but words. In reality, they continued as before to collude with the Japanese and American imperialists and make up to them. They kept silent about the provocations from Japanese *rōnin* in Fuzhou, but as for granting democratic rights to the popular masses and arming the popular masses, they categorically refused to make good, under the pretext that it was a time of military emergency. Not only did they have no concrete methods for improving the lives of the workers, the peasants, and all the toilers, but on the contrary they did everything they could to prohibit workers from participating in strike struggles and peasants from participating in struggles to resist the landlords and seize the land. In military affairs, they also adopted a completely defeatist line. In the face of Chiang Kaishek's active assaults, they took no concrete military countermeasures at all in advance, and repeatedly capitulated and sold out afterward. Their betrayal extended from Situ Fei and Teng Qixiu to Shen Guanhan, Mao Weishou, Qu Shounian, and Zhang Yan. Warlords of the Nineteenth Route Army, such as Jiang Guangnai and Cai Tingkai, retreated without putting up a fight and surrendered to the warlords of Guangdong to protect their own skins. Many other bureaucrats and politicians, such as Chen Mingshu, Chen Youren, and Huang Qiyu, did nothing but make empty speeches

all day long to deceive the popular masses. But as soon as they heard gunfire, they fled like panic-stricken chickens and dogs to the legations and warships of the imperialists to save their own lives. Although our Red Army, in order to support their war against Chiang, took vigorous action in northern Fujian, from occupying Shaxian to attacking Youxi, this proved to be useless assistance to this gang of scoundrels who were frightened out of their wits.

In accordance with the preliminary agreement, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army repeatedly warned the People's Revolutionary Government, pointing out that Chiang Kaishek's military attack could be defeated and Japanese imperialism truly opposed only by honoring every clause of the agreement and unleashing the revolutionary struggles of the broad popular masses. But the warnings of the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army entirely failed to get the attention of the bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords of the People's Revolutionary Government. They were hostile to the popular masses and were in no way different from other Guomindang bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords. As a result, exactly as we pointed out, this People's Revolutionary Government ended its fifty-odd days of tragic life when confronted with Chiang Kaishek's arms.

Popular masses of all China! You can see clearly, from the preliminary agreement signed by the Soviet Government and the People's Revolutionary Government, and from the telegrams of the Soviet Government, how the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army have been struggling without the slightest vacillation to oppose the Japanese imperialists and their running dog Chiang Kaishek and to achieve the complete liberation of the Chinese nation. All the facts prove that only the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army constitute the anti-imperialist vanguard that can liberate China from the iron heels of imperialism and the Guomindang. All the reformist factions, from the Producers' Party of the Masses<sup>1</sup> to the Social Democrats, to the Third Party, and all the way to the Liquidationists of Trotsky and Chen Duxiu, are no more than yes-men of the imperialist Guomindang, and the accomplices of the imperialist Guomindang in opposing the revolutionary masses of China!

The Central Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission once again proclaim to the popular masses of all China, to revolutionary soldiers and officers, and to all armed forces: the Soviet Government will never abandon the proposals contained in the joint combat agreement signed under the three conditions because of the defeat of the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian and because of the failure by the bureaucrats, politicians, and warlords in the People's Revolutionary Government to honor the agreement. On the contrary, the Fujian Incident enables every worker, every peasant, every soldier, every intellectual, and every Chinese who opposes Japan to see more clearly that

1. The reference is to the short-lived Producers' Party (*Shengchandang*), organized at the end of 1933 by Chen Mingshu and some of his close associates in the People's Revolutionary Government in Fujian. On this obscure episode, see Eastman, *Abortive Revolution*, pp. 111-12.

the Soviet Government is willing to unite with all forces that oppose imperialism and the Guomindang, not in words but in deeds, in order to fight for the independence, freedom, and liberation of the Chinese nation. All those forces that can genuinely resist Japan and oppose Chiang, the imperialists, and the Guomindang may receive strong guidance and support from the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. But the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will continue ruthlessly to attack and expose all the counterrevolutionary reformist groups that attempt to use empty promises and deceptive propaganda to maintain the rule of the imperialists and China's landlords and bourgeoisie. Popular masses throughout China, the history of the tragic defeat of the People's Revolutionary Government of Fujian once again points out that only your own heroic and resolute struggle can finally overthrow the rule of the imperialist Guomindang and guarantee China's independence, freedom, and territorial integrity. The victorious and successful experience of the tens of millions of toilers in the extensive soviet areas in China tells you that only the soviet path can secure national and social liberation for the popular masses of the entire country! When you oppose the attacks of the imperialists and the Guomindang against the soviet areas, when you defend the Chinese soviets, you are also defending the Chinese revolution and safeguarding your own victory!

Anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist forces of all China, unite!

Smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang!

Down with the Japanese and all imperialists!

Down with the treasonous Nanjing Guomindang government and all Guomindang governments!

Long live anti-imperialist Soviet China!

Chairman of the Central Government    Mao Zedong

Chairman of the Revolutionary  
Military Commission

Zhu De

## ***Order “Central No. 5” of the Central Executive Committee***

(March 20, 1934)

Xiong Xianbi, former chairman of the Yudu *Xian* Soviet, has played a leading role in, and covered up for, embezzlement, appropriating public money for private purposes to engage in business and seek profit. Since Xiong is a member of the Central Executive Committee, in addition to authorizing the Council of People's Commissars to remove him from office as soviet chairman, he is hereby expelled from the Central Executive Committee and handed over to the Supreme Court for punishment.

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

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## *How Should We Carry Out the Work of the Township Soviets?*

(April 10, 1934)

The township soviets (as well as the city soviets<sup>1</sup>) are the basic soviet organizations. They are the level of the soviets that is closest to the masses. They are the organs that directly lead the masses in carrying out various revolutionary tasks of the soviets. Under conditions of civil war, the work of mobilization for war is extremely intense, and the standard of living of the masses must be further improved. Consequently, it is extremely important to make every effort to improve the work of the township soviets (and of the city soviets), and to perfect the organization and leadership of the township soviets, so that they will be capable of developing the revolutionary war effectively, and of meeting the demands of the masses for an improvement in the quality of their lives. The orientation of our efforts to improve the work of the township soviets should be directed toward getting as close as possible to the broad masses, to calling forth as much as possible the activism and creativity of the masses, and to mobilizing the masses to the greatest possible extent to carry out the tasks of the soviets, as well as doing so as rapidly as possible, thus fully conciliating the work of the soviets, the revolutionary war, and the satisfaction of the needs of the masses. Such is the principle guiding the work of the soviets. Right now, there are a great many township soviets in our soviet areas that are able to follow this principle. They have created many good organizational forms and work methods. But there are many other township soviets that are violating this principle or not entirely conforming to it. Therefore it is absolutely essential, on the basis of this principle, to understand the concrete regulations laying down how the work of the township soviets should be carried out, so that every soviet staff member has a set of common criteria for carrying out his actions.

In the last analysis, how is the township soviet supposed to carry out its work? It should do so in accordance with the following regulations.

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1. *Shi suweiai*. The character “shi” used here can mean either city or town. Although there were no substantial cities in the Red areas at this time, the system of local government in the Chinese Soviet Republic made a clear distinction between “township soviets” in predominantly rural areas, and “city soviets,” with “urban districts” under them. See below, in the Appendix, the “Temporary Organizational Law for Local Soviets” of December 12, 1933.



## I. The Work of the Presidium of the Township Soviet

A. The presidium is composed of seven people in a large township and five in a small township. They are elected by the conference of deputies. Only the most enthusiastic and the most capable people are to be elected.

B. The presidium is the supreme executive organ of the whole township when the conference of deputies is not in session. It should carry out unwaveringly the decisions and directives of the conference of deputies and of higher-level soviets. It should actively lead the work in the whole township.

C. The presidium must understand how to grasp firmly the central tasks at any given time and raise these tasks for discussion at the conference of deputies. It should never become engrossed in trivial matters and thereby lose sight of the central tasks.

D. In order to ensure the success of meetings of the presidium, the full-time members should do their work earnestly and conscientiously. Laziness and carelessness are not to be tolerated, and coercion and commandism should be completely eliminated.

E. The presidium must know the circumstances in every village, understand the characteristics of every village, and pay attention to the difficult problems among the masses of every village. In the light of the concrete situation and peculiar characteristics of every village, it should push forward the work in each village and solve the difficult problems of the masses in each village.

F. In order to ensure that the work in every village progresses rapidly, due emphasis should be placed on pressing the chairmen and vice-chairmen of each village to pay attention to the conference of village deputies, as well as to mass rallies and small unit grass-roots meetings under the leadership of the various deputies, to ensure that they all meet on time and are carried out well.

G. The presidium should be mindful of uniting all the deputies, all the various committees, and all mass organizations around itself. It should motivate the deputies, committees, and mass organizations to mobilize the masses of the whole township to carry out the work of all kinds. They should never detach themselves from the deputies, committees, and mass organizations, and rely on a few people to do all the work.

H. The presidium must devote the greatest possible attention to leading the conferences of deputies. Every time the conference of deputies meets, careful preparations must be made in advance.

I. The presidium should hold a meeting every five days, that is, it should meet twice between the two conferences of deputies which precede and follow it. Village heads may be invited to the meetings.

Questions to be discussed at the meetings: The first meeting should deal with the guidance to be given to the village heads and deputy heads, and with how the comrade deputies have carried out the resolutions of previous conferences of deputies and of earlier conferences. This meeting is best held two or three days

after the previous conference of deputies. The second meeting is mainly devoted to gathering work experience of the various villages in the last few days and to preparing topics for the next deputies' conference. It is best to hold this meeting two or three days before the next conference of deputies.

The meetings of the presidium should also resolve some relatively minor issues. Do not hand over all these minor problems to the conference of deputies. Urgent problems of this kind should also be solved at the meeting of the presidium; such urgent problems should not be held over until the next deputies' conference.

The best time for the presidium to meet is after the evening meal. The meeting should not last much over two hours.

J. There should be a division of labor within the presidium. The comrades on the presidium who are not full-time members ought to be given some work, such as supervising certain tasks in certain villages.

The chairman is naturally in charge of the work in the whole township. He acts as chairman at presidium meetings, participates in meetings called by higher levels, and deals with day-to-day affairs. He should be in firm control of the central tasks assigned to him by higher levels during a given period (such as expanding the Red Army, the Land Investigation Movement, elections, road construction, land tax collection, government bond sales, development of cooperatives, the spring plowing movement, and so on). He should pay attention to routine operations (such as the training of the Red Young Pioneers, Red martial law, food, education, hygiene, preferential treatment of Red Army soldiers' families, and so on). He should also pay attention to special problems arising in his own township (such as famine, pestilence, floods, counterrevolutionary activity, and so on). He should be frequently thinking about these tasks and problems, and observing how various villages deal with them. Whenever a village lags behind, he should intensify the efforts to help out. He should divide the tasks with the vice-chairman and the secretary, attend meetings in every village, collect good experiences and bad examples regarding every item of work in every village; raise the issues in the presidium's meetings or make reports to the conference of deputies, and provide material for discussion by these meetings (when the question is under discussion). The chairman should also divide the work with others and take responsibility for attending the meetings of several committees and mass organizations, as well as mass meetings in every village.

The vice-chairman should share some of the workload with the chairman and the secretary by attending meetings in various villages. He should take personal responsibility for the work in one or two villages. He should be capable of effectively supervising and speeding up the work; he must collect materials and make a report when he comes back. He should also strive to understand the work in the whole township, so that in the absence of the chairman, he can deal with the work as acting chairman. Full-time vice-chairmen should assist the chairman in managing daily affairs and regularly take responsibility for attending the meetings of several committees and mass organizations.

The work of the secretary is to deal with the population registry; the land registry; recording marriages, births, and deaths; and the forms for all kinds of investigations. He also writes reports to the district soviet, dispatches messengers, sends notices to each village, deals with travel permits, and helps Red Army soldiers' families write letters. If both the chairman and vice-chairman are illiterate, he reads to them documents from higher levels, and at meetings of the presidium or the conference of deputies, he reads important points in the documents. During meetings, he takes notes and brings to the attention of the chairman and vice-chairman matters that escape their notice. The secretary should also take responsibility for attending a few meetings of committees and mass organizations. If the secretary is a deputy, he should participate in [meetings of] the presidium.

K. The presidium should pay attention to examining and educating the deputies. If some of the representatives work actively and some are slack in their work, then the model work of the activists should be commended and shown to those passive elements by way of a demonstration. Those passive elements should be criticized, and some of their names should be made public at the meetings and everyone encouraged to struggle against them. Thus all the deputies can be educated and the passive elements activated. There are some people who, when they are first elected, do not know how the work should be done. In this case, we need to instruct them carefully about ways to carry out their duties. In the case of those who have gone through several rounds of criticism, struggle, and education and still do not change or progress, if they totally fail to fulfill the tasks assigned to them after a month or two, or even fail to attend meetings and deliberately miss the deputies' conferences five or six times in a row, a motion should be put to the deputies' conference to have them expelled and alternate members should take their seats. It would be wrong not to expel and replace those very bad representatives. When a deputy is transferred to other work, his position should also be immediately filled.

Investigations should also be conducted to find out whether there are any landlords, rich peasants, and counterrevolutionaries who have passed themselves off as deputies and sneaked into our soviet organizations to undermine our soviets. If there are any, they should be expelled immediately. If they are counterrevolutionaries, they should be arrested and punished immediately.

L. The township messengers and check-point inspectors may be selected in one of the following three ways: either find people to take responsibility full-time, excuse them from all the chores, send others to till the land for them, but do not pay for their food; or send people in turn from the Young Pioneers, telling them on the previous afternoon, so that they can come and work the next day, going home to eat, and sending no one to help them till the land; or have the local inhabitants provide grain and money for food, and let the person live permanently at the township soviet. Each locality may choose one of these three methods, but the first one is preferable. The messengers and check-point inspectors should all be

chosen from among the young comrades. It is even more essential that the check-point inspectors should be capable and literate. They should also be trained for their work.

## II. The Work of the Conferences of Deputies

A. The township deputies' conference is the highest organ of political power in the whole township. After discussion at the conference of deputies, all soviet laws and policies are carried out and all the various tasks of the soviets are thereby fulfilled, so the leadership of the conference of deputies is extremely important.

B. The conference of deputies normally meets once every ten days. During the busy season for the peasants, the session should be held in the evening. In general, the meeting should last about two hours; three hours is the limit.

There are only two items on the agenda of every meeting: reports and discussion. The chairman and the participant from the district each make a ten-minute report. If they have more to say, they can speak again during the discussion period. During the discussion of every item of work that has been carried out in the township in question, each village head can make a report lasting a few minutes. If they have more to say, they can speak again during the discussion. The rest of the time is all reserved for the discussion. At meetings devoted to checking up on the work, village heads can, however, give slightly longer reports. The reports should contain realistic facts and opinions. Reports which are nothing but empty talk should be abolished.

C. There should be only one major question at each meeting of the deputies' conference. In addition, one or two secondary points can also be added. More time should be spent on the major topic, and less time on the minor topics. If several major issues are raised on each occasion, the result may be that nothing will come out of that conference.

D. Issues under discussion should be made more concrete. For example, when discussing the problem of spring plowing, we should distinguish such items as "Develop labor mutual-aid societies," "Develop draft animal cooperatives," "How the plow team should give preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers' families," "Increase fertilizer production," "Plow more and harrow more," "Reclaim barren land and hills," "Maintain ditches, ponds, and water wheels," "Plant cotton," "Plant more long-grain and less short-grain rice," "Plant more miscellaneous grain and vegetables," and so on. These items should be discussed in the light of the actual situation in each village. A realistic method should be laid down for dealing with each item. For example, in discussing "Develop labor mutual-aid societies," we must estimate how many more people may join at present in the township as a whole, decide on a total, and assign a quota for the required increase to each village according to its actual situation. The matter should then be handed over once again to the head and deputy head of each

village, asking them to produce an even more realistic quota, according to the number of residents who come under the authority of each deputy, and to fix a deadline for the completion of these tasks. The items should be discussed one at a time, and the second item should not be started before a conclusion has been reached regarding the first. The results of the discussions should be incorporated into resolutions and recorded in the minutes. Thus one has something to refer back to on future occasions, and the presidium can supervise the process better. If one meeting is not enough to solve all the problems, leave some for the next meeting.

The second discussion about spring plowing should check the results against each item of the resolution reached in the first discussion. Village heads should make reports on the implementation of each item and the reasons why it is complete or incomplete. The main purpose is to find good experience from which the deputies and the masses can learn. After checking the results, new issues in the spring plowing should be discussed. In the process of verification, those representatives and village heads who failed to complete their tasks should be criticized appropriately, in order to bring the matter home to them. The above is one example. All discussions can follow this pattern.

Many conferences of township deputies cannot cut to the core of problems. They cannot tell large issues from small ones. They discuss a lot of problems in general, but never take up one problem at a time. This way, no one can go home with a clear-cut conclusion. In discussion, they ignore the actual situation and characteristics of each village, never set target figures (for those issues that need a definite number) for the villages, never give a deadline, and never instruct the village head to redistribute tasks or to supervise the deputies to complete their jobs. Or when they have the task of deciding on a regulation adapted to the particularities of a certain village (e.g., it is decided that one village needs to dig a few ponds, while others do not have to), they do not emphasize the point by asking the deputies of that village, "What do you think of this decision?" to make them fully aware and fully responsible. They just pass the decision. Some township soviets do nothing more than debating and making decisions; they never check the results at subsequent meetings. If they do follow up the results, they fail to see the characteristics of each village. They do not understand why some fail while others succeed. They do not reprimand the sluggish deputies and village heads. What is the use of such discussion and inspection? This kind of discussion is empty, bureaucratic, and a waste of time, and cannot carry out the tasks of the soviets. If we adopt a pacifist attitude toward those inactive and slothful people, the deputies' conferences will be lacking in vitality. The conferences will not be able to stimulate the deputies from backward villages and hamlets (small villages) to lead the masses to work hard and catch up with more advanced villages and hamlets. All of these things are wrong.

E. In order to have a successful deputies' conference, the presidium must prepare carefully. This is why, as mentioned before, it is absolutely necessary for

the presidium to hold a meeting prior to the deputies' conference to prepare fully the reports and discussion topics for the next conference. The chairman, in particular, should be responsible for this kind of preparation. The vice-chairman and the secretary should assist the chairman.

F. In many places, the chairman who presides over the conference of deputies when it is in session is chosen on a temporary basis. In some other places, the regulations even stipulate that members of the presidium may not be elected to this post. This is not right. The person who presides over the conference must be a permanent member of the staff. This post is best filled by the chairman of the township soviet himself, since he is the person who is most familiar with the overall situation of the township and has a firm grasp of what goes before and after.

G. There should be a roll call every time the deputies' conference convenes. The names of those absent will be marked on the list. The presidium should have a list of the names of the deputies, with name, sex, age, and class status, listed under each village and hamlet.

### III. The Organization and Work of the Village

A. The focus of the work of a township is on the villages. The presidium of the township soviet should therefore concentrate very strongly on leadership and organization at the village level.

B. All townships that have not yet been divided into villages should carry out such a division. Some townships can be divided into two or three villages, while some larger townships can be divided into four or five villages. The number of villages should be based on the actual local situation. In general, however, it is best to make them small. Larger villages are not convenient for the work of leadership.

C. In each village, there should be one post for the head and one post for the deputy head. They are to be elected by the township deputies' conference from its members. The most enthusiastic and capable persons should be selected from among the deputies for each village to fill these positions. In villages where there are only a few hamlets, the head and deputy head should not be elected from the same hamlet.

The village head is in charge of supervising the work of the whole village, and the deputy head assists him in his functions.

(Note) If the families of the head and deputy head are short of labor power, the township soviet can decide to mobilize the masses to offer appropriate help during the busy seasons, in order to make up for the time they devote to exertions on behalf of the soviet (which is somewhat greater than that required from ordinary representatives). If the masses agree, the village head can be totally freed from manual labor, so he can spend all his time on soviet work in the interests of the masses of the whole village.

D. The village head should, as a rule, call a meeting of all the village deputies every ten days (i.e., if there are fifteen deputies in a village, all fifteen should be called to the meeting). When there is much work to do, a meeting may be called every five days. The purpose of the meeting is to check on the work of each representative. It is to discuss, in the light of the characteristics of each hamlet and each individual, the ways and means to carry out the tasks assigned to the village by the township deputies' conference. It should also settle petty disputes among the villagers and work out ways to help each other in times of distress. Other functions of the meetings include preparing reports for mass meetings in the village and pushing forward the village committee's work.

E. The schedule of this kind of village deputies' meetings should be decided by the township presidium. The best timing would be between two deputies' conferences, closer to the latter of the two. For instance, there are three villages in a certain township. If the township deputies' conference falls on the fifth, then the first village should have its meeting on the first, the second village on the second, and the third village on the third. This will make it convenient for the full-time personnel of the township, especially the chairman, to attend the meetings in each village. If the village representatives meet once every five days, then one meeting can be scheduled a few days after the previous township conference and the other a few days after the ensuing township conference. The purpose of this kind of meeting is to check on and supervise work. The results of the checkup are, moreover, to be reported by the village head to the next township deputies' conference.

F. Establish a system in which every deputy is responsible for leading a certain portion of the resident masses. For example, if there are fifteen deputies in a certain village and five hundred inhabitants, divide the five hundred into fifteen units, on the basis of the proximity of households and hamlets. Assign one deputy to each unit to take charge of the masses in it. The division should not, however, be based on the average number of people. The size of the units is to be determined by the disposition of the hamlets and households, and the strength or weakness of the deputy. The appropriate number could range from a maximum of fifty or sixty to a minimum of thirty or forty.

This division of labor among the deputies is to make each and every one of them shoulder some of the responsibilities. Each deputy should lead the masses to carry out the tasks of the soviets within a certain sphere (for example, supervise the several dozens of people under his jurisdiction to work hard in spring plowing; make propaganda urging the activists among these several dozens of people to join the Red Army; make propaganda for everyone to join the cooperative; see to it that children go to day school and adults go to evening school; make sure that every family sweeps its floor, clears the drainage ditches, and is mindful of hygiene; lead the several dozens of people to attend mass meetings; supervise the activities of the landlords and rich peasants; and so on). They should gather popular opinions speedily and make them known at the village

deputies' meetings and the township deputies' conferences. They should solve quickly the difficult problems facing the masses. These measures are truly beneficial, and yet there are many places where such a system of division of labor among the deputies is not yet being carried out. We must definitely put it into practice immediately.

(Note) The village head should have a notebook in which to record the village population, amount of arable land, the number of Red Guards and Young Pioneers, amount of grain (total amount, how many families have a surplus, and how many do not have enough), and other necessary items. Each deputy should also have a name-list of the people he supervises.

G. Each deputy should call meetings of the several dozens of people under his jurisdiction, in order to check on how each family is carrying out the tasks of the soviets. At the meeting, they should also discuss the work to be accomplished now, report on competition agreements,<sup>2</sup> report to the masses the township soviet's resolutions, and gather the opinions of the masses to report to the village and township deputies' meetings and conferences. This kind of meeting takes the form of a discussion, with the deputy serving as chairman. An hour is time enough, and the meeting takes place when everyone has the leisure.

This kind of meeting should be scheduled once every ten days. All the units in a village can hold their meetings on the same day. If a deputy cannot hold the meeting because of being otherwise engaged, he should make it up on a different day. The chairman of the township soviet should send for all the village heads to draw up a schedule and to make sure that there is no time conflict between these and other meetings of the township and villages. At meetings of this kind, we need to guide the masses to initiate criticism of each other. Examples would be: a certain family keeps a deserter and does not send him back; a certain family is lax in spring plowing; a certain family goes through the motions when helping the Red Army soldiers' families plow; in a certain family there is a lonely old person who should be helped, but no one pays any attention; a certain family does not encourage their children to study; a certain family does not pay attention to hygiene; and so on. This sort of meeting enables the decisions of the soviet to reach the masses very quickly, so the work of the soviet goes faster, the life of the masses is rapidly improved, and the fighting spirit of the masses is soon increased.

Besides attending this kind of meeting, every deputy should set aside some time to visit each of the families of which he is in charge, to find out whether they have any problems that need to be solved and whether or not they have

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2. See below, section VI. Various forms of competition or emulation are mentioned in the materials translated here. For example, section IX of the conclusions on the Land Investigation Movement dated June 21, 1933, contains a reference to competition in carrying out this movement.



carried out the decisions of the soviets. They should go first of all to the families of the Red Army soldiers and to those of the poorest people. They also need to visit the homes of the landlords and the rich peasants, to see whether or not they are engaged in wrong actions.

We can see from the meetings of the small units led by each deputy whether the village heads are equal to their supervisory role and whether each deputy has done good work.

H. Mass meetings in the villages are very good for educating the masses, for mobilizing the masses to carry out the tasks of the soviet, and for raising the fighting spirit of the masses. These meetings are to be considered as a major method for mobilizing and educating the masses. In many localities, they do not pay attention to holding this kind of mass meeting. This is not right.

At this kind of mass meeting, reports are given regarding the resolutions of the township soviet and regarding the revolutionary emulation projects of the home village and of other villages, and of the home hamlet and other hamlets. Explanations are also given about the revolutionary tasks assigned by the higher-level soviets, so that the masses will understand them fully and lose no time in carrying them out.

This kind of mass meeting should be held twice a month. The township soviet presidium determines the date on which each village meets and informs the village head, so that there is no conflict with other meetings. Each village should have its mass meeting on a different date, so it will be convenient for the township soviet to send people to participate.

In villages where the population is extremely concentrated and there is only one hamlet, the whole of the village should, of course, serve as a unit for holding this kind of mass meeting and the village head should chair the meeting. In the majority of the villages in the soviet area there are, however, two or more hamlets in each village. Such villages should have their meetings in two separate units, so that the majority of men and women, the old and the young, can attend the meeting. The village head and deputy head should each serve as chairman at one of the meetings. Careful preparations should be made in advance before holding this kind of mass meeting. A meeting of the village deputies should discuss and resolve beforehand such items as how to mobilize the deputies so as to persuade the great majority of the masses to attend the meetings, what should be reported at the meetings, and how to induce the masses to air their opinions. The meeting should not last longer than two hours and should be held when the majority of people have some leisure.

As for mass meetings on the scale of the whole township, we should not summon them arbitrarily, if there are no important problems or anniversaries to commemorate. The work of mobilization and education should be carried out for the most part through village mass meetings and through the small unit mass meetings called by each deputy.

#### IV. Township and Village Committees

A. Under the township soviet, various committees should be organized to help the soviet in managing the various kinds of specialized work. Activists from among the masses should be drawn in as committee members. Every township representative should participate in one or two committees and play a leading role in them. We should consider the committee system as an important method for uniting with the broad masses and pushing forward soviet work. Where committees have not yet been organized, they should be organized very rapidly.

B. Some of the committees are permanent. They include committees such as those in charge of expanding the Red Army; giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers' families; bringing gifts to the Red Army; Red martial law; anti-aircraft defense; defense against poison gas; agricultural production (spring plowing, summer plowing, autumn harvest, fall plowing, winter plowing); production education; hills and forests; water conservancy; investigation and registration; education; hygiene, bridges and roads; grain; state property (in townships where there is state property); and the worker-peasant procuratorate. All these committees have permanent work.

Some committees are temporary. For instance, the committees on land investigation, confiscation and redistribution, land tax collection, bond sales, reclaiming wasteland, and elections are temporary. Once the work is done, the committees are no longer needed. The next time such work must be done again, a temporary committee should once more be organized. As for the land investigation committees and committees on confiscation and redistribution, once the land problem has been completely resolved, there will be no need for them.

C. Some committees are needed only at the township level. Others, however, should be organized in the villages as well. These include Red Army expansion, giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers' families, production education, spring plowing, hills and forests, water conservancy, education, and hygiene. These committees need to have their organizations in the village in order to facilitate broadening and deepening their work.

D. The number of people on the committee: Depending on their nature, they should range from a minimum of five to a maximum of seven or nine. There should not be too many. If a committee exists on both the township and village levels (as in cases such as that of the spring plowing committees), five members to each level is quite enough. The chairman of the village committee should serve as a member of the township committee.

E. As regards the chairman and members of the committee, on the township level, the presidium prepares the list of names of committee members and submits it to the township deputies' conference for approval. On the village level, the village head prepares the name-list and submits it to the meeting of village deputies for approval.

F. Every committee should seek out an extremely active comrade to serve as

its chairman. The presidium should teach each of the chairmen how to carry out the work, supervise them in calling their meetings on time, and check on the work of every chairman. If the chairman is slacking, fire him and get a new one.

G. The chairman must be well prepared in advance for the meetings of his own committee, for only thus can he ensure that every meeting achieves results. After the meeting, he should assign an item of work to every committee member, tell them how to do it, and ask them to give work reports at the next meeting. Committee members who are slackers should be dismissed and replaced by new ones.

H. The committee should be reelected every six months. At that time, the activists should be retained and the passive members and slackers should be got rid of.

I. Members of the township soviet presidium should share the responsibility of participating in the meetings of the various committees at the township level. It is preferable that the division of labor among the members of the presidium should be stabilized over a period of time. Each member should be in charge of several committees. For example, the chairman should be in charge of committees on military and financial affairs (expanding the Red Army, bringing gifts for the Red Army soldiers, enforcing Red martial law, defense against air raids and poison gas, collecting land taxes, selling government bonds, confiscating and redistributing land, managing state property, and so on), the vice-chairman should be in charge of committees on production and the economy (giving preferential treatment to Red Army soldiers, spring plowing, hills and forests, water conservancy, grain, bridges and roads, production education, and so on), and the secretary should be in charge of committees on other things (education, hygiene, the worker-peasant procuratorate, investigation and registration, and so on). The division is to be made at a meeting of the presidium. Each one should have specific responsibilities, so that he can gather information and give reports at the meetings of the presidium and at the deputies' conferences.

When the village committees meet, the chairmen of the township committees should attend the meetings of the corresponding committee at the lower level (for example, the chairman of the township education committee should attend the meetings of the village education committee). The chairman and vice-chairman of the village deputies should also share the responsibilities of attending meetings.

J. The dates for the meetings of the various committees at the township and village level are fixed by the township presidium, on the basis of the relative importance of the various items of work at any given time. For instance, the spring plowing committee meets more frequently in spring, while the winter plowing committee may meet somewhat less often in winter. The meetings should not last more than two and a half hours.

## V. The Relation Between the Township Soviet and the Mass Organizations

A. More attention should be paid and more assistance given to the various mass organizations at the township level (labor unions, poor peasant league, conference of women workers' and peasants' deputies,<sup>3</sup> the league for opposing imperialism and supporting the Soviet Union, mutual aid associations, children's league, labor power mutual aid societies, draft oxen cooperative societies, consumer cooperatives, production cooperatives, grain cooperatives, credit unions, nurseries, association for eradicating illiteracy, literacy movement committee, clubs, and so on). We should rely on their efforts to mobilize the broad masses to undertake all kinds of revolutionary work.

As for those bodies that do not have a corresponding organization at higher levels, such as the poor peasant league,<sup>4</sup> the conference of women workers' and peasants' deputies, the labor power mutual aid societies, the draft oxen cooperative societies, the nurseries, and so on, it is even more important that the township soviet should shoulder the full responsibility of leadership. Check on their progress regularly. If anything goes wrong, speedy discussion and rectification should immediately follow. Whatever the mass organizations, the township soviet should come to their help whenever they have a problem.

B. When the presidium and the deputies' conference are debating work related to a mass organization, its leader should be present. When organizations hold their meetings, the township soviet should also send its people to attend. The village deputies' meeting should have the same kind of relationship with village mass organizations. The township soviet presidium should consult with the leaders of every mass organization in order to set a date for their meeting and to avoid clashes in the times of different township and village meetings.

C. The township soviet should pay attention to its leadership over the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers. Make all young men and women and adults join the Red Guard armies and the Young Pioneers. Make the majority of them attend the drills in their villages and townships, so that they can make progress in training. Send people to attend their cadres' meetings.

## VI. Revolutionary Competition and Shock Brigades

A. In order to achieve quality and speed in soviet work, in order that the work may be done faster and better, we should establish the rules of revolutionary

3. The conference of women workers' and peasants' deputies (*nügong nongfu daibiao huiyi*) was set up under the auspices of the Women's Department of the Chinese Communist Party. It held a congress once or several times a year, which elected a presidium at the district and township levels, but otherwise it had no permanent existence.

4. The poor peasant league did not exist above the level of the township.

competition and organize shock brigades in each and every township and village.

B. Every item of competition in revolutionary work, no matter whether it is assigned by the superior or is spontaneously raised by the local township, should be debated in the township deputies' conference. It should also be reported at the village mass meeting and at the mass meetings of the deputies' small units. If that item has to do with a certain mass organization, it should also be reported at the meeting of that organization in order that it may be known and accepted by every deputy and every member of the popular masses. Only full understanding and acceptance by all will stimulate everyone's revolutionary fervor, so they will shoulder responsibilities and do the work well and fast. The demands of competition will be met on time or even ahead of schedule. In this respect, coercion and commandism should be totally done away with.

C. Competition in each item of work is not carried out simply by discussion and reports. We must follow up the results closely. The deputies should check on each household; the village heads and deputy heads should check on each deputy; the township soviet presidium and the deputies' conference should check on each village head and deputy head. Without this kind of checking system, some families, some deputies, some villages and hamlets will go through the motions and will be unable to fulfill tasks on time, or will satisfy quantity with poor quality. The checking system is a vital method in ensuring the quality and quantity of soviet work. Passing resolutions without following up on the results is bureaucratic leadership, which is as harmful as commandism.

D. When competition on each item of work reaches its deadline, the village or township deputies' conference must give an evaluation of the good and the bad. Those who did their work well should be rewarded; those who did poorly should be reprimanded.

E. In order to achieve quality and speed in soviet work, shock brigades of five to seven people may be set up in every village. On a voluntary basis, select the most active and most capable comrades among the deputies and the masses to participate. There is one shock brigade leader in every village. The members of the brigade should not be selected from the same hamlet.

There are two ways the shock brigades may carry out their work. One method is that within the village, brigades from each hamlet go to other hamlets to help (the brigade from hamlet A to hamlet B, and that from hamlet B to hamlet A), but mainly it is for brigades from the more advanced hamlets to help the less advanced hamlets. The other method is that, within the township, each village shock brigade visits the other village (village A to village B, village B to village A). It is mainly for the more advanced village shock brigades to go to the less advanced villages. They go there not to berate the others, but to help in the work there, to teach the local comrades their good methods, and cause the work there to progress rapidly. The local people can thus learn the work methods of the hamlets in advanced villages.

Set up a post for a leader of all the shock brigades under the township soviet

presidium. He has the power to move the shock brigades of every village. The presidium should call regular meetings of the brigade leaders of townships and villages to check up on their work and teach them proper work methods. The leaders then may call meetings of their men to train them. The presidium should also call for biweekly or monthly training meetings of all the commandos.

## **VII. Leadership of the District Soviet over the Township Soviets**

The district soviet should guide the township soviets in carrying out all the above-mentioned provisions. It should explain patiently the above provisions to the comrades of the township and make sure they understand everything. It should constantly check to see whether each township soviet is carrying out the above provisions. Backward township soviets should receive special attention. Repeat the explanation of the provisions and offer help. The higher-level soviet, in inspecting the work of the district soviet, should see whether the district soviet has effectively led each of its townships in applying all the above-mentioned methods and whether it has achieved the greatest speed and optimal results in all the soviet tasks.

(Note) This document is generally appropriate for municipal and district soviets.

# ***Proclamation by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Support of the Struggles of the Striking Workers in the America-Asia Silk Factory in Shanghai***

(April 16, 1934)

Dear worker friends all over the country! Laboring masses!

On April 10, a tragedy happened in Shanghai when the imperialists and the Guomindang fascists massacred a thousand workers in an unprecedentedly cruel way.<sup>1</sup>

The brave fighters of the working class, the striking workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory, have shed their blood under the knives of the Guomindang butchers. One hundred workers were killed and nine hundred were wounded. Cold and hungry on a night accompanied by wind and rain, several thousand workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory had been fighting hand-to-hand with the police and security forces of the Guomindang for twenty-three hours. They were struggling and resisting the bloody and cruel attack by the Guomindang fascists.

Workers of the whole country! This is how the Guomindang fascists have attempted to use the most cruel and bloody massacre to suppress the struggle of the working class.

But no matter how the butcher Chiang Kaishek and his henchmen have colluded with the imperialists in using cruel violence against the working class, the

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1. Founded in 1920, by 1927 the America-Asia (Meiya) Silk Company had become China's largest silk-weaving company; in 1934, its one thousand looms were half of the silk-weaving looms used in Shanghai. Weavers of the company had formed a union and frequently went on strike. The strike of March-April 1934 mentioned here was sparked by a wage cut, and involved 4,500 workers of all ten of the firm's Shanghai factories. The strike was unsuccessful and led to the dismissal of 143 workers. The confrontation between police and strikers on April 10–11 evoked here was a turning point in the strike. A great many people were injured, but Mao's figure on deaths may well be exaggerated. See Elizabeth Perry, *Shanghai on Strike* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 182–201.

courageous struggles of the working class, from the joint strike of workers in the five mines in Tangshan to the bloody battle by the workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory against the fascists, have not been suppressed. They have instead reached a higher stage at which the workers are fighting hand-to-hand with the Guomindang military police. The struggle by the workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory further shows the strikingly brave and staunch character of our working-class fighters. It is precisely because of our bravery that our struggles have aroused extreme hatred on the part of the Guomindang fascists and have encountered their extremely barbarous violence.

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the Red Army have always most resolutely opposed the murderous policy of the Guomindang fascists and have always been on the side of all the workers in the country in their struggles. That is why the imperialists and the Guomindang have mobilized all their troops in carrying out the most cruel Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Soviet Area and the Red Army. At the same time, we are assembling all our forces for a victorious offensive against the enemies in order to support workers all over the country in their struggles. We are determined to wipe out the imperialist Guomindang in this decisive battle of smashing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression." Meanwhile, we must point out that only by overthrowing the rule of the imperialist Guomindang can we wipe out the White terror of the fascists, establish the soviet régime, and help the working class achieve complete liberation.

After hearing the news that our worker friends of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory had been killed, the broad masses of the people and Red Army soldiers in our Soviet Area have already expressed at various meetings their indignation at the cruel violence by the Guomindang fascists. They have sworn to fight to the death to overthrow the imperialist Guomindang. In the meantime, they are raising money and getting donations everywhere to help the striking workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory and the families of the victims. We also want to call on all the workers in the country and all the toiling masses to rise up as one, support the workers of the Shanghai America-Asia Silk Factory, and encourage them to persist in their struggle until they achieve final victory.

Worker friends of the whole country! We are persuaded that every economic struggle and every strike by you is a most powerful aid to the soviets and the Red Army. In order to strive for a great victory of the soviets and achieve the thorough liberation of the working class, let the strike struggles by the workers all over the country and the bloody battle of the soviets and Red Army to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" unite most closely! Oppose the cruel exploitation by the capitalists! Oppose the bloody massacre by the Guomindang fascists! Down with imperialism! Down with the Guomindang! Overthrow the fascist rule of the imperialist Guomindang!

Chairman

Mao Zedong



## ***Proclamation by the Central Government Regarding the May 1 Holiday of the Toilers***

(April 1934)

Worker and peasant masses in the whole Soviet Area:

"May Day" of this year arrives precisely at a time when we are engaged in a decisive and cruel battle against the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang.

Two-thirds of the regular army of the Guomindang in the whole country, and all the main forces of the fascist bandit chieftain Chiang Kaishek, totaling sixty-six divisions and eight independent brigades of more than seven hundred thousand White army soldiers, are mounting an attack on our Central Soviet Area.

All the battlefields at the front are bombed by the airplanes and artillery, strafed by the machine guns and rifles, and blocked by the fortified lines of the Guomindang's White army. People are ruthlessly and inhumanely massacred and houses are burnt. The imperialists and Guomindang just want to use these measures to immerse our soviet régime of the workers and peasants in a sea of blood.

But such crazy and desperate attacks by the imperialists and the Guomindang cannot in the slightest degree cause panic and despair among our brave Red Army soldiers fighting at the front and our workers, peasants, and poor laboring people in the whole Soviet Area. On the contrary, such attacks by the imperialist Guomindang arouse the indignation and strengthen the fighting resolve of every Red Army soldier at the front and every member of the laboring masses in the whole Soviet Area to an even greater degree. Thousands upon thousands of worker and peasant masses are getting involved in the powerful current of participating in the battles, and swear to carry the struggle through to the end in order to defend the soviet régime.

The fifth war<sup>1</sup> is more cruel and protracted than any of the previous wars. This is a war to the death between the Guomindang régime of the landlords and capitalists and the soviet régime of the workers and peasants. Only by mobilizing all the masses of workers and peasants in the whole Soviet Area to participate in this war can our soviet régime achieve a final victory.

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This proclamation was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 179, April 24, 1934. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 355–57, where it is reprinted from this version.

1. I.e., the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."

On "May Day" of this year, the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls upon every worker and peasant in the whole Soviet Area to arm himself and join the Red Army, join the Red Guard armies, the Young Pioneers, the Model Little Red Guards, and guerrilla forces! Let us fight a decisive battle against the attacking enemies and defend our Soviet Area.

All the comrades and members of the Model Young Red Guards who participated in the military parade on Red May! Join the Red Army in the form of whole companies, whole battalions, and whole regiments! Let's carry the struggle through to the end in order to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression."

Let us develop guerrilla warfare extensively to disturb, encircle, fatigue, strike, and wipe out the enemy. Let us defend every inch of land in our Soviet Area. Let us help our Red Army main force to achieve victory in this decisive battle.

Only by victory in the armed struggle, and first of all only by wiping out the main force of the bandit chieftain Chiang Kaishek, can we protect the land, the freedoms, the eight-hour working day, and all the other revolutionary rights that the soviet revolution has brought us. Only by victory in the armed struggle can we finally overthrow the rule of the imperialists and the Guomindang, establish soviet political power in all of China, and finally liberate ourselves from under the iron hooves of the landlords and capitalists.

Toiling worker and peasant masses in the rear area! Assemble all our capital and goods to ensure provisions for our Red Army. Every worker and peasant, please save 3 *sheng* of rice to help the food supply of the Red Army.<sup>2</sup> Grow more vegetables and raise more pigs to treat our Red Army soldiers fighting at the front. Let us carry out the sale of economic construction bonds as quickly as possible. Let us collect and transport our grain to where it is most needed. Let us save on all the expenses in the rear, and save every copper cash for achieving victory in the struggle at the front.

Toiling masses of workers and peasants in the whole Soviet Area! The decisive battle, which will decide between life and death, lies ahead of us. Let us make use of our iron fists, and of the strong and resolute united wills of the worker and peasant masses, to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of the imperialist Guomindang and strive for the victory of the soviets in all of China. Only the soviet road is the road of liberation for all the exploited popular masses and all the oppressed nations.

Long live the "May Day" holiday of the toilers!

Long live a new Soviet China!

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

2. Regarding the "Three *Sheng* of Rice Campaign," see above, the relevant note to the text of March 1, 1933.

# *Comrade Mao Zedong on the Plot of the Japanese Imperialists*

(April 1934)

Since the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese imperialists issued a diplomatic note on its China policy to the Powers on April 17, all the imperialists have expressed their dissenting views from the perspective of their own spheres of influence in China.<sup>1</sup> The Guomindang government in Nanjing also issued some most shameful, traitorous remarks immediately.

In order to seek the views on this issue of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the correspondent of this newspaper specially interviewed Comrade Mao Zedong, who said:

The recent diplomatic note by the Japanese Foreign Ministry is the most obvious expression of the Japanese imperialists' intention to occupy China. In this diplomatic note, the Japanese imperialists have already publicly affirmed that China is Japan's protectorate and directly stated that Japan will use force to maintain Japan's military, political, and economic monopoly in China. What the Japanese imperialists intend to do during the process of completely colonizing China by Japan alone is to use their own force to suppress the Chinese revolution directly and build a consolidated rear-area defense for launching a war against the Soviet Union.

This intention of the Japanese imperialists has been opposed by other imperialists, but the actual meaning of their opposition is their reluctance to let Japan alone occupy China. They want China to be carved up by international imperialism and to become a public colony with an "open door." As for directly suppressing the Chinese revolution and reinforcing the rear-area defense for launching a war against the Soviet Union, all the other imperialists and Japan are in complete agreement.

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This text was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 181, April 28, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 359–61, which reproduces this version.

1. The Japanese note of April 17, 1934, referred to here was issued by Amō Eiji, head of the information division of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Referred to by the Western press as the "Monroe Doctrine for Asia," this statement read in part: "We oppose . . . any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance." See Coble, *Facing Japan*, p. 154.

Here it is the Guomindang government, which has sold out China, that appears most shameful and pitiful. The spokesman of the Guomindang government in Nanjing issued a statement on April 19 which is as disgusting as one made by a prostitute.<sup>2</sup> The statement says that the Guomindang government "encourages international cooperation and promotes international peace and security," which is to say that it is the "obligation" of the Guomindang government to encourage the international imperialists to carve up China together, and that it will guarantee the security of the interests in China of the international imperialists.

Naturally, the Guomindang has indeed "no intention of attacking other countries or disturbing the peace in East Asia." What's more, the Guomindang cautiously explains to the Japanese that it is "purchasing military supplies (such as military airplanes, etc.) or hiring foreign military instructors or experts merely for national defense needs and mainly for maintaining domestic order and tranquility."

Indeed, the facts have proved that this is the case. From the money borrowed and arms purchased from Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Italy, not even half a copper or a single bullet has been used by the Guomindang to resist the Japanese imperialist invasion in Manchuria and North China, or to oppose the savage acts of the British and French imperialists in occupying Tibet and Xikang by force. The Guomindang has been constantly surrendering and compromising in the face of imperialist aggression. There has been no question of national defense.

On the other hand, the Guomindang's so-called "maintaining domestic order and tranquility" actually means the suppression of the revolutionary movement of the Chinese workers and peasants. In particular, it means attacks on the soviet areas and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The arch-criminal who is selling out the country, Chiang Kaishek, has mobilized 70 percent of the national regular army to carry out the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" in Jiangxi. This truly demonstrates the Guomindang's loyalty to the imperialists, and its role in clearing the way for the imperialists to carve up China.

The Guomindang has raised this point with particular emphasis in its statement to Japan. The Guomindang has gone even farther, stating that the Guomindang's attitudes toward Japan "can be corrected if there is any element of inequality, thereby bringing about an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations, so as to meet the common desires of the two countries." This has fully shown the slavishness of the Guomindang as a running dog. The Guomindang, fearful that it may not perfectly fulfill its duty as a running dog, and cannot win favor from

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2. The Guomindang government statement of April 19 reads in part: "No state has the right to claim the exclusive responsibility for maintaining international peace in any designated part of the world. Being a member of the League of Nations, China feels it her duty to promote international cooperation and achieve international peace and security. In her endeavour to attain these ends, she has never harboured any intention of injuring the interests of any particular country, far less causing a disturbance of the peace in the Far East." See Coble, *Facing Japan*, p. 155.

every one of its masters, has made such a shameless plea to Japan alone, like a dog wagging its tail.

On behalf of the workers, peasants, and toiling masses of the whole country, and of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Central Soviet Government strongly opposes the Japanese imperialists' intention to monopolize China. The Central Soviet Government also wants to expose the Guomintang's scheme for leading the imperialists to carve up China together. The masses of Chinese workers and peasants wish to pursue national and social independence, freedom, and liberation. Only when we all rise up together under the leadership of the soviet régime and smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Soviet Red Army by the imperialist Guomintang can we prevent China from becoming totally colonized and can we strive for the victory of a new Soviet China.

# *Proclamation by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on the Selling Out of North China by the Guomindang*

(June 19, 1934)

Workers, peasants, soldiers and all the poor toiling masses in the whole country!

After having sold out the Three Northeastern Provinces, Inner Mongolia, Beijing, and Tianjin, the vicious Guomindang government has now sold out the whole of North China to the Japanese imperialists.

After the Lushan meeting and the Nanchang meeting among the traitors Chiang Kaishek, Wang Jingwei, and Huang Fu, and after direct negotiations between Wang Jingwei, Huang Fu, and the representatives of the Japanese imperialists, the Guomindang is already willing to put all Chinese territories north of the Yellow River under the full administration of "Manchukuo" as its own territories.<sup>1</sup> Train and postal services between "Manchukuo" and North China have already begun. All troops in North China have moved southward, or they are being reorganized into armies of "Manchukuo." The Reorganization Committee in Beijing has been further changed into a direct puppet organization of the Japanese imperialists. Moreover, the Guomindang even allows "Manchukuo" to set up tax office outposts in North China to collect taxes while the products of the Japanese imperialists are floating around without any difficulty. Under "Mutual Support and Aid among China, Japan, and Manchukuo," the Guomindang has recognized the priority of the Japanese investments in North China and that the two sides will "jointly" explore the wealth and develop transportation in North China. In the meantime, the Guomindang has assumed the responsibilities for banning all the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist revolutionary organizations and activities, whereas the Japanese imperialists will allow a large supply of

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This proclamation was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 206, June 23, 1934. It is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 215–19, which constitutes our source.

1. In April 1934, Huang Fu, Wang Jingwei, and Chiang Kaishek met in Jiangxi at Lushan and Nanchang, and decided to proceed with the establishment of rail and postal links between Japanese-occupied Manchukuo and the Chinese territories to its south. Establishment of such links had been strongly opposed by many Chinese on the grounds that it undermined the Chinese policy of nonrecognition of the legitimacy of the state of Manchukuo. See Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 166–70.

loans and arms to the Guomindang for launching attacks on the Chinese soviets and the Red Army.

Popular masses of all China! North China has already been sold by the vicious Guomindang to the Japanese imperialists. The selling out of North China to Japan, however, has not only failed to stop the invasion and plundering of China by the Japanese imperialists, but has further aroused its ambition and greed to annex all of China. The bloody hands of the Japanese imperialists are reaching out toward areas in Fujian and along the Yangzi River. On April 17 of this year, the Japanese imperialists openly proclaimed that China belongs to Japan, Japan is the master in East Asia, and Japan opposes any other country "plundering China" under any pretense. Meanwhile, the selling out of North China and the Japanese imperialists' attempt to monopolize China naturally prompted other imperialist countries to speed up their efforts to carve up China directly. In the vast areas of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Xikang, and Tibet, the British imperialists are now establishing their "Tibetan State." The areas of Banhong<sup>2</sup> and Canglan<sup>3</sup> in Yunnan have also been occupied by the British. The French imperialists are invading and plundering in Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi. The American imperialists are also making frenzied efforts to establish their rule over China. Neither the unity between these imperialist countries (such as the British-Japanese alliance) nor the clashes among them (such as the conflicts between Japan and the United States) are aimed at helping China. They are only designed to carve up China more quickly and turn China into a colony of the imperialists. The policy of the Guomindang toward all the imperialist countries is consistently one of capitulation and selling out. The Guomindang has not only wanted to sell out North China to the Japanese imperialists, but also wanted to sell all of China to all the imperialists. The Guomindang government in Nanjing has had conflicts with the Guomindang government in Guangzhou not because they have different views about selling out China, but because they quarrel over the spoils from selling out China, and are racing with each other in selling out China.

Popular masses of all China! In a situation in which the Japanese imperialists are annexing the whole of North China, all the imperialists are directly carving up China, and the Guomindang is selling out the country and humiliating China, only when the popular masses of all China unite and arm themselves to launch a

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2. Banhong is situated in southwestern Yunnan near the Burmese border, in an area inhabited by the Wa national minority, which had enjoyed a degree of autonomy since Qing times, and is now known as the Cangyuan Wa Autonomous Region. In 1933, the British had seized control of the area in order to control the silver mines located there. This provoked an uprising known as the "Banhong Incident."

3. The two characters for "Canglan" are marked with the Japanese equivalent of "*sic*" in the Tokyo edition, and there is undoubtedly a mistake here. The correct reading is probably "Cangyuan," as in the autonomous region mentioned in the previous note, but the characters may simply have been inverted, and the reference may be to Lancang, which was, at this time, the name of a nearby *xian* in Yunnan.

national revolutionary war to drive the Japanese, British, American, French, and other imperialists out of China, and only by overthrowing the Guomindang, which has sold out North China and the whole of China, can we avoid the sufferings of being slaves without a country, rescue China from becoming a colony, and establish an independent and free new China with territorial integrity. The time is pressing and we cannot for a moment more have any doubts and hesitation. Delay means death.

Only the traitorous Guomindang will shamefully say that China at present "has insufficient national strength and is unable to resist Japan." The Guomindang has an army of two million soldiers, but it says that it is "unable to resist Japan." The Guomindang has large amounts of arms, but it says that it is "unable to resist Japan." The Guomindang has millions in loans and taxes, but it says that it is "unable to resist Japan." In the meantime, the Guomindang is using all these resources to attack the soviet régime and its Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, which are the only forces in China resisting Japan, and to suppress the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist revolutionary movement by the popular masses of all China. Every worker, every peasant, and every revolutionary will see clearly that it is not that the Guomindang is "unable to resist Japan," but that the Guomindang is a running dog of the Japanese imperialists and of all the imperialists and that it serves to clear the way for the imperialists to carve up China.

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic calls on the popular masses of all China to unite and arm themselves to oppose all the oppression, massacres, and trickery of the Guomindang, and to fight against Japan and all the other imperialists. The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic completely supports the anti-imperialist program put forward by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This program is as follows: (1) Resolutely oppose the Guomindang's policy of surrender and selling out China; oppose the Tangu Agreement by which the Guomindang government in Nanjing has sold Northeast China, North China, and the whole of China; oppose direct negotiations between China and Japan and cast away any illusions about the League of Nations and the United States. Only the solidarity and unity of the workers, peasants, and all the toilers can be a force resisting imperialism for the Chinese nation and a guarantee of victory. (2) The popular masses of all China must arise to defend China's territory and independence, and to carry out a sacred national revolutionary war. (3) Call on the Chinese people to participate directly in an anti-Japanese war and guerrilla war, use all the arsenals to arm all the people, organize an anti-Japanese army of volunteers and actively support and participate in the Anti-Japanese Army of Volunteers in Northeast China and in the actions by the broad masses of people boycotting Japanese goods. (4) Confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists and traitors and collaborators, stop paying all the principal and interest on loans, levy a progressive tax to finance the anti-Japanese war. (5) China must immediately and completely break off



diplomatic relations with Japan. The whole of the navy, army, and air force must be mobilized to fight against Japan. The attack on the soviet areas and the wars among the warlords must be immediately stopped.

The Chinese Soviet Republic calls on all those Chinese who are truly willing to oppose imperialism and are unwilling to become slaves without a country to unite under this anti-imperialist program put forward by the Chinese Communist Party, without regard for political tendencies, or for differences in profession or sex. Only when this program is carried out can the Chinese nation achieve complete liberation. The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has made repeated statements to the armed forces attacking the soviet areas throughout the country that it is willing to sign combat agreements with them to fight against the imperialists under the following three conditions: (1) stop attacks on the soviet areas; (2) immediately guarantee the democratic rights of assembly, association, speech, and publication of the popular masses, as well as the right to strike; and (3) immediately arm the popular masses and establish armed volunteer forces to defend China and strive for China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity. But the arch-traitors Chiang Kaishek, Chen Jitang, and He Jian responded to our statements by selling out the whole of North China and the whole of China to the Japanese, British, American, French, and other imperialists, so as to get more money and arms to speed up the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression against our Soviet Area. Under these circumstances, our Soviet Government had no alternative but to assemble all our forces first to destroy the main forces of the arch-traitor Chiang Kaishek. Without destroying the armed forces of Chiang Kaishek, the running dog of imperialism, it is impossible for the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the thousands upon thousands of toiling masses in the whole Soviet Area to do battle directly against Japan and other imperialisms.

The Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has declared to the popular masses of all China that, under the aforementioned three conditions, it is ready at any moment to mobilize tens of thousands of our Red Army soldiers and millions of our toiling masses to be the first to fight against Japanese imperialism. We believe that all the Chinese people who are willing to oppose imperialism and unwilling to be slaves without a country will voluntarily join this sacred national revolutionary war. We believe that this national revolutionary war involving thousands upon thousands of the masses throughout the country can defeat not only Japanese imperialism, but also all imperialisms. We have already driven imperialism completely out of the soviet areas and we are determined to sweep it out of all China.

Launch the national revolutionary war to drive Japan and all other imperialisms out of China!

Let the Chinese popular masses arm themselves voluntarily to recover the Chinese territories in the Northeast and in North China!

Down with Japanese imperialism and all the other imperialisms!

Oppose the Guomindang's selling out of Chinese territories in the Northeast and in North China and abolish all the traitorous and humiliating secret agreements between China and Japan!

Down with the Guomindang government in Nanjing, which has sold out the Northeast, North China, and all of China. Down with all Guomindang governments!

Smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Chinese soviets and the Red Army by imperialism and defend the anti-imperialist Chinese soviet régime!

Support the program of the Chinese Communist Party opposing Japanese imperialism!

Long live the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist united front of the popular masses of all China!

Long live an independent and free new Soviet China!

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Letter From Mao Zedong and Zhu De to the Officers and Soldiers of the White Army***

(June 1934)

Brother officers and soldiers of the White army:

Japanese soldiers have already fought their way to North China, killing as ferociously as wolves and tigers. Their airplanes and artillery are now bombing your native places. The Japanese soldiers are killing your parents, raping your sisters, burning your villages, and digging up your ancestral graves. Japan is killing and destroying your families, but what is the Guomindang doing? It has again signed a traitorous treaty to sell out North China to Japan. As a result, North China is no longer your home. Your parents and wives are longing for you to go to North China to rescue them!

Brothers! "Maintain an army for a thousand days to use it for an hour!" To save the country, to save your native places, to rescue your own parents and wives, to go to North China to fight the Japanese, now is indeed the time for our true Chinese men to defend the country and protect the people and to render meritorious service to the state. And yet, precisely when it is time to stop the civil war and to resist Japan as one, Chiang Kaishek has refused to send you to resist the Japanese, but forced you to come to Jiangxi to kill your own Chinese countrymen. What kind of logic is this? This is a traitorous act of Chiang Kaishek in selling out the country. Chiang Kaishek has sold our native places, and he is the "accomplice" of the Japanese soldiers in burning and killing your parents and wives.

Chiang Kaishek deceived you by saying, "The Red Army is making trouble in the rear area." As a matter of fact, it is Chiang Kaishek who is selling out our country and refusing to resist Japan. You only need to think for a moment about the facts regarding the last three years. Who has sold out the Three Northeastern Provinces? Who has ordered the Nineteenth Route Army, which had resisted Japan in Shanghai, to withdraw to Fujian? Who has ordered the anti-Japanese armies along the Great Wall to withdraw? Who has now once again ordered the troops in North China to withdraw to the south? It is no one else but the traitorous warlord gang of Chiang Kaishek and Zhang Xuiliang. The Red Army de-

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Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 221–24. It is cited briefly in *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 430.

clared war on Japan as early as three years ago! It has long declared that it is willing to unite with any force to fight the Japanese as long as this force really wants to resist the invaders. Because the Red Army wants to resist Japan, Chiang Kaishek helps Japan by the "Encirclement and Suppression" of the Red Army. Employing a large force of seven to eight hundred thousand troops, he encircles the Red Army and prevents it from going north to fight Japan. By saying, "To resist Japan, it is necessary to suppress the Communists first," Chiang Kaishek is in fact on the one hand aiding Japan to wipe out the Red Army, and on the other hand<sup>1</sup> [refusing to let] our brother armies go to North China to fight the Japanese, completely eliminating China's anti-Japanese forces, [and thereby allowing] Japan to destroy China without any effort. Therefore, if Chiang Kaishek, the traitor and collaborator, is not overthrown, our four hundred million countrymen can only become slaves without a country.

Chiang Kaishek deceived you by saying, "China does not have the strength to resist Japan." This is even more nonsensical. China has a regular army of three million soldiers and four hundred million compatriots. If the navy, army, and air force in the whole country are totally mobilized, how can such a big China be unable to defeat tiny Japan? Does China lack guns and artillery? There are several dozen munitions factories in the country, and the warlords have enough guns and artillery in their hands. Does China need money for military purposes? If China declares war on Japan, China can immediately confiscate Japanese banks, factories, and shops, and this will yield four billion silver dollars. It is said that if China declares war on Japan, it must fear isolation. At the very least, the workers and peasants in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan will respond by carrying out an armed uprising. If we carry out a converging attack from the front and from the rear, we need not worry that Japan will not be defeated. China can surely defeat Japan. By saying "China does not have the strength to resist Japan," Chiang Kaishek is actually deceiving you in order to prevent you from fighting against Japan and to let Japan conquer China.

Brothers! What is good for you about coming to Jiangxi? What about your own native places? Right now, they are being burned and people are being killed by the Japanese soldiers. What about your mothers and daughters? Right now, they are being raped by the Japanese soldiers. What can you do in Jiangxi? You are climbing mountains, building blockhouses, repairing roads, and getting exhausted. Every day, your parents and wives are longing for you to go to North China to rescue them, but you yourselves "cannot return to your home and cannot rescue your mothers." Such sufferings have set your minds in turmoil.

Brothers! Chiang Kaishek has not allowed you to save your native places and

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1. Here, and in three other places in the available text of this document, there are blank spaces indicating that several characters are missing. On the whole, the meaning seems clear in all cases, but we have marked these ellipses by putting in square brackets the words we have supplied.

forced you to fight the Red Army. In the end, what can you gain from this? Will you become officials and get rich? It is Chiang Kaishek who has cars and concubines; such is not your lot. What have you got? You are hungry and your hands [are empty]. You are unwilling to fight and want to retreat, but Chiang Kaishek has deployed teams of machine guns and broadswords to deal with you. Don't wait until you see your native places being burned by the Japanese and don't sacrifice yourselves for the individual interests of Chiang Kaishek. It is glorious to save the country and our homes. Make up your minds quickly. Chinese don't fight Chinese! Unite with the Red Army to fight the Japanese!

The Red Army has long been ready to unite with you. The Red Army can sign an operational agreement to oppose Japan and Chiang Kaishek with any armed force on the following three conditions: (1) immediately stop attacks on the soviet areas; (2) immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the people (freedom of assembly, association, speech, and publication, and freedom to strike); and (3) immediately arm the popular masses and establish a volunteer army.

Don't be afraid! Don't hesitate; guns are in your hands! As long as all of you voluntarily stop fighting your Chinese countrymen and go back to North China to fight the Japanese, Chiang Kaishek can do nothing and all of your four hundred million countrymen will support you!

We make the following proposals to you:

1. Don't fight the Red Army, or shoot in the air. Carry out the slogan that Chinese don't fight Chinese. The Red Army will never attack you first.
2. Quickly make agreements with the Red Army troops, let the two sides send representatives, and sign an agreement to cease hostilities and form an anti-Japan alliance.

The Red Army is willing to unite with any officer or soldier in the White army to fight the Japanese, regardless of what party he belongs to, as long as he really wants to resist Japan.

Brothers! Our enemy is Japan. It is [Chiang Kaishek] who refuses to allow you to return to your native places and refuses to let us unite in fighting the Japanese.

Drive out the Japanese imperialists! Down with the traitor, Chiang Kaishek!

The Red Army, which is willing  
to unite with you

De<sup>2</sup>  
Zedong

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2. Zhu De and Mao Zedong signed this letter with their given names (*ming*) only, omitting their surnames, presumably in order to convey a sense of familiarity and camaraderie with the White soldiers to whom it was addressed.

# *Proclamation on the Northward March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Fight Japan*

(July 15, 1934)

Workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary popular masses of all China!

Evil Japanese imperialism, after swallowing up our Three Northeastern Provinces and occupying our Rehe and Inner Mongolia, has now also seized the whole of North China. In South China, the Japanese imperialist warships, cannons, and naval, ground, and air forces are currently planning to take Fujian Province directly. Japanese imperialism intends to transform China into its colony and turn the popular masses of all China into slaves without a country, doomed to suffer eternally the massacre, rape, exploitation, and trampling of the Japanese bandits!

In the face of the invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Guomindang warlords, Chiang Kaishek, Zhang Xueliang, and the others, have consistently capitulated and sold out. They have sold out our Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, and Inner Mongolia, and now they have direct postal services and communications with "Manchukuo." They have recognized "Manchukuo" and sold out all of North China and Fujian Province, and they have helped Japanese imperialism to suppress the Chinese anti-Japanese movement and to suppress the movement to boycott Japanese merchandise and the guerrilla warfare of the anti-Japanese volunteer army. Under the slogan "No strength to fight Japan," they have mustered over one million troops across the country, and raised one billion silver *yuan*. Making use of all their airplanes and cannons, they have instituted ceaseless campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government, which is the only anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist government in all of China, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. All this has proved that the Guomindang warlords are the most faithful running dogs of

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Japanese imperialism, and that the Guomindang warlords are the greatest traitors and collaborators in all of Chinese history!

In the face of the ceaseless aggression of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army have repeatedly called upon the popular masses of China to arm themselves to oppose the Japanese imperialist invasion by means of a national revolutionary war. They have openly declared war against Japan and have issued an urgent order regarding the declaration of war against Japan, in order to mobilize all the popular masses from the soviet areas to get ready to fight directly against Japanese imperialism. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army have, moreover, proclaimed repeatedly to the popular masses of all China that under three conditions they are willing to conclude agreements regarding military operations with any armed force anywhere in China: (1) stop attacking the soviet areas and the Red Army; (2) give the popular masses elementary democratic rights—freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, strikes, and demonstrations; and (3) immediately arm the popular masses and establish a volunteer army of the popular masses to defend China. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army have repeatedly opposed the Tanggu Truce, direct Sino-Japanese negotiations, recognition of the Japanese puppet regime "Manchukuo," and the selling out of North China by the Guomindang. They have openly supported the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army and all the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist revolutionary movements throughout China, and opposed all the suppression and slaughter of anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist movements by the imperialist Guomindang.

All the workers, peasants, soldiers, and revolutionary popular masses throughout China are against the Guomindang's sellout of the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, Inner Mongolia, North China, Fujian, and the whole country, but support the anti-Japanese proposals and actions of the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. This cannot but impel the Guomindang to blockade us and attack us even more frantically, thus making it impossible for our Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to unite directly with the popular masses of the whole country and to act together with the Northeast Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army to wage a national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialism, in order to drive the Japanese imperialist bandits out of China. The Guomindang warlords have completely ignored the proposal put forth by the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to join together to fight against Japan, and have been selling out China even more shamelessly, intensifying their Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and helping Japanese imperialism to swallow up China.

Therefore, if the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are to mobilize all their strength to fight directly against Japanese im-

perialism, they must, of necessity, begin by fighting a bloody war with the more than a million Guomindang bandit troops that are attacking us. Only thus can we protect and maintain the free Soviet Area, which has already been saved from imperialist bondage, so that it will not again be trodden underfoot and sold out by the imperialist running dogs, the Guomindang bandits. We will definitely never abandon the anti-imperialist bases of the Chinese revolution that have been created as a result of countless bloody fights with Guomindang bandit troops. But neither can the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army sit idly by and watch the ruin of the Chinese people at the hands of Japanese imperialism, let all of China be auctioned away completely by the Guomindang traitors who are selling out the country, let the broad toiling popular masses of all China be slaughtered and trampled on, or let the North-eastern Volunteer Army fight alone. Therefore, at the critical moment of the brutal decisive battle against the superior armies of the Guomindang bandits, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, despite all obstacles and with the greatest resolution, are sending an anti-Japanese advance guard detachment northward to fight Japan.<sup>1</sup> Provided only that the armed forces attacking the soviet areas accept the three conditions we have put forth, the entire main force of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will be able to set out, following the advance guard, and unite with all the armed forces of China to resist Japan.

Popular masses of all China! The vanguard forces of our Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army moving northward to resist Japan are willing to unite with the popular masses and all the armed forces throughout China to resist Japan, launching a national-revolutionary war of the popular masses to overthrow Japanese imperialism. All the anti-Japanese popular masses should assist the vanguard of our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that has been dispatched northward to resist Japan, rally around them, join them, arm themselves, and wage war directly against the Japanese imperialist bandits who are invading China. All the anti-Japanese popular masses are our compatriots; and all the anti-Japanese armed forces are our companions. We should all unite. All those individuals, groups, and armed forces that forbid and repress our efforts to resist Japan are traitors and collaborators. We should all rise up together and wipe them out.

We believe that only an armed national-revolutionary war of the popular masses of all China can overthrow Japanese imperialism and all other imperialisms, secure the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation, and preserve China's territorial integrity. In order to gain victory in the national-revolutionary war, the Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army make the following concrete proposals:

1. This force was the Red Seventh Army. For the context and fate of this troop movement, see above, the Introduction.



1. Resolutely oppose the Guomindang government's selling out of the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, Inner Mongolia, North China, Fujian, and all China. Oppose the Guomindang government's direct dealings with Japan, in which they are selling out the country and bringing shame on China. Oppose recognition of the puppet Manchukuo régime. Abandon the illusion that help will come from the imperialist bandit bloc, the League of Nations, or the American imperialists.

2. Immediately proclaim the rupture of relations with Japan, and declare the "Tanggu Truce" and all the Sino-Japanese secret treaties null and void. Mobilize all Chinese naval, ground, and air forces to fight Japan. Immediately stop attacking and blockading the soviet areas, so that the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army can be used exclusively to fight directly against Japanese imperialism.

3. Call upon the popular masses of the whole country to arm themselves with the weapons that can be found in the Guomindang arsenals and factories, as well as with all the imported weapons, and to organize anti-Japanese volunteer armies and guerrilla detachments of the popular masses to participate directly in the anti-Japanese war and in guerrilla warfare. Actively assist the Northeastern Volunteer Army and the anti-Japanese vanguard of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

4. Confiscate all the enterprises and property of the Japanese imperialists and Chinese traitors; stop payment on all Sino-Japanese debts, including both principal and interest; institute progressive taxation; and devote the Guomindang's entire military budget to the expenses of the war against Japan.

5. Organize everywhere anti-Japanese groups of the popular masses, such as anti-Japanese associations, committees to boycott Japanese goods, fund-raising committees to help the volunteer army and the Red Army, and various anti-Japanese pickets, sabotage teams, traffic teams, propaganda teams, and transportation teams. Draw the broad masses, regardless of sex, age, religious beliefs, or political faction, into these anti-Japanese organizations. Make use of strikes and demonstrations by workers, students, public servants, and shopkeepers to fight against the Japanese imperialist invasion and the Guomindang government's treason and capitulation.

The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army will spare no sacrifice in struggling to carry out this program. The Soviet Government and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army call upon the popular masses of all China to support this program and to struggle to the end with us to carry it out completely.

Let the Guomindang, the running dog of imperialism, and the Guomindang traitors who are selling out their country shout, "China is powerless to fight Japan!" By mobilizing the popular masses of all China against Japan, by arming the popular masses of all China against Japan, by uniting the popular masses of all China against Japan, we shall gain ample strength to overthrow Japanese

imperialism and all imperialisms, as well as the band of traitors and collaborators of the Guomindang!

Chairman of the Central  
Government of the Chinese  
Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

Chairman of the Revolutionary  
Military Commission of the  
Chinese Workers' and  
Peasants' Red Army

Zhu De

Vice-Chairmen

Zhou Enlai  
Wang Jiaqiang

# ***Six-Point Proposal by Zhu De and Mao Zedong to White Army Soldiers Regarding Guidelines for Resisting Japan***

(1934)

1. We demand that you go north to resist Japan and immediately stop attacking the soviet areas, that you put into effect [the proposition] that Chinese do not fight against Chinese, and that you do not fight against the Red Army, but instead aim your guns at the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors!

2. We demand that soldiers resisting Japan have freedom of assembly, association, speech, and action, and that they organize a soldiers' resist-Japan association and make decisions regarding the great cause of resisting Japan, and regarding questions concerning the soldiers themselves!

3. Let the soldiers' living conditions and treatment be improved, and let them be paid whatever is due them. We demand that corporal punishment and reprimands be abolished, and we oppose fascist oppression and slaughter!

4. Agree with the Red Army that both sides should send representatives to sign an agreement to establish a truce and unite to resist Japan!

5. Kill those officers who do not allow the soldiers to resist Japan, mutiny, and come over to the Red Army, which is truly resisting Japan!

6. Do not burn or kill the workers and peasants in the soviet areas, oppose the Guomindang's suppression of the anti-Japanese movements of the popular masses, and unite with compatriots throughout the country to resist Japan together!

Brother soldiers of the White army!

If you do not want to become slaves without a country, and if you want to save China, you must immediately unite to carry out these six guidelines for resisting Japan! The Red Army is prepared to welcome your delegates at any time to come to sign a truce and an alliance to resist Japan. Let us all unite and go north to resist Japan!

Let the White army soldiers unite with the Red Army!

Down with Japanese imperialism!

Down with the traitorous Guomindang!

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This document was first published in *Shibing rike*, no. 1, July 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 369–70, where it is reproduced from that source.

# ***Comrade Mao Zedong Discusses the Current Situation and the Red Army's Anti-Japanese Advance Party***

(July 1934)

A reporter from our newspaper met with Chairman Mao of the Central Government yesterday and interviewed him on the topics of the current situation and the Red Army's anti-Japanese advance party. What follows is based on the interview:

Ever since the Japanese imperialists refused a settlement in Manchuria and Rehe, established their control over Beiping and Tianjin, seized the rights to transportation and postal services [with Manchuria], issued the manifesto proclaiming their exclusive right to dominate China, and requested that the Guomindang resolve over a thousand "unsolved cases," they have intensified their new offensive aiming at swallowing up China. The Japanese Government's recent proposal to the United States that Japan and America should divide the Pacific evenly between them,<sup>1</sup> its frenzied efforts to instigate an anti-Soviet war in northern Manchuria, and the holding of the Dalian Conference with Guomindang representatives<sup>2</sup> have all clearly demonstrated that the Japanese imperialists are striving with all their might to mitigate the struggles among the imperialists and to bring about a temporary understanding among the imperialists with a view to joining their forces to carve up China, attacking the Chinese revolution, and opposing the Soviet Union. The running dog of the Japanese imperialists, the

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This interview was originally published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 221, August 1, 1934, and we have translated it from that source. This version is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 371–75, but a number of characters are missing or wrong there because they were illegible in the copy used by the Japanese compilers.

1. In late May 1934, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials presented to the U.S. Government a proposed declaration which the two countries would issue jointly. Among other provisions, it would have announced that both countries recognized the paramountcy of the United States in the eastern Pacific and of Japan in the western Pacific. The U.S. State Department rejected the idea of such a declaration. See Dorothy Borg, *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 96–97.

2. The "Dalian Conference" referred to here was in fact an ongoing series of negotiations in June–July 1934 over the opening of rail and postal service between China and Manchukuo. See Coble, *Facing Japan*, pp. 170–71.

Guomindang government in Nanjing, is now spreading the smoke screen of "annulling the Tanggu Truce" and "retrieving the war zones" to conceal the Dalian Conference, which is selling out China in a hurry. In the meantime, the northern warlords, the old pro-Japanese hands of the Anfu Clique, are cooperating completely with the Guomindang. Its key members, such as Wang Keming, have been going southward one after the other to hold secret talks with Huang Fu, Tang Youren, and their ilk in Shanghai and Moganshan. The leader of the Anfu Clique, Duan Qirui, went to Lushan and held a secret meeting with Chiang Kaishek. This great cooperation between the new and old traitors has made it absolutely plain that the Japanese imperialists' new onslaught has become extremely intense, that the Chinese nation has arrived at an extremely critical moment, and that a destiny of death and slavery is threatening the toiling masses in the whole country!

The Japanese imperialists' new invasion is completely coordinated with the Guomindang's large-scale invasion of our basic soviet areas. The Guomindang's hundreds of thousands of troops are just now advancing toward our central areas from the gateways to the Soviet Area—Guangchang, Liancheng, Longgang, and Taihe, in order to carry out the final steps of its Fifth Encirclement and Suppression, attempting to drown the Soviet Area in blood, to eliminate the Soviet Red Army, and to be the most loyal running dog of the imperialists who are carving up China. These are the characteristics of the current situation.

In order to defend their own territory and quell the traitorous Guomindang, the Soviet Government and the Red Army are currently leading the broad masses and the valiant Red Army on all fronts to launch a fierce and bloody war against the superior enemy forces, and are expending every effort and using every possible method to crush this fiendish "Encirclement and Suppression." The soviets and the Red Army long ago resolved to crush this fiendish Encirclement and Suppression at all costs. At present, it is even more essential that we summon up all our resolve, indomitability, and perseverance. There is no doubt that we will ultimately succeed in smashing them if we do this.

In the Soviet Area, we have recently created a new Red Army with seventy thousand troops, and mobilized several hundred thousand *Dan* of grain to solve the problem of provisioning during the period before the new harvest. Right now, we are engaged in the great autumn harvest mobilization. Our guerrilla forces have been greatly expanded and are continuing to expand, and guerrilla warfare is developing on a massive scale. As far as material provisions such as salt and cloth are concerned, mass movements for salt manufacturing and cloth weaving are just being developed. The military industries such as ammunition manufacturing and so on have increased several dozen times. All these strengths are, of course, beyond the Guomindang's wildest dreams. The Guomindang has long said how "terrible" we were, and that they could nonetheless achieve great victories over us. The facts have proved, however, and will eventually prove that the only thing really "terrible" is the utterly corrupt Guomindang. Chiang

Kaishek has boasted of having built fortifications thousands of *li* in length, and several dozen stories high around the Soviet Area, and of how his policy of "draining the pond to catch the fish" will soon "succeed." It is true that Chiang Kaishek has built a lot of fortifications and has occupied some of our territory. He is even planning to advance and take Tingzhou, Shicheng, Ningdu, and Xingguo. But the fact that many Guomindang troops have been defeated and crushed under the iron fists of the Red Army is something he dares not mention and regards as taboo. Moreover, stupid swine like Chiang Kaishek do not understand that it is not the Soviet Red Army, but rather Chiang Kaishek and the whole of the Guomindang of the landlords and bourgeoisie that will ultimately prove to be "terrible," and those imperialists who are issuing orders to Chiang Kaishek's Guomindang do not understand this either. Let me point out two more things: First of all, there is the influence exerted by the Soviet Red Army on the masses of soldiers in their million-plus troops advancing to invade our soviet areas (Jiangxi, Sichuan, Hunan, Fujian, and Hubei-Henan-Anhui). We must say that on the one hand, these numerous soldiers are forced to attack us, but on the other they are receiving revolutionary education from us. It may be said that all of these various soviet areas are so many universities where the White army soldiers can learn about revolution. Consequently, it is not only the Red Army which is digging a grave for Chiang Kaishek, but also his own soldiers. May we ask, does this blockhead Chiang Kaishek understand this? The second point is that the Guomindang, striving desperately to sell out its own country, daily kneels down and worships the imperialists, the deadly enemies of the popular masses of our whole country. It has given away half of China to the Japanese imperialists, never firing a single shot at the invading hundreds of thousands of Japanese bandit troops. Instead, it has gathered all the troops from the Three Northeastern Provinces, Rehe, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Hankou, as well as from Henan, Hebei, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang; redeployed them to fight against the Red Army; and offered up all these places to the imperialists to be devastated and oppressed. Similarly, Chen Jitang did not go to defend Hong Kong (the base for the British imperialists' invasion of China), but rather, gave the Guangzhou-Kowloon Railway to Great Britain and sent eight-tenths of his troops to Jiangxi and Fujian to fight the Red Army. May we ask, Will the broad masses of these places let Chiang Kaishek and Chen Jitang continue to sell out the country to the very end? Will they let the imperialists freely come into China to kill and burn? May we ask, once again, will the masses of soldiers in the armies that have been sent here let the imperialists burn and kill their own home villages, and still feel at ease about being forced by the Guomindang to fight against their own brothers—the workers, the peasants, and the Red Army? No, absolutely not. Chiang Kaishek, Chen Jitang (as well as Zhang Xueliang, He Jian, and the others) have thousands and thousands of bombs hidden under them. Some bombs have already exploded or are exploding (the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army in the Three Northeastern Provinces, the People's Revolutionary

Army, the war in Shanghai, and the guerrilla warfare and mass uprisings in various places). Some other places are still waiting for the opportune time to explode in a big way. Let us ask the laboring masses of the entire country and the White army soldiers: Who does not support the Chinese Communist Party's Five Great Anti-Japanese Principles? Who does not support the order of the Soviet Central Government declaring war against Japan? Who does not accept the call of the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission, "Do not fight the Red Army, but instead join with the Red Army in fighting Japanese imperialism"? There is no doubt that as soon as they see or hear our guiding principles, orders, and appeals, they will jump up and be willing to act in consequence. There is no doubt that an anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist storm in the whole country will surge up under our bright red banner.

At the time when the Guomindang has sold out half of China and the popular masses of the whole country are yearning for the Red Army to move north to fight Japan like people yearning for rain in the midst of a drought, the Soviet Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission are dispatching their anti-Japanese advance party on August 1 of this year, when the toiling popular masses of the whole world will be holding great demonstrations against imperialist invasion and war. Within a day or two, it should have approached Fuzhou, and then it will move northward via the eastern provinces to fight against Japan. The purpose is to make the popular masses of the whole country understand that the Red Army is the genuine anti-Japanese army of all China. Although the main forces of the Red Army have been blocked from going north by the Guomindang's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression and can only move northward after they have thoroughly crushed the Guomindang's Encirclement and Suppression, even at this juncture, they are sending out their own advance party. This force, although it is only an advance party, possesses high combat capacity and is equipped with sufficient firepower. All of its fighters and commanders are of high quality, and in the past have shown great bravery in combat with the Guomindang forces. Although this force is not very large, we are persuaded that it will definitely be able to get the support of the popular masses along the way and that the resolutely anti-Japanese elements in the Guomindang armies will continually join it, or will unite with us and advance hand in hand. In this way, our anti-Japanese advance party will very soon be expanded into a great anti-Japanese force. The only thing is that, when these troops are moving northward, Chiang Kaishek and his Nanjing government—these running dogs of the Japanese imperialists—because of their utter loyalty to Japan, will surely send troops to block them. If so, then the advance party, in the course of its advance, will have to fight against Chiang Kaishek's blocking troops. Hence, we will need to make forceful propaganda to persuade the soldiers of the blocking troops to sympathize with us and cause this blockading force to disintegrate so that we can quickly move northward. The sooner we can fight against Japan the better, because the new offensive of Japanese imperialism is imminent, the ac-

tions of all the imperialists aimed at carving up China are marked by increasingly threatening gestures, and the sufferings of the popular masses of the whole country are constantly increasing. Consequently, we call upon the whole country to arise as one and support the soviets and the Red Army, so that we can quickly smash the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression and concentrate our forces to resist Japan and oppose imperialism. Help our anti-Japanese advance party and oppose the Nanjing government's policy of blockade, so that the anti-Japanese Red Army may quickly advance.

The anti-Japanese advance party of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has already set out! Our valiant Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has already taken practical actions to fight against the Japanese imperialist invasion and to save China from perishing. At the same time, the Soviet Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission have already ordered the Red Army in the whole country to be prepared at any time to move out, following the advance party. But the Guomindang is blocking the Red Army with a big force of hundreds of thousands of troops, and has withdrawn the whole of its northern armies and sent them southward into Jiangxi. Popular masses of the whole country, can't you understand? The Guomindang are clearing the way for Japanese imperialism. Popular masses of the whole country and brothers of the White army, oppose the Guomindang's policy of selling out the country and capitulation! Demand that all naval, ground, and air forces be mobilized to resist Japan and oppose the attacks on the Red Army! All of China's armies should point their guns in the direction of Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors who are selling out the country! Only by so doing can we defeat, and will we assuredly defeat, Japanese imperialism.



# *Order of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

(August 15, 1934)

Kong Hechong, a member of the Central Executive Committee, former commander of the Sixteenth Army of the Red Army, working in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area, has violated the orders of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission many times. Stricken with panic and wavering in the face of enemy attacks, he has led the Red Army to retreat and flee; tolerated counter-revolutionary, liquidationist elements within the army; and caused the Sixteenth Army and the masses of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area to suffer severely. He was repeatedly criticized and educated, without producing any change at all. Last October, he was stripped of his position as commander of the Sixteenth Army, but since it was hoped that he could be reeducated, he was ordered to come to the Center and enter the Red Army University to study. Not only did he fail to make the slightest progress, but he even went from wavering to open counterrevolution. In July this year, when he was sent to work in the supplementary division, he took the opportunity to defect to the enemy. Kong Hechong, as a member of the Central Executive Committee, has had a rather long history of struggles. Just at the time when our valiant Red Army and the broad masses are engaged in the final, decisive battle against the enemy's Fifth Encirclement and Suppression, he has not only failed to recognize the victorious future of the revolution, but has engaged in the most shameful acts of betrayal. Besides expelling him from the Central Executive Committee, we are issuing this general order to all Red Army forces throughout the country, to all local troops, and to soviet governments at all levels, and are calling upon all revolutionary bodies, as well as the worker-peasant masses in the soviet areas and the White areas. If you encounter the said Kong Hechong, he should immediately be arrested and killed, as a warning to all those who waver and betray. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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This order was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 228, August 30, 1934. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 377-78, where it is reproduced from that source.

# Huichang<sup>1</sup>

(To the Tune "Pure and Serene Music")

(Summer 1934)

In the East dawn is about to break,  
Say not, "You are early afoot."  
We who have traversed the whole of these green hills  
are yet unwearied.<sup>2</sup>  
The scenery here is singularly fair.

Beyond the walls of Huichang mountains rise high,  
Peak after peak, straight to the Eastern Sea.  
The fighters, pointing, gaze toward Guangdong,  
Greener still, and more luxuriant.

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This poem was first published in the first issue of *Shikan* in January 1957. Our source is *Shici duijian*, pp. 46–47.

1. Huichang is the name of a *xian* in southeastern Jiangxi. The *xian* town of Huichang was part of the Central Soviet Area, and when Mao wrote this poem he was there doing investigation work as the Red Army prepared for the Long March.

2. The following note to this line, now officially attributed to Mao himself, appeared when this poem was first published in book form in December 1958: "In 1934, the situation was desperate. We were preparing for the Long March and the mood was very gloomy. This poem to the tune 'Pure and Serene Music' reveals the same sort of inner feelings as the earlier one, to the tune 'Bodhisattva Stranger.'" Two poems to that "tune-title" in fact appeared in the first issue of *Shikan* and in the 1958 edition along with this one: "Yellow Crane Tower" (Spring 1927), translated in Volume II, p. 484, and "Dabodi" (Summer 1933), translated above. The editors of *Shici duijian* state that Mao is here referring to "Yellow Crane Tower" and this seems most likely.



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## APPENDIX

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# ***Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army***

(November 1931)

In the four years of arduous struggle from the defeat of the 1927 Revolution to the present, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, under the correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and in concert with the broad masses of the workers and peasants, has resolutely carried out the land revolution, opposed the Guomindang warlords, opposed imperialism, taken back the land from the despotic gentry and the landlord class, established the soviet political power of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, tempered itself to become a powerful Red Army, and crushed three large-scale offensives of the running dogs of imperialism—the Guomindang warlords. This spirit of courageous struggle and these victories on behalf of the soviet political power of the worker and peasant classes merit admiration and praise. In the soviet stage the continued development of the revolutionary movement requires even more the expansion and consolidation of the Red Army, so that, in the course of a long period of arduous struggles, it can first win victory in one or several provinces, in order to build a new Soviet China, and carry out the historic class mission of the Red Army. Therefore, the Red Army fighters and their family members should receive all kinds of preferential treatment from the Soviet Republic. To this end, the Congress promulgates the following provisions regarding preferential treatment:

Article 1. All Red Army fighters in the soviet areas and their family members must receive the same share of land as the poor peasants of the locality in question, as well as houses, hills and forests, ponds. . . .<sup>1</sup>

Article 2. All Red Army fighters located in the White areas, including those who have just come over from the White armies, should be given a share of the public land in the soviet areas. The local government of the relevant area shall assign persons to cultivate it on their behalf.

Article 3. Officers and soldiers of the Red Army who are discharged because they are no longer capable of serving and are given long-term leave must all have land distributed to them to cultivate from the public land of the Red Army. If they have families settled in the soviet areas, their family members must also receive shares.

Article 4. During their period of service, those Red Army fighters who do not have the labor power to cultivate their family's land, or the public land allocated to them, should have people sent to them by the soviet governments (the district governments make the plan and the township governments carry it out) to help them with all the work of

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 259–62.

1. Here there are suspension points in the source we are using; there is no indication as to how much (if anything) is missing.

cultivation, irrigation, and harvesting. The number of laborers sent annually should be no fewer than fifty. Those families of Red Army fighters that are short of labor power should be assisted according to their need.

Article 5. In order to carry out the above regulations, it is prescribed that all those who have not served in the Red Army must provide free of charge "days of work for giving preferential treatment to the Red Army." Every person is to work two days a month to help the members of the families of Red Army men. The time and the type of work should be decided on the basis of the needs of the family members of the Red Army men.

Article 6. During their time of service, Red Army men themselves and their family members are exempted from all taxes of the Soviet Republic.

Article 7. During their time of service, state-owned houses in which the family members of the Red Army men live are exempted from rent.

Article 8. During their time of service, Red Army men themselves and their family members enjoy a 5 percent discount in state stores. When there is a shortage of articles of daily necessity, they have the right to buy first.

Article 9. While traveling by boat or train, all expenses of Red Army fighters are provided from the public purse.

Article 10. All theaters must entertain Red Army men free of charge once a month. On other occasions, the ticket price should be reduced by half.

Article 11. During the time of service of Red Army men, their children are entitled to free education.

Article 12. During their time of service, Red Army men who need to rest and recuperate from wounds or illness should be sent to the most appropriate convalescent hospital for recuperation. While they are recuperating, all expenses are covered by the state.

Article 13. Those who have served five years or more in the Red Army and are over the age of forty-five may resign and recuperate, and the state will provide them with an allowance for the rest of their lives. Those who do not wish to retire and are willing to go on serving should receive special preferential treatment.

Article 14. The state will set up homes for the disabled. All those who become disabled because of the war or during service in the Red Army are to enter homes for the disabled for recuperation, and all their living expenses will be covered by the state. Those who do not wish to live in these homes should be given an annual pension for the rest of their lives, to be fixed by the *xian* soviet on the basis of the living standards in the locality. But the minimum amount at present is 50 big foreign dollars a year.

Article 15. Letters from Red Army men to their family members may be mailed home without paying postage if they carry the seals of their direct superiors. Letters sent to the Red Army by family members of Red Army men may also be mailed without postage if stamped by the local governments and sent to Red Army organs for forwarding. Governments and Red Army organs at every level must conscientiously take responsibility for this.

Article 16. In the case of all Red Army soldiers killed in action and those who die of illness during their service in the Red Army compensation is to be provided according to the following regulations:

- a. In the case of all those fighters who have died, the Red Army organs or the government shall collect and publish information concerning the time and place of death, the campaign in which it occurred, and their contributions.

- b. Belongings left by dead soldiers shall be collected by Red Army organs or by the government and displayed in the museums of the history of the revolution for memorial purposes.
- c. Local governments shall help Red Army organs to bury the dead and set up memorial monuments.

Article 17. Family members of all Red Army soldiers who die or become disabled shall be given preferential treatment according to the following regulations:

- a. Their children or brothers and sisters who are still very young shall be specially educated in revolutionary memorial schools established by the state, and the state will support them until they are eighteen and are given a job by the state.
- b. Their parents and wives shall be supported by the state with a suitable allowance.
- c. Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in this regulation also apply to this situation.

Article 18. During the period of service of all Red Army men, if their wives wish to divorce, approval from the man himself must be obtained. Otherwise, the government must prohibit the divorce.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao



# ***Resolution on Issuing Temporary Tax Regulations***

***Adopted by the First Session of the  
Central Executive Committee***

**(November 28, 1931)**

1. Taxes collected constitute the principal source of the state's fiscal revenues and expenditures. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the Central Government abolishes all land taxes, household levies, miscellaneous contributions and taxes, *lijin*,<sup>1</sup> and such imposed by the Guomindang warlords, and applies a unified progressive tax.

2. The unified progressive taxation system collects only one kind of tax from all, in whatever domain. The principle of taxation is, apart from placing the heaviest burden of tax payment on the exploiting classes, to handle matters according to the principle of class, exempting from the duty of paying taxes the exploited classes and the poorest strata among the masses.

3. At present, because of the revolutionary war, the soviet areas throughout the country cannot be joined together as one, and given various other special circumstances, agricultural taxation can be based only on the principal crop. For the time being no taxes will be levied on any secondary crop. Moreover, as far as setting agricultural taxation rates is concerned, the criterion for imposition of taxes begins with what is over and above the amount required for meeting basic living expenses, and the rate is calculated progressively from there. Those [whose income is] below the standard are exempt from taxation. Rich peasants are taxed rather more heavily; for them, the figure for the starting point of taxation is to be half that for poor peasants and middle peasants. This principle having been set, the government of each province may establish an agricultural tax rate according to the actual situation in the area.

4. At present, in order to develop the economy of the soviet areas, there is a temporary moratorium on commercial import and export taxes, and taxes on manufactured goods.

5. These tax regulations take effect from December 1, 1931.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 17-18.

1. As indicated in previous notes, the *lijin* was a transit tax imposed on a wide variety of goods moved by road or river.

# *Temporary Tax Regulations*

## *Notice No. 4 of the Provisional Central Government*

(December 1, 1931)

### **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. Unified progressive taxation shall be established, and all land taxes, household levies, *lijin*, and other miscellaneous contributions and taxes of the Guomindang government shall be abolished.

Article 2. Types of tax regulations: There shall be three types of taxes, namely commercial tax, agricultural tax, and industrial tax.

### **Chapter 2. Commercial Tax**

Article 3. Tax rates: For the time being, there shall be thirteen levels of commercial capital tax, [for amounts] from 200 *yuan* to 100,000 *yuan*. Taxes on income derived from capital (that is to say, total profits, not the capital itself) shall be levied according to the rates prescribed for the different levels. Tax rates on capital above 100,000 *yuan* shall be fixed separately. The [tax] table is as follows:

<u>Level</u>	<u>Capital (yuan)</u>	<u>Rate (percent)</u>
1	200–300	2
2	301–500	2.5
3	501–700	3
4	701–1,000	3.5
5	1,001–1,500	4.5
6	1,501–3,000	5.5
7	3,001–5,000	6.5
8	5,001–10,000	8
9	10,001–20,000	9.5
10	20,001–30,000	11.5
11	30,001–50,000	13.5
12	50,001–80,000	16
13	80,001–100,000	18.5

Article 4. Taxation methods: Tax rates are set according to the amount of a shop's capital as entered on its operating license obtained from a financial organ of the government. Thereafter, tax will be levied according to this rate.

Article 5. Tax periods: Each year shall be divided into two periods, but seasonal businesses should be taxed after they have completed their business [for the year].

Article 6. Tax exemption procedures:

- a. All consumer cooperatives organized in accordance with the rules and regulations concerning cooperatives promulgated by the government and registered with the *xian* government are exempt from taxation upon report by the *xian* government to the provincial government in question.
- b. Street vendors and peasants selling their surplus produce directly are all exempt from commercial taxes.
- c. All those with commercial capital of less than 200 *yuan* are exempt from taxation.
- d. Merchants who are in distress or have suffered unexpected damages may be exempted from taxation after reporting to the government and being investigated and approved.
- e. The government may announce tax exemptions by decree at any time for certain daily necessities and military supplies.

### Chapter 3. Agricultural Tax

(Note) At present agricultural production and commodity values in the countryside are extremely complex and a uniform method of taxation cannot be established. Only the principles of agricultural taxation can be determined. On the basis of these principles, each province may determine appropriate agricultural taxes in light of local conditions.

Article 7. After the land has been distributed to the peasants, the amount of the annual harvest per person and the necessary living expenses per person shall be calculated by dividing the annual harvest of the main crop for the whole family by the number of family members. Then, on the basis of these standards, the minimum amount of income per person on which tax is levied and the rate of progressive taxation shall be established.

Article 8. Only the main crop (rice and wheat) is taxable; sideline products are tax-exempt for the time being.

Article 9. When tea-oil producing hills, cotton and hemp fields, and orchards have been redistributed as rice paddies and wheat fields, their produce becomes the main crop and is likewise subject to taxation.

Article 10. Dependents of Red Army soldiers enjoy tax exemption in accordance with the regulations concerning preferential treatment for the Red Army.

Article 11. All farm laborers and workers to whom land has been distributed shall be exempt from taxation.

Article 12. Poor peasants whose incomes have reached the level of taxation but who still cannot support their families may be granted tax reduction or exemption by the township soviet on a case-by-case basis.

Article 13. Taxes on former rich peasants should be somewhat heavier.

Article 14. Regions that have suffered floods or drought and other natural disasters, or from depredations by White bandits, shall be granted tax exemption or reduction according to the severity of the situation.

Article 15. Increased agricultural income resulting from the improvement of seeds and methods of cultivation is exempt from taxation.

Article 16. Agricultural produce obtained from the cultivation of wasteland is exempt from taxation for three years. Rich peasants may benefit from tax reduction or exemption for one year in light of the circumstances of the harvest.

Article 17. Methods and periods for agricultural taxation: The taxes start to be levied one or two months after the harvesting of the crops. During the period when taxes are being collected, each person in every family should pay the amount of tax required by the regulations regarding tax rates.

Article 18. Whether agricultural taxes take the form of cash or crops shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the peasants.

The Method of Agricultural Taxation of Jiangxi Province is appended for reference by all other provinces:

Agricultural Produce ( <i>Dan</i> ) <sup>1</sup> (Taxation starts when the average harvest per person per family is over four <i>dan</i> of dry unhusked rice.)	Tax Rate (percent)
4	1
5	2
6	3
7	4
8	5
9	6.5
10	8
11	9.5
12	11
13	12.5
14	14.5
15	16.5

Taxation for rich peasants begins at 2 *Dan* with a rate of 1 percent, at 3 *Dan* it is 2 percent, and so on.

#### Chapter 4. Industrial Tax

Article 19. Production cooperatives that are approved and registered by *xian* governments may be exempted from the payment of taxes upon report to the provincial government by the *xian* government.

Article 20. At present, in order to promote the industrial development of the soviet areas, the tax on manufactured products is not being levied for the time being.

Article 21. Industrial tax rates are determined according to the amount of capital, and only the profits from the capital are taxable. [Industrial] tax rates will be established by a separate regulation, but the rate must be lower than that for the tax on commerce.

1. As before, we distinguish between the unit of weight and the unit of volume pronounced *dan* by capitalizing the first of these. (For extensive illustrations of the way Mao used these in the 1930s, and the relation between the two when dealing with grain, see the Xunwu and Xingguo investigations in Volume III, pp. 296-418, and in particular note 12, p. 301.)

**Chapter 5. Additional Article**

Article 22. These tax regulations shall come into force on the date they are promulgated.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution on the Marriage Regulations***

***Adopted by the First Session  
of the Central Executive Committee***

**(November 28, 1931)**

Under feudal rule, marriage between men and women is barbarous to the point of inhumanity, and the oppression and suffering borne by women is even more extreme than that borne by men. Only the victory of the workers' and peasants' revolution, by which men and women take the first step toward economic emancipation, leads to a change in the marriage relationship between men and women, bringing them freedom. At present, in the soviet areas,<sup>1</sup> marriage between men and women has already achieved a basis for freedom. The principle of freedom of marriage must be established, and the whole feudal system of arranged marriages and marriages involving compulsion or buying and selling must be abolished.

It remains a fact that women have only just been liberated from feudal oppression, and many have suffered great physical harm (such as bound feet), from which they have yet to recover. In economic terms, they are still unable to be completely independent. At present, therefore, as regards the problem of divorce, it is necessary to emphasize protection for women and to place the greater part of the obligations and responsibilities entailed by divorce upon men.

Children are the masters of the new society. The old social customs, in particular, neglected the nurturing of children, so special regulations have been established for the protection of children.

These regulations are to be promulgated and enter into force as of December 1, 1931.

Central Executive Committee

Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 37–38.

1. The words "in the soviet areas" do not appear in the Chinese text as reproduced in the *Mao Zedong ji*, Volume 3, but are included in the version contained in *Suwei'ai Zhongguo*, p. 207.

# *Marriage Regulations*

(Promulgated on December 1, 1931)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. The principle of freedom of marriage between men and women shall be established. The whole feudal system of arranged marriages and of marriages involving compulsion or buying and selling is abolished, and child brides<sup>1</sup> are prohibited.

Article 2. Monogamy shall be practiced, and polygamy shall be prohibited.

## **Chapter 2. Marriage**

Article 3. The marriage age: Males must be at least twenty years old and females must be at least eighteen years old.

Article 4. Marriage between a man and a woman must have the consent of both sides, and no compulsion may be employed by either party or by a third party.

Article 5. Marriage between men and women who are blood relatives within five generations is prohibited.

Article 6. The marriage of those with venereal disease, leprosy, tuberculosis, and other dangerous contagious diseases is prohibited. Those with the above-mentioned diseases who have a doctor's permission to marry after examination may marry.

Article 7. The marriage of those who suffer from mental illness or paralysis is prohibited.

Article 8. When a man and woman marry, they must go together to the township or city soviet to register and obtain a marriage certificate. Betrothal money, betrothal gifts, and dowries<sup>2</sup> are abolished.

## **Chapter 3. Divorce**

Article 9. Freedom of divorce shall be established. If both parties, man and woman, agree to a divorce, the divorce shall take effect. If one party, either man or woman, resolutely demands a divorce, the divorce will also take effect.

Article 10. When a man and woman are divorced, they must have the divorce registered with the township or city soviet government.

## **Chapter 4. The Care of Children after Divorce**

Article 11. The rearing of children born prior to the divorce is the responsibility of the man. If both the man and the woman wish to rear their children, the woman shall have custody.

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Our source for these regulations is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 39–42.

1. The term used, *tongyang xi*, refers to child brides who, for reasons of poverty, are brought up in the family of their future husbands.

2. Betrothal money (*pinjin*) and betrothal gifts (*pinli*) were given by the family of the groom to the family of the bride; dowries or trousseaux (*jiazhuang*) accompanied the bride to her new home. These practices were the principal forms of the "buying and selling" abolished by Article 1 of this statute.

Article 12. Infants should be raised by the woman during the period when they are being nursed.

Article 13. Land distributed to children follows the children wherever they go.

Article 14. Two-thirds of the necessary living expenses of children who are being reared by the woman should be the responsibility of the man, until the children are sixteen years old. Methods of payment may take the form of paying cash or of cultivating the land belonging to the children on their behalf.

Article 15. Only when a woman remarries, and the new husband is willing to provide for the children, is the children's father relieved of responsibility for the living expenses of the children.

Article 16. New husbands who wish to provide for stepchildren must register with the township or city soviet government. Once registration has taken place, they have the obligation to provide for the children until they become adults, and may not stop halfway or abuse the children.

#### **Chapter 5. Disposal of Property Belonging to the Man and Woman After Divorce**

Article 17. The man and woman shall each dispose independently of the land, property, and debts which are their own. If they have been married for at least a year, property that has increased in value as a result of joint management by the man and the woman shall be divided equally between them. If there are children, the property is divided equally among the members of the family.

Article 18. The joint debt of the man and the woman incurred while they were living together should be paid by the man.

Article 19. If neither the man nor the woman is willing to leave their house after divorce, the man must sell part of his house to the woman so that she can live there.

Article 20. If the woman has not remarried after divorce, the man must provide for her, or cultivate land on her behalf, until she remarries.

#### **Chapter 6. The Care of Children Born Out of Wedlock<sup>3</sup>**

Article 21. Two-thirds of the living expenses of the children born without marriage registration should be paid by the man who is proven to be the father. All the provisions contained in Articles 11 to 15 of Chapter 4 are applicable.

#### **Chapter 7. Additional Articles**

Article 22. Violations of these statutes shall be duly punished in accordance with the criminal law.

Article 23. This statute shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee  
of the Chinese Soviet Government

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

3. Literally, "born when no marriage has been registered."



# ***Detailed Regulations Regarding Elections in the Chinese Soviet Republic***

*Adopted by the First Session  
of the Central Executive Committee*

(November 1931)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. With a view to unifying electoral procedures within the borders of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and in accordance with the provisions regarding elections in Articles 68 through 79 of the Constitution, these electoral regulations are hereby promulgated.

Article 2. These electoral regulations shall be effective everywhere within the borders of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 3. The Central Executive Committee has the right to suspend or amend these regulations.

Article 4. If there are questions about these regulations, or if disputes arise in the course of their implementation, the authority to interpret them is vested in the Central Executive Committee.

## **Chapter 2. The Right to Vote and the Right to Be Elected**

Article 5. In accordance with the provision of Article 68 of the Constitution, "All those people residing within the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic who have attained the age of sixteen, regardless of sex, religion, or nationality, have the right to elect and be elected to the soviets. These rights are, however, limited to the following types of people:

1. All those who do not exploit the labor of others, such as hired laborers, peasants, independent laborers, the urban poor, and their families;
2. Those who are serving in the navy, army, and air force of the Chinese Soviet Republic; and
3. Those in the aforementioned two groups who are currently unable to work or are unemployed."

Article 6. In accordance with the provision of Article 69 of the Constitution, "People who have offended in one of the following ways are denied the right to vote and to be elected:

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 27-35.

1. Those who exploit the labor of others (including rich peasants);
2. Those who live off profits from land and capital, and do not themselves labor;
3. Merchants, capitalists and their agents, brokers, and compradors;
4. Missionaries of the various religions, pastors, priests, and Daoist monks, geomancers and fortune-tellers, and all those whose profession is religious proselytizing;
5. Policemen, detectives, military police, bureaucrats, and warlords of the Guomindang and other reactionary governments, and members of reactionary parties who oppose the interests of the workers and peasants;
6. The mentally ill;
7. Those who have been convicted of a criminal offense by a court and are serving their sentences;
8. Family members of those who fall under (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5)."

Article 70 of the Constitution also stipulates as follows: "Anyone belonging to one of the three categories of people listed under Article 68 of this Constitution who has offended under any of the subheadings of Article 69 is also denied the right to vote and the right to be elected."

### **Chapter 3. Organs for Conducting Elections**

Article 7. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 71 of the Constitution, the organs for conducting elections shall be as follows:

1. In urban areas, elections shall be carried out by election committees of not more than nine members organized by the city soviets.
2. In rural areas, elections shall be carried out by the election committee organized by the district executive committee, and comprising not more than eleven members for the entire district.

Article 8. In large cities and districts, branch election committees should be set up under the city election committees and the district election committees, to carry out their work under the direction of the general election committee.

Article 9. Members of the election committees are to be reported by the city soviets and district soviets to the *xian* executive committees for review, and then to be reported by the *xian* executive committees to the provincial executive committees or their presidium for approval and appointment. Only residents of the given locality are eligible. In special circumstances, higher-level governments may appoint individuals who are not residents of the locality in question.

Article 10. Chairmen of city soviets and township soviets may not become members or chairmen of election committees.

### **Chapter 4. Election Procedures**

Article 11. Registration of voters must be carried out two weeks before the beginning of the elections.

Article 12. Individuals may be designated by the election committee as voter registra-

tion officers. Those people who are organized may be registered by the respective organizations. Those who are not organized may be registered by the individuals specially engaged for this purpose.

Article 13. At the time of registration a voter registration form as laid down by the Central Executive Committee must be filled out.

Article 14. After registration, voter registration forms must be sent to the election committee.

Article 15. When registration has been completed, the election committee must announce the total number of voters in the particular area and the number of deputies to be elected.

Article 16. Before an election begins, the election committee must, through the city soviet or executive committee, make public the list of individuals deprived of their right to vote.

Article 17. The election committee must announce in advance to each area, group, and enterprise the place and date of the election meeting.

Article 18. In the cities, elections are to be conducted on the basis of production units. Those individuals who cannot take part in the election on the basis of production units may hold election meetings in designated places in the area. The families of workers and toilers participate in the elections in the same place as the workers and toilers themselves. In rural areas, election meetings are held in the villages, which serve as the basic units. Several small villages may jointly convene an election meeting.

Article 19. After registration, the election committee must give all those entitled to vote a notice regarding the elections, informing them of the time and place of the election meeting. Only when they have received such a notice can voters enter the place where the election meeting is held.

Article 20. The election committee has the right to borrow any public place or private house as the location for an election meeting.

Article 21. The site for holding the election meeting should be prepared beforehand by the election committee. At the entrance to the meeting place, a specially appointed person must register people and admit only those presenting election notices.

Article 22. The presidium of an election meeting is composed of three persons. Two of them are selected by the election meeting; the other is the chairman of the election committee or its plenipotentiary representative. In addition, a secretary is to be selected to keep the minutes of the proceedings.

Article 23. The chairmanship of the presidium of an election meeting must be assumed by the chairman of the election committee or its plenipotentiary representative.

Article 24. After declaring the election meeting to be in session, the chairman must announce the number of people in attendance, and whether or not it is in conformity with the law.

Article 25. The agenda of the election meeting has been laid down as follows:

1. The chairman or plenipotentiary representative of the election committee announces, pursuant to Articles 68, 69, and 70 of the Constitution, who has the right to vote and be elected, and who has been deprived of these rights.
2. Election of deputies.
3. Election of alternate deputies.
4. Adoption of proposals put forward by the constituents for the deputies to take with them

Article 26. The minutes of the election meeting, the list of those registered as attending, as well as all documents related to the election, are to be sent to the election committee to verify the results of the election.

Article 27. The minutes of the election meeting must be signed by all members of the presidium, and by the secretary.

Article 28. The election meeting may proceed if more than half of the total number of voters are present at the meeting.

Article 29. If the number of voters present at the election meeting is below the legal quorum, an announcement must be made that the meeting is postponed, and the election committee must fix another date for reconvening it. In the event that the election meeting is rescheduled, new election notices must be distributed.

Article 30. If the second election meeting again fails to meet the legal quorum and is thus postponed, the third election meeting called may proceed to elect the required number of deputies, whether or not the number of people present meets the legal quorum.

Article 31. Written ballots are not used in the voting; the result is determined rather by a show of hands. Those for whom the most hands are raised are elected.

Article 32. Whether the names of candidates shall be put forward individually or in a complete list may be decided according to the wishes of the majority of the voters present at the meeting.

Article 33. Deputies and alternate deputies may not be elected at the same time. The voting for deputies must first be completed, and then alternate deputies may be elected.

#### **Chapter 5. Procedures for Electing Deputies to Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets at Various Levels, and the Proportion Between Deputies and Residents**

Article 34. The deputies to township soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers are elected by a meeting of the voters in the entire township. Every fifty residents may elect one deputy to the township soviet of workers, peasants and soldiers.

Article 35. City soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers are elected by a meeting of the voters in the entire city. Every two hundred residents may elect one deputy to the city soviet.

(Note) In addition to the deputies to the township and city soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers, alternate deputies should be elected; their number should be based on the ratio of one alternate deputy to five deputies.

Article 36. The deputies to township soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers elect representatives to the district congress of soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies. The number of representatives is to be one for every four hundred residents.

Article 37. The representatives to the district congresses of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and the deputies to the city soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers elect representatives to the *xian* congress of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers. The number of representatives shall be in the proportion of one for every 500 urban residents, and one for every 1,500 rural residents.

Article 38. The representatives to the *xian* congresses of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to the congresses of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers in the cities directly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government elect delegates making

up the provincial congress of soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers. The number of delegates is determined by the proportion of one delegate for every 5,000 urban residents, and one representative for every 25,000 rural residents.

Article 39. The delegates to the provincial congresses of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and the congresses of soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers in the cities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government elect the delegates making up the national congress of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies of the Chinese Soviet Republic. The number of delegates is based on the ratio of one for every fifty thousand rural residents and one for every ten thousand urban residents.

Article 40. The qualifications of delegates to district, *xian*, or provincial congresses of the soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers must be verified by the credentials committee organized by the congress of soviets at the level in question.

Article 41. Any area where the number of residents is below the legal minimum should also elect one delegate, with the right to speak but not to vote.

Article 42. The armed detachments of workers and peasants and Red Army units in areas under the jurisdiction of the district soviets take part in the election of the district soviet; the armed detachments of workers and peasants and Red Army units under the jurisdiction of the *xian* soviets take part in the election of the *xian* soviets; and the armed detachments of workers and peasants and Red Army units under the jurisdiction of the provincial soviets, as well as those not under the jurisdiction of the provincial soviet but located within the territory of the province, take part in the election of the provincial soviets. Election rules for the Red Army are to be issued separately by the Central Executive Committee.

#### **Chapter 6. Recognition and Annulment of Basic (City and Township) Elections and Recall of Deputies**

Article 43. Only elections conducted in accordance with the Constitution, and with the procedures laid down in the present regulations, are considered legitimate and must be recognized as such.

Article 44. If an election is conducted in violation of the Constitution and the procedures laid down in these regulations, voters may lodge a complaint at the city soviet or the district executive committee. The soviet government concerned must organize a committee to investigate the matter after receiving such complaints.

Article 45. At the conclusion of the election, the election committee must gather together all the documents regarding the election and deliver them to the city soviet or the district executive committee for inspection.

Article 46. The city soviet or district executive committee, upon receiving the documents of the election, must organize a special committee to inspect them.

Article 47. If some part of the elections is found not to have conformed to the electoral procedures, the city soviets and the district executive committees have the right to partial annulment of these elections.

Article 48. If the elections as a whole are found to have violated the electoral procedures, the right to annul such elections is vested in the soviet government at the next higher level.

Article 49. When disputes arise regarding the legitimacy of elections, it should be resolved by the city soviet and the district executive committee.

Article 50. The Central Executive Committee is the organ with ultimate authority to decide electoral appeals.

Article 51. If any deputy of the city and township soviets fails to fulfill his responsibilities, violates the trust of the people, or commits illegal acts, the city or township soviet must expel him. Voters also have the right to recall such a representative. Moreover, a special election should be held. Such circumstances must be reported to the soviet government at the next higher level for approval.

## Chapter 7. Funding for Elections

Article 52. The cost of holding elections is to be borne by the national treasury.

Article 53. Each election committee must prepare an election budget, which is to be reported by the city soviet or the district executive committee to the *xian* executive committee for approval; it is to be paid for out of election funds appropriated by the Central Executive Committee.

Article 54. At the conclusion of the election, the election committee must make a financial report to the city soviet or the district executive committee and prepare final accounts, which are to be reported by the city soviet or the district executive committee to the *xian* executive committee for approval.

## Chapter 8. Additional Provisions

Article 55. These electoral regulations take effect on the day they are promulgated.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee  
of the Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

# ***Labor Law***

## ***Passed by the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets***

(November 1931<sup>1</sup>)

### **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. All hired workers in enterprises, factories, workshops, and all other productive enterprises and agencies (including state-owned, cooperative, and private) are to benefit from the provisions of the Labor Law.

Article 2. Fighters and commanders performing military service in the navy, army, and air force of the Chinese Soviet Republic are not subject to the regulations of this Labor Law.

Article 3. Any collective contract, labor contract, or other labor agreement, whether already in effect or not, is void if the working conditions provided for therein are worse than those prescribed by this Labor Law.

Article 4. Farm laborers, lumber workers, seasonal workers, transport workers, coolies, housemaids, cooks, and others with particular conditions of work, in addition to enjoying the general provisions of this Labor Law, also benefit from particular provisions on working conditions promulgated by the Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, and the Central Commissariat of Labor specifically for such workers.

Article 5. The maximum weight of loads to be carried by coolies (including stevedores, rickshaw pullers, boat towers, sedan carriers, and porters) will be separately regulated by the Central Commissariat of Labor. In addition, the rights under this Labor Law to which independent laborers are entitled when they are hired by others will be separately laid out in detail by the Central Commissariat of Labor.

### **Chapter 2. Procedures for Hiring Labor**

Article 6. Workers must be hired through labor unions and labor exchanges, and in accordance with collective contracts. All forms of contract labor, contractual systems, and gang boss systems carried out by so-called foremen, contractors, compradors, or any private agencies are strictly prohibited.

Article 7. All labor exchanges must be organized by the labor departments<sup>2</sup> at various

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 69–82.

1. Promulgated on January 1, 1932.

2. The Chinese term is *bu*, commonly rendered “ministry.” In this volume we translate it as “commissariat” when it refers to the central level, and “department” when it refers to lower levels.

levels. Private individuals are strictly prohibited from establishing labor exchanges or employment agencies.

Article 8. Demanding that workers pay a fee for finding employment or deducting a fee for this service from their wages is strictly prohibited and will be severely punished.

Article 9. All those seeking employment must register at the labor exchanges established by the Central Commissariat of Labor in various areas, and have their names entered on the list of unemployed laborers.

### **Chapter 3. Collective Contracts and Labor Contracts**

Article 10. Collective contracts are collective agreements reached by labor unions on behalf of the workers and employees on the one hand and employers on the other. In such collective contracts, the conditions of employment for hired laborers provided by enterprises, organs, families, and private employers are set forth, as is the content of the labor contracts that will be signed by individual laborers and their employers.

Article 11. The conditions of the collective contract are valid for every employee within the enterprise or organ, whether or not he has joined the labor union.

Article 12. Collective contracts already registered with the Commissariat of Labor take effect on the day they are signed by the two sides or on the date specified in the contract.

Article 13. Labor contracts are agreements established between one or more workers and their employer. Any labor contract in which the conditions are worse than those stipulated in the current Labor Law and in collective contracts is null and void. The duration of limited collective contracts and labor contracts is not to exceed one year. Labor unions have the right to demand the abrogation of contracts before their expiration.

### **Chapter 4. Hours of Work**

Article 14. For all hired laborers, the normal work day shall not exceed eight hours, in accordance with the provisions of this Labor Law.

Article 15. Young workers between the ages of sixteen and eighteen may not work more than six hours during a normal work day. Child laborers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen may not work more than four hours a day.

Article 16. All workers who work in industrial sectors harmful to their health (such as underground mining, and work with lead, zinc, and other toxic [substances]) must have their work day reduced to six hours or less. The types of industries harmful to the health of the workers, and the number of hours to which the work day is to be reduced in each case, are to be determined and promulgated by the Central Commissariat of Labor.

Article 17. All night workers are to have their work time reduced by one hour as compared to the regular working day (a regular eight hour day is reduced to seven, a seven hour day is reduced to six, and so on). (Note: The time from 9 P.M. until the next morning at [X] A.M.<sup>3</sup> is called the night shift.)

Article 18. Unless special permission is granted by the labor inspectorate or the labor

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3. The specific hour is missing in the text used, and it is unclear whether one or two characters are missing.



unions to certain industrial sectors, no industry or seasonal employment may permit overtime work in excess of the hours specified by this Labor Law.

### **Chapter 5. Rest Time**

Article 19. Every worker must regularly have forty-two hours of continuous rest per week.

Article 20. Workers in all enterprises must be given at least two weeks' vacation with pay after six months of continuous employment. Workers employed in industries harmful to their health must be given at least four weeks' vacation with pay every year.

Article 21. All work must stop without exception on the following commemorative dates and holidays:

(a) January 1, New Year's. (b) January 21, commemorating the death of the leader of the world revolution, Lenin. (c) February 7, commemorating the massacre of the workers on the Beijing-Wuhan railway by the warlords. (d) March 18, commemorating the Paris Commune. (e) May 1, International Labor Day. (f) May 30, anti-imperialist day of commemoration of the tragedy of May 30th. (g) November 7, commemorating the proletarian revolution, and the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic. (h) December 11, commemorating the Guangzhou Uprising.

(Note) Labor departments at all levels should consult with local labor federations and establish local commemorative days as special holidays, in accordance with local conditions. Wages are paid on holidays and commemorative days.

Article 22. On the day before each holiday and commemorative day, the work day may not exceed six hours.

Article 23. The daily work time specified by this Labor Law includes time for a meal of between half an hour and one hour, for which pay is not to be deducted.

Article 24. Workers' and employees' sick leave and maternity leave should not be included in the calculation of the normal holidays covered by Article 20.

### **Chapter 6. Wages**

Article 25. No worker may receive wages lower than the real minimum wage specified by the Commissariat of Labor. The Commissariat of Labor determines the minimum wages for all industrial sectors at least once every three months.

Article 26. The actual wage rate within all types of enterprises (state-owned or private) is to be determined through collective contracts between workers (represented by the delegates of the labor unions) and owners or managers of the enterprises.

Article 27. Workers must receive double wages for all overtime work specially permitted by the labor inspectorates and labor unions.

Article 28. When work is authorized on holidays or commemorative days by the labor inspectorate, workers must receive double wages.

Article 29. Female workers and young workers are to receive equal pay for equal work in comparison to adult male and female workers. Although child workers and young workers work reduced hours, their wages must be calculated on a full-day basis according to the wage scales for their occupations.

Article 30. Wages for the night shift must be higher than normal wages. A one-seventh increase is given to those who work eight hours. A one-fifth increase is given to those who work six hours (dangerous work). For piecework, if it is performed at night, those who work eight hours should receive a one-fifth increase over their normal pay in addition to the wages due them.

Article 31. All wages must be paid in cash (no payments in kind are allowed); they must be paid regularly every week or every half month (no delay beyond half a month is allowed, and any form of postponement is forbidden); moreover, wages are to be paid directly to workers.

Article 32. Vacation pay for workers and employees during regular annual vacations is to be paid in advance.

Article 33. [Pay for] piecework may be worked out by collective contracts between workers (represented by labor unions) and employers. For all piecework, daily average productivity and a daily median wage must be stipulated (calculated according to the amount of time each item takes in each particular industry).

## **Chapter 7. Female Workers, Young Workers, and Child Workers**

Article 34. Apart from the general rights laid down in the various chapters of this Labor Law, female workers, young workers, and child workers benefit from the following special provisions for the protection of female workers, young workers, and child workers.

Article 35. Female workers, young workers, and child workers are prohibited from working in all especially strenuous or dangerous industrial sectors. The industrial sectors in which female workers, young workers, and child workers may not work will be determined and announced by the Central Commissariat of Labor (for example, underground work in mines; work in rubber, lead, copper, glue, silver, and tin factories, foundries, and other similar mines and workshops; or work felling trees in excessively high or low places).

Article 36. Female workers are forbidden to work in any enterprise in which lifting weights in excess of 40 kilograms is required. If some female workers must be included in certain special industries or production processes, the work time for female workers must not exceed two-thirds of the normal work time.

Article 37. Male and female workers under the age of eighteen, pregnant women, and nursing women workers are strictly prohibited from working the night shift.

Article 38. Female workers engaged in manual labor shall have eight weeks of paid leave before and after childbirth. Female employees engaged in intellectual work (such as female clerks and secretaries) shall have six weeks of paid leave before and after childbirth. In case of premature birth (miscarriage) the paid leave is for two weeks.

(Note) Pay for leave before and after childbirth and for miscarriage is to be provided by the factory owner. If a social security agency has already been established, it is to be paid by the social security agency.

Article 39. Female workers may not be fired five months before or nine months after childbirth. They may not be sent out on business or transferred elsewhere without their consent.

Article 40. Nursing female workers, in addition to benefiting from the provisions of Article 23 of this labor law, are to have half an hour's rest every three hours to nurse; no

pay deduction is permitted. Moreover, nursing rooms and nurseries must be established in factories; the factories are responsible for hiring people to look after the children.

Article 41. The hiring of males or females under the age of fourteen is strictly prohibited. Child laborers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen may be hired only after authorization has been obtained from the labor inspectorate.

Article 42. Every enterprise must have complete and detailed records of the ages, work time, and wages of young workers and child workers.

Article 43. Factory or commercial schools are to be established to raise the technical levels of young workers and provide them with remedial education; funding is to be provided by the factory owners. The old-style apprentice system and all kinds of systems using training pay scales are strictly prohibited. Any conditions (wages, work hours, benefits, etc.) that are inferior to those specified in the provisions of this Labor Law are declared invalid.

## **Chapter 8. Work Safety**

Article 44. No organs or enterprises are permitted to operate, set up business, or move without inspection and authorization from the labor inspectorate.

Article 45. All machines must be equipped with protective devices. No new machines can be added to the facilities that have not been inspected by the labor inspectorate and provided with appropriate protective devices.

Article 46. All enterprises, regardless of their nature, must issue work uniforms to their workers; the types of these special uniforms and the periods during which they are to be worn will be explicitly specified by the Central Commissariat of Labor.

Article 47. In those enterprises where working conditions and production processes are particularly harmful to the health of the workers (such as abnormal temperatures and poisonous fumes), the management of the enterprise must provide workers with special protective uniforms and other protective materials (such as eye protection equipment, masks, breathing devices, soaps, and special foods such as meats and milk). In enterprises where poisonous substances are present, decontaminants and decontamination equipment must be provided. Such equipment is not to be paid for by the workers. These enterprises must also provide regular physical examinations for the workers to protect their health.

Article 48. All types of fines and pay deductions are strictly prohibited. It is also prohibited to require compensation for losses. At the same time, any type of levies on workers in the form of deposits or savings plans after they are hired is strictly forbidden.

Article 49. There may be no pay deduction for work stoppages which are the fault of the factory owners (such as breakdown of machinery, lack of raw materials, and the factory owners' failure to implement the regulations of the soviets).

Article 50. No pay may be deducted for workers' participation in the election of soviets, attendance at soviet congresses or at congresses and meetings of the labor union, taking responsibility for the work of the factory committee, appearing as a witness or expert witness, or serving as a juror at the demand of a court, regardless of whether the absence from work is long or short.

Article 51. A worker or employee who loses his job as a result of conscription into the Red Army must be given three months of average pay in advance.

Article 52. The employer is required to provide workers with the tools with which to work; pay may not be deducted for use of such tools. If workers use their own tools, the

employer is required to reimburse them at the original price. Details regarding the procedure are to be specified in collective contracts.

Article 53. Factories must provide the capital to build dormitories for workers and allocate them, free of charge, to workers and their families. In factories where no dormitories have been built, the factory owners must provide an equivalent sum as monthly housing subsidy.

Article 54. If workers and employees voluntarily annul the work contract, the employer must provide severance pay of half a month's median wages. If employers dismiss workers and employees, they must provide severance pay of three months' median wages.

Article 55. If a worker or employee temporarily loses his ability to work, the employer must keep his job for him at the original median wage.

Article 56. The labor inspectors monitor the application of the Labor Law. Whenever labor inspectors conclude that a certain enterprise is in imminent danger of harming the health and lives of its workers, the inspectors have the right to shut down the enterprise in question. The duties of labor inspectors will be defined separately by the Ministry of Labor.

Article 57. All occupational diseases contracted in the course of the production process once a worker is employed are considered by the Labor Law as equivalent to accidents on the job, and wages during the illness must be paid in full.

## **Chapter 9. The All-China Federation of Labor and Other Local Organizations**

Article 58. The All-China Federation of Labor is organized to unite the workers and employees in enterprises and organs throughout the country. Individual labor unions and other local organizations must be formed according to the statutes adopted by the National Congress of the All-China Federation of Labor. Those unions that are not formed on the basis of these statutes may not be called labor unions and may not enjoy the legal rights of labor unions.

Article 59. The soviets guarantee freedom of action for labor unions, which have the right to declare and lead strikes, represent workers in negotiations, and sign contracts. The industrial labor federations in each province and *xian* must represent workers in a given industry or commercial sector, or in a given locality, in signing collective contracts.

Article 60. All collective contracts and labor contracts are carried out under the supervision of factory or shop committees, for these are the basic organizations of the labor unions in the enterprises. They must also monitor the implementation of the labor law and other decrees relating to the problems of labor.

Article 61. The primary task of the labor union is to represent individual workers or collective groups in protecting the interests of all hired laborers, as well as to find ways to improve the workers' economic and cultural conditions as a whole, and to use every means to participate actively in, strengthen the development of, and protect the soviet movement and the Soviet Government.

Article 62. In all state-owned and cooperative enterprises, labor unions directly participate and assist in economic and administrative matters in these enterprises. In private industries, labor unions set up special organs to monitor production.

Article 63. The Soviet Government provides material assistance toward the organiza-

tion of labor unions; it grants labor unions preferential terms in enjoying public services provided by the municipal government such as postal, telephone, and telegraph services, electricity, and running water, as well as railway and river transportation.

Article 64. Employers supply an additional 2 percent of the total wage bill for the operating expenses of the labor unions; they also supply an additional 1 percent for the cultural expenses of the workers.

Article 65. Employers must obtain the agreement of the labor unions to fire workers. The factory committees and shop committees of the labor unions represent workers in joining the Committee of Adjudication to resolve all conflicts between labor and capital.

Article 66. Every factory and shop committee works directly to protect the working conditions of the workers in that industry. The factory committee in each industry must organize a special committee on the protection of labor, which is to be formed by selecting three to seven activist workers. The committee's function is (a) to monitor the application of all provisions of the Labor Law relating to the protection of labor and collective contracts and (b) to monitor the implementation of the recommendations recorded in the inspection reports by the labor inspectorate.

Article 67. Labor unions have the right to recommend to the Soviet Government the promulgation of various types of labor decrees, as well as to nominate labor inspectors. Members of the factory committee holding identification from the factory committee have the right freely to enter and leave the factory, and to visit any part of the factory.

## Chapter 10. Social Insurance

Article 68. Social insurance is extended to all hired laborers, whether employed in state-owned industries, cooperatives, or private industries, and regardless of length of service or form of wages received.

Article 69. In addition to paying the wages due, employers are to pay between 10 and 15 percent of the total sum of wages to serve as a social insurance fund. The rates of social insurance will be promulgated by the Central Commissariat of Labor in a special directive. It is absolutely impermissible to collect social insurance fees from the insured or to deduct them from the wages of workers.

(Note) Social insurance funds must absolutely not be used for purposes unrelated to the insurance of the workers.

Article 70. The types of social insurance benefit payments are as follows:

- a. Free medical assistance, which pays medical costs both for routine illnesses and for work-related illnesses, injuries, and occupational diseases. The families of workers similarly enjoy free medical assistance.
- b. Temporary disability compensation—equivalent to wages during absence from work as a result of illness, injury, quarantine, pregnancy, maternity, and home-care for sick family members.
- c. Unemployment allowance—(i) Members of labor unions may receive unemployment allowance after being employed for more than one year. Non-members of labor unions may receive unemployment allowance only if they have worked for more than two years. (ii) In order to receive such an allowance, unemployed workers must register at the employment agency or the labor unions in their localities;

- they must also produce official proof of having been employed or membership cards of labor unions. (iii) The duration of receiving unemployment allowance may be limited according to the local situation or the conditions of social security funds. But unemployed workers may continue to receive other allowances to which they are entitled.
- d. Disability, old-age, and sickness compensation—when a worker, under normal circumstances, suffers partial or complete disability as a result of an accident or an occupational disease, or when he becomes too old to work, he may receive cash compensation after a special committee has investigated and determined the degree and nature of the disability, as well as the family's circumstances.
  - e. Subsidies for infants—when a child is born to a worker, he may receive a subsidy to purchase a ten-month supply of milk and other necessities for the child. The total amount of this subsidy must not, however, exceed two months' wages.
  - f. Funeral subsidies—a funeral subsidy will be received from the social insurance department when a worker or a member of his family dies.
  - g. Welfare relief for families of workers—a family that relies exclusively for subsistence on a worker's income should receive welfare relief if that worker dies or disappears. The amount and duration of this welfare relief payment are to be determined upon examination by a special committee according to the size of the worker's family. Workers who have been employed by any enterprise for more than six months are entitled to this payment.

(Note) Sickness compensation can be paid out from the first day of sickness and may reach the same amount as the wages, but must not exceed the maximum amount that has been set. Workers who are disabled because of their occupations may also receive sickness compensation up to the amount set for disability compensation.

(Note) Unemployment allowance for underage workers should be paid to them regardless of the length of their employment and the type of work they do.

Article 71. Employers are not allowed to interfere in the management of the Department of Social Insurance or the use of the social insurance fund. Employers merely fulfill the duty of paying the insurance premiums. The management committee of the social insurance organ is elected by the congress of labor unions and approved by the government; it manages the collection and use of the social insurance funds under the supervision of the labor unions and the Commissariat of Labor.

(Note) Before the Department of Social Insurance is established, the types of compensation listed in this section are the responsibility of the employer.

## **Chapter 11. Organs Responsible for Resolving Labor-Capital Conflicts and Violations of the Labor Law**

Article 72. All cases involving violations of the Labor Law and disputes between labor and capital may be either adjudicated by the Labor Law Tribunal of the People's Court, whose decisions are enforced, or peacefully resolved by the Committee of Adjudicators, formed by representatives of labor and capital, and the Arbitration Council, set up within the Commissariat of Labor. The operational details of the Committee of Adjudica-

tors and the Arbitration Council are to be issued separately by the Central Commissariat of Labor.

Article 73. All violations of the Labor Law, and of all decrees relating to labor problems, collective contracts, and so on, are to be dealt with by the Labor Law Tribunal of the People's Court, regardless of the types of punishment imposed on the violators by the criminal law.

## **Chapter 12. Supplementary Provisions**

Article 74. When questions or disputes arise over the application of the Labor Law, the Central Commissariat of Labor interprets them. In soviet areas that have not yet been linked up with the Central Soviet Area, the provincial labor department of the soviet area interprets them.

Article 75. In soviet areas that have not yet been linked up with the Central Soviet Area, the highest organ of state power of the soviet area has the same rights as the Central Commissariat of Labor to issue all administrative regulations and forms.

# ***Temporary Organizational Regulations for Local Soviet Governments***

*Adopted by the First Session<sup>1</sup> of  
the Central Executive Committee*

(November 1931)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. With a view to unifying the internal organization of local soviet governments at all levels, these temporary regulations are promulgated in accordance with the Constitution.

Article 2. Soviet governments at all levels within the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic should strictly obey these regulations in building up sound and comprehensive organizations and work methods.

Article 3. The right to suspend or revise these regulations is vested in the Central Executive Committee.

Article 4. The right to interpret these regulations in case questions or disputes arise in the course of their practical application is vested in the Central Executive Committee.

## **Chapter 2. Township Soviets**

Article 5. Township soviets are the organs of political power for the entire township, elected by the voters of the whole township in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. They are the basic organizations of soviet political power.

Article 6. A township soviet shall not establish an executive committee or presidium, but rather an individual chairman. Large township soviets may have one deputy chairman. In the absence of the chairman, an acting chairman must be elected to exercise the functions and powers of the chairman.

Article 7. A township soviet is not divided into sections; all matters are the responsibility of the soviet as a whole. When specific issues require attention for a time, ad hoc committees may be organized to handle them. For example, during the confiscation and redistribution of land, a land committee should be organized to carry out this work, and so

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 303–17.

1. The text here reads *diyici quanti huiyi*, "First Plenum" or "First Plenary Session." The reference is manifestly to the same meeting at which the Marriage Regulations, translated above, were adopted, and the characters *quanti* are not present in that document. To avoid confusion, we have omitted "plenary" here.



on. As members of these ad hoc committees, in addition to deputies to the township soviets, activists in the townships may be invited to participate. Those who participate in the work of the committees on such a temporary basis have the right to speak but not to vote.

Article 8. Each deputy to a township soviet must take responsibility for a part of the work of the soviet.

Article 9. As a general principle, staff members of township soviets should not be released from production.

Article 10. It is prescribed that the following staff members of township soviets should receive allowances for living expenses: (1) one chairman, (2) one person responsible for communications, and (3) one person responsible for the rest of the work. The number of staff members receiving an allowance for living expenses may not exceed three. In small or remote townships, or when there are financial difficulties, only the chairman shall be paid living expenses. Other staff members will not be given such allowances, or will be paid only for part of their living expenses.

Article 11. If the number of staff members of a township soviet being paid living expenses exceeds the specified number, review and approval by the district executive committee must be obtained.

Article 12. A plenary session of all deputies to the township soviet shall be called by the chairman once every ten days. When there are special circumstances, extraordinary sessions should be convened.

Article 13. Plenary sessions of the deputies to the township soviets need not necessarily always be held in a single place. They may be held in the various villages in turn. The best way is to hold the meeting in the village to which the issues under discussion are related.

Article 14. Township soviets should make monthly reports on the work of the township soviet to the electors in their respective townships. In a township that is composed of several villages, they may hold meetings of the electors in the various villages to report on their work.

Article 15. Resolutions and orders on questions of great significance should be made known to the entire population of the township by posting bulletins and calling mass meetings to report. Certain questions of lesser importance may be reported on orally by the deputies.

Article 16. The responsibilities of the chairman of the township soviet shall extend to convening meetings, supervising and promoting the carrying out of resolutions, and handling routine matters.

Article 17. Township soviets have the authority to resolve various disputes that do not involve violations of the law.

### **Chapter 3. City Soviets (Excluding Cities Directly Attached to the Central and Provincial Governments)**

Article 18. City soviets are the organs of political power for the entire city, elected by the voters of the city in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Like township soviets, they are the basic organizations of soviet political power.

Article 19. A presidium is elected by a plenary session of deputies to the city soviet; the presidium then elects one chairman and one deputy chairman.

Article 20. In order to carry out the work in various sectors, the city soviet should establish sections: internal affairs, labor, culture, military affairs, public health, grain and foodstuffs, workers' and peasants' inspectorate, land, and so on.

Article 21. Each deputy of a city soviet must participate in the work of at least one section. In addition to the deputies, activists from the city may be drawn in to participate in the work of the various sections. Those who participate in the work of the various sections, but are not deputies to the city soviet, have the right to speak but not to vote.

Article 22. The various sections of the city soviets should set up secretariats to organize and plan their respective work. Secretaries are to be appointed by the presidium of the city soviet.

Article 23. City soviets should appoint instructors to guide and inspect the work of the organs under their jurisdiction.

Article 24. Under the labor section, a labor exchange and a labor inspectorate should be established. Under the section of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate, a complaints office should be established.

Article 25. The system of secretaries is abolished, and a general affairs office shall be established to handle miscellaneous matters within the city soviet. Each general affairs office shall have one director.

Article 26. Under the general affairs office, clerical, printing, accounting, administration, receipt and dispatch, and other units should be established.

Article 27. To manage the clerical work of the presidium of a city soviet, a technical secretary should be employed.

Article 28. The staff members of city soviets who receive allowances for living expenses are specified as follows:

1. One chairman
2. One deputy chairman
3. Two staff members for the military affairs section
4. One staff member for the labor section
5. One staff member for the land section
6. One staff member for the finance section
7. One staff member for the internal affairs section
8. One staff member for the section of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate
9. One staff member for the cultural section
10. One staff member for the public health section
11. One director of the general affairs office
12. One person for each of the fields of clerical work, printing, accounting, administration, and receipt and dispatch
13. Two staff members for other work

The number of staff members who receive allowances for living expenses should not, however, exceed nineteen. When there are financial difficulties and in small cities, no more than nine staff members in each city soviet may receive living expenses. The work of various sections may be done concurrently by the same staff members, and some staff members may not leave production.

Article 29. If the number of staff members in a city soviet who receive living expenses exceeds the number specified, the approval of the *xian* executive committee must be obtained.

Article 30. Meetings of the presidium of a city soviet are convened once a week. Plenary sessions of all deputies to a city soviet are held once every two weeks. Extraordinary meetings may be convened if special circumstances arise.

Article 31. Each section of a city soviet must hold one meeting of the secretariat every week. Meetings of the entire membership of the various sections must also be held once every week and minutes of these meetings should be sent to the presidium for approval.

Article 32. Meetings of the entire membership of various sections of city soviets, and plenary sessions of deputies to city soviets, are not restricted to certain places. They may be held in enterprises and organs where the masses are. The best way is to hold meetings in the enterprises and units that are related to issues under discussion, for the purpose of drawing the masses to participate in the discussion of these issues.

Article 33. City soviets must report once a month to the electorate of the city in question on their work.

#### **Chapter 4. District, *Xian*, and Provincial Executive Committees**

Article 34. Organization at the three levels of district, *xian*, and province is virtually the same. District executive committees are elected by district congresses of soviets; *xian* executive committees are elected by *xian* congresses of soviets; and provincial executive committees are elected by provincial congresses of soviets. The executive committee at each level then elects a presidium. Executive committees of districts and *xian* elect one chairman and one vice-chairman; only executive committees of provinces elect one chairman and two vice-chairmen.

Article 35. Under district, *xian*, and provincial executive committees, departments should be established for land, finance, labor, military affairs, culture, public health, workers' and peasants' inspectorate, grain and foodstuffs, internal affairs, and so on.

Article 36. District, *xian*, and provincial executive committees may appoint instructors to guide and inspect the work of the lower-level soviets.

Article 37. Provincial executive committees should hire experts to help with the work of some departments.

Article 38. The labor department should establish a labor inspectorate and a labor exchange. Under the workers' and peasants' inspectorate, a complaints office may be set up. Under the provincial internal affairs department, a people's police section, municipal administrative section, and criminal investigation bureau may be established.

Article 39. Executive committees at the district, *xian*, and provincial levels must establish a general affairs office to handle miscellaneous affairs. Under the general affairs office, separate clerical, printing, accounting, administrative, receipt and dispatch, and communications units may be established.

Article 40. A technical secretary may be employed to handle the clerical work of the presidium.

Article 41. The staff members of the district executive committee who receive allowances for living expenses are specified as follows:

1. One chairman
2. One head of the military affairs department
3. One head of the finance department
4. One head of the land department

5. One head of the cultural department
6. One head of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate
7. One head of the labor department
8. One head of the general affairs office
9. One secretary who is also in charge of receipt and dispatch
10. One person each for printing, administration, and communications.

The number of staff members who receive allowances for living expenses should not, however, exceed fifteen. When there is financial difficulty, the responsibility for the work of different departments may be combined and the number of staff members who receive living expenses should not exceed seven.

Article 42. If the number of staff members in a district executive committee who receive allowances for living expenses exceeds the number specified, the approval of the *xian* executive committee must be obtained.

Article 43. The staff members of *xian* executive committees who receive allowances for living expenses are specified as follows:

1. One chairman
2. One deputy chairman
3. One head of the military affairs department
4. One head of the finance department
5. One head of the department of grain and foodstuffs
6. One head of the land department
7. One head of the cultural department
8. One head of the public health department
9. One head of the labor department
10. One head of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate
11. One head of the internal affairs department
12. One head of the general affairs office
13. One person each for the secretariat, printing, administration, and receipt and dispatch, and two to five persons for communications
14. Five persons for other work.

The total number of staff members should not, however, exceed twenty-five. When there is financial difficulty, responsibility for the work of various departments may be combined and the number of staff members receiving allowances for living expenses should not exceed fifteen.

Article 44. If the number of staff members of a *xian* executive committee<sup>2</sup> exceeds the number specified, approval must be obtained from the provincial executive committee.

Article 45. The staff members of provincial executive committees who receive allowances for living expenses are specified as follows:

1. One chairman
2. Two deputy chairmen

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2. Presumably the words "who receive allowances for living expenses," missing in the Chinese text, should appear here as they do in Articles 11, 29, and 42.

3. One head of the department of internal affairs and one deputy head
4. One head of the department of military affairs and one deputy head
5. One head and one deputy head of the financial department
6. One head and one deputy head of the land department
7. One head and one deputy head of the cultural department
8. One head and one deputy head of the workers' and peasants' inspectorate
9. One head of the department of grain and foodstuffs
10. One head of the department of public health
11. One head and one deputy head of the labor department
12. Five staff members for the newspapers of the government organs
13. One head of the general affairs office
14. One technical secretary
15. Two clerical staff members, two printing staff, one person for administration, one for accounting, and four for communications
16. Fifteen to fifty-three persons for other work.

The total number of staff members should not, however, exceed ninety people.

Article 46. If the number of staff members of a provincial executive committee<sup>3</sup> exceeds the specified number, approval by the Central Executive Committee is required.

Article 47. The various departments of district, *xian*, and provincial executive committees should organize committees chaired by the department heads and made up of members who are executive committee members at the level in question. The number of committee members may be from three to nine persons.

Article 48. All departments are of equal status, and one department may not command another department. Issues that concern two different departments may be handled through joint discussion. Relatively important issues should go through the presidium of the executive committee.

Article 49. Meetings of the committees of the various departments and meetings of the presidiums of executive committees at all levels are held once a week. Extraordinary meetings may be held in special circumstances.

Article 50. Plenary sessions of district executive committees are convened by the presidiums of the district executive committees once every month. Plenary sessions of *xian* executive committees are convened by the presidiums of *xian* executive committees once every two months. Plenary sessions of provincial executive committees are convened once every four months by the presidiums of provincial executive committees. Extraordinary meetings may be held in special circumstances.

Article 51. For the purposes of auditing the finances of the soviet governments at all levels, auditing commissions should be set up to take responsibility for this work. Members of the auditing commission are appointed by the presidium of the executive committee at the next higher level or of the same level.

Article 52. District executive committees must report on their work to the voters of their respective districts once every two months. *Xian* executive committees must report on their work to the voters of their respective *xian* once every four months. Provincial executive committees must report on their work to the voters of their respective provinces

3. As in the case of Article 44, the words "who receive living expenses" should presumably be added here.

once every six months. The masses of the voters may criticize the work of the government at the work report meetings.

Article 53. These work reports may be drawn up in writing, and an executive committee member or the soviet government at a lower level may be entrusted with presenting the report to the masses of the electorate. The opinions put forward by the voters must be relayed to the governments making the reports for their reference.

## Chapter 5. Work Methods

Article 54. The work methods of the soviet governments are basically the same for all levels. The following general work methods are hereby established:

1. Meetings
2. Periodic inspection of the work of various sections, departments, and lower-level soviet governments
3. Periodic meetings to listen to and review work reports of various sections, departments, and lower-level soviet governments
4. Making regular reports on one's own work to the electorate.
5. Organizing revolutionary competitions and regularly reviewing the outcome of such competitions
6. Bulletins, notices, and so on
7. Disseminating through various means among the masses the resolutions of the Soviet Government

Article 55. Types of meetings: secretariat meetings of various sections of city soviets; meetings of all staff members of various sections; committee meetings of various departments, the presidium, and all the members of *xian* and provincial executive committees; plenary sessions of deputies to city soviets; and district, *xian*, and provincial congresses of soviets.

Article 56. All sections and departments should inspect the units that are under their jurisdiction and have relations with them at least once every two months. The results of inspections should be reported at secretariat meetings of various sections, at general meetings of the people, or at the committee meetings of the various departments.

Article 57. The presidium should inspect the work of the various sections and departments at least once every two months; the presidium should inspect the work of the soviet governments under its jurisdiction at least once every three months. The results of such inspections should be reported to the presidium or to plenary meetings of the executive committees.

Article 58. All sections or departments should periodically hear the work reports of the units under their jurisdiction, at meetings held by the various sections and departments. The presidium must periodically hear the work reports of various sections or departments and lower level soviet governments. The executive committee should periodically hear the work reports of the presidium or lower level soviet governments.

Article 59. Organizing various competitions: Agreements should be concluded for competitions between groups, villages, cities, districts, and provinces. When the period fixed in the agreement has expired, the results of the competition should be reviewed. Representatives should be sent from higher-level soviet governments to review and evaluate the results of the competition, and present certain awards to the winners.

Article 60. Resolutions of the Soviet Government on matters of policy should be made to penetrate deeply among the masses by the use of proclamations, announcements, orders, wall newspapers, leaflets, and so on.

Article 61. The workers' and peasants' inspectorate has its own special tasks and should establish a complaints office to receive complaints from workers and peasants. At the same time, it may entrust loyal and reliable worker and peasant cadres with the task of receiving complaints from the worker and peasant masses on its behalf. It must also furnish complaint boxes in various places into which the worker and peasant masses may drop letters expressing their opinions. This unit can also organize "shock troops" of worker and peasant masses to carry out surprise inspections of the work of an organ and rip the masks from bureaucrats and corrupt elements. Mass courts may also be organized to try and sentence bureaucratic and corrupt elements who violate the law.

## **Chapter 6. The Concrete Work of Local Soviet Governments**

Article 62. The concrete work of local soviet governments (from township soviets and city soviets to provincial executive committees) is laid down as follows:

1. Carrying out the orders, directives, instructions, ordinances, resolutions, and so on of superior soviet governments.
2. Establishing work plans for periods of one month or several months for their own governments, and working agendas to realize these plans.
3. Preparing agendas, reports, proposals, and other materials prior to plenary sessions of the soviets, plenums of executive committees, meetings of the presidium, and meetings of various sections and departments.
4. Resolving contentious issues in their own areas.
5. Directing the work of lower-level soviet governments and making reports to higher-level soviet governments.
6. Carrying out registration of population, land, marriages, births and deaths, contracts, documents, and also of industrial and commercial enterprises, and so on.
7. Handling issues concerning land, such as confiscation, redistribution, and building cultivated land and irrigation systems.
8. Collecting taxes and levies on behalf of the state.
9. Establishing and reviewing budgets and final accounts.
10. Undertaking volunteer work such as helping the Red Army, relieving natural disasters, and repairing roads.
11. Organizing local armed forces and handling the work of guarding, sentry, liaison, assisting the Red Army in battles, and so on.
12. Planning and carrying out local construction projects.
13. Carrying out cultural and educational work within the territory of the soviet in question.
14. Setting up city governments.
15. Administering police and criminal investigations.
16. Carrying out public health work.
17. Waging struggles against bureaucratic and corrupt elements.
18. Establishing labor insurance.
19. Developing social insurance.

## **Chapter 7. The Finances of Local Soviet Governments**

Article 63. All revenues of local soviet government organs at all levels must be handed over in their entirety to the organs of the People's Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government at various levels as items of income for the national treasury of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 64. There must be estimated budgets for the expenditures of local soviet governments, and these must be sent to the soviet government at the next higher level for approval. Expenditures should conform to the approved estimated budgets.

Article 65. Expenses for one item should not be used for other items. If they are to be used for another item, approval by the soviet at the next higher level is required.

Article 66. The figures laid down in estimated budgets may not be exceeded. If an estimated budget must be exceeded, the authorization of the soviet at the next higher level is required.

Article 67. When the period covered by an estimated budget has come to an end, draft final accounts in the same form must be prepared in two copies. One copy should be submitted to the soviet government at the next higher level for approval, and the other copy should be kept in the local soviet government for reference during audits.

Article 68. Violations of the procedures for financial expenditure laid down in this regulation shall be considered as constituting the crime of wasting public funds.

## **Chapter 8. Signature of Documents**

Article 69. Documents of local soviet governments must be signed by the chairman and deputy chairman. In the absence of the chairman, the deputy chairman may sign as acting chairman. In the case of soviet governments with no deputy chairman, the chairman should sign, and in the absence of the chairman, the acting chairman may sign.

Article 70. Documents relating to a particular section or department should be signed by the chairman. in conjunction with the head of the relevant section or department.

## **Chapter 9. Review of Local Soviet Government Staff Members**

Article 71. When staff members are hired by local soviet governments, they must fill out a form containing their life histories in two copies, one to be kept by the soviet government where the staff worker will be employed and the other to be sent to the soviet government at the next higher level for review.

Article 72. Higher-level soviet governments have the right to review and dismiss staff members employed by a lower-level soviet government at any time.

## **Chapter 10. Additional Points**

Article 73. These temporary organizational regulations shall enter into force from the date of publication.

Central Executive  
Committee Chairman

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



## Appendix: Charts of the Organizational Systems

818





Chart of the Organizational System of District, *Xian*, and Provincial Executive Committees



**Chart of the Organizational System of City Soviets**

# ***Concerning the Election of Central Committee Members and People's Commissars at the First Congress***

*Notice No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee*

(December 1, 1931)

The First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets met in the Jiangxi Soviet Area on November 7, 1931, the anniversary of the October Revolution in Soviet Russia. It discussed and adopted various important laws and decrees such as the political program, the Constitution, the Land Law, the Labor Law, the problem of the Red Army, economic policy, and so on. The establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed. Those elected were Mao Zedong, Xiang Ying, Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Lu Futan, Zhu De, Qu Qiubai, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Fa, Wang Jiaxiang, Xu Xigen, Fan Lechun, Chen Shaoyu, Peng Dehuai, Guan Xiangying, Kong Hechong, Fang Zhimin, Ren Bishi, He Long, Shen Zemin, Tan Zhenlin, Huang Ping, Zeng Shan, Lin Biao, Chen Yu, Luo Dengxian, Xia Xi, Deng Zihui, Liu Shaoqi, Liu Dazhao, Chen Zhengren, Yuan Desheng, Cui Qi, Qu Denggao, Duan Dechang, Ge Yaoshan, Peng Gui, Chen Fuyuan, Gu Dacun, Wei Baqun, Zhang Huaxian, He Shuheng, Huang Su, Hu Hai, Teng Daiyuan, Xiao Hengtai, Luo Binghui, Chen Yi, Zhang Yunyi, Zhou Yili, Lu Deguang, Hu Junhe, Xu Teli, Shao Shiping, Hong Ziqing, Liu Guangwan, Yu Hanzhao, Wu Zhimin, Liu Jianzhong, Li Zongbo, Liu Shengyuan, Wang Yongsheng, Ruan Xiaoxian, and others, as Central Executive members, who make up the Central Executive Committee, the highest organ of political power after the National Congress is adjourned. The Central Executive Committee held its First Session on November 27 and elected Mao Zedong, Chairman, and Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao, Vice-Chairmen of the Central Executive Committee.

Under the Central Executive Committee, a Council of People's Commissars was organized as the central administrative organ of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Elected were Mao Zedong as Chairman, Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao as Vice-Chairmen, Wang Jiaxiang as People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Zhu De as People's Commissar of Military Affairs, Xiang Ying as People's Commissar of Labor, Deng Zihui as People's Commissar of Finance, Zhang Dingcheng as People's Commissar of Land, Qu Qiubai as People's Commissar of Education, Zhou Yili as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Zhang Guotao as People's Commissar of Justice, and He Shuheng as People's Commissar of Worker-Peasant Procuratorial Work.

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This text was first published in *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 1, December 11, 1931. We have translated it from *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 43-45, which reproduces this version.

At the same time, under the Council of People's Commissars a State Bureau for Political Security was set up, with Deng Fa as its head.

The establishment of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic has already been proclaimed. From today on, there are two totally different states on the territory of China. One is the so-called Republic of China, which is a tool of imperialism and the state by means of which warlords, bureaucrats, landlords, and capitalists oppress the workers, peasants, soldiers, and toiling masses; the national government of Chiang Kaishek, Wang Jingwei, and others is the counterrevolutionary organ of political power of this state. The other is the Chinese Soviet Republic, the state of the broad masses of exploited and oppressed workers, peasants, soldiers, and toiling masses. Its banner is that of overthrowing imperialism; eliminating the landlord class; bringing down the Guomindang warlord government; establishing a Soviet Government in the whole of China; working hard for the interests of hundreds of millions of oppressed and exploited workers, peasants, and soldiers, as well as the other oppressed masses; and striving for genuine peace and unification of the whole country. This state is built on the basis of the aspirations and support of hundreds of millions of oppressed and exploited workers, peasants, and soldiers, and other oppressed masses, both inside and outside the soviet areas. It possesses great power and authority and is delivering blows to the Guomindang warlord government so that that government is going from collapse to utter destruction. It is certain to win rapid victory for the revolution in the whole of China.

The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, acting under the mandate of the National Congress, will do everything in its power to carry out the political program, the Constitution, the Labor Law, the Land Law, and all other decrees and resolutions; create solid, vast revolutionary bases; create a large-scale Red Army; organize large-scale revolutionary warfare; and bring about the victory of the revolution first in one or several provinces and then in the whole country. Now, as this government is about to begin its work, this announcement is made to clarify matters to the workers, peasants, soldiers, and poor people, and to all the oppressed masses.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

*Passed by the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets*

December 1, 1931

The peasant struggle, led by the proletariat, continues to develop and rises higher every day. Despite the frenzied attempts of the imperialists and the warlords to resist it, the soviet movement is nonetheless growing and expanding, and is daily leading more and more of the Chinese peasants to arm themselves and build a Red Army. The peasants of one *xian* after another have been emancipated from the oppression of the feudal landlords and despotic gentry, which has lasted for thousands of years, confiscated the land of those oppressors and redistributed it, overthrown the feudal system, destroyed the political power of the Guomindang, and set up a worker-peasant-soldier soviet political power. This political power is capable of carrying through China's anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution.

The First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets authorizes the confiscation of the land belonging to landlords and other big private owners. In order that there may be a unified system for the confiscation and redistribution of land, the First Congress, basing itself on what is advantageous to the masses of ordinary peasants and to the future development of the revolution, adopts the following land law as the best guarantee for the solution of the land problem.

Article 1. All the land of the feudal landlords, despotic gentry, warlords, and bureaucrats, as well as other big private owners, regardless of whether they manage it themselves or rent it out, is to be confiscated without any compensation. The confiscated land will be redistributed to the poor and middle peasants by the soviets. The former landowners whose land has been confiscated have absolutely no right to participate in the land redistribution. Farm laborers, coolies, and toiling peasants, regardless of sex, have the same right to land redistribution. Unemployed independent laborers in the villages may also be given land if the peasant masses approve. The old, the weak, and the disabled, as well as orphans and widows, who are unable to work and have no one in the family to fall back on, should be provided social relief by the Soviet Government or dealt with separately after the land has been distributed.

Article 2. A Red Army soldier is a vanguard fighter in supporting soviet political power and overthrowing imperialism. Regardless of whether the soviet régime has been set up in his home area, or the area is still ruled by the reactionaries, he should be given his share of land and the Soviet Government should arrange for it to be cultivated for him.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 47-52, where it is reproduced from a contemporary mimeographed version.

Article 3. It is characteristic of rich peasants in China that they are at the same time semilandlords or usurers, so their land should also be confiscated. The land of the middle peasant class should not be confiscated. The rich peasants, after their land has been confiscated, may be allotted some relatively poor land on a "labor power" basis,<sup>1</sup> but only on condition that they employ their own labor to till the land themselves.

Article 4. All the land and property of the organizers of counterrevolution, as well as the organizers of the White armed forces and active participants in counterrevolution, is to be confiscated. Nevertheless, those poor and middle peasants who have been unwittingly enticed into opposing the soviets, after the local soviet has determined that they should be acquitted, may be treated as an exception. This law should, however, be applied unconditionally to their leaders.

Article 5. The First National Congress considers that the equal redistribution of all land is the most thoroughgoing way to eliminate all feudal relations of enslavement and break with the private ownership rights of the landlords. The local soviet governments must not, however, under any circumstances implement it by force or by issuing commands from above, but should explain it comprehensively to the peasants and carry it out only with the consent and direct support of the masses of ordinary peasants. If a majority of the middle peasants are not willing, they may refrain from participating in the equal distribution of the land.

Article 6. The Soviet Government must do its utmost to hand over to the peasants unconditionally all the land attached to ancestral halls and temples, as well as other public land. But in carrying out this policy and dealing with these plots of land, the Soviet Government must obtain the willing support of the peasants and, as a matter of principle, avoid offending their religious sentiments.

Article 7. All attempts by the relatively well-to-do peasants to have the confiscated land redistributed in proportion to the instruments of production are considered by the First Congress to be a reactionary plan by the rich peasants for deliberately obstructing the development of the land revolution and for pursuing their own interests, which must be severely repressed. The local soviet governments should, in accordance with the actual conditions in each rural area, select those principles for land distribution that best serve the interests of the poor and middle peasants. Either the land may be redistributed on the basis of a mixed principle, according to the number of able-bodied workers in each family, and at the same time according to the number of mouths; or land may be allotted equally to poor and middle peasants and farm laborers according to the number of people in a household, while rich peasants are given land on the basis of the number of able-bodied workers (that is to say that, in places where land is evenly distributed according to population, only the able-bodied individuals in a rich peasant family are given land, each as much as every individual in the area receives), the number of mouths [in a family] being a supplementary criterion for distribution. In distributing the land, not only the area of the land but also its quality (its yield in particular) should be taken into account. In the process of land redistribution, all possible and appropriate efforts should be made to carry out land reform in such a way as to eliminate feudal survivals such as narrow strips of land, fragmented plots, and very wide crisscross footpaths that cut into the fields.

Article 8. All personal and real property of the feudal lords, warlords, landlords, and

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1. See Article 7 for an explanation of what this implies for the treatment of rich peasants.

despotic gentry, such as houses, storehouses, livestock, and farm implements, is to be confiscated. When rich peasants are allotted land, surplus houses, farm implements, livestock, hydraulic rice-hullers, and oil presses should also be confiscated. Some of the confiscated houses are to be allotted, after decision by the local soviet and in accordance with the interests of the middle and poor peasants, to house the poor and middle peasants who have no place to live, while others are to be used for schools, clubs, local soviet government offices, Party and Youth League committees, Red labor unions, poor peasant leagues, and various other organs. Livestock and farm implements may be distributed to the poor and middle peasants on a basis of groups or households; or, if the peasants so desire, they may voluntarily pool together the various kinds of confiscated farm implements and organize an initial-stage cooperative; or, if the peasants so propose and obtain the approval of the soviet, an office may be set up to manage the livestock and farm implements and make them available to the poor and middle peasants for tilling the land. The office is to be run by the local soviet, and peasants should pay reasonable fees for the use of the implements, in accordance with established rules. The peasants should also pay an additional percentage of these fees to cover the expenditure on farm implement repairs, the salaries of employees in the office, and the purchase of new farm implements and livestock.

Article 9. When confiscating the property and the land of the landlords and the despotic gentry, all oral and written rent contracts must be simultaneously annulled, the obligation or debt of the peasants for this property and land abolished, and all usurious loans and debts proclaimed null and void. Any attempt by the former landlords to get the peasants to agree to voluntary repayment should be strictly forbidden by the revolutionary law, and no peasant should be allowed to return part of the land to the landlords and despotic gentry or pay back part of his debts.

Article 10. All irrigation works, rivers, lakes, streams, forests, pastures, and wooded mountains are to be managed by the soviets and made conveniently available for public use by the poor and middle peasants. Mulberry fields, bamboo forests, tea-oil hills, and fish ponds should, like rice paddies and wheat fields, be allotted to the masses of local peasants for their use in accordance with their wishes.

Article 11. In order to realize the benefits of the land revolution in a realistic and thoroughgoing way, the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets proclaims that farm laborers' unions, coolies' unions, and poor peasant leagues are necessary organizations, and considers them solid pillars of the soviets in carrying out the land revolution.

Article 12. The First National Soviet Congress considers that, under the régime of the soviets, the nationalization of land and irrigation works is a necessary step toward the elimination of all feudal relationships in the countryside, and in reality toward high-level and rapid development of the rural economy. The practical application of this method will, however, be possible only on condition that the land revolution is victorious in major areas of China and the fundamental masses of peasants support nationalization. At the present stage of the revolution, the Soviet Government should explain to the peasants the advantages to be derived from the nationalization of land and irrigation works. For now, however, the leasing of land, and its purchase and sale, should not be prohibited. At the same time, the Soviet Government should strictly prohibit any land speculation on the part of the rich peasants or the repurchasing by landlords of the land they formerly possessed.

Article 13. Local soviet governments should, if the circumstances in the area permit, launch the following undertakings: (1) plowing of wastelands; (2) organizing migrations; (3) transforming existing irrigation systems and building up new ones; (4) cultivating forests; and (5) intensification of road construction, creating enterprises, and promoting the development of the rural economy.

Article 14. This law is applicable not only to the existing soviet areas but also to non-soviet areas, as well as to areas where soviet political power has just been established. The land in soviet areas need not go through redistribution again if the former redistribution was in conformity with the principles laid down in this law, but if it was not, the land should be redistributed a second time.

Members of the Standing Committee of the Presidium of  
the First National Congress of Chinese Workers',  
Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviets

Xiang Ying, Zhou Yili, Zeng Shan, Deng Fa,  
Zhang Dingcheng, Chen Zhengren, Zhu De

Chairman of the Central Executive

Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



## ***Resolution on Putting the Labor Law into Effect***

(December 20, 1931)

The following is the resolution on putting the Labor Law into effect<sup>1</sup> adopted by the Central Executive Committee.

1. This law should be put into effect in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Law approved by the First All-China Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies.

2. This Labor Law takes effect on January 1, 1932.

3. Once this Labor Law goes into effect, all other decrees and resolutions on the labor question promulgated in the past by governments at all levels shall no longer be valid.

4. The Council of People's Commissars and the Labor Commissariat of the Central Government shall issue various kinds of special decrees, detailed rules and regulations, and statistical forms, based on the provisions of the Labor Law, and to promote the application of the law.

5. All revisions of or supplements to the Labor Law shall be issued in the form of decrees by the Central Executive Committee.

6. This Labor Law is effective everywhere within the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

7. All violations of the provisions of the Labor Law, or of the various decrees on labor to be promulgated in the future, must receive appropriate punishment in accordance with the provisions of the criminal law.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 67-68.

1. See, above, the Labor Law of November 1931.

# ***Detailed Regulations Regarding the Work of the Election Committees***

*Adopted by the First Session of the  
Central Executive Committee*

(December 1931)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. For the sake of convenience in the work of the election committees, these detailed work rules are specially promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 through 79 of the Constitution and the various articles of the detailed electoral regulations.<sup>1</sup>

Article 2. The Central Executive Committee has the authority to suspend or revise these regulations, as well as the authority to interpret any uncertainties or disputes about them.

Article 3. These regulations are to be carried out throughout the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic. All election committees are expected to pursue their work in accordance with these regulations.

## **Chapter 2. The Personnel of the Election Committee**

Article 4. As soon as the election committee has been created, in accordance with the detailed regulations regarding elections, the members of the committee should immediately carry out a division of labor. Every member should be responsible for a part of the work of the election committee.

Article 5. Members of the election committee should not withdraw from production. During the time when they are running the election, they can be freed temporarily from the work for which they are responsible, so that they can concentrate on the electoral work.

Article 6. Technical personnel, such as secretaries, printing workers, and registration assistants, may be hired as judged appropriate, but the technical personnel of the district executive committees and city soviets should be relied on as much as possible.

Article 7. The election committee can carry out its activity on the premises of the district executive committee and the city soviet government and need not set up its own separate office.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 83–86.

1. The reference is to the detailed regulations of November 1931 regarding elections.

### Chapter 3. Work Prior to the Election

Article 8. The registration of voters must take place in a given electoral district two weeks before the actual election begins. During the course of this work, voters who do not belong to any organization may be registered to vote by the special registration officer appointed by the election committee. Voters who belong to a certain organization may entrust the person in charge of that organization with the task of registering for them.

Article 9. The registration should be entered on the registration form issued by the Central Executive Committee.

Article 10. After registration has been completed, the electoral committee must appoint and organize a committee to examine the forms.

Article 11. After this examination has been carried out, the list of names of those voters who are eligible to vote must be publicly proclaimed and posted in the locality or in a market frequented by the voters.

(Note) According to the detailed electoral regulations, a written notice regarding the election must be sent, but to facilitate the work involved in the election, we may, for the time being, have recourse instead to the posting of the list of voters.

Article 12. The list of voters' names must be made public three days before the election meeting takes place.

Article 13. Before the elections, the drafts of any proposals that the voters want their delegates to bring to the meeting should be prepared ahead of time and posted in places frequented by the voters, so that the voters will be informed in advance about the proposals that are going to be put forward.

Article 14. Before the elections begin, the election committee should announce the total number of voters for each election meeting within its electoral area, and the number of the regular and alternate delegates to be elected. (The number of alternate delegates should stand in a ratio of one to five to the number of regular delegates. If the number of regular delegates is less than five, one alternate delegate can still be elected.) In addition, the election committee should also make public the list of names of those who have been deprived of the right to vote, after this list has been submitted to the district executive committee and the city soviet.

Article 15. Three days before the election meeting is held, the place and time at which it is to take place must be posted in public.

Article 16. The site for the election meeting should be arranged in advance. The door keeper and the person who keeps a record of those who attend the meeting should be well prepared, and should admit people to the meeting in accordance with the list of voters.

### Chapter 4. Work During the Election

Article 17. In the case of every election meeting, the chairman of the election committee should [either attend personally] or send his plenipotentiary representative to attend.

Article 18. The chairman of the election committee or his plenipotentiary representative should declare the meeting open. Afterward, the total number of people in attendance, and whether or not they constitute a quorum, should also be announced.

Article 19. The chairman of the election committee or his plenipotentiary representative must definitely chair the election meeting.

Article 20. As the first item on the agenda of the election meeting, the chairman of the election committee or his plenipotentiary representative must, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the Constitution, declare who has the right to vote and to be elected, and who has been deprived of these rights.

### **Chapter 5. Work After the Elections**

Article 21. The election committee must collect all the documents regarding the election (such as the registration forms of the voters, the minutes of the election meeting, the form recording access to the meeting place, and so on) and send them to the district executive committee or the city soviet in readiness for checking.

Article 22. When the election has been completed, the election committee must submit to the district executive committee or the city soviet a report summarizing the election; a detailed financial report on all the expenses incurred by the election committee during the election must likewise be submitted to the district executive committee or the city soviet.

Article 23. As soon as the election has been completed, the election committee must wind up its activities and turn over all the equipment it has purchased to the district executive committee or the city soviet. Thereupon, the election committee announces that it has ceased work.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# *Temporary Financial Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic*

(December 1931)

Article 1. In order to unify our financial system, all of the state's tax revenue must be collected by the financial institutions of the state (including the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government and the financial departments of every province, *xian*, and district, as well as the financial section in every city), in accordance with the tax regulations promulgated by the Provisional Central Government. Local governments may not issue their own tax regulations nor collect taxes. Only after receiving, when the collection of taxes begins each year or each quarter, the directive of the Central Commissariat for Finance stipulating the time and the procedures for this can the local government start to collect taxes through the agency of the bank designated by the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government.

Article 2. All income received by the financial organs at every level from taxes, from businesses run by the government, or from fines or confiscated property and other miscellaneous sources must be transferred at the time, indirectly or directly, to the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government or to the bank designated by it. So long as they have not received orders for payment from the financial organs at the next higher level, financial organs at all levels must not, on their own initiative, allocate these funds, make deductions from them, or use them to make up a deficit, nor must they delay in remitting the funds.

Article 3. The funds for administrative expenses at all levels, and for all munitions, food, and other miscellaneous expenses, should first of all be laid down in the concrete budgets prepared by the financial organs at the respective level, handed over to the financial organ at the next higher level for examination, and then submitted to the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government for approval. All payments are then made by the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government in accordance with the budgets it has approved.

Article 4. All financial organs immediately below the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government (the financial department of each provincial government and the general management department of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission) should prepare a budget for the following month prior to the 25th of each month, and submit it to the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government for verification and approval. Financial organs at all other levels should prepare their budgets for the following month prior to the 20th of each month, and hand them over to the organ at the next higher level for checking and inclusion in the overall budget.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 319–21.

Article 5. After approving the budgets submitted by financial organs at the level immediately below, the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government sends a notice of payment, in accordance with the budget, to the financial organ in question. This organ, in turn, approves the budgets submitted by financial organs at the next level down and sends corresponding notices of payment to them.

Article 6. When financial organs at various levels receive such notices of payment, they should fill out the disbursement form, but they can draw the money from the financial organ at the level immediately above only after the form has been signed jointly by the responsible persons in the financial organ, as well as in the governmental, Party, or military organ. (For example, the disbursement form of the provincial government must bear the signatures of the head of the financial department and of the chairman of the provincial government.)

Article 7. Every financial organ at the level immediately below the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government must send its final accounts for the previous month before the 10th of each month to the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government for verification and approval. All [other] financial organs must send their final accounts for the previous month before the 5th of each month to the financial organ at the level immediately above for verification and approval.

Article 8. When submitting the forms containing their final accounts, financial organs at the various levels should paste all the receipts they have in the receipt book and send it, together with the accounts, to the financial organ at the next higher level. Such accounts and receipts should be preserved in the financial organs at the next higher level and should not be further transferred upward. (For instance, the final accounts, receipts, and so on of a division should be preserved in the management department of the army, while the final accounts, receipts, and so on, of a district financial department should be preserved in the financial department of the *xian*.) The financial organs at a higher level may, however, send for the receipts, forms, and other materials from a lower-level financial organ whenever they deem it necessary.

Article 9. For those transactions which have not left any receipts, a substitute form must be prepared by the people who handled the matter, along with a statement explaining why the receipt was not available.

Article 10. The budgets and balance sheets of the financial organs at various levels should be prepared in two copies, one of which they keep, while the other is submitted to the financial organ at the level immediately above them for the record.

Article 11. All the account books, forms, and receipts used by the financial organs at various levels for financial matters must correspond to the unified format determined by the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government. The old-style account books should not be used any more, nor should anything new or strange be devised.

Article 12. The monetary units employed in account books and receipts of all kinds must be uniformly converted to big foreign dollars for purposes of calculation. The current exchange rate must also be clearly noted (how much is one big foreign dollar in terms of *yuan* or copper coins). In the event that what is collected as income is gold bars, silver ingots, or paper currency not in common use, these items themselves should be sent to the Commissariat for Finance of the Central Government; it is not permissible to figure out the exchange rate oneself.

Article 13. The account books, forms, and receipts of financial organs at all levels

must be preserved for a period of five years; after that, they must be destroyed under the supervision of a responsible person of the organ.

Article 14. These regulations will go into force on the day they are promulgated.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Concerning the Right to Vote and to Be Elected of Those Workers and Peasants Who Once Joined Counterrevolutionary Organizations***

*Directive No. 7 of the Central Executive Committee*

(January 13, 1932)

In the past some worker and peasant elements, because of weak political consciousness or having been deceived, joined the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganization Clique, the Trotskyites, and other counterrevolutionary organizations. Of those who defected under pressure or deception, and later voluntarily turned themselves in to the soviet governments, some were able to make sincere confessions about the counterrevolutionary organizations when they were arrested by the government and were permitted by the government to make a fresh start. Some were duped by counterrevolutionary elements into joining covertly counterrevolutionary organizations, and some defected and left under pressure from the White army but later came back. As to whether or not all of these worker and peasant elements who have once joined counterrevolutionary organizations and defected should be deprived of their rights as citizens, the soviet governments at all levels have failed to make clearcut regulations. Consequently, it is difficult to deal with them at election time and, in some areas, they are simply excluded from the elections. This is an obstacle both to the protection of the workers' and peasants' interests and to the thoroughgoing elimination of counterrevolutionary organizations. For this reason, this government hereby issues the following directive with clearcut stipulations:

It should be declared that all those who fall into any of the following categories shall retain their rights as citizens and that during elections they retain the same rights as ordinary peasant and worker elements to participate in the election with the right to vote and to be elected:

1. Poor worker and peasant elements who joined counterrevolutionary organizations (the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganization Clique, the Trotskyites) but, having come to their senses, were able to turn themselves in voluntarily to the Soviet Government and report everything they knew about the counterrevolutionary organizations.

2. Poor worker and peasant elements who were tricked by counterrevolutionary elements into joining various covertly counterrevolutionary organizations (the Lovers' League, the Heterosexual Cooperative, the Gourmets' Committee, the Seedling Committee, the Heart and Soul League, the Spiritual League, etc.) and who, upon their arrest by the Soviet Government on evidence from confessions made by members of the AB Corps,



the Social Democratic Party, and so on, demonstrated through investigation during their self-reformatory probation period that they had not been aware of the counterrevolutionary nature of these organizations and so had joined them blindly, misled by their affection for friends or their desire for temporary gratification of certain desires, and now know that they were deceived and have broken off from these covertly counterrevolutionary organizations.

3. Poor worker and peasant elements who joined counterrevolutionary organizations (the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganization Clique, the Trotskyites, etc.) only to go along with them, and who were able, after being arrested, to make faithful confessions about the counterrevolutionary organizations and, through [the opportunity for] self-reformation provided to them by the Soviet Government, at the end of the self-reformation period have clearly recognized their past mistakes and have demonstrated this awareness in their behavior.

4. Worker and peasant elements who had joined counterrevolutionary organizations, been arrested by organs for the elimination of counterrevolution, been set free after trial, and whose sentence of deprivation of civil rights is up, and to whom civil rights have been restored.

5. Poor worker and peasant elements in border zones between Red and White areas who were tricked and coerced by counterrevolutionaries such as White bandits or militia bandits into defecting and have now clearly come to their senses, recognized their past mistakes, and are once again making efforts to participate in revolutionary work.

However, all die-hard counterrevolutionaries who belong to counterrevolutionary organizations (the AB Corps, the Social Democratic Party, the Reorganization Clique, the Trotskyites, etc.), who are key figures or leaders in defection and who show no signs of sincere repentance in their behavior, even though they are poor workers or peasants, should be deprived of civil rights and absolutely excluded from participation in elections.

The above regulations are designed on the one hand to protect the political rights of the poor workers and peasants and, on the other, to use a variety of methods to facilitate the thorough elimination of the various kinds of counterrevolutionary organizations and schemes that are hidden within soviet areas. It is expected that soviet governments at all levels will follow them and carry them out, and see to it that they are publicly made known to the masses. It is so ordered.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Outline of the Organization of the State Political Security Bureau of the Chinese Soviet Republic***

(January 27, 1932)

1. Within the boundaries of the soviet areas, in accordance with the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic and under the jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars of the Provisional Central Government, the State Political Security Bureau carries out such tasks as investigating, suppressing, and eliminating all political and economic counterrevolutionary organizations and activities, as well as spies and bandits.

2. The State Political Security Bureau differs in its tasks, organization, and the scope of its activities from the Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries in districts where the insurrection has recently taken place or which have been newly captured by the Red Army. The task of the Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries is, relying on the power of the revolutionary workers and peasants, to arrest all overt counterrevolutionary elements during and immediately after the insurrection and to send a report on their activities to the Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries to be handled there. The Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries is elected by the rebellious masses and carries on its work under the leadership of the command organ of the insurrection, which is the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee. The Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries may maintain its own armed forces, so as to carry out its assigned task of arresting, guarding, and executing all counterrevolutionary criminals. The term of existence for the Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries is determined by the time when the soviet régime was established in the area in question and the degree to which it has been consolidated.

3. The task of the State Political Security Bureau is, relying on its centralized and systematic organization, as well as the trust and assistance of the revolutionary masses, constantly and systematically to resist, report on, and eliminate all open and especially all secret and clandestine counterrevolutionary organizations and activities, so as to safeguard and consolidate the soviet régime. At present, in the new soviet areas where the soviet movement is precisely in the process of developing, it is generally necessary to go through a stage in which the Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries is operative. In areas where a Committee for the Elimination of Counterrevolutionaries exists, the State Political Security Bureau should develop an organizational relationship of jurisdiction over it and gradually turn it into an organization subordinate to the Political Security Bureau.

4. The organizational principle of the State Political Security Bureau is complete centralization. It carries out its work under the jurisdiction of a committee organized within it. The director of the State Political Security Bureau is himself chairman of the committee and is entitled to attend meetings of the Council of People's Commissars, without the right to vote, but with the right to speak. The right to appoint, dismiss, and discipline members of the committee of the State Political Security Bureau resides in the Soviet Central Executive Committee and its Presidium. One committee member should be an investigator of the Supreme Court.

5. The State Political Security Bureau has its representative organ in every provincial soviet government and in the Central Military Commission to direct the work of the State Political Security Bureau within local organs and the Red Army. At the provincial and *xian* levels, branch offices will be set up, also directed by committees. The chief of the branch office serves as the committee chairman. In the Red Army, special representatives are to be appointed to the Central Military Commission, the military commissions in various soviet areas, and even to army groups, divisions, and units at lower levels. Special representatives may also be appointed directly to certain organs by the State Political Security Bureau or by the branch office one level higher. The power of appointment, removal, and punishment of all chiefs of sub-bureaus, committee members, and specially appointed representatives resides with the State Political Security Bureau. The right to appoint, remove, and discipline the heads of branch offices, committee members, and special representatives rests in all cases with the State Political Security Bureau. At the lowest level, the provincial branch office and the military commission have the authority to appoint, remove, and discipline special representatives, but the power of final sanction rests with the State Political Security Bureau.

6. Within the State Political Security Bureau, the relationship between superior and subordinate organs is, except in cases of special obstacles, a consistently vertical system. Lower levels must absolutely obey orders from higher levels. In political matters, branch offices and special representatives are to accept guidance from the local government or from those responsible for military and political matters in the Red Army in the same locality, and chiefs of branch offices are entitled to nonvoting attendance at meetings of the presidium of the provincial or *xian* soviet. In terms of working relationships, however, they are strictly subordinate to the State Political Security Bureau. Local governments or command organs of the Red Army have no right to alter or suspend orders from the State Political Security Bureau. If they wish to protest, they can only submit the matter to the Council of People's Commissars for resolution.

7. The State Political Security Bureau grants to branch offices in the localities and in the Red Army the authority to investigate and deal with all cases of counterrevolution, but final decision-making power rests with the State Political Security Bureau. Only within limits specially permitted by the State Political Security Bureau can the branch offices make their own decisions. As for the special representatives, they may carry out their work only within the scope of tasks entrusted to them by higher authorities, except for temporary emergency measures. For example, when it is certain that counterrevolutionary elements or organizations will stage a rebellion, the special representatives may, with the help of the local government or the Red Army, arrest the criminals and smash the organizations, and then report to higher authorities for approval.

8. It is on behalf of the political authority that the State Political Security Bureau, its

branch offices, and special representatives investigate, take on, and decide all cases involving counterrevolutionaries. The masses in the locality in question, as well as government organs, Communist Party and Communist Youth League offices, all revolutionary bodies, and the Red Army, have the duty of providing and reporting to them all kinds of information. When necessary, local governments and the Red Army should aid them with their armed forces and must temporarily follow their orders. In terms of work relations, local governments and command organs of the Red Army may have only horizontal relationships with political security branch offices and special representatives. Only when necessary should branch offices and special representatives make some materials available to governments or Red Army commanding organs on the same level, and they may do so only within the limits specified by the State Political Security Bureau. Relations with Red Army commanding organs are to be closer, to facilitate the Red Army's constant effort to expel evil elements and to make it impossible for counterrevolutionary activities to take root.

9. In general, the authority to arrest and interrogate counterrevolutionary criminals and suspects rests with the Political Security Bureau. Other government organs, Communist Party and Communist Youth League offices, and all other revolutionary bodies may not on their own initiative carry out arrests or trials, still less carry out executions. The only exception is in emergency situations when, for example, it is discovered that counterrevolutionary elements or their organizations have already decided to rebel or to flee; in such cases, it is permissible for other organs, or even the masses, acting on their own initiative, to arrest them and hand them over to the Security Bureau, but even this is limited to arrest. When the Security Bureau has obtained sufficient evidence of counterrevolution to require the arrest of a responsible person concealed in a government organ, a Red Army unit, or a revolutionary body, before the arrest is made the Security Bureau must inform the most responsible person of that organ, so that replacement personnel may be found. Even if the most responsible person in that organ disagrees, he may not obstruct the action but can only lodge a protest with higher authorities. If the Security Bureau determines on the basis of evidence that there is no longer anyone in the organ in question who is qualified to receive such advance notice, it must then, before taking action, inform the responsible person in the organ at the next higher level.

10. In general, as regards the punishment of counterrevolutionary criminals, the authority to sentence them and to carry out the sentences resides in the judicial organs, while the Political Security Bureau stands in the position of prosecutor and accuser. Only in times of civil war, when the soviet movement is expanding outward, does the State Political Security Bureau have the authority, within the limits permitted by the Council of People's Commissars and in accordance with the law, to decide on and carry out punishments for certain kinds of counterrevolutionary criminals.

11. The principles of the workers' and peasants' democratic political power for punishing counterrevolutionary criminals are determined on the basis of the class line. All those belonging to the exploiting classes, such as landlords, despotic gentry, former officials, capitalists, proprietors, and rich peasants, who commit active counterrevolutionary crimes, must be given severe punishment; ordinary workers, Red Army fighters, farm laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants, and independent laborers, provided only that they are not leading elements who resolutely capitulated to the counterrevolution, but rather joined in or followed counterrevolutionary activities or organizations under coer-

cion or deception, should all in principle be offered a way out if they turn over a new leaf. The methods for this range from open persuasion, disciplinary warning, confinement, and discharge from the army, to arrest and denial of civil rights for a time. The most severe punishment for class-alien counterrevolutionary elements is death. Next are imprisonment, forced hard labor, and deportation from the soviet areas. Workers and peasants who were coerced or deceived by counterrevolutionaries and who turned themselves in are exempt from punishment; those who were discovered or accused and have made a fresh start are to be given mild punishment and set free if imprisoned. Among class-alien elements who have surrendered, a distinction should be made between leaders and followers, and the period of investigation set accordingly. During the investigation period, freedom of movement is not permitted, but those who turn over a new leaf should still be given lighter punishment than actually deserved.

12. The work of the State Political Security Bureau should, in principle, consist of two working systems: investigation and enforcement (including the examination of materials from investigation and re-investigation). They are separate from each other and not interdependent. Under the investigative division there should be an intricate, complex operational network. The enforcement division should have its own armed organization.

13. All activities of the State Political Security Bureau are governed by law. Prior to the establishment of a Supreme Court of the Provisional Central Government, the Council of People's Commissars shall handle these matters directly.

14. Before a local soviet area has established a territorial link with the Central Soviet Area, the State Political Security Bureau should hand over control of the political security bureau there to the presidium of the executive committee of the soviet government of the area in question, to be exercised on its behalf. Within the Central Soviet Area, when a local branch office is temporarily cut off from the State Political Security Bureau because of objective obstacles, the same rule applies.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Order No. 3 of the Central Executive Committee***

(February 1, 1932)

In order to safeguard the rights of fighters, commanders, and working personnel of the Red Army, and to maintain the iron discipline of the Red Army, this Executive Committee hereby promulgates the "Temporary Regulations for the Organization of Military Tribunals of the Chinese Soviet Republic" to take effect from May 15, 1932. Upon receipt of this order, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission shall transmit it to the headquarters of Red Army units at all levels and the headquarters of local armed forces, so that they may organize military tribunals in accordance with the regulations herein prescribed, to exercise jurisdiction over all criminal cases within the Red Army. It is so ordered.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Temporary Regulations for the Organization of Military Tribunals***

*Promulgated by the Central Executive Committee  
on February 1, 1932*

(February 1, 1932)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. All those who perform military duties in the ranks of armed forces such as Red Army guerrilla units, independent divisions, independent regiments, and Red Guard companies, whether they are fighters or other types of working personnel, are to be tried by a military tribunal if they break the criminal law, the military criminal law, or any other law. This does not apply to those who violate ordinary discipline but do not go so far as to commit actions in violation of the laws.

Article 2. Illegal acts by residents of the war zones, regardless of whether they violate the military criminal code or any other law, are all to be tried by a military tribunal. Spies of the enemy army and hidden traitors within our ranks, if operating in the war zones, are also to be judged by a military tribunal.

Article 3. Red Army military tribunals at all levels must be organized in accordance with the provisions of these regulations.

## **Chapter 2. The Organizational System of Military Tribunals**

Article 4. Military tribunals are divided into the following four categories: (1) military tribunals of primary jurisdiction, (2) military field courts of primary jurisdiction, (3) the Supreme Military Tribunal, and (4) the Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals.

Article 5. Military tribunals of primary jurisdiction are established in the Red Army at the levels of army, division, military district headquarters, and independent division; field courts of primary jurisdiction are established at the highest-level headquarters within the military front area.

Article 6. The Supreme Military Tribunal is established under the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.

Article 7. The Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals is established under the Supreme Court.

Article 8. Military tribunals and field courts of primary jurisdiction are subordinated to the Supreme Military Tribunal. The Supreme Military Tribunal is subordinated to the Supreme Court.

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong Ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 27-32.

(Supplementary Note 1) Prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court, cases to be heard by the Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals will be handled by a court temporarily organized by the Provisional Central Government.

(Supplementary Note 2) In soviet areas that are not territorially connected with the Central Soviet Area, a higher military tribunal should be established in the highest military affairs commission of the area, with the right to take final decisions in all cases.

### **Chapter 3. Personnel of Military Tribunals**

Article 9. In military tribunals of primary jurisdiction, the judicial committee is composed of the chief judge and two judges. In the Supreme Military Tribunal, the chief judge, the deputy chief judge, and three judges make up the judicial committee, which directs the entire judicial process. The Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals is composed of members appointed by the Supreme Court but it must include a representative from the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission.

Article 10. The chief judge and judges of military tribunals of primary jurisdiction are nominated by the Congress of Soldiers' Representatives and approved by the Supreme Military Tribunal; the chief judge and judges of the Supreme Military Tribunal are nominated by the Central Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission and approved by the Supreme Court.

Article 11. Army commanders at any level may not appoint chief judges or judges of military tribunals.

Article 12. The court of a military tribunal of first instance is made up of three people, a judge, who serves as chairman, and two assessors. Assessors are required in the Supreme Military Tribunal when it deals with cases as a court of primary jurisdiction, but are not employed when it acts as a court of final instance; in such cases, the court is made up of the chief judge and other judges.

Article 13. Assessors are elected from among the soldiers and are changed once a week. While they are serving, assessors may be relieved of their duties as soldiers, but as soon as their term is completed, they must return to serve in their original units.

Article 14. Military tribunals at all levels may employ secretaries and other staff.

(Supplementary Note 1) If the number of cases is small, military tribunal personnel can be reduced to the chief judge alone for military tribunals of the first instance; higher military tribunals may consist of the chief judge and one judge.

(Supplementary Note 2) Simple, less important legal cases may be tried by a single judge.

### **Chapter 4. Judgments and Related Procedures In Military Tribunals at All Levels**

Article 15. Military tribunals of primary jurisdiction shall hear cases involving commanders below the rank of army commander, combat soldiers, and all army staff workers, but they serve only as organs of the first instance.

Article 16. Military tribunals of local armed forces hear military cases involving the local armed forces of the whole province.

Article 17. Field courts of primary jurisdiction hear all cases within a war zone, but also only as organs of first instance.



Article 18. The Supreme Military Tribunal is the organ of final instance for cases that have been heard and decided by military tribunals of primary jurisdiction and then appealed. At the same time, it serves as the organ of first instance for hearing cases involving commanders at and above the army level, as well as troops and other staff workers directly under the Revolutionary Military Affairs Commission.

Article 19. The Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals is the organ of final instance, which hears cases that have been adjudicated by the Supreme Military Tribunal but are submitted on appeal. At the same time, it is the judicial organ for the trial of important military personages at the level of army group commander and above.

Article 20. In all cases adjudicated by military tribunals at every level except the Supreme Conference of Military Tribunals, the accused has the right of appeal within the period stipulated in the written judgment. The length of the period for appeal is determined by the court that handles the case, the limits being from seventy-two hours to one month.

Article 21. In cases involving the death penalty, even if the defendant does not appeal, the tribunal handling the case must submit the files to a higher level tribunal for approval.

(Supplementary Note 1) Under urgent battle conditions, the death penalty can first be carried out, and a copy of all files then made and submitted to a higher level tribunal for retroactive approval.

Article 22. Trials must be open to the public, and soldiers and army staff members must be permitted to attend them. However, cases involving military secrets may be tried in secret, although the verdict must still be publicly announced.

Article 23. It is not necessary that trials be held where the military tribunal is located. They may be held where the army unit is located or where the person breaking the law works.

## **Chapter 5. The Organization and Tasks of the Military Procuratorate**

Article 24. In places where there are both military tribunals of primary jurisdiction and a supreme military tribunal, a military procuratorate of primary jurisdiction and a supreme military procuratorate should be established.

Article 25. A military procuratorate of primary jurisdiction should have one chief prosecutor, one deputy chief prosecutor, and several prosecutors; the Supreme Military Procuratorate should have one chief prosecutor, two deputy chief prosecutors, and several prosecutors. There should also be a technical staff of secretaries and copy clerks.

(Supplementary Note 1) The number of people working in a military procuratorate can change at any time, according to the situation in the army.

Article 26. When they have obtained evidence of an illegal act in the army, commanders and political commissars at various levels may arrest the criminals and send them to the appropriate military procuratorate for investigation.

Article 27. The procuratorate is an organ for the examination and preliminary examination of military criminals. All cases, except simple ones that are already clear and call for no further examination, must be sent to the military procuratorate at the relevant level for examination; after a case has been examined by the military procuratorate and a conclusion reached, it is sent to the military tribunal for trial.

Article 28. A military procuratorate is an accusatory organ conducting the prosecution

against military criminals on behalf of the state. It is entitled to investigate all criminal cases in the army or related to military affairs, institute prosecution before the court, and appear in court and bring an indictment on behalf of the state.

Article 29. When examining a case, prosecutors have the authority to summon for interrogation anyone involved in the case.

Article 30. Three kinds of warrants may be employed when summoning people for interrogation: a summons, a detention warrant, and a prosecution warrant.

(Supplementary Note 1) Military tribunals may use only two: the summons and the detention warrant.

(Supplementary Note 2) The army and division headquarters and other military organs located where there are military tribunals should designate some troops to be placed at the disposal of the military procuratorates.

## **Chapter 6. Funding**

Article 31. Funding for military tribunals and military procuratorates is to be provided by the military units at the corresponding level in accordance with the budget.

## **Chapter 7. Supplementary Articles**

Article 32. These regulations are to be promulgated by the Central Executive Committee in the form of an order.

Article 33. The Central Executive Committee has the authority to revise or suspend these regulations at any time.

Article 34. These regulations enter into force on the day they are promulgated.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Practical Methods for Carrying Out the Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Red Army***

*Directive No. 9 of the Executive Committee*

(February 1, 1932)

The First National Congress of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies of the Chinese Soviets passed regulations to give preferential treatment to the Red Army. These regulations give many preferential rights to the Red Army. Why do we have to create so many preferential conditions for the Red Army? Because during the struggle over the past few years, the Red Army has been the major force in resolutely carrying out the land revolution and in fighting against imperialism and the Guomindang warlords, and it is a strong defender of the Soviet Government. Throughout the history of the Chinese revolutionary struggle, the Red Army has done a brave and glorious job. At present the Chinese revolution is in the midst of a ruthless revolutionary war, and it is a time to fight this revolutionary war actively, to wage war even more ruthlessly and on a larger scale against the imperialists and the Guomindang warlords. Only if there is a vast Red Army can we win initial victory in one or several provinces and then a nationwide victory for the soviets. The Red Army is a group of fighters who are battling for the liberation of workers and peasants and other oppressed people, and for soviet political power, fighting hard with the utmost spirit of sacrifice for the interests and the liberation of workers and peasants and all the other oppressed people. Therefore, the Soviet Government and the masses of workers and peasants should give preferential treatment to the Red Army, to make the Red Army fighters feel comforted in their hearts and stop their worries over their families, so that they can devote themselves wholeheartedly to brave fighting. For this reason, the First National Soviet Congress specially made these regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army.

In the past, soviet governments in various places had some regulations on preferential treatment for Red Army fighters and their families, but not enough attention was paid to their actual implementation, and in some places people simply ignored them and refused to carry them out. In some places, the treatment meted out to Red Army family members amounted quite simply to sabotage of the Red Army. This is a great obstacle to expanding the Red Army and enhancing the Red Army's fighting capacity, and is a very big mistake. In the future, the soviet governments at every level should strictly correct these mistakes and absolutely carry out the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army that

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 87-91.

were passed at the National Soviet Congress. If there remain cases in which preferential treatment for the Red Army is neglected, or the implementation of these regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army is ignored or inhibited, the people concerned should be punished as counterrevolutionaries. The following concrete measures for carrying out the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army are hereby stipulated, to facilitate implementation.

1. With the district as a unit, immediately begin an investigation of the people in the district who have joined the Red Army, the number of people in the families of those in the Red Army, the amount of land they have, how many people are able to work, how many are unable to work or unable to work full-time, compile the statistics and make two copies, one to be retained and one to be turned in and preserved by the *xian* soviet. This task is to be completed by March 1.

2. Within each army of the Red Army, each independent division, and local armed forces that are no longer engaged in production, the political department and the political commissar are to be responsible for making a detailed record of the name, age, address, and family circumstances of every commander, soldier, and staff member in these armed forces and then reporting to the revolutionary military committee or the local soviet government. This task is also to be completed by March 1.

3. As for fighters in the Red Army who have given their lives in the past, local governments, the political department of the Red Army, and political commissars are to do everything possible to investigate the facts and submit a report to the military committee or the local government, which can be handed over to and dealt with by the *xian* government.

4. In the past, in the Red Army and local armed forces there remained those who joined counterrevolutionary organizations. Whether it is a case of elements who have already been executed, or of elements who turned themselves in and made a new start, distinctions are to be made according to class status and between leaders and followers, to be investigated by those responsible in each army and local armed force and then reported to superior organs, to facilitate the decision as to whether or not their land is to be confiscated. After decisions are made, they are to be handed over to the various local governments to be carried out.

5. As for the registers compiled by each army, excluding Red Army fighters who are from outside,<sup>1</sup> the Central Government will turn them over to the various district governments. The district government will then make a comparison with the register compiled by each army and the register compiled through local government investigation, and send a report to the superior level of government to be kept on file. If there are discrepancies, they must be further investigated in detail and reported to the superior level of government for further investigation, to avoid omissions and errors.

6. As far as the main issue in carrying out the regulations for preferential treatment is concerned, **at present it is to mobilize the masses to help Red Army families till their fields and to cultivate the collective land of the Red Army.**<sup>2</sup> Based on the registers compiled through investigation, district and township governments should calcu-

1. The reference is apparently to those who come from, or have their legal residences in, places outside the soviet base areas.

2. In the Chinese text, the passage that is here in bold is emphasized by the addition of dots to the right of the characters.

late, for each Red Army family in its area, the total number of family members who are unable to work or unable to work full-time, determine the amount of volunteer labor needed, and then total the number of laborers in every township in its respective area and appropriately allocate the worker and peasant masses in one place to help the Red Army family members in another place till their fields and cultivate the collective fields of the Red Army. This responsibility should be given to the various township soviets to make specific allocations of cultivation work.

7. After receiving notification from the district soviet, every township soviet should immediately call a township soviet conference and determine the measures of implementation. Then it should call a rally of Red Army family members and all residents of the district to discuss and proclaim the significance of helping Red Army family members till their fields and of cultivating the Red Army's collective land, how much volunteer labor the particular township will undertake, and upon approval by the masses, the specific number of days and the dates for volunteer labor should be assigned. At the same time, the township soviet should make every effort to call a meeting of those responsible in the poor peasant leagues and unions of hired hands and enlist their aid to the government in mobilizing the masses to help the Red Army and Red Army families till the fields. During cultivation and harvesting, the township soviet is responsible for supervising and urging forward the work, but should at the same time prevent coercive behavior and giving orders. (This does not apply, however, in dealing with rich peasants.)

8. During cultivation and harvesting, the township soviet should mobilize the broad masses beforehand through propaganda and agitation to help the Red Army and Red Army families cultivate and harvest according to the stipulated [schedule of] volunteer labor, so that the cultivation and harvesting of Red Army fields takes place slightly earlier than regular cultivation and harvesting.

9. With regard to the method for setting aside collective fields for Red Army fighters from outside, the amount set aside for collective fields should be determined on the basis of the amount of land allocated to each person in the locality. Where less land is allocated, less should be set aside, and where more is allocated, more should be set aside. For example, the method stipulated in Jiangxi is that where the allocation to each person in a township is 5 *Dan*,<sup>3</sup> the total amount of land set aside for collective fields is that of three to five people; where it is more than 5 *Dan*, more land will be set aside for collective fields; where it is less than 5 *Dan*, some land must still be set aside for collective fields, at least the amount for two people. Other soviet areas may make their own stipulations on the basis of the method used in Jiangxi. Aside from the fact that already existing soviet areas should find a way to set aside collective fields, in newly developed [soviet] districts particular attention must be paid to setting aside collective fields when land is being distributed.

10. With the district as a unit, the amount of collective fields should be totaled and reported to the *xian* government, then totaled and reported to the provincial government, and then again the amount of collective fields in the entire province should be totaled and reported to the Central Government. After that, based on the number of Red Army

3. As noted earlier in this volume, we distinguish between the two characters read "dan," one corresponding to a unit of weight and the other to a unit of volume, by capitalizing the first of these. Here 1 *Dan* stands for the amount of land which, in the conditions prevailing in each village, may be expected to yield that quantity of grain.

fighters who are from outside and the amount of collective fields in the various *xian*, the Red Army's General Political Department will distribute it. On the one hand it should be reported to the Central Government to be handed down to the local governments to be announced to the masses in every locality, and at the same time it should be announced to the fighters in each army what amount of collective fields have been recently allocated to them and where they are located. The fighters in each army are to elect representatives who will go for inspection purposes to the locations of the various collective fields that have been allocated.

11. For the collective fields in every location, the district government is to stipulate a special marker on which it is written that this is the collective field assigned to the fighters in a certain army; as for seeds, fertilizer, and so on, primarily the masses should be mobilized to provide them, to be supplemented by the government when possible.

12. After the harvest each year, the district soviet is responsible for selling the produce and turning it into currency, to be sent in succession to the *xian* government and the provincial government, and in turn to the Red Army to be distributed among those who have shares in the collective fields.

13. As for Red Army fighters from outside who have given their lives, their names, home addresses, and families are to be recorded, and when the revolution develops into that locality, the Central Government should instruct the local government to investigate according to the given address, and their families should be given preferential treatment based on the regulations for preferential treatment.

14. When a Red Army fighter sacrifices his life, if his family does not have enough to get by or is totally unable to survive, the government should subsidize them to a certain extent, according to the basic cost of living of the particular area, to the point that the children can survive on their own. If there are no children, the parents and wife should be supported for the rest of their lives.

15. In places where schools have been established, Red Army children are entitled to education free of charge; it is the responsibility of the township and district soviets to carry this out.

16. Red Army soldiers and their families are to enjoy special correspondence privileges, to be handled according to Order No. 1 of the Council of People's Commissars.

17. As for disabled Red Army fighters, they are to be handled by the Compensation Commission of the Red Army Military Committee and the Home for the Disabled, according to the regulations for preferential treatment.

18. In order to implement the above measures and all stipulations in the regulations for preferential treatment, a committee on preferential treatment for Red Army fighters is to be set up under the military department in each *xian* government, to be responsible for all matters of preferential treatment for Red Army fighters. Under the provincial government a provincial committee on preferential treatment for the Red Army is to be established, with responsibility for guiding, supervising, and encouraging the *xian* committees on preferential treatment for the Red Army in [the fulfillment of] their responsibilities.

19. For the purpose of supervising and encouraging the governments at various levels in sincerely implementing the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Departments in the various governments are responsible for sending people down to carry out inspection from time to time. If it is found that the various governments are not carrying out the regulations on preferential treatment for

the Red Army, or in cases where a Red Army fighter and his family have lodged a complaint, after investigation by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Departments, [the situation] should be rapidly corrected, or criminal charges may be brought in a court of law and punishment meted out accordingly.

Spring has come and soon it will be time for spring plowing, so governments at all levels and the political departments of the Red Army must immediately discuss concrete measures of implementation according to the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army and the methods set out in this order, and actually carry them out. They must report from time to time regarding the way in which this is carried out to superior organs, up to the Central Government, for their examination. It is crucial that this work not be neglected or slowed down. It is so ordered.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Order No. 4 of the Central Executive Committee***

(June 9, 1932)

The "Temporary Organizational and Judicial Regulations of the Judicial Departments" are provisional regulations for the organization of temporary judicial organs and the handling of legal matters before courts are formally established. These regulations take effect beginning on June 15, 1932, in the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian, and in Ruijin *xian*, which is directly [under the Central Government], and will take effect in all other soviet areas that are not yet directly connected to the Central Soviet Area on the day the document is received. All provincial judicial departments and those of *xian* that are directly [under the Central Government], upon receiving this order and the said regulations, must immediately carry them out. It is so ordered.

Chairman, Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



# ***Temporary Organizational and Judicial Regulations of the Judicial Departments***

(Promulgated by the Central Executive Committee  
on June 9, 1932)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. Judicial departments are provisional judicial organs set up prior to the establishment of the courts, which will temporarily exercise all the functions and powers of the judicial organs and accept and hear both civil and criminal cases.

Article 2. Except for cases of members of the armed forces currently in active service and personnel of military organs, all civil and criminal cases are to be heard by the judicial departments.

Article 3. The organizational and judicial procedures of judicial departments at all levels within the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic should be conducted in conformity with these provisional regulations.

## **Chapter 2. The Organizational System of the Judicial Departments**

Article 4. Judicial departments and judicial sections must be established at all levels within the governments of cities, districts, *xian*, and provinces; only within the township soviets is it unnecessary to establish them.

(Note) In small city soviets it is not necessary to establish a judicial section; in such cities, the *xian* judicial department is to try all cases.

Article 5. Judicial departments at lower levels are subordinate to judicial departments at higher levels, which have the right to appoint or dismiss the director and working personnel of the judicial departments under them. At the same time, the judicial department must accept the supervision of the presidium of the government at its own level.

Article 6. In terms of jurisdiction, judicial departments are under the supervision of the Provisional Supreme Court, but in terms of the administration of justice and administration in general, they are under the direction of the Commissariat of Justice of the Central Government, which has the right to appoint and dismiss their presiding judges and working personnel.

(Note) In those soviet areas that have not yet been merged into the Central Soviet, the Executive Committee of the Provincial Party Committee should temporarily exercise the functions and powers of the Provisional Supreme Court and the Central Commissariat for Justice in resolving all judicial problems.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 41–47.

Article 7. District judicial departments should have one director and one secretary; *xian* judicial departments should have one director, one judge, and one secretary; provincial judicial departments should have one director, two vice-directors who are concurrently judges (one in charge of criminal cases and the other in charge of civil cases), and one secretary. The judicial committee is composed of the director and the vice-directors.

(Note 1) A judicial committee may also be organized within a *xian* judicial department, to be composed of the director, the judges, the local chief of police, and others.

(Note 2) When necessary and with permission from a higher level of government, other technical personnel may be used.

Article 8. Judicial departments have the authority to transfer the Red Guards, the local guards, and the people's police at any time to perform various tasks within the scope of the administration of justice.

Article 9. Those without the right to vote (including those under the age of sixteen) may not work for the judicial departments. The secretary must also be a person enjoying the right to vote.

Article 10. Places of detention may be set up under judicial departments at various levels, for the purposes of confining prisoners awaiting trial or trying prisoners confined for short periods of time. In addition to places of detention, judicial departments at the provincial and *xian* levels should establish reform-through-labor institutions for the purpose of confining criminals sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

### Chapter 3. Organization of and Judicial Procedures for the Courts

Article 11. A criminal court and a civil court should be organized by judicial departments at every level to hear criminal and civil cases.

Article 12. Judicial departments at all levels may set up mobile courts to go where cases have arisen and try relatively important cases, so as to involve the broad masses as observers.

Article 13. The court must be composed of a group of workers, with the director or a judge from the judicial department as chief judicial officer, and two others as assessors.

(Note) Simple and less important cases may be tried singlehandedly by the director of the judicial department or one of its judicial officers.

Article 14. The assessors should be selected from labor unions, farm laborers' associations, poor peasant leagues, and other mass organizations, and two assessors should be replaced at each trial.

(Note 1) Those without the right to vote, including those under the age of sixteen, may not be selected as assessors.

(Note 2) Assessors should be released from their own work while the trial is going on, be paid their average salary, and return to their original jobs after serving as assessors.

Article 15. In coming to a verdict, the presiding judge and the assessors should use as a standard the opinions of the majority. If there is disagreement and no conclusion can be reached, the final verdict should be based upon the opinion of the presiding judge. If any one of the assessors has a particular opinion and insists upon holding to it, this may be [written down and] submitted in a sealed envelope to the judicial department at the next higher level as reference material in considering the case.

Article 16. Trials must be open to the public. If a secret matter is involved, the trial may be conducted in secret, but the verdict must be publicly announced.

Article 17. When cases are tried, one or two secretaries must be present to make a record.

Article 18. Each time the court is in session, after a case is heard, the court must adjourn for discussion and come to a verdict. Only after the verdict is announced can the court hear the second case. It is strictly forbidden to wait several days before announcing a verdict after the case has been heard.

Article 19. Those related to the defendant by blood or marriage and those who have a personal relationship with the defendant are prohibited from participating in the trial of that defendant's case (this applies equally to the assessors and to the presiding judge).

Article 20. On the front of the verdict must be written the time of the trial; the names of the presiding judge, the assessors, and other participants in the trial; the defendant's record and charges against him; then the crimes of which he has been convicted; and finally a clear statement of the period during which the defendant may appeal. If there is a prison sentence, it is to be calculated from the date of arrest. The written verdict must bear the seal or signature of the presiding judge and of the assessors.

Article 21. The defendant must be given a copy of the original text of the verdict.

Article 22. All materials and evidence pertaining to each case must be compiled together, placed in one file, given a serial number, kept at the judicial department, and must not be lost.

Article 23. When a case is tried in court, in addition to the prosecutor, who appears in court as the one bringing the indictment, in cases involving mass organizations, the relevant mass organizations may also send representatives to the court as plaintiffs.

Article 24. In his own interests, the defendant may send representatives to court to defend him, but must obtain the permission of the court.

Article 25. In cases decided by judicial departments at all levels, the defendant has the right to appeal within the time limit specified on the written verdict. The time limit for appeal is two weeks, and the date of appeal is determined on the basis of the nature of the case by the court that tried the particular case.

(Note) The time limit for appeal is to be calculated from the date the defendant delivers a written appeal to the judicial department that tried his case, not from the date on which it is submitted to the judicial department at the next higher level.

Article 26. In cases in which a death sentence is pronounced, even if the defendant fails to appeal, the judicial department that heard the case should submit for approval the written verdict and all files pertaining to the case to the Commissariat for Justice at the next higher level.

Article 27. Only after the time limit for appeal specified on the written verdict has elapsed or the verdict has been approved by the higher level Commissariat for Justice may the verdict be put into effect.

Article 28. Judicial departments may issue three kinds of warrants—the summons, the detention warrant, and the search warrant.

#### **Chapter 4. The Jurisdiction of Judicial Departments at All Levels**

Article 29. Judicial departments have the power to issue warnings to, fine, confiscate the property of, sentence to forced labor, imprison, and execute all those accused of crimes.

Article 30. In routine, minor cases heard by district judicial departments, sentences to forced labor or imprisonment should not exceed six months.

Article 31. The *xian* judicial department is the organ of last instance to solve the problems and approve the verdicts of all cases submitted by the district judicial department; at the same time, it is the organ of first instance to hear cases of significance to the whole *xian*. It has the power to issue the death sentence, but not to carry out the death penalty; death sentences issued by *xian* judicial departments may be carried out only upon approval by the provincial judicial department.

(Note) *Xian* judicial departments that are cut off from the provincial judicial department may carry out [the death sentence] without the approval of the provincial judicial department.

Article 32. The provincial judicial department is the organ of last instance to solve problems and approve verdicts of all cases submitted to it by the *xian* Commissariat for Justice; at the same time it is the organ of first instance to hear all important cases of the province. It has the right to issue a death sentence, but must obtain approval of the Provisional Supreme Court before carrying it out. (Note) In provinces that are not yet directly connected with the Central Soviet Area, the provincial judicial department has the right to carry out the death sentence.

## Chapter 5. The Task and Duties of the Prosecutor

Article 33. There may be a prosecutor and a deputy prosecutor in the provincial judicial department, one prosecutor in the *xian* judicial department, and no prosecutor in the district judicial department.

Article 34. The chief duty of the prosecutor is to handle the preliminary examination in a case. Except for simple and clearcut cases that do not require a preliminary examination, all cases submitted to judicial departments must be examined beforehand by the prosecutor, who has the right to investigate the criminal acts of the accused.

Article 35. After the preliminary examination, if the prosecutor finds facts and evidence that a crime has been committed, he may draw his conclusions and submit them to the court for trial.

Article 36. In cases in which criminal behavior is discovered and an immediate arrest needs to be made before an investigation can be carried out, the prosecutor has the right to arrest the criminal beforehand.

Article 37. When investigating a case, the prosecutor has the right to summon and interrogate anyone involved in the case at any time.

Article 38. When a prosecutor investigates a case, whether examining the defendant or a witness, the proceedings must be taken down as the record of the preliminary examination, which then must be signed and sealed by those examined (defendants and witnesses) and the prosecutor, to be used as evidence in the case.

Article 39. The prosecutor brings the indictment on behalf of the government, and when court is in session he may make accusations on behalf of the government.

(Note) Before the prosecutor system is established, one of the judges may be put in charge of the preliminary hearing of the case and perform the functions of the prosecutor, but when the case is heard in court, the judge who conducted the preliminary hearing may not serve as presiding judge or as an assessor. But in cases involving counterrevolutionary

ies, the State Bureau of Public Security may send delegates to the court to bring the indictment on behalf of the state.

## Chapter 6. Supplementary Provisions

Article 40. The Central Executive Committee has the right to amend and suspend these regulations at any time; the regulations are issued as an order by the Central Executive Committee.

Article 41. In the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian and in Ruijin *xian*, which is directly [under the Central Government], these regulations take effect beginning on the day they are promulgated. In soviet areas that are not yet directly connected to the Central Soviet Area, however, they are to take effect beginning on the day the order is received.

Central Executive Committee Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Temporary Outline of the Organization Of Departments of Internal Affairs***

***Adopted at the 16th Meeting of the Standing Committee  
of the Council of People's Commissars***

(June 20, 1932)

1. In the Central Government, the department of internal affairs is under the jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars and is called the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. At the *xian* and provincial levels it is under the guidance of the presidium of the executive committee and is called the Department of Internal Affairs. Districts will not have a department for internal affairs.

2. Administratively, departments of internal affairs at all levels are directly under the jurisdiction of the department of internal affairs at the next higher level, with which direct systematic relations are established, and they must absolutely carry out the orders of the higher-level department of internal affairs. At the same time, they are subject to the direction of the presidiums of the governments at their own levels, thereby establishing a horizontal relationship. Departments of internal affairs may organize committees for internal affairs, composed of three to nine people.

3. The heads of lower-level departments of internal affairs, once they are elected by the Soviet Congress at the equivalent level, must be approved by the department of internal affairs at the next higher level.

4. The Commissariat for Internal Affairs is temporarily in charge of such matters as urban administration; people's police; crime detection; public health and hygiene; transportation; postal services and telecommunications; food supplies; social security; census-taking; registration of births, deaths, and marriages; and so on. The following offices are temporarily to be established under the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs:

- a. Office for Urban Administration
- b. Office for Administration
- c. Office for Public Health and Hygiene Administration
- d. Office for Transportation Administration
- e. Office for Social Security Administration
- f. Office for Postal Services and Telecommunications Administration

(Note 1) The offices for public health and hygiene, transportation, postal services and telecommunications, social security, food supplies, and so on, are temporary organizations to be set up prior to the establishment of commissariats for public health and hygiene,

transportation, postal services and telecommunications, social security, and so on and are, for the time being, under the administration of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

(Note 2) Departments (or sections) for public health and hygiene will not be established for the time being in city soviets or at the district, *xian*, and provincial levels, but at the district level, the presidium will be in charge. As for offices for food supplies at the city soviet and district, *xian*, and provincial levels, separate departments (or sections) should be established, under the guidance of the Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

5. Within the departments of internal affairs at the provincial and *xian* levels, only sections for administration, urban administration, transportation, public health and hygiene, and social security are to be established. In city soviets, a section for administration is set up to manage the people's police department, as well as to do the work of crime detection. In large cities, a section for urban administration and a section for administration are established to manage urban administration, the people's police, and crime detection.

6. In addition to the commissar and the vice-commissar of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the Central Government appoints six directors of the administrative offices. Provincial governments appoint five people to head the sections of administration, urban administration, transportation, public health and hygiene, and social security. *Xian* governments appoint only two people to such offices. City governments appoint only one person to head the section for administration.

(Note) In small *xian*, the head of the department of internal affairs may also serve concurrently as section head; only one additional section head is appointed.

7. In addition to the responsible working personnel listed in No. 6 above, a suitable number of technical working personnel may be appointed to deal with technical matters; they are to be appointed by the head of the department.

8. The matters to be managed by each administrative office (or section) are as follows:

a. The office (or section) for urban administration manages urban development and construction such as roads, streets, trolleys, electricity, running water, and the construction and management of other public works agencies.

b. The offices for administration and the sections for administration (i) manage the people's police force, including training and education; household registration; registration of births, deaths and marriages; installation of street lights; monitoring and supervision of the police force; maintenance of law and order in the cities; street cleaning; and enforcement of the ban on opium-smoking and gambling, and so on; and (ii) handle crime detection, training of detectives, and investigation and arrest of criminals (such as thieves and murderers, etc.).

c. The office (or section) for public health and hygiene administers hospitals; prevents and controls the spread of epidemics and contagious diseases; monitors public health; inspects health conditions on vehicles, ships, in public dining facilities, and residential buildings; examines and monitors physicians and pharmacists; tests drugs; manages the medical supplies business; and so on.

d. The office (or section) for transportation plans, builds, inspects, repairs, and improves roads and bridges; it administers the operation of ships and shipping routes; it installs traffic signs; it administers and improves land transportation (such as railways, highways, and air traffic); and it administers other transportation-related affairs.

e. The office (or section) for social security [X][X][X] administers relief of the poor in society, such as relief for [victims of] floods and droughts, and for areas struck by different types of disasters.

f. The office for postal services and telecommunications develops and administers the postal services, wire telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and long-distance telephone services of the whole country.

(Note) Postal services and telecommunications are centrally administered, so the office for postal services and telecommunications is set up only within the Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; no such organization is set up at or below the provincial level.

9. When the work requires, individual offices or sections may form committees, hire specialists as committee members, and appoint the heads of the offices or sections to chair the committees. The number of committee members may range from three to five.

10. Organizational and operational details for departments for food supplies and public health and hygiene within local governments will be specified and announced separately.

11. To supervise the work of the departments and direct the work at the lower levels, several people should be appointed as guidance personnel.

12. Detailed rules and regulations for the work of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs will be specified separately.

13. The Council of People's Commissars may amend or annul this temporary outline at any time.

14. This temporary outline takes effect on the day of its promulgation in the two provinces of Fujian and Jiangxi and in Ruijin *xian*. In soviet areas that have not yet established a direct connection with the Central Soviet Area, it takes effect on the day the document is received.

Chairman of the Council  
of People's Commissars

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao



# ***Regulations Regarding the Issuance of Short-term “Revolutionary War” Bonds***

(June 25, 1932)

Article 1. In order to advance the revolutionary war, the Provisional Central Government is issuing bonds to replenish its war funds; the bonds are to be called “revolutionary war” bonds.

Article 2. The amount of these particular bonds is set at 600,000 *yuan* in national currency.

Article 3. The interest rate of the bonds is 10 percent per annum.

Article 4. There are three denominations for the bonds: (1) 50 *fen*, (2) 1 *yuan*, and (3) 5 *yuan*.

Article 5. The interest and principal of the bonds are set to be paid back in six months; payment of the interest and principal will begin on January 1, 1933, at which time the interest and principal will be paid back at the same time.

Article 6. The bonds are fully usable to pay commercial taxes, land taxes, and other government-imposed taxes, but no interest will be paid when the bonds are used to pay the current year's taxes.

Article 7. The bonds may be traded, and used as collateral or security in place of other forms of cash.

Article 8. Any person who deliberately damages the credit and price of the bonds will be prosecuted as having committed a crime against the soviets and the revolution.

Article 9. Financial agencies of governments at all levels, the management department of the Red Army, state banks, and government-authorized worker-peasant banks and cooperatives in all areas are to handle the sale of bonds and the repayment of interest and principal.

Article 10. These rules and regulations are promulgated and become effective on July 1, 1932.

Chairman of the Provisional  
Central Government

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 55–56.

# *Amended Temporary Tax Regulations*

(July 15, 1932)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. Unified progressive taxation shall be established, and all land taxes, household levies, *lijin*, and other miscellaneous contributions and taxes imposed by the Guomindang warlord government shall be abolished.

Article 2. There are three types of taxes: commercial taxes, agricultural taxes, and industrial taxes.

## **Chapter 2. Commercial Tax**

Article 3. Tax rates: For the time being, there shall be fourteen levels of commercial capital tax [for amounts] from 101 *yuan* to 500,000 *yuan*. Taxes on income derived from capital (that is to say, total profits, not the capital itself) shall be levied according to the rates prescribed for the different levels. Tax rates on capital in excess of 500,000 *yuan* shall be fixed separately. The [tax] table is as follows:

### **Commercial Tax**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Capital (<i>yuan</i>)</b>	<b>Rate (percent)</b>
1	101–200	6
2	201–400	7
3	401–700	8
4	701–1,000	9
5	1,001–1,500	10
6	1,501–3,000	11
7	3,001–5,000	12
8	5,001–10,000	13
9	10,001–20,000	15
10	20,001–30,000	17
11	30,001–50,000	19
12	50,001–80,000	21
13	80,001–100,000	23
14	100,001–500,000	25

Article 4. Taxation methods: Tax rates are set according to the amount of a store's capital as entered on its operating license obtained from a financial organ of the government. Thereafter, tax will be levied according to this rate.

Article 5. Tax periods: Taxes shall be collected once every month; taxes on seasonal businesses must also be collected regularly.

Article 6. Tax exemption procedures:

- a. All consumer cooperatives organized in accordance with the regulations on cooperatives promulgated by the government, and approved by and registered with the *xian* government, are exempt from taxation upon report by the *xian* government to the provincial government in question.
- b. Street vendors with less than 100 *yuan* in capital and peasants selling their surplus produce directly are all exempt from commercial taxes.
- c. All those with commercial capital of less than 100 *yuan* are exempt from taxation.
- d. Merchants who are in distress or have suffered unexpected damages may be exempted from taxation after reporting to the government and being investigated and approved.
- e. The government may announce tax exemptions by decree at any time for certain daily necessities and military supplies.

### Chapter 3. Agricultural Tax

(Note) At present agricultural production and commodity values in the countryside are extremely complex and a uniform method of taxation cannot be established. Only the principles of agricultural taxation can be determined. On the basis of these principles, each province may determine the appropriate agricultural taxes in the light of local conditions and report to the Central Government for approval and application.

Article 7. After the land has been redistributed to the peasants, the amount of the annual harvest per person and the necessary living expenses per person shall be calculated by dividing the annual harvest of the main crop for the whole family by the number of people in the family. Then, on the basis of these standards, the minimum amount of income per person on which tax is levied and the rate of progressive taxation shall be established. For rich peasants, however, the standards for [income from the] harvest and taxes imposed shall be based on averages computed using the number of able-bodied workers in the family (rather than the number of family members).

Article 8. Only the main crop (rice and wheat) is taxable; sideline products are tax-exempt for the time being. Those who harvest rice and wheat twice a year should, however, be taxed twice.

Article 9. When tea-oil producing hills, cotton and hemp fields, and orchards have been redistributed as rice paddies and wheat fields, their produce becomes the main crop and is likewise subject to taxation.

Article 10. Dependents of Red Army soldiers (limited to the individual's own parents, wife, and younger siblings without labor power) enjoy tax exemption in accordance with the regulations on preferential treatment for the Red Army.

Article 11. All farm laborers and hired workers and coolies to whom land has been distributed land, and their wives, shall be exempt from taxation.

Article 12. Poor peasants whose incomes have reached the level at which taxes may

be imposed but who still cannot support their families may be granted tax reduction or exemption by the township soviets on a case-by-case basis.

Article 13. A special point should be made of making the taxes on former rich peasants somewhat heavier.

Article 14. Areas that have suffered floods or drought and other natural disasters, or from depredations by White bandits, shall be granted tax exemption or reduction according to the severity of the situation.

Article 15. Increased agricultural income resulting from the improvement of seeds and methods of cultivation is exempt from taxation.

Article 16. Agricultural produce obtained from the cultivation of wasteland is exempt from taxation for three years. Rich peasants, however, may benefit from tax reduction or exemption for one year in light of the circumstances of the harvest.

Article 17. The methods and periods for agricultural taxation are to be promulgated by the Central Commissariat of Finance. In other soviet areas separated [from the Central Soviet Area], however, they may be determined and promulgated by the highest level of local governments according to local conditions. During the period when taxes are due, each person in every family should pay the amount of tax required by regulations regarding the tax rates.

Article 18. Agricultural tax shall be paid in cash, which is limited to the national currency of the Chinese Soviet Republic. Other currencies are not acceptable.

#### **Chapter 4. Industrial Tax**

Article 19. Production cooperatives that are approved and registered by the *xian* government may be exempted from taxation, upon report to the provincial government by the *xian* government.

Article 20. At present, in order to promote the industrial development of the soviet areas, the tax on manufactured products is not being levied for the time being.

Article 21. Industrial tax rates are determined according to the amount of capital, and only the profits from the capital are taxable. [Industrial] tax rates will be established by a separate regulation, but the rate must be lower than that for the tax on commerce.

#### **Chapter 5. Additional Article**

Article 22. These tax regulations shall come into force on the date they are promulgated.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on Redrawing Administrative Boundaries***

(July 21, 1933)

The division of the soviet administrative areas is substantially different in principle from that of the administrative areas of the old reactionary government. The size of the administrative areas of the old reactionary government is always very large. This is because their government is a bureaucratic organ divorced from the masses. The only purpose of their government is to weaken and oppress the masses. The principles in the division of soviet administrative areas are completely different. Our government must get as close as possible to the masses and work for all the interests of the masses. Therefore, whether it is a township, a district, a *xian*, or a province, the administrative area should not be too large. Although the division of the administrative districts in the Central Soviet Area has already gone through several changes, generally speaking, most of the areas continue to follow the old divisions and there have been no radical changes. This has proved to be extremely inconvenient for war mobilization, and for economic and cultural construction and construction in other domains. Consequently, the Central Executive Committee has decided to redraw the administrative boundaries in the Central Soviet Area and has laid down the following criteria for dividing the administrative areas at various levels:

## **A. Towns**

In addition to a market area, it can also have jurisdiction over a portion of the countryside around this market, but its jurisdiction should not extend beyond 5 *li* from the market.

## **B. Townships**

1. First class townships, which are on flat land and particularly densely populated. The standard population under the jurisdiction of such a township should be 2,000. If the population in one village or in several neighboring villages exceeds 2,000, the population under the jurisdiction of a township soviet may be somewhat larger, but it should not exceed 2,500 at most. Similarly, if one area should appropriately be divided into two townships, because of geographical conditions (for instance, division by a river), and the population in each township is less than 2,500, then the population under the jurisdiction of each township soviet may be somewhat smaller.

2. Second class townships, which are situated between flat land and hilly land. Such townships are not as densely populated as first class townships and the size of the area is

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much larger. The standard population under the jurisdiction of such a township should be 1,500. If, because of geographical conditions, it is convenient that the size of the area under the jurisdiction of one township soviet be larger or smaller, then the population of one township may be more or less than 1,500.

3. Third class townships, which are in sparsely populated localities where much of the land is hilly. The standard population of such a township should be 1,000. If, because of geographical conditions, it is convenient that certain villages or hamlets be under the jurisdiction of one township, the population of such a township may exceed 1,000. The administrative area should not, however, be too large, so as not to violate the principle that soviet governments should be close to the masses. Similarly, if because of geographical conditions, it is not convenient for a township soviet to have jurisdiction over [certain localities], it may have a population of less than 1,000. In some places, where there are many high mountains, the area is particularly vast, and the population is particularly sparse, the population of one township may be as few as 400 or so. But it should not be fewer than 250 at a minimum.

### C. Districts

A standard district should have jurisdiction over seven townships. In particularly densely populated areas on flat land, a district may have jurisdiction over as many as nine townships. In particularly sparsely populated places in mountain areas where land is extensive, a district may have jurisdiction over only five townships.

### D. *Xian* and Provinces

The Council of People's Commissars is instructed to issue orders regarding the division between *xian* and provinces, in accordance with the principle of getting close to the masses.

Soviet areas outside the Central Soviet Area should all conduct a reexamination of their administrative areas in line with the principles set forth in this resolution. The boundaries of those areas that are too large and not in accord with these principles should be redrawn.

After the promulgation of this resolution, the "Temporary Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic Concerning the Division of Administrative Areas" issued in December 1931 should be declared null and void.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution on Carrying Out the Redrawing of Administrative Boundaries***

*Order No. 46 of the  
Central Council of People's Commissars*

(July 22, 1933)

The resolution by the Central Executive Committee concerning the redrawing of administrative boundaries lays down the principles for dividing administrative areas and the standards for dividing towns, districts, and townships. As regards the division of provinces and *xian*, the Central Executive Committee instructs the Council of People's Commissars to issue orders determining this. Now only a little over four months remain before the Second All-Soviet Congress convenes. During these four months, elections must be carried out for the soviets at the four levels of township, district, *xian*, and province, and deputies to the All-Soviet Congress must also be elected. Before these elections can be held, however, all the administrative boundaries of townships and districts which do not conform to the principles set out in the resolution of the Central Executive Committee must be redrawn. Some *xian* administrative boundaries must also be redrawn. In order to reexamine the existing administrative boundaries and redraw them, in accordance with the principles set out in the resolution by the Central Executive Committee, so as to facilitate carrying out the elections expeditiously, the Council of People's Commissars issues the following stipulations:

1. The plan of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs to add eight more *xian* administrative areas in the two provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian is approved. The *xian* of Luokou, Longgang, Yangyin, Chishui, Changsheng, Xijiang, Menling, and Pengpai are established. The provincial soviets in Jiangxi and Fujian should immediately send their representatives to each of the newly established *xian* to summon the leaders of the district and township governments to meetings for electing an interim *xian* soviet to manage local political affairs, and to start immediately redrawing the administrative boundaries of districts and townships, so as to facilitate the elections. In order to strengthen the leadership of the new *xian*, the provincial soviet can appoint one or several people to the chairmanship and other posts of the interim *xian* soviet. The *xian* soviet which originally had jurisdiction over the area of the new *xian* must send some people to strengthen the leadership of the interim soviets of the new *xian*.

2. In order to guarantee that the principles set forth in the resolution of the Central Executive Committee will be completely followed during the actual process of redrawing

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 125–26, where it is reproduced from the Chen Cheng Collection.

the administrative boundaries at the levels of district and township, the district soviet should be in charge of the division into townships and should report the work to the *xian* soviet for review and approval. The *xian* soviet should be in charge of redrawing the boundaries of districts and should report to the provincial soviet for its approval. All the reports should be accompanied by simple maps. The provincial soviet should send a report about the redrawn districts and townships in each *xian*, with maps attached, to the Central Commissariat for Internal Affairs for review.

3. The redrawn districts and townships should be named after the local markets or major place names. Old names may remain in use, except those containing implications of feudalism or superstition. If there are no appropriate old names which can be used, the new administrative areas may be named after well-known local events in the revolutionary struggles in the past or they may be named after revolutionary leaders who have laid down their lives and are respected by the local masses. Or they may use other revolutionary terms as their names. But no numbers shall be used as names.

4. The presidiums of the governments at various levels shall direct the departments of internal affairs to take charge of the work of redrawing the administrative boundaries. They should send people to each locality to take the lead in carrying out this work. The Central Commissariat for Internal Affairs must assume overall responsibility for directing this work.

5. As soon as the work of redrawing the administrative boundaries is completed, elections should immediately be held. The Central Government will issue separate instructions about running the elections.<sup>1</sup>

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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1. See below, the Provisional Soviet Electoral Law and the resolution putting it into effect, both dated August 9, 1933.



# ***Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds***

(July 22, 1933)

The vigorous development of the revolutionary war requires that the Soviets mobilize all forces to carry out the work of economic construction in a planned way, and to organize the broad masses for economic construction. To set up cooperatives everywhere, to coordinate the grain supply and the production and sale of all products, and to promote external trade,<sup>1</sup> so as to smash the enemy's economic blockade, resist the cruel exploitation by the unscrupulous merchants, further improve the life of the masses, and provide the revolutionary war with even more solid material strength—such is the great fighting task at present. In order to carry out economic construction work forcefully, the Central Executive Committee hereby approves the proposal put forward at the Conference on the Land Investigation Movement attended by soviet personnel from the eight *xian* of Ruijin, Huichang, Kuidu, Shengli, Bosheng, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting, and by the Congress of the poor peasant leagues of these eight *xian*, to issue 3,000,000 *yuan* worth of Economic Construction Bonds and to allow people to use grain or money freely as payment in purchasing the bonds. A certain portion of the money raised will be used for current military purposes, while most of the money will be used for purposes such as promoting cooperatives, coordinating food supplies, and expanding external trade. In order to define the purposes of the bonds and the procedures for paying back the principal plus interest, the Central Executive Committee hereby issues the "Regulations on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds." The Central Executive Committee has instructed the Council of People's Commissars to supervise and encourage the Commissariat of Finance and the Commissariat for the National Economy in directing the local governments to issue and control the bonds rapidly and correctly, in accordance with this resolution and the Regulations on Economic Construction Bonds. At the same time, broad propaganda and explanatory work should be carried out among the worker and peasant masses, and among all residents who respect soviet laws, so as to help launch an economic construction movement rapidly within the borders of the soviet area. If there are any counterrevolutionaries who attempt to discredit the bonds and sabotage

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1. The expression *duiwai maoyi* normally means "foreign trade," but here it obviously refers to trade with the regions under Guomindang control outside the soviet base areas.

other economic facilities, the State Political Security Bureau is hereby instructed to take the necessary measures against them and rigorously to suppress these elements, in order to guarantee the smooth progress of the work of economic construction.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *Regulations on the Issuance of Economic Construction Bonds*

(July 22, 1933)

1. In order to promote the cause of economic construction in the Soviet Area, improve the lives of the masses, and strengthen our combat forces, the Central Government has decided to issue Economic Construction Bonds. Two-thirds of the money raised from issuing the Economic Construction Bonds will be used for promoting external trade, coordinating grain supplies, and developing cooperatives and agricultural and industrial production, while one-third will be used for military expenditures.

2. The fixed amount of the Economic Construction Bonds to be issued this time is 3,000,000 *yuan* in the national currency.<sup>1</sup>

3. The annual interest rate of the Economic Construction Bonds is 5 percent.

4. The interest on the Economic Construction Bonds will be paid within seven years starting from October 1934. The annual interest on each big foreign dollar is 5 *fen*.

5. The principal of the Economic Construction Bonds will be paid back within five years starting from October 1936. Ten percent of the total principal will be paid back in the first year (1936), 15 per cent in the second year (1937), 20 per cent in the third year (1938), 25 per cent in the fourth year (1939), and 30 per in the fifth year (1940). The methods of repayment will be decided and announced by the Commissariat for Finance at the appropriate time.

6. The profits from the Grain Coordinating Bureau, External Trade Bureau, and other state enterprises will be used as funds for paying back the principal and interest of the Economic Construction Bonds.

7. It is permitted to buy and sell the Economic Construction Bonds and to use them as security for other purposes.

8. The purchaser of Economic Construction Bonds may pay for them either in grain or in money, just as he prefers. The price of the grain will be calculated according to the price list published by local *xian* governments.

9. There are five denominations of Economic Construction Bonds: 5 *jiao*, 1 *yuan*, 2 *yuan*, 3 *yuan*, and 5 *yuan*.

10. Anyone who deliberately attempts to damage the credit of the Economic Construction Bonds will be prosecuted on a charge of sabotaging the soviet economy.

11. Matters concerning the issuance of the Economic Construction Bonds will be the responsibility of the Economic Construction Bonds Committee of governments at various

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Our source for this text is *Hongse Zhonghua*, no. 96, July 26, 1933. It is reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 3, pp. 297-98, but in that version one character, which we have been able to supply from the newspaper, is missing.

1. *Guo bi*, i.e., the currency of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

levels. The money raised will be sent to various branches of the treasury and the grain received will be sent to the Storehouse Committee.

12. This regulation goes into effect on August 1, 1933.

Chairman of the  
Central Government

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on Putting into Effect the "Temporary Soviet Election Law"***

(Promulgated by the Central Executive Committee  
on August 9, 1933)

Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on putting into effect the "Temporary Soviet Election Law":

1. The provisions of the "Temporary Soviet Election Law," upon being adopted, shall be in force as of August 15, 1933.

2. After August 15, 1933, the previously promulgated "Detailed Regulations Regarding Elections in the Chinese Soviet Republic," "Temporary Detailed Regulations Regarding Elections in the Red Army and Local Armed Forces," "Detailed Regulations Regarding the Work of the Election Committees," and Directive No. 8 of the Central Executive Committee are all declared null and void.<sup>1</sup>

3. Elections to the soviets at all levels, and procedures for electing deputies from the Red Army to attend the representative congresses of the soviets at various levels, must conform to the provisions of the "Provisional Soviet Election Law."

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, p. 127.

1. The first and third items on this list, dated respectively November and December 1931, are translated above. The regulations regarding elections in the Red Army, and Directive No. 8 of the Central Executive Committee, are not available to us.

# *Temporary Soviet Election Law*

(August 9, 1933)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. All elections held at all levels of the soviets within the territories of the Chinese Soviet Republic shall without exception be guided by the provisions of this law.

Article 2. During the war period, elections for the Red Army shall be determined by a special section of this law.

Article 3. The proletariat is the vanguard of the soviets, leading the peasants in the overthrow of the Guomindang political power of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and establishing the soviet political power of the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. In order to strengthen the leadership of the proletariat within the soviet organs, workers shall enjoy an advantage compared to other residents in the proportion of representatives to the number of residents.

## **Chapter 2. The Right to Vote and to Be Elected**

Article 4. All the people residing within the territory of the Chinese Soviet Republic who, on election day, have attained the age of sixteen [*sui*], without distinction as to sex, religion, or nationality [*minzu*], who meet one of the qualifications listed below, shall enjoy the right to vote and be elected:

1. All hired laborers and their families, and all who have lived by their own labor and their families (such as workers, hired personnel, poor peasants, middle peasants, independent laborers, the urban poor, etc.);
2. Military personnel and military workers of the navy, army, and air force of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and their families; or
3. Those of the above two categories who at the time of the election either are no longer able to work or have lost their jobs.

(Note) Family members of the categories of people in this article, if their backgrounds deprive them of electoral rights, still do not have the right to vote or to be elected.

Article 5. Those who have committed one of the following offenses do not have the right to vote or to be elected:

1. Those who have sought to profit from hiring the labor of others (such as rich peasants and capitalists);
2. Those who live not by their labor, but by the profits obtained from capital, land, or

- other property (such as despotic gentry, landlords, usurers, and capitalists);
3. The agents and middlemen of landlords and capitalists (such as intermediaries or brokers), and compradors;
  4. All those who make their profession the propagation of religion and superstition, such as missionaries of various faiths, pastors, priests, and Daoist monks, as well as geomancers and fortunetellers;
  5. The police, detectives, military police, bureaucrats, and warlords of the Guomindang government and of all the reactionary governments, and all the reactionary elements who have participated in opposing the interests of the workers and peasants;
  6. Those who have suffered an attack of mental illness;
  7. Those who have been pronounced guilty of a crime by a court of law and are serving their sentences, or for whom the period of deprivation of the right to vote has not yet expired; or
  8. The family members of those included in items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

(Note) In regard to item 4 of this article, the family members of those whose profession is the propagation of religion and superstition, if they live by their own labor, have the right to vote and to be elected.

Article 6. Of the various categories of people included in Article 4 of this law, those who fall under any one of the items 1 through 7 of Article 5 of this law shall likewise be deprived of the right to vote and of the right to be elected.

### **Chapter 3. Election Procedures**

Article 7. Elections shall be held at regular intervals by the local soviet, in accordance with the decisions of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 8. Elections can be held only in the presence of a representative of the election committee.

Article 9. Before an election begins, voter registration must be carried out, and a list of registered voters and of those who have been stripped of the right to vote, and the total number of residents of the election district, shall be made public by the local soviet five days before the election.

Article 10. After voter registration has been completed, each voter must be notified of the time and place of the election meeting, and voter registration must be carried out at the entrance to the meeting place of the election meeting.

Article 11. Workers shall hold election meetings taking their production, occupational, or industrial organizations as the units. Those people who cannot vote by production units shall hold election meetings by districts or streets at specified locations. The peasants shall hold election meetings based on the hamlet (small village) as the unit. If the number of persons in a given hamlet is too small, one or several neighboring hamlets may join together to hold an election meeting.

Article 12. The family members of workers shall participate in elections at the same location as the worker who provides their support, and moreover shall have the same election qualifications as the worker who provides their support. If family members of a worker do not live with him, they shall still participate in the elections at the work or residence location of his family members.

(Note) If any family member of a worker has been deprived of election rights, that person may not participate in the elections.

Article 13. An election meeting may be called to order only when half or more of the total number of voters of that place are present at the meeting. If the number of voters present does not meet the legally required number, it shall be announced that the meeting will be postponed and the election committee shall fix a new date for the election meeting. In the event that a new election meeting is to be called, there must be a new notification of the time and place of the meeting.

Article 14. If a second election meeting is called, the meeting may be held whether or not the legally required number of people are present, and elect the number of delegates who were supposed to be elected.

Article 15. Paper ballots are not used in the elections. The decision is taken by a show of hands. Those for whom the most hands are raised shall be elected.

Article 16. The presidium of the election meeting shall consist of three persons. Two of them shall be selected by the election meeting and one shall be a representative of the election committee. The representative of the election committee will naturally serve as the chairman of the presidium of the election meeting. A secretary shall also be selected, who shall be responsible for keeping the minutes of the election meeting.

Article 17. When the election meeting has been called to order, the chairman must announce the number of those present according to the registration book of those entering the election place, and whether or not it meets the legally required number of people.

Article 18. The agenda of the election meeting is laid down as follows:

1. The representative of the election committee, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4, 5, and 6 of this law, shall announce who has the right to vote and the right to be elected, and who has been stripped of these rights.
2. Election of regular deputies.
3. Election of alternate deputies.
4. Adoption of resolutions.

(Note 1) When the names of candidates are put to the vote, the method of voting on them individually must be used. An entire slate may not be elected in just one vote.

(Note 2) Regular and alternate deputies may not be voted on at the same time. The election of regular deputies must be completed before the alternate deputies are elected.

Article 19. The minutes of the election meeting must be signed and sealed by the whole presidium and by the secretary.

Article 20. The minutes of the election meeting, the register of those attending the meeting, and all documents relating to the election must be submitted to the election committee and turned over to the city soviet or district executive committee for verification of the election results.

#### **Chapter 4. Election Procedures and Criteria for Representation in Soviets at All Levels**

Article 21. A township soviet shall be composed of deputies elected by the voters of the entire township at their respective election meetings. Every thirteen worker-residents shall elect one regular deputy, and other residents shall elect one regular deputy for every fifty persons.



(Note) In townships with a population of less than 500, the ratio of deputies to residents may be reduced to the following: Every eight worker-residents shall elect one regular deputy, and every thirty-two persons among the other residents shall elect one regular deputy.

Article 22. A city soviet under the jurisdiction of a district is composed of deputies elected by the various voter meetings throughout the entire city. For every thirteen worker-residents, one regular deputy shall be elected.

Article 23. A city soviet that is directly under the jurisdiction of a *xian* is composed of the deputies elected at the various election meetings of the voters throughout the entire city. For every twenty worker-residents, one regular deputy shall be elected, and for other residents, one deputy shall be elected for every eighty persons.

Article 24. A city soviet that is directly under the jurisdiction of a province is composed of the deputies elected at the various election meetings of the voters throughout the entire city. For every 100 worker-residents, one regular deputy shall be elected, and for other residents, one deputy shall be elected for every 400 persons.

Article 25. A city soviet directly under the jurisdiction of the Central Government is composed of the deputies elected at the various election meetings of the voters throughout the entire city. For every 500 worker-residents, one regular deputy shall be elected, and for other residents, one deputy shall be elected for every 2,000 persons.

Article 26. A district soviet congress is composed of the deputies elected by the township soviets and by the Red armies stationed in the district. Of the deputies having seats in the district soviet congress, every 200 residents of the countryside shall elect one regular deputy, and the composition of the deputies should be such that 20 to 25 percent are workers.

(Note) If there are city soviets under the jurisdiction of the district soviet, deputies to the city soviets should be included. City residents shall elect one regular deputy for every fifty persons.

Article 27. A *xian* soviet congress is composed of the deputies elected by the district soviet congresses, and by those city soviets that are directly under the jurisdiction of the *xian*, as well as the deputies elected by the Red armies that are under the jurisdiction of the *xian*. Of the deputies seated in the *xian* soviet representative assembly, every 400 city residents shall elect one regular deputy, and every 1,600 residents from the countryside shall elect one regular deputy. As regards the class composition of the deputies, they should include 20 to 25 percent workers.

Article 28. A provincial soviet congress is composed of the deputies elected by the *xian* soviet congresses and by those city soviets that are directly under the province's jurisdiction, as well as by the deputies elected by the Red armies that are under the jurisdiction of the province. Of the deputies seated in the provincial soviet congress, every 1,500 city residents shall elect one regular deputy, and every 6,000 residents from the countryside shall elect one regular deputy. As regards class composition, the workers should constitute 25 to 35 percent.

Article 29. The National Soviet Congress is composed of deputies elected by the provincial soviet congresses, by soviet congresses from *xian* directly subordinated [to the Center], by soviet congresses from cities directly under central jurisdiction, and also by deputies elected by the Red Army. Of the deputies seated in the National Soviet Congress, every 1,500 city residents shall elect one regular deputy, and every 6,000 residents from

the countryside shall elect one regular deputy. As regards class composition, workers should constitute 25 to 30 percent.

Article 30. In those places where there are not enough residents to meet the legal quota, if the number of people is more than half of the legal quota, they shall elect one regular deputy, and if the number of people is less than half the legal quota, they shall elect one alternate deputy.

Article 31. There shall be one alternate deputy for every five regular deputies. Alternate deputies attend meetings and have the right to speak but not to vote on resolutions. If a regular deputy for some reason withdraws or is removed from office, an alternate deputy should replace him, in the proper order.

Article 32. The soviet congresses at the district, *xian*, and provincial levels, in addition to electing the soviet congresses at the *xian*, provincial, and national levels, shall also elect the executive committees of the soviets at their respective levels. The National Soviet Congress thus elects the Central Executive Committee.

Article 33. The credentials of deputies to the district, *xian*, provincial, and national soviet congresses will be examined by committees organized by the soviet congresses at their respective levels. The credentials of deputies to the township and city soviets will be examined by committees organized by plenary sessions of the township and city soviets, which will organize committees for this purpose.

Article 34. The number of members of the executive committees at the various levels of the soviets are stipulated as follows:

District executive committees, not to exceed 35 persons.

*Xian* executive committees, not to exceed 55 persons.

Provincial executive committees, not to exceed 95 persons.

Central Executive Committee, not to exceed 581 persons.

(Note 1) The criteria and procedures for Red Army representation to the different levels of the soviet congresses are specially stipulated in Chapter 5 of this law.

(Note 2) The criteria for representation in the National Soviet Congress of *xian* directly under the Central Government are laid down in a special order of the Central Executive Committee.

## **Chapter 5. Red Army Election Procedures and Criteria of Representation**

Article 35. During wartime, the Red Army cannot be stationed in fixed locations and cannot possibly participate in the elections of city or township soviets. Consequently, there should be temporary flexible measures, as specifically provided in the articles of this section.

Article 36. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that is under the jurisdiction of a district soviet government (such as guerrilla detachments) shall directly elect representatives to participate in the soviet congress of that district; a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that is under the jurisdiction of a *xian* soviet government (such as an independent regiment) shall directly elect representatives to the *xian* soviet congress; a Workers' and Peasants' Red Army that is under the jurisdiction of a provincial soviet government, or which, though not under the jurisdiction of the provincial soviet government, is responsible for long-term work in that province (such as independent divisions, and the army

groups in Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi, Hunan-Jiangxi, Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi, and other soviet areas) shall directly elect representatives to the provincial soviet congress; the Red Army front armies shall directly elect representatives to the National Soviet Congress.

(Note) Guard forces, such as guard companies, guard regiments, political guard forces, and so on, shall participate in the elections of the local city and township soviets, and the criteria of representation shall be similar to those for workers.

Article 37. The criteria of representation for the Red Army are stipulated as follows: For deputies elected to district soviet congresses, every twenty-five persons shall elect one regular deputy; for deputies elected to *xian* soviet congresses, every 100 persons shall elect one regular deputy; for deputies elected to provincial soviet congresses, every 400 persons shall elect one regular deputy; for deputies elected to the National Soviet Congress, every 600 persons shall elect one regular deputy.

(Note) The criteria for alternate representation are stipulated according to Articles 30 and 31 of this law.

Article 38. The task of holding elections in the Red Army shall be carried out by an election committee formed of three to five persons appointed by a regimental political department, by the political commissar of an independent battalion, or by a company political instructor.

Article 39. To elect deputies to the district soviet congress, companies or battalions constitute the units and the elections should be held at election meetings. To elect deputies to the *xian* and provincial soviet congresses, battalions or regiments constitute the units and the elections should be held at election meetings. To elect representatives to the National Soviet Congress, regiments constitute the units and the elections should be held at election meetings.

(Note) The election procedures and the tasks of the election committee are all fixed as indicated in the various articles of Chapters 3 and 7 of this law.

## **Chapter 6. Recognition and Nullification of Basic (City and Township) Elections and the Recall of Deputies**

Article 40. Elections must be carried out in accordance with the procedures stipulated in this law in order to be considered legal and to be recognized.

Article 41. Upon receiving the various documents regarding the elections, the city soviets and district executive committees shall organize a committee for the express purpose of examining them. If it is found that some part of the election violated the stipulations of this law, the right to nullify that part of the election belongs to the city soviet and district executive committee. If it is found that the entire election violated the stipulations of this law, the right to nullify the election belongs to the executive committee of the soviet at the next higher level.

Article 42. When a dispute arises concerning the results of an election it shall be resolved by the city soviet and district executive committee. If it cannot be resolved by the city soviet and the district executive committee, it shall be turned over to the executive committee of the soviet at the next higher level for resolution.

Article 43. When an election has violated the stipulations of this law, any voter may report a complaint to the city soviet or to the district executive committee, and the city soviet or executive committee, upon receipt of such complaint, must investigate it. If it

cannot be resolved, it may be appealed to the appropriate level. The Central Executive Committee is the final examining organ for election appeals.

Article 44. In the event a deputy of a city soviet or township soviet, in the performance of his duties, violates the trust of the voters, or engages in an illegal act, the city soviet or township soviet, upon approval by a meeting of all the deputies, shall expel him. The voters who elected said representative have the right to recall said representative at any time and to hold another election, in which case a report must be made to the executive committee of the soviet at the next higher level for investigation.

## **Chapter 7. Election Committees and Their Work**

Article 45. The election committees are special organs for conducting elections and are organized in the following two ways:

1. City election committees supervise the work of city elections and have seven to eleven members.
2. District election committees supervise the work of elections of all townships in the entire district and have nine to thirteen members.

Article 46. Election committees are composed of representatives of the government and of various mass organizations. Their members shall be approved at a meeting of the presidium of the city soviet or of the district executive committee, and sent to the presidium of the *xian* executive committee for examination and endorsement.

Article 47. The members of an election committee shall meet the qualification of working or residing in that place. Under very special circumstances, a higher-level government may appoint persons from another place.

Article 48. The chairmen of city soviets, township soviets, and district executive committees shall not be members of an election committee.

Article 49. The members of an election committee need not give up their original positions. During the period that an election is being conducted, they may be temporarily released from their work duties to work solely on carrying out the election.

Article 50. The election committees shall not be set up as independent administrative organs, but may carry out their business within the district executive committees and city soviets, and may also make use of all of the technical personnel of the district executive committees and city soviets, hiring additional technical personnel when necessary.

Article 51. The tasks that an election committee should undertake prior to an election are as follows:

1. Carry out voter registration. Voters who are organized may be registered through their organizations (such as labor unions, poor peasant leagues, etc.). Unorganized voters shall be registered by an election committee registrar. Registration must be filled out according to the voter registration form.
2. After registration has been completed, the election committee shall appoint someone specifically to examine the registration forms, and five days before the election meeting, through the local soviet government, shall publicly announce the list of voters in that place and in the marketplace. The number of regular and alternate deputies shall also be publicly announced in that area at the same time.

3. Three days before the election meeting, the place and time of the election meeting must be publicly announced and the voters in that area must also be notified.
4. Prepare proposals to be passed at the election meeting.
5. Establish the order in which the various organizations, organs, and hamlets (small villages) shall hold their election meetings; set up the meeting place; and appoint the person who will register those entering the meeting place.
6. The election committees, through the local soviet government, shall publicly announce the list of those who have been stripped of voting rights five days before the election.

Article 52. Whenever an election meeting is held, the election committee must delegate someone to participate in the meeting. The election meeting shall be opened by the representative of the election committee, who shall naturally act as the chairman of the presidium of the election meeting.

Article 53. The first item of business on the agenda of the election meeting shall be for the representative delegated by the election committee to report regarding the regulations concerning the right to elect and the right to be elected from Articles 4, 5, and 6 of this law.

Article 54. After the election, the election committee shall collect all documents relating to the election and turn them over to the city soviet or the district executive committee for safekeeping and for preliminary verification, and shall also give them a general report on the election.

Article 55. After the election is completed, the election committee shall be declared dissolved.

## **Chapter 8. Election Expenses**

Article 56. The election committee shall draw up an estimated budget of the election expenses, which shall be examined and approved by the city soviet or district executive committee and reported to the higher soviet government, and which shall be paid by the national treasury out of the election expenses account.

Article 57. In the Red Army, the election committee shall draw up an estimated budget to be examined and paid by the respective political department.

Article 58. The election committee shall be responsible for accounting for and reporting to the funding organ all expenses incurred for the election.

## **Chapter 9. Addendum**

Article 59. This election law shall take effect in the Central Soviet Area from the date of its publication. In those soviet districts not yet incorporated into the Central Soviet Area, it shall come into force on the date it is received.

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# *Temporary Agricultural Tax Regulations*

(September 18, 1933<sup>1</sup>)

Article 1. The agricultural progressive tax is based on the yearly primary produce harvest of each household as a whole after the peasants have received their land. The tax rate is decided by the number of people in a household who received land and the actual harvest on those individuals' land. The rate for rich peasants should be somewhat higher than that for poor and middle peasants.

Article 2. Agricultural tax tables are to be prescribed and publicized by the Council of People's Commissars.

Article 3. Only primary produce (rice and wheat) is subject to taxation. Secondary products are not subject to taxation. Those who harvest twice a year, however, should be taxed twice.

Article 4. Hills on which tea-oil or Chinese catalpa is cultivated, and vegetable plots, are treated as rice or wheat fields. Their output becomes primary produce and should also be taxed.

Article 5. Family members of Red Army soldiers (limited to the soldier's own parents, his wife, and siblings without labor power) are exempt from taxation under the Regulations on Preferential Treatment for the Red Army, but this applies only to those who joined the army before the harvest.

Article 6. Regulations on workers who are exempt from taxation are as follows:

1. Farm laborers and those who do coolie labor on land<sup>2</sup> and their wives (or husbands) and children are exempt from taxation.
2. Those who do coolie labor on the water and their wives (or husbands) are exempt from taxation.
3. Sales clerks, craftsmen, sailors, and other industrial workers who receive land are themselves exempt from taxation.
4. The above articles apply only to those who have worked continuously for two years or more. Those who have not worked for at least two years are not exempt from taxation.

Article 7. Families affected by natural disasters or enemy destruction, or those deprived of labor power through bereavement or physical handicap, may have their taxes reduced or waived altogether in proportion to the gravity of their circumstances.

Article 8. Soviet government staff workers, their parents, and their wives are taxed at half the usual rate. Those of worker origin who are exempt from taxation under Article 6

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 33–36.

1. This is the date given at the end of the document, but the editors of the *Mao Zedong ji* indicate that it was passed on the previous day.

but whose family members are not exempt pay one-half of the regular tax. This article applies only to those employed by the government before the harvest.

Article 9. Increase in agricultural income resulting from improved seeds and farming methods is exempt from taxation.

Article 10. Agricultural produce from reclaimed land is exempt from taxation according to the years the land lay waste, and the class status [of the person reclaiming it], as indicated in the following table:

<i>Years Land Lay Waste</i>	<i>Years of Tax Exemption</i>		
	<i>Reclaimer Status</i>		
	<i>Middle/Poor Peasant</i>	<i>Rich Peasant</i>	<i>Landlord</i>
One year or more	2 yrs.	1 yr.	No exemption
Two years or more	3 yrs.	2 yrs.	1 yr.
Three years or more	5 yrs.	3 yrs.	2 yrs.

Article 11. These tax regulations enter into force beginning on September 18, 1933. The Amended Temporary Tax Regulations issued on July 15, 1932, become null and void upon issuance of these regulations.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

Appendix: Tax Rates for Poor and Middle Peasants

		Number of Dan of Rice Actually Harvested per Person													
No. getting land in each family	over 1 dan	over 2 dan	over 3 dan	over 4 dan	over 5 dan	over 6 dan	over 7 dan	over 8 dan	over 9 dan	over 10 dan	over 11 dan	over 12 dan	over 13 dan	over 14 dan	over 15 dan
	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt	ex- empt
1	3.8	5.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0	18.0
2	3.9	5.1	6.1	7.1	8.1	9.1	10.1	11.1	12.1	13.1	14.1	15.1	16.1	17.1	18.1
3	4.0	5.2	6.2	7.2	8.2	9.2	10.2	11.2	12.2	13.2	14.2	15.2	16.2	17.2	18.2
4	4.1	5.3	6.3	7.3	8.3	9.3	10.3	11.3	12.3	13.3	14.3	15.3	16.3	17.3	18.3
5	4.2	5.4	6.4	7.4	8.4	9.4	10.4	11.4	12.4	13.4	14.4	15.4	16.4	17.4	18.4
6	4.3	5.5	6.5	7.5	8.5	9.5	10.5	11.5	12.5	13.5	14.5	15.5	16.5	17.5	18.5
7	4.4	5.6	6.6	7.6	8.6	9.6	10.6	11.6	12.6	13.6	14.6	15.6	16.6	17.6	18.6
8	4.6	5.8	6.8	7.8	8.8	9.8	10.8	11.8	12.8	13.8	14.8	15.8	16.8	17.8	18.8
9	4.8	6.0	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0	18.0	19.0
10	5.0	6.2	7.2	8.2	9.2	10.2	11.2	12.2	13.2	14.2	15.2	16.2	17.2	18.2	19.2
11	5.2	6.4	7.4	8.4	9.4	10.4	11.4	12.4	13.4	14.4	15.4	16.4	17.4	18.4	19.4
12	5.4	6.6	7.6	8.6	9.6	10.6	11.6	12.6	13.6	14.6	15.6	16.6	17.6	18.6	19.6
13	5.6	6.8	7.8	8.8	9.8	10.8	11.8	12.8	13.8	14.8	15.8	16.8	17.8	18.8	19.8
14	5.8	7.0	8.0	9.0	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0	18.0	19.0	20.0



# ***Labor Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic***

(October 15, 1933)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. This Labor Law is applicable to all hired laborers. All enterprises, organs, shops (no matter whether they are state-owned, owned jointly by groups or private persons, or households hiring workers to do housework), as well as individuals who pay other people for their labor in cash or goods, must observe the restrictions of this law.

(Note 1) Middle peasants, poor peasants, small ship owners, small handicraft producers, or handicraft production cooperatives who employ supplementary laborers may, with the consent of workers and workers' trade unions, be exempt from the restrictions of some articles of this law. The Central Executive Committee shall formulate special laws and ordinances to be issued and carried out.

(Note 2) In the case of special events (such as when there is a shortage of manpower for the prevention of famine and natural disasters, or for the war), the Central Council of People's Commissars may, with the agreement of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, promulgate and implement special decrees within specified periods of time and not enforce this law.

The above-mentioned two exceptions and time limits may be rescinded and reduced at any time upon the request of the workers and the trade unions.

Article 2. This law is not applicable to members of the navy, army, and air force of the Chinese Soviet Republic on active duty.

Article 3. Regarding agricultural workers, seasonal workers, handicraft and artisan workers in rural areas, coolies, maids and servants, and workers under other special conditions, the Central Executive Committee shall formulate, promulgate, and implement supplementary decrees to provide special protection for these workers on the basis of their working conditions, in addition to the application of the general rules and regulations of this law.

Article 4. The terms of various formal and informal collective contracts or individual labor contracts that are inferior to the terms specified by this law shall have no effect.

## **Chapter 2. Procedures for Employing and Obtaining Labor**

Article 5. All individuals, enterprises, units, and shops in the territories of the Soviet Republic of China that wish to carry out work by obtaining other people's labor through employment must, apart from the exceptions laid down in Article 10 of this law, request introductions from subordinate organs of the labor departments of the government (labor

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introduction agencies). Prior to the establishment of the labor departments of local governments, requests for introductions must be made to trade unions.

Article 6. All those who seek jobs must register at the labor introduction agencies under the labor departments of local governments and their names should be entered into the name-lists of unemployed workers. In case the labor departments of local governments have not set up labor introduction agencies, they may register at local trade unions.

Article 7. Labor introduction agencies and employment agencies set up by private individuals, selection of employees by entrusted foremen, working as compradors, and all forms of private employment of workers are prohibited. It is forbidden to demand cash or goods from the introduced as introduction fees or to deduct money from the wages of the introduced as fees of introduction.

Article 8. All enterprises, organs, shops, and private employers who want to employ laborers should follow the procedures below and request labor introduction agencies to introduce [them].

1. A list of qualifications of the laborers needed should be presented and requests for introduction should be made to the government labor introduction agencies of their respective sectors in the names of the management departments of the respective enterprises and units or in the names of private employers themselves or their representatives.
2. The people registered at labor introduction agencies and meeting the qualifications mentioned in the above item should be introduced to their jobs in accordance with the rules of labor introduction agencies.
3. Employers should notify labor introduction agencies of respective governments of their decisions to refuse or accept the people sent over by the labor introduction agencies according to the rules determined by the labor departments.

Article 9. If the following problems occur, employers should take full responsibility:

1. The required qualifications listed to labor introduction agencies by employers are unrealistic.
2. Procedures necessary for the employment of workers are not followed.
3. The personnel introduced by labor introduction agencies are rejected illegally.

Article 10. In the following cases, employers may hire laborers by themselves without going through labor introduction agencies. But they must register with their respective labor introduction agencies.

1. It is necessary to employ people to take political responsibilities and to hire experts, business and management personnel who have employee status.
2. Labor introduction agencies are unable to hire for them desired workers within the time limit stipulated by the rules of labor introduction agencies starting from the date of the request by the employers.

Article 11. All enterprises, organs, and other employers should report to local labor departments all the laborers in their employment within the time limit specified by labor departments.

Article 12. The Labor Department of the Center and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions shall jointly formulate special rules and regulations concerning the hiring of laborers and the registration of people looking for jobs in rural areas.

### Chapter 3. Working Time

Article 13. In general, the actual daily working time of employed laborers working on all kinds of jobs should not be longer than eight hours.

Article 14. The following types of people may not work more than six actual hours a day:

1. Minors sixteen to eighteen years of age;
2. All mental workers, apart from those who are directly related to manufacturing; and
3. All those working in industries that endanger the health of workers, and those who work underground.

(Note) All industries that endanger the health of workers should be decided upon and announced by the Labor Department of the Center.

Article 15. The actual working hours per day of minors below the age of sixteen should not exceed four hours.

Article 16. Regarding the working times specified in Articles 13, 14, and 15, the Labor Department of the Center with the agreement of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions may designate several types of workers of special circumstances (such as those responsible for political work, participants of meetings, workers with responsibilities, and workers in production cooperatives), make separate rules and measures for them, and exempt them from the restriction on working time specified above.

Article 17. All those who work at night should work fewer hours than the general working hours in daytime. But in the case of continuous production or working different shifts in turns, the working hours at night should be the same as those of daytime. However, the pay for nighttime work should be more (i.e., an increase of one-seventh of pay as compared with daytime work should be granted to those who are covered by the provision of Article 13 and an increase of one-fifth of daytime pay should be given to those who fall under Article 14). For people earning piece-rate wages, if they are in the above-mentioned situations and work at night, their pay should also be increased by one-seventh or one-fifth apart from the wages they earn on a piece-by-piece basis.

(Note) The so-called nighttime in this article refers to the time starting from 10 P.M. to 6 A.M. the following day.

Article 18. During the working time every day, there should be a half-hour or one-hour interval for workers to eat meals or rest. However, the interval time may not be counted as working time.

(Note) For workers in industries that cannot stop work, the rest time should be provided for by the Labor Department of the Center in other special measures.

Article 19. In general principle, work over the legally allowed working time is prohibited. But if it is necessary for the work and the workers and trade unions agree, local labor departments may approve overtime work.

(Note) In especially urgent circumstances (such as the prevention of public disasters and elimination of obstacles in projects), overtime work must be done. If the agreement of trade unions and labor departments cannot be obtained in time, the labor inspector should be notified the following day for the record.

Article 20. The amount of overtime work should not exceed four hours in total for two consecutive days.

(Note) In agriculture and other seasonal work, which must require work that exceeds the time specified by this article, the agreement of trade unions and the approval of labor departments must be obtained before the working time may be increased appropriately.

Article 21. Concerning all delays resulting from mistakes on the part of factories, workers may not be ordered to do overtime work to make up the lost time.

#### **Chapter 4. Holidays and Rest Time**

Article 22. All employed workers should have at least forty-two consecutive hours of rest per week.

(Note) In case of special circumstances at work that do not permit the adoption of the ordinary method of rest every week, then to compensate for this, several days of rest may be given at once in the course of an appropriate period.

Article 23. Everyone should cease work on the following commemoration days:

1. January 1, New Year's Day
2. February 7, the commemoration day of the massacre of the Beijing-Hankou railway workers
3. March 18, the commemoration day of the Paris Commune
4. May 1, International Labor Day
5. May 30, Anti-imperialism Day
6. August 1, the commemoration day of the anti-imperialist war and the founding of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
7. November 7, the commemoration day of the October Revolution of the Soviet Union and the founding of the Soviet Republic of China
8. December 11, the commemoration day of the Guangzhou Uprising
9. Local commemoration days may be decided by the labor departments at all levels with the agreement of local trade unions and in light of local situations as holidays. But such local commemoration holidays may not be more than two days a year.

Article 24. Workers cease work but receive pay on the rest days every week and on the previously mentioned various commemoration days. If it is necessary to continue to work during these days, the workers' pay should be doubled.

Article 25. The working time of the day before the rest days and the various commemoration days listed in Article 23 may not be over six hours and the pay is exactly the same as the working days. There should be no deductions of pay for those who earn monthly wages.

Article 26. All employed workers who work continuously for five months to a year should have at least two weeks of vacation with pay. Minors below the age of eighteen and those who work in industries that endanger the health of workers should have at least four weeks of vacation a year with pay.

Article 27. Workers may choose any time to take the vacations specified in Article 26, provided that it does not obstruct the operation of their respective institutions, organs, and households.

Article 28. Sick and maternity leaves of the employed should not be included among the vacation days as specified in Article 26.

**Chapter 5. Wages (Payment for Labor)**

Article 29. The amount of pay gained by the employed for selling their labor (wages) should be spelled out in collective contracts and labor contracts.

(Note) The wages mentioned in this article is a general term that includes both the cash portion and the in-kind portion (such as food, clothes, and natural goods given by employers).

Article 30. Wages of all employed workers may not be less than the minimum wages stipulated by local governments at the time on the basis of local living conditions and the professional levels of various types of work.

Article 31. Minimum levels of wages of all types of employed workers should be decided by local government labor departments once every three to six months.

Article 32. Overtime work outside the legally specified working time should earn extra pay. The amount of extra pay should be spelled out in collective contracts and labor contracts. But the initial two hours or less of overtime work should be paid 50 percent more than the work done in ordinary work time and the pay of overtime work in excess of the two hours should be doubled.

Article 33. All employed women and minors should get the same pay as adult male workers if doing the same work. Minors should only work within the work time stipulated by Articles 14 and 15. But they should still be paid full-time according to the wage levels of their respective trades. The methods of calculating the wages of minors and the amounts of wages should be decided by the Labor Department of the Center in light of the situations in various enterprises and the nature of the work.

Article 34. If employees are transferred to jobs with less pay than their original work, they should still be paid the same wages for two weeks starting from the day of their transfer.

Article 35. Wages for all permanent work should be paid in installments, but wages should be paid at least twice a month. Temporary jobs or work for less than two weeks should be paid upon the completion of the work.

(Note) The calculation of wages on a monthly, seasonally, and yearly basis is not restricted by this article, if the employees and trade unions agree.

Article 36. Wages should be paid with prevailing local currencies, but with the consent of the employees, goods may be substituted for some cash. The proportion of in-kind substitutes and the methods of calculating goods should all be provided by labor contracts and collective contracts.

Article 37. Wages should be paid during work time and at work locations and must be handed directly to the employees and the representatives entrusted by them.

Article 38. If paydays happen to be holidays, the wages of holidays should be paid before the holidays.

Article 39. Regarding piecework, the wages for piecework should be specified in collective contracts and labor contracts and standard daily wages should also be specified on the basis of average production per day. The contracts should also stipulate the methods of calculating and paying contract work. But it is forbidden to use the method of contract work to reduce and exploit the pay due to workers.

Article 40. The management departments or employers and trade unions of various enterprises and organs should negotiate and decide the standards of productivity. If employees are unable to meet the productivity standards under normal working conditions

because of their own shortcomings, they may be paid for what they have completed, but no less than two-thirds of their original wages. If employees cannot fulfill the requirements of productivity repeatedly, their contracts may be cancelled in accordance with the provision of item 3 of Article 12.

(Notes) The normal working conditions referred in this article are:

1. Machines and their operations have no defects or problems.
2. All materials and tools needed for the work are supplied sufficiently and on time.
3. In work locations, there are appropriate hygiene, health, and sports equipment (such as lights and heat).

## **Chapter 6. The Work of Women and Minors**

Article 41. No women or minors below the age of eighteen should be employed to work on jobs that are especially hard, require lifting of heavy weights, harm the health of workers, or demand working underground. The labor departments of the Center and all provinces should designate and announce the work places that should not admit women and minors.

Article 42. Pregnant and nursing women and minors below the age of eighteen may not be employed to work at night.

Article 43. Women who work with physical strength shall have eight weeks of maternity leave both before and after giving birth, and women who do mental labor shall have six weeks of maternity leave both before and after giving birth.

(Note 1) The wages for the leaves provided in this article should be paid by the social insurance bureaus, if the employers are insured by the social insurance bureaus. Otherwise, the employers should pay.

(Note 2) [Women who have suffered] miscarriages certified by doctors may be given sick leave.

Article 44. Employed women over five months pregnant may not be dispatched to work in other places and to leave their original resident areas without their agreement. Employers may not fire them five months before giving birth or nine months after giving birth, with only the exceptions provided in item 7 of Article 102.

Article 45. During work time, apart from the ordinary stops and rests specified by Article 18 of this law, nursing women should have a half-hour's rest in every three hours to nurse their infants. This rest time should be calculated as work time. Factories must set up nurseries and kindergartens and hire people to look after them.

Article 46. It is prohibited to hire males and females below the age of fourteen, and the hiring of minors of ages fourteen to sixteen requires permission from labor inspection organs.

## **Chapter 7. Apprenticeship**

Article 47. Apprentices are people who learn various skills under the guidance of expert and skilled workers of factories, workplaces, and shops and in technical schools attached to factories.

Article 48. The time of learning by apprentices shall be decided by the Labor Commissariat of the Center jointly with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the

Commissariat of Education on the basis of the natures of different trades. But the longest time of learning should not be above three years.

(Note) The Labor Commissariat of the Center shall announce in other places various additional decrees concerning the protection of various types of apprentices.

Article 49. Regardless of the types of apprenticeship, apprentices may not be forcibly ordered to shoulder **other work or miscellaneous duties unrelated to the special skills they are learning** or to hold any kinds of religious ceremonies.

Article 50. Apprentices should have a minimum of **one hour** per day reserved for the study of techniques.

Article 51. After learning techniques for three months, apprentices should be paid appropriate wages. After that, wages should be increased according to the apprentices' time of study and productivity standards. The amounts of wages to be paid to apprentices shall be decided by the Labor Commissariat of the Center in conjunction with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Article 52. Various organs, enterprises, and shops and special teachers of apprentices must take responsibilities to maintain, protect, and supervise by all means the normal progress of the study of minor apprentices in accordance with the decrees promulgated by the Labor Commissariat, the Commissariat of Education, and the Commissariat of the National Economy. But it is strictly forbidden to engage in physical and verbal abuse and mistreatment of apprentices.

(Note) Relevant organs of the labor departments shall have the responsibility of examining and supervising the proper learning of apprentices.

## Chapter 8. Protection and Subsidies

Article 53. All workers and staff members who are elected as delegates to the representative congresses called by the soviets or the trade unions shall still have the right to be paid during the time of the meetings.

Article 54. All workers and staff members who are called by the court to be witnesses, experts, or assessors shall still have the right to be paid if the time of completing the duty entrusted by judicial organs is not over a week.

Article 55. All workers and staff members whose jobs are cancelled because of being recruited by the Red Army or sent to work in the soviet trade unions or other social organizations must be paid a month's wages in advance.

Article 56. Those who lose their labor contracts for the reasons specified in items 1, 2, and 3 in Article 102 and in Articles 93 and 94 and in the various items of Article 103 must be given two weeks' pay as a termination subsidy.

Article 57. Employees should be guaranteed the right to use necessary tools and materials for their work in various enterprises at all times and may not be asked to pay fees. If the work requires the use of private tools of employees and the private tools are damaged, the employers should be responsible to pay compensation.

If workers' clothes are damaged because of work in any enterprises, the employers are responsible for paying compensation that matches the original costs.

(Note) This Article does not apply to handicraft workers doing odd jobs.

Article 58. The original jobs of all workers and staff members who temporarily lose their ability to work must be kept for them. But there is a three-month time limit for the

sick and another three months for pregnant workers apart from the vacations provided for in Article 43 (item 7 of Article 102).

Article 59. Workers should still be paid in various organs and enterprises that stop production and work without declaring the cancellation of contracts.

Article 60. In case machines, tools, manufactured goods, and materials are damaged as a result of employees' negligence and nonobservance of the internal management regulations of factories and units, the employees shall pay compensation with the agreement of trade unions and factory committees. The value that may be deducted from the wages of employees for compensation may not exceed one third of the monthly wages of the workers.

Article 61. If employers are lacking in financial resources, the wages of workers and staff members that are provided in collective contracts or labor contracts have priority to be paid as much as possible before the payment of other debts.

## **Chapter 9. Labor Protection**

Article 62. No enterprise may open or reopen business or move construction without permission from labor inspection organs.

Article 63. All enterprises and organs must use proper equipment to eliminate, reduce, or prevent the occurrence of dangers to workers and maintain hygiene in the workplace.

Article 64. All those who do work that is particularly harmful to their health (such as under the conditions of irregular temperature or humidity and contamination of bodies) and who work in enterprises where poison is present must be issued working clothes, various protection gear (such as glasses, masks, respirators, and soaps), sterilization liquid, and special food (such as meat, milk, and eggs).

Workers working under the above-mentioned conditions should be given regular physical check-ups.

Article 65. Labor inspection organs under government labor departments shall supervise the implementation of the various existing labor protection laws and decrees. Labor inspectors may be elected regularly by trade union conferences and reported to local labor departments for approval. The jurisdiction of labor inspection organs shall be announced in the special regulations formulated by the Labor Commissariat of the Center.

## **Chapter 10. Social Insurance**

Article 66. Social insurance should be provided to all employed workers, regardless of whether they work in state-run enterprises, cooperative enterprises, private enterprises, shops, or families, and regardless of the nature and time of their work or the form of their pay.

Article 67. All enterprises, organs, shops, and private employers should, in addition to the wages paid to workers and staff members, pay 5 percent to 20 percent of the total amount of wages to the social insurance bureaus to form a social insurance fund. The percentage table should be decided by an order of the Central Commissariat for Labor. Social insurance premiums may not be solicited from the insured, nor should they be deducted from the wages of the insured.



(Note) Social insurance funds may not be used for purposes other than social insurance.

Article 68. Social insurance benefits:

1. Free medical care and medicine
2. Subsidies to the temporarily disabled (such as [those who are] sick, wounded, quarantined, pregnant, giving birth, and helping the sick at home)
3. Unemployment benefits
4. Disability and old age pensions
5. Allowances to the families of those who are giving birth, have died, or have disappeared

Article 69. All insured who temporarily lose the ability to work as stipulated by item 2 of Article 68, no matter what the causes are, must be paid benefits that equal the amount of wages the insured would obtain from their respective enterprises from the day they lose the ability to work till the recovery to their original state or the confirmation of disabilities.

Article 70. The loss of ability to work as a result of pregnancy or labor should be compensated in accordance with the holiday pay specified in Article 43 of this law.

Article 71. If social insurance organs are short of funds, they may appropriately reduce the amount of benefits paid to those who temporarily lose their ability to work.

Article 72. The insured and the wives of the insured may be given a one-time subsidy and all necessary goods and foster money before the infants are ten months old, if they give birth to babies and lack the means to care for them. But the total amount of these subsidies may not exceed two months' wages of the insured.

Article 73. When the insured and the relatives whose living expenses are paid by the insured die, the necessary funeral expenses must be paid and the amount should be decided by local social insurance bureaus but should not be more than one month's wages of the insured.

Article 74. If the insured lose their jobs, they should be paid unemployment benefits. If the insured are members of trade unions and have worked over half a year, and if their insurance premiums have been paid by their employers, they may receive unemployment benefits. Nonmembers of trade unions who have worked over a year, and for whom their employers have paid their insurance premiums, may receive unemployment benefits. To receive unemployment benefits, unemployment certificates should be obtained in labor introduction agencies first. Trade union members must show their trade union membership cards.

The time limit of unemployment benefits may be determined in light of local conditions and the state of the social security fund.

(Note) Unemployment benefits for coolies and those doing odd jobs should be paid according to special measures to be stipulated by the labor department.

Article 75. All insured who become partially or totally disabled because of sickness or accidents, or who lose their ability to work because of old age, must be given compensation upon review and confirmation by special committees. The amounts of the compensation are determined by the nature and degree of disability and the family situations of the insured.

Article 76. Allowances should be given to the families of all those insured who have died or disappeared, [when the families] have no other means of living, upon review and confirmation by special committees. The amounts and methods of the allowance payments should be decided by local social insurance organs in view of the ages and property

situations of the subsidized. But only the following relatives of the insured may be eligible for receiving the allowances specified in this article:

1. Sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters below the age of sixteen
2. Fathers, mothers, and wives unable to work
3. The above-mentioned relatives if they have the ability to work, but the insured have children below the age of eight

Article 77. The operation of the social insurance of agricultural workers, coolies, household workers, and those who do odd jobs shall be stipulated by the Labor Department of the Center in special regulations.

Article 78. Employers pay social insurance premiums, but they may not interfere with the management by social insurance organs and the use of the social insurance fund.

### **Chapter 11. Collective Contracts**

Article 79. Collective contracts are agreements between trade unions as representatives of workers and staff members on the one side and employers on the other. They lay down terms of work and employment for employed workers in various enterprises, organs, and shops and specify the content of future labor contracts for various individuals.

Article 80. The provisions of collective contracts are applicable to all workers and staff of respective enterprises, organs, and shops, no matter whether they are members of the trade unions that have signed the agreements.

(Note) Collective contracts will not be applicable to managers who have the right to fire and hire workers.

Article 81. The terms for which collective contracts are signed shall be decided by the Labor Commissariat of the Center in conjunction with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Article 82. If the conditions of collective contracts are inferior to the provisions of this law and other existing labor decrees, they shall have no force.

Article 83. Collective contracts shall be in written form and registered with the subordinate organs of the labor departments. These organs have the power to cancel certain provisions of the contracts that they believe are contradictory to the various existing labor laws and decrees and harmful to workers and staff members. The procedures of registration of collective contracts shall be determined by the Labor Department of the Center.

(Note) After the canceling of certain provisions of the collective contracts by the subordinate organs of labor departments, if both sides declare their willingness to register the rest of the provisions, they may do so.

Article 84. Already-signed collective contracts shall be in force as of the date of signing by both sides or as of the date specified in the contracts.

Article 85. When enterprises, organs, and shops are transferred to new owners, the registered collective contracts may still be in force within their effective terms.

(Note) If the above-mentioned situation occurs, both sides of the contract have the right to declare their intent to review the contract, but they have to notify the other side two weeks in advance. Before the signing of a new contract, the old contract shall still be in force.

Article 86. Collective contracts that are not registered with the subordinate organs of labor departments, regardless of the reasons, may not be the bases of solutions for future

disputes between workers and employers concerning the contract. The various existing labor laws and decrees shall be the bases of solutions.

## **Chapter 12. Labor Contracts**

Article 87. Labor contracts are agreements signed by two or more persons, one side (the employee) providing labor to the other side (the employer) for payment. Labor contracts may be signed no matter whether there are collective contracts.

Article 88. The terms of labor contracts are the outcome of negotiation and agreement by both sides. But if the terms of labor contracts are inferior to the terms of existing labor laws and decrees, collective contracts, or internal management rules and regulations of various factories and units, or restrict the political or civil rights of the workers, they will be of no effect.

Article 89. After the signing of labor contracts, the person employed should be given an employee's passbook. The content of the passbook shall be decided by the Labor Commissariat of the Center in the form of special orders.

(Note) Labor contracts with effective terms of one week or less may not require the issuance of the above-mentioned employee passbooks.

Article 90. Minors have the same rights as adults in labor contracts. But their parents and the organs and persons responsible for supervising the application of labor laws and decrees may demand the dissolution of the contracts before their expiration dates if the continuation of these contracts is harmful to the health of the minors.

Article 91. The effective terms of labor contracts are of the following three types:

1. Definite terms of less than a year
2. No definite term
3. The completion term of a specific project

Article 92. The employed should not transfer their own jobs to others on their own and without the consent of their employers. But the following situations are not covered by this article:

1. The labor contract is a joint work contract involving many workers.
2. The employed himself lost his ability to work and the circumstances at that time really did not permit the notification of his employer.

Article 93. Employers may not require the employed to do other work unrelated to the work stipulated in the contract or to do work that endangers the life of the employed or violates labor laws and ordinances.

If workers employed for certain jobs cannot carry them out temporarily or there are no such jobs for them to do for the time being, employers may require the employed to move to other jobs of similar nature. If the employed refuse to do so, the labor contract may be dissolved, but the employed must be given lay-off payment that is equivalent to two weeks' pay. If they are odd-job workers, the employed should be paid for the relevant day. If they are monthly workers, they should be paid for five days. In case of special needs for the prevention of dangers and public catastrophes, employers may still ask the employed to do work that is totally unrelated to their professions.

If the above-mentioned situation occurs, the original wages of the employed may not be reduced. But the temporary work should be paid. If the wages for the temporary

work are higher than the original wages of the employed, he should be paid the higher wages.

Article 94. To move the employed from unit A to unit B or from place A to place B, [employers] should have the consent of the employed, even though sometimes the unit and finances move together with the employed. If the employed do not agree to move, the labor contract may be dissolved by one side alone, but the employed must be given lay-off subsidies equivalent to two weeks' pay.

Article 95. Before signing labor contracts for work of a permanent nature, a considerable period of time to test the employed should be allowed. But such testing periods may not be over six days for ordinary workers, half a month for clerks and technical personnel, and one month for responsible persons. The results of the above-mentioned tests are the decisions whether to employ or not to employ. In case of no employment, the workers should be paid remuneration during the testing period according to the wage levels of the work.

The results of the above-mentioned tests (to employ or not to employ) should be reported to local labor introduction agencies immediately. All workers are considered unemployed during the testing period and their places in the list of order for the introduction of jobs shall be kept.

Article 96. All acts of secret communications and exchanges of information between one employer and another with the aim of determining the terms of employment of labor are prohibited.

Article 97. Employers or managers of enterprises or organs are forbidden to impose fines on the employed, except in accordance with special laws and decrees and the internal rules and regulations of factories and units.

Article 98. If one of the following situations occurs [with respect] to a contract, the contract is null and void:

1. Both sides agree to abolish it;
2. The term of the contract expires;
3. The work specified in the contract is completed; or
4. One side declares it to be null and void in accordance with the provisions of Articles 93 and 94 in this law.

Article 99. The moving of enterprises and organs and changes of owners should not result in the abolition of labor contracts.

Article 100. When the term of a labor contract has expired, but labor relations still continue, the original terms of the labor contract shall continue to be effective with no specific time limit, provided that neither side declares the intent to abolish it.

Article 101. The employed may demand the abolition of labor contracts without specific time limits at any time, but ordinary workers should notify their employers one week in advance and responsible persons and technical personnel must notify their employers two weeks in advance.

Article 102. If one of the following situations occurs to labor contracts without definite terms and to labor contracts with definite terms that have not expired, the employers may demand the dissolution of the contract except in situations specified in Articles 93 and 94:

1. The enterprises, organs, and shops stop business completely or partially or reduce workers;

2. Work stops for over a month because of insurmountable economic difficulties;
3. It is discovered that the employed is not capable of doing the work;
4. The employed refuses to carry out the responsibilities as stipulated in the contracts or the internal management rules and regulations of factories and units without adequate reasons;
5. The employed has committed a crime and his crime is directly related to the job of the employed and he is proven guilty and sentenced by a court, or this worker is sentenced to over three months of imprisonment;
6. The employed fails to come to work for five consecutive days without reason or is absent for a total of seven days within a month without reason; or
7. The employed who temporarily lose the ability to work fail to come to work after three months from the starting date of the disability, or women who are pregnant or give birth are unable to come to work for another three months after the rest time allowed by the provision of Article 43 of this law.

(Note 1) If the employed of the labor contract to be terminated is a factory branch committee member or a member of other equivalent committees, the agreement of trade unions must be obtained before the termination may be carried out.

(Note 2) If the situations of items 3 and 4 occur, the termination of labor contracts may be carried out only with the agreement of trade unions.

(Note 3) When a labor contract is terminated because of the three reasons specified in items 1, 2, and 3, the employed must be given a discharge subsidy that is equivalent to two weeks' pay.

Article 103. If the following situations occur to labor contracts with time limits, the employed may cancel the contracts on their own, even though the term of contracts have not expired:

1. The employed cannot obtain remuneration they should get on time;
2. The employers act contrary to their responsibilities specified in labor contracts or labor laws and ordinances;
3. The employers or managers or their relatives mistreat the employed;
4. Working conditions change for the worse; or
5. Other situations that are stipulated by law.

Article 104. All types of labor contracts may be terminated at the request of trade unions.

Article 105. All organs, enterprises, and shops that employ new workers and staff members must notify trade union branch committees within three days, and all organs, enterprises, and shops that wish to dismiss workers and staff members must notify trade union branch committees three days in advance.

### **Chapter 13. Associations of Trade Unions and Other Organizations in Enterprises, Organs, and Shops**

Article 106. Associations of workers and staff members (or trade unions of workers and staff members or trade unions) are organizations that unite the employed workers in various enterprises, organs, shops, and households. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions is the central organ of all types of trade unions throughout the country. The organization of various trade unions must be in conformity with the constitution adopted

by the National Representative Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and be registered at the central committees of the trade union associations of their respective industrial sectors and at the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Article 107. All other types of associations may not be called trade unions or enjoy the legal rights of trade unions without registration with the central organs of the associations of trade unions of various industrial sectors and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, as stipulated in the previous article.

Article 108. Trade union associations and their branch unions have the following various rights:

1. Declare and lead strikes.
2. Represent workers and staff members in signing contracts with the managements of enterprises and organs and private employers.
3. Publish newspapers and periodicals; establish schools, libraries, and clubs; and purchase and manage property.
4. Assist labor inspection organs to supervise the application of the Labor Law and all other labor laws and ordinances in enterprises, organs, and shops.
5. Set up special organs of labor supervision in private enterprises.
6. Participate in the business management of state-run enterprises.
7. Make proposals to the Soviet Government for the promulgation of various labor laws and ordinances, and propose and select the staff members of various subordinate organs of labor departments.

Article 109. Trade unions are entitled to various material assistance from the Soviet Government and favorable treatment in using postal, telephone, telegraph, electricity, running water, and trolley bus services; municipal public goods; railways; ships; and so on, as stipulated in various regulations.

Article 110. Branch committees of trade unions inside military organs should be established in accordance with the special regulations promulgated by the Labor Department of the Center in conjunction with the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

Article 111. The managements and employers of all organs, enterprises, and shops may not obstruct the actions of any organs of trade unions. But the convening of assemblies or representative congresses of workers and staff members should, under ordinary circumstances, be carried out outside work time. The dispatch of representatives to soviet conferences or to participate in higher-level representative congresses of trade unions is allowed within work time.

Article 112. All organs, enterprises, and shops should pay an amount [equal to] 2 percent of the total wages as operational funds for trade unions and another 1 percent as cultural and educational funds for trade unions, in addition to paying the wages of workers.

Article 113. The members of committees of trade unions at all levels have the right, on presenting their identification, freely to inspect all workplaces of enterprises, organs, and shops.

#### **Chapter 14. Management Rules**

Article 114. In order to regulate internal working order, enterprises, organs, or shops

that employ more than five workers may formulate rules for internal management. After determining these rules in conformity with the legal procedures (Articles 116 and 118), the rules are effective as they are announced to the workers.

Article 115. In the rules of internal management mentioned in the above article, there should be precise and detailed provisions concerning the ordinary and special responsibilities of workers and management personnel, the scope of responsibility for violations of the rules, and remedial methods.

Article 116. Internal management rules and regulations should not run counter to the various existing labor laws and decrees and the still-effective collective contracts of the respective enterprises, organs, or shops.

Article 117. The standard internal management rules should be drawn up by the Labor Department of the Center jointly with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and the Commissariat for the National Economy of the Center. Before the formulation of their own internal management rules and regulations or the approval of the rules and regulations (Article 118), enterprises, organs, and shops should observe the above-mentioned standard management rules.

Article 118. All internal management rules of enterprises, organs, and shops should be agreed upon by the respective management departments and local trade unions and be reported to the subordinate organs of labor departments for ratification.

#### **Chapter 15. The Unit for Settling Disputes and Handling Violations of the Labor Law**

Article 119. The Labor Court has jurisdiction over all cases of violation of the Labor Law and other laws and decrees concerning labor and collective contracts.

Article 120. When enterprises, organs, and shops have disputes and conflicts with the employed over various issues of working conditions, labor departments at all levels may conduct mediation and arbitration subject to the consent of the two sides in the dispute. But in case of major disputes, labor departments at all levels may proceed with arbitration even without the consent of the two sides.

Article 121. In state-run enterprises, state organs, and cooperative enterprises, management departments and branch committees of trade unions in factories and workplaces should send equal numbers of representatives to organize wage dispute committees. The functions of the wage dispute committees are as follows:

1. Evaluate the appropriate wages the workers and staff members in an enterprise or organ should be paid;
2. Settle disputes between management departments and workers and staff members concerning the application of labor laws and ordinances and collective contracts;
3. The decisions of wage disputes committees must be agreed upon by both sides. Cases that the wage disputes committees cannot resolve should be submitted to the subordinate organs of labor departments and the labor court for settlement.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Resolution on the Promulgation of the New Labor Law***

(October 15, 1933)

On the basis of one and a half years of experience in applying the Labor Law promulgated on December 1, 1931, it is now considered that some of its provisions are incompatible with the realities of the soviet areas at present. That law does not provide for flexible measures concerning middle peasants, poor peasants and handicraft producers who hire supplementary laborers, and difficulties have arisen in carrying it out. Moreover, there are no stipulations regarding many concrete matters which urgently need regulation. To strengthen the interests of workers, consolidate the alliance between workers and peasants, and develop the soviet economy, the Central Executive Committee organized a drafting commission on the Labor Law in April 1933 to draft a new labor law. Over the past five months, the new draft labor law has been discussed by the worker and peasant masses in all localities, and many opinions have been gathered about it. The Central Executive Committee, reviewing and revising the draft labor law in accordance with opinions from all localities, hereby makes the following resolution:

1. The adopted and published articles of the Labor Law shall be in force as of October 15, 1933.
2. Upon the promulgation of the new Labor Law, the Labor Law issued on December 1, 1931, is declared null and void and all laws and ordinances concerning labor problems that clash with the provisions of the new Labor Law shall be rescinded.
3. Specific procedures for carrying out the various articles of the new Labor Law should be announced by the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Commissariat of Labor in the form of orders.
4. Amendments and additions to this Labor Law shall be made through the orders of the Central Executive Committee.
5. This Labor Law shall be effective throughout the territories of the Soviet Republic of China.
6. All violations of the provisions of this Labor Law should be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations Concerning Punishment for Violations of the Labor Law, promulgated by the Central Executive Committee on October 15, 1933.

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

October 15, 1933, by the Western calendar



# ***Regulations Concerning Punishment for Violations of the Labor Law***

(Promulgated by the Central Executive Committee  
on October 15, 1933)

Article 1. The following regulations are hereby laid down to punish all employers (including employers of private, state, and cooperative enterprises) who violate the Labor Law. Any offense against the Labor Law will be punished in accordance with these regulations.

Article 2. The offense of an employer against any rules specified in the different chapters of the Labor Law must be punished based on the following regulations:

1. For an employer whose enterprise or institution only hires fewer than three employees, the offense should be penalized by a fine of 3 big foreign dollars or more, or by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for three days or more.
2. For an employer whose enterprise or institution hires more than three but fewer than seven employees, if the offense involves only a few of his employees, the employer should be penalized by a fine of 10 big foreign dollars or more, or by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for ten days or more. In case the offense involves the majority, or all, of the employees, the employer must be penalized by a fine of 20 big foreign dollars or more, or by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for two weeks or more.
3. For an employer whose enterprise or institution hires more than seven employees, if the offense involves only a few of his employees, he should be penalized by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for one month or more, or by a fine of 30 big foreign dollars or more. In case the offense involves the majority, or all, of the employees, the employer must be penalized by a sentence of imprisonment for three months or more, or by a fine of 100 big foreign dollars or more.

Article 3. Any employer who violates the existing decrees on labor questions should be penalized according to the rules specified in Article 2 of this document, with consideration of how serious the offense is and how many employees it has involved.

Article 4. Any private employer or manager of a state-owned or cooperative enterprise who breaches the collective contract he has signed with a labor union, a contract that has been registered at the local department of labor, should be found guilty of violating the Labor Law and be penalized in accordance with the rules specified in Article 2 of this document.

Article 5. Anyone who either interferes with the legal activities of a labor union or the heads and representatives of organs at different levels, or obstructs them from exercising

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 95-97.

their authority, should be penalized, based on the degree of his crime, by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for three days or more, or by a fine of 3 big foreign dollars or more.

Article 6. Anyone who restrains workers or staff members from joining a labor union by threat of violence or bribery in an attempt to achieve the aim of violating the Labor Law or the collective contract should be penalized, based on the degree of his crime, by a term of forced labor or imprisonment for five days or more, or by a fine of 5 big foreign dollars or more.

Article 7. All cases that are concerned with violation of the Labor Law, or other existing laws on the issue of labor and any collective contracts, should be tried by the Labor Court in accordance with the principles of this document.

Article 8. All cases that are concerned with violations by a state-owned or cooperative enterprise against the Labor Law or any collective contracts may be handled by a special committee organized by the Commissariat of Labor, the Commissariat for the National Economy, and the labor union. In the event that some of the cases cannot be solved by the committee, they should be turned over to the Labor Court, which must make judgments and enforce them in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of these Regulations.

Article 9. In case a middle peasant, or a poor peasant, a handicraftsman, or an owner of a small boat, who hires some workers simply because he lacks enough labor force, has done something against the rules specified in the Labor Law with the consent of the workers and the labor union, his offense should not be penalized mechanically in accordance with the rules specified respectively in Articles 2, 3, and 4 of this document.

Article 10. The Central Executive Committee holds the right to revise or annul these regulations at any time.

Chairman of the Central  
Executive Committee

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying

Zhang Guotao

# ***Supplementary Regulations to the Temporary Rules on the Agricultural Tax***

(Passed on October 26, 1933)

In order to specify more clearly the items of exemption and deduction in the agricultural tax, the following articles on exemptions and deductions are hereby promulgated as a supplement to the Temporary Rules on the Agricultural Tax. In case there is any contradiction between the Temporary Rules on the Agricultural Tax and this supplement, this supplement must be observed as the standard.

## **I. About Workers**

1. Farm laborers, coolies working on the land, and longshoremen: they and their wives (or husbands) and children under the age of sixteen are exempt from the tax.

2. Coolies working on the water (laborers on boats, bamboo rafts, and lumber rafts): they and their wives (or husbands) are exempt from the tax.

3. Shop-assistants, handicraftsmen (such as bricklayers, carpenters, hairdressers, and weavers . . . ), paper-makers, or workers in other industries (such as the mint and printing houses): those who have been allocated plots of land are exempt from the tax. (Independent manufacturers who produce and sell their own products are not included in this category.)

(Note 1) Workers and farm laborers classified in the above three categories only include those who have worked for two consecutive years (shortly before or after the revolution). Those who have not worked for two consecutive years are not exempt from the tax.

(Note 2) Workers and farm laborers who are classified in the above three categories and, therefore, are exempt from the tax may enjoy the privileges specified in the above three articles, no matter when they joined the union or what kind of union they joined. Farm laborers and coolies who have joined the union of shop-assistants and handicraftsmen may still enjoy the exemption privileges specified in Article 1. Similarly, handicraftsmen who have joined the union of agricultural laborers may still enjoy the privileges specified in Article 3.

4. Workers in post offices, printing houses, ordnance factories, garment factories, other various state-owned (belonging to the state) and non-state-owned factories, mines, and shops, who have been allocated plots of land and have worked for more than two years, are exempt from the tax. Workers who have worked for more than two years in banks, the Bureau of Grain Exchange, the Bureau of Trade, the telegraph company, and the telephone company and are drawing full salaries are exempt from the tax.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 111-15.

5. Those who are not drawing full salaries from various state-owned factories, mines, banks, custom houses, shops, and other enterprises may have their tax reduced by half (exemptions for themselves, their parents, and their wives) in accordance with similar privileges for personnel of the Soviet Government specified in Article 8 of the Rules on the Agricultural Tax.

6. Farm laborers, coolies, handicraftsmen, and shop-assistants who are working for various state-owned or non-state-owned factories, mines, shops, banks, and cooperatives may still retain their original status and, therefore, be exempt from the tax if they have not drawn a full salary from these enterprises for two years.

7. All workers who are exempt from the tax must have union member cards or official certificates from various state-owned factories or enterprises to prove their status.

8. Those who receive allowances from banks and exchange bureaus (they are different from ordinary salaried earners) may enjoy the same tax privileges as personnel working for the soviet and have their tax as well as the tax of their family members reduced by half.

## II. About the Red Army

1. If family members of the Red Army soldiers (parents, children, wives, and brothers and sisters under the age of sixteen) died this year, there is an exemption from the tax this year. If they died last year, there is no exemption from the tax this year.

2. Porters in the Red Army who have served for more than five months are exempt from tax. If they have only served for three months, they cannot be exempt from tax. If they have not yet served for five months at the time they pay their tax, but in fact will have served for more than five months after they pay their tax this year, they can get compensation next year.

3. Divorcees of Red Army soldiers are not exempt from the tax.

4. Laundry staff and nurses in Red Army hospitals may enjoy the same tax exemptions as family members of Red Army soldiers if they have served there for more than six months.

5. Those who have returned home after deserting their Red Army units are not exempt from the tax. They can be exempt from the tax if they return to their units.

6. Those who have returned home after staying at the battlefield for one or two months simply in an attempt to evade their tax must pay their overdue tax.

7. Those who returned home on leave after they got sick and lost their ability to work because of their job in the Red Army may retain their Red Army status and be exempt from tax until they regain their ability to work.

8. In the case of those who sacrifice their lives in Red Army operations at the battlefield, there should be an exemption from tax for three years as in the case of the Red Army. Rich peasants on penal servitude teams who die at the battlefield receive an exemption from tax for one year.

9. If any members of local armed forces who are not engaged in production sacrifice themselves for the revolution, they may likewise be exempt from tax for three years.

10. Any soldiers who came from landlord and rich peasant families but have been allocated plots of land may also be exempt from tax.

11. Any Red Army soldiers who were seen being captured by counterrevolutionaries may be treated as family members of the Red Army and exempted from tax.

12. Wives of disabled soldiers, if they are poor women, are exempt from the tax themselves, as are the children they have brought along with them. If they are women from rich peasant families, husband and wife and children ten or younger whom they have brought along with them are exempt from the tax, but all others are not exempt from the tax.

13. Soldiers who are over forty-five years old, have served in the Red Army for more than five years, have been discharged with permission, and can produce certificates to prove their status are exempt from the tax, as are their family members.

14. Among Red Army soldiers, only those who had joined the Red Army before the tax law went into effect are exempt from the tax.

### III. About Personnel Working for the Soviet Government

1. Those who have worked in the government for more than six months may have their tax reduced by half.

2. In the case of those who sacrifice their lives for the government, their tax as well as the tax of their family members may be reduced by half for three years. If they die of illness, their tax as well as the tax of their family members may be reduced by half for two years.

3. Those who have married women from rich peasant families may only have their own tax reduced by half, while their wives are not exempt from the tax.

4. Those who are working for mass organizations such as unions, the Young Pioneers, the Children's Corps, and the anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet Mutual Help Society of the Party and the Youth League, are not exempt from the tax.

### IV. Others

1. After land division, any field that lies waste for no good reason is not exempt from the tax. In case the field is really no good for cultivation, it may be exempted from the tax with permission from the township soviet.

2. For workers who are being punished by hard labor or serving criminal sentences, their family members who are exempt from the tax retain their exempt status.

3. Requests for tax exemption made by individual peasants on the grounds of various natural disasters must be approved by the representative assembly of the township after discussion. Similar requests made by villages must be agreed to by the presidium of the district soviet first, and then approved by the *xian* government. Similar requests made by a district must be approved by the provincial soviet.

4. After coolies themselves die, their family members may be exempt from the tax for a year as coolies. Other workers may receive an exemption only for their own tax after they die.

5. Poor workers and peasants who have been married to women from rich peasant families for less than a year pay tax according to the original status of each individual, but after a year they [all] pay their tax as poor workers and peasants.

6. Daughters and [former] wives of rich peasants who are married to poor workers and peasants and were allocated plots of land half the size of those for adults because they were young or did not work are to be taxed as rich peasants. The number of people should be calculated on the basis of their new husbands' families.

7. Poor workers and peasants, men or women, who are married into rich peasant families are taxed according to their original class status.

8. Land that is used to plant cotton is exempt from the tax.

9. Handicapped people, widows, and widowers among middle peasants and poor peasants who have no one to support them are exempt from the tax, but they are not exempt from the tax if they do have someone to support them.

Chairman of the Executive Committee  
of the Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic

Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen

Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

# ***Temporary Organizational Law for Local Soviets of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Draft)***

(December 12, 1933)

## **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. The various levels of the provincial, *xian*, district, city, and township soviet political organs are the local organizations of the soviet régime. They are called the local soviets.

Article 2. The various levels of the provincial, *xian*, district, city, and township soviets must be organized pursuant to these laws.

## **Chapter 2 The Basic Organizations of the Soviet Régime**

(Note) The city and township soviets are the basic organs of the soviet régime. The main characteristics of these organs are the system of their regular deputies' assemblies.

The deputies do not leave their production work and are scattered among the masses.

### ***A. City Soviets***

Article 3. The city soviet is the highest political organ of the city and is made up of representatives elected by the voters of that city.

Article 4. Each city soviet should be divided into several "urban districts," forming urban district soviets. But those cities with under four thousand people and those cities directly under the jurisdiction of a district soviet are not to be divided into urban districts. Each urban district outside the city (i.e., villages under the jurisdiction of a city soviet) should be divided into several villages according to distances and population. But there should be no more than five villages within each urban district.

(Note) As for the name for the urban district, they may be called, "The City Center Urban District," "The Eastern Suburban Urban District," or "The Western Suburban Urban District," and so on, for a smaller city; for those in a bigger city, they may be named after some famous streets or some other proper names for places. As for villages within the urban districts outside of a city, they may be named after some famous places in those villages, but none should be named by numbers.

Article 5. The urban district soviet is the highest political organ of the urban district

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 145–201, where it is reproduced from *Zhongguo ximinzhuzhuyi geming shiqi genjudi fazhi wenxian xuanbian* (Selected Documents Regarding the Legal System in the Base Areas in China During the Period of the New-Democratic Revolution) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuixue chubanshe, 1981), Vol. 2.

and is made up of deputies elected by the voters of the entire urban district. The urban district soviet is directly under the jurisdiction of the city soviet.

(Note) The number of deputies of an urban district soviet may temporarily apply to that of the deputies of a township soviet.

Article 6. The deputies of a city soviet, except for those cities under a district, are to be elected by the plenary session of the urban district soviets.

(Note) The number of the deputies of a city soviet will be based on the regulations of the Temporary Election Law, Articles 22 to 25.

Article 7. The urban district soviet presidium, elected by a plenary session of the city soviet, is the highest urban district political organ during recesses of the urban district deputies' assembly.

Article 8. For each city with fewer than 50,000 residents, there will be a presidium elected by the city soviet plenary session.

This presidium will be the highest political organ of the entire city during recesses of the city soviet representative assembly.

Article 9. For each city with more than 50,000 residents, there will be a city executive committee elected by the city soviet plenary session. This executive committee will be the highest political organ of the entire city during recesses of the city soviet plenary session. The city executive committee will, in turn, elect a presidium, which will be the highest political organ of the entire city during recesses of the city executive committee.

(Note) Those city soviets with city executive committees will continue to maintain the system of their regular deputies' assemblies, just like those city soviets without city executive committees.

Article 10. A city executive committee, in a city with fewer than 50,000 residents, is made up of twenty-one to twenty-five members and five to seven alternate members; but in a city with more than 50,000 residents, it is made up of thirty-five to seventy-five members and seven to eleven alternate members.

Article 11. An urban district soviet presidium, in a city with under 50,000 residents, is made up of five to seven members; in a city with more than 50,000 residents, nine to eleven. The presidium of a city soviet subordinate to a district is made up of five to seven members. The presidium of a city soviet subordinate to a *xian* is made up of seven to eleven members. The presidium of a city soviet under a province is made up of eleven to nineteen members. The presidium of a city soviet subordinate to the Central Government is made up of nineteen to twenty-five members.

Article 12. For each urban district soviet or city soviet, a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen are chosen.

Article 13. The duties of the deputies at the urban district soviet and city soviet are as follows: On the one hand, they represent their constituents to work in the soviets, to relay their opinions about elections and the work the voters need to do to be discussed at the urban district soviet or the city soviet. On the other, they communicate to the masses the work the higher soviets want done, after it has been discussed by the urban district soviet or the city soviet; lead the residents in the constituency of each deputy to carry out resolutely the orders and ordinances of the higher soviets; and carry out the resolutions of the urban district soviet and the city soviet.

Article 14. Among five to nine deputies of an urban district soviet, according to the



distances from their residences, one will be appointed by the urban district soviet presidium as the chief deputy, who, within the rights given by the presidium, assigns and directs the work of the other deputies under him, conveys the notices of the urban district soviet presidium, and under whose leadership all the deputies call the residents under them to meet and to solve minor problems of the residents. When necessary, he may attend the presidium's meetings. In villages within the urban districts outside of the city, when there are more than two chief deputies in one village, one of them should be assigned to assume the responsibility of receiving notices from the presidium and conveying them to the other chief deputies, calling the meetings of village residents to discuss problems within the village, and calling meetings of the village deputies.

Article 15. Within the jurisdictions of an urban district soviet and a soviet directly under a district, in order to maintain a close relationship between the deputies and the residents and in order to facilitate the collection of the residents' opinions and the supervision of the work, the residents are to be properly assigned under the leadership of each deputy according to the proximity of the residences of the deputies to those of the residents (usually for each deputy, there will be thirty to seventy residents under him), so that each deputy will have a regular relationship with the residents within a certain area under his leadership.

Article 16. Under each urban district soviet and city soviet under a district, the following regular or temporary committees are to be organized; the number of members and duties of each are stipulated below:

1. Committee to Expand the Red Army

Has seven to nine members and is in charge of expansion of the Red Army and the movement of returning to one's unit.

2. Committee to Give Preferential Treatment to the Red Army

Has seven to nine members. In urban districts within a city, the committee, along with representatives from the labor union and the poor masses, collects monthly allowances of workers and the poor masses and the 5 percent business taxes and store rentals submitted by the city financial department and properly appropriates them to those Red Army families that are without land or poor and the families belonging to staff members who have left their production work; leads the able-bodied of the entire urban district to chop wood, haul water, or do other necessary chores for the Red Army families that lack sufficient laborers and the families of staff members who have left their production work; and looks for jobs for Red Army families and leads them to open production cooperatives. In urban districts outside of the city, the committee supervises farming teams to till the land for Red Army families that lack sufficient laborers and families of staff members who have left their production work, to solve the general problems concerning living for the Red Army families and the families of those staff members who have left their production work, and is responsible for the farming, harvesting, and maintenance of the public fields of the Red Army.

3. Committee Rendering Care Services to the Red Army

Has seven to nine members who are deputies of an urban district soviet or a city soviet under the jurisdiction of a district and of various mass organizations. Its duties are to lead residents in the movements to render care services to the Red Army, to collect goods donated by the residents for the Red Army, and so on.

4. Red Martial Law Committee

Has five to seven members who are deputies of the urban district soviets or the city

soviets under the jurisdiction of a district, cadres of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers, and other activists. Its responsibilities are to reinforce the Red martial law and the struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, for example by supervising and inspecting sentries, keeping a lookout from high places, checking travel permits, questioning suspicious residents and visitors, leading the masses to scrutinize closely the activities of the exploiting elements, looking into rumors spread by the counterrevolutionaries, helping the Political Security Bureau and the Judicial Department put down the counterrevolutionaries' activities, and so on.

#### 5. Air Defense and Gas Defense Committee

Has five to seven members whose duties are to instruct the residents in various essential matters concerning defense against the enemies' air raids, such as setting up signaling cannon stations, building air-raid shelters, preparing gas defense equipment, and so on.

#### 6. Voluntary Labor Committee and Transportation Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of investigating, registering, assigning, reallocating, and mobilizing transport teams, farming teams, road-repairing teams, forced labor teams (of landlords and counterrevolutionary rich peasants), and other voluntary labor activities. In order to mobilize laborers to go to the front quickly to move the wounded and the sick, to transport plunder, and to provide transportation services for the rear, a separate Transportation Committee may be organized, containing five to seven members.

#### 7. Unemployment Relief Committee

Within the urban districts in a city and in the urban districts and cities under the jurisdiction of a district outside of a city where unemployed workers are rather numerous, unemployment relief committees are to be organized (in the urban districts outside of a city where there are no unemployed or very few unemployed, such committees do not need to be organized). It is made up of seven to eleven members from among the deputies of the urban district soviet or the city soviet under the jurisdiction of a district, and active elements among the unemployed workers. Its responsibilities are to assist the unemployed labor section of the city labor department in investigating, registering the unemployed workers in the entire city, discussing and actually looking for employment and housing for the unemployed, raising funds, collecting goods as temporary relief, and so on.

#### 8. Committee for the Poor

To be organized in each urban district within the city (the urban districts outside the city need no such organizations), with nine to fifteen members. Committee members must come from representatives in the urban district soviet with poor family backgrounds and active elements from the poor masses from various walks of life. Their responsibilities are to investigate and register the number, vocations, and unemployment situations of the poor in the entire city, and to discuss and solve all the difficulties in the lives of the impoverished masses in all walks of life.

#### 9. Housing Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of investigating and registering public and private housing within the entire urban district, confiscating and redistributing the houses of the despotic gentry, landlords, and counterrevolutionary capitalists, discussing and solving the problems of the housing shortage for the workers and the poor, trying to

reconstruct burned and destroyed houses, and so on. This committee is only organized in the urban districts within a city; it is not necessary to organize it in areas outside of the city.

#### 10. Residence Committee

Has three to five members whose responsibilities are to investigate and register, according to the class status of each family, the households and the population of the entire urban district, to register monthly the numbers of births, deaths, moves, marriages, and divorces.

#### 11. Industrial Committee and Agricultural Committee

In urban districts, especially those within the city, industrial committees are to be organized, with nine to fifteen members each. The members are deputies of the urban district soviets or the city soviets subordinated to a district, activists among the staff of state-owned industries, representatives of industrial production cooperatives, and activists from other independent production workers. Their responsibilities are to guide the workers and the impoverished masses to develop nationalized, cooperative, and independent production enterprises; to supervise the industrial capitalists in increasing capital and expanding their businesses; to oppose their moving capital away or closing down their enterprises; and so on.

In urban districts outside the city, according to the agricultural production seasons, the spring plowing committee, the summer plowing committee, the autumn plowing committee, and the winter plowing committee should be organized with seven to nine members each who are from the deputies to the urban district soviet or the city soviet under a district and the active and experienced elements from the peasants. Its responsibilities will be to supervise the peasant masses to redistribute labor, to increase fertilizer, to solve problems of plowing oxen, to repair and purchase farming equipment, to select seeds, to improve cultivation methods, to eliminate pests, to harvest agricultural products without wasting time, and so on.

#### 12. Industrial Research Committee and Agricultural Research Committee

Each committee will have seven to nine members. The industrial research committee is organized in the urban district in a city and its responsibilities are to supervise research on various important industrial production problems of the state-owned, cooperative, and private small enterprises, such as how to improve production techniques, and so on. In urban districts outside the city, agricultural research committees will be organized instead. Their responsibilities are to supervise research on the various important issues of agricultural production within that urban district, such as where to plant which seeds, which fertilizers are needed, which cultivation methods are better, and so on. It is also in charge of the agricultural experimental stations of that urban district.

#### 13. The Confiscation and Collection Committee

Has five to seven members. Its responsibilities in an urban district within a city are to assist the political security bureau and the judicial department in confiscating counterrevolutionary criminals' properties, confiscating properties of landlords who live in the cities and those of counterrevolutionaries hidden by those landlords, [collecting] the fines or donations imposed on the capitalists by the federation of trade unions, and so on. This is a standing organization.

Such a committee in the urban districts outside a city will be responsible for confiscating cash and other properties that belong to landlords and raising funds prop-

erly among rich peasants, according to the orders of the national financial organs. This will be a temporary organization. When it has fulfilled its duties, it will be dissolved.

#### 14. Nationalized Property Committee

Has three to five members whose responsibilities are to be in charge of nationalized properties. This is to be organized in the urban districts or in cities directly under an urban district where there are nationalized properties. Where there are no nationalized properties, such committees need not be organized.

#### 15. Commercial Tax or Agricultural Tax Collection Committee

Has seven to nine members. A commercial tax collection committee is to be organized in the urban districts in a city to help the municipal finance department investigate the business status of stores and help collect commercial taxes. This is a standing organization.

In urban districts outside of a city, an agricultural tax collection committee will be organized instead. It helps the municipal finance department collect agricultural taxes. It is organized only during the time when the agricultural taxes are collected. Upon completion of the task, the committee will be dissolved.

#### 16. Government Bonds Issuing Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of sales promotion of the bonds and the collection and temporary preservation of cash loans and grain loans. This committee is organized during the time the bonds are issued and will be dissolved upon the completion of the task.

#### 17. Education Committee

Has nine to eleven members from among the deputies of the urban district soviets or the city soviets under the jurisdiction of a district, the principal of the Lenin elementary school, the principal of the evening continuation school, the director of the club, and representatives of the Communist Youth League, the labor unions, the poor people's league, the Young Pioneers, the Children's Corps, the conference of representatives of women workers and peasants, and so on. It is in charge of the development, organizing, surveying, and statistics of all cultural and educational endeavors within the entire city and the city subordinate to a district.

#### 18. Hygiene Committee

Has seven to nine members from among the deputies of the urban district soviets or the city soviets subordinate to a district, and activists from the masses in the neighborhoods and in the villages. It is in charge of lighting, ventilation, water supply, dirt and garbage removal, cleaning ditches and toilets, killing flies, catching mice, epidemic prevention, and medical matters.

#### 19. Bridges and Roads Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of the repair and construction of streets, ordinary roads, bridges, ferries, tea-stalls, and so on.

#### 20. Grain Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of investigating, recording, and keeping statistics on grain (including miscellaneous grains) each season for an entire urban district and the cities subordinate to the district, and investigating and preparing statistics of the total grain needed each season for the residents in the entire urban district and the city subordinate to a district to see whether there is a surplus or shortage.

#### 21. Committee for Preparation against Natural Disasters

Has seven to nine members who are responsible for grain collection and storage for

the purpose of disaster relief; investigating and counting the number of residents in an entire urban district and the cities subordinate to the district who do not have enough grain, and those who are suffering from famine, and how much grain is needed; and carrying out disaster relief measures.

#### 22. Forestry or Mountain Forestry Committee

Has five to seven members. In the urban districts in a city and the urban districts outside a city where there are no mountains, the forestry committee is organized. It is responsible for leading the resident masses to plant trees wherever possible, such as in gardens, courtyards, along riverbanks, and alongside roads, and cultivating and protecting them. As to the urban districts outside the city where there are mountains, the mountain forestry committee will be organized instead. It is in charge of planting, cultivating, and protecting the mountain forests.

#### 23. Water Conservancy Committee

Has five to nine members who are responsible, in an urban district within a city, for repairs of sewers on the streets and underneath the houses, repairs and construction of embankments surrounding the city, and dredging of the ponds and wells inside and outside the city. In an urban district outside the city, it is responsible for repairs and construction of hillside fields, embankments, and ponds, and repairing and equipping waterwheels.

#### 24. Land Registration Committee

Has three to five members who are responsible, in an urban district of a city, for the investigation, registration, and statistics of the hillside fields, ponds, wells, gardens, fruit trees, forests, and so on. In the urban districts outside a city, it is responsible for the investigation, registration, and statistics of the fields, mountain forests, ponds, gardens, sandy dykes, fruit trees, and so on, and the issuing and reissuing of the land licenses.

#### 25. Wasteland Reclamation Committee

Has five to seven members. It is organized within the urban districts outside the city for those who have waste fields, wastelands, and waste mountains. It is in charge of leading the masses in reclaiming waste fields, wastelands, and waste mountains.

#### 26. Land Investigation Committee

To be organized only in the urban districts outside a city, it has seven to eleven members, who are made up of the chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary of an urban district soviet or a city soviet subordinated to a district, the director of the poor peasant league, the branch head of the labor union, and key leaders from the other mass organizations. This is a leading organ for the Land Investigation Movement, and is dissolved when the Land Investigation Movement has been thoroughly carried out. During the Land Investigation Movement, in order to confiscate the property of the landlord class, and the surplus draft animals, agricultural tools, and houses of the rich peasants, and redistribute them to the masses, a committee for the confiscation and redistribution of property needs to be organized. This committee will have seven to eleven members and will work under the leadership of the land investigation committee.

Similarly, in order to confiscate and redistribute the landlords' land and the rich peasants' surplus land and superior land, a land confiscation and redistribution committee with seven to eleven members should be organized under the land investigation committee.

#### 27. Election Committee

Has nine to thirteen members. This committee is to be organized during the elec-

tions of the urban district soviets and the city soviets subordinated to a district. It is made up of representatives of the urban district soviet and the city soviet subordinated to a district, representatives from various mass groups, and other activists. Under the direct supervision of the city soviet election committee, it is in charge of all election-related propaganda, registration of voters, zoning of election units, preparation of the candidate lists, calling of election meetings, and all other election-related matters. This committee will be dissolved as soon as the elections are over.

#### 28. Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Committee

Has seven to nine members who are representatives from the labor unions, the poor people's league, the conference of representatives of women workers and peasants, the Communist Youth League, and other activists. It is directly under the jurisdiction of the city soviet workers' and peasants' inspection committee. (If it is a city under a district, then it is directly under the district soviet's workers' and peasants' inspection committee.) The responsibilities of the committee are to carry out regular inspections of the presidium of the urban district soviet or the city soviet subordinate to a district, the various committees of the representative assemblies, the Red Guard armies, the Young Pioneers, and the national enterprises, to determine whether or not they have been in full compliance with the ordinances and directives of the higher-level soviets in carrying out their work. If any elements in these organs and enterprises are found to have become corrupt, to have slacked off in their work, to have carried out suppression and coercion, or to have engaged in any other conduct contrary to the public opinion of the masses of their constituents, or contrary to the ordinances of the soviets, the committee must assist the city soviet workers' and peasants' inspection committee to bring charges against these bad elements.

Article 17. Depending on the needs of each locality, the number of committees under urban district soviets and city soviets subordinated to a district may be increased or decreased upon approval of the higher-level soviets.

Article 18. In urban districts outside the city, if the region is vast or the work has been highly developed, some necessary committees may be organized using the village as a basic unit. Each of these committees will have three to five members; as subdivisions of a township committee, one of the members of the township committee will serve as chairman.

Article 19. Each committee should have a head who is in charge of the work of that committee.

Article 20. Each deputy from an urban district soviet or a district soviet must be a member of one or two committees. It is up to the deputies themselves to decide first which committees they would like to be on, and then the presidium will make appropriate assignments.

Article 21. In addition to the deputies, it is necessary to recruit activists among the workers, the peasants, and the poor to serve as members on various committees.

Article 22. While carrying out the work, the committees may not go against the opinions of the conferences of deputies and of the presidium.

Article 23. Various departments of city soviets and district soviets should have close relationships with the various committees under urban district soviets and city soviets subordinated to the district, depending on the nature of their responsibilities, through the conference of deputies and the presidiums of urban district soviets and city soviets subor-

dinate to a district. When necessary, the various departments of the city soviets send for the heads of the related committees of each urban district within that city to come to the city soviets for meetings, or dispatch personnel to urban districts to call meetings by gathering the related committees together and to give directives for work.

Article 24. When necessary, the meetings of various committees of plenary sessions of representative assemblies of city soviets, urban district soviets, and city soviets subordinate to a district may take place in an enterprise, an organ, a mass group, or a village involved, so that local workers, peasants, and the poor may participate in the meetings and express their opinions.

Article 25. In principle, the deputies from city soviets, urban district soviets, and city soviets subordinated to a district, except for regular staff members, may not abandon production.

Article 26. In cities with fewer than 50,000 residents, a plenary session of the city soviet is to be convened by the presidium once a month; in cities with more than 50,000 residents, it should be convened by the presidium once every other month. In urban districts with fewer than 50,000 residents, a plenary session of the urban district soviet should be convened by the presidium once every ten days; in urban districts with more than 50,000 residents, it should be convened once every twenty days.

The city executive committee is convened by the presidium once a month.

The urban district soviet presidium is convened by the presidium once every three days.

The city soviet presidium, for a city with under 50,000 residents, is convened by the presidium once every three days, whereas for a city with over 50,000, it is convened by the presidium once every seven days. Each committee is convened by the head once every ten days.

When necessary, any organ may have a special meeting.

In an urban district within a city, the regular staff for an urban district soviet and a district soviet is limited to five. In an urban district outside of a city, when the population is below one thousand, [it is limited to] two; when the population exceeds one thousand, [it is limited to] three; when the population exceeds two thousand, [it is limited to] four; and the city soviet subordinate to a district, [it is limited to] four.

Article 27. The regular staff of city soviets will be determined by orders of the people's committee, according to the number of population of said city and the workload.

Article 28. Every two months urban district soviets and city soviets subordinate to a district must report to their constituents about their work. The city soviets must report to their constituents about their work every three months.

The constituents have the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding these reports.

Article 29. An urban district soviet must report its work to the city soviet at least once a month and the same is true of the city soviet subordinate to a district to the district soviet. A city soviet must report its work to a higher soviet at least once a month.

Article 30. Each urban district soviet and each city soviet subordinate to a district may employ a secretary to assist the work of the presidium.

Article 31. Deputies of urban district soviets and city soviets subordinate to a district will be elected every six months. Deputies of a city soviet in a city with fewer than 50,000 voters will be elected every six months; but in a city with over 50,000 voters, once a year. Deputies may be reelected.

Article 32. Between two elections, if any deputy is found to have violated the public opinion of the voters, missed the conferences of deputies for two consecutive months without good reason, violated the resolutions of the assembly without heeding warnings, or committed any other serious mistakes, he may, upon the request of over ten voters and with approval of over half of the voters, be recalled; or he may be recalled or expelled by a vote of the conference of deputies, with the approval of over half of the voters. The functions of a deputy who has been recalled or expelled will be taken over by an alternate deputy.

## ***B. Township Soviets***

Article 33. The township soviet is the highest political organ of the entire township. It is made up of deputies elected by the voters of the whole township.

Article 34. A presidium will be formed by five to seven members elected by the plenary session. It will serve as the highest political organ of the entire township during recesses of the plenary session.

Article 35. The presidium may choose a chairman and a vice-chairman from within its own membership.

Article 36. The responsibilities of the deputies are, on the one hand, to work in the soviet, as representatives of their constituents; to relay the voters' opinions; and to bring up the work proposed by the voters to the soviet for discussion. On the other hand, their responsibilities are to convey the work that the higher-level soviets want done, after discussion by the conference of deputies or the presidium, back to the masses, and to lead the residents within each deputy's jurisdiction to carry out resolutely the orders and directives from higher-level soviets and the resolutions of the township soviet.

Article 37. For each three to seven deputies in the township soviet, according to the distances of their residences, one will be appointed by the presidium of the township soviet as the chief deputy who, within the boundaries allowed by the presidium, allocates and supervises the other deputies' work, communicates notices of the township soviet presidium to the other deputies under his leadership, calls the residents under his leadership to meetings, solves minor problems for them, and, when necessary, may take part in the presidium's meetings.

Article 38. Depending on the distances of the residences and the population, each township should be divided into several villages. But no more than five villages are allowed for each township (the villages may be named after famous places within that village, but numbers should not be used). If there are more than two chief deputies in a village, one of them should be appointed to be in charge of receiving notices from the presidium, communicating them to the other chief deputies, and calling meetings of the village residents. In order to discuss the work of the village, he may also call meetings of all the deputies in the village.

Article 39. Within the territory under the jurisdiction of a township soviet, for the sake of maintaining close relationships between deputies and residents, and for convenience in collecting the residents' opinions and leading the work, it is necessary to assign residents appropriately to the leadership of each of the deputies, according to the distances between their residences and those of the deputies (usually thirty to seventy residents are placed under the leadership of one deputy), so that each deputy may have a regular relationship with the residents under his leadership.



Article 40. Under each township soviet, the following regular or temporary special committees should be organized. The number of members and the responsibilities of each committee are stipulated as indicated below:

1. Committee to Expand the Red Army

Has three to nine members and is in charge of expansion of the Red Army and the movement of returning to one's unit.

2. Committee for Giving Preferential Treatment to the Red Army

Has seven to eleven members who supervise farming teams to till land for Red Army families that lack sufficient laborers and for those of the staff members who have left their production work; solve the general problems concerning living for Red Army families and those of staff members who have left their production work; and are in charge of the farming, harvesting, and maintenance of the public fields of the Red Army.

3. Committee on Rendering Care Services to the Red Army

Has seven to eleven members who are deputies of the township soviet and representatives of other mass bodies. Its duties are to lead the residents in the movements to render care services to the Red Army and to collect goods donated by the residents to the Red Army.

4. Red Martial Law Committee

Has seven to nine members who are deputies of the township soviet, cadres of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers, and other activists. Its responsibilities are to reinforce the Red martial law and the struggle to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, for example by supervising and inspecting sentries, keeping a lookout from high places, checking travel permits, questioning suspicious residents and passengers, leading the masses to scrutinize closely the activities of the exploiting elements, looking into rumors spread by counterrevolutionaries, helping the political security bureau and the judicial department put down counterrevolutionary activities, and so on.

5. Air Defense and Gas Defense Committee

Has five to seven members whose duties are to instruct residents in various essential matters concerning defense against the enemies' air raids, such as setting up signaling cannon stations, building air-raid shelters, preparing the gas defense equipment, and so on.

6. Confiscation and Collection Committee

Has five to seven members whose responsibilities are to confiscate landlords' cash and other properties, and to collect donations from rich peasants as appropriate, in accordance with the orders of the national financial institutions. This is a temporary organization and is dissolved upon the completion of the tasks.

7. Nationalized Property Committee

Has three to five members whose responsibilities are to be in charge of nationalized properties. This is to be organized only in townships where there are nationalized properties.

8. Agricultural Tax Collection Committee

Has nine to fifteen members who are in charge of collecting agricultural taxes. This is organized only temporarily when agricultural taxes are collected and will be dissolved upon completion of the task.

9. Government Bonds Issuing Committee

Has nine to fifteen members who are in charge of sales promotion of the bonds, and collection and temporary preservation of cash loans and grain loans. This is temporary.

ily organized during the time the bonds are issued and will be dissolved upon completion of the tasks.

#### 10. Seasonal Agricultural Production Committee

According to the agricultural production seasons, the spring plowing committee, the summer plowing committee, the autumn plowing committee, and the winter plowing committee should be organized. Each committee should have nine to fifteen members, who are deputies of the township soviet or activists from among the peasant masses with long experience of agricultural work. Its responsibilities are to supervise the peasant masses to redistribute manpower, increase fertilizer, solve the problems of plowing oxen, repair and purchase farming equipment, select seeds, improve cultivation methods, eliminate pests, harvest agricultural products without wasting time, and so on.

#### 11. Wasteland Reclamation Committee

Has five to seven members who are in charge of reclaiming waste fields, wastelands, and waste mountains. This is a temporary organization and will be dissolved upon completion of the tasks.

#### 12. Mountain Forestry Committee

Has five to seven members who are in charge of planting, cultivation, and protection of mountain forests.

#### 13. Water Conservancy Committee

Has five to seven members who are in charge of repair and construction of hillside fields, embankments, and ponds, and repairing and equipping the waterwheels.

#### 14. Land Registration Committee

Has three to five members whose responsibilities are to conduct research on various problems of agricultural production, such as what kind of seeds can best be planted in which place, what fertilizers to use, which cultivation methods are better, and so on, and to be in charge of the agricultural experimental stations of the township.

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#### 16. Land Investigation Committee

Has seven to eleven members who are the chairman, the vice-chairman, and the secretary of the township soviet; the director of the poor peasant league; the branch head of the labor union; and key leaders from other mass bodies. This is the leading organ for the Land Investigation Movement and will be dissolved upon completion of the movement.

During the Land Investigation Movement, in order to confiscate the property of the landlord class, and the surplus draft animals, agricultural tools, and houses of the rich peasants, and redistribute them to the masses, a committee for the confiscation and redistribution of property should be organized. This committee will have seven to eleven members and will work under the leadership of the land investigation committee.

Similarly, in order to confiscate and redistribute the surplus land and superior land of the landlord class and the rich peasants, a land confiscation and redistribution committee with seven to eleven members should be organized under the land investigation committee.

#### 17. Education Committee

Has nine to fifteen members, comprising deputies of the township soviet, the principal of the Lenin elementary school, the principal of the evening continuation school,

1. According to a note by the editors of the collection from which this document has been reproduced in the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, this item is missing from the available Chinese text.

the director of the club, and representatives of the Communist Youth League, the labor unions, the poor peasant league, the Young Pioneers, the Children's Corps, the conference of representatives of women workers and peasants, and so on. This committee is in charge of developing, regulating, and gathering statistics on all cultural and educational endeavors in the entire township.

#### 18. Hygiene Committee

Has seven to nine members who are deputies of the township soviet and activists from each village. It is in charge of lighting, ventilation, water supplies, dirt and garbage removal, cleaning the ditches and toilets, killing flies, catching mice, epidemic prevention, and medical matters.

#### 19. Bridges and Roads Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of the repair and construction of bridges, roads, ferries, tea-booths, and so on, throughout the entire township.

#### 20. Grain Committee

Has seven to nine members who are in charge of investigating, recording, and keeping statistics on grain for each season for the entire township, and investigating and keeping statistics for the total grain needed by all the inhabitants of the entire township for each season, to see whether there is a surplus or shortage.

#### 21. Committee for Preparation against Natural Disasters

Has seven to nine members who are responsible for grain collection and storage for the purpose of disaster relief, investigating and counting the number of people in the township as a whole who are in need of grain or are suffering from famine and how much relief grain is needed, and carrying out the disaster relief measures.

#### 22. Residence Committee

Has three to five members who are responsible for investigating and registering the households and population of the residents in the whole township, according to their class status, and registering monthly the numbers of births, deaths, moves, marriages, and divorces.

#### 23. Compulsory Labor Committee and Transportation Committee

Composed of seven to nine members who are in charge of investigating, registering, assigning, regulating, and mobilizing transportation teams, farming teams, road-repairing teams, compulsory labor teams (of landlords and counterrevolutionary rich peasants), and other matters relating to compulsory service. In order to mobilize laborers to go to the front quickly to move the wounded and the sick, to transport plunder, and to provide transportation services for the rear, a transportation committee with five to seven members may be organized separately.

#### 24. Election Committee

Has nine to thirteen members. This committee is to be organized during the elections to the township soviet. It is made up of deputies of the township soviet and of representatives of mass bodies and other activists. It is in charge of election propaganda, registration of voters, division of the election units, preparation of the lists of candidates, calling election meetings, and all other matters related to elections.

#### 25. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Committee

Has seven to nine members who are made up of representatives of the labor unions, the poor peasant league, the conference of representatives of women workers and peasants, the Communist Youth League, and other activists. It is directly under the

jurisdiction of the workers' and peasants' inspection committee of the district soviet, and its responsibilities are to examine routinely whether or not the presidium and the conference of deputies of the township soviet, the various committees, the Red Guards, and the Young Pioneers have indeed followed the ordinances and directives of the higher soviets in carrying out their work. If, in any of these organizations and local armed forces, any elements are found to have become corrupt, to have slacked off in their work, to have carried out suppression and coercion, or to have engaged in any other conduct contrary to the public opinion of the masses of the voters, or contrary to soviet law, the committee must assist the district workers' and peasants' inspection committee to bring charges against these elements.

Article 41. The various committees under the township soviet may be increased or diminished in number depending on local work needs, but the approval of the soviet at the next higher level must be obtained.

(Note) When the township is rather vast and the work has been highly developed, some essential committees may be organized using the village as the basic unit. Each committee may have three to five members, serving as branch committees of the township committee with one of the members from the township committee as its head.

Article 42. Each committee should have one head to be in charge of the committee's work.

Article 43. Each deputy of the township soviet must serve on one or two committees. It is up to the deputies themselves to decide first which committees they would like to be on, and then the presidium will make appropriate assignments.

Article 44. In addition to the deputies, it is necessary to recruit activists among the workers, the peasants, and the poor to serve as members on various committees.

Article 45. In the course of their work, committees may not go against the opinions of the conferences of deputies, and of the presidium.

Article 46. Various departments of the district soviet and various committees under the township soviet, according to their respective responsibilities, should have close relationships with each other by means of the township conference of deputies and its presidium. When necessary, the departments of the district soviet may send for the chairmen of the related committees of all or certain villages of the district to go to the district soviet for meetings and give them directives for work.

Article 47. The plenary session of the township soviet should be convened by the head once every ten days. The presidium is convened by the head once every three days. Each committee will be convened by the head once every ten days. When important matters come up, extraordinary meetings may be called for any of these organizations.

Article 48. Meetings of the plenary sessions and all the committees may take place in the villages or among the mass groups directly related to the matters under discussion, so that the local masses and interested parties may participate in the meetings.

Article 49. In principle, the deputies of a township soviet, except for the regular staff, should not leave their work of production.

Article 50. The township soviet may employ one documentation clerk to assist with the work of the presidium.

Article 51. The regular staff for a township soviet in a township with under 1,000 inhabitants consists of two people, the chairman and the documentation clerk; in a town-

ship with more than 1,000 inhabitants, it consists of three people, the chairman, the vice-chairman, and the documentation clerk. A township that is located on an important thoroughfare, and constitutes the end point of one day's journey, where there is a heavy workload, may have four regular staff members.

Article 52. The township soviet must assemble the voters for a meeting every two months and report its work to them. The voters have the right to criticize and make suggestions regarding the township soviet's report.

Article 53. The township soviet should report its work to the district soviet at least once a month.

Article 54. Deputies of the township soviet need to be elected every half-year, but may be reelected consecutively.

Article 55. Between elections, deputies may be recalled if they are found to have violated the voters' opinions, have not attended deputies' meetings for two consecutive months without good reasons, have rebelled against the assembly's resolutions without heeding warnings, or have committed serious mistakes, upon the request of more than ten voters and with the approval of over half of the voters; or may be expelled upon approval by the plenary session and approval by over half of the voters. The duties of recalled or expelled deputies will be taken over by alternate deputies.

### **Chapter 3. District, *Xian*, and Provincial Soviet Congresses of Deputies and Their Executive Committees**

#### ***A. The District Soviet Congress of Deputies and Its [Executive] Committee***

Article 56. The district-wide soviet congress of deputies is the highest political organ of that entire district.

Article 57. The district-wide soviet congress of deputies elects its district executive committee, which is the highest political organ during recesses of the district-wide soviet congress of deputies. The district executive committee is made up of twenty-one to thirty-five members, with five to seven alternate members.

Article 58. The district-wide soviet congress of deputies is convened by the district executive committee once every three months.

Article 59. The responsibilities of the district-wide soviet congress of deputies are to listen to and discuss reports presented by the district executive committee, discuss the overall guidelines for the work of the entire district soviet and the methods for carrying them out, and elect the district executive committee. But the election of the district executive committee will only take place once every two meetings of the district-wide soviet congress of deputies (that is, once every six months).

Article 60. The district executive committee elects seven to eleven members to form a presidium, which will be the highest political organ for the entire district during recesses of the district executive committee.

Article 61. The district executive committee presidium elects its own chairman and vice-chairman.

Article 62. The district executive committee presidium may employ one secretary and one or two documentation clerks to assist with paperwork, and so on.

Article 63. The full-time staff of the district executive committee will be regulated by orders of the Council of People's Commissars, according to number of residents and workload.

Article 64. The district executive committee plenary session will be convened once a month by the presidium. The presidium meetings will be convened by the chairman once every three days. Temporary meetings may be called whenever important problems arise.

Article 65. The district executive committee must report its work to the *xian* executive committee at least once a month.

Article 66. The district executive committee must report on its work to the plenary session of all the township soviets in the district at least once every two months.

Article 67. The district executive committee must report its work to the district soviet congress of deputies.

### ***B. The Xian Soviet Congress of Deputies and Its Executive Committee***

Article 68. The all-*xian* congress of soviet deputies is the highest political organ of the entire *xian*.

Article 69. The *xian* executive committee, elected by the all-*xian* soviet congress of deputies, is the highest political organ of the entire *xian* during recesses of the all-*xian* soviet congress of deputies. The *xian* executive committee is made up of thirty-five to fifty-five members and seven to eleven alternate members.

Article 70. The *xian*-wide soviet congress of deputies is convened by the *xian* executive committee once every six months.

Article 71. The responsibilities of the all-*xian* soviet congress of deputies are to listen to and discuss reports of the *xian* executive committee, discuss and decide on the directions of work for the entire *xian* soviet, and elect the *xian* executive committee. But the election of the *xian* executive committee takes place only once every two meetings of the all-*xian* soviet congress of deputies (that is, once a year).

Article 72. The *xian* executive committee members choose nine to fifteen people from among themselves to form a presidium to be the highest political organ of the entire *xian* during recesses of the *xian* executive committee.

Article 73. The *xian* executive committee presidium chooses a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen.

Article 74. The *xian* executive committee may employ two to five inspectors to inspect and supervise a particular task or several tasks assigned by the presidium.

Article 75. The *xian* executive committee presidium may employ one or two secretaries and one or two documentation clerks to assist in paperwork, and so on.

Article 76. All full-time staff of the *xian* executive committee are regulated by orders of the Council of People's Commissars according to the number of residents in each *xian* and the workload.

Article 77. The plenary session of the *xian* executive committee is convened by the presidium once every two months.

The presidium is convened by the chairman once every five days.

Extraordinary meetings may be called when important problems arise.

Article 78. The *xian* executive committee must report on its work to the provincial executive committee at least once a month.

Article 79. The *xian* executive committee must report on its work to all the district soviet congresses of deputies.

Article 80. The *xian* executive committee must report on its work to the *xian*-wide soviet congress of deputies.

### ***C. The Provincial Soviet Congress of Deputies and Its Executive Committee***

Article 81. The provincial soviet congress of deputies is the highest political organ in the entire province.

Article 82. The provincial soviet congress of deputies will elect the provincial executive committee to be the highest political organ of the entire province during recesses of the provincial soviet congress of deputies. The provincial executive committee is made up of fifty-five to ninety-five members and eleven to nineteen alternate members.

Article 83. The provincial soviet congress of deputies will be convened by the provincial executive committee once a year.

Article 84. The responsibilities of the provincial soviet congress of deputies are to listen to and discuss work reports presented by the provincial executive committee, discuss and decide on the directions of work for the soviets within the boundaries of the entire province, and elect the provincial executive committee.

Article 85. The provincial executive committee members elect from among themselves thirteen to nineteen people to form a presidium, which will be the highest political organ of the entire province during recesses of the provincial executive committee.

Article 86. The provincial executive committee presidium chooses its own chairman and two vice-chairmen. The provincial executive committee may employ five to nine inspectors to inspect and supervise one or more tasks within a certain boundary related to a certain subordinate organ under the presidium or the departments.

Article 87. The provincial executive committee may employ specialists to assist the work of the presidium or the various departments.

Article 88. The presidium may employ one to three secretaries and one to three documentation clerks to assist in paperwork, and so on.

Article 89. All full-time staff of the provincial executive committee are regulated by orders of the Council of People's Commissars according to the population of each province and its workload.

Article 90. The plenary session of the provincial executive committee is convened by the presidium once every four months.

The presidium is convened by the chairman once every seven days.

When important problems arise, extraordinary meetings may be called.

Article 91. The provincial executive committee will report on its work to the Central Executive Committee once every four months. The presidium should report on its work to the Central Council of People's Commissars at least once a month.

Article 92. The provincial executive committee must report on its work to all *xian* soviet congresses of deputies in the entire province.

Article 93. The provincial executive committee must report on its work to the provincial soviet congress of deputies.

## Chapter 4. The Departments

Article 94. Under each level of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city soviet executive committees, there are a labor department, a land department, a military department, a financial department, a department of the national economy, a grain department, an education department, an internal affairs department, a judicial department, a workers' and peasants' inspection committee, and a branch office of the State Political Security Bureau. But the work of the provincial military department will be incorporated into the headquarters of the military area command and will not be set up as a separate entity. At the district level, the State Political Security Bureau has only special agents. At the provincial level, there is an auditing committee.

Article 95. The various departments of a district and of a city subordinate to a *xian* are under the jurisdiction of the departments at the *xian* level; those departments of a *xian* and of a city subordinate to a province are under the jurisdiction of those at the provincial level; and those departments of a province and of a city subordinate to the Central Government are under the jurisdiction of those at the level of the Central Government, forming a hierarchy with the lower organs absolutely obeying the higher ones.

Article 96. The departments of the district, city, *xian*, and provincial soviets are, at the same time, under the supervision and control of the executive committees and the presidiums of the same level, besides their subordination to each of their corresponding departments at higher levels.

Article 97. The presidiums do not have the right to restrain various departments from carrying out orders issued by their corresponding departments at higher levels. If the presidiums have any opinions different from the orders given by the higher authorities to their subordinate departments, they should bring them to the higher-level executive committees or presidiums for solution. But without any directives from higher executive committees or presidiums, they may not restrain any departments from carrying out orders given by higher authorities.

Article 98. Without the agreement of their corresponding departments at higher levels, the various levels of soviets may not shuffle at will the key staff members (department heads, deputy department heads, etc.).

Article 99. Department heads, besides being chosen from among the members of the executive committees, may also be chosen from outside the executive committees. Appointments of department heads and deputy heads must be submitted to the executive committees or presidiums at the next higher level, and confirmed after review by the various departments at the higher level. Department heads and deputy department heads, except for reasons of incompetence, will not be changed following the election of executive committees.

Article 100. When the staff members of each department change, the departing staff should hand over work clearly to the new staff. In addition, an inventory of stationery, equipment, assets, and so on, should be prepared and signed by both the previous staff and the new staff, so it will be clear what has been handed over.

Article 101. The entire staff of each department at each level will be determined by the orders of the Council of People's Commissars according to the work situations of each department in each locality. Departments at lower levels will decide only regarding key appointments.



### ***A. The Labor Department***

Article 102. Under the labor department of each of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there should be a labor committee for the purpose of discussing and making recommendations concerning all problems related to the labor department.

The labor committee at the provincial level will have fifteen to twenty-one members; at the *xian* level, thirteen to nineteen; at the district level, nine to eleven; and the city level, nine to twenty-one, depending on the size of the city.

Article 103. A labor committee is made up of the department head, the deputy department head, the chief of the labor protection section, the chief of the unemployed labor section, the chief of the social insurance bureau, two to three representatives from the labor union, representatives of the Commissariat of the National Economy and the Commissariat for the Land, heads of lower-ranking labor departments in the vicinity, and others among the other staff members who are competent in this capacity. The members of a labor committee must be reviewed and passed by the presidium of the same level before they are approved by the higher labor departments.

Article 104. Under the labor department for each of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there should be a labor protection section, an unemployed labor section, and a subbureau, branch office, or agency of the Social Insurance Bureau (the Social Insurance Bureau is temporarily under the control of the Labor Commissariat).

Article 105. The provincial labor department has one head and one or two deputy heads.

Each labor department of a *xian*, a district, or a city will have a head and a deputy head.

Each labor protection section and each unemployed labor section will have one chief.

The social insurance bureau will have one chief.

The provincial labor department and the labor department of a city subordinate to the Central Government will each have a secretary.

The *xian* labor department and the labor department of a city subordinate to the provincial government will each have a documentation clerk.

Under the labor protection sections at all levels, there should be labor inspection stations.

Under a labor protection section in an area with industrial development, there should also be hygiene inspection stations, technology inspection stations, and economic jurisdiction stations.

Under the unemployed labor sections at all levels, there should be labor employment agencies.

Under the unemployed labor sections in areas where unemployment is serious, there should be unemployed labor relief committees.

Article 106. The responsibilities of the head and deputy head, and of the various section chiefs, are as follows:

1. The department head is in charge of the work of the entire department, and the deputy head assists the head in carrying out the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head assumes his responsibilities.
2. The labor protection section is in charge of the work of protecting laborers, and oversees and checks on the application of the labor laws.

3. The unemployed labor section is in charge of registration and statistics regarding unemployed laborers, redistribution of laborers, finding employment for laborers, directing workers to organize cooperatives, and so on.

4. The social insurance bureau takes charge of the work of social insurance.

Article 107. The director and inspectors of the labor inspection stations and all the bureau chiefs of the various levels of the labor security bureaus must be recommended by the labor unions of the same levels and appointed after having been reviewed by the labor department.

### ***B. The Land Department***

Article 108. Under the land department at each of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, a land committee should be established as an institution to discuss and make recommendations on problems related to land struggles and land production. The land committee at the provincial level is made up of fifteen to twenty-five members; at the *xian* level, thirteen to nineteen; at the district level, eleven to seventeen; and at the city level, eleven to nineteen, depending on the number of agricultural villages in the surroundings under the jurisdiction of the city.

Article 109. A land committee is made up of the head and deputy head of the land department; the chiefs of the confiscation and redistribution section, the mountain forestry and water conservancy section, and the investigation and registration section; the director of the agricultural experiment station; the director of the agricultural product exhibit hall; representatives from the labor department, the department of the national economy, and the union of agricultural workers; the heads of lower-level land departments in its jurisdiction; and people among other personnel who are competent in this capacity, with the head of the department as its chairman. The members of the land committee must be approved by higher-level land departments after having been reviewed and passed by the soviet presidium at the same level. The committees at the provincial and *xian* levels must include two to three heads of the lower-ranking land departments in their vicinity. The committees at the district and city levels must include three to five members of the nearby township soviets who are involved in land problems.

Article 110. Under a land department at the provincial, *xian*, district, or city level, there should be a confiscation and redistribution section, a land construction section, a survey and registration section, an agricultural experiment station, and an agricultural product exhibit hall. In *xian*, districts, and cities where the tasks of land confiscation and redistribution have been completed, the work of the confiscation and redistribution section will come under the land construction section.

Under the land department of a city subordinated to a district, several temporary committees may be organized: the confiscation and redistribution committee, the land investigation committee, the land registration committee, and so on.

Article 111. At the provincial level, a land department should have one head and one or two deputy heads.

At the *xian*, district, and city levels, a land department should have a head and a deputy head.

The confiscation and redistribution section, the land construction section, the mountain forestry and water conservancy section, and the survey and registration section should each have one section chief. The agricultural experiment station and the agricultural product exhibit hall should each have one director.

A provincial land department and the land department of a city subordinated to the Central Government should have one secretary each.

A *xian* land department and the land department of a city subordinate to a province should each have one documentation clerk.

Article 112. The responsibilities of the heads and deputy heads of a land department and its various sections are as follows:

1. The head is in charge of the work of the entire department, and the deputy head assists the head in the conduct of his work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.

2. The confiscation and redistribution section is responsible, in accordance with the laws and decrees regarding the land, for the confiscation and redistribution of land and property, and checking on the land (the Land Investigation Movement).

3. The land construction section is in charge of matters concerned with developing agricultural production, such as planting and harvesting each season, labor assignment, reclaiming wastelands, plow oxen assignment, improvement of agricultural tools, selection of seeds, increase of fertilizers, improvement of cultivation methods, elimination of pests, organizing and supervising the agricultural experiment stations, the agricultural product exhibit halls, cooperatives for plow oxen, labor mutual aid associations, and so on.

4. The mountain forestry and water conservancy section is in charge of repairs, construction, and development of hillside fields, river embankments, and ponds; repairs and purchases of waterwheels; planting, cultivating, preservation, and opening up of mountain forests; and so on.

5. The survey and registration section is in charge of the survey and statistics of the land, issuing land licenses, and so on.

### ***C. The Military Department***

Article 113. Each *xian*, district, and city will have a military department.

At the provincial level, there is the headquarters of a military district command, which is the highest authority for the *xian* military department.

Below the levels of the provincial headquarters of a military district command and the *xian*, district, and city military departments, no committees are to be set up.

(Note) The provincial headquarters of a military district command and the organs of military administration of a city directly subordinated to the Central Government will be regulated by orders of the Central Military Commission.

Article 114. The military departments of a *xian* and of a city subordinate to a province will each have a director and a deputy director. The director is in charge of the work of the department and the deputy director assists him in the conduct of the work. When the director has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy director will act on his behalf.

Article 115. The military department of a *xian* and of a city subordinate to a province will have first, second, and third sections, each headed by a section chief. The section chiefs' responsibilities are as follows:

1. The chief of the first section is in charge of the establishment and training of local armies, and is, at the same time, the first staff officer for the headquarters of the Red Guards.

2. The chief of the second section is in charge of the expansion of the Red Army and all the work of mobilization for warfare, and is, at the same time, the first staff officer for the headquarters of the Red Guards.

3. The chief of the third section is in charge of keeping and distributing weapons and ammunition, and the other affairs of the military department.

Article 116. The district military department and the military department of a city subordinated to a *xian* should have one head and one deputy head each. The head is in charge of the work of the entire department and the deputy assists the head in the conduct of his work. When the head has to leave his office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.

Article 117. The district military department will have a first section and a second section, each with a section chief.

The section chiefs' responsibilities are as follows:

1. The chief of the first section is in charge of matters related to the establishment and training of local armies, and is, at the same time, the chief of staff for the district or city Red Guards.

2. The chief of the second section is in charge of the expansion of the Red Army and all the work related to mobilization for warfare.

Article 118. The *xian* military department and the military department of a city subordinate to a province will have a secretary each, while the district military department and the military department of a city subordinate to a *xian* will have a documentation clerk each.

#### ***D. The Finance Department***

Article 119. Under each finance department of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there will be a finance committee, an entity to discuss and make recommendations for all finance-related problems. The finance committee at the provincial level is made up of eleven to nineteen members; at the *xian* level, nine to eleven; at the district level, seven to nine; and at the city level, seven to fifteen, depending on the size of the city.

Article 120. The finance committee at each level is made up of the head and deputy head of the finance department; the chiefs of the accounting section, the taxation section, and the nationalized financial management section; representatives from the department of the national economy; the director of the divisional treasury of the branch treasury; the presidents of banks; representatives from lower-ranking finance departments of the vicinity; representatives from institutions related to the finance departments; and those among the other personnel who are competent in this function. The head of the finance department will be the chairman of the committee. The members of each finance committee must be reviewed and passed by the soviet presidium of the same level and submitted to a higher financial department for approval.

Article 121. Under the finance department at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there should be an accounting section, a tax affairs section, and a nationalized properties section. Besides these, in the areas where confiscation and requisition of exploiters is needed, a confiscation and requisition committee needs to be formed. During the time of collecting agricultural taxes, an agricultural tax collection committee should be formed under the district and city finance departments.

When government bonds are issued, a bond-issuing committee should be organized.

In areas where many mountain forests exist, a nationalized mountain forestry management committee should be formed.

All committee members will be appointed by order of the department head.

Article 122. The provincial finance department will have a head and one or two deputy heads.

At the *xian*, district, and city levels, finance departments will have one head and one deputy head.

The accounting section, the tax affairs section, and the nationalized properties section should each have a section chief.

Each committee will have a head. The provincial finance department and the finance department of a city subordinated to the Central Government will have a chief of the general affairs section and a chief of the accounting section.

The provincial finance department and the finance department of a city subordinated to the Central Government will each have one secretary.

The *xian* finance department and the finance department of a city subordinate to a province will each have one documentation clerk.

Article 123. The responsibilities of the heads and deputy heads of the finance departments at every level and of the various sections are as follows:

1. The head is in charge of the work of the entire department and the deputy head assists him in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.

2. The accounting section is in charge of the inflow and outflow of money, book-keeping, organization of budgets, account books, and so on. Under the accounting section, there should be bookkeeping, cashier verification offices, and so on.

3. The tax affairs section is in charge of the collection, inspection, and supervision of commercial taxes, agricultural taxes, and mountain forest taxes. Under this section, there should be an agricultural tax office, a commercial tax office, and bookkeepers. When necessary, there should also be a mountain forest tax office.

4. The nationalized properties section is in charge of registration and organization of state-owned mountain forests, mines, stores, houses, factories, workshops, and so on, that come under the jurisdiction of this department; the checking and registration of lending and borrowing of public funds; and the collection of various rents. Under the nationalized properties section, a nationalized properties management committee may be organized.

5. The general affairs section is in charge of food, printing, mail, and all affairs that do not fall within the responsibilities of the other sections.

### ***E. The Department of the National Economy***

Article 124. Under the departments of the national economy at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there should be a committee on the national economy, an organ to discuss and make recommendations on all problems related to the national economy. The committee on the national economy at the provincial level is made up of fifteen to nineteen members; at the *xian* level, it has thirteen to fifteen members; at the district level, eleven to thirteen; and at the city level, thirteen to nineteen, depending on the size of the city.

Article 125. The committee on the national economy at each level is made up of the head and deputy head of the department; the chiefs of the design section, the industrial section, and the survey and statistics section; the transportation management bureau chief; the trade bureau chief; the heads of all the advisory boards of the cooperatives; representatives from the labor department, the land department, the finance department, the trade unions, and the cooperatives at the same level; the heads of all the lower-level departments of the national economy in the area in question; and those among the other personnel who are competent in these matters. The head of the department of the national economy will be the chairman of this committee. The members of each committee on the national economy must be reviewed and passed by the soviet presidium at the same level, and submitted to the department of the national economy at the next higher level for approval.

Article 126. Under the department of the national economy at every level are a design section, an industrial section, a commercial section, a survey and statistics section, an advisory board of the cooperatives, and a transportation management bureau (or branch bureau). When necessary, a nationalized enterprise section may be formed. But at the district level, when necessary, there will be no industrial and commercial sections.

Article 127. The provincial department of the national economy will have a head and one or two deputy heads.

The departments of the national economy at the *xian*, district, and city levels will have one head and one deputy head each. The design section, the survey and statistics section, and the nationalized enterprise section will each have one chief.

The transportation management bureau and the trade bureau will have one bureau chief each.

The departments of the national economy at the provincial level and at the level of a city subordinated to the Central Government will have one secretary each; the departments of the national economy at the level of the *xian* and of cities subordinated to a province will have one documentation clerk each.

Article 128. The responsibilities of the heads and deputy heads of the departments of the national economy at the various levels, and of their various sections and committees, are as follows:

1. A department head is in charge of the work of the entire department, and the deputy head assists him in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.
2. The design section draws up plans for the development and regulations of farming and forestry, industrial, business, mining, and transportation enterprises, and so on, within its jurisdiction.
3. The industrial section is in charge of development and regulations for the industries.
4. The commercial section is in charge of commercial development and regulations.
5. The survey and statistics section is in charge of the surveying and statistics of farming and forestry, industrial, commercial, mining, and transportation enterprises, and other essential matters in its jurisdiction.
6. The nationalized enterprise section is in charge of the operations of various nationalized enterprises.
7. The advisory board of the cooperatives is in charge of the development of the cooperatives and supervises their work.

8. The trade bureau manages state-owned trade.

9. The transportation management bureau manages transportation for the state-owned enterprises.

Article 129. The departments of the national economy at various levels may employ specialists and set up special institutions to conduct certain necessary tasks.

### ***F. The Grain Department***

Article 130. Under the grain departments at the various levels of the province, the *xian*, the district, and the city, there should be a grain committee, which serves as an organ to discuss and make recommendations for problems related to grain. The grain committee is made up of fifteen to nineteen members at the provincial level; thirteen to fifteen at the *xian* level; nine to fifteen at the district level; and eleven to seventeen at the city level, depending on the size of the city.

Article 131. The grain committee at each level is made up of the head and deputy head of the grain department; the leaders of the redistribution section, the disaster relief section, and the storage and preservation section; the director of the grain cooperative; the chairman of the Red Army public grain preservation committee; the chairman of the land taxes and grain preservation committee; the chief of the grain allocation bureau; representatives from the department of the national economy, the finance department, the land department and the staff workers' union; the heads of grain departments at lower levels; and those among the other personnel who are capable of exercising these functions. The head of the department is the chairman of this committee.

After the members of each grain committee have been examined and accepted by the presidium of the soviet at the same level, the list must be submitted to the grain department at the next higher level for approval.

Article 132. Under each grain department at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, there should be a redistribution section, a disaster relief section, a storage and preservation section, a Red Army public grain management committee, a land taxes and grain preservation section, a grain allocation bureau or branch bureau, and so on.

Article 133. The provincial grain department and the grain department of a city subordinated to the Central Government should have a head, one or two deputy heads, and one secretary each.

*Xian*, city, and district grain departments should each have a head and a deputy head; *xian* grain departments and the grain departments of cities subordinated to a province should have one documentation clerk each; redistribution sections, disaster relief sections, and storage and preservation sections should each have one chief.

The grain allocation bureau (or branch bureau) will have a bureau chief. The Red Army public grain preservation committee and the land taxes and grain preservation committee will each have a head.

Article 134. The responsibilities of the heads and deputy heads of grain departments at various levels, and of their sections and committees, are as follows:

1. A department head is in charge of the work of the entire department and a deputy head assists the head in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.
2. The redistribution section investigates and keeps a record of the status of the

grain production and distribution within its jurisdiction, and draws up and executes the allocation plans.

3. The disaster relief section plans and manages all affairs related to disaster relief.

4. The storage and preservation section manages all affairs related to receiving and giving out grain.

5. The Red Army public grain committee collects and keeps all the Red Army public grain within its jurisdiction.

6. The land taxes and grain preservation committee collects and keeps all the land taxes and grain within its jurisdiction.

7. The grain allocation bureau allocates the production and sale of grain to insure grain provisions for the Red Army and the masses.

### ***G. The Education Department***

Article 135. Under the education department at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, an education committee is established and serves as the organ that discusses and makes recommendations for the various cultural and educational problems. The education committee at the provincial level is made up of thirteen to seventeen members; at the *xian* level, eleven to fifteen; at the district level, nine to thirteen; and at the city level, nine to seventeen, depending on the size of the city.

Article 136. The education committee at each level is made up of the head and the deputy head of the education department; the chiefs of the general education section, the social education section, and the editing, review, and publication section; representatives from such mass organizations as the Communist Youth League, the Young Pioneers, the Children's Corps, labor unions, and so on; the editor-in-chief of the government newspaper; one or two principals of the local schools; representatives from various cultural groups; and the heads of lower-level education departments in the area in question. The head of the department will be the chairman of the committee. The members of the education committee must be reviewed and accepted by the presidium at the same level and submitted to the education department at the next higher level for approval.

Article 137. Under the provincial education department, a general education section, a social education section, and an editing, review, and publication section are established.

Under the education departments at the *xian*, district, and city levels, general education and social education sections are established.

Article 138. Provincial education departments have a head and one or two deputy heads.

*Xian*, district, and city education departments have one head and one deputy head.

The general education section, the social education section, and the editing, review, and publication section each have one chief.

Provincial education departments and education departments of cities subordinated to the Central Government each have one secretary.

*Xian* education departments and education departments of cities subordinated to a province have one documentation clerk each.

Article 139. The responsibilities of the head and deputy head of the education department at the various levels, and of the sections, are as follows:



1. The department head is in charge of the work of the entire department, and the deputy head assists him in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.

2. The general education section is responsible for adult and youth continuing education, children's education, and middle school education.

3. The social education section is responsible for social clubs, movies, theaters, local newspapers, book and newspaper reading rooms, libraries, revolutionary museums, circuit lectures, and so on.

4. The editing, review, and publication section is responsible for editing and reviewing various materials used for general education and social education, materials edited by lower-level education departments and private individuals, and publishing facilities.

## ***H. The Internal Affairs Department***

Article 140. Under the internal affairs departments at provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels, internal affairs committees are established as the organ which discusses and makes recommendations concerning various problems related to the work of the internal affairs department. The internal affairs committee at the provincial level is made up of fifteen to twenty-one members; at the *xian* level, eleven to fifteen; at the district level, eleven to thirteen; and at the city level, thirteen to nineteen, depending on the size of the city.

Article 141. The internal affairs committee at each of the various levels is made up of the head and deputy head of the department; the chiefs of the election supervisory section, the transportation section, the preferential treatment for the Red Army section, the hygiene section, the social security section, the civil affairs administration section, and the compulsory labor section; the people's police branch bureau chief or the people's police office chief; representatives from the labor transportation union and the revolutionary mutual aid association; the heads of lower-level internal affairs departments in the area in question; and other personnel who are capable of exercising these functions. The head of the department is the chairman of this committee.

The members of each internal affairs committee must be reviewed and accepted by the soviet presidium at the same level, and submitted to the internal affairs department at the next higher level for approval.

Article 142. Under the provincial, *xian*, district, and city internal affairs departments, an election supervisory section, a transportation section, a preferential treatment for the Red Army section, a hygiene section, a social security section, a civil affairs administration section, and a compulsory labor section are established.

Article 143. Within the jurisdiction of the provincial internal affairs department is established a provincial people's police branch bureau, which is directly under the people's police administration bureau of the Central People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Under the people's police branch bureau in a bigger city is a people's police office, and in a smaller city, a people's police station, forming a hierarchical structure, but at the same time, they are under the supervision and control of the internal affairs department at the same level.

Article 144. The provincial internal affairs department has a head and one or two deputy heads.

The *xian*, district, and city internal affairs departments have one head and one deputy head.

The election supervisory section, the transportation section, the preferential treatment for the Red Army section, the hygiene section, the social security section, the civil affairs administration section, and the compulsory labor section each have a chief.

The provincial internal affairs department and the internal affairs department of a city directly subordinated to the Central Government each have one secretary.

The *xian* internal affairs department and the internal affairs department of a city subordinated to a province each have one documentation clerk.

Article 145. The provincial people's police branch bureau will have one bureau chief and one deputy chief.

A people's police office will have one director and one deputy director.

A people's police station will have one head and one deputy head.

(Note) The detailed organization of the people's police is stipulated separately in specialized regulations.

Article 146. The responsibilities of the heads and deputy heads of the internal affairs departments at all levels, and of their various sections, bureaus, and stations, are as follows:

1. The department head is in charge of the work of the entire department and the deputy head assists him in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.

2. The election supervisory section is in charge of work related to elections for the soviets, sees that the election laws are accurately executed, collects and counts materials related to the elections, solves problems arising during elections, and so on.

3. The transportation section is in charge of construction and maintenance of streets, ferries, embankments, roadside tea-stalls, and so on, and the registration of boats and vehicles.

4. The preferential treatment for the Red Army section is in charge of the registration, statistics, and control of the Red Army; the execution of laws concerning providing preferential treatment for the Red Army; mobilizing the masses and assigning laborers to help the Red Army farm the land; solving other problems of Red Army families; and so on.

5. The hygiene section is in charge of supervision of mass hygiene movements, hospitals, clinics, and sanatoriums; registers and examines medical doctors; inspects pharmacies; organizes medicine cooperatives; educates medical doctors; and so on.

6. The social insurance section is in charge of relief work for the masses who are suffering as a result of war or disasters, provides pensions for the families of members of the local armed forces or soviet staff who have been killed or wounded as a result of their participation in the revolutionary war, provides relief during famines, supervises the storage of disaster relief supplies, and so on.

(Note) Red Army pensions are the responsibility of the pension committees and sub-committees under the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.

7. The civil affairs administration section is in charge of registration and statistics of residences, marriages, births, and deaths; sees that the marriage laws are correctly applied; supervises civil administration; issues residence cards; and so on.

8. The compulsory labor section is in charge of registration, statistics, and assignments for all compulsory labor undertakings in the country.

9. The people's police branch bureaus, the people's police offices, and the people's police stations are in charge of the affairs of the people's police in various cities.

Article 147. In order to discuss certain special issues, temporary special committees may be organized under each section.

### ***I. Judicial Departments and Military Tribunals***

(Note) Judicial departments are set up under the various local soviets, but military tribunals are set up within the Red Army units.

Article 148. Under each provincial, *xian*, district, or city judicial department, there should be a judicial committee, serving as an organ to discuss and make recommendations concerning the administration of justice and regarding various problems in procuratorial and judicial work.

The judicial committee at the provincial level is made up of nine to thirteen members; at the *xian* level, nine to eleven; at the district level, seven to nine; and at the city level, seven to thirteen.

Article 149. The judicial committee at each level is made up of the head and deputy head of the department; the judges; the prosecutors; the bureau chief or the special officer of the national political defense branch bureau; the chief officer of the people's police branch bureau or of the people's police office or of the people's police station; representatives of the workers' and peasants' inspection committee, of the labor departments, and of the unions of staff and workers; the heads of the lower-level judicial departments within the area in question; and those from among the other personnel who are competent to carry out this function. The head of the department will be the chairman of this committee.

The membership of the judicial committee must be reviewed and accepted by the soviet presidium at the same level and submitted to the judicial department at the next higher level for approval.

Article 150. As regards the administration of justice, the provincial judicial department is subordinated to the Central People's Commissariat for Justice. But in procuratorial and judicial aspects, it is subject to the control of the provisional supreme court.

Article 151. Under the judicial department at each level, a criminal court and a civil court are to be organized. When necessary, a circuit court may be organized. Under the city judicial department, a labor court must also be formed.

The criminal court tries criminal cases.

The civil court tries civil cases.

As for the circuit court, it travels to the actual locations where important criminal and civil suits have taken place and tries them in order that the masses of those locations and nearby will be able to observe the trials.

The labor court tries cases related to violations against the Labor Law.

Article 152. The provincial judicial department will have a head and one or two deputy heads, one to three judges, two to five inspectors, one to five procurators, one secretary, and one to three documentation clerks.

The *xian* judicial department will have one head and one deputy head, one or two

judges, two or three inspectors, two or three prosecutors, one secretary, and one or two documentation clerks. The district judicial department will have one head and one deputy head, and one documentation clerk.

The city judicial department will have one head and one deputy head, one to three judges, one to three prosecutors, and one or two documentation clerks.

Article 153. The responsibilities of the heads, deputy heads, prosecutors, and judges are as follows:

1. The head is in charge of the work of the entire department, and the deputy head assists him in the conduct of the work. When the head has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy head will act on his behalf.
2. The prosecutors are in charge of the investigation of cases and preliminary examinations of cases, and assist in matters related to prosecutions by the courts.
3. The judges are in charge of hearing and pronouncing judgment in cases.

Article 154. Under a provincial judicial department and a judicial department of a city subordinated to the Central Government are established detention centers and centers for reform through labor; under a *xian* judicial department and a judicial department of a city subordinated to a province are established detention centers, and if necessary, also centers for reform through labor, so as to provide an instrument for imprisoning and educating criminals. Districts will have detention centers.

Article 155. Within the scope of the administration of justice, the judicial departments at various levels have the right to mobilize the Red Guards, the people's police stations, and the political security detachments.

Article 156. The military tribunals can be divided into military tribunals of primary jurisdiction, military field courts, and higher-level military tribunals.

Article 157. Higher-level military tribunals are placed, as far as the administration of justice is concerned, directly under the Central People's Commissariat for Justice, but they are placed under the control of the Provisional Supreme Court as regards the procuratorial and judicial aspects.

Where the military tribunals should be located, and what their jurisdiction is to be, will be determined by orders of the Central People's Commissariat for Justice.

Article 158. Judicial committees are to be set up under all primary-level and higher-level military tribunals.

The judicial committee under a primary-level military tribunal is made up of five to seven members.

The judicial committee under a higher-level military tribunal is made up of seven to nine members.

Article 159. The judicial committees of primary-level and higher-level military tribunals are made up of their chief judge and deputy chief judge, the judges, the prosecutors, the head (or the special representative) of the branch office of the State Political Security Bureau, representatives from political organs of the army, and those from among other personnel who are capable of exercising these functions, with the chief judge as the chairman of the committee.

Article 160. Basic-level and higher-level military tribunals must all establish civil courts and criminal courts. When necessary, circuit courts may also be formed to try cases, just as is done by the judicial departments.

Article 161. Higher-level military tribunals have a chief judge and one or two deputy chief judges, two or three prosecutors, one to three judges, two to five inspectors, one secretary, and one to three documentation clerks.

Primary-level military tribunals have a chief judge and a deputy chief judge, one or two prosecutors, one or two judges, and one or two clerks.

Depending on the actual work situations, higher-level military tribunals may submit recommendations to the Central People's Commissariat for Justice to increase or decrease the number of regular staff working in the various levels of the military tribunals, and make the necessary changes after they have been approved by the Commissariat.

Article 162. The chief judge of each military tribunal is in charge of the work of the entire office and the deputy chief judge assists him in the conduct of his work. When the chief judge has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy chief judge will act on his behalf. The responsibilities of the prosecutors and the judges are identical to those of the prosecutors and judges of a judicial department.

Article 163. Judicial departments at all levels and primary-level and higher-level military tribunals have court police, the number of which will be determined by orders issued by the Central People's Commissariat for Justice.

Article 164. Nonvoters (including those under sixteen years of age) are not allowed to work in judicial departments and military tribunals.

### ***J. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Committee***

(Note) The duties of workers' and peasants' inspection committees have been stipulated in the Organic Law of the Soviet Central Political Power. The regulations below are limited to the provincial, *xian*, district, and city organizations.

Article 165. The provincial, *xian*, district, and city inspection committees are made up of members chosen by the congresses of soviet deputies at various levels according to fixed quotas.

There will be thirteen to twenty-one members at the provincial level, and the same will be true of the cities subordinated to the Central Government.

There will be nine to eleven members at the *xian* level (the same will be true for cities subordinated to a province).

There will be five to seven members at the district level (the same will be true for cities subordinated to a *xian*).

Article 166. Members of the various levels of the workers' and peasants' inspection committees must meet the following requirements:

1. They must be workers, peasants, poor people, and other elements with a history of [participating in the] revolution, who are endowed with class consciousness and are extremely loyal to the soviet régime. At least 40 percent must be workers.
2. They must never have been punished for any criminal offense by the soviet courts.

Article 167. The various levels of the workers' and peasants' inspection committees are a part of the soviet administrative organizations. They maintain the same hierarchies as do other administrative organs.

Article 168. The workers' and peasants' inspection committees at the provincial, *xian*,

district, and city levels should work in the same office with the control commissions of the Chinese Communist Party at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels to obtain close contacts.

Article 169. Each workers' and peasants' inspection committee will choose a chairman and a vice chairman. The chairman takes charge of the routine work and supervises the staff in carrying out their responsibilities. The vice-chairman assists the chairman in his work. When the chairman has to leave the office for some reason, the vice-chairman will act on his behalf.

Article 170. Under each of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city workers' and peasants' inspection committees, a complaints bureau is established to take charge of people's complaints and communications between the worker and peasant correspondents, and so on. The complaints bureau has a bureau chief.

Committees at the level of the province and of a city subordinated to the Central Government have one secretary; those at the *xian* level and that of a city subordinated to a province have one documentation clerk to assist with paperwork and other matters.

At the levels of the province and of a city subordinated to the Central Government, there are from five to nine inspectors; at the level of the *xian* and of a city subordinated to a province, there are from two to five inspectors. They are responsible for inspecting and supervising certain assigned work.

Article 171. The workers' and peasants' inspection committees at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels must recruit correspondents within all the national institutions, enterprises, factories, workshops, schools, social groups, on the streets, and in the villages in order to form a communication network. The correspondents, however, may not leave their production work.

Article 172. The various workers' and peasants' inspection committees have the right to suggest that the soviet executive committees or presidiums of the same level punish or remove certain personnel from certain national institutions and enterprises. If it is found on investigation that any of these people have indeed committed crimes, the cases should be submitted to the judicial organizations to be dealt with there.

Article 173. The various workers' and peasants' inspection committees may submit recommendations directly to certain national institutions or enterprises within their jurisdictions concerning work measures.

Article 174. When the various levels of the workers' and peasants' inspection committees bring charges against certain personnel of certain national institutions or enterprises, temporary accusation committees may be organized. Temporary inspection committees may also be organized when the work of certain national institutions or certain enterprises is under investigation.

### ***K. The State Political Security Bureau***

(Note) The duties of the State Political Security Bureau are specified in the Organic Law of the Central Soviet. The regulations below are limited to the organizations and duties of state political security bureaus at the provincial, *xian*, district, and city levels.

Article 175. The organs of the state political security bureau at all levels are entirely centralized organizations; the lower-level ones are subordinated to the higher-level ones, and the system of appointment is practiced.

Article 176. The State Political Security Bureau will set up branch offices in the provinces, the cities subordinated to the Central Government, the *xian*, and the cities subordinated to a province, but will have only special agents in cities subordinated to a district or a *xian*.

Branch offices are also set up in each front army and each army group, but for divisions, regiments, and independent battalions there will be only special commissioners and clerical workers. When necessary, the State Political Security Bureau may directly appoint special agents in certain organs.

Article 177. Under each level of political security bureau, there is established a committee in charge of examining and discussing the work of the bureau and the materials it has collected. The chief of each bureau is the chairman of that committee. The other committee members will be representatives from the Communist Party of the same level, and the procurators of the courts (currently the judicial departments). The members of the State Political Security Bureau at the highest level will be approved and appointed by the Central Council of People's Commissars; as for the members of the branch bureau committees, they are appointed by the State Political Security Bureau.

Article 178. Under each branch bureau of a province, city subordinated to the Central Government, front army, and army group, there is an executive department, a reconnaissance department, and a general affairs office.

Under the executive department there is an executive section and a preliminary examination section.

Under the reconnaissance department there is a reconnaissance section and an investigation section.

Under the branch bureau of a *xian* and of a city subordinated to a province there is an executive section, a reconnaissance section, and a general affairs section.

Article 179. Each branch bureau of a province, city subordinated to the Central Government, front army, and army group has a chief and a deputy chief.

The executive department and the reconnaissance department each have one head.

The executive section, the preliminary examination section, the reconnaissance section, and the investigation section each have a chief.

The *xian* branch bureau and the branch bureau of a city subordinate to a province each have one bureau chief and one deputy bureau chief.

The executive section and the reconnaissance section each have a chief.

The general affairs section has a chief.

The number of other personnel will be determined by the circumstances of each bureau of a province, a city subordinated to the Central Government, or front army and submitted to the Central State Political Security Bureau for orders to increase or decrease it.

Article 180. The duties of the bureau chiefs and section heads are as follows:

1. A bureau chief is in charge of the work of the entire bureau and supervises lower-ranking branch bureaus or special agents. The deputy chief assists the bureau chief in the conduct of the work. When the bureau chief has to leave the office for some reason, the deputy chief will act on his behalf.

2. The executive department (or section) is in charge of arresting, interrogating, and dealing with criminals; oversees the security teams; and supervises the issuing of passports, travel passes, and travel permits.

3. The reconnaissance department (or section) organizes the network, supervises reconnaissance work, and screens mail and publications from the White areas.

4. The general affairs office (or section) is in charge of the internal affairs of the bureau.

Article 181. The state political security branch bureaus have the right to investigate, arrest, and conduct preliminary examinations concerning all counterrevolutionary cases. As to the right to pronounce judgment and execute it in accordance with the law, it belongs to the judicial organs. The special agents have only the right to conduct work within the framework that their higher authorities give them. Without permission from higher authorities, they may not arrest anyone at will, though there will be exceptions under special circumstances (such as when counterrevolutionaries are escaping or have decided to riot, etc.).

Article 182. The actions of organs of the State Political Security Bureau must be bound by the law. Within the limits of the law, procurators of the courts have the right to prosecute cases involving the various organizations under the State Political Security Bureau.

Article 183. Before any of the various organs of the State Political Security Bureau pursue and arrest any counterrevolutionaries hidden in a certain organization or body, they must inform the key leaders of that institution or body. If the key leaders are deemed not qualified to be told, then the key leaders of that body at a higher level must be informed before action is taken.

Article 184. All branch bureaus of the State Political Security Bureau have the right to organize their own armed forces.

Article 185. Branch bureaus and special agents of the state political security bureau must maintain a close horizontal relationship with local soviets, as well as with the command organs and political organs of the Red Army. The bureau chief and special agents may attend meetings of these organs.

#### ***L. The Auditing Committee***

Article 186. Under a provincial executive committee and an executive committee of a city subordinated to the Central Government, there is an auditing committee that comes directly under the central auditing committee and, at the same time, is under the supervision and control of the provincial executive committee and the executive committee of the city subordinate to the Central Government and their presidiums.

Article 187. The auditing committees of a province and a city subordinate to the Central Government are made up of seven to nine members each. The chairman of the workers' and peasants' inspection committee, the heads of the department of the national economy and the department of justice, and the leaders of the provincial military administrative organs are the natural members. The auditing committee will have a chairman.

Under the auditing committee, there should be a secretary, a documentation clerk, and two to five auditors.

Article 188. The responsibilities of the auditing committees of a province and of a city subordinated to the Central Government are to audit the budgets and final accounts of the revenues and expenditures of provincial, city, and urban district soviets; to audit the temporary revenue and expenditure accounts of financial institutions; and to recommend



principles of budgeting to the central auditing committee for a specific province or a particular city.

Article 189. If a provincial auditing committee and an auditing committee of a city subordinated to the Central Government have found any violations against the ordinances in local soviets or local armies at any level, or improper transactions regarding their financial handling, they must propose solutions to the presidiums and report to the Central Auditing Committee.

Article 190. Besides reporting their audits to the Central Auditing Committee and the provincial and city presidiums from time to time, a provincial auditing committee and an auditing committee of a city subordinated to the Central Government must submit, at the end of each fiscal year, a report detailing their auditing procedures.

Article 191. The *xian* will not have an auditing committee. As for the budgets and final accounts of various districts and cities subordinated to the *xian*, they should first be audited by the finance committee before they are submitted to the provincial auditing committee for auditing.

Article 192. When necessary, the provincial auditing committee and the auditing committee of a city subordinated to the Central Government may dispatch auditors directly to the lower-level soviets to investigate matters related to their revenues and expenditures.

### ***M. The General Affairs Offices***

Article 193. Under every provincial, *xian*, district, and city executive committee is a general affairs office to take charge of the internal affairs of the executive committee at all levels. The general affairs office at each level has a director and deputy director to be appointed by the presidium of the same level.

Article 194. Under a provincial general affairs office, a general affairs office of a city subordinated to the Central Government, or a general affairs office of a city subordinated to a province, there is a documentation section, an accounting section, an incoming and outgoing mail section, and a management section, each with a chief. Under each district general affairs office and the general affairs office of a city subordinated to a *xian*, there are one secretary, one to three documentation clerks, one mail clerk, and one custodian.

Article 195. Each general affairs office is solely under the control of the executive committee and the presidium at the same level, and does not belong to a hierarchy of the other general affairs offices.

But in case of necessity, such as to correct some mistakes in incoming and outgoing mail, to improve techniques of paperwork and printing, to reassign technicians, and so on, the general affairs office of a higher-level executive committee may give instructions to that of a lower-level executive committee and may ask the latter to report on these matters.

### **Chapter 5. The Powers of the Local Soviets**

Article 196. The powers of the soviets at the various levels of province, *xian*, district, and city are stipulated as follows:

1. To execute all laws, orders, resolutions, and directives of the central political organs, and to execute the orders, resolutions, and directives of higher-level authorities.
2. To decide upon and execute plans concerning the work of establishing various soviets within its territory.

3. To solve all problems of a local nature.
4. To unify all administrative work of the various levels of soviets within its territory.

Article 197. The provincial soviet representative assembly and its executive committee have the right to supervise soviets at all levels throughout the entire province.

The *xian* soviet representative assembly and its executive committee have the right to supervise soviets at all levels throughout the entire *xian*.

Lower-level soviet organs must absolutely obey higher-level soviet organs.

When resolutions, orders, and directives from lower-level soviets clash with the laws, orders, resolutions, and directives of the central political organs and with those of the immediately superior soviet organs, the higher-level soviets have the right to annul them.

If lower-level soviet organs have violated the orders, resolutions, and directives of higher-level soviet organs, the latter may transform them in part or dissolve them entirely.

## Chapter 6. Provisional Local Organs of Political Power—Revolutionary Committees

Article 198. Provisional organs of political power—revolutionary committees—are to be organized in all areas where the insurrection is taking place and areas newly occupied by the Red Army.

Article 199. In areas where the organization and work of revolutionary mass bodies had begun earlier, and the insurrection has now broken out, the method for establishing revolutionary committees at various levels is as follows:

1. City or township revolutionary committees will be made up of representatives chosen from the city or township revolutionary mass bodies.
2. District revolutionary committees will be made up of representatives chosen from city or township revolutionary committees along with those chosen from district revolutionary mass bodies.
3. *Xian* revolutionary committees will be made up of representatives chosen from district revolutionary committees and *xian* revolutionary mass bodies.
4. Provincial revolutionary committees are made up of representatives chosen from the *xian* revolutionary committees and the provincial revolutionary mass bodies.

The list of members for each revolutionary committee, except for those areas that are isolated by the White areas or inaccessible by transportation, must, however, be reported to the revolutionary committee or the soviet executive committee at the next higher level for review and approval.

Article 200. In areas newly occupied by the Red Army or guerrillas that have never had any bases for the organization and work of revolutionary mass bodies, the methods for establishing the various levels of revolutionary committees are as follows:

1. The list of members for a city or township revolutionary committee will be nominated and appointed by the political organs of the Red Army or guerrilla troops working in that city or township. But after the members are appointed, their names will be announced in a meeting of all the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses in that city or village. If there is a higher soviet or revolutionary committee nearby, the list must be submitted to that soviet or revolutionary committee for appointment.

2. The list of members for a district or *xian* revolutionary committee will be nominated and appointed by the political organs of the Red Army or guerrilla troops working in that *xian*. But a meeting must be called with the attendance of as many workers, peasants, and impoverished masses of the whole district or *xian* as possible to report on this.

Article 201. The revolutionary committee at the township level is made up of seven to eleven members; at the district or city level, eleven to nineteen; and at the *xian* level, fifteen to twenty-five.

Article 202. The provincial revolutionary committee presidium is made up of nine to eleven members. They are either chosen from among the provincial revolutionary committee plenary session, and then appointed by the Central Executive Committee, or directly appointed by the Central Executive Committee.

The *xian* revolutionary committee presidium is made up of five to nine members. They are either chosen from within the *xian* revolutionary committee plenary session and then appointed by the provincial soviet or revolutionary committee, or directly appointed by the provincial soviet or revolutionary committee.

The district revolutionary committee presidium is made up of three to five members. They are either chosen from within the district revolutionary committee plenary session and then appointed by the *xian* soviet or revolutionary committee, or directly appointed by the *xian* soviet or revolutionary committee.

The city revolutionary committee presidium is made up of five to eleven members. They are either chosen from within the city revolutionary committee plenary session and then appointed by the next higher-level government, or directly appointed by the higher-level government.

The township revolutionary committee will have no presidium of its own.

Article 203. The provincial revolutionary committee and the *xian* revolutionary committee will each have a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen.

The district revolutionary committee and the township revolutionary committee will each have a chairman and a vice-chairman.

The city revolutionary committee will have a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen.

The chairmen and vice-chairmen are all chosen from within the presidiums and then reported to the next higher-level government for appointment, or directly appointed by the higher-level government.

Article 204. Under each of the provincial, *xian*, district, and city revolutionary committees, there is a labor department, a land department, a military department, a committee to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, a financial department, a grain department, and other departments according to the stage of development of the work.

Each department will have one department head and one deputy head. The committee to eliminate counterrevolutionaries in a township will have seven to nine members; at the district and city levels, seven to eleven; and at the *xian* and provincial levels, five to seven.

As for the quota for the other staff members, it will be determined by the provincial soviet or provincial revolutionary committee, according to the needs of the work, and submitted to the various departments of the Central Government. After approval by the Council of People's Commissars, the quota will be either increased or decreased according to orders.

Under each department is its committee. The number of committee members and their responsibilities are identical to the corresponding departments of the various levels of soviets. (The grain department and the department of the national economy are the same.)

Article 205. Each department is directly subordinate to the corresponding department at the next higher level and absolutely obeys its orders. But, at the same time, it is also under the supervision and control of the revolutionary committee of the same level.

Article 206. The duties of the revolutionary committees are to develop the struggles of the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses against the landlords and the bourgeoisie; to seize the arms of the armed forces of the local landlords and bourgeoisie; to organize the Red armed forces that are under its own command and are completely made up of the exploited workers, peasants, and impoverished masses (without the participation of any exploiting elements); to develop revolutionary war with the utmost vigor; to eliminate and suppress all local counterrevolutionary armed forces; to lead the masses in forceful suppression of all those counterrevolutionaries who have already been overthrown but are still active in secret; to lead the masses in confiscating and redistributing the land; to carry out the Labor Law; to organize unions and poor peasant leagues, making them pillars of the revolutionary committees, and in cities to pay special attention to leading the workers in supervising the capitalists' enterprises and stores; and, finally, to call a congress of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies and elect formal organs of political power (soviets).

Article 207. The transition from a revolutionary committee to a soviet depends on the development stage of the revolutionary struggle of the workers, peasants, and impoverished masses in that area, and is to be determined by the highest political organ of that area.

## Chapter 7. Supplementary Article

Article 208. The organizational law will become effective as of the date it is issued. The Central Executive Committee may change or abolish any article of this law at any time.

Chairman, Central Executive Committee	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

# ***Organic Law of the Central Soviet***

## ***Order of the Executive Committee of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Central, No. 1)***

(February 17, 1934)

The Organic Law of the Central Soviet of the Chinese Soviet Republic has been formulated and is hereby promulgated.

February 17, 1934

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

### **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. This Organic Law is formulated on the basis of the principles laid down by the Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and the Central Soviet state organs should be structured in accordance with this law.

### **Chapter 2. The National Soviet Congress**

Article 2. The National Soviet Congress is the organ of supreme state power of the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 3. The National Soviet Congress is made up of the deputies elected by provincial soviet congresses, the soviet congresses of those *xian* directly under the Central Government, and the Red Army.

Article 4. The National Soviet Congress is convened once every two years by the Central Executive Committee. The assembly may be postponed to a later date if it cannot be called on schedule because of special circumstances.

Article 5. An interim National Soviet Congress may be convened by the Central Executive Committee of its own accord when necessary, or at the request of local soviets representing one-third of the population of the whole nation.<sup>1</sup>

Article 6. The National Soviet Congress hears and discusses the report prepared by the

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 307-16.

1. The meaning is obviously one-third of the population of the areas controlled by the soviets.

Central Executive Committee, draws up and amends the Constitution and other laws, determines the broad political orientation for the whole state, and restructures the Central Executive Committee.

### **Chapter 3. The Central Executive Committee**

Article 7. The Central Executive Committee is the organ of supreme state power when the National Soviet Congress is not in session.

Article 8. The number of members on the Central Executive Committee must not exceed 585.

Article 9. The plenary session of the Central Executive Committee is convened every six months by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. It may be postponed to a later date if it cannot be called on schedule because of special circumstances.

Article 10. An interim session of the Central Executive Committee may be convened upon a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee or upon the request of more than half of the members of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 11. The Central Executive Committee is responsible to the National Soviet Congress and should report its work to the Congress.

Article 12. The Central Executive Committee may promulgate laws and directives and have them enforced throughout the Chinese Soviet Republic.

Article 13. The Central Executive Committee examines and approves any policy pertaining to the political and economic policies of the state as a whole, and any change in state organs.

Article 14. The Central Executive Committee has the power to suspend the application of or to alter the laws, decrees, and decisions made by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, and other organs.

Article 15. The Central Executive Committee elects its Presidium, the number of which must not exceed twenty-five, with one chairman and two to four deputy chairmen.

Article 16. The Central Executive Committee selects and appoints the Council of People's Commissars and its chairman. Those appointed as commissars must be members of the Central Executive Committee.

### **Chapter 4. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee**

Article 17. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee is the highest organ of state power when the Committee is not in session.

Article 18. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee supervises the enforcement of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the laws, decrees, and decisions made by the Central Executive Committee of the National Soviet Congress.

Article 19. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the power to suspend or alter the decisions, laws, and decrees made by the Council of People's Commissars.

Article 20. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the power to suspend or alter the decisions and directives of provincial soviet congresses and their executive committees.

Article 21. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee has the power to

promulgate laws and directives, and to examine and approve the laws, ordinances, and directives issued by the Council of People's Commissars, the various commissariats, and its other subordinate organs.

Article 22. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee resolves problems in the relationship between the Council of People's Commissars and the various commissariats, and between provincial soviets.

Article 23. The Presidium is fully responsible to the Central Executive Committee and must report its work to the Committee.

#### **Chapter 5. The Powers of the National Soviet Congress and of the Central Executive Committee**

Article 24. The powers of the National Soviet Congress and of the Central Executive Committee are stipulated as follows:

1. Promulgating and amending the Constitution;
- (Note) This right belongs exclusively to the National Soviet Congress.
2. Concluding treaties with foreign countries and ratifying international pacts on behalf of the Soviet Republic of China;
3. Establishing the organizational system of the courts, and promulgating the civil, criminal, and procedural laws;
4. Promulgating the Labor Law, Land Law, Election Law, Marriage Law, Soviet Organic Law, and other individual laws;
5. Determining the broad orientations for internal and foreign affairs;
6. Altering the borders of the country;
7. Determining the jurisdiction of the local soviets and settling disputes among them;
8. Dividing administrative areas, and establishing, merging, reforming, or dissolving organs of local political power;
9. Declaring war on or making peace with foreign countries;
10. Determining measures and weights and the monetary system;
11. Issuing government bonds both at home and abroad;
12. Examining and ratifying the state budget and final accounts;
13. Systematizing tax rates;
14. Organizing and guiding the army, navy, and air force;
15. Specifying the rights of the citizens of the Chinese Soviet Republic and the right of residence and other civil rights of nationals of other countries who live in the Chinese Soviet Republic;
16. Granting complete or partial pardons;
17. Laying down general principles for national education;
18. Selecting, appointing, and removing members and the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars;
19. Formulating policies and plans for industry, agriculture, commerce, and transportation;
20. On behalf of the Chinese Soviet Republic, concluding with other nationalities living within the boundaries of the country treaties establishing the Soviet Federal Republic; and
21. Removing and changing the members of the soviet executive committees at lower levels.

## Chapter 6. The Council of People's Commissars

Article 25. The Council of People's Commissars is the administrative organ of the Central Executive Committee and is in charge of the political affairs of the whole country.

Article 26. The Council of People's Commissars is made up of the following members:

1. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,
2. People's commissar for foreign affairs,
3. People's commissar of labor,
4. People's commissar of land,
5. People's commissar of military affairs,
6. People's commissar of finance,
7. People's commissar for the national economy,
8. People's commissar of grain,
9. People's commissar of education,
10. People's commissar for internal affairs,
11. People's commissar of justice, and
12. Chairman of the workers' and peasants' inspection committee.

(Note 1) The number of commissars may be increased by the Central Executive Committee as required by the work.

(Note 2) The title of people's commissar may be used only by the members of the Council of People's Commissars, and must not be used by the members of other central or local committees.

Article 27. For the purpose of suppressing counterrevolution, the State Political Security Bureau is set up under the Council of People's Commissars. Its organization is laid down separately.

Article 28. In order to accomplish the goal stipulated in Article 25 of this Organic Law, the Council of People's Commissars may promulgate decrees and regulations, within the limits specified by the Central Executive Committee, and may also employ appropriate administrative measures in order to enhance speed and order in administrative work.

Article 29. All decisions made and decrees and regulations issued by the Council of People's Commissars should be reported to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 30. Any decision made by the Council of People's Commissars, if related to the broad political orientation, should be submitted to the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium for examination and approval. On matters of urgency, however, the Council of People's Commissars may take a decision and then report it to the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium.

Article 31. The Council of People's Commissars is empowered to examine, revise, or suspend the decrees and decisions put forward by the people's commissariats.

Article 32. When a people's commissariat or a provincial soviet executive committee disagrees with the decision or decree made by the Council of People's Commissars, it can put forward its objection to the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium, but must not cease to carry out the decision.

Article 33. The Council of People's Commissars is responsible to the Central Executive Committee and its Presidium, and should report to them on its work in a timely fashion.



## **Chapter 7. The Supreme Court**

Article 34. In order to guarantee the validity of the revolutionary laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Supreme Court is set up under the Central Executive Committee.

Article 35. The Supreme Court has one president and two vice-presidents, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 36. Under the Supreme Court there is set up a criminal court, a civil court, and a military tribunal, each having a chief judge.

Article 37. The authority of the Supreme Court is specified as follows:

1. To give legal explanations of general statutes;
2. To examine the verdicts and decisions made by provincial courts and the Supreme Military Tribunal;
3. To hear cases of senior government functionaries other than members of the Central Executive Committee who have violated the law while in office (violations of the law by members of the Central Executive Committee are to be dealt with separately by the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium); and
4. To conduct trial on appeal against verdicts passed by provincial courts or the Supreme Military Tribunal, and on cases on which procurators disagree with provincial courts or the Supreme Military Tribunal and have therefore lodged a protest.

Article 38. A committee is to be organized in the Supreme Court, its numbers to be determined by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee according to circumstances, with the president of the Supreme Court as chairman, to discuss and decide all the important matters and cases within the powers of the Supreme Court.

Article 39. The Supreme Court has one chief procurator, one deputy chief procurator, and a certain number of procurators. The chief procurator and the deputy chief procurator are appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 40. The detailed organization of the Supreme Court is specified separately.

## **Chapter 8. The Audit Committee**

Article 41. The Audit Committee is set up under the Central Executive Committee and its functions are

1. To examine and approve the state revenue and expenditure; and
2. To supervise the institution of the state budget.

Article 42. The Audit Committee is made up of five to nine people, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 43. The Audit Committee has one chairman and one deputy chairman. Other positions are to be created according to need.

## **Chapter 9. The People's Commissariats and Commissions for Dealing with the Affairs of the Commissariats**

Article 44. Under the Council of People's Commissars are set up commissariats of foreign affairs, labor, land, military affairs, finance, national economy, grain, education, internal affairs, and justice.

Article 45. Each commissariat has one or two deputy commissars, appointed by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, to assist the commissar or to act on his behalf in his absence.

Article 46. In order to facilitate the work of the people's commissariats, under each commissariat there should be established a commission of the commissariat, an organ that discusses and advises on the work of the commissariat.

Article 47. The members of the commission under each commissariat are appointed by the Council of People's Commissars. The number of members is increased or reduced by the Council of People's Commissars whenever necessary. The people's commissar is automatically the chairman of the commission of his commissariat.

Article 48. Each commissar is authorized to settle all problems by himself within the limitations on his power. Important problems must, however, be submitted to the commission of the commissariat for discussion. When the commission disagrees with the commissar, it has the right to raise the matter with the Council of People's Commissars or the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee.

Article 49. The powers and functions of each people's commissariat and its detailed organization are specified separately.

Article 50. Under the Council of People's Commissars there are established the Revolutionary Military Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection Committee, the powers and functions as well as the organization of which are specified separately.

#### **Chapter 10. Supplementary Article**

Article 51. This Organic Law becomes valid on the day of its promulgation.

# *Temporary Regulations for Employing Auxiliary Labor*

*Order of the Executive Committee of the  
Provisional Central Government of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic (Central, No. 3)*

(February 20, 1934)

The temporary regulations for employing auxiliary labor have now been formulated and are hereby promulgated.

February 20, 1934

Chairman Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen Xiang Ying  
Zhang Guotao

Article 1. The present regulations are formulated in accordance with the provisions of Note 1 to Article 1 of the Labor Law promulgated on October 15, 1933. The middle peasants, poor peasants, small boat owners, and small handicraftsmen, who depend on their labor for a living but are short of hands and employ the labor of other people to supplement their own, must observe the regulations so as to be freed from the restrictions established by certain articles of the Labor Law. But the regulations do not apply to the rich peasants who exploit other people's labor on a regular basis or to the enterprises, organizations, shops, and workshops that often employ two or more people.

Article 2. The recommendation for employing auxiliary labor must proceed in accordance with the general stipulations about employment procedures of the Labor Law. In busy seasons or at certain times of the year when other seasonal work is called for, however, employers may hire people by themselves, but must report it to the recommendation office.

Article 3. The actual daily working hours of those hired as auxiliary labor must not exceed eight on the average, but, with the consent of the workers, extra work is permitted. The hours for the extra work must not exceed four hours in two successive days.

Article 4. For those not yet of age but hired as auxiliary labor, usually the actual working hours in a day must not exceed six on the average. When some particular job requires them to work the same length of time as adults, the employer may ask the employees, with the latter's consent, to extend their working hours. But their working time may only be extended when they are working together with adults.

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 317-21.

Article 5. The actual time of the day to start work and cease work should be negotiated and agreed upon by the employer and the employees before the start of work, or specified in the contract if the labor is hired by the year or month.

Article 6. In both the morning and the afternoon of each working day, there should be one or two work breaks for workers to rest, have tea, or smoke as needed. At noon there should be a longer break so that the workers can have lunch and take a nap. Neither of the breaks is to be included in the actual working hours.

(Note) Nursing mothers are to nurse their babies during work breaks.

Article 7. On official holidays, those who are hired by the year or the month may take the day off with pay. For those who do not take days off on official holidays, a vacation of several days may be granted at an appropriate time.

Article 8. All work is to stop on the commemoration days specified in the Labor Law and revolutionary commemoration days stipulated by local governments. Work on commemoration days is to be done only with the consent of the employees, whether they are hired on a long-term basis, by the month, or by the day, and their pay on these days shall be doubled without exception.

Article 9. Those hired as auxiliary labor who have worked continuously for five and a half months or more shall have the length of their vacation, the arrangements for the vacation, and the vacation pay determined in accordance with the provisions of articles 26, 27, and 28 of the Labor Law.

Article 10. The amount of pay and the method of payment for all those hired as auxiliary labor should be specified in the contract. In the case of odd jobs, pay should be negotiated and agreed upon between the employer and the employee before the work begins, but it may never go below the minimum wage promulgated by the local government.

Article 11. Wages are to be paid mainly in the form of currency commonly used in the locality in question; however, with the consent of the employee, payment in kind instead of in money is permitted.

Article 12. Payment of wages may not fall into arrears. The dates on which laborers hired by the year or by the month are paid on a regular basis should be specified in the contract.

Article 13. Extra pay should be given for extra work done outside of official working hours. The method of payment for overtime should be specified in the contract, or negotiated and agreed upon before the start of work in the case of odd-jobs.

Article 14. All those who undertake jobs that are injurious to health and hygiene, such as carrying manure and demolishing houses, should be provided by the employer with things like aprons and special foods, such as eggs and meat.

Article 15. Employees should be assigned to live in quarters that are clean and conducive to health and not in rooms that store ashes or shelter cows or are in the vicinity of a lavatory; they should be provided with quilts in cold weather and mosquito nets or mosquito-repellent incense in hot weather.

Article 16. Employees should be served the same sort of food as the employer, with adequate dishes and rice.

Article 17. Women who are hired by the year are entitled to two months' maternity leave with pay before and after childbirth. The employer is responsible for providing pay during such leave.

Article 18. When an employee hired for a period of six successive months or more

falls ill or is injured after having worked for two months, he is to be treated at the expense of the employer for up to a month, while receiving full pay. Those who have not yet worked for two months are to be treated in accordance with Article 19 of these regulations.

Article 19. When an employee hired on a monthly basis for a period of three successive months or more falls ill or is injured after having worked for one month, he is to be treated at the expense of the employer for up to a week, while receiving full pay. Those who have not yet worked for one month are to be treated in accordance with Article 20 of these regulations.

Article 20. When an employee hired on a month-to-month basis falls ill or is injured after having worked for ten days, he is to be treated at the expense of his employer for up to three days, while receiving full pay. Those who have not yet worked for ten days are to be treated in accordance with Article 21 of these regulations.

Article 21. When an odd-jobber hired on a daily basis falls ill or is injured on the job, he should be given the day's pay and the necessary medicine.

Article 22. When someone hired as auxiliary labor dies while employed, the employer should subsidize the family for funeral expenses, the payment of which is specified as follows:

1. When an employee hired by the year dies of an occupational disease or an injury suffered on the job, regardless of the length of service, he is to be given a subsidy of two months' pay. If death is the result of an injury from an ordinary accident, the employer should give the family a funeral allowance in the amount of one and a half months of his pay if he has worked for at least a month, or a subsidy in the amount of a month's pay if he has worked for less than a month.

2. When an employee hired by the month dies of an occupational disease or injury suffered on the job, regardless of the length of service, the employer should give his family a death allowance in the amount of his monthly pay. If his death is the result of an illness or an injury from an ordinary cause, the employer should give the family a funeral allowance of half his month's pay if he has worked for at least ten days, or an allowance equaling ten days' pay if he has not yet worked for ten days.

3. When an odd-jobber dies of an injury suffered on the job, the employer should give his family 10 *yuan* for funeral expenses.

Article 23. These regulations take effect from the date of their promulgation.

# Judicial Procedures

## Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Central, No. 5)

(April 8, 1934)

The following judicial procedures for the Chinese Soviet Republic have been established and are hereby promulgated. It is so ordered.

April 8, 1934

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

Under the circumstances of the civil war, organs such as soviet courts of justice, political security bureaus, committees to eliminate counterrevolutionaries, and so on, should take resolute, swift, and correct measures to eliminate the counterrevolutionaries, so as to protect the interests of the revolutionary people and consolidate soviet political power. To this end, the following judicial procedures are stipulated:

1. Special agents from district security bureaus, district courts, district committees for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries (under the revolutionary committees in new soviet areas), people's police bureaus, and labor courts are all entrusted with power to arrest counterrevolutionaries and other criminals who should be arrested. The previous regulation, according to which a district may not make such arrests without approval from higher levels, should be annulled. It is further stipulated: in times of emergency, township and urban district soviets, and township and urban district revolutionary committees, as long as they have the support of the revolutionary popular masses in the locality, also have the authority to arrest counterrevolutionaries and other important criminals. Following their arrest, they are to be turned over to the organs for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries and the judicial organs at the district level.

2. District judicial departments and district committees for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries have the right to try and sentence all local criminals (counterrevolutionaries and others).

In new soviet areas or border areas, areas under enemy attack, or where counterrevolutionaries are particularly active, and also in times of urgent mobilization for certain work (such as the Land Investigation Movement, Red Army expansion, and the sudden attack campaign<sup>1</sup>), district judicial departments and committees for the elimina-

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 323–25.

1. *Tuji yundong*. This term is probably an abbreviated reference to the military tactics of *duancun tuji*, commonly translated as "the tactics of short, sharp thrusts," which were being promoted at this time. See above, the Introduction.

tion of counterrevolutionaries, as long as they have the support of the revolutionary popular masses in the locality, have the right to carry out death sentences directly after a trial of the first instance in cases of counterrevolutionaries and other criminals from the gentry and landlord classes. But after such a sentence is carried out, it must be reported to higher authorities to deal with the matter.

3. Judicial departments at both provincial and *xian* levels, committees for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and military tribunals at both basic and higher levels are all authorized to arrest, try, and sentence any criminal, and to carry out the sentence (including the death penalty).

4. In all cases involving counterrevolutionaries, state political security bureaus at all levels have the authority to hold preliminary examinations, after which the case is turned over to a court to deal with the matter.

Local security bureaus in border areas and Red Army security bureaus at the front are, however, authorized to deal directly with enemy spies, fascist elements, sword-wielding bandits, and militia bandits,<sup>2</sup> as well as counterrevolutionary gentry and landlords, without having to go through the judicial departments. In serious and pressing cases of counterrevolution, the State Political Security Bureau and its branches in local areas, in the Red Army, and in military districts are authorized to adopt emergency measures. After an emergency measure has been taken, if disputes arise with the local government, top leaders in the military administration, or other organs, the right to determine whether or not the matter was handled appropriately rests with the Council of People's Commissars or, in soviet areas not directly joined with the Central Area, with the presidium of the provincial soviet.

5. The system of requiring approval from higher levels is hereby abolished, and the practice of appeal instituted. A criminal who does not accept the sentence is permitted to appeal to a higher level. It is further stipulated that the period of time allowed for appeal is a maximum of seven days, starting from the day the defendant is served with a written sentence. (If the defendant is illiterate, this must be explained to him orally.)

In new soviet areas or border areas, areas that are under enemy attack, or in other emergencies, counterrevolutionaries and criminals from the gentry or landlord classes may be deprived of the right of appeal.

6. It is stipulated that the soviet courts adopt a two-level trial system, that is, one composed of the trial of first instance and the final judgment. If the district is the organ of the trial of first instance, the *xian* is the organ of final judgment. If the *xian* is the organ of the trial of first instance, the province is the organ of final judgment. If the province is the organ of the trial of first instance, the Supreme Court is the organ of final judgment. If the lower-level military tribunal is the organ of the trial of first instance, the higher-level military tribunal is the organ of final judgment. If the higher-level military tribunal is the organ of the trial of first instance, the organ of final judgment is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ in the judicial process. After going through the two levels of trials, no case may be further appealed. If, however, the procurator has

2. The term *daofei*, literally "sword bandits," refers to old-fashioned local bandits; *luanfei* is a pejorative appellation for the landlord militias or *minluan*, here translated "militia bandits." For occurrences of such usage in the body of the volume, see the relevant note to the text of February 27, 1931 (where the military forces in the service of the landlords are called *jingfei*, or "pacification bandits"), and numerous texts of 1931 and 1932 where they are referred to as *luanfei*, notably the orders of August 12, 1931, and September 26, 1932.

further objections in a particular case, he may lodge a protest with the proper judicial organ and bring about one more trial.

7. Apart from the organs specified in these procedures, no other organ has the right to arrest, try, or punish any criminal. Exceptions are made only in times of emergency.

8. The judicial procedures stipulated in Directive No. 6 of December 16, 1931; the Temporary Organizational and Judicial Regulations of the Commissariat for Justice of June 9, 1932; and the Temporary Regulations for Military Tribunals of February 1, 1932, all promulgated by the Central Executive Committee, are hereby declared null and void.



# *Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries*

*Order of the Central Executive Committee of the  
Chinese Soviet Republic (Central, No. 6)*

(April 8, 1934)

The regulations for the punishment of counterrevolutionaries are hereby laid down and promulgated. It is so ordered.

April 8, 1934

Chairman	Mao Zedong
Vice-Chairmen	Xiang Ying Zhang Guotao

Article 1. Whoever commits any of the crimes enumerated in these regulations, whether he be a Chinese or a foreigner, and whether within or beyond the territorial boundaries of the Chinese Soviet Republic, shall be punished pursuant to these regulations.

Article 2. Whoever attempts to overthrow or sabotage the Soviet Government or the rights secured by the democratic revolution of the workers and peasants, with the intention of maintaining or restoring the rule of the gentry, the landlord class, and the bourgeoisie, regardless of the means employed, commits a counterrevolutionary act.

(Note) Counterrevolutionary criminal acts against the soviets or committed within the soviet boundaries, as referred to in these regulations, include all counterrevolutionary criminal acts against revolutionary committees or committed in areas under the jurisdiction of these revolutionary committees.

Article 3. Whoever organizes counterrevolutionary armed troops, militia bandits, or local bandits to invade soviet territory, or incites the residents to counterrevolutionary rebellion within the soviet boundaries, shall be punished by death.

Article 4. Whoever collaborates with imperialist forces and Guomindang warlords in armed encroachment upon soviet territory, or in resistance to any maneuver of the Soviet Red Army, shall be punished by death.

Article 5. Whoever organizes any sort of counterrevolutionary group to oppose or undermine the soviets, with the intention of maintaining or restoring the rule of the despotic gentry, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie, shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than three years.

Article 6. Whoever organizes or incites residents to refuse payment of taxes or perfor-

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 327-32.

mance of other obligations with intent to jeopardize the soviets shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year.

Article 7. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, intentionally opposes and transgresses any laws and ordinances issued by the soviets and opposes and undermines any enterprises run by the soviets shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year.

Article 8. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, worms his way into a soviet organ or an enterprise run by the soviets with intent to usurp or undermine soviet power and its enterprises shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years.

Article 9. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, instigates or executes the murder or attempted murder of someone who works in the Soviet Government, the Red Army, a revolutionary body, or any other revolutionary element, regardless of the means used, shall be punished by death.

Article 10. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution or to be rewarded for services to the counterrevolution, carries out any sort of espionage activity or discloses, steals, and collects any material that is of the nature of a state secret or military information shall be sentenced to death. Whoever leaks any such secrets as the result of neglect of duty and without realizing the consequences of his actions shall be sentenced to imprisonment for from one to five years.

Article 11. Those who have held important responsibilities in the reactionary régime and engaged in active opposition to the interests of the workers and peasants and to the revolutionary movement shall be punished by death. Sentence may, however, be reduced under special circumstances.

Article 12. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, gives talks or engages in conversation using reactionary writings and pictures to carry out propaganda and agitation toward residents or Red Army soldiers, or spreads rumors that cause panic in society and undermine faith in the soviets or the Red Army, shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 13. Whoever produces or is found in possession of any sort of reactionary demagogic writings or pictures to be used for counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation shall be punished with imprisonment for from one to five years.

Article 14. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, uses religious superstition to incite residents to undermine the soviets and violate their laws and ordinances shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 15. Whoever surrenders to the counterrevolution and discloses to it any secrets of the Chinese Soviet Republic, or helps the counterrevolution in active opposition to the Soviet and the Red Army (i.e., a traitor to the revolution), shall be punished by death.

Article 16. Whoever defects to the enemy bringing with him firearms or other military supplies or incites or organizes other people to surrender to the enemy shall be punished by death.

Article 17. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, worms his way into a revolutionary army unit with intent to capture or disband the unit in assistance to the enemy shall be punished by death.

Article 18. Whoever leads or organizes Red Army soldiers to desert, and any Red Army soldier who has deserted as many as five times, shall be punished by death. Under special circumstances, the punishment may be reduced.

Article 19. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, intentionally destroys or abandons firearms and other military supplies or steals military supplies to trade with the enemy shall be sentenced to death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year.

Article 20. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, deliberately disobeys any order from a higher commander with intent to interfere with some military task, intentionally fires at his own troops on the battlefield, or seizes an opportunity to create disturbances on the battlefield shall be punished by death.

Article 21. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, murders revolutionary people or deliberately destroys or seizes their property so that the reputation of the soviets and the Red Army is impaired among the masses shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious cases shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 22. Whoever is found in secret possession of firearms in the service of his counterrevolutionary purposes shall be punished by death.

Article 23. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, sets up any secret organ that sabotages transportation on land and water or damages or destroys any public warehouse, state-run enterprise, or public building shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 24. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, destroys by fire any house or mountain forest, thus causing great loss to the state and the residents, shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 25. Whoever, with the intent to undermine the economy of the Chinese Soviet Republic, produces or transports counterfeit soviet currency, public bonds, or credit bills; incites the residents to reject soviet currency or abate its value to create disturbances in the market; or hoards or smuggles out a large amount of cash with intent to disrupt the market shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 26. Whoever, for the purpose of counterrevolution, obstructs or undermines the trade of the Chinese Soviet Republic, causing great losses to state-run enterprises, cooperatives, and the people, or deliberately closes down his business to provoke economic turmoil, shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one year.

Article 27. Whoever falsely assumes the name of the soviets, the Red Army, or any revolutionary body, or falsifies any public or personal seal and document in the pursuit of counterrevolutionary activities shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months.

Article 28. Whoever, sneaking into a soviet organ for the purpose of counterrevolution, deliberately connives with any counterrevolutionary element or criminal from the landlord class or the bourgeoisie, instigates the person's escape, or administers light punishment to him for grave crimes; or on the other hand brings false charges against a revolutionary element, subjects him to brutal torture, or suppresses his prosecuting or

exposing counterrevolutionaries, shall be punished by death. Those whose cases are less serious shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years.

Article 29. Whoever has been deported by the soviets, but secretly reenters soviet territory with intent to carry out counterrevolutionary activities shall be punished by death.

Article 30. Whoever hides, shelters, or assists anyone who has committed any offense as specified in Articles 3 to 29 in these regulations is deemed to have committed the same crime as the alleged offender.

Article 31. Punishment shall be increased for whoever has been sentenced to imprisonment by a court for committing one or more offenses as specified in Articles 3 to 30 of these regulations, but again commits one or more of these crimes.

Article 32. Punishment shall be reduced for whoever has attempted to carry out an offense as specified in these regulations, but has not succeeded in doing so (an attempted crime), and was merely an accomplice of the said crime.

Article 33. Punishment for a person who has committed an offense not willingly, but as a result of coercion by others which he truly could not avoid, or who was not aware of the ultimate object of the criminal act, or not directly involved in the actual commission of the crime, shall be remitted or reduced from that prescribed in the appropriate article.

Article 34. Punishment for an offender who is a worker or peasant element and plays no leading or major role in the offense should be lighter than that stipulated in these regulations for a person committing the same crime from the landlord or bourgeois class.

Article 35. Punishment for a person who has done meritorious services to the Soviet should be reduced from that prescribed in the appropriate article relating to his crime in these regulations.

Article 36. Punishment for whoever, having committed one of the offenses specified in these regulations, voluntarily surrenders himself to the Soviet before he is discovered (a voluntary confessor), or whoever is repentant when his crime is discovered, frankly tells everything related to the crime, and helps the organs engaged in the elimination of counterrevolutionaries to capture other accomplices (a person making a fresh start), shall be reduced from that prescribed in the relevant articles.

Article 37. Punishment for a young offender under the age of sixteen who has committed one of the crimes specified in these Regulations shall be reduced from that prescribed in the appropriate article. A juvenile offender under the age of fourteen shall be sent to a reformatory for reformation through education.

Article 38. Counterrevolutionary criminal acts not specified in these regulations shall be punished in accordance with similar provisions herein.

Article 39. In addition to the punishment meted out to a person who has committed one of the offenses specified in these regulations in accordance with the appropriate provisions, all or part of the person's property may be confiscated, and he may be deprived of all or part of his civil rights.

Article 40. These regulations prescribe ten years as the maximum length of imprisonment.

Article 41. These regulations take effect on the date of their promulgation.

# *Marriage Law*

## *Order of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (Central, No. 7)*

(April 8, 1934)

The Marriage Law has now been formulated and is hereby promulgated. The marriage regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued on December 1, 1931, become void from the date of the promulgation of this law.

April 8, 1934

Chairman                Mao Zedong

Vice-Chairmen        Xiang Ying  
                              Zhang Guotao

### **Chapter 1. General Principles**

Article 1. The principle that a marriage between a man and a woman must be based on free will is established. The entire system of arranged marriages, compulsion, and marriages based on buying and selling is abolished. The practice of raising child brides is prohibited.

Article 2. The system of monogamy shall be practiced, and polygamy and polyandry are prohibited.

### **Chapter 2. Marriage**

Article 3. The marriageable age is twenty for men and eighteen for women.

Article 4. The marriage of a man and a woman must be agreed upon by both parties, and no coercion by either side or by a third party is permitted.

Article 5. Marriage of a man and a woman who are related by blood within three generations is prohibited.

Article 6. Marriage by those suffering from venereal disease, leprosy, pulmonary tuberculosis, and other types of dangerous infectious diseases is prohibited. But those who have been examined by a doctor and found fit for marriage are excepted from this article.

Article 7. Marriage of those suffering from mental disorders or paralysis is prohibited.

Article 8. To marry, a man and a woman must go together to the township soviet or an "urban district" soviet to register and receive a marriage certificate. Bride-price, betrothal gifts, and dowry are abolished.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 4, pp. 333–36.

Article 9. A man and a woman who cohabit are considered to be married, whether or not they have registered.

### **Chapter 3. Divorce**

Article 10. Freedom of divorce is hereby affirmed. A divorce can be granted when either the man or the woman resolutely demands it.

Article 11. A request for divorce by the wife of a Red Army soldier must be agreed to by her husband. In places where correspondence is easy, however, after two years without hearing from her husband, the wife may request the local government to register a divorce. In places where correspondence is difficult, after four years without hearing from her husband, the wife may request the local government to register a divorce.

Article 12. A divorce between a man and a woman must be registered at a township soviet or an "urban district" soviet.

### **Chapter 4. Disposition of the Property of the Man and the Woman after Divorce**

Article 13. After divorce, the man and woman are both free to dispose of the land, property, and debt each of them had originally. When the man and woman have been married for a full year, any increase in property under their joint control is to be divided equally between them. If they have children, it is to be divided equally on a per capita basis. The repayment of any joint debt incurred during the period when the man and the woman lived together shall be the responsibility of the man.

Article 14. After her divorce, if she moves to another village, the woman shall be allotted a piece of land according to the rate of land distribution in her new village of residence. If the new village of residence has no more land for distribution, then the woman shall still hold the land she owned before, and the method of dealing with it—whether by renting it out, selling it, or exchanging it with someone else—shall be decided by the woman herself. With regard to children raised by the mother, who follow her to her new residence, the methods for distribution or dealing with the land shall be determined entirely by the aforementioned rules.

Article 15. After divorce, if the woman does not remarry and lacks labor power, or has no fixed occupation and is therefore unable to support herself, the man must help the woman plow and cultivate the land or provide support for her to live. If, however, the man himself is unable to work, or has no fixed occupation, and cannot provide support, he shall be exempted from this provision.

### **Chapter 5. Arrangements Regarding Children after a Divorce**

Article 16. Children born or still being carried before the divorce shall be raised by the woman. If the woman does not want to raise them, then they shall be raised by the man. In the case of older children, however, the wishes of the children must be respected as well.

Article 17. As regards children to be raised by the woman, the man shall bear two-thirds of the children's necessary living expense until the age of sixteen. He can make the payment either in cash or by cultivating the land distributed to the children.

Article 18. When a woman remarries, only if her new husband is willing to raise her children can the natural father of the children be relieved of the responsibility for paying for the children's necessary living expenses as prescribed in the previous article. A new husband who adopts the children must register at the township soviet or the city soviet. Once registered, he must take responsibility for raising the children to adulthood, and may not stop halfway or abuse them.

#### **Chapter 6. Arrangements Regarding Illegitimate Children**

Article 19. All children born out of wedlock shall enjoy all rights granted to legitimate children in this Marriage Law. Abusing or abandoning illegitimate children is prohibited.

#### **Chapter 7. Supplementary Articles**

Article 20. Anyone in violation of this law will be duly punished in accordance with the Criminal Law.

Article 21. This law comes into force upon promulgation.

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# Index

- AB Corps: xliv, xlix; civil rights and, 833–34; elimination of, 319; and Futian Incident, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvii, xliii, 47–48, 61, 62, 493; infiltration by, xxix, 48, 50, 63, 89, 101; and masses, 20, 27, 104; prosecution of, 171, 173, 182, 557–58; in Red Army, 65; in soviet areas, 105, 677
- Accusation committees, 427–28, 515, 535, 571–72, 935
- Adventurism, 56–57, 58, 59, 197–98, 199
- Agitation: defined, 24n4; errors in, 257, 471; in *News Bulletin*, 24; for Red troops, 31; slogans for, 212. *See also* Propaganda
- Agrarian revolution: lxiv–lxv; class status in, 317, 435, 512, 548, 684–87; defeat of enemies and, 324; development of, 413, 671, 711; errors in, 199; in Fujian Province, 199; land reform in, xxvi; political power in, 822; poor peasant league in, 453, 457
- Agriculture: bankruptcy in, 465, 685; collective, 846–47; committees for, 908, 915, 925; competitions in, 238, 349, 621; delays in, 18–20, 69–70; department of, 385; discussions on, 457, 741–42; experiment stations for, 567, 596, 692, 908, 915, 923; instructions for, 321, 328–29, 348–49, 382–83; and irrigation, 372, 784, 810, 824–25; labor power for, 630, 691–92, 706; and model farming, 603–04; production in, 348–49, 395, 417, 453, 485, 487, 576, 578, 687, 915; taxes on, 786, 815–16, 860–61, 879–80, 881t, 900–903, 909, 914, 925; wages in, 605, 682t. *See also* Grain; Harvest
- Air raids: committees on, 907, 914; at front line, 754; Japanese, 206, 764; preparation for, 33, 72, 73, 152, 153, 307, 599; in soviet areas, 392, 491, 538
- All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 883, 884, 888, 891, 894–96
- All-China General Labor Union, 417
- America: and China, 528, 760, 761, 770; GMD support from, 461, 469, 481, 537–40, 757; imperialism of, 46, 210, 405; and Japan, 195, 760, 773; and Soviet Union, 657
- Ancestral halls, 450–51, 546, 547, 565–66, 823
- Anfu Clique, 774
- Anhui Province, 36, 46
- Anti-Bolshevik Corps. *See* AB Corps
- Anti-imperialist movement, 170
- Anti-Japanese volunteer armies: CCP support for, 661, 761, 768–70; and guerrilla warfare, 212, 213; Mao's letter to, 652–53; as revolutionary force, 207, 315, 392, 775; strength of, 315, 575, 660; suppression of, 355, 580–81
- Anyuan (Jiangxi), 306, 394, 432
- Anyuansi, Ninghua *xian* (Fujian), Red Army in, 103, 120, 185, 186
- Apprentices, 162, 226, 798, 887–88
- Army Committees, 13, 57–60, 77, 81–96, 98–104, 107, 109, 110, 113
- Artisans, 882
- Asset redistribution: pace of, 438, 507, 515–17, 525; to poor masses, 396, 425, 438–39; by swapping, 558–59. *See also* Land redistribution
- August 1 Commemoration, 443, 519n1, 885
- Baggage, 6, 8, 32, 79, 83, 136, 143, 153
- Bai Chongxi, 36n7, 93, 699

- Baisha, Shanghang *xian*, 121, 204, 367;  
GMD forces near, 67, 72, 98, 132,  
151
- Baishi, 80, 124, 150
- Bandits: in Fujian Province, 187;  
guerrilla warfare against, 238;  
militia (*tuangui*), 134, 199, 952,  
954; pacification, 18–19, 20,  
952n2; suppression of, 14, 46, 48,  
580
- Banks, 169; functions of, 162, 310, 318,  
689, 707; and taxes, 830, 901
- Beijing, 402, 775
- Beijing-Tianjin line, 405
- Beiping area: GMD withdrawal from,  
388, 391, 392, 405; Japanese in,  
373, 461, 465, 659, 773; sell-out of,  
362, 759
- Blockades (GMD): and cooperatives,  
240, 431, 458; economic,  
1xx–lxxiii, 318, 362, 363, 462, 502,  
665; and economic construction,  
487, 495, 690, 705; and shortages,  
298, 441, 629, 671, 713; in  
strategy, 303, 384; and war  
mobilization, 298
- Blockhouse strategy (GMD), lxxi,  
lxxxiii, lxxxvii–lxxxviii, 118n3,  
665, 719
- Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), lxvii,  
lxxvi–lxxviii, lxxxiii–lxxxviii,  
xc–xciii, 730; biography of,  
lxin63; and Central Executive  
Committee, 729–730; and Long  
March, xci–xciii
- Bolshevism, 117, 169, 489, 505, 508, 509,  
515
- Bond sales, lxxiii; cadres and, 497, 498;  
coercion in, 310, 332, 544–45;  
committees for, 909, 914–15, 926;  
competitions in, 237, 310;  
examples of, 607–08, 627, 638,  
721; goals for, 485, 505;  
instructions for, 497–501; mass  
organizations in, 488, 684;  
sabotage of, 501; as soviet work,  
504, 525–26
- Bonds, economic construction: issuance  
of, 431, 462, 500–501, 576–77,
- Bonds, economic construction  
(*continued*)  
694, 866–67; as public debt, 495;  
regulations for, 501, 868–69, 959
- Bonds, war, 236, 308–11, 321, 858, 959
- Bosheng *xian*: conference in, 479n1;  
GMD threat to, 723; grain surplus  
in, 358, 402, 403; investigations in,  
398–401, 504, 508, 511; poor  
peasant league in, 512. *See also*  
*Ningdu xian*
- Bourgeoisie, 519–21; and Chiang  
Kaishek, 46, 460; and  
counterrevolution, 166, 676–77; in  
GMD, xxv, 445, 462; intellectual,  
542, 561, 679; in ruling class, 529,  
871, 941
- Braun, Otto (Li De), lxxviii, lxxxin99,  
lxxxiii, lxxxv–lxxxviii, xc–xcii;  
biography of, lxxviii87; and Long  
March, xci–xciii
- Britain: alliance with Japan, 760;  
colonization by, 481–82; GMD  
support from, 46, 355, 469, 481,  
757; in Hong Kong, 775; and Tibet,  
373, 392, 405, 520, 528, 582, 659
- Bureaucratism: and counterrevolution,  
166; and elections, 336, 337, 473,  
476; in land investigation, 412,  
424, 509, 514; and mass work,  
331–33, 489, 709, 722; and quotas,  
498–99; in soviet organs, 224, 322,  
332–33, 578, 584–85, 810
- Bureaucrats, 162, 546, 822
- Buzhoushan (Imperfect Mountain),  
52–53
- Cai Huiwen, 82, 95, 98n1, 102
- Cai Tingkai, 37, 51, 90n27; biography  
of, lxxix n91; attacks Central  
Soviet Area, 663; and Chiang  
Kaishek, 99n3; deception by, 406;  
at Donggu, 71, 124, 133; in Fujian  
Province, lxxix–lxxxii, 402, 733;  
near Gaoxingxu, 145, 147;  
harassment of, 134; and Japanese,  
210; at Liangcun, 132; near  
Longgang, 129; near Ningdu, 67;  
retreats of, 149, 151; strategies

- Cai Tingkai (*continued*)  
 against, 72, 98–99, 100, 102, 131, 133; troop movements, 9, 37, 67, 127; near Xingguo, 14, 42, 49, 51
- Caixi Township investigation, 623–40
- Capitalism, 278, 314, 324, 519, 657, 679
- Capitalists, Chinese: concessions to, 318, 710; in economic construction, 140, 693; and elections, 336, 532, 789, 871, 871–72; execution of, 173; fines on, 908; flight of, 318, 557; and GMD, 169; investment by, 706, 707; and Labor Law, 188–89; in manufacturing, 160; reactionary, 556, 557; rich peasants as, 138; struggle against, 473; supervision of, 160, 908; tax burden of, 318; and weapons, 377. *See also* Commerce; Merchants
- Casualties, war: care for, 84, 117, 143, 784–85, 847; management of, 31–32; medical teams for, 6, 8, 33, 142; pensions for, 931; reported, 83, 88, 262; responsibility for, 6, 84, 130n2, 146
- Central Army (GMD), 663
- Central Bureau (CCP): bulletins from, 44; circulars of, 115; errors of, 61–63; establishment of, xxxii–xxxiii, xxxvii, 61; and land investigation, lxvi–lxviii, 508–10; letters to, 217–18, 242, 244, 255; members of, xxxviii, xlvii, lviii, 61n14, 115n1; and mobilization, 416; and Qingtang conference, xxxviii–xxxix, lxvin73; resolutions of, xxxiv, lxii, 56–66; and Tingzhou, 367
- Central Soviet Area: administrative areas in, 862–63; attacks on, xxiv, xxxix, xli, 281, 308, 315, 346, 348, 663, 754; campaigns in, lxx, lxxi, lxxv, lxxxvii–lxxxviii, 259, 669; collapse of, xxix, xxxvii, xciii; and economic construction, 479n1; economy in, 689, 691, 693; education in, 695; establishment of, xxviii, xlv; famine in, 441; GMD Central Soviet Area (*continued*) threat to, 315, 317, 331, 774; guerrilla warfare in, 671; labor unions in, 683; land distribution in, lxvi, 411; recruitment in, 482, 669; Red Army in, 222, 231, 480; subversives in, 677; victories in, 222, 353, 574, 663; war preparations in, 284, 291, 295, 303; *xian* in, 394, 415–16, 684. *See also* Fujian Province; Jiangxi Province
- Central Soviet Government, Provisional, 70, 142, 155, 707; anniversary of, 278–79, 314; announcements of, 500; anti-imperialism of, 169, 821; on bonds, 858, 868–69; on cease-fire, 376, 388, 392; circulars of, 398; offers combat agreements, 356, 362–63, 388, 406, 537, 583, 660; correct leadership of, 464, 469, 508; declaration of war by, 206–08, 210, 211, 316, 465, 660, 764–65; directives of, 194, 209; establishment of, 65, 97, 165, 278, 666, 821; and Guomindang, 219–20; and League of Nations, 292; letter to masses, 167, 402; Manifesto of, 206; notices of, 524, 814; orders of, 163, 257, 368, 371, 495, 569; organization of, 942–47; and preferential treatment, 844; proclamations of, 328, 355, 361, 373, 381, 464, 732, 752, 754, 759; on provincial congress, 222; report of, 314–25; resolutions of, 810; and revolutionary order, 171–72; on social relief, 822, 847, 907; on taxation, 814–17; and war revenue, 236; on women's issues, 225. *See also* Executive Committee, Central
- Changgang Township investigation, lxxiv, 584–622
- Changsha (Hunan): attacks on, 58–60, 186, 491n1, 538; and GMD, 94, 103; Red Army at, 33
- Changsha (Jiangxi), 152
- Changting *xian* (Fujian): as battlefield, 99; and Border Committee, 104;

Changting *xian* (Fujian) (*continued*)

Central Bureau at, 203; errors in, 263, 313, 411; labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, 394, 395, 398–401, 504n1; and Red Army, 151, 152, 201–02; as work area, 107–08, 110, 111, 113, 721. *See also* Tingzhou

Chen Ajin: biography of, 410n1

Chen Cheng, lxviii74; attacks by, 723; at Futian, 127, 132; at Ji'an, 151, 248; letter from Chiang, 460; at Ningdu, 121; strategies against, 133, 250; troop movements, 249; at Wan'an, 131, 132, 242–43

Chen Duxiu, xxii

Chen Guofu, 165

Chen Jitang, 402, 762, 775

Chen Lifu, 165

Chen Mingshu, lxxx, 649, 733;

biography of, lxxixn91

Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming), xxxviii18,

xlx, lxin63; biography of, xxxvin16

Chen Tanqiu, 731

Chen Yaohan, 290

Chen Zhengren, 162, 820, 825

*Chi* (unit of measure), 342

Chiang Kaishek, xlii; accusations

against, 45–46, 374, 537; army units under, 37; attacks on Central Area, xxiv, xli, lxxi, lxxv–lxxvi, lxxxvi, 357, 362, 431–32, 754; and bourgeoisie, 46, 460; and Cai Tingkai, 99; and “CC Clique,” 165; and constitution, 64n21; deception by, 105, 374, 765–66; defeats of, 36, 94, 217, 353, 389, 402, 431, 460; and First Campaign, 36; forces at Longgang, 129; foreign support for, 46, 355, 461, 469, 481, 537–40, 757; and Fujian Incident, lxxix–lxxx, lxxxiv, 733; and Guangdong government, 64n21, 93n32, 103, 108; and Guangdong Province, 90, 94, 100, 108, 115; and Guangxi clique, 36, 52n2, 94; and He Yingqin, 14n1; and Huang Shaoyu, 36; and Hunan Province, 90; and imperialists, 46,

Chiang Kaishek (*continued*)

373, 762; and Japanese, 355–56, 360n2, 373, 375, 388–89, 392, 580–81; and Jiang Guangnai, 99; in Jiangxi Province, 374, 759; and KKK organization, 164–65; letters by, 460, 764; loyalty to, 99n3, 100, 375, 664; and Lushan meetings, 581n4, 759, 774; in Nanchang, 115, 538, 581n4, 581, 759; in negotiations, 373, 388, 580–83; and Northern Provinces, 361, 374, 662; opposition to, 90, 644, 649; and Red Army, 36, 46, 115, 406, 723; and Republic of China, 821; and ruling class, 46; and Second Campaign, xxxiv, 37, 94; and Third Campaign, xli–xlii, 103; and truce agreement, 388n2, 391; as warlord, 45–46, 105, 460, 764, 767; and warlords, 29, 35n4, 36, 45–46, 52n2, 93n32, 406, 662; weakened, 217; and Zhang Xueliang, 29, 374

Children: class status of, 564–65; of divorced parents, 818–19, 952–53; in labor laws, 884–86, 887, 892; land distribution to, 819, 952; production by, 552, 630, 683, 795, 796, 798; protection of, 787, 797; treatment of, 616, 618, 698, 960

Children's League, 598–99, 613, 617, 618, 696, 902, 929

China: colonization of, 209, 481–82, 581, 659, 699, 756; minorities in, 415n1, 699–700; territorial integrity of, 356, 392, 407, 520, 582, 664, 761

Chinese Communist Party (CCP): anti-Japanese program of, 761–62; class-alien elements in, 60; correct line of, 56–57, 65, 481, 573, 665; establishment of, xxii; factionalism in, xxiv, xxvii–xxviii, xxxvi–xxxvii, 57–61, 62; Fifth Plenum of, lxix, lxxxiv–lxxxvi; Fourth Plenum of, 56–66; and investigations, 417, 506, 508–09, 511, 513; liaison office of, 163; mass work by, 415; members of,

- Chinese Communist Party (*continued*)  
 164, 165; and Mutual Help Society, 902; and poor peasant league, 455; provincial committees of, 850; and Red Army, 783; Second Plenum of, 60–61; and Security Bureau, 837; Sixth Congress of, 57; Third Plenum of, 57, 61; Women's Department of, 749n3
- Chinese Revolution. *See* Revolution
- Chinese Soviet Republic: capital of, 367n2; establishment of, xxiv, xlviii, 634, 666, 820, 885; foreign policy of, 160, 169, 292–94, 726, 944; government of, 821; and proletariat, 520; revenue for, 237, 344, 395, 786, 830
- Chongren, 14, 247–48, 249–50, 253
- Chongren *xian*, as Red area, 574
- Chongxian, 72, 124, 127–28, 131, 147
- City soviets: construction of, 175, 810–11; delegates for, 179–80, 874; and elections, 473–74, 531–32, 795, 797–99, 827, 829; establishment of, 162, 192, 199; organization of, 811–12, 904–13; and police, 856. *See also* Soviets
- Class consciousness, 112, 188, 337, 415, 480, 541, 670, 701, 934
- Class investigation: accusations in, 427–28, 515; instructions for, 436–37, 506; with land investigation, lxvi–lxvii, 412, 423, 524–25; propaganda for, 517
- Class status: and agrarian revolution, 317, 435, 512, 548, 684–87; analysis of, 55, 418, 423, 437–38, 509–10, 513; of children, 564–65; of counterrevolutionaries, 171, 173, 319, 823, 833–34; criteria for, 546–49, 550–67; of delegates, 179–80, 400, 874–75; and fund-raising, 190–91; and labor unions, 66; and land distribution, 54–55, 413–14; and marriage, 564–65; and punishment, 171, 173, 190–91, 477, 515; revolutionary, 528; and taxation, 688, 786
- Class struggle: and counterrevolution, 173, 378; in countryside, 411, 413, 530, 685–86; development of, 268, 394–95, 482, 671, 687; fostering, 188, 298, 462; and GMD, 165, 324, 331, 348; ideology of, xxiii; and land investigation, 434, 457, 509; leadership of, 66, 439, 515–16; and money market, 502; opponents in, 324; and Red Army, 268; and slogans, 413; stages in, 413, 418
- Clothing: army uniforms, 204, 232–33, 377–79; for masses, 321, 601, 635–36, 687; trade in, 486, 487; for transport teams, 257–58; work uniforms, 798
- Clubs: confiscated houses for, 824; and cultural construction, 431, 504–05, 577, 612–13, 640, 697; and labor unions, 895; social, 930
- Comintern. *See* Communist International
- Commandism: avoidance of, 437, 456; and coercion, 358, 544, 585, 709, 722, 738, 750; and economic construction, 489; and land investigation, 412, 424, 426, 516–18
- Commerce: in consumer goods, 417; department for, 385; market prices for, 602–03, 636–37; policies for, 161, 191, 318; regulation of, 395, 927, 959; sabotage of, 484. *See also* Merchants; Trade
- Communication: disruption of, 132–33, 134, 234; establishment of, 10, 288; infrastructure, 213, 251–52; and labor unions, 800; lines, 15, 16, 17, 43, 121, 132; maintenance of, 48–49, 103, 857; management of, 204, 857; teams for, 16, 116, 142
- Communism, 19, 314, 577
- Communist International (Comintern): lxvi, xc; and August 1, 443n1, 519n1; instructions from, 61; political line of, 56–57, 66. *See also* Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Communist Youth League (CY), 411n2; and education, 542–43, 929; establishment of, 91–92; and



- Communist Youth League (*continued*)  
middle peasants, 511; mobilization of, 417, 506; production by, 630–31; in Red Army, 61; and Security Bureau, 837
- Confiscation: approval of, 396, 425, 437, 438, 506; committees for, 595, 803–04, 908, 910, 914, 915, 923, 925; discussions on, 457; errors in, 513–14, 517–18, 557; of foreign assets, 169; by judicial departments, 852; regulations for, 191, 557, 822–25, 960
- Congress: of labor unions, 805, 894, 895; of working women, 227, 228, 617, 749
- Congress of deputies, local: delegates for, 179–80, 870–78, 888; district, 180, 588, 791, 875–76, 918; and economic construction, 500; participation in, 223, 265; *xian*, 919–20
- Congress, Provincial: and Central Government, 535, 943; delegates for, 180, 791–92, 874–76; Fujian, 193–200; Hunan-Jiangxi, 222–24; Jiangxi, 221
- Congress of Soviet Deputies, First National: xlv–xlix; and Constitution, 820; date of, 97; and elections, 470–71, 820; Labor Law of, 794–802, 826; Land Law of, lxvi, 822–25; minorities in, 700; on preferential treatment, 783–85, 844; preparation for, 63, 65; and reports, 314; on revolution, 821; work done by, 160–62, 187, 654, 685, 699
- Congress of Soviet Deputies, Second National: lxxix, lxxxiv, lxxxvi–lxxxvii; on anti-Japanese forces, 652–53; closing of, 727–28; and Constitution, 729; date of, 464, 469, 654–55, 729; and elections, 528, 532, 729–31; errors at, 714–16; preparation for, 398, 432, 466–67, 579, 864; organic law on, 942–44
- Conservation, committees for, 429, 594–95, 910, 915, 923
- Conservatism, 22–23, 198, 217n1, 313, 331
- Constitution, Soviet: adoption of, 729, 820; and central government, 942–44; on counterrevolution, 835; on elections, 788–89, 792, 827, 829; on minorities, 699–700; on soviets, 175, 803, 804–05; and taxes, 786
- Consumer cooperatives: CCP support for, 161, 240; development of, 431, 458, 576, 694; examples of, 608–10, 632–33; goals for, 485; for masses, 140, 707; tax exemption for, 815, 860
- Contracts, labor: collective, 795, 796, 891, 898–99; and committees, 799; defined, 795, 892; and labor laws, 882, 886–87, 888, 892–94
- Coolies: and elections, 179–80; and labor laws, 794, 882, 890, 891; and land distribution, 822, 824; and poor peasant league, 454; tax exemption for, 318, 860, 879, 900–901, 902; wages for, 682t
- Cooperatives: and asset redistribution, 824; development of, 485, 500, 504, 505, 526, 576, 691, 927; in economic planning, 385, 395, 441–42, 488–89, 693–94; examples of, 608–10, 631–35; regulations for, 321, 889; and socialism, 140, 694; tax exemption for, 161, 815, 816, 860, 861, 901. *See also types of cooperatives*
- Corporal punishment, 171, 174
- Corruption: bureaucratic, 322; government, lxxxix, 239, 359; inspections for, 224, 476, 911, 917; prosecution for, 736, 810; and reporting movement, 458, 471, 473; in soviets, 263–64, 320, 525, 689, 710
- Council of People's Commissars: chairman of, lxxxvi, lxxxix, 730, 820, 945; decisions of, 330, 550; directives of, 344, 384, 394; and Executive Committee, 943–44, 945; functions of, 820, 920, 936, 955; instructions of, 541; on

- Council of People's Commissars  
(*continued*)  
internal affairs departments,  
855–57, 864–65; and labor laws,  
826, 897; members of, 945; orders  
of, lxix, 163, 301, 302, 326, 327,  
339, 346, 364, 377, 386, 408, 441,  
497, 568, 864; organization of, 945,  
946–47; and revolutionary  
committees, 940; and tax tables,  
879; work methods of, 708
- Counterrevolutionaries: class status of,  
171, 173, 319, 823, 833–34,  
837–38; campaigns against, xxviii,  
xxx, xxxvii, lxii, lxxxii; cliques as,  
36, 52n2, 89, 93n32, 94, 165, 319;  
confiscation from, 823, 908, 960;  
elimination of, 191–92, 380–81,  
414, 417, 429, 504, 571, 711, 835,  
940, 954–56; Executive Committee  
on, 182–83, 245–46, 368–70,  
380–81; factions in, 64, 319, 528;  
and GMD, 140, 528; internal,  
xxxiv, xliii–xliv, 368–70, 420, 432,  
528; leadership struggle in, 28, 35;  
and national currency, 502;  
prosecution of, 105–06, 170–74,  
182–83, 319, 381, 677–79;  
punishment of, 245–46, 957–60;  
purge of, ruling class and, 28, 64,  
139, 414–15, 676–77; search for,  
412; and Security Bureau, 836–38,  
854, 937; struggle with, 223, 299,  
315, 317, 368, 657; threat from, 67;  
and treasury bonds, 499, 500–501;  
and weapons, 377–78; Zhou Enlai  
on, xlix–l
- Credit cooperatives, 140, 431, 458, 576,  
694, 707
- Criticism, mass, 264, 279, 322, 337,  
592, 594, 709, 809; of candidates,  
471, 474, 534
- Cultural construction: and blue-clad  
troupes, 542, 577, 697; delay in,  
416; and education, 431, 505, 543;  
institutions for, 504; and  
newspapers, 696; poor peasant  
league in, 453; as soviet work, 469,  
480
- Cultural departments, soviet, 22, 25, 806
- Currency, 637n6; foreign dollars, 10, 143,  
485, 520, 551, 784, 831, 868,  
898–99; national, 236, 237, 318, 495,  
689, 707, 861, 868n1; privately  
issued, 191; silver, 161, 502–03;  
soviet, 162, 637. *See also* Money
- Dai Ji, 9, 14, 42
- Dalian [Dairen] Agreement, 445–47,  
519n2, 580, 773
- Dan (unit of measure), 87, 403, 449n1,  
450–52, 816, 846, 881t
- Debts: cancellation of, 23, 63, 161, 185,  
186, 414, 567, 824; to cooperatives,  
633; foreign, 169
- Defections: from GMD, l, 47, 49, 196,  
234, 375; to GMD, 109, 556–57,  
833, 958; of Gu Shunzhang, 163;  
of masses, 36–37; of officers, 82n6,  
209; to Red Army, 247n1, 375,  
783; of soldiers, 196, 211
- Democratic dictatorship, xxv;  
components of, 672–76; and  
elections, 477; and marriage  
system, 698; and soviets, 169, 528,  
871; as stage, 667–68, 727
- Democratic revolution, 18, 19–20, 62,  
187, 727
- Democratic rights: in combat  
agreements, 356, 376, 388, 392,  
406, 537, 583, 762; deprivation of,  
466, 834, 872
- Deng Fa, xlv, lviii, 104, 162, 283,  
312–13, 410, 730, 820, 821, 825
- Deng Ping, 90, 730
- Deng Xiaoping, lxxi, lxxiin67
- Deng Ying, 492, 494
- Deng Zihui, 730, 820; biography of, 496n1
- Deputies, local: and committees, 911,  
917, 934; conferences of, 593–94,  
629, 741–43; congresses of,  
179–80, 223, 265, 500, 870–78,  
918; duties of, 674, 905–06,  
913–14; election of, 474–45, 625,  
790–92, 870–78, 905, 912–13;  
presidium and, 738–40, 746–51  
*passim*, 804, 806; ratio to voters,  
179–81; township, 589–94,

- Deputies, local (*continued*)  
624–26; women as, 474, 499,  
590–91, 617, 625–26, 629
- Desertion, Red Army, lxxxix, 257, 378,  
599, 669; consequences of, 269,  
641–42, 959; and return to ranks,  
267–68, 570, 618n15, 628, 901
- Disasters: and GMD, 155, 270, 315,  
582, 685; preparation for, 910, 916;  
relief for, 191, 321, 458, 614–15,  
634–35, 928–29, 931; tax  
concessions for, 161, 815, 861,  
879, 902
- Discipline: battlefield, 89–90, 103; lapse  
in, 89, 270, 840; in local armed  
forces, 212, 299–300; mass, 333;  
Red Army, 65, 185, 670, 704, 839
- District congress, 180, 588, 791,  
875–76, 918
- District executive committees: and  
counterrevolutionaries, 173; and  
elections, 789, 827, 829; and land  
investigation, 429; organizational  
of, 812f, 875, 918–19; oversight  
by, 804; regulations for, 806–07,  
808–09
- Divorce, 226, 228–29, 319, 616, 715,  
785, 787, 818–19, 901, 952
- Donggu (Jiangxi), xxix, 71–73, 98, 99,  
123, 124, 127–28, 131
- Dongshao: battle at, 7–8, 35; critique of  
battle, 30–31; GMD retreat from,  
78; military activity at, 16, 79; Red  
Army near, 10, 248; victory at, 28,  
60, 65
- Dramatic productions, 358, 542, 577,  
613, 640, 697
- Duan Qirui, Anfu Clique, 774
- Eastern Army (CCP), victories of, 468,  
530, 574; and Fujian Incident, 732
- Eastern Branch Committee, 83, 87–88
- Eastern Jiangxi Independent Division  
(CCP), 109, 113
- Eastern Route Army (CCP), lii–liiii, 215,  
218
- Economic construction, lxxii, 690–94;  
and blockades, 487, 495, 690, 705;  
conference on, lxxiii, 479–90;
- Economic construction (*continued*)  
implementation of, 416, 435, 466,  
469, 495; regulations on, 500;  
reports on, 475; with revolution,  
430–31, 569, 571, 576–77, 638–39,  
866; in townships, 588. *See also*  
Bonds, economic construction
- Economic policies, 160–62;  
implementation of, 140, 187–89,  
198, 224, 320; nationalization in,  
160, 169; publishing of, 65; state  
department for, 384–85;  
state-owned enterprises in, 385;  
and war mobilization, 240
- Economy, national: collapse of, 29, 465,  
582, 657, 694; crisis in, 67, 93,  
315, 461, 575; departments of,  
384–85, 395, 926–28; development  
of, 495, 689; and treasury bonds,  
500; and warlord fighting, 29, 465
- Economy, National, Commissariat for,  
384–85, 395, 730, 866, 888, 896,  
899, 922, 945
- Education, 694–97; administrative  
system for, 321; committees for,  
429, 909, 915–16, 929;  
compulsory, 541–42, 697, 711;  
conference on, 542; cultural, 395,  
417, 541, 569, 572; departments of,  
385, 395, 417, 473, 929–30; free  
public, 542, 784, 785, 847;  
instructions for, 541–43; at job site,  
228; for land investigation, 418,  
422; movement, 480, 577; and poor  
peasant league, 456; for women,  
228, 696. *See also* Literacy;  
Schools
- Education, Commissariat for, 395, 473,  
541–42, 731, 820, 888, 945
- Education, political, 12, 228, 269,  
272–73, 297, 462, 704
- Eighth Army (CCP), 282
- Eight-xian Conference, lxxviii, 398–413;  
and land investigation, 413–33,  
504, 508, 509–11, 866; and poor  
peasant league, 454
- Election Law, 65, 474, 534, 575,  
709–10, 870–78
- Election regulations, 322, 672–73, 931;

- Election regulations (*continued*)  
 listed, 336–38, 472–77, 789–93, 833–34
- Elections: and activists, 428–29, 458, 471, 476; annulment of, 792–93, 876; bureaucracy in, 336, 337, 473, 476; candidates for, lxxiv, 533–34, 592; committees for, 534, 591, 627, 827–28, 875, 877–78, 911, 916; conference on, 527–35; delegates for, 179–81, 400, 624, 791–92, 828, 870; errors in, 175, 336, 471–72, 593; exclusion from, 833–34; Executive Committee on, 335–38, 469–78; inspections of, 335–38, 458n1; instructions for, 469–78; participation in, xxv, 458, 470–71, 526; and reelections, 264–65, 322, 482; township, 591–94, 626–27, 791–93; women in, 225, 471, 474, 533, 673. *See also* Voting
- Eleventh Independent Division (CCP), 367
- Embargo. *See* Blockades (GMD)
- Encirclement Campaigns, 28n1, 266n2, 658; recovery from, 321; Red victories in, 195, 466, 661–62, 669; strategies for, xxviii, xxx, 217–18. *See also* First Campaign, . . . , Fifth Campaign
- Espionage, xxxii, 116, 142, 368, 958
- Europe, 446, 519; GMD support from, 461, 469, 481, 537–40, 757; imperialism of, 46, 355, 405, 469
- Execution: of “big tigers,” 505, 507; of capitalists, 173; of counterrevolutionaries, xxix, xliii–xliv, 173, 319, 369–70, 381, 429–30, 525, 687, 835, 837, 955; of criminals, 852, 853; for desertion, 641; of gentry, 173, 955; of Hu Zhusheng, 104; judicial departments and, 852–53; of landlords, 173, 510, 955; by military tribunal, 842; of rich peasants, 173, 510; for sabotage, 105–06, 503, 959; threats of, 580, 664, 679, 957–58; of traitors, 89
- Executive Committee, Central: on administrative areas, 862–63, 864; anti-imperialism of, 761; and bonds, 308–11, 866–69, 944; corruption in, 736; on counterrevolutionaries, 182–83, 245–46, 368–70, 380–81, 833–38, 957–60; criticism of, 57; on delegates, 179–81, 870; on deserters, 641–42; directives of, 171, 179, 230, 263, 266, 308, 312, 322, 348, 469, 833; on economic policy, 160–62; and elections, 335–38, 469–78, 788–93, 827–29, 833–34, 870–78, 944; and financial issues, 830–32, 945; and foreign policy, 726, 944; and Fujian Province, 194–200, 312–13, 726; on imperialism, 536–40; instructions from, 175–76; on Japan, 209–14; and Jiangxi Province, 221; and judicial system, 182–83, 245–46, 840–43, 849–54, 944, 946, 954–56; and Labor Law, 826, 882–96, 897, 899, 944, 948–50; and marriage, 787, 818–19, 944, 951–53; members of, xxviii, 64n21, 729–30, 736, 820, 875, 943; on military tribunals, 839, 840–43; notices of, 729, 820; on order, 171–72; orders of, 278, 295, 353, 357, 641, 736, 778, 839, 849, 942, 948; organization of, 943–48; powers of, 944; on preferential treatment, 844–48; and provincial soviets, 920; reports of, 656–722; resolutions of, 1, 245, 335, 380, 786, 826, 866; on revolution, 1, 230–41, 295–300, 348–49, 357–60, 754–55; and revolutionary committees, 940; on secret work, 371–72, 803–13; on Security Bureau, 835–38; on soviet organs, 263–65, 904–41; on taxes, 686, 786, 859–61, 879–80, 900–903. *See also* Central Soviet Government, Provisional
- Exploitation: capitalist, 420, 465–66, 717; examples of, 554–56; gentry, 465–66; GMD, 687; imperialist, 582, 668; Japanese, 167; landlord, 215, 270, 424, 434, 450, 465–66,

Exploitation (*continued*)

513, 546, 565–66, 684, 687;  
 merchant, 458, 486, 487, 495, 500,  
 866; middle peasant, 552–54;  
 profiteer, 431; rich peasant, 55,  
 62–63, 138–40, 224, 424, 434, 513,  
 547, 554–56, 565–66; usurer, 452,  
 513, 547; warlord, 215, 270,  
 465–66, 684

Export products, 441, 442, 486, 576,  
 636–37, 693, 706–07

Factionalism: in Communist Party,  
 xxiv, xxvii–xxviii, xxxvi–xxxvii,  
 56–61, 62; imperialists and, 665,  
 760; in Nanjing GMD, 581n4;  
 ruling class and, 35, 665, 699;  
 warlords and, 35, 45–46, 64–65,  
 206, 210, 774. *See also*  
 Guangdong Government; People's  
 Revolutionary Government

Factories: in labor law, 798–800, 893,  
 894, 896; munitions, 212;  
 nationalization of, 160; schools in,  
 798, 887; and taxes, 861, 901

Famine: in *Current Affairs*, 27;  
 discussions on, 458; foreseeing,  
 212, 365; and grain redistribution,  
 364; Guomindang and, 168, 441;  
 Japanese invasion and, 355;  
 prevention of, 70, 289, 599, 882;  
 relief of, 485, 634, 916; in White  
 areas, 523

Fan Shude, biography of, 247n2

Fang Zhimin, 730, 820

February 7th Conference (Pitou), 60

Fen (monetary unit), 95, 143, 682t, 868

Feng Yuxiang, 35n4, 45–46, 64n21,  
 93n33, 103, 406, 580, 581n3, 699

Feudal forces, 453, 457, 787, 818,  
 823. *See also* Land Investigation  
 Movement

Fifteenth Army (CCP), in Yihuang *xian*,  
 253

Fifth Army Group (CCP), liii, 201, 203,  
 247, 250, 253, 288, 304, 305, 306

Fifth Campaign: call to arms for,  
 466–67, 583, 755; defeats in, xxiv,  
 lxxxvii–lxxxviii; described, lxxiv,

Fifth Campaign (*continued*)

lxxv–lxxviii, lxxxvii–xci, 754;  
 foreign aid for, 537–39, 762;  
 mobilization for, 541, 569–72,  
 723–25; preparations for, 461–63,  
 469–70, 479, 481, 520, 528,  
 661–66, 774; victories in, 468, 530,  
 655, 723

Fifth Independent Division (CCP), 121,  
 133, 150, 247

Fifty-eighth Army (CCP), near  
 Nanfeng, 185

Finance, Commissariat of, 344, 359,  
 395, 495–96, 544, 730, 811, 820,  
 861, 866, 868, 945

Finance departments, soviet, 344, 417,  
 806, 830–31, 925–26, 940

Financial issues: and auditing bodies,  
 731, 808, 937–38, 946; budgeting,  
 320, 344–45, 811, 830–31, 926,  
 937–38; First National Congress  
 on, 161–62; National Treasury,  
 344; in provinces, 36, 198;  
 regulations for, 320–21, 830–32; in  
 soviet areas, 688; war revenue, 213,  
 236, 298, 495–96, 571; in White  
 areas, 224, 688–90; *xian*  
 conference for, 36. *See also*  
 Bonds; Currency; Money

Fines: on capitalists, 908; class status  
 and, 224; on employers, 898–99;  
 imposition of, 19, 139, 395, 503;  
 on landlords, 395, 417, 495, 505,  
 565; as revenue, 830; on workers,  
 798, 893

First Army Group (CCP): artillery, 88;  
 battle at Donggu, 73; Front  
 Committee of, 58; and Lin Biao,  
 253; occupation of Nanfeng,  
 78–79; raid on Zhangzhou, lxx–liii,  
 201; at Toupi, 304; troop  
 movements, lii–liv, lvi, 124, 250,  
 305; work areas for, 288, 306; at  
 Xinqiao, 201; in Yihuang *xian*,  
 247, 253

First Campaign: Chiang Kaishek and,  
 14n1, 36; errors in, 30–31; Mao on,  
 45n1; poem about, 52; preparation  
 for, 59n8; Shanghai and, 36;

- First Campaign (*continued*)  
 victories in, xxx–xxxi, 9, 34, 36, 47, 52n2, 52
- First Front Army (CCP): attack on Le'an, 247–48; battle at Dongshao, 7–8; at Changsha, 33; defense of Donggu, 71–73; and elimination of Twentieth Army, xliii; in Jiangxi, 242n1; Management Office, 94–95, 142, 204, 310n4; military activity of, 94; near Chongxian, 127; fund-raising by, 10, 42; orders of, 5, 7, 9, 14, 28, 33, 42, 67, 74, 76, 78, 121, 124, 127, 142, 145, 147, 149, 253; orders to, 242n1; radio team for, 88–89; troop movements, 6, 8, 68
- Flightism, 58
- Food, Commissariat for, 708, 731
- Food cooperatives, 365, 458, 485. *See also* Grain cooperatives
- Food supply: department for, 385, 855–56; regulation of, 385, 487, 489; shortages of, 27, 70, 224, 441–42; subsidiary, 409; and war mobilization, 298
- Foot binding, 787
- Foreign affairs, 160, 169, 292–94, 726, 762, 944
- Foreign Affairs, Commissariat for, 730, 820, 945
- Formalism, 190, 192, 199, 270, 312, 337, 457, 509, 514
- Fortifications, lxxvi, 6, 73, 116, 259, 724; GMD, 98, 118, 324, 775; village, 100–101, 158–59, 299
- Fourteenth Army (CCP), 218, 574
- Fourth Army Group (CCP), 58, 91, 253
- Fourth Campaign: call to arms for, 294, 393, 446–47; in Central Soviet Area, lxx, lxxi, 284, 368, 393, 431; and economic policies, 384–85; food supply for, 365; key cities policy in, 266, 316, 323; mobilization for, 257–58, 466; preparations for, 295–300, 303–07; strategies for, lxxi, 259–61, 284; victories in, 295, 316, 402, 460, 469, 479–81, 527–28, 573–74, 662–63
- Fourth Front Army (CCP), 259–60, 291, 575, 662–63
- Fourth Independent Division (CCP), 133, 147, 150
- Fourth Army (CCP): attacks by, 74, 76–77, 83, 84; attempts on Nanfeng, 78–79, 90, 93; battles of, 7–8, 73, 129–30, 491–94; near Donggu, 72; Front Committee of, 57–58; in Fujian Province, 152; fund-raising by, 10, 15, 85, 109; near Gaoxing, 128; near Guangchang, 15; near Jinning, 84, 91; near Liantang, 147, 148; at Nanfeng, 185; officer of, 122; at Shipoxu, 123–124; in Shunchang and Shaxian, 110; in Sichuan Province, 538, 662; near Taipingkeng, 75; Tenth Division, 84; in Toupi, 16; troop movements, 42, 68, 80, 102, 123, 145–46, 150; work areas for, 109
- France: GMD support from, 469, 481, 537–40, 757; imperialism, 46, 355; in provinces, 528, 582, 659, 760
- Front Committee, General, xxix, xxxiii, xxxvii–xxxviii, xliii, 57–60, 58; errors of, xlix; Mao and, xlvii; minutes of meetings, 81–96, 98–104
- Fu Lianzhang (Nelson Fu), biography of, lxin62
- Fujian Incident, lxxix–lxxxiv, 649n1, 732–35
- Fujian Province: administrative areas in, 864; agrarian revolution in, 199; bond sales in, 544, 638; building soviets in, 176; and Central Government, 323; cooperatives in, 693–94; counterrevolution in, 64, 665–66, 677, 715; education in, 695; elections in, 530; First Congress in, 194–200; and GMD, 203, 357, 402, 432, 723, 764, 775; grain-lending in, 359; Japanese threat to, 644–45, 649–50, 767, 768; judicial organs in, 849–54; land investigation in, 508, 686; opposition government in, 581n4, 665–66; recruitment in, 267–68,

- Fujian Province (*continued*)  
 670; Red army in, lii–liii, lxxvi, 151–53, 203, 720; threats to, 659, 760; troop movements, 151–53, 201; warlords in, 374; as work area, 151–53
- Fujian, northern, 275, 277, 574
- Fujian, northwest, soviet areas in, 663–64
- Fujian Soviet Area, 232, 683, 721–22
- Fujian, western: agrarian revolution in, 199–200; bandits in, 187, 199; errors in, 192, 198, 199; GMD forces in, 47, 276; government in, xxxiv, lxxxi, 191, 192; letter to, 187–93, 194–200; Red Army in, xl–xli, xliii, 47, 201; as work area, 96
- Fujian–Jiangxi Soviet Area: counterrevolution in, 677; elections in, 530; errors in, 721; establishment of, 574, 664; GMD forces in, 570; labor unions in, 683
- Fujian–Jiangxi Special Border Area, 103–04, 110–11, 113
- Fujian–Zhejiang–Jiangxi Soviet Area: counterrevolution in, 677; economy in, 689, 691, 693; elections in, 530; establishment of, 574; guerrilla warfare in, 671; labor unions in, 683; Red Army in, 480; soviet work in, 722
- Fund-raising: in captured areas, 82–83, 84; and class status, 190–91, 688; by committees, 909; by governments, lxxi–lxxiii, 571; by local armed forces, 344; by masses, 458; orders for, 9–11, 14, 15–17, 42–43; and Red Army, 42–43, 51, 90–92, 102, 109, 191, 321; strategies for, 87, 110–11; for Third Campaign, 85, 92
- Futian: battle at, 121; and battle at Donggu, 72; and GMD, 67, 72, 74, 98, 127–28, 132; orders for, 74–75, 124–25
- Futian Incident, xxix, xxx–xxxiv, xxvi–xxxix, xliii, 29n7, 29, 37, 47–48, 56, 60–61, 62, 493
- Fuzhou (Fujian), 644–45, 649–50, 776
- Fuzhou–Linchuan (Jiangxi): battle at, 353; GMD forces at, 248, 249, 275; as key city, 323; Red Army near, 317; in strategies, 83, 90, 94, 99n4, 103
- Gan River area: battles at, 68, 114n5, 231; and First Congress, 223; GMD forces in, 99n3, 242–43, 248, 282
- Guangdong Army at, 275; militia bandits in, 134; troop movements in, 29, 87, 131; as work area, 29n7, 91
- Ganzhou (Jiangxi): attacks on, li–lii, lix; GMD retreats to, 151; as key city, 323
- Ganzhou *xian* (Jiangxi): GMD forces at, 90, 99, 242–43; military activity in, 204; in strategies, 102, 133; under siege, 187; as work area, 190, 223
- Ganzhu, 78, 80, 83, 121, 304
- Gao Shuxun, 42, 67, 76, 276, 282, 316
- Gao Zili, 730; biography of, 410n1
- Gaoxingxu, 127–28, 145, 147
- General Political Department: and agitation, 29, 31; circulars of, 34, 54, 184n4; directives of, 29, 31; expenses of, 143; Front Committee at, 93; instructions of, 184–85, 190; and investigations, 55; and Japanese invasion, 212; and political education, 12; publications of, 22n1, 24, 26, 27, 51; relocation of, 204; tasks of, 12–13; and war preparation, 38. *See also* Political departments
- Geng Kai, 103, 118; biography of, 102
- Gentry: and Chiang Kaishek, 46; class status of, 546, 556; confiscation of assets, 162, 185, 238, 317, 505, 783, 822, 823–24; elimination of, 299; execution of, 173, 955; and GMD, 324; voting by, 872
- Germany, xxii, 469, 481, 537–40, 757
- Gong Bingfan: and CCP, 74–75; at Donggu, 71–72; near Futian, 67, 74–75; near Ji'an, 14, 28; as officer, 9n3, 37, 51; near Taihe, 42, 132; troop movements, 9

- Grain: committees for, 909, 928;  
confiscation of, 69, 223; conservation  
of, 213, 239, 505; distribution of, 16,  
23, 216, 365, 485, 928–29; exports,  
441, 442; granaries for, 161, 239,  
442, 595, 634; hidden, 50, 403, 408;  
loaned to Red Army, 357–59, 403;  
looted, 50, 357, 364, 441; millet,  
402–04, 588; miscellaneous, 237,  
239, 328, 403, 408, 576, 635; price  
of, 441, 486, 633–35; for Red Army,  
68, 357–60, 402–04, 505, 929;  
shortage of, 402–04, 408–09,  
441–42; storage of, 161, 408–09,  
444, 485, 928, 929; supply of, 42,  
237, 239, 364, 500, 706; surplus,  
lxix, 19, 365, 402, 403; taxes on, 465,  
815, 860, 879. *See also* Harvest; Rice
- Grain, Commissariat for, 708, 945
- Grain cooperatives, 576, 634–35, 694;  
and redistribution, 365, 431, 633–35
- Grain departments, soviet, 928–29, 940
- Grain Redistribution Bureau, 365, 486,  
571, 633–34, 868
- Great Wall, 388n2, 391, 405, 519n2,  
764
- Gu Bo: biography of, lxiiin67
- Gu Shunzhang, 163–66; biography of,  
xlxxn39
- Gu Zuolin, xlvii, lviii; biography of,  
xxxviii18
- Guangchang (Jiangxi): battle at, 83;  
Front Committee at, 83;  
fund-raising in, 10; GMD forces  
near, 67, 81–82, 121, 151, 774;  
guerrilla warfare near, 120; military  
activity at, 103, 118; Red Army at,  
42, 91, 109, 113, 304; strategy for,  
99, 100, 304; as work area, 15, 29,  
37, 85, 95, 109, 306
- Guangchang *xian* (Jiangxi), 288n4,  
394–401, 517, 723
- Guangdong army, 205, 242, 275, 316,  
432, 537, 663
- Guangdong government: and balance of  
power, 99; CCP view of, 169, 760;  
Chiang Kaishek and, 64n27, 93n32,  
103, 108; creation of, 64n21, 93,  
406n3; support for, 538
- Guangdong Province: Chiang Kaishek  
and, 90, 94, 100, 108, 115; East  
River area, 96; GMD in, 201, 204,  
215, 218, 248, 89; and Guangxi  
clique, 36n7, 36; invasion of, 36;  
land investigation in, 686; Red  
Army in, 47, 575; strategies for, 86,  
94, 100, 108, 218; warlords in, 187,  
733; as work area, 197
- Guangdong–Jiangxi Soviet Area, 530,  
544, 695, 721
- Guangxi Army, 205, 242, 663
- Guangxi clique: Chiang Kaishek and,  
36, 52n2, 94; members of, 36n7,  
36, 93n32
- Guangxi Province: French in, 760;  
Longzhou Soviet in, 538; Red  
Army in, 29n7, 575; and separatist  
régime, 93, 374n4; strategies for,  
90, 94, 108
- Guangzhou uprising of 1927 (Canton  
Commune), 157, 339, 464, 467, 538,  
885
- Guerrilla forces: anti-Japanese, 212,  
213, 575; expansion of, 671; in  
Fujian Province, 84, 204–05,  
215–16; GMD, 145, 284, 287–88;  
instructions for, 133–34, 234–35;  
in Jiangxi Province, 67, 71–73,  
120, 251, 276, 286, 304;  
jurisdiction over, 875; near  
Luofang, 73; from among the  
masses, 67, 185–86, 255, 259; of  
military, 120, 131, 204–05, 251;  
mobilization of, 296, 297;  
organization of, 16, 23, 87, 91, 116,  
224, 668; and peasants, 69, 235;  
Red Guards as, 16, 235, 270, 340;  
as reinforcements, 63n18, 233; and  
revolutionary committees, 185,  
939–40; and slogans, 40–41; and  
soviet areas, 306, 666;  
strengthening, 223, 284; targets of,  
90; training for, 198–99, 671; in  
Wan'an *xian*, 133; weapons for,  
378; in White areas, 216, 234, 238,  
273, 297, 481, 571, 705, 712, 776;  
women in, 225; Young Pioneers as,  
235, 340



- Guerrilla warfare: against bandits, 238; against landlords, 185–86, 238; at Dongshao, 8; and local armed forces, 131, 133–35, 234, 255, 263, 340–41; in Soviet Areas, 671; as strategy, 59, 261, 285–86
- Guihua *xian*, Fourth Army in, 102
- Guizhou Province, 528, 582, 659, 760
- Guloggang, Xingguo *xian*, 42, 121, 122, 129, 132, 152, 184
- Guo Huaruo [Huayu], 81–96, 94, 98n1, 102; biography of, 81n3
- Guo Huazong, 14, 28, 42, 71–72, 90, 127, 132; troop movements, 46, 67
- Guodoujian Mountain, 127
- Guomindang (GMD): allies of, 520–21; attacks by, 47, 210, 266, 303–04, 348, 357; bankruptcy of, 195–96, 461, 665, 685, 688, 690, 732; betrayal of China, 167–69, 712; and class struggle, 165, 324; and counterrevolution, 140; deception by, 64, 293, 374, 392–93, 406; decline of, 195, 222, 315; defeats of, 105, 149, 151, 195, 278, 316, 375, 783; and disasters, 155, 270, 315, 582; education under, 695; factions in, 45–46, 64n21, 206, 293, 481, 581n4, 582, 699, 760, 774; and famine, 168, 441; foreign support for, 461, 469, 481, 537–40, 757; and Gu Shunzhang, 163; and League of Nations, 292–93; mass movement against, 460, 461, 469, 732–33, 821; and masses, 293, 368, 388, 523; political power of, 822; sell-out of China, 195–96, 207, 464–65, 469, 480–82, 660, 757–58; taxation by, 465, 786, 814; voting by, 872; and warlords, 154–55, 196, 209–10
- Guomindang government (Nanjing): 99, 115; attacks by, 65; CCP view of, 169, 582–83; and counterrevolution, 164–66; and secret treaties, 167, 168, 388, 405, 481. *See also* Japanese and Guomindang
- Gutian Resolution, 58n6
- Han Deqin, 28, 42; capture of, 87, 149n2; defeat of, 149; at Futian, 127; in Nanchang, 14; retreats of, 145, 147; strategies against, 131; troop movements, 46
- Han Fuqu, biography of, 45n3
- Handicrafts: and class status, 55; in economic policy, 395, 417, 485, 487, 576, 706; and labor law, 882; and labor unions, 455, 459, 513, 900; taxes on, 900–901; trade in, 692–93; wages for, 681t, 682t
- Hao Mengling: defeat of, 131; near Jishui, 28, 38; as officer, 42, 90n27, 127; in Red Area, 290; retreat by, 90; troop movements, 67, 110; in Xiushui and Wuning, 14
- Harvest: abundance of, 365, 576, 599–600; as basis for tax, 860, 879, 881t; confiscation of, 238; for government staff, 372; importance of, 431; improvements in, 457, 485, 504, 706; from public lands, 444; shared, 19; from soldiers' lands, 783–84, 847. *See also* Grain
- He Cheng, 152–53; biography of, 153n3
- He Jian, 47, 94, 402, 762, 775
- He Long, 1xin62, 36, 156, 480, 729, 820
- He Shuheng, 730, 820
- He Yingqin, 14, 46, 86, 110, 114n6
- He Zizhen (wife of Mao), li, lx, xc
- Health care, 321, 458, 596, 613–14; and social security, 800; at work sites, 798–99, 884, 889, 949
- Hebei Province, 519, 575, 580, 775
- Henan Province: border area of, 36, 316; GMD forces in, 46, 94, 775; Red Army in, 316, 375, 575
- Hong Kong, as base for British imperialism, 775
- Horses, 31, 136–37, 142, 154
- Hospitals: army, 88, 117, 152, 289; confiscation of, 92; convalescent, 784; disruption of, 262; local armed forces and, 326; locations of, 8, 75, 83, 84, 101, 247, 251; rear general, 89, 152–53; staff of, 901
- Houses: burned, 49, 147, 754, 959;

- Houses (*continued*)  
 committees on, 907–08; confiscation of, 161, 162, 191, 396, 438, 686, 823–24; redistribution of, 162, 439, 457, 783, 824
- Hu Hai, 383, 730, 820; biography of, 410n1
- Hu Hanmin, xlii, 64n21, 93–94n32, 406n3
- Hu Zhusheng, biography of, 104n6
- Hu Zongnan, 249
- Hu Zuyu: defeats of, 81–82, 83–84, 86; execution of, 105; near Nanfeng, 42, 78, 79, 83–84, 90; in Yihuang, 14n21, 28
- Huang Fu, 581n4, 759, 774
- Huang Gonglue, xxix, 82–83, 154–56, 157, 655
- Huang Meizhuang, 105–06
- Huangpi (Jiangxi): conference in, 59; Red Army at, xli, 10, 15; in strategies, 98, 250; troop movements near, 16, 68, 150; victory at, 460n1, 527n2, 663
- Huangpu Academy. *See* Whampoa Academy
- Hubei Province, 36, 46, 47, 316, 375
- Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area: attacks on, 259, 303, 662; border of, 36; counterrevolution in, 677; development of, 574; elections in, 530; GMD forces in, 284, 290–91; GMD threat to, 775; Red Army in, 316, 480, 663; strategies for, 259–61, 276, 280; victories in, 231, 295, 316
- Huichang *xian* (Jiangxi): class struggle in, 418; counterrevolution in, 378; errors in, 411; grain surplus in, 402, 403; land investigation in, 394, 398–401, 504, 508–09; poem about, 779; Red Army in, 91; troop movements at, 203; as work area, 107, 109, 112
- Hunan Province: battles in, 47; border area of, 36; Chiang Kaishek and, 90; GMD forces in, 402; GMD threat to, 775; Mao in, xxi, xxiii; Red Army in, 375; warlords in, 94, 663
- Hunan-Henan-Anhui Soviet Area, 232–33, 303
- Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet Area: attacks on, 303, 331; counterrevolution in, 677; development of, 574; elections in, 530; and GMD, 284, 317; labor unions in, 683; Red Army in, 232, 480, 778; soviet work in, 721; victories in, 295, 316
- Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan Soviet Area, 480
- Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area: attacks on, 331; counterrevolution in, 677; development of, 574; elections in, 530; labor unions in, 683; Mao's telegram to, 222–24; merging with Central Base Area, li; and provincial congress, 222–24; Red Army in, 232, 480
- Imperialism: and aggression, 169, 464; and bandit wars, 443; call to arms against, 170, 521, 540; CCP opposition to, 169, 661, 844; and Chiang Kaishek, 46, 373, 762; and colonialism, 209, 465, 482, 520–23; combat with, 267; conference on, 519–23; conflicts within, 195, 665; decline of, 195; fascism and, 314; GMD collusion with, 406, 581n3; international, 46, 154–56, 167–68, 461, 522, 528, 536–40, 756–57; League Against, 66; and masses, 460; opposition to, 66, 156, 160, 210, 266, 443, 711–13
- Industry: bankruptcy in, 465; committees for, 908; and labor laws, 884; loans for, 240; management of, 385, 927; manufactured goods, 786, 816; mines, 160, 169, 240, 486, 795, 797, 900, 901, 926, 927; and production, 385, 576, 799; site inspection for, 798, 800; taxes on, 816, 861, 900
- Inspection: and bond sales, 499; committees for, 911, 934–35, 945, 947; for corruption, 224, 476, 911, 917; departments for, 847–48,

*Inspection (continued)*

916–17, 932; of elections, 335–38, 458; and land investigation, 418; by Red Guards, 379, 911, 917; of regulation compliance, 273, 387, 847–48; work, 224, 322, 383, 588–89, 621. *See also*

*Investigations*

*Intellectuals*: bourgeois, 542, 561, 679; class status of, 542, 561; revolutionary, 393; in soviets, 607

*Internal Affairs, Commissariat for*, 386, 444, 473, 477, 533, 731, 820, 855–57, 864–65, 930, 945

*Internal Affairs departments*, 385, 930–31

*International. See Communist International (Comintern)*

*International Conference Against Imperialism and War*, 519–23, 535n6

*“Internationalist” faction (CCP). See Returned Students*

*Investigations*: as battle preparation, 287; class, 412, 423, 427, 429, 436–37, 453, 506, 510–11; criminal, 810, 843, 853, 856, 936; inspection committees for, 503, 935; land and population, 54–55; Mao’s rural, xxiv, 584–640; in military, 842–43; of Red Army families, 845; by Security Bureau, 838; township, 54–55, 584–640. *See also* *Inspection; Land Investigation Movement*

*Irrigation*, 372, 784, 810, 824–25

*Italy, support for GMD*, 469, 481, 757

*Itineraries, Red Army*, 79–80, 149–50, 250, 305

*Japan*: and America, 195, 760, 773; declaration of war on, 206–14, 230, 316, 465, 660, 764–65; GMD support in, 537, 581; proletariat in, 519

*Japanese*: air raids by, 206, 764; in Beiping area, 373, 461, 465, 659, 773; and Dalian Conference, 228, 445–46, 580, 773; intentions in

*Japanese (continued)*

China, li, 756; investments in China, 759

*Japanese and Guomindang*: and August 1, 443; call to arms against, 154–56, 356, 363, 393, 406–07, 446–47, 762–63; and cease-fire, 219–20, 230, 406; and Chiang Kaishek, 355–56, 360n2, 375, 388–89, 392, 580–81; and Fourth Campaign, 315–16, 469; and GMD concessions, 167–68, 206–07, 210, 293, 767; Mao Zedong on, 756–58; negotiations of, 373–74, 388, 392, 580–83, 660; in Rehe Province, 361. *See also* *North China Truce Agreement*

*Japanese in Northeastern Provinces*, 773; call to arms against, 169–70; CCP demands on, 169; and invasion, xlv, 64n21, 93–94n32, 195, 230, 292, 519, 652, 659, 712; and mass slaughter, 293. *See also* *Manchukuo*

*Ji’an (Jiangxi)*: attacks on, 60, 491–94; GMD forces in, 38, 127, 151, 248, 275; GMD forces near, 9, 14, 28, 99n3, 133; GMD threat from, 100; as key city, l, lii, lvi, 323; mass struggle in, 37; strategies for, 61, 87, 94, 99, 223, 243

*Ji’an xian (Jiangxi)*, Red Army in, 150, 721

*Jiang Dingwen*: attack by, 723; in Changjiengkou, 145, 147; harassment of, 134; retreats of, 151; strategies against, 133; at Xingguo, 49, 132; near Yudu, 127, 131–32

*Jiang Guangnai*: advancing on Chongxian, 127; advancing on Longgang, 129; battle at Donggu, 71; biography of, lxxixn91; in Central Soviet Area, 663; and Chiang Kaishek, 99n3; and Fujian Incident, lxxix–lxxxi, 469n1, 733; near Gaoxingxu, 145, 147; and Japanese, 210; as officer, 37, 51, 90n27, 124, 649; retreats of, 90,

- Jiang Guangnai (*continued*)  
 149; strategies against, 72, 98–99, 100, 102; troop movements, 127; near Xingguo City, 14, 49, 51, 90
- Jiangsu Province, 575, 775
- Jiangxi Province: administrative areas in, 864; battles in, 37–38, 357; Chiang Kaishek in, 374, 759; committees in, 29n5; cooperatives in, 693–94; education in, 695; elections in, 530; First Congress of, 221; GMD forces in, 14, 46, 52, 115, 367, 765; GMD threat to, 775; grain-lending in, 358–59; judicial organs in, 849–54; land investigation in, 557, 686; Mao's letter to, 18–21; *News Bulletin* in, 22; Party line in, 60–61; recruitment in, 267, 670; soviet work in, 176, 323, 722; taxes in, 816; victories in, 36, 94, 375; war preparations in, 231, 236; women in, 229. *See also* Central Soviet Area
- Jiangxi, eastern: GMD forces in, 248; soviet areas in, 250, 664
- Jiangxi, northeast: elections in, 470; GMD forces in, 47, 248; soviet work in, 721
- Jiangxi, northwest, GMD forces in, 248
- Jiangxi, southeast, villages in, 100–101
- Jiangxi, southern: GMD forces in, xlv, 248, 276; soviet work in, 92; Special Committee of, 60, 137. *See also* Xingguo *xian*
- Jiangxi, southwest: GMD forces in, liv, 47; Second Plenum of, 60–61
- Jianning (Fujian): attacks on, 86; GMD forces near, 85, 120; occupation of, 324; Red Army near, 15, 86, 90, 91, 103, 120, 304; troop movements, 15, 84, 85; as work area, 15, 87, 109, 306
- Jianning *xian* (Fujian): as work area, 84, 85, 109, 113, 394; and GMD, 723; as Red area, 574
- Jiao (monetary unit), 84, 95, 142, 868
- Jin (unit of weight), 85, 450–51
- Jinggangshan, xxiv, xxvii, lxin62, 29n7, 85n16, 86n18, 95n36, 111n2, 390n1
- Jinzhou (Liaoning), neutral zone in, 167
- Jishui (Jiangxi): GMD forces near, 9, 28, 42, 248, 275; strategies for, 87
- Judicial Affairs, Commissariat for, 731, 932
- Judicial departments, soviet: corruption in, 514; and counterrevolution, 319, 380, 429, 525, 907; jurisdiction of, 385, 852–53; and land investigation, 417; regulations for, 932–34
- Judicial organs: assessors for, 851–52, 888; circuit courts, 429, 507, 851, 932, 933; and committees, 380–81, 932; establishment of, 150–51, 171–74; functions of, 172, 528, 677–79, 937; labor law courts, 801–02, 896, 899, 932; mass courts, 810; military tribunals, 839, 840–43, 933–34, 946, 955–56; procedures for, 954–56; temporary, 849–54. *See also* Supreme Court
- Justice, Commissariat for, 395, 428, 477, 510, 820, 850, 852, 853, 933–34, 945
- Kangdu, Nanfeng *xian*, 15, 85, 95, 98n1, 102, 107–08n1
- Key cities policies, 34, 187, 193, 211, 266, 316, 323, 482
- KK organization, 164, 165
- Kuzhu, 15, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84
- Labor: auxiliary, 948–50; compulsory, 932; convict, 258; courts, 801–02, 896, 899, 932; essential, 551; exchanges, 794–95, 806; federations for, 799, 883, 884, 888, 891, 894–96; forced, 327, 559, 852–53, 898–99, 902, 907, 916; volunteer, 257, 559, 846, 907. *See also* Labor power
- Labor, Commissariat for, 471, 473, 730, 794–802 *passim*, 820, 888, 889, 897, 899, 945
- Labor departments, soviet, 883–92 *passim*, 895, 896, 922–23, 940

- Labor law: of 1931, 800–09; of 1933, 882–96; and auxiliary labor, 948–50; and eight-hour day, 155, 160, 188, 318, 680, 683, 710, 795, 884; and elections, 336; enforcement of, 223, 898–99, 932; Labor Protection Law, 140, 889; Voluntary Labor Law, 571; and women, 226, 228, 796, 887, 894; for working class, 466, 482, 529, 575, 679–80
- Labor law application, 187–88; errors in, 318; investigation of, 471, 473, 798, 799; progress in, 469; resolutions for, 66, 826; as soviet task, 526, 710–11; and war mobilization, 572
- Labor power: for agriculture, 630, 691–92, 706; and land distribution, 62, 823; for preferential treatment of the Red Army, 372, 845–46, 931; redistribution of, 630–32, 670, 706; shortage of, 19; for soldiers' land, 783–84
- Labor unions: agricultural, 455, 459, 513, 687; All-China General Labor Union, 417; associations of, 894–95; and bond sales, 497, 684; class-based, 66; and committees, 929; and Communist Party, 684; confiscated houses for, 824; congresses of, 801; and cooperatives, 799; correct leadership of, 434; craftsmen's, 455; and economic construction, 488; and elections, 337, 474, 591; employment through, 794–95; farm laborers', 66, 237, 238; handicraft, 455, 459, 513, 900; and investigations, 436, 439–40, 505–06, 512–13; and judicial system, 851; and labor laws, 882, 883, 884, 889–91, 894–96, 899, 901; and land investigation, 436; at local meetings, 409; in manufacturing, 160; and martial law, 299; obstruction of, 898–99; organization of, 188, 575, 683; and poor peasant league, 459, 512–13;
- Labor unions (*continued*)  
 preferential terms for, 800, 895; and Red Army, 237; regulation of, 799–800; in soviet areas, 61, 417, 684; tasks of, 799
- Labor and War, Committee for, 240, 297, 312, 330, 343
- Laborers, farm: asset redistribution to, 438; CCP reliance on, 686; exploitation of, 450; and investigations, 506, 512; and labor unions, 66, 237, 238, 824, 900; and land distribution, 55, 188, 317, 411, 414, 422–23, 822; mobilization of, 185, 187, 188; and poor peasant league, 453, 512–13; tax exemption for, 318, 689, 815, 860, 900–901. *See also* Peasants, poor
- Laicun, Ningdu *xian*, 42, 100, 121–22
- Lampson, Sir Miles, 538
- Land: confiscation of, 62, 66, 155, 188, 413, 419, 686, 822–25; construction, 413, 414, 810, 923–24; deeds for, 414; nationalization of, 824; private ownership of, 18, 65–66, 691, 823; public, 444, 458, 566–67, 595, 631n2, 783, 906; reclaimed, 816, 880t, 910, 915; registration of, 910, 923; struggle, 413, 456, 923
- Land, Commissariat for, 383, 395, 416, 448, 730, 820, 922, 945
- Land departments, soviet, 382, 444, 594, 923–24, 940
- Land Investigation Movement: bureaucratism in, 412, 424, 509, 514; Central Bureau and, lxvi–lxviii, 508–10; committees for, 518, 627, 910, 915, 923; eight-*xian* conference on, lxviii, 398–419; errors in, lxix, 419, 449–50, 524; implementation of, 462, 469, 471, 475, 480, 482, 575, 711, 924; instructions for, 394–97, 448–52; launching, 524–26, 686; and mass organizations, 416, 421–24, 426, 436, 439–40; mass work in, 434–40, 505; outcomes of, 575; and mobilization, 569;

- Land Investigation Movement  
(*continued*)  
radicalization of, lxxxix,  
summaries of, lxi, 420–33,  
504–18; tasks of, 411, 434, 439,  
508. *See also* Confiscation
- Land Law: adoption of, lxvi, 820, 822;  
application of, 187, 189, 223, 317,  
711; text of, 822–25;
- Land redistribution, lxiv–lxv; and class  
status, 54–55, 413–14; in class  
struggle, 413; to coolies, 822, 824;  
discussions of, 457; exclusions  
from, 66; by governments, 55, 396;  
equal, 61, 62, 65–66, 140; to farm  
laborers, 55, 188, 317, 411, 414,  
422–23, 822; incomplete, 18–19,  
60; investigations of, 54–55, 317;  
to laborers, 55, 188, 317, 411, 414,  
860; to masses, 505, 525; and  
merchants, 66; methods for, 685;  
and middle peasants, 19, 55, 188,  
190, 317, 411, 414, 511, 822–24; in  
new areas, 185–86, 189–90, 571,  
712; pace of, 425, 516, 686–87; to  
peasants, 414, 548, 691, 822–24,  
860; problems with, 19, 54–55; and  
provincial soviets, 19; by Red  
Army, 87, 91, 107, 109, 111, 112,  
190; regulations for, 822–25; and  
rich peasants, 189, 396, 414, 525,  
558–59, 823; and socialism, 62; to  
soldiers, 669, 783, 822; as a stage,  
419; and women, 225–26, 228,  
563, 616, 952
- Land rent, 19, 66, 449–52, 514, 546,  
547, 685, 824
- Land revolution: attack on, 292; and  
middle peasants, 190; opportunism  
in, 57–58, 60, 188–89; and peasant  
warfare, 62; and Red Army, 59,  
189, 783, 844; in White areas, 298,  
*See also* Land Investigation  
Movement
- Land taxes: abolition of, 786, 814;  
collection of, 928–29; paid in grain,  
359–60; as war revenue, 213, 236,  
298, 571; for workers and peasants,  
19, 237, 332, 689
- Landlord armed forces: destruction of,  
16, 23, 37, 134, 377; and GMD,  
331; and guerrilla warfare, 185–86,  
238; militia (*mintuan*), 237, 238,  
307, 834, 952n2, 954; and peasants,  
18–19, 20; in White areas, 285
- Landlords: attacks on, 184–85;  
bankrupt, 559–60; “big tigers,”  
505, 507, 515; CCP policy toward,  
546–47; and Chiang Kaishhek, 46;  
and counterrevolution, 166, 368,  
370, 414–15, 676–77, 908;  
deception by, 401, 414–15, 421,  
435, 456, 506; descriptions of,  
449–52, 513, 525, 546; and  
elections, 336, 472–73, 532, 677,  
872; elimination of, 299, 413, 434,  
546, 686; execution of, 173, 955;  
families of, 65, 66, 563; fines for,  
395, 417, 505, 565; as forced labor,  
559; and GMD, 46, 169, 324, 871;  
identification of, 411, 504–05,  
513–14, 525, 546–47, 686–87;  
investigation of, 396, 436, 524–25;  
and money market, 502, 503; Red  
Army and, 562–63; resistance  
from, 423, 425, 511; in  
revolutionary bodies, 60, 411, 414,  
425, 677; surveillance of, 369, 370,  
401, 907; and weapons, 377, 941;  
in White areas, 223, 685
- Landlords, confiscation from:  
committee for, 507; of land, 686,  
783, 822; of land and property,  
396, 422, 546, 685, 823–24,  
908–09; and redistribution, 155,  
162, 185, 411, 413, 438, 505, 525
- League Against Imperialism, 66, 618
- League of Nations, 210, 761, 770; CCP  
on, 761; China in, 757; and GMD,  
210, 538–39; as tool of  
imperialism, 292, 770; and  
Japanese invasion, 355; and Lytton  
Commission, 209n1, 209, 292–93,  
522; and partition of China, 219,  
292–93
- Le'an (Jiangxi): GMD forces near, 9,  
10, 14, 42, 98, 247–49, 275; orders  
to attack, 16–17, 247–49; Red

- Le'an (Jiangxi) (*continued*)  
 occupation of, 316–17; strategies for, 87, 249, 276, 280–81; as work area, lvii–lviii, 29, 37, 95
- Le'an *xian* (Jiangxi): GMD forces in, 67; and land investigation, 394; as Red area, 288n4, 574
- Lei Shourong, biography of, 445n3
- Lenin Teachers' College, 321, 542
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, xxvi, 24n4, 267
- Li De. *See* Otto Braun
- Li Jingquan, 104, 112
- Li Jishen, 649
- Li Lisan line, xxx, xxxii–xxxiii, xxxvi, lxxv–lxxvi, lxxxvi, 56–57, 57n3, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 493
- Li Mingrui, 122
- Li Shaojiu, xlix, 367; biography of, xlii–xliii, 29
- Li Weiha, 164
- Li Yunjie, 127, 151, 248, 249, 275
- Li Zhuoran, 86, 729
- Li Zongren, 36n7, 93
- Liancheng (Fujian): GMD forces near, 432, 569, 774; Red Army in, 732; victories in, 530, 570, 574
- Liancheng *xian* (Fujian): and Border Committee, 104; GMD threat to, 367; Red army in, 111, 113; as work area, 96, 107, 109, 313
- Liang Botai, 731; biography of, 410n1
- Liao Zhongkai, 64n21
- Lichuan (Jiangxi): GMD forces near, lxxviii, 118, 569, 570, 723; Red Army near, 87, 90–91, 93; strategies for, 86, 87, 93, 304; victories in, 324, 574; as work area, 306
- Lichuan *xian* (Jiangxi): fund-raising near, 84–85; land investigation in, 394; as Red area, 574
- Lijin*, 213, 786, 906
- Lin Biao, xxxviii–22, lxxxviii–112, 247, 307; and Executive Committee, 729, 730, 820; and Front Committee, 81–84, 90–96, 98n1, 102; and Mao Zedong, lii–liiii, 203
- Lin Boqu, 496, 730
- Lin Ye, 83–84
- Linchuan. *See* Fuzhou–Linchuan
- Litan River, 87n22
- Literacy: classes, 431, 473, 505, 612, 639–40, 695–96; movement, 26, 321, 526, 542, 577; and newspapers, 26; for women, 228, 696
- Liu Bochong, 302, 729
- Liu Bojian, 86, 729
- Liu Heding, 28, 42, 84, 85, 86
- Liu Shaoguang [Shaoxian], 242n2, 249, 275n3
- Liu Shaoqi, 729, 730, 820
- Liu Xiang, 538
- Liu Yalou, 120
- Livestock: cattle, 23, 27, 103, 457, 606, 706; draft animals, 18, 20, 321, 349, 396, 438, 559, 691–92; hidden, 39, 724n2; horses, 31, 136–37, 142, 154; looted by GMD, 357; pigs, 438, 507, 554, 600–601, 602, 635; poultry, 438, 600–602, 636; redistribution of, 824
- Livestock cooperatives, 439, 458, 576, 606–07, 635, 691–92, 706
- Loans: bank, 162, 707; cancellation of, 414, 567, 824; to GMD, 760, 761; government, 240, 486, 926; by individuals, 55, 449–52, 567; international, 46, 469, 664, 757; regulations for, 190. *See also* Credit cooperatives
- Local armed forces: and AB Corps, 50; class-alien elements in, 414, 416, 677; consolidation of, 116; and counterrevolution, 368, 394; delegates for, 180; errors of, 198–99; establishing, 92, 107, 192, 413, 571, 668, 810; example of, 597–99; expansion of, 37, 197, 268, 395, 417, 469, 504, 569; fund-raising by, 344; garrison companies, 235; and guerrilla warfare, 131, 133–35, 234, 263, 340–41; harassment by, 49–50; and Japanese invasion, 212; vs. landlord armed forces, 20, 135; and martial law, 240, 299; and military

- Local armed forces (*continued*)  
tribunals, 841; mobilization of, 295–300; in Party line, 58; and propaganda, 40; and Red Army, 29, 61, 63, 133, 134–35, 255, 901; strength of, 48; training for, 116, 343, 629, 924–25; weapons for, 29, 37, 48, 340–42; women in, 228; work in *xian*, 134
- Local bullies: attacks on, 414; blockhouses of, 158–59; class status of, 546; confiscation of assets, 320; toppling, 23, 49, 84, 92, 103, 109
- Local governments: administration by, 856; and bond sales, 498, 500; Central Government Circular to, 398–401; class-alien elements in, 416, 432, 473, 677; confiscated houses for, 824; corruption in, 263–64, 320, 322, 471; errors of, 369, 435; and food shortages, 409; judicial departments in, 850; and labor laws, 883; and land distribution, 55, 190; and land investigation, 421; mass assistance for, 371–72; and masses, 330–34; and preferential treatment, 783, 785; reforming, 396; regulations for, 175; and war preparation, 39; working women in, 472, 476, 617. *See also* Soviets
- Long March, xxiv, lxiii, xc–xciii, 537n2, 779nn1–2
- Longgang *xian*, establishment of, 864
- Longgang, Yongfeng *xian*, battle at (1930): xxx, 30–31; battle at (1931), xxxix–xl, 129–30; GMD forces near, 127, 774; strategies for, 98–100, 123–24; troop movements, 68; victory at, 28, 29, 34, 35, 37, 52, 60, 65
- Longgangtou, 67, 148, 149–50, 151, 152
- Longsha *xian*, women in, 226
- Longyan (Fujian), 36, 204, 263, 574
- Longyan *xian* (Fujian): GMD destruction of, 357; strategy for, 201
- Lu Dingping, 46, 492
- Lu Xiaochen, 9, 14, 42, 83n8, 83, 132
- Lumpenproletariat. *See* Vagabonds
- Luo Binghui, 82–86, 111, 729, 820
- Luo Fu. *See* Zhang Wentian
- Luo Lin, 9, 14, 28, 37, 42, 51, 87, 151
- Luo Ming, biography of, lxin64
- Luo Ming Line, lxi–lxiii, lxxviii, 496n1
- Luo Ronghuan, 81–84, 93–96, 730
- Luo Zhanglong, 57
- Luo Zhuoying, 28, 121, 127, 121, 131–32, 151, 242–43
- Luofang Conference, xxx, 59
- Luokou, Ningdu *xian*: casualties at, 83; GMD forces in, 5, 81; strategy for, 7, 8; troop movements, 78, 80; as work area, 15, 16
- Lytton Commission, 209n1, 209, 292–93, 522
- Ma Hongkui, biography of, 45
- Ma Zhanshan, biography of, 209
- Manchukuo: and Dalian conference, 580; establishment of, 209n2, 391, 405, 528; formal recognition of, 445–46, 759, 767, 768; puppet rulers in, 374, 770; tax offices in North China, 759
- Manchuria. *See* Northeastern Provinces; Japanese in Northeastern Provinces; Manchukuo
- Mao Bingwen, 5n4, 7, 9, 14, 37, 42, 51, 78, 79, 81–83, 86, 90, 90n27, 121, 132, 151, 248–49, 275
- Mao (monetary unit), 449n2, 553, 636, 637n6
- Mao Zedong: on Central Military Commission, 12, 41, 97, 138, 373; and circulars, 115–17, 292; on class status, 546–68; criticisms of, xxviii, xlvi, li, liv–lv, lix–lx, lxxix–lxx, lxxxv; on economic policy, 160–62, 384–85; election of, 410, 729, 730, 820; on elections, 179–81, 469–78, 527–35, 871–78; and First National Congress, xlvi, 785, 825; foreign policy of, 160, 169, 292–94, 726; and Front Committee, xlvii, 81–96, 98–104,



Mao Zedong (*continued*)

107n1, 113; and General Political Department, 12, 21, 23; and GMD, xxiii–xxiv, 219–20, 391–93, 445–47, 759–63; illness of, xxviii–xxix, lxi, lxxv, lxxix, 58n5; in Jianfeng, 118, 120; letters of, xxxiin6, xxxiin11, 107–13, 118–20, 167–70, 184–93, 764; on local armed forces, 340–42; and Long March, xciii–xciv; memorials by, 157, 353–54, 641, 651; and and Military Affairs Commission, xxxiii, xlviii; Nanchang Uprising, 443; and National Congress, 97, 162, 464–67, 652, 653, 654–56, 727, 727–28; on newspapers, 22–27; and Organic Law of the Central Soviet, 942–47; at Party conference, 56n1; poems by, 52, 114, 390, 779; and Politburo, xxv, lxxv, lxxix; as Political Commissar, lvii, 247, 249, 252, 253, 257, 284, 303; on preferential treatment, 783–85; on propaganda, 44–51; and provincial congress, 194–200, 221–24; and Red Army, xxiii–xxiv, lii–liv, 11, 266–74, 303–07; on rich peasants, 138–41; on soviet work, 18–21, 69–70, 175–76, 230–41, 479–90, 737–51; and traitors, 105–06, 163–66, 245–46; utopianism, xxvi; and Western thought, xxi, xxv; to White army, 154–56, 388–89, 644–45, 649–50, 652–53, 764–66; and women's issues, 225–29; at *xian* conferences, 410–33, 479–90, 527–35; to Zhou Enlai, xc, 201–05, 215, 367; and Zunyi Conference, xxiv; orders, First Campaign, 6, 8, 11, 17; orders, Second Campaign, 33, 41, 43, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 80; orders, Third Campaign, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 135, 137, 144, 146, 148, 150, 153, 159; orders, Fourth Campaign, 159, 247, 252–54, 258, 289, 300, 301–02, 326–27, 343, 347, 360, 366; orders, Fifth Campaign, 572;

Mao Zedong (*continued*)

other orders of, 370, 372, 379, 387, 642. *See also* Central Bureau; Central Soviet Government; Executive Committee

Marriage laws and regulations, 226, 228–29, 264, 319–20, 629, 697–98, 787, 818–19, 951–53

Marshall, George C., xxvi

Martial law (*jieyan*), 724; temporary, 369; committees for, 906–07, 914; defined, 39n16; enforcement of, 39, 116, 240, 298–99; and food supply, 237; and Japanese invasion, 212, 213; and passports, 346–47; in war mobilization, xxxi, 724

Marxism–Leninism, xxii–xxiii, xxv, lxiii, 56, 542, 577

Mass consciousness, 184

Mass organizations: and agitation meetings, 296; anti-Japanese, 206; class-alien elements in, 416, 740; and committees, 594–96, 929; contributions to, 19; and counterrevolution, 368, 394, 415, 429, 432; and economic construction, 488; establishing, 185, 413, 571; and judicial system, 851, 852; and land investigation, 416; list of, 749; and national currency, 502; recruitment in, 268, 273; and revolution, 237; subversive, 223, 319, 368, 396, 833; and taxes, 902; and treasury bonds, 488, 497, 500, 684; in White areas, 185, 207, 211; women in, 228

Mass struggle: elements in, 23, 414; enthusiasm for, 23, 504; expansion of, 37; leadership in, 515–16; promotion of, 273, 507; revolutionary, 198; in White areas, 216

Masses: alienation of, 139, 332–33, 358; asset distribution to, 396, 425, 438, 438–39, 507, 515–17, 525; conservatism in, 22–23, 313, 331; evacuation of, 67; Japanese slaughter of, 154–55, 168, 206,

*Masses (continued)*

- 210, 293, 315, 355, 361–62; local soviets and, 330–34; looting by, 223; newspapers for, 26;
- propaganda for, 12, 16, 257; Red Army work with, 58, 59, 70, 95, 109; slogans for, 325, 435, 439, 488, 489, 502–03, 535; strength of, 169. *See also* Mobilization; Mutual aid
- Masses, arming: with captured weapons, 48, 207; and combat agreements, 356, 376, 388, 392, 406, 537, 583, 762; Front Committee and, 58; for revolution, 269, 340–43, 668, 671. *See also* Local armed forces
- Medical teams, military, 6, 8, 33, 142, 143; bandage units, 8, 32; first aid, 341
- Medicines, 17, 32, 86, 87–88, 92, 102, 633, 693, 890
- Meetings: of activists, 87; of businessmen, 237; for cadres, 103, 749; on class status, 437, 506, 517–18; committee, 912; election, 337, 474, 533–34, 592–93, 626, 790, 828–29, 872–73, 911; on grain shortages, 409; on land issues, 189, 395, 424–26, 435, 506; of local soviets, 176, 738–39, 804, 806, 808; mass, 115, 188, 334, 425, 436, 686, 746; and mobilization, 296, 332–34, 570; of poor peasants, 400, 426–27, 459; for recruitment, 268, 273; secret, 414; on treasury bonds, 497, 498, 500, 608; as war preparation, 31–32, 38–39, 40, 296; for women, 629
- Merchants: confiscation of assets, 503, 565; and counterrevolution, 368; and elections, 789; fund collection from, 191; and land distribution, 66; market manipulation by, 364–65, 403, 441, 484, 705; and national currency, 502, 503; surveillance of, 369; and taxes, 236–37, 688, 815; and war bonds, 310. *See also* Commerce; Trade

- Military Affairs, Commissariat for, 730, 820, 841, 842, 895, 945
- Military affairs departments, soviet, 234, 379, 395, 417, 924–25, 940
- Military Affairs Commission, liii, lxxv–lxxvi; 85n12, 570; advance to Huangpi, 16; and army expansion, 703–04, 720; and August 1, 443; in campaigns, 10, 16, 43, 71–73, 75, 203; on combat agreements, 356, 388–89, 583, 660; establishment of, xxxii–xxxiii, 668–69, 947; functions of, 244; and Japanese, 211–13; on land ownership, 18–21; and military tribunals, 840; and *News Bulletin*, 22n1; notices of, 138; orders of, 12, 34, 73, 97, 131, 136, 144; and pensions, 931; proclamations of, 355, 373; and Security Bureau, 836; and war booty, 117; and war mobilization, 211, 233. *See also* General Political Department
- Military training: as battle preparation, 32–33, 65, 92, 286–87, 297; internal, 12; for Japanese invasion, 212, 213; for local armed forces, 116, 343, 594–98, 629, 924–25; for prisoners of war, 88; for Red Army, 32–33, 42–43, 92, 320, 462, 704–05; for Red Guards, 269–70, 272, 297, 300, 570, 599, 749; for reinforcements, 231–33, 269–70; for Young Pioneers, 570, 599, 749
- Military tribunals, 840–43, 933–34, 946, 955–56
- Militia, xxxi, 134, 237–38, 287; guard detachments, 147n2, 147
- Mines, 160, 169, 240, 486, 795, 797, 900, 901, 926, 927
- Minorities in China, 415n1, 699–700
- Mobilization: of cadres, 197, 417; Central Bureau and, 416; economic, 240, 453, 457–58, 489, 866; for elections, 471; errors in, 139, 331–32; for farming, 348, 382–83; for harvest, 238, 774; for land investigation, 506; and land revolution, 188; and mass

**Mobilization** (*continued*)

organizations, 416, 421–24, 517;  
methods for, 23, 333–34, 382,  
720–21, 746; for recruitment, 268,  
273, 395, 720; as Red Army task,  
xli, 12, 90; and revolution, 716–17;  
for soviet work, 710, 737; to  
support Red Army, lxxii, 39–40,  
49–50, 58, 69, 117, 235, 669–70

**Mobilization, war:** against Japan, 223,  
660; and bonds, 236, 310–11, 321;  
components of, 115–17, 458, 462;  
directive on, 209–14; and  
education, 541; emergency,  
295–300, 317, 324, 337–38,  
569–72, 723–25; in Fujian  
Province, 197; and land  
investigation, 430–31; and mass  
organizations, 237, 453; and  
military commissions, 211; officers  
for, 924–25; pace of, 394, 416; in  
townships, 587; in war zones, 12

**Money:** for defectors, 49; enemy, 6;  
exportation of, 191, 368, 908, 959;  
for military units, 33; pocket, 43,  
84, 95; waste of, 191, 198, 320,  
689, 811. *See also* Currency;  
Financial issues

**Mongolia:** as colony, 581, 699;  
Japanese in, 479, 767; state of, 528;  
recognition of, 405; sell-out of,  
580, 659, 759, 768

**Mu** (unit of measure) 55, 525

**Muslims,** 699

**Mutual aid:** associations for, 576, 604–06,  
614–15, 706, 902, 924; in cultivation,  
20, 349; discussions on, 458; and  
grain shortage, 404, 408–09; and  
labor power, 631, 670, 691–92; and  
land investigation, 458

**Nanchang** (Jiangxi): attack on, 491n1;  
Chiang Kaishek in, 115, 538, 581n4,  
759; GMD forces at, 14, 492; as key  
city, 1, 323; Mao on, 484; Red Army  
near, 47, 317; strategy for, 51, 94,  
223; uprising in, 443

**Nancheng** (Jiangxi), lviii, 90–91, 248,  
304, 353

**Nanfang xian,** fund-raising in, 84

**Nanfeng** (Jiangxi): fortifications in, 276;  
fund-raising in, 10, 15; GMD  
forces in, 9, 10, 38, 42–43, 90–91,  
93, 102, 248; GMD forces near, 14,  
67, 78; Red occupation of, 317;  
strategies for, 82, 84, 87, 98,  
100–101, 276–77, 281, 304; troop  
movements near, 78–79; work area,  
29, 37, 95, 185–86

**Nanfeng xian** (Jiangxi), 288n4, 574

**Nanjing xian** (Fujian): battle in, 215,  
218; guerrilla warfare in, 215–16

**Nanjing Government.** *See* Guomindang  
government

**Nantuan, Ningdu xian,** 7, 76–77, 78–80

**National Revolutionary Army (GMD):**  
attacks by, xxix–xxx, xxxix,  
lxxxvii, 47, 49, 357; as bandits, 50,  
69, 140, 307; Cavalry Division  
(GMD), 42; concessions to  
Japanese, 167n1; condition of, 65,  
122, 132, 375, 664; defeats of, 28,  
149, 151, 261, 278, 316, 363, 375,  
402, 460; defections from, 196, 209;  
destruction by, xxx, 49, 50, 284,  
321, 357, 441; food allowance for,  
51; near Gan River, 99n3, 242–43,  
248, 282; harvest sabotage by, 238;  
logistics of, 37, 48–49, 115; Mao's  
letters to, 154–56, 388–89, 764–66,  
772; morale in, 37, 49, 460, 665;  
opposition to Japan in, 465, 565,  
644–45; pincer strategy, 99;  
propaganda for, 40, 49, 776;  
revolutionary movement in, 66,  
270, 273, 339, 469, 576, 702, 775;  
in Soviet areas, 50, 255, 290, 362,  
774; stopped, 94, 105; strength of,  
xxxv, xli, lvi, lxxx, 37, 105, 331,  
482, 754, 761, 765, 777; supplies  
for, 757

**Nationalization,** 160, 169, 824, 925,  
926, 927. *See also* State-owned  
enterprises

**News Bulletin on Current Affairs,** 22–27

**Newspapers,** 22–27, 95, 112, 212,  
410n1, 473, 499, 696, 930; wall,  
436, 612, 640

- Nie Rongzhen, lii, liii, 203, 247, 307, 729  
 Nineteenth Red Army: establishment of, 367  
 Nineteenth Route Army (GMD): defeats of, 9, 468, 530, 723; in Jiang Province, lxxvi, lxxix–lxxx, lxxxiv–lxxxv, 230, 649–50, 732–33, 764; and Japanese invasion, 206, 230; near Ji'an, 99n3; Mao's telegram to, 644–45; officers of, 9n3, 14, 28, 37, 90n27, 210n2, 649, 733; Seventy-eighth Division, 14n2, 132, 151, 367; Sixtieth Division, 9, 42, 49, 67, 124n2, 132, 151; Sixty-first Division, 9n2, 14, 131n2, 132, 151, 367n1; troop movements, 67  
 Ningdu (Jiangxi): conference in, xxviii, lv, lviii–lix, lxiii, lxx, 59, 244n1, 275n1, 312n1; and GMD forces, 42–43, 67, 121, 151, 242, 775; strategy for, 98–100; as work area, 15, 29, 37, 42, 42–43, 118  
 Ningdu Uprising, 246, 339, 353  
 Ningdu *xian*: becomes Bosheng *xian*, 353; GMD forces in, 5, 7n2; production in, 240; as work area, 107  
 Ninghua (Fujian): GMD forces in, 15; Red occupation of, 316, 367; strategy for, 304; as work area, 16, 91, 96, 102, 192  
 Ninghua *xian* (Fujian): labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, 394, 396, 398, 401, 504, 508, 509; as work area, 107, 108, 110–11, 113, 185  
 Ninth Army (GMD), 9; deputy commander, 38n14; Fifty-fourth Division, 14, 42, 110, 129  
 Ninth Division, Third Red Army, 121, 147; troop movements, 145–46  
 North China: Japanese occupation of, 469, 481, 575, 659, 712, 737, 767; sellout of, 759–60, 768  
 North China Truce Agreement, 580; buffer zone in, 519n2; and CCP, 660, 761, 768, 770; and Chiang Kaishek, lxxi, 388n2, 391;  
 North China Truce Agreement  
     *(continued)*  
     conditions of, 391, 405; date of, 445; in GMD strategies, 461, 774  
 North Pole Society, 64  
 Northeast Jiangxi Soviet Area: attacks on, 303, 331; GMD forces in, 284; GMD threat to, 317; and mass work, 298; Red Army in, 232; victories in, 295, 316  
 Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army: Mao's letter to, 652–53  
 Northeastern Provinces: anti-imperialist movement in, 315; as colony, 581; and GMD armies, 581, 775; guerrilla warfare in, 575; puppet government in, 209–10; sellout of, 195, 389, 481, 580, 759, 768,  
 Northern Fujian Soviet Area, labor unions in, 683  
 October Revolution, 97, 325, 820, 885  
 Opium, 154–55, 223, 239, 328–29, 374n3, 856  
 Opportunism, 57–58; and class struggle, 509–10; correction of, 60; "left," 414, 440, 462, 510, 725; in mass work, 109; preventing, 185; right, xlv, li, lxix, 217n1, 218, 440, 462; sentiments of, 66; wrong, 485, 487, 489–90  
 Organic Law of the Central Soviet, 934, 935, 942–47  
 Ouyang Jian, 98n1; biography of, 100n5  
 Oxen, 20, 458, 559, 635, 692, 908, 924.  
     *See also* Livestock  
 Pan Hannian, lxxxi; biography of, lxxxi, 96  
 Paris Commune, 194  
 Peasants: class status of, 55, 506; and elections, 477, 532; food supply for, 69; in guerrilla forces, 69, 235; and landlord armed forces, 18–19, 20; political power for, 57, 324, 529, 672, 685, 783, 822; recruits from, 232, 267–71; in Red Guards, 234; slaughter of, 154, 293, 362; in White areas, 685. *See also* Land redistribution

- Peasants, middle: CCP alliance with, 190, 396, 434–35, 510, 548, 686; and class investigation, 436, 438, 506, 510–12, 524–25; descriptions of, 55, 247–48; false reports on, 424–25; and government bonds, 497; and land distribution, 19, 55, 188, 190, 317, 411, 414, 822–24; mobilization of, 185, 187; and poor peasant league, 453; in soviet structure, 458, 476; taxes on, 786, 879, 881; treatment of, 139, 190, 401, 423, 424; well-to-do, 552–54
- Peasants, poor, 138–41; CCP reliance on, 396, 434, 686; and class investigation, 506; defined, 55; as delegates, 400; descriptions of, 548; and land distribution, 414, 548, 822–24; and land issues, 188, 395, 411; mobilization of, xxiii, 185, 187, 413, 416; in soviet structure, 476; taxes on, 786, 815, 860, 879, 881, 903. *See also* Laborers, farm; Poor peasant league
- Peasants, rich: CCP policy toward, lxv, 547; confiscation from, lxii–lxiii, 396, 413, 422, 425, 438, 525, 556–57, 565, 823, 824; and counterrevolution, 368, 414–15, 556–58; deception by, 396, 401, 414–15, 421, 435, 456, 506; defection of, 109; described, 55, 138, 434, 451–52, 525, 547; donations from, 360, 395, 417, 495, 505, 558, 565, 909; economic disarmament of, 62–63, 70; and elections, 336, 472–73, 532, 789, 871; execution of, 173; families of, 557–58, 563, 901–02; as forced labor, 327, 559; identification of, 411, 504–05, 513–14, 547, 686–87; and instruments of production, 824; investigation of, 396, 436, 524–25; and Land Law, 188–89, 317, 823; and local armed forces, 50; market manipulation by, 364–65, 403, 441; and money market, 502, 503; opposition to, 138–41, 224, 513; poor land for, 189, 396, 414, 525, 558–59, 823; purges of, 65, 116, 185; reactionary, 556–57; Red Army and, 70, 360, 562–63, 901; resistance from, 425, 511; in revolutionary bodies, 60, 139, 141, 371, 414, 425; surveillance on, 299, 329, 369, 370, 401, 907; taxes on, 236–37, 318, 786, 815, 816, 860, 879, 903; undercover, 337; and war bonds, 310; weakening, 430, 434, 558–59, 686; and weapons, 377; in White areas, 557, 685
- Peddlers, 633, 815, 860
- Peng Dehuai, xxix, xxxviii–22, xlviii, lxxxiii, lxxvi, lxxxiii, lxxxviii; and Executive Committee, 729, 820; and Front Committee, 82, 98n1, 102; in Fujian, 468n1, 530; in Jiangxi, 122; on Japanese invasion, 154–56
- Peoples' Revolutionary Government (Fujian), lxxxi, 581n4, 644–45, 649–50, 665–66, 715, 723, 732–35, 775–76
- Ping'anzhai, Yudu *xian*, troop movements at, 121, 122, 152, 153
- Pinghe (Fujian), 47, 204–05, 215, 216
- Pingjiang Uprising, 157
- Pitou, Ji'an *xian*, February Conference, 60
- Poems, by Mao, 52, 114, 390, 779
- Police: military, 292, 393, 445, 753, 872; peoples', 851, 855, 856, 930, 932, 933; provincial, 806; urban, 322, 856. *See also* State Political Security Bureau
- Politburo (CCP), xxv, lxxxv, lxxxix, xci, xciii, 56–57
- Political commissars, Red Army, 704; appointment of, 272, 320, 342; and Front Committee, 58; and General Headquarters, 130; and Military Commission, 73; tasks of, 12–13
- Political departments: expenses of, 142; fund collection by, 191; and investigations, 55; propaganda section, 26–27; in Red Army, 12–13, 26, 142, 193; tasks of,

- Political departments (*continued*)  
 38–40, 44, 54–55, 104, 146,  
 878. *See also* General Political  
 Department
- Political Guards Regiment (CCP), 8, 876
- Political power: and agrarian revolution,  
 822; for peasants and workers, 57,  
 324, 529, 672, 685, 783, 822; and  
 revolution, 528, 685; for soldiers,  
 783, 822; and soviets, 185, 455,  
 529, 844
- Poor peasant league: in agrarian  
 revolution, 453, 457, 824; and bond  
 sales, 497, 498, 500; confiscated  
 houses for, 824; congress of,  
 398–401, 454, 512, 866; delegates  
 for, 400; democracy in, 457; and  
 economic construction, 488; and  
 elections, 474, 591; errors of,  
 453–54; expansion of, 575; and  
 feudal forces, 453, 457; and  
 investigations, 426–27, 436, 437,  
 439–40, 506, 525; and judicial  
 system, 851; and labor unions, 459;  
 leadership of, 434; and meetings,  
 409, 422, 425, 426; membership in,  
 66, 512–13; and middle peasants,  
 439, 455–57, 510; organization of,  
 453–59, 515–16, 619–20, 687,  
 749n4; propaganda for, 455
- Population: registration, 299, 322;  
 statistics, 54–55, 400, 686, 908,  
 916, 931; in townships, 586–87,  
 623–24
- Postal service: department for, 385,  
 855–56, 857, 926; to Europe, 446;  
 express, 118, 386–87; Japanese  
 and, 759, 767, 773n2; and labor  
 unions, 800, 895; for soldiers, 318,  
 784; standardization of, 321; and  
 war mobilization, 213, 236
- Preferential treatment: for government  
 workers, 318, 371–72, 566, 610,  
 879–80, 900–901, 902; for labor  
 unions, 800, 895; regulations for,  
 268, 372, 458, 669–70, 783–85, 860;  
 for teachers, 542, 610
- Preferential treatment, Red Army:  
 committees for, 627, 906, 914;
- Preferential treatment, Red Army:  
 committees for (*continued*)  
 failure in, 226, 267, 319;  
 implementation of, 223, 268,  
 273–74, 443–44, 458, 629, 704,  
 931; instructions for, 318–19,  
 844–48; and land distribution, 563;  
 and mutual aid, 604–05; and postal  
 service, 318, 784; price discounts,  
 633, 669, 784; tax exemptions, 318,  
 689, 815, 879, 901–02; for women,  
 228
- Price: market, lxxii, 20, 602–03,  
 636–37; of rice, 402, 408, 441, 484,  
 486, 499; of salt, 602–03, 637
- Prisoners, enemy: capture of, 291; care  
 for, 6, 31, 40; count of, 374;  
 disposition of, 31, 75; pay for, 49,  
 143; and propaganda, 39, 40, 49,  
 117; recruitment of, 88; repatriation  
 of, 32, 103
- Production: development of, 414, 500;  
 exemptions from, 186, 235, 610,  
 851; increase in, 223, 239, 318,  
 348–49, 382, 526, 690–91, 706;  
 industrial, 160, 385, 576, 799;  
 instruments of, 823, 824; labor  
 power for, 224, 629–32, 670, 706;  
 and labor unions, 799; market  
 prices for, 602–03, 636–37;  
 piecework, 796–97, 884, 886;  
 standards for, 886–87; and work  
 inspection, 224, 322, 588–89,  
 621. *See also* Agriculture;  
 Handicrafts
- Production cooperatives: development  
 of, 458, 576, 693–94, 906;  
 industrial, 240, 693, 706–07; labor,  
 504, 631; and labor laws, 882; and  
 labor unions, 799; manufacturing,  
 140, 431; tax exemption for, 816,  
 861
- Proletariat: and Communist Party, xxiii,  
 314; dictatorship of, xxi, xxv, 322,  
 668; and elections, 471, 871;  
 international, 47, 208, 314, 519–21,  
 535; leadership of, 66, 139, 179,  
 217n1, 413, 417, 455, 459, 483,  
 672, 822; and revolution, 194

- Propaganda:** anti-imperialist, 66; for bond sales, 310–11, 497, 499, 608, 638, 866; for cooperatives, 442, 488; by defectors, 49; directives on, 29; for economic construction, 488–89; for elections, 471, 473, 531–32, 591, 626, 911; for enemy troops, 40–41, 49; for grain-lending, 358; and Japanese invasion, 212; for land investigation, 400–401, 424, 434–36, 506–07, 516–17, 524; making, 16, 434–36, 620; for masses, 12, 16, 44–50, 268, 310, 358; methods for, 38, 95, 436; on mutual aid, 409; on national currency, 502; newspapers as, 26; outlines for, 44–51, 95, 499; political, 29, 38; for poor peasant league, 455; recruitment, 233–34, 267–68, 629, 669; for soldiers, 40, 49, 95, 776; subversive, 958; for volunteer labor, 846; as war preparation, 29, 38, 39, 40, 115–16, 257, 572, 724; in White areas, 216, 224
- Provincial executive committees,** 313, 806, 807–08, 812f, 850, 875, 920
- Provincial soviets:** cultural departments of, 22; judicial departments of, 853, 933; and land distribution, 19; in Laoyingpan, 145; and local soviets, 175–76, 920; and mass mobilization, 258; oversight by, 258, 418; and revolutionary committees, 709; and rich peasants, 224; and Security Bureau, 836; work style of, 267, 312–13, 708. *See also* Congresses, provincial; Soviets
- Provisions, Red Army:** drinking water, 32; food allowance, 16, 33, 51, 84, 95, 142, 402; from masses, 357; meetings for, 30, 32, 33; purchase of, 68; shortage of, 30–31; stockpile of, 10, 298, 317, 462, 576, 668, 671, 688, 724; system for, 58, 91, 306; transport of, 75, 326, 705
- Public health:** committees for, 596, 613, 909; department for, 806, 855–56, 931; and epidemics, 321; and hygiene, 458, 613; movement for, 613–14; as soviet work, 810
- Qin Bangxian.** *See* Bo Gu
- Qingtang, Ningdu xian,** 127; conference in, xxxviii–xxxix, lxviii, 73, 56n1; troop movements, 43, 121, 129
- Qiu Shigui:** biography of, 410n1
- Qu Qiubai,** 164, 729–31, 820
- Qu Shounian,** 14, 151, 733
- Radio:** enemy, 6, 81, 86, 87, 110, 117, 133; Red Army, 88–89, 142, 204
- Railways,** 9, 230, 260, 446, 775; confiscation of, 169
- Recruitment:** of activists, 417, 570, 917; of masses, 108–09, 232, 267–71; meetings for, 268, 273; and mobilization, 395, 720; pace of, 291; and political education, 269, 297; of prisoners, 88; propaganda for, 233–34, 268, 629, 669; in provinces, 267–68, 482, 669, 670
- Red areas.** *See* Soviet areas
- Red Army:** 668–72; and AB Corps, 65; attacks by, xli–xlii, 5–6, 74, 76, 83, 124, 281, 316, 363; booty, liii, 31, 32, 87–88, 117; and Chiang Kaishek, 36, 46, 115, 723; class mission of, 783; compulsory service in, 271, 798, 888; defense of government, 844; deployment of, 91, 93, 102, 123, 128, 129–30, 276–77, 286f; and elections, 180, 792, 870–71, 874, 875–76; errors of, 92, 138–39, 143–44, 494; establishment of, 58, 155, 443, 666–68, 885; GMD attacks on, xxix–xxx, xciii, 69, 72, 207, 210; itineraries of, 79–80, 149–50, 250, 305; and land revolution, 59, 189, 783, 844; and local armed forces, 29, 61, 63, 133, 134–35, 255, 901; mass work of, 12, 26, 58, 69–70, 92, 186; model divisions of, 505; morale in, 31, 37, 89, 276; political

**Red Army (continued)**

departments in, 12–13, 39, 142, 193; political education for, 12, 462, 704; recruits for, 142, 232, 233–34, 267–71, 273, 291, 395, 417; reinforcements for, 231–32, 269–70, 273, 297; and Security Bureau, 836–37; and slogans, 39, 40–41, 95, 184; strength of, xxxv, lxxv, 48, 65, 267, 574, 670; subversives in, 47–48, 65; tasks of, 12, 38–39, 87, 91–92, 107, 109, 134, 783; tax support for, 212; training for, 32–33, 42–43, 92, 320, 462, 704–05; uniforms for, 204, 232–33, 377–79; women in, 228, 273; and Youth League (CY), 61. *See also* Desertion; Recruitment; Soldiers

**Red Army assistance**, 49–50, 69, 81, 82, 117; committees for, 267, 270, 906, 914; local armed forces and, 29, 49–50, 133, 134–35; masses and, 39, 40, 67, 100n7

**Red Army expansion**, 266–74, 669–70; committees for, 267, 594, 906, 914; errors in, 320; and Military Commission, 233; officers for, 924–25; pace of, 270–71; and preferential treatment, 223, 629; and revolutionary enthusiasm, 435, 504, 638; in soviet areas, 92, 430–31, 469, 482, 577–78, 628–30, 783; victories and, 35, 296–97; and war mobilization, 458, 462, 569–71

**Red Army Military Academy**, 85n12, 232, 302, 320

**Red Army Newspaper (Hongjun bao)**, 22, 27, 95, 112; content of, 24

**Red China (Hongse Zhonghua)**, 410n1, 473, 499, 640, 696

**Red Guards**: in army hospitals, 326; battle at Ji'an, 491–94; described, 233n1, 234, 340; establishment of, 186, 320; expansion of, 273, 458, 462, 526, 577, 671; in guerrilla warfare, 16, 235; near Hexi, 79; and inspections, 379, 911, 917; and Japanese invasion, 212, 213;

**Red Guards (continued)**

judicial departments and, 851; and landlord armed forces, 16; membership in, 271–72, 749; mobilization of, 296, 299–300, 933; model units of, 272, 279, 297, 341–43, 570, 577; officers of, 924–25; organization of, 29, 87, 233–34, 320, 705; reinforcements from, 273, 627, 705; restrictions on, 103; security duties for, 237, 238, 299, 326, 907; in southern Jiangxi, 94; training for, 269–70, 272, 297, 300, 570, 599, 749; as transport workers, 258, 299, 326, 327, 571, 577–78; and weapons, 272, 299, 341–42, 377, 378; in White areas, 10; women in, 225, 341, 597

**Red May**, 570, 629, 704, 755

**Red Security Regiment**, 43

**Red Star (newspaper)**, 212, 696

**Rehe Province**: attacks on, 315, 361–62, 374, 443; and GMD armies, 775; Japanese occupation of, 461, 465, 481, 519, 575, 659, 712, 767, 773; sell-out of, 388, 768

**Religion**, 562, 617, 661, 789, 823, 872, 888, 958

**Ren Bishi**, xxxvii, xlvii–xlviii, lv–lvii, 61n14, 194n1, 730, 820; biography of, xxxviii18

**Rent**: cancellation of, 824; collection of, 298, 514, 926; land, 19, 66, 449–52, 514, 546, 547, 685; systems, 495

**Reorganizationists**, 64, 89, 171, 173, 319, 677, 833–34

**Returned Students**. xxiv–xxv, xxxvi–xxxvii, lxiii, lxxix80, lxxv–lxxvii, lxxxii, lxxxiv, lxxxix

**Revolution**: against GMD, 169, 196; anti-imperialist, 196; attacks on, 28, 34, 64, 67, 115, 317, 324; call to arms for, 155–56, 219–20, 294, 324–25, 407; development of, 64, 187, 419, 465, 654–55, 700–713, 783; economic construction during, 483–85, 487; economic



Revolution (*continued*)

emancipation in, 787; enemies of, 324, 546; Executive Committee on, 230–41, 295–300, 348–49, 357–60, 754–55, 821; of 1927, defeat of, 783; and political power, 528, 685; sabotage of, 138, 140, 394, 415; socialist, 727; spontaneous, 155; strategies for, xxiv, 35; support for, 47; suppression of, xxiii, 46, 206, 210, 222, 292–93, 315, 658, 757; tasks of, 12, 46, 51, 667; threats against, 46; traitors to, 163–66, 336, 778, 958; and treasury bonds, 500; women in, 225, 264; world proletarian, lxxxvii, 194, 657. *See also* Agrarian revolution

Revolutionary committees: acts against, 957; on counterrevolution, 173, 191–92, 380–81, 835, 940, 954–55; establishment of, 939–41; and guerrilla units, 185, 939–40; and provincial soviets, 709; tasks of, 192, 709, 835, 941

Revolutionary competition: and agriculture, 238, 349, 621; and bond sales, 237, 310, 499, 545; described, 621–22; and revenue collection, 237; in soviet work, 709, 749–50, 809

Rice: confiscation of, 223; price of, 364, 402, 408, 441, 484, 486, 499; processing, 226; for Red Army, 68, 75; shortage of, 224, 328; supply of, 16, 33, 237, 364. *See also* Grain

Right-deviationism, as main danger, 66

Ruijin (Jiangxi): and Border Committee, 104; Central Government in, lv, lxxv, 367n2, 464; conference in, 479n1; counterrevolution in, 368; and GMD, 121, 367, 723; officers for, 301–02; production in, 240; strategy for, 100; troop movements at, 151–53; as work area, 43, 91, 109

Ruijin *xian* (Jiangxi): bandits in, 91; battle in, 390; bond sales in, 497, 544, 721; building soviets in, 176; class struggle in, 418; cooperatives

Ruijin *xian* (Jiangxi) (*continued*)

in, 694; errors in, 411, 448–52, 497, 517; grain surplus in, 402, 403; judicial organs in, 849–54; land investigation in, lv, lxxv, 394, 395, 398–401, 448–52, 504–11 *passim*; poor peasant league in, 454, 512; Red Army in, 505, 720, 724; strategy for, 99; as work area, 107, 111–13, 323

Ruling class: bourgeoisie in, 529, 957; and Chiang Kaishek, 46; contradictions in, 64; and counterrevolution, 28, 64, 115; deception by, 668; factionalism in, 35, 665; opposition to, 528; reactionary, 47, 167–68, 295, 556–57; and revolution, 46, 47, 64, 957; slogan of, 115; workers and peasants as, 466, 529, 667–68

Russia, xxii, xxvi, 168–69, 278, 314, 820. *See also* Soviet Union

Sabotage: of bond sales, 501; of currency, 368, 502–03, 959; execution for, 105–06, 503, 959; of governments, 64, 957; of harvest, 69, 238; of infrastructure, 959; of land investigation movement, 432; of production, 160, 237; of Red Army, 48, 64, 105, 134, 268; of revolution, 138, 369, 394, 415; of soviets, 64, 369, 421

Salt: hidden, 50; price of, 602–03, 637; shortages of, lxxi, 24, 27, 484, 578, 636; supply of, 16, 298, 365, 600; trade in, 486, 487, 707

Sandu–Qibao, Xingguo *xian*, 29, 184; resistance in, 37, 184n2, 186

Schools: army, 79; confiscated houses as, 824; and elections, 473; evening, 504, 505, 577, 611–12, 639–40, 695; factory, 798, 887; and labor unions, 895; Lenin, 526, 610; missionary, 661; preservation of, 191; primary, 321, 431, 504, 577, 610–11, 639, 640, 695–96; universities, 577, 697, 778; for women, 228

- Second Campaign: conditions for, 45–50; errors in, 116–17; GMD armies in, 90n27; poem about, 114; preparations for, 28–33, 38–43, 56n1, 65–66; and Soviet areas, 34–35; strategies for, xxxiv–xxxvi, xxxix–xliii, 98–101; victories in, xl, 83, 84, 86, 87, 115
- Second Red Army, victories of, 47
- Second Route Army (CCP): battle at Dongshao, 7; Eleventh Division, 28, 121n5, 132, 151, 243, 275; troop movements, 5
- Second Route Army (GMD): Fourteenth Division, 121, 132, 151, 242, 248–49, 275, 290, 353; officers of, 243n3
- Seventh Independent Division (CCP), 201–02
- Seventh Red Army: near Chayuan, 124; in Chongyi, 36; in Fujian Province, 151, 153; near Gaoxing, 128; in Guangdong Province, 47; in Guangxi Province, 36, 37; and Han Deqin, 87; and Japanese, 769n1; in Jiangxi Province, 37, 68; near Longgangtou, 148; troop movements, 29, 47, 145, 150
- Seventy-eighth Division, Nineteenth Route Army (GMD): in Central Soviet Area, 367; at Ji'an, 132; officers of, 14n2, 132, 151, 367
- Shaanxi Province: GMD forces in, 46, 94; Red Army in, xxiv; land taxes in, 689
- Shandong Province: factionalism in, 45, 103; GMD forces in, 94
- Shangguan Yunxiang, 121, 127, 290
- Shanghai: battles in, xlv, 195n3, 660, 776; CCP in, xlix, 164; and cease-fire, 219–20, 230; conferences in, 230, 522–23, 535; and First Campaign, 36; and GMD armies, 196, 775; invasion of, 195, 196, 230, 292; mass slaughter at, 206–07, 362, 374; negotiations in, 209–10, 373–74; self-out of, 195, 316, 362; strike in, 752–53
- Shanghang (Fujian): capture of, 187, 194, 204; GMD near, 432; occupation of, 316; and troop movements, 93
- Shanghang *xian* (Fujian): investigations in, 394, 623–40, 718; labor unions in, 684; Mao in, 202; Red Army in, 203, 215; as work area, 187–93, 197, 721
- Shanxi Province, Red Army in, 575
- Shen Guanghan: and Fujian Incident, 733; strategies against, 131–32
- Sheng* (unit of measure), 361, 364–65, 619
- Shengli *xian*: labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, 398–401, 504, 508–09
- Shicheng (Jiangxi): and Border Committee, 104; counterrevolution in, 368; GMD threat to, 723, 775; military activity at, 37, 118; strategy for, 304
- Shicheng *xian* (Jiangxi): grain surplus in, 402, 403; land investigation in, 394, 395, 398–401, 504, 508, 509; strategy for, 98, 99; as work area, 15–17, 42, 91, 107–11, 113, 185
- Shock brigades, 238, 273, 621, 749–51, 810
- Shuinan: battle at, 121; mass flight from, 67; Red army in, 92, 117, 120; strategy at, 75, 98; troop movements, 84–85; as work area, 15, 95
- Sichuan Province: factionalism in, 36; GMD threat to, 775; land taxes in, 689; Red Army in, 375, 538; Tibetan forces in, 520, 659
- Sichuan Soviet Area: elections in, 530; growth of, 575; Red Army in, 480, 662–63
- Sichuan–Shaanxi Soviet Area, 662–63n10
- Sixteenth Red Army: activities of, 231, 282; betrayal by commander, 778; troop movements, 47
- Sixth Campaign. *See* Fifth Campaign
- Sixth Red Army, troop movements, 47

- Sixth Route Army (GMD): Eighth Division, 5n4, 94, 132, 151, 249; Fifth Division, 14n3, 129–30, 132, 151, 249, 275n4, 275; officers of, 7n3, 78n3, 100n6; retreats of, 9; troop movements, 67;
- Sixtieth Division, Nineteenth Route Army (GMD): at Liangcun, 132; officers of, 9n2, 9, 124n2, 151; near Xingguo, 14, 42, 49; troop movements, 9, 37, 67
- Sixty-first Division, Nineteenth Route Army (GMD): at Gaoling, 132; at Liancheng, 367n1; officers of, 9n2, 14n2, 14, 131n2, 151
- Sixty-fourth Division, Twelfth Red Army, 251; attack on Guanyingya, 74; work area for, 15, 43
- Social Democratic Party: class status and, 415, 833–34; elimination of, 319; and GMD, lxxix, lxxxii, 734; prosecution of, 171, 173, 557, 677; in soviet areas, 64, 105, 368
- Social Insurance Bureau, 922–23
- Social security: department for, 855–56; development of, 810; and disaster aid, 857; regulations for, 800, 889–90; soviet units for, 930, 931; for women, 228
- Socialism: and cooperatives, 140, 694; vs. capitalism, 195; and cooperatives, 140, 694; as goal, 727; and land distribution, 62; in Soviet Union, 195, 278, 657, 667n19, 728
- Soldiers, GMD: against Japan, 196, 209, 213; condition of, 65; defection of, 47, 49, 211, 234; illness in, 132; Mao's letters to, 154–56, 388–89, 764–66, 772; morale of, 37, 49, 460, 664, 665; propaganda for, 40, 49, 95, 776; revolutionization of, 196, 273. *See also* Defections; Prisoners, enemy
- Soldiers, Red Army: age of, 297, 570, 626; and agitation, 31, 38; committees for, 58; delegates for, 180, 870; discharged, 783; divorce from, 715, 785, 901, 952; families
- Soldiers, Red Army (*continued*)  
 of, 168, 408, 438, 669–70, 783–85, 931; illness in, 143, 251, 262, 276, 784, 901; land distribution to, 669, 783, 822; light packs for, 254; meetings for, 32, 38–39, 296; morale of, 31; newspapers for, 26–27; pay for, 43, 84, 95, 143; pensions for, 318, 784, 931; political power for, 783, 822; propaganda for, 40, 49, 95, 776. *See also* Casualties, war; Preferential treatment, Red Army
- Song Ziwen [T. V. Soong], 36n6, 461, 539n7, 581n4
- Southern Route Army (CCP), disbanded, 43
- Southwestern Jiangxi Special Committee, Second Plenum, 60–61
- Soviet areas: AB Corps in, 105, 677; and air raids, 392, 491, 538; attacks on, 46, 64, 67, 259, 757; battle preparations in, 295–300; borders of, 20, 116, 117, 199, 238, 298, 330, 418, 571; and Comintern, 61; consolidation of, xl, xlv, I–II, 35, 61, 71, 215, 313, 460; creation of, 184, 198; development of, 34–35, 91, 107, 317; enlarging, 90, 223, 316, 577, 658; GMD forces in, 50, 255, 290; in Jiangxi Province, 60, 65, 113; and Red Army expansion, 92, 430–31, 469, 482, 577–78, 628–30, 783; Red Army in, 231–32, 255; size of, 63, 862–65; strength of, 116; zones in, lxxviii, 413, 418. *See also* specific soviet areas
- Soviet Union: as ally, 169, 208, 446, 618–19; and America, 657; communism in, 19; and imperialism, 66, 222, 230, 278, 292–93, 314, 443, 464, 519, 756; revolution in, 19; Russia, 168–69, 278, 314, 820; socialism in, 195, 278, 657, 667n19, 728; threats to, li, 195, 659
- Soviets, 672–76; administrative areas for, 175–76, 862–65; benefits of,

Soviets (*continued*)

658; bureaucracy in, 224, 322, 332–33, 578, 584–85, 810; and Central Government, 707–08; class-alien elements in, 458, 471–72, 473, 504–05, 514–15, 525, 677; committees in, 139, 747–48, 875, 906–11, 914–17, 928, 934–35, 937–38; competitions in, 621–22, 709, 749–50, 809; construction of, 51, 175–76, 322–23, 413, 420, 577, 707–11, 803–13; delegates for, 180, 624, 870, 873–74; and democratic dictatorship, 169, 528, 871; departments under, 921–38; errors of, 65, 171–72, 224, 263–64, 267–70, 702–03; establishment of, 23, 63, 91, 186, 199, 864–65; functions of, 528–29, 667; infiltration of, 192, 958; instructions for, 175–76, 803–13; and land investigation, 395, 421–29, 506; organizational law for, 175n1, 596, 904–41; political power in, 59, 185, 455, 464, 466, 529, 844, 871; powers of, 938; reform of local, 175–76, 263–65, 395, 396; tasks of, 528–29, 666–68, 671–72, 690, 708–09, 716–17, 744, 810; transformation of, 427–28. *See also* Elections; Local governments

State Political Security Bureau: and confiscation, 908; and counterrevolution, 299, 380–81, 429, 677, 711, 853–54, 866–67, 907, 955; detachments of, 933, 937; establishment of, 319, 821, 945; and firearms permits, 378; and land investigation, 395, 411–12, 416, 510, 525; organization of, 835–38; prosecution by, 172–73; regulations for, 935–37, 955; and travel permits, 346

State-owned enterprises: and economic construction, 385; External Trade Bureau as, 486, 571, 868; Grain Bureau as, 365, 486, 571, 868; income of, 830, 868; and labor

State-owned enterprises (*continued*)

unions, 799, 895, 896; management of, 927–28; nationalized, 160, 169, 824, 925, 926, 927; and social security, 800, 889; stores as, 784; and taxes, 900–901

Students, revolutionary, 167n1, 168, 373, 393, 406

Suichuan *xian* (Jiangxi): GMD forces in, 242, 248; military activity at, 91; Red forces in, 47

Sun Lianzhong, 9, 14, 15, 42, 45, 67, 78, 90–91, 121, 129, 132, 151, 247–49, 275, 280; biography of, 37n11

Sun Yatsen, xxi, xxiii, 64n21, 461n3  
Superstition, 424, 541, 617, 865, 872, 958

Supreme court: appeals to, 955; chief justice of, 731; and counterrevolution, 319; decisions of, 182–83, 245–46; establishment of, 319, 838; and Executive Committee, 836; and judicial departments, 850, 853, 932, 933; and military tribunals, 840–41; organization of, 946

Taihe: GMD forces in and near, 9, 42, 68, 242, 248, 275, 774; strategy for, 131; troop movements, 145n2, 145–46; as work area, 91, 134, 150

Taining (Fujian): occupation of, 324; strategy for, 306; as work area, 109

Taining *xian*: fund-raising in, 85, 87; as Red area, 574; Red Army in, 90–91, 304

Tan Daoyuan: battle at Dongshao, 7; defeat of, 37n12, 46, 48, 49; in Jiangxi, 248; retreats of, 14; troop movements, 5, 9

Tan Sitong, xxi–xxii

Tan Zheng, biography of, 111n2; 251

Tan Zhenlin: and Executive Committee, 820; and Front Committee, 84–86, 95, 98n1, 102; guerrilla warfare, 204–05; and Mao Zedong, 202; in Mao's letters, 107, 110, 113

Tang Youren, 774; biography of, 373

Tang Yulin, biography of, 374n3

Tanggu Truce. *See* North China Truce Agreement

Tax exemptions, 237, 688–89, 784, 900–903; for coolies, 860, 879, 900–901, 902; for cooperatives, 161, 815, 816, 860, 861, 901; and disasters, 161, 815, 861, 879, 902; for farm laborers, 318, 689, 815, 860, 900–901; and Red Army, 318, 689, 815, 879, 901–02

Taxes: and class status, 688, 786; collection of, lxxiii, 162, 224, 298, 320, 810, 830, 926; commercial, 688, 814, 859–60, 909; by GMD on grain, 465; laws regarding, 190, 318, 688, 786; progressive, 213, 236, 318, 558, 688–89, 786, 859; for Red Army, 212; reform of, 495, 685; regulations for, 786, 814–17, 830, 859–61, 900–903, 957–58; state, 236; warlord, 154, 161, 318; in White areas, 685, 688, 689, 761. *See also* Agriculture, taxes on; Land taxes

Teachers, 321, 542, 563, 610, 612, 639, 640

Teng Daiyuan, 468n1, 820

Tenth Division, Fourth Red Army, 84

Tenth Army (CCP), 36, 47, 231

Third Army Group (CCP), 59–60, 494; attacks by, 74, 77, 83, 84, 85, 247; attempts on Nanfeng, 78–79, 90, 93–96; battles of, 7–8, 10, 71, 72, 73, 129–30; at Chayuan and Shacun, 124; and discipline, 89–90; errors of, 59; First Division, 16; Front Committee of, 59, 89; and Fujian Province, lxxvi, 151, 152, 153, 203; fundraising by, 15, 109; at Huzhuaping, 123; and Japanese invasion, 231; at Jiangle and Shunchang, 102; in Laicun area, 42, 43; near Gaoxing, 128; near Guangchang, 304; near Lichuan, 87, 90–91; officer of, 122, 156, 468n1; Sixth Division, 76, 87; troop movements, 5–6, 10, 15, 42, 68, 145–46, 150, 250, 305; at

Third Army Group (*continued*)

Wacun, 82; work areas for, 109, 113, 288, 306

Third Campaign, 28n2, 85n14, 98n2; battle at Fangshiling, 149; order to oppose, 126; predictions regarding, 98–100, 103; preparations for, 92, 115–16, 126; tactics for, 107–08n1, 131, 133–37; victories in, xlii, 105, 149, 151, 171

Third Party, lxxix, lxxxii, 319

Third Army (CCP): attack at Qifang, 103; attack on Le'an, 16; attempts on Nanfeng, 78–79, 82–83, 86, 93; battles of, 7–8, 129, 491–94; defensive strategy, 98; division of force, 255; near Donggu, 72; Eighth Division, 10, 16, 147, 218; fortifications of, 6; and Front Committee, 58–59; in Fujian Province, 152, 153; fund-raising by, 15, 87; near Futian, 74; near Goaxing, 128; at Laoyingpan, 123, 124; in Longfeng, 185; Ninth Division, 121, 145–47; officer of, 82n4, 156; in Shunchang and Shaxian, 110; in Tenglian area, 42; troop movements, 5–6, 42, 68, 79–80, 150; work areas for, 10, 107, 109; at Xinyu, 127–28; near Yihuang, 90, 91, 251; near Zhongcun and Nantuan, 76

Third Route Army (CCP), troop movements, 5–6

Thirty-fifth Division, West Route Army (CCP): near Donggu, 72; and guerrilla warfare, 133–34; mass assistance for, 67; troop movements, 68, 87, 91, 147, 150; near Xingguo, 10; work areas for, 108

Thirty-fifth Army (CCP): attack on Futian, 74; at Dongshao, 79; guerrilla warfare, 131; local armed forces in, 61; military activities, 134; at Ping'anzhai, 122; troop movements, 68, 111, 145, 147, 150; work areas for, 43, 107, 109, 112, 113; at Xingguo, 124

- Tianjin: and GMD armies, 775; GMD proposal for, 167; Japanese in, 388, 391, 392, 402, 659, 773; Japanese near, 461, 465; riots in, 167n1; sell-out of, 362, 759
- Tibet: Britain in, 520n3, 528, 659, 757, 760; colonization of, 699; puppets in, 373; resistance to CCP, 520n3, 520; sellout of, 405
- Tingzhou (Fujian): counterrevolution in, 368; errors in, 177; GMD threat to, 367, 775; Red Army in, 367. *See also* Changting
- Tingzhou *xian* (Fujian): meeting in, 57, 58; production in, 240; as work area, 91, 96, 102, 151, 191–92
- Tongmenghui, 64n21
- Toupi, Guangchang *xian*: GMD forces in, 67, 81–82; Red Army near, 16, 42–43, 304; as work area, 15, 95
- Township soviets, lxxiv, 737–51; construction of, 175, 803–04, 862–63; cultural department of, 25; deputies for, 179, 873–74; elections in, 473–74, 531–32, 789–91, 793; investigation of, 584–622, 623–40; and labor allocation, 846; organization of, 913–18. *See also* Soviets
- Trade: and blockades, lxxi, 318, 462, 484, 500, 692, 707; bureau for, 486, 927, 928; export products, 441, 442, 486, 576, 636–37, 693, 706–07; external, 161, 385, 485–87, 866; promotion of, 488–89, 526, 691, 692–93; tariffs on, 688; taxes on, 786. *See also* Commerce; Merchants
- Trade unions. *See* Labor unions
- Transportation: and baggage, 6, 8, 32, 79, 83, 136, 143, 153; committees for, 907, 909, 916; defense of lines, 240; department for, 385, 855–56; infrastructure, 236, 251, 299, 321, 327, 578, 588, 595, 856, 909, 931; and labor unions, 800, 895; management of, 204, 705, 927–28; organization of, 668; for provisions, 39, 50, 298; by railway, Transportation (*continued*)  
9, 230, 260, 446, 775; for soldiers, 784; stations, 212; teams for, 116, 235, 257, 327, 569, 724, 916; workers for, 258, 299, 326, 327, 571, 577–78, 598
- Travel restrictions, 116, 298–99, 346–47, 571, 598–99
- Trotskyite–Chen Duxiu Liquidationists, 319, 833–34
- Twelfth Army (CCP): Army committee of, 107, 109, 113; to attack GMD at Gewa, 122; attacks by, 76–77, 83, 84, 85; attempts on Nanfeng, 78–79; battles of, 7–8, 129, 491–94; and discipline, 89–90; fortification–building, 73; fund–raising by, 10, 15–16, 87; near Gaoxing, 128; guerrilla actions by, 251; near Jaining, 87, 90–91; in Jiangxi Province, 68; at Lixin and Anyuansi, 103; Mao's letter to, 113; medical department of, 88; officer of, 82n6; at Shanghang and Wuping, 187–93, 194; at Shicheng–Ninghua border, 185; Sixty-fifth Division, 251; Sixty-fourth Division, 15, 43, 74, 251; strategy near Donggu, 72; near Taishannao, 75; Thirty-fourth Division, 15–17, 85, 91, 107–08, 111, 113; Thirty-sixth Division, 108, 111, 218, 251; troop movements, 6, 7, 68, 80, 102; victories of, 187; work areas for, 43, 107; at Xiaoyaoling, 123, 124
- Twentieth Army (CCP), xxix, 29n7, 61, 494; disbanded, xliii, 122n7
- Twenty-second Army (CCP): troop movements, 304–05; work areas for, 288, 306
- Twenty-sixth Army (GMD):  
Twenty-fifth Division, 42, 151, 275; Twenty-seventh Division, 42, 67, 76n3, 132, 151, 247, 262n7, 353
- Twenty-sixth Route Army (GMD): officers of, 14n1, 90n27; troop movements, 67

- Unemployment, 168, 188, 465, 619, 656, 907, 922–23; and social security, 800–801, 890
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union
- United States (U.S.). *See* America
- Usurers: class status of, 55, 452; prohibitions on, 161–72; replacement for, 707; voting by, 872
- Vagabonds (*liumang*): defined, 55, 561–62; line of, 57, 58; in local soviets, 371; purge of, 65, 116
- Vagrants (*yumin*), 109, 685
- Vandalism, prohibition of, 191
- Voting, 591–92, 641, 672–73, 676, 698; exclusion from, 182–83, 336, 833–34, 871–72, 878; registration for, 531–32, 591–92, 789–90, 828, 872, 911; regulations for, 336, 788–89, 828, 833–34
- Wages: in agriculture, 605, 682t; deductions from, 798, 800; disputes over, 896; equality in, 226, 228; in labor laws, 796–98, 884, 886–87, 892; for porters, 143, 257; for workers, 188, 619, 680, 681t, 682t, 710, 892, 949
- Wan'an *xian*, 91, 132–34, 242, 248
- Wang Jiaxiang, xlviii, lvi, lix, lxx, xciii, 242, 244, 248, 256, 260, 262, 275n1, 281, 283, 291; biography of, xxxviii18; and Central Bureau, xlvi, lix, lxx; and Central Military Commission, 771; and Council of Commissars, 730, 820; and Executive Committee, xxxvii, 729, 820; and Front Committee, 98, 102
- Wang Jingwei, xlii, 64n21, 537, 821; in Guangzhou, 93n32; and Japanese, 373n1, 375, 759; and Lushan meetings, 581n4, 759; and Reorganization Clique, 64n20
- Wang Jinyu: battle at Donggu, 71–72; at Beiping meeting, 94; biography of, 37n1; on front line, 42; Red Army attacks on, 68, 74–75; troop movements, 9–10, 28, 38, 67
- Wang Ming. *See* Chen Shaoyu
- Warlords: armies of, xli, 94, 402, 765; attacks on Red Army, 61, 65; and Chiang Kaishek, 29, 35n4, 36, 45, 52n2, 64, 93n32, 406; class status of, 546; confiscation of assets, 162, 822, 823–24; and counterrevolution, 166, 822; fortifications of, 158–59; and GMD, 115, 168; and Japanese, 206, 209–10, 315, 774; resolution against, 63–64; tactics of, 37, 45–46; taxation by, 154, 465
- Weapons: allocation of, 92, 925; confiscation of, 405, 941; found, 411; for GMD, 520, 521, 537–39, 581–82, 664, 757, 760, 762; gunpowder, 85; homemade, 297, 342; for local armed forces, 29, 48, 340–42, 597; poison gas, 462, 520, 521, 537, 599; privately owned, 377–79; for Red Guards, 272, 299, 341–42; regulations for, 378–79, 959; training with, 33, 232; warlord, 765; for Young Pioneers, 234, 341–42
- Weapons, captured, 48, 133, 375, 663; disposition of, 88, 117, 570; firearms, 7, 36, 47, 86, 291, 316, 530
- Wei Lihuang, 121n4, 132, 151
- West Henan Soviet Area: attacks on, 303, 662; victories in, 316; war preparations in, 295
- West Hunan–Hubei Soviet Area: counterrevolution in, 677; development of, 574; elections in, 530; GMD forces in, 284; Red Army in, 232, 480; strategies for, 255–56, 276, 280; victories in, 231–295
- West Route Army (CCP), 43; attacks by, 47; and landlord armed forces, 16; Seventh Division, 72, 147; strategy for, 218; Thirty-fifth Division, 10, 67, 72, 108, 133–34; troop movements, 68, 87, 91, 147, 150; near Xiajiang, 87; troop movements, 68

- Western medicine, 17, 32, 86, 87–88, 92, 102
- Whampoa Academy, 81n3, 82n4, 83n9, 84n12
- White areas: attacks on, 10; economy in, 575; efforts in, 223; fund-raising in, 224; guerrilla forces in, 216, 234, 238, 273, 297, 481, 571, 705, 712, 776; Japanese in, 224; land rents in, 685; landlord armed forces in, 285; and mass organizations, 185, 207, 211; near cities, 276; mass work in, 298, 339; opposition to Japan in, 212, 576; propaganda for, 216, 224; Red Guard in, 10; revolution in, 66, 270, 375, 480–81, 575–76, 655, 664, 712, 732, 775–76; taxes in, 685; trade with, 20, 385, 485–87, 866; workers in, 461, 679. *See also* Soldiers, GMD
- White Army. *See* National Revolutionary Army (GMD)
- White Cloud Mountain, 114
- White Terror, 165, 522, 581
- Women, 615–17; in armed forces, 225, 228, 326; associations of, 409, 497; as cadres, 228; in CCP, 749n3; Committees for, 225–29, 320, 474; conference for, 629, 696; congress for, 227, 228, 617; as deputies, 499, 590–91, 617, 625–26, 629; education for, 228, 696; and elections, 225, 471, 474, 533, 673; and labor laws, 226, 228, 796, 887; and land redistribution, 225–26, 228, 563, 616, 952; raising consciousness of, 228; rights of, 264, 319–20; as workers, 226, 472, 606, 796, 797, 887, 894, 949
- Worker-peasant inspection departments, 916–17, 932; committees for, 911, 934–35, 945, 947; and regulations, 144, 273, 847–48
- Worker-Peasant Procuratorate, 395, 471, 473, 514–15, 525; Commissariat for, 427–28, 820
- Workers: artisans, 882; asset distribution to, 438, 549, 680; description of, 548–49, 563; and elections, 179–89, 336, 471, 477, 532, 871; employment for, 794–95, 882–83; in guerrilla forces, 235; illness in, 800, 801, 885, 890, 949–50; intellectual, 797; job safety for, 798, 884, 889, 949; mental, 561, 884, 887; mobilization of, 187, 197; political power for, 57, 324, 529, 672, 783, 822; and poor peasant league, 455, 512; recruits from, 232, 267–71; in Red Guard, 234; slaughter of, 154, 293, 362, 752; and strikes, 168, 293, 406, 460, 481, 661, 799, 895; taxes for, 815, 879, 902; urban, 563; in White areas, 679; women as, 226, 472, 606, 796, 797, 887, 894. *See also* Wages
- Workers, independent, 66; defined, 55; and labor laws, 794, 884; land rights of, 563–64, 822; and poor peasants' association, 66; poor people, 560, 902–03; with profession, 55, 393, 560, 562
- Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. *See* Red Army
- World war, 196, 206–07, 210, 539, 659
- Wu Liangping, 730
- Wu Qiwei, 242n2, 248, 253, 276, 282
- Wuping *xian* (Fujian), 204, 316, 394; capture of, 187, 194; guerrilla warfare in, 215; military activity in, 187–93, 197, 203
- Xiajiang, 59, 87, 248
- Xian congresses, 532, 919; deputies to, 180, 791, 874–76
- Xian executive committees: organization of, 812f, 875, 919–20; oversight by, 805, 845; regulations for, 806–07, 808–09
- Xi'an Incident, xxiv
- Xiang Ying, xxxiii–xxxix, xlv–xlvi, lii, lv, lvii, lviii, lxx, lxxxiii, 61n14, 62n16, 283; biography of, xxxiIn8; and Central Government, 220, 224, 294, 329, 356, 363, 376, 383, 393,



Xiang Ying (*continued*)

401, 404, 407, 444, 447, 459, 467, 468, 496, 501, 521, 523, 545, 583, 763, 771, 817, 858; and Central Military Commission, 13, 97, 138–141, 373; and Council of Commissars, 187–193, 225, 258, 301, 302, 326, 327, 328, 339, 345, 346, 364, 377, 384, 386, 394, 408, 441, 497, 541, 550, 731, 857, 865; and election law, 878; election of, 729, 730, 820; and Executive Committee, 176, 181, 183, 200, 214, 221, 241, 246, 265, 311, 313, 338, 349, 354, 381, 478, 540, 726, 731, 778, 786, 787, 793, 811, 819, 821, 826, 829, 832, 834, 838, 839, 843, 848, 849, 854, 863, 870, 880, 896, 897, 899, 903, 941, 942, 948, 951, 954, 957; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi–lxxviii, xciiin120, xciiin121; and First National Congress, xlvi, 162, 785, 825; letters from, 367

Xiang Zhongfa, xxxviin18, xlixn39, 164

Xiao Jinguang: biography of, lxxviii89

Xiao Ke, 150, 729

Xiaobu, Ningdu *xian*, 7, 9, 10, 14, 61n14, 83, 84, 98

Xie Weijun, lxii, 95; biography of, lxiin67

Xikang Province, 405, 520, 582, 757, 760

Xin'an, GMD forces in, 64, 124, 127

Xinfeng *xian*, 91, 101, 201, 394

Xin'an *xian*, as Red area, 574

Xingguo (Jiangxi): and battle at Donggu, 71; elections in, 470, 534; GMD forces at, 9, 10, 85, 129, 145, 147; GMD retreat from, 151; Red Army in, 124; in strategies, 90, 100

Xingguo *xian* (Jiangxi): cooperatives in, 240, 694; and deserters, 570, 599; education in, 695–96; GMD threat to, 127, 723, 775; investigations in, xxivn6, 394, 584–622, 718; labor unions in, 683, 684; literacy in, 431, 696; mass flight from, 67; middle peasants in, 512; Red Army

Xingguo *xian* (Jiangxi) (*continued*)

in, xli, xlii, 724; Red Guards of, 103; soviet work in, 721; strategies for, 98, 99, 102, 131–35; women workers in, 226, 472, 606

Xinjiang, British in, 373, 582

Xinyu *xian*, conference in, 59

Xu Kexiang: at Dongshao, 7; in Guangchang, 132; near Nancheng, 248, 249; near Nanfeng, 14, 42, 78, 79, 83–84, 86, 90, 121, 275; retreats of, 9, 81–82; troop movements, 5

Xunwu (Jiangxi), 91, 94n35, 205, 378, 432; labor unions in, 684; land investigation in, xxivn6, lxiiin67, 394

Yan Xishan: and GMD, 64n21, 93n32, 103; and warlord factions, 35n4, 45–46

Yang Lisan: biography of, 86n18; and Front Committee, 86, 93–96; and Management Office, 94–95

Yang Shizhu, 730; biography of, 410

Yangzi River area: Bureau for, 93n31; GMD forces in, 291; and imperialists, 196, 393, 405, 528, 659; Japanese in, 206, 760; and Red Army, 108, 663–64n10

Ye Jianying: biography of, lxxn95; 302, 367, 729

Yihuang (Jiangxi): and GMD, 67, 78, 90, 280; land investigation in, 394; and Red Army, lvii, 251, 253, 316–17; strategies for, 87, 108, 249, 250, 281; work area for, 95

Yihuang *xian* (Jiangxi): fund-raising in, 15, 84; GMD forces in, 247, 248, 253, 363n3; land investigation in, 394; as Red area, 288n4, 574; strategy for, 285

Yongding *xian* (Fujian), 47, 204–05, 215, 721

Yongfeng: GMD forces in, 90, 248, 275, 276; GMD forces near, 9, 10, 42, 723; strategy for, 87, 100, 110, 186; as work area, 29, 37, 150, 185

Yongfeng *xian* (Jiangxi): GMD forces in, 5n5, 7n2; landlord armed forces

- Yongfeng *xian* (Jiangxi) (*continued*)  
in, 16; Red Army in, 16n10, 76n2,  
374, 418, 574
- Yongfeng–Beikeng Soviet Area, 569
- Yoshizawa Kenkichi, 373–74
- Young Pioneers: in army hospitals, 326;  
battle at Ji'an, 491–94; and  
committees, 929; establishment of,  
320, 705; expansion of, 458, 462,  
526, 577, 671; as guerrilla forces,  
235, 340; and inspections, 379,  
911, 917; and Japanese invasion,  
213; and martial law, 299;  
membership in, 749; mobilization  
of, 296; model units of, 297, 313,  
341–43, 570–71, 577;  
reinforcements from, 271, 273,  
570, 705; and religion, 617;  
security duty by, 238, 907; and  
taxes, 902; training for, 570, 599,  
749; and weapons, 234, 341–42,  
377, 378; women in, 225, 326
- Yuan Guoping, xxxiin6, 83, 184–86, 729
- Yuan (monetary unit), 10n9, 553, 619,  
637n6, 831
- Yuantou, 5, 7, 76, 77
- Yudu *xian*: as battlefield, 98, 99, 100;  
bond sales in, 544–45; cooperatives  
in, 240; counterrevolution in, 378;  
GMD forces near, 127;  
headquarters in, 121, 122; labor  
unions in, 684; land investigation  
in, 394, 395, 398–401, 504,  
508–09; local armed forces in, 133;  
Mao in, xc; military activity in, 91,  
122; in strategies, 100, 102, 131;  
troop movements, 121, 122, 152,  
153; as work area, 107, 109, 112
- Yun Daiying, 164, 655
- Yunmenling, 203, 240
- Yunnan Province, 36, 528, 582, 659, 760
- Zeng Shan, xxxiin11, xxxviii22,  
18–21, 162, 221n1; Council of  
Commissars, 731; and Executive  
Committee, 729, 820; and First  
National Congress, 825
- Zhang Dingcheng, 162, 202, 730, 820,  
825
- Zhang Guotao: biography of, xlviii37;  
and Central Government, 170, 224,  
294, 329, 356, 363, 383, 393, 401,  
404, 407, 444, 447, 459, 467, 468,  
496, 501, 521, 523, 545, 579, 763,  
817, 858; and Central Military  
Commission, 373; and Council of  
Commissars, 187, 225, 257, 301,  
302, 326, 327, 328, 339, 344, 346,  
364, 377, 384, 386, 394, 408, 441,  
497, 541, 857, 865; and election  
law, 878; election of, xlviii, 729,  
730, 820; and Executive  
Committee, 176, 183, 200, 214,  
221, 241, 246, 265, 311, 313, 338,  
349, 354, 373, 381, 478, 540, 726,  
731, 778, 786, 787, 793, 811, 819,  
821, 826, 829, 832, 834, 838, 839,  
843, 848, 849, 854, 863, 870, 880,  
896, 897, 899, 903, 941, 942, 948,  
951, 954, 957; and First National  
Congress, 162, 785, 825;  
intelligence for, 290n1; in Sichuan  
Province, 530n4
- Zhang Huizan: capture of, 46, 47, 50,  
52; defeat of, 7, 37n12, 48, 49;  
execution of, 105, 492n6
- Zhang (unit of measure), 532
- Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu), xxxviii18,  
lxix, lxxxv–lxxxix, xcii, 730
- Zhang Xueliang, 94n34, 94, 103, 775;  
and Chiang Kaishek, 29, 374; and  
Japanese invasion, 361n2; as  
warlord, 764, 767; and warlord  
forces, 35n4, 35–36, 45–46
- Zhang Zhen: defeated, 215, 316; in  
Longyan, 201; in Nanjing *xian*,  
218; in Nanyan and Baisha, 151
- Zhangzhou (Fujian), liv, 96, 231;  
occupation of, 215, 216, 316; Red  
Army attack on, lii–liii, lix, lxii,  
201–05
- Zhao Bosheng, 353–54, 655; biography  
of, 353n1
- Zhao Guantao, 121, 131; and battle at  
Longgang, 129; in northeast  
Jiangxi, 248; retreats of, 149, 150,  
151; near Xingguo and Gaoxing,  
132; near Yudu, 127

## Zhejiang Province, 775

Zhou Enlai, xxxiin8, xxxiii, xxxvin15, xlixnn39–40, l–liii, lvi–lx, lxx, lxxx, lxxxv, 61n14, 164, 165; and Central Bureau, xxxiii, xlix, liii, lvi–lix, lxx, 242, 244, 248, 255, 259, 261, 275, 280, 282, 290; and Central Military Commission, 767; Circulars from, 292; election of, 729, 730, 820; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi–lxxviii, lxxxiii, lxxxviii, xci–xciii; Mao's letters to, 201, 203, 204, 215, 367; as Political Commissar, 303; and Zhu De, 460n1

Zhou Hunyuan: in Longgang, 132; retreats of, 149, 150, 151; troop movements, 249; in Yihuang, 275n4, 276

Zhou Yili, xxxviiiin22; biography of, 93n31; and Executive Committee, 820; and First National Congress, 162, 825; and Front Committee, 93–96, 98n1, 102; and Fujian–Jiangxi border, 103–04, 110; in Mao's letters, 107, 109, 113

Zhou Zhiquan, 15, 42, 86n19, 275

Zhu De, xxxiiin9, xxxix, xliii, xlvi, xlviii, li, lvii, lxxin80, lxxx, lxxxin99, lxxxvii, and Central Bureau, xlvi, lix, lxx, 61n14, 242, 244, 248, 255, 259, 261, 275, 280,

Zhu De (*continued*)

282, 290; and Military Affairs Commission, xlviii, 12, 97, 138, 355, 373, 580, 767; and Central Soviet Government, 644, 649, 732; Circulars from, 292; as Commander-in-Chief, xxiv, xxix, xxxvi, lv, lvi, 247, 249, 252, 253, 284, 303, 460n1; and Council of Commissars, 730, 820; election of, 729, 730, 820; and Executive Committee, 536, 729, 730; and Fifth Campaign, lxxvi–lxxviii, lxxxiii–lxxxiv, lxxxviii; and First National Congress, 162, 825; and Front Committee, 81–96, 98n1, 102; on Japanese invasion, 154–56, 772; in Jianfeng, 118, 120, 388; letters of, 118, 120, 764; Mao's letters to, 367; orders, First Campaign, 5, 7, 10, 28, 42; orders, Second Campaign, 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 78; orders, Third Campaign, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 136, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151, 158

Zhu Shaoliang: near Guangchang, 67, 68, 78, 86, 121; as officer, 248; Red Army and, 7, 91, 100; retreat of, 90

Zhu Yunqing, biography of, 85n16

Zuo Quan, 85–90, 92; biography of, 85n2

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