Xunwu Investigation[1]

(May 1930)

Preface

The scale of this investigation is the largest of all I have done. In the past I systematically investigated seven *xian*: Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, Liling, Changsha, Yongxin, and Ninggang.[2] The five Hunan *xian* were done during the period of the Great Revolution (1926–1927). Yongxin and Ninggang were done during the Jinggangshan period (November 1927). I placed the materials on the Hunan investigations in the hands of my wife, Yang Kaihui. In all probability, when she was killed, these five investigations were lost. I gave the Yongxin and Ninggang investigations to a friend in the mountains when the Red Army left Jinggangshan in January 1929. These were lost when Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi clique both attacked the Jinggangshan. I am not too concerned when I lose things, but losing these investigations (especially the ones for Hengshan and Yongxin) caused me pain. For an eternity I can never forget them. The Xunwu investigation occurred in May 1930 when the Fourth Army arrived. At this time, after the Pitou Conference (the joint conference of the Fourth Army Front Committee and the West Jiangxi Special Committee held on February 7),[3] and before the Tingzhou Conference (joint conference of the Fourth Army Front Committee and the West Fujian Special Committee held in June),[4] I still did not completely understand the problem of China's rich peasants. At the same time, in the area of commerce, I was a complete outsider. Because of this I pursued this investigation with great energy. Throughout the time when I organized this investigation, I was helped by the Xunwu Party secretary, Comrade Gu Bo (Gu is a middle school graduate, the son of a bankrupt small landlord, a former primary school teacher, and former chairman of the *xian* revolutionary committee and of the *xian* soviet; he is from Huangxiang District).[5]

Several people gave me many documents and always came to the investigation meetings:

Guo Youmei. Fifty-nine *sui*,[6] owner of a general store, former president of the chamber of commerce; from Xunwu City District.

Fan Daming. Fifty-one *sui*, poor peasant, *xian* soviet official; from Xunwu City District.

Zhao Jingqing. Thirty *sui*, middle peasant, former iron-founder, former small merchant, former soldier and platoon leader under Chen Jiongming, now a *xian* soviet committee delegate; from Shuangqiao District.

Liu Liangfan. Twenty-seven *sui*, formerly involved in *xian* tax collection, now chairman of the Xunwu City suburban township soviet; from Xunwu City District.

Those who gave us some documents and who sometimes attended our meetings were:

Li Dashun. Twenty-eight *sui*, poor peasant, a former district soviet delegate.
Liu Maozai. Fifty *sui*, an old examination degree student *[tongsheng]*, once

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The "Xunwu Investigation" was originally scheduled for publication in 1937, and the final chapter of the report was at one time included in the draft table of contents for Vol. 1 of Mao's *Selected Works*, which was issued in 1951, but the work did not actually appear in print until thirty years later. It first became available in *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong on Rural Investigations) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 41–181. A few further corrections and improvements were made in this carefully edited text when the Xunwu Investigation was incorporated into Vol. 1 of the *Mao Zedong wenji*, pp. 118–245, and it is the 1993 version which we have followed here. For details regarding the authorship of our English translation, see Note 1 below.

1. This translation of Mao's Xunwu investigation is reproduced from Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, Trans., and with an introduction and notes, by Roger R. Thompson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), with the kind permission of Professor Thompson and of the publisher. Apart from changes required in order to make the text conform to the usage employed in these volumes (for example, the replacement of "county" by "*xian*"), this excellent version has been reproduced almost verbatim. A few modifications of detail have been made after consultation with the translator. Roger Thompson's monograph contains, in the introduction and notes, a wealth of information about the history of Xunwu, conditions prevailing there in 1930, and the political context in which Mao produced this document, as well as detailed maps of the area. It would not have been appropriate to include all this material in our edition. Some of his notes have been reproduced below; they are marked at the end "RT." Those interested in local history and grass-roots revolution are strongly urged to consult Professor Thompson's original work.

2. The first five of these are in Hunan; Yongxin and Ninggang are in Jiangxi.

3. Regarding the Pitou Conference, also called the February 7 Conference, see above, the three documents dated February 7, February 14, and February 16, 1930, emanating from it, and the notes to these texts.

4. The Tingzhou Conference refers to the joint conference of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army and the Western Fujian Special Committee which took place in June 1930 in Tingzhou (now Changting), in southwestern Fujian. The conference discussed political, military, and economic issues. In regard to land redistribution, it adopted a strongly leftist line, which finds expression in the resolution "On the Problem of the Rich Peasants," translated below.

5. Throughout this report, Mao tends to write extremely long paragraphs. In Roger Thompson's monograph, these are broken up to make the text more readable. In this documentary collection, we have on the whole followed Mao's own paragraphing, while deviating from this principle occasionally. In the Chinese original, the three lists of people which appear below are all run together with what goes before, making the text difficult to follow. Other similar departures are not mentioned in the notes.

6. Throughout Mao gives ages in terms of *sui*, the Chinese system that reckons age in terms of the number of calendar years in which a person has lived.—RT.

operated a gambling house and had a small business; originally a small landlord but declined and became a poor peasant; was a delegate to the *xian* revolutionary committee; now a delegate to a district soviet.

Those who came to a few investigation meetings and who gave us a small number of documents were:

Liu Xingwu. Forty-six *sui*, peasant; had a small business; a delegate to a township soviet; from Xunwu City District.
Zhou Buying. Twenty-three *sui*, student at Mei *xian* Normal School, chairman of the district government; from Shipaixia.
Chen Zhuoyun. Thirty-nine *sui*, graduate of a local self-government school, a former worker in a tailoring shop; had a small business; a former primary school teacher.
Guo Qingru. Sixty-two *sui*, a *xiucai*, participated in the imperial provincial examinations, a former primary school teacher; from Xunwu City District.

Our investigation meetings involved these eleven people and myself. I was the chairman and secretary. Our investigation, which lasted over ten days, took place while the Red Army units were organizing the masses in Anyuan, Xunwu, and Pingyuan. This gave me time to organize these investigation meetings.

Xunwu *xian* is located at the junction of three provinces— Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. Since conditions in the neighboring *xian* of the three provinces are similar, conditions in Xunwu *xian* can serve as an example.

This investigation has one great defect: there is no analysis of middle peasants, hired hands, or vagrants. Also, in the section "Traditional Land Relationships," there is no separate discussion of the landholdings of rich peasants, middle peasants, or poor peasants.

February 2, 1931, Xiaobu, Ningdu *xian*

Chapter I. Administrative Jurisdictions in Xunwu

There are seven districts, which include four wards in Xunwu City and twelve *bao*.[7]

The seven districts are:

7. According to a map in the 1881 edition of the gazetteer for Xunwu *xian*, the area beyond Xunwu City was divided into twelve *bao* (lit., fortress) and four wards *(xiang)*. Except for Renfeng (Huangxiang) District and Shuangqiao District, the sub-*xian* districts in Republican Xunwu *xian* took their names from a consolidation of the Qing jurisdictions: Nanqiao *bao* and Bafu *bao* became Nanba District; Xiangshan *bao*, Yaogu *bao*, and Zixi *bao* became Jiansan (lit., unites three) District; Xunwu *bao*, Dadun *bao*, and Guiling *bao* became Chengjiang District (taking the name of the major market); and Sanbiao *bao* and Shuiyuan *bao* became Sanshui District. See *Changning xianzhi* (Gazetteer for Changning [Xunwu] *xian*) (1881), 1: 2b–3a. Until January 1914, Xunwu *xian* was known as Changning *xian*.—RT.

Xunwu City District: including East, West, South, and North wards; this is the administrative center of the *xian*.
Renfeng District[8] (or Huangxiang *bao*): there are two administrative centers in this district, Gongping and Changpu (or Huangxiang), with a bureau in each center.
Shuangqiao District (or Shuangqiao *bao*): divided into thirteen *duan* [sections], with Liuche the administrative center.
Nanba District: two *bao*, Nanqiao and Bafu, with Niudouguang the administrative center.
Jiansan District: three *bao*, Xiangshan, Yaogu, and Zixi, with Jitan the administrative center.
Chengjiang District: three *bao*, Xunwu, Dadun, and Guiling, with Chengjiang the administrative center.
Sanshui District: two *bao*, Sanbiao and Shuiyuan, with Sanbiao the administrative center.

There was no *xian* government in Xunwu before the Wanli period [1573–1620] in the Ming dynasty; Xunwu *xian* was established during the Wanli period. Before that time, part of Xunwu was under the jurisdiction of Anyuan *xian* in Jiangxi Province. This was Shiqi *bao*, which comprised the present Chengjiang, Sanshui, Renfeng, and Xunwu City districts; the other part was under the jurisdiction of Pingyuan *xian* in Guangdong Province and comprised the present Shuangqiao, Nanba, and Jiansan districts.

Chapter II. Transportation and Communication in Xunwu

Waterways

The Xunwu River originates in the Pangu'ai area of the Guiling Mountains. Passing through Chengjiang, Jitan, Shipaixia, Chetou, and Liuche, it merges into the Longchuan River, which goes down to Huizhou [in Guangdong]. The Xunwu River is a tributary of the Dongjiang [East River], and ships can go as far upstream as Chengjiang. There are three big market towns [*xu*] along the river: Chengjiang, Jitan, and Liuche, with Jitan the biggest.

Ships can also go from Shipaixia to Heling in Xunwu City District (10 *li* south of the town).

Land Routes

With Shipaixia being the hub, there are four main roads. One road goes to Yunmenling (110 *li*) via Jitan (30 *li*), Chengjiang (60 *li*), and Pangu'ai. This is

8. Renfeng District was renamed Huangxiang District after the Xunwu *xian* soviet government was established in May 1930.

the main road to Guangdong Province for Xingguo, Yudu, and Huichang *xian*. Another goes to Anyuan City (140 *li*) via Xunwu City (30 *li*), Sanbiao (60 *li*), and Taiyangguan. This is the main road to Mei *xian* for Xinfeng and Anyuan. Another road goes to Bachi in Pingyuan *xian* (45 *li*) via Zhucun and Niudouguang (20 *li*). This is the main road to Mei *xian* for Huichang and Anyuan. The roads from Huichang and Anyuan merge at Shipaixia and then go to Mei *xian* together. Another road goes to Xingning and Wuhua *xian* via Chetou (20 *li*), Liuche (35 *li*), Huangtangdu (60 *li*), and Luofu (95 *li*) and Luogang (125 *li*) in Xingning *xian*. This last road is the main way from Xunwu to Huizhou.

There are some other, smaller roads. One goes from Chengjiang to Luotang (30 *li*) in Wabujie of Anyuan, then from Luotang south to Xiaba and then north to [Yun]Menling. Another road goes from Jitan to Pingyuan (60 *li*) via Xiaotian, Chuandu, and Shuyuan. Another road goes from Xunwu City to Wuping (180 *li*) via Daluxia, Zixi, Jianxi, Liche, and Laidi. Another road goes from Xunwu City to Hushan (60 *li*) in Nanxiang in Anyuan *xian* via Shangping, then north from Hushan to Anyuan City (60 *li*), and then west to Taiping (36 *li*) and Egong (60 *li*). Another road goes from Xunwu City to Xinxu (60 *li*), then from Xinxu to Egong (80 *li*) in Dingnan, passing through Gongping (3 *li*) and Liangguangting (45 *li*), then south from Egong and then west to Dingnan City, passing through Hezi on the way to Xinfeng. The following roads are even smaller: one from Xinxu to Longchuan City (240 li) via Changpu (20 *li*) and Aipaikou; and another road from Changpu and Aipaikou to Xingning City (180 *li*).

Xunwu City is 90 *li* from Menling, 180 *li* from Wuping, 240 *li* from Mei *xian*, 240 *li* from Xingning, 110 *li* from Anyuan, 310 *li* from Longchuan, and 160 *li* from Dingnan (via Shangping, Hushan, Taiping, and Egong).

Telegraph

The Telegraph Bureau was moved from Jitan to Xunwu City in 1922. The telegraph line goes from Jitan to Xunwu City to Yunmenling and to Pingyuan.

Postal Service

There is a third-class post office in Xunwu City. One postal route goes to Menling via Jitan and Chengjiang. Another route goes to Bachi via Niudouguang and then from Bachi to Mei *xian*. Another route from Bachi goes to Pingyuan. Another route goes to Anyuan via Sanbiao. There are "postal agents" in Chengjiang, Jitan, and Niudouguang and "receiving offices" in Sanbiao and Shipaixia. There is postal service on the Menling route on the second, fifth, and eighth days of the [ten-day cycle of the] lunar calendar.[9] The Bachi route has

9. The thirty-day lunar month is divided into three ten-day periods. In addition to postal deliveries, periodic markets were also scheduled in terms of the lunar calendar. For example, a market town might host a regularly scheduled market on the first, fourth, and seventh days of the ten-day cycle.—RT.

service on the first, third, fifth, seventh, and ninth, and the Anyuan route on the second, fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth. Letters to Ganzhou are sent via the Anyuan route, and those to Yudu and Xingguo via the Menling route. Usually, amounts up to 200 *yuan* can be remitted through the post office in Xunwu City. With advance notice up to 500 *yuan* can be remitted. But otherwise not.

During the March 25 uprising the year before last,[10] the director of the post office was seized and fined 500 *yuan*. This time the new director, fearing capture, fled first. The director of the Telegraph Bureau was killed during the March 25 uprising.

The Means of Land Transportation

Just as in Guangdong Province, there are no vehicles on any roads. The major means of land transportation are the shoulders of humans, and next mules and horses. There are many mules and horses on the road from Xunwu City to Mei *xian* and some on the roads from Xunwu City to Menling and Jitan, but none on the other roads. There are more mules than horses, but they are generally called "horses." The goods carried by horse are mainly salt and soybeans.

Chapter III. Commerce in Xunwu

Business from [Yun] Menling to Mei Xian

Of the goods brought from Shicheng and Ruijin *xian*, rice and soybeans are the most important, with an [annual] worth of several hundred thousand *yuan*. Tea-oil is the major item of trade from Xingguo *xian*,[11] although some rice (not much) is imported from there. No goods are brought in from Yudu or Huichang *xian*.

Four boatloads of oil come from Menling to every market in Chengjiang (the oil is carried by humans from Menling to Chengjiang and then loaded onto boats). Every boat carries 12 *Dan*[12] of oil, and each *Dan* is worth 30 *yuan*

10. The March 25 uprising was the *xian*-wide uprising that was organized by the Xunwu Communist Party, which led the peasants and young students on March 25, 1928.

11. *Chayou* and *muyou* refer to the oil pressed from the seeds of the tea-oil plant. They are used mainly as a foodstuff. "Tea-oil" *(chayou)* is pressed from the camellia plant.—RT.

12. The Chinese word *dan* stands for two different characters, one of them signifying a measure of capacity, and the other a measure of weight. The exact value of these units varied from place to place, or even according to the commodities being measured. Here the reference is presumably to the *dan* as a unit of weight (sometimes called a picul), variously defined as 50 kilos or 133 pounds. The other *dan*, roughly equivalent to a bushel or 1 hectolitre, was a dry volume measure used for rice. It occurs very frequently in Mao's Xunwu report as the unit in which land rents were fixed. As pointed out in a note to the volume containing the Chinese text of this document, however, Mao often uses the two terms loosely and interchangeably. For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix B, "Weights and Measures in Xunwu," in Thompson, pp. 224–25. In this volume, we have distinguished between these two characters by capitalizing the transcription when it refers to the unit of weight.

(xiaoyang).[13] Figuring a hundred markets a year, the oil traded is worth 150,000 *yuan.*

Most of the rice coming from Shicheng and Ruijin to Menling goes to Mei *xian* via Luotang, Xiaba (in Wuping *xian* [Fujian], at the common boundary of the three provinces), and Xinpu (in Jiaoling *xian* [Guangdong], 30 *li* from Mei *xian*). The amount transported is about 300 *Dan* a day. Rice bound for Mei *xian* usually does not pass through Xunwu *xian*, but oil and soybeans do. The amount of beans is almost double that of oil. Some *Dan* contain 5 *dou,*[14] and some contain 3 *dou*; the amount is not very regular. One *dou* is worth 1.5 *yuan (xiaoyang).* There are five boatloads of oil and beans at every market (one market every three days); each boat contains 14 *Dan*, and the value of each *Dan* is 6 *yuan* (assuming 4 *dou* in each *Dan*). So the value of the oil and beans at each market is 420 *yuan*, and the annual total is 42,000 *yuan* for the hundred markets held each year. The amount carried by porters is 20 *Dan* per market, for a total of 2,800 *Dan* annually, with a value of 16,800 *yuan.* So the sum of these two categories is 58,800 *yuan.*

***Business from Anyuan to Mei* Xian**

Chicken

The most important good transported along this route is chicken, with oxen next, and pigs third. Most of the chickens come from Tangjiang, Nankang, and Xinfeng, although some come from Anyuan, and some even from Suichuan. The transport route for chickens runs through Wangmudu, Jinji, Xintian, and Banshi but avoids Anyuan City, passing 5 *li* to the north, and enters Xunwu *xian* on the way to Mei *xian.* From Mei *xian*, the chickens are shipped to Songkou [Jiaoling *xian*] and then to Shantou for export. Most of the chickens passing though Xunwu are from Anyuan, with some from Menling. Since between 100 and 300 *Dan* are shipped each day, if each *Dan* weighs 60 *jin,*[15] then a daily amount of 100 *Dan* is equal to 6,000 *jin*. Chicken dealers carry chickens from the Tangjiang area to Mei *xian* or Xinpu to sell (from Xunwu the route to Xinpu runs through

13. As pointed out in a note to the Chinese edition of Mao's rural investigations, the exchange rate among the three currencies mentioned by him—*dayang (guangyang, zayang), xiaoyang (haoyang, maoyang), and tongyuan*—varied according to time and place. For a detailed discussion of the problems thus raised, see Appendix A, "Currency and Prices in Xunwu," Thompson, pp. 221–23.

14. The *dou* is a unit of measure commonly translated "peck," and equivalent to approximately 1 decalitre. This sentence illustrates the point, made above, that Mao sometimes uses the two characters read *dan* interchangeably. Here *Dan*, in principle a unit of weight, plainly stands for the unit of volume.

15. A *jin* is a measure of weight commonly taken to correspond roughly to one pound, or 500 grams (1.1 pounds). In Xunwu, the value of the *jin*, and the relation between the *jin* and the *Dan*, varied widely according to the product being measured.—RT.

Dazhe; after being loaded on boats, the chickens go directly to Songkou without passing through Mei *xian*) and get a price of 0.5 *yuan* per *jin* (0.4 *yuan* in Xunwu). With 6,000 *jin* every day, the value of the chickens is 3,000 *yuan* a day or 1.08 million *yuan* each year. Since the chicken guild in Mei *xian* sells chickens in Songkou at the price of 0.7 *yuan* or more a *jin*, we can say the profit is great.

Oxen

The first day of [each ten-day] cycle is the "ox market day." The ones in November are most prosperous, with seven hundred to eight hundred oxen at each market; the ones in January and February are the next most prosperous, with one hundred to two hundred oxen at each market. Those in March, April, May, June, and July are the slackest, with three to five or ten-odd at the most for each market. The first day in August is the "opening day"; business becomes more prosperous from this day, with forty to fifty or sixty to seventy oxen sold per market. There are almost a hundred oxen at each market by September and October.

How many oxen each year?

January	100
February	100
March	60
April	no markets
May	"
June	"
July	"
August (3 fairs)	250
September (3 fairs)	250
October	300
November (3 fairs)	2,100
December (2 fairs)	160
Total	3,320

The average price of an ox is 40 *yuan*, making the total value each year 132,800 *yuan.*

Like chickens, most oxen come from Tangjiang and Xinfeng, with some from Anyuan, but none from Xunwu. The difference is that chickens only pass through Xunwu, but oxen are sold here. The ox market is held on the riverbank outside the East Gate of Xunwu City. The sellers are from Tangjiang, Xinfeng, and Anyuan; the buyers are from Mei *xian*, Wuping, Jiaoling, and Pingyuan. The middlemen (brokers) are from Xunwu. Oxen not exported through Shantou via Songkou are usually bought by ox dealers to sell to families for plowing farm-

land or sold to other towns for slaughter.The fee for brokers is a half *mao*[16] from both the buyer and the seller. The ox tax paid to the government by the tax farmer is 1,740 *yuan* each year. In the past "bidding" *(toubiao)* [for the post of tax farmer] took place annually, and the one who offered the most obtained the bid. But recently, the bidding has been held once every three years. The tax is figured by the head, at 0.4 *yuan* for each ox and 0.5 *yuan* for each water buffalo. The tax is called *xiang.* After the tax [is paid], the character *xiang* is burned on the hide of the ox with a lime stamp, and the buyer can lead the ox away. Besides this tax, a levy of 0.1 *yuan* per ox was added recently. The tax that the tax farmer sends to the government plus his own income totals 2,000 *yuan* or more each year. Based on a tax rate of 0.4 *yuan* per ox, more than 4,500 oxen should be sold in Xunwu each year; thus, the figure of 3,320 cited above is a low estimate.

Pigs

Most come from Xinfeng; some are from Anyuan. Pigs arrive by two routes: most come from Anyuan *xian* to Mei *xian* via Xunwu City, Niudouguang, and Bachi. Some come from Nanxiang in Anyuan *xian* to Mei *xian* via Gongping, Xinxu, Liuche, and Zhongkeng in Pingyuan *xian.* A total of five thousand pigs, valued at 225,000 *yuan*, arrives via these two routes. The average weight is 100 *jin*, and at a price of 0.4 *yuan* a *jin*, the [average] value of a pig is 45 *yuan*. The Xunwu government levies a tax of 0.2 *yuan* per pig.

Business from Mei* Xian *to [Yun] Menling

Most business is in the following five categories:

Foreign Goods. Tooth powder, toothbrushes, flashlights, rubber shoes, soaps, foreign umbrellas, lanterns, and foreign iron [tinned iron] are major trading items. Some of these items, for example, tooth powder and toothbrushes, are made in China, but are usually called foreign goods.

Sea Delicacies. Kelp, sea cucumbers, fish maw, squid, mussels, and salted fish are all major trade items.

Salt. Ten years ago it came mostly from Huizhou, but three or four years ago most of it began coming from Chaozhou. This is because merchants began using a different route. Right now most salt is again coming from Huizhou because of the blockade set up by reactionaries in Bachi and Zhongkeng against Red areas. The blockade also stops salt from arriving from Chaozhou. After arriving in Menling, most salt goes directly to Xingguo.

Kerosene. Mostly Asia Brand.

16. The *mao* was both a unit of account and an actual silver coin. It was defined as one-tenth of a *yuan*, though the 20-cent coin was more common than the 10-cent coin.—RT.

Textiles. Most textiles come from Xingning; a much smaller amount comes from Mei *xian.* Both places purchase foreign yarn to make into cloth. The weaving industry in Xingning is well developed, and the businesses there are generally larger than those in Mei *xian.* Foreign yarn (from foreign countries) [is also imported over this route].

A good quantity of sugar and flour is also traded.

There is no transportation service from Mei *xian* to Menling. Most goods are carried by people. All salt is carried by horses; the only transportation service is to Chengjiang by boat. Part of the flour is also carried by horses.

Porters carry a *Dan* of goods from Menling to Mei *xian* and then bring back another *Dan* of goods.

Business from Mei* Xian *to Anyuan and Xinfeng

The goods traded are the same as those to Menling, but in smaller amounts. The ratio is about four to six. This is because Anyuan and Xinfeng comprise a small area, whereas the goods going to Menling are sold in Ruijin, Shicheng, Yudu, and Xingguo—a very large area.

Products from Huizhou

The only major trade is in salt. Apart from a little salted fish and sugar sold to Xunwu, there is nothing else.

Xunwu's Exports

The goods listed in the sections above are imported to or pass through Xunwu. In this section exported goods are listed.

First is rice. Mei *xian* is short of rice; so it is twice as expensive there as in Xunwu, and a lot of rice is supplied by Xunwu to Mei *xian* every year. Rice from Chengjiang, Sanbiao, Jitan (in Xiangshan), and Xunwu City District is exported to Mei *xian* through Niudouguang, Bachi, and Dazhe. Rice from Longtu, Yutian, Liuche, Fangtian, and the upper half of Huangxiang District is exported to Mei *xian* via Zhongkeng. Rice from Datong, the lower half of Huangxiang District, Datian, Lantian, and Douyan, as well as from Longchuan *[xian]* is exported to Mei *xian* via Cenfeng and Shizheng. The amount carried over these three routes is almost equal—about 100 *Dan* a day or 36,000 *Dan* a year. At a price of 8 *yuan* a *Dan*, the value is 288,000 *yuan.*

The second is tea. Tea grows in Shangping and Xiaping in the West Ward, and Tuhe, Gangsang, and Ezihu in the South Ward. Tea is picked in March, April, May, July, and August. Twenty *Dan* (70 *jin* per *Dan*) are exported at each market, for a total of 2,000 *Dan* at the one hundred markets held each year. With

a total of 140,000 *jin* at a price of 0.5 *yuan* per *jin*, the total value is 70,000 *yuan*. Eighty percent or more is exported to Xingning, and 20 percent or less is shipped to Mei *xian*.

When tea is being picked, the traders from Xingning come to the countryside and buy freshly picked tea shoots and process the tea themselves. Among the tea shoots, the "tea before rain" (picked before April 20,[17] also called "first spring tea") can be sold at the price of 1 *yuan* for 8 *jin*, a *jin* of tea can be made from 5 *jin* of tea shoots. This tea before rain is expensive, with a price of 1 *yuan* per *jin*. As for the "second spring tea" (picked in March and April) and "autumn tea" (picked in July and August), 15 *jin* sells for 1 *yuan*. Tea made from these tea shoots can be sold for 0.5 *yuan* per *jin*.

In the tea trade, profits can be made from the second spring tea and autumn tea, but very little money is made from the first spring tea. Some tea can be made from the tea picked in December, which is called "snow tea." The snow tea is as expensive as the tea before rain and is also sold to the same upper-class families. Not much snow tea is [produced], and traders cannot make much money from it.

Besides the Xunwu City District, some tea is also grown in Yanyangping in Shuangqiao District, although not much is produced (just over 100 *yuan* each year). The quality is very good. This is because tea plants are grown in gardens instead of on hillsides.

The third is paper. Paper is made in Huangxiang and exported to Xingning (via Luofu and Luogang), Mei *xian* (via Zhongkeng, or some via Cenfeng), and Longchuan (via Beiling). On the average 60 *Dan* is traded at each market. With a hundred markets a year, a total of 6,000 *Dan* at 8 *yuan* per *Dan* is worth 48,000 *yuan*.

The fourth is timber. It is produced in the West Ward (Shangping and Xiaping) and South Ward (Ezihu) of the Xunwu City District, Hejiao in Nanba District, Xiangshan and Gaotou in Huangxiang District, Xiaomukeng and Zhaitangkeng in Sanshui District, and Luofuzhang in Jiansan District. All the timber is exported to Dongjiang[18] except for that from Luofuzhang, which is exported to Chaozhou and Shantou. The timber shipped from Luofuzhang to Chaozhou and Shantou is very expensive, but that shipped to Dongjiang is very cheap. The total value is more than 10,000 *yuan* a year. Twenty years ago much more was produced.

As for timber exports, the traders from Longchuan make investments, assisted by the local timber merchants. They all go to the hills to check the trees and then give the money to the "mountain lord" (the money is for those trees, among the

17. The text reads *guyu*, one of the twenty-four solar periods of the Chinese solar year. This corresponds approximately to the period from April 20 to May 4.—RT.

18. Dongjiang refers to the catchment of the East River, which is fed in part by the Xunwu River. The East River passes through Longchuan and Huizhou in eastern Guangdong before entering the Pearl River estuary near Canton.—RT.

many on the hills, that they have agreed may be felled). The trader employs some workers to fell the trees, and the local merchant takes care of those trees already felled so that they will not be stolen. Most of the trees are felled in April and May, with fewer and fewer after June and none after September. The tree bark is peeled off as soon as the trees are felled; they are then laid on the ground for at least two months and dried. If, after two months, the price is good and selling is to the trader's advantage, the timber is bound together to make rafts and then transported down the river. Sometimes the timber is held for three or four years there. The position of the local merchants, relative to the lumber dealers (outside traders), is like that of workers; so they call the lumber dealers "boss," whereas the lumber dealers call them "raft chief." The profit is divided so that 90 percent goes to the boss and 10 percent to the raft chief.

The fifth is [dried] mushrooms. The most important places for production are the hilly areas in Sanbiao; places along the boundary with Anyuan like Dahudong, Xiaohudong, Zhaitangkeng, Shangba, and Xiaba; and places along the boundary between Xunwu City District and Anyuan like Shangping and Xiaping. Next is Yeziche on the boundary between Shuangqiao District and Pingyuan. The price of mushrooms is 2 *yuan* a *jin*, and an amount worth 10,000 *yuan* is produced each year. More mushrooms are produced in Anyuan than in Xunwu. Mushrooms from Anyuan are sold to Nanxiong, and those from Xunwu to Xingning. There are no traders to buy mushrooms. Rather, Xunwu natives buy them and sell them in other places.

The sixth is tea-oil. It is produced in Datong, Douyan, Huangtangdu, Lantian, and Datian in Shuangqiao District. The amount is about 15,000 *jin* a year, which, at 25 *yuan* per 100 *jin*, brings in a total of 3,750 *yuan*. Tea-oil is exported to Xingning and Mei *xian* via Luofu and Cenfeng.

Here is a list of the six products and their values (only for export):

1. Rice	288,000 *yuan*
2. Tea	70,000
3. Paper	48,000
4. Timber	10,000
5. Mushrooms	10,000
6. Tea-oil	3,750
Total	429,750 *yuan*

The Major Markets of Xunwu

First is Jitan. Salt, rice, oil, and soybeans are the main trade items. The second is Niudouguang. Less salt and rice is traded here than in Jitan, but about the same amounts of oil and soybeans are handled here as in Jitan. The third is Liuche.

The major item is textiles imported from Xingning; oil and soybeans are second. The fourth is Xunwu City. The largest trade is the oxen trade, followed by oil, salt, and rice; the third is textiles. (There used to be textiles from Ganzhou, but none were brought in after 1928. This is because those textiles, made from local thread with "one ply big, another ply thin," were replaced by textiles made in Xingning and Mei *xian* from foreign thread. Those textiles from Xingning and Mei *xian* are very good, "very smooth.") The chicken business is large, but chickens are only passing through and are not traded [in Xunwu], so they do not count. The fifth market is Chengjiang. Oil, soybeans, and salt are the major goods passing through here; rice is next; there is also a large trade in opium, which comes from Xingning and Yudu. The sixth is Shipaixia, which is the general port for oil, salt, rice, soybeans; but most of these goods are only in transit. There is some trade in salt and rice. Chicken, pigs, and oxen also pass through here.

There are some small markets, such as Cenfeng (rice), Gongping (paper), Huangxiang, and Sanbiao.

Xunwu City

What Is Xunwu City?

A person who is completely ignorant of the inside story of the world of commerce is bound to fail in choosing proper tactics to deal with the mercantile bourgeoisie and in attempting to gain the support of the poor urban masses. It is extremely clear that gaining the support of the poor is deemed unimportant by some comrades, but the high-level organs of the leadership feel that it is important. However, even they have never been able to give comrades concrete tactics to follow and have particularly failed to indicate a concrete work method. Doesn't this phenomenon result from a lack of understanding of what a market town is? I have resolved to understand the town problem, but I have never been able to understand it because I have never found people who could supply sufficient data. Now in Xunwu, through Comrade Gu Bo's introductions, I found two old gentlemen, Guo Youmei and Fan Daming. Many thanks to these two gentlemen for allowing me to become like a young student and to begin to understand a bit about town commerce. I was overjoyed. If my findings can pique the interest of comrades (particularly those comrades in the rural movement and those doing Red Army work) to study the town problem and encourage them to study towns in addition to studying the rural question, then this will have been a valuable experience. Our study of the town question is the same as our study of the rural question; **we must spare no effort in studying one place thoroughly**.[19] Afterward, it will be easy to study another place and to understand general situations. If one views the flowers from horseback, like a certain

19. The words in bold, here and elsewhere in this document, are underscored in the original by placing dots next to the characters.

comrade's so-called "going to a place and asking questions randomly,"[20] then one cannot understand a problem profoundly even after a lifetime of effort. This study method is obviously incorrect.

Among Xunwu's many markets, because of this convenient opportunity, we can take Xunwu City's market as an example to investigate.

In speaking of Xunwu City's market, one truly longs for the past to replace the present. Compared with the present level of business in Xunwu City, twice as much was done in the past. The most flourishing years were 1901 and 1902. At that time not only did people from Chengjiang and Jitan in the northern half of the *xian* come to Xunwu City to buy things, but people from settlements in the southern half of the *xian* like Huangxiang and Liuche and even people from Bachi in Pingyuan *xian* [Guangdong] came to Xunwu City to buy things. This is because during the Qing products from Ganzhou passed through Xunwu on the way to eastern Guangdong. If the inhabitants of eastern Guangdong wanted to buy Ganzhou products, it goes without saying that those of Liuche and other places would. Because of this, the trade in Xunwu City, occupying a central position, naturally was quite well developed. But since the development of the trade in foreign-style goods in Mei *xian* and of the textile trade in Xingning, the decline of the trade in native products from Ganzhou kept people not only from eastern Guangdong and Bachi from coming to Xunwu City but also from Liuche and other places in the southern half of the *xian* from coming to Xunwu City to buy things. And in 1901 and 1902 it was still the so-called Age of the Degree Holders. The New Policies[21] hadn't yet been implemented, and the major trade in Xunwu City was in silk goods from Ganzhou. But from that time on things changed, the need for silk decreased, and the imperial degrees were abrogated in the first year of the Republic [1912]. The market for silk goods was virtually wiped out, and trade in Xunwu City declined greatly. Xunwu is the kind of place where the competition between handicraft products and capitalist products expresses the drastic force of the cycle of boom and bust. How can it not be worthwhile to pay attention? Moreover, until now [i.e., before the town was occupied by the Red forces], Xunwu City had both shops and stalls that were open every day and periodic markets on the first, fourth, and seventh days [of the ten-day cycle]. Approximately two thousand seven hundred people live either inside or just outside the stout walls of the city. The aspect of the city is quiet and deserted; only on market days does it become lively and

20. It is not clear to whom Mao is referring here.

21. The New Policies *(xinzheng)* were promulgated beginning in 1901. Among the reforms under this rubric were reorganizations of government administration and the military; educational reforms, including the abolition of the examination system in 1905; and attempts to establish electoral bodies at the local, provincial, and national levels.—RT.

then only for a few hours. Is not Xunwu, then, an excellent source of data?

In order to analyze living conditions and the organization of Xunwu City, we will look at all kinds of goods and services in Xunwu City.

Salt

Goods are sold mostly to people from the four wards of the city and people from Sanbiao and Shuiyuan, two *bao* in Sanshui District. People from other localities rarely come to Xunwu City to buy things. The only exception to this is salt. The greater part of the salt is sold for export to Anyuan and Xinfeng; only a small part is sold in Xunwu City District and Sanbiao. Also, because it is an item used daily, it is the number-one good traded in Xunwu City. There are five salt shops in Xunwu City. Each shop can do as much as 20,000 *yuan* of business or as little as 6,000 or 7,000 *yuan*. The five shops together can have 100,000 *yuan* of business in a year.

Salt is divided into Chaozhou salt and Huizhou salt. Chaozhou salt is good, but expensive. A *yuan [xiaoyang]* buys 10 to 11 *jin*. The color of Chaozhou salt is dark green, and since it is pure, it can prevent spoilage. The color of Huizhou salt is white, but it is less salty. Because of this, the price is relatively low; a *yuan* buys 16 to 17 *jin*. Only those who want inexpensive salt eat Huizhou salt. In the past most salt sold in Xunwu was Chaozhou salt; not much Huizhou salt was used.

Two of the shops (Huitong and Xinfachang) selling Chaozhou salt are run by natives of Xunwu; one shop is run by Han Xiangsheng, a native of Pingyuan; another is run by Zhou Yuchang, from Wan'an *xian* [Jiangxi]; and one (Wanfengxing) is run jointly by a native of Xunwu and by someone from Taihe *xian* [Jiangxi]. Huitong has 3,000 *yuan* of capital and is considered the largest. Zhou Yuchang previously had 2,000 *yuan*, but last year, because the paper trade was disrupted by bandits, he lost over 900 *yuan* of capital. Now he has only about 1,000 *yuan* left. These two businesses were started over twenty years ago. The number-three shop is Han Xiangsheng's, with capital of around 700 *yuan*; he started business some ten years ago. The number-four shop is Wanfengxing, with 200 *yuan* invested four years ago. Now its capital is 400 to 500 *yuan*. The number-five shop is Xinfachang, begun more than ten years ago. Although its owners have tried every tactic, its capital does not exceed 100 *yuan*.

The proprietor of the Huitong Shop is Zhong Zhourui. He is a landlord (among those who run salt businesses, he's the only landlord). His shop is inside the East Gate, and his family lives outside the South Gate. He owns rice paddies with rents of 220 *dan*. Every year there are two crops, and every crop yields 220 *Dan* of grain. One crop goes for the rent; one crop is kept by the peasants. His family consists of his wife, three sons, three daughters-in-law, and one bride-in-waiting (she was purchased and is now five *sui*; because she does not have a husband now and must wait for the boss's wife to bear a son, she is called a

bride-in-waiting, which elsewhere is referred to as a daughter-in-law raised from childhood).[22] Including himself, there are nine people in the household [lit., nine people eat there]. He does not hire any clerks, and he directs his sons and daughters-in-law himself. He was the first "capitalist" *[zibenjia]* in Xunwu City.

Han Xiangsheng is from Bachi in Pingyuan *xian*. He supports three people: his wife, one child, and himself. He does not hire anyone, and every year he can make a little money. The owner *[zhuren]* of the Xinfachang Shop is Kuang Mingkui, a Chetou man who was a civil *xiucai* during the Qing. He opened his shop more than ten years ago and does a business of several dozen *yuan*. In his household are his wife and one child. Because he does things fairly and justly, he has twice served as president of the chamber of commerce: once for a term of two years in the Qing and again from last year until the present. He is sixty-odd *sui* and is a white-haired old man.

General Goods

There are sixteen or seventeen general stores, of which ten or so are large. The names of the thirteen largest stores and the places of origin of their owners are:

Name of business	*Origin of owner*
Zhicheng	Xingning
Luntaixing	Ji'an
Yitaixing	Ji'an and Xunwu
Yicheng	Xingning
Pan Yueli	Xingning
Wang Runxiang	Xingning
Pan Dengji	Xingning
Xiangxing	Xingning
Yongyuanjin	Xingning
Junyi	Began by a porter from Xunwu
Luo Jinfeng	Xunwu (with 300 *Dan* of rents, the only landlord among these owners)
Fan Shunchang	Fujian
Huang Yufeng	Fujian

Among them, the Huang Yufeng Shop's business is mainly tobacco and paper. The most important trade for the others is in textiles, followed by foreign

22. For a discussion of the practice of minor marriages referred to in the text, see Arthur P. Wolf and Huang Chieh-shan [Jieshan], *Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), pp. 1–15 (hereafter, Wolf and Huang, *Marriage and Adoption*). A report on this custom as practiced in southern Jiangxi at the turn of the century can be found on p. 7.—RT.

goods. Foreign goods of all kinds are sold in small markets. Here is a brief list of 131 items:

tooth powder*
toothbrushes*
rubber overshoes*
leather shoes*
rubber boots*
sport shoes*
slippers
pencils
pens (fountain pens)
chalk
ink sticks
writing brushes
inkstones
ink boxes (for Chinese calligraphy)
brush covers
brush racks
paste
exercise books
red paste for seals
plain paper
printing ink
textbooks (there is no separate bookstore; books are sold in the general goods stores)
calligraphy and paintings
small towels
soap*
perfumed soda
toilet water
perfumed toilet water
woolen towels*
foreign socks*
foreign enamel wash basins
foreign enamel bowls
foreign enamel bowls (with a handle)*
hair oil
hair cream
gloves
rouge
mufflers*
big or small combs
cosmetics
vanishing cream
flashlights*
batteries*
matches*
cigarettes (there are many brands: Jinzi, Zhongguo, Sanpaotai, Hademen, Shanmei, etc., with Jinzi and Zhongguo more popular)
Magu cigarettes
cigarette holders
foreign umbrellas
straw hats
formal hats
imported enamel cups
visored caps
imported felt
cotton blankets
woolen hats (for children)
nightcaps
kapok pillows
leather pillows
Zhongshan buttons
white bone buttons
black bone buttons
conch buttons
snaps
elastic
suspenders
silk belts
imported belts
talcum
undershirts
fans (black and white paper)
clocks
watches
alarm clocks
letter paper*

envelopes*
diaries
mirrors
eyeglasses
foreign knives
toys (small guns, trains, roly-polies, dolls, small rubber balls, whistles, etc.)
German razors
safety razors
shears
hair scissors (this and the three preceding items are for haircutting)
leather suitcases
rattan suitcases
indigo* (blue)
dyestuff (red, black, gray, pinkish red)*
copper locks
foreign copper locks
iron locks
foreign iron locks
copper net hooks
bone net hooks
kerosene*
storm lanterns*
rush-wick lamps*
covered lamps
enamel table lamps
lamps with lotus lids
foreign lamps
square lamps
six-cornered lamps
round flints
flat flint steel (this and the preceding item are for lighting lanterns)
bone chopsticks
lacquer chopsticks
abacuses
water pipes
pipes
nails*
copper pots (for tea)
iron pans
iron trays
iron spoons
tiles
various pieces of china*
dominoes
mahjongg tiles
jujubes
dried *longyan*
various canned foods (beef, mixed vegetables, duck, winter bamboo shoots, loquats, sand pears, lichee, *longyan,* pineapple, milk)
couplets
foreign candles
white foreign wax
raisins
foreign thread
galvanized wire
ink

These 131 products are all called "foreign goods" by the merchants, and are sold at general stores. The twenty-three asterisked items are sold the most; the items not asterisked are sold in lesser quantities. One hundred eight of the 131 items come from Mei and Xingning *xian.* Most of the goods are from Mei *xian;* only Western-style socks, mufflers, and other woven goods come mainly from Xingning. Tiles and couplets come from Ganzhou. Leather pillows, letter paper, envelopes, copper bowls, kerosene, fans, water pipes, and writing brushes—these eight items come from both Mei *xian* and Ganzhou. Most leather pillows, letter paper, envelopes, enamelware, fans, and water pipes come from Ganzhou and are of the highest quality. The stationery from Ganzhou is made of paper

manufactured in China; that from Mei *xian* is made with foreign paper. Kerosene and cigarettes come mostly from Guangdong; smaller amounts come from Ganzhou. Cigarettes come from Mei *xian*, Xingning, and Ganzhou. Writing brushes come mostly from Ganzhou; only a few come from Mei *xian*.

The foreign goods of secondary importance are as described above; below I discuss the most important item traded in the general stores—textiles.

The textiles include native cotton cloth (blue, white, printed, gray, red, green, and striped cotton); glazed [i.e., shiny, smooth] cotton cloth (blue, white, gray, black, red, glazed, green, and printed); fine cotton (white, gray, black, blue, striped, and indigo blue); silk goods (all kinds of silk with patterns, all kinds of satin, brown-colored raw silk, and gambiered [i.e., dyed yellow] Guangdong gauze); woolen cloth (thick woolen cloth, rough woolen cloth, fine glazed woolen cloth); Chinese linen (white, blue, black, off-white, light green). Native cotton cloth is made from foreign yarn by Chinese. It is shipped from Xingning. Glazed cotton cloth and fine cotton are called foreign cloth and are shipped from Hong Kong via Mei *xian*. As for the silk goods, patterned silks and brown-colored raw silk come from Hangzhou via Ganzhou and Mei *xian*. Xunwu women use it to make bonnets. Every woman wears this type of bonnet. The textile business is worth some 100,000 *yuan* annually in Xunwu City. The marketing area is Xunwu City District and Sanbiao District.

General stores, in addition to the two main categories of textiles and foreign goods, also sell tobacco, pastries, incense and candles [for ancestor worship], and also a bit of [cooking] oil and salt.

In Qing times, the general goods business within Xunwu City was worth around 150,000 *yuan* annually; now it is around 120,000 *yuan*. The 120,000 *yuan* is divided among:

textiles	80,000-odd *yuan* (native cloth: 70,000 *yuan*; foreign cloth: 10,000 *yuan*, of which, woolens, 2,000 *yuan*, Chinese linen, 1,000-odd *yuan*)
foreign goods	20,000 *yuan* (each business sells at most 1,100–1,200 *yuan*; at the least 200–300 *yuan*)
tobacco	about 10,000 *yuan*
pastries	about 400 *yuan* (only two businesses sell pastries on the side)
incense,spirit money, firecrackers	about 500 *yuan* (two businesses sell incense and spirit money on the side; thirteen businesses sell firecrackers)

In order to understand general stores better, let us look at the concrete details of a few.

The shopkeeper *[dianzhu]* of the largest general store is a Xingning native, Chen Zhicheng, who owns a shop in Xunwu City, in Jitan, and in Chengjiang.

The shop in Xunwu City has capital of 3,000 *yuan*. He himself had only about 1,000 *yuan*. He borrowed the rest. The annual interest each year on 3,000 *yuan* is 900 *yuan*. Apart from paying wages, food, and fuel costs, he uses his profits for interest payments. Chen also likes to use his money for whoring and gambling.

The second-largest business is Luntaixing, whose capital, comprising three shares, is 2,000 *yuan*. After expenses, it makes profits of 300 to 400 *yuan* every year.

The third-largest business is Yitaixing, whose capital, comprising three shares, is more than 1,000 *yuan*.[23] Every year it makes a profit of 100 to 200 *yuan*.

The fourth-largest business, Luo Yicheng, is owned by one person with over 1,000 *yuan* of capital. Every year he can make 400 to 500 *yuan*. He's very economical: vegetables for food; native cloth for clothing. There are two apprentices. His family is still in Xingning. He is a Xingning native who, when he first came to Xunwu, peddled sweets from baskets he carried in Xunwu City and the four wards. For one copper cash[24] he'd break off a piece of candy. (Now a piece of candy costs one copper cent.)[25] Sometimes he exchanged candy for every type of salvage goods (hair, scrap copper, scrap iron, pig and ox bones, scraps of padded cloth). He is the kind of person who started from scratch. He came to Xunwu more than thirty years ago, made good, and opened a general store more than fifteen years ago.

Guo Yihe is the general store with the least capital, about 100 *yuan*. It sells tobacco, safety matches, eggs, red rope (red cord), silk thread, strips of embroidery (used on shoe quarters), writing brushes and ink, towels, towels made with foreign yarn, bone buttons, and other items. The store shopkeeper is Guo Youmei (he is participating in our investigation meetings), and he and his wife have clothing, food, and tax expenses each year of over 100 *yuan*. His business is barely sufficient for those expenses. He is a Wan'an native who came to Xunwu when he was twelve *sui*; he is now fifty-nine *sui*. Before he came, his uncle had traded in Xunwu for sixty years. Together these two have been in business in Xunwu for a hundred years. The store has always dealt in textiles. Business was best in 1899 and 1900; they had capital of 3,000 *yuan* and from elsewhere they received on consignment *[jiao]* (when merchants borrow goods and then sell them, it's called *jiao*) goods worth 5,000 to 6,000 *yuan*. He himself consigned to other people goods worth 4,000 to 5,000 *yuan*. So, at that time, although he had only 3,000 *yuan* of capital, he could do around 20,000 *yuan* of business. This was the number-one store in Xunwu City. Now one can go to Liuche, Bachi, Niudouguang, and Chetou to buy things, but at that time the merchants from shops in those places all came to Xunwu City to buy things. The most important

23. The text has "more than a string of capital," which is glossed parenthetically as "over a thousand *yuan* of capital."—RT.

24. *Mingqian* is copper cash *(tongqian)*.

25. *Tongpian, tongban,* and *tongkezi* are all copper coins *[tongyuan]*.

source of goods was Ganzhou (textiles, silk goods, paper, writing brushes and ink, straw hats, and straw mats from Suzhou); there was also trade with Ji'an (purple cloth and silk thread). At that time one could go to Ganzhou and buy 300 *yuan* of goods with only 100 *yuan* of cash and take them away. Now this is impossible. This kind of impossibility is not limited to the Guo Yihe Shop. Almost no shops consign goods. No goods are being consigned in Ganzhou or in Mei *xian* and Xingning. This is a great change in the economy. Just recently (1928), the "world went out of kilter." As for goods consigned by merchants to peasants, the peasants are exploited by heavy rents and interest, and have always been impoverished. On top of this, the year before last locusts ate the grain and there was also a drought, so the peasants could not pay the bills held by Xunwu City merchants. As a result, Xunwu City's merchants cannot pay the bills of merchants in Mei *xian* and Xingning, and Mei *xian* and Xingning merchants are nervous about consigning goods to people. In 1916 the Guo Yihe Shop suffered a great attack (the Guangfu faction led more than a thousand peasants to Xunwu City and attacked many other stores). After government troops recovered the city, they launched a great attack upon Guo Yihe and plundered more than 6,900 *yuan* worth of things. From that year until now, one year has been worse than the last, until things have reached the present state. Guo [Youmei] served two terms as president of the chamber of commerce, from 1925 to 1927.

Here I want to talk about the system of employees in general stores and look at the origins of their class connections, which are so obscure.

To become a master *[chushi]* after being an apprentice for three years in a general store, according to established practice one must help the boss for a year. At the beginning of the year, the person takes the old clothes worn during his apprenticeship that he no longer wants and exchanges all of them for new ones, because now he has some money. Moreover, his status is not the same. After helping for a year, if he is capable, the boss continues with him in place. If he is not capable, the boss dismisses him. The boss says to him: "Our store doesn't need so many people; next year you must find other work." But he can turn around and go to a new shop, where his status becomes a bit higher and the clothes he wears become a bit better, and his salary (not called wages) is increased each year. In society he is not referred to as an "apprentice" any more. Rather, people respect him as a "gentleman" *[xiansheng]*.[26] During the year that he is helping, the boss does not give him a fixed salary. Also, he does not have a "salary" label. But the boss gives him every kind of winter and summer clothing.

26. A more specific translation might be "articled clerk," to borrow a coinage from early nineteenth-century England. This type of clerk agreed to certain articles of apprenticeship, much as the "gentleman" in a Xunwu shop might have. This Chinese term for "gentleman" can also be used for "teacher," "sir," or "mister." In the past it could be appended to various occupations, like that of bookkeeper *(zhangfang xiansheng)* or fortune-teller *(suanming xiansheng)*. As the text makes clear, in Xunwu a "gentleman" was considered capable enough to take over the business eventually.—RT.

If he returns home to get married, the boss, besides sending more than 10 *yuan* of travel expenses (if his home is far away), must also send him more than 10 *yuan* of gifts like fruit and sea delicacies, so that when he returns home he can give a fine banquet. If he is going home not to get married but only to see his father and mother and if his home is far away, then he is given some "traveling expenses." The least amount of traveling expenses is 10-odd *yuan*, although the amount can reach 24 or 25 *yuan*. If he is someone from close by, without a doubt, he is sent 10-odd to 20-odd *yuan*. After helping for a year, he formally has a salary. The lead year he gets 40 to 50 *yuan*; the second year more than 50 to 60 *yuan*. If he does well and the shop makes money, his salary increases each year. During the Guangxu period [1875–1908] when business was good, the highest "gentleman's" salary was 120 *yuan*, but now because business is bad, the highest salary does not exceed 80 *yuan*. If a gentleman is loyal, dependable, smart, and capable, the boss may turn the business over to him completely and, in some cases, return home to live. When the profit is divided, a bonus is given to the gentlemen. In most cases it is three-tenths of the profit; in a few cases two-tenths; and in a very few cases one-tenth. When the boss of the Guo Yihe Shop, Guo Youmei, returned home to Wan'an to live, for example, he gave the business to a dependable and esteemed gentleman. There are undependable gentlemen to whom a business cannot be turned over, because of their whoring, gambling, and cheating.[27]

Oil

The third-largest business in Xunwu City is the oil trade. The oil comes from Menling and Anyuan and is sold in Xunwu City District and Huangxiang and a bit in Sanbiao. The only broker for oil is Liu Fuxing, whose capital consists of 100 silver dollars *[dayang]*. He paid a license fee for the oil monopoly. As an agent for buying or selling oil, he receives 0.2 *yuan* for each *Dan* of oil traded. Business is greatest in November and December, when a large market (first day in the market cycle) has a trade of 100 *Dan*; so in two months 600 *Dan* are traded. In the small markets (fourth and seventh days) maybe 30, 40, or 50 *Dan* are traded; so in two months 400 *Dan* are traded. From January to October the trade in each market does not exceed 3-odd *Dan*, so altogether the trade does not exceed 300 *Dan*. The total for the whole year is 1,300 *Dan*; so the brokerage fees are 260 *yuan*. Everyone has to buy oil from him since his license grants him a monopoly. This license is granted by the provincial government in Nanchang after the *xian* government sends a document stating the license was paid. Then

27. A parenthetical comment in the text glosses *da futou* and *da leigong* as meaning, literally, "to eat fried doughcakes" *(chi youbing)*, which the editors of *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* explain as behavior in which one secretly gains petty advantages.—RT.

and only then is one issued. Besides the 100-*yuan* for a license, one must also pay a 5-*yuan* administrative fee. A license is good for eight years, after which it expires and a new one must be obtained. Licenses are not limited to oil brokers *[hang];* they are also required for salt brokers, [soy]bean brokers, and livestock brokers.

[Soy]beans

There is also only one broker. In the public area of the City God Temple, beans are bought and sold. He Zizhen, a leader of the reactionaries in Xunwu who was head of the Public Security Bureau and who recently become head of the police, bought a license in 1927 and opened a soybean business. Business is greatest in November and December, when there is a trade of 800 *Dan*. One thousand *Dan* of business is done a year. The broker's fee is 2 *sheng* per *Dan* (1 *Dan* = 5 *dou*; 1 *dou* = 10 *sheng*). The price of every *Dan* of beans is 7.5 *yuan* (every *sheng* is 1.5 *mao*). This figures out to 4 percent; so every year one can make 300 *yuan*. He Zizhen is a native of Xunwu City and lives outside the East Gate. He had a deprived childhood but graduated from a middle school in Pingyuan and studied two years at a Henan mining school. He returned to Xunwu and became a schoolteacher for eight or nine years; both Gu Bo and Pan Li were his students. Around the time of the Guomindang's purge of 1927, the Cooperative Society faction led by Gu and Pan clashed with the New Xunwu faction led by He Zizhen. There was a clash in April 1927. He Zizhen fled Xunwu during the March 25 uprising in 1928, but by April he had regained his power. Afterward he also became head of the Public Security Bureau and police chief. He gradually became wealthy and bought land near Xunwu City. Before 1925 and before he was struggling with the Cooperative Society faction, he represented the power of merchant capital. He organized the Society of Fellow Students Studying in Guangdong and began the Commoners Charitable School in 1921. In June 1925, when the Cooperative Society faction held a big meeting in Xunwu City and showed an increase in its revolutionary strength, he cooperated with feudal bullies and gentry and attained a leading position among the feudal faction. He Zizhen became the worst reactionary leader. This time when the Red Army came to Xunwu, he led the retreat of the Pacification and Defense Militia *[jingwei tuan]* to Xiangshan.

Butchers

There are only three butcher businesses, which are set up along the side of the street; there are no butcher shops. The three are Liu Ener, Chen Laoer, and Liu Shiwei. Liu Ener once had 100 *yuan* of capital, but now he has nothing. Chen Laoer and Liu Shiwei have no capital at all because no money is needed to buy pork [for butchering]. They take the pig on credit, butcher it, and sell the pork.

Then they pay the [pig's owner]. On the average one can butcher two pigs a day. If a pig weighs 100 *jin*, then every year the total weight of the slaughtered pigs is 72,000 *jin*. At present, a pig can be bought for 0.25 *yuan* per *jin*, and pork can be sold for 0.28 *yuan* per *jin*. So there is a profit of 0.03 *yuan* per *jin*. So every year one can make 2,160 *yuan*. This is not a bad trade. But one must pay a large slaughter tax. In the past these three men paid 100 *yuan* of taxes a month or 1,200 *yuan* a year. Recently, because business has been relatively bad, only 1,000 *yuan* has been paid; so each man pays a bit more than 300 *yuan*. Because the three men must collect the slaughter tax, no one apart from these three can sell pork or slaughter pigs, except for personal use. After the Red Army entered Xunwu City, the number of butchers increased to seven or eight, and the activity around the market increased markedly. Because no tax was collected, you earned what you got. All the butchers liked this. Before the Red Army came, the price of pork was 0.32 *yuan* but now it is 0.28 *yuan* per *jin*.

Wine

Chen Guihe, Gao Yuanli, Yuan Lizhan, Zhou Yuchang, Liu Shuangsheng, Ling Wensheng, Peng Tongfu—these are the seven largest wine businesses. Fan Guangchang, Kuang Hongsheng, and Luo Deli are the smaller businesses. The four largest businesses, with capital not exceeding 100 *yuan*, are those of Zhou Yuchang (Ji'an native), Gao Yuanli (Ji'an native), Liu Shuangsheng (Xunwu native), and Chen Guihe. Ling Wensheng (Xunwu native), Yuan Lizhan (Ji'an native), and Peng Tongfu are businesses whose capital does not exceed 40 or so *yuan*. These seven businesses all sell sweet wine made of polished glutinous rice, which is called *shuijiu*. It is also called yellow wine because of its color. Because it has a mellow taste, does not harm people, and is relatively inexpensive, peasants and the poor people in Xunwu City like to drink it. It is divided into double *[shuang]* wine and single *[dan]* wine (these terms are used only in Xunwu City; in the countryside, instead of *shuang[jiu]* or *dan[jiu],* they say "good" or "weak"). Since fermented glutinous rice wine has more fermenting agent, it has a higher proof. Wine is sold by the bottle, not the *jin*. Double wine [sells] for 18 coppers a bottle; it is the best of the yellow wine. When common people invite someone to dinner, they drink it, but they also use it for their own meals. Drunkards have to have a little at every meal, but if they have some wine, they do not even care about eating. Single wine, which is 10 coppers a bottle, is bought by poor people when they are thirsty; they drink it like tea [i.e., in great amounts]. The business in double wine is greater than that in single wine.

Fan Guangchang, Kuang Hongsheng, and Luo Deli are all run by natives of Xunwu City. Their capital does not exceed 10 *yuan*. They all sell white wine. Zhou Yuchang also sells white wine. This kind of wine is made with sticky rice. It is stronger than yellow wine. It is not sold by the bottle, but by the cup; each cup costs two coppers. A *jin* sells for 0.16 *yuan*. Yellow wine outsells white wine

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nine to one. Whether speaking of white wine or yellow wine, both are part of the wine business. But the purpose of these businesses is not just to sell wine. The mash that is left after making wine is fed to pigs; this is an even more important purpose. If there is too much for your own pigs, you sell the leftovers. It takes two coppers to buy one small bowl of wine. During the best season for yellow wine shops (March through August is the thirsty season), every shop can sell 5 *yuan* of wine a day. In the off-season (September to February), a wine shop can take in 2 *yuan*. Yellow wine shops can make 1,020 *yuan* a year. The seven shops together do a business of over 7,000 *yuan*. In the hot half of the year white wine shops can take in a *yuan* a day, and in the cold half of the year they can take in 0.5 *yuan* a day. So every business makes 270 *yuan* a year. Together the four businesses make around 1,000 *yuan*.

A wine tax must be paid. Depending on whether business is good or bad, the large wine shops can pay about 0.4 *yuan* a month; the small wineshops about 0.2 *yuan* a month. There are also ones that pay 0.15 *yuan*.

Marine Products

The items in the marine products stores are plentiful. "Delicacies from the hills and seas" is their slogan. The gains and losses of the marine product merchants are quite interesting. First I illustrate the categories of items sold and then observe the merchants' gains and losses.

Salted Fish. The most sales [lit., the first category]. These include mandarin fish, mackerel, seahorses, perch, skinned fish, rockfish, golden carp, sturgeon, spotted butterfish, carp, big-eyed sea bream, salamander (big body, small tail), flounder (also called *bingbeiluoshishi,* it has eyes on only one side; thus it needs to collaborate with another fish when seeking food. For this reason, occasions when people rely on one another are usually called *bingbeiluoshishi;* so this kind of fish has become a metaphor), spiny dogfish (it has two horns on its head). These salted fish all come from Chaozhou and Shantou.

Seaweed. Second in sales. It includes green seaweed and kelp. Green seaweed, also called Jiangxi seaweed, is of the highest quality and comes from Ganzhou. Compared with green seaweed, less kelp is sold, its quality is lower [lit., next], and its price is cheaper. It comes from Mei *xian* and over a thousand *jin* are sold each year. The price is 0.2 *yuan* per *jin*.

Sugar. Also carried at the marine products store; third in sales. It is divided into white sugars, brown sugars, rock candy,[28] and slabs of sugar-preserved kumquats. The white sugars include snow powder, nice-looking but not sweet, which comes from Mei *xian*; rough white sugar, very sweet, from Huizhou; and white-rice sugar,[29] a medium-quality sugar that comes from Huizhou. These three kinds are all imported sugars; one *jin* sells for 0.17 to 0.18 *yuan*. The brown

28. Rock sugar *[bingtang]* is a crystallized sugar formed into lumps.—RT.
29. This kind of sugar is white and looks like rice ground into small grains.—RT.

sugars are taro sugar, which is ball shaped and comes from Mei *xian*; loaf sugar, which is sold by the block, is the best, and comes from Huizhou; loose-sand sugar, which is mixed with sand, is the worst, and comes from Huizhou. In the past, brown sugar was cheaper than white sugar; now brown sugar is expensive and white sugar is cheap. Previously brown sugar was not more than 0.16 *yuan* per *jin*; now the price has risen to 0.23 to 0.24 *yuan* per *jin*. The old price for white sugar was 0.26 to 0.27 *yuan* per *jin*, and now it is only 0.17 to 0.18 *yuan* per *jin*. Brown sugar is native sugar, and white sugar is imported sugar. The annual sale in Xunwu City of white sugar is over 1,000 *jin*, and of brown sugar (available only during the winter season) 6,000 to 7,000 *jin*. Since brown sugar is sweeter [than white sugar], it sells better. Rock candy [for cooking] comes from Mei *xian*, and annual sales amount to only several dozen *jin*, at about 2 *mao* and a few *fen*[30] per *jin*. Sugar-preserved kumquats in slab form come from Mei *xian*. There are annual sales of over 20 or 30 *jin* at 0.3 *yuan* per *jin*.

Of the above sugars, loaf sugar sells the best. This is because it is an important ingredient in rice cakes. At New Year's, it does not matter whether a family lives in town or the countryside or whether it is poor or rich, every family makes rice cakes.

Bean Flour. Fourth in sales. Most of it comes from Yunmenling; some comes from other *xian*. It is made from sweet potatoes and sold in powdered form, not yet made into noodles. It is an ingredient for meatballs and the like. Annual sales are a few thousand *jin* at about 0.15 to 0.16 *yuan* per *jin*.

Pigskin. Fifth in sales. It is used in ordinary meals as imitation fish maw. It comes from Mei *xian*. Annual sales are over a thousand *jin*, 0.1 *yuan* for 3 *liang*, 0.55 *yuan* per *jin*.

Fujian Bamboo Shoots. These come from Mei *xian* and Anyuan; "Fujian bamboo shoots" is just a name. Sixth in sales. They are used not only at banquets but also at ordinary meals as well, especially during the harvest and field-weeding periods. There are some bamboo plantings in Xunwu itself. In March and April, peasants go to Mei *xian* and sell it. In July and August Xunwu people want to have some, but there isn't enough; so they buy some from Mei *xian*. Annual sales are 500 to 600 *jin*, one *jin* sells for 0.23 to 0.24 *yuan*.

Squid. It is used at banquets and at ordinary meals. Seventh in sales. It comes from Mei *xian*. The annual sales are around 300 to 500 *jin*. One *jin* costs 0.7 to 0.8 *yuan*.

Fermented Soybeans. Annual sales of about 3,000 *jin* at one *jin* for 0.14 *yuan*. The inhabitants of Xunwu can also make this and use it to make soy sauce, but the locally produced product is not sold commercially. It is a very common food; almost every household eats it. Add some oil and then steam it. One bowl of it can be served for several meals; so for frugal people this is very economical.

30. One *fen* was equivalent to a tenth of a *mao*. It was purely a unit of account, because the one-cent copper coin introduced in 1914 had depreciated to less than half its face value.

Mianhui. That is, flour. Coming from Mei *xian*, much of it is foreign-style flour. Buns, Chinese dumplings, noodles, and cakes are all made with it. Cakes are most popular. Egg cakes, cookies, *pang* cake (*pang* means hollow in the center), five-seed cake,[31] and lard cake are all made of flour. At 0.2 *yuan* per *jin*, annual sales are about a hundred packages.

Foreign Wax. It comes in white chunks. One *jin* costs 0.25 to 0.26 *yuan*. There are annual sales of 500 *jin* or so.

Yufen. This is also called *xifen;* it is made from sweet potatoes. It is different from bean powder because it comes in the form of noodles. It comes from Mei *xian*. All the common people eat it. At 0.1 *yuan* for about half a *jin*, there are annual sales of about 600 to 700 *jin*.

The above eleven items are used the most; those that follow are less commonly used.

Top Quality [lit., unsurpassed in the market]. This type of squid is the best and is served only when guests are invited. It comes from Mei *xian*. It is not used much; each year squid worth 200 to 300 *yuan* is sold. The common squid is called "foreign[-style] squid."

Preserved Vegetables. This is a turnip and is similar to a radish. This preserved vegetable comes from Xinfeng. There are annual sales of 200 to 300 *jin*. It is sold only after the Dragon Boat festival,[32] but after August no more is shipped in. One *jin* costs 0.2 *yuan*; it is a little more expensive than *xifen*.

Sharkfin. One *liang*[33] costs 0.4 *yuan*; it is rarely used. Annual sales amount to only 10 to 20 *jin*.

Sea Cucumbers. With annual sales of 200 to 300 *jin*, business is greater than for shark fin. One *jin* costs 2.8 to 2.9 *yuan*.

Fish Maw. Annual sales are 200 to 300 *jin*, and the price is about the same as for sea cucumbers. Normally, if a meal has sea cucumbers, you would certainly serve fish maw, and it would not be the imitation fish maw made from pigskin.

Cuttlefish. There are annual sales of only 40 to 50 *jin*. One jin costs 0.7 to 0.8 *yuan*, about the same as squid.

Scallops. Annual sales are about 20 *jin*; one *jin* sells for 1.2 or 1.3 *yuan*.

Dried Gongyu [lit., tribute fish]. Annual sales of about 8 to 10 *jin*. Each *jin* costs 0.2 *yuan*. About 70 to 80 *jin* used to be sold.

Big Shrimp. Annual sales are 70 to 80 *jin*. One *jin* sells for 0.6 *yuan*. "Big shrimp" are not really shrimp that are big. They are also called "dried shrimp"

31. Melon seeds, almonds, and walnuts are among the types of seeds and nuts used to make this cake.—RT.

32. According to the 1881 gazetteer for Xunwu *xian*, the Dragon Boat festival was held on the sixth day of the sixth lunar month, instead of the usual fifth day of the fifth month. *Changning xianzhi*,"Fengsu," p. 1b.—RT.

33. The *liang* or Chinese ounce was a unit of weight equivalent to one-sixteenth of a *jin*. One ounce or *liang* of silver (commonly referred to as a tael) was also a unit of currency, equal to approximately .72 silver dollars.—RT.

and are smaller than Chaozhou shrimp, which can weigh as much as 4 *liang* apiece.

Pressed Shrimp [lit., shrimp shells]. Tiny shrimp pressed as flat as shrimp shells are called shrimp shells. Annual sales are over 100 *jin*. During New Year's and [other] festivals, every household makes [Hakka-style] stuffed bean curd. This involves making a hole in [the middle of] a piece of bean curd, inserting ground pork, fish roe, and dried mushrooms mixed with the pressed shrimp or adding garlic and leeks. All these are diced and stuffed [into the bean curd]. One *jin* of pressed shrimp costs over 0.1 *yuan*.

Jellyfish. One *jin* goes for 0.3 *yuan*, and annual sales aren't much—20 to 30 *jin*.

Dried Mussels. The big ones are called *haoshi* [dried oyster]. They are also called *xili.* Annual sales of dried mussels are 40 to 50 *jin*, and one *jin* costs a bit over 0.3 *yuan*. No dried mussels are sold in Xunwu City.

Tianqingpu [lit., reddish-black ray]. This is a kind of marine fish, and big ones are as big as a fan. They are rarely sold in Xunwu City.

These products, from Top Quality to *tianqingpu,* are marine products that come from the Chaozhou-Shantou region.

Day Lily. Also called golden needles. Two *mao* per *jin*; annual sales of 40 to 50 *jin*.

Cloud Ears.[34] Annual sales of 50 *jin*; a *jin* costs 1 *yuan*. During the Guangxu period, these cost no more than 0.5 *yuan* a *jin*. They have since doubled in price. They come from Mei *xian*.

Dried Mushrooms. Annual sales of 100 *jin*. Winter mushrooms are better and cost 2 *yuan* per *jin*. Spring mushrooms are not as good, with one *jin* going for 1.2 to 1.3 *yuan*. They are local products.

Shredded Preserved Cabbage [lit., winter vegetables]. This canned food is made with cabbage. It used to come from Tianjin, but recently it has also been made in Mei *xian*. There are annual sales of over one hundred jars at 0.4 *yuan* a jar.

Dried Bean Curd Roll [lit., curd bamboo]. This is made of thin sheets of bean curd rolled into tubes. One *jin* costs 2 *mao* and several *fen*; annual sales are 40 to 50 *jin*. It comes from Xingning.

Doufumei [lit., bean curd mold]. This is fermented bean curd that comes from Mei *xian*. It is made from three items: soybean milk, taro, and flour. It is not made the way the dried bean curd used by the common people is made.

Pepper. For white pepper, annual sales are 10 *jin* at 1.2 *yuan* per *jin*. In the Guangxu period the price was under 0.4 *yuan*. Now the price has tripled. Annual sales of black pepper are 20 to 30 *jin*, and one *jin* costs 0.5 to 0.6 *yuan*. It used to be not more than 2 *mao* and a few *fen* per *jin* during the Guangxu period. All pepper comes from abroad.

Dried Chinese Olives. Dried Chinese olives are made by boiling fresh olives,

34. Cloud ears are a type of white fungus that grows on trees.— RT.

taking the seeds out, and then curing them. In Xunwu these are called *lanjiao,* and in Mei *xian* they are called *lanshi.* Annual sales are 10-odd *jin* at 2 *mao* and a few *fen* per *jin.*

Soy Sauce. Produced locally and in Menling. This is how to make soy sauce. First steam the soybeans and then dry them halfway, spread them flat and wait until they ferment, and then boil them again. Add some spices and salt to the boiling liquid, and soy sauce is the result. After boiling, the soybeans become fermented soybeans *[doushi].* However, the quality of this type of fermented soybeans is not good. Good fermented soybeans are made by boiling down the soy sauce. Fermented soybeans and soy sauce sell well in March, June, and September. Monthly sales for fermented soybeans are 200 to 300 *jin*; annual sales are over 3,000 *jin*, one *jin* sells for 0.14 *yuan.* Annual sales of soy sauce are over 300 *jin*, one *jin* goes for 0.15 *yuan.*

Persimmons. Annual sales are about 100 *yuan*; a small one costs three coppers, two large ones cost a *mao.*

Red and Black Dates. Annual sales for both are 100 *jin* or so. Black dates cost 0.4 *yuan* per *jin*, red dates 0.2 *yuan* per *jin.*

Longyan. Annual sales of 10 to 20 *jin.* One *jin* of those with a skin costs a little over 0.3 *yuan.* Peeled ones are called *yuanrou,* cost 1 *yuan* per *jin*, and are available only in herb stores.

Lichees. This fruit is rarely sold. The price is about the same as that of longyan.

Dried Star Fruit. Annual sales are some 10 *jin*, one *jin* sells for 0.4 *yuan.*

These products, from persimmon to dried star fruit, all come from Mei *xian.*

Melon Seeds. Melon seeds come from both Xinfeng and Menling. One *jin* costs a little less than 0.3 *yuan.* Annual sales are 200 to 300 *jin.*

All thirty-nine products listed above are part of the trade of marine products shops. In addition, marine products shops also supplement sales with kerosene and tea-oil.

The general outline of marine products shops in good times and bad is related below.

The stores with the most business are Shunchang Laodian, Shunchang Xingji, Lu Quanli, Tang Yaojie, Rong Chunxiang, Luo Jieci, and Zhang Junyi. In addition, there are a number of small stalls that sell marine products. Among these stores, Shunchang Laodian and Zhang Junyi are both general stores and marine products stores.

Shunchang Xingji is a branch of Shunchang Laodian; it has the best marine products business. It has capital of 1,000 *yuan* and consigns 200 to 300 *yuan* [of goods] to Mei *xian* each year. The store proprietor, Fan Zuxian, is a native of Xunwu City and supports over twenty people in his family. Business profits are barely sufficient for living expenses and consignment fees.

Lu Quanli is the proprietor of the second-largest marine products shop. He is a Mei *xian* native, and his store has capital of 1,000 to 2,000 *yuan.* Besides

marine products, he sells tong oil, tea leaves, mushrooms, and tea-oil of various kinds and ships wholesale to Xingning and Mei *xian.* His marine products business is not as good as that of Xingji, but Xingji does not engage in the side trades he does. He also consigns goods to Mei *xian.* Because he is a native of Mei *xian,* his business is very good. He has no problem doing about 1,000 *yuan* of business. He supports a wife and hires two "gentlemen" (annual salary of 60 *yuan* each). After expenses, he has at least 200 or 300 *yuan* of profits annually. In years with a good business climate, he has profits of about 1,000 *yuan.*

Tang Yaojie, a native of Jiaoling, has capital of 2,000 *yuan.* He has no hired employees. He covers consignment fees and living expenses but makes no profits. Many years ago [when there were] brokers for oil and salt, he made a lot of money; but two years ago he started losing money, so he changed to marine products.

Rong Chunxiang, a native of Xunwu *xian*, has capital of 700 to 800 *yuan.* His family has several dozen *Dan* of paddy land. He supports seven or eight people. He has no employees. As for his expenses, he uses his business profits to pay for them. The grain from the family's land outside Xunwu City is saved up. Among the marine products businesses, his was the best. After the soviet was established, one part of his land was confiscated. Needless to say, he seethed with anger. His childhood was difficult; he helped a local bully with his accounts and made some money and got a start.

The proprietor of the Shunchang Laodian is Fan Xingfu, a Xunwu City native; he has 300 to 400 *yuan* of capital. He has more than ten family members and hires one gentleman at an annual salary of 50 to 60 *yuan.* His marine products business makes just enough to supply [his family's] needs. His grandfather Fan Yuanfu was a large landlord with three children and an extended family of 140-odd people. He received 800 *Dan* of rent a year. Later their wealth declined as their land was dispersed, and Fan Xingfu's family had land with rents of only 30 to 40 *Dan.* Under the soviet's division of land, his family was eligible to receive a bit of land. But his brother Fan Laoba still received over 100 *Dan* of rent; so this year during the land redistribution most of his land was distributed. Fan Laoba does not engage in business. The Shunchang Xingji was started by his cousin. He had 40 to 50 *Dan* of paddy land and over twenty family members. When the soviet divided the land, they received some land. From the final years of the Qing through the early years of the Republic, his family and his brothers together had seven stores—Laodian, Xingji, Daji, Maoji, Junji, Hongchang, Lufeng—which dealt in silk, textiles, general goods, and marine products. Their businesses were known far and wide. They could consign to Ganzhou 4,000 to 5,000 *yuan* [of goods]. That is about what the Guo Yihe Shop could do back then. In 1922 business gradually fell off, and in 1925 they had only two businesses: Laodian and Xingji. The most important reason was the changing market—foreign [and foreign-style] goods replaced native goods. When Mei *xian* business replaced Ganzhou business, the southern half of Xunwu

no longer required native goods supplied from Ganzhou. The Guo Yihe Shop declined for the same reasons. Another reason has to do with the large number of children born and raised in feudal families (large landlord and nascent mercantile capitalist families). Much whoring, gambling, feasting, and wearing of fine clothes—their ostentatious behavior impoverished their families. Before 1921, the primary school in Xunwu City (some landlords raised shares to build it; 5 *yuan* for one share) was a famous "diploma mill." The children of landlords throughout the *xian*, ostentatious but without prospects, spent money to go to this "mill" for three years, obtained a diploma, and then put on airs. They used the words "graduate of Xunwu City East Primary School" on their namecards, returned home, and swindled their ancestors. Why do we say they swindled their ancestors? First, just after they graduated, their ancestral halls, in accordance with precedent, awarded the graduates some money. This is called "grabbing the bonus." Second, every year, along with *xiucai* and *juren,* they receive an equal part of the educational allowance [lit., study grain]. Third, every year after the ancestral sacrifices are completed, they, along with the degree holders, receive a part of the sacrificial meat. The Fan family has sixty or seventy young scions who had entered that diploma mill. In addition to grabbing the bonus and obtaining grain, after they graduated, they got 100 *jin* of meat from their ancestral trusts *[gongtang]*,[35] large and small, during the division of meat each year.

Luo Jieci, a native of Xunwu City, has 200 to 300 *yuan* of capital. He supports four people [including himself], has no employees, makes wine, and sells marine products. After expenses, he makes a profit of 100 to 200 *yuan*. His is a fine business. He liked to whore in the past, but now he has stopped on account of his wife (her brideprice was 500 *yuan*). He is honest and hardworking. He uses mash [from wine making] to feed pigs. So things have gotten better year by year, and the family now has more than 10 *Dan* of paddy land.

Zhang Junyi trades in both marine products and general goods and has 200 *yuan* of capital; the rest is borrowed. He does not hire anyone, but his children are in the trade. Every year he makes some profit. He is a native of Xunwu *xian*. Five or six years ago, he was a porter and helped Xunwu City merchants ship grain and mushrooms to Mei *xian*. From Mei *xian* he shipped back cloth and salted fish to Xunwu. He shipped things himself, and at the same time he was a head porter, a job that allows one to make a profit. Xunwu *xian* merchants gave him money to go buy things. Xunwu City merchants and Mei *xian* merchants tipped him money, and from this he became rich.

As for the marine products business carried on from stalls, no business exceeds a few dozen *yuan* of capital, or at most 100 *yuan*. These [peddlers'] goods come from Xunwu City's large marine products stores and from petty traders

35. *Gongtang* land refers to land owned by all types of ancestral halls, religious associations, and village associations. These lands were controlled mostly by the landlords and rich peasants.

[xiaofan]. [People in] this kind of stall trade often can get rich if they work hard. Xunwu City has many shops that began as stalls. Pan Dengji, He Xiangsheng, Luo Yisheng, Liu Hengtai, and Fan Laosi had a business but no shop. On the first, fourth, and seventh days [of the ten-day market cycle, peddlers] take goods on a pole to the market in Xunwu City; on the third, sixth, and ninth days, they take goods on a pole to the market in Jitan. [In this way] they can make some money.

Herbs

The seven herb stores in Xunwu City are Baihetang, Yang Qingren, Xin Desheng, Tian Renhe, Wang Putai, Huang Yuxing, and Fuchuntang.

Baihetang is the number-one store. The proprietor, a certain Chi, is a native of Chaozhou. But originally he was a native of Huangxiang named Liu. When he was young, his family was very poor; so his father and mother sold him to the Chi family, herb merchants from Chaozhou. Later he came to Xunwu to open an herb shop with capital of about 1,000 *yuan*. He became the boss. Guangdong merchants have a common saying: "Not afraid of difficulties; only afraid of not having progeny." Those people who are without children can certainly purchase children to carry on the family line; this is because they are "afraid of not having progeny." The need for labor power also prompts the purchase of children. When children are bought, usually the intelligent and capable ones are adopted as sons. The dull ones are kept as servants *[nugu]*.[36] Baihetang's manager, who was himself purchased, had a child who died young; so he bought a son. He supports seven people [including himself]: [the son just mentioned], the two sons and two daughters he fathered, and his wife. He has also taken on three apprentices. He makes some profit. The herb business is very profitable. One buys in bulk and sells in small quantities. There are two categories of herbal medicines: common and special. The common category (water medicine) is for curing illnesses, and everyone needs them. The special [lit., delicate] kinds are used as supplements [to food], and only local bullies are able to buy them. One can bargain about the prices for special kinds, but the prices of common herbal medicines are set by the herb merchants. Among the seven herb stores, only three businesses—Baihetang, Yang Qingren, and Wang Putai—have the special types of herbs.

Yang Qingren, a native of Zhangshu, used to have capital of 500 to 600 *yuan*, but last year his son gambled away several hundred *yuan* and now he only has 200 to 300 *yuan*.

Wang Putai, who is also a native of Zhangshu, has capital of 100 *yuan*. He works hand in glove with the evil gentryman He Zizhen and the Catholic father Chen (a Mei *xian* native). Father Chen loaned him 400 *yuan*. Furthermore, he borrowed 200 *yuan* from the local prostitute Lai Fengzi. In addition to the herb

36. *Nugu* means "male servant" in Hakka.

shop, he also opened a foreign-goods store. Where did Lai Fengzi's money come from? She became the mistress of one of the company commanders subordinate to Lai Shihuang[37] and returned to Xunwu last year with 300 ill-gotten *yuan*. Wang Putai thought of a way to flatter Lai Fengzi in order to borrow this money. When the money was received, Wang Putai sent Lai Fengzi perfume, terrycloth towels, and many other gifts.

Xindesheng is owned by a certain Du, who is also a native of Zhangshu. It has 400 to 500 *yuan* of capital. Tian Renhe, Huang Yuxing, and [the owner of] Fuchuntang are also from Zhangshu, and all have capital of 100 *yuan*.

Annual herb sales are:

Baihetang	3,000
[Yang] Qingrentang	800
Xindesheng	600
Tian Renhe	600
Wang Putai	400
Huang Yuxing	300
Fuchuntang	300
Total	6,000 *yuan*

Wang Putai has participated in counter[revolutionary] organizations. When this faction meets, he certainly attends, although on the surface he does not appear to be an official. General goods merchant Chen Zhicheng, marine products merchant Bao Huaxiang, and the manager of the boarding house Tonglaian are all involved in local politics. When Xunwu City came under the influence of the soviet, the businesses of these four were confiscated.

Tobacco

Two shops in Xunwu City process tobacco. One shop is Huang Yufeng's, a Shanghang native whose family has operated a shop in Xunwu for two generations. In the past they had capital of 3,000 *yuan*. By selling tobacco, paper, and general goods, they made a profit of more than 10,000 *yuan*, which they took back to Shanghang to buy land. More than 1,000 *yuan* of capital was retained by the Xunwu City shop. Another shop is Yongquanhao, which also processes its own tobacco. This shop, opened by an Anyuan native the year before last, has capital of 300 to 500 *yuan*.

37. Lai Shihuang (1889–1927) was a native of Jiangxi, who had commanded the Guomindang Fourteenth Army in the Northern Expedition. He was shot for dereliction of duty on December 31, 1927.

Huang Yufeng has two workers, one who shaves the tobacco [blocks] and one who makes the packages. Yongquanhao hires one worker. The workers' annual salary is 60 *yuan*. They eat the boss's food. Their lot is about the same as the "gentlemen" in the general goods and herb stores. What differs is that the workers do not usually eat meat or drink wine and have a special dinner only on the first and fifteenth. The gentlemen usually have meat to eat; hence they do not have special dinners. Moreover, gentlemen usually eat at the same table as the boss. Workers, when few, eat together at the table with the boss. If there are a lot of workers, the boss and the gentlemen eat at one table and the workers eat at another. These examples all show that the status of the gentlemen is higher than that of the workers. Workers are generally not called workers, but "master workers" *[shifu]*.

Most of the tobacco in general stores and marine products stores is purchased from this type of tobacco shop.

Tailoring

Altogether there are thirteen shops with sewing machines and three shops that use hand labor. Liu Qinying, Huang Saozi, Liao Jiefang, Liu Senhe, Liu Shifu, Xie Shenbao, Fan Laizi, Xie Qilong, He Xianggu, Xie Shifu, Huang Laowu, and Huang Shangxian all use machines. Every shop has one *chezi* (sewing machine). Every shop's boss is also a worker. Every person has an apprentice to do finishing work like hemming and making buttons and hooks. The capital of this type of sewing shop is in the machine. First-quality machines cost more than 200 *yuan*; second-quality around 70 to 80 *yuan*; third-quality (secondhand) about 30 to 40 *yuan*. Before 1920 there were no sewing machines in Xunwu; without exception sewing was done by hand. In 1920 a Xingning man, He Shifu, opened the first shop with a sewing machine. He originally opened a shop in Liuche, and in 1920 he moved to Xunwu City. Because his "scissors were very sharp" (when Xunwu people want to say that the tailor steals the fabric, they don't say he steals; rather, they say his scissors are sharp), and because he also liked prostitutes and did not stay put, he took his sewing machine back to Xingning. The year before last (1928) there were still only four machines in Xunwu, but last year the number increased to thirteen. This number includes several used machines bought from other people. Among the tailors, Huang Laowu's handiwork was the best, and his business was the largest. He worked hand in glove with officials and powerful gentry and had a monopoly in making fine clothes. Because of this, he had profits that he used to buy land. During the March 25 uprising he expressed opposition, and when the revolution reached Xunwu City, he fled with the reactionary faction. [As for clothing styles,] in 1920 He Shifu started using a machine. He popularized "Shanghai-style clothes" ([shirts] cut down the center with rounded bottoms and embroidery).[38] In 1923 the Shanghai

38. Center-cut (*poxiong*, lit., split-the-chest) refers to shirts and jackets that buttoned down the middle rather than being fastened on the side as traditional Chinese jackets were.—RT.

style fell from favor, and a type of shirt cut down the center with a square bottom and embroidery became the style. Last year the "Canton style" (seven buttons, four pockets, cut long) became the fashion. A small number of people liked to wear this kind of clothing, but most people were still wearing the embroidered style. In the past clothing was uniformly made in the old "large lapel" *[dajin]* style. The new style of center-cut [shirts and jackets] coincided with the introduction of new-style education. In 1918 or 1919, this style gradually began to be worn by more and more people. But even last year, if we speak of the population of all of Xunwu *xian*, most people still wore old-style clothing. Wearers of new-style clothing were in a minority. But in the past two years, particularly after the victory of the land revolution, the wearing of new-style clothing has increased daily, especially among the young people. Young students, of course, began wearing the new-style long ago, but [now even] the majority of young peasants and young workers wear new-style clothing. Only in the case of the very poor, who lack the money for new clothes, are old-style clothes still worn. Last year in the summer, with the victory of the rent resistance movement in the southern half of the *xian*, and in the winter, when the land was divided, among the young people in the countryside under thirty *sui*, over 70 percent wore rubber-soled shoes and sport shoes. (The soles for these kinds of shoes come from Canton to Xingning. The shoes are completed in Xingning, and each pair costs around 1 *yuan*.) Cadres in the Red Guard and soviet not only, without exception, wear new-style clothing and new-style shoes but also want to use electric flashlights and wear scarves. Some want to wear pants padded with down.

There are still three hand-tailoring businesses in Xunwu City.

To compare hand sewing and machine sewing of clothes, in the time it takes to sew one item by hand, someone using a sewing machine can sew about three items. To compare prices, a pair of pants produced by hand costs 0.7 *yuan*; by machine 0.6 *yuan*. To compare quality, machine-made is better than handmade. How can machines not drive out handicraft workers?

The most important markets in the *xian* are these ten places: Jitan, Chengjiang, Shipaixia, Chetou, Niudouguang, Liuche, Huangxiang (sewing machines were used here earlier than in other places), Gongping, Huangtangdu, and Cenfeng. All these places have sewing machines. Because of this, 30 percent of the population has given up handmade clothing for clothing made by machine, especially in the southern half of the *xian*, in which the speed of mechanization has been very fast.

Umbrellas

Peng Wanhe and Li Xiangren are shops that make paper umbrellas. Peng Wanhe was from Wuping [Fujian] and opened an umbrella shop in Xunwu City more than a hundred years or three generations ago. When Peng first came to Xunwu, he had only 100 to 200 *yuan* of capital, but he gradually accumulated profits

from making umbrellas. As of the year before last (1928), before the March 25 uprising, the shop's capital, including land, was 1,000 to 2,000 *yuan*. The shopkeeper, the fifth Peng brother, and his father, Peng Shengxiang, bought 60 *Dan* of paddy land in the Tianbei area outside Xunwu's South Gate. They built a new house. The fifth Peng brother's third and seventh brothers lived in Tianbei. He himself manages the business in [Xunwu] City. The Tianbei land was rented out to peasants for cultivation for 50 percent of the year's crops. His family originally consisted of seven brothers, but four have died; so there are three brothers left. There are also six sons and nephews, one mother, three wives, and five daughters-in-law; so altogether he supports eighteen people. The sons attended a primary school. Among his three brothers, he is the one who manages the umbrella business. He is thirty *sui*. He employs two workers. The seventh brother is over twenty *sui* and studied at the Sun Yatsen Middle School established by the Revolutionary faction, for over twenty days. Then when the March 25 uprising occurred, the reactionary faction said he was a "thug" *[baotu]*[39] and confiscated the family property in Tianbei and burned its buildings in Tianbei. The third and seventh brothers both graduated from the East School in Xunwu City. Nevertheless, the third brother studied at the East School during the "diploma mill" era. The seventh brother was at the East School after the school had been reformed, when it was run by the revolutionary Sun Yatsen Middle School faction. Because of this, after the seventh brother graduated from the East School, he entered the Sun Yatsen Middle School and joined the "thugs' " forces *[duiwu]*. After the third brother graduated from the East School, he served as a teacher in an elementary school in Wuping. Now the seventh brother has fled to Wuping. The fifth brother's shop now only has 40 to 50 *yuan* of capital. In the time of his father, Peng Shengxiang (during the Guangxu period), paper umbrellas were still popular. At that time about 30 percent of the people used foreign-style umbrellas and 70 percent used paper umbrellas. From the beginning of the Republic until now, this has turned around: foreign-style umbrellas now constitute 70 percent of the market, and paper umbrellas only 30 percent. It does not matter whether one is speaking of towns or the countryside, worker or peasant, merchant or student—all young men and women almost without exception use foreign-style umbrellas that come from Mei *xian* and Xingning. Because of this, those in Liuche and Niudouguang who, during the age of Peng Shengxiang, would come to the Xunwu City shop to buy paper umbrellas always go to Mei *xian* and Xingning to buy foreign-style umbrellas. In the past the Peng Wanhe Shop made and sold three thousand paper umbrellas every year. Now yearly production does

39. This term of opprobrium was used by opponents of the Chinese Communist Party in the Jiangxi countryside. Western observers noted in April 1928 that Communists were allying with so-called local bandits *(tufei)*. In fact, a new compound—*gongfei*—was coined to refer to the alliance of Communists *(gongchan)* and local bandits *(tufei)*. See *North China Herald* 167 (April–June 1928): 54. This double meaning could often be obscured, with *gongfei* meaning simply Communist bandits.—RT.

not exceed twelve to thirteen hundred umbrellas. Previously (in the Guangxu period), the Peng Wanhe Shop hired six or seven workers; now it employs only two people. In the past the price of umbrellas was 0.25 *yuan*; now it is 0.45 *yuan*.

Li Xiangren, from Nankang, is over forty *sui*. He began as an umbrella craftsman and then became a boss in the early Republic. He has 40 to 50 *yuan* of capital, and every year he sells around two thousand umbrellas. He hires two workers: one carves bamboo into frames and one mounts the paper; he puts on the lacquer.

There are two kinds of foreign-style umbrellas: silk umbrellas and foreign-cloth umbrellas. All silk umbrellas are made in Japan; China cannot make them. The cloth for foreign-cloth umbrellas and the iron rods come from abroad. Chinese take the cloth and pull it tight over the umbrella frame. The price of a silk umbrella is more than 1.5 *yuan*. The price of each foreign-cloth umbrella is 1.2 to 1.3 *yuan*. The proportion of sales of paper umbrellas, foreign-cloth umbrellas, and silk umbrellas is paper and foreign-cloth umbrellas, 30 percent each, silk umbrellas 40 percent.

The umbrella business now has no apprentices. In the past ten years, no one in Xunwu City has wanted to learn how to make umbrellas for the following reasons: (1) there is no future in the umbrella business; and (2) the situation of apprentices in umbrella shops, compared to that in general stores, is much worse. The craft must be studied from the age of thirteen or fourteen *sui* and then and only then can it be mastered. The apprentices must cook meals for shop personnel and must also buy food. They also must sweep the floors and do odd jobs around the shop.

Wooden Goods

In the past there was only one business, that of Hu Donglin, a Ganzhou man who did a business of 400 to 500 *yuan*. He has been in business for over twenty years and makes every kind of wooden item for sale: desks, benches, chairs, tables, beds, foot basins, clothesracks, water buckets, cabinets, wash basins, urine buckets, serving trays, signs[40] (for religious festivals, birthdays, and congratulatory occasions), couplets, bookcases, suitcases, clothes bureaus, blackboards and other items used in schools, and boxes [suspended from carrying poles] used for sending gifts.

The carpentry trade can be considered a larger business. Hu's wooden goods were sold not only in Xunwu City District but also in each district and every *xian*. But items in his store were generally not sold to workers, peasants, and poor people. Rather, they were sold to the landlord class, midlevel merchants, and rich peasants because workers, peasants, and poor peasants cannot afford

40. *Bian'e,* a horizontal inscribed board.—RT.

these things except for a bride's dowry [lit., when marrying off a daughter]. Then they buy clothes bureaus and small cabinets. Hu's family was in straitened circumstances in Ganzhou. Twenty years ago he came from Ganzhou to Xunwu to help in a workshop as a carpenter. He saved some money and opened a small wood shop, which slowly developed. At its height he hired four or five workers and made profits of 1,000 *yuan*. He sent half of it back to Ganzhou and what was left—400 to 500 yuan—he used for the business. The year 1928 marked the beginning of the period when business fell off. He kept only one worker, and he himself worked. His son helped a little; he had enough to feed his family. The reason for his declining business lies in the land revolution. The northern half of the *xian* did not experience revolution, but it was influenced by the revolution. The landlord class and others who had money no longer celebrated birthdays. They also no longer celebrated auspicious occasions and festivals or held honorific gatherings. Most schools closed. How could Hu's business not have declined?

All his furniture—all that was sold to feudal landlords—is in the old style. But some of it was progressive; these were the items used by schools and churches. Because he knew Pastor Bao, the wood sections of the church and hospital built outside South Gate were done by him.[41]

His relative, a certain Xie, last year asked ten people to form a "monthly loan society." Every person contributed 5 *yuan*, and altogether 50 *yuan* was raised. Xie opened a very small wood shop at the side of the City God Temple. No workers were hired; just the father and son. In one year not only did they make no profit but they lost their capital. The business is almost dead.

The wooden items used by the workers, peasants, and poor people are sold at periodic markets. On the first, fourth, and seventh days of the ten-day market-cycle, one can buy from artisans *[jiangren]*. They are called "those who make round wooden objects." They live deep in the hills and carry their goods by pole to market. These goods are commodes, carriers, water buckets, foot basins, rice buckets, rice pots, rice scoops, water dippers, wok lids, bowl covers (to cover food bowls and cooking pots), chopping boards, cutting boards (for vegetable cutting: the round one is called a chopping board and the square one is called a vegetable board), dish-washing pots, grain buckets (to carry cut stalks to the threshing area for threshing), grain flails (to beat the grain), rice hullers,[42] and

41. "Pastor Bao" refers to Dr. Cyril E. Bousfield.—RT. (The correspondence of Dr. Bousfield, a medical missionary stationed in Xunwu since 1912, constitutes one of the sources for Roger Thompson's account of the area.)

42. The grinding disks for hand-operated rice-hulling mills could be made with stone, clay, or wood. The rice huller *(longpan)* mentioned in the text was made of wood. For a description, with three photographs, of this type of huller, see Rudolf P. Hommel, *China at Work: An Illustrated Record of the Primitive Industries of China's Masses, Whose Life is Toil, and Thus an Account of Chinese Civilization* (New York: John Day, 1937), pp. 91–95 (hereafter Hommel, *China at Work*). Mao's text glosses *longpan* as *tuizi* (lit.,

ladders. All are sold by these craftsmen who come out of the hills. Of course, these items are not available on every market day, but depending on the season or needs, there is a market for these things. Rice hullers must certainly be ordered. Windmills must be made by master craftsmen from Shanghang. In the whole *xian*, there are ten master craftsmen from Shanghang. Every year master craftsmen from Shanghang visit the *xian* once or twice. Waterwheels are owned by only one in a hundred peasant families in Xunwu *xian* because this *xian* has many irrigation ditches in the hills. Because droughts are rare, waterwheels are not used.

Outside the South Gate are two coffin-making shops. Each shop has only 40 *yuan* of capital. They make the "firewood" (also called *huobanzi,* or kindling) used by poor people. Landlords and capitalists and tenants and workers with even a little money usually hire a carpenter to make coffins. Only by the poorest households, or in emergencies *[doujin],*[43] will this "firewood" [coffin] be bought. Those people who have lost everything or have had things taken always curse loudly: "I hope you are wiped out and lose all your children. I hope you end up packed into a cheap coffin." This refers to coffins that are made of kindling wood and are used only by nameless people. Families with money hire carpenters to make coffins. Such carpenters, except for Xunwu natives, come from Shanghang. The master workers who make windmills also make coffins.

Boarding Houses

There are Liu Wanli, He Changlong, Liu Hongxing, Wen Deli, Pan Fali, Pan Jinli, Tang Riheng, Tonglaian, Zeng Jitao, Jiu Saozi, Dazhi Sisaozi, Gu Liufang, Liu Ener (also sells white wine) and Gu Yuchang: some ten-odd boarding places. Eighty percent of the boarders are porters; the remaining 20 percent are ox dealers, people carrying bundles wrapped in cloth (these people are traveling to look for a job), people of neighboring villages coming to Xunwu City because of lawsuits, people passing through here to Ganzhou to attend school there, acrobats and trick performers, plaster vendors, fortune-tellers, monks who beg for alms, medical practitioners, geomancers, and beggars (they sing folk songs called *lianhualuo*). Among those 80 percent of customers who are porters, most carry chickens or ducks in baskets suspended from poles on their shoulders; a few carry tobacco skin (tobacco skin is tobacco leaf).

It requires little capital investment to open a boarding place. Some old quilts, some rough mats, a little rice, and some firewood will do. The rent for the place can be paid after a few months of operation.

pusher). This refers to a rice huller whose grinding wheel is turned by a push-pull type of motion. A turning pole, attached to the outer edge of the top grinding disk, turns the wheel by being pushed and then pulled.—RT.

43. *Doujin* is glossed as "times of emergencies."—RT.

The profit comes from those customers with long gowns and those who carry umbrellas. They are customers who are treated to better food and a nicer quilt. However, they are charged a lot more when they check out. The porters and poor people are charged lower fuel and meal fees. They pay by the bowl of rice instead of by the meal, as does the first type of customer; this is much cheaper. One bowl of rice costs half a *mao* (people with larger appetites can consume about one and a half bowls, half a bowl is enough for people with smaller appetites). One pot of wine costs the same as a bowl of rice, for those who drink. The fuel fee for one night is three coppers, which includes fuel for lighting and wood to heat the water for bathing. In the winter it costs each customer two coppers to have a quilt. The money obtained by selling food and wine is about 40 percent of the overall profit. Essentially, the ultimate source of profit for the boarding place is pig raising, because boarding houses always have table scraps and garbage, which can be used as pig food.

The enemy of a boarding house is the police and underlings from the yamen. They often come to check customers' luggage on the pretext of investigation and thus harass the customers or steal their belongings. For example, when they come to the boarding house on the pretext of checking for opium, they steal the money that belongs to customers. During curfew, the customer might get into some unnecessary and unexpected trouble because of a reply the police do not like. Therefore, customers are afraid of coming to the boarding places in Xunwu City. They seek to find places in Huang'ao, Heling, Changju, and Xinzhai—towns that are 3 to 10 *li* from Xunwu City—long before it gets dark. This, no doubt, negatively affects the boarding place business a great deal.

Among the boarding houses, the Tonglaian Boarding House is reactionary. The owner, Chen Dengqi, comes from a poor peasant family in Liuche, where he could not keep his whole family fed. He knew some martial arts; so he taught these in the Liuche countryside. In 1918 or 1919 he went to Xunwu City and became a bailiff. In 1925 he opened the Tonglaian Boarding House and sold oil at the same time. He colluded with government officials and was friends with the evil gentryman Chen Tufeng of Liuche. During the March 25 uprising, he sheltered *xian* magistrate Xie Yin in his escape and got into Xie's good graces. After [Xie's] political power was restored, Chen was promoted to captain of the Pacification and Defense Corps. He led corp members to Shuangqiao District to kidnap people for ransom and burn down the houses of the revolutionary masses. After the *xian* magistrate left, he went back to the boarding house. This time the soviet confiscated his house.

Bean Curd

The population of Xunwu City is under three thousand, and yet there are more than thirty bean curd stores. Nine out of ten meals in this city are served with bean curd. Bean curd is popular because it is cheap and convenient. In Xunwu's

villages, people also like bean curd—it constitutes half the peasants' daily diet—but it is not as popular as in Xunwu City.

One tray of bean curd is made with 2.5 *sheng* of soybeans. The cost of 2.5 *sheng* of soybeans is 0.5 *yuan*. One tray of bean curd sells for 0.65 *yuan*. The profit is 0.15 *yuan*. "One tray of bean curd" means forty-six pieces of big dry bean curd. The retail price is seven pieces for 0.1 *yuan*; one piece for three coppers. One tray of small dry bean curd contains ninety-two pieces. The retail price for fourteen pieces is 0.1 *yuan*; two pieces for three coppers.

There are four varieties of bean curd: regular soft bean curd, fried bean curd, dry bean curd, and stuffed dry bean curd. The regular soft bean curd sells the most, fried bean curd ranks second, followed by dry bean curd. Stuffed dry bean curd sells the least because it is used only for special occasions. The profit of a bean curd shop comes from the soybean residue, for it is used to raise pigs. Because the bean curd store sells an average of one tray of bean curd a day—maybe two trays when something special is going on—its profit ranges from only 0.15 to 0.3 *yuan* a day. In raising pigs, a "sow and piglet" can usually be produced twice a year. The profit is about 40 *yuan* each time. If a store raises pigs to be sold as pork, each store can raise four pigs a year, which averages 400 *jin* of pork. This makes a profit of 100 *yuan*. However, this type of pig raising requires more rice, and it is not as profitable as raising the sow and piglet.

Bean curd businesses operate out of the owner's home; people who sell bean curd also farm at the same time. It is not easy to make bean curd. It is said: Learned easily, mastered with difficulty. It is also said: Few people claim to be masters of making bean curd and liquor.

Barbers

There are eight barbershops in Xunwu City. Before 1912 all the tools were traditional ones, and the queue was the only style. In 1912, Western scissors began to be used (shears and hair scissors) and only the monk style was in fashion. In 1913 the "Japanese-style" cut started becoming popular. Large mirrors, plastic combs, and lightweight metal combs had not appeared yet. In 1917 and 1918 the "crew cut" and the "army style" were quite popular. But the tools remained those used traditionally, not the ones like the large mirror. In 1921 some of the local young men who attended school in Ganzhou returned to Xunwu and brought back with them the "Ph.D. style." In 1923 the tall, large mirror (eight or nine inches wide; thirteen inches tall) appeared, and rattan chairs replaced the four-legged bench (one foot tall). In addition, the lightweight metal comb was brought into the city. All the new-style tools were from Mei *xian*. During the great revolution of 1926–1927, plastic combs appeared. The Japanese-style cut was renamed, and the Ph.D-style cut went out of fashion. Nevertheless, crew cuts and army-style cuts, originally widespread among students and merchants, spread widely among young workers, peasants, and poor people.

New hairstyles also became popular among the petty bourgeoisie and student masses (these masses accepted capitalist culture and opposed landlord culture): the "cultured style," "American style," and "round-headed style" (Mei *xian* people laughed at this style, calling it the "Thai pomelo").[44] The cultured style was also called the "Western style." The American style is called the *huaqi* style.[45]

It spread from Southeast Asia to Mei *xian* and then from Mei *xian* to Xunwu. Nowadays, in Xunwu City and other big market towns no one wears the shaved-head style, although a large portion of the peasants in the countryside still wear this style. Only a small part of the population wears fashionable styles like the crew cut and the army-style cut. This minority, moreover, is made up of young men.

As for prices, the shaved-head style costs a *mao* whether one is shaved or sheared. All other styles cost 1.5 *mao*; a shave costs half a *mao*.

To open a barbershop requires capital of about 40 to 50 *yuan*. The master barber usually hires two people, although a few hire one or three people. The wage for half a year is at least 30 or 40 *yuan*; a regular wage is 50 to 60 *yuan*; 80 *yuan* is maximum. When business is good, each person can make a *yuan* [a day]. Normally the boss and the two workers, on the average, bring in 3 *yuan* a day; so in a year they can bring in 1,000 *yuan* or so. Except for the expense of wages of more than 100 *yuan*, the rest goes to the boss. Expenses are fuel and food (75 *yuan* for each of the four people), rent for the shop (about 30 *yuan*), and the cost of the tools (not more than 100 *yuan*). So the boss can make a profit of around 400 *yuan* (including his own wage). How is this money used up? For whoring and gambling by the boss.

Very few barbers and tailors, whether workers or bosses, save up enough money to become rich. The reason is that these two types of people, though generally bright and capable, indulge in whoring and gambling and are fond of fine food and nice clothing. Why are they like this? It is probably because their social position is low. During the Qing dynasty, barbers were regarded by society as one of the "nine low classes." As elsewhere, the social position of tailors is also very low. Even though they are married, tailors still frequent brothels. Eight of ten barbers do not have wives, but they do not feel miserable at all. They are quite content to frequent brothels.

The "nine low classes" are contrasted with the "nine high classes." The nine low classes are (1) pedicurists, (2) masseuses (those who massage backs), (3) musicians (those who play drums and instruments), (4) chimney sweeps, (5) folk

44. The text reads *xuanluo you;* the first two characters are a classical reference to Thailand, and the last character refers to a grapefruit-type citrus known as pomelo or shaddock.—RT.

45. *Huaqi,* or checkered flag, refers to the U.S. flag, hence, "American." Other colloquialisms include "sun flag" for Japan and "rice flag" for Great Britain. The "rice flag" designation derived from the similarity of the design of the Union Jack to the character for "rice" *(mi)*. See Li Jui, *Early Mao*, p. 79.—RT.

performers [lit., tea pickers] (men and women singing tea-picking songs *[xi]* together), (6) opera singers *[changxi]*, (7) yamen clerks and runners *[chairen]*, (8) barbers, and (9) prostitutes. The nine high classes consist of (1) degree holders *[juzi]*, (2) doctors *[yi]*, (3) fortune-tellers *[kanyu]*,[46] (4) geomancers, (5) painters *[danqing]*,[47] (6) craftsmen, (7) monks, (8) Daoist priests, and (9) performing artists [lit., qin players] and chess players *[qi]*.

Blacksmiths

There are three blacksmiths: Master Ye, Master Yang, and Master Li. Master Yang comes from Anyuan, Masters Ye and Li both come from Yudu. Each of them has invested about 50 *yuan*. They make different kinds of firewood cleavers, axes, hoes, iron rake heads, weeding rakes, harrows (pulled by an ox), planes, shuttle spears (in the Xunwu dialect these are called *baozoi*, in Mei *xian tiaohaozi*, in Dongjiang *jianchuan*), kitchen cleavers (vegetable cleavers) spatulas (for frying vegetables), shovels (to ladle food out of woks),[48] fire [charcoal] tongs, fire [charcoal] shovels, hooks (for carrying water pails), iron ladles (to scoop rice and oil), all kinds of iron tools used by carpenters (various kinds of iron planes and rulers, oblique shovels, iron awls, carpenter's pincers, drills, choppers), irons (to press cotton cloth when making a shirt), knives for cutting cloth (for the tailor), sickles, sabers, and double sabers *(kazidao)*, small rakes *(xiaoba)*, iron nails, hinges (for mounting doors), and iron hoops. All items except sickles, sabers, and double sabers are household items that are sold in the city and the surrounding area. Traditional tools and methods are used to forge iron. Iron is produced in six places locally: Huangshashui in Xunwu City District's South Ward; Tiezashui and Shiduankeng in Shuangqiao District; and Chetou, Hengjing, and Dabeijiao in Nanba District. Every place has furnaces and casts iron ingots as well as woks, plowshares, and moldboards *(libi)*. The locally produced iron is also sold outside Xunwu *xian*; most of it is sold in Huizhou, Shilong, and Menling. Some of the woks are sold in Xunwu *xian*, but about half are sold in Huichang and Ganzhou, and a small number are sold in Chaozhou and Shantou. Plowshares and moldboards are sold only in Xunwu *xian*. Altogether about two hundred people are required for one furnace for casting iron. Every furnace needs those who carry the *xiangtan* (charcoal *[mutan]*; this is used in casting iron and casting woks; about twenty men are needed to carry it), those

46. A note to the Chinese edition of Mao's report indicates that *kanyu* is the same as *dili xiansheng* and *kan didi* [geomancers]. It refers to those who, through the use of superstitious practices, helped people select the location of a house or tomb. Usually they were called *fengshui xiansheng* or *yinyang xiansheng*.

47. *Dan* and *qing* are two pigments commonly used in Chinese painting. *Danqing* usually means painting, but refers to painters here.

48. Mao uses the compound *guotou*. *Guo*, the Mandarin pronunciation for the character for cooking bowl, is pronounced *wok* in Cantonese. This refers to the round-bottomed cooking vessel associated in the West with Chinese-style stir-fry cooking.—RT

who make charcoal (to turn wood into *xiangtan* requires three men per kiln; the charcoal from five kilns supplies one iron furnace; so fifteen men are needed altogether), those who transport the sand (sand for iron production comes from landslips; peasants carry it and sell it to those who run the furnaces; these workers are difficult to count), and those workers at the foundry (tall furnaces for casting pig iron require ten men; cupola furnaces for casting cast iron require twelve men;[49] casting woks requires twelve men, one man is the stoker, and three men are either managers or apprentices). Every furnace for producing iron requires capital of 1,000 *yuan* as does every furnace for making woks; so [together] the furnaces for making iron and woks require 2,000 *yuan*. The biggest expense is for sand and charcoal, the next is for the fuel, food, and wages of the workers. Some foundries are run by one family; others are joint-share operations. As for wages, the foreman *(gongtou)* gets 1.2 *yuan* a day; workers get 0.3 *yuan* and eat the boss's food and use his fuel. The managers get 70 *yuan* a year. Wages for foremen and workers are reckoned daily—they work a day and get paid for a day. A manager's salary is figured on an annual basis. There is also money for rituals, New Year's, and travel. These are all expenses paid by the boss for the workers. The status of foremen is high. If a foreman is treated poorly, he will take it easy, and the business will start losing money. A foreman can make 500 *yuan* a year. A foundry can produce [iron worth] 4,000 *yuan* a year. Six foundries yield 24,000 *yuan*. Before the Republic, foreign iron had not arrived here at all, or only in a very small amount, and wages were low. Iron production was greater than at present. Foundries could produce iron worth over 20,000 *yuan*. Although in the Qing there were only two foundries, together their production was more than 40,000 *yuan*. Now the number of furnaces has increased, and the amount of production of each foundry has decreased. The primary reasons are that labor is expensive (labor is expensive because industrial products from abroad are expensive) and that foreign iron is being imported.

The current price of iron is double that of thirty years ago (1899–1900). At that time a *Dan* (about 40 *jin*) of pig iron was, at most, 1.1 *yuan*. Now it is certainly 3.2 *yuan*, or 0.08 *yuan* per *jin* of pig iron. Three *jin* of pig iron can be made into one *jin* of cast iron, which is priced at 0.5 *yuan*.

Of the three blacksmiths in Xunwu City, two are Yudu natives; one is from Anyuan. All furnace operators in the countryside are natives of Yudu. There are many Yudu iron-founders. Since tall furnaces require four men to operate and short furnaces require three men to operate, with about three thousand seven hundred to three thousand eight hundred furnaces in operation, these iron-founders number about thirteen thousand. Not only do they make iron in Jiangxi, but they work in Fujian, Guangdong, and even Southeast Asia.

49. Pig iron ingots cast in sand molds from smelted iron ore, when resmelted in a cupola furnace and poured into molds, become cast iron. For a description of iron casting as observed in China in the 1920s, see Hommel, *China at Work*, pp. 28–31.—RT.

Fireworks

There is a fireworks shop whose boss is a certain Zhong, a Huichang man. With capital of several dozen *yuan*, this shop has been around for six or seven years. He himself works along with a master he has hired to help. Every year he does a business of 400 to 500 *yuan*. An old custom on the first day of the year is to set off large displays of fireworks. Even the smallest shop would spend a couple of *yuan* on fireworks. This year on the first the reactionary government announced restrictions. Firecrackers were forbidden not only on the first day of the year, but even on ordinary days. Because of this, the fireworks business has plummeted. The peasants in the areas of the insurrection in the southern half of the *xian* have completely rid themselves of superstition and do not want to use fireworks. Because of this, not only has Zhong's fireworks business in Xunwu City decreased, but also the importing of fireworks into Xunwu from Mei *xian* and Menling has ceased recently.

Jewelry

Xunwu women are the same as women in other places where the feudal economy has not completely collapsed. It does not matter whether they are workers, peasants, merchants, or poor peasants or rich peasants, they all wear jewelry in their hair or on their hands. All of it is silver except for the gold jewelry worn by women in large-landlord families. Every woman puts silver hair clasps in her hair and wears silver earrings. No matter how destitute the woman, she has these two kinds of jewelry. Also, bracelets and rings are owned even by those of the most modest means. Silver earrings are actually silver-plated tin or silver-plated copper. More than seven shops in Xunwu City make this kind of jewelry. Each shop needs only several dozen *yuan* of capital. Some of the jewelry is done to order; some is sold by peddlers carrying goods on their backs in a box and going to the countryside. Among the seven jewelry shops, four shops have a boss, a worker, and an apprentice, one shop has four people, one shop has two people, another shop only has one person. The apprenticeship system resembles the one for haircutting, but the work is harder and the clothes are a bit more threadbare.

Tinsmith

There is one shop [in this category], which is run by Liu Junji, a native of Xingning. This shop was opened in Xunwu City the year before last; there was no so-called tinned iron[50] before then. It has capital of several dozen *yuan*. The shop has three people: his wife, one apprentice, and Liu himself. The raw materials are kerosene tins. It produces small tin lamps (rush-wick lamps),[51] pots for holding oil and tea-oil, ladles for scooping oil, pots for making tea, filters for oil and wine, tea canisters, all sorts of small boxes, and other household necessities. So this type of tin goods store is a social necessity. The business is also profitable. A kerosene tin costs 0.3 *yuan* and comes from general stores in Xunwu City, Jitan, Sanbiao, Chengjiang, and Niudouguang. These tins are made into tin products and sold for 0.6 *yuan*. This time when the Red Army entered Xunwu City, Liu Junji, for unknown reasons, fled with the reactionary faction.

50. *Yangtie*, literally "foreign iron," the Chinese term for tinned or galvanized iron.

Watch Repairing

Ye Gongchang, a native of Mei *xian*, runs the one watch repair shop. In addition to his tools, he has around 10 *yuan* of capital. He specializes in fixing watches and clocks. In addition to the business in Xunwu City, the only other such business in the whole county is in Niudouguang. These two businesses were started the year before last (1928). Xunwu *xian* has 120,000 people; 2 percent have watches and clocks. Altogether there are two thousand four hundred watches and clocks; so it is necessary to have one or two businesses that repair watches and clocks.

Periodic Markets

Xunwu City is a city whose trade is carried on in shops and in periodic markets. In Xunwu, the business in periodic markets represents the seminatural economy, and the business done by shops and stalls represents the mercantile economy. To compare the shop and stall business with the periodic market business, the shop and stall business constitutes 70 percent, and the periodic market 30 percent. It is apparent that the strength of the mercantile economy exceeds that of the natural economy by far.

The most important products sold at the periodic markets are as follows.

The first is rice. The rice trade takes place only on the first, fourth, and seventh days of the ten-day market schedule. Shops and stalls do not engage in this trade. Not only is rice desired by most people in Xunwu City (Xunwu City's peasants have their own rice), but it is also shipped to Guangdong. Mei *xian* or Dazhe people carry in a *Dan* of salt and take back a *Dan* of rice. This is called "salt coming; rice going." Because of this, the rice trade is greater than any other trade in Xunwu City. The items most traded in Xunwu City are, in order, (1) rice,

51. In the text "small tin lamps" is glossed *dundeng*, which, on p. 136 of the Chinese text, is itself glossed "rush-wick lamp" (*caodeng*, lit., grass lamp). These are lamps in which light is produced by the slow burning of two or three piths of rush extending from a raised dish filled with oil. Oils pressed from soybeans or rapeseeds were frequently used as fuel. This traditional type of lighting was replaced by kerosene lamps. See Hommel, *China at Work*, pp. 313–14.—RT.

(2) salt (more than 100,000 *yuan* annually), (3) textiles and foreign-style goods (100,000 *yuan*); and (4) [soy]beans (in excess of 20,000 *yuan*). In 1900, the price of 1 *Dan* (172 *jin*) of rice was 4 *yuan*; in 1912, it was 5 *yuan*; in 1927, during a drought, it was over 16 *yuan*. This year, before the Red Army arrived, it was 8.5 *yuan*; since the Red Army arrived, it has been 7 *yuan*.

The second is firewood. Charcoal, *shuitanzi,* kindling, bundled firewood, and brushwood are carried by shoulder "to the market" from rural areas. In 1900, 100 *jin* of charcoal *(xiangtan)* was worth 0.5 *yuan*. From 1912 to 1928, the price rose from 0.8 *yuan* to 1.2 *yuan*. Because it rained a lot last year, the price for 100 *jin* went up to 2.2 *yuan*, but now 100 *jin* costs 0.6 or 0.7 *yuan*. The price for a *Dan* (70 *jin*) of kindling was 0.17 to 0.18 *yuan* in 1900. It went up to 0.22 to 0.23 *yuan* in 1912, and it was 0.4 *yuan* from 1921 to 1927. It has been 0.5 to 0.6 *yuan* from 1927 until now.

The third is pork. Those three butchers mentioned previously in the section on shops and stalls actually should have been included in the section on periodic markets because theirs is a business carried on in periodic markets.

The fourth is pigs. Piglets (two months old) and older piglets (three to four months old) are not sold by licensed brokers. They are bought and sold in periodic markets. Since each market has about thirty of them, and there are nine markets per month, altogether about 270 are traded each month. The price per *jin* for piglets now is 0.3 *yuan*, and for [older] piglets 0.2 *yuan*. Pigs with much meat cost 0.25 *yuan*. Why are older piglets the cheapest? Because the average weight for an older piglet is 50 *jin* or so. Unless he needs the cash, an owner does not want to sell it. But when an owner is forced to sell an older piglet, people [know the situation and] bargain the price down. The owner reluctantly lets it go.

The fifth is chicken and duck. Not many from this area are sold at markets—normally twenty at most. Sometimes no one wants even one. This proves the poverty of Xunwu. Around New Year's and other festivals over a hundred are sold at every market. The price per *jin* for chicken is 0.45 *yuan* and for duck 0.3 *yuan*.

The sixth is bamboo and wooden goods. Wooden goods that are sold at the periodic markets are discussed in the section on shops and stalls under the heading of wooden goods. Here I discuss bamboo goods: grain baskets, bamboo mats *[da]* for drying grain, bamboo scoops (to carry ashes and manure to the field), chicken and duck cages, pig cages, baskets, bags (for carrying rice cakes and other odds and ends), mill-turning handles, threshing sieves, sieves for sifting grain, bamboo beds (sleeping chairs), dustpans, bamboo chairs, stove scoops *[laoji],* chopsticks, brooms, wok brushes, *duoerzi* (that is, kite scoops, smaller than bamboo scoops), small, square-bottomed bamboo baskets *[jiaoluo]* (small food baskets used by children to hold cakes), containers (fish baskets, also used when picking tea-oil seeds *[chazi]),*[52] bamboo fish traps (that is, the trap of

52. *Chazi, muzi, tao,* and *taozi* all mean seeds from the tea-oil plant.

"after the fish is caught, the trap can be forgotten";[53] it is called a *hao* elsewhere), tea baskets, bamboo hats (straw rainhats), vegetable baskets, and drying baskets. These are all sold at periodic markets.

The seventh is vegetables. These are leaf mustard, celery, amaranth, Chinese onion, *maizi,* Chinese kale, garlic bolt, bitter melon, winter melon, pumpkin (gourd), seasonal melon, sweet melon, cucumber, watermelon, sweet potato (cushaw), eggplant (Guangdong people called it *diaocai),* water convolvulus (also called *kongxincai,* it is called *yongcai* elsewhere), taro, *puzi,*[54] turnip, leek, scallion, garland chrysanthemum, cabbage, *caitou* (main stem of leaf mustard), *dangji* (blade bean), chili, snow pea, *pengpidou* (hyacinth bean), kidney bean, *bayuejiao* (August bean), tiger bean, tree bean, mung bean, yellow soybean sprout, purslane, and celery cabbage. These vegetables are supplied by the nearby villages to the residents of this city.

The eighth is fish. There are grass carp, silver carp, variegated carp, shrimp, carp, crusian carp, yellow eel, loach, frog, prawn, soft-shelled turtle *(jiaoyu),* freshwater fish, and *"qiang."* Ordinary markets have only grass carp, silver carp, carp, crusian carp, yellow eel, loach, and frog; the rest are seldom seen. One *jin* of grass carp costs 0.25 *yuan*; 10 *liang* of yellow eel cost 0.1 *yuan*; a *jin* of loach costs 0.1 *yuan*; 7 *liang* of frog costs about 0.1 *yuan*. *Qiang* is a kind of rare big fish. A 40-*jin qiang* was sold in Xunwu last year. Some *qiang* found elsewhere weigh as much as 70 to 80 *jin*. Sometimes along rivers in the Huizhou area people who have drowned serve as food for this type of fish.

The ninth is candy. There is powder, glutinous paste, *nazi* (vermicelli), cakes (soft cake, *tielian* cake, *tieshao* cake, bean cake, *youguo,* sugar cake, fish cake, ramie-leaf cake, sweet potato cake, and impressed-character cake).[55] Whenever the market is open, candy vendors are there; especially during a "joyous procession" (during folk dancing or a religious festival), a lot more of them appear. The capital is only a *yuan* or two.

The tenth is fruit. Plums sell best; water chestnuts rank second. In addition, there are loquats, pomelos, red bayberries, persimmons, peaches, oranges, and tangerines. The fruit trade is not a small business.

53. Mao here evokes a passage from chapter 26 of the *Zhuangzi*. Watson renders the relevant sentence: "The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you've gotten the fish, you can forget the trap." See *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 302.

54. *Puzi* is a local term for a type of aquatic grass known elsewhere in China as *jiaosun* or *jiaobai*. The base of the stalk swells under the action of a fungus which is attracted to the plant, and it is the resulting tubers which are eaten.

55. Impressed-character (lit., seal) cakes are fried cakes impressed with decorative designs such as flowers or Chinese characters. A hinged mold, which could be made of camphor wood, might impress, for example, the auspicious characters for "double happiness." See Hommel, *China at Work*, p. 155.—RT.

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The ninth is candy. There is powder, glutinous paste, *nazi* (vermicelli), cakes (soft cake, *tielian* cake, *tieshao* cake, bean cake, *youguo,* sugar cake, fish cake, ramie-leaf cake, sweet potato cake, and impressed-character cake).[55] Whenever the market is open, candy vendors are there; especially during a "joyous procession" (during folk dancing or a religious festival), a lot more of them appear. The capital is only a *yuan* or two.

The tenth is fruit. Plums sell best; water chestnuts rank second. In addition, there are loquats, pomelos, red bayberries, persimmons, peaches, oranges, and tangerines. The fruit trade is not a small business.

53. Mao here evokes a passage from chapter 26 of the *Zhuangzi*. Watson renders the relevant sentence: "The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you've gotten the fish, you can forget the trap." See *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 302.

54. *Puzi* is a local term for a type of aquatic grass known elsewhere in China as *jiaosun* or *jiaobai*. The base of the stalk swells under the action of a fungus which is attracted to the plant, and it is the resulting tubers which are eaten.

55. Impressed-character (lit., seal) cakes are fried cakes impressed with decorative designs such as flowers or Chinese characters. A hinged mold, which could be made of camphor wood, might impress, for example, the auspicious characters for "double happiness." See Hommel, *China at Work*, p. 155.—RT.

Prostitutes

There are thirty to forty brothels in this town of two thousand seven hundred people. The best known among the hard-bitten lot of prostitutes, young and old, are Chang Jiao, Yue E, Zhong Simei, Xie Sanmei, Huang Zhaokun, Wu Xiu, Run Feng, Da Guanlan, Xiao Guanlan, Zhao E, Lai Zhao, Yu Shu, Wu Feng, and Yi E. Except for Da Guanlan and Yi E, all are young prostitutes. Run Feng, Wu Xiu, Yue E, Wu Feng, and Zhaokun are the five best known.

When the civil and military imperial examinations were flourishing, there were just as many prostitutes as now. After the imperial examinations were abolished, their numbers declined. Around 1904 there were only about ten prostitutes. Later the number gradually increased; so now it is the same as during the booming period of the exams. When the land revolution in the southern half of the *xian* moved to the north and the Red Army arrived in Chengjiang, many of the prostitutes fled to the countryside. Among them it was said: "Wherever the Red Army is, not a blade of grass remains; even a broom will be snapped into two pieces." Therefore, they were frightened and ran away.

In Xunwu City most of the prostitutes are from Sanbiao. The people of Xunwu have a saying: "Prostitutes [lit., 'goods' *(huo)*] from Sanbiao; glutinous rice from Xiangshan." This means that the women of Sanbiao are very pretty.

Ten years ago, when business was flourishing, merchants visited prostitutes the most, powerful gentry were second, and the sons of powerful gentry (the "young masters") participated in this activity the least. In the past ten years the positions have changed: the powerful gentry visit prostitutes the most, their sons and brothers are second, and merchants the least. Why do merchants go whoring the least? Because business is not good now. Why do the gentry do this the most? Because they are involved in litigation and stay in brothels throughout the year. Only at New Year's and other holidays do they return home. Where does the money for this come from? In lawsuits, country folk give them 100 *yuan* when only 20 *yuan* is needed for legal fees. They pocket the 80 *yuan* and in this way are provided with the means to cover their expenses for prostitutes. Why are the young masters coming to the city for whoring much more than in the past? Because an increasing number of "diploma mills" are being established. The young masters break away from the warmth of their families when they go to town to study; so they feel quite lonely and leave a lot of footprints leading to brothels.

Fellowship of Goodness

In 1901 or 1902 the manager (boss) of the Hengfu Silk Store in Ganzhou, a certain Xiong (a native of Nanchang), came to Xunwu to start the Fellowship of Goodness.[56] He was a so-called Heavenly Grace Master. At that time the leader

56. The Fellowship of Goodness *[Tongshanshe]* was a religious sect which had split off from the Great Way of Former Heaven *[Xiantian dadao*, also known as *Xiantian dao]*

[shanzhang] of the society was Gu Hefu, a *xiucai* who lived in the city and whose family circumstances were deteriorating. Later the director of the Fellowship of Goodness was Pan Mingdian, a holder of a *bagong* degree, whose wealth was about 1,000 *yuan* and who served as a clerk in the *xian* court in Jiujiang [Jiangxi]. Guo Youmei joined the Fellowship of Goodness in 1901 or 1902 at a time when the fellowship had eighty to ninety members. Afterward many more people joined, and during the most flourishing period there were more than two hundred members of the Fellowship of Goodness. The Fellowship of Goodness originated in Sichuan, where the society sent formal letters to each provincial capital asking them to initiate Fellowships of Goodness. Once permission was granted by the government in each province, the society spread to the *xian*, where branches were set up. The Heavenly Grace Master of Ganzhou Prefecture received official approval from the provincial government in Nanchang. After he arrived in Xunwu, paid respects to the *xian* magistrate, and [secured] the magistrate's approval, the magistrate issued a proclamation protecting this society. The Fellowship of Goodness could then carry on its activities. Joining the society required approval by the gods. Pieces of paper rolled into balls, some with the word "permitted" and some blank, were placed in a bamboo container. The deity of the Fellowship of Goodness was Bodhidharma.[57] A person wanting to join the society was led by the person introducing him before the deity, to whom he kowtowed and paid respect. Then he picked a paper from the holder; if he picked one that said "permitted," he was allowed to join. If it was blank, then he was not allowed to join. One butcher drew a blank three times, and a local bully drew a blank four times. "You couldn't say there is no god; actually you could say there is a god."[58] Lin Hu[59] arrived in Xunwu City as a big-headed and ferocious man of 27 or 28 *sui*. Xu Chongzhi[60] also passed through once.

in 1843, at a meeting held in Hanyang in Sichuan. For a detailed account of the organization and doctrine of this whole family of sects, see Marjorie Topley, "The Great Way of Former Heaven: A Group of Chinese Secret Religious Sects," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol 26, part 2, 1963, pp. 362–92 (hereafter Topley, "The Great Way"). We have followed Topley in our translation of these two names, and of certain other terms used by the sects.

57. Bodhidharma, the founder of the Chan School of Buddhism in China, is referred to in the text as *Dama zushi. Dama* is a Chinese transliteration of the Sanskrit dharma, which refers to the teachings of Buddha. *Zushi* refers to a founder of a sect. See Werner, E.T.C., *A Dictionary of Chinese Mythology*, (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1932; reprinted New York: Julian Press, 1961), pp. 359–61; also Ch'en [Chen], Kenneth K.S., *Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 351–53 (hereafter, Ch'en, *Buddhism in China*).—RT.

58. The incarnation of the Great Way, or of the Void, to whom these applications for membership were addressed was commonly called "Mother" in the Fellowship of Goodness. See Topley, "The Great Way," pp. 370–71.

59. Lin Hu was the brigade commander of the Jiangxi Independent Brigade.

60. Xu Chongzhi (1887–1965), *zi* Ruwei, a native of Guangdong, was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy. He joined the Guomindang in 1912, and played an im-

Seven or eight company commanders under Lin Hu, stationed in Xunwu for over a month, joined the society. The membership fee was 1 *yuan*. Later, although not mandatory, you could contribute as much as you wanted. The Nanchang Fellowship of Goodness and the Sichuan Fellowship of Goodness asked for contributions in a letter that said, "If you contribute money, some day when you go to Nanchang or Sichuan, your name will be on the register and then you will be able to find a job." Guo Youmei contributed 3 *yuan* to Nanchang and 5 *yuan* to Sichuan. Xunwu's society had more than two hundred members, of whom thirty to forty were women. Their backgrounds were merchants 50 percent, landlords 20 percent, and peasants 30 percent. But the so-called peasants were not poor peasants. All of them had "food on the table" or were "quite independent." In 1918 or 1919 on the orders of the provincial government, the Fellowship of Goodness was closed for a year or two. Afterward Tang Shengzhi issued a directive saying: "The Bodhisattvas[61] can be worshiped; you do not have to abolish the society." Therefore it was re-established. In 1923 or 1924 a government directive ordered the society closed, and then and only then did it really cease to function.[62]

Every day you meditated three times—morning, noon, and evening. This was called "to practice." Those who were "practicing" could not sleep with women for two days, because if they slept with women they would not be effective. The Fellowship of Goodness had secret practices if you reached the fifth level. Then the Heavenly Grace Master told you some secrets. Guo Youmei had only reached the second level, so he never heard the secrets. Sichuan had a ninth-level Heavenly Blessing Master who came to Ganzhou. The Fellowship of Goodness members there contributed 2 *yuan* each for a welcoming banquet for the Heavenly Grace Master. Fang Benren[63] also came. Every year the Fellowship of

portant role in Sun Yatsen's Guangdong army from 1922 to 1925. In the summer of 1925, he reached the peak of his influence as minister of war in the Guangzhou national government, but he was expelled from Guangzhou on Chiang Kaishek's orders in September 1925 on grounds of collusion with Chen Jiongming. In December 1929, the Nanjing government ordered his arrest on suspicion of involvement in the various rebellions by local warlords against Chiang Kaishek which had taken place in 1928 and 1929. The visit to which Mao refers here presumably took place in Xu's heyday, in the early 1920s.

61. The text uses the abbreviation *pusa,* derived from the Chinese transliteration for the Sanskrit bodhisattva: *putisaduo.* A bodhisattva is a person destined for enlightenment who delays leaving the world so that he or she may help others attain enlightenment. See K. Ch'en, p. 13.—RT.

62. According to Topley, the Fellowship of Goodness, which opposed Guomindang ideology, was proscribed in 1927, rather than 1923 or 1924. Mao is referring here to action by the provincial rather than the central government. After 1949, this sect opposed the Communists as well. Two leaders of the Fellowship of Goodness were put on trial in Chongqing in early 1955. (See Topley, ibid., pp. 390–91.)

63. Fang Benren had been, during the years 1922 to 1925, commander of the southern Jiangxi garrison for the Beiyang warlords, director of frontier defenses in Jiangxi and Guangdong, and military governor of Jiangxi.

Goodness had two *Longhua hui*:[64] all members came and were charged 0.2 *yuan* per person when they arrived. They kowtowed toward the Bodhidharma, music was played, and they ate a vegetarian meal.

If you joined the Fellowship of Goodness, you could make friends and become an official.

The Xunwu magistrate went to the Fellowship of Goodness three times and kowtowed [to the god] together with Fellowship of Goodness members.

Status Within Population and Positions Within Administration

Having analyzed the composition of the population in Xunwu City, we know that it is a city based on agriculture and handicrafts. The percentages of the population in and around the city in various occupations are as follows.

Occupation	Number of Persons	Percentage
peasant	1,620	60%
artisan	297	11
vagrant[65]	270	10
prostitute	162	6
merchant	135	5
government	100	4
landlord	78	3
religious leader	22	<1
Total	2,684	100%

From this list, we can see that peasants and artisans *[xiao shougong]* constitute 71 percent of the population. It is apparent that agriculture and handicrafts are the major activities in the city. The majority of the residents in adjacent areas also get their livelihood from farming and handicrafts. The so-called artisans include workers, owners, and store clerks. The so-called handicraft industries include shops for tailoring, tobacco, liquor, umbrellas, firecrackers, haircutting, wooden goods, bean curd, jewelry, tinned-iron, watch repair, and slaughtering. Those twenty-two religious leaders include ten Protestants, three Roman Catho-

64. As indicated by Topley, "The Great Way," p. 373, the term *longhua hui* (lit., "dragon flower meetings") is taken from the name of the bodhi tree of Maitreya, whose flowers are said to resemble dragons' heads. There is a Buddhist belief he will hold three *longhua* meetings under this tree, and Great Way sectarians used the same name for the major meetings they held (normally three rather than two annually).

65. In the "Xunwu Investigation" Mao uses "vagrant" *(youmin)* in statistical references that should be interpreted to include also "vagabonds" *(liumang)*. When Mao uses the latter term, his reference is to the more active and violent element in the vagrant class.—RT.

lics, six Daoists, and three Buddhists. In Xunwu City there are twelve households surviving totally on land rents. There are seventy-eight people in these households. The five merchants who are also landlords are included in the category of merchants. Merchants include people who are salt, oil, or soybean brokers; merchants dealing in general goods, textiles, marine products, and herbs; or those who run boarding houses. Altogether there are 135 people in this category. There are over thirty brothels, with over thirty prostitutes. These prostitutes, combined with people they support, number 162. Those vagabonds who are neither workers nor peasants nor merchants specialize in gambling, blackmail, or being running dogs for the rulers *[tongzhi]*. The total number of these people is, surprisingly, twice the number of merchants. They almost equal the total number of artisans. The number of vagrants and prostitutes is about equal to the number of merchants and artisans. This shows the stunning number of jobless people. The hundred government workers are the forty people of the new Xunwu *xian* soviet government and the Xunwu City District government along with the sixty people in the *xian* soviet's Red Guard. Here we do not mean the former government workers, although the number of them was about the same as that of the new government. When we talk about the leaders of the masses, we mean the leading segment of the ruling class in the old society. Naturally these were not the peasants, workers, vagrants, and prostitutes constituting 87 percent of the whole population. These were the people led by the ruling class. The rulers consisted only of the landlords, merchants, and Protestant pastors and Catholic priests, constituting 13 percent of the population. The chamber of commerce did not have much power. However, some of the merchants participated in the *xian*-wide government. Nevertheless, those few merchants did not speak just for the mercantile bourgeoisie. They did things at the instruction of the landlords. This is because the scale of commerce in Xunwu is very small; moreover, it has gradually been declining.

First among the merchants in political influence was He Zizhen, who was a soybean broker, having used a false name to obtain a license and then having someone else run the business. He was a teacher, director of the Public Security Bureau, head of the police *[jingcha duizhang],* and a Guomindang deputy. His father was a tax farmer for the ox tax who exploited the ox dealers. Just after he returned to Xunwu, He Zizhen behaved as a bourgeois and was a member of the New Xunwu faction. Later, he cooperated with landlords. Now he has fled the *xian*. The second [in influence] was Huang Guangfu. He was the boss of the Baohuaxiang marine products store and the secretary of the chamber of commerce. He was able to influence the yamen. He fled and his store was confiscated. The third was the boss of a boarding house, Chen Dengqi. He first worked as a bailiff and later was promoted to captain of a pacification and defense corps. He hung out at the yamen. He fled. The fourth was the boss of a general store, Chen Zhicheng. He was not an official

and yet consulted with the reactionary faction on all their affairs and attended their meetings. He fled, and his store was confiscated.

The following is a list of the twelve landlords who collect rent.

He Dexin. He previously collected 600 *dan* [in rent] but now collects 100 *dan*, just enough to feed his family of seven or eight members. People from the *xian* who had business with the yamen would ask him to intercede for them. His son, He Tingba, graduated from Pingyuan Middle School and is one of the main members of the New Xunwu faction.

He Chengzhi. He previously collected over 300 *dan*. With very few family members, he could sell 300 *dan* and thus became the richest landlord in the city. After he died, his widow managed household affairs. His son was purchased and cannot influence the yamen.

Liu Forong. He collected over 200 *dan* and sold some of it because his family was small. He was the second-richest landlord in Xunwu City. [He was known as] *shui jin niupi,* which means he was very stingy. He pays no attention to outside matters.

Liu Duanxuan. He collected only a few *dan* in rent and belonged to the Sun Yatsen faction. He exhausted his fortune in a lawsuit against He Zizhen. His son is still in jail in Ganzhou. His son is a graduate of Ganzhou No. 4 Middle School and is the new principal of Xunwu City East Primary School.

Fan Laoba. He collected over 100 *dan* and had a surplus. His elder brother managed the Shunchang Laodian store. He collected rent at home and did not hang out at the yamen. This time [the soviet] imposed a contribution of 300 *yuan* on him. The peasants confiscated his property.

Fan Jiasheng. He collected over 100 *dan* and had a surplus. He is about fifteen or sixteen *sui* and is a student at Sun Yatsen Middle School. He Zizhen imposed a fine on him. This time he was also assessed a contribution of 1,000 *yuan* by the soviet.

Zhang Sanyu. She collected over 100 *dan* and had a surplus. She is a widow and is in charge of household affairs. She is not interested in other things.

Kuang Sisao. She collects less than *100* dan and has a surplus. She has one son and one grandchild. She is not a reactionary.

Wu Laosi. He is dead and is survived by a wife, one son, and one grandchild. He collected over 100 *dan* and had a surplus. He did not meddle in politics. Wu Laosi was in charge of tax collection for the *xian* government during the Guangxu reign in the Qing dynasty. All the *xian* grain levies were managed by him. He died four years ago.

Fan Mingcai. He used to have a general store, but he closed it over ten years ago. He collected 80 *dan* and had some surplus. He was a head of a protection militia in 1912 and was an evil gentryman who indulged in whoring and gambling. He fled.

He Xiangsheng. He used to be a street vendor and became rich selling marine products. During the March 25 uprising, he was fined and his business was shut down. His adopted son, He Jiachang, whom he purchased, graduated from East Mountain Middle School in Mei *xian*. He Jiachang was one of the leaders of the March 25 uprising and a Communist Party member. He went to Southeast Asia and now is in Fujian.

He Xuecai. The father of He Zizhen. He worked as a clerk in the Judicial Section in the [former] *xian* government. Later he worked as a geomancer. He was a tax farmer for the ox tax and bought a piece of land that produced some 10 *dan* of income. He was a very evil member of the gentry.

These twelve households subsisted on land rents alone. Among them, He Dexin, Fan Mingcai, and He Xuecai are active reactionaries; Liu Duanxuan and Fan Jiasheng are sympathetic with the revolution; He Xiangsheng's son, He Jiachang, is a Communist Party member; the remaining six are households that "care only about making a fortune and don't want to mind other business."

The following five households have characteristics of both merchants and landlords.

Zhong Huitong. He was the first salt broker in Xunwu City. He collected over 220 *dan* and had a surplus of over 100 *dan*. He hung out at the yamen and influenced the people there.

Luo Jinfeng. The household was split into four separate households. Altogether their income was 6,000 to 7,000 *yuan*. The second child is the richest one; he had 250 or 260 *dan*. He was honest and did not try to influence the yamen. The oldest son is dead; he had over 10 *dan*. That was not enough to support his family. The third child had 30 to 40 *dan*, just enough to feed his family. The fourth child (a former president of the chamber of commerce and the main teacher at the Fellowship of Goodness) had only several dozen *dan*, just enough to feed his family.

Rong Chunxiang. He had several dozen *dan* of income. He saved all of it and made a living doing business. He did not try to influence the yamen.

Wen Rongji. He saved all of his 80 *dan* of income and made a living doing business. His third son, Wen Xichun, colluded with the New Xunwu faction.

Lin Bili. He manages a marine products business. He collected over 100 *dan* and had some surplus. He minds his own business.

These five households have characteristics of both merchants and landlords. Among them, Zhong Huitong and Wen Rongji are members of the reactionary faction. The rest of them are the "mind their own business" type. Among these five households, Zhong Huitong and Luo Jinfeng are middle landlords; the remaining three are small landlords.

Chapter IV: Traditional Land Relationships in Xunwu

Rural Population

Large landlords (receive more than 500 *dan* of rent)	0.045%
Middle landlords (receive 200–499 *dan* of rent)	0.4
Small landlords (receive less than 200 *dan* of rent)	3.0
Bankrupt families	1.0
Newly rich families	2.0
Rich peasants (have surplus grain and capital for loans)	4.0
Middle peasants (have enough to eat and do not receive loans)	18.255
Poor peasants (insufficient grain and receive loans)	70.0
Manual workers (craftsmen, boatmen, porters)	3.0
Vagrants (no occupation)	1.0
Hired hands (permanent and day laborers)	0.3

Old Distribution of Land[66]

Corporate	40%
Landlord	30
Peasant	30

Ancestral Trusts

There is much corporate land in Xunwu, a phenomenon spread throughout each district. There are many kinds of trusts *[gonghui]*. Trusts belonging to ancestral halls are mostly those of this deceased "esteemed person" or that deceased "esteemed person." As long as there are descendants and the descendants have money, each will certainly contribute a share from his own family's property to establish a trust. This method of making contributions toward establishing a trust is widespread. Generally that which is contributed as a share is land; money is not used. Furthermore, if that esteemed person is still alive, he himself can make bequests and establish a trust [in his own name or in the name of an ancestor]. This type is more prevalent than the previous type. After this type of corporate land *[gongtian] is* established, the rent is collected year after year. [After some of the] rent money is used for ancestral sacrifices, there is generally a surplus, which is set aside. Money is saved, not grain. Thus, every year the surplus grain is sold to poor people, and the money accumulates. After a certain number of

66. Throughout this chapter, "old distribution of land" refers to the situation before the land redistribution.—RT.

years, the savings yield a sum of money, and land is bought. In this way, the trust land gradually increases quite a bit. But using income to increase the total resources of a trust constitutes only a portion of the disbursements; there is also a portion that can be distributed to the descendants of the one [who established the trust]. When most of the descendants are poor, then and only then do they emphasize division. When the descendants are mostly well off, they do not concern themselves with division. When does the division happen? Also, what is the method of division? At New Year's and at other festivals, grain and meat are divided at the ancestral hall. The men all get a share; the women do not get any (in some lineages widows get a share). Every person gets a share of several *dou* of grain and several *jin* of meat. This grain is called the annual grain allowance *[hongding gu]*. There are four ways to distribute meat.

1. Meat for sacrifices. In the past shares were given to those who had won a *xiucai* or *juren* degree. Afterward graduates from new-style schools were added.
2. Meat for branches. Every branch [in the ancestral trust receives] one share.
3. Meat for old people. Every person over the age of seventy receives one share.
4. Meat per capita. Every male gets one share.

The order of the division is as follows. First, the meat for sacrifices [i.e., for degree holders] is distributed and then the meat for old people. Because these two types of people are quite respected, every person gets about 1 *jin*. Next is the meat for branch families. Every branch gets about 8 or 10 *jin*, but there are also ones who get as much as 20 *jin*. After this division is completed, a smaller division is made to the members of the branches. Why do some want a division of the meat by branches? This is a kind of struggle. Those in a branch with few people want to distribute the meat by branches; those in branches with many people oppose distributing the meat by branches and advocate a per capita division of the meat. But the result is that in every area most of the meat is divided by branches; thus the division occurs in accordance with the viewpoint of the branches with the fewest people. Why do the small branches prevail? Because in this kind of property trust, every branch originally had equal rights [and an equal voice]. Next is the division of the meat per capita. Not every trust makes this kind of division. Most trusts lack a per capita division of the meat, because trust monies are few or because there are too many people. A few trusts do not divide the grain and meat equally but rather in rotation. This is called "collecting in turn" or "the one in charge" *[guantou]*. That is, the members of the trust take turns collecting the ancestors' rent. When the rent is collected, every year a small part is used to pay the expenses for sacrifices to the ancestors. Most of the rent money lines the pockets of the one in charge but this certainly is not cheating, because this is the economic basis for the trust. Why? While the patriarch is still

alive, he takes the family land and divides it among his children. But because he is afraid that his descendants will later take their share and sell it and there will be nothing left to eat, he takes from his land a part that cannot be divided. This becomes corporate land, forever inalienable. On the one hand, it provides sacrifice money after his death, and, on the other hand, it provides relief for his descendants in difficulties. This is called "providing security." His descendants quite approve of this method because this is their security. When most of these patriarchs are alive, no trusts are established. After the patriarch dies, the descendants, provided they are moderately well off, certainly establish a trust. Nominally this is called "sacrificing to the ancestors," but actually it is for themselves. So the practice of taking turns in receiving the rent is ostensibly collecting rent on behalf of the patriarch, but it is actually taking turns collecting rent on behalf of oneself. Under the circumstances, those poor descendants always clamor to divide the corporate land, whereas the rich descendants are opposed. This becomes a kind of class struggle within a lineage. The poor people clamoring to divide the land do not want to till the land after it is divided. They want to divide the land and sell it to obtain money to pay off loan sharks or to buy gruel for tomorrow's breakfast. In this situation, we can see the poor masses, because of their suffering and inability to get food, gradually abandoning the feudal thought associated with the sacrifices performed for ancestors. Their life compels them to dismiss such treasures.

To sum up ancestral lands, they constitute 24 percent of all land and 60 percent of corporate land.

Religious Trusts

There are six kinds of "religious trusts": god and shrine associations, village communities, temples, Buddhist monasteries, and Daoist monasteries. Every kind and type of god *[shen]* can have an association *[hui];* for example, the Duke of Zhao Association, the Guanyin Association, the Guanye Association, the Dashen Association, the Zhenjun Association, the Potai Association, the Laiye Association, the Gongwang Association, the Bogong Association, the Wenchang Association, and the like. None of these have temples.[67] In this cate-

67. Various types of deities are represented in this list, including Buddhist (Guanyin, Potai), extralocal deified mortals (Duke of Zhao, Guandi [Guanye], Wenchang), and apparently local deified mortals (Laiye). For a discussion of these categories, see Arthur P. Wolf, "Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors," in *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society,* ed. Wolf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 131–82. Several of the gods of these god associations are mentioned in the 1881 Xunwu *xian* gazetteer, in a section on shrines and temples *(cimiao)* (see *Changning xianzhi*). There appear to have been temples for Laigong (Laiye), Wenchang, the Duke of Zhao, and Zhenjun. Since Mao specifically mentions that god associations lacked temples, we must assume that temple associations, becoming divorced from their buildings, perhaps because of state-mandated secularization efforts, had become "god associations" that still controlled land resources.—RT.

To sum up, the landholdings of religious trusts *(shen, tan, she, miao, si, guan)* constitute 8 percent of all land and 20 percent of corporate land.

Administrative Trusts

These are divided into two kinds: (1) land set aside to fund institutions connected with the traditional examination system, the Confucian Temple, and education; and (2) public works-related lands associated with bridge societies, road societies, and tax societies.

The examination hall lands *[kaopeng tian]* of Xunwu City bring in about 650 *dan* of rent. The powerful gentry *[haoshen]* managers skim off 180 *dan* for feasting, which leaves 470 *dan* for the examination hall [account].[72] The examination hall lands originated in the Qing when buildings were constructed and large landlords contributed much grain for the building. Funds not needed for construction were used to buy land, the income from which provided monies for repairs. A Shrine for Esteeming Righteousness [Shangyi ci] was built, and the names of the large landlords who contributed were put on tablets. The tablets of those who contributed the most were put at the top of the display case, and the tablets of those who contributed the least were put on the bottom of the display.

Sojourning stipend lands *[binxing tian]* were also contributed by landlords.[73] These lands are dispersed in every *bao* throughout the *xian*. Most are still managed by the original owner. Half of each year's income is given to the Xunwu City Sojourning Stipend Shrine (Binxing ci). This shrine has a branch bureau in every district to manage the property. Income from the property was used to provide travel money for those taking the provincial- and metropolitan-level imperial examinations and stipends for *juren* and *jinshi* degree holders. (Most was disbursed to provide traveling money for those going to the provincial *[xiangshi]* examinations or awards for those who won degrees at the provincial exams). These awards were also called stipends [*huahong,* lit., flower red]. The *xian* Sojourning Stipend Shrine can collect 1,500 to 1,600 *dan* of rent grain annually. The provincial examinations occurred once every three years, in the *zi,*

72. The text uses the compound "examination hall" *(kaopeng).* Although the funds generated from this type of public land seem to have been used in part for educational purposes, the text is not clear.—RT.

73. The term *binxing,* borrowed from the *Zhouli* (Rites of Zhou), means to "raise the virtuous and entertain them as guests at banquets." *Shengyuan* who had been selected to participate in the provincial exams might be invited to attend ceremonies in their honor, feted at a banquet, or given traveling expenses. See Chang Chung-li [Zhang Zhongli], *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-century Chinese Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), p. 41 and 41n166. Mao uses the term in the last sense, and hence *binxing* is translated as "sojourning stipend."—RT.

wu, mao, and *you* years.[74] Over a hundred Xunwu men took the provincial exam each time. Each person received 24 *yuan* for travel expenses. Those who won a *juren* degree received a stipend of more than 100 *yuan*. Within the Sojourning Stipend Shrine are over a hundred tablets on which are written the names of all the powerful gentry who contributed money. After the examination system was abolished, everyone who graduated from the No. 2 Normal School in Ganzhou received travel money of 30 *yuan* to travel in Jiangsu and Zhejiang [to broaden his knowledge]. Furthermore, everyone who went overseas to Japan to study received an allowance of 360 *yuan* for his trip. When Xunwu City built a preliminary normal school and an upper primary school, money from the Sojourning Stipend Shrine [account] was used.

A Confucian temple *[xuegong]* was also built with money contributed by landlords. Just like the Shrine for Esteeming Righteousness and the Sojourning Stipend Shrine, a Shrine for Loving Righteousness [Haoyi ci] was built to commemorate these contributions. Later, more than 1,000 *yuan* was donated for the annual worship of Confucius—this was in currency, not land.

Educational lands were contributed by every surname group of landlords in order to encourage the young people of their surname group to take the [Qing] examinations. Every surname group has these lands. For example, the Gu of Huangxiang contributed land that yields rent of 100 *dan*. The Kuang of Chetou gave land yielding over 200 *dan*. At the least, the contributions amounted to several dozen *dan*. Furthermore, Xunwu City District, like every other district, has a teacher salary association. Throughout every district there are also literary societies. These resemble associations for encouraging people to study for the examinations, but they are a kind of local form in which a group of families or a whole district unites together. Also, a certain landlord in the Gu family of Huangxiang (Gu Bo's paternal grandfather) contributed land yielding 100 *dan* of rent to build a Hall for Recognizing the Educated [Zunyu tang]. This rewards students from throughout the county, but this is a special case.

To sum up, land connected with education amounts to 4 percent of all land and 10 percent of corporate land.

A rather considerable amount of land is associated with public works-related organizations like bridge associations, road associations, and tax associations. Not only do large bridges and long bridges have associations, even small bridges in villages have associations. If there is a bridge, then there is land, because landlords and merchants contribute to maintain bridges. When a bridge is first built, there is little money [in the bridge fund], but year after year enough rent is

74. This refers to "branches" in the traditional sixty-year cycle designated by sixty unique combinations of characters taken from the ten "stems" and twelve "branches." The first, fourth, seventh, and tenth branches in the text would appear, for example, in the combinations corresponding to 1900, 1903, 1906, and 1909.—RT.

collected and saved so that land can be bought. Every year in December, an accounting is made and the bridge god is worshiped. This is called "gathering for the bridge association." The contributors all come together to eat, and afterward they divide up the pork. Actually the bridge association is an organization for exploitation. Larger bridge associations, such as the Fu Bridge Association in Liuche, have 8,000 *yuan*, and their property brings in 500 *dan* of rent each year. Smaller ones get 2 to 3 *dan* of rent—these are the smallest of the small bridges.

There are not many road associations, and no association owns much land. In the whole *xian* there are more than fifteen such associations. Each road association only takes in about 7 or 8 *dan* of grain. Why do bridge associations [have more assets] than road associations? Because, unlike a bridge, a road in disrepair is easy to fix; even if it is not fixed, it does not ever get to the point that people cannot use it.

There are only a few tax associations in the *xian*. For example, the Yan of Huangxiang have one, as do the Mei of Datian, the Kuang of Chetou, or the Liu of Chuanxia in Jitan, and each association has some land. The richest is that of the Kuang of Chetou. Their tax association has land with rents of 500 *dan*. Originally it was called "army land," but now it is called a tax association. The purpose of the tax association is to be responsible for an entire lineage's tax quota in order to counteract the government's grasping taxation of every family in the lineage. With every type of extortion and blackmail, tax collecting was harmful to all involved; to prevent this, a tax association would be established, or money would be collected from small ancestral trusts. If [a lineage] has a tax association, then the authorities collect taxes only from the tax association, and hence every family avoids harm. Without a tax association, the authorities take more than the quota. If the payment is late, then interest is computed and it is really high. Because of this, tax associations are started. When a tax association is organized, it has little money, but after several years it mounts up.

To sum up, public works-related land constitutes 4 percent of all land and 10 percent of corporate land.

Large Landlords

Above I discussed the land held by trusts. Now I turn to the land of individual landlords. The land owned by individual landlords constitutes 30 percent of all land, which is much less than the amount of land owned by the trusts. Of this land, small landlords (rents under 200 *dan*) own the greatest part; middle landlords (rents of 200 to 499 *dan*) are next; and large landlords (rents over 500 *dan*) own the least. In the whole country there are eight pre-eminent landlords:

Liu Tuyuan	Xunwu City District
Luo Hanzhang	Huangxiang District
Xie Jie	Nanba District
Kuang Wenrong	Nanba District
Mei Hongxing	Shuangqiao District
Pan Mingzheng (nicknamed "Uncle Shitcrock")	Jiansan District
Lin Chaoguan	Chengjiang District
Wang Juyuan	Chengjiang District

Each receives rents of 1,000 *dan* or more. The greatest among these is considered Uncle Shitcrock, who is from Xiangshan *bao* in Jiansan District. The value of all his holdings—land, buildings, forests, livestock, and his herb store and general store in Jitan—is 300,000 *yuan*. His land rents are about 10,000 *dan*. He is the leader of the powerful gentry throughout the *xian*. In the early Republic, his third son, Pan Mengchun (an illiterate scoundrel who did not pass the civil service exam or attend a new-style school), became chief of the *xian* Tax Collection Bureau (national taxes). In 1917 or 1918, his eldest son, Pan Yiren (a *xiucai* who is more or less literate), finished his three years as chief of the Tax Collection Bureau (local taxes, managing funds from the examination hall and Sojourning Stipend Shrine lands, the ox tax, the gambling tax, the business protection tax, and others). In 1924 or 1925 Pan Mengchun became the head of the All-*Xian* Protection Militia and controlled the militias of all seven districts. All true power was in his hands. He was head of the All-*Xian* Militia and needed money [for it]. At the same time the Beiyang Army's Deng Ruzhuo[75] came to the *xian* to ask for money, and Pan issued a lot of paper money. After these bills had been in use for several months, a middle landlord named Lai Aoxu in the provincial capital brought suit against him and only then was this practice stopped. In 1926, when the Guomindang's influence reached Xunwu, he lost his clout. But he immediately united with the New Xunwu faction, which, although it originally had the character of the bourgeoisie, was cooperating with the landlords at that time. He became a member of the Guomindang's *xian* branch. In March of this year, the powerful gentry brought down Magistrate Hu Zefan, and Pan became magistrate. When the Red Army arrived, he fled to Wuping. His seventy-odd guns were taken over by Zhong Shaokui of Wuping. Liu Tuyuan is the second great local bully, but he is not active. He is a graduate of a middle school and has no power in the *xian*. Xie Jie is a graduate of the Jiangxi Army Academy and was a division commander under Lai Shihuang. Now he is in Shanghai organiz-

75. Deng Ruzhuo was the brigade commander of the Ninth Mixed Brigade for the Beiyang warlord army and the division commander of the First Division between 1924 and 1925.

ing the South Jiangxi Mining Association in order to encourage [Chinese-operated] mines. He has joined the Reorganization faction [Gaizu pai] that organized the Jiangxi Self-salvation Society [Zijiuhui] and publishes the *Zijiu ribao* [Self-salvation Daily] and opposes Chiang Kaishek. He is zealous in calling for "mopping up the Communists." Wang Juyuan is a graduate of Ganzhou's No. 4 Middle School. He is influential in Chengjiang and is on good terms with the vagabonds. He has opened three shops in Chengjiang for marine products, general goods, and opium. In the back of the shops he has opened opium dens and invites the vagabonds to come and take opium for free. Because of this, he gets their support. He messes with other men's wives but if other people have no sense of propriety and go whoring, they are severely tormented by the vagabonds. Those who receive this kind of torment can be completely ruined financially.

Xunwu's large landlords (500 to 999 *dan*) number twelve.

Cao Shancheng (Tianbei, West Ward). Five hundred *dan*; his grandfather [was the one who] got rich; he is from an old rich family [lit., *laoshuihu,* or old tax family].

Qiu Shulie (Tuhe, West Ward). Five hundred *dan*; a useless person; his son is an engineer who graduated from Nanyang University and went to England for a while; now he is in Tianjin serving as an engineer for some boiler company.

Cao Yuansen (East Ward). Five hundred *dan*; a graduate of Xunwu City Upper Primary School; forty *sui*; he is a power in the East Ward.

Huang Jiabin (Changju, North Ward). Seven hundred *dan*; Guomindang member; He Zizhen wanted to use him, but he would not agree. Now he opportunistically expresses sympathy toward peasants. If they want guns, he gives them guns. If they want money, he gives them money. He said: "The Guomindang is useless. If I pay them, I still don't get protection; but if the money goes to the soviet, it can save my life."

Xie Shande (Yazimu, Sanbiao). Five hundred *dan*; he is a reader of old books and a hermit *[shanlaoshu]*.

Wang Fosheng (Aobei, Shuiyuan). Five hundred *dan*; his son Wang Weifan, a graduate of Chaoyang University in Beijing, is a Guomindang member who left and has not returned.

Lan Shaozong (Chengjiang). Five hundred *dan*; since his death, his widow has handled family affairs.

Cao Guodong (Jitan). Six hundred *dan*; in the past his was called a 10,000-*dan* family, but he used some money to build a mansion; a graduate of upper primary school; a relative of Uncle Shitcrock; cooperates with Pan Mengchun.

Yi Zhanliang (Guishixia, Shuangqiao District). More than 500 *dan*; at the beginning he was a reactionary, but his land was quickly divided and he was fined more than 1,000 *yuan*, so he became poor; not a reactionary.

Lai Pengchi (Danxi, Shuangqiao District). Called a 10,000-*dan* family; more than 500 *dan*; a Qing *fusheng;* very conservative, still has a queue, but not reactionary.

Kuang Mingjing (Jizijiao, Nanba). Six hundred *dan*; his fourth brother is a White army battalion commander; whole family has fled.

Chen Wanbao (Tingling). Six hundred *dan*; deals in pork and opium and runs a general store; he himself is not a reactionary, but his brother is a member of the New Xunwu faction and lives in the same household; his brother is very reactionary.

The above eight great landlords and the twelve second-level landlords together number twenty. When Jiangxi people speak of "10,000-dan families," they mean these people. Why have I listed them one by one? In order to study the class's political function. If we failed to mention examples, then we would not have substantive evidence. For this reason, I want to list examples of middle landlords. However, it is not easy to list small landlords because there are too many. Why do we distinguish middle landlords within the landlord class? Because not only is their political function greatly different from that of small landlords, but it is obviously different from that of large landlords.

Middle Landlords

Xunwu City District

Qiu Weiwu (Tuhe, West Ward). Four hundred *dan*; graduated from the Leather Course of the Imperial University in Japan;[76] worked as an engineer at Ganzhou Poor People's Factory for six months; returned to Xunwu in 1922 to serve as head of the Education Bureau; joined the Guomindang; one of the leaders of New Xunwu faction and helped make plans for the faction; tough guy; ran away with Xie Jiayou when the Red Army arrived in Xunwu.

Huang Jiakui (Changju, North Ward). Over 300 *dan*; Pingyuan Middle School graduate; member of Guomindang Executive Committee in Xunwu; member of New Xunwu faction (teacher at New Xunwu School); active reactionary.

Luo Songsheng (Changju, North Ward). Three hundred *dan*; runs the Luo Jinfeng General Store in the city; not very reactionary; his nephew is a

76. Mao may have misunderstood his informants. If we assume "Imperial University in Japan" is a reference to the Imperial University of Tokyo, which was the proper nomenclature beginning in 1897, there was no course corresponding to the "Leather Course." Of the university's six colleges (Law, Medicine, Engineering, Literature, Science, and Agriculture) in the 1910s, the most likely place for Qiu's course of study would have been the College of Agriculture. This college had five courses (Chinese: *ke*) of study: Agriculture, Agricultural Chemistry, Forestry, Veterinary Medicine, and Fisheries. See the *Calendar* (1917–18) of the Imperial University of Tokyo, pp. 202–3.—RT.

Guomindang member and a higher primary school graduate who speaks badly of the Communist Party.

He Tingba (outside North Gate). Over 300 *dan*; a graduate of Pingyuan Middle School; member of the Guomindang; major figure in the New Xunwu faction; energetically works against the revolution.

Liu Forong (outside Little East Gate). Three hundred *dan*; is not a reactionary; works as a doctor.

Sanshui District

Lei Changxiang (Changpai, Sanbiao). Three hundred *dan*; a "hermit"; useless.

Hu Enrong (Sanbiao *xu*). Three hundred *dan*; a religious vegetarian; uninterested in current events; tends to look for a few coppers and then stays at home and sleeps.

Hu Jingru (Sanbiao *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; graduate of No. 4 Middle School in Ganzhou; in his twenties; famous local strongman in Sanbiao; involved in *xian* politics.

Ling Lushi (Jingshi, Sanbiao). Over 300 *dan*; an old *xiucai*; in the past served as Tax Collection Bureau chief for many years; was a section chief of something; official in charge of examinations; after working for over ten years, he accumulated some savings; built a new house in Sanbiao; in his fifties.

Yuan Dehe (Yuanwu, Shuiyuan, the most reactionary area). Two hundred *dan* or so; middle school graduate; member of the Guomindang; counterrevolutionary.

There are many other middle landlords in Sanshui District, but it is difficult to name them all.

Chengjiang District

Lan Ziqian. Four hundred *dan*; provincial middle school graduate; owns the Lan Xietai general goods and textile store in Chengjiang; counterrevolutionary.

Xie Jiayou. Three hundred *dan*; higher primary school graduate; in his forties; was a regimental commander under Xie Jie in the Fourteenth Army; the head captain of the Xunwu militia; member of the Reorganization faction; he was the one who wiped out the First Battalion of the Fiftieth Regiment of the Red Army; graduated from the Jiangxi Army Academy.

Ling Xixian. Three hundred *dan*; a middle school graduate; member of the New Xunwu faction; member of the Guomindang; owns a store in Chengjiang Xin *xu*.

Jiansan District

Chen Yuheng (Jitan). Three hundred *dan*; graduate of Pingyuan Middle School; local strongman at Jitan; major figure in the New Xunwu faction; Uncle Shitcrock's grandson-in-law; very active.

Liu Taizang (Chuanxia, Jitan). Four hundred *dan*; a gambling boss; started as a vagabond; became rich through gambling; until 1916 he was a *dangwu* (a thief who tunnels into the walls of a house, and comes out at night, is called a *dangwu*).[77]

Pan Jindi (Xiangshan). Over 200 *dan*; graduate of Mei *xian* Normal School; a member of the New Xunwu faction; an active Guomindang member; the commander of Jitan Pacification and Defense Militia.

Pan Mingrui (Xiangshan). Four hundred *dan*; relative of Uncle Shitcrock; owns two stores in Jitan for general goods and marine products; the leader of Xiangshan reactionaries.

Pan Guanlan. Although he is a small landlord with a hundred-odd *dan* income, he is a reactionary leader; Pan Li died by his hand; graduated from Ganzhou Higher Primary School; worked as a primary school teacher for five or six years, he was not a reactionary at that time; was corrupted into a counterrevolutionary around the time of the March 25 uprising; his father was a gambling boss and made his money that way.

Pan Mingdian (Pingdi, Xiangshan). Over 100 *dan*; a Qing *bagong;* graduated from a school of law and administration during the Republican period; was a magistrate in Lufeng [Guangdong] and Huichang [Jiangxi]; was the head of the Education Bureau in Xunwu *xian* for a few years; was assigned to many other positions; known as *Shenjianjiuzhang* [one who holds many posts simultaneously]; originally was a middle landlord; has spent over 4,000 *yuan* campaigning for election to the provincial assembly but still has not been elected; was the warden of Nanchang High Court last year; this year he is a clerk in the Jiujiang High Court; a bureaucratic frame of mind; speaks well; has good calligraphy; handsome appearance; very proper; resembles Confucius.

Pan Jingwen (Dali, Xiangshan). Over 300 *dan*, a Qing *xiucai*; an old scholar.

Pan Guocai (Xiangshancun). Three hundred *dan*; also an old *xiucai*.

77. This parenthetical remark is part of Mao's text. The second character in *dangwu* is that for "crow," and the compound might be translated "to behave like a crow." (*Wuhe*, or "a gathering of crows" refers to a disorderly mob.) Presumably the meaning here is that before 1916 Liu was a burglar.

Pan Guoqing (Xiangshancun). Only 50 or 60 *dan*; higher primary school graduate; secretary to the bandit Ye Zishe; counterrevolutionary.

Liu Hanyuan (Jianxi). Over 200 *dan*; good for nothing.

Huangxiang District

Li Qilang (Huangxiang *xu*). Over 300 *dan*; gambling background; his son, Li Hanhui, a higher primary school graduate, is an important member of the reactionary faction.

Liu Yujie (Huangxiang *xu*). Over 200 *dan*; his son, Liu Jinyan, went to Xinyuan Middle School in Nanchang and then to Hujiang University and Shanghai University for some time, previously was close to the Cooperative Society faction.

Liu Yulin, younger brother of Liu Yujie. Four hundred *dan*; is a mute; has four or five sons who graduated from primary school; his youngest son went to middle school; all participated in the March 25 uprising; now they are counterrevolutionaries.

Lai Shoucheng (Hongtouling). Four hundred *dan*; his son, Lai Shifang, studied at East Mountain Middle School in Mei *xian*; counterrevolutionary.

Lai Aoxu (Hongtouling). Four hundred *dan*; *xiucai*; graduated from Shanghai Technical Training School; principal of the *xian* higher primary school for one year; was a teacher for five or six years; campaigned for the provincial assembly but lost; has two sons who went to middle school; one of them graduated from Beijing Normal School and is close to the Cooperative Society faction; the New Xunwu faction attacked him during the March 25 uprising, and now both sons are counterrevolutionaries.

Wang Ziyuan (Shanzixia). Two hundred *dan*; reactionary leader in Huangxiang; is a great evil gentryman *[lieshen];* was the head of a protection militia *[baowei tuan];* the head of an educational trust.

Liu Jingxi (Sichengcun). Over 300 *dan*; graduated from Mei *xian* Middle School; his father worked for Hu Qian and was killed by bandits; is not a reactionary.

Liu Quanlan (Sicheng). About 200 *dan*; started out as a usurer; is not a reactionary now; his son joined the peasants' association, but because of a misunderstanding he was mistakenly shot to death by the peasants.

Luo Chengtian (Xiwei). Four hundred *dan*; bargains with merchants even when purchasing a tiny bit of tobacco; a miser; values money more than life. That whole village of his is counterrevolutionary.

Luo Fushou (Xiwei). Used to have 300 *dan*; now the property has been divided; a counterrevolutionary.

Luo Peici (Xiwei). Two hundred *dan*; was Yudu *xian* magistrate; is a very cunning person; before the March 25 uprising occurred, while everybody was still preparing in secret, he spied [it coming]; he walked about the countryside urging [other landlords] to pretend to reform; "Sell your family's grain at a fair price and don't try to make money. Or give the grain to poor people with the same surname. If you don't, there's going to be real trouble." He is a reactionary leader; among the powerful gentry, he's fearsome.

Luo Lushou (Xiwei). Two hundred *dan*; his son is a member of the New Xunwu faction who likes attention.

Gu Lesan (Tangbei). Three hundred *dan* (with his brother); his older brother is a *xiucai* and was a provincial assemblyman for two terms; he [Gu Lesan] worked under Hu Qian as a commissariat officer; was a district head in Wuhua *xian* during the Chen Jiongming period; one of the reactionary leaders in the *xian*; taking 30–40 guns, he fled with Xie Jiayou.

Gu Guangrui (Tangbei). Over 200 *dan*; higher primary school graduate; reactionary.

Gu Hua'nan (Tangbei). Two hundred *dan*; is an honest man.

Gu Guanglu (Tangbei). Four hundred *dan*; stingy; likes to take advantage of other people; haggles with a vendor over small dishes; his son is a graduate of East Mountain Middle School in Mei *xian*; he is a fellow who cannot figure out much.

(The Tangbei Gu listed above are Gu Bo's relatives.)

Gu Youyu (Tangbei). Five hundred *dan*; operates a paper store; sells raw opium; runs a brothel; indulges in gambling; is a miser, indifferent to current events, cares only about making money; he is the weak one in a powerful family; his family takes advantage of him; if they ask for 50 *yuan*, they get 50 *yuan*; if they ask for 100, they get 100.

Yan Jinxiu (Gaotou). Used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; he became poor after spending too much money building his house; he now has about 300 or 400 *dan*; owns a store in Gongping; has over ten children and grandchildren; apathetic toward the world; primary concern is money; is a "hermit."

Yan Guoxing (Gaotou). Over 100 *dan*; a small landlord; main pursuit is business; runs a general store in Gongping; also sells paper; had good relations with other businesses; some merchants from Beiling and Yanxia lent him money; together with his own money he spent about 6,000 to 7,000 *yuan* when he ran for the provincial assembly; he lost and now is in debt; one of the reactionary leaders in Huangxiang District.

Yan Xibo (Gaotou). Two hundred *dan*; runs a general store in Gongping; not extremely reactionary.

(In the above list, several small landlords are mentioned because they are well known.)

Shuangqiao District

Huang Qingyun (Huangtian). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Luo Shouhan (Huangsha). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Zhao Shangqin (Yutian). Three hundred *dan*; Pingyuan Middle School graduate; reactionary.

Xie Youfeng (Yutian). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Chen Dequan (Liuche). Two hundred *dan*; ran a salt store in Liuche; reactionary; the Twenty-first Column executed him.

Chen Jingri (Liuche). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary. His son, Chen Jiguang, participated in the March 25 uprising; Mei *xian* Middle School graduate; after the failure of the March 25 uprising, he escaped to Southeast Asia.

Chen Shanniu (Liuche). An inveterate gambler; over 200 *dan*; not a reactionary.

Chen Biaoji (Zukeng, Liuche). Used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; later was divided into four households; since his death, his son "Dunziliu" [Fatty the Sixth] has 300 *dan*; owns a marine products store in Liuche; is a reactionary leader.

Chen Guocai (Zukeng, Liuche). Two hundred *dan*; Mei *xian* Middle School graduate; reactionary.

Chen Tufeng (Zukeng, Liuche). Over 200 *dan*; an evil gentryman; one of the "Five Tigers of Xunwu." "Pan (Mingdian), Xie (Xuzuo), Chen (Tufeng), Peng (Zijing), Kuang (Tailan) are the so-called Five Tigers of Xunwu." With the rise of the two new factions, New Xunwu and the Cooperative Society, the five old tigers fell from the [political] stage. Chen, Pan, Peng, and Kuang are *xiucai*; only Xie is a graduate (Xunwu Preliminary Normal School).

Liao Honggui (Shijie). Two hundred *dan*; has a store that carries marine products, general goods, and pastries in Fengshan; not a reactionary.

Liu Junfu (Qiufang). Used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; after division, he now has 400 *dan*; his son Liu Hongxiang graduated from South Jiangxi [Gannan] Middle School; later he went to Culture University in Beijing; is incoherent and yet very reactionary; is one of the counterrevolutionary leaders in Shuangqiao District; he still is guarding the [Qiufang] stronghold with his life.

Liu Shifu. A brother of Liu Junfu's; over 200 *dan*; once donated some money to set up a primary school; is still in the stronghold.

Liu Yuanying (Qiufang). Over 200 *dan*; in the stronghold.

Liu Zuorui (Qiufang). Four hundred *dan*; his large family consists of about thirty members; participated in the revolution; the family property was divided. The reason was that earlier he competed with Liu Junfu in buying land; later they quarreled with each other because of an adultery case; some of his family members took part in the March 25 uprising; after its defeat, Liu Junfu brought a false charge against him and colluded with the bandit Ye Zishe and burned down Liu Zuorui's house. Now his nephew Liu Guoxiang is a soviet committee member. Liu Risheng is a township soviet committee member; he himself [Liu Zuorui] stays at home and cares about nothing. He graduated from the No. 5 Middle School in Mei *xian*; very honest; twenty-three or twenty-four *sui*; even younger than his nephew; the lawsuit was handled by his nephew's father, that is, his older brother.

Liu Baohua (Shibei). Three hundred *dan*; his son graduated from the Sun Yatsen Middle School in the *xian*; is involved in the revolution; is a Communist Party district committee secretary.

Liu Kaixiang (Shibei). Two hundred *dan*; higher primary school graduate; not a reactionary.

Tang Sixian (Xiaqi). Three hundred *dan*; graduated from Mei *xian* Middle School, a cadre of the New Xunwu faction; a complete reactionary.

Tang Lixian (Xiaqi). Two hundred *dan*; was a student at Whampoa Military Academy; was a head of a pacification and defense corps; member of the New Xunwu faction.

Tang Foshu (Xiaqi). Two hundred *dan*; is an evil gentryman; people called him a local strongman; graduated from the Primary School Teacher Training Institute; a lackey of the New Xunwu faction.

Zeng Chaoqun (Shangqi). Over 100 *dan*;[78] Mei *xian* Middle School graduate; not a reactionary.

Zeng Xilin (Fangtian). Three hundred *dan*; received a traditional education; makes extremely usurious loans; he and his nephew Zeng Guanghua (a primary school graduate) are extremely [lit., 120 percent] reactionary; they are besieged in the Qiufang stronghold by the peasants.

Zeng Juxiang (Fangtian). Two hundred *dan*; his nephew is Zeng Chanfeng; a higher primary school graduate; a member of the Communist Party whose house was burned down by the bandit Ye Zishe.

78. A note to the Chinese edition explains that Mao included Zeng Chaoqun in the list of middle peasants, even though he had less than 200 *dan* of lands, because Zeng and his brother together had owned more than 200 *dan* before the family property was split up. The figure cited here is that for Zeng Chaoqun's share after the division.

Zeng Hailan (Bogongao). Used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; recently the property was divided, and he got 200-odd *dan*; participated in the March 25 uprising; he spent 1,000-odd *yuan* in a lawsuit brought by Zeng Xilin; Bandit Ye also fined him; one of his younger brothers was fined over 600 *yuan* by Bandit Ye; not a reactionary now.

Yi Songzhou (Guishixia). Two hundred *dan*, a Qing *xiucai*; an evil gentryman; colluded with Bandit Ye; has fled.

He Ziwen (Danxi). In the past a 10,000-*dan* family; land was divided, and now he has more than 200 *dan*; not too reactionary.

Widow Zhong (Danxi). Over 200 *dan*; a reactionary; fled.

Lai Rongjun (Cenfeng). Over 200 *dan*; was a minor evil gentryman; now he is not a reactionary.

Mei Renhua (Cenfeng). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Mei Diaoxian (Datian). *Xiucai*; 300 *dan*; member of the reactionary faction; fled.

Lai Wenlian (Datong). Three hundred *dan*; was caught by the Twenty-first Column of the Red Army and was fined 2,000 *yuan*; his land was divided and distributed; not a reactionary now.

Kuang Chunlong (Yanyangping). Two hundred *dan*; a usurer; property was confiscated; not a reactionary now.

Kuang Shiyang (Yanyangping). Two hundred *dan*; graduated from Mei *xian* Normal School; Guomindang member; very reactionary.

Kuang Yingshao (Huangqiangping). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Kuang Lanchun (Huangqiangping). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Chen (née Tao) Xianggu (Zukeng). Three hundred *dan*; widow who handles her own affairs; started as a gambler; counterrevolutionary.

Nanba District

Liu Huangxian (Longtu). Three hundred *dan*; counterrevolutionary; was executed by shooting.

Liu Tianyuan (Longtu). Three hundred *dan*; counterrevolutionary; surrendered after one of his sons was killed.

Liu Huantong (Longtu). Three hundred *dan*; was fined over 1000 *yuan* by the Red Army; now he is not a reactionary.

Liu Shidi (Longtu). Two hundred *dan*; a Qing *xiucai*; reactionary faction; the whole family fled.

Liu Zhenguang (Hejiao *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; his third son is a reactionary who fled; the other sons are not reactionary.

Liu Meirong (Hejiao *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary.

Zeng Yuehui (Hejiao *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; not a reactionary; his widow manages household affairs.

Zeng (née Lu) Fuxing (Hejiao *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; has some savings; colluded with Bandit Ye; whole family is reactionary and has fled.

Chen Erlaihe (Jizijiao). Two hundred *dan*; he, his sons, and his nephews were executed by shooting by the Red Army; were very reactionary.

Zhao Zhixiang (Chetou). Two hundred *dan*; old scholar; used to be a bit of an "evil" [gentryman]; not a reactionary.

Zhao Zan (Yanger) (Chetou). Two hundred *dan*; the whole family is reactionary; fled to the Qiufang stronghold; a gambler; his grandfather made the [family's] money.

Zhao Ener (Chetou). Two hundred *dan*; honest; engages in business; runs the Huaxing Store in Chetou, which was set on fire this year during the third attack by [militia from] the four *xian*;[79] his father was killed; not a reactionary.

Zhao Yinghua (Chetou). Two hundred *dan*; used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; he divided his land and gave half of it to his four sons, the other half is for himself and his wife; (when dividing family property, to keep a share for oneself is called *zuo zaozi*, "to sit on the stove"); not a reactionary; has temporarily given his remaining savings to the son who has the most children.

Wen Zanbiao (Qinglong). Over 200 *dan*; higher primary school graduate; not a reactionary.

Zhong Wenfa (Zhucun). Four hundred *dan*; has both a salt and a grain business; his grandfather willed him some money; not reactionary.

Zhong Bansan (Zhucun). Three hundred *dan*; has some property willed by his grandfather; used to gamble; sometimes serves as a mediator; not a reactionary.

Zhong Jishan (Zhucun). Two hundred *dan*; studied at the Mei *xian* Middle School; participated in the revolution; works for the Fifth Column of the Eleventh Army of the Red Army.

79. This was an attack by militia from Anyuan, Huichang, Pingyuan, and Xingning.—RT.

Zhong "Big Face" Liu[80] (Zhucun *xu*). Three hundred *dan*; old rich family; gambles; reactionary; the whole family has fled.

Zhong Yongliu (Zhucun *xu*). Two hundred *dan*; studied in Japan; was the head of the Wuxue [Hubei] police station; was a first-class section clerk, investigator, and the chief of the Industry Bureau in this *xian*; worked for Xie Jie; one of the reactionary leaders in Nanba District; fled to Pingyuan.

Peng Zijing (Gukenggang). Three hundred *dan*; a Qing *xiucai*; one of the Five Tigers in the *xian*; in the late Qing he was a police chief *[xunjian]* in Fenghuang Autonomous Subprefecture in Hunan; in the Republican period he was a member of the Xunwu *xian* Tax Collection Bureau and accepted bribes from gamblers; recently has worked as a commissariat officer in a unit of a militia *[tuan fangdui];* has participated in every rural mop-up operation. His son, Peng Bingyi, graduated from the Mei *xian* Middle School; member of the New Xunwu faction and of the Guomindang; was the principal of the Zhichi Primary School. The whole family is extremely reactionary.

Li Zude (Gukenggang). Used to be a 10,000-*dan* family; suffered business losses; only 300 *dan* left; the whole family is reactionary; fled.

Peng Hongyun (Xialiao). Two hundred *dan*; not so reactionary; has a general store in Xialiao.

Peng Hongquan. Peng Hongyun's brother; 200 *dan*; reactionary; fled to Pingyuan.

Peng Jinhan (Xialiao). Two hundred *dan*; runs several businesses; has an herbal medicine store and a general store; very money-minded; not a reactionary.

Han Foxian (Mankeng). Two hundred *dan*; did some business and farming; honest man, but also fled to Pingyuan.

Zhong Yicai (Lintianba). Three hundred dan; higher primary school graduate; in his grandfather's time, his was a 10,000-*dan* family, but the land was divided among two families; did not accept the revolution and fled; now he is willing to be fined because he wants to return home.

Zhong Dingsi (Lintianba). Two hundred *dan*; has some property willed by his grandfather; some of his children are cultivators; not a reactionary; "worries about communal property" *[gongchan]* .

80. The editors of *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* mentioned Zhong "Damian" Liu as an example of the types of puzzles presented by the text that they were able to solve during their investigations in Jiangxi. In this case, a man surnamed "Zhong" had a large face *(damian)*. "Liu," the editors found out, referred to his place in the family tree. See *Guangming ribao*, February 12, 1983, p. 3.—RT.

Zhong Shufen (Lintianba). Two hundred *dan*; he is dead; his widow manages the household; fined 200 *yuan*; not a reactionary.

Xie Ruilin (Niudouguang). Three hundred *dan*; doctor; unwilling to accept a fine; fled.

Xie Zhaofan (Niudouguang). Two hundred *dan*; member of the New Xunwu faction; graduated from the South Jiangxi Middle School; was the head of a protection militia; recently was the captain of a pacification and defense militia; after the success of the revolution in Nanba District, he worked as a secretary in the reactionary *xian* government; is one of the reactionary leaders in Nanba District.

Chen Chunrong (Tingling). Two hundred *dan*; honest; his son is a higher primary school graduate and served as a company commander in the White army; reactionary; the whole family fled to Pingyuan.

Chen Liuji (Niudouguang). Three hundred *dan*; had stores [selling] oil, grain, and soybeans in both Liuche and Niudouguang; colluded with Bandit Ye; very reactionary; the whole family fled.

Chen Zhongjun (Tingling). Two hundred *dan*; honest; his son was a head of a protection militia; not a reactionary.

Xie Peiqin (Fengshugang, Niudouguang). Four hundred *dan*; was a usurer; many inveterate gamblers borrowed money from him; his son was studying at the New Xunwu School; reactionary; fled.

Chen Anru (Tingling). Three hundred *dan*; trader of pigs and oxen; runs a boarding house; was fined; it is unlikely that he is a reactionary now.

Zeng Rensheng (Lianping). Over 300 *dan*; did farming himself; made money by gambling; did not pay his fine; fled.

Zhong Xingkui (Longhukeng, Zhucun). Two hundred *dan*; graduated from the Pingyuan Middle School; participated in Guomindang affairs; graduated from Nanchang Political Tutelage Training School; major figure in the New Xunwu faction; extremely reactionary.

Altogether there are 113 middle landlords in the seven districts of the *xian.*[81]

81. There are some discrepancies. The concluding statement that there are 113 middle landlords in Xunwu *xian* contrasts with Mao's earlier admission that it is "difficult to name" all the middle landlords in Sanshui District. Also, 116 middle landlords are named in the preceding list. Of that number, Pan Guanlan, Pan Mingdian, and Pan Guoqing (Jiansan); Yan Guoxing (Huangxiang), and Zeng Chaoqun (Shuangqiao) had less than 200 *dan*, the minimum amount required for the middle-landlord classification. Furthermore, the only way there could be "several small landlords" in Huangxiang, besides the clear case of Yan Guoxing, would be to assume that Luo Fushou became a small landlord after

Attitudes of Large and Middle Landlords Toward Production

The middle landlords, who receive 200 *dan* in rent or more, and the large landlords, who receive 500 *dan* or more in rent, pay no attention to production. They do not work personally and also do not organize production—their only goal is to sit around and watch the rents come in. Certainly every large and middle landlord has some land cultivated [under his direction], but his purpose is not to improve production methods or increase productivity. You cannot get rich on this. In order to avoid the dilemma of having no use for accumulated human and animal wastes and also to keep hired hands from being idle, the landlord selects the richest of his own land and cultivates land yielding 10 to 20 *dan* of grain. None cultivates enough land to yield 40 to 50 *dan*. This kind of landlord normally hires one worker. Only the large landlords of 10,000 *dan* or above and households without much manpower hire two workers. In order to make sure that workers do not loaf, landlords ask them to cultivate small plots of land in addition to doing other odd jobs.

Political Attitudes of Large and Middle Landlords

The life-styles of large and middle landlords can be divided into three categories on the basis of the situation in Xunwu. The first kind is the progressives *[xinde],* who have been influenced the most by capitalism. Their life-style is comparatively luxurious. They spend freely and want to buy every kind of foreign-style good. The clothes they wear button down the middle, and they have Western-style haircuts. They are relatively keen on sending their sons to school or have themselves graduated from middle school or other kinds of schools. There are relatively few people of this type among the landlord class; most of them live near rivers or near markets. Most of them have merchant backgrounds. Wang Juyuan of Chengjiang is a good example. The second type is the moderates [lit., half-new, but not old]. They approve of new trends a bit, but right away criticize their weak points. They build schools and serve as heads of the Education Bureau, but the schools they establish are the traditional rotten ones. They become head of the Education Bureau in order to get power and money, not to "enlighten the people and promote education." In the past most of those who served as Education Bureau heads were in this category. The first type are too progressive for the job. The landlords in this group are not misers but they are not profligates

his land was redistributed and that the joint ownership of 300 *dan* by Gu Lesan and his brother meant that both men, separately, were classified as small landlords. This survey of Xunwu's middle landlords was skewed toward areas that had already been subject to land redistribution earlier in the year. There are 93 names given for landlords in the three southern districts in Xunwu: Huangxiang (20), Shuangqiao (36), and Nanba (37). There are 23 landlords listed for the four northern districts, which fell to Red Army troops in the spring of 1930: Chengjiang (3), Xunwu City District (5), Sanshui (5), and Jiansan (10).—RT.

either. Most of the large and middle landlords are like this. The basic characteristic of landlords is to preserve the old, so why do the second type want to jump on the bandwagon of moderation? In order to grasp the power to lead. Otherwise leadership would be seized totally by the People's Rights faction or the so-called New Study faction; so they must change their ways a bit. Because their economic connections still depend on feudal exploitation, they display all the characteristics of landlords. Their progressive attitude *[gexin]* is only on the surface. Qiu Weiwu of Xunwu City District, Pan Yiren of Jiansan District, and Xie Jiayou of Chengjiang District are examples of this layer. The third kind [of people] have totally feudal attitudes and life-styles. They live in the hills, far from rivers or markets. They have never ceased to hope for the restoration of the examination system; they are total monarchists. They want to use monarchical ideas to strike down ideas about people's rights, restore their political leadership, and return to the deteriorating and collapsing situation of the feudal economy. Their life-style is very rigid. Although most have adopted the shaved-head style haircut, some still follow the Qing practice. In Xunwu this kind of person makes up the smallest part of the large and middle landlords. An example is Mei Hongxing of Datian in Shuangqiao District. Among the large and middle landlords, the progressives constitute 10 percent, the moderates 70 percent, and the traditionalists 20 percent. But we cannot say that the so-called progressives, who are heading toward capitalism, are revolutionary. As a whole, the large and middle landlords oppose revolution. There is also a situation that needs to be explained. The moderate part of the large and middle landlord class is not formed only by reason of locality (near rivers or in the hills; close to markets or far from markets). There is also an age factor in these formations. Within one family, most of the old people are old-fashioned, most of the young people are reform-minded, and most of the middle-aged are moderate. The age factor reflects the times one grew up in. The old folks were deeply affected by the old system. Moreover, they are going to die soon and lack the ability to speak of progressive matters; they can only preserve the old. Young people are influenced by old ways only slightly, but because they have no future without reform, they are relatively less conservative. The middle-aged people are on both sides. For example, the large landlord Uncle Shitcrock is very conservative. His children advocated building schools, but these new-style schools are neither new nor old. His grandchildren—six or seven of them—have gone to Canton, Shanghai, Beijing, and England to study the so-called New Curriculum *[xinxue]*. Nevertheless, it does not matter what they have studied, they all are counterrevolutionary. Pan Zuoqin, a grandson of Uncle Shitcrock, graduated from medical school in England and returned. Now he is in Shantou, where he is considered the second best of the Western-trained doctors. Every day he earns 40 to 50 *yuan*; every month he can receive more than 1,000 *yuan*. When he first returned home, he refused the Xunwu Education Society Clinic's offer of 1,200 *yuan* a year because his income at Shantou was much greater.

Small Landlords

Small landlords (less than 200 *dan*) far outnumber the other two categories. Taking landlords as a whole, large landlords (over 500 *dan*) make up 1 percent, middle landlords (over 200 *dan*) 19 percent, and small landlords 80 percent. The number of large landlords is the smallest; their influence throughout the *xian* is insignificant. The center of power in the *xian* is among the middle landlords. Most of their children have gone to middle school. The administrative power of the *xian*—Tax Collection Bureau, Education Bureau, Security Militia—is mostly snagged by them, especially the monies for the spring and autumn sacrifices *[zhengchang]*,[82] which are almost totally in their hands. Small landlords and rich peasants cannot interfere. But among the landlord class, small landlords are absolutely the greatest in number, and they display the following special characteristics. (1) Many have small businesses. They open small general stores and buy agricultural goods at a low price and wait until the price is dear to sell. Probably ten out of every hundred small landlords engage in this kind of small business. Some middle landlords engage in business and their businesses are larger than those of small landlords, but the proportion of middle landlords engaged in business is smaller. Most middle landlords have a life-style that is part of the feudal economy, unlike the extreme mercantilization of the small landlords. (2) Particularly indicative of the mercantilization of small landlords is that they also send their children to new-style schools. All the children of small landlords go to primary schools, and almost all go to higher primary school—at least in eight families out of ten. And three families out of ten have children in middle school. This class, compared with any other single class, has been influenced by the new culture *[xin wenhua]* quickly and in great numbers. In terms of administrative affairs, the small landlords are ruled by the middle landlord class; that is to say, they have no power. Their revolutionary demands during the first period of the revolutionary movement were expressed very stridently; their revolutionary activism advanced sharply. The Cooperative Society faction in Xunwu (Sun Yatsen Middle School faction) represents this class, but the New Xunwu faction (Young Revolutionary Comrades Society faction) represents the counterrevolutionary segment of the middle landlord class. Why does the small landlord class, influenced by capitalist culture, become so quickly infused with the revolutionary culture of the People's Rights movement, and why are its revolutionary demands and activities so intense and so fiercely advanced? This is solely because their class in general suffers, to the point of bankruptcy, from the encroachments of capitalism and from forced contributions to the government (of large and middle landlords). Because of the struggle between these

82. *Zhengchang* monies covered the expenses of memorial ceremonies, involving sacrifices to gods and ancestors. The type of ceremony that was held in the winter was called *zheng,* the one held in the autumn *chang.*

two strata (the small landlords and the large and middle landlords), which gives rise to the struggle between the peasant class and the landlord class, the New Xunwu faction, representing the middle landlords inclined in a capitalist direction, daily forms a counterrevolutionary battle line in cooperation with the large landlords. But the Cooperative Society faction represents the small landlords inclined toward the revolutionary People's Rights [movement], and daily they receive the guidance of proletarian ideology. They have united with the poor peasant class and risen up, creating the recent struggle for land revolution.

These comments on small landlords do not refer to all small landlords, just to a portion of them. Generally speaking, the small landlords can be divided into two parts. One part comes from the so-called old rich families. This part originates mostly in the division of property of large and middle landlords, the so-called large share becoming small. That is why so many large and middle landlord families become small landlord families. The portion of these people within the whole landlord class is 32 percent.

In terms of economic position, the small landlords can be divided into three categories.

1. Those who annually have surpluses: the percentage of these people within the whole landlord class is 0.96 percent; during the land struggle they were counterrevolutionary. Liu Hongxiang, Lai Shifang, and Liu Ruibiao of the Cooperative Society faction belong to this layer. They are all Cooperative Society members, but since the outbreak of the March 25 uprising and even after its defeat, they have incessantly displayed counterrevolutionary [actions and ideas].

2. Those who, in years with a declining standard of living, must incessantly sell land in order to survive. This group has a very miserable future ahead. There are many people in this layer—22.4 percent of the entire landlord class. They are enthusiastic for revolution. The people in the Xunwu Cooperative Society faction are mostly part of this stratum. For example, the following are members of this group.

Those leaders of the land struggle who have died:

Pan Li (Xunwu Communist Party *xian* committee secretary)
Liu Weilu (chairman of the Revolutionary Committee during the March 25 uprising)
Liu Weie (Communist Party district committee member)

Current leaders of the struggle:

Gu Bo (Xunwu Communist Party *xian* committee secretary)
Zhong Xiqiu (Red Army battalion commander)
Huang Yugui (Communist Party district committee secretary)

Those who did not participate in the Cooperative Society but have participated in the revolution:

Mei Ruhuang (Red Army group political commissar)

3. Those whose bankruptcy is quite severe and depend on loans to survive. This part constitutes 8.64 percent of all landlords. They are revolutionary, with many people participating in the struggle going on in Xunwu today.

Of the second and third parts of the small landlords, generally all the so-called old rich families whose circumstances are deteriorating participate in the revolution. To speak of Cooperative Society members, there are thirty middle-school students and a hundred upper-primary students or teachers who have participated or are participating in the revolution. All belong to those two strata of small landlords in deteriorating circumstances; most belong to the second stratum.

Besides the old rich families discussed above, another rather large stratum—48 percent of small landlords—is the so-called newly rich. This layer, in complete contrast to the layer of the old rich, consists of peasants who get rich from farming or from small businesses. This layer is "flourishing." Its economic situation is based, on the one hand, on self-cultivation (little use of full-time hired help; mostly part-time hired help) and, on the other hand, on renting out remote arid land to others and collecting rents. They are serious about money, and their special trait is stinginess; getting rich is their central concern. They toil all day. They have surpluses every year, and, moreover, they either sell their unhulled grain or hull it and take it to market themselves, even to faraway places like Bachi in Pingyuan *xian*, in hopes of making a lot of money. They also make loans at reprehensively high interest rates—most at 50 percent. They loan out grain and oppress poor people [by making loans that] "take the first crop for the principal and the second crop for the interest." They also make "grain-money" and "oil-money" loans. What is a "grain-money" loan? When the last harvest is eaten and the new crop is still in the fields, they take advantage of this opportunity to loan money to the peasants and then are repaid in grain. Usually they loan out 2 *yuan* before harvest time and are repaid with a *Dan* of grain. But at that time the price of grain is almost 4 *yuan* per *Dan*. This is a type of 100 percent interest. "Oil-money loans" are the same; most are of the double-interest type. Loan-sharking is almost always done by the newly rich families. Large and middle landlords loan money at a 30 percent rate; very few make 50 percent loans, and these landlords do not make grain loans or oil-money loans. Also, there is the more severe "monthly interest" loan, with an interest rate of 10 percent a month; so that the annual interest rate exceeds that of the double-interest loan. To receive this kind of loan requires a mortgage; moreover, to save face, some borrow the term "society" *[hui]*, like the Dingtong Society. There is also the "chop loan society,"[83] a 10 percent per month loan at compound interest, which is more severe than the Dingtong Society. Large and middle landlords usually do not make such loans. During the Qing these reprehensible loans were relatively scarce, but they have increased during the Republican period. "Now people are more greedy" is the historically significant criticism of poor people toward loan sharks. "Today the hearts of people are relatively more greedy"—this is something one hears when one goes among the poor peasant masses throughout Xunwu. Nothing is more important than money to the newly rich families. They do not waste money [on tuition]; nor do they sacrifice the labor of their children by sending them to school. Middle-school graduates among them are few, and although there are a few graduates of primary school, there are not as many as among the bankrupt layer. As for the bankrupt families, why have most of them gone to school? Because they inherited money and are not that desirous of it. Moreover, since those who depend on study and on their own ability for their livelihood lack other ways to raise their family's fortunes, most of the graduates come from this layer. Some people refer to the so-called newly rich families of small landlords discussed above, not as small landlords, but rather as rich peasants, the so-called half-landlord-like rich peasant. This half-landlord-like rich peasant class is the most evil enemy in the countryside. In the eyes of poor peasants there is no reason not to strike them down.

83. The text reads *yinzi hui. Yinzi* can refer to the mark made by a "chop," a stone carved with the characters for a person's name and used to make ink impressions on paper. However, *yinzi* can also refer, as it does in the text, to a small loan made for a short period at a high interest rate.—RT.

Rich Peasants

There is also a kind of peasant who is relatively rich, and is normally called an owner-peasant or middle peasant, but who is actually a kind of rich peasant. As for the so-called "half-landlord-like rich peasant" mentioned earlier, we did not call them rich peasants but rather small landlords. This is the viewpoint of the poor peasants. During struggles, most people do not argue for attacking the so-called relatively rich owner-peasants or middle peasants because they do not have the characteristics of half-landlord[-like rich peasants]. All their production comes from their own labor, not from the exploitation of others. Actually in the eyes of poor peasants, they are a special class. Except for not renting land to other people to till, they are the same type of high-interest exploiters because they have surplus money and surplus land. They add labor to their own agricultural produce, for example, turning unhulled grain into hulled rice, and then go to market themselves to sell it. They also carry on small hoarding activities. They raise piglets, shoats, and meaty pigs. These rich peasants have all the characteristics of half-landlord[-like rich peasants], but they are not the same as the self-sufficient middle peasants. Because of this, when the land struggle develops into a mass activity, most of the poor peasants cry out [slogans like] "equal land" and "tear up debts" in opposition to this kind of rich peasant. If the Communist Party should stop this activity of poor peasants, those poor peasants could not but hate the Communist Party. Because of this, we know that not only must we decide to strike down these half-landlord-like rich peasants, but moreover we must equalize the rich owner-peasants' land, cancel loans made by the rich owner-peasants,

and divide the rich owner-peasants' grain—there is no doubt that we have to do this. We must do this, and then and only then can we win over the poor peasant masses. This is the paramount policy of the rural struggle. Only those opportunists who take the rich-peasant line oppose this policy.

Poor Peasants (The Four Layers of Poor Peasants)

What is a poor peasant? We can answer simply: a poor peasant does not have enough to eat (the reason is exploitation, that's obvious). But this is a conventional explanation. If we once again analyze the poor peasantry from within, then we know that poor peasants are certainly not a homogeneous class made up of one economic position, for the class has four different strata. The first group is the semiowner peasants. They do not have enough to eat because of insufficient land. They must rent some land from landlords. After paying all the rent, they do not have enough to eat, but among the poor-peasant masses they are the best off, because not only do they have oxen and plows, they also have some money in their hands. Moreover, there is something that manifests their special characteristic: they own a bit of land. This level constitutes 10.5 percent of the total rural population. Among the poor peasants they constitute 15 percent. The second level is made up of that group among tenants who are doing fairly well. They have oxen, plows, and some money, but not a bit of land. Their special characteristic is their oxen: most have one ox, and an extremely small number have two or three. Compared with semiowner peasants, they are poorer and have even less to eat, but compared with other parts of the poor peasantry, they are certainly better off. This level constitutes 42 percent of the rural population and 60 percent of the poor peasant population—they are **the largest mass** in the countryside. The third level is made up of tenants in dire straits. They likewise have no land. They have plows, but most are in poor shape, and they have some money, but not much. They also have a special characteristic: not every family has oxen. Several families may share an ox, or if they have an ox, it certainly is not their own. It is the landlord's, who turns it over to them in order to save on fodder costs. Only under certain conditions can they use the work power of this ox. In Xunwu, they refer to this as "getting only one hoof." Their level of insufficiency with respect to food, compared with those groups mentioned above, is more severe. They constitute 10.5 percent of the total rural population and 15 percent of the total poor peasant population. They are a mass of the same size as the semi-owner peasants. The fourth category comprises the poorest tenants. Besides having no land, they have no money—they normally borrow rice and salt. They also lack one iota of animal power. During the busy agricultural seasons, they wait until other people have tilled, and then afterward they join with other people (their relatives) and borrow or rent oxen. They cultivate several *mu* of infertile land rented at high rates. Although they have plows, they have no harrows, because to make one requires quite a bit of money. Their means are insufficient to do this. This layer

constitutes 7 percent of the rural population and 10 percent of all poor peasants. They are not an insignificant mass. The clothes they wear are very ragged; they have to beg them from people. Two out of three meals they eat are *zaliang* (millet, slices of sweet potatoes). To supplement their income, they make cakes for sale, chop wood to sell for fuel, or hire themselves out as porters.

The System in the Hills

Most hill land in Xunwu is in the hands of the lineages who first homesteaded; the lineages that came later do not have any hill land or only a little, because the land had been occupied by first-comers. Therefore, the small lineages, who settled first, have hill land, while the great lineages, who came later, don't have any. The situation of hill lands differs from that of croplands. Cropland is bought and sold quickly. Through mortgaging, the land of small landlords and peasants can be transferred *[zhuanyi]* twice a year, and even more land is transferred once a year. Outright sales are also frequent. Generally speaking, because of its low productivity, a lineage hill (single-surname village) is managed by an ancestral trust. Within an area of 5 or 6 *li*, a system of compacts is used. The so-called prohibitions not only forbid the buying and selling of land, but also absolutely prohibit tree foraging. Apart from those "who chop down wood to build a temporary hut to cover a tomb site," permission to cut timber can be obtained only for purposes of the public good, like building roads or canals and repairing bridges. Besides this, the hills are opened only twice every three years for clearing brushwood and once every two years for timbering. The schedule for opening the hills is set by a gathering of lineage mates from a land reeve's [*jinzhang,* lit., restriction chief] village. When the time comes, every family supplies a worker who goes to the hill to collect brushwood and timber (thinning timberland is also called *luoka,* which means "to prune tree branches"). These are distributed to everyone. There are also cases when the whole hill is divided into lots in accordance with the production situation in the hills. The masses are called together to draw lots. Afterward, based on the lots drawn, they individually take their share. This is the "lineage system" of hill "communism." But there is also a geographical system of hill communism. In most cases, the village is taken as the unit, and each lineage elects the reeve. They strictly forbid private foraging and set a schedule for opening the hills—just as in the system of family "communism" in the hills. The number of land reeves varies from a minimum of three to a maximum of ten or more, based on the size of the village's forest—in most cases, there are five or six. The land reeves are all elected, and their terms are indefinite. Some serve for six months; others for four or five years. It all depends on whether a reeve fulfills his responsibility or not. All land reeves must be absolutely incorruptible and fairminded. "It doesn't matter if you are the old wet nurse of the emperor, if you exceed your quota of wood or licorice root, you will be punished." There was a land reeve in Longtu Township in Nanba District who came

upon a woman stealing wood. The woman said to him: "I would like to chop down some wood to build a stand, you must not punish me. I am a Longtu person just like you—we are related. Why do you seem so cold-hearted?" The land reeve answered her: "Be quiet, you old liar. Even if you were my great-aunt, I would penalize you. You must know that I, Liu Shilie, am just and fair." If the land reeve does not maintain order and everyone chaotically chops trees down, not minding the public good, he must *nuanjin.* (Calling people's attention to the rules is called *nuanjin.* If anyone neglects the spirits and then once again pays respects, that is called *nuanshen* or *nuanfu).* Every year the land reeves call a Protect the Hills meeting. All the regulations for protecting the hills are decided at this meeting. Most Protect the Hills meetings are called on an ad hoc basis, but there are also "scheduled meetings." On the day when the Protect the Hills meeting is called, not only do the land reeves come, but also one person from every family in the area comes. Every person brings wine and rice and also pays 5 or 10 *fen* to buy cooked dishes and incense for worshiping "Bogong." (Bogong is Yang Dabogong. Every place has a shrine; every tree, field, and hill has one.) The "communism" of the public hills is shown in the above-mentioned systems. There is also the "capitalism" of the private hills, with mushrooms, tea-oil plants, tea, bamboo, and Chinese firs. The produce can be sold for relatively good profits. These hills were originally public hills but gradually fell into the hands of the wealthy. Large landlords probably own half of them, and small landlords who are newly rich and rich peasants own the other half. Because this kind of hill cannot be developed without capital, especially when growing mushrooms and tea, the owners must be large landlords. The rest are mostly small landlords and rich peasants who have gone capitalist. The hill lands of Xunwu are distributed as follows: lineage hills constitute 15 percent, village hills 5 percent, private hills 10 percent, and the so-called waste-hills—those that are remote from inhabited areas, inaccessible hills, and neglected hills—70 percent. There are waste-hills because in areas of low population with many hills there is no need for them. Some are delineated by lineage boundaries. Although people from other lineages might want to use such land, they are forbidden to do so by the Hill Lord. They can only let it be wasteland. This type of situation in which a person desires to develop a hill but cannot do so because of restrictions is common. After the land revolution, this kind of lineage barrier was wiped out.

Exploitation

Exploitation by Land Rent

Sharecropping. There are two ways of collecting land rents in Xunwu County: "sharecropping" and "measuring rent." In the former, the peasant goes along with the landlord to the fields when the crop is ripe, and the yield is split 50–50. Moreover, the peasant is asked by the landlord to take his share to the landlord's home. In some places the landlord first takes one *Dan* of grain before

the division, and this *Dan* is not included in the rent. The landlord's reason for this is: "When I bought this land I spent a lot, and you, the tenant, did not supply the fertilizer. If I didn't take this *Dan* first, it would be too advantageous for you." But this method is not used by more than one family in a hundred. In another method, however, the peasant takes some grain first; this is called "taking seeds." The amount is one measure *[cuosuan]* out of all the land rent. The reason is that the seedlings came from someone else's land, not from the landlord's in question. The owner of the other land has no spring harvest from the seedling land and will suffer a loss. The first measure from the crop is to compensate the tenant or the other landlord for the loss. When the landlord or his agent comes to watch the dividing process, he requires a lunch with pork and fish (even duck sometimes), and the peasant has to carry the rent to the landlord's home after the lunch and the dividing of the crop. The peasant even has to put two eggs on the rent rice; this is a daily occurrence in this area. If the peasant has better relations with his landlord, he may put on seven or eight eggs.

Measuring Rent. The system of rent by measure is called "early rice six parts; late rice four parts." In Pingyuan *xian,* the split is 50–50. Why must it be "early six, late four"? Since the yield of early rice is greater and it gets a higher price, taking 60 percent of the yield as rent does not give the tenant any advantage. But late rice yields less and its value is lower, so the rent is 40 percent of the yield. At first glance it would seem that the 60–40 ratio, when applied to the two crops grown each year, comes out to 50–50, but this is not so. The landlord usually gets 56 percent to the tenant's 44 percent. Since the yields for early rice are relatively great, the landlord gets 6 *Dan* out of every 10 *Dan* of early rice, leaving the tenant with only 4 *Dan.* As for late rice, which generally yields 8 *Dan* (2 *Dan* less than early rice), the tenant hands over 4 *Dan* for rent and keeps 4 *Dan* for himself. These 4 *Dan* plus the 4 *Dan* of early rice [gives the tenant] a total of 8 *Dan* whereas the landlord gets 10 *Dan.* So the ratio is 56 to 44.

Rents based on sharecropping are figured at the Great Heat (sixth lunar month), and measuring rents are assessed during the first period of autumn (seventh lunar month). Landlords notify peasants that land rents are due; if the rent is not sent, the landlord goes to the tenant's home himself to press the tenant. If the rent is still not paid, he sends some workers to take the rent. If this does not succeed, he turns the land over to someone else. Some bad landlords even bring lawsuits against tenants and imprison them, but bad landlords of this type are few. Originally sharecropping covered 40 percent of all cases in this county, and "measuring rents" covered the other 60 percent. But recently the incidence of sharecropping has increased and that of "measuring rents" has decreased to about 50 percent. Why has sharecropping been on the rise? Because the number of poor tenant households has

been increasing, and they frequently have no seed rice left after the rent is sent. Landlords, afraid that peasants cannot afford to pay the rents, often prefer to sharecrop, causing this method to increase. At the same time, because the peasants are afraid of losing the land or of involvement in lawsuits, they prefer sharecropping too.

From the Top of the Stalks to the Bottom of the Roots, There's Nothing to Eat. "From the top of the stalks to the bottom of the roots, there's nothing to eat" means that just after the harvest and payment of the rent the tenant has nothing left to eat. This occurs in almost 40 percent of the cases in Xunwu *xian*. Why is there no food to eat from the top of the stalks to the bottom of the roots? Take, for example, a piece of land yielding 20 *Dan*, of which over 11 *Dan* are paid as rent. Of the remaining 8-plus *Dan*, 2 to 3 *Dan* may be used to repay the landlord for loans of grain. These short-term (up to two years) loans, with an interest rate of 50 percent, are extended when the previous year's crop is consumed and the current crop has yet to be harvested.[84] At harvest time, tenants have to purchase fine things for entertaining landlords. And after the harvest, they buy some cooking oil and salt and in the spring some rice. When autumn comes, everything is gone. This is what "From the top of the stalks to the bottom of the roots, there's nothing to eat" and "One year's yield is all gone" mean. During the land struggle in the southern half of the *xian*, peasants and children everywhere sang this song:

The moon is shining, as if burning.
We bear hardship, while others are happy.
Little to eat, little to wear.
Year after year of work, always living in a dilapidated house.
I've no money to obtain a pretty wife; I'll grow old alone.
With no schooling, we're blind even though we have eyes.
Oh, Heaven! How bitter is our lot.
No other work to do but till the land year after year.
The June harvest is hardly over before the landlord arrives.
With umbrella in hand he looks over the rice sacks.
Asking nothing but "Is the rice dry?"
As soon as the destitute reply, "Not yet,"
The landlord starts talking like an official.
Every word he says is as mean as a tax collector's.
Oh, what can we do?
Bushel *[luo]* after bushel,[85] land rent plus interest,
That's one year's yield, and it's all gone.

84. *Qinghuang bujie*, literally, "when the green and the yellow do not meet."
85. *Luo:* a square-bottomed bamboo basket.—RT.

Oh, all is gone.
Being aggrieved, let us poor brothers be united and of one heart.
Let's join the Red Army and kill our enemy.[86]

Renting Land. In Xunwu landlords require all tenants to sign a lease.[87] There are no exceptions to this. In Xunwu there are small leases for periods of five years and large leases for periods of seven years. Although no formal law governs this, this is the rule between landlords and tenants. Only bad landlords find an excuse to break this rule and try to change tenants in three to four years or seven to eight years.[88] Although no formal law governs this, this is the rule between landlords and tenants. The following items are covered in a lease:

86. In a note to this song Mao Zedong added the following glossary for passages in the lyrics in the Xunwu dialect:

ai	me
mao	do not have
xiang qi zuo	continue
an qing nuzi	pretty women
yang de lao	how to make a living
an hao xuetang	good school
ge ye jiu	just after harvesting
zuo zei tou	very bad, like a thief
daizi yi da kun	sacks for land rent
guo jie liu	umbrella
ma ge dou wu wen	nothing to ask
fang chu xia ma tou	like an official
shui hu tou	major landlord
a he	all gone
ai tong xin	be of one heart

Mao makes no special note of it, but there are numerous phrases scattered throughout the text that are Hakka in origin. S. T. Leong argues in "The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in Modern Times," in *Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China, 1860–1949*, ed. David Pong and Edmund S.K. Fung (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 297, 318, 324, that Xunwu *xian* was a "pure Hakka" *xian* in the core of the Hakka-dominated region of southern Jiangxi. We do know that Mao sometimes needed help from investigation meeting participants like Gu Bo, Guo Youmei, and Fan Daming in translating the information being conveyed by the people of Xunwu.—RT.

87. For an excellent short story published in 1933 concerning the issues of tenancy, tensions at harvest time, and the often harsh plight of the peasantry, see Zheng Nong's "On the Threshing Field," in Harold R. Isaacs, ed., *Straw Sandals: Chinese Short Stories, 1918–1933* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), pp. 371–93. Zheng Nong, born in 1904, was the pen name of Xia Zhengnong, a native of Nanchang County in Jiangxi (ibid., pp. lxix–lxx).—RT.

88. This refers to the third or fourth year of the first term or the seventh or eighth year of the second term of a small lease.—RT.

The location and boundaries of the land are clearly stated.
The amount of rent and whether it is determined by sharecropping or by measure.
The quality and quantity of the rent payment: rent rice should be dry enough, and shorting is disallowed and can be penalized by the landlord.
Tribute: a chicken every year or two.

There are leases even for land yielding only 3 *Dan*. There are two reasons for this. First, without a lease, if a tenant does not pay the exact amount of rent, there is no proof in legal proceedings. Second, landlords are afraid that after a long period of time tenants might take over the land. A landlord never signs a lease; only tenants sign leases and give them to landlords. The following is an example of a lease:

> Leasee, Kuang Shiming, rents a piece of land from Ling Jiangui. This piece of land is called Tieliaoba, it is arable and has one large mound *[qiu]*.[89] After negotiations witnessed by a third party, an agreement was made to rent the land for six buckets *[tong]* of rent each year, which may be sent in two payments, one in autumn and one in winter. The rent is 60 percent for early rice and 40 percent for late rice and is to be sent to the [landlord's] home. The rice must be clean and dry; the quantity must be exact. If there is shorting, the landlord may rent the land to someone else, and the leasee will have no cause for complaint. Because an oral [agreement] does not constitute a lease, this lease is drawn up to establish the agreement.
>
> There will be tribute of one chicken each year.
>
> Witness: Luo Changsheng
> Written by: Xie Yulin
> Leasee: Kuang Shiming
> The sixteenth year of the Republic [1927], November 24.

Fees, Tribute, and Landlord Dinners. There are two kinds of fees: fees-in-money and fees-in[-kind] (a rooster). The fee-in-money is generally 0.1 *yuan* for each *dan* of rent specified in a five-year lease and 0.2 *yuan* for each *dan* in a ten-year lease. But sometimes, as in Huangxiang, the fee is 0.3 *yuan*. This fee is paid at the beginning of the lease. The fee[-in-kind requires] one rooster for one lease, whether a five-year or a ten-year lease, to be sent when the lease begins. Fees-in-money or fees-in-kind should be sent again when the lease is renewed (that is, either every five years or every ten years). In the southern part of the *xian*, most leases run for ten years. In Huangxiang and Shuangqiao, there are no five-year leases, and, although these are few in number, some leases run for decades. If a landlord sells land after it is leased, he returns part of the fee. In the northern part of the *xian*, most leases are for five years and fees are never refunded in any way.

89. *Qiu*, the word for "mound," also means "grave."—RT.

A chicken is sent in tribute each year. Although leases can specify a "rooster," because a rooster is bigger than a hen, most peasants still send hens. Peasants usually send one every other year—even though the leases say one rooster a year—around the time of the New Year's celebration or after the winter harvest. If a chicken is not sent, the landlord goes out and presses the peasant for payment. "Did you send the tribute rooster?" "Not yet, sir, please wait until I buy one." Or "No, sir, I can't give you one this year."

In Shuangqiao, there is a custom of landlord dinners, in which [a tenant] invites his landlord to dinner once a year. This is not common in other areas.

Grain Rent and Money Rent. Eighty percent of the rent in this *xian* is paid in grain; the other 20 percent is paid in money. About half the ancestral, religious, temple, and bridge trusts accept money because most of their tenants are members of ancestral trusts, religious associations, and so on. Because of this, the tenants can keep the rice for their own use and use money to pay the rent (figured according to the current rice price). Most of these tenants make money through small businesses or by raising chickens and pigs for market. Some ancestral and religious trusts controlled by powerful gentry may force tenants to send rice for rent in order to pursue their exploitative practices (rice can be sold later at a higher price). The tenants have no alternative but to turn over the grain and put it in the granary. For the same reason, landlords accept only rice and do not allow the peasants to pay in money except for landlords who live far from the croplands.

Fixed Rents and Variable Rents. Eighty percent of the rents in the *xian* are variable [lit., not-iron] rents. When there is a flood, drought, or other disaster, the rent can be reduced by 10 to 20 percent. If the yield is affected too much by a big disaster, landlords will accept some blighted grain *[panggu]* once they know the facts. Twenty percent of the rents in this *xian* are fixed. In such cases there is a "no rent reduction for disaster" clause in the leases. Actually, tenants rarely follow this rule. They ask landlords to come and see the disaster, so that blighted grain may be accepted as part of the rent.

Go Sleep with Someone If You Want Some Clothing. Many peasants have no food left to eat after paying the rent and their debts, and landlords who receive their rents in grain are unwilling to sell the grain. Only around New Year's time do landlords give some grain to peasants badly in need of food. But this is for loan only, not for sale. This is because the interest on grain loans is 50 percent semiannually (the interest rate was 30 percent for money and 40 percent for grain every half-year, but recently few grain loans have been let for 40 percent; most interest rates are 50 percent), and the appeal of such loans is much greater than that of selling. Landlords sell rice only in April or May, when the new crop is still in the fields and the old crop is gone. At that time the price is highest, and

[in order to get a higher price] the landlords pretend to be reluctant to sell.

A peasant will come to a landlord's house and ask: "Sir, did you have your dinner?"

Landlord: "Um, yes."

Then the peasant will slowly bring up the subject of buying grain: "Could I buy a couple of *dou* of your grain?"

Landlord: "N . . . no, I don't have enough for my family."

Peasant: "Hey, if you don't have enough, then there's no water in the river. Please help me out; I'm waiting for food to eat."

Landlord: "OK, if you really need it, I can save some for you, but will you pay this high price?"

Peasant: "Sir, please do me a favor and don't charge me too much!"

The price is set according to the landlord's wishes; afterward he gives the grain to the peasant.

There is a story known all over the *xian*. The landlord Liu Fulang of Huangxiang is a famous miser who always mixes blighted grain with the good to sell at times when the new crop is still in the fields and the old one is gone. One day, a peasant came to his home to buy some rice. Liu called his daughter-in-law and daughter and said: "Go sleep with someone if you want some clothing." Peasants have spread this sentence so that it has become a famous joke in the whole *xian*. Why did this sentence become a joke? Because it is customary in Xunwu for adulteresses to be called *lao,* but *lao* also means to mix blighted grain with good grain. The landlord could not clearly tell [his daughter and daughter-in-law] in the presence of the peasant to mix blighted grain with good, so he carelessly came out with these funny words to his daughter and daughter-in-law. This story is still being told.

Corvée Labor. There is no corvée labor in the *xian* now. If there is any emergency or a wedding or funeral, a landlord may ask tenants to help him. If the landlord has some farmwork to do, he may ask tenants to help him in the busy season, but these laborers are paid.

Buying or Selling Land. According to Liu Liangfan, who was a clerk in the *xian* yamen, six hundred households sold land in this *xian* in 1925. Since some households bought the lands of more than one household, there were fewer than six hundred households buying land. Suppose there are 30,000 households in the *xian* (a population of 120,000, with four people per household). [This means that] one household out of every fifty became bankrupt. Even more mortgaged their lands—five households out of every hundred. (There are two mortgagees for every hundred households because one mortgagee may have several properties mortgaged to him.) So, in recent years 2 percent of the households in Xunwu have gone bankrupt, and 5 percent are heading toward bankruptcy.

The price of land: for every *dan* of rent, 17 to 20 *yuan* for [terraced] rice paddies *[kengtian]* and 30 to 40 *yuan* for bottomlands *[duantian];* generally 20 *yuan* for rice fields and 30 *yuan* for bottomlands. Rice fields can be mortgaged for 15 *yuan* [for each *dan* of rent] and bottomlands for 20 to 25 *yuan*.

There are two kinds of mortgages: *fiducia cum creditore [guoshou]* and *antichresis [buguoshou]*.[90] Fiducia cum creditore means that the mortgagor gives the land to the mortgagee after receiving money from him. The mortgagee either tills the land himself or leases it to someone else. The mortgagee makes all the decisions, and the mortgagor has no say. After the transfer of the land, the mortgagee does not pay rent to the mortgagor. Apart from reserving the right to buy the land back, the mortgagor loses the rights of ownership. It is almost like selling the land because most of the rights to the land are in the hands of the mortgagee.

Antichresis means that the mortgagee pays some money to the mortgagor, but the land is tilled by the mortgagor, who has to pay rent to the mortgagee every year. The rent is the same as for other rented land: for every [2] *dan* of combined yield [of the early and late crops], there is a *dan* of rent. For example, if the land price is 20 *yuan* for each *dan* of rent, the mortgagor gets 20 *yuan* but has to pay a *dan* of grain in rent. Since the grain normally sells for 4 *yuan* per *dan*, the yearly interest is 20 percent. Why is the mortgage rate lower than the interest rate on money charged by moneylenders? (Generally the interest rate for borrowing money starts at 30 percent a year.) This is because rich peasants (those who have just become rich) think that the low rates for mortgages are safer than the high interest rate for money loans. "Putting the money in the earth is very safe." Why do the rich peasants buy mortgages and not land? Because the bankruptcy of peasants and landlords occurs gradually, not suddenly. "First buy mortgages and then buy land" has become a common phenomenon. "Land belongs to rich people, mortgage means selling" is also a common phenomenon. So buying a mortgage is almost the same as buying the land. Ninety percent of the mortgages are fiducia cum creditore and only 10 percent are antichresis. Most of the antichresis mortgages are governed by fixed rents. But [in some cases], even though the land is legally transferred in the manner of fiducia cum creditore to the mortgagee, so that a lease changes the relationship of the original owner and the mortgage owner to that of landlord and tenant, the original owner still tills this piece of land. This is another layer of landlord-tenant relationships beyond the one between mortgagor and mortgagee.

90. The Chinese *guoshou* [lit., pass from one's hand], as described in the text, is similar to the type of transfer of ownership referred to in Roman law as *fiducia cum creditore*. The debtor is allowed to keep legal title and can be a tenant at will, but ownership is transferred de facto to the creditor. The Chinese *buguoshou* [lit., not to pass from one's hand] is similar to the Roman legal term *antichresis,* in which the possession of the land goes to the creditor but the debtor retains ownership. See *New Encyclopedia Britannica,* 15th ed., 26: 188.—RT.

Some antichresis land is mortgaged secretly. For example, when one of the young masters who "live for whoring and gambling" owes gambling debts or lacks money for whoring, he may secretly mortgage his family's land to some powerful and eminent rich peasants and landlords, and then transfer the land in the manner of fiducia cum creditore after his father is dead. Why does he mortgage land to the powerful and eminent? Because they don't fear complications. Even if the secret deal were to become known, they're confident that the father would honor the agreement.

Antichresis mortgages present opportunities for high degrees of exploitation between mortgagee *[dianzhu]* and mortgagor *[tianzhu]*. When the mortgagor cannot afford to pay the rent, the mortgagee adds interest to the unpaid part of the rent. This adds up year by year and finally the mortgagor certainly cannot pay off the mortgage for this land. The interest rate for unpaid rent is 30 percent or higher, rather than the 20 percent rate for mortgages.

Exploitation Through High Interest Rates

The Interest on Money. The ordinary rate of interest on money loans is 30 percent [in reality, 36 percent]. There are also 40 percent and 50 percent loans. Respectively, these constitute 70, 10, and 20 percent of the total money in the loan market. If a debtor has no land, all loans are secured by property, such as houses, livestock, or tea-oil fields *[muzi]*, specified in the contract. Those with extra money to lend include large and middle landlords, ancestral trusts, and the newly rich (small landlords and rich peasants who have suddenly become wealthy). In terms of the total amount of money lent, the middle landlords lend about 50 percent, the newly rich about 30 percent, and the big landlords and ancestral trusts about 20 percent. In terms of lending frequency, the newly rich are the most frequent lenders with 75 percent of the loans, and the middle landlords are next with 20 percent, followed by the large landlords and ancestral trusts with 5 percent. In terms of borrowers, as for 50 percent loans (50 *yuan* of interest per 100 *yuan* of principal per year) or 120 percent loans (a 10 percent interest charge per month, or 120 *yuan* in interest payments per year for a 100-*yuan* loan), poor peasants are the ones who usually borrow on these terms. Poor peasants seldom take out 30 percent interest loans. Such loans carry a 3 percent interest rate per month (36 *yuan* in interest payments per year for 100 *yuan* in principal). Among the total amount of money borrowed by poor peasants, 30 percent loans constitute 20 percent, 50 percent loans constitute 70 percent, and 120 percent loans make up 10 percent. Most of the creditors lending to poor peasants are newly rich, for they are willing to lend small amounts of money such as 3 to 5 *yuan* or 8 to 10 *yuan* to poor peasants bit by bit and charge compound interest. Since poor peasants have no land, they are able to use only their houses or livestock as security. Because creditors always jump at the chance to gobble up poor peasants' houses, livestock, small pieces of land, or

gardens, when poor peasants stand in need of money, creditors are always eager to lend money. Later on, they seize the security if poor peasants do not meet their payments. Sometimes middle landlords do the same thing as the newly rich. For example, Gu Youyao, Gu Bo's grandfather, acquired three parcels of vegetable gardens and two houses from poor peasants in this manner. He might lend one *yuan* one day and two *yuan* the next day to a poor peasant. As the debt built up gradually, he came to possess the debtor's whole vegetable garden. He devotes much attention to occupying other people's property by this method. He cares about nothing else, for he thinks that taking care of local affairs and the ancestral trust will keep him from making money. He is a typical high-interest exploiter.

Most 30 percent loans occur between rich peasants and make it possible for rich peasants to start small businesses, such as trading in rice or livestock, or to establish a small shop in a market town. Why can rich peasants get 30 percent loans whereas poor peasants can get only 50 percent loans or 120 percent loans? There are two reasons: the first is the "bigness" of the loan amount. The amount of money lent by rich peasants is usually around 200 to 300 *yuan*, which can be used to do something big when it is repaid, whereas poor peasants usually borrow only a little money, which is too small to do anything with after it is repaid. The second reason is the security of the loan. Rich peasants use their land as security for loans, and, in addition, they borrow to make investments that always have the prospect of making money. But poor peasants have little property, and they frequently spend their money or use the money to pay another creditor; so their dependability is very low.

Middle landlords usually lend money, for the purposes of amassing land, to small landlords who are bankrupt or to peasants who are on the road to bankruptcy.

Few large landlords or lineages lend money. They hold on to their money because they prefer to enjoy life rather than increase their capital. They spend money on celebrating eightieth birthdays, building large houses, or educating their children (this is not a major purpose). A few of the large landlords who have become mercantilized are willing to invest their money in business. Therefore, there is no money left for lending. Some of the large landlords with extra money who do not have a business to invest in and who are not interested in lending to poor peasants or small landlords because of the risks and poor returns would rather dig a pit and bury their money in the ground than get interest by lending. Moreover, local warlords collect heavy customs and duties from those who have extra money to lend out; there is no escaping this. For instance, on several occasions Lin Hu and Liu Zhilu,[91] troop leaders under the command of

91. Lin Hu (1887–1960), a subordinate of Chen Jiongming, had been appointed commissioner in Guangdong by the Beijing government in 1924. Liu Zhilu, commander of the garrison in Chaozhou and Meixian, Guangdong Province, had also thrown in his lot with Chen Jiongming. When Chen was defeated in 1925, he rallied to Wu Peifu. For Mao's attacks on both of them in 1925, see Volume II, pp. 228–29 and 273–76.

Chen Jiongming, levied contributions totaling more than 10,000 *yuan* on large, middle, and small landlords, ancestral trusts, and religious trusts in the Huangxiang area. These levies encouraged landlords to hide their money in cellars.

Interest on Grain Loans. The interest on grain loans is much higher than that on money loans. It is the most sinister way in which rich peasants and well-off middle or small landlords exploit poor peasants. Most high-interest loans are made in December and March. Poor peasants borrow in December to celebrate New Year's and in March to sow seeds. No matter when they borrow, the loan has to be repaid in June when the early rice is harvested. The interest is 50 percent of the principal (repaying a principal of 1 *dan* with 1.5 *dan*) (three measures *[luo]*). A loan with 50 percent interest for six months or three months is a most terrible loan.

Early rice is harvested in June. After paying the rent for the use of the field and repaying the grain loan, poor peasants eat the remainder by August and have to borrow grain again from landlords or rich peasants. Poor peasants borrow 1 *dan* of grain in August and have to pay back 1.2 *dan* of grain in October. In other words, the interest is 20 percent for about two months. If a poor peasant cannot repay the loan, he has no option but to talk it over with the creditor: "I have nothing left to repay your grain loan this year. May I repay it after I harvest my early rice next June?" The creditor answers: "Well, we must calculate the interest in a different way. The 1.0 *dan* of grain borrowed last August is the principal of the loan and has a 5 *dou* interest due by next year, the 2 *dou* that is the interest for the 1.0 *dan* of principal for the period from last August through October should have 50 percent interest too: 1 *dou* by next year. So the total payment should be 1 *dan* 8 *dou* of grain by next June." (The original *dan* had interest of 2 *dou*, plus the interest of 5 *dou* to which was added 1 *dou*, together making 1 *dan* 8 *dou*.) In fact, the total interest payment is 80 percent from June of this year to June of next year. If the borrower cannot repay it the following year, the principal becomes 1 *dan* 8 *dou*, with the 50 percent interest being automatic. If the poor peasant is still unable to repay the loan at the harvest of late rice *[fanzi]*, nor the next year or in subsequent years, the total payment for the loan becomes a huge amount after ten years.

Tea-oil Loan Interest. The tea-oil loan is called "double oil" and is the most odious type of loan. The so-called double oil is found in the southern part of Xunwu *xian*, where there are many hillsides planted with tea-oil plants. There are no double-oil loans in the northern part of Xunwu *xian* because there are no hillsides of tea-oil plants there. Why is it called the double-oil loan? Because a loan of 1 *jin* of oil is repaid with 2 *jin*, 2 with 4, and 4 with 8. This is the double-oil loan. What is its time limit? It is always repaid in September when the tea-oil seeds are gathered, regardless of when the [loan] was made, whether it was made that month or up to a year earlier.

Landlords and rich peasants own hills with tea-oil plants and rent them to poor peasants to cultivate. Then they collect half the harvested tea-oil seeds as rent. The rent is 10 *jin* of oil when a poor peasant harvests 20 *jin* or 30 *jin* when 60 *jin* is harvested. After receiving the rent, landlords and rich peasants usually market 90 percent and lend 10 percent to poor peasants as double-oil loans. When a peasant borrows the tea-oil, the lender always says the tea-oil is his son's or his daughter-in-law's. Sometimes it is true that it is from his son and daughter-in-law's supply of tea-oil. In fact, young people in rich peasant families who have as yet not managed household affairs frequently have their own tea-oil. After the harvest season for tea-oil seeds is over, the youths pick up the tea-oil seeds that have fallen to the ground under the tea-oil plants and then squeeze oil out of those tea-oil seeds. This oil belongs to the youths. This makes it possible for the youths in a rich peasant family to make high-interest tea-oil loans:

"Sir, could you lend me some money?"
"No, I don't have any."
"Some grain."
"No."
"I have nothing to eat. Please lend something to me, anyway."
"How about some of my son's tea-oil."

The interest on tea-oil is so high that no poor peasant wants to borrow it. However, poor peasants have no choice but to take out a tea-oil loan, because neither landlords nor rich peasants are willing to lend them money or grain. Poor peasants can only sell the tea-oil they borrow and then use the money to buy grain to eat.

Sometimes poor peasants want to borrow tea-oil in order to eat. When they have harvested their crops and need cooking oil, they go to the landlord's or rich peasant's house with a bottle to borrow a bottle of oil. They borrow one big bottle of tea-oil in June and repay with two big bottlesful in September. Many poor peasants have no steelyard with which to weigh the tea-oil. Moreover, some poor peasants' wives and daughters-in-law do not know how to use a steelyard. Consequently, it is easier to measure the tea-oil with a bottle than with a steelyard. So they borrow one bottle of tea-oil and repay it with two bottles.

Selling Children. A loan in default for ten years, as mentioned above, is rare. In fact, a lender will seldom allow a borrower to extend his loan for ten years. The lender always forces the borrower to repay the loan as soon as possible and makes a new loan only after the old loan has been cleared up because he is worried about the peasant's ability to repay. Frequently a lender permits the borrower not to pay the interest on a loan for a couple of years, say no longer than three to five years, provided that the borrower repays the principal of the loan on time. By that time the interest has doubled. How does a lender force a borrower to repay a loan? During the harvest season the lender goes straight to

the borrower's cropland with a pair of big baskets and says: "You must give me your crops as repayment for your loan." The only thing that the borrower can do is watch the lender take away his crops. During the harvest season, after paying the rent and loans, "from the top of the plants to the bottom of the roots, there's nothing to eat." In these cases, many peasants wipe their tears with their sleeves.

There is a saying in Xunwu *xian*: "You must repay your loan even if you marry off your daughter or sell your son." Lenders usually shout this out when pressing "terribly stubborn borrowers" for repayment. Their anger builds up because the borrower is unable to repay the loan. Reader, I am not exaggerating in order to expose the evil of the exploiting class in Xunwu. All my survey reports are made carefully without any overstatement. I always doubted that the description of "selling his wife or son" appearing in articles was true. So I carefully questioned peasants in Xunwu to see whether this really happens. The result was careful interviews of three peasants who participated in an investigation meeting. The following happened in their three villages. Liu Liangfan, from Fufushan in Xunwu City District (about 18 *li* from the city) said that his village consists of thirty-seven households divided into five surnames: the Liu, the Cao, the Chen, the Lin, and the Huang. Five households had sold sons *[naizi]*. (The Hakka call their sons *naizi*.) Three of the five households were from the Liu surname group and are related to Liu Liangfan, the chairman of the Xunwu City suburban township soviet. These were the households of Liu Changyu, Liu Changlun, and Liu Changchun. The other two households were those of Lin Fangting and Chen Liangyou. Liu Changyu (Liu Liangfan's uncle) is a carpenter; the other four are tenants. Liu Changyu sold three of his four sons, Liu Changlun sold one of his three sons, Liu Changchun sold one of his two sons, Lin Fangting sold two of his three sons, and Chen Liangyou sold half of his one son. All five households had become bankrupt with nothing left; consequently, they had to sell their sons to repay their debts and buy food. The buyer was either a nearby member of the gentry of the same surname as the seller or a rich peasant. There are more gentry buyers than rich-peasant buyers. The price of a boy ranges from a minimum of 100 *yuan* to a maximum of 200 *yuan*. When making this transaction neither the buyer nor the seller call this business "selling"; rather they call it an "adoption." But the world in general calls it "selling a child." An "adoption contract" is also commonly called a "body deed." An "adoption contract" might read:

> X writes this adoption contract. Because he is too poor to feed his children, who have a crying need for food, and because he cannot borrow money, on the advice of his relatives and friends, he would rather give his (first, second, etc.) son to his brother, X, as a son. The biological father will get . . . *yuan* in payment for his son. After adoption, the adoptive father has all rights to teach and to control the marriage of the adopted son; he can even beat him. But the biological father has no right to interfere. Both parties voluntarily agree, without coercion, with the contents of this contract, and no party will change his mind in the future. Because words are unreliable, we have written this contract as evidence.
>
> Matchmaker A (signature)
> B (signature)
> C (signature)
>
> Relative A (signature)
> B (signature)
> C (signature)
>
> Friend A (signature)
> B (signature)
> C (signature)
>
> Biological father of the boy (signature)
> Biological mother of the boy (signature)
> Biological older brother of the boy (signature)
> Biological younger brother of the boy (signature)
> Day Month Year

Only the seller writes up a contract; the buyer writes nothing. The so-called matchmakers are go-betweens. At most there are four or five of them [per transaction], who share a fee for services rendered amounting to 5 percent of the selling price. More than ten relatives and friends might be present and are paid a "signature fee" by the buyer. When a close relative or influential person (most are members of the gentry) signs his name to the adoption contract, the signature fee is high, from more than 10 to 20 *yuan*. But the fee paid to ordinary relatives and friends is less than 1 *yuan*. The ages of the boys sold range from three or four *sui* to seven and eight *sui* to thirteen or fourteen *sui*. After the deal is made, the matchmakers carry the boy on their backs to the buyer's house. At this moment the biological parents of the boy always weep and cry. Sometimes couples even fight with each other. The wife scolds the husband for his uselessness and his inability to feed his family, which have forced them to sell a son. Most of the spectators weep too. When Liu Changyu sold his son, for example, his nephew Liu Liangfan was one of those who wept for Liu Changyu. Now let us talk of Li Dashun's story. He was the second of our peasant friends to attend the investigation meeting. He comes from the large village of Huangsha, in Shuangqiao District, with four hundred households. He personally witnessed five cases of households in his village selling a son. Each of the five households sold one boy. When one boy was sold to someone in the Bachi area in Pingyuan *xian*, Guangdong, Li Dashun came across the father, carrying his baby on his back, going in the direction of Bachi. The father had tears on his face and was ashamed when he realized an acquaintance could see he was selling his son. Why did he sell his son to someone in the Bachi area in Guangdong? Because the price was

higher. A boy could be sold for 200 or 300 *yuan* there. A child of four or five *sui* brings the highest price because such a child can easily "develop a close relationship." In contrast, the price of an older child, eight or nine *sui* or over ten *sui*, is lower, because it is difficult to develop such a relationship and the boy can easily escape from his adoptive parents. Mei Zhiping, the third of our peasant friends who attended the investigation meeting, is a peasant in Lantian Village in Shuangqiao District. The selling of children happened in his village also. His uncle, Mei Hongpo, is an extremely poor peasant. He has three sons: one went abroad to Southeast Asia, one is living with him, and the other was sold to someone in Pingyuan *xian*. In the neighboring village of Anjing, the poor peasant Mei Chuanhua sold five of his seven sons. Here were only three people—Liu, Li, and Mei—at the investigation meeting, but in their own villages so many people had sold their children. One of the three people, Liu, comes from the northern half of this *xian*; the other two come from the southern half of the *xian*. Therefore, we can easily imagine the situation in the *xian* as a whole. Based on their knowledge of the places they are familiar with, they estimate that 10 percent of the households in the *xian* have sold their sons. Liu Liangfan told us that he had seen of, or heard about, more than a hundred boys being sold in the vicinity of his village.

It is common to sell a boy, but no one has heard of wives or daughters being sold.

On hearing that a borrower has sold a son, lenders will hurry to the borrower's house and force the borrower to repay his loan. The lender will cruelly shout to the borrower: "You have sold your son. Why don't you repay me?" Why does the lender act like this? Because it is a critical point for his loan. If the borrower does not repay his loan after selling his son, the lender knows that he will never have another chance to get his loan back once the money is used up. Therefore, he considers only how to force the borrower to repay the loan without regard for anything else.

The old society was truly a society of man eat man!

Establishing a Savings and Loan Association. The purpose of establishing a savings and loan association is for mutual help, not to exploit the other members in it. A person might invite his relatives or friends to establish a savings and loan association in order to pay for wedding expenses, engage in business, pay burial expenses, or repay a debt. However, since such associations as the month association, the double-year association, and four-season association have a strong tendency to make money, the result can be exploitation of the peasants.

The one who organizes the association (association head) is seldom a person who is utterly destitute but is rather a middle peasant or a small merchant. Rich peasants do not need to take part in such associations. The utterly destitute cannot establish an association because no one will join it. Only semiowner peasants and tenants with their own draft animals and plows, owner-peasants,

and small merchants not in danger of bankruptcy can invite people to join an association and have people come.

There are five kinds of associations: permanent associations, half-year associations, month associations, four-season associations, and double-year associations.

Permanent associations consist of six people, and one cycle lasts six years. Ten *yuan* is collected from every member but the organizer, who receives 50 *yuan*. In the first cycle there is "no principal but there's interest." [Interest rates are:] 30 percent for the first three years (15 *yuan* for each year, for a total of 45 *yuan* in three years); 25 percent for the next two years (12.5 *yuan* for each year, for a total of 25 *yuan* for two years); and 20 percent for one year (10 *yuan*). In the first cycle, the interest payments for six years total 80 *yuan*. The rules for the second cycle are the same as those for the first cycle, except that the interest decreases each year. For example, the recipients in the second cycle pay 30 percent interest for the first two years (15 *yuan* each year for a total of 30 *yuan*); 25 percent [for the next two years] (12.5 *yuan* for each year for a total of 25 *yuan*), and 20 percent for one year (10 *yuan*). The total interest is 65 *yuan*. The interest rate for the third cycle is much less than that for the second cycle. The saying the "first cycle loses face whereas the second cycle gets benefits" means that although the first cycle has economic advantages, the organizer has to beg people to join his association [before he gets it]. In the second cycle, however, one gets benefits, though a bit less, without begging.[92]

92. These savings and loan associations, also known as "rotating credit societies" or "cooperative credit clubs," provided money for unexpected large capital outlays. Each member had one chance, or turn, during the life of the association, to receive money from the others. The longer one waited, the lower the interest rate on funds received. In Mao's example, the association organizer received 50 *yuan* at the beginning of the association's existence. At the next meeting, a year later, another member would receive a sum of money provided by the others. The organizer would pay 15 *yuan*, and the others would pay the regular 10 *yuan*. Thus, the second recipient would receive 55 *yuan*. The first six-year cycle would proceed as follows (italicized figures indicate amount received):

Member	*Start*	*Year 1*	*Year 2*	*Year 3*	*Year 4*	*Year 5*	*Year 6*
Organizer	*50*	15	15	15	15	15	15
Member 2	10	*55*	15	15	15	15	15
Member 3	10	10	*60*	15	15	15	15
Member 4	10	10	10	*65*	12.5	12.5	12.5
Member 5	10	10	10	10	*67.5*	12.5	12.5
Member 6	10	10	10	10	10	*70*	10
							80

At the end of the first six-year cycle, the organizer, who received 50 *yuan* at the outset, had paid out 90 *yuan*. Therefore, he paid interest of 40 *yuan*, spread over six years. The last member paid only 60 *yuan*, but received 70, thus implicitly receiving interest of 10 *yuan*. The second cycle would begin with an initial fund of 80 *yuan*, which, as Mao points out, represents the total of all reinvested interest payments for the first cycle. Interest

The interest rates for half-year associations change each half-year. The number of association members can be as few as eight, nine, ten, or eleven or more than twenty. The system of "no principal but there's interest" does not work in a half-year association. Instead, accounts are cleared up among each member of the association once each six months. (No data for month associations, double-year associations, and four-season associations.)

Exploitation Through Taxes and Levies

Money and Grain:

Land Tax. The total tax revenue in the *xian* was 1,424 ounces of silver. A liability of one ounce of silver in regular taxes could be met with three silver dollars. The supplementary tax was 0.34 *yuan*. In fact, the land tax was collected in the form of rice, not money. Eight *shao* of grain were collected per *dan* of yield. (10 *shao* = 1 *ge*; 10 *ge* = 1 *sheng*.) According to the exchange rate, one *sheng* of land tax grain equals 0.642 ounces of silver and one ounce of silver equals 3.24 silver dollars, [so] 0.2 silver dollars *[dayang]* were collected from a 1-*dan* field. It was said that long ago Yang Xiaoyuan, a jail warden *[dianshi]* in Anyuan went to the capital city of Beijing to see the emperor. On meeting the emperor, he put a plate on his head and held a piece of paper in his hand. There were many liquor cups on the plate, which represented Anyuan and Xunwu *xian*, where there are many hills and mountains but few fields. On the paper he petitioned the emperor to reduce the land tax, with such words as "in ten thousand *qing* [1 *qing* = 16.5 acres] of mountains there is only a thread's width of land where it is possible for people to grow crops." The emperor flew into a towering rage and roared out: "You are such a low-ranking official that you should not be reporting directly to me. Not only do I disagree with you; I would also like to cut your head off." But after he read the paper, especially the paragraph that included "in ten thousand *qing* of mountains there is only a thread's width of land where it is possible for people to grow crops," the emperor said: "The words in the paper sound reasonable." So he approved a land tax reduction. Since then, the land tax in Anyuan and Xunwu *xian* has been lighter than in other *xian*. And to this day,

payments totaled 92.5 *yuan*, of which 2.5 *yuan* and 10 *yuan* were paid to members 5 and 6, respectively, and the remaining 80 *yuan* formed the initial fund for the beginning of the second cycle. See also James Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*, 5th ed. (Shanghai: Kelley & Walsh, 1925), pp. 596–605. The associations were often identified by the periods of payment: fortnightly, monthly, quarterly, or annually (p. 597). Ball makes the illuminating remark that these associations were at once a borrowing club and a lending club (p. 601).—RT.

the landlords and rich peasants in the two *xian* still hold a memorial ceremony for Yang with incense and candles at the end of each year's harvest. You can see temples to Yang in both *xian*.[93]

State Rent. All land in Huangxiang District, part of Sanbiao District, and part of Xunwu City District is owned by the state. The land is called state land *[guantian]*. The government does not collect land tax from state land but rather "state rent" *[guanzu]*, which totals about 940 ounces of silver each year. The state rent rate is nine to ten times heavier than the land tax and is about 0.2 *yuan [xiaoyang]* per *dan*. How did this land become state land? In the Ming dynasty there was a very powerful rebel, Ye Kai, who made his base in Huangxiang District for many years and fought against the emperor. But finally the emperor overcame him through a stratagem and took over all of Ye Kai's land. This land became state land. It was illegal to buy and sell state land, and transfers could be effected only under the guise of rent, the so-called *dingtui* between tenants of state land. Ye Kai's subordinates had occupied Sanbiao District, and so the story behind the state land in Sanbiao is the same as in Huangxiang. As for the small pieces of state land in the City District, these came from the expropriations of the land of those in the town who broke the emperor's law.

Total. In total, the land tax and the state rent should yield 2,360 ounces of silver, which is equal to about 7,640 silver dollars at the exchange rate of one ounce of silver for 3.24 silver dollars. However, because of (1) natural disasters like erosion and flooding, (2) the fact that some residents have moved out and others were without offspring, and (3) the fact that some taxpayers were too poor to pay tax or rent, the local government lost 20 percent of the figure. In fact, about 6,100 silver dollars were collected.

Bitterness. As mentioned above, a sum of only about 6,100 silver dollars was collected each year. But the *xian* government needed more than 10,000 silver dollars each year for public expenditures on administration, justice, prisons, and public welfare. There was a big gap between revenue and expenses. Consequently, all those appointed as officials in Xunwu felt that life in Xunwu was very bitter and, as a result, collaborated with the local gentry to make up a variety of pretexts to oppress the poor people in the area in order to get money. The collection of the taxes on tobacco, liquor, and slaughtering was controlled directly by the provincial government, not the *xian* government. The latter was able to administer only the land tax.

93. The story was part of the oral and written tradition in Xunwu. A record of shrines dedicated to Yang (Yanggong ci) can be found in the 1881 edition of *Changning xianzhi, "Yiwen," 4: 19a–21a*.—RT.

Customary Fees. The Money and Grain Collection Department in the local government charged several customary fees. The first was the discount *[yinshui]* in the exchange rate; the person in charge of the Collection Department would get a cut of 5 to 10 percent of the money he handled. For example, the chief of the Collection Department might decide that one silver dollar *[dayang]* was equal to 1.25 *yuan [xiaoyang]*, when the official exchange rate was 1.2 *yuan*. So he could rake off more than 300 silver dollars when he collected a little over 6,100 silver dollars in land taxes and state rents each year. These discounts were the biggest way in which taxpayers were exploited by the Collection Department. The chief of the Collection Department had no salary at all and could survive only on discounts and other customary fees. The second fee was called the land transfer tax [lit., the after severance present] (also called the "severance grain" present). When anyone sold land, he had to pay a land transfer tax of 0.2 *yuan* to the Collection Department. Each year some six hundred households sold land. The Collection Department would get 120 *yuan* from that. The third was the [land deed] recording fee [lit., present]. When someone sold land, he had to pay not only the land transfer tax, but also the deed fee. He had to take the land deed to the Collection Department and have an official deed (issued by the Tax Collection Bureau) made. A recording fee of 0.2 *yuan* was charged to transcribe the information on the land deed onto an official deed. Each year the amount collected was the same as the land transfer tax. The fourth was the receipt fee, namely, the money collected from grain-tax receipts. The Collection Department got 0.03 *yuan [xiaoyang]* for each grain-tax receipt, or a total of 60 *yuan* from two thousand grain-tax receipts each year. All income from the four customary fees mentioned above belonged to the government *[gonggong]*, except for the discounts. When a new magistrate arrived and started his tour of duty, the chief of the Collection Department always gave him a present of twenty to thirty silver dollars. The money was called *diangui*. This meant the chief of the Collection Department hoped to be reappointed by the new magistrate. In addition, the Collection Department had to present the festival fees (for the Dragon Boat festival) and the New Year's fee not only to the magistrate but also to the section chief of the Tax Collection Bureau in the *xian* government. The former could receive things, whereas the latter received money (ten to twenty silver dollars). These expenses were derived from customary fees.

The People Who Are in Charge of the Money and Grain. Three people—Liu Shihui, Liu Meifang, and Huang Shaotang— were in charge of the Money and Grain Collection Department since the beginning of the Republic. They controlled the tax registers and worked hand in glove with the magistrate. Their position was hereditary. They voted one of their number in as chief, and the others automatically became assistants. When the Red Army attacked and occupied the town, they fled with all the books.

The Tobacco and Liquor Stamp Tax. The revenue from the taxes on tobacco and liquor in Xunwu *xian* was 60 *yuan [xiaoyang]* a month for each, or a total of 120

yuan. A merchant had contracted to collect the taxes and had established a tax bureau inside the North Gate. Once a month he went out and collected taxes in sixteen market towns: Chengjiang, Jitan, Sanbiao, Shipaixia, Liuche, Chetou, Niudouguang, Zhucun, Huangtangdu, Gongping, Huangxiang, Zhonghe, Cenfeng, Maoping, Longgang, and Shangping. He collected the tax from vendors selling liquor and every shop selling tobacco. He collected the taxes in accordance with the regulations from crooked vendors, but forced upright vendors to pay much more. He made 80 *yuan* each month based on the difference between the 120 *yuan* he had contracted to pay the government and the 200 *yuan* he actually collected. The tax bureau employed two clerks and one cook. The tax farmers were always from Ganzhou.

The Slaughter Tax. The collection of the slaughter tax was also contracted out. The amount that person contracted to pay the government was 80 *yuan*, but the actual money he collected was more than 150 *yuan* per month. So he could clear about 70 *yuan* each month. The slaughter tax farmer also established a bureau and employed one clerk and one cook. The clerk not only served the tax farmer, but also helped him to collect the tax. One-third of the 150 *yuan* came from the three butchers in Xunwu City. The slaughter tax farmers were also from Ganzhou. Although by law any rural resident had to pay a slaughter tax when he killed a pig for food, it was impossible for the tax farmer to uphold the law to the letter. He was actually able to collect the tax only from butchers with permanent slaughtering places in marketplaces.

Business Protection Tax. This was a local tax and was also called a sales tax. The funds for the Guomindang and the Pacification and Defense Militia came from the sales tax. Sometimes when the Public Security Bureau had a shortage of money, a certain percentage of the sales tax would be appropriated for it. The Sales Tax Bureau was under the Tax Collection Bureau and had established three branches, in Jitan, Pangu'ai, and outside the North Gate. There was a tax on all goods in transit, such as cooking oil, salt, rice, beans, chickens, ducks, oxen, pigs, sheep, dogs, marine products, general goods, and textiles. The tax payment started at 0.05 *yuan* and rose to a maximum of 0.5 *yuan*. Goods from nearby rural areas that were sold in small amounts—cakes, fruit, firewood, and [items] made from bamboo or wood—that were not being shipped elsewhere were tax free. In other words, everything shipped long distance was taxed. Since the development of the mass movement in the southern part of the *xian*, in areas like Liuche and Niudouguang, the Sales Tax Bureau was unable to open a branch there to collect the tax. Anyway, the three branches collected more than 2,000 *yuan* each month. The branch in Jitan itself once collected more than 2,000 *yuan* in a month, and the branch outside the North Gate once collected more than 800 *yuan* in a month. There used to be no branch in Pangu'ai, but a new branch was opened there recently by Xie Jiayou. Although

the tax was called the "business protection tax," the merchants in fact hated it very much.

Ox Tax. This was collected only in Xunwu City. A total of 1,700 *yuan* was collected each year by a handful of people who contracted to collect this tax. No bureau [was associated with it]. One person emerged as spokesman. For four years he has been He Xuecai, the father of He Zizhen of the New Xunwu faction. Although the tax farmers paid 1,700 *yuan* to the government, they actually collected about 2,300 *yuan*. The ox tax was a local tax and was administered by the *xian* Tax Collection Bureau.

Gambling Tax. The gambling tax was called the "public interest tax" and was collected from gambling houses and brothels. It was a local tax. The gambling tax collector was appointed by the Tax Collection Bureau. (He Zishao did the job for two years.) The income from the gambling tax was 1,100 *yuan* each month from Xunwu City, although on one occasion 1,800 *yuan* was collected there. The gambling tax was also collected from other places in the *xian*. The year before last over 3,000 *yuan* was collected from the entire *xian*. At that time Liu Shiyi[94] sent some soldiers to collect the gambling tax. But Liu Shiyi received 2,000 *yuan* each month from this money, calling it a "protection tax." He did the same thing in every *xian* in southern Jiangxi. Later on, the Southern Jiangxi Native Place Association censured Liu Shiyi before the Jiangxi [provincial] government. Liu was forced to stop doing this. But the other powerful gentry kept doing the same thing as Liu had. This was but one act in the struggle between the powerful gentry and Liu. Many other *xian* had this kind of struggle.

General Income of the Tax Collection Bureau. The annual income was:

Ox tax	1,700 *yuan*
Business protection tax	24,000
Examination hall land rents	2,000
Sojourning Stipend Shrine land rents	3,000
Confucian Temple land rents	300

The total was around 30,000 *yuan* per year. This sum funded the Guomindang, the Pacification and Defense Corps, Tax Collection Bureau, Reconstruction Bureau, Education Bureau, the Rural Reform Bureau, Public Security Bureau, the New Xunwu School (established by He Zizhen and He Tingba), and the Puhua School (in Chengjiang, established by Xie Jiayou and Lan Yuqing). Generally speaking, this bankrolled the eating, gambling, whoring, and drug habits of the gentry and their lackeys.

94. Liu Shiyi was the division commander of the Jiangxi Seventh Independent Division and the brigade commander of the Fifteenth Independent Brigade in 1928.

Contributions and Loans. The [Jiangxi] provincial government forced this *xian* to buy 3,000 *yuan* of government bonds, 2,000 *yuan* of the 2.5 percent Surtax Treasury Bonds,[95] and 1,000 *yuan* of central government bonds, and to lend 4,000 *yuan* for other kinds of loans. In addition, more than 40,000 *yuan* was collected by the warlords who passed through the *xian*, such as Lin Hu, Liu Zhilu, Li Yibiao, Huang Renhuan,[96] Xu Chongzhi, and Lai Shihuang. The *xian* government made assessments on every district, village, and market *[xu]* in the *xian*. Every person in the *xian* who had either a one-*dan* field or business capital in excess of 100 *yuan* shared the responsibility. But the powerful gentry, landlords, and large merchants with political influence, and officials at every level of government did not have to pay. Those who were exempt from collection also tried every method to reduce their relatives' and friends' obligations. Therefore, all the money was collected from the upright small landlords, rich peasants, and other merchants. Furthermore, a service fee, transportation fee, and tea fee were added to the assessments. In addition, for every 1,000 *yuan* originally required, the Tax Collection Bureau would collect 1,200 *yuan* and the district and township governments would add a percentage. They all cashed in on this method. In the rare case when bonds or debts were redeemed by the *xian* from either the provincial government or the warlords, the commanders of the local militia in the towns as well as in every district would gobble it up, and the money never got back to the people. When Wang Ziyuan was general commander of the local militia, for example, he took 1,000 *yuan* that had been intended to repay a debt incurred by the army. The result was that all the lenders in Huangxiang sued him, but in the end they did not get a copper.

Culture in Xunwu

We can say that essentially no women can read, for no more than 300 women in the whole *xian* are literate. The cultural level of men is certainly not low—the southern half of the *xian* is more advanced than the northern half because of more developed transportation facilities and because of the influence of Guangdong. Based on the population of the whole *xian*, the figures are as follows:

95. The 2.5 Percent Surtax National Treasury Bonds were floated by Chiang Kaishek's régime in May and October 1927 in order to raise funds for military expenditures. These bonds were secured by a 2.5 percent surtax on custom duties that was being collected, by the end of 1927, in all treaty ports in China. This surtax on imports had been authorized, in the view of Chinese officials, by the Chinese Customs Tariff signed in Washington on February 6, 1922. See Stanley F. Wright, *China's Customs Revenue Since the Revolution of* 1911, 3rd ed., revised and enlarged with the assistance of John H. Cubbon (Shanghai: Inspectorate General of Customs, Statistical Department, 1935), pp. 345–52.—RT.

96. Li Yibiao was military commissioner for Guangzhou and Huizhou under the Beiyang warlords and the army commander of the Fourth Army of the Guangdong Army before 1925. Huang Renhuan was the commander of the First Division of the First Army of the Guangdong Army before 1925.

illiterate	60 %
literate	40 %
can read 200 characters	20 %
can keep accounts	15 %
can read the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*	5 %
can write a letter	3.5%
can write an essay	1 %
lower primary students	5 % (5,000 people)
higher primary students	8 % (8,000 people)
middle school students	500 people
college students	30 people
returned students	6 people
xiucai	400 people
juren	1 person

(The above percentages are in terms of total population.)[97]

There are more higher primary students than lower primary students because most higher primary students enter directly after studying at private schools. In the whole *xian* there are not more than ten lower primary schools in each district. With seventy schools in seven districts, taking a figure of fifty students in each, there is a total of three thousand five hundred students. In addition there are eighty hybrid[98] lower primary schools that either exist on paper but not in reality or have not even put up a sign. Students in such schools number about one thousand five hundred. Together these two categories total about five thousand people.

There is at least one higher primary school in each district. Shuangqiao District normally has two, although at one time (before the March 25 uprising) it had four. Nanba District has two, but at one time (before the March 25 uprising) it had three. Xunwu City District has two schools (the East School in the city and the Cao Lineage School in Tianbei). At one time Huangxiang District had three schools (before the March 25 uprising). Xunwu City has three (excluding the East School). The whole *xian* normally has thirteen higher primary schools and at the height, that is, around the time of the high tide of the cultural movement

97. In order to make sense of this table, one must assume that the first three subdivisions under the general category "literate" are primary. They define different levels of reading ability, which might be characterized as "minimal," "functional," and "classical" (since the *Sanguo yanyi* [Romance of the Three Kingdoms] is written in *wenyan*), and add up to the total of 40 per cent for literate men. The other subdivisions, which relate to writing ability, schools attended, and traditional degrees obtained, overlap with the first three, and provide additional detail.

98. The expression here translated as "hybrid" means literally "half-old not-new." Mao uses it in reference to schools combining the traditional Confucian curriculum and the Western-influenced curriculum.—RT.

[wenhua yundong] (before the March 25 uprising but after China's Great Revolution), there were eighteen. Normally every school has a hundred students. The oldest have a history of twenty-odd years, from the end of the Guangxu period in the Qing to the present, with a total of about ten thousand students. Of these ten thousand, two thousand have already died. Higher primary school students, for the most part, are children of small landlords, with the children of large landlords and rich peasants each constituting a small part.

This *xian* has had four middle schools, but all have had a short life. The large landlord Uncle Shitcrock of Xiangshan established the Zhichi Middle School in Xiaohang in Xiangshan, which lasted a year. The Shangzhi Middle School (in Qiufang), which lasted half a year, was established by a group of Shuangqiao landlords. In Chengjiang [District] the publicly established Puhua Middle School (in Chengjiang) lasted two years. The Sun Yatsen [Zhongshan] Middle School established by the Revolutionary Faction (in Xunwu City) lasted two months. Together these schools had more than a hundred students, but there were no graduates. Most [current] middle school students attend schools in three places: Mei *xian*, Pingyuan *xian*, and Ganzhou City (each place has around a hundred students). All of them are children of landlords; most of them are from small-landlord families.

College students come mostly from the large- and middle-landlord class. Only five students are from the small-landlord class. Liu Weilu studied one term at Sun Yatsen University in Canton, Liu Weie studied two years at Beijing University, and Kuang Caicheng studied over a year at Beijing Normal University. These three were all Communist Party members. The two Liu were killed during the March 25 uprising. Kuang was a chief of staff of the Fiftieth Regiment of the Red Army and was tortured to death by Xie Jiayou in Chengjiang. Kuang Shifang, who studied for four years at Chaoyang University in Beijing, became ill and died—his thought was revolutionary. Ling Delu studied at Culture University in Beijing for a year and then went to Russia to study, but he did not have enough to live on so he tutored the children of the [Chinese] ambassador to Finland. His thought is revolutionary. These five were able to go to college only because their tuition was provided by their ancestral halls.

The twenty-five college and vocational students from large-landlord families are all reactionaries. The most important are:

He Zizhen: two years of study at a Henan mining school; head of the Xunwu Pacification and Defense Corps.

Lai Shiyuan: two years of study at Beijing Normal Preparatory School; participated in counterrevolutionary activities in Huangxiang.

Liu Hongxiang: two years of study in Beijing at Culture University; a leader of counterrevolutionary forces in Nanba District.

These three people are in Xunwu; the rest are elsewhere and are members of Chiang Kaishek's faction. Of the thirty people who have been to college, 80 percent studied law.

Six people have gone overseas to study:

Pan Zuoqin: a graduate of an English medical school; practices medicine in Shantou.

Qiu Lingyun: although he has been to England and back, he really cannot be considered a returned student; an engineer with a Tianjin mining company.

Qiu Weiwu: a graduate of Imperial University in Japan and a core member of the New Xunwu faction; he fled with He Zizhen.

Gu Ziping: returned to China from Japan after purchasing a diploma; a person who whores and gambles; from Huangxiang; has served as president of the Education Society; he was attacked at a stronghold in Huangxiang by the Red Army and fled.

These four all have large- and middle-landlord backgrounds.

Zeng Youlan: the first to go overseas to study; during the Guangxu period, he went to Japan and graduated from a law course; he served as a judicial official in Fengtian, Beijing, and Hubei; the Sun Yatsen Middle School faction has treated him as their nominal leader; after the defeat of the March 25 uprising, his home was burned; now he is a member of the Reorganization faction.

Kuang Mohan: studied in Japan; refers to himself as a Marxist; is dean at Culture University in Beijing; formed a transportation company in Nanjing along with the large Xunwu landlord Xie Jie.

These two people are neither of large nor of middle landlord background. Zeng is a small landlord who studied in Japan on government money; Kuang is a poor peasant, a graduate of a higher primary school who entered the Nanchang Military School, where someone saw his promise, sponsored him, and gave him money to go to Japan.

There are still four hundred *xiucai* scattered throughout the *xian*. Of the six hundred Gu in the single-surname village of Tangbei in Huangxiang, eleven are *xiucai*. This is the place where *xiucai* are most concentrated. When Gu Bo's great-great grandfather died at seventy *sui*, an imperially sanctioned memorial arch was constructed. Over the arch is inscribed "He personally saw seven generations." On each side is inscribed "His eyes saw five who held the *lingong* degree" and "Twelve *shengyuan* gathered at his knees."[99] This means that at that

99. These inscriptions refer to various Qing civil service examination degrees. *Shengyuan* (the official title for those referred to elsewhere in this text by the popular expression *xiucai*) are represented here by the word "collar" *(jin),* which evokes the so-called Confucian gown worn by scholars in late imperial China. The other inscriptions quoted in the text refer to five men who held either the *linsheng* or *gongsheng* degrees. These degrees were just below the *juren* degree in prestige. Holders of the *linsheng* degree were given stipends and could become powerful and privileged members in their communities. They could compete for a *gongsheng* degree, the receipt of which, in the opinion of Chang Chung-li, marked one's arrival into the ranks of the upper gentry. They could be named to educational or administrative posts. See Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), pp. 17–18, 27–29.—RT. (See also Appendix C to Roger Thompson's monograph.)

time there were twelve *xiucai* among his descendants. In the whole *xian*, the old culture was richest among the Tangbei Gu. They occupied a central position in administration in the past. Among the two thousand people of Chetou Township in Nanba District are nine *xiucai*, which is a lot. Among the fourteen hundred people of Longtu Township in Nanba District are two *xiucai*, which is few. Recently most *xiucai* have not had anything to do, and in the countryside they are called *laotai.* (Within a lineage peasants call the most respected person a *laotai;* he is called *xiansheng* by the local people.) These people are mostly rent-receiving small landlords, but some teach (both old and new curricula) and others make their livelihood by practicing medicine. *Xiucai* are essentially products of the landlord class, but an extremely small number have a poor peasant background. They were nurtured by landlords, studied, and entered school. Xunwu only has one *juren* now: Gu Luping. His father was a farm laborer, and the family had nothing to eat. When he was young, Gu Luping carried small baskets of snacks (sweets, water chestnuts, and salted turnips) for sale. Later, while he was studying, a teacher saw he was bright and would not accept tuition. Thus, he really advanced in his studies. He served as a [Qing] magistrate twice and twice as a provincial assembly representative. In the countryside he is extremely smooth and everyone likes him. On the surface he supported the New Xunwu faction, but at the same time he prohibited his daughter from cutting her hair and he restricted her freedom of marriage. When the land struggle began in the southern half of the *xian*, he opposed it. This time when the Red Army entered and attacked the Gu family stronghold, he advocated surrender.

After the victory of the land struggle in the southern half of the *xian*, every township soviet has built at least one Lenin primary school. Each township usually has two, and in exceptional places (Longtu, Niudouguang) four have been built. Every school has forty to fifty students, which is more than double the number of schools and students during the old days of Guomindang schools. The children say: "If it hadn't been for the land revolution, we wouldn't be able to study." As for higher primary schools, because of a lack of money and teachers (revolutionary intellectuals are busy participating in the struggle), schools have not been opened.

Chapter V: The Land Struggle in Xunwu

The Method of Land Redistribution

There are a few methods for distributing land. The major one is equal redistribution per capita. Only 20 percent of the land in the *xian* was not redistributed. Of

the land already redistributed, 80 percent of the land was reallotted on the basis of equal redistribution per capita, regardless of age or sex. At the beginning of the land struggle, no law existed that could be applied to this situation. The Xunwu *Xian* Revolutionary Committee (the *xian* government) suggested four methods, asking that the district and township soviets summon mass meetings to discuss and choose one method. The four methods are: (1) Equal redistribution per capita. (2) Redistribution according to labor power. Those who have more labor power receive more land and those who have less labor power receive less land. In other words, anyone over four years old and under fifty-five is regarded as one labor unit and receives one share; those who are under four or over fifty-five receive only one-half share.[100] (3) Redistribution according to financial resources. Artisans get less land, and those who do not have an occupation get more. (4) Redistribution according to soil fertility. Those who receive poorer lands receive more; those who get fertile lands get less. In the event, most places chose the first method. Later on, the Xunwu *Xian* Communist Party applied the first method to all districts and was supported by the majority of the poor peasants and the masses. At present about 80 percent of the areas that redistributed land used this method. Within these areas, regardless of age, sex, or labor power, the total amount of land was divided by the number of persons.

Some villages did not redistribute the land to people under four. From those over four all the way to the elderly, those incapable of farming got a 50 percent share or a 70 percent share; the rest received a full share. This was the method practiced in Liuche, Fengshan, Shangqi, and Datong townships, which have a population of about ten thousand.

Some areas redistributed the land equally by the number of persons and then had those who were incapable of farming return part of their share to the soviet; this land was then added to the share of those with greater labor power. (The amounts of shares returned were unequal; each person decided individually.) In the end, persons capable of greater physical labor got more land and those not as capable got less. This method is similar to the second method suggested by the *xian* government. The difference is that peasants returned some part of the land of their own accord after the land was redistributed instead of redistributing the land according to labor power from the beginning. Longtu Township followed

100. Although the editors of *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji* think that the text should actually read "over fourteen and under fifty-five," based on their analysis of the March 1930 "Xingguo Soviet Government Land Law," they decided to leave the text as it appears in the manuscript, i.e., reading "over four and under fifty-five." See *Guangming ribao,* February 12, 1983, p. 3.—RT. (This corresponds to the extremely prudent editorial policy of the Department for Research on Party Literature, which is reluctant to make any emendations at all in the text of Mao's writings, even when there are compelling grounds for doing so, if there is no written source to support such a change.)

this method. In another township, Huangsha, a similar situation occurred, except this time the land was not returned by the peasants of their own accord. When the government saw that some people could not farm the land they had received, it ordered them to return part of the land to the government. The peasants did not complain when asked to return part of the land unless the government forced them to return the fertile part and would not let them return the poor part; then they got upset. The combined population of Longtu and Huangsha is two thousand five hundred.

In addition, there is the free-farming method practiced in Datian Township. Whoever wants to farm can farm, and there is no limit on how much land these people should get. This is because Datian Township experienced a White terror in which nearly a hundred able-bodied men and dozens of elderly people and children were killed. In some cases, entire families were slaughtered. Some thirty people became Red Guards or went to other *xian* to participate in revolutionary work. The population of the township was reduced from eight hundred to six hundred, and much land was left uncultivated. Meanwhile, all the oxen in the township were taken away by the reactionaries. Thus, the land is open, without restriction, to anyone who wants to farm. Farming oxen were [then] fetched from rich households in other townships.

The Question of Redistribution of Hills and Forests

The hills in the *xian*, except for those in Niudouguang Township, still have not been redistributed and are being farmed by the original cultivators. In name, the soviet owns these hills and forests, and the cultivators pay land taxes to the soviet. Why were hills and forests redistributed only in Niudouguang? Because there are many people and little land in that township, and the peasants urgently asked that hill land be redistributed. Many peasants in other villages are also eager for the hills to be redistributed. For example, because the hills are owned by the ancestral trusts in some big lineages, the peasants in the areas outside Xunwu City's North Gate and South Gate and peasants from small lineages have no hill land to farm and are thus pushing to redistribute the hills.

The Question of Redistributing Ponds

The owner is the soviet, but the right of usage goes to the peasants. Pond management rotates annually among families who live around the pond. This method applies to the whole *xian.*

The Question of Redistributing Houses

There was no redistribution of houses. However, people who had fewer houses or whose houses were burned down by the reactionaries were allowed to move

into the houses owned by those who have more houses. Many houses in Shuangqiao and Nanba districts were burned down by the enemy, and those who were burned out moved into the landlords' and rich peasants' houses; some also moved into middle and poor peasants' houses too. This created a problem. The owners of the houses disliked these newcomers giving birth to male infants in their houses. It is believed in Xunwu that if an outsider gives birth to a son in a house, the spirit of the family will be taken away by the newborn and the family's prosperity will decline. There was once a *jinshi* named Zeng Xingsong in Fangtian Township, Shuangqiao District. He was born in his maternal grandfather's house and later became a *jinshi* and an official. People believe that he thus took the good fortunes of his grandfather's family. This is a well-known story throughout the *xian*. After the failure of the March 25 uprising, the wife of the commander of the rebellion in Liuche, Zhong Xiqiu,[101] took refuge at her maternal grandfather's house. Her grandfather worried that she might be in labor soon and told her to leave right away. She finally escaped to a village in Longchuan *xian*, built a hut in the hills, and gave birth to a son there. Although at present most people whose houses are occupied by poor peasants and workers do not dare to oppose openly the latter giving birth to male infants in their houses, they are still resentful of this. The only solution is to change the status of "temporary residence" to "permanent residence"; in other words, to redistribute landlords' houses based on the land redistribution method. This is also a strategy to gain the support of poor peasants and thus shake the foundations of the feudal system.

The Area Standard for Land Redistribution

For two reasons, peasants like to take a small district as a unit and object to taking a large district as the unit within which land redistribution takes place. First, they are concerned that the land in their area will be redistributed to other areas. Because of this, not only will they not agree to take the district as a unit for redistributing land but they also are not inclined to take the township as a unit. What they wholeheartedly want is to take the village as a unit so that village land is redistributed to local villagers. Thus, although 85 percent of the land in Xunwu was redistributed within townships, the majority of the peasants did not support this method even though they did not strongly object. They did not actively disagree because the difference in the quantity of land owned by villages was not so great; hence the peasants suffered only a small economic loss with the application of this redistribution method. In those villages where the differences in the quantities of the land are large, or in villages that cover a large area almost equal to that of a township, the peasants strongly oppose taking the township as a

101. The organization of the March 25, 1928 uprising included a general command post led by Liu Weilu, with Zhong Xiqiu, Gu Bo, Liu Weie, and He Jiachang serving as assistant commanders. Six command posts were established in the *xian*.—RT.

unit. Xunwu City Suburban Township (which is divided into four villages) and Xinzhai Township (divided into two villages) of the Xunwu City District, and Zhucun Township (which is divided into six villages) of Nanba District, all took the village as a unit for redistribution. This type of area was not very common, constituting only about 15 percent of the *xian*. The other reason is that the peasants disliked moving. They did not want to move from district to district, or from township to township. "Whenever you move, you need a basket of grain" means that in moving one suffers great losses. In addition, the peasants have a blind faith in geomancy and consider it unlucky to abandon their ancestors' tombs. The peasants believe that geomancy is good for production. Peasants value familiarity with their fields and accustomed living arrangements. In leaving all this and moving to another township, they suffer a sense of loss without knowing why. Also, for geographical reasons some people are not willing to move. For example, owing to Chetou's convenient location, commerce flourishes there. People do not want to move to out-of-the-way places (even though these places are still in the same district and only a dozen or so *li* away). This can be regarded as an economic factor too. It is wrong to think that these peasants' localism is simply old-fashioned thinking, and it is also a mistake to regard this type of thinking in psychological terms instead of economic terms.

Vagrants Who Live in the Outskirts of Xunwu City Ask to Share in Land Redistribution

The peasants in Xunwu City received the least land during redistribution. Every person got land yielding 1 *dan* 8 *dou* [of grain]. This is the smallest amount of all the districts in the *xian*. There were fewer peasants than in other districts, yet many vagrants and prostitutes who did not farm also asked to share in land redistribution, thus reducing the amount of each share. Those prostitutes who had lovers ran away with them; those who did not have lovers asked to share in the land redistribution. They said, "There's no business; we will starve to death if we don't get our share of redistributed land." People criticized them for not being able to farm. They replied, "We can learn how to farm." In fact, they are farming in the fields already. Most of the vagrants and prostitutes have received some land. Among the vagrants, some have the ability to farm, whereas others have sons or a small bit of capital. Some prostitutes have husbands or sons. Those with a number of family members are even more earnest in asking for redistributed land. Without it, they might have created a disturbance. Under these circumstances, the government distributed some land to them. Those inveterate vagabonds and prostitutes who had absolutely no ability to farm still have not been given any land. In the outskirts of Xunwu City, 60 percent of the vagrants received land; the remaining 40 percent had no knowledge of farming.

The Quantity of Land Per Person and the Supplement for Living

The peasants in the suburban area got the least land. Each person got only 1 *dan* 8 *dou* per *dang*. (There are two crops a year; each crop is called a *dang.)* Peasants in the four wards of the Xunwu City District got a little more. Each person got over 3 *dan*. Shuangqiao District had the highest allotments. Each person got over 7 *dan* per *dang*. In Longtu and Hejiao, each person got 7 *dan*. In most places each person got 5 *dan* per *dang*. Daily rice consumption is 1 *jin*, or 360 *jin* a year. One hundred eighty *jin* equals 1 *dan*, and 2 *dan* of [hulled] rice equal 4 *dan* of [unhulled] grain. When redistributing the land, wet grain (that is, *maogu*) is always taken as a unit. Each *dang* produces 5 *dan* of wet grain, two *dang* a year equals 10 *dan*. Ten *dan* of wet grain yield 8 *dan* of dry grain. Four *dan* are consumed, leaving 4 *dan*, of which 3 *dan* of grain are made into rice cakes and rice wine. The rest is insufficient for daily expenses, such as clothes, oil, and salt, and for social intercourse (e.g., weddings, funerals, and festivals). In this case, how do people manage to make up the difference? Raising pigs, chickens, and ducks; growing some vegetables (in the suburbs of Xunwu City), sugarcane, bamboo, and miscellaneous crops (like sweet potatoes, taro, chestnuts, soybeans); and also making handicraft products (all kinds of articles made with rounded wood and with bamboo, such as wok lids, buckets, rice containers, foot basins, urine buckets, water dippers, bamboo chairs, straw rainhats, winnowing fans, rice sieves, bamboo scoops, fire grates, bamboo baskets, and other items. Most of the peasants do this as sideline work; very few of them do it as an occupation. Some peasants even make desks, benches, chairs, and tables). Some work as porters (carrying rice, salt, soybeans, oil, and miscellaneous crops; they all are hired by other people to carry these things, mostly rice and salt; the rest of those things being less common); run small businesses (like selling oil, salt, rice, soybeans, pigs, chickens, and even rice cakes, etc.); and also working for the capitalists (picking mushrooms and tea, making paper). Everyone does one or two of the above as sideline occupations in order to supplement his income. In general, income from land constitutes two-thirds of a family's income, and the miscellaneous income makes up the remaining third.

The Question of Whether to Have Corporate Land

There is no corporate land. During the meetings, the peasants were very eager to redistribute all the land; no one ever suggested keeping some of the land as corporate land. Because of the high population density and the scarcity of land, there is barely enough land for the peasants to feed themselves, not to mention that some of the peasants still do not have enough land. Who would agree that the government should still allow corporate land?

The Speed of Redistribution

After the uprising, land in the northern part of the *xian* was redistributed very quickly. For instance, from the insurrection and taking of Xunwu City to the completion of redistribution took the Xunwu City District only twenty days. Chetou and Longtu in Nanba District and Shangping in Sanshui District accomplished the redistribution at an even faster rate. They finished the investigation within one day, completed calculations within two days, promulgated the results for a day, and then spent the rest of the time determining the division of each share of redistributed land according to the principle of "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" [i.e., taking land away from those with more than the average share and giving it to those with less than the average share]. In such cases, it takes at least one week **because the real struggle is in using the principle of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce.** This type of struggle is the peasants' struggle against landlords and rich peasants. Those who have plenty of land and need to have land taken away do not want to give away the fertile part. Those who lack land do not want to accept the poor part. Thus, it takes time to mix them well. Most of the southern part of the *xian* (except Chetou and Longtu) experienced a rather slow redistribution. Since last February [1929], there has been an armed struggle in the Shuangqiao area. However, it was not until the end of November that the *xian* Revolutionary Committee was established and the statistical forms for the land investigation were distributed. After a month the investigation was still incomplete because of improper methods. The investigation forms contained innumerable items (population, class status, cultural level, ethnicity, age, land ownership, land boundary, land area, yearly harvest), including some that did not need to be investigated. On top of that, the procedure was quite inconvenient. (The *xian* Revolutionary Committee first distributed the investigation forms to each township, and then each township returned the completed forms to the *xian* Revolutionary Committee for review.) This slowed the speed of redistribution. In January of this year the method was changed. The investigation forms contained only a few simple items: the name of the household head, total number of family members, how many family members can farm, how many make a living in commerce or industry, the quantity of land, and the quantity the household should get. The investigation procedure was as follows: the township government convened a "conference on the redistribution of land." Each household sent one delegate to discuss the method of redistributing land. Then the conference investigations began. (Many tables were set up at the conferences, and representatives from each village sat at tables and took down the information that people reported.) The forms were turned in to the township governments, which checked and ratified this information and then figured out the amount for each person by dividing the total quantity of land by the total number of persons. The results were then announced. Thus, it took only

four days from the investigation to the announcement (one day for investigation, two days for checking, and one day for announcing). It remained, then, to redistribute the land. This was started on the fifth day. Each township government sent out a dozen or so political instructors *[zhidaoyuan],* who fanned out to all the villages to investigate whether the land was fertile or infertile and to confirm whether the reports made by the peasants on the first day of the investigation were true or false. Based on the investigation, redistribution was then carried out. The most troublesome work was applying the principle of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce and in determining the boundaries of the land. This is where the struggles occurred. This aspect of redistribution takes about a week to complete. Nevertheless, with the application of this method, the whole procedure of investigation and redistribution takes only two weeks. The northern part of the *xian* later applied this method.

Fairness

Frequently discussed issues at many land redistribution conferences included whether the township or the village should be taken as a unit, whether the standard of redistribution should be the number of persons or labor power, and how fishponds, gardens, and embankments should be redistributed. (There was no discussion of the redistribution of hills, forests, and houses.) Making a false report was strictly forbidden, but how should those who make a false report be punished? There was no need to discuss confiscation standards at all because, without any written orders, whenever people see the red flag, they know that confiscation has been announced. The simple question is how to redistribute this massive amount of land. Apparently, dividing the total quantity of land by the total number of persons was the most direct and equitable land redistribution. It also was supported by the majority of the masses. The minority who did not approve of this method (landlords and rich peasants) was frightened by the power of the masses and did not dare say a word. In other words, the word "fairness" contains the meanings of confiscation and redistribution.

Those People Who Resist the Fair Redistribution of Land

A small landlord named Liu in Fengshan Township, Shuangqiao District, hoarded his own fertile land and turned only poor land over to the government. When the masses tried to force him to turn over his fertile lands, he replied with indignation, "Over my dead body!" The township government could not solve the problem. The *xian* government sent someone to Fengshan to bear down on him, and then he turned over the land. There were other small landlords and rich peasants in Niudouguang, Nanba District, who failed to turn over their land. The township government was afraid of them and did not take any action. It was not until the *xian* government sent someone to summon a mass meeting that these

small landlords and rich peasants were forced to give in. In Datian Township, Shuangqiao District, the house of a small landlord, Mei Yuankun, was burned down by the reactionaries. Mei considered this to be his contribution to the revolution. When the masses wanted him to distribute his land, he replied with vicious abuse, "Redistribute my land, but chop my head off first!" The masses informed the *xian* government, which had the district government arrest him. The person in charge in the district government, Mei Lisan, is a Communist who also is a member of Mei Yuankun's lineage. He covered up this mistake for him. Mei Yuankun later denied having said such a thing, and his land was redistributed. Another case involved the person in charge of the government of Huangtangdu Township, Shuangqiao District, a certain Lin, and the person in charge of the Xuxi Township government, also named Lin (he is also a Communist); both received fertile lands in the land redistribution. The masses cried, "The persons in charge got fertile lands, and we got poor lands." Being upset with this, the masses became apathetic in the land struggle. The *xian* therefore took the fertile land from those two people and redistributed it to the masses, to their satisfaction. Except for Mei Yuankun, who opposed the confiscation of his land, the others mentioned above argued over the redistribution of fertile and poor land rather than the confiscation of land. The masses did not consider confiscation of rich peasants' land an issue. It was the issue of who got fertile land and who got poor land that concerned them. And that is the heart of the land struggle, as is the struggle between the rich peasant and the poor peasant.

Total Redistribution of the Original Farming Land

The principle of "the township as a unit" was applied to the population and not to the land. The land cannot be divided by district. People from Township A farm land in Township B; Township B's people farm land in Township A; people from one township might farm land belonging to a neighboring district. The boundaries between districts, *xian*, and provinces are all crisscrossed by peasants when farming. So that when the people of one township totaled up the land they farmed in their township and in neighboring areas and then redistributed it equally, this was considered a reasonable act. The land redistribution was carried out this way too.

How to Take Care of the Land If the Insurrection Occurred After the Rice Seedlings Had Been Transplanted

There are three ways of dealing with this issue. The first one is the method being carried out in the northern part of Xunwu *xian.* (The land redistribution in the southern part of Xunwu occurred before the rice seedlings had been transplanted. Therefore, this problem did not exist.) The first crop (also called early rice) goes to the original cultivator, and the second crop (also called late rice) goes to the new cultivator. In this way, the rich peasant does not suffer a loss. However, the poor peasants with less land and those who do not farm, such as landlords and

vagabonds, were not satisfied, especially because they felt that they had no financial resources. If the landlords cannot collect land rents, they have no grain. Vagabonds no longer had a means of livelihood since gambling had been abolished, and there was no one to borrow money from. The second way is to have the new cultivator reimburse the original cultivator for the first crop. This method also offers two standards for reimbursement, one of which is less than the other. The original cultivators were naturally not contented if they thought the subsidy was too little and were happy with a greater subsidy. This situation provoked general criticism among the poor peasants and vagabonds. Some even said, "There are so many big landlords who are flat broke nowadays and you are still trying to hold onto that tiny bit of property!" No written law in Xunwu recognizes this method; the peasants adopted it themselves. In the Xunwu City District, poor peasants who did not have enough to eat offered a small sum of money to the rich peasants, and demanded that they let them have a part of the first crop. This was actually quite common. The third method is that no matter what the state of the crop, whoever got the land gets the harvest. Some parts of Pingyuan *xian*, Guangdong, adopted this method.

Should Nonpeasants Get Redistributed Land?

In Xunwu City vagabonds with the ability to farm were allowed to receive redistributed land, and those who did not possess any farming ability did not get a share of land. Since districts other than Xunwu City had few vagabonds, all of them were allowed to get redistributed land. Artisans, merchants, and students without a stable income got redistributed land. In Xunwu City and in large townships, people who had a stable income did not get a share; those who did not have enough income got some part of the land as a supplementary source for their livelihood. Not only did Red Army soldiers and revolutionaries get land but the soviet also mobilized peasants to farm the land for them. Landlords shared in the redistribution if they lived in the township. Buddhist monks, Daoist priests, and Christian pastors were required to change their occupation. If they were no longer monks, priests, or pastors, they could share in the land redistribution. Otherwise, they could not. Because of the small number of fortune-tellers and geomancers, there are no regulations about them; they were generally allowed to share in the land redistribution. There are no monks, priests, pastors, fortune-tellers, or geomancers in the southern part of the *xian* anymore; all changed their occupation. When the father of the chairman of the Huangsha Township government died, the peasants opposed having the monks offer a Buddhist ceremony. There are very few geomancers in Xunwu *xian*; most of them are from Xingguo. There are about a hundred Buddhist monks in the *xian*. Xunwu City has one Protestant church with over two hundred members, and one Catholic church with over one hundred members. Huangxiang has one Protestant church with a hundred members or so; Niudouguang has one Protestant church with seventy to eighty members; Jitan has one Protestant church with about a hundred members;

Chengjiang has one Protestant church with about seventy to eighty members. In the *xian* there are five Protestant churches with about seven hundred members and one Catholic church with over a hundred members. Altogether there are over eight hundred members. The Protestant churches belong to the Americans. There was an American pastor in Xunwu City; Chinese preachers were in charge of the other four churches. The Catholic church belongs to the Germans, with one Chinese priest in charge of it. Members include widows (including poor peasants) and elderly women (landlords' wives) (30 percent); sly and capricious gentry and their families (30 percent); peasants of small and powerless lineages (20 percent—peasants belonging to big and powerful lineages do not convert); and young intellectuals of landlord origins without prospects (10 percent); the remaining l0 percent of members are of all types. These converts can be divided into two groups: the very bad and the very weak. The bad ones are not vagabonds, but they are wicked and crafty local people who want to be strongmen—the church is a means by which to accomplish this. The other group of people are the weak; their purpose is to seek shelter in the church.

The Question of Abolishing Debts

This question is divided into loans and bills of credit. The purpose in abolishing loans was to wipe out highly exploitative loans with interest rates of 20 percent or more. A bill of credit from a merchant was paid if it was made after January 1928. Since no debt carried less than a 20 percent interest rate, all debts were wiped out. Money that was lent without interest and as a favor from relatives and friends was still returned by the masses, but this happened rarely. The merchants had not extended the poor peasants credit; most of the credit was for the rich peasants and some for the middle peasants.

Land Tax

Last year, every *dan* [of yield] was taxed 2 *dou* in land taxes. This was practiced in both Shuangqiao and Nanba districts. In February of this year, the *xian* Revolutionary Committee held an expanded meeting that drew up tax regulations. The land tax was set at 10 percent regardless of the quality of the land. The tax rate is the same as the tax on land rent. This type of taxation makes no distinction about the quality of the land (it is not a progressive tax). In May, the *xian* soviet congress adopted the progressive taxation announced by the Western Jiangxi [Ganxi] Soviet.

Women in the Land Struggle

Women and men are equal partners in production in Xunwu. Strictly speaking, in terms of farming, women's duties are much heavier than those of men. Because certain tasks require physical strength, men are more likely to take charge of plowing and raking the fields and carrying the muck and grain. However, women assist men in carrying the muck and grain, transplanting rice seedlings, weeding fields, uprooting the weeds in the paths between the fields and on the edges of

the fields, turning over the soil, and cutting the grain. But although men help out, women are chiefly responsible for hulling grain, polishing grain, watering gardens, transplanting vegetables, cutting wood, mowing grass, making tea, cooking meals, raising pigs and other domestic animals *[tousheng]* (the six domestic animals are called *tousheng*), washing and ironing clothes, mending clothes, making shoes, sweeping floors, and doing dishes. Besides these tasks, raising children is also a woman's duty; thus, the toil of women is harder than that of men. Women's tasks come one after another, and their work never ends. They are appendages of the male economy (that is, the economy from the feudal economy to the first stage of a capitalist economy). Although men are no longer serfs, a woman is still a man's serf or semiserf, without political rights and personal freedom. No one suffers more than women. As the land struggle developed, many local women bravely participated in it. When the Second Column of the Fourth Army attacked the reactionaries holed up in their stronghold, groups of women from Huangxiang carried wood to burn it. They also seized grain from reactionary landlords. With the victory of their struggle, these women attained self-consciousness. Soon after the establishment of township governments in every township, a number of divorce cases were received. Most of these cases were initiated by women (about 90 percent); very few were started by men (only 10 percent or so). Men were firmly opposed to divorce. A small group of men, on the other hand, became passive. "The revolution wants to get rid of everything, wives included." This is a sigh of resignation, for they cannot stop divorces from happening. This group of men was made up of mostly poor peasants. The majority of men are very opinionated. In Fangtian, the captain of the Red Guards, Zeng Jiaxun, who was married, got involved with another woman. His wife asked for a divorce. He would not agree and told her: "Never can a wife leave this family while she is alive. If you want to get a divorce, then I will kill you first." In Longtu, a rich peasant named Liu Xuesheng refused his wife's request for divorce. He told the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee: "If she wants to divorce me, I will exterminate her. After I exterminate her, I will then die without complaining." This category of men is mostly made up of rich peasants. The policy adopted by the political organs on this issue has been changed four times. The first was based on a resolution of the congress of peasants in November of last year. The resolution did not take a clear stand against a husband's having more than one wife; it allowed a married man to have a lover as long as his wife did not object; the proposed conditions for divorce were not rigid. If one spouse had a disease, if the woman was oppressed, if the husband and wife had a falling out and had not lived together for half a year, or if the man went to another area and had not been heard from for a year—these people were allowed to get divorced. The landlord class could divorce without any conditions. In addition to the legal provisions, it was explicated that no one should try to catch a person in the act of adultery. However, after this was made clear throughout the *xian*, much turmoil occurred between men and women in

the southern part of the *xian*, especially in Longtu and Hejiao (in Nanba District). Armed fights almost broke out between groups of men and women. The reason was that groups of young men from both townships frequently assailed young women of the other township with obscenities. So the women themselves organized women's associations, and with this unity they became more liberal in their behavior when engaging in hard work. (They went to the hills in groups to cut firewood and tended to return home later than usual.) Meanwhile, love affairs between them and their young male friends (from other townships) increased, and couples had dates freely in the hills. People from these two townships are from the same lineage but from different branches. Because the masses, who were against the rule of trying to catch people in the act of adultery, intervened with the people who were involved in doing so, this almost led to an armed fight this January. In addition to this type of incident, there were married people in almost every township and village who had new lovers. The wives rallied together to oppose such affairs. Under these circumstances, the government made another law quite different from the previous one. This February, the enlarged meeting of the *xian* Revolutionary Committee came to a resolution on the "issue of fidelity": "Married men and women are prohibited from having sexual intercourse with a third party; whoever engages in illicit intercourse will be punished severely." At the same time another law was passed to regulate the "lover" issue: "Oppose polygamy and polyandry. [Estranged] husbands and wives who have yet to be divorced cannot have lovers. Those who have made mistakes in the past must separate immediately and unite with only one person." The resolution did not change the policy for divorce cases. Ever since this was promulgated, disputes have stopped. Peasants united together to face the crisis at that time and managed to break the enemy's attack. On May 2 we took over Xunwu City. At the same time, the Fourth Red Army had taken over the reactionary northern part of the *xian* and aroused the masses in Huichang, Anyuan, and Pingyuan to action. In this situation, on May 6, the first soviet congress of the whole *xian* withdrew the fidelity resolution. And even though the congress did not clearly forbid people to catch others in adultery, it no longer talked about "whoever engages in illicit intercourse will be punished severely." With regard to the "lover" issue, this congress adopted the resolution of the meeting in February and continued the policy on divorce of the previous two meetings. However, within one month, a soviet congress in a third area adopted a totally different resolution on the "lover" and divorce issues. Its slogan was "Absolute freedom in divorce and marriage." Naturally, the result is to forbid efforts to catch people in adultery and to ensure the freedom to have lovers. The district that approved this is the district that has had the longest period of struggle in all of Xunwu *xian* (from 1928 to the present) and is also the district that first had capitalism. Its struggle began with the arrival of the Fourth Army and with the development of the struggle in Huichang, Anyuan, Xunwu, and Pingyuan *xian*. When this proposal was mentioned, the person who made the proposal spoke out: "The people

from the Fourth Army said that conditional divorce implies feudal thought." After this speech, the proposal was approved immediately. This [i.e., the marriage policy] is a new issue in Xunwu City District. Although the new government is less than a month old, the question of relations between the sexes has become very turbulent. One of the townships rejected the propagandist *[xuanchuanyuan]* sent by the government, saying: "Comrade, please do not give us any propaganda. With more propaganda, the women in our township will all run away." In fact, the propagandist had come to propagandize about "overthrowing the feudal forces" and "bringing down the village bosses and redistributing land." The divorce and marriage policy was explained according to the regulations. Nevertheless, once the masses are aroused, just as water flows from high hills to low plains, they cannot be reversed. In one township in Xunwu City District, over ten women ran away. Their husbands went to the township soviet and complained tearfully. Heeding their desperate pleas, the township soviet was forced to put up a notice that read: "Young people have misinterpreted the meaning of freedom and hence have run away in the dark of night in pursuit of their lovers and are finding new lovers before divorcing their mates. These are absurd, inappropriate, furtive doings. . . ." This official notice clearly expressed the voice of the older husbands. However, this "incongruous" trend—the trend of a democratic system taking the place of a feudal system—could not be halted.

Women have expressed their appreciation for the land struggle, because it can help dissolve the restrictions on their personal freedom. Regardless of their class, all unmarried young people support the slogan of freedom in marriage. However, married men in the poor-peasant class generally oppose the right to divorce. But their opposition differs from the obstinacy of the counterrevolutionaries. They worry that they will lose their wife's labor and will not be able to farm if their wife runs away. They sigh, "The revolution wants to get rid of everything, wives included." They go to the township government and ask for help. Meanwhile, although they feel annoyed with their wives, they do not dare hit them. The attitude of adult males from the rich-peasant and small-landlord classes is completely different. Their expressed desire to kill their wives if the latter ask for a divorce shows their tendency toward counterrevolutionary attitudes. And why do these adult male peasants oppose the freedom to get a divorce? (They have no objection against marriage freedom.) Apparently, it is because of labor power.

Do male peasants oppose liberating women? No, they do not. Once the whole class is liberated, poor peasants and farm laborers will soon free their women. The reason why they are afraid that their wives will run away is that before the land struggle develops in depth, they cannot fully foresee the outcome of overthrowing the feudal system and exploitation, and they develop such thoughts. As long as the land struggle is developed in depth, their attitudes toward marriage will change greatly.

Oppose Bookism[1]

(May 1930)

I. Without Investigation, There Is No Right to Speak

If you have not investigated a certain problem, you will lose your right to speak on it. Isn't this too brutal? Not in the least. Since you have investigated neither the actual situation nor the historical circumstances of this problem, and have no detailed knowledge of it, anything you said about it could only be nonsense. Talking nonsense can solve no problems, as everyone knows, so is there anything unjust about depriving you of your right to speak? Many of our comrades keep their eyes shut all day long and go around talking nonsense. This is disgraceful for a Communist. How can someone be a Communist, and yet go around with his eyes shut talking nonsense?

This won't do!
This won't do!
Stress investigation!
Oppose talking nonsense!

II. To Investigate Is to Solve Problems

You can't solve that problem? Well, go and investigate its present situation and its history! When you have really investigated it thoroughly so that you understand it, you will have a way of solving that problem. All conclusions emerge at the end of an investigation of the circumstances, not before it. Only a dolt, alone

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This essay was originally entitled "On the Work of Investigation"; "Oppose Bookism" was the title of an earlier and shorter piece on the same theme. After circulating the present version within the Party in 1961, Mao revised it for publication in 1964 in *Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu (jiazhongben)* (Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 1, pp. 17–28. At the same time, he reverted to the title of the earlier article. Since this authorized version, which constitutes the source for our translation, is the only Chinese text available, it seems logical to give it the title which Mao bestowed on it in 1964. The text can also be found in the 1991 second edition of *Mao Zedong xuanji*, Vol. 1, pp. 109–18, and in *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*.

1. In a note accompanying the draft when it was circulated in 1961, Mao explained that "bookism" or "book worship" (*benbenzhuyi*) was simply the term he had used in 1930 for "dogmatism" (*jiaotiaozhuyi*).

or with a small group of people, cudgels his brains to "find a way," or "come up with an idea," without making any investigation. We must know that in this way it is quite impossible to think of a good method, or devise a good idea. In other words, such persons will certainly produce wrong methods and wrong ideas.

Many of those doing inspection work, many leaders of guerrilla units, and many newly assigned cadres delight in proclaiming their political views the moment they arrive. After seeing only a little bit of the surface of things, or one minor detail, they begin to gesticulate and to say that this is not right, and that is wrong. Such purely subjective "talking nonsense" is truly detestable. Such people will assuredly mess things up, lose the support of the masses, and be unable to solve problems.

Many people in leading positions, when they encounter difficult problems, merely heave a sigh and are unable to solve them. They become annoyed and ask for a transfer, on the grounds that "their abilities are too slight, and they cannot do the job." These are the words of a coward. Just get moving on your own two legs, go to every section and locality within your area of responsibility, learn from Confucius to "ask about everything,"[2] and then, however limited your abilities, you will be able to solve problems. For when you have not left your gate, your brain is empty, but when you return it is already empty no longer, it has already brought back all sorts of material necessary for solving problems, and thus problems are solved. Must you go out? Not necessarily—you can summon those people who do know about the situation to an investigation meeting, grasp the "source" of your so-called difficult problem, clarify the "present situation," and thus this difficult problem of yours will easily be solved.

Investigation is like the "ten months[3] of pregnancy," and solving problems is like the "moment of birth." Investigation is solving problems.

III. Against Bookism

The idea that whatever is written in a book is correct persists even today among the culturally backward Chinese peasantry. Surprisingly, when problems are discussed within the Communist Party, there are also people who say, whenever they open their mouths, "Show me where it's written in the book." If we say that the directives of leading organs at higher levels are correct, it is absolutely not simply because they emanate from "leading organs at higher levels," but because their content is in accord with the objective and subjective circumstances of the struggle and corresponds to the requirements of the struggle. To carry out directives blindly without discussing and examining them in the light of the real

2. See the *Analects*, III, XV: "The Master, when he entered the grand temple, asked about everything." (Legge, Vol. I, p. 160.)

3. I.e., ten lunar months, approximately equivalent to nine months of the Western calendar.

conditions, simply because they come from "higher levels," is a formalistic attitude which is quite wrong. If the tactics and line of the Party do not penetrate deeply into the masses, the reason lies in the mischief caused by such formalism. To carry out the directives of the higher levels blindly, and without any apparent disagreement, is not really to carry them out, it is in fact the most artful way of opposing or sabotaging such directives.

The bookist method of conducting research in the social sciences is equally dangerous and may even lead to taking the path of counterrevolution. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in China there are many Communist Party members who carry out social science research exclusively by studying life as described in books, and no small number of them have turned into counterrevolutionaries. When we say that Marxism is correct, it is absolutely not because Marx was some kind of "sage," but because his theories have been proved correct in our practice, and in our struggles. We need Marxism in our struggle. If we welcome this theory, it has nothing whatsoever to do with any formalistic or even mystical notions of a "sage." Many people who have read Marxist "books" have become renegades to the revolution, while illiterate workers have often been able to grasp Marxism very well. We must study the Marxist "books," but they must be integrated with our actual situation. We need "books," but we must definitely correct the bookism which departs from reality.

How can we correct this bookism? Only by investigating the actual situation.

IV. If You Do Not Investigate the Actual Situation, You Will Be Idealist in Your Estimate of Class Forces, and in Your Leadership of the Work, and the Result Will Be Either Opportunism or Adventurism

Do you not believe in this conclusion? Facts will force you to believe in it. Just try to make an estimate of the political situation, and guide the struggle, without reference to concrete investigations. Will this not be empty idealism? Will not such empty idealism in your political estimate and leadership of the work give rise to opportunist or adventurist errors? Most certainly it will cause errors. This is not at all because the person in question has not made careful plans before acting, but because he has not taken care before making plans to understand the real conditions of society. We encounter this constantly in the guerrilla units of the Red Army. Those officers of the Li Kui type,[4] when they observe that their brother soldiers have committed offenses, hand out punishments right and left at random. The result is that the offenders are not convinced they have been fairly treated and stir up all kinds of disputes, so that the leaders lose prestige. Do we not encounter this frequently in the Red Army?

4. Li Kui was one of the heroes of *Shuihu zhuan* (Water Margin), the novel of rebellion in late Song China. He was good-hearted, but notoriously short-tempered and violent.

We must completely rid ourselves of the idealist spirit and prevent the emergence of every kind of opportunist and adventurist error. Only thus can we fulfill the task of winning over the masses and defeating the enemy. We must strive to make real investigations, for only thus can we rid ourselves of the idealist spirit.

V. The Aim of Social and Economic Investigations Is to Obtain a Correct Estimate of Class [Forces], and Following on from That to Decide on Correct Tactics for the Struggle

This is our answer to the question: "Why should we carry out social and economic investigations?" Consequently, the object of our social and economic investigation is the various classes of society, but not all sorts of fragmentary social phenomena. Recently, the comrades of the Fourth Army have, on the whole, all been paying attention to the work of investigation, but many people's methods of investigation are wrong. Consequently the results of their investigations are like posting a bill for dog meat, like a person from the country listening to the many strange tales told in the street, like standing on a high mountaintop and observing the people in a walled city. This kind of investigation is of little use and cannot enable us to attain our principal objective. Our principal objective is to understand the political and economic situation of the various social classes. The conclusion which should result from our investigation consists in a picture of the present circumstances of each class, as well as the history of its ups and downs. For example, when we investigate the composition of the peasantry, we must know not only the number of owner-peasants, semiowner peasants, and tenant peasants, which are distinguished from one another by rent and share-cropping relations, but also, and more particularly, the number of rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor peasants, who are distinguished from one another by class or stratum. When we investigate the composition of the merchants, we must know not only the number in each trade, such as grain, clothing, medicinal herbs, and so on; we must, in particular, investigate the number of small merchants, middle merchants, and big merchants. We must investigate not only the situation of each trade, but more particularly the class relations within it. We must investigate not only the relations among various trades, but above all the relations among various classes. Our principal method of investigation is to dissect the various social classes. Our ultimate goal is to understand the reciprocal relations among the various classes, and arrive at a correct estimate of class forces, so that we can establish correct tactics for the struggle, determine which classes constitute the main force in the revolutionary struggle, which classes constitute allies we must win over, and which classes must be overthrown. This is our sole purpose.

What are the social classes to which we should pay attention when carrying out investigations? They are listed below:

The industrial proletariat
The handicraft workers
The farm laborers
The poor peasants
The urban poor
The vagrants
The master handicraftsmen
The small merchants
The middle peasants
The rich peasants
The landlord class
The commercial bourgeoisie
The industrial bourgeoisie

When we carry out our investigations, we should pay attention to the situation of all these classes (some of them are strata). In the areas where we are working for the time being, only the industrial proletariat and the industrial bourgeoisie are absent; we constantly encounter all the others. Our tactics for the struggle are tactics toward all these numerous classes and strata. Our previous investigations have also had another very great defect: we have concentrated on the villages and not paid attention to the cities, with the result that, from beginning to end, many comrades have been confused about tactics toward the urban poor and the commercial bourgeoisie. The development of the struggle has caused us to leave the mountains for the plains, but though our bodies have long since left the mountains, our thinking is still up there. We must understand the villages, but we must also understand the cities; otherwise, we will be unable to adapt to the demands of the revolutionary struggle.

VI. Victory in China's Revolutionary Struggle Will Depend on the Chinese Comrades' Understanding of Chinese Conditions

The goal of our struggle is the transition from democracy[5] to socialism. The first step in this task is to win over the majority of the working class, rouse the masses of the peasantry and of the urban poor, overthrow the landlord class, overthrow imperialism, overthrow the political power of the Guomindang, and complete the democratic revolution. The development of this struggle will give rise in turn the task of carrying out the socialist revolution. The fulfillment of these great revolutionary tasks is neither simple nor easy. It will depend entirely on whether the tactics of the proletarian party in this struggle are correct and resolute. If the party's tactics are wrong, or wavering and irresolute, the revolution will inevitably suffer a temporary defeat. We must be aware that the bourgeois parties, too,

5. Once again, Mao uses *minquan zhuyi*, Sun Yatsen's term for democracy.

are constantly engaged in discussing tactics. Their problem is how to spread reformist influences among the working class, so as to deceive the working class and detach it from the leadership of the Communist Party. They are also concerned with how to get the rich peasants to put down the uprisings of the poor peasants, how to organize the vagabonds to repress the revolution, and so on. In such a situation, where class struggle at close quarters is constantly becoming more acute, the proletariat can obtain victory only by relying on the correctness and resoluteness of the tactics of struggle of its own party, the Communist Party. A Communist Party's correct and unwavering tactics of struggle can on no account be produced by a small number of people sitting in an office; they can only emerge in the process of mass struggle, that is to say, in the course of real experience. For this reason, we must at all times understand social conditions and carry out practical investigations. Those unwaveringly conservative and formalistic comrades whose heads are filled with empty optimism think that the present tactics of struggle could not be bettered. They believe that the "book of documents"[6] of the Sixth Congress[7] guarantees victory forever, and that so long as you observe the methods laid down there, you can never fail to triumph. Such thinking is totally wrong; it has nothing to do with the ideological line that Communists should create a new situation through struggle, it is a wholly conservative line. If we do not completely discard this conservative line, it will cause great losses to the revolution and will also harm these comrades themselves. Manifestly, part of our comrades in the Red Army are satisfied with the existing state of affairs, do not seek to understand things thoroughly, and are filled with empty optimism. They propagate the erroneous idea that "the proletariat is like this," eat their fill all day, sit in the bureaus dozing, and do not deign to take so much as a step to go out among the masses of society to investigate. Whenever they open their mouths, all they ever utter are those old platitudes people are really tired of hearing. Let us awaken these comrades by calling out to them:

Change your conservative thinking in a hurry!
Replace it with progressive and militant Communist thinking!
Go into the midst of the struggle!
Go among the masses and carry out real investigations!

VII. The Technique of Investigation

1) Hold investigation meetings, and carry out investigation through discussion.

This is the only way you can come close to correct [results], the only way to draw conclusions. Investigations which follow the method of holding no meetings and carrying out no discussions, but simply relying on one person recounting his experience, can easily lead to error. Such a method of merely asking a few questions at random and not raising the basic issues at a proper meeting, where they can be debated, cannot elicit conclusions which are more or less correct.

2) What kind of people should attend the investigation meetings?

They must be people who have a profound understanding of social and economic conditions. As far as age is concerned, old people are the best, because they have a wealth of experience, and not only understand present circumstances, but know about their causes. There must also be young people with experience of struggle, because they have progressive ideas, and are acute observers. As regards occupation, there should be workers, peasants, merchants, intellectuals, and sometimes soldiers or vagabonds. Naturally, when a particular problem is being investigated, those who have nothing to do with it need not attend. For example, workers, peasants, and students need not be present when commerce is being investigated.

3) Is it better to have a large or a small number of people at an investigation meeting?

That depends on the investigator's capacity to preside over the meeting. Those who are good at this can hold a meeting of a dozen, or even twenty-odd people. A large meeting has the advantages of numbers, namely that it enables you to get relatively accurate answers in preparing statistics (for example, in finding out the percentage of poor peasants in the total peasant population), and in drawing conclusions (for example, in deciding whether equal or differentiated land distribution is better). Naturally, a big meeting also has the disadvantages of numbers; those who are not skilled at chairing meetings may find it difficult to keep order. So in the end, how many people attend will be determined by the circumstances of the investigator. There must, however, be at least three; otherwise, you will be handicapped by lack of knowledge and experience, and the information obtained will not correspond to the real situation.

4) Prepare a detailed outline for the investigation.

A detailed outline should be prepared beforehand, and the investigator should ask questions according to the outline, which those present will answer orally. Any points which are unclear or doubtful should be put up for debate. What I call the "detailed outline for the investigation" should have main headings and subheadings. For example, if "commerce" is a main heading, subheadings might include "cloth," "grain," "miscellaneous goods," and "medicinal herbs." Cloth can be further subdivided into "calico," "homespun," and "silk and satin."

6. Mao writes here "*benben,*" in quotation marks, i.e., the same term representing the "bookism" against which he is inveighing.
7. Of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow from June 18 to July 11, 1928.

5) You must participate personally.

Everyone responsible for leadership work, from the chairman of the township government to the chairman of the central government, from the detachment leader to the commander-in-chief, from the Party branch secretary to the secretary general, must definitely participate personally in the investigation of social and economic conditions, and must not rely exclusively on written reports, for these are two quite different things.

6) You must probe deeply.

Anyone who is participating in the work of investigation for the first time should carry out one or two thorough investigations, with the aim of understanding a particular place (such as a village or a city), or a particular problem (such as the problem of grain or currency). If you thoroughly understand one place or problem, this will make it easier for you to orient yourself subsequently in investigating other places or problems.

7) Take your own notes.

The investigator should not only preside at investigation meetings himself, and give appropriate guidance to those attending, he should also take his own notes and record the results of the meeting himself. To rely on others for this won't do.

Guidelines of the Fourth Red Army for Political Work at All Levels

(June 5, 1930)

In the past, the political departments of the army and columns have done some miscellaneous work of assistance, neglecting their main task, which is to direct the political work of the entire army or column.

The political departments at both the army and column levels are, at the same time, temporary organs of mass political power. In the past, this duty has not been carried out well either. For example, requests of the masses have not received a good response, and mass organizations and local political organs have not been helped to formulate well-rounded plans, so that when the Red Army left they would still be able to carry out their work effectively.

I. Guidelines for the Work of the Army Political Department

1) Grasp well the plan of Red Army political tasks for each period, and carry it out in political work. For example, as regards the task of overthrowing the western Fujian warlords and expanding Red political power in western Fujian, plans [should be made] for rousing the enthusiasm of the entire army, both officers and men, helping them understand the significance of this task, and heightening their sentiments of struggle.

2) Plan, supervise, and inspect the political training of the entire army, both officers and men. [This should include], for example, (a) special training for new recruits and captured troops; (b) special training for young soldiers (school for young soldiers); (c) general soldier training (ordinary classes); (d) lower level cadre training (special classes); (e) providing political training materials; (f) specifying slogans for the morning and evening roll call; (g) various kinds of assembly talks, and so on.

3) Guide and inspect the organization and work of the All-Army Soldiers' Association.

4) Plan, supervise, and inspect the propaganda work of the entire army. For example, (a) provide main propaganda materials; (b) inspect and also direct the propaganda materials and methods of the individual units; (c) supervise the

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 107–14, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

organization and training of the propaganda teams of the various individual units; (d) organize and inspect propaganda in makeup.[1]

5) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the three articles of discipline and proper military conduct generally.

6) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the items on special treatment for wounded soldiers.

7) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the various policies governing the army, such as the ban on corporal punishment, the ban on executing deserters, and so on.

8) Prepare and distribute forms for socioeconomic surveys, provide guidance for the various units in actual survey methods, and also supervise each unit in calculating the figures, and turn them over to the political department of the army to be totaled.

9) Plan and supervise mass propaganda for organizing mass organizations.

10) Plan and supervise assistance to the masses in setting up local political organs, such as revolutionary committees and soviets.

11) Plan and supervise assistance to local political organs in establishing local armed forces, such as uprising squads, Red Guards, and local Red Armies.

12) Plan and supervise the various units, or assist the local political organs, in eliminating reactionary forces.

13) Plan, and also guide and assist the mass organs in carrying out, the confiscation and distribution of land.

14) Plan, and guide the various units in running, leadership training classes for the masses.

15) Guide and supervise the various units in helping the local political organs to carry out various kinds of construction tasks such as schools, cooperatives, health clinics, and so on, so that they take root among the masses.

16) Deal with and also reply to requests from the masses.

17) Plan, and provide direction to the various units and to the highest mass organs in carrying out, the raising of money for Red Army supplies and for expenses for mass work.

18) Guide, and also supervise and encourage, the various units and mass organs in upholding well the policies toward towns and cities.

II. Guidelines for the Work of the Column Political Departments

1) Grasp well the plan of political tasks for each period, as provided by the higher levels, and carry it out in political work. For example, as regards the task

1. As indicated in earlier notes, this refers to propaganda carried out through the medium of skits and theatrical performances.

of overthrowing the western Fujian warlords and expanding Red political power in western Fujian, plans [should be made] for rousing the enthusiasm of the entire Army, both officers and men, helping them to understand the significance of this task, and heightening their sentiments of struggle.

2) Plan, supervise, and inspect the political training of the whole column, both officers and men. [This should include], for example, (a) special training for new recruits and captured troops; (b) special training for young soldiers (school for young soldiers); (c) general soldier training (ordinary classes); (d) lower-level cadre training (special classes); (e) providing political training materials; (f) specifying slogans for the morning and evening roll call (when detached for guerrilla actions, on work away from the army political department); (g) various kinds of assembly talks, and so on.

3) Guide and inspect the organization and work of the All-Column Soldiers' Association.

4) Plan, supervise, and inspect the propaganda work of the entire column. For example, (a) provide main propaganda materials; (b) inspect and also direct the propaganda materials and methods of the individual units; (c) supervise the organization and inspection of the propaganda teams of the various individual units.

5) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the three articles of discipline and proper military conduct generally.

6) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the items on special treatment for wounded soldiers.

7) Supervise and encourage the political organs of the various units, in coordination with the military affairs organs, to uphold the various policies governing the army, such as the ban on corporal punishment, the ban on executing deserters, and so on.

8) Supervise and guide workers at all levels in doing real social surveys, and also supervise each unit in calculating the figures, and turn them over to the political department of the Army to be totaled.

9) Plan and supervise mass propaganda for organizing mass organizations.

10) Plan and supervise assistance to the masses in setting up local political organs, such as revolutionary committees and soviets.

11) Plan and supervise assistance to local political organs in establishing local armed forces, such as uprising squads, Red Guards, and local Red Armies.

12) Plan and supervise the various units, or assist the local political organs, in eliminating reactionary forces.

13) Plan, and also guide and assist the mass organs in carrying out, the confiscation and distribution of land.

14) Plan, and guide the various units in running, leadership training classes for the masses.

15) Guide and supervise the various units in helping the local political organs to carry out various kinds of construction tasks such as schools, cooperatives, health clinics, and so on, so that they take root among the masses.

16) Deal with and also reply to requests from the masses (when working together with the army political department, they must be turned over to the army political department to deal with).

17) Plan, and provide direction to the various units and to the military supplies organ in carrying out, the raising of money for Red Army supplies and for expenses for mass work.

18) Guide, and also supervise and encourage, the various units and mass organs in upholding well the policies toward towns and cities.

When with the army political department, the above items should be dealt with under the direction of the army political department. When separated from the army political department, plans and decisions must be made independently, but reported to the army political department afterward.

III. Guidelines for the Work of Detachment Political Committee Members

A. Plan political training for the officers and men of the entire detachment, and also supervise and assist the various companies to put it into practice.
1) Intensify the political education of officers and men.
2) Direct the work of the All-Detachment Soldiers' Association.
3) Make strong efforts to help the officers and men of your detachment understand higher-level policy directives.
4) At all times examine and correct erroneous tendencies among officers and soldiers.
5) Train and guide the work of the propaganda team.
6) Make plans to open a school for young soldiers (supervise the selection of students in all units, the setting of class times and places, the teaching personnel, the selection of teaching materials, and so on).
7) Plan and implement special political training classes for the soldiers.

B. Oversee matters relating to the administration of the detachment as a whole.
1) Supervise officers and troops in carrying out all higher-level commands.
2) Oversee economic management.
3) Supervise the maintenance of military bearing and discipline.

C. Improve the way the troops are treated.
1) Take care to improve the methods of managing the troops.
2) Take care to improve the daily life of the troops (food, entertainment, sanitation, and so on).
3) Take care to improve the care of sick and wounded troops.

D. Expand political propaganda, and organize mass organizations.
1) Plan and direct mass meetings.

2) Direct officers and men and the propaganda team in presenting oral, written, and theatrical propaganda to the masses, at any time, any place.
3) Direct the officers and men in making social surveys and reporting to the higher organs.
4) Direct the officers and men in organizing mass organizations, and also provide guidance for their struggle methods.
5) When at war, direct the treatment of, and propaganda aimed at, captured soldiers by the officers and men.

E. Direct the tasks of eliminating counterrevolutionaries and of collecting funds.
1) Direct investigations by officers and men, and also find ways to arrest despotic gentry and all reactionaries, and report to the higher organs for handling (when on separate maneuvers, relatively far away from higher levels, handle it first independently, and then make a report).
2) Direct the investigation of local bullies by officers and men, and assist in fund-raising work.

IV. Guidelines for the Work of the Company Political Committee Members

A. Plan and carry out political training for the officers and men, to consolidate the political leadership, to unite the forces of the officers and men, and strengthen their fighting ability.
1) Intensify the political education of officers and men.
2) Direct the work of the Soldiers' Association (direct the meetings, and at the meetings discuss the various items of work, and also direct the application of the various resolutions).
3) Make strong efforts to help the officers and men of one's unit understand higher-level policy directives.
4) Take care to correct erroneous tendencies among officers and soldiers of one's unit.
5) Take care to provide special education for new soldiers and for captured soldiers.

B. Oversee matters relating to the administration of one's unit.
1) Supervise officers and troops in carrying out all higher commands.
2) Oversee economic management.
3) Supervise the maintenance of military bearing and discipline.

C. Improve the way the troops are treated.
1) Take care to improve the methods of managing the troops.
2) Take care to improve the daily life of the troops (food, entertainment, sanitation, and so on).
3) Take care to improve the care of sick and wounded troops.

D. Expand political propaganda and organize mass organizations.
1) Plan and direct mass meetings.

2) Direct the officers and men, or the propaganda branch team, in presenting oral, written, and theatrical propaganda to the masses, at any time, any place.
3) Direct the officers and men in making social surveys and reporting to the higher organs.
4) Direct the officers and men in organizing mass organizations, and also provide guidance for their struggle methods.
5) When at war, direct the treatment of and propaganda toward captured soldiers by the officers and men.

E. Direct the tasks of eliminating counterrevolutionaries and of collecting funds.
1) Investigate and also find ways to arrest despotic gentry and reactionaries, and report to the higher organs for implementation (when engaged in independent action, relatively far away from higher levels, deal with it first yourselves, and then make a report).
2) Investigate the local bullies and assist in the work of raising funds.

Issued by the Political Department of the
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Committee

On the Problem of the Rich Peasants

Resolution of the Joint Conference of the Red Fourth Army Front Committee and the Western Fujian Special Committee[1]

(June 1930)

1) Who Are the Rich Peasants

There are three types of rich peasants. The first type are the semilandlord rich peasants who work the land themselves and still have extra land to rent out. The second type are the capitalist rich peasants who do not rent out land. Some of them even rent land from other people, but hire farm laborers to cultivate it for them. The third type are the newly enriched peasants who neither rent out land nor hire farm laborers, but rely only on their own labor in working the land. However, they have sufficient land and labor and have surplus grain to sell or lend every year.

All types of rich peasants have two common ways of exploiting the im-

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1. This conference was Mao's answer to Li Lisan's gathering of delegates from the soviet areas, which had been held a few weeks earlier in Shanghai. It met in the middle and latter part of June, first in Nanyang, Changting *xian,* and then in Tingzhou City. For this reason, it is referred to sometimes as the Nanyang Conference, and sometimes as the Tingzhou Conference. (See *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 310.) It adopted this resolution, and also the resolution on the vagabonds which constitutes the next document in the present volume. Mao did not draft either of them, but he revised and approved both. The line taken here regarding class struggle in the countryside is an extremely radical one, which did not attract universal support, as Mao himself underscores throughout the text. Already in his Jinggangshan report of November 1928, Mao had denounced what he called there "the intermediate class," corresponding in fact to the same stratum baptized here "new rich peasants," and the land law which he had drafted at the February 7, 1930, Pitou Conference likewise singled out for expropriation those "owner-peasants" who enjoyed more than the bare minimum for survival. (See above, section (B) of the Jinggangshan report, "The Land Problem," and the text of the February 7 law.) For a comparison of Mao's agrarian policy with the views of Li Lisan and of Moscow, see the Introduction to this volume.

poverished masses. The first way is through usurious loans (charging interest on loans of money, grain, pigs, cattle, and oil) and sale of grain on a commercial basis. The second way is through the particular methods of exploitation used by various types of rich peasants, namely the semilandlord rich peasants' exploitation through land rental and the capitalist rich peasants' exploitation of the labor of farmhands. Besides, among all types of rich peasants many engage in commercial businesses at the same time, running a small shop and peddling goods. Therefore, they use the methods of the commercial capitalist to exploit the impoverished masses.

2) The Reactionary Nature of Rich Peasants

Rich peasants are the bourgeoisie in the countryside. **But exploitation by Chinese rich peasants generally carries with it the cruelty of semifeudalism.**[2] In all aspects such as land rental, usurious loans, hiring laborers, or commercial capitalism, exploitation by the rich peasants is crueler than that by the landlords. Thus, the interests of this class and the interests of the poor peasants and farm laborers are diametrically opposed. **This class is reactionary from start to finish.**

Although in the initial period of the revolution the rich peasant class has a need to oppose exorbitant taxes and levies by warlords, because of their fundamental interests (land and capital) they will surely stand by the landlords and oppose the poor peasants and farm laborers as soon as the revolution is initiated by the poor peasants and farm laborers.

During the upsurge of the revolutionary tide, the rich peasants will fervently burn land deeds and divide up the land, adorn themselves with red ribbons, call each other comrade, and even sneak into the Communist Party. All such opportunist actions are **aimed at seeking social status and rights of leadership over the poor peasants and farm laborers** and attempting to save the development of rural capitalism from the crisis in its development (so as to move from the protection of family property at present to the development of capitalism in the future). This is the most serious issue in the rural struggle and deserves the full attention of our comrades.

When the rural struggle deepens, that is to say, when the poor peasants and farm laborers establish strong leadership, overthrow the political position of the rich peasants, confiscate the land, forests, and farm cattle of the rich peasants and abolish the debts owed them, what the rich peasants do is to create rumors to confuse the masses and to slow down the work.

When the revolution develops from crisis toward defeat, the rich peasants move from vacillation to accommodation and even to complete betrayal, following the reactionary line of the landlords and attacking the poor peasants and farm laborers.

2. This and other passages in bold are emphasized in the original by the use of dots next to the characters.

3) The Controversy over the New Rich Peasants

In the past, all sides (especially those from the East River) recognized only two types of peasants, namely the semilandlord and the bourgeois types, as rich peasants. They did not call the newly enriched peasants rich peasants, but "middle peasants." They opposed taking over the surplus land of the new rich peasants as well as abolishing the debts owed to them. They forgot that these new rich peasants were still an exploiting class. Although these people do not collect land rent or exploit farm laborers, they practice usurious loans and sell surplus grain at high prices in times of crisis. These two types of exploitation are exactly the same as those practiced by the semilandlord and bourgeois rich peasants. These rich peasants rely on the above-mentioned two types of exploitation and accumulate capital gradually, rushing toward the ranks of the other two types of bourgeois and semilandlord rich peasants. The poor peasants and farm laborers demand not only the confiscation of the land of the two types of semilandlord and bourgeois rich peasants and the abolition of debts owed to them but also the confiscation of the land of the new rich peasants and the abolition of debts owed to the new rich peasants. In all the places where the struggle has deepened, the poor peasants and farm laborers have done this. Nevertheless, this remains an unresolved issue of contention within the Communist Party. The view of the joint meeting on this issue is that the same **resolute support should be given to the masses' confiscation of land and abolition of debts owed to the new rich peasants** as that which is given to confiscation of land and abolition of debts owed to the other two types of rich peasants. Why should this policy be adopted? Because the confiscation of their land is the only reply to their cruel exploitation by selling highly priced surplus grain in times of crisis, and the abolition of debts owed to them is the only reply to their brutal exploitation by making usurious loans. These two kinds of exploitation are both of a semifeudal nature. Only through thorough elimination of these two kinds of exploitation can the peasants be completely liberated from these semifeudal relationships. It is not enough to eradicate only the exploitation by landlords and the first and second types of rich peasants.

4) The Broad Peasant Masses Have Sufficient Force to Overthrow the Rich Peasants, and Only by Establishing an Anti-Rich-Peasant Policy Can the Party Win over the Broad Masses of Poor Peasants to Accomplish Thoroughly the Tasks of the Democratic Revolution and Move Toward the Stage of the Socialist Revolution

Generally speaking, in the basins of the Yangzi River and the Pearl River, over 70 percent are poor peasants and farm laborers, approximately 20 percent are middle peasants, and less than 10 percent are rich peasants. The main forces of the rural struggle are the broad masses of poor peasants and farm laborers, and the middle peasants are the force with which alliances can be made. The rich

peasants are an extremely isolated minority. Although the rich peasants necessarily have a counterrevolutionary nature, **the balance of class forces indicates that they will be overthrown by the broad masses of poor peasants.** Some people obviously exaggerate the class forces of rich peasants by saying that there are some provinces in the south where rich peasants or owner-peasants are the majority or account for large numbers (e.g., "Owner-peasants make up the majority of peasants in Jiangxi"; "Owner-peasants in Meixian and Dapu are numerous and the agrarian revolution cannot be carried out there"; "The rich peasants in Changting and Jianning, Fujian, amount to 40 percent"). They believe that the first step should be to oppose only the landlords, and that the time is not now right for attacking the rich peasants. These are not simply objective mistakes that run completely counter to the social conditions. Some are counterrevolutionary conspiracies subjectively attempting to set up the leadership of rich peasants inside the Party and among the masses, to confuse the class consciousness of the Party and the masses, and to weaken and abolish the Party's tasks of opposing the rich peasants.

The right-wing opportunist views of exaggerating the class forces of the rich peasants and maintaining that concessions should be made to the rich peasants at the time of attacking the landlords are extremely dangerous. To acknowledge the rich peasants as "an extremely isolated minority" and **not to realize the "severe cruelty of semifeudalism"** will naturally weaken and even lead to abandonment of the Party's tasks of opposing the rich peasants. This is also very dangerous. The Chen Duxius of the right opportunist opposition say that the Chinese countryside has already undergone a capitalist transformation and that feudal exploitation is a remnant of the remnants. Their conclusion is obviously to give up the democratic revolution and abandon the struggle against the landlords. If our reply does not take into consideration the nature of exploitation, but only the methods of exploitation, it will inevitably confirm that the "rich peasants are not the main enemies and the landlords are," and lead to refusal to recognize that the nature of the struggle against the rich peasants, like that against the landlords, is to combat brutal semifeudal exploitation. In this case our conclusion would also certainly lead to the weakening and abandonment of the important tasks of the struggle against the rich peasants. The abandonment of this task will fail to win over the broad masses of poor peasants in completing the democratic revolution and in marching toward the stage of the socialist revolution. On the contrary, only by understanding that the struggles against the rich peasants and against the landlords are both directed against the same brutal semifeudal exploitation can the Party's policy of opposing the rich peasants be established firmly, the broad masses of poor peasants be won over to complete the democratic revolution and turn toward the stage of socialist revolution, and the bases of the theories of the Chen Duxius be overthrown completely, stopping them from talking gibberish about the "rich peasants" controlling one region.

5) The Reasons for the Defeat of the Struggle in Hailufeng Lie in Adventurism and Hailufeng Localism, Not in the Struggle against the Rich Peasants[3]

The comrades in the East River area, drawing lessons from the defeat in Hailufeng and the counterrevolutionary actions of the rich peasants (the new rich peasants, whom they call the "middle peasants"), asked various localities not to attack the new rich peasants. Such arguments sometimes also crop up in other places. This is not very different from what happened during the Great Revolution, when comrades in Hunan and Hubei, tailing along with Tang Shengzhi and Xu Kexiang, screamed about the excesses of the peasant movement.[4] Now it is clear to everyone that the failure of the Great Revolution was not due to "excesses" but rather to "lack of excesses" (opportunism). The defeats in Hailufeng and other places are the results of adventurism, myopic localism, and the low tide of the national revolutionary situation at this time, but are not the results of opposing the rich peasants. With adventurist and localist leadership, defeats will occur at any time and cannot be avoided merely by refusing to oppose the rich peasants. At the same time, the struggle against rich peasants should never be equated with wanton burning, killing, and looting, which lead to adventurism and setbacks from which one may draw lessons for the future. On the contrary, resolute struggles against the rich peasants and establishment of absolute leadership by the poor peasants and farm laborers in the countryside are essential conditions to guarantee the victory of the revolution.

6) It Is Extremely Foolish to Refrain from Abolishing the Debts Owed to Rich Peasants in Order to Maintain the Circulation of Money

It is very wrong to obstruct the poor peasant masses' struggle to write off completely the debts owed to the rich peasants in order to "keep money in circulation," which means enabling rich peasants to lend money to poor peasants again. It would not be strange for the rich peasants to raise such slogans to deceive people, but would be most foolish if such proposals were put forward from the poor peasants' point of view. Because once order in the rural areas is disrupted, all lending and borrowing and buying and selling on credit will stop immediately. How can there be a situation in which the struggle has developed to the extent of confiscating the land, but the rich peasants are still out there circulating money? The facts in all the Red areas taught us long ago that the circulation of money could depend only on the poor peasants' organizing credit

3. Regarding the peasant movement in Haifeng and Lufeng (known collectively as Hailufeng) in Guangdong, under the leadership of Peng Pai, see above, the relevant note to "General Guidelines of the Hunan Provincial Committee," August 1, 1927, and also the numerous references to Peng Pai in Volume II of our edition, especially the note on p. 486.

4. See, in Volume II, pp. 425–517, the materials about events in the spring and summer of 1927.

cooperatives on their own, and on action by the soviet government to force the rich peasants to give loans at low interest. It is a total illusion to depend on the rich peasants to act generously and relieve the poor peasants on the condition that the poor peasants not attack them.

7) Confiscating All Land and Abolishing All Debts

"Confiscating all land" and "abolishing all debts" are the two central and irreplaceable slogans in the agrarian struggle in various southern provinces. The masses are implementing these two slogans widely everywhere, but the Party is acting like the tail of the masses everywhere and has affirmed the slogans "retroactively" after the masses themselves had already carried them out. Some have gone so far as to "deny" them from start to finish, thus acting not only as tails of the masses but also as opponents of the masses. Without correcting these serious mistakes, the Party will not be able to lead the agrarian struggle in various southern provinces. Undoubtedly, the two slogans of "confiscating the land of the landlord class" and "abolishing all debts" are no longer appropriate, and many localities have been used by the rich peasants and opportunist Communist Party members as tools to thwart the struggle of the poor peasants. Undoubtedly, the slogans of "confiscating all land" and "abolishing all debts" should be raised openly and straightforwardly all the time and in all places in the southern provinces. It is, of course, very wrong to "deny" them, and it constitutes tailism to "affirm retroactively." These two slogans should be used to mobilize the masses. The Party should not wait for the masses to start the struggle and then impose leadership on them. This tactic of "leading the masses only after they have risen up themselves" is still a tactic devoid of deep understanding of the land conditions in various southern provinces and thus it is a tactic of opportunist vacillation. This tactic of vacillation is unsuitable for the leadership of the imminent great struggle of the hundreds of millions of poor peasants.

8) The Two Slogans Should Be Raised at All Times

The view has been expressed that the Party's tactics toward the rich peasants should be different in the White regions and in the Red regions. In the Red regions, the rich peasants may be attacked and the slogans of confiscating all the land and abolishing all debts may be carried out. In the White regions, the slogan of confiscating the land of the landlords and abolishing the debts owed to the landlords should still prevail, in order to neutralize the rich peasants temporarily and enable the poor peasants to win the struggle against the landlords first. This opinion is wrong. If we recognize that the rich peasants (including those who are rich peasants in fact, but are generally regarded as "middle peasants") are the minority among the peasants (but more numerous than the landlords), and that this minority of rich peasants are still exploiting the poor peasants and farm laborers in the cruelest semifeudal way and are inevitably reactionary, **our tactics should from the beginning proclaim the evils of the rich peasants and treat the rich peasants in the same way as the landlords**, and should in no way blur the class distinction between the rich peasants and other peasants, or give the rich peasants any chance to gain advantages. Their true features should be exposed from the beginning, so that the masses may recognize their reactionary nature. Furthermore, the rich peasants will never be "neutral." As soon as they see the poor peasants and farm laborers become united, they immediately join the front of the landlords. Where is such a thing as neutrality? This illusion of the neutrality of the rich peasants will certainly hinder the proletariat from mobilizing the poor peasants and farm laborers to launch fierce struggles and to fulfill the tasks of winning over the middle peasants as their allies. Therefore, if we fail to put forward the slogan of opposing the rich peasants from the very beginning, the poor peasants will be disappointed. This point has been proved in the struggles in various areas of western Fujian. Because the enemies of the poor peasants and farm laborers are not only the landlords but also the rich peasants. Exploitation by the landlords is certainly very severe, but exploitation by rich peasants is even more so.

9) The Two Slogans Should Be Raised in All Places

Another view holds that concessions should be made to the rich peasants in certain places. For example, if certain *xian* in a province and certain townships in a *xian* are so-called places "with a rich-peasant majority," it is all right not to follow the example of places where the poor peasants account for the majority in dividing up the land and abolishing debts. In such areas, local soviet governments may decide on a method that is different from the general method, for example, redistributing the land according to labor power and not cancelling the debts owed to the petty bourgeoisie, and so on. Higher-level soviet governments should criticize these viewpoints. Such opinions present two kinds of danger: The first danger is that the so-called "special places" may sacrifice all the interests of the poor peasants and farm laborers in order to please the rich peasants. They do not understand that the places that have many rich peasants must have even more poor peasants and farm laborers, that it is the tactic of the Guomindang to accommodate the interests of the rich peasants at the expense of the interests of the poor peasants and farm laborers, and that the Communist Party should never adopt such tactics. The second danger is the granting to the soviet governments of the special places the right to safeguard the interests of the rich people (i.e., the land would not be redistributed on an equal basis and the debts owed to the petty bourgeoisie would not be written off). In this case, the places may not necessarily be the places that have "many rich peasants" or "more owner-peasants" **(in fact, there is no such situation in any of the southern provinces and it is merely a rumor created by the rich peasant Communist Party members)**. Even though the places may have very few rich peasants

and owner-peasants, as long as the rich peasants manage the soviet governments there, they can hoodwink the masses and make such demands. Consequently, the danger of these opinions is nothing less than guaranteeing the rich peasants' exploitation and oppression of the poor peasants and farm laborers. In all the southern provinces, the slogans of confiscating all the land and abolishing all debts should be put forward regardless of regions. This is the only way to avoid the danger.

10) Redistribution of the Land Not Equally, on a Per Capita Basis, But According to the Criterion of Labor Power, Is Definitely to the Advantage of the Rich Peasants[5]

To redistribute the land according to labor power, giving more land to families with more labor power, and less land to those with less labor power, favors only the rich peasants. The reason is that the Chinese rich peasants are mainly of two types, the semilandlord and the newly enriched. There are very few purely capitalist farms or agricultural companies, and hardly any in the various southern provinces. The absolute majority of Chinese rich peasants rely primarily on their own labor power. So the redistribution of land according to the criterion of labor power is greatly to the advantage of the rich peasants, because they have not only labor power but also ample draft animals, farm tools, and capital to go with it. They are not like the poor peasants, who although they have labor power, have inadequate draft animals, farm tools, and capital, or none at all. Therefore, the redistribution of land according to the criterion of labor power is advantageous to the rich peasants. Even among the poor peasants, the poor peasant families with more labor power (i.e., a family of eight with four able-bodied persons) may be better situated, thanks to the fact that they get more land, than families with fewer laborers (i.e., a family of eight with two able-bodied persons) to grow into rich peasants rapidly.

11) Winning Support from the Masses Is the First Criterion for Present Policies; Developing Production Is Not the First Criterion for Present Policies

When the outcome of the battle between the Red and White forces is still unclear, as is currently the case, **the only issue now is how to win over the broad masses to defeat the enemy and achieve the victory of the revolution.** At this time, the criterion that determines all tactics is winning over the masses, and not something called developing production. The reason is that at present the instruments of production (such as land) are still in the hands of the enemy, or, although they may have fallen into the hands of the people, may still be seized back by the enemy, and at such a time it is out of the question to talk about the problem of developing production. Those who raise inappropriate questions such as developing production at a time like this obviously represent the right-wing opportunist line of the rich peasants, because objectively they are not promoting production but obstructing the development of the struggle, helping the landlords to prolong their existence, and moving the revolution toward defeat.

5. Consistently, in his land laws of December 1928, April 1929, and February 1930, Mao had included the criterion of labor power, but placed it second, and indicated that its use should be restricted. Regarding Mao's disagreements with Li Lisan and the Central Committee over this issue, see the Introduction to this volume.

12) Equal Distribution of Land on a Per Capita Basis Does Not Weaken Production, But Rather Serves as the Condition for Increasing Production

As mentioned above, when the struggle becomes fierce, only the redistribution of land on a per capita basis can win the support of the broad masses of poor peasants. **Even for the development of production, it is better to redistribute the land equally on a per capita basis than unequally on the basis of labor power,** and western Fujian is a very good example of this. The land in western Fujian having been divided up equally according to the number of family members, the crops there are growing very well this year. It is estimated that the output will increase by 20 percent compared with the time at the end of last year when the land had not yet been redistributed. In the past, some comrades in western Fujian worried that "the land had been divided into pieces that are too small" and that "those who did not work the land originally and who do not know how to work the land would allow it to fall into disuse after receiving their share." They are also concerned about various other dangers that may lead to a decrease in productive output. But current reality has proved that these worries are unwarranted. Instead of falling, productive output has risen. What are the reasons? Once the poor peasants and the unemployed masses have acquired land, they pour all of their energies into it. Now, moreover, all those parasites, landlords, and vagrants in the countryside who never engaged in production before will go hungry if they don't cultivate the land, so they are forced to start doing so. Among poor peasants, labor power that was unused in the past because of insufficient land is put to use once land is acquired. Therefore, productive output has risen. Another reason is that Chinese agricultural production is still at a stage of manual tilling, irrigation, and fertilization (with plant fertilizers and animal manure). In the period of landlord exploitation, the poor peasants, figuring that the land was not their own, were unwilling to work hard cultivating it. They staunchly refused to "plow deeply and weed frequently." They were also unwilling to build and maintain irrigation systems or to put much fertilizer down and did not even bother to gather manure. So the fields were increasingly neglected, and production declined greatly, creating a nationwide agricultural crisis. The peasants in western Fujian have acquired land, with every person having been

given an equal share, and this has completely eliminated the phenomenon of work slowdowns. They are now willing to plough deeply; they have used a great deal of manpower in building irrigation ditches. This is very different from the period of exploitation by the landlords and rich peasants, when such irrigation ditches were not built. Without equal redistribution, it would have been impossible to use so much manpower in constructing and repairing irrigation ditches on a large scale. Grain straw is put into pigsties and cattle pens to make fertilizer. Grass roots are dug out to be composted. With nightsoil on top of this, the fertilizer problem is solved. The above are all results of equally redistributing the land and mobilizing manpower on a large scale. With these results, productive output has increased.

If they are short of cattle and cannot till the land they are given, those who used to rent cattle from the rich peasants may just confiscate these cattle and be done with it (or not pay the rental fees for the cattle and be done with it), and those who didn't even have rented cattle in the past may temporarily borrow or rent cattle from their relatives and friends.

If they are short of farm tools, they may borrow the spare farm tools of the rich peasants (once their surplus land has been confiscated, the rich peasants will have extra farm tools), or even confiscate rich peasants' extra farm tools.

As for the argument that fragmentation of the land into pieces that are too small is detrimental to production, this phenomenon affects only large-scale corporate agriculture, and agricultural corporations are extremely rare in China. What we see everywhere is small peasant production. Even the land of big landlords is rented out to many peasant families for cultivation, not leased to one peasant family. So there is no such thing as dividing up the land in a way not advantageous for production. Moreover, in agriculture we need to encourage the poor peasants to engage in collective production and move toward the socialist road, and discourage the rich peasants from moving toward capitalist production. **The poor peasants should gather together many small pieces of land and use the method of cooperatives, set up the cooperative system of production, and thus head toward socialist agricultural production. This is our sole purpose.**

During the period of revolution, the prices of agricultural produce were very low, and the scissors effect[6] developed further. The rich peasants with a lot of

6. The reference is to a metaphor coined by Trotsky in a speech at the Twelfth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1923, which has been widely used ever since, even though Trotsky himself soon fell out of favor. On this occasion, he exhibited a diagram showing the relation between agricultural and industrial prices during the previous year. Early in 1922, agricultural prices had been high as compared to industrial prices; the two lines intersected in September 1922, and thereafter agricultural prices declined rapidly with reference to those of industrial products. The graph thus had the appearance of an open pair of scissors. The moral was, of course, that the peasants were increasingly unable to purchase the implements and other industrial goods they needed. For a concise account of Trotsky's speech and the background to it, see E. H. Carr, *The Interregnum. 1923–1924* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp. 27–36.

land were not enthusiastic about cultivating it because doing so was not to their advantage, so production was actually undermined.

Production will not decline because families with fewer members able to work and more members unable to work have equal shares of land. This is because the few members in a family who are able to work are often capable of shouldering the task of providing food for the whole family. In addition, those who are said to be without labor power are not totally without labor power, so they can still help out with some of the work. As for large families in which those who cannot work greatly outnumber those who can (for example, a ratio of nine to one), this situation is rare, and such a family may return its land to the soviet government for transfer to others, so that it would not go to waste.

13) The Rich Peasants' Demand for Setting Aside Public Land and Use of the Slogan of Joint Production

The model farms of the soviet governments and cooperative-style collective production are good ways of moving toward socialization in agriculture, but in the present period of struggle, the main task of the soviet governments is to guide the struggle, not to promote production. Therefore model farms cannot be set up now. **In order to persuade the masses to expand the struggle, all land should be distributed to those who need it. It is not necessary for the soviet government to retain public land, forests, and extra buildings. Everything the masses need should be redistributed in principle.** There are those who propose not to distribute all the land, but rather to set aside some public fields, forests, and extra buildings and not redistribute them at all, because the soviet governments need money, or in preparation for having sons the following year. Others, such as Yuan Wencai of Jiangxi[7] and Fu Bocui of Fujian,[8] seem on the surface to stand on the Left and advocate what is called "socialist joint produc-

7. Yuan Wencai had, in fact, already been deliberately killed on February 10, 1930, together with the other former bandit leader on the Jinggangshan, Wang Zuo, in accordance with instructions of the Communist leadership in the old base area. The two were accused of returning to their bandit ways. This is now regarded as an error, resulting from the "leftist" line prevalent at the time, and the denunciation of bandits in the resolution of the Sixth Congress on soviet power. Mao is said to have disapproved at the time; he paid a visit to their widows in 1965.

8. Fu Bocui (1896–1993) was a native of Shanghang in Fujian Province, and an early participant in Sun Yatsen's Tongmenghui. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in September 1927, and was appointed secretary of a Party branch in Shanghang *xian*. In August 1928 he became a member of the Western Fujian Special Committee, and in 1929 he was elected to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army. In the spring of 1930, he was appointed commissar for economic and financial affairs in the Western Fujian Soviet Government, but in December 1930 he was expelled from the Party because of his resistance to land reform. Thereafter, he became a *xian* magistrate under the Guomindang, but in 1949 he rallied to the Communist cause again, and in January 1986, he rejoined the Party.

tion" (all land to be managed by the soviet governments; the peasants to work and till the fields under the command of the soviet governments; products to be distributed by the soviet governments according to number of people and need; the surplus to go to the soviet governments). All such proposals are thoroughly tainted with the rich peasants' line. They are clever and deceptive policies of the rich peasants to delay the redistribution of land by the poor peasants during the high tide of the revolution. Because what the poor peasants are busy doing is not preparing for having sons the following year, but rather getting their own nourishment the following day. Therefore, the poor peasants demand rapid redistribution of all land. From the poor peasants' point of view, it is entirely unnecessary to retain public land in preparation for having sons. As for socialist production, the poor peasants should organize cooperatives for collective cultivation after the land has been redistributed and feudal relationships have been thoroughly eliminated. The soviet governments will select places to set up farms after victory of the revolution has been won throughout the country and move toward socialism from there. The notion of directly implementing soviet management policies, without going through the process of redistribution and the process of cooperatives, is an out and out illusion of the petty bourgeoisie which objectively obstructs the agrarian struggle, leads the agrarian revolution toward defeat, and fundamentally negates the future of socialism.

14) When to Redistribute the Land and When to Reap the Harvest

In the past, the method was that if redistribution of land took place after seeds were sown, then that crop would be harvested by those who had done the sowing. Only the rich peasants were satisfied with this policy, and the poor peasants greatly resented it. According to this policy, in regions where there is only one harvest each year, the poor peasants and unemployed masses acquired land in name only, but in fact had to wait until the next autumn to harvest grain for the first time, so the poor peasants and unemployed masses were greatly dissatisfied. **The harvest should go to whoever acquires the land as soon as it is redistributed.** This way the rich peasants are displeased, but support of the poor peasants and the unemployed masses can be secured. Purchasing the crops of the rich peasants is another way of siding with the interests of the rich peasants. In light of the poor peasants' needs, it is even unnecessary to pay for the crops at all, because the poor peasants have no money to pay the price anyway.

15) Grain Can Also Be Divided Equally

When the rural struggle develops to a state of uprising, and in the struggle by the poor peasants, farm laborers, and unemployed masses to attack despotic gentry and burn land deeds, there will certainly be a struggle to divide up the grain equally, followed by a struggle to redistribute the land equally. **Therefore, dividing up the grain is an important aspect of the rural struggle.** A thorough struggle for redistributing the grain divides up equally not only the grain of the landlords, but also that of the rich peasants. The total store of grain in a township should be divided by the total population of the township, and then the surplus grain of all the households should be redistributed equally without compensation. If we raise the slogan of "opposing absolute egalitarianism" from the point of view of the rich peasants in this struggle, we will certainly lose the poor peasant masses. Obviously, this is wrong. Unquestionably we should side with the poor peasants, farm laborers, and impoverished masses, and launch the struggle to divide up the grain on an equal basis. In places where guerrilla warfare is going on and the régime cannot be stabilized even for a short time, the method of "seizing the grain" should be adopted. Although our purpose is to seize the grain of landlords, if the masses want to seize the grain of rich peasants, we should also completely support the actions of the masses.

16) It Is Not Adventurism to Raise Funds from the Rich Peasants

For the Red Army guerrilla groups and **the soviets to requisition funds from the rich peasants is entirely appropriate.** In the past the masses were forbidden to raise funds from the rich peasants, and such actions were considered adventurist. This is based on the position of currying favor with the rich peasants and is fundamentally wrong.

17) Drawing on the Fat to Make up for the Lean

If redistribution of land is carried out solely on the basis of "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce," as with the experience of western Fujian last year, and the documents say "do not wishfully expect equalization," then the rich peasants will have an excuse to give the poor land to others and keep the rich land to themselves. Then the poor peasants will be very unhappy. This situation has occurred not only in western Fujian but in most other places as well. This is a real and important struggle within the overall agrarian struggle, which we should not neglect. On top of "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce," **another principle of "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean" should be added,** and in the documents, "do not wishfully expect equalization" should be changed to "do not retain the rich lands."[9]

9. These two principles—"drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce," and "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean"— were characteristic traits of Mao's agrarian policy for several years, beginning at this time. See the Introduction to this volume. It should be recalled that the use of only the first slogan, which Mao stigmatizes here as an error committed in western Fujian, occurs in his own February 7, 1930, law as well.

18) Oppose the Rich Peasants' Slogan of Investigation and Study, and Speedily Redistribute the Land

Many rich peasant Communist Party members try to obstruct the agrarian struggle and delay the redistribution of land. Their slogan is that more investigations and studies need to be done. So in some cases, three years after the uprisings, the investigation and study are still going on, and the land still remains to be redistributed. In other cases, the investigation and study have been carried out for a year and the land is not divided up. We should fundamentally oppose this kind of empty investigation and study. On the issue of actually redistributing the land, it is simply not necessary to have the superior organs' investigation and study. After investigation by a township government, redistribution may begin at once. For the purpose of mobilizing the masses rapidly and thoroughly, and quickly spreading revolutionary influence, redistribution of land should be initiated very rapidly. **In all places where the masses have launched uprisings, redistribution should be finished within two weeks at most.**

19) Land Taxation Should Be Based on the Principle of Protecting the Poor Peasants, Allying with the Middle Peasants, and Attacking the Rich Peasants

The aim of progressive taxation on land, industry, and agriculture is to meet the financial needs of the struggle. With this aim, the principle of protecting the poor peasants, allying with the middle peasants, and attacking the rich peasants should be adopted. To meet the financial needs of the struggle, the poor peasants themselves have to pay considerable amounts of land taxes. But only very light taxes should be levied. The extremely poor peasants (those who do not have enough to eat every year) should be exempted. In comparison with the poor peasants, the middle-income peasants may pay a little more, but the principle of allying with the middle-income peasants should not be violated. In other words, the middle-income peasants should not be taxed too heavily either. The rich peasants may pay as much as 15 percent in land taxes. To fulfill the urgent needs of the struggle, the surplus grain of the rich peasants may be requisitioned without compensation.

20) Even after Equal Distribution, There Will Still Be Rich Peasants

The main objective of attacking the rich peasants now is not to eliminate them, but to **win the support of the poor peasant masses,** to expand the struggle, and to win the victory of the revolution. In reality, after being attacked, the rich peasants will not disappear altogether, because they enjoy all kinds of superior social and economic conditions. Even after their land has been redistributed, they will still have advantages over the poor peasants. The development of the rich

peasants will certainly be more rapid than that of the poor peasants, and the latter will still be exploited by the former (the forms of exploitation are commercial and speculative selling and purchasing, and running small shops). Truly to eliminate rich peasants, and to free the poor peasants and farm laborers from exploitation by the rich peasants in the future, a national victory of the democratic revolution must be transformed into a national victory of the social revolution, and agriculture must be socialized. The socialization of agriculture must rely on the assistance and guidance of the workers in cities and the efforts of the poor peasants and farm laborers themselves. The capitalist production of the rich peasants will then be replaced by socialized production. At that time, all peasants will be proletarianized, and only then will there be no exploitation in the countryside. These are the common goals toward which the industrial proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, want to lead the peasants.

21) Criticisms Are Intended to Encourage the Poor Peasants to Make Progress, Not to Pour Cold Water on Them

When the masses rise up enthusiastically and struggle to redistribute the land, the rich peasants and Communist Party members of rich peasant origin often use criticisms such as "wishfully expecting equalization," or "petty bourgeois illusions," and alter their meanings so as to resist the poor peasants' struggle for equal redistribution of the land. Examples of this can be seen everywhere. This amounts to nothing but pouring cold water on the emerging vigorous struggle of the poor peasants and will certainly discourage them. The criticism we originally put forward did not say equal redistribution of land was no good, but pointed out that **with regard to the countryside,** the private property system will not be eliminated, and the Communist system will not be realized, after the equal distribution of land, and exploitation of the poor peasants by the rich peasants will continue to occur. Therefore, after the equal distribution of land, the poor peasants **must take a further step forward and adopt the method of collective cultivation to move toward socialism;** only this will mark the final victory. Speaking about the whole country, the workers, after the equal redistribution of land, will still not be able to overthrow the bourgeoisie and the imperialists in conjunction with the forces of the peasants. Capitalism will not only continue to exploit the peasants but will intensify its exploitation as compared with the past. This will become the brutal scissors effect in the rural areas, where the peasants, though they have food to eat, have no clothes to wear and no goods to use. All farm produce is extremely cheap, and all cloth and goods are extremely expensive, and the life of the peasant is still most difficult. If the peasants want to be relieved from the suffering of the scissors effect, the only way is to **enlarge the Red Army, expand the struggle, and help the working class to win victories in big cities throughout the country, and overthrow the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, so that the soviets can manage the whole country. At the same**

time, we must promote the high tide of world revolution and overthrow capitalism all over the world. Only then can the peasants gain assistance from the working class of the whole country and even the whole world and get rid of the sufferings caused by the scissors effect. Our comrades ought to seek all means and opportunities in every Red rural area to inform the peasants about the political and economic situations in the countryside and the whole world (as indicated above), encourage them to step forward, and absolutely never, taking the position of the rich peasants, drag them backward.

Criticism should start after the victory of the struggle for equal redistribution of the land. If such criticisms are raised in the fierce life-and-death struggle of land equalization, they may easily be distorted and used by the rich peasants, and two objectives may be posed before the masses (democracy and socialism), easily confusing their perceptions. For until the current objective has become a reality, the masses understand only this objective and do not understand the next objective. If we do not inspire the masses to strive forcefully to realize the current objective before this has been achieved, but neglect the current objective while encouraging the realization of the future objective, the masses may have doubts, and say: "Since they tell us that this is good, and that is also good, which one is really good?" If the criticism starts after the victory of the masses' struggle for equal redistribution of the land (two weeks is sufficient for completing the struggle for equal distribution), there will be no such problems.

22) Purge the Organization of Rich Peasants

a) To Guarantee the Victory of the Agrarian Revolution, Rich Peasant Elements Inside the Party Should Be Eliminated.

In order to ensure that the broad masses of poor peasants and farm laborers resolutely attack the rich peasants, establish the leadership of the poor peasants and farm laborers in the countryside, and guarantee victory of the agrarian revolution in the countryside, priority must be placed on the elimination of rich peasant elements inside the Party, and the rural Party in particular. This work is very significant, because up to now, local party organizations, especially the leading organs everywhere, have been full of rich peasant elements. The reason is that before the struggles in the rural areas started, most of those sent to work in the countryside by superior organs and those who came out and made the first contacts in the countryside were intellectuals of rich peasant and small landlord family backgrounds. These intellectuals naturally continued to introduce into the Party those of their own kind. When the time came for the struggle in the countryside to develop, most of this group of rich peasant and small landlord Party members became cadres in leading organs at Party branch level and above. The delays and superficiality of the development of the struggle everywhere have invariably resulted from the trouble stirred up by this group of people. They

have blocked the instructions of high-level leading organs so they could not penetrate deeply into the masses. Only when the development of the struggle of the masses breaks through their opportunist leadership, and the tactics of the high-level leading organs against the rich peasants put pressure on them, can the anti-rich-peasant tactics of the high-level leading organs be linked up with the struggle of the masses, and the rich peasant line of various leading organs of the Party be eradicated. Almost all localities have experienced this process.

It is quite apparent that without purging the rich peasants (especially in the leading organs), **the mass struggle cannot be waged. The unconditional expulsion of rich peasants and all followers of the rich peasant line is a precondition for winning over the masses and guaranteeing the victory of the rural struggle.** How can we purge the rich peasants? By observing and discovering those who represent the rich peasant line in all types of struggle and getting rid of them as soon as they are discovered.

b) Rich Peasants Should Not Be Admitted into the Soviet Governments

Besides eliminating rich peasants from the Party, another fundamental means of establishing the leadership of the farm laborers in the countryside and prohibiting the leading role of rich peasants is to deprive the rich peasants of their voting rights. All past and present rich peasants may not participate in the soviet elections, and, of course, they are not allowed to be elected as representatives of the soviet governments or to other posts in all other government organs. This is an important link in ensuring that the revolution evolves from a democratic revolution to a socialist revolution. Neglect of this important link will certainly lead to serious mistakes.

23) Develop the Theoretical Struggle of Opposing the Rich Peasants

Apart from expelling the rich peasants from the organization, it is also very important to develop the theoretical struggle opposing the rich peasants. This theoretical struggle against the rich peasants should be greatly promoted both inside the Party and among the masses. Only by doing so can the rich peasant line be fundamentally overcome. It is not only necessary to overthrow the actual leadership of the rich peasants now, but also to make sure that it will not raise its head at any time.

The Problem of Vagabonds[1]

Resolution of the Joint Conference of the Red Fourth Army Front Committee and the Western Fujian Special Committee

(June 1930)

I. The Problem of Vagabonds Has Become a Grave Issue in the Struggle

In various localities, especially in the Red Army, the problem of vagabonds has become a very grave issue as the struggle develops. Many comrades have expressed incorrect points of view regarding this problem, saying such things as "The vagabonds know how to fight; we should not exclude them"; "People of all sorts may join, all we have to do is deal with anyone who breaks the rules"; "As long as the officers do a good job of leading, the organizational makeup of the troops is not important"; "Don't attack the vagabonds right now; it won't be too late to attack them when there are general uprisings"; and so on. Such erroneous viewpoints often crop up in the Red Army. The vagabond elements in the Red

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 135-39, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982. No earlier version is known to exist.

1. The social category under discussion in this text, *liumang*, is now commonly translated and understood in China as "hooligan," but its meaning in 1930 was broader. The term might be rendered as "vagrant ruffian," but *liumang* evokes people in either of these categories, in other words those who are drifters, rogues, or both. It is difficult to find a precise English equivalent, but "vagabond," for which the *Oxford English Dictionary* gives the definition "leading an unsettled, irregular, or disreputable life," seems as appropriate as any. More commonly, Mao refers to these people as *youmin*, using an expression which has the rather similar meaning of "floating elements." This latter term is sometimes rendered as "lumpenproletariat," but we have consistently translated it in our edition as "vagrants." When, however, Mao combines *liumang* or *youmin* with *wuchanjieji* (proletariat) or *wuchanzhe* (proletarians), and speaks, for example, of *liumang wuchanjieji*, we have used Marx's term of "lumpenproletariat." Mao's approach to the problem in this text is very different from that which he had adopted earlier, especially in his essay "An Analysis of the Various Classes among the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitudes Toward the Revolution" of January 1926, translated in Volume II, pp. 303–09. There he listed five of the same categories that he enumerates here—soldiers, bandits, thieves, beggars, and prostitutes—and concluded: "These people are capable of fighting very bravely, and if a method can be found for leading them, they can become a revolutionary force."

Army have produced many erroneous political and organizational concepts such as roving-rebelism, the purely military viewpoint, flightism, the policy of burning and killing, the policy of corporal punishment, a system of severe treatment, individual hedonism, individual heroism, small-groupism, and ultrademocracy, which are extremely harmful to the revolution. Especially at this time, when the high tide of revolution is approaching swiftly, and it is increasingly urgent to prepare for a general uprising in the whole country to achieve nationwide victory, the future of the struggle will be fraught with dangers if all forms of right opportunist vagabond consciousness are not overcome, and the vagabond elements are not cleaned out.

II. The Social Status and Role of the Vagabonds

Many comrades are very confused in their concept of vagabonds; lacking a clear understanding of vagabonds, they are unable to determine a correct policy toward them. Therefore, a detailed analysis of vagabonds is a precondition for determining a policy toward them.

A. The Origin of Vagabonds

The brutal exploitation by imperialism in semicolonial China has led to widespread bankruptcy among peasants and handicraft workers, thus creating an enormous mass of unemployed. Since there can be no large-scale national industries to absorb them, these unemployed masses have no way out, and this gives rise to large numbers of vagabonds.

B. The Social Occupations and the Characteristics of Vagabonds

Vagabonds have approximately thirty illegitimate occupations, such as: (1) bandits; (2) thieves; (3) prostitutes; (4) mercenary soldiers; (5) opera performers; (6) errand runners; (7) gamblers; (8) beggars (there are large masses of the above eight categories; the categories below contain relatively few people); (9) court henchmen; (10) *baojia* henchmen; (11) witnesses (with certain exceptions); (12) opium shop owners; (13) opium shop assistants; (14) diviners;[2] (15) fortune-tellers; (16) physiognomists; (17) geomancers (with certain exceptions); (18) jugglers or acrobats; (19) remedy and ointment peddlers; (20) martial arts demonstrators (with very few exceptions); (21) itinerant teachers; (22) hired snoops; (23) kidnappers; (24) vandals; (25) matchmakers; (26) traders in human beings; (27) monks (with certain exceptions); (28) Daoist priests (with certain exceptions); (29) witches; (30) Christian converts (with certain exceptions).

2. Diviners (*buguade*) foretold the future by the Eight Diagrams; the next category, fortunetellers (*suanmingde*), might do so by various methods.

What are called vagabonds in the current controversy should be limited to those in the categories listed above. They constitute a rough average of 5 percent of society's total population, there being approximately 20 million of them in the whole country.

They have the following characteristics: (1) they are divorced from production; (2) they have illegitimate and unstable occupations, and rely on "deception," "robbery," and "begging" for a livelihood; (3) they live irregular lives.

C. The Organizational Structure of the Vagabonds

To secure their survival and social status, the vagabond masses have organized many kinds of secret societies, such as the Green Gang and the Red Gang [Qingbang yu Hongbang][3] along the Yangzi River; the Three Dots Society [Sandianhui] in Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Guangxi and Southeast Asia; the Elder Brothers Society [Gelaohui] in Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Shanxi, and Gansu; the Attain Impartiality Lodge [Zhigongtang] in Fujian, Guangdong and Southeast Asia; the Amulet Society [Fuzihui] in Fujian; the Big Sword Society [Dadaohui] in Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong and Henan; the Observance Society [Zailihui, also known as the Zailijiao, or Observance Sect] in the region of Beijing and Zhili; the Bearded Bandits [Hufei] in the three northeastern provinces; the Red Spear Society [Hongqianghui] and other similar groups in various northern provinces; the Three Harmonies Society [Sanhehui, commonly referred to as the Triad Society] and the Heaven and Earth Society [Tiandihui] in various southern provinces; the Society for the Restoration of the Han [Hanliuhui] on the banks of Lake Dongting; the Three Ks Party [SanKdang] in Shanghai; the Orchid Society [Lanhuahui] of Nanchang; the Green Dragon Society [Qinglonghui] south of the Xiang River; the Butterflies Plucking Flowers Association [Hudie caihuatuan] of Changsha; and so on. There are all kinds of societies everywhere, but they are very loosely organized and fragmented, and most of them are feudal in nature.

D. The Characteristics of the Vagabonds

The first is opposition to organization (opposing discipline and unity; individual freedom). The second is individual hedonism (indulging in visiting prostitutes, gambling, feasting, and spending in a big way). The third is a strongly mercenary

3. It does not seem appropriate to include even a brief note about each of the fifteen secret societies mentioned here by Mao. A convenient overview regarding this phenomenon can be found in the volume edited by Jean Chesneaux, *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China 1840–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). In order to facilitate reference to this or other sources, we have given here the Chinese name of each society, as well an English translation.

nature. The fourth is a destructive nature. The fifth is muddled class consciousness. The sixth is opposition to the masses. The seventh is opposition to socialism. The eighth is adventurism (wanton burning, killing, and looting). The ninth is roving-rebelism (no concept of political power). The above nine characteristics of vagabonds are not all separate from each other, but are connected, and result from their class status and social occupations.

E. The Vagabonds' Attitudes toward the Revolution

According to the above analysis, it is certain that the vagabonds have no enthusiasm for the revolution. On the contrary, in general they are full of counterrevolutionary tendencies. Under great pressure, they may join the revolutionary ranks out of opportunism, but they will vacillate from start to finish. At any time they are capable of turning traitor and becoming running dogs of the counterrevolution.

III. The Party's Tactics with Regard to Vagabonds

Once we have understood the social position of the vagabonds and their role in the revolution, we can determine the tactics to deal with them. The Party's overall tactics toward vagabonds should be: to wrench the vagabonds out from under the ruling class, provide them with land and jobs, force them to work, thus changing their social conditions, and, finally, transform them from vagabonds into nonvagabonds.

Under special circumstances they can be used temporarily so as to separate them from the ruling class. Then proper arrangements should be made for them, or their forces should be temporarily used to destroy the ruling class. But under no circumstances should the slightest political concession be made to the vagabonds.

When vagabonds harbor counterrevolutionary conspiracies, have counterrevolutionary potential, when they hinder the struggle of the masses, so that the masses cannot rise up unless the vagabonds are wiped out, or when the vagabonds, hiding behind revolutionary banners, are suppressing the masses, or when they are resolutely opposing the revolution and helping the ruling class to confront the revolutionary masses to the end, they should be eliminated without any hesitation. Not only should their leaders be eliminated, but some or all of their masses should also be destroyed whenever necessary.

The Red Army and the Red Guards are the important tools of the revolutionary masses in seizing state power and protecting it. **The components of these important tools must all be workers, peasants, and revolutionaries; no vagabonds can be allowed to penetrate into these organizations.**[4] Now the Red

4. This and other sentences in bold are emphasized in the Chinese original by the use of dots next to the characters.

Army and the Red Guards contain many vagabonds, who are the worst violators of discipline. Their interests are counter to that of all the fighting masses. They also behave in a cowardly fashion on the battlefields, afraid to advance. Although they sometimes demonstrate bravery, they do so for selfish interests and not to fulfill the tasks of a particular class. The adventurism and roving-rebelism in the course of guerrilla warfare are generated by them. On every occasion, they are always the ones who drag their feet or run away. Unless these elements are eliminated, and workers, peasants, and revolutionaries join the Red Army and Red Guards to take their place and transform the organization of the Red Army and Red Guards, such a Red Army and Red Guards will be very dangerous. Only by getting rid of them can the Red Army and the Red Guards be perfected so as to implement the great tasks of the class. In addition, eliminating all anti-organization and antidiscipline elements is the only way to win over the masses on a large scale and enable them to join the Red Army willingly and fulfill the task of expanding the Red Army and enlarge the scope of the struggle. This is not to say that the vagabond elements now in the Red Army must be expelled within twenty-four hours. **But the vagabonds must be systematically replaced by activists of the struggle of workers and peasants, and any inner-Party protection of vagabonds must be firmly opposed.** Criticism should be made of the illusions of "still having some hope of being revolutionary"; of the viewpoints that "all sorts of people may join the Red Army"; "the vagabonds should not be attacked during the guerrilla war, but only at the time of the armed uprising"; "as long as the officers do a good job of leading, the organizational makeup of the troops is not important"; and erroneous and strange opinions such as "if we don't want the vagabonds now, then we won't want the peasants later, and we won't want the workers in the future, and we'll be left with only the Communist Party."

Great efforts must be made to wipe out roving-rebelism, pure militarism, escapism, policies of burning and killing, the system of corporal punishment, individual hedonism, individual heroism, small-group mentality, ultrademocratism, and other erroneous political and organizational ideas of the vagabond elements. At the same time, those with only a few vagabond habits should receive appropriate education.

Inside the Party, general education and propaganda directed toward vagabonds should be stepped up among the masses, and an atmosphere of opposing vagabonds should be created. The Party, in particular, should purge vagabond elements, overcome the vagabond mentality, and recognize the fact that competing for leadership with the vagabond mentality is the most serious task in the Red Army now. This is the only way to ensure that the tool of the Red Army will be used by the worker and peasant classes, and that it will not be led astray by the vagabonds, thus causing the defeat of the revolution.

Order to the First Route Army[1] of the Red Army to Set Out from Western Fujian and Regroup at Guangchang

(June 22, 1930, at the city of Tingzhou)

1. The war between Chiang [Kaishek] and Yan [Xishan] is raging fiercely, and each has suffered casualties of more than a hundred thousand. Traitor Chiang has also been wounded, Zhang's troops and those of Guangxi have arrived in Changsha,[2] and the workers' and peasants' movement is on the rise everywhere. The situation is opening up a great deal.

2. This route army has the task of working in concert with the masses of workers and peasants in Jiangxi to seize Jiujiang and Nanchang so as to establish political power in Jiangxi. The plan is for the entire route army to move towards Guangchang and concentrate its forces there by July 5.

3. The Fourth Army (minus the Third Column) should advance towards Ninghua tomorrow (the 23rd). Upon arrival in Ninghua it should work for a week on raising funds. Fourth Army Commander Lin Biao will stay behind on important business, and the troops will be temporarily under the command of Zeng Shimao, chief-of-staff of this army.

4. The Second Column of the Sixth Army and the First Column of the Twelfth Army should advance toward Shicheng the day after tomorrow (the 24th), and work in the vicinity of Shicheng. They should also arrive at Guangchang and concentrate their forces there by July 5th, making sure to establish communication with the Fourth Army in Ninghua. This Second Column of

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Our source for this order is Volume 6 of *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* (Materials on Jiangxi Party History), pp. 48–49. This volume of the series, published in 1988, is a special collection dealing with "events around the time of the Luofang Conference." The document does not seem to have been published elsewhere.

1. The First Route Army [*diyi lujun*] had been formed from the Fourth Red Army of Zhu De and Mao Zedong, plus the Sixth and Twelfth Red Armies, in obedience to the orders brought from the Central Committee on June 21 by Tu Zhennong. It was shortly renamed the First Army Group [*diyi juntuan*], and is so designated in many of the documents translated below for the period beginning in July 1930.

2. Zhang refers to Zhang Fakui; Guangxi refers to the Guangxi faction and its leader, Li Zongren. In early May, these two commanders had led their armies into Hunan and driven back the troops loyal to Chiang Kaishek, occupying Changsha on May 28. Subsequently, however, they quarreled with one another, and as a result they were defeated in a counterattack. By the time Mao issued this order, Changsha had already been reoccupied by Chiang's troops on June 16.

the Sixth Army and First Column of the Twelfth Army are both under the direction of the column commander, Luo Binghui.

5. The Twenty-sixth Column should proceed tomorrow (the 23rd) to Ruijin for work, mobilizing the masses and undertaking to make uniforms for the First, Second, and Fourth Columns of the Twenty-second Army. It must also be in contact with the troops operating in Shicheng.

6. The Third Column of the Fourth Army, the Twelfth Army (minus the First Column), as well as the units directly attached to Headquarters will remain in Ting[zhou] for reconsolidation and training while awaiting orders, and then proceed via Shicheng to Guangchang to concentrate its forces.

7. The various large units of the original Fourth Army (that is, the First and Second Columns of the present Fourth Army, the First and Second Columns of the present Twelfth Army, and the espionage team of Headquarters) should each send tomorrow morning (the 23rd) one active, energetic soldier who has the rudiments of literacy, armed with one rifle and fifty rounds of ammunition, to the office of the original Fourth Army to assemble and await orders. They are to be sent to study at the Red Army School so that they may be used in future as reinforcements for lower-level Red Army cadres.

8. We are now in the city of Ting[zhou] but in the future will follow Headquarters in our movements.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Telegram of the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission on Attacking Nanchang and Regrouping at Wuhan[1]

(June 25, 1930)

From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, for transmittal to Party branches everywhere, from the All-China General Labor Union for transmittal to Red labor unions everywhere, to the revolutionary mutual-relief societies and revolutionary student associations in all provinces, to the soviet governments in all localities, and to the Red armies in all army districts. To the *Shanghai Daily*, the *Hong Kong Daily*, the *Shanghai Red Flag*, the *Western Fujian Red Report*, and Red newspapers everywhere, for transmittal to the workers, peasants, soldiers, and toiling masses of the entire nation:

Since 1927, the Guomindang has betrayed the revolution and surrendered to the imperialists, and the various factions of the Guomindang have all become the loyal running dogs of the imperialists, with the result that the imperialist forces in China have grown day by day and the attacks of capital have been extremely severe. This has caused an evil trend of ever-deepening colonialization in China, the decline of industry, depression in the cities and bankruptcy in the villages, creating extreme panic in the Chinese economy. In particular, the sharpening conflicts and contradictions between the imperialists and the Guomindang warlords have created the continuous and

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Our source for this document is the text published in *Dangshi ziliao*, no. 3, July 1978, as reproduced in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 327–29.

1. As noted above, Li Lisan had enunciated in February 1930 a radical strategy aimed at achieving the rapid victory of the revolution in all of China. After calling a meeting of delegates from the various soviet areas, which finally met in Shanghai at the end of May, even though Mao had twice refused to obey a direct order to attend, Li produced, in the shape of a Politburo resolution of June 11, the definitive formulation of what has become known as the "Li Lisan line." (For the text, see *Central Committee Documents* [1930], pp. 115–35.) These events, and the relation between Mao's position, Li Lisan's position, and the line of the Communist International are discussed in the Introduction to this volume. As stated in the letter of October 14, 1930, translated below, the text of the resolution of June 11 did not reach the Red Army until early October. Mao had, however, learned about the substance of the new policies from an emissary of the Central Committee, Tu Zhennong, who arrived on June 21. (Regarding Tu, see the relevant note to the text of September 17, 1930.)

expanding tragic and confused wars of the warlords. All this proves that reactionary rule is already headed toward collapse. On the other hand, the revolutionary forces are moving toward balanced development, and with the intensifying struggle of the workers, the deepening of the land revolution of the peasants, the rapid expansion of the soviet districts and of the Red Army, the daily increasing revolutionization of the soldiers, the fact that the poor people and petty bourgeoisie of the towns and cities are daily moving further toward the Left, all the objective conditions for the victory of the revolution in the whole country are fully mature, and the revolutionary high tide is already before us. Given this political situation, the present task of the revolutionary masses is to concentrate all the revolutionary forces, to overthrow reactionary politics root and branch, to seize political power throughout the whole country, and to win nationwide victory for the revolution. In compliance with the resolution of the First National Conference of the Soviet Districts to complete the task of the revolution, this committee, in command of the First Army Group of the Red Army, will advance toward Nanchang and regroup at Wuhan with the Second and Third Army Groups.[2] They will seize victory first in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, in order to push forward the nationwide revolutionary high tide, and will call upon the workers, peasants, soldiers, and the masses of poor people to rise up together, for the workers to carry out political strikes, for the peasants to carry out local uprisings, for the soldiers of the White armies to carry out troop insurrections, and turn the wars among the warlords into a revolutionary class war. We believe that only the force of the broad revolutionary masses is capable of thoroughly overthrowing all reactionary warlord forces. We are persuaded that only by overthrowing completely the reactionary rule of the Guomindang can China be unified and the workers, peasants, soldiers, and impoverished masses obtain liberation. In order to liberate themselves, and in order to seek the victory of the revolution throughout the country, the toiling worker, peasant, and soldier masses must resolutely and courageously stand with the Red Army on the battlelines, for the final decisive battle against the Guomindang warlords and the imperialists. We further believe that the victory of the Chinese revolution can assuredly raise the curtain on the world revolution. The victory of the Chinese revolution will not only be the death of the Chinese reactionary rulers and the Guomindang warlords; it will also mark the eve of the collapse of imperialism. This, our decisive war, is the decisive war in which our China will be liberated from beneath the iron heel of the imperialists and warlords.

2. The Shanghai conference of soviet areas had been invoked by Li Lisan to provide added authority for the Politburo's June 11 resolution on revolutionary strategy, a point which Tu had no doubt made in his lengthy report to Mao and his comrades. Tu also conveyed a directive from the Central Committee stipulating that the former Red armies should be combined into army groups, and that the First, Second, and Third Army Groups should join forces at Wuhan, as stated here.

The gunpowder of the revolution is already exploding, and the light of the dawn of the revolution will quickly arrive. Our Red flag will fly throughout the entire world. Workers, peasants, soldiers, and impoverished masses, arise as one, and shatter the shackles that the imperialists and the Guomindang warlords have placed on us.

Chinese Revolutionary Military Commmission

Chairman Mao Zedong

Members Zhu De, Zeng Shan, Li Wenlin, Liu Shiqi, Deng Zihui, Huang Gonglue, Peng Dehuai, Wang Huai, Lin Biao, Peng Qingquan, Wu Zhonghao, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Yi, Duan Yuequan, Fang Zhimin, Shao Shiping

June 25, 1930

From Tingzhou to Changsha

(To the Tune "Butterflies Court the Flowers")

(July 1930)

In June the heavenly troops[1] smite the corrupt and evil,
Seeking with ten-thousand-*zhang*[2] ropes to bind the *kunpeng*.[3]
Across the River Gan a patch turned red,
Thanks to Huang Gonglue's wing.[4]
A million workers and peasants eagerly rise together,
Rolling up Jiangxi like a mat, striking straight at Hunan and Hubei.
The solemn strains of the *Internationale* are heard,
A raging tempest falls upon us from the heavens.[5]

This is another of the poems first published together in the May 1962 issue of *People's Literature*. (For the author's note accompanying it, see Mao's autumn 1929 poem "The War between Chiang Kaishek and the Guangxi Warlords.") Our source is *Shici duilian*, pp. 35–37.

1. Here the Chinese term is *tianbing*, traditionally used to mean the emperor's army, or the army "with Heaven on its side."

2. The *zhang* is a measurement of length equal to 10 Chinese feet, or 3.3 meters.

3. This mythical creature appears in the opening passage of chapter 1 of the *Zhuangzi* (translated in Angus Graham, *Chuang-tzu. The Seven Inner Chapters and Other Writings from the Book* Chuang-tzu [London: Allen & Unwin, 1981], pp. 43–44). The bird called *peng* (usually translated as roc) is presented there as a metamorphosis of a giant fish called the *kun*. Here the composite name *kunpeng* is used to evoke the image of a giant, ever-changing, predatory force.

4. Huang Gonglue (1898–1931), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and was a leader in the Pingjiang Uprising of 1928. In June 1930, his Sixth Army, which had already set up a base area (the "patch of red" of the poem) on the western bank of the Gan River, became part of the First Army Group under the command of Zhu and Mao. Huang was killed in action on September 15, 1931.

5. Mao's last two lines appear to be patterned on a poem by Du Fu, the first of "Seven Songs of a Sojourner in Tonggu *xian* in 759." William Hung translates Du Fu's concluding lines: "Oh! Just this first song is sufficiently sad: A bitter wind blows on me from high above." (William Hung, *Tu Fu: China's Greatest Poet* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952], p. 157.) The character *bei* (sad, melancholy) appears in both poems; Mao applies the adjective to the *Internationale*, and in that context we have rendered it as "solemn"; Du Fu's last line speaks of a *bei feng*, translated by Hung as a bitter wind. Mao's perception of the *Internationale* was colored by the fact that, though it is a song of victory, he was hearing it (or thinking of it) in defeat. Unlike virtually all previous Chinese commentators on this poem, the editors of the *Mao Zedong shici duilian jizhu* refer (p. 37) to the last two lines as "obscurely conveying the author's complicated feelings at the time, solemn and resolute, and at the same time a mixture of grief and anger [*beizhuang er beifen*]."

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Change Its Route and Advance on Chongren

(July 20, 1930, in the afternoon,
at General Headquarters in the city of Yongcheng)

1. The situation of the enemy is as before.

2. On the basis of its original task, this army group will change its route and advance on Chongren. It has been decided that we will set off from here in three groups on the 21st of this month, and arrival at the *xian* seat of Chongren is to be on the 22nd.

3. The order of battle and the plans for the movement of the troops:[1]

Date	Place of Encampment		
	Left route (Fourth Army, Commanding Officer Lin Biao)	Middle route (Twelfth Army, General Command Headquarters)	Right route (Third Army, Commanding Officer Huang Gonglue)
First day, July 21	Daifang, 80 *li*	Around Zhongxiqiao and Pengzhou, 80 *li*	Arrive at Chongren (40 *li*) via Niutian (60 *li*), Le'an (50 *li*) and Gongpo (40 *li*). Arrive at *xian* town of Chongren within 3 days (on July 23). Fix own marching plan
Second day, the 22nd	Gongpo, 55 *li*	The area around Jianglei, Majiadu, and Xiawan(?)[2]	
Third day, the 23rd	Chongren, 40 *li*	Chongren	

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 57–60.

1. The figures on this chart manifestly indicate the distances in *li* from one point to another.

2. A question mark appears in parentheses here in the original text, possibly indicating that the distance is unknown.

Addendum:

a. General Command Headquarters and directly attached units follow the Revolutionary Military Commission in marching along the middle route. A detailed marching plan is to be fixed separately.

b. Detailed marching plans for the left and right routes are to be fixed separately by the commanders of each route.

4. We will lead the General Headquarters and march with the Revolutionary Military Commission along the middle route.

Addendum:

a. For all army routes, the troops that arrive first at the *xian* seat of Chongren will be in charge of allocating encampment sites for the entire Army Group (the Third, Fourth, and Twelfth Armies), and for posting sentries and sending out scouts in all directions.

Chart of marching plans for the second period of the northward advance of the Right Route Army of the Red Army's First Army Group

Date	21st	22nd
Marching order	1. Twelfth Army 2. Espionage team of General Headquarters, Front Committee of General Command Headquarters, espionage team of the Front Committee, transportation team, baggage of units directly attached to the army 3. Third Army	Same as previously
Departure time	Leave at 1:00 A.M. Get up at 1:00 A.M., leave at 2:30 after the Twelfth Army, leave at 3:00 A.M. following the baggage of the units directly attached to General Headquarters	Same as previously
Places passed	Leave this town via the north gate, pass 10 Lusiping —20 Xianlieqiao—20 Liuyuan (50 *li*)	40 *li*
Encampment sites	Camp along the way near Liuyuan	Lixie

Marching order	Follow the order as above: espionage team of General Headquarters, General Headquarters, Front Committee, espionage team of the Front Committee, transportation team, the baggage of the directly attached units, and the 102nd Army
Time of departure	Get up at 1:00, leave at 2:00, leave at 2:30 Get up at 1:30, leave at 2:30, leave at 3:00
Places passed	Chudong 5 Lingxiali 5 Upper and Lower Luzhou 10 Jiangkou 10 Xiapo 5 Kengkou 15 Guangganyu 10 Qian 6 Zhongxiqiao 15 Pengzhou
Encampment sites	Area around Zhongxiqiao and Pengzhou; area around Matiwan, Xiawan, and Guofang

Addendum:

1. All units must set their clocks accurately and keep strictly to schedules so as not to interfere with the marching of the other units.

2. While on the march, the vanguard is to be dispatched by the Twelfth Army, and the rearguard is to be dispatched by the Third Army. While encamped, sentries are to be posted by the Twelfth Army on the way out, and by the Third Army on the way back. For unusual situations there will be separate orders.

3. The matter of setting up camp will be directed by the chief of the Adjutants' Section of the Twelfth Army, Yang Zhicheng.

4. For the departure of troops directly attached to the General Headquarters tomorrow (the 21st), the place of assembly will be on the lawn in front of the transportation team's encampment (that is, at the rear entrance to General Headquarters).

5. Upon setting out tomorrow morning, the Fourth Army must rapidly get onto the main road, so as to avoid crossing paths with the Twelfth Army.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Set Out from Yongfeng

(July 20, 1930, 7.30 P.M. at
General Headquarters in the city of Yongfeng)

1. The overall situation of the enemy is as before.

There are at present no White troops in Xin'gan. It is said that there is one regiment of enemy troops in Xiajiang, or that it has already set out for Jishui.

2. This army group has decided to go northward according to the original plan. The plan for advancing during the second period is to divide into two routes, to set out from here (the city of Yongfeng) tomorrow (the 21st), to march for two days, and to be sure to arrive at Maixie (90 *li* from the city) and concentrate forces. A chart of the plans is as below.

Chart of the Red Army First Army Group's plans for the second period of advancing northward (setting out from Yongfeng *xian* to Maixie for concentration of forces):[1]

date	units and places of encampment	
First day: July 21	left route (the Fourth Army): via Wangjia 15 Hanshanqiao 5 Muyuan 5 Zhangjia 5 Wangjia Encamp in the vicinity of Zhangjia, Wangjia	right route (General Headquarters plus Third and Twelfth Armies): 10 Luosiping 20 Xianningqiao 20 Encamp at Liuyuan
Second day: July 22	20 Nabu 25 Maixie Encamp at Maixie	40 Maixie Encamp at Maixie

3. A detailed marching plan for the left route is to be drawn up by the Fourth Army itself. A marching plan for the right route is to be issued in a separate chart.

4. After setting out, our position will be that of the General Headquarters.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 55–56.

1. The numbers in the columns marked "place of encampment" on this chart presumably indicate distances in *li* from one location to another.

Addendum: Upon setting out tomorrow morning, the Fourth Army must rapidly get onto the main road so as to avoid crossing paths with the Twelfth Army.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Attack Zhangshu[1]

(July 22, 1930, 7:00 P.M.
at General Headquarters in Maixie)

1. At present, there are no enemy troops in the town of Zhangshu. The town of Nanchang has one battalion each of artillery and espionage, and one regiment each of garrison and reserves. There is the possibility of their advancing to Zhangshu and stubbornly resisting our forces.

The rest of the intelligence about the enemy is as reported today by the staff office of this General Headquarters; there is no enemy in Xin'gan.

Today our Fourth Army has already dispatched troops that have taken the town of Xin'gan.

2. This army group has decided to launch an assault and take Zhangshu, according to the original third period plan for northward advance.

3. As the left wing forces, the Fourth Army should enter Xin'gan by tomorrow morning and clearly ascertain the enemy situation in Zhangshu. If it is true that there are no enemy forces, they should all advance toward the town of Zhangshu and take it (as soon as it is taken, sentries should be posted to Nanchang, and a way should be found to block the public road between Nanchang and Zhangshu; a floating bridge should be quickly built leading to Gaoan, or boats should be gathered). If it is found that there are enemy troops in Zhangshu, then [the Fourth Army] is to advance from Xin'gan to the area around Xiazhuang, Liuzhuang, and Huangzhuang, which are on the right of Yongtaijie, encamp, and wait for the order to attack.

The rest constitute the main force of the right wing army, and their distribution is as follows:

a. The Third Army should dispatch one column as the vanguard, to set out tomorrow promptly at 1:00 A.M. from its present encampment, march to the Yanghuzhuang area by way of Mixiang, Miaoxia, Hepo, Zhangshuxia, Lijiang, Yujiafang, Sangzhuang, and Tanjiafang, and encamp there (60 *li*).
b. The rest constitute the main force of the right wing army, to advance according to the following order: the Third Army (minus one column, to set out tomorrow at 1:20 A.M. from its present location and follow after the vanguard), the General Command Headquarters and its espionage team, the espionage team of the Front Committee, the transport team (to arise at 1:20 A.M. tomorrow, and to assemble and set out at 2:20 from the mouth of the street here), and the Twelfth Army (minus one column, to set out tomorrow at 2:50 A.M.), plus the baggage of the right wing army (to advance according to the marching order of the troops).
c. The Twelfth Army is to dispatch one column as rear guard to march after the baggage and provide protection.
d. Yang Zhicheng, chief of the Adjutants Section of the Twelfth Army, is in charge of all matters relating to setting up camp for the right wing army.
e. As for the baggage of the right wing army, the main person in charge is Fan Shude, head of the baggage team of the Sixth Army's second column, and second in command is Yang Lisan, chief of the supplies section of the Twelfth Army. Each unit's baggage is to follow its own personnel in the marching order designated.

4. While marching, we will be at the head of this unit.

Addendum:

1. When setting out tomorrow morning, each unit must be strictly punctual.
2. Prior to departure, each unit must be clear about the road out, so as to avoid crossing paths with other forces.
3. Wounded and sick soldiers are to advance along with the large baggage.
4. If there is no way to gather together the baggage of all the troops, it should be stopped at the side of the road and wait until all the personnel of the unit in question have passed before being moved ahead. The person in charge of baggage in each unit is to be held fully responsible.
5. The left wing troops must be in close touch with this unit.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 61–62.

1. Zhangshu was a market town in Qingjiang *xian*, located some 50 miles southwest of Nanchang on the Gan River. Generally speaking, in the orders from the summer and autumn of 1930 which appear below, Zhangshu refers specifically to the town, and Qingjiang to the *xian* as a whole, or to its administrative center. Subsequently, Zhangshu increased in importance until it became an urban district which swallowed up the whole of Qingjiang *xian*, so only this name will be found on recent maps.

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army About All Stipulated Arrangements for Crossing the River

(July 25, 1930, at General Headquarters in the town of Zhangshu)

Our stipulations for crossing the river at this point are hereby laid down as shown below; every unit must strictly observe them.

1. The order for crossing the river is as follows: (a) Fourth Army; (b) General Headquarters and its directly attached units; (c) Twelfth Army; (d) given this order for the three army units, we must first get across the horses, mess supplies, and large and small baggage, after which the people are to cross in the aforementioned order.

2. Security for the river crossing: the northern shore of the Gan River is the responsibility of the Fourth Army, which must dispatch one column as security forces to cross the river first at 3:00 P.M. and deploy security guards along the northern shore. The Third Army is responsible for the deployment of security guards along the southern shore the Gan River, and the guards should be dispatched at 5:00 P.M. Each unit of security forces must occupy a stronghold along the major roads on land (Qingjiang Road on the northern shore, and Nanchang Road, Fuzhou Road, and Xin'gan Road on the southern shore), and keep a close watch on them. In addition, each security force is to dispatch sentries to keep watch as far as 20 *li* in the direction under surveillance. West of the river it is necessary to set up machine guns to protect the river area so as to prevent enemy interference by steamer or small warship.

3. Dock routes

There are three docks in this area, and the routes leading to them are as follows:

Number 1 dock (there are two routes): a. Xiaogong Temple—Manzhou Street—and Suxian Street—to number 1 dock. b. Bus station—Men Street—Pingchang Street—Xianyu Street—Yufu Street—to number 1 dock (General Headquarters will cross the river here).

Number 2 dock

Bus station—East Gate—Denglong Street—Yugu Miao—to number 2 dock.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 63–66.

Number 3 dock

Bus station—Zijing Lane—Zhongshipai—the sportsground—Sanwanggong—Yangong Lane—Dade Gate—to number 3 dock.

4. Distribution of docks

a. The espionage team of the Revolutionary Military Commission, General Headquarters, and its directly attached units board boats and cross the river at number 1 dock via the second route.
b. The Fourth Army can board boats at any dock except the one at which General Headquarters makes the crossing.
c. The Twelfth Army should board boats and make the crossing at number 1 dock via both routes leading to it.
d. The Third Army should board boats at docks numbers 2 and 3, and at number 1 dock via the second route leading to it.

(Each unit should still try on its own to come up with short cuts to the boarding places, and have the adjutants make signs.)

5. Times for the river crossing

a. Security forces (one column of the Fourth Army) at 3:00 P.M.
b. Horses and mess supplies for each unit between 3:00 and 5:00 P.M.; crossing must be completed within two hours.
c. The Fourth Army and the Revolutionary Military Commission, plus the directly attached units of General Headquarters (minus one column) between 5:00 and 8:00 P.M.
d. The Twelfth Army between 8:00 and 12:00 P.M.
e. The Third Army between 12:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. tomorrow. (The security forces of the Third Army will be the last to cross the river, and its signal to withdraw sentries will be determined on its own.)

6. The number of people on each boat

Each large boat may carry approximately 80 to 90 people (about one company).

Each small boat may carry 30-odd people.

7. Stipulations regarding the crossing of horses and baggage

All horses are to be taken across the river in small open boats.

Baggage and mess supplies may be carried across the river in large boats, but when loading, each unit must dispatch one adjutant to direct the operation so as to avoid crowding. After landing they should be assembled and led to designated rest areas.

8. Escort personnel

The Fourth Army is to dispatch one company to be responsible for escorting the boats, with one soldier assigned to each boat (there are about 80-odd boats).

9. Illumination during the river crossing

When crossing the river at night, lighting on the docks is to be provided by the Adjutants Section of General Headquarters, and on the boats each unit is to carry its own lantern.

10. Safety during the river crossing

The chief of the Adjutants Section of the Fourth Army is to designate several small boats (a minimum of six), choose twenty-odd boatmen who are good swimmers, put them on the small boats (four to a boat), and situate them down river from the point of crossing, so as to provide rescue in case of emergency.

11. Points for attention when crossing the river

a. Obey orders, and do not vie with each other for position or crowd each other.
b. Keep quiet, do not make unnecessary noise.
c. Do not light matches or smoke on the boat.

12. Command during the crossing

During the time when each unit is making the crossing, that unit should designate capable officers to direct the crossing at each dock. The units directly attached to General Headquarters will be commanded by General Headquarters chief adjutant Chen Yezhen.

13. Places to rest after the river crossing

After the river crossing has been completed, the Fourth Army will advance to Jinglouyu (resting on the road leading to Gaoan), the units directly attached to General Headquarters and the Twelfth Army will rest in the area around Zhujiadu and Yangjialing, and the Third Army will choose its own place to rest.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to Seize the Niuhang Railway Station[1]

(July 29, 1930)

1. One regiment of Dai Yue's forces[2] proceeded from Xinyu to Xin'gan on the 25th; the 107th Regiment of Zhu Yaohua's forces[3] proceeded from Chongren to Zhangshu on the 26th; the 108th Regiment has also received orders from Zhang Huizan[4] to proceed to the provincial capital and appears disposed to march into Nanchang in haste so as to defend against us. According to a report from someone who came from Zhangshu today, the 103rd and 107th Regiments, led by Zhu Yaohua, and one regiment from the Thirteenth Division (Deng Ying)[5] are proceeding from Zhangshu to Nanchang by boat.

2. On the basis of the original task of our army group, we intend to occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad on August 1, International Day of Anti-Imperialist Demonstrations and anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising, in order to spread [our] political influence. A plan of operation has been decided on, according to which as a second phase of the second step in the march northward, the

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 152–54, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

1. This is an order of the First Army Group issued by Mao Zedong and Zhu De from Gaoan in Jiangxi. On June 25 Mao Zedong, in his capacity as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Commission, had issued a telegram, translated above, expressing agreement with Li Lisan's line of attacking major cities and announcing that the First Army Group would advance toward Nanchang. Entering Jiangxi from Changting in western Fujian, the forces under Mao Zedong and Zhu De proceeded on July 24 to attack and capture Zhangshu in Qingjiang *xian*, to the southwest of Nanchang, destroying part of the Guomindang's Eighteenth Division. At this point, a conference of cadres from the First Army Group convened by Mao and Zhu decided not to attack Nanchang, but to limit their aims to taking the Niuhang Railway Station, across the Gan River from Nanchang, where they could shoot off guns as an "August 1" demonstration to commemorate the third anniversary of the Nanchang uprising.

2. The reference is to the Fifty-second Brigade of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army, commanded by Dai Yue (1888–1971), a native of Hunan.

3. This regiment was part of the Fifty-fourth Brigade of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army; Zhu Yaohua was the brigade commander.

4. Zhang Huizan (1884–1931), a native of Hunan, was, at this time, the commander of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army. He was defeated and captured by the Red Army on December 30, 1930.

5. Deng Ying, a native of Hubei, was at this time the commander of the newly established Thirteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army.

entire army group will proceed on the 30th to the area of Wanshougong and Shiziling, and wait for an opportunity to seize the Niuhang Railway Station.

3. The Twelfth Army should proceed in the direction of Nanchang after noon today (the 29th), and choose a place to encamp about 30 *li* from the city. Tomorrow (the 30th) one column should be sent to seize Shengmijie and wait for an opportunity to occupy the Niuhang Railway Station. The remaining [troops] should proceed to Wanshougong (Twelfth Army Acting Commander Luo[6] shall delegate encampment [personnel] and security forces at Wanshougong).

The Third Army should set out from here tomorrow (the 30th) by way of Yangjiafang, Licun, and Chitujie, and arrive in the vicinity of Shiziling on the 31st, to rest there and await further orders.

The units under the direct command of General Headquarters will set out from here tomorrow (the 30th) along with the Revolutionary Military Commission and the Fourth Army, and proceed by way of Xiangfuguanjie and Liangcun to Wanshougong, where they will encamp, and rest and await further orders on the 31st.

4. Upon arrival at its destination, each military unit should immediately set about mobilizing the masses and making efforts to raise funds.

5. As for the troops delegated by the Twelfth Army to take Shengmijie, as soon as Niuhang Railway Station has been taken, they should immediately set about destroying the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad line (pay attention to destroying the iron bridge) and the nearby telegraph lines.

6. When on the move, all movements should follow those of General Headquarters.

It is so ordered.

Addendum:

1. Departure time and order of march for General Headquarters and the Fourth Army tomorrow (the 30th) is as follows:

a. Departure time for General Headquarters and units under its direct command, and the espionage team of the Revolutionary Military Commission is: rise at 1:30, set out at 2:30.
   The Fourth Army sets out at 3:00.
b. When on the march, the order of the ranks is: General Headquarters espionage team, General Headquarters, Revolutionary Military Commission and its espionage team, transportation team, and the Fourth Army. The baggage of the units under the direct command of the General Headquarters are to follow behind the transportation team.

6. Luo Binghui (1897–1946) was a native of Yunnan. A former Guomindang general who had participated in the Northern Expedition, he went over to the Red Army in November 1929. At this time, he was, as indicated by Mao, commander of the Twelfth Division.

c. The Fourth Army should assign a rear guard to provide security during the march.

2. The route to Wanshougong is as follows:
   Starting from this city, passing through Lengcun—Wangcun—Wukouqiao—Zuojiashan, Xiangfuguanjie—Xiongboqiao—Guloupu —Shaoshan—Liangcun—Wanshougong.

3. The route to Shiziling is as follows:
   Starting from this city—Lianchengqiao—Xiejialing (Songjia)—Yangjiafang—Xiaogang (Beiyi)—Hucun—Licun —Chitujie—Luowa—Shiziling.

4. The Third Army should pay attention to finding out clearly the marching route, so as not to cross paths with the Fourth Army.

Order to Withdraw to Anyi and Fengxin for Rest and Reconsolidation

(August 1, 1930)

1. The Hundred and third and Hundred and fifth Regiments have both arrived at the Nanchang Railway Station, and they appear to be taking a solid defensive stand while waiting for reinforcements.

The troops we sent out have begun their attack on Nanchang from around the Nanchang Railway Station today (August 1) as an armed demonstration to commemorate the August 1 holiday.

2. In order to accomplish rapidly the task of marching northward, this army group has decided to lure the enemy out of its den and destroy him. It is planned to arrive at Anyi *xian* and Fengxin *xian* tomorrow (August 2) to rest, consolidate, work, and raise funds.

3. The Twelfth Army should proceed tomorrow morning (the 2nd) at 3:00 to Anyi and keep a close watch on Jiujiang (sending some [troops] in the direction of Wanjiafu and Nanxi for guerrilla [warfare]), setting out from here (excluding the First Column) and passing by way of Wushanpu, Luowa, Lianglukou (crossroads), and Shibijie to the Anyi *xian* seat. Its First Column, sent to Guofangling, should begin to withdraw after five o'clock tomorrow morning, procede to Anyi via shortcut, and rejoin the main forces (it would be best for this army to arrive and encamp at Shibijie on the first day).

The Third Army should set out from its original place of encampment (Shiziling) at two o'clock tomorrow morning, pass through Luowa, Lianglukou (making sure to go through Lianglukou on time and rapidly, so as not to cross paths with the Twelfth Army), Liujia, and Guangfuqiao, and arrive at the Fengxin *xian* seat (60 *li*). Its First Column sent to Guofangling can proceed tomorrow as far as a few *li* beyond Wanfuqiao and choose a place to encamp, and rejoin the main forces at Fengxin the day after tomorrow (the 3rd).

The Fourth Army (excluding the Second Column) should set out from its original encampment (Caoshan) at three o'clock tomorrow morning (the 2nd), pass through Liangcun, Tangjia, Tangjiafang, and Guangfuqiao, and arrive at the Fengxin *xian* seat. Its Second Column should set out at 4:30 tomorrow morning, following the directly attached unit of the General Headquarters, pass through

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 155–56, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

Wushanpu, Luowa, and Lianglukou, and arrive at and encamp in the vicinity of Guangfuqiao. It should begin its work there, mobilize the masses, and make efforts to raise funds, and at the same time keep a close watch over the direction of Nanchang.

The espionage team of General Headquarters, the General Command, the Revolutionary Military Commission, and the espionage division and transportation division should rise at three o'clock tomorrow morning, muster and set out at this crossroads in order at four o'clock, following behind the Twelfth Army, pass through Wushanpu, Luowa, Lianglukou (there is a crossroads here), Liujia, and Guangfuqiao, to the Fengxin *xian* seat (60 *li*), and encamp (the baggage of the directly affiliated units follows behind the transportation division).

4. As for communications between the troops in Anyi (the Twelfth Army) and General Headquarters in Fengxin, a squad of signalmen will be sent by the transportation division of General Headquarters to install telephone lines.

5. During the march, we are in the position of General Headquarters.

Addendum:

1. Huang Gonglue, army commander of the Third Army, shall be responsible for all matters of encampment at the Fengxin *xian* seat.

2. The Third Army is to send people to set up an appropriate marker at the crossroads in Lianglukou near Luowa.

3. Officers in each unit must inform all soldiers and porters in their units of the direction of movement and the destination, to prevent those who fall behind from taking the wrong route.

4. As for telephone wires, poles, and so forth, located where all troops pass through or are encamped, it is forbidden to destroy them arbitrarily without orders, to avoid difficulties arising when our army comes to install telephone lines.

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Advance from Fengxin to Yifeng

(August 6, 1930, 7:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in the town of Fengxin)

1. In accordance with the original plan, the troops directly attached to this General Headquarters, together with the Third Army, will march toward Yifeng along with the [Revolutionary] Military Commission tomorrow (the 7th).

2. The Third Column of the Third Army should set out promptly at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow (the 7th) via the west gate of this town, march toward Yifeng by way of Liuchiqiao and Bailuyu, and find an opportunity to encamp at Cunqian (70 *li*). The General Headquarters and its espionage team, as well as the Revolutionary Military Commission and its espionage team and transportation team, should rise at 3:00 tomorrow morning. At 4:00 they should cross the bridge outside the west gate to assemble and set out, march behind the Third Column, find an opportunity to encamp at Cunqian, work in Cunqian the day after tomorrow (the 8th), arrive at Tangpu (30 *li*) on the 9th, and arrive at the town of Yifeng (40 *li*) on the 10th. The baggage of the troops directly attached to General Headquarters is to proceed following the transportation team, and it is under the command of this unit's adjutant.

3. The Third Army (minus the Third Column) should set out following the baggage of the troops directly attached to General Headquarters at 4:30 A.M. tomorrow (the 7th), and encamp in the vicinity of Bailuyu. The day after tomorrow (the 8th) it should dispatch one column to take another road and advance to Yifeng by way of Huaqiao. It should arrive in the city of Yifeng on the 10th; the rest are to enter Xinyu on the 8th, arrive in the vicinity of Banqiao and Chengtang on the 9th, and enter the city of Yifeng on the 10th.

4. During the march our position will be with General Headquarters.

It is so ordered.

General Headquarters espionage team:	
Team leader	Chen Shuxiang
Political Commissar	Chen Xiping
Revolutionary Military Commission espionage team leader	He Jinyun
Revolutionary Military Commission adjutant	Xiao Gangde (acting)
Transportation team:	
Acting team leader	Yang Zaikui
Political Commissar	Feng Wenbin
Chief adjutant of this Headquarters	Chen Yezhen
Commander-in-chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Volume 6, pp. 74–75. The document does not appear to have been published previously.

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Leave Yifeng and Concentrate Its Forces in Wanzai

(August 10, 1930, at Yifeng)

1. After our troops carried out a demonstration at the Niuhang railway station on the August 1 holiday, Nanchang was greatly shaken.[1] The reactionary government was at a loss, and hurriedly ordered two regiments of Li Baobing's forces to Nanchang (they were moved immediately on the Tianjin-Pukou railway line). Moreover, it ordered Jiang Kunchuan[2] to come to Nanchang to assist in the defense, and also ordered Tan Daoyuan's division to Jiangxi. One unit of the Thirteenth Division in Ji'an was also moved to Zhangshu on the 12th, and it seems that it is going to come back to the provincial capital to reinforce the defenses.

2. This army group has made a change, and decided to complete the concentration of its forces at the *xian* town of Wanzai before the 15th of this month.

3. The vanguard forces of this army group (led by Lin Ye, the chief of staff of this army) should begin advancing from this town (Yifeng) toward Wanzai after noon today (the 10th). The time of their arrival at Wanzai has been fixed for the 12th. (Upon arrival, they must allocate camp sites for the whole army group.)

The rest of the troops (led by acting army commander Luo) should arrive at Wanzai by way of short cuts and complete the concentration of their forces before the 15th.

4. The Third Army will be responsible for the work on the front from this town (Yifeng) to Wanzai. Its army headquarters should lead one company of troops and accompany the General Headquarters in the occupation of the town of Wanzai.

5. On receiving this order, the Fourth Army should move continually forward

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Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 76–77. No earlier versions are available to us.

1. Regarding the attempt, on August 1, the International Day of Anti-Imperialist Demonstrations and the anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising, to seize the Niuhang railway station rather than attacking Nanchang itself, see above, the order dated July 29, 1930.

2. The personal name "Kunchuan" which appears in the only available text may be a misprint. The individual in question was probably a local or middle-ranking Guomindang military commander. No information is available about him.

from Shanggao *xian* to the town of Wanzai, and it must concentrate its forces at the town of Wanzai before the 15th.

6. The unit attached to the General Headquarters should follow the Revolutionary Military Commission in setting out from here tomorrow (the 11th), and is scheduled to arrive at the town of Wanzai on the 12th.

7. We are now at the position occupied by the General Headquarters on Shangkui Street at the east gate inside the town. When the advance begins, all our movements will be coordinated with those of the General Headquarters.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to Attack Wenjiashi

(August 18, 1930)

1. Approximately three regiments of the remaining forces under He Jian are now entrenched along the line of Wenjiashi (approximately two regiments) and Sunjiaduan (approximately one regiment). There are also enemy communications forces in Qingjiang, between Wenjiashi and Sunjiaduan.

2. [As this] army group has as its objective to eliminate the remaining forces of this enemy division and then attack and take Changyue, the plan is to eliminate the enemy first along this line.

3. The Fourth Army should leave here tomorrow (the 19th) and proceed by way of Cihua and Qingshuitang to encamp at Tongmu. On the next day (the 20th) it should set out from Tongmu at one o'clock in the morning, and its main forces should proceed by way of Xiawan, Lishu'ao, Shizhaoshang, Niantang, Juntian, Shayekeng, Upper and Lower Jinjiawan, and Xiaojiawan, and sweep across the enemy's security forces along the main road, then turn toward Wenjiashi to surround and attack it. The line along Sanfengjian and Yanjiatan in the northwest of Wenjiashi is also the responsibility of the same army, so it should act accordingly in sending attacking and occupying forces.

4. The Third Army (excluding the Third Column) should advance tomorrow (the 19th) via Cihua to encamp at Qingshuitang, and at 2:00 A.M. the next day (the 20th) set out from Qingshuitang and, via Dougu'an, Baizhu'ao, Shanghuayuan, Zhonghuayuan, Xiahuayuan, Dalingshang, and Longtouwan, advance to attack the enemy strongholds in Gaoshengling and Guancailing.

5. The Third Column of the Third Army should set out from here after noon tomorrow (the 19th) via Fozikou and Tieyan, to encamp near Yanqian (taking care to conceal its forces). At 3:00 A.M. the next day (the 20th) it should set out from Yanqian and, via Huaihuaduan, Baimazhou, Bishuiling, Shiniutan, Wushenling, Heishizui, and Heliantang, advance to attack Wenjiashi.

6. General Headquarters will not be on the main road to Yanqian and Wenjiashi until the morning of the day after tomorrow (the 20th).

7. The Twelfth Army (attacking the enemy in Sunjiaduan) should set out from its present location tomorrow (the 19th), and proceed via Wangjiachang, Qiaoxia, Fengshu'ao, and Wanyangqiao to encamp along the line of Datuli and Songshu'ao. After completing preparations, it should advance the next day (the

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 157–59, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

20th) toward Sunjiaduan to attack. After wiping out the enemy at that location, it is to press on toward Qingjiang and find a way to establish contact with General Headquarters, as well as pay close attention to [the situation in] the direction of Jiangfujiang.

8. The time for the general offensive along the entire front is set at dawn on the 20th (around five o'clock).

9. Each unit's baggage is to move along with the unit itself.

10. After wiping out the enemy at that location, those of the troops attacking Wenjiashi who arrive first should vigorously pursue the remnant enemy forces to make sure that they are thoroughly destroyed.

11. Upon arrival at the preparatory position for attack (i.e., Tongmu, Qingshuitang, Yanqian, Songshu'ao, etc.), each unit must at once begin acting in concert with the local Red Guards.

Addendum:

1. At each offensive stronghold each unit must maintain close communication with its neighboring forces.

2. Each unit must conserve its forces and, when necessary, must offer mutual support to its neighboring units.

3. During the attack, the baggage of the Third Army's Third Column must be halted at Yanqian and then advanced together after the baggage of General Headquarters has arrived.

Letter to the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee, for Transmission to the Central Committee, on the General Situation with Regard to All New Military Operations of Our Army in Western Jiangxi

(August 19, 1930, at Huangmao)

To the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee, for transmission to the West Fujian Special Committee and the Central Committee:

At the beginning of this month from Fengxin, I sent a brief letter to the Special Committee, reporting our past operational experiences and future operational plans, and I wonder whether or not it has been received. The First Army Group set out from Xingguo, and by way of Jishui (because of the difficulty in crossing the river, which delayed us, we were unable to carry out our plan of attacking in the dark, and in the end did not take the town of Jishui), Yongfeng, and Xin'gan (we did not engage in any fighting at all on the way, the bandit-suppression troops[1] in Xin'gan and Yongfeng simply fired a few shots and fled), attacked Zhangshu at daybreak on July 24. Two battalions of the enemy's Hundred and eighth Regiment were routed, nearly two hundred rifles were captured, and more than a hundred enemy soldiers were taken prisoner. At this time there were two enemy regiments in Fuzhou, and it appeared as though the forces at Daiyue would cross the river at Xin'gan and move to Zhangshu. If we went to attack Fuzhou, the enemy in Fuzhou would surely flee without our being able to inflict damage on them. If the enemy continued to advance, we did not know either when we would be able to finish them off. If we marched directly to Nanchang, then the enemy's main forces would not have been wiped out, but would actually have been behind our army. In addition, Nanchang is surrounded by water on all four sides, and this would have put us in an unfavorable situation. Therefore, we took the opportunity to cross the river, marched in the direction opposite to Nanchang,

We have translated this letter from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 80–82. No earlier source appears to be available.

1. The term *jingfei* here refers to the White forces engaged in suppressing the Communist "bandits."

and took as our objective an attack on the Niuhang Railway Station in order to hold an August 1 demonstration. By way of Gaoan, we arrived on July 30 in the area of Wanshougong, Shiziling, and Shengmijie, about 30 *li* from Nanchang. On August 1, two columns were sent across the river from Nanchang to attack the Niuhang Railway Station. The enemy forces in Nanchang did not fire a single shot or send out a single soldier, and at this time we were unable to find any enemy to fight. Since we could not attack Nanchang, and we had fulfilled our task of holding an August 1 demonstration, we scattered in the area around Fengxin and Anyi to conduct our work, mobilize the masses, raise funds, make propaganda, and so on. We were afraid that if we waited too long for the enemy but they did not come, once the enemy did assemble enough troops and begin to attack us we would be put in a difficult situation. Moreover, at the time it was reported in the newspapers that He Jian was marching toward the Fifth Army. In order to wipe out the enemy, aid the Fifth Army, and open up broader prospects in the border region of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, our army decided to march to Liuyang to attack the enemy, and go directly to take Changsha. On our way back we would take the Zhu[zhou]-Ping[xiang] railway[2] to attack the enemy in Jiangxi (at that time we predicted that the enemy had already concentrated enough forces and was about to attack us), take Ji'an, and then come back along the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad and attack Wuhan. When we arrived at Wanzai we learned that the Third Army Group had taken Changsha. When leaving Fengxin, we received the July 30 and August 1 telegrams from Shanghai and learned that our troops had taken Changsha (but we did not know how it had been taken). This seizure was achieved not by a sudden attack. Instead, it was done by defeating the enemy first and then taking the city while He Jian was hesitating greatly. (The campaign started on the 23rd and did not stop until our troops moved into Changsha on the 27th, during which time we defeated six regiments of enemy troops, took two thousand to three thousand captives, and captured more than four thousand rifles and countless bullets, as well as many cannons and machine guns. Until August 5, because of our inaccurate estimation of the enemy, we underestimated the enemy and thought he did not have enough strength for a counterattack, so we did not make preparations. In addition, we did not adequately guard against the hidden counterrevolutionaries in Changsha, so that we were attacked by the enemy—the enemy surrounded us on all four sides but we were unaware of this until the enemy had already entered the streets of Changsha. As a result, the Third Army Group suffered great casualties and losses during this battle.) It is our estimation that the present situation represents a turning point. After suffering a huge defeat imposed by our Third Army Group, He Jian will certainly waver even more. It is imperative that our First Army Group (which is now operating in the Tonggu area, where we have already sent

2. The railway from Zhuzhou, southeast of Changsha in Hunan, to Pingxiang, just across the border in Jiangxi.

people to get in touch with it) wipe out the enemies one by one, take Changsha and Yuezhou, attack Wuhan and Jiujiang, open up bigger prospects in the three provinces, and promote a nationwide general uprising. With Jiujiang under attack, the enemy forces on the southern bank of the Yangzi River will have to move to the lower reaches and advance toward Jiujiang, so that Ji'an will be taken without a fight.

2. At present He Jian has a force of more than ten regiments that are concentrated in Liuyang and are marching toward our Third Army Group. The right route forces, about ten regiments, are scattered in the two points of Wenjiashi and Sunjiaduan. The left route is situated in the Hudongmenshi area. Yesterday we arrived here—in Huangmao (100 *li* from Wanzai, 30 *li* from Wenjiashi) and decided to finish off the enemy in Wenjiashi and Sunjiaduan tomorrow, and then to attack the enemy's left route. We require that the Third Army Group attack from Pingjiang, so as to wipe out the enemy's main force, and go directly to Changsha. This time the enemy has penetrated deeply into the Red area, and they still do not know that we are in front of them. In addition, the enemy has suffered repeated defeats, and we are confident that this enemy can be eliminated.

3. Given this increasingly intense revolutionary situation, the expansion of the Red Army is an extremely urgent matter, and we hope that the Special Committee will have Comrade Wu Zhonghao[3] bring the thirty thousand reinforcements for the First Army Group as originally decided upon, or that at the very least, ten thousand will arrive at Pingjiang and Liuyang by the middle of September. Because of the needs of the Red Army, Comrade Bao Ping, who remained behind in Donggu to provide medical treatment for Comrade Wu Zhonghao, must come together with Comrade Wu Zhonghao. To meet the needs of developing the three provinces of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, Comrade Deng Zihui should immediately lead the Red Army School northward, and Comrade Liu Shiqi should also be prepared to go north.

Secretary of the Front Committee Mao Zedong

3. Wu Zhonghao (1905–1930), a native of Hunan, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924. In 1927, he had participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, and had followed Mao up the Jinggangshan. In 1930 he was commander of the Twenty-first Western Fujian Red Army.

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Advance on Xiaohe and to Continue to Attack Zhangjiafang

(August 20, 1930, at Wenjiashi)

1. The enemy's situation is as reported today by the staff office.

2. To achieve the objective of wiping out He Jian's forces, the army group has decided to continue the attack on the enemy in Zhangjiafang (Chen Guangzhong's independent Seventh Brigade[1]), and to advance toward Xiaohe (70 *li*) tomorrow morning (the 21st).

3. The Third Army will advance along the right route, and it should set out from the present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow and progress toward Xiaohe via Baimazhou, Jiaobanchong, Yaowangmiao, Caipaiao, Xiaokeng, Lishu'ao, and Hechang, encamping at Xiaohe upon arrival.

4. The rest should advance along the left route and progress toward Xiaohe via Qingjiang, Sunjiaduan, and Pendou, in the following order:

a. The Twelfth Army is to allocate enough troops as a vanguard, and the entire army should complete its departure from here promptly at 3:30 A.M. tomorrow.
b. General Headquarters, the espionage team of General Headquarters, the Revolutionary Military Commission, the Revolutionary Military Commission's espionage company and transportation team, as well as [those in charge of] the baggage of the units directly attached to General Headquarters should all get up at 2:30 tomorrow morning, and assemble at 3:30 at the eastern end of this city for departure (everyone carrying his lunch).
c. The Fourth Army is to dispatch the rear guard. Its vanguard unit should set out at 4:30 A.M. tomorrow and advance following the baggage of the units directly attached to General Headquarters.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 83–84. No earlier source is available to us.

1. Chen Guanzhong (1897–1949) was a native of Hunan. As indicated, he was at this time the commander of the Guomindang's Seventh Independent Brigade.

5. During the march our position will be that of General Headquarters.

Addendum:

1. The commander of the troops that arrive first at Xiaohe (Twelfth Army or Third Army) should allocate camp sites for the entire army group.

2. The right route troops should pay attention to the roads to the city of Yonghe and to Shiwan.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Leave the Town of Yonghe and Concentrate Its Forces in Guanzhuang

(August 24, 1930, in the town of Yonghe)

1. The enemy's situation is as before.

2. Following orders from the Front Army, the army group is to set out from here tomorrow (the 25th) and advance in two separate groups to arrive at the Jingqian and Xijingqiao line, to arrive at the Zhoujiaping and Guanyin'ge line on the 26th, and arrive at Guanzhuang on the 27th and concentrate its forces there.

3. The Fourth Army is to advance along the right route. It should set out from here around 4:00 A.M. tomorrow and arrive in the vicinity of Xijingqiao by way of Gaoping, Shentong, Hujiatan, Liujiaao, Lingjiachong, and Dafoling. On the 26th it should choose its own route and procede to Guanyin'ge, arriving at Guanzhuang and concentrating its forces there on the 27th.

4. The rest should advance along the left route in the following order:

a. The Twelfth Army (responsible for dispatching a vanguard) should complete its departure from here by 3:30 tomorrow morning (the 25th), and go via Shiwan and Tingziling to the vicinity of Jingping and encamp there.

b. General Headquarters, the espionage team of General Headquarters, the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, and the baggage of the Military Commission's espionage team, transportation team, and directly attached units should leave here at 3:30 tomorrow morning and follow behind the Twelfth Army.

c. The Third Army (responsible for dispatching a rear guard) should set out from its present location at 4:00 A.M. tomorrow, take a short-cut directly to the main road, and follow behind the directly attached units.

d. The entire left route should arrive at the Zhoujiaping line by way of Fengshupu, Dayaopu, Tuoxishi, Jin'gangtou, and Jinpenling on the 26th, and arrive at Guanzhuang by way of Xikeng, Zhuangshuichong, Shuangjiangkou, Yanshanchong, and Zhujiawan on the 27th and concentrate its forces there.

5. During the march our movements will follow those of General Headquarters.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political commissar Mao Zedong

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 95–96.

Letter to the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee, for Transmission to the Central Committee

(August 24, 1930, in the town of Yonghe, Liuyang)

To the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee, to be copied and transmitted to Comrades Chen Yi and Wu Zhonghao, and to the Western Fujian Special Committee, with the request to copy it and transmit it to the Central Committee:

1. Under the command of He Jian, four divisions are attacking the Ping[jiang] and Liu[yang area]. Approximately fourteen regiments have reached the Pingjiang-Liuyang area, and the Third Army Group has retreated toward Changshoujie in Pingjiang.

2. The First Army Group went to the Niuhang Railway Station, but because the enemy in Jiangxi is very obstinate and perverse, we could not find them and make them fight. The masses in central Jiangxi also failed to rise, so it was decided to proceed towards Hunan with the objective of taking Changsha and attacking Wuhan. On August 20 we attacked the enemy in Wenjiashi from three directions. Without suffering large losses (seven hundred officers and soldiers were killed or injured, many officers at the two levels of battalion and company were injured, and Comrade Ke Wudong died in battle), our forces totally eliminated three regiments, one battalion, and one machine-gun company of enemy forces, and captured over eleven hundred enemy officers and soldiers, including one brigade commander and two regimental commanders. Approximately a thousand enemy officers and soldiers were killed or wounded. We captured fourteen hundred rifles, twenty water machine guns, seventeen portable and light machine guns, more than a hundred Mauser pistols, and a large supply of bullets.

3. The enemy forces that entered Liu[yang] constitute a total of five units, all of which have previously done battle with the Red Army and have a rather strong fighting capacity. They are [the forces of] Dai Douyuan (three regiments), Chen Guangzhong (three regiments), Li Jue (three regiments), and Peng Changren (two regiments).[1] In addition, there is a motley collection of other

We have translated this letter from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 97–98.

1. Dai Douyuan (dates unknown) was at this time commander of the First Division of the Guomindang Thirty-fifth Army. Chen Guangzhong (1897–1949), a native of Hunan, had begun life as a bandit. In June 1928 he had become commander of the Seventh

troops such as those of Guo Bushi, with a total force of approximately four regiments. One quarter has been wiped out by our army, and the other three quarters are still in the midst of their attack. These are the main forces of He Jian, and once they are eliminated, political power in Hunan will be in our hands. In addition, the Red Army will be greatly expanded, and we will be able to count on taking Wuhan, although inevitably at a considerable price.

4. On August 23 our army fought all the way to the town of Yonghe in eastern Liu[yang], and Tao Guang and Chen Guangzhong had fled toward the town of Liuyang the day before. At the same time the Third Army Group (the Fifth Army and the Eighth Army) had arrived from Changshoujie for the purpose of concentrating their forces. The morale of the Third Army Group was very high, and it had seven thousand guns, which is comparable to what the First Army Group had coming to the front. Tomorrow is the time set for the advance on Changsha, and it should be possible to take Changsha after an intense campaign.

5. The reserve army in southwestern Jiangxi must send ten thousand men to Changsha within two weeks after receiving this letter, and another twenty thousand within a month after receiving the letter. In a word, the sooner the better. The first group should be led here by Comrade Wu Zhonghao, and the second group should be brought by Comrade Chen Yi. This is a matter of extreme importance, and it is urgently hoped that efforts will be made to bring it about. Comrade Bao Ping must come.

6. It is hoped that the Central Committee will give its guidance on taking Wuhan, that it will prepare to establish organs of political power and a Red Army General Headquarters, and that it will send a responsible person to southern Hubei.

Mao Zedong

Independent Brigade. Li Jue (1898–1987), likewise a Hunanese, had graduated from the Baoding Military Academy, and had participated in the Northern Expedition. In 1930, he was deputy commander of the Nineteenth Division.

Order to Advance Toward Changsha[1]

(August 24, 1930)

1. According to reports, the enemy's main forces under the command of He Jian are retreating from Liuyang toward Changsha via [the village of] Pujishi, the unit (approximately four regiments) in Pingjiang under Luo Lin[2] is also retreating to Yong'anshi, and this enemy appears to be shortening its defense lines at Yong'anshi, Zhongsigang, Longtoupu, and Zhuzhou to resist our army.

2. The goal of this division of our army being to wipe out He Jian's troops and occupy Changsha, it has been resolved to advance toward Changsha along three routes. The First Army Group takes the left route, and the Second Army Group (excluding the Sixteenth Army) takes the central route. Setting out tomorrow (the 25th) from their present location, they should advance the first day along the Gugang, Jingxiqiao, and Jingping line, the second day along the Liuyang, Guanyin'ge and Zhoujiaping line, on the third day along the Pujishi and Guanzhuang line, and the fourth day along the Baixianqiao and Yangjiaqiao line, attacking the Zhongsigang and Zhuzhou line on the fifth day.

3. Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai and Political Commissar Teng Daiyuan[3] of the Third Army Group will lead their forces, the Third Army Group (excluding the Sixteenth Army) plus the masses in Liudong, and as a main force advance to attack from their present location along the Liuyang, Pujishi, Baixianqiao line toward Longtoupu. They must arrive in the vicinity of Gugang on the 25th, occupy the town of Liuyang on the 26th, occupy Pujishi on the 27th, advance upon Baixianqiao on the 28th, and attack the enemy along the Longtoupu and Zhongsigang line on the 29th.

4. Under the joint leadership of the present commanders, the First Army Group and the masses in Liunan will advance in attack from the present location along the Fenglinpu, Guanzhuang, Yangjiaqiao line to Zhuzhou. It is necessary to arrive at the Jingxiqiao and Jingping line on the 25th, the Guanyin'ge and Zhoujiaping line on the 26th, and occupy Guanzhuang on the 27th. On the 28th the main forces should advance to the vicinity of Yangjiaqiao, and attack Zhuzhou on the 29th.

5. Commanding his troops and in cooperation with the masses in Pingjiang, Army Commander of the Sixteenth Army Kong Hechong is to chase Luo Lin, seek an opportunity to attack Yonganshi, and gain control over this enemy, so that it will be easier for the troops south of the Liuyang River to advance.

6. After setting out, the area to the south of the line formed by Gaoping, Luojiachong, Guanyin'ge, Waziping, Xiaojiapo, Shiweili, Shihuizui, Meiziyuan, Xinsi, and Hetangpu (including these places themselves) is to be the fighting zone of the First Army Group, and the area to the north of this line (not including these places themselves) is to be the fighting zone of the Third Army Group.

7. If enemy forces take and hold the line formed by Yonganshi, Pujishi, and Guanzhuang, the Sixteenth Army, on the right, should continue to carry out its tasks as listed in item 5; the First Army Group, on the left, should quickly eliminate the enemy in Guanzhuang and send its main forces towards Zhentoushi to help the Third Army Group, in the front, to attack the enemy in Pujishi, to make sure that the entire enemy is thoroughly destroyed.

If the enemy uses its main forces to defend the southern end of the Zhongsigang and Zhuzhou line (around Longtoupu and Zhuzhou), then the Third Army Group should at once send its main forces southward along the railway line via Jiaochongpu, Youmachong and Yijiawan to attack the enemy's flank and rear.

If the enemy's main forces are at the northern end of this line (around Baiheqiao and Zhongsigang), then the First Army Group should use its main forces to take Yijiawan at once and attack the enemy's flank and rear along Tiaomajian.

If the enemy's main forces withdraw to the city of Changsha, then the Sixteenth Army, on the right, should promptly occupy the region along the railway line in Dongtundu to the north of Changsha, and the Third Army Group, in the middle, proceeding along Baiheqiao, Tiaomajian, and Guitang, should attack the Xiaowu and Liuyang Gates of Changsha. The First Army Group, following the railway, should then attack the southern suburbs of Changsha.

If the enemy gives up the railway line on the eastern bank of the Xiang River and withdraws to Xiangtan, then the Sixteenth Army, on the right, should act in concert with the masses to occupy the city of Changsha. The main forces of the Third Army Group should immediately advance on and occupy Yijiawan and cross the river there and attack Xiangtan. At the same time, it should send one unit of its forces to the vicinity of Liuputang for a feigned crossing of the river toward Xiangtan, as a cover for its main forces crossing at Yijiawan. The First

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 160–63, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

1. This is an order to the First Front Army of the Red Army. It was issued by Mao Zedong and Zhu De at 11 P.M. on August 24, 1930, from the town of Yonghe in Liuyang *xian*, Hunan.

2. At this time, Luo Lin (1892–?), a native of Hunan, was the commander of the Guomindang's newly established Twenty-second Division.

3. Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974) was a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. In 1928 he served as a member of the Hunan-Guangdong Border Area Special Committee; in December of that year he accompanied Peng Dehuai up the Jinggangshan. He had been appointed political commissar of the Third Army Group in June 1930.

Army Group is to ford the river rapidly in the vicinity of Zhuzhou and attack Xiangtan along the left bank of the Xiang River, ensuring the thorough elimination of the enemy.

8. The troops of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area Red Guards located in Liuyang should be divided into two parts, attached to the First and Third Army Groups, respectively, and put under the command of the general commanders and political commissars of these army groups, to take charge of matters in the rear such as liaison, communications, transportation, and so on.

9. We ourselves will operate along with the First Army Group.

Points for Attention:

1. Discipline—in every place that troops pass through, it is imperative that discipline be strictly obeyed. Above all, it is forbidden to take property from workers and peasants without authorization; confiscation of property and burning of houses can be carried out only on orders. In particular, the masses following the army must be led to act this way.

2. Communication—all units should report daily to General Headquarters (temporarily incorporated within General Headquarters of the First Army Group) and maintain close communication with one another as well.

3. Sabotage of transportation and communication [equipment]—As for transportation and communication equipment (such as railways, bridges, trains, automobiles, steamboats, electrical cables, radio stations, etc.) there should be no unauthorized sabotage of it without orders from senior officers. Violators will be severely punished.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Attack Changsha

(August 28, 1930, 9:00 P.M., at Zhentou)

1. It is reported that upon hearing about our army's advance, the enemy's main forces fled in disorder to the vicinity of Langlishi and Dongshan, where it appears they will seek to offer stubborn resistance to our army. A floating bridge has been erected on the Xiang River in the direction leading toward Mount Yuelu.

The bandits of the Liuyang household militia[1] and the Changsha garrison troops who were decimated here (in Zhentoushi) by us today retreated to the area around Bojiashan and Dutoushi.

Controlled by the Sixteenth Route Army of our right route, Luo Lin's forces retreated again to Pingjiang.

Around the area of Wumeiling, Huangtuling, and Houzishi near the southeast of Changsha, there are some simple fortifications. It is said that there is a small number of enemy troops in Jiaozhongpu and Longtoupu.

2. The objective of this front army is still to take Changsha and destroy He Jian's forces. It has been decided to occupy the Fengshuhe, Xinqiao, Luoxiaping, Jiaozhongpu, and Longtoupu line tomorrow (the 29th), and press our attack forward toward Changsha.

3. The First Army Group is to switch to the middle route, and tomorrow (the 29th) it should occupy the line from Fengshuhe (30 *li* from Changsha), to Xinqiao and Luoxiaping, and quickly establish contact with the Third Army Group, after which its main forces should advance towards Changsha along the area of Dongsigang, Baimaotang, Dongshan, and Yanziling. After breaking through the enemy's stronghold in Wumeiling, it is to launch an immediate attack on Xiaowu Gate in the city of Changsha and its northeastern area.

4. The Third Army Group is to switch to the left route, and tomorrow (the 29th) it should occupy the Baiheqiao, Jiaozhongpu, and Longtoupu line (if there are enemy forces along this line they should be rapidly swept away and [the area] occupied), and quickly establish contact with the First Army Group. Thereupon, its main forces should advance toward Changsha along the area of

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 99–100.

1. For an earlier reference to the *aihutuan* or household militia, which had become an instrument of the landlords, see above, the report of June 16, 1928.

Tiaomajian, Zhujialing, Zhongjiawan, and Huangnitang. After breaking through the enemy's stronghold near Huangtuling, it should launch an attack on Liuyangmen and that area.

5. The area to the left of the line that runs along Zhentoushi, Nanshanpu, Tiaomajian, Zhongjiawan, and Dongjingpu to the main road leading to the city of Changsha (including the line itself) is the battle zone of the Third Army Group. To the right of the line (excluding the line itself) is the battle zone of the First Army Group.

6. The composition and the marching position of the general reserve forces will be announced at a later date.

7. After setting out our position will be that of First Army Group General Headquarters (in Xinqiao tomorrow). During battle it will be the position of the general reserve forces.

Attention:

1. When the Third Army Group has occupied the Jiaozhongpu and Longtoupu line, it should immediately send troops to sabotage the nearby railway between Yijiawan and Zhuzhou. In the future attention should always be paid along the way to destroying the nearby railway, and guards are to be posted along the Xiang River.

2. After arriving at its designated destination tomorrow, each unit should immediately prepare knives, axes, hoes, and so on, and confiscate the water buffalo of the local bullies, or lay out money to buy the water buffalo of the peasants, so as to be prepared to launch an attack on the barriers around the enemy's strongholds.

3. After arriving at their designated positions tomorrow, all units should immediately establish contact with the other units. Neighboring units to the First Army Group and Third Army Group are to pay particular attention to this point.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Occupy the Line from Fengshupu and Xinqiao to Luoxiaping

(August 28, 1930, 9:00 P.M., at Zhentou)

1. An order has been received from Commander-in-chief Zhu and Political Commissar Mao of the Front Army as follows:

. . . (Omission)[1]

2. In accordance with the order, this army group will occupy the Fengshupu, Xinqiao, and Luoxiaping line tomorrow.

3. The Fourth Army is to be the right wing of this army group (middle route), and it should leave here tomorrow morning and advance toward Fengshuhe (10 *li*) by way of Baijiashan (25 *li*), Dutou (5 *li*), and Tuantouhe (a total of 45 *li*). Upon arrival at Fengshuhe it should encamp and await orders to attack Changsha.

4. The Twelfth Army is to be the left wing of this army group, and it should leave here at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow and advance toward Xinqiao (15 *li*) by way of Qijiachong (3 *li*), Jiutiaolong (2 *li*), Tuqiao (6 *li*), Zhangqiao (5 *li*), Shijiaduan (4 *li*), and Maguomiao (15 *li*) (a total of 45 *li*), encamp (straight across to Guandaopu is 5 *li*), and await orders to attack Changsha.

5. Units directly attached to General Headquarters are to follow the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, set out at 3:30 after the Twelfth Army, and advance to encamp at Xinqiao.

6. The Third Army is to be the reserve force of this army group, to set out from here at 4:00 A.M. tomorrow, and march after the units directly attached to General Headquarters to encamp near Xinqiao.

7. During the march we will be at the position of General Headquarters.

Addendum:

1) When the Twelfth Army arrives in Xinqiao tomorrow, if there are enemy troops in Dongsigang it should immediately aid the Fourth Army in surrounding and destroying them.

2) Acting Army Commander Luo of the Twelfth Army is in charge of allocating camp sites and posting guards in the vicinity of Xinqiao tomorrow.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
and
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 101–102.

1. An omission is indicated in this manner in the original text.

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Exterminate the Enemy at Yijiawan and Take Advantage of the Victory to Occupy Changsha

(August 29, 1930, 8:00 P.M.,
at Xinqiao General Headquarters)

1. According to reliable reports, yesterday and today the enemy's main forces have been moving in succession toward Yijiawan, and it appears that they have in mind to use a small portion of their forces to pin down our army by relying on the battlefield fortifications in the area of Houzishi, Shimapu, Litang, Huangtuling, and Wumeiling in the vicinity of Changsha, and have their main forces leave Yijiawan by railway and attack our army from the flank.

2. It has been decided that the Front Army should first wipe out the enemy forces in Yijiawan tomorrow (the 30th), and take advantage of the victory to make a forceful surprise attack on Changsha.

The Third Army Group is hereby ordered to use all its strength to attack the enemy forces in Yijiawan tomorrow. After succeeding in this, it should immediately dispatch a portion of its forces to attack and advance toward Changsha along the motor road. The remaining portion of its forces should attack the enemy's strongholds and advance towards Shimapu and Huangtuling by way of Tianxinqiao, Yangjiachong and Laodian. After taking them, its main forces must concentrate in the Huangtuling area and have one unit enter the city through the southern outskirts to pursue and destroy the remnants of the enemy.

3. The Twelfth Army of the First Army Group is hereby ordered to take a short cut and arrive near Datuopu before 7:00 A.M. tomorrow to intercept the routed enemy from Yijiawan (if the fighting in Yijiawan has not come to an end, then apart from posting one unit as sentries in the direction of Changsha, this army's main forces should immediately assist the Third Army Group in destroying the enemy in Yijiawan). After accomplishing this task it should rapidly advance to attack the enemy in Wumeiling and Xiaowumen by way of Linjiazui, Dongjingpu, and Guitang. After accomplishing this it should concentrate its troops around the Wumeiling area and await further orders.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 103–104.

The Fourth Army should leave its present location (Dongsigang) before 7:00 A.M. tomorrow, take a short cut, advance to the Zhoujiati and Zhongjiawan line, and then stop and post guards in the direction of Changsha. When the Third Army Group and the Twelfth Army advance toward Changsha, said army should rapidly attack and advance along Tianjiling and Xujiachong towards Erliting and Jingwumen in front of Litang Lake. After accomplishing this, apart from using one unit to leave through the north gate at Xinhe to cut off the enemy's path of retreat, it should mass its main forces near Erliting.

The Third Army shall constitute the general reserve force, and it should dispatch one column at 3:30 tomorrow morning to advance to Baitianpu following General Headquarters by way of the main road of Tiaomajian. The rest should set out before 7:00, follow General Headquarters, arrive near Baitianpu, and await further orders.

4. During the attack on Yijiawan, we and the general reserve forces will be near Baitianpu, and during the attack on Changsha we will be on the main road between Baitianpu and Dongjingpu.

Attention:

1) If the enemy forces we eliminated at Yijiawan were not their main forces, then the Third Army Group should only advance as far as the Shipailing and Shirenchong line, the Twelfth Army as far as the Dongjingpu and Yanziling line, and the Fourth Army only as far as the Xujiachong line. General Headquarters and the general reserve forces will then stop at places on the main Longjiawan road and await further orders.

2) As for the large baggage of General Headquarters, the Twelfth Army (except for a small number of this army's cooking utensils that can go along with it), and the Third Army, the Third Army should use its discretion to assign troops to protect it. They are to stop tomorrow after dawn 10 *li* behind the general reserve forces, and are to be under the command of Fan Shude.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army Regarding Extermination of the Attacking Enemy

(August 30, 1930, afternoon, at Baitianpu)

1. The enemy did indeed seek to launch a sudden attack on our flank (see report of the staff office for details).

2. The plan is for the Front Army first to lure out and destroy the attacking enemy, and then to take advantage of the victory to launch an attack on Changsha.

3. The Third Army Group should move all its forces to the Huangchong, Xitangchong, and Longshantang line by tonight and hide there. They should also dispatch capable spies to places such as Tianxinqiao and Xujiaqiao, wait until the enemy in Banshigang on the western bank of the Xiang River (the Seventh Independent Brigade) is halfway across the river, and then attack and eliminate them. After accomplishing this they should swiftly advance toward Changsha along the railway and motor roads to attack. If by then the battle by the First Army Group is not yet over, they should exert all their strength to help.

4. The Twelfth Army remains at its present location near Dongjingpu, and it should send out guerrilla troops at 2:00 A.M. to launch a feigned attack on the enemy stronghold in Lannichong. Its battle zone tomorrow morning is the line extending from the main road near Huangnitang to Shipailing. It is to join with the right wing of the Fourth Army, and cooperate with the Fourth Army in attacking the enemy forces which we have lured out from Houzishi (the Thirty-first Division). Its main attack route is from Laodian to Shirenchong to block off the enemy's line of retreat, and it must make sure to destroy the said enemy. After this is accomplished, it should pursue the routed enemy along the motor road and take the enemy strongholds in Houzishi. After these have been taken, its main force should move to the right to sweep across the defensive forces in the enemy's strongholds in such places as Huangtuling, Yuhuating, and Wumeiling, and then attack and advance toward Liuyangmen. The rest of the main forces shall go along the motor road straight toward the city walls of Changsha.

5. The Fourth Army remains at its present location, and it should send out troops to investigate and occupy the battlefield to the north of West Station at

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 105–106.

Longjiawan. It should separately send a guerrilla detachment to arrive in the vicinity of the enemy's stronghold in Houzishi by 2:00 A.M. tonight, and mount a fierce feigned attack on it so as to lure the enemy out to launch an offensive from Houzishi. When the enemy's main forces have penetrated deep into the vicinity of Shipailing they should link up with the Twelfth Army's left wing and together with the Twelfth Army launch a sudden and fierce attack on the enemy forces near Shipailing and destroy them. After this is accomplished they should advance along the motor road, and take the enemy stronghold in Houzishi. When this has been occupied the main forces should also shift toward the right and attack and advance in the direction of Huangtuling, Wumeiling, and Liuyangmen.

6. The Third Army should immediately dispatch a force of one column to the vicinity of Dongjingpu to replace the Twelfth Army in the task of pinning down [the enemy] to the right of Shimapu and Shiba. In addition it should promptly dispatch troops at 2:00 A.M. tonight along that line (Shimapu and Shiba) to launch a fierce feigned attack on the enemy stronghold there. It should also establish firm liaison with the Seventh Regiment of our Liuyang Red Guard Forces in Dongshan and Dongsigang, and when the Twelfth Army in the front and the Fourth Army on the left wing have broken through the enemy's strongholds in Houzishi and Huangtuling, this column will attack and advance in the direction of Shimapu, Shiba, Huqian, and Jingwumen. The rest will be the general reserve forces, and will take up a position where they now are (Baitianpu), stop, and await further orders.

7. The general clinic for wounded soldiers is in the Tongrenqin and Banzhutang area (each army must send someone to take responsibility).

8. We are at the position of the general reserve forces at Baitianpu.

Attention:

a. The guerrilla forces dispatched by each army of the First Army Group (Third, Fourth, Twelfth) at 2:00 A.M. tonight should be at least one company, must arrive promptly at the enemy's stronghold, and must fire as many shots as possible.
b. Tomorrow morning all units must finish breakfast and complete all preparations before 4:00 A.M.
c. Our Liuyang Red Guard forces have already built two raft bridges in Dongsigang and Dongshan so as to establish liaison with the Sixteenth Army.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army About Mobilizing the Masses to Force the Enemy in the Area Northeast of Changsha to Submit

(August 30, 1930, 8:00 P.M., at Baitianpu)

1. He Jian's reactionary armies are still waging stubborn resistance against us, relying on fortifications in such places as Houzishi, Lannichong, Shimapu, Shiba, Yuhuating, Huangtuling, Wumeiling, Erliting, and so on.

It has been reported in the newspapers that the armies of Zhang and of Guangxi[1] have indeed reached Wugang, and that the enemy in Xinning and Hengbao (approximately three regiments) may retreat to Xiangtan.

2. Led by commander-in-chief He,[2] our Second Army Group has already arrived at the Gong'an and Shishou line, and is now pushing forward toward Xiangyuan.

Our Third Army Group of the left route and First Army Group of the middle route are now in the region from Yijiawan and Dongsigang to the south of the city of Changsha, and are in the middle of surrounding and attacking the provincial capital.

3. Your army will remain as the left wing and be stationed along the Huaixidu, Dongtundu, and Shanmudu line, and should start at once to mobilize the masses along this line to connect with the Red Area in Ping[xiang] and Liu[yang], and pin down the enemy forces in the northeast section of the city of Changsha, seize an opportunity to cross the river and fight a way through, and establish firm contact with our Liu[yang] Seventh Regiment in Dongshan.

It is so ordered.

Sixteenth Army

Commander Kong Hechong
Political Commissar

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, p. 107.

1. As indicated in a note to the text of June 22, 1930, Zhang refers to Zhang Fakui, and Guangxi to the forces of the Guangxi faction and of its leader, Li Zongren, which were combatting Chiang Kaishek in Hunan.
2. He is He Long.

Order to Lure the Enemy out of Their Fortifications, Destroy Them, and March into Changsha on the Heels of Victory

(August 31, 1930)[1]

1. Relying on their fortifications, the enemy forces in Changsha continue to wage stubborn resistance against us. The enemy in Banshigang has gathered many boats and appears to be preparing a secret crossing between Datuopu and Yijiawan.

Two regiments of the enemy's troops under the command of Gong Bingfan[2] arrived in Changsha from Yuezhou[3] on the 24th.

It is also said that the enemy troops in Hengbao[4] (approximately three regiments) have marched into Xiangtan.

2. The Front Army is still planning to lure the enemy forces out of their fortifications, destroy them, and march into Changsha on the heels of victory.

3. The Third Army Group (excluding the First Division of the Fifth Army) is still located around Linjiadan, Yangjiachong, Longshantang, Xitangchong, and Huanghuchong, and they will wait until after the enemy in Banshigang has crossed the river to attack and annihilate them. After accomplishing this they will carry out their original task of attacking and advancing along the railways and highways toward the southern outskirts of Changsha.

4. The First Division of the Fifth Army is still located in the vicinity of Mojialong. Tonight it should send troops to make a feigned attack on the enemy's position in Houzishi, and before dawn it should occupy a position immediately behind Shipailing. It should be able to destroy very rapidly the enemy coming from Houzishi, and at the same time to support through coordinated action the left wing of the First Army Group (Twelfth Army) and the right

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 164–66, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from a documentary collection published in 1942.

1. This order to the First Front Army of the Red Army was issued by Mao Zedong and Zhu De on the afternoon of August 31 from Baitianpu in the southern suburbs of Changsha.
2. Gong Bingfan (1902–1982), a native of Shaanxi, was the commander of the Fifth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army.
3. Yuezhou is now called Yueyang.
4. Hengbao was the collective designation for Hengzhou and Baojing, which were the old names for the towns now called Hengyang and Shaoyang.

wing of the Third Army Group (primarily supporting the Twelfth Army).

5. The Twelfth Army remains at its present location (around Laomiao and Dongjingpu). Tonight it should send troops to make a feigned attack on the enemy's positions in Shiba, Shimapu, and elsewhere. It should leave patrols along the line of Yanziling, Jingwanzi, and Laomiao, which will be in charge of attacking Guitang, Shiba, Shimapu, and other places (including the Guitang highway) when the enemy launches an offensive.

6. The Fourth Army should immediately withdraw to the north end of Liaojiachong and Zhoujiaba. Before dawn tomorrow it should occupy a position to the south of Tianjiling, from which it should be able to launch a fierce assault on the enemy attacking us from the right wing, and destroy them. Tonight it should send forward patrols to the vicinity of Xujiachong, in order to establish a link with our Seventh Regiment of the Liuyang Red Guards Army, and with the Twelfth Army in Yanziling. When the enemy strikes, this army should connect with the right wing of the Twelfth Army and carry out the attack on the area to the right of the Guitang highway (not including the highway).

7. The Third Column of the Third Army should withdraw tonight to the area around Duanjialong and rejoin its main forces.

8. The entire Third Army is located around Duanjialong and Baitianpu as the general reserve forces.

9. The heavy baggage and the station for wounded soldiers of the First Army Group remain in the original location.

10. We ourselves are with the general reserve forces in Baitianpu.

Attention:

1. At night it is necessary to watch out for enemy harassment.

2. There must be mutual exchange of personnel among all units in order to establish links, and any intelligence should be shared among them.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Land Law

Promulgated by the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission

(August 1930)[1]

Chapter One: Confiscation and Redistribution of Land

Article 1. Following the overthrow of the political power of the despotic gentry and landlord class through armed uprising, all land, hills, woods, ponds, and houses owned by all private individuals or groups—the despotic gentry, landlords, ancestral halls, temples, societies, and rich peasants—must be immediately confiscated, turned over to public ownership by the soviet government, and redistributed by the soviet to landless peasants, peasants with little land, and other needy people for their use. Where there is only a peasant association, and a soviet has not yet been set up, the peasant associations can also carry out confiscation and redistribution.[2]

Article 2. The families of the despotic gentry, landlords, and reactionaries, after undergoing investigation by the soviet and receiving permission to reside in the countryside, may receive an appropriate amount of land when they have no other means of supporting themselves.

Article 3. Officers, soldiers, and porters of the Red Army currently in military service and those engaged in revolutionary work shall also receive redistributed land; moreover, the soviet shall assign people to help their families farm the land.

Article 4. Rural residents who can make a living through other lines of work, such as industry, commerce, and education, shall not receive redistributed land. Those who cannot make ends meet may receive a suitable amount of land, no more than enough to make up the shortfall in their income.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 179–84, where it is reproduced from a collection of captured Communist documents published by the Guomindang in 1931.

1. On the relation between this land law and that of February 7, 1930, see above, the Introduction to this volume. In assessing the evolution of Mao's agrarian policy during the summer and autumn of 1930, the resolution of June 1930 on the problem of the rich peasants should also be consulted.

2. The relative moderation of Mao's line at this time is underscored by the omission, in this text, of the article in the February 7 law providing for the distribution of the land of owner-peasants if the poor peasants demanded it.

Article 5. Farm laborers and unemployed vagrants, if they are willing to receive redistributed land, should be given land. But those vagrants who receive redistributed land must rid themselves of evil addictions such as to opium and gambling, otherwise the soviet will take back their land.

Article 6. Those who have traveled to other areas and do not live in their native villages shall not be given land.

Article 7. Land shall be redistributed taking the township as the unit. The peasants of a given township pool the farmland they till in their township and in neighboring townships, and redistribute it jointly. If three or four townships are adjacent to each other, some of them having more land and the others less, and if circumstances are such that when land is redistributed using one township as the unit, the townships with less land cannot support themselves, and have no other form of production to support themselves, three or four townships may be combined into one unit to carry out the redistribution. The township soviets must, however, make a request, and obtain the approval of the district soviet.

Article 8. In order to meet the demands of the majority of the people and enable peasants to receive land quickly, land should be redistributed according to the number of people in the countryside; men, women, the old, and the young should receive equal shares. The method of distribution taking labor power as the criterion shall not be adopted.

Article 9. In principle urban businessmen and workers are not eligible to receive redistributed land. However, unemployed workers and members of the urban poor who request redistributed land may be given an appropriate amount of land when circumstances permit.

Article 10. In order to destroy the feudal forces rapidly, and strike a blow at the rich peasants, land redistribution should follow the principles of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, and drawing on the fat to make up for the lean.[3] Landlords and rich peasants are not allowed to conceal their land and not declare it, nor to retain fertile land. After the land has been redistributed, the soviets shall make wooden markers and place them in the fields to mark the yield of the plot and the name of its current tiller.

Article 11. All land deeds of the despotic gentry, landlords, common land owned by ancestral halls, and temples must be surrendered to the township soviets or township/district peasant associations within a specified period to be burned in public.

3. As indicated in the note to the law of February 7, 1930, above, that law provided only for quantitative equalization of landholdings, through "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce," i.e., taking from those who have ample land to give to those who do not have enough. This law adds a prescription for qualitative equalization, "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean," i.e., taking good land from the more affluent peasants to complement the generally inferior land of the poor peasants. These two slogans are characteristic of Mao's approach to land reform; he restated them frequently from this time forward.

Article 12. After land is redistributed, the *xian* soviets or district soviets are to issue cultivation permits.

Article 13. The redistributed land of all those in the countryside who have died, changed their occupation, or gone elsewhere will be taken back by the soviets for further redistribution. As for newcomers and newborn babies, the soviets should find a way to give them land, but only after the harvest.

Article 14. When land is redistributed following an armed uprising and after sowing by the peasants, the crops harvested belong to the peasants to whom the land has been redistributed; the original tillers are not allowed to lay claim to the harvest.[4]

Article 15. Vegetable gardens, dikes, and uncultivated land (which can be used to grow miscellaneous cereals)[5] should be redistributed. Large ponds that are not easy to redistribute are placed under the management of the soviet, or leased out by the soviet at a fixed price.

Article 16. Hills on which bamboo and Chinese catalpa grow must be converted into land units according to the yield of their products and redistributed together with fields. But if hired labor was previously employed, and manufacturing facilities were previously established there, thus giving them an industrial capitalist character, they may be leased out in their entirety by the soviet and need not be redistributed.

Article 17. Pine and China fir forests are to be managed or leased out by the soviet government. However, when people of the township need lumber to repair dams and irrigation canals, build public properties and houses, or repair the houses burned down by the reactionaries, they may make use of them upon obtaining permission from the district soviet government.

Article 18. Large firewood-producing hills shall be closed or opened to the public [for collection of firewood] by the soviet government.

Article 19. In order to meet the demands of the impoverished peasants, all confiscated land should be completely redistributed to them; the soviet need not keep any. Under certain circumstances, however, the soviet may use the undistributed portion to establish model farms, or lease it out on a temporary basis. At the same time, the soviet shall reserve some houses to be used for public purposes.

Chapter Two: Cancellation of Debts

Article 20. No debts owed by workers, peasants, and poor people to the despotic gentry, landlords, and rich peasants are to be repaid. Notes and debt certificates must be turned over to the soviet or to the peasant associations within a specified time to be burned.

Article 21. Debts owed by the despotic gentry, landlords, and merchants to

4. For an extended discussion of this point, see below, the text of November 15, 1930, "The Problem of Dividing up Green Crops and Renting Land."

5. I.e., crops other than the staple foods of rice and wheat.

the government, or to workers, peasants, poor people, or the petty bourgeoisie must be repaid in full regardless of whether they are old or new.

Article 22. Old debts owed by workers, peasants, and poor people to merchants as a result of commercial transactions occurring before the armed uprising are not to be repaid regardless of whether they are commercial high-interest loans or merely principal.

Article 23. In principle, debts incurred between workers, peasants, and poor people themselves before the armed uprising are also not to be repaid. Only interest-free loans made for the sake of friendly assistance and willingly repaid by the borrower are exempt from this rule.

Article 24. As for articles and houses pawned by workers, peasants, and poor people to the despotic gentry, landlords, and pawnshop owners, the collateral must be returned unconditionally.

Article 25. Credit unions and grain associations are to be abolished without exception.

Article 26. Usurious loans are banned under the soviet régime; *xian* soviets set appropriate interest rates according to local financial conditions. These rates must not exceed the amount of returns obtained by ordinary capital under normal local economic conditions.

Chapter Three: Land Taxes

Article 27. In order to meet the needs of overthrowing the counterrevolutionaries (for example, maintaining and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards, and maintaining the organs of political power) and increase the benefits for the masses (for example, setting up schools and clinics, providing relief to the handicapped, old, and young, and repairing roads and irrigation canals), the soviet must collect land taxes from peasants.

Article 28. The principle of levying land taxes is to protect the poor peasants, build ties with the middle peasants, and attack the rich peasants. They may be collected only after the soviet has been established, the masses have received actual benefits, and permission is granted by higher-level soviets.

Article 29. Land taxes are to be collected progressively according to the quantity of rice harvested by the peasants each year from redistributed land:

1) Those who receive, per person, land that yields less than 5 *Dan* of rice are exempted from tax.
2) A tax rate of 1 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 6 *Dan* of rice.
3) A tax rate of 1.5 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 7 *Dan* of rice.
4) A tax rate of 2.5 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 8 *Dan* of rice.

5) A tax rate of 4 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 9 *Dan* of rice.
6) A tax rate of 5.5 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 10 *Dan* of rice.
7) A tax rate of 7 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 11 *Dan* of rice.
8) A tax rate of 8.5 percent is levied on those who receive, per person, land that yields 12 *Dan* of rice.

Each additional yield of 1 *Dan* of rice is accompanied by an increase of 1.5 percent in the land tax rate.

Article 30. Land tax revenues and expenditures are subject to the unified control of higher-level soviet governments. Lower-level governments are not authorized to collect taxes or to make expenditures at their discretion. The scale of expenditures is determined by higher-level governments according to the amount of tax revenues and the degree of urgency of the needs of the governments at various levels.

Chapter Four: Wages

Article 31. Rural artisans, workers, and farm laborers whose previous wages were too low should get a raise. Future wages are to be set by the soviet according to two criteria: fluctuation in the cost of living and fluctuation in the peasants' harvests. Wage rates set by township and district soviets must be approved by the *xian* or provincial soviets.

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Launch a General Offensive

(September 1, 1930, 8:00 P.M., at Baitianpu)

1. We have received the following order from Commander-in-chief Zhu and Political Commissar Mao of the Front Army:

. . . (Omission)[1]

2. Following instructions received, this army group has decided to launch an offensive against the enemy along the entire front, and has made arrangements for attack as follows:

The Twelfth Army will remain in the area of Yanziling, Jingwanzi, Laomiao, and Dongjingpu.

The Third Army should leave enough troops to seize the battlefield slightly behind Shipailing, but its main forces should be concentrated along the Xiangumiao and Mojialong line so as to prevent the enemy from making a surreptitious crossing near Huilongpu.

3. The battle zones of this army group are divided as follows:

To the right of the line along Huangtuling, Lannichong, and Huangnitang (including the line itself) is within the domain of this army group; the Wumeiling, Shiba, and Guitang line is the responsibility of the Twelfth Army; to the left of the Huangtuling, Lannichong, and Huangnitang line is the responsibility of the Third Army.

4. The heavy baggage of this army group, all army clinics for wounded soldiers, as well as all noncombatant units should move tomorrow morning to Bozhutang, stop there and await further orders. All troops and personnel at this location (including the Liu[yang] Seventh Regiment) are under the command of Fan Shude, who will be assisted by Yang Lisan, head of the Twelfth Army's military supplies section, and Wu Hanjie, head of the Fourth Army's military supplies section.

5. Tomorrow we will lead the directly attached units and move to Xujiachong. During the campaign we will be in command from here.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 110–11.

1. An omission is indicated here in the Chinese text.

Addendum:

Tomorrow all armies must send scouts to reconnoiter targets for attack within their respective battle zones.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
and
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Surround and Attack Changsha and to Launch a General Offensive

(September 1, 1930, 8:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Baitianpu)

1. The enemy forces in Changsha are still occupying their fortifications and stubbornly resisting us.

2. The Front Army has decided to launch a general offensive against this enemy along the entire front tomorrow evening (the 2nd).

3. The Third Army Group should move in the evening from its present location to the Dongshan and Litang line, and must complete this shift by tomorrow morning. In addition, it should construct a raft bridge near Dongshan, and take charge tomorrow of attacking the area to the right of the line along Guitang, Shiba, and Wumeiling (including the line itself).

4. The First Army Group (minus the Fourth Army) will be in charge of attacking the area to the left of said line (excluding the line itself). It is to remain in the area of Dongjingpu, Mojialong, Zhoujiaba, and Baitianpu, and must be on guard against an enemy attack from such places as Houzishi, Tantangzi on the other side of the river, and elsewhere. It should construct a raft bridge near Bozhutang. This army group's large baggage should be moved to this place and stored there.

5. It is ordered that the Sixteenth Army of the Third Army Group return to its original unit, and tomorrow from its present location (the Dongtundu and Hujidu line) it should begin to attack along Xinhe toward the northern outskirts.

6. The Fourth Army constitutes the general reserve force, remaining at its present location (the Longjiawan and Zhoujiaba line).

7. After achieving success in their attack, the troops of the First Army Group that will have taken Huangtuling should immediately build on their victory to expand toward the right; the troops of the Third Army Group that will have taken Wumeiling should immediately expand toward Huangtuling along the way behind the enemy's stronghold in Yuhuating; the troops of the Third Army Group that will have taken Erlipai should expand from the enemy's strongholds marked 49 and 50 toward Xinhe to the right, but must leave enough forces in

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We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 112–13.

Yangjiashan, which is between Erlipai and Wumeiling; the troops of the Sixteenth Army that will have taken Xinhe should build on their victory to expand along the railroad towards the enemy stronghold marked 49.

8. At 7:00 tomorrow evening (the 2nd), the First Army Group and the Sixteenth Army will start to attack. At 8:00 the Third Army Group will start to attack.

9. We are now at the position of General Headquarters at Baitianpu. Tomorrow morning we will lead the directly attached units and move to Xujiachong; tomorrow evening the command post will be established there.

Addendum:

1. The Fourth Army, which constitutes the general reserve force, should dispatch capable scouts to places such as Tiaomajian, Tianxinqiao, and Xitangchong, and send Red Guard forces as well as espionage agents to the area between Hengtang and Huilongpu so as to be on guard against an enemy attempt at a secret crossing.

2. The artillery regiment of the Third Army must choose its position near Shiba, so as to be able to fire at the enemy's strongholds in Yuhuating, Wumeiling, and elsewhere.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army about Luring the Enemy to Come Out and Attack, and Preparing to Encircle and Destroy Him

(September 4, 1930, 8:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Baitianpu)

1. The First and Second Brigades, as well as the Supplemental Regiment, the Independent Regiment, the Sixth Regiment, the espionage battalion, and the engineer battalion of the enemy Tao Guang's Division, which launched an attack from Houzishi yesterday, were all driven to the edge of the river by one unit each of our Third Army, Twelfth Army, and Fourth Army. Most of them surrendered, seven or eight hundred were shot dead in the river, and more than a thousand were taken prisoner. We decimated Li Jue's troops, and they retreated back to their enemy stronghold in Houzishi.

The enemy Chen Guangzhong's brigade, which tried to cross the river surreptitiously from Datuopu at 10:00 A.M. yesterday, was met, attacked, defeated, and put to flight by our Fourth Army. They retreated to Yijiawan at 11:00 P.M. yesterday, and we have no reliable report on whether or not they have yet crossed the river. The enemy Luo Lin's division, which launched an attack from Laodaohe at the north gate, was met and attacked by our Sixteenth Army, so they did not succeed either. The forces of Gong Bingfan, Wang Dongyuan, and Luo Shujia were also met and attacked by our Fifth Army and Eighth Army, so they dared not advance.

2. To achieve the goal of luring the enemy out of their strongholds and annihilating them outside their fortifications, this Front Army will remain tomorrow (the 5th) at its present location (from Yangjiachong on the left to Dongsigang on the right along the line of Taohuaduan, Liaojiachong, and Bozhutang), lure the enemy closer, and use our concentrated forces to surround and destroy them.

3. The First Army Group will remain at its present location of the Yangjiachong, Taohua, and Baitianpu area. It should post sentries in the direction of Houzishi, Shimapu, Yijiawan, Tianxinqiao, and Zhuzhou.

The Third Army Group will remain at its present location of the Liaojiachong,

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 114–15.

Bozhutang, and Dongsigang area. It should post sentries in the area to the right of Xujiachong to Dongshan, and pay particular attention to the movements of the Gong and Luo divisions, in preparation for an attack on these enemies by this army group. If the enemy approaches our front, each of our guard units should immediately take up their positions, meet and attack the enemy, and await orders to concentrate large forces to surround and destroy them.

4. If the enemy does not come out and attack tomorrow (the 5th), then the entire Front Army is to rest for one day at its present location.

5. We are now at General Headquarters in Baitianpu.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Concentrate Their Troops and Await the Opportunity to Come Out and Attack the Enemy

(September 4, 1930, 9:00 P.M., at Baitianpu)

1. The following order has been received from Commander-in-chief Zhu and Political Commissar Mao of the Front Army:

(Omission)

2. In accordance with orders, the army group will concentrate its forces at its present location tomorrow (the 5th) and await the opportunity to go out and attack the enemy.

3. The Third Army is to post sentries on the main road in Houzishi (Shipailing) and in the direction of Datuopu and Huilongpu.

The Twelfth Army is to post sentries on the minor road in Houzishi and in the direction of Shimapu.

The Fourth Army is to post sentries in the direction of Guitang and the minor roads in Xujiachong. The right wing is to make sure to establish contact with the Third Army Group's Fifth Army.

4. If the enemy does not come out and attack tomorrow, the army group is to rest for a day in accordance with orders.

5. We are now at the position of General Headquarters in Baitianpu.

Addendum:

1. Each army's wounded soldiers should be carried and transported by members of the Red Guard teams assigned by the aforementioned front army to each army to take responsibility for this.

2. Each sentry unit should send agents beyond the security line, and before dawn they should send out a screen of agents to scout ahead for 5 *li*.

3. The location of this general command headquarters is the location of the Front Army's General Headquarters. It is indicated at night by the suspension of three red lanterns in front of it.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
and
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 116–17.

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army About Luring and Destroying the Enemy Who Is Coming Out by Two Routes to Attack

(September 5, 1930, 11:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Baitianpu)

1. According to the scouts' report, the Duan Xing brigade of the enemy's Nineteenth Division advanced to the other side of the river facing Yijiawan at 3:00 P.M. yesterday (the 4th); the [part of the] Chen Guangzhong brigade routed by our army retreated to the other side of the river facing Datuopu and Huilongpu; and the [part of the] Chen Guangzhong brigade routed by our Fourth Army retreated to the other side of the river facing Dapu and Huilongpu. All of them gave the appearance of intending to make a secret crossing and launch an attack on us from the flank and rear. The remnant forces of He Jian's troops that retreated in defeat to the city of Changsha also have the intention of coming out and attacking along the main road between Huangtuling and Dongjingpu.

2. The Front Army has decided first to lure out and destroy these enemy forces who are coming out by two routes to attack, and then to take advantage of victory and fight our way into Changsha.

3. The First Army Group is to be responsible for destroying the enemy that is coming to attack by making a secret crossing along the line of Datuopu and Yijiawan. Tomorrow morning (the 6th) they must advance from their present location to the area southeast of the Zhujialing and Tianxinqiao line, and await an opportunity to annihilate the enemy along the Datuopu and Yijiawan line.

4. The Third Army Group is to take charge of destroying the enemy that is coming out to attack from the two routes of the city of Changsha and Dongshan. By dusk tomorrow it should seize the opportunity to transfer its entire force (including the Sixteenth Army) to Tongrentang, Baimaotang, Panshiba, Banzhuyu, and all the way to the area on the eastern edge of Zhujialing, and make sure to establish contact with the First Army Group's troops near Zhujialing, the Twelfth Army.

5. The Hunan Red Guard Army should move to the line between Dongsigang, Luzhiling and Zhentoushi, and is to be in charge of transportation in the rear as well as pinning down the enemy in Dongshan.

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 118–19.

6. Once the movement has begun, we will be moving with the First Army Group (if there is no enemy in Yijiawan tomorrow the plan is to camp near Qiantangpo and Tianxinqiao).

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Advance on Tianxinqiao and Exterminate the Enemy in Datuopu and Yijiawan When Opportunity Offers

(September 5, 1930, 12:00 noon,
at General Headquarters in Baitianpu)

1. The following order has been received from Commander-in-chief Zhu and Political Commissar Mao of the Front Army:

. . . (Omission)

2. According to the order, this army group is to set out from its present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow (the 6th), advance to Tianxinqiao, and after arriving at Tianxinqiao, annihilate the enemy in Datuopu and Yijiawan when opportunity offers.

3. The Fourth Army should send capable scouts tonight to set out from the present location and search and advance to Yijiawan by way of Tianxinqiao. They must return to Tianxinqiao and report by tomorrow morning. The rest are to complete their departure from the present location by 2:30 tomorrow morning, advance to Tianxinqiao by way of Daijiachong and Jizhumiao, stop and await further orders (a vanguard should be sent out as well).

4. The General Headquarters espionage team, General Headquarters, and the transportation team should set out from the present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow and advance following behind the Fourth Army.

5. The Twelfth Army (which should dispatch a rear guard force) should set out from the present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow, advance behind the units directly attached to General Headquarters, and stop to await further orders after arriving near Tianxinqiao.

6. The Third Army should advance from the present location at 3:00 A.M. tomorrow by way of a short cut and arrive near Tianxinqiao, stop there, and await further orders (it should send out sentries on the right flank in the direction of Datuopu).

7. If during the course of its advance the Third Army on the right flank finds enemy troops in the direction of Datuopu, then the Third Army on the right

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We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 120–21.

should immediately occupy an advantageous position from which to attack the enemy. The Fourth Army should rapidly follow the left wing of the Third Army to launch a fierce attack on the enemy's flank. The rest of the forces are to await further orders to provide reinforcements, so that they may be destroyed once for all.

8. The large baggage of the army group (excluding the mess supplies each unit should carry) and the noncombat forces, led by their original commanders, should move tomorrow morning from Tiaomajian to Xinqiao, stop there, and await further orders.

9. During the advance we will be operating at the position of the Fourth Army's army headquarters.

Addendum:

1. Tomorrow each unit (or each company) is allowed to carry along only three or four loads of mess supplies (the rest of the luggage should all be moved to Xinqiao).

2. After arriving at Tianxinqiao, each unit should at once send orderlies to the position of General Headquarters to receive orders.

3. Each column in each army must assign one person to be in charge of the sick and wounded officers and soldiers, and each army should also designate someone to provide unified leadership. Tomorrow morning Director Yang of the General Political Department will guide the Hunan Red Guard forces in escorting [the sick and wounded] from Tiaomajian to the rear in Liuyang.

4. If there is no enemy in Yijiawan and Datuopu tomorrow, the Fourth Army should then move from Tianxinqiao in the direction of Yijiawan and camp there; the Third Army is to arrange to camp in the Jizhumiao and Baimachong area; and the Tenth Army is to arrange to camp in the Louditang and Qiantangpo area. General Headquarters is to encamp near Qiantangpo and Tianxinqiao.

Commander-in-chief and Political Commissar — Zhu De, Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Launch a Forceful Attack on Changsha City

(September 10, 1930, 9:00 A.M.,
at General Command Headquarters in Tianxinqiao)

1. We have received the following order from the Commander-in-chief and the Political Commissar of the Front Army:

a. The enemy He Jian's forces are still holding the city of Changsha and are resisting us by relying upon their fortifications. Luo Lin's division is now in the Leigongling area.
b. It has been decided that the Front Army will take the said enemy by storm and seize the city walls. A general attack on the enemy in the area of Erlipai, Wumeiling, and Huangtuling has been set to take place at 8:00 tonight.
c. The Third Army Group (minus the Sixteenth Army) is in charge of the attack on the right wing. At around 3:00 P.M. today it should move from its present location (the Banzhutang and Panguba area) to the area near Litang, and must complete its movement by dusk. Tonight it should promptly (at 8:00 o'clock sharp) attack and advance toward the enemy's stronghold in Erlipai, and position its reserve forces near Litang.
d. The First Army Group is in charge of the attack on the left wing. At around 3:00 P.M. today it should move from its present location (the Zhujialing and Tianxinqiao area) to the area of Wumafeng (several *li* beyond Xujiachong), Guitang, and Tianjiling, and must complete its movement by dusk. Tonight it should promptly (at 8:00 o'clock sharp) attack and advance toward the enemy's stronghold in Wumeiling, and dispatch troops to feign an attack on the enemy's stronghold in Huangtuling, positioning its reserve forces near Tianjiling behind Xujiachong.
e. The Sixteenth Army should move this morning (the 10th) from its present location (near Banzhutang) and advance to the area near Langlishi by way of crossing the river in Dongsigang, to pin down the enemy in Leigongling.
f. The heavy baggage of the Front Army is to be concentrated in Dongsigang

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 122–24.

(under the direction of the head of the military supplies section of the Third Army, Fan Shude). The First Army Group's mess unit will be positioned on the road between Dongsigang and Xujiachong. The Third Army Group's mess unit will be positioned in Dongshan.

g. During the general offensive tonight we will be on Wumafeng Mountain in front of Xujiachong.

Addendum:

a. Along the way each army group's advance troops attacking the city should pay attention to destroying the enemy's advancing security forces.
b. Darkness is taken to fall at precisely 7:00 o'clock.
c. When attacking the city, all officers and soldiers must march ahead with full courage. Anyone who shrinks and retreats from the battle shall be dealt with by military law.
d. When there is the possibility of attacking an enemy's stronghold, a torch should be lit as a signal.
e. All army groups are to communicate with General Command Headquarters (on top of Wumafeng) by telephone. All armies and army groups, in turn, are to communicate through orderlies or special signals.
f. Command positions at all levels are to be indicated according to originally stipulated torch signals.
g. All night attacks are to be carried out through hand-to-hand combat.

2. According to orders, this army group will take the enemy's stronghold in Wumeiling by storm, and has made the following arrangements:

a. The Fourth Army constitutes the force attacking the city. It should move at 2:00 P.M. today from its present location to the area of Guitang and Shiba, and promptly launch a fierce attack on the enemy's stronghold in Wumeiling.
b. The Twelfth Army will be the reserve force for the attack on the city. It should move from its present location at 4:00 P.M. today and advance following the Fourth Army. Tonight it should dispatch forces (roughly the equivalent of a company) along the main road in Dongjingpu to feign an attack on Shimapu and Huangtuling.
c. The forces attacking the city and the reserve forces for the attack on the city are all under the command of Attack Commanding Officer Lin Biao and Political Commissar Luo Ronghuan.
d. The Third Army constitutes the reserve force of this army group. It should move at 4:30 P.M. today following General Headquarters to the reserve forces position near Tianjiling behind Xujiachong. It should also post a strong security force to stand guard in the direction of places such as Mojialong and Shipailing.

3. The army group's heavy baggage and the mess units of its combatant forces should halt at the positions designated in the Front Army's aforementioned order and begin cooking.

4. During the general offensive tonight we will be atop Wumafeng Mountain.

Commander-in-chief and Political Commissar — Zhu De, Mao Zedong

Instruction on Methods for Capturing the Enemy's Weapons[1]

(September 12, 1930)

During the period of guerrilla warfare in the past, our Red Army did not fight any campaigns against big enemies and did not capture large amounts of enemy weapons. As a result, our comrades, officers and soldiers, often ran forward, seized a gun in their hands, and asked the enemy to give it to them. Once they got the gun, they slung it on their back. This habit has been maintained down to the present day. During our attack on Changsha this time, one detachment of the Fourth Army had pursued a regiment under Chen Guangzhong to the point where it was willing to surrender its weapons voluntarily. As in the past, however, our officers and soldiers wanted to carry all these guns themselves, and this was simply impossible, for they were few and the enemy's guns were many, so they naturally could not carry them all. As a result, while they were struggling with this problem, the enemy launched a counterattack, and all the guns of this entire regiment were taken back again by the enemy. This was truly a pity. From now on, every one of us should understand the methods for fighting big campaigns and capturing large numbers of weapons. Whenever the enemy troops raise their banners or hands and wave, or play a salute, or raise their guns and indicate that they are willing to give up their weapons and surrender, we should, on the one hand, be on guard with arms, order them to put their guns in piles (stack their rifles), or order them to put their guns on the ground and move a few steps backward. Afterward, officers should be sent to gather these captives together and lead them away from the battlefield, and the necessary number of troops should be sent to guard them to the rear. As regards all the weapons (whether lying on the ground or piled up in stacks), we should send someone else (it is best to send an adjutant) to lead a few soldiers to escort them to the nearest place in the rear and give them to the empty-handed people to transfer to the rear (removing the triggers if necessary). We absolutely must not carry large amounts of captured enemy weapons ourselves, for this will reduce our fighting strength.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 167–68, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

1. This is Instruction No. 2 of the General Headquarters of the First Front Army.

Particular attention must be paid to this point. The people sent should run back to their units immediately, to deal with the enemy elsewhere. While gathering up the weapons surrendered by the enemy, we should act swiftly and guard them with extreme caution, so as not to give the enemy the opportunity to launch a counterattack. While the guns are still in the enemy's hands, in order to reduce their fighting capacity and accomplish our fighting tasks, we should kill them without the slightest compunction. Conversely, if the enemy has already laid down his weapons and expressed his willingness to surrender, we should not injure him simply because of hatred. This is a very important matter. We hope that all our comrade officers and soldiers will pay special attention to the importance of carrying this out. Be it so ordered.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Occupy Places Such as Ping[xiang], You[xian], Li[ling], and Zhu[zhou], and to Await Opportunities

(September 12, 1930, 5:30, at Xinqiao)

1. It is said that Zhang [Fakui]'s troops and those of Guangxi have arrived at Xiangtan, and that there is one unit of the Nineteenth Division in Zhuzhou.

2. To achieve the objective of first eliminating the forces of Zhang [Fakui] and Guangxi, and those of He Jian, and then taking Changsha and attacking Wuhan, the Front Army's intention is to take Ping[xiang], You[xian], Li[ling], and Zhu[zhou] and await opportunities.

3. Our Third Army Group will enter and take Pingxiang today by way of Liling.

4. This army group has received orders to take Zhuzhou tomorrow (the 13th).

5. The Twelfth Army is designated as the vanguard, and it should set out tonight at 4:00 o'clock by way of Longtoupu. If there are enemy forces in Zhuzhou they must destroy this enemy and occupy [Zhuzhou].

6. The unit directly attached to General Headquarters (to set out at 4:00 o'clock) is to march following the vanguard.

7. The Fourth Army constitutes the rear guard. It should set out at 6:00 o'clock and advance following the unit directly attached to General Headquarters.

8. The Third Army should find its own route to advance toward Zhuzhou (on the principle of marching to the right of the Longtoupu road so as not to cross paths with those troops going through Longtoupu).

9. Baggage is to be returned to its original unit.

10. Our movements shall be with the position of General Headquarters.

Addendum:

If there is no enemy upon arrival in Zhuzhou, the Twelfth Army is to be stationed in the direction of Lukou, the Third Army is to be stationed in

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We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 125–26.

Zhuzhou, the Fourth Army is to be stationed in Longtoupu and Zhuzhou, and General Headquarters is to be stationed in the direction of Liling. In other words, they are not to be all stationed in one clump. It is forbidden to sabotage the railroad power lines from Zhuzhou to Liling and Lukou.

It is so ordered.

Front Committee general espionage team leader, He
General Headquarters espionage team leader, Chen
Political Commissar, Liu
Transportation team deputy leader, Yang
Political Commissar, Feng
Headquarters adjutants' section
General Political Department general affairs section, He

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Attack and Take Ji'an

(September 13, 1930, 8:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Zhuzhou)

1) In accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and as a prelude to our objective of achieving the initial victory of the revolutionary uprising in Wuhan and the seizure of political power in the whole country, our front army has the tasks of gathering the tens of millions of workers, peasants, and poor people of Jiangxi, and applying a strategy of concentrated offensives to seize Nanchang and the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad line as far as Hukou in the fiercest, fastest, and bravest way, destroying Lu Diping and reactionary rule in Jiangxi, blocking and blockading the Yangzi River, attacking Nanjing to the right, and securing the seizure of Wuhan to the left. Our front army has decided on the plan for the first stage of taking Nanchang, which requires the First Army Group to attack Ji'an, and the Third Army Group to plan the seizure of Xiajiang and Xin'gan.

2) This army group has decided to leave here (Zhuzhou) tomorrow (the 14th), and spread out to work along the way, our task being to mobilize the masses, raise funds, and sew clothes and quilts. The duration of the march will be seventeen days in all, and the deadline for the whole army group to reach the township of Yanfu in Ji'an and concentrate its forces there is the 30th of this month.

3) The Twelfth Army should leave here (Zhuzhou) tomorrow, head for the areas of Huangtuling and Youxian, and work along the way, pass through Lianhua and Anfu, and then arrive at the township of Yanfu by the 30th of this month to concentrate its forces. It will also have the responsibility of keeping a close watch in the direction of Hengzhou.

4) The Fourth Army should, starting tomorrow, leave here (Zhuzhou) and scatter its forces to Baiguanpu, Yaojiaba, Lukou, Yutanwan, Shenfuwan, Sifenpu, Shentan, and other places. The working period is eleven days, with a deadline of the 24th for reaching Pingxiang by following the railroad and assembling there (a further order will be issued later regarding the future plans for troop movements of the Third and Fourth Armies and the unit directly attached

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 127–29. A slightly less complete text can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 141–42.

to the General Headquarters), and with the responsibility of keeping a close watch in the direction of Changsha.

5) The Third Army should leave here for Dongchongpu tomorrow morning, work eleven days in Banyupu, Liling, Huangshapu, Chudongqiao, and other places, and then reach Pingxiang by the deadline of the 24th for assembly and further orders.

6) General Headquarters, the directly attached unit and the Workers' and Peasants' Military Commission should leave here tomorrow, advance behind the Third Army, and reach the area between Liling and Pingxiang between the 15th and the 24th.

Addendum:

1. The Fourth Army should send a detachment tomorrow to destroy the main iron bridge within the Zhuchang section of the Guangdong-Hankou railroad, and burn the sleepers of the railway for a distance of ten *li*.

2. After arriving at Youxian, the Twelfth Army should maintain telephone contact with the Fourth Army that has remained here, and the General Headquarters that has gone to Liling. Motor vehicles may be used as the means of transportation between Youxian and Liling.

3. If a large mass of enemy troops from Changsha is pressing upon us, the Fourth Army should move in the direction of Li[ling] and Ping[xiang], remaining in contact with this unit. If a large body of enemy troops appears from the direction of Hengzhou, then the Twelfth Army should also move in the direction of Pingxiang, remaining in contact with this unit.

4. Our Third Army Group is already advancing past Liling in the direction of Pingxiang.

5. Tomorrow morning, when the Third Army and the Twelfth Army set out, they can travel over ten *li* together along the railroad at the beginning of their journey. The Third Army should walk on the left side of the railroad and the Twelfth Army should take the right side of the railroad.

6. During the period when the troops are dispersed, 1 *yuan* in silver for pocket money may be distributed, plus 0.4 *yuan* for buying straw shoes for September.

7. The military uniforms should be lined, and everyone should receive an additional bedsheet.

It is so ordered.

The Head of the General Services Department of the General Political Department, He

The Secretary General of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, Gu

The Head of the Front Committee Espionage Team, He

The Head of the Espionage Team of
General Headquarters, Chen

Political Commissar, Liu

Acting Head of the Communications Detachment, Yang

Political Commissar, Feng

Deputy Head of the Adjutants' Department of This Unit

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De

and

Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Report to the Central Committee

(September 17, 1930, at Liling)

To the Provincial Committee, for transmission to the Central Committee:

1) There are three reasons why we failed to take Changsha this time:[1] (1) We were unable to wipe out the main force of the enemy before attacking the fortifications. The enemy had a total of thirty-one regiments, and although we had wiped out more than five regiments of enemy troops in the two campaigns in Wenjiashi and Houzishi,[2] the enemy's main forces retreated behind the city wall before we were able to wipe them out. Thus the enemy had ample strength to defend the city. (2) Various conditions relating to the masses were not met. There was no workers' uprising and no soldiers' revolt inside the city in response [to our action], and the masses along the Guangdong-Hankou Railway line and the Zhuzhou-Pingxiang Railway line, and those of the other side of the river did not rise up. Thus we were unable to cut off the enemy's transportation and communication lines by water or land, and unable to blockade the enemy's economic and military transportation. (3) The technical conditions were not fulfilled. The enemy's fortifications were European-style multilayered works, with eight or nine rings of barbed wire and trenches. We can only fight hand-to-hand campaigns; we do not have heavy artillery to destroy the enemy's fortifications, nor do we have transportation and communication tools such as radios. Thus communications between the two army groups were poor, and as a result, opportunities were missed. The three points noted above account for our failure to take Changsha, and the first cause was the most important. Nevertheless, in the Wenjiashi campaign we wiped out three enemy regiments, and in the Houzishi campaign we wiped out more than two enemy regiments. We captured two thousand rifles and twenty-five machine guns, killed the enemy brigade commander Dai Douheng, injured the enemy brigade commander Chen Wo, captured two enemy regimental commanders, injured two enemy regimental

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 132–34. The first section also appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 169–70, where it is stated that the text has been reproduced from the original document in the Party archives.

1. As discussed above, in the Introduction to this volume, the decision to terminate the second attack on Changsha, demanded by Li Lisan, and to retreat toward the southwest, was a crucial turning point in the relations between Mao Zedong and the Central Committee. On August 24, Mao Zedong and Zhu De had issued the order, translated above, to launch the attack; on September 12, they ordered its abandonment. This text contains Mao's own contemporary justification for his actions.

2. On the battle at Wenjiashi, see above, Mao's order dated August 18, 1930. The battle at Houzishi had taken place on September 3, 1930.

commanders, and killed, injured, or captured so many of the enemy's middle- and lower-ranking cadres that we could not keep count. We captured more than two thousand enemy soldiers and killed or injured more than four thousand. We surrounded Changsha for sixteen days and fought hard for several days and nights, on a front extending for more than thirty *li*. On September 3 we routed the attacking enemy troops completely, and thereafter they retreated behind the trenches and did not dare to come out even one step. On September 10 our army's second general offensive failed to achieve its goals, and on September 12 we decided to withdraw to Ping and Li.[3] We had completely demolished the morale and prestige of more than thirty regiments of the enemy troops, to the extent that they did not dare to look the Red Army in the eyes. At the same time, it had a great influence in the entire country, and that constitutes a victory in this war.

This campaign constitutes the first major battle since the founding of the Red Army, and as a result our forces also suffered a considerable number of casualties. According to reports from the First Army Group alone, among the senior cadres Comrades Ke Wudong and Liu Zuoshu were killed on the battlefield, several dozen middle ranking cadres were either killed or injured, and we also lost more than a hundred lower-level cadres and around sixteen hundred soldiers. The losses of the Third Army Group were also not inconsiderable. Although we suffered these losses, generally speaking our morale is still very strong, and there are no problems about going to Jiangxi and continuing our fighting there.

2) The letter to us of early August from the Yangzi Bureau and the Military Commission of the Central Committee was discovered by Zhang Huizan and reported to the national government, which distributed it to the various provinces. He Jian in turn transmitted it to the various *xian*, and consequently we obtained a copy in Zhuzhou. As a result of our discussions, we find the directives of the Central Committee to be entirely correct: seizing Wuhan is a great class battle of national import, and without the existence of revolutionary conditions nationwide, especially in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Henan, the taking of Wuhan would be quite difficult to sustain and expand upon.[4] The tasks

3. The reference is to the two towns of Pingxiang in Jiangxi and Liling in Hunan, located almost immediately across the provincial border from one another, which were on the way to Mao's subsequent destination of Ji'an. Both the order of September 10 to launch yet another assault on Changsha and the order of September 12 to turn away from the city are translated above.

4. This document is not available to us. A directive of the Central Committee to the Yangzi Bureau dated August 10 spoke of the rapid advance of the revolutionary situation, and called for a more aggressive attitude by the Red Army in the battles for Wuhan, Nanchang, Changsha, and Jiujiang. The directive also stressed the importance of rapidly building up Party and workers' organizations to support the coming military offensive. When Nanchang fell, it stated in conclusion, an All-China Revolutionary Committee should be created, with its seat in Nanchang, and Mao Zedong as provisional chairman. The letter from the Yangzi Bureau mentioned by Mao may have reflected or paralleled this directive. See *Central Committee Documents*, 1930, pp. 247–49.

of the First Army Group are to take Nanchang and Jiujiang, occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad, establish political power in Jiangxi and in the whole country, blockade the Yangzi, attack Nanjing on the right, and ensure victory in Wuhan on the left. Resolutely destroying all present enemies, relieving them of their arms and thereby arming the Red Army, the First Army Group should expand its numbers to over a hundred and twenty thousand. At present Ji'an should quickly be attacked and taken, and the millions of revolutionary masses in southwestern Jiangxi led to advance toward Nanchang and Jiujiang from the two routes of Zhangshu and Fuzhou. The Tenth Army should set out from Hukou and Madang; the Twenty-second Army should set out from Fuzhou and Fengcheng; the Twentieth Army should set out from Zhangshu and Linjiang, advance towards Nanchang, and surround it. As for the First and Third Army Groups, one of them is to occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad and proceed directly to take Jiujiang, while the other army group is to attack Nanchang. The Third Army Group is to go on to Hunan or Hubei after working for a time in Jiangxi.

3) Both the First and Third Army Groups currently need a monthly cash supply of more than four hundred thousand [*yuan*]. At present the provisioning has run out, and it is necessary to raise funds of approximately two hundred thousand *yuan* in the three *xian* of Ping[xiang], Li[ling], and You[xian] to be able to sustain ourselves for half a month. At the same time, the local work in the various *xian* such as Ping, Li, and You is of crucial importance to seizing political power in Hunan and opening up connections between Hunan and Jiangxi (these three *xian* are all White areas, and the masses are heavily affected by a sense of defeat). Therefore, beginning on September 14th for a period of twelve days the two army groups are to raise funds in the three *xian*, and help the local Party headquarters mobilize the masses to establish Party and Youth League organizations, establish soviets, and set up Red Guard units. After twelve days, the First Army Group will attack Ji'an from Anfu, and the Second Army Group will attack Zhangshu from Yuanzhou. Around the time of taking Ji'an and Zhangshu, the problem of recruiting new soldiers must be solved, and the Twentieth and Twenty-second Army Groups must be transferred to advance northward and, in concert with the broad masses, to mount forceful attacks on Nanchang and Jiujiang, and occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad.

4) As regards a Jiangxi provincial committee, three to five capable comrades should be sought to establish one quickly. It would be most suitable for the organ to be set up in Ji'an. The establishment of a Jiangxi provincial committee is of crucial importance to the work in Jiangxi. Last time when we went from Yongfeng through the town of Zhangshu, Shengmijie, and the Niuhang station, there was not a single branch, and there was not a single place where the masses were organized to lend assistance to the Red Army in its actions. The same was true in Ruizhou and other places, and a march of a month's duration was nothing but a purely military action. According to our experience, without the condition

of mass [support], it is very difficult to occupy central cities, and it is also very difficult to destroy the enemy. Naturally, we have no intention of waiting for the provincial committee to prepare the proper conditions among the masses before attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang. Without a doubt it is through such actions as attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang that we will mobilize the masses and create the necessary conditions among the masses. Nevertheless, when there exists a provincial committee it will be easier to attain our goals.

5) For the purpose of commanding the First Army Group and the Third Army Group, the Joint Conference of the Front Committees of the First and Third Army Groups has already decided to organize a General Front Committee with Mao Zedong as Secretary, and openly to organize a General Political Department of the First Front Army General Headquarters, with Zhu De as Commander-in-Chief, Mao Zedong as Chief Political Commissar, and Yang Yuebin as Chief of the General Political Department. Above the Red Army and local political organs will be organized a Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee to direct them, with thirty-five committee members and Mao Zedong as Chairman.[5]

6) Comrade Tu Zhennong[6] is relatively familiar with the situation in the First Army Group. After he went with the army from Tingzhou to Ji'an he was to return immediately to the Central Committee. I trust he has already arrived there.

7) The Front Committee of the Third Army Group has a separate detailed report on the situation in the Third Army Group.

Secretary of the Front Committee of the First Army Group Mao Zedong

5. Central Committee Directive No. 47 of July 21, 1930, had called for the creation of such an organ in each battle zone to wield both military and political authority, adding that when victory was won in several provinces, these committees should be immediately combined and transformed into a national organ of revolutionary power. See *Central Committee Documents*, 1930, pp. 178–80.

6. Tu Zhennong (1896–1951) was a native of Jiangxi, who had joined the Guomindang in 1921, and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. As indicated above, in a note to the text of June 25, 1930, Li Lisan sent Tu to the Jiangxi–Hunan soviet base area as an inspector, to inform Mao of the new policies adopted by the Central Committee in May and June. In this capacity, Tu addressed a number of meetings, and became familiar with the situation in the army. When a Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government was set up in Ji'an on October 7, 1930, Tu became a member of the Executive Committee. In the early years of the Anti-Japanese War he played an important role in the organization of the Chinese Communist Party, but after being arrested in 1942 he rallied to the Guomindang, which he rejoined in 1943. From then until 1949, he published several anti-Communist books, and helped to train Guomindang special agents. He was executed as a counterrevolutionary in April 1951.

Order for the First Army Group of the Red Army to Leave Pingxiang and Advance Toward Ji'an

(September 23, 1930, 1:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in the city of Pingxiang)

1. Orders have been received from the Front Army as follows:

a. The vanguard of the enemy in Hunan (such as the Nineteenth and Thirty-first divisions of He Jian's forces) has reached Liling, and some of the forces of the enemy in Jiangxi (Dai Yue's brigade) have reached Wanzai.
The city of Ji'an remains under the occupation of Deng Ying's forces.

b. For the purpose of accomplishing its original tasks of taking Nanchang and Jiujiang, eliminating Lu Diping, and then going on to seize Changsha and Wuhan and attack Nanjing, it has been decided that this front army will first take the city of Ji'an. This will cause the forces of the worker and peasant masses of southwestern Jiangxi to progress downstream and cooperate with us, and thus provide a large number of new recruits to expand the ranks of the Red Army.

c. The Third Army Group should set out from here (the city of Pingxiang) tomorrow (the 24th), and then advance toward the town of Zhangshu, first occupying Linjiangfu, mobilize the masses in the Linjiang area, block transportation on the Gan River, and cut off the enemy's reinforcements.

d. The First Army Group should be divided into two routes: the right route via Youxian (Twelfth Army), and the left route via Pingxiang (Third and Fourth Armies) passing through Yuanzhou (the Twentieth Army is also in Yuanzhou), and advancing towards Ji'an. The troops in Anyuan and Pingxiang must set out by the 27th, gather together on arrival at Futian to the north of Ji'an, and coordinate with the local masses in resolutely seizing the city of Ji'an.

2. This Army Group will follow orders to take Ji'an.
3. The General Headquarters, the various directly attached units, and the

Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 145–47. A fragmentary version of the first four paragraphs appears in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 143–44, where the text is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1980.

Fourth Army will follow the Central Military Commission[1] in moving to Anyuan tomorrow (the 24th) to work for three days. The whole army group (except the Twelfth Army) will advance towards Yichun from both Anyuan and Pingxiang on the 27th and converge in the vicinity of Futian, 90 *li* north of the city of Ji'an, after passing through Yichun (see chart below for details).

Time of arrival at locations shown	General Headquarters Fourth Army	Second Army	Twentieth Army	Twelfth Army
24th–26th	Anyuan	Pingxiang	Arrive 28th to await orders near Linyuan from Yichun by route of own choice. Must arrive at specified place to await orders before October 1	Must gather to await orders before October 1 near Futianjie in Beixiang, Ji'an, coming from Youxian
27th	From Anyuan to Baishapu, from Anyuan to Fenjiepu	From Pingxiang to Xuanfengshi		
28th	From Baishapu, Fenjiepu, to Yichun	From Xuanfengshi to Yichun		
29th	To city of Fenyi	Area around Yantianxin, Lubian		
30th	Arrive at area around Damiaoqian, Yingtangling	Around Fangli, Daijiafang		
31st	Futianjie, Hantang	Around Guojiadian, Pancun		

4. The Twelfth Army, according to the original plan, will come from Youxian, concentrate its forces north of the city of Ji'an, and await orders.

5. After departure, we shall follow the General Headquarters in our movements.

Addendum:

1. Route map to be distributed separately.
2. The destination points for each army are listed tentatively in the chart. Each unit is to judge the actual conditions along the way and adjust its position

1. Here our source has "Central Revolutionary Committee" (*zhonggewei*) instead of "Central Military Commission" (*zhongjunwei*) as in the *Bujuan* version. We take the former for a misprint.

slightly backwards or forward, to the left or right according to circumstances, but must arrive at the assembly point at the scheduled time.

3. After departure, each army must provide a daily written report to the General Headquarters.

General Commander Zhu De
and
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Statutes of the Red Army Soldiers' Association

(September 25, 1930)

Chapter 1: Purposes

Article 1. Raising the political standards of soldiers, strengthening class consciousness, establishing revolutionary ideas, and increasing capacity for struggle.

Article 2. Uniting the revolutionary spirit of soldiers, uniting the revolutionary forces of workers and peasants, and fulfilling the political tasks of the revolution (overthrowing imperialism, the landlord class and the National Government, and setting up a government of workers and peasants).

Article 3. Representing the interests of soldiers, improving their livelihood (such as provisions, hygiene, treatment, and entertainment), and heightening the revolutionary sentiments of soldiers.

Article 4. Assisting the military and political organs, maintaining revolutionary discipline, expanding the political influence of the Red Army, and winning over the broad masses.

Chapter 2: Functions and Rights

Article 5. The soldiers' association conducts its work under the guidance of the political departments and political committees.

Article 6. Regarding all military and political questions, the soldiers' association may put forward its opinions to military and political organs.

Article 7. When the management of the troops is considered inappropriate, the soldiers' association has the right to put forward protests or complaints to superior organs.

Article 8. The soldiers' association has the right to inspect the economy of the army and supervise the provisioning of the army (i.e., examining expenditures and revenues and catering accounts).

Article 9. As regards punishment of its members, the soldiers' association has the right only to give warnings and to expel them from the association directly.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 145–51, where the text is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.

When it comes to imprisonment, [X] punishment,[1] execution by firing squad, and so on, it may only make proposals to the responsible officers for them to handle.

Article 10. The soldiers' association has the right to select and send representatives to participate in the soviet organization.

Chapter 3: Organization

Article 11. The soldiers' association is a mass organization of soldiers, so its organization should be based on the criterion of the conditions of the masses. The political department of the Red Army is the organ of political power in the army. All the units above the division or column level have political departments. Therefore, the committee of the soldiers' association should not be set up in the units above divisions and columns. Organizations of the soldier masses should be established in all units below the level of regiment. Various levels of directly attached army units may also organize soldiers' associations. The soldiers' associations of regiments are subordinate to the political departments of their respective armies and divisions. The soldiers' associations of the directly attached army units at all levels should be under the direct guidance of the respective political departments.

Article 12. All Red Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and laborers may become members of the soldiers' committee.

Article 13. All Red Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and laborers have the right to elect and to be elected, but the number of officers elected should not exceed one-third of the committee members.

Article 14. The methods of forming the executive committee of the soldiers' committee at all levels:

1) The executive committees at the company level should be composed of seven to nine persons elected by the general meetings of all the soldiers of the respective companies. The executive committee should elect three persons to form a standing committee and recommend one person among them to be the chairman. All military and political administrations have the discretion to increase or decrease the number of those elected.

2) The executive committees of the soldiers' associations at the regiment and battalion level should be composed of nine to eleven persons elected by the representative conferences of the entire regiments or battalions. The executive committee should elect three to five persons to form a standing committee and recommend one person among them to be the chairman. (The same applies to the attached units.) The number of representatives is determined by the number of people in each company, with one representative being elected from among every five or ten persons.

1. The missing word is presumably "corporal."

Article 15. The organizational systems of the soldiers' associations at all levels are as follows:

1) Soldiers' associations in companies

General Meeting of All Soldiers				
Executive Committee				
Standing Committee				
Chairman				
Member for organization	Member for propaganda	Member for entertainment	Member for health matters	Member for economic affairs

2) Soldiers' associations in divisions and regiments. (This also applies to the soldiers' associations in the directly attached units.)

Representative Conference				
Executive Committee				
Standing Committee				
Chairman				
Secretary	Organization section	Propaganda section	Entertainment section	Health section

Article 16. Below the level of company, small groups should be formed within the units of platoons or squads and have one group leader and one deputy group leader. Group leaders are designated by the executive committees. (The soldiers' associations in military and political administrations may form small groups among ten or twenty persons in light of the conditions of their respective units.)

Article 17. The soldiers' associations of companies may have one member responsible for organization, one for propaganda, one for entertainment, one for health, and three for economic affairs. The members responsible for organization, propaganda, entertainment, and health should all be appointed from the members of the soldiers' associations. The director of the economic committee should also be a member of the soldiers' association and the other two members may be appointed by the executive committee or elected by the general meeting of all the soldiers.

Article 18. The soldiers' associations at the level of regiments and battalions and of the directly attached units may set up sections of organization, propaganda, entertainment, and health. The heads of the four sections should all be members of the soldiers' associations of the regiments and battalion, and a section may be composed of one to three persons appointed by the executive committee.

Article 19. The soldiers' associations at the level of regiments and battalions and of the directly attached units may have one secretary (concurrently held by a member or held by a person hired for the purpose).

Article 20. Tenure of the members of the executive committee:

1) The members of the executive committee of the soldiers' associations in a company are reelected every two months;

2) The members of the executive committee of the soldiers' associations at the level of regiments and battalions and of the directly attached units are reelected every three months and may be reelected consecutively.

Article 21. The time of various meetings:

1) The general meetings of the member of the soldiers' associations in companies should be held every two weeks, the executive committees hold their meetings every week and the standing committees hold their meetings every five days. (The above various sections may hold meetings at any time in case of special circumstances.) Small groups hold meetings every seven days.

2) The general meetings of the soldiers' associations at the level of regiments and battalions and of the directly attached units are held once in a month; the executive committees hold meetings every ten days; and the standing committees meet every five days. (Meetings may be held at any time in case of special circumstances.)

Article 22. Discipline:

1) Members of the associations must abide by the three main rules of discipline of the Red Army [1] Do not take anything from the workers, peasants, and small merchants; [2] When attacking the local bullies, turn over [whatever you take from them]: [3] Obey orders in all your actions) and the eight points for attention ([1] Put back the doors; [2] Bundle up the straw; [3] Speak politely; [4] Pay fairly for what you buy; [5] Return everything you borrow; [6] Pay for anything you damage, and protect public property; [7] Do not shit all over the place; [8] Do not search the pockets of enemy soldiers).[2] Violation of any one of the above-mentioned rules should be reported to responsible officers for appropriate punishment.

2) Decisions of the majority must be obeyed by all members of the association without exception.

3) Those who do not call meetings in a timely fashion, do not attend meetings on time, and disobey the resolutions of the associations shall be

2. As indicated above, in a note to the order of March 21, 1930, the rules and points for attention were still evolving in 1930. Although the order of the Three Main Rules is different here from that given in the note to the March 21 document, the wording is the same except for the addition of small merchants to the list of those whose property must not be taken.

punished, warned, or expelled by the associations at all levels according to the circumstances.

4) Members who do not pay dues for three months consecutively without reasons are expelled.

Chapter 4: The Work of the Association

Article 23. Under the guidance of the political departments and the political commissars, the work of agrarian revolution must be carried out with great efforts ([1] Constructing political régimes; [2] Redistributing land; [3] Arming workers and peasants).

Article 24. Revolutionary propaganda must be conducted with great earnestness to expand the political influence of the Red Army in such ways as holding mass meetings to welcome new soldiers and captured soldiers and to send off soldiers on leave and other meetings. Declarations may be distributed and representatives may be sent to attend mass meetings in the name of the soldiers' associations. . . .

Article 25. Close relationships should be established with local mass organizations at all times, and local mass organizations should be set up in places where no mass organizations exist.

Article 26. The literary standards of soldiers should be raised by running literary movements and youth schools, publishing newspapers of soldiers, discussing political issues and practicing speech making, and so on and so forth.

Article 27. Social conditions should be investigated.

Article 28. Suitable amusements for soldiers should be provided, such as organizing clubs, fraternity groups, racing, singing, games, dancing, acting, speeches, martial arts, soccer, and so on.

Article 29. Supervision of supplies and catering accounts.

Article 30. Matters of hygiene should be dealt with, for example, paying attention to the hygiene of tea and drinking water, food, clothes and barracks, keeping fit, installing latrines for the garrisoned troops, putting on more clothes, and covering well with quilts in the mornings and evenings and washing clothes and feet.

Article 31. The soldiers and officers who are ill and wounded should be comforted (sending people to carry and assist the wounded and ill officers and soldiers, fetching water for them to wash their faces, boiling tea and water for them, cleaning houses, raising funds, donating clothes and money, and helping the wounded and ill officers and soldiers). In light of actual conditions, methods of providing special treatments to them should be proposed to the military and political administrations for handling.

Article 32. Investigation and registration should be conducted of comrades who have died, and ways should be found to assist the families of those who have given their lives.

Chapter 5: Finances

Article 33.

1) The expenses of the soldiers' associations of companies are 5 *yuan* each month, those of the associations at the level of regiments, battalions, and directly attached units are 10 *yuan* each month, and funds for all these purposes shall be issued by the Political Department.

2) Members who violate the rule against gambling will have their property confiscated; 80 percent of it shall belong to the soldiers' associations of companies, and 20 percent shall belong to the associations of regiments and battalions. Every member of the soldiers' associations should hand in dues of one copper cash per month.

Chapter 6: Supplementary Articles

Article 34. If the charter of the Soldiers' Association is not satisfactory, it may be revised by the political departments upon the recommendation of over one-third of the members and the opinions of the soldiers' associations and take effect upon the approval of the general political department.

Article 35. This charter will go into force on the day of issuance.

Printed and distributed by the General Political Department of the First Front Army of the Red Army

Order of the First Army Group of the Red Army to Leave Yichun, Go to Futian, and Concentrate Its Forces There

(September 29, 1930, 6 P.M., at Yichun)

1. The Hunan enemy is still in the area of Laoguan, Liling, and Huangtuling, and the Dai brigade of the Jiangxi enemy[1] is already retreating from Wanzai toward Nanchang. There are reports that the troops of Deng Ying are being moved from Ji'an back to Nanchang, that the town of Ji'an is being defended by the battalion of Ma Kun moved there from Ganzhou,[2] and that one of the guards regiments near Nanchang has been sent to Ji'an. We are continuing to investigate whether or not this is true.

2. In accordance with the original plan, this army group (minus the Twelfth and Twentieth Armies) is to leave here (Yichun Town) tomorrow (the 30th), and advance past Fenyi toward Ji'an, with the intention of reaching the vicinity of the town of Fenyi (80 *li*) on the 30th, of reaching the vicinity of Lukou (60 *li*) on October 1, and of reaching the vicinity of Futian (55 *li*) on the 2nd, to assemble there.

3. The Fourth Army should have completed its departure from its present location (Xiapu) by five o'clock tomorrow morning, advance through Binjiang to Fenyi, and encamp before the town of Fenyi.

General Headquarters, the General Political Department, and the units directly under them, following after the Revolutionary Military Commission, should get up tomorrow morning at 3:30, assemble at 4:30 on the main road, and start off in this order, directly after the advancing Fourth Army.

The Third Army (minus one column), should set out tomorrow morning at

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Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 148–149. This version is more accurate than that in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 331–32, where the text is reproduced from *Dangshi ziliao* No. 3, July 1978.

1. The reference is to the forces of Dai Yue (1888–1971), *zi* Xipeng, a native of Hunan. As indicated above, in a note to the "Order to Seize the Niuhang Railway Station" of July 29, 1930, he was at this time the commander of the Fifty-second Brigade of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army.

2. Deng Ying was at this time the commander of the Thirteenth Division of the Nationalist army, and Ma Kun was the commander of the Thirty-fourth Brigade of the Twelfth Division of the Nineteenth Route Army. Apart from these bare facts, little is known about either of these men.

five o'clock, immediately after the units directly under the General Headquarters, reach Fenyi, and encamp in the vicinity.

4. The Third Army should send a force of column strength to Cihua to meet the personnel coming from the Yangzi Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, and the returning company that the Third Army had previously sent to Liuyang to escort the wounded. After they meet, they should come quickly to the vicinity of Futian, and all return to their units.

5. After setting out, we shall be traveling with the General Headquarters.

Addendum:

1. Along the way, all units should listen for news of the enemy's dispositions.

2. The location of all encampments along the way shall be determined by Commander Lin Biao of the Fourth Army.

3. After the advance units reach Futian, they should mount a surprise attack and take the city of Ji'an when the opportunity offers.

Order for the First Army Group to Attack Ji'an

(October 2, 1930, 8:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Futian)

1) Ji'an remains under the occupation of Deng Ying's forces. Ma Kun's battalion is still in Ganzhou and has not arrived in Ji['an].

2) This Army Group has decided to launch a general assault on the city of Ji'an at dawn on the 4th. It is scheduled to advance on the line of Baizitang, Sanjiaotang, and Huajia tomorrow (the 3rd), finish preparations, and wait for orders to attack the city of Ji'an. (Orders to attack and supplementary maps will be issued separately tomorrow.)

3) The Fourth Army should complete its departure from here (Futian) tomorrow morning at 6:00 o'clock, pass through Qinghu, Jiekaoxie, Qishanmiao, Huangluping, Cangkeng, Xin'an, Shentang, Zhoujiashan, and Sanheping, and take up quarters in the vicinity of Baizitang. Upon arrival at the place of encampment, officers should immediately be dispatched to reconnoiter the terrain near the Luozi Mountains outside the north gate of the city of Ji'an and prepare for the attack on the morning of the 4th.

4) The Twentieth Army should set out tomorrow morning from its current location (Nanyuan, also known as Linyuan), and advance toward the area of Hujia, Sanjiaotang, and Huajia to set up camp. Officers must be sent to reconnoiter the terrain on the line of the Zhenjun Mountains and the Tianhua Mountains west of the city of Ji'an, and prepare for the attack on the morning of the 4th.

5) The Third Column of the Third Army and the units directly attached to the General Headquarters should set off tomorrow morning (arising at 4:30) from here (Futian) at 5:30, pass through Junziting, Huyuan, Pantang, Jiangzishang, Fenggangqiao, and Tongshuping, and arrive near the front of the mountains to make camp (the place of encampment is to be designated by the adjutants of this Headquarters). The Third Column of the Third Army should also dispatch personnel to reconnoiter the terrain between the Tianhua Mountains and the Shen'gang Mountains, and the area around the southwest of the city, and prepare for the attack on the morning of the 4th.

6) The army headquarters of the Third Army and the First Column should hasten tomorrow (the 3rd) to encamp in the vicinity of Mawugang in front of Tongshuping, and prepare for the attack on the morning of the 4th.

7) The Twelfth Army should advance towards the Shen'gang Mountains tomorrow morning, watch for an opportunity to encamp, and prepare to attack towards the Shen'gang Mountains on the morning of the 4th. (Having accomplished this they are to attack the south gate along the river.)

8) During the advance, we shall be with the vanguard of the general headquarters.

Addendum:

1) After arriving at the place of encampment tomorrow, each unit must immediately prepare equipment for attacking the city.

2) After reconnoitering the terrain, each unit must sketch a rough map and submit it to headquarters.

3) Each unit must effectively cut the lines of communication.

4) Tomorrow each unit must find its own guides.

It is so ordered.

Team leader Chen Shuxiang

General Headquarters espionage team
Political Commissar Liu Guangwan
Deputy team leader Huang Zhijin

Communications team
Political Commissar Feng Wenbin
General Political Department, General Affairs chief He
Central Revolutionary Committee espionage team chief He Xinyun
Headquarters Adjutant Section, adjutant Liu Jinding

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De
and
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 150-51. It also appears in *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 171-72, under the title "Order for the First Army Group to Stand By to Attack Ji'an," where it is indicated that the text is reproduced from the original document in the Party archives. The two versions are virtually identical except that the names of the officers listed in this one before the signatures of Zhu and Mao are omitted from the other text.

Order for the First Army Group of the Red Army to Launch a General Assault on Ji'an

(October 3, 1930, 2:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Shanqian)

1) The enemy troops of Deng Ying (fewer than three regiments) are still strongly defending themselves with the help of fortifications in the suburbs of the city of Ji'an. Their position has been arranged along the line of the Luozi Mountains, the Zhenjun Mountains, the Tianhua Mountains, and Shen'gang Ridge.

2) This army group has the tasks of seizing Ji'an, destroying Deng Ying's troops, uniting the forces of the masses in southwest Jiangxi, advancing straight toward Nanchang and Jiujiang to establish political power in Jiangxi, blockading the Yangzi River, and attacking Nanjing and safeguarding the victory of the Wuhan uprising. It has been decided to launch a general assault on the city of Ji'an at dawn on the 4th, and to take the city of Ji'an before dawn on the 5th.

3) The Fourth Army constitutes the left flank, which is to attack the enemy position between the Luozi Mountains and the Zhenjun Mountains. With the road from Daxiaochang to Pantang as the demarcation line, the left side of the line (including the road) belongs to the Fourth Army and the right side of the line belongs to the Twentieth Army.

4) The Twentieth Army constitutes the main force, and is to launch feigned attacks against the enemy along the line of the Zhenjun Mountains and the Tianhua Mountains, establishing contact on the left with the Fourth Army and on the right with the Third Army. It will be under the orders of the commander of the Fourth Army, Lin Biao.

5) The Third Army (minus one column) and the Twelfth Army together constitute the right wing, and are to attack the enemy along the line of the Shen'gang Ridge and the Tianhua Mountains. With the road along the river and Taiping Bridge as the demarcation line, the area to the left belongs to the Third Army, and that to the right belongs to the Twelfth Army (not including the line). The Third Army is to secure contact to the right with the Twelfth Army and to the left with the Twentieth Army, and the Twelfth Army is to establish contact to the left with the Third Army.

Our source for this document is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 152–53. A less complete and less accurate version, reproduced from a collection published in China in 1980, appears in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 155–56.

6) After each army has successfully carried out the attack on enemy positions, a small portion of the forces should keep watch on the enemy inside the blockhouses, and the main forces should attack the city and cut off contact between the enemies inside the city and those on the front.

7) The army group has no general reserve units and all armies should prepare their own reserve forces.

8) We are now in the Shanqian General Headquarters. At dawn on the 4th, we shall be at the mouth of the the road near Datang (north of the Zhenjun Mountains), and on the afternoon of the 4th we shall move to the side of the river (south of the Tianhua Mountains).

Attention:

1. Each unit is to attack in the direction of the city immediately after storming the enemy positions. If there are still enemy fortifications around the city, then all surface features should be put to use, and simple bunkers should be constructed as support points, where an opportunity may be awaited to attack the city again.

2. At night all officers and soldiers attacking the city are to wear white towels or white handkerchiefs wrapped around their heads. The rest of the sentry signals, signal calls, and passwords will all be used according to the signals originally fixed by the staff office.

3. In attacking at night, bayonets should be used, so that soldiers need not open fire before enemy positions. Special attention should be paid so as not to get confused with one's own men.

4. After seizing an enemy position, a torch should be immediately raised as a signal.

5. At night, ditches should be used as much as possible to advance.

6. All troops attacking the city should go forward with all their might, and must pay no attention to the enemy's encirclement.

7. All units must strive to move forward at all times.

8. After entering the city, all officers and soldiers must strictly observe discipline, and must not take things arbitrarily.

9. After entering the city, it is forbidden to destroy communications equipment left in the city such as radios, telephones, electric lights, automobiles, and so on.

Commander-in-Chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

A Secret Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Carry Out Household by Household Inspections

(October 12, 1930, at 12:00 noon, in Ji'an City)

Although we have now captured this city, there are still reactionary armed forces, as well as the AB Corps of the local bullies and bad gentry, hiding in the vicinity of the city. In order to eliminate these reactionaries completely, it is hereby ordered that household by household inspections should be carried out this night (October 12). The arrangements are as follows:

1. Inspection time: All the inspection personnel involved must be in their positions by 2:30 A.M. this night (the 12th) [i.e., on the morning of the 13th]; the inspection will commence everywhere simultaneously at 3:30 A.M.

2. Partition of the inspection area (divided into 7 districts):

a. The city proper.

b. The area that lies north of Tianhou Temple and Laifu alley, south of Xixi Bridge, and east of South Lake Bridge and Salt Bridge and along the Rivulet.

c. The area that lies south of Tianhou Temple and Laifu Alley, north of Zhupai Alley and Bansu Alley, and east of Jingfu Bridge, Wangjia Bridge, and Xiao Bridge along the rivulet.

The abovementioned three districts are the responsibility of the Fourth Army, and constitute a single district.

d. The area that lies south of Zhupai Alley and Bansu Alley, and east of Xiao Bridge and Tiegou Bridge along the river, up to the vicinity of Malan Pagoda.

e. The area that lies west of Salt Bridge, Jingfu Bridge, Wangjia Bridge, and Xiao Bridge along the rivulet, and south of the Salt Bridge Electricity Bureau.

The above-mentioned two districts are the responsibility of the Third Army.

f. The area that lies north of the Salt Bridge Electricity Bureau, and west of Xixi Bridge, South Lake Bridge and Salt Bridge, up to the border of the city proper.

Our source for this document is the text in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 158–60. No earlier version appears to be available.

This district is the responsibility of one column of the Twelfth Army.

(The water craft on each segment of the river are to be dealt with by the army unit responsible for the district bordering it.)

3. Inspection personnel. Each inspection group, composed of one squad from the army, and personnel dispatched by the General Political Department of the Government of Jiangxi Province, shall inspect the households in the district assigned to it.

4. The targets of inspection:

Reactionaries and suspected persons.

Arms and military materials.

Reactionary documents.

5. Procedures

a. Vigilance should be exercised while the inspection is taking place:

Guards are to be posted by the Fourth Army at the entry to all roads at Sansi Shoal, North Gate Bridge, Tung Tree Stockade, XX and Long Pond. Traffic is to be cut off beginning at nightfall tonight.

b. Subdivision of the inspection area.

The terrain of each district should be reconnoitered by high-ranking officers sent out by the relevant division, who further subdivide the district into smaller areas and designate those units which are to be responsible for them.

c. Beginning the inspection.

All the teams sent out by each unit should arrive at the areas for which they are responsible by 2:30 A.M., wait until 3:30 A.M., and commence the inspection simultaneously.

6. Point for attention during the inspection:

No seizure of property is allowed. Upon completion of the inspection, the company commander and the political instructor of each company shall make a body search of their officers and soldiers.

Houses in which inspection has been completed should be marked "checked" with chalk on the door, in order to avoid repeated inspection.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Army Group of the Red Army to Move Its Forces to the North and Concentrate Them in Qingjiang

(October 13, 1930, 1:00 P.M.,
at General Headquarters in Ji'an City)

1. The main force of our enemy in Jiangxi Province, the troops of Lu Diping, is located near Nanchang; the main force of Deng Ying's troops is in Zhangshu, and Dai Yue's troops are in Gaoan. Our Third Army Group is in the region of Qingjiang and Sanhu.

2. Our army group has the mission of attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang, annihilating the enemy army of Lu Diping, seizing political power in the whole of Jiangxi Province, safeguarding the victory of the uprising in Wuhan to the left, and attacking Nanjing to the right, so as to promote a direct revolutionary [situation] in the whole country. We have decided to begin moving our forces northward tomorrow, and in four days' travel, by two routes, to arrive in the vicinity of Qingjiang and concentrate our forces.

3. The Third Army will take the left route, via Futian–Pengpo–Anhe–Pengjiazhou (cross the river to Luofang), and concentrate its forces in the vicinity of Shanqianjie.

The Fourth Army will take the right route, via Sanqutan–Xiajiang *xian*–Changpai–Jiefu, arriving in Qingjiang to concentrate its forces. The above two armies should set out from here (Ji'an) tomorrow morning (the 14th), and must arrive at their destinations by the 17th. (Marching plans are to be made independently.)

The Twelfth Army (minus the Second Column) and all organs of units directly attached to General Headquarters will set out on the right route, following the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, on the morning of the day after tomorrow (the 15th). The intention is to spend the night at Sanqutan on the first day, to stop in Xiajiang *xian* on the second day, to reach the vicinity of Changpai and Jiefu on the third day, and to arrive at the *xian* seat of Qingjiang on the fourth day (times of departure will be communicated separately by the Staff Office). The Second Column of the Twelfth Army will cross the river from Jishui to Sanqutan on the west bank on the 15th, and march ahead of General

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 161–62.

Headquarters and the Twelfth Army. The Twentieth Army will follow behind.

4. During the march, our position will be that of General Headquarters.

Addendum: General Headquarters of the Third Army is in charge of allocating areas of encampment at Qingjiang.

It is so ordered.

Acting brigade leader of the transportation brigade of General Headquarters Huang Zhijin

Brigade leader of the engineering brigade of General Headquarters Yang Zaikui

Director of the general affairs office of the General Political Department He Ducai

Leader of the espionage team of General Headquarters Wang Jie

Leader of the espionage team of the Front Committee He Jinliang

Adjutant of General Headquarters Liu Jinding

Commander-in-chief Zhu De

Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Letter to the Central Committee

(October 14, 1930, at night, in the city of Ji'an)

To the Southern Bureau, for transmission to the Central Committee:

1. I expect you have already received the letter sent on September 17th from the Front Committee of the First Army Group in Liling to the Central Committee via the Hunan Provincial Committee and the West Fujian Special Committee, and the letter sent on September 26th from the Front Committee of the First Front Army in Anyuan to the Central Committee via the Hunan Provincial Committee, which recounted the course of the attack on Changsha, together with our assessment of the situation, and plans for action. On the way from Anyuan to Yuanzhou, we have conducted a few more discussions regarding problems of the actions [to be taken], and have once again determined that [the goal of] our current actions is to seize political power in Jiangxi, to occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad and attack Nanchang and Jiujiang, and then to blockade the Yangzi River, to attack Nanjing on the right, and to guarantee victory in Wuhan on the left. Just as we were all packed up and about to set out from Yuanzhou, Comrade Zhou Yili, who had been sent by the Yangzi Bureau, arrived there. After hearing Comrade Zhou's report, we had another detailed discussion that resulted once more in the decision to seize political power in Jiangxi. The First Army Group is to attack and take Ji'an within a very short time, establish the Soviet Government of Jiangxi Province, recruit new soldiers, procure provisions, and so on. For its part, the Third Army Group is to occupy the *xian* seat of Qingjiang and its vicinity, blockade the Gan River, procure funds, mobilize the masses, reorganize and replenish its ranks, and so on.

2. The entire First Army Group reached the vicinity of Ji'an on October 3rd, and before dawn on October 4th, with the collaboration of over 100,000 of the masses from western Jiangxi Province, it began to attack Ji'an. The forces besieged in the city of Ji'an—Deng Ying's troops, a brigade of Jiangxi Provincial police, and others—amounting to approximately four brigades, retreated that same evening under cover of night, and our army broke through the barbed wire fence that evening and entered the city. As a result, we failed to wipe out the enemy and capture their arms, and this is most regrettable. Although from a military point of view, the victory of the Ji'an uprising on this occasion did not

Our source for this letter is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 163–66. No other version appears to be available.

lead to the destruction of the main force of the enemy army or to the capture of a large quantity of guns (we did, however, seize over a hundred guns in the river), from a political point of view the achievements were nevertheless not inconsiderable. The victory of the Ji'an uprising undoubtedly marks the final destruction of rule by the despotic gentry, the warlords, and the Guomindang in southwest Jiangxi, the completion of a local uprising in southwest Jiangxi, the beginning of initial victory in the whole of Jiangxi Province, and an excellent occasion for the bold expansion of the Red Army. The first day we entered the city, the Revolutionary Committee of Chinese Workers and Peasants put up posters promulgating the significance of the victory of the Ji'an uprising. As regards the tasks of the revolutionary masses in Jiangxi Province, more than ten provisional regulations were promulgated by the Southwest Jiangxi Soviet Government (the content is to call upon the masses to eliminate the reactionaries and so on). The Southwest Jiangxi Soviet Government also issued regulations for the enforcement of martial law. Plans to pursue the retreating enemy were also immediately discussed, and troops were sent out immediately to pursue the enemy along the two routes of the Jishui and the Xiajiang. As for procuring funds, the Financial Administration Committee of the Southwest Jiangxi Soviet Government was put in charge. Positions were filled equally by personnel from the General Political Department of the First Front Army and personnel from the local governments. The method employed for procurement is that, based on investigation by the Financial Administration Committee, stores with assets in excess of 2000 *yuan* are enlisted for contribution, the amount based on their progressive taxes (those with assets of less than 2000 *yuan* are exempt). The total amount of the procurement will be over 600,000 *yuan* (however, it cannot all be collected quickly, and to date, only 240,000 *yuan* have been received). Regarding the elimination of the reactionaries, relatively comprehensive work has been done this time, and no reactionaries hanging around in the town of Ji'an have been able to flee, although they haven't all been completely rooted out so far. Now we are still actively mobilizing urban workers to carry out this task.

3. As for the establishment of the Soviet Government of Jiangxi Province, the General Front Committee convened an enlarged session of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee to decide on a list of names, which was then approved by a mass meeting. There were fifty-three nominees in all, including local revolutionary leaders as well as those from the Red Army, and leaders of the Ji'an workers (relatively few leaders of the workers of Jingdezhen and Jiujiang, and revolutionary leaders from Northeast Jiangxi are included, for we are less familiar with them). The Provincial Soviet was already established on October 7th, and various resolutions were passed by the meeting, including the following: (1) Launch attacks on Nanchang and Jiujiang, (2) Enlarge the Red Army to 1,000,000. (3) Resolutely oppose the rich peasants, and guarantee the success of land redistribution. The following documents were issued: (1) A letter to the Soviet Union. (2) A letter to the proletariat of the whole world. (3) A letter to the revolutionary

masses of the whole country about striving for the victory of the revolution throughout the country. Moreover, in response to instructions in the letter of August 29th from the Central Committee for us to issue a proclamation to those outside [the Party], the Government issued another proclamation, announcing its establishment, and proclaiming thirteen articles of its political program. We are sending a clean copy of each of these documents upward [to the Central Committee]. Please let us know your directives. (Note:[1] only the letter regarding resolutely launching attacks on Nanchang and Jiujiang and the proposal to all revolutionary masses in the country to strive for the nationwide victory of the revolution were received.)

4. As for the arrangement of the work in the province after the Ji'an uprising, the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, made up of Comrade Li Wenlin and 12 other people, set up at an enlarged session convened by the General Front Committee, with the participation of local Party branches, will deal with this. It has been decided to establish West Jiangxi, South Jiangxi, East Jiangxi, Northeast Jiangxi, and Northwest Jiangxi action committees. The Provincial Action Committee and the Provincial Soviet will advance northward with the army. In addition to the action committee within the Party in west Jiangxi, a west Jiangxi office of the Provincial Soviet has also been set up to direct the work in Jiangxi. For the purpose of rooting out residual counterrevolutionary forces, continuing to recruit new soldiers, and so on, about 200 additional people have been organized to go northward to carry out this work, and to cooperate with the Red Army in its uprising.

5. Recently the entire Party in southwest Jiangxi has been showing signs of a very serious crisis. The entire Party leadership is dominated by the rich peasants' line, and the slogan about transforming the consciousness of the peasants is being exploited by the rich peasants and landlords to oppose the poor peasants and farm laborers, or even to undermine the trend of equal land distribution in southwest Jiangxi. A large number of AB Corps members have been found in the organs of the Special Committees of both the Party and the Youth League, the Soviet Government of southwest Jiangxi, and the Red Army School respectively. A majority of the leading organs at all levels, both internal and external, are leading organs filled with AB Corps members and rich peasants. Thus, the equal distribution of land means merely "taking from the plentiful to make up for the scarce," but not "taking from the fat to make up for the lean."[2] As a result, the rich peasants have obtained good land, and the farm laborers and poor peasants remain oppressed. So the land is being redistributed once again, to serve the

1. In the Chinese text, this note is attributed to *xin* ("heart"). We do not know whether this is a code word for the Central Committee, the Yangzi Bureau, or some other editor.

2. As indicated above, in a note to the land law of August 1930, Mao himself had only very recently discovered this second principle. In February 1930 he had called only for quantitative redistribution.

interests of the farm laborers and poor peasants, to repress the rich peasants, to eliminate rich peasant leadership, and to get rid of the AB Corps. Without a basic transformation of the Party in southwest Jiangxi, this crisis can assuredly not be overcome. At present the General Front Committee is engaged in planning this work but, because of obstacles to our action, the task may not be accomplished very well. The Central Committee must pay careful attention to this matter, and offer assistance.

6. The Twentieth Army in west Jiangxi has recruited over 3,000 men, with more than 1,700 guns. Recently, the Twenty-second Army in south Jiangxi has also developed substantially. We are preparing to have the whole Twentieth Army work in Ji'an for a short time before advancing northward. The Twenty-second Army will attack Ganzhou, or make arrangements for an uprising in Ganzhou, and then proceed northward.

7. This time, while we were in Ji'an, we enlisted 8,000 new soldiers. This reinforcement is far from adequate, and because the local party branches are carrying out a rich peasant line, the number previously set cannot be achieved. This problem is extremely serious. After our departure, we left an office in Ji'an to continue enlisting new soldiers. It is predicted that by the end of this year, at least twenty independent regiments can be recruited to send to the front. This plan is closely linked to correct leadership by the Party in southwest Jiangxi. This goal can be realized only after the Party in southern Jiangxi has undergone a transformation.

8. We are convinced by experience that the more imminent the decisive battle between the classes, the more indispensable is preparation in terms of military technology. Because there was no one to use the radios captured during the occupation of Changsha by the Third Army Group and during the attacks on Ji'an by the First Army Group, we have lost numerous opportunities to wipe out the enemy. In addition, we must request the Central Committee to give us assistance in obtaining military equipment and trained personnel for items such as guns to shoot to high altitudes (used against airplanes), cannons, poisonous gases and masks against them, and so on, for only thus can we successfully prepare for this decisive class war against the imperialists and the Nationalist warlords.

9. The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee in June and the letter from the Central Committee to the Front Committee of the Fourth Army were not received until recently.[3] We have discussed them in detail, together with the political report presented by Comrade Zhou,[4] and the letter from the

3. The reference is to the resolution of June 11, which constitutes the fullest and most extreme expression of the Li Lisan Line, and the letter of June 15, 1930, to the Fourth Army. For summaries of these two documents, see above, the Introduction to this volume.

4. The reference must be to Zhou Enlai's report to the Politburo on August 22 and 24, 1930, immediately after his return from Moscow. For a summary of the report and the discussion which followed it, see Jin Chongji, *Zhou Enlai*, pp. 219–20.

Central Committee dated August 29th.[5] We consider that all the instructions from the Central Committee are completely correct, and we accept them all.[6] Decisions (which will be sent in a few days) have already been made to carry them out. We have also read lately, in the Western Fujian *Red Report*, the recent declaration of the Central Committee. The Front Committee considers that the twenty-nine political principles put forward by the Central Committee are entirely correct and will carry them out immediately.[7]

10. The Third and Fourth Armies of the First Army Group set out from Ji'an today. General Headquarters and the Twelfth Army will have completed their departure tomorrow. They can be expected to arrive at Qingjiang by October 18th, where they will be joined by the Fifth and Eighth Armies, seize the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad, and launch an attack on Nanchang. In that area, there will be a great decisive battle.

11. As regards fund-raising by the Central Committee, we have decided to pay 100,000 *yuan* in gold and 50,000 *yuan* by cash remittance.

General Secretary of the Front Committee of
the First Army of the Red Army Mao Zedong

5. The full text of this letter, addressed to the Yangzi Bureau, for transmittal to the Hunan Provincial Committee, does not appear to be available. For a summary of the contents, see *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, p. 286.

6. This statement is perplexing, to say the least. The first two documents Mao mentions, the resolution of June 11 and the letter of June 15, are marked by unqualified optimism and radicalism. In them, Mao's tactics of creating base areas are stigmatized as entirely erroneous, and there is a call for an offensive against Wuhan, to take advantage of the crisis of world capitalism, and achieve rapid victory. Zhou Enlai's report of August 22–24, and the letter of August 29, marked the first stage in Zhou's efforts, following the instructions which he had received in Moscow, to rein in Li Lisan's revolutionary extravagance. In them, Li's previous condemnation of establishing bases as a conservative tactic is explicitly condemned, and it is laid down that for the time being, an attack against Wuhan would be premature. These two pairs of documents were not totally contradictory, but it is hard to understand how Mao could regard all four of them as "completely correct." Perhaps this should be taken as one more instance of Mao's skill at understanding only those aspects of the documents he received which it suited his purposes to understand.

7. The reference is to the declaration issued by the Central Committee on August 14, and published in *Hongqi ribao* on the following day. (For the text, see *Central Committee Documents*, 1930, pp. 250–65.) The twenty-nine points listed in paragraph 5 of this document, under the heading "The Demands of the Chinese Revolution," range from overthrowing imperialism and the Guomindang, establishing a nationwide soviet government, and repudiating unequal treaties to creating peasant cooperatives, establishing equality between men and women, and instituting free public education.

Letter to the Eastern Hunan Special Committee

(October 19, 1930)

To the Eastern Hunan Special Committee:

Your letter of September has been received today at Xiajiang.[1] In all, we have received three letters from you dated prior to September. We made a general reply on the 15th, and hope that you will have received that letter.[2]

Your September letter says that the Central Committee, the provincial committee, and the Yangzi Bureau all sent us letters which were delivered to us. But we have not received them to date, and do not know where they were sent from and went astray.[3] We are most concerned. If you have kept copies, we hope you will copy them again and send them to us as soon as possible.

As for the problem of new soldiers, it would be best if you could send five thousand by the end of this month. We hope that you will step up your efforts at propaganda and agitation, so as to recruit this number of new soldiers or even more. As regards the method of transportation, you should also correspond with the office of the Revolutionary Committee of the Workers and Peasants in Ji'an. We have set up an office in Ji'an, with Mao Zetan as the director and Wan as his deputy. Internally, a Committee of the Rear has been established with Mao Zetan as secretary. The task of the Committee of the Rear is to recruit and transfer new soldiers and to make clothes. You should correspond with the Committee of the Rear concerning the issue of sending new soldiers.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 157–58, where the text is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1981. The letter can also be found in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 169–70.

1. The reference may be to a missive accompanying the text of a letter from the Central Committee dated September 4, which had been sent to the Yangzi Bureau with the request that it be transmitted to the Front Committee. This letter indicated that, if it had proved impossible to carry out the plans outlined in the Central Committee's directive of August 29 for taking Changsha and destroying He Jian's main force, the Red Army could turn toward Jiangxi and develop its action there. (See the summary in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 287–88.)

2. The reference is probably to the letter to the Central Committee translated above, written on the night of October 14.

3. As indicated above, in the Introduction to this volume, Zhou Yili, the emissary of the Yangzi Bureau, had brought to Mao and Zhu on September 29 the letter of August 29 from the Central Committee ordering a renewed attack on Changsha. Thus Mao and his comrades had in fact received at least one letter from higher Party authorities "dated prior to September," but no information is available about the other two letters which had "gone astray."

The General Front Committee arrived at Xiajiang on the 17th of this month, held a plenary meeting here, and adopted resolutions on the assessment of the situation, the question of action, the land question, and the question of capital. As regards the situation, we believe that the chaotic fighting among the warlords of the ruling class will definitely not subside or stop for the time being, but it will also not continue to expand to the extreme. This is to say that under the increasingly tense conditions of the Chinese revolutionary situation, all factions of the reactionary ruling class feel the necessity for a reformist political program. But the question of the leadership of this reformist political régime certainly cannot be resolved by peaceful means. In the near future, a warlord war will undoubtedly break out cruelly. But on the other hand, we should never depart from class analysis and believe that the fighting of the warlords will expand further and continue to the end. It should be understood that when class contradictions surpass the internal contradictions of the ruling class, the reactionary ruling class will inevitably unite to attack the revolution. But we must absolutely not give way to pessimism, because this is a manifestation of the revolutionary high tide. Therefore, our task is to win initial victory in one province, continue to develop and expand such victories, and break through and destroy the allied offensives of the reactionaries before the ruling class settles the issue of the leadership of the reform. Our action at present is to go forward and occupy the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad, attack Nanchang and Jiujiang, and annihilate the enemy. The whole army group is scheduled to set out from Xiajiang tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and advance toward the Nanchang-Jiujiang railroad. As regards the land question, we maintain that complete and equal redistribution must be carried out, and that this is the only correct policy. Only by confiscating everything and redistributing it equally can the broad masses of poor peasants be won over, feudal exploitation be overthrown completely, and a future advance toward the victory of socialism be guaranteed. As for the problem of capital, we hold that it is wrong at present to confiscate all factories and shops unconditionally. We should confiscate the shops of counterrevolutionaries, and the factories and shops of warlords and bureaucratic capital. In dealing with capital that does not violate the labor laws of the soviet régime, we should use the method of workers supervising capital to restrict it and overcome its plots and conspiracies (transferring capital, going slow, and not fulfilling orders). These are a few simple words of explanation. For a detailed explanation, please consult the letter of Comrade Zhou Yili, representative of the Yangzi Bureau.[4]

Secretary of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army

Mao Zedong

Xiajiang *xian*, on the night of October 19.

4. For the text of this letter, likewise dated October 19, 1930, see *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, pp. 171–73.

Resolution on the Land Problem of the Joint Conference of the General Front Committee and the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee

(October 19, 1930)[1]

1. The Land Problem Is the Main Content of the Chinese Revolution at Present

The present democratic stage of the revolution consists mainly in opposition to the feudal forces. The land revolution thoroughly destroys the economic basis of feudalism. We must make the land revolution penetrate deeply, for only thus will it be possible to eliminate the domination of the warlord system and of imperialism, only thus can the broad masses of the bitterly poor peasantry be liberated, only thus will the proletariat be able to draw the hundreds of millions of bitterly poor peasant masses into a solid alliance, and win victory for the Chinese revolution. The Red Army was born from the struggles of the land revolution, and it will assuredly assume responsibility for the whole of the proletarian revolution, but if at present it becomes divorced from the land revolution, to the point of

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 9, pp. 333–45, where the text is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1981. It also appears in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 174–84.

1. In the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, this text is dated October 19; in the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, it is dated simply October. The "joint conference" mentioned in the title took place from October 25 to November 1, 1930. (See the note to the text of October 26, 1930.) It was preceded by a conference of the Front Committee alone, convened by Mao on October 17. This gathering adopted resolutions on several of the same topics discussed at the joint conference, and a chronology in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, p. 292, indicates that the line taken on the peasant question was entirely in harmony with the text translated here. A plausible explanation for the problem of the date is therefore that the present text was adopted on October 17, issued on October 19, and then laid before the joint conference the following week in the same or very similar form. In any case, one of Mao's primary concerns in October 1930 was to justify his own line regarding the land problem. This accounts for the very sharp attacks on the Party organs in southwestern Jiangxi, which were dominated by Li Lisan's supporters. The statement, in section 2 of this resolution, that two-thirds of their leading personnel are members of the AB or Anti-Bolshevik Corps marks a further escalation of the conflict. (On the AB Corps and the political context in general see above, the Introduction to this volume.)

neglecting the correct implementation of the land revolution, it will no longer be the Red Army, and it will be even more difficult to enlarge the Red Army and to create a Red Army of steel. It is only the liquidationists who, lacking a basic understanding of the antifeudal forces, would want to discard the land revolution.

2. The Crisis in Revolutionary Work

The present soviet districts include many places where the insurrections are not yet complete or which can only be occupied temporarily by guerrilla actions. In southeastern Hubei, even today, we do not have a single *xian* town, and the phenomenon of opposing White and Red forces is a serious situation everywhere. Not only is this true, but there are even many Red districts in which the masses are revolutionary today and defect tomorrow. In the soviet district of eastern Hubei, the Reorganization Clique has developed in a big way, and has put down the uprising. In southwestern Jiangxi, the AB Corps has filled the special committees of both the Party and Youth League, to the point that two-thirds of the personnel of the leading organs of the southwestern Jiangxi soviet government and of the technical workers are AB Corps elements. All levels of the Party and Youth League and soviets, and even the Red Army schools, the Red Guards, and the Red postal service, are filled with the organizations of the AB Corps, carrying out assassinations, preparing to make contact with the army of Deng Ying, and plotting a revolt to eliminate the soviets and the various revolutionary organizations—these problems have become so serious that they merit the close scrutiny of every one of our comrades. We must analyze the origins of these crises and resolutely overcome them. The major causes of these crises are the rich peasant line and opportunism within the land revolution.

3. The Rich Peasant Line and Opportunism Within the Land Revolution

A. Dividing the Land and Not Dividing the Land

The facts have taught us that wherever the land is really divided equally, it is possible to arouse the broad popular masses and firmly establish a revolutionary base. In most cases, it is possible to complete the local uprisings, as in western Fujian and in such *xian* as Yongxin and Xingguo (the second time was more thorough). Whenever the mistake is made of following the rich peasant line and not dividing the land, not only are the local uprisings not completed but it is even impossible to eliminate the opposition between White and Red. In Guangji, in eastern Hubei, the land has not been divided, and the Communist Party and local bullies peacefully coexist in the revolutionary district, with the result that as soon as the White terror arrives, the defections are really terrible. In Anfu, rich peasant elements saw to it that the land was not divided, with the result that most people defected, bringing about a grave betrayal of the revolution. In only two

districts, District One and District Three, which were close to and influenced by the land division at Yongxin and did divide the land, did the peasants stoutly resist the counterrevolutionary attacks. In those places in Yongxin and Xiajiang *xian* where the land was completely divided, there are very few from the AB Corps. In Taihe, Xingguo, Jishui, and even in Dayi and Yangxin of the Longxian district of eastern Hubei, wherever the land was not divided completely, if it didn't give rise to a serious AB Corps, then the Reorganization Clique emerged; wherever the land was divided completely, large Red Armies were formed, as in Yongxin, otherwise they could not be mobilized. Why is it that not completely dividing the land equally is so serious? Because the main policy of the antifeudal forces is the land revolution. At present the land revolution must divide the land, and divide it equally and quickly. Only in the struggle to divide the land truly equally can the feudal forces be completely eliminated, and a revolutionary base be established. But how is our land revolution carried out? Brandishing the Red flag, and not dividing the land for three years, for one year, for half a year, is a more or less universal phenomenon in the Red districts of southwestern Jiangxi, of the East River area, of eastern Hubei, of western Hubei, of western Hunan, and even of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. A large number of Red Army and guerrilla units have not paid attention to this problem. This is not just opportunism, it is quite simply the landlord line. By not standing on the side of the poor suffering peasants and representing their desire to divide the land, such failure to divide the land in reality preserves the landlord system. They even go so far as to use the excuses that there must be a detailed investigation with full statistics, that the land that has been planted with young rice plants cannot be divided, and that if it is divided, then the peasant who originally planted it should receive two-thirds of the grain, and the poor peasant who has been given the field should receive one-third, the two and one split (as in Daye). Or they just allocate a bit of the land any old way (in part of Yangxin), or carry out only drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, but not drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. Wherever such rich peasant lines as these exist, they are an obstacle to the progress of the land revolution. Thus, not only can the broad masses of the impoverished peasants not be mobilized to complete the local uprising but also, when the land revolution makes the despotic gentry and landlords run away, eliminates high rents and heavy interest rates, and does away with harsh fees and miscellaneous taxes, if the land is not completely redistributed, in reality those who profit the most are just the rich peasants. Consequently, it is impossible to promote class confrontation between the broad masses of the bitterly poor peasants and the rich peasants, and impossible to establish the revolutionary authority of the poor suffering peasant masses, recognize the true face of the vicious plots of the rich peasants, and suppress the reactionary actions of the rich peasants. On the contrary, the right to lead the land revolution is taken over by the rich peasants. The rich peasants take over the soviets, the Red Guards, and the Party, and use them for the interests of the rich peasant class, to oppress the poor

peasants, and then go on to organize the AB Corps, the Reorganization Clique, and the Third Party, to put down the uprisings and betray the revolution. This is precisely the main root cause for not dividing the land equally and resolutely opposing the rich peasants, thus leaving behind a foundation for the activities of the counterrevolutionaries, and of the serious crises that have occurred in the soviet districts.

B. The Opportunist Line

Formulations of the rich peasant line mentioned above, such as the "land allocation method" or the "two and one split," are clearly and obviously proposals of the rich peasants for obstructing the land revolution, and could have been rejected. But because the Party itself fell prey to the formulas of the opportunist line and rationalized them—a very subtle rich peasant line—it not only could not reject these rich peasant proposals but, on the contrary, lent its assistance to developing the proposals of the rich peasants. What kind of opportunist line is this? It makes use of the argument that dividing the land corresponds to peasant consciousness to oppose dividing the land equally. Dividing the land [they argue] is a capitalist fantasy that goes against the socialist future. If you divide the land, this will contribute to the concept of private ownership among the peasantry and is incompatible with the objectives of communism. Therefore, do not put forward the proposal to divide the land or listen to peasant self-determination. Using developing production as their argument, they oppose dividing equally according to population and propose using the criterion of labor power in distributing the land. Using the principle of the democratic stage of the revolution, they oppose all confiscation, because any confiscation would threaten the middle peasant. If these arguments do not come from those who consciously stand on the right (the rich peasant elements in the villages who use the excuse that the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party criticized equal distribution as a petty bourgeois fantasy to oppose equal distribution), then they are empty theoretical speculations that ignore reality. These empty unrealistic speculations seem on the surface to be an ultraleftist defense of socialism, but in reality, being rationalizations for the rich peasants, they constitute the ultrarightist rich peasant line.

C. The Roots of the Errors of This Line

They lie in not understanding that, in China, with its backward semifeudal agricultural economy, the land revolution must go through the process of redistribution, that the Chinese agricultural economy is mainly a small peasant economy, and that whether farmed by tenant farmers or by those who own the land themselves, it is cut up into extremely small economic units and tilled by peasant masses of several hundred millions using Chinese plows. There is virtually no (European-style) landlord economy, and capitalist-type farms are few indeed. It is for this reason that the land revolution does not immediately join all these very small economic units together to carry out socialist collective farm production.

Economic conditions do not allow this, and consequently it must be recognized that when the land revolution begins, the small peasant economy will still be the main form of production, and that the land must be redistributed to the peasants. Furthermore, because those among the peasant masses who have no land or very little land everywhere constitute the vast majority in the countryside, in the south over 70 percent, when the movement for land revolution begins, this kind of redistribution must start with complete confiscation and equal redistribution. Only this will satisfy the needs of the masses. Therefore, the last congress[2] already pointed out that in those places where there were a lot of unemployed and poor suffering peasants, it was necessary to have a movement to "divide the land equally," and that when this slogan was supported by the majority of the peasant masses, the Communist Party should defend it, because this is a slogan for thoroughly eliminating all vestiges of feudalism, and also directly undermines private ownership. All this was resolved theoretically long ago. The Chinese land revolution has already been in progress for two or three years, and we should make further use of the actual lessons of these two or three years to understand this problem.

In fact, so long as the peasants do not rise up and divide the land, things can remain like this, but when they do rise up they will everywhere demand that it be divided equally.

In fact, it is not enough just to confiscate the land of the landlords, it is essential to confiscate all the land even of the rich peasants, because the amount of land they hold, in the various southern provinces, is barely less that of the landlords, and furthermore, most of it is very fertile land. If it is not totally confiscated it is not possible to satisfy the demands of the broad masses of bitterly poor peasants. Thus, in the Northern Route area of Xiajiang and Ji'an, the land was divided several times, but it was only when, finally, all the rich peasant lands had been confiscated and there was an equal distribution that it could be considered completed. In fact, it is a characteristic of the Chinese rich peasant that he engages in severe semifeudal exploitation, no different from the landlord class. From their first cunning tricks until their betrayal is crushed, from beginning to end, they are counterrevolutionary. Unless the land is divided equally, it is impossible from the very beginning to separate a village along a class line of fire in which the impoverished peasant masses are opposed to the rich peasant class, and there is no way to set up a leadership of farm laborers to suppress the reaction of the rich peasants. Any so-called firm opposition to the rich peasants that does not confiscate their land is just empty talk. The fact is that the masses are already marching forward, and that they want everything to be confiscated, while the Party is still mired in the principle of the democratic stage, confiscating only the land of the landlord class, not daring to suggest confiscating everything. But the masses are already confiscating everything, so the Party also says that when the masses demand that everything be confiscated, the Party should not

2. I.e., the Sixth Congress of June 1928.

oppose it. How liquidationist this is, not even grasping the tail, just letting the rich peasants lead without fighting for the more than 70 percent constituted by the impoverished peasant masses. In fact, not only will complete confiscation not upset the middle peasants but most of the middle peasants will, on the contrary, receive a share of the land to be divided, as was the case in the Xingguo Tenth District. Although in some places a small number of the middle peasants will inevitably have to give up a little bit, in the face of the revolutionary prestige of the broad masses of the bitterly poor peasants who want to confiscate everything, the middle peasants will feel that all oppressive exploitation has already been eliminated, that the rich peasants can do nothing, much less the landlords, that everyone is equal, and that giving up a little bit is right (as with the middle peasants of Jinjiang in Yangxin *xian*). In other words, it is only the great authority possessed by the impoverished peasant masses that can lay hold of the middle peasants under the conditions of mounting a fierce attack on the landlords, and it is only dividing the land equally that is the best technique for doing so. If the bitterly poor peasant masses are still eking out a living under the rich peasants, and the rich peasants can still exercise power over them, you cannot even think of forming or consolidating an alliance with the middle peasants.

In fact, there are at least two kinds of so-called peasant consciousness: rich peasant consciousness and poor peasant consciousness. Rich peasant consciousness advocates not dividing, while the poor peasants demand dividing equally. To say that dividing the land equally corresponds to peasant consciousness, and that if you want to oppose peasant consciousness, just don't divide the land, is precisely to oppose poor peasant consciousness and to represent rich peasant consciousness. Dividing the land equally is, of course, not socialist consciousness, but at present it truly plays a great revolutionary role and is historically significant in shattering the feudal system and in moving toward socialism. In the past, the Russian Mensheviks criticized Lenin for advocating equal land distribution, saying that this went against socialism. Lenin replied, "Equal distribution has an historical revolutionary role to play that the Mensheviks do not understand." The Sixth Congress pointed out that equal distribution is a petty bourgeois fantasy of socialism that must be criticized by the Party, but it definitely did not reject equal distribution, or oppose it. The Sixth Congress put it very clearly: "We should support the slogan of equal distribution of land but should also criticize it . . . in order to make the peasants understand fully that under the present capitalist system true peace is absolutely impossible. Only after the victory of the proletariat will true socialist reconstruction be possible."[3] This means

3. This is a quotation from the "Resolution on the Peasant Question" adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on July 9, 1928. For a nearly complete translation of this document, see Saich, *Rise to Power*, Doc. C.12, pp. 369-76. Mao's citation is accurate, except that equality (*pingdeng*) has been replaced by peace (*heping*) in the statement ". . . under the present capitalist system true equality is absolutely impossible." This must be a copyist's error.

that the job of equal distribution must be done, while at the same time it is necessary to do the job of criticism. The opportunist gentlemen just sit there wasting their breath criticizing. Since they have not yet carried out equal distribution, what are they are criticizing? As for the opposition to expanding the Red Army, the opposition to expanding outward, and the failure to concentrate military forces, all these are the rich peasant ideology. It is the poor peasants who are thoroughly toppling the feudal forces, who are actively expanding outward. At present, to smash conservative ideas, we must concentrate on "opposing rich peasant consciousness"; we definitely cannot sweepingly oppose peasant consciousness and suppress that part of the consciousness of the poor peasants that is very revolutionary (dividing the land equally and opposing the rich peasants). Of course, the Communist Party must establish the leadership of proletarian consciousness (such as criticizing equal distribution) and cannot become bogged down in poor peasant ideology.

In fact, using the so-called development of production and labor power as the criteria for distributing the land is precisely the demand of the rich peasants. The rich peasants count farm implements, fertilizer, seed, and ox power as labor power, and it is only the rich peasants who have the most labor power, who have the best conditions for developing production. The rich peasants say that the poor peasants don't have anything, that if they are given more fields they will lie idle, and therefore the rich peasants use the revolutionary placard of developing production best to obtain a lot of land, while the poor peasants, who are most urgently in need of land, are still unable to solve the problem of a shortage of land. Furthermore, using labor power as a criterion permits not counting capital, but the elderly, the young, and women, having little or no labor power, would be given little of the land distributed. But they certainly do not consume less, and at times they even have to hire peasants to till the fields, and even though they don't have enough to eat they have to pay the wages. How are they to maintain their livelihoods? In the present struggle developing production is not the main thing; only winning over the popular masses is an urgent necessity. It is only by arousing the broad poor peasant masses, thoroughly overthrowing the feudal forces, and winning victory for the revolution nationwide that we can talk about developing production. In reality, the poor peasants divide the land in order to eat. When the entire labor power of a family, male and female, young and old, is used on the land, not only does the land not lie idle but its productivity is already increased—as proved by the harvest this year in western Fujian, which was 20 percent higher than before the revolution.

In fact, when concrete proposals for confiscating and distributing the land are not put forward, in accordance with what is called letting the masses decide, the result usually is that they are manipulated by the rich peasants, and not only is the land not divided equally, it is not even divided at all. This was the case in Anfu. What is called letting the masses decide means to accept the correct demands of the masses. Everywhere the masses have already de-

manded confiscation of all the land and its equal redistribution. Thus the Party should firmly suggest confiscating all the land and dividing it equally, and see to it that the broad popular masses get resolute leadership, and the rich peasants are not able to carry out their cheating schemes. The Communist Party no longer has any reason to say that distributing the land is not an ultimate objective of the Communist Party, and just sit back and let the peasants divide it. If we do not come out and actively assume the leadership of this present great struggle then, as in the past, we'll just be playing a passive role.

The facts listed above teach us that we should recognize the land problem. The Central Committee instructs us to confiscate according to the principle of the democratic stage, that confiscating from the rich peasants is political, that when the poor peasant masses demand confiscation of all the land, then of course all the land will be confiscated. Regarding redistribution, two methods are also proposed, dividing equally according to population, and division according to labor power. This means working flexibly according to the actual facts of different locations. At present, the facts everywhere teach us to demand complete confiscation and equal distribution. Thus, from among the two methods proposed by the Central Committee, we should select one realistic task. This is the only way to implement the Central Committee line flexibly and correctly. Those who say that confiscating everything and dividing equally is a peasant ideology contrary to the Central Committee directives do not misunderstand the directives of the Central Committee; they purposely give them a distorted interpretation to bolster the rich peasants.

4. The Persistent Historical Development of Opportunism Regarding the Land Problem

In regard to the land problem, the Communist Party has persistently committed the error of the opportunist line. Before the great revolution, the land problem was never raised within the Party. During the period of the great revolution, when the peasant movement of Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong entered a high tide of dividing the land equally, not only was the Party unable to offer a correct proposal in regard to the land problem, it simply cursed the peasant movement for being excessive. During the Nanchang uprising, knowing that the land revolution was very serious, it still fell into the pit of opportunism and said not to confiscate the land of small landlords who had less than 50 *mu*. This was one grave reason for the failure of the Great Revolution. During the period of adventurism, it engaged in peasant uprisings, but never paid attention to solving the land problem. The Sixth Congress pointed out that the land revolution is the main content of the Chinese revolution, and that we should confiscate the land of the landlord class and support distributing it equally. When the time came to carry out this policy, however, many soviet districts once again followed a grave rich peasant line, and if they divided the land at all they did not divide it

thoroughly. And today the broad masses of impoverished peasants have already demanded that all land be confiscated, while we are still saying that this violates the principle of the democratic stage and are still arguing with the masses, putting the popular masses in last place. This cannot even cut off the tip of the tail of opportunism. If we do not resolutely propose confiscating all the land and redistributing it equally, we will not be able to lead the high tide of the peasants' agrarian revolution and establish a strong alliance with the proletariat. The consequence is the phenomenon prevailing today: the slow development of the Red districts, a serious stand-off between the Red and White masses in the soviet border areas, the shrinking of the Red districts and the defection of the masses, and the inability to enlarge the Red Army aggressively. It can be seen that this once again threatens to render the Chinese revolution abortive. Thus the present struggle to oppose the rich peasant opportunist line in the land revolution, on the eve of the high tide of the revolution, is the most important task in mobilizing the hundreds of millions of poor suffering peasant masses to complete their local uprisings and to fight with the proletariat to win victory first in one or several provinces.

5. Eliminating Rich Peasant Elements and Opportunist Elements from Organizations

At present, the Communist Party, especially the Party branches in the countryside, is filled with rich and middle peasant elements, and the proletarian base is extremely weak. This is the organizational source of the grave development of the rich peasant line and opportunism. Thus to oppose firmly the rich peasant line and opportunism in the land revolution, it is necessary, during the struggle, firmly to carry out dividing the land equally, to expel rich peasant elements from the organizations, and to clean out all opportunist elements, because these elements, not having a class viewpoint, are totally divorced from the popular masses and do not recognize the demands of the popular masses. They even use the Party branches and the revolutionary organs of the soviets to suppress the masses and impede the deepening of the land revolution. This must be done in order to guarantee the implementation of the correct strategy of the land revolution.

6. Confiscate All the Land, and Distribute It Equally

Confiscate without exception all land belonging to the landlord class, to public shrines and temples, and even to rich peasants—confiscate without exception and divide it equally. All buildings and wooded hills, such as bamboo or tea-oil growing hills that can be divided and that the poor peasants want to divide, shall be equally distributed without exception. The land must be divided according to population, carrying out drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, and drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, to be

completed in seven days at most. Of these three principles, drawing on the fat to make up for the lean is the first that must be done, to avoid having to redistribute the land equally again later, or causing trouble for the poor peasants.

7. The Question of Distributing the Land to All Kinds of People

In principle, land is not distributed to farm laborers; a labor protection law is applied to guarantee their livelihood. When, however, farm laborers ask to be included in the redistribution, they should be given a share. As for porcelain industry workers and semiunemployed workers and unemployed independent laborers, if they cannot be encouraged to join the Red Army, and the government cannot organize production to solve the problem of their livelihood, they will likewise be given land in order to win over the popular masses. Vagabonds are also to be given shares of land. They should be removed from under the ruling class's policy of making use of them, and forced to toil. In order to provide special treatment for Red Army soldiers themselves, they should be given land and the soviet governments should also delegate persons or else force the rich peasants to till it for them, using mutual assistance or other organizations. Rich peasants and landlords who submit to the laws and decrees of the soviets and who do not engage in counterrevolutionary plots shall likewise receive shares of land and be forced to labor.

8. The Question of Organizing Cooperatives

Organize cooperatives for agricultural production and confiscate the draft animals and farm implements of counterrevolutionaries and the surplus oxen and farm implements of rich peasants, to help the poor hired peasants till and plant. Confiscate the wealth of the landlord class and counterrevolutionaries and collect loans of rich peasant monies, organize loan cooperatives that will provide low-interest loans to the poor peasants, and organize trading cooperatives. Collective farms run by the government should be a present propaganda slogan, and whenever possible the soviet governments may run collective farms that use socialist production techniques to compete with capitalist production methods and lead the peasants toward socialist collective production. But at present the political authority of the soviets is characterized by political struggle and does not have the economic and managerial capabilities that can easily run collective farms, and if they are not well operated, the peasants will lose faith in collective production. At present, generally speaking, it is still mainly production cooperatives which should be organized.

9. Nationalization of the Land

At present this is a propaganda slogan. In reality, the ban on buying and selling land and on renting land, and turning the land over to the soviets for redistribution, already constitutes nationalization. It is only when carrying out active propaganda for socialism that we criticize dividing the land equally as insufficient (but when criticizing, it must first be admitted that dividing the land equally is a great victory in overthrowing the several-thousand-year-old feudal system and liberating the peasants). [In carrying out such propaganda, we explain] that the land and farm implements cannot be improved, that fertilizer and seed cannot be managed well, and that insect plagues and flood and drought cannot be prevented [on the basis of equal distribution alone]. Only by cooperating with the proletariat to overthrow totally the rule of the imperialists and of the warlords, and winning the victory of the soviets nationwide, by abolishing the capitalist system and establishing a socialist society, by implementing collective farms, by bringing electrification to the countryside, and by making use of new-style mechanized planting and harvesting, and of scientific fertilization and scientifically improving the fields, and by preventing natural disasters, can the full victory of the land revolution be attained, and thereby the greatest peace and happiness for mankind. This is the real educational task of leading the poor peasants and winning over the middle peasants to the march toward socialism. If nationalization is proclaimed mechanically, it goes against the present demand of the peasants that the land be distributed to them for private ownership, and it will not have a good influence.

10. Cancel All Debts

From the day of the land revolution, all debts, whether as loans or as outstanding bills, including the interest on all kinds of grain loans, shall be totally cancelled. This is because in the countryside, all loans, except for those few friendly loans between one poor peasant and another poor peasant, are by their very nature feudal and exploitative. Their total cancellation is an urgent demand of the broad masses of the poor suffering peasants, but because the rich peasants and the landlord class, for special reasons, have borrowed against the accounts of the poor and hired peasants, they definitely want the loans to be repaid. Debts among the rich peasants and landlords will be turned over to the soviets to provide capital for loans to the cooperatives.

11. Establishing Soviet Political Power

In the struggle of the land revolution, it is essential that the popular masses be resolutely mobilized and that the masses slaughter the despotic gentry, the landlords, and all counterrevolutionaries with their own hands. It is only by ruthlessly eliminating the counterrevolutionaries that the masses can be made to rise up and seize the arms of the landlords, and to establish soviet political power and Red Guard units that are firmly under the leadership of the farm laborers and poor peasants.

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Attack Gaoan

(October 19, 1930, 7:00 P.M., at General Headquarters beneath Bamboo Hill outside the town of Xiajiang)

1. The enemy situation is as before, and it is reported that Gaoan is under the domination of Dai Yue's brigade.

2. Given the Front Army's task of directly occupying the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad and then awaiting the opportunity to seize Jiujiang and Nanchang, the plan for the first step is to destroy the enemy presently in Gaoan, and then to occupy it.

3. The Third Army Group should complete all preparations by the 19th of this month, set out on the 20th from its present location, and go to the right of the line of Qingjiang, Qushuiqiao, Luojia, Heshujia, Huangshagang, and Lianglukou. The journey is to take place over a period of five days, and the town of Gaoan must be occupied on the 24th. Having accomplished this, a close watch must be kept in the direction of Nanchang and Fengxin.

4. The Fourth Army of the First Army Group should set out tomorrow (the 20th) on a five days' journey by way of Renhe, Tiangang, Yongfang, Hamojie, Tuohujie, Dapingjie, Shanqian, and Miaoqian to the line along Gongmiao, Taiyangyu, Guanzigang, Shanghupu, and Zhangjiadu to help the Third Army Group destroy the enemy in Gaoan. If there is no trace of the enemy in Gaoan, then they are to be stationed along the line of Wulipei and Qiliqiao to await further orders. The Third Army should set out on the 21st for a journey of five days by way of Sixi, Dongxibian, Luofang, Wupingyu, Taiheyu, Liyu, Quangang, Qianjialing, Shangxiafang, Longcun, Lujiadian, Guantangfang, Taojia, Luojia, Huibu, and Shinaoyu to Huangpoqiao, stop and await further orders. The said army must dispatch a vanguard tomorrow (the 20th) to destroy the enemy remaining in Dongxibian and Luofang. Along the way they must pay attention to keeping a close watch to the left in the direction of Yuanzhou.

The Twelfth Army, along with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, the Provincial Soviet government, and General Headquarters and its directly attached units should set out on the 21st for a five-day journey by way of Guantian, Tankou, Wangjiadian, Yaoxijie, Huangtujie, Luogang, Zhanxi,

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 167–68.

Yinggangling, Taiyangyu, Wulichen, and Shanghupu to Xiaojia, stop, and station themselves in the area to the rear of the temple.

5. Upon arrival on the 22nd at the line along Qingjiang, Dapingjie, Huangtujie, and Luofangyu, each route must immediately establish contact with General Headquarters. Along the way they must also maintain contact with each other.

6. During the march our position is that of General Headquarters.

Addendum:

1. Each unit (with the exception of the Second Army) is to make its own detailed plans for the march and they are to be reported together.

2. General Headquarters will encamp on the 21st near Huangjiadian, on the 22nd at Huangtujie, on the 23rd near Zhanxi, on the 24th at Wulichen, and on the 25th at the rear of the temple at Xiaogongmiao.

3. Everyone must carry enough rice for two days.

4. Along the way, all units must pay attention to raising funds and strictly maintaining discipline.

5. Upon arriving at the town of Gaoan, the Third Army Group is to be stationed in the northeast outskirts of the city, the First Army Group in the southwest. It is best not to station troops within the town.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Work Between the Yuan River and the Ruizhou River and to Await Opportunities

(October 24, 1930, 2:30 P.M., at General Headquarters in Laojia on the northern edge of Huangtujie)

1. The entire enemy division of Tan Daoyuan has already reached Nanchang. Xu Kexiang's forces[1] and the vanguard troops of Xiong Shihui's Fifth Division arrived in succession in Jiujiang on the 19th of this month. According to newspaper reports it is said that the forces of Jin Handing and those of Mao Bingwen[2] continue to make their way towards Jiangxi. The division of Gong (Bingfan) is now in Nanchang; the division of Zhang (Huizan) is now on the Zhangshu and Fengcheng line; the division of Deng (Ying) is now in Fuzhou; in Yuanzhou there are now Luo Lin's forces[3] (the Hunan enemy); in Fenyi there is approximately one battalion of their vanguard forces.

2. The Front Army has the tasks of striving for further victory in the wake of the victory in Ji'an, mobilizing the masses, destroying enemy forces, expanding the Red Army, taking Nanchang and Jiujiang in a planned, collaborative, step-by-step manner, and striving for victory in the entire province of Jiangxi. It has been decided to begin by arranging the work between the Yuan River and the Ruizhou River, deploying the main forces along the Yuan River, mobilizing the masses in this area to raise money for provisions, and making every effort to create the conditions for a decisive battle with the enemy. The provisional time limit is seven days (there will be a separate order in case of extension).

3. The Third Army Group is to undertake the work in the area to the east of the Huangtujie, Zhanxi, Yinggangling, Guantangxu and Huifu line (including the line itself), and should dispatch advance forces to the main roads of Yinggangling and Bojiaxu to threaten and pressure the enemy in Gaoan.

4. The First Army Group is to undertake the work in the area to the west of the same line (excluding the line itself). The Third Army is to be positioned in

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 185–86.

1. Regarding Xu Kexiang see above, the relevant note to the text of July 4, 1927. At this time, he was commander of the Guomindang Twenty-fourth Division.

2. Mao Bingwen (1891–1970), a native of Hunan, was at this time the commander of the Eighth Division of the Guomindang Sixth Route Army.

3. Regarding Gong Bingfan, Zhang Huizan, Deng Ying, and Luo Lin see above, the relevant notes to the orders of July 29, August 24, and August 31, 1930.

Fenyi *xian* and to be in charge of the work in the vicinity of the *xian* seat and on both shores of the Yuan River. Special attention must be paid to keeping a close watch in the direction of Yuanzhou. The Twelfth Army is to be positioned in Xinyu *xian* and to undertake the work in the vicinity of the town seat and on both shores of the Yuan River. The Fourth Army is to be positioned in Luofang, and should dispatch advance troops to Qianxu to press on towards Gaoan. Their work area would also tend to be on both shores of the Yuan River.

5. All army groups should set out tomorrow (the 25th).

6. All units should concentrate their main forces on the left wing. The degree to which forces are dispersed is to be decided based upon the enemy's situation.

7. Along the north shore of the Yuan River, on the route from Qingjiang *xian* via Huangtujie, Luofang, and Xinyu *xian* to Fenyi, a main communication line is to be constructed by making use of existing electricity poles, with Luofang as the center (construction to the east of Huangtujie goes to the Third Army Group, and to the west to the First Army Group.)

8. General Headquarters moves tomorrow (the 25th) to Luofang.

Attention:

1. All units stationed along the river (the Yuan River) must set up as many floating bridges as possible and locate as many fording spots as possible.

2. In the area where the First Army Group is to set up electric lines, the Third Army and the Twelfth Army together are to construct the lines between the *xian* seats of Xinyu and Fenyi, and the Fourth Army and the General Headquarters transportation team are to construct the lines from west of Huangtujie to the *xian* seat.

3. All units should as much as possible avoid encampment on the streets, especially in the case of high-level organizations.

4. The amount of funds each army must raise for itself in a week should be enough for a month's provisions.

5. Troops must be sent along the electrical power lines to safeguard them effectively.

6. In the course of this work particular attention should be paid to the work on the borders between Red and White areas.

Above are eight orders and six points for attention.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

The Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the First Front Army and of the Party In Jiangxi

(Resolution of the Joint Conference of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army and the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee) [1]

(October 26, 1930)

I. The Victory of Ji'an and the New Revolutionary Upsurge

Changsha has been occupied, and heavy offensives are still going on. The First and Third Army Groups have converged, and the major city of Ji'an has been seized. These vigorous developments of the forces of the Red Army in coordination with the sharp struggles of the proletariat in all major cities throughout the country and the development of the soviet régime in the countryside have already ensured that the revolutionary high tide in China will soon take the form of a general outburst. In particular, the seizure of Ji'an is the culmination of a local uprising with the greatest mass support and the strongest foundations, carried out by millions of organized masses in southwest Jiangxi, and by over twenty *xian* soviet governments. The victory of Ji'an is the beginning of victory in the whole province of Jiangxi. This victory is the first seizure of a major city by the Red Army and the masses in the course of several years of fighting. It not only provides a more solid foundation to assist the further development of the Red Army, and it is not merely a call to the revolutionary masses of all Jiangxi to complete the recent general uprising in Jiangxi. It is also of the greatest significance in giving an impetus to the revolutionary forces of the whole country and achieving nationwide revolutionary victory. Beyond a doubt, we must continue to build on the victory at Ji'an and seek victory first in Jiangxi.

Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 159–74, where the text is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1980, after checking with a version in the Chen Cheng collection.

1. This conference took place in Luofang, Xinyu *xian*, northeast of Ji'an, from October 25 to November 1, 1930. The purpose was to discuss strategic options in the wake of the retreat from Changsha. See *Zhongguo gongchandang huiyi gaiyao* (A Summary Account of Chinese Communist Party Meetings) (hereafter *Party Meetings*) (Shenyang: Shenyang chubanshe, 1991), pp. 120–22; see also *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 321.

II. The International Situation and the Development of the World Revolution

Recent developments in the international situation, such as the preparations for war by Italy and France, the breakdown of the naval negotiations between Italy and France, the active expansion of naval forces by France, the anti-German riots in Czechoslovakia, the forceful British denunciation of the U.S. policy of tariff increases, and the organization by seventeen South American republics of the South American Alliance, a movement to resist the United States, are all manifestations of the tensions of a second imperialist world war. The United States has incited Europe and the Americas to impose an economic boycott of the Soviet Union. The recent Soviet dumping of wheat in the United States, in particular, has caused the price of American wheat to collapse and made it more difficult to prevent the panic resulting from its agricultural overproduction, thus increasing U.S. hatred of the Soviet Union. The suppression of the Communist parties and the arrest of their leaders in various countries further demonstrate the intensification of the attack on the Soviet Union. But the irreconcilable contradictions in the era of the imminent demise of imperialism have already urged forward the torrent of world revolution. The French Communist Party has won a big victory in the recent election. Opposing the government's 8 percent cut in the wages of the metallurgical workers, 140,000 workers have waged a big strike in Berlin. The strike of the ship-building workers of Malaga, Spain, has led to a general sympathy strike in Vitoria, causing a situation of rebellion.[2] Although the government has adopted severe measures, it cannot clamp down effectively. Fifty thousand Hungarian workers have taken to the streets, and the Czechoslovakian Communist Party has also staged big anti-German demonstrations. The capital of Poland has witnessed general strikes, protesting the government's arrests of opposition leaders. In southern Chile, revolution broke out suddenly. The strikes of silk workers in Japan have developed into armed confrontations with the police. There have been rebellious riots of the inhabitants in India. The socialist construction of the Soviet Union has been further consolidated and developed. For example, agricultural production has become superior to that of the United States. All this shows that the world revolution is developing in great surges. This situation is very advantageous to the Chinese revolution. It will turn the offensive wars against the Soviet Union into a war for the victory of the world revolution.

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2. More than four hundred strikes, mainly under Communist and Anarcho-Syndicalist leadership, took place in Spain during the year 1930. Malaga was one of the centers affected by the first big wave of strikes, which began in June. The locality transcribed *Weiduoli* by Mao, which we assume to be Vitoria, a small city in northern Spain, may well have been involved too, but there is no reason to believe that there was any direct influence between two places so different and so far apart. Probably Mao is simply making the point that the strikes swept across the whole country, from North to South.

III. Several Events That Have Occurred in the Chaotic Wars among the Warlords

A. After Chiang Kaishek seized Ji'nan, Zhang Xueliang issued a clever telegram, proposing peace and unification, while waiting for the Nanjing government to take action.

B. Zhang Xueliang led his armies south of Shanhaiguan, and occupied Beiping and Tianjin. Recently, he published a telegram, calling for the convening in Beiping of a reconstruction conference to discuss the so-called question of "striving to save the country."[3]

C. Chiang Kaishek published two important telegrams: (1) asking the Guomindang government to issue an amnesty for all political crimes, excluding Chen Jiongming and Yan Xishan and the Communist Party. (2) convening the Fourth National Congress of the Guomindang to decide on the meeting of a national assembly for the promulgation of a provisional constitution. A proclamation to the citizens contained five items, including eliminating the Communists (within a time limit of three to six months, with regional responsibilities, on the one hand, and comprehensive joint repression, on the other hand), sorting out financial affairs, streamlining the bureaucracy, developing the economy, and practicing self-rule.

D. It was carried in the newspapers that Liu Luyin, the head of the Central Propaganda Department in Nanjing, stated in a report regarding current affairs, "The Japanese language newspapers have created various rumors about Zhang Hanqing [Zhang Xueliang] and the authorities of northeast China. . . . The diplomats of the Japanese government in China go so far as to instigate the Japanese language newspapers to sow discord inside our country, thus making people wonder whether the Japanese government is engaging in deliberate manipulation." He also said, "Englishman Simpson has helped Yan to seize the customs, committing the crime of creating disorder in another country. No response has been made to the several protests of our country and we believe that the British diplomatic authorities in China are irresponsible and that the British government no longer amounts to anything."

E. Chiang Kaishek has occupied Zhengzhou. It is reported that some of the forces of Feng Yuxiang have been captured by Chiang Kaishek, some have surrendered to Chiang, and still others have retreated to northern Henan. There are also reports of an attack on Shanxi.

3. In February 1930, Yan Xishan had called for Chiang Kaishek's resignation, and in April he had launched an offensive against Chiang in alliance with Feng Yuxiang. After some initial successes, the dissident forces were decisively defeated in August. It appeared that only Zhang Xueliang could save the northern coalition, and Yan Xishan, on assuming office as chairman of the state council in Beiping on September 9, sought Zhang's collaboration. Instead, Zhang Xueliang issued a call on September 18 for a "reconstruction conference" (*shanhou huiyi*, literally, "a conference so that things will be better afterward") to bring peace to the country and sent his forces into North China.

F. Chiang Kaishek has dispatched Xu Yuanquan, Wang Jinyu, Chen Cheng, Xia Douyin, Cai Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai, Ye Weijun, Xiao Zichu, and others back to Henan and dispatched Tan Daoyuan, Jin Handing, Xu Kexiang, Peng Qilong, Mao Bingwen, Li Yunjie, Tang Yunshan, and other army units to Hubei to suppress the revolution.

IV. The Evaluation of These Events

A. The wars among Chiang, Yan, and Feng are wars among Britain, Japan, and the United States. Exploiting the tensions which have resulted from the clashes between Britain and the United States, Japan has occupied a pivotal position. Seizing the opportunity of the compromise between the United States and Chiang, Japan has caused her lackey Zhang of Fengtian to obtain a sphere of influence in Hebei. As expected, both Britain and the United States have had to make concessions to Japan, and this has been followed by Chiang and Yan's reluctant recognition of the advance made by the forces of Zhang of Fengtian. Chiang especially wants to use this move to deal with Yan.

B. The occupation of Changsha and the continuing heavy attacks [of the Red Army], as well as the seizure of Ji'an, have not only led to widespread changes in the Chinese revolutionary situation but have, at the same time, transformed the relationships among the ruling classes. That is to say that the development of the revolutionary forces and the fundamental contradictions among classes have prompted the imperialists and the Chinese ruling classes to try desperately to moderate the conflicts among themselves and unite in dealing with the revolution. Even the U.S. imperialists feel that this is necessary because the Nanjing government under its control has been increasingly threatened by the revolutionary forces. The Japanese imperialists also naturally feel that the victory of the Chinese revolution is detrimental to Japan first and foremost. Therefore, there is the possibility of temporary compromise between Japan and the United States. Chiang also has to win over Zhang, so as to end the wars speedily. The suppression of the Chinese revolution is urgently necessary to British imperialism as well. With the alliance between Japan and the United States, and the disastrous defeats of Feng and Yan, they have no alternative but to yield temporarily. The temporary alliance of imperialism and the warlords against the revolution makes it necessary and feasible for Chiang Kaishek to remove large numbers of troops from the front to attack the revolution. Meanwhile, suppressing the Chinese revolution requires the employment of new policies of reformism and deception. So, Chiang Kaishek, taking advantage of the military victories after the occupation of Kaifeng and Zhengzhou, published several telegrams which put forward policies of reform and deception and attempted to establish reactionary leadership. The so-called amnesty of political prisoners and convening of a national assembly are in fact acceptance of the programs of the reformists and attempts to seek the support of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. At the same time, he

attempts to draw the subordinates of Feng over to his side to oppose Yan and organize an anti-Communist alliance under the leadership of the Chiang faction, that is to say, under the leadership of the United States, for the purpose of crushing the Chinese revolution. This is an effort to achieve leadership in opposing the Chinese revolution, as well as to seek leadership in attacking the Soviet Union and opposing the world revolution.

C. This counterrevolutionary alliance will inevitably disintegrate in the face of the revolutionary upsurge. This can be predicted in advance by the contradictions, vacillations, and collapse of the ruling classes and the vigorous development of the revolutionary forces. Despite their desperate efforts to unite, the internal conflicts among the imperialist warlords have become more acute. Zhang Xueliang's proposal of holding a reconstruction conference obviously clashes with Chiang Kaishek's national assembly. In the chaotic wars among Chiang, Feng, and Yan, the Japanese imperialists and their running dog Zhang Xueliang have actually gained the territories of Beijing and Shandong, thus further intensifying the conflicts between Japan and the United States, and between Zhang and Chiang. The report of Liu Luyin has already provided a clue. Chiang Kaishek has dispatched his troops to the south in a great hurry, setting the deadline of eliminating the Communist bandits within three to six months. These are signs of the tensions of the war between Chiang and Zhang. In particular, because the politics and economy of the ruling class are completely bankrupt, financial disorder has become a nationwide phenomenon, the rural economy is seriously bankrupt, and the peasants' uprisings against the landlords in various southern provinces have been taking place for several years in succession. The fact that no faction of the Guomindang can resolve this situation indicates how much more serious the problem has become. Under the threat of imperialist production, national industries have closed down and collapsed in great numbers, intensifying the crisis of unemployment. Although Feng and Yan have been defeated, the bankrupt in Shanxi and Shaanxi can no longer survive, and a war for territory will naturally take place. In order to extricate themselves from the industrial crisis, the British imperialists will certainly exert all their efforts to regain the influence and political leadership in China they have lost. This proves that, because of their fundamental economic and political bankruptcy, the imperialists and the Chinese ruling classes are no longer capable of stabilizing their future, or of having a solid alliance, and that new fighting among the warlords will certainly occur in the near future and further accelerate their downfall. Chiang Kaishek's so-called peace and unification is nothing but deceptive and ridiculous nonsense. Even lackey Wu Zhihui has said, "One is afraid that there will be no 120 percent guarantee for the hope of eternal peace." On the basis of the facts set out above, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the broad masses has, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, moved toward a resolute struggle to overthrow the rule of the Guomindang. What the masses demand is not the national assembly of the warlords, bureaucrats, despotic gentry, landlords, and bourgeoisie, but the soviet assembly of the workers, peasants, soldiers, and broad masses of the oppressed toilers, which is scheduled to be held on November 7. What the masses demand is not the constitution and laws that maintain the oppression and exploitation of the ruling classes, but the soviet laws, ordinances, and programs that guarantee the dictatorship of the proletariat and the interests of the workers, peasants, and toiling masses. What the masses demand is not the local autonomy of the political régime of the despotic gentry and landlords, but the soviet politics of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Why are the reformists and the Chiang Kaishek faction putting forward these tricks at this time? Precisely because the revolution is moving toward its high tide and striving for the thorough overthrow of the ruling classes, and because they see the masses waging resolute struggles for the above demands, they have to propose so-called national assemblies, constitution, and laws to attract the middle and petty bourgeoisie in jointly suppressing the demands and the revolution of the workers and peasants. These conspiracies and tricks further lay bare the increasing collapse of the ruling classes and their ugly features of fright and helplessness. The counterrevolutionary alliance of the imperialists and warlords is formed in the present situation of a raging tide of revolution throughout the world and the vigorous development of the Chinese revolution. The nature of these attacks is that the ruling classes are trying to save themselves from crisis and doom. It is not at all the case that the ruling classes are trying to destroy the revolutionary forces at the low ebb of the revolution, as in the past, when they conducted the campaigns of joint suppression against the Jinggangshan. We must reply to the massive offensives of the warlords of the Chiang faction with a nationwide revolutionary uprising. In the present situation where on the one hand the imperialists and warlords are forced to compromise, and on the other hand they are not able to reconcile their contradictions, so that they are tottering on the brink of collapse, we must confirm our victory in this decisive class struggle by obtaining not just victory in one province, but the victory of the revolution in the whole country.

D. There are two incorrect evaluations concerning the fighting among the warlords. The first is a nonclass and unrealistically optimistic evaluation, which holds that the chaotic struggles among the warlords will become forever larger and larger until the destruction of the warlords themselves, and that they will never unite to oppose the revolution. This is a totally wrong and nonclass evaluation. It shows a lack of the understanding that when the class contradictions supersede the internal contradictions of the ruling classes, the ruling classes must inevitably wage last-ditch struggles, abandon their own contradictions for the time being, and unite to oppose the revolution. The consequence of this evaluation will be relaxation in the arrangement of the revolutionary work, a purely military viewpoint, which can easily lead to separation from the masses in our concrete actions, and helplessness whenever we face a reactionary alliance. These empty optimistic evaluations will certainly lead to extreme pessimism.

The other evaluation is pessimistic in believing that the enemies are united against us, and therefore the revolution is faced with great difficulties. This is another nonclass analysis, for it does not understand the revolutionary high tide. The last-ditch joint struggle of the ruling classes is directed at meeting the offensives of the revolutionary forces, and this proves that the revolution has reached high tide. If the revolution is about to destroy the ruling classes, why should not the ruling classes unite and save themselves from dangers and destruction? When the revolution is still developing within one province, the ruling classes use the forces of one province to deal with the revolution every time. This is also the case in the period of guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, when the ruling classes are forming a nationwide alliance, this undoubtedly proves the existence of a nationwide revolutionary high tide. Those who do not recognize this point are incapable of truly understanding the revolutionary high tide and will develop pessimism, evasion, and shameful capitulationism. The correct understanding is that the victory of the Chinese revolution will encounter the brutal wars not only of the domestic warlords but of the international imperialists. As the revolution begins to be victorious, the imperialists and warlords must and can set aside the contradictions among themselves and join forces in dealing with the revolution. This requires us to step up the arrangement of our work throughout the country, pay attention to the balanced development of the four major revolutionary forces, and get ready for the final brutal struggle. The fundamental economic and political bankruptcy of the Chinese ruling classes can no longer be salvaged, and the revolutionary forces are expanding vigorously. We must definitely seek the victory of the Chinese revolution under the conditions of coordinating the work of the whole nation and the smooth development of the world revolution. At present, while the ruling classes are uniting in confronting the revolution, the rightists are easily pessimistic, and those who always used to be optimistic have also turned pessimistic. Therefore, correctly pointing out the vacillation and collapse of the ruling classes, the brewing of new wars, the vigorous development of the revolutionary forces, and the struggle against pessimistic ideas constitutes the necessary preliminary work in order to carry out decisive class struggles and achieve victory in one province.

V. Opposing the Guerrilla Line in Seizing Political Power in One Province

Today, the task of seizing political power in one province actually confronts us. To fulfill this task requires modifications in the guerrilla line inherited from the guerrilla period of the Red Army in the past, that is, changes in the line of lightly armed raids based on the purely military viewpoint. Because this line does not include a correct evaluation of the chaotic wars among the warlords and does not understand that seeking victory in one province is work contributing to the decisive class struggle, it leads to a divorce from the masses and pays no attention to winning over the masses, establishing work among the masses, or expanding the Red Army and strengthening the forces of the Red Army. With regard to military tactics, it still employs only guerrilla warfare and does not know the conditions that are necessary in preparing for the final decisive battle between the classes. Superficially, purely military lightly armed raids (the raids mentioned here refer to the strategic line of seeking victory in one province; it is not a matter of opposing surprise attacks in military tactics) appear as a result to correspond to the left-wing line of resolute attacks, but in fact they delay the coming of the initial victories of the revolution, thus becoming an extremely right-wing line. The events of Changsha and Ji'an have abundantly educated us on this point. The inability to hold Changsha firmly and continue to occupy it the first time resulted mainly from inadequate preparations among the masses, and the fact that the Red Army forces were still not the backbone forces of the Red Army. The second time, because conditions among the masses and contacts with enemy soldiers were still inadequate, it became simply an attack of the Red Army. As a result, half a month of ferocious attacks did not lead to victory. In Ji'an, conditions were quite different; there was a broad mass base, so it could be truly seized. As for the seizure of Changsha the first time, the enemies then had no reinforcements and no fortifications. Only under such circumstances was there the possibility of employing lightly armed raids. At present, as the enemies greatly reinforce their forces and Nanchang and Jiujiang consolidate their fortifications, the Red Army's lightly armed raids on Nanchang and Jiujiang, with the considerable lack of supplies and provisions for the Red Army and the seriously inadequate conditions of transportation, will unquestionably become guerrilla attacks. The consequence is that the Red Army cannot seize the cities and will have to move to other places, thus putting off the victory in one province instead. Therefore, such guerrilla ideas of lightly armed raids run completely counter to the systematic and planned strategy of seeking victory in one province and should be firmly corrected. The Central Committee has recently pointed out that the Red Army needs intensified training and promotion of cadres from among the good elements of peasants and the workers to become the backbone of the Red Army and turn the Red Army into an iron army. It has stated that thirty to fifty thousand backbone troops of the Red Army are required to secure victories in big cities and establish the confidence of the masses in the Red Army. Fighting must be based on the systematic and planned use of strategy. This has given greater depth to our arrangements for seeking victory in one province. We believe that this instruction is very clear. Of course, using the lack of coordination with the masses as a pretext not to launch strong offensives by the Red Army, scattering the work aimlessly, refusing to attack even when success is assured, and lacking understanding of the importance of supplies, reinforcements, and training are problems that can be solved only in the course of struggles waged according to a plan. Naturally, abandoning the task of achieving victory in one province is also a serious right-wing viewpoint, which should be guarded against. Another problem which should be pointed out is the inability to employ

strategies and tactics flexibly. Strategies are determined by both objective conditions and subjective forces, whereas tactics involve the use of all available means in the light of various actual conditions at a particular time to realize the objectives of a strategy. So without contravening the strategy, the tactics may change frequently. To take Ji'an first in the task of seizing Nanchang is a very correct strategy. One should not mechanically ask why Ji'an should be attacked first, since it was originally planned to attack Nanchang. For example, under the strategy of occupying the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad, the tactics of either moving into the city with attacks or destroying the main forces of the enemy at appropriate places on the two banks of the Gan River and then trying to seize the city depend on the objective and subjective conditions at that time; there are no rigid rules. This should be especially understood by the lower-ranking cadres and the soldier masses of the Red Army. Otherwise, if the masses know only the general objective, they will be suspicious and wavering once they encounter strategic and tactical changes, and will even require the superior leading organs to adapt to the backward thinking of the masses and hinder the flexible use of strategies and tactics. This issue deserves attention.

VI. To Achieve Victory in Jiangxi First Is the Current Task of the First Front Army and the Party Headquarters of Jiangxi

Basing ourselves on the premise that victory must first be won in the provinces and regions surrounding the center of Wuhan, we must now strive for victory in Jiangxi and then to go on to realize victory in Wuhan. Naturally, victory in Jiangxi cannot be separated from the nationwide revolutionary upsurge. Nevertheless, the conditions for victory are more likely to exist in Jiangxi. Jiangxi has over sixty *xian* soviets, and the peasants' uprising has become a widespread revolutionary upsurge. The convergence of the forces of the First and Third Army Groups, the continuous attack on Hukou and Panyang by the Tenth Army of the Red Army and the recent occupation of Ji'an, in particular, have combined all revolutionary forces and seriously threatened Nanchang. The economic bases of the bourgeoisie and landlords in the countryside of Jiangxi have been basically destroyed and are shaking and collapsing further under the increasingly serious threat against Nanchang. The Red Army has been carrying out propaganda from the other side of the river, targeting the Eighteenth Division of the enemy forces. One platoon of their soldiers have come over with their guns and joined the Red Army. The enemy soldiers and we have agreed that we will not fire arms in attacking Nanchang, and the enemy officers are greatly alarmed, gathering the soldiers and reprimanding them in the middle of the night. Not long ago, there were soldiers who came over to the Third Army Group with guns. In May, when they were not paid a single cash, the soldiers were all unwilling to fight, and the officers were often assassinated. It was discovered that there were frequent calls among the troops to go to the Red Army, and they feel that Red

Army soldiers are not oppressed. This situation demonstrates that the tools which the ruling classes use for the desperate struggle are not reliable. Besides, the experience of the enemy soldiers wavering and unwilling to fight in the past further indicates to us that we should not be frightened by the large numbers of enemy troops. At present, although the warlords of the Chiang faction have dispatched many troops to Jiangxi, the struggle among the ruling classes for the counterrevolutionary leadership has by no means been resolved, and new clashes are brewing. Chiang Kaishek is merely using a temporary compromise to deal with the revolution. Furthermore, after the prolonged and chaotic fighting, the soldiers are extremely exhausted and wavering. So long as we step up political and organizational leadership, we can undoubtedly destroy the main forces of the enemy's offensives. Therefore, the tasks of the Party in Jiangxi, and of the First Front Army, are undoubtedly to coordinate their actions with the masses of Jiangxi to carry out the decisive class struggle in a planned and systematic way and to strive resolutely for an initial victory in Jiangxi.

VII. The Line of the First Front Army and of the Party in Jiangxi for Work in Accordance with This Task

1. Intensify propaganda to promote resistance to the warlords' suppression of the revolution, support the armed uprisings to seize political power in Jiangxi, expand propaganda regarding the victory at Ji'an and regarding the establishment of the soviet government in Jiangxi Province and the laws and ordinances issued by it, and raise the slogans of "opposing the suppression of the revolution by the warlords" and "carrying out armed uprisings to seize political power in Jiangxi." We must inspire the masses to fight for the soviet régime, and to reply to the enemy's attacks with a resolute and decisive class struggle and the achievement of initial victory in Jiangxi. Before the high tide of the revolution, increased efforts should be made to oppose the deceptive policies of the reformists, the Reorganizationists, the Third Party, the AB Corps, the liquidationists, and recently of Chiang Kaishek's national assembly, fully exposing all their crimes and eliminating their influence among the masses. This has become a serious political task in smashing the enemy's plots to weaken the revolution during the period of the decisive class war.

2. Make arrangements for work in Nanchang and Jiujiang, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad. Today the proletarian uprising has become the principal and indispensable force in seizing the major cities. The last desperate struggle of the enemy is to rely on strong fortifications to hold the cities. The events in Changsha teach us that it is impossible to achieve victory in one province if work in the main cities is lacking. Now we should correct the pessimism and neglect of the work in cities and overcome all difficulties in setting up the work in cities. The main line of the trade union movement is the direct organization of armed uprisings and strengthening the political alliance in preparation for strikes. Red trade

unions of the masses, pickets, and the Red vanguards, which are the core force at the time of the uprisings, should be established. The daily economic struggle should naturally not be abandoned and should be linked to the armed struggle.

3. Carry out local uprisings. First of all, local uprisings should be carried out in such *xian* as Anfu, Taihe, Xinyu, Fenyi, and Yuanzhou in western Jiangxi, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, and Xin'gan in eastern Jiangxi, and Ganzhou in southern Jiangxi. In the White regions, guerrilla wars should be resolutely initiated, and preparations made for uprisings so as resolutely to eliminate the situation of confrontation between the Reds and Whites and join together all the Red regions. Then, Fujian, Hunan, and Hubei should be connected, and we must prepare to use the flame of the mass uprisings to destroy the advancing forces of the enemies and complete the local uprisings. It is imperative to learn the lessons of the past, and confiscate all the land rapidly, for only thus can thorough equalization of the land be carried out. In this struggle, it is necessary to establish the leadership of the farm laborers and set up independent trade unions of farm laborers. When poor peasant committees and soviet Red Guards are set up, rich peasant elements should be strictly prohibited from joining them. Farm laborers and poor peasants should be resolutely selected as leaders. From the beginning of the rural struggle, not only should the landlord class be fiercely attacked, but at the same time the redistribution of land and refusal to pay land rent and debts should also take place. All exploitation and oppression of the poor peasants by the rich peasants should be opposed, and the impoverished peasant masses should be mobilized to combat the rich peasant class, thus laying a solid revolutionary foundation for the thorough destruction of the feudal forces.

4. Mobilizing the broad masses to participate in the fighting and the expansion of the soviet régime. We should point out the development of the national revolutionary situation and the inevitability of a political victory. On this occasion when the warlords are repressing the revolution, we must summon the masses and mobilize all the people, men and women, old and young to cooperate with the Red Army, carry out the final decisive class struggle, destroy the main forces of the enemy, and achieve initial victory in Jiangxi. In all the regions subjected to the attacks of the enemy forces, such as Xiajiang, Xinyu, Fenyi, Yuanzhou, Anfu, and Lianhua, and in Ji'an, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, and other *xian*, the Red Guards and Young Pioneers need to be concentrated. Military and political training should be strengthened and the command should be unified. The main routes used by the enemies should be reconnoitered, and the rear of the enemies and their transportation systems should be disrupted. In addition, capturing the enemies' arms, cutting off their supplies, launching surprise attacks everywhere, and engaging in all sorts of rioting and terrorist activities will entrap the enemies in the Red regions and immobilize them, leading to their total destruction. The Red Guards ought to help the Red Army in guarding and reconnoitering, transportation, and first aid. All *xian* need to get organized and prepared. The arms of all *xian,* including spears and home-made cannons and

ammunition, should be fully prepared by the districts and townships with all possible means. The work described above must employ agitation, the mass line, and soviet mass meetings held in every district and *xian* to enable the masses themselves to decide on the concrete actions and preparations involved in their participation in the struggle. Only the initiation of spontaneous and enthusiastic participation constitutes a political victory. Therefore, commandism (abandoning persuasion and agitation, and forcing the masses to implement the line without understanding the situation) and the parochial line (the Party and the soviet régime do not play the role of agitation and leadership; major issues are not decided by the mass meetings, and an atmosphere of commandism of the few is formed in which the masses feel that they are working only for the sake of individual destinies) must be opposed. On the other hand, the brutality of the warlords in suppressing the revolution, killing villagers, and burning forests must also be exposed. The voluntary confession of betrayals and conspiracies [should be encouraged], and class hatred should be heightened. The slogan of "fighting for the class to the end, and never surrendering" should be put forward to inspire determination in the struggle. In noncombat soviet regions, similar mobilization should also be conducted, and forcefully expanded outward, in order to eliminate the confrontation between Red and White [areas], and win over the masses in carrying out joint attacks against the despotic gentry and landlords. The Red masses need to be persuaded to restrain their vengefulness,[4] and to redistribute the land equally and resolutely. During the considerable time of occupation of the White regions, the masses should be helped to divide up the land and to set up Red Guard units in order to eliminate the serious obstacle of confrontation between Red and White.

5. Stepping up the movement among the White soldiers. Because of brutal sacrifices in the confused fighting, the unbearable oppression and misery of life, and the influence of the revolutionary upsurge of the workers and peasants, the White soldiers are wavering in the extreme. In recent times, incidents of surrendering to the Red Army with guns have been happening incessantly. The conditions for soldiers' uprisings are entirely ripe. The fact that not many uprisings have taken place results from the lack of organization and leadership by the Communist Party. Local Party headquarters and army Party committees must address the past neglect of this work and pay great attention to it. It must be understood that unless the enemy forces disintegrate, the revolution will assuredly not be victorious. This work line is aimed at establishing a broad political base and strict organizational leadership. In the process of turning the wars of warlords into the revolutionary wars of defeating the warlords and the wars of killing workers and peasants into wars of assisting the liberation of workers and peasants, the class consciousness of the soldiers and their uprisings should be raised and organized, the past parochial opportunist line and purely military

4. *Baofuzhuyi*, literally "revengeism."

mutinies (a few people running away with guns) should be corrected. Local Parties and political departments of the Red Army must set up the committees of the soldiers' movement, and dispatch large numbers of people to take advantage of all opportunities to penetrate into the enemy forces to conduct this work. Especially at present, propaganda and agitation should be intensified among the White soldiers and the low-ranking officers who have come to Jiangxi. The key is to seize upon the fact that they fought long and hard in Shandong and Henan, and the result was only that massive numbers of people died and were wounded in vain, and that now they are again to be ordered back to fight the workers and peasants. They need to understand the crimes of the warlords, the present development of the revolutionary situation, and that their only way out lies in joining the revolution of the workers and peasants. They should be encouraged to rebel and mutiny. In the regions under the attack of the enemy, a mass movement of soldiers should be carried out. Taking the opportunity of the soldiers barracking in the area, women, children, and old men should be mobilized to approach them and agitate among them by washing clothes for them and selling things to them (but no staple food is to be supplied). The Red Guards should, on the one hand, boldly capture the weapons of the enemy and, on the other hand, try hard to treat the captured White soldiers well, so as to win over the masses of White soldiers, and smash the rumors propagated by the enemy side about the brutal killing of White troops by the Red Guards, and other rumors and deceptions that make the soldiers afraid to mutiny.

VIII. The Serious Tasks in Western Jiangxi, Southern Jiangxi, and Other Soviet Regions

1. Uniting the poor peasants and farm laborers to confront the rich peasants. In the areas where the rich peasants control fertile land, another redistribution of the land on the basis of quality should be carried out rapidly to implement the principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. This is necessary to eliminate classes in the countryside and satisfy the needs of the broad masses. It is also the most effective policy for suppressing completely the counterrevolutionary conspiracies of the rich peasant class. Regarding the places where the redistribution has been thorough in quantity (drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce) and in quality (drawing on the fat to make up for the lean), the victory of the land redistribution should be safeguarded and the original redistribution is not allowed to be disrupted. Our slogan is "Fair distribution should not be touched, and unfair distribution should be redone."

2. Reforming the organization of the whole Party and reestablishing the organization of the Youth League. No rich peasant counterrevolutionary element (AB Corps member) is permitted to remain in the Party and the [Youth] League, because the Party and the League in southwestern Jiangxi are full of rich peasant counterrevolutionaries now. This transformation can be carried out only by a thorough egalitarian redistribution of the land, and by inciting the farm laborers and poor peasants to wage a class struggle against the rich peasants and mobilizing them to purge the rich peasants and other go-slow and vacillating elements, in the course of the final decisive class struggle against counterrevolutionary attacks. Only thus will it be possible to select and promote the activists among the poor peasants and farm laborers. Meanwhile in the local cities (various *xian* towns, especially Ji'an), the will of the poor workers should be carried out thoroughly, and the slogan of workers supervising capitalists and implementing the laws of labor protection should be used to combat exploitation by capitalists. Those workers who are close to capital, and the strata which are not directly exploited, should be guarded against organizationally. All petty bourgeois wavering elements must be purged from urban and rural branches and resolute proletarian elements selected.

3. Putting forward the slogans of "replacing committee members violating the interests of the poor and suffering workers and peasants" and "replacing the committee members opposing the soviet conferences," and reelecting all members of the soviet governments. The poor peasants, farm laborers, and genuine leaders of the masses should be reelected as members of the soviet committees. No rich peasant counterrevolutionary element (AB Corps member) is allowed to remain anywhere, at any level in the soviet governments. The reason is that all levels of the soviet governments in southwestern Jiangxi are full of rich peasant counterrevolutionaries. The soviet government ought simultaneously to root out new-style bureaucratism and commandism, which are suicidal policies of departing from the masses and ruining the soviets. The key tactic in consolidating the soviet régime is to invite the broad masses to participate in management of the soviets and to discuss and solve all major issues through representative conferences. The government shall present work reports to the representative conferences and hear the criticisms of the conferences. This requires regular soviet mass meetings in villages and townships, and representative conferences above the level of township. The fixed system of representation should be opposed, and "the election of the leaders of the poor peasants and workers as representatives" by mass meetings in villages and townships should be proposed. In places where the population under a township government is too large, and its territory too extensive, village soviets must be set up. Government employees may not leave production and are not paid. This is the only way to prevent the occurrence of new-style bureaucratism, enable all soviet administrations to meet the needs of the masses, win the support of the masses, and consolidate the soviets.

4. Pointing out various deceptive schemes of the AB Corps politically, eliminating their influence among the masses, rigorously suppressing the AB League, and executing all activists of the AB League.

5. Establishing, in cities, genuine trade unions of the class, implementing workers' supervision of capital, and strengthening the organization and training of pickets.

6. Setting up independent trade unions of farm laborers, which are extremely important organizations in establishing the leadership of the proletariat in the villages. Branch activities of the trade unions of farm laborers should be initiated, strengthening class education and leading the struggle against the rich peasants. In order to win over the basic masses of the poor peasants and launch the class struggle against the rich peasants, poor peasants' committees should be established, composed of the poor peasants who were exploited by high rent and interest in the past, and the poor peasants who are still poor after the present redistribution of the land. Attention should be given to selecting activists as leaders.

7. Using the method of persuasion and agitation in the vigorous expansion of the reserves of the Red Army, resolutely opposing commandism and deceptive methods which do not contribute to expanding the Red Army, but hinder its development. The reserves must pay attention to military and political training and taking the lead in participating in the work of the masses.

IX. The Present Work of the First Front Army

A. Military strategy: The First and Third Army Groups believe that the situation in which the enemy is advancing toward us after massive reinforcements presents the most excellent opportunity to replenish the weapons of the Red Army, expand the Red Army, and create an iron Red Army. The present strategy is, given the general objective of occupying the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad, Nanchang, and Jiujiang, to build on the victory at Ji'an, and achieve further victories. That is to say that we must mobilize the broad masses in the areas between Ji'an and Nanchang and prepare supplies, while at the same time stepping up the mobilization of the masses and the preparation of supplies in the rear, so as to be ready for a large scale decisive battle with the enemy, to destroy his main forces and realize victory in the whole province.

B. Strengthening political training in the army. At present, attention should be concentrated on carrying out the decisive class struggle. The political agitation for achieving initial victory in Jiangxi may point out the inevitable collapse of the counterrevolutionary alliance, the excellent opportunity posed by the massive offensive for creating an iron Red Army and strengthening the determination of the soldiers and officers. At the same time, the army should give attention to opposing the AB Corps and the Reorganizationists, conducting general political education of new soldiers, and establishing soldiers' committees and Party organizations. Special attention should be paid to strengthening the leadership capacity of the Party and enlarging its organization. The number of Party members in each army should double within a month. In addition, emphasis should be placed on planned propaganda on Communist theory and on various questions of revolutionary tactics. Literacy lessons ought also to be conducted in a planned way, in an effort to raise the political level of the Red Army, and the soldiers should be led in doing mass work frequently. Resolute

worker and peasant elements should be absorbed in the course of mass struggles, and the Red Army should be expanded, in order to fulfill the task of creating an iron Red Army.

C. Strengthening practical military training is one of the important tasks of an iron Red Army. This applies in particular to the numerous new soldiers. It cannot be neglected in carrying out the decisive class struggle. Inappropriate, formalistic methods of physical culture (such as training in posture) must be abolished. In addition to conducting drills, all time for activity and rest should be used to fulfill this task. The officers of all armies must supervise and inspect the implementation of this work in a planned way.

The Front Committee of the First Front Red Army
The Action Committee of Jiangxi Province

Reproduced on October 26, 1930

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army to Extend Its Work for Three Days in the Original Location

(October 29, 1930, in front of Luofangyuan)

1. The Jiangxi enemy has not made any significant movements, every single one of the Hunan enemy has returned to Hunan, and there are no enemies in Shanggao, Wanzai, and Yuanzhou.

2. The plan is for this front army to remain in its present location and extend its work for three days until November 2.

3. Points for attention in the work of all units:

a. Each unit should raise enough funds to supply itself with provisions for one month or longer.

b. Make efforts to capture weapons from the landlords and reactionaries, arm reliable peasants to the extent possible, or concentrate forces to organize Red Guard units.

c. Thoroughly distribute all farmland within each work area.

d. Each unit must find ways to purchase bullets (because in the local villages a large quantity of bullets are being hidden.)

e. Pay attention to internal political and military training.

4. General Headquarters remains with the Central Revolutionary Military Committee in the original location.

Attention:

a. The work area should be expanded as much as possible according to circumstances.

b. Transportation and communications during the period of operations should be carried out in compliance with the communications network diagram and the regulations issued by the Staff Office of this headquarters.

c. Each unit must submit a daily report to this headquarters documenting in detail the following items:

(i) Reconnaissance results. (ii) Espionage and transportation arrangements. (iii) Captured arms and their allocation. (iv) Situation and process of land distribution. (v) Amount of funds collected and the process. (vi) Drilling of the unit itself. (vii) Other. (viii) Comments and suggestions.

d. During this period of work, all units of the First Front Army should operate in accordance with the principles decided upon at the education conference of the whole army group in Ji'an. All must use the new troop formations based on the newly formulated tactics, and must undertake training in the construction of fortifications.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

We have translated this order from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 203–204.

The Problem of the Rich Peasants after Land Redistribution (The Situation in Yongxin and Beilu)[1]

Report by Wang Huai and Chen Zhengren, as noted by Mao Zedong[2]

(October 1930)

Exploitation by the rich peasants in the Red areas in Yongxin is carried out, first, through hoarding grain and, second, by selling industrial products. There are two ways of hoarding grain: (1) hoarding one's own surplus grain and (2) buying poor peasants' grain at cheap prices. This year's serious spring famine was caused in this way. Since rich peasants will hoard grain, and the government sets the maximum grain prices, they hide away their grain altogether, to the point where once the poor residents and workers in the cities ate rice gruel for a whole week. Unable to get rice, the farm laborers and poor peasants in the countryside also went hungry. Later, the leadership of the *xian* soviet led a spring famine struggle, fought the rich peasants resolutely, and made no concessions to them, in a determined effort to bring down grain prices. The Party played a role in each district and township, organizing young pioneers to dig out the hidden grain; they found a large amount of grain concealed by rich peasants in wine barrels, hollow walls, straw huts, clay-brick yards, and underneath their beds. As a result, there was not only enough grain to eat, but even a surplus. When new grain was harvested, rich peasants, one after another, hauled the old grain to the cities for sale. In the small business of selling industrial products, rich peasants make an enormous profit, mainly from salt, machine-knitted socks, towels, sugar, soap, and so on. They have capital and all kinds of old social connections. Rich peasants can do things that poor peasants and farm laborers cannot.

Our source for this report is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 252–53, which reproduces the text as it appears in the 1941 Yan'an edition of *Nongcun diaocha*, with helpful annotations.

1. In March 1930, the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee had set up Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Route action committees, under its own control, to help in the task of leadership. The reference here is to the area controlled by the Beilu or Northern Route Action Committee.

2. This observation was added by Mao himself to the text as published in 1941.

(The above is reported by Wang Huai; what follows is reported by Chen Zhengren.)[3]

Not only is it like this in Yongxin, it is the same in Beilu. There, too, a spring famine struggle was waged this year. Rich peasants made money in business, just as in Yongxin. In Futian there is a shop called the Jiuru Tang; the owner is a small capitalist. When there was a shortage of salt in Beilu, he went to Nanchang to buy salt. When there is no ink or paper, he can also get them in Nanchang. Because he has been able to establish contact with the head of the Guomindang's self-defense corps,[4] he has old social connections. The salt and other goods he sells are all very high-priced. During June and July, his salt is sold for as much as six hundred cash per *jin*. He has two sewing machines, which have deprived the tailors in Futian of work, so they are all against him. Moreover, because his prices are too high, the municipal soviet of Futian, at the demand of the masses, arrested him and fined him one thousand *yuan*. Having paid the fine, he continues to do business in Futian. After Ji'an was liberated, his business grew even bigger. At the time of the spring famine in Beilu, rich peasants sold grain to the White areas. The spring famine struggle was to stop grain from flowing into the White areas, and allow it to circulate only between the Red areas.

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3. Wang Huai (1906–1932) was a native of Jiangxi, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. He was a member of the Standing Committee of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee from March to October 1930. Chen Zhengren (1907–1972), a native of Jiangxi, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In October 1928, he became deputy secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area Special Committee. He was secretary of the Northern Route Action Committee of Southwest Jiangxi from May to October 1930; in October, he became head of the Propaganda Department of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee.

4. The "self-defense corps" [*shouwang dui*] was an organization that the landlords forced the peasants to join for the purpose of sabotaging the Red areas.

Xingguo Investigation

(October 1930)

In September 1930, the First Front Army of the Red Army returned from the attack on Changsha to Jiangxi. At the beginning of October, it fought its way into Ji'an and advanced into the Yuan River basin. Xingguo sent a large number of peasants to join the Red Army, and I took advantage of this opportunity to conduct an investigation of the Xingguo tenth district, that is, the Yongfeng District. I located eight persons—Fu Jiting, Li Changying, Wen Fengzhang, Chen Zhenshan, Zhong Dewu, Huang Dachun, Chen Beiping, and Lei Hanxiang—and held an investigation meeting. The investigation was conducted at the end of October 1930, the meeting place was Luofang in Xinyu *xian*, and the investigation meeting lasted one week.[1] Yongfeng is located at the juncture of the three *xian* of Xingguo, Gan, and Wan'an, and is divided into four townships [*xiang*]. The old Lingyuan District is the first township, Dongjiang District is the second township, the Shankeng District is the third township, and the Jiangtuan District is the fourth township; Yongfeng Town in the second township is the political and economic center of the district. The population distribution is: the first township, 3,000; the second township, 800; the third township, 3,000; and the fourth township, 2,000; making a total of 8,800. Since the borders of this district cut across Xingguo, Gan, and Wan'an *xian*, it is clear that this district is not much different from the two *xian* of Gan and Wan'an and not much different from the land struggle situation in all of southern Jiangxi. Real policy decisions must definitely be based on the concrete situation. Things

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Our source for this investigation is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 182–251, which reproduces the text as it appears in the 1941 Yan'an edition of *Nongcun diaocha*. The version in *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 2, pp. 185–252, is taken from the 1947 Jin-Cha-Ji edition of Mao's works. The content is exactly the same, except that the 1947 edition confuses the date of Mao's preface to this work, which was written on January 26, 1931, with the date of the investigation itself, which was completed in October 1930.

1. These peasants had come a substantial distance, for the Yuan River basin is north of Ji'an, and Xingguo *xian* is to the south, well over 100 kilometers away. Presumably these men were members of the Red Army Reserve Corps from the Xingguo Tenth District, whose participation in the Xinyu campaign is mentioned below in Section VII 5 of this text. As indicated above, in a note to the text dated October 26, 1930, a Joint Conference of the General Front Committee of the First Front Army and the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee took place in Luofang from October 25 to November 1, 1930, to discuss strategy after the retreat from Changsha. Since Mao says his investigation meeting lasted one week, he was evidently engaged in these two activities simultaneously.

imagined sitting in a room and things reported and written down in rough outline in a book are certainly not the concrete situation, and to determine policy according to what you "think ought to be" or from reports that do not reflect reality is dangerous. A great many mistakes that the Red districts made in the past were the result of Party directives' not being in accord with the real situation. Therefore, detailed, scientific, real investigations are extremely necessary. This investigation, generally speaking, does not probe very deeply, but it is rather more thorough than my previous investigations. First, I have never before investigated eight households, and actually, without this kind of investigation, you do not have a basic concept of the village. Second, investigating the reactions of the various classes in the land struggle is something I did in the Xunwu survey, but it was not done fully. The weakness of this investigation is that it did not investigate the conditions of children and women, that it did not investigate trade conditions or make price comparisons, and that it did not investigate the conditions of agricultural production after land redistribution had been carried out, nor did it investigate the cultural situation. Originally these were supposed to be investigated but, because of the enemy attack on Luofang, the Red Army decided to use the tactic of luring the enemy deep, so we had no choice but to terminate our investigation meeting. This is how the materials that appear below were obtained: From the investigation outline that I suggested, questions were asked and discussed, and all the conclusions were obtained from suggestions that I made on which the eight comrades agreed, which were then written down. There were some things about which no conclusions were made, but which are recorded as their responses. Our investigation meetings were lively and interesting. We met two or even three times every day, sometimes late into the night, yet they never felt tired. I would like to express my deep thanks to these comrades. A few of them were Party members, but most were not.

Mao Zedong

Revised January 26, 1931, in Xiaobu Town, Yudu

I. Observations of Eight Households

1. Fu Jiting:

Resident of the tenth district, first township; ran a small slaughterhouse, had no capital. Fed five persons. Had rice fields yielding 23 *dan*, 3 *dan* to be paid in rent, leaving 20 *dan*. With five people eating 7 *dan* each, altogether they needed 35 *dan*, so they were short 15 *dan*, and relied on their slaughterhouse business to make up the deficiency. For each pig killed, they could receive about 1.30 *yuan* (now there are no large pigs for slaughter, so they can get only 0.50 *yuan* per

pig). The five people include: the father (aged eighty),[2] the wife (who cooked, raised pigs, got firewood, did the laundry, and could not till the fields), a son (aged five), a daughter (aged one), and himself (aged thirty-nine, tilled the fields and slaughtered the pigs). In addition to his own fields, he rented fields with a yield of 5 *dan* from someone else, and every year he had to hire a temporary laborer for one month to help him work the fields. His mother died five years ago, and when she died they spent over one hundred *yuan*.[3] In addition to what his brothers put up, he himself borrowed 50 *yuan*, a debt which accumulated interest on the interest, and now already amounted to 150 *yuan*. Of the 23 *dan* of rice from the fields, 17 *dan* were his own. Six *dan* were "absentee fields" belonging to public lands of the Zhong clan over in Bailu (in Gan *xian*, some 10 *li* away). Of these 6 *dan*, each *dan* carried a security deposit of 6 *yuan*, for a total of 36 *yuan*, in addition to which he paid rent of 3 *dan* (50 percent).

In the third [lunar] month of last year, when the revolution failed, he fled to the mountains of Juncun to help work in the mountains. In the ninth month, when the Red Army arrived in Xingguo, he returned to his home, the pacification defense corps dogs went into the hills, and the land was not redistributed. In the second month of this year (March by the solar calendar), the Red Army attacked Ganzhou, and in the second month redistributed the land, but though the redistribution had not got this far, he did not have to pay the rent of 3 *dan*, and the debt of 150 *yuan* was cancelled. At the same time, the security deposit of 36 *yuan* was also not collected. For three months, beginning in the second month, acting as land section chief in the village government, he has helped the people divide the land. Beginning in the fourth month, he has been head of a Red Guard detachment that has spears and no guns. After holding this position for three months, on the 15th of the sixth month, he led the detachment in an attack on the pacification defense corps dogs of Xingguo *xian*. Since the sixth month, the Red Guard detachment has been reorganized as a Red Army reserve brigade, and after being a platoon chief for more than one month, he became company commander. At this time the first township organized two companies. In the eighth month, in the attack on Qifang, he led his forces in the attack, and the attack was successful. At present (October), in the Xinyu campaign, he has been made battalion commander. It is not good for him to be away from the fields, and he has received nothing from the butchering

2. All ages in this text are given according to the Chinese system of *sui*.

3. The text specifies that these were *xiaoyang yuan*, literally, "small foreign dollars." These coins, also referred to as "subsidiary silver currency," were 10- and 20-cent silver pieces, which were discounted significantly as compared with the large one-*yuan* coins called *dayang yuan*. Such coins, and the paper money based on them, constituted in fact the normal unit for all day-to-day transactions in the countryside at this time, so in the balance of this text the term has been translated simply *yuan*. Regarding the monetary system at this time, see Roger Thompson, *Report from Xunwu*, Appendix A.

which has been turned over to someone else. He wants to return home and does not want to be in the Red Army.

With six years of schooling, he can, with some difficulty, read newspapers.

2. Li Changying:

From Pengwudong of the first township, tenth district.

Family of six. He, himself, aged forty-eight, tilled the fields. Wife is also forty-eight, has a weak heart, can only cook, wash the clothes, and feed the pig. Son, aged twenty, tilled the fields, very stupid, cannot do calculations. Bride, aged twenty, every day gathers firewood, cannot till the fields. Daughter, aged twelve, was married off in the sixth month of this year, married to a child of the Wu family in Sishili. The second son, aged three, died this year in the fourth month, so now they have only four mouths to feed.

He himself had rice fields yielding 30 *dan* and borrowed the 20 *dan* of fields of his younger brother, Li Changfen. Because his fields were not good enough to cover expenses, Li Changfen had gone to Taihe and Luokeng to work as a fieldhand. If water could be obtained for Li Changfen's 20 *dan* of fields, they would produce only 13 *dan* of rice, of which 9 went for the rent in kind. Li Changfen had a debt of 120 *yuan*, so the 9 *dan* in rent amounted to paying the interest for Changfen. Because his own 30 *dan* of fields were on hillsides where the terraces easily collapse, in reality he could harvest only 17 *dan*, and together with Changfen's fields, which actually brought in only 4 *dan*, his total yield was 21 *dan*. All of this was wet (unhulled) rice, which with a reduction of 30 percent amounted to 15 *dan* of dry hulled rice, and only 17 *dan* in a good year. The annual consumption of rice for six people is 40 *Dan*.[4] Having less than half of what they needed, he relied on sweet potatoes to help out, of which he harvested roughly 30 *Dan* per year. By raising one pig and selling it in the twelfth month, he got enough to buy oil and salt. Ordinarily, they could not eat meat. They bought meat to eat only on the holidays of the Bright and Clear Festival [*qingming*] (0.40 *yuan*), the Transplanting Festival [*shitian*] (1.50 *yuan*), Double Five [*duanwu*] (0.30 *yuan*), Eat-New Festival [*chixin*] (1 *yuan*), Mid-Seventh Month Festival (0.20 to 0.30 *yuan*), Mid-Autumn Festival (0.20 to 0.30 *yuan*), Harvest Festival [*gehe*] (2 *yuan*), Double Ninth Festival [*chongyang*] (0.20 to 0.30 *yuan*), and the New Year's Festival (3 *yuan*). On the Eat-New Festival he had to buy 1 *yuan* worth of meat because he had to hire workers to plant the sweet potatoes. At the Transplanting Festival and the Harvest Festival he also had to hire workers. Every year he had to hire workers for twenty days. In addition to doing their own work, the father and son also had to help out on the 20-*dan* fields of his

4. As indicated above, in a note to chapter III of the Xunwu Investigation, we distinguish between the two characters read *dan*, one being a unit of weight and the other a unit of volume, by capitalizing the transcription when it refers to the first of these.

second brother, on which every year they had to spend eighty workdays (every *dan* of rice fields required three workdays for good fields, and four workdays for poor fields). Because his second brother had died, leaving behind his wife, Changying's second son has been given to them to continue the family line. Eighty workdays with no pay, so after doing their own work and the work for the second brother's wife, they had no energy left over to work for anyone else.

The debt of 120 *yuan* was owed to the public granary and bore an annual interest payment of 7.5 *dan* (every 16 *yuan* borrowed attracted interest of one *dan* of grain, each *dan* being worth 2.40 *yuan*). At the end of every year, the sale of a pig brought something over 20 *yuan*, and except for buying 6 or 7 *yuan* of salt and oil, all the rest was turned over to pay back the interest to the public granary. The new and the old public granaries in this village each had something over 30 *dan* of rice, for a total of 70 *dan*.

With the redistribution of the land in the third month of this year the six persons each received shares of seven *dan* in fields, for a total of 42 *dan*, and that piece of land owned by Changfen was turned over totally to Changying; the interest that Changying had been paying on Changfen's debt was cancelled, and the debt of 120 *yuan* to the public granary was also cancelled. The 42 *dan* of land is poor land that can give a yield of only 60 percent, about 25 *dan*, more or less, which, together with the sweet potatoes, gives them just enough to get by on.

In the eighth month of this year, there was a development in southwestern Jiangxi. The land was redistributed yet again, [applying the principle] of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. One of his sons had died and one of his daughters had been married off, leaving only four persons in the family, each of whom received a share of 6 *dan* and 1 *tong* (4 *tong* make 1 *dan*), for a total of 25 *dan* of rice fields. A piece of his poor fields was given to someone else and a piece of someone else's good fields was given to him. This time the land distribution shares were evenly balanced. Why was it that in the third month distribution everyone received shares of 7 *dan* and in the eighth month distribution only 6.25 *dan*? Because after the victory of the revolution, twelve peasants from Pengwudong who had earlier gone to farm in Taihe now returned. The revolution had not yet reached Taihe, and, hearing that there had been a revolution in Xingguo and that the land was being distributed, they all returned so that the shares of everyone in this village were now somewhat smaller.

There are only four surnames in Pengwudong, Yi, Li, Qiu, and Zheng, with a total population of over 130 persons, and there is no village government.

He has not taken any part in affairs of the township government. His son, Li Quanpo, has been in charge of weapons for Pengwudong (spears, shotguns, knives, etc.). His son joined in the attacks on Xingguo and Liangkou, and for the attack on Nanchang it was his turn. He was willing to join the Red Army, but he wanted a one-month leave to return to buy an ox, for only then could he plow the

fields, because his ox had fallen down and died[5] on the 27th of the third month, this year. An ox he had bought for 23 *yuan* the year before last, fell and died, and and he was able to sell it for beef for 10 *yuan*. In the sixth month, he spent 12 *yuan* to buy an ox that fell down and died in the seventh month, which sold for beef for 8 *yuan* (which he still has not yet collected). He must buy yet another ox in order to till the fields, and so he wants a month off to return home, after which he will rejoin the Red Army.

"Thanks to the blessings of the Red Army," an ox that cost 70 *yuan* in the past can be bought today for only 20 *yuan*. "Thanks to the blessings of the Red Army," everything is cheaper. Oil that in the past cost 23 *yuan* per *Dan* (100 *jin*), now cost only 20 *yuan* a *Dan*. Unhusked rice that in the past cost 4 *yuan* a *dan* is now 1 *yuan* a *dan* (three coppers[6] per *sheng* of husked rice). Firewood that in the past cost 20 copper cash [*wen*] per *jin* is now 8 copper cash per *jin*. Pork that in the past was 530 copper cash per *jin* is now 320 copper cash per *jin*. Only such items as salt and cloth have become especially expensive. Salt that in the past was 320 copper cash per *jin* is now 800 copper cash per *jin*, while cloth that in the past was, for white cotton cloth, 140 copper cash per foot[7] is today 320 per foot.

3. Wen Fengzhang:

From the fourth township (Houjing) of the tenth district. Houjing has over three hundred persons and a village government.

Four mouths to feed.

The father, aged fifty-six, has sore feet and cannot do any work at all. The mother, aged forty-six, has poor eyesight and, except for feeding the pig, cannot do anything else. He himself is twenty-two, and he tilled the fields. Since the third month of this year, he has been the commander of a detachment, and since the seventh month he has been on the finance committee of the township government. In the tenth month he joined the attack on Nanchang, as company commander of the Red Army Acting Reserves. His wife is sixteen, and she does the cooking, gets firewood, looks after the ox, and does not help in the fields.

He himself had 8 *dan* of absentee landlord fields. He does not know how much security deposit his father put down on them, but every year he still had to pay rent of 2.5 *dan* (dry hulled rice). These were originally 8-*dan* wet [unhulled] paddy fields, and, since they were good fields, they could yield 8 *dan* of dry hulled rice. The four persons needed 28 *dan* per year, or a minimum of 20 *dan*.

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5. *Diesi*. It has not been possible to identify this disease. Presumably it is some virulent malady such as anthrax, which kills the cattle very quickly.

6. *Tong pian*, modern one-cent copper pieces of which 21 equaled 0.1 *yuan* in silver, according to Mao's Xunwu investigation. The copper to small silver exchange rate, like that between large and small silver coins, varied according to time and place.

7. The reference is to the Chinese foot (*chi*), equivalent to approximately 14.1 English inches, or 0.358 meters.

From a landlord, he rented 120 *dan* of rice fields, with no security deposit and rent in kind. The 120 *dan* of fields were all flood-plain fields. In reality, only 90 *dan* of wet rice could be harvested (there was one harvest a year). After a 20 percent reduction, this made 72 *dan* of dry rice, of which 55 *dan* went to pay the rent (at a rate of 75 percent), leaving 17 *dan*, which was not enough to feed them. After the harvest in the sixth to seventh months, although he had reaped the grain, after paying the rent, and paying back the cost of the grain he had borrowed[8] last year, they had nothing to eat. Then in the eighth to ninth months he again needed to borrow grain. He borrowed from a rich peasant, repaying 1.5 *dan*[9] for each *dan* borrowed for one year. Every year he needed to borrow over 10 *dan* of grain. This year, "thanks to the Red Army," he did not have to pay back last year's 12 *dan* of grain borrowed. He had a debt of 60 *yuan* that he owed to the landlord, Liu Huarang, on which the interest was 1 *dan* of rice for every 10 *haoyang* dollars.[10] Now he does not have to repay this. Fortunately, he was able to harvest 40 *Dan* of sweet potatoes, and with 3 *Dan* of sweet potatoes being the equivalent of 1 *dan* of rice, this was equivalent to a total of 13 *dan* of rice.

In the third month of this year, the four persons received shares in the distribution of the fields totaling 32 *dan* of fields; in addition to their 8 *dan* of absentee landlord fields, they received an additional 24 *dan* of fields. The method of dividing the fields was to take the 128 *dan* that he had originally tilled (120 *dan* as a tenant, plus the 8 *dan* of his own) and to carve out 96 *dan* to give to other people, leaving him with 32 *dan*. As much as possible, the fields given to others were poor fields, while the fields they retained were all good fields. In the second redistribution in the eighth month, it was discovered that he had been given too much, and that his land was too good, so 2 *dan* were cut away, leaving him with 30 *dan*. Some of his good fields were also taken away, and he was given others that were poorer. "The township government distributes the land very equitably."

In the past, when tilling 120 *dan* of rice fields, he was desperately busy, and for the three seasons of transplanting, harvesting, and planting the sweet potatoes, he had to hire workers. At transplanting time he would hire workers for six or seven workdays, and at harvesting time he needed over thirty workdays of help. At sweet potato planting time (twice, for early and late plantings) he needed over thirty workdays, for a total of over seventy workdays of help, not counting the more than ten workdays of friendly exchange (I help you work and you help me work) for transplanting and sweet potato planting. Now he tills only 30 *dan* of rice fields. Not only does he not have to hire outside help, or do friendly exchanges, but his work is not so difficult as it was in the past. Compared with the past, his work is only one-third as difficult, and he has a lot of spare time, which he uses to do things in the financial administration of the township government. He has participated in the attack on Xingguo, the attack on Liangkou, and the present attack on Nanchang.

He has four years of schooling. He can make out about half of a poster, and he can keep accounts.

8. *Shenggu*, loan-grain; see below.

9. The text actually reads "3 baskets" (*luo*); two such measures were equivalent to one *dan*.

10. *Haoyang* is another name for *xiaoyang*, used in southern China.

4. Chen Zhenshan:

From the second township (Zhigesi) of the tenth district.

The second township has a total population of eight hundred persons, with the township government at Yongfeng Town.

Seven mouths to feed, three brothers, each with a wife, and the daughter of the eldest brother. The eldest brother is twenty-nine. Chen Zhenshan, the second oldest, is twenty-four, and the third brother is eighteen. The eldest brother had a salt and oil stall that was set up outside the entrance to a store. He sold the salt and oil only in small amounts. He borrowed 130 *yuan* from someone as capital, lost it, and "linked up with the revolution." He did not want to repay the debt, so he could not reopen his stall, and he is now a soldier with the Twentieth Army. The second brother has eight years of schooling. Up until the age of nineteen, he was at home looking after the ox. Beginning at nineteen, he learned how to "look after the land,"[11] and he has been "looking after the land" for five years. He is a propagandist in the township government. In this mobilization he was a company-level political committee member. The third brother was an apprentice to a bamboo carpenter. He had been studying this trade for three years and is now a soldier in the Twentieth Army. The eldest brother's wife cooks, gathers firewood, and grows vegetables. The second brother's wife does the same things and is now head of the women's Red Guard unit of the township government. The third brother's wife is only nine years old. The eldest brother's daughter is aged two.

They had 20 *dan* of rice fields of their own, and rented another 10 *dan* (on which they paid rent of 5 *dan*), under the direction of his eldest brother. The market at Yongfeng Town lasted three days. When the market was open, the eldest brother would go to sell oil and salt, and when the market was over, he would return home to till the fields. In addition to tilling the fields himself, the eldest brother annually hired workers for eighty workdays to help with the work.

On a debt of 130 *yuan*, they had to pay interest of 10 *dan* of rice. Of the 30 *dan* of rice harvested annually they paid 5 *dan* in rent and 10 *dan* in interest,

11. The expression translated "to look after the land" (*kan di*) is strictly parallel to that in the previous sentence, *kan niu* (to look after the ox). Since the character used for land is *di*, meaning land in general, or place, rather than *tian*, meaning cultivated field, the sense is apparently "to mind the farm," or "to look after the place." By putting the expression in quotation marks, Mao suggests that it has such a loose or broad meaning.

leaving only 15 *dan*. Of the seven persons, except when the third brother was away helping others to make things from bamboo splints, the six of them needed 42 *dan* to feed themselves, so they are short 23 *dan*, and they relied on the supplement of the little bit of money that came from the eldest brother's oil and salt business, and what the second brother earned looking after the land. The third brother was still in his apprenticeship term, during which he did not earn anything.

In the second month of last year, with the coming of the revolution, both the eldest and second brothers joined the revolution, the eldest brother acting as head of the food supplies office of the peasant association, and the second brother doing propaganda. All the women support the revolution because the creditor of their debt was always pressing them and making life impossible for them. When they heard about resisting rents, resisting service, resisting special fees, resisting grain taxes, and resisting debt payments, they were delighted and thus supported the eldest brother and second brother joining the revolution. The third brother is very naive. He does whatever anyone tells him to do, and this time he did not join the revolution. When the revolution failed in the fourth month, the Pacification Defense Corps dogs came and the eldest brother fled to Juncun and worked in the mountains, while the second brother fled to Guanchao in Taihe to act as a caretaker of someone's property, where he earned 70 to 80 *yuan*. In the twelfth month of last year, the Red Army again occupied Xingguo, and the eldest brother and second brother returned home to again participate in the revolution. When the revolution failed, six of their buildings were burned down by the Pacification Defense Corps dogs.

In the land distribution of the third month this year, in addition to their own 20 *dan* of land, they also received shares of 29 *dan*, giving them a total of 49 *dan*, or 7 *dan* per person. When the women saw that the land had been distributed and that they did not have to pay the rent or return the debt, they were overwhelmed with joy. The wife of the second brother was delighted to go to the township government, where she acted as leader of the women's Red Guard brigade. The land shares received in the third month redistribution were all good fields. When in the eighth month the land was redistributed again to balance the good and poor fields, half their good fields were taken away and replaced with poor fields, so that they still had 7 *dan* per person. Nevertheless, the women remained content, because they were working in the government where they frequently talked about the fact that the good and poor fields of other people should be balanced, so when it came time to balance their own fields, they also agreed.

The eldest brother, the second brother, the third brother, and the wife of the second brother all left home to work for the revolution, leaving at home only the three women, the wife of the eldest brother, the daughter of the eldest brother's wife, and the child wife. Since none of them had the ability to till the fields, the township government delegated people to till the fields for them. The extra

manpower delegated by the township government to till their fields tilled the Chen family's fields first, before tilling their own, and did it very well. Those sent to till their fields ate with the Chen family. Of the seven in the family, four were away eating elsewhere, so the 7 *dan* that each of these four would have consumed became a surplus that was then sold, and with the money they bought oil and salt and cloth.

5. Zhong Dewu:

From the third township (Shankeng) of the tenth district.

The family has eleven persons. He himself is aged twenty-eight, has had seven years of schooling, and has a position as a gentleman[12] (accounts manager) for Wang's General Store in Bailu (30 *li* from Shankeng), with an annual salary of 60 *yuan*. From the time he began there as an apprentice to becoming store manager, it had been a total of thirteen years. In the third month of last year, when the Red Army came to Bailu, he returned to live at home. The mother is an old woman of fifty-seven, and she takes care of the little children. His older brother, the eighth brother, is thirty-one and tilled the fields. His eighth brother's wife is thirty-two, and she cooks, gathers firewood, does the laundry, and does not work in the fields. He has two nephews, one aged nine, who is studying, and the other aged three. His own wife, who is twenty-eight, cooks, gathers firewood, and tends the pig. He has two sons, one, aged seven, who is studying, and one who is two. His older nephew is married to a girl of nine, who takes care of the little children. There is one niece aged two. Of the above total of eleven persons, only the eighth brother was able to till the fields, while he himself was able to engage in business. None of the others had any productive abilities.

They themselves had only 30 *dan* of rice fields, and they rented from others another 36 *dan*, for a total of 66 *dan* of rice fields. On the rented land they paid rent of 60 percent, or 21.6 *dan,* which they paid in cash, and kept the rice for themselves. They were able to harvest 40 *Dan* of sweet potatoes annually. Eleven persons need 77 *dan* of rice to eat. Such items as raising ducks and a pig, making wine, hiring workers, entertaining guests, and so forth, took another 20 *dan* more or less. Thus, they needed a total of about 100 *dan*, of which their relatively low income left them 20 *dan* short. Annually, the entire family needed a total of 150 to 160 *yuan* for salt, cloth, labor, for buying grain, and all social obligations, including 20-plus to 30 *yuan* for salt, 30-plus *yuan* for cloth, and 25 to 26 *dan* for grain at about 3 *yuan* per *dan* for a total of over 70 *yuan*. In addition, they needed over 20 *yuan* for social obligations. The source of this 150

12. For a detailed discussion of the system under which employees in stores at this time progressed from the status of apprentices to that of "gentlemen" (*xiansheng*) see, above, the relevant passage in Mao's Xunwu investigation, Chapter III, the section on "general stores," and the note thereto.

to 160 *yuan* was the 60 *yuan* salary from the general store in Bailu, plus a bonus of 20 *yuan*; 10 or more *yuan* from miscellaneous produce that they grew, such as beans; something over 10 *yuan* from selling the meat that was left over from what they themselves ate of the pig they raised; and 10 or more *yuan* from pine firewood sold annually. This makes a total of approximately 120 *yuan*, to which must be added an annual debt of 30 to 40 *yuan*. The family formerly had a total indebtedness of over 200 *yuan*.

In the past, they had 46 *dan* of rice fields. Ten years ago, they sold 7 *dan* of fields (at a price of 10 *yuan* per *dan*), and the year before last they sold another 9 *dan* of fields (at 12 *yuan* per *dan*), leaving them with only 30 *dan*. The eighth brother did not have enough strength to till them alone, so every year they had to hire over 120 workdays of labor, at 240 cash per workday, for a total of twenty-eight strings of cash for labor annually.

In the second month of this year (March by the solar calendar), with the success of the revolution, each person received 5.5 *dan* of rice fields, giving the eleven persons a total of 60.5 *dan* (including their own 30 *dan*). Because that time the township did not balance good versus poor fields, they now are about to have a new redistribution, which has yet to be carried out. This township has a large population and a shortage of rice fields. A 5.5 *dan* share per person is not enough to live on. In the past, their family needed about 100 *dan* of rice to eat annually, plus miscellaneous funds of 150 to 160 *yuan*. The result of the land redistribution left them with 60.5 *dan*, 6 *dan* less than the 66 *dan* they had before the revolution. But they do not need to pay the 22 *dan* in rent (corresponding to over 60 *yuan* in cash), nor do they have to pay the 40 *yuan* in interest on their loan of over 200 *yuan* (20 percent interest rate). This is the good side. On the bad side is the fact that with the failure of Wang's General Store in Bailu, he is out of a job, so they have 80 *yuan* less in annual income (salary of 60 *yuan*, plus bonus of 20 *yuan*). Taking both aspects into account, they are about the same after the revolution as before. But after the revolution, their miscellaneous expenses are considerably diminished, and although they will still have expenses for entertaining hired workers, these will be somewhat less. Because they can be more economical in their clothing, they can also save a little on cloth. Since they do not have enough rice to eat, they will still have to buy rice, but the price of rice is much lower, 70 cents per *dan*. Their social obligations will be reduced considerably. Thus, the 150 to 160 *yuan* that they formerly needed for miscellaneous expenses will be cut in half, so that 80 *yuan* per year will be sufficient (in Xingguo money is always calculated in *haoyang*).[13]

The land distribution in the third month followed the principles: "take the original tiller as the standard, and draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce." Taking the village as the unit, since in this village there is a larger

13. As noted above, the meaning of *haoyang* is essentially the same as that of the more common *xiaoyang*; presumably Mao is simply indicating which term is in use here.

population and less land, in practice they could only apply letting the original tillers keep their lands and did not draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. The further redistribution that is planned to take place will take land from other villages, so that probably each person will be able to receive 7 *dan*. If this is possible their food grain will be about right.

In the fifth month, he accepted responsibility in the land office of the township government for distributing hillside forest lands (as one of the four person committee on distributing the hillsides) and distributed all the hillside forest lands of the third township. Using a model that had been decided upon by the township representative assembly, he then went out and called a mass meeting in each village separately and carried out the distribution of the hillsides in each village. Larger hillside shares were given to those with less in fields, while those with more fields received less in hillside plots. While some with fields received no hillside plots, no one was given just hillside plots and no fields. Those with hillside plots are all given a little in fields. In the fifth month, he became brigade leader of the Red Guard reserve brigade. In the sixth month, he became a propaganda worker in the Independent Brigade. For this latest Xinyu mobilization, he was again a propaganda worker. He participated in the seventh and eighth attacks on Ji'an.

He wants to be a propaganda worker in the Red Army.

6. *Huang Dachun:*

From Chagan Village of the first township, tenth district.

This village has over 390 people.

Four mouths to feed. Aged thirty-six, he worked for someone else making firecrackers. His mother, aged fifty-four, has been ill for nine years and cannot do any work. His wife, aged thirty-one, cut firewood, which she carried to Bailu town to sell (Bailu is 10 *li* from Chagan), and with the money she would buy rice for the table. She also did the cooking, grew vegetables, and did the laundry, a very difficult life. His younger brother, aged thirty-two, was a bamboo craftsman. Last year, in the third month, he went to the Second Regiment and joined the Red Army. There has been no word from him since he left.

The family had 5 *dan* of rice fields that they tilled themselves, and they did not rent land from anyone else.

He helped someone else make firecrackers, working as a hired hand at the rate of 14 cents a day. If he worked every day, he could earn 4 *yuan* per month. His brother, the bamboo craftsman, made 11 cents a day, from which, after tobacco and clothing, he had no money left over.

After the revolution, firecrackers were no longer made, and his younger brother also no longer did the bamboo work and joined the army.

In the past, relying on his job making firecrackers and on the wife selling cut firewood, they never had enough to eat, from the beginning of the year to the

end. With the land distribution, they have enough to eat. He owed a debt of 40 *yuan* to a rich peasant named Chen, for which his 5 *dan* of fields was the security deposit. This rich peasant was extremely evil, and during the revolution the masses beat him to death. Last year in the third month, a secret peasant association was organized, and the Chagan Village peasant association had fifty-six members. He was responsible for liaison. In the eleventh month of last year he became leader of the Red Guard brigade. This year, in the fourth month, he was the land cadre; in the sixth month, he became platoon leader in the Red Army Reserve Corps; in the eighth month, he became company commander in the Reserve Corps, and this time he led the corps in the action at Xinyu.

In the third month land redistribution, they received only 6.5 *dan* of fields each, all of which was poor land. Also, because the original tiller had already sown the seeds, the original tiller received 60 percent of the harvest and the new household received only 40 percent. In the new redistribution carried out in the seventh month (August by the solar calendar), each person received 7 *dan* and this time half of it was in good fields.

Since he was an unemployed firecracker worker and his brother was a bamboo worker who had joined the Red Army, both were given shares of land. Other workers who had employment also received shares of land, and furthermore, in the same amounts as the peasants. This was because even if the workers are presently employed, their jobs are not secure and they are always in fear of losing their jobs, so they requested that they be given shares of land. Also, because workers who received shares of land could not farm the fields themselves, they had to hire others to till the fields, and thus they needed the same amount of land as the others. In the beginning the peasants agreed only to let the workers have half shares. When the workers said that if they got only half shares they would have to raise the price of their labor, only then did the peasants say, "We will let you have full shares of land if you do not raise the price of your labor."

When the workers received shares of land, they did not have oxen and had to borrow oxen from friends or relatives, and having no plows they had to borrow plows as well, so they felt this was rather difficult.

Has had no schooling at all and can only write out a bill.

7. Chen Beiping:

From the third township (Shankeng) of the tenth district.

Eleven people. Three brothers, each with a wife. Two nephews, one father and one mother, and one paternal grandmother. The eldest brother, aged thirty-eight, was a bricklayer. The second brother, aged thirty-one, farmed the fields. The third brother, Chen Beiping, aged twenty-four, has had six and a half years of schooling, having studied for one and a half years at the higher elementary school. He has taught in the township elementary school for five years. The

father is sixty-five and the mother is sixty-two. The wives of the three brothers stay at home doing the cooking, cutting firewood, growing vegetables, and doing the laundry, and they do not work in the fields. One nephew is aged two, and the other aged three. The grandmother is ninety-one.

They themselves had 32 *dan* of fields and rented from someone else another 20 *dan*, on which they paid 10 *dan* in rent. Of the eleven people, two ate at work, and since the young and the elderly ate somewhat less, 60 *dan* of rice annually would have been enough for them to eat, but their income was only 42 *dan*, so they were short about 20 *dan*. In addition, there were miscellaneous necessities such as entertaining, craftsmen, miscellaneous items such as salt and oil and cloth, gifts for marriages and funerals and seasonal holidays, and so on, for which they needed about 120 *yuan*. They relied on the eldest brother's wages of about 50 *yuan*, on the teaching salary of about 50 *yuan* of the third brother, on about 20 *yuan* they made on items they took from the hills, like palm fiber, firewood, bamboo, and lumber, and on the calf that the female ox gave birth to every year that they were able to sell for about 20 *yuan*, for a total of about 140 *yuan*, which was not enough both to pay for their miscellaneous necessities and to supplement their supply of table rice.

They had a debt of 80 *yuan*.

Last year, the grandmother, mother, and the two nephews all died, leaving behind the three brothers, the wives of the second and third brothers, plus the eldest brother's mother-in-law, so they now have six mouths to feed.

In the third month land redistribution, based on nine persons (at that time, there was one newly born son, one newly born nephew, and the eldest brother's new wife, but in the second half of this year they all died) at 5.5 *dan* of fields each, they were allotted a total of 50.5 *dan*. In addition to their own 32 *dan* of fields they received 18.5 *dan*, all of which were poor fields. In the present reallotment, the survey has already been made clear, but the redistribution has not yet been carried out.

With the fall of the landlords and rich peasants, people no longer build houses, so the eldest brother is out of a job and has turned to farming. The third brother continues to teach, at the newly founded Village People's School, and like the government workers he is paid 10 cents per day for food expenses and receives no salary. In the third month, the third brother (Chen Beiping) became a member of the political committee of the standing reserve corps; in the fourth month, he became a propagandist for the township government; in the fifth month, he became head of the cultural bureau of the township government; in the sixth month, he became a secretary in the township government; in the intercalary sixth month, he returned home to teach; in the ninth month, he went to Xinyu to become a member of the political committee of the Second Company of the army reserves.

Both the eldest brother and the second brother participated in the attacks on Wangtang and Langcun.

8. Lei Hanxiang:

From the third township (Shankeng) of the tenth district.

Five mouths to feed. Three brothers, a mother, and the wife of the eldest brother. The eldest brother, aged forty-three, worked part-time helping others as a hired farm hand, and part-time tilling their own fields. The second brother, aged thirty-nine, worked part-time as a hired farm hand and part-time tilling their own fields. Lei Hanxiang, the third brother, is aged twenty-five, and is a second-year brickmason's apprentice who had returned home to work as a hired farm hand. The mother is seventy. The eldest brother's wife, aged thirty-four, does the cooking, gathers firewood, and grows vegetables.

They had 7.5 *dan* of fields of their own, and they rented 44 *dan* of fields from the public domain [*gongtang*], on which they paid the public domain 60 percent in rent.

They had a debt of 120 *yuan* at 20 percent interest that was borrowed from a rich peasant of their own village named Lei Zurong.

The eldest brother and the second brother did odd jobs for other people. The eldest brother worked at home two-thirds of the time and the second brother no more than one-third of the time. The third brother worked practically all the time doing odd jobs for other people. The eldest brother is head of the household.

In a lean year, the harvest on their own 7.5 *dan* of fields could yield only 6 *dan*, and the 44 *dan* of public domain land they tilled could yield only 70 percent, or 30 *dan*. Even when the harvest was smaller, the rent was not reduced, and they still had to pay 60 percent of the 44 *dan* as rent, which came to 26 *dan*. For all their work in the fields, they then could keep only 4 *dan*. Together with the 6 *dan* from their own fields, this gave them a total of no more than 10 *dan*, which was much less than they needed just to eat. Also, they still had to pay 24 *yuan* in interest, so that the entire family was in really desperate straits.

The way that they supplemented their livelihood, first of all, was with the money that the eldest brother and the second brother, and especially the third brother, earned working for other people. The third brother hired out for about 220 days per year, while the eldest brother hired out for about 30 to 40 days per year, and the second brother helped other people with their work for about 170 to 180 days per year. All together they hired out to work for other people a total of about 420 to 430 days a year. Ordinarily, this kind of work paid 200 copper cash a day. Harvesting and wood cutting paid 500 coppers per day. Their total annual wages came to about 40 *yuan*. Second, they relied on growing sweet potatoes, of which they got over 40 *Dan* annually, which is the equivalent of more than 10 *dan* of rice. Third, they relied on *fandao*, that is, late rice, of which they harvested over 10 *dan* a year. They did not have to pay rent on this. When they planted late rice they could not grow other miscellaneous crops. Fourth, they relied on raising pigs, raising two each year, getting 20 *yuan* or more for each, for a total of over 40 *yuan,* which, subtracting the half that they ate themselves, left them with something over 20 *yuan*.

The above figures show a total income of more than 30 *dan* of rice, and over 60 *yuan* in money. On the expense side, they had only three mouths to feed (about two-thirds of the time the three brothers ate at work, so there was only one mouth to feed at home, plus the two women, for a total of three), plus the 24 *yuan* in interest, so that their expenses were fairly low and they could use the rest of their income on oil and salt and miscellaneous expenses, and their livelihood should not have been too difficult. Why is it then that their family still suffered badly (they really never had anything good to eat, just rice mixed with sweet potatoes every day, and they also had no decent clothes to wear)? The first reason is that all three brothers liked to gamble, especially the second brother, who was always losing at gambling. The second reason is that the wife of the eldest brother liked to eat but was too lazy to cook, and was always storming around the house, so that the three brothers did not want to work, and she killed the pig. The third is that two oxen died one after the other, one from drinking nitric acid, and the other from falling down. The family had bad luck and nothing seemed to go right. For these three reasons, their family was always having problems.

In the third month land distribution, each person received a share of 6.5 *dan* of fields, for a total of 32.5 *dan*. From the 51.5 *dan* they originally tilled (the 7.5 *dan* of their own fields plus the 44 *dan* they rented), 19 *dan* of fields were given to someone else, and the rest became their own. However, the 19 *dan* that were given to someone else were all very poor hillside fields that could yield only one crop a year, while the fields they kept were good fields that could be double-cropped.

The survey for the new redistribution has been completed but not yet carried out.

Since the 19 *dan* of fields taken out in the third month redistribution were then farmed by the new household, the 19 *dan* of rice harvested then belonged to the new household. From those fields that have been given to another family, they will get part of the harvest, 60 percent to the original tiller and 40 percent to the new household. Since the new family does not have to plant the new crop and the fertilizer has already been put in by the original tiller, when it comes time for the harvest, the new household is willing to give 60 percent to the original tiller and the original tiller is willing to let the new household keep 40 percent, just as if the new household was renting it from the original tiller for 40 percent of the yield.

The eldest brother is a soldier in the Red Guard brigade of this village. He participated in the attacks on Qifang and Wangtang. The second brother is a squad leader in the Red Guards. The third brother began as a soldier in the Red Guards and then became a platoon leader, and in the recent campaign at Xinyu was a company commander.

II. The Old Land Relations in This District

A. Distribution of the Land

According to the land situation in the Xingguo tenth district, that is, in the Yongfeng Town area, the old land distribution was as follows:

Landlords:	40 percent	
Public land: [*gongtang*]	10 percent	(owned in common by landlords and rich peasants)
Rich peasants:	30 percent	
Middle peasants:	15 percent	
Poor peasants:	5 percent	

B. As Percentage of the Population

Landlords:	1 percent
Rich peasants:	5 percent
Middle peasants:	20 percent
Poor peasants:	60 percent
Farm laborers:	1 percent
Handicraftsmen:	7 percent
Small merchants:	3 percent
Vagrants:	2 percent

According to the above data, the truly exploiting class (landlords and rich peasants) constituted no more than 6 percent of the population, while they owned 80 percent of the land, of which the rich peasants owned 30 percent, and the rich peasants also had control over a good amount of the public domain. If the lands of the rich peasants had not been divided equally, it would have been difficult to solve the problem posed by the fact that the majority of the people did not have enough land. The middle peasants were 20 percent of the population, but they had only 15 percent of the land. The middle peasants needed equal distribution of the land because they did not have enough land, and equal distribution added to their lands, rather than decreasing them. Those who say that equal distribution will hurt the middle peasants are wrong.

For the analysis of population distribution here, the household was the unit, not the individual. The 1 percent listed as farm laborers refers to those who were solely hired farm laborers. Those poor peasants who also hired out as farm laborers are not included in this category. The 3 percent small merchants refers to those who were solely small merchants and does not include those who were part-time peasants and part-time small merchants. The 2 percent vagrants refers solely to that group of people who were unemployed and who made a living by gambling, as bandits, and the like, and does not include those who were partially unemployed.

Why did the landlords constitute only 1 percent of the population? Because most of the landlords who had land in this district lived in the Bailu and Tiancun districts of Lingxian and in the *xian* town of this *xian*. If all of these were to be included here the landlord class would probably constitute 2 or 3 percent of the total population.

C. The Conditions of Exploitation

The first category, land rent exploitation.

In the first township (Lingyuan Hamlet), second township (Yongfeng Town), and fourth township (Houjing), all land rents were 50 percent, while in the third township (Shankeng) some were 60 percent and a small portion were 50 percent. Because the first, second, and fourth townships are subject to both flooding and drought, the harvests were often bad, and so the rents were comparatively low. Because the third township does not have floods or droughts, the rents were comparatively high.

Why are the first, second, and fourth townships subject to flooding and drought, while the third township is not? Because fields of the first, second, and fourth townships are alluvial. The hills in that area are all of shifting sands with no trees. All the sand in these hills has been rinsed by the river. The river is higher than the fields, and a section of the river levies are breached by the flood waters, and then when there is no rain for a long time they also have drought. The third township comprises mostly hillside fields. The fields are higher than the river, and although the plots are very small, they do not fear flooding when it rains, nor do they fear drought when it is dry.

There is no way to plant trees on hills of shifting sands.

The fields in this district are planted once a year, and less than 5 percent can grow a second crop of rice. Rent is not collected on the small second rice crop or on other crops.

The second category, high interest exploitation.

1) Money interest: divided into two stages. Before 1927, interest was 30 percent (30 *yuan* interest per 100 *yuan*). But not everyone could get loans. Only those with fields or hillsides or homes to put up as security could get loans. After 1927 (the world had begun to change), very few loaned out their money.

There were very few residing in this district who were strictly landlords. Most of the landlords lived in the Bailu and Tiancun area of Ganxian, and they simply owned land in this district. There were a lot of rich peasants. For this reason, in this district none of the poor peasants borrowed money from the landlords. Eighty percent of the loans came from the rich peasants, with 20 percent coming from the public domain [*gongtang*]. The middle peasants did not want to borrow

money, and the hired farm hands could not borrow money. It was only the poor peasants who both wanted to borrow money and had something to put down as collateral. On the other hand, it was mainly the rich peasants who had money to lend, and for this reason confrontation between the poor peasants and the rich peasants in the land revolution unquestionably was inevitable. The rich peasants also sometimes borrowed money from the landlords, several hundred or a thousand *yuan* at a time, at very low interest rates of 15 to 18 percent. This is how the rich peasants got plenty of loan money that they then loaned out to the peasant people in loans of several tens of *yuan* against security items, squeezing out high interests. In this way the rich peasants were the middlemen for the landlord exploitation of the poor peasants, and it is for this reason that the interests of the landlords and rich peasants were inseparable.

The public domain in this district was mostly in the hands of the bad gentry. The greater part of these bad gentry had some fields, but not enough to live on, so they were neither rich peasants nor landlords. They were bad gentry. Because they did not have enough to live on, they wanted to control and exploit the public domain. Sixty percent of the public domain in the first, second, and fourth townships was controlled by the bad gentry; 40 percent was controlled by the rich peasants. In the third township, before the establishment of the Republic of China, most of it was controlled by the bad gentry because at that time the public domain could be managed only by someone with an official degree. With the advent of the Republic, most of it was managed by the rich peasants. The situation was just the opposite of that which prevailed in the first, second, and fourth townships; 60 percent was controlled by the rich peasants, and 40 percent by the bad gentry. When the poor peasants borrowed money from the public domain, the interest rate was slightly less than from the rich peasants. Interest on loans from rich peasants was 24 percent, and public domain interest was 20 percent. Public domain loans likewise required security deposits. The demand for repayment on public domain loans was even more peremptory than for rich peasant loans. If the interest was not paid on time, your ox and pigs were confiscated, and they came into the fields and cut the grain. They could do any of these things. On a rich peasant loan, if the interest was not paid on time, it was possible to explain it to him and pay interest on the interest, to be repaid together next year. Or he could take the fields used as collateral and rent them out to someone else to farm, taking the interest owed from the rent. The purpose of the rich peasant was just to get the interest, so at times they could be flexible with the payment schedule.

Of all the forms of interest, the most outrageous was monthly interest. This was the rate at which vagabonds borrowed money to gamble. The payment period was one month, after which a 1 *yuan* loan required a 2 *yuan* repayment. But this was not common.

2) Interest in rice: a loan in rice was called "living rice" [*shenggu*]. The rich peasants charged very heavy interest, while the interest from the public domain granary was relatively light. When the rich peasants loaned rice to the poor peasants, no matter whether the loan was made in the eleventh month or twelfth month of the previous year, or in the first month, second month, or third month of the current year, it had to be repaid at the seventh month harvest, and always required 50 percent interest, that is, for each *dan* borrowed, the repayment was 1.5 *dan*. A loan borrowed in the eleventh month and repaid in the seventh month is less than one year; a loan borrowed in the first month or second month and repaid in the seventh month is only half a year; a loan borrowed in the third month and repaid in the seventh month is only four months. Why was the interest so high (30 percent more than money interest)? Because in the winter and spring seasons, the price of rice was very high, twice the price in the fall. In the fall, it was 1.5 *yuan* per *dan*, but in the winter and spring it generally was 3 *yuan*. For this reason, the rich peasant wanted to add his loss in the price of the rice to the interest. Furthermore, he only wanted to sell rice. He did not want to lend rice, because even though the interest rate had risen to 50 percent it was still more profitable for him to sell it in the winter and spring seasons. For a poor peasant to borrow rice from a rich peasant at all, they had to have very close relations. Of 100 *dan* of rice, a rich peasant would sell over 90 percent and lend less than 10 percent. In Chagan (in the first township) there was a rich peasant, Chen Fengwu, who lent grain to a poor peasant, Huang Dachun (in the fourth month of 1920). He did not want to make the loan. He was only willing to lend the money that would then be used to buy the grain from him.

Eighty percent of the money that the poor peasants borrowed was lent to them by the rich peasants, and 20 percent was borrowed from the public domain granaries. They did not borrow any money from the landlords directly. Ninety percent of the rice that the poor peasants borrowed came from the public domain granaries and 10 percent from the rich peasants. From this it can be seen that the rich peasants were purely exploitative and that the public domain granaries actually did give a little relief.

The public domain granaries were also largely exploitative. In the first township, 80 percent of the public domain rice was sold and 20 percent was lent out. In the second, third, and fourth townships, all the rice was sold and virtually none was lent. Only the grain that belonged solely to the welfare granary was all lent out with none of it being sold. Each of the townships in this district had welfare granaries. The first township (population 3,000) had four welfare granaries with 800 *dan* of rice. The second township (population 800) had five welfare granaries with 500 *dan* of rice. The third township (population 3,000) had six welfare granaries with 400 *dan* of rice. These three townships had a total of twenty welfare granaries, with a total of 1,700 *dan* of rice, practically one welfare granary for each village. It was only township four (population 2,000) that had but one welfare granary with 100 *dan* of rice. During the lean months, all the poor peasants of this district relied on borrowing a little cooking rice from the public granaries. It would have been futile to rely on the rich peasants to lend

them rice. Interest on rice borrowed from the public granaries was 30 percent, and although this was less than what the rich peasants would charge, a security deposit was very strictly required. Iron implements (plows), tin utensils, silver items, quilts, curtains, clothing, and so on, could all be used for the security, but there had to be something. Only the Yangfang Village public granary in the first township did not require some security deposit for borrowing rice, and required only a "guarantor's note" [*dingpiao*] signed by a neighbor who would guarantee that the interest would be paid. The grain in the public granaries came from contributions made by the landlords, rich peasants, and middle peasants. Their contributions to set up a granary and the relief given to the poor peasants in lean and explosive times were a fraudulent reformist policy to appease riots by the poor people. Those who do not understand this stand there and praise their generosity. The public granary rice, except for the landlords and rich peasants and middle peasants who could not and did not want to borrow it, could be borrowed by poor peasants, hired farm laborers, by workers, and vagrants, as long as they had something to put up as security or could provide a "guarantor's note."

"Living rice" was terrible, but "picking up new rice money" was worse. In the second, third, fourth, and fifth months, when the poor peasants had nothing to eat and "picked up new rice money" from the rich peasants, the price of rice was 3 *yuan* a *dan* while picking up new rice money was 3.50 *yuan*. In the seventh and eighth months, when they repaid the rice loan the price of rice was generally about 2 *yuan*. If they could have borrowed at the market price at this time, it would not have been so bad, but the problem was that the poor peasants turned over their rice at the low price, and then in the spring and summer of the next year would look to the rich peasants who sold at a high price of 3 *yuan* per *dan*. The rich peasants would buy at 1.50 *yuan* and sell at 3 *yuan*, a profit of 100 percent. Wasn't this even worse than the 50 percent interest on "living rice"?

3) Interest on pigs: not applicable in this district.

4) Interest on oxen: seen in all the townships, but not to a great extent. The rich peasants took their female oxen and loaned them to the poor peasants, and the poor peasants fed these oxen and used them to till their fields, for which the rich peasant received a yearly interest of 1.5 *dan* (3 *luo*) of rice. If the ox gave birth to a calf, the rich peasant and poor peasant each owned half of it. Three out of the ten rich peasant families in the first, second, and fourth townships, rented oxen which were called "tax oxen" [*shuiniu*]. In the third township, only one out of ten rich peasant families had oxen that they rented out. The oxen might die of disease or of falling down, so this kind of interest on oxen was not necessarily reliable, and the rich peasants did not make much of an effort to get this kind of interest. They were also afraid that the poor peasants might not feed the oxen well, might starve them or work them too hard, or that they would be stolen by thieves. Thus there had to be a close relationship between the two families for a poor peasant to rent an ox from a rich peasant.

5) Oil interest.[14] When those poor peasants who had hills on which oil crops were grown had no rice to eat in the fifth and sixth months, they would borrow money from the rich peasants by selling new oil in order to buy rice for the table. In the fifth and sixth months, when the price of oil was 25 *yuan* per *Dan* (100 *jin*), they sold new oil for 12 *yuan*, or for as little as 10 *yuan*. In the ninth month, when they turned over the cooking oil, it must not be short. Thus, for 12 *yuan* borrowed from the rich peasants in the sixth month, they had to turn over one *Dan* of oil in the ninth month. The price of oil in the ninth month was generally 18 *yuan* per *Dan*, but might be as high as 20 *yuan* or as low as 15 *yuan*. If 12 *yuan* was borrowed in the sixth month and in the ninth month the price of oil was 18 *yuan*, the interest over four months was the difference of 6 *yuan*, an interest rate of 50 percent. If in the ninth month the price of oil was 20 *yuan*, then the interest of 8 *yuan* equals a rate of interest of 80 percent. When the rich peasants received the oil in the ninth month, they put it into storage and waited until the fourth through eighth months of the next year, when the oil has settled, and ship it to Jiangkou or to Ganzhou City, where they would sell it for at least 25 to 26 *yuan* per *Dan*. There were even times when it sold for as high as 40 *yuan* per *Dan*. In the sixth month of the year before last, when peasants from the first township went to Bailu to buy oil, 1 *yuan* (10 *mao*) would only buy 1 *jin* 12 *liang*. Although this was the retail price on small quantities, if put together, it would have taken 57 *yuan* to buy just 1 *Dan* of cooking oil. In the sixth month of last year, 1 *yuan* would buy 2.5 *jin*, which is 40 *yuan* per *Dan*. Using this figure for the calculation, the 12 *yuan* that a poor peasant would have received from a rich peasant against 1 *Dan* of new oil, by the sixth month of the next year, would mean a loss of over 28 *yuan*, or a rate of interest of over 200 percent. Not only was this form of oil interest very heavy, it was also very reliable. From the ninth to the twelfth month is the time period during which the poor peasants press the oil, and the rich peasants had no fear that the peasants would "run out on them" so they could just sit back and let the poor peasants bring the oil to their doorsteps. If they were afraid that a poor peasant might "run out on them," they could go in person to the poor peasant's house to collect the pressed oil and take it back themselves.

This form of interest on oil, from the poor peasant's point of view, was called "picking up new oil money," and from the rich peasant's point of view it was called "giving out new oil money." The lending of oil by rich peasants (not giving out new oil money) was extremely rare, but did occur occasionally. If a poor peasant borrows 1 *Dan* of oil from a rich peasant in the twelfth month of this year, he will buy it for 20 *yuan*, and next year when the price of oil is high, and he will return the 1 *Dan* of oil or pay in cash at the market price without

14. This refers to the "tea-oil" which played such a large part in the economy of Xunwu. For a vivid account of the same type of loan, see above, the "Xunwu Investigation," Chapter IV, section on exploitation.

interest. This was the same as the poor peasant storing 1 *Dan* of oil for the rich peasant, so there was not a heavy interest payment. Only those with close relations to the rich peasants and who could be relied upon to return the oil the next year could get such loans. A poor peasants would get this kind of oil loan upon the death of a parent, or when taking a wife, or for some other emergency at which time he would ask a rich peasant he knew well for a loan in money, to which the rich peasant would reply that he had no money, only oil (or he would say that he only had rice). So the poor peasant would borrow the oil and sell it for cash to meet the emergency expenses. The next year, when the price of oil was high, if the lender wanted oil, the borrower would buy oil from the market to return to him. If the lender wanted cash he would have to repay him in cash at the current market rate. This method of oil borrowing was called "grabbing oil."

Neither the former form of "picking up oil money" nor the latter form of "grabbing oil" was used often. These occurred only in those areas where there were oil crop hills. In the areas that did have oil crop hills, such as the eleventh district of Xingguo (the area around Juncun), many of the poor peasants farmed oil crop hills (very few of the poor peasants had their own oil crop hills, most were rented from landlords and rich peasants). Of one hundred poor peasant families that farmed oil crop hills, twenty of them picked up new oil money. The rich peasants in the Juncun area severely exploited the oil interest loans. In that area, no more than one or two out of a hundred poor peasant families who farmed oil crop hills "grabbed oil" from the rich peasants.

6) Interest on pawning: of two kinds, big pawns and small pawns. There were no big pawns in this district, only in Tiancun and Bailu, where the monthly interest rate was 5 percent. On 100 coppers the monthly interest was 5 coppers, on 1,000 coppers the monthly interest was 50 coppers, and on 1 *yuan* the monthly interest was 5 cents, all calculated in small foreign dollars. The term of a pawn loan was ten months. If the money was not returned by the end of the term, after an extension of one month the item pawned was forfeit. A monthly interest of 5 percent is 60 percent annual interest. This was a particularly severe form of exploitation. A great many poor peasants, hired farm laborers, workers, and vagrants went to the pawnshops. Among these four categories of people, sixty out of a hundred families were in hock to the pawnshops. Iron, tin, or silver utensils, mosquito netting, quilts, or clothing could all be pawned.

A great many people in this district ran over to Bailu to pawn things, some 60 percent of the poor destitute masses. The owner of the pawnshop in Bailu was someone from the Xingguo *xian* town. After eleven months and default, the owner of the pawnshop would send the pawned items to the Xingguo *xian* town to be sold at auction. An item worth 3 *yuan* was pawned for 1.50 *yuan*. But the objective of the pawnshop owner was the interest, not auctioning off the items pawned.

Small pawning took place in all the townships of this district. The rich peasants who gave out pawn loans did not do so openly, nor did they do it often. It

was only when an impoverished worker or peasant was really destitute that he picked up something and ran over to a rich peasant's house and begged him to accept it as security for a little cash. This did happen occasionally. Ten out of a hundred impoverished worker and peasant families got small pawn loans this way. Why is it that many went to the regular pawnshops and few pawned things elsewhere? Because engaging in this kind of activity gave one an extremely bad name, and furthermore, the people here in this township knew each other too well, and even if something were accepted as security, the poor peasants would always beg for a few more pennies on the item pawned, and it was not easy for the rich peasants to put up a stiff argument. It is for this reason that most of the rich peasants were not really willing to engage in this activity. The interest rate for small pawns was the same as for big pawns but the time period was very short. It was up to the rich peasant—one month, two months, three months, four months—and if the money was not repaid by the time the period was up, the pawn was forfeit.

Of the eight persons who participated in this survey meeting, the families of four of them, Chen Beiping, Zhong Dewu, Fu Jiting, and Chen Zhenshan, had never pawned anything. The four families of Wen Fengzhang, Lei Hanxiang, Huang Dachun, and Li Changying had all pawned things. Wen Fengzhang pawned something once a year. In the fourth or fifth month he pawned something in order to buy rice for the table, and he also did this once last year. In the fourth month of last year he pawned one iron plow and two wine jars at the Hengxing Pawnshop in Bailu for 2.40 in small foreign dollars, with which he bought and brought back 1 *dan* of rice. In the twelfth month he repaid it. Lei Hanxiang's family also pawned something every year. In addition to things pawned by the eldest brother and second brother, the third brother, Lei Hanxiang, himself, in the first month of last year got one loan in which he pawned one long gown for 1 *yuan*, and two hoe blades for 60 cents, that he has not yet repaid. In the sixth month, he again borrowed money by pawning one trowel for 30 cents and one "*yang touzi*" for 50 cents (both of which are tools that the third brother uses in his masonry work), which also have not been retrieved. Before last year, Li Changying had never pawned anything, but when the revolution began in the second month of last year, he went to work with the large guerrilla corps, and when the White bandits arrived he fled to Bailu, and since his wife at home had nothing to eat he pawned one cotton padded jacket for 1.20 *yuan*. The revolution returned, but he has not yet reclaimed the jacket. Before last year, Huang Dachun had never pawned anything but in the fifth month of last year, since firecrackers were not selling, no one would hire him to make firecrackers, so he had nothing to eat and pawned one quilt for 1.50 *yuan* to a rich peasant in his village named Zhong Kuaizi. When revolution took place in the entire *xian* in the seventh month of this year, the Bailu guerrilla team came to his village, and the poor people rose in revolt. They arrested Zhong Kuaizi, took him to Bailu and killed him, and Huang Dachun got his quilt back. The

father of this Zhong Kuaizi was a good man who wanted to help the poor people, so the masses did not kill him. Zhong Kuaizi had had a fireworks shop in Tangjiang, had learned fighting with one hand,[15] and had wounded several dozen people. Everyone was glad to see him dead. His fields were distributed, and three fines, amounting to several hundred *yuan,* were imposed on his family.

7) Interest on salt: Really terrible, because in Xingguo all the salt came from Guangdong and also because quite a few poor peasants engaged in the salt trade. Ten out of a hundred poor peasant families in this district were also salt carriers. Having no capital, they would borrow from the rich peasants to buy ducks, which they then carried to Jiayingzhou (in Meixian, Guangdong). They would carry a load of ducks there and return with a load of salt. For the 1 foreign dollar they borrowed they paid interest of one *jin* in salt. The time period was no more than twenty days to one month. The price of one *jin* of salt was 12 or 13 cents, so in one month, they paid 12 or 13 cents interest on a loan of 1 *yuan*. Since 1927, as the revolution has spread day by day, interest rates have generally come down, falling to 24 percent, but the interest on salt has not fallen.

D. The Third Form of Exploitation: Taxes and Fees

In this district, aside from the grain tax, there were no direct taxes or fees on the peasants.

Three *dan* of rice fields equaled 1 *dan* of "seedling-rent," on which the grain tax payment was 0.044 *yuan* (in silver). For the grain tax, one ounce of silver equaled 3.60 big foreign dollars, so 0.044 *yuan* amounted to 0.1584 big foreign dollars, which was the grain tax on 1 *dan* of seedling-rent.[16] Since 1 *dan* of seedling-rent fields was currently equal to 3 *dan* of ordinary fields, the current grain tax on 1 *dan* of ordinary rice fields was 0.0528 big foreign dollars. Last year, the price of rice in this district was 3 small foreign dollars per *dan*, the equivalent of six copper *yuan* or strings of cash. With 1 *yuan* in big foreign dollars equal to 2.80 *yuan* copper, 0.0528 *yuan* in big foreign dollars, the equivalent of 148 copper cash, could buy slightly less than 2.5 *sheng* of rice.[17] This means that currently in Xingguo, for one *dan* of rice fields the annual grain tax was 2.5 *sheng*. But in this district, the actual grain yield per 1 *dan* of rice fields was only 0.7 *dan* (70 percent), and so this means that for every 0.7 *dan* of rice harvested 2.5 *sheng* were paid in grain tax, a total of about 3.5 percent.

Although in this district there was no other direct tax exploitation, those who go from this district to Guangdong to engage in the salt business have been

15. *Yishou da*, apparently a martial art of some kind.

16. The *liang* or ounce of silver (often translated "tael") was no longer an officially recognized monetary unit, but was in fact widely used at this time. Regarding the difference between "big" and "small" foreign dollars, see above, the Note on Sources and Conventions.

17. One *sheng* is equivalent to 1 liter, or 0.01 *dan.*

exploited by various taxes and fees along the way. Middle or poor peasants who engage in the salt trade buy 70 *jin* of ducks in this township at 0.32 *yuan* per *jin*. In the past, a carrying-pole load of ducks taken to Jiayingzhou would bring a little over 0.3 ounces of silver per *jin*, and sometimes as much as 0.4 ounces per *jin*. This year the price has gone up to 0.48 ounces per *jin*. Each 0.74 ounces of silver is equal to one big foreign dollar, so 0.48 ounces of silver is equal to 0.65 big foreign dollars, or 0.91 *yuan* in small foreign dollars. Subtracting the 0.32 *yuan* in capital outlay, each *jin* of ducks could earn 0.59 *yuan* in small foreign dollars, so 70 *jin* of ducks could earn 41.30 *yuan*. Why is the price of ducks so especially high in Jiayingzhou this year? Because of the revolution, few ducks from the various *xian* of southern Jiangxi have been taken there, so they have become very expensive.

From the 41.30 *yuan* net earnings, it is necessary to subtract the expenses incurred along the way. First is wages. In past years, one could get to Jiayingzhou in ten days, but at present it is necessary to make detours in many places that lie between the Red and White districts, so it takes at least fifteen days. At 0.25 *yuan* for a day's work, fifteen days makes a total of 3.75 *yuan*. Second is the expense for food, tobacco, tea, and straw sandals, which comes to at least 0.45 *yuan* per day, or for fifteen days a total of 6.75 *yuan*. Third is the cost of feed for the ducks. Each day 70 *jin* of ducks will eat 0.30 *yuan* in grain, a total of 4.50 *yuan* for fifteen days. Fourth is the *lijin.*[18] From Xingguo to Menling there are no fees, but when you reach Menling there is a *lijin* fee of one *yuan* in big foreign dollars per load of ducks (equal to 1.40 *yuan* in small foreign dollars). After Menling, there are no fees. Fifth, expenses incurred in this district for each load of ducks must be added in, including three days of wages and food and buying the duck cages, for a total of 2 *yuan*. The expense account for the above five items comes to a total of 19.40 *yuan*.[19] Subtracting 19.40 *yuan* from 41.30 *yuan* leaves real earnings per load of ducks of 21.90 *yuan*.

One load of ducks going, and one load of salt coming back again. This year, 1 *yuan* in big foreign dollars can buy only 14 *jin* of salt in Jiayingzhou, and the same was true last year. This year, as the revolution has developed, the consumption of salt has stagnated, so salt has become cheaper. One load of 80 *jin* costs 4.50 *yuan* in big foreign dollars, or 6.30 *yuan* in small foreign dollars. When the salt was carried back to Xingguo, in the fifth and sixth months of this year, salt was very scarce and so the price had risen to the point that 1 *yuan* in small foreign dollars could buy only 2.5 *jin*. Using the market price at this time, 80 *jin* of salt could be sold for 32 *yuan* in small foreign dollars. Subtracting the outlay

18. The road tax on goods moved from one locality to another. For a detailed discussion of its impact by Mao, see, in Volume II, his article of July 11, 1923, "The Beijing Coup d'État and the Merchants."

19. These figures do not add up, as the Japanese edition emphasizes by placing the annotation "thus" opposite the total of 19.40 *yuan*, and opposite the profit of 21.90 *yuan* below.

of 6.30 *yuan*, this would leave earnings of 25.70 *yuan* in small foreign dollars.

But from the 25.70 *yuan* net earnings, it is necessary to subtract expenses. First, wages for 15 days, amounting to 3.75 *yuan*. Second, for food, tobacco, tea, straw sandals, 6.75 *yuan*. Third, *lijin* fees in six places, Jitan, Menling, Baibu, Diaoyutan, Huichang, and Huaqiao, a transit fee [*guoli*] at Menling, and inspection stations [*jianpiao*] at the five other places. In the past the transit fee was 0.60 to 0.70 *yuan* per load of salt, but it is now 1 *yuan* in big foreign dollars. At each of the inspection stations the charge is 0.20 *yuan* in big foreign dollars,[20] for a total of 2 *yuan* in big foreign dollars (equal to 2.80 *yuan* in small foreign dollars). The three expenses above total 13.30 *yuan*. Subtracting 13.30 *yuan* from 25.70 *yuan* leaves a remainder of 12.40 *yuan*.

Taking one load of ducks earns 21.90 *yuan* and bringing one load of salt back earns 12.40 *yuan*, for total earnings of 34.30 *yuan* in one month's time. In the past, trade in the two items of ducks and salt was not as lucrative as it is now, but it was more reliable, it was not necessary to make detours, and the round trip took only twenty days. Now you can make more money, but the road is not safe, the militia and the pacification defense forces frequently take any cash that travelers are carrying (after selling the ducks only a small portion of the cash is needed to buy the salt, and most of it is carried on your person). Although they do not want the salt, they will frequently take ducks to eat. They just don't go as far as killing people. Even so, the number of people who go out and engage in trade has by no means diminished.

In the fifth and sixth months salt was expensive, 1 *yuan* for 2.5 *jin*. Now (the tenth month), salt is a somewhat cheaper, 1 *yuan* for 3 *jin* 12 *liang*. This is because the two areas of Jiangkou and Dahujiang have been opened up and salt can be brought to Ganzhou. In comparison to the prerevolution times, it is very expensive. Before the revolution, 1 *yuan* could buy 6 *jin* 4 *liang*, which is about half the price it is now (the tenth month), and about one-third the price of what it was in the fifth and sixth months of this year.

III. The Various Classes in the Struggle

1. Landlords

All the landlords of the first township lived in Xingguo Town and in Bailu, not in their own villages, and the rents had to be sent to Xingguo Town or Bailu. Four or five of the big landlords who owned land in this township lived in Bailu, and each family received rents on over 1,000 *dan*. Some had stores in Bailu, and some did business in Nanchang and in Ganzhou. The one family that lived in Xingguo Town and received rents on 1,000 *dan* owned the Hengchunhao foreign goods store in the town and also had a store in Ganzhou.

20. The text reads "small foreign dollars," but this appears to be an error.

In the second township there were three landlord households, each receiving rents of over 300 *dan*, all living in their original villages. Liu Yuelin, with 300 *dan* in rentals, did not himself farm. During the revolution two members of his family were killed, the first and third sons of Yuelong, both of whom were branch commanders in the Pacification Defense Corps. After the revolution, their household still had ten mouths to feed. They were given land shares and submitted to the government. Du Xiyou farmed 200 *dan* of fields himself and received rent on 300. The household numbers over twenty persons. Du Xiyou is aged forty, and in the second month of last year joined the revolution. In the second month of this year when the Red Army arrived, on his own initiative he voluntarily took the land deeds and burned them and distributed the land. Du works in the government, in propaganda. Xie Wenlin, with a household of thirty, farmed 500 *dan* of fields himself and received rent on 100. He is related to Du Xiyou, and he voluntarily burned his land deeds and distributed the land. He is now head of the office of finance in the township government. There are six brothers in his family, five of whom farmed; they also employed four permanent workers, and were the richest in the village. No one in his household can read, and he is very honest and forthright. (Actually, Xie Wenlin was a big rich peasant.)

In the third township there were two landlord families. Ceng Xiqun had five households that received rent on a total of over 1,000 *dan*. He himself did not farm. The five households totaled over twenty persons. He was a famous big landlord and counterrevolutionary. The men have all fled, leaving behind five or six women and little children, each of whom has received land distribution shares. Their house was burned. No one in his family has yet been killed. Two people with the same surname who acted as running dogs for him have been killed. Xie Yuanxiang rented out over 400 [*dan*]. He himself did not farm. Over twenty persons, counterrevolutionaries, have fled. None were killed.

In the fourth township, Wang Runlan, a big landlord, rented out 400 *dan*, and he himself farmed another 200 in rice fields. He had many oil-producing hillsides, all of which he farmed himself. A counterrevolutionary and head of the Pacification Defense Corps, he killed a great many workers and peasants, burned a large number of workers' and peasants' homes, and has now fled. Liu Jiahong had 300 *dan* of fields, of which he farmed 100 himself and rented out 200. Five people, counterrevolutionary, started the Pacification Defense Corps with Wang Runlan and Ceng Meixi. Liu Jiahong and his son were both killed. Ceng Meixi received rent on 100 *dan*, and himself farmed over 100 in rice. A rich peasant, his family comprised five persons, and as second in command of the Pacification Defense Corps he killed many workers and peasants. When he killed the poor peasant Gao Laogou, "his spirit made a ruckus in their house, and the ghost strangled to death Ceng Meixi and his father." Xie Chuanzhen rented out 600 *dan*, and did not do any farming himself. [His family comprises] five or six people. Xie Chuanzhen was arrested by the third district and turned over to the government for detention. He has not yet been killed. The family wealth has been confiscated.

2. *Rich Peasants*

The first township had a total of twelve families, of which seven were counter-revolutionary. Of these seven families, the heads of household of two of them have been killed. The adult males of all the other five families have fled. The property of the families of those who have fled has been confiscated, including all their cooking pots and pans. The properties of those families whose family heads were killed have not been confiscated. None of the women, old people, or children of the seven families have fled and land has been distributed to all of them. Several of the women have remarried. Liu Nengchang, one of the family heads who was killed, has a son, Liu Shuyao, aged twenty, who joined the revolution and was a squad leader in the Xinyu campaign. The house of one of the families, that of someone called Chen Fengming, was burned down. Five of the twelve families were not counterrevolutionary. They were fined and land was distributed to them. They have joined the Red Guards, and have also made great efforts in revolutionary work. Among them, Xu Changhan had 400 *dan* of rice fields, most of which he farmed himself, a small portion of which were rented out. There are ten people in the household. He also had a lot of cash on which he received interest. The guerrilla team fined him 700 *yuan*. His household goods were not confiscated. His rice was not divided, but his fields were. Xu Changhan, aged twenty-six, joined the revolution in the second or third month of last year, and beginning in the third month of this year acted as a director in the Youth Vanguard Corps and then went to work in the southwestern Jiangxi government (position unknown). In the eighth month he returned home and again went to work in the district government as director of the Youth Vanguard Corps. He was accused of belonging to the AB Corps and arrested. Ling Yuepo had 400 *dan* of rich fields, all of which he himself farmed. With twelve people in the family, his son, Ling Leihan, is a "graduate" who has been a secretary in the village government. He was fined over 100 *yuan* but still continued to act as secretary until people accused him of being part of the AB Corps, when he was detained by the district government for over two months. He was allowed to confess, and then released. Xie Zhongjie, with over 200 *dan* of rice fields, farmed most of them himself and rented out some fields. Eight people. Recently the township government arrested him and will impose a fine in money. Not yet released. Seven of the above twelve rich peasants actively opposed the revolution. Although five of them ostensibly joined the revolution, two were plotting reactionary members of the AB Corps, leaving three families, one of which has been arrested.

There were nine rich peasants in the second township: Chen Xianwei, Mei Jiasheng, Yang Zulian, Xie Zhongyu, Xie Wenlin, Chen Gunwei, Wang Zhengke, Zou Xiangchun, and Xie Liangci. Chen Xianwei had 200 *dan* in fields, of which he himself farmed 120 and he rented out 80. He had money to lend out. Over ten people. He engaged in extremely harsh exploitation and was a counter-

revolutionary. Chen Xianwei fled, his three sons were killed, and the family's possessions were confiscated. Mei Jiasheng was actually a small landlord with over 100 *dan* of fields, all of which he rented out. He had money to lend out, was in the cloth business, and was a counterrevolutionary who supervised the Pacification Defense Corps. Mei Jiasheng and his mother, as well as one of their long-term farm laborers, were killed by the guerrilla team, and their household was confiscated. Yang Zulian had over 100 *dan* of fields, half of which he farmed himself and half of which he rented out. A counterrevolutionary and head of the AB Corps assassination team. Executed by the district government in the seventh month. Xie Zhongyu was also a small landlord who rented out all his land and had money to lend. A counterrevolutionary and head of the AB Corps. Generally speaking, he was a member of the evil gentry, and he was executed on the 16th of the eighth month by the district government. Xie Wenlin had 600 *dan* of rice fields, all of which he rented out, and he owned a general merchandise store in Yongfeng Town. At the beginning he joined the revolution and was in charge of finances for the government of the second township. He embezzled over 80 *yuan*, was fired and fined 150 *yuan*. One day at a mass meeting he wrote out somebody's ready-made slogans, "Convince the soviet authorities of the necessity for the AB Corps reform group" and "Defend the necessity for the AB Corps reform group in Ganzhou and Ji'an." He was arrested and beaten. Seven of the above nine rich peasants (three of whom were small landlords while one was a small merchant) were counterrevolutionaries, and only two were revolutionary.

In the third township, there were nine rich peasants: Xie Jiuzhang, Mao Shiji, Lei Yongxia, Chen Fengming, Jiang Taoshu, Qiu Futian, Qiu Shili, Qiu Zhikui, and Xie Yixing. Xie Jiuzhang had over 400 *dan* of fields, of which he farmed over 200 himself and rented out 200. Eight people. He charged high interest rates and was a counterrevolutionary. In the village he was called a despot, and was a local bully. When the revolution started, the entire family fled. Mao Shiji had over 200 *dan* of fields, all of which he farmed himself. He lent money. Some time ago, there were twenty-three people in the household, but now it is divided into four. The grandson, Mao Zhangping, aged twenty-two, a middle school student and a team leader in the AB Corps, has been arrested. Lei Yongxia had over 200 *dan* in fields, of which he farmed 50 himself and rented out over 100. He had money that he lent out. He ran away some time ago. The township government fined him over 200 *yuan*. When he returned home the township government ordered him to go to the Red Army school, and when he failed the entrance examination, the township government told him to go to the Xingguo *xian* training unit. Aged twenty-one. Graduated from higher primary school. Chen Fengming had over 100 *dan* of fields, all of which he farmed himself. Seven people. He had no money to lend out because his son needed money for school in Ganzhou. A counterrevolutionary and secretary of the AB Corps, he was killed and his possessions confiscated. Jiang Taoshu had over 100 *dan* in fields, all of which he farmed himself, and had money to lend out. Ten people.

He joined the revolution, and they fined him 120 *yuan*. Qiu Futian had over 100 *dan* in fields that he farmed himself. Had a little money to lend out. Five people. A counterrevolutionary, he fled, and his wife went off with somebody else. Qiu Shili had 130 *dan* of fields, of which he cultivated 40 *dan*, and rented out 90 *dan*. He smoked opium, and had no money to lend. He was a counterrevolutionary, and he himself fled. The township government told his wife to remarry. His house has been turned into offices of the township government. Qiu Zhikui had 150 *dan* of fields that he farmed himself, and he had money to lend. Six people. He joined the revolution, and his son enlisted in the Red Guards. He was fined 60 *yuan*. Xie Yixing had two hundred *dan* of fields, half of which he cultivated himself, and half of which he rented out. He had money to lend. Twelve people. A member of the AB Corps, he was arrested. His fourth son fled, leaving three sons still at home. Six of the nine rich peasants in the third township were counterrevolutionaries, leaving only three who are not counterrevolutionaries.

In the fourth township, the two rich peasants, Liu Jiahong and Ceng Meixi, were both counterrevolutionaries (see the above section on landlords).

In the four townships of this district, the first township had twelve rich peasants, nine of whom were counterrevolutionaries; the second township had nine rich peasants, seven of whom were counterrevolutionaries; the third township had nine rich peasants, six of whom were counterrevolutionaries; and the fourth township had two rich peasants, both of whom were counterrevolutionaries. The four townships had a total of thirty-two rich peasants, twenty-four of whom were counterrevolutionaries, and although the remaining eight do not yet appear to be counterrevolutionary, who knows what they will be like in the future.

The rich peasants had very good fields, just as good as those of the landlords and the public domain. When they buy land from the poor peasants, they always want to buy their good fields, and the poor peasants have no choice but to sell them their good fields. If they sell their poor fields they have to sell several *mu* for the price of one *mu*. When they make loans the poor peasants have to put up security, for which they want only good fields, not the poor fields. It is for this reason that day by day the good fields become concentrated in the hands of the rich peasants.

When the revolution first begins, as in the second and third month of this year, quite a few of the rich peasants opportunistically join the revolution. Thirty percent of the positions in the township and district soviets were held by rich peasants and their running dogs. During the fourth and fifth months, with the promotion of Oppose the Rich Peasants Week, they were overthrown. By now there are only two rich peasants active in the affairs of this district (one is Xie Wenlin, who is head of the finance office of the second township soviet, and the other is Zou Lidong, who is director of the cultural department of the district government).

3. The Middle Peasants

The middle peasants gain from the land revolution. First, the middle peasants do not lose in land, but rather most of them gain from the equal distribution of the fields. The middle peasants represented 20 percent of the total population of this district, while they had only 15 percent of the land. Thus, with the equal distribution of fields, most of the middle peasants in this district have come out ahead. Although there are some who ended up with less, they were only a very small proportion.

Second, in the past, taking a wife cost about 200 *yuan*, practically the entire resources of the family, so it was not easy for a middle peasant to get married. A great many are in debt because of getting married. If a wife died, it was extremely difficult to marry again. Now, with freedom of marriage, you do not need a penny, and this is a very big benefit.

Third, in the past when one of the elderly people died in a middle peasant family, they had to spent a minimum of 50 *yuan*, and as much as 100 *yuan*, and more. In the past, it was common for a middle peasant to be bankrupted by the death of a father or mother. Today, with the breaking of superstitious customs, when people die they are just buried without spending a penny.

Fourth, in the past oxen were very expensive. When an ox fell down and died the ox meat could be sold for 10 *yuan* or 8 *yuan*, to which more than 10 *yuan* had to be added to buy another ox. Today, although the meat of an ox that has fallen down and died still brings in 10 *yuan* or 8 *yuan*, you need only 3 or 4 *yuan* more to buy another.

Fifth, with the overthrow of the power of the landlords and rich peasants, the abolition of the ceremonial practices, and the breaking of superstition, it is no longer necessary to send gifts and presents or make temple offerings of paper money and candles, and this saves some money.

Sixth, in addition to the five economic benefits listed above, there is also a political benefit, which may be considered as the most important benefit of all. In the past, under the rule of the landlords and rich peasants, the middle peasants had no "right to voice an opinion on things." They had to do whatever others prescribed. Now, together with the poor peasants and farm laborers, they have the right to speak and to act. In both the township and district soviets, about 40 percent of the work is done by the middle peasants. About 10 percent of them had no debts at all, while 30 percent had small debts that did not really threaten their financial well-being.

The middle peasants have very courageously joined the revolution and have participated in "campaigns" (meaning that, organized as self-defense armies, they have gone out into battle), have gone out on patrol, and held meetings, just like the poor peasants.

The middle peasants in this district were 20 percent of the population and had 15 percent of the land. Although the land of the middle peasants was somewhat better than that of the poor peasants, it was far from that of the rich peasants. Generally, the land of the middle peasants was half good land and half poor land.

4. *The Poor Peasants*

After the revolution, the poor peasants achieved the following benefits:

First, they received shares of the fields. This was a fundamental benefit.

Second, they received shares of the hills. In the past, few poor peasants owned hill lands. In the first and second townships 30 percent of the poor peasants owned hill land, and 70 percent had none. In the third township (Shankeng) in the vicinity of Juncun, there are a lot of hills so 70 percent of the poor peasants had hill land and 30 percent had no hill land. Most of the hills in that area grow oil-bearing crops. In the fourth township, 50 percent of the poor peasants had hill land, and 50 percent did not. In all townships, even those poor peasants who did have hill land had only very small amounts. Of the hills in this district, in the first and second townships most of the hills are of loose sand, so the landlords want only the fields, leaving the hills to others, so the rich, middle, and poor peasants all had parts of the hills. In the first township, the distribution of the hill land was: rich peasants, 40 percent; middle peasants, 40 percent; poor peasants, 20 percent. In the second township, the hill land distribution was: rich peasants, 50 percent; middle peasants, 30 percent; poor peasants, 20 percent. Because the third township has a lot of oil crop hills, the hill areas are valuable and the landlords wanted the hill lands. But the rich peasants had most of the hill lands. The distribution was: landlords, 15 percent; rich peasants, 50 percent; middle peasants, 20 percent; poor peasants, 15 percent. Above we said that in the third township seventy out of a hundred poor families had hill lands, but the amount of hill land they owned was no more than 20 percent. Each family had only a very little bit. In the fourth township, the distribution was: landlords, 20 percent; rich peasants, 20 percent; middle peasants, 50 percent; poor peasants, 10 percent. Having no hill plots or having too little was one of the big difficulties of the poor peasants. First, they had no firewood or not enough firewood and had to gather reed grasses from other people's hillsides. Second, they could not collect pine firewood to carry to the market to sell for oil and salt. They could only take reed grasses to exchange for oil and salt, and 3 *Dan* of reed straw was worth only 1 *Dan* of pine firewood. Third, they had no wood for making houses or utensils. Fourth, having no oil crop hill land or too little, they had no cooking oil, or not enough cooking oil. Now that the land has been redistributed, and like the fields the hills have been distributed according to population, every family has hill land. Although some towns have more hill land and some have less, so that the shares of hill land in some towns are smaller than in other towns, even in those towns that have less hill land, everyone has received some hill land, thus solving a difficult problem of the poor peasants. Because they needed it, the poor peasants adamantly proposed the redistribution of the hill lands. For production too, it was essential to redistribute the hill lands, because where there was not enough manpower some of the land grew wild and some was not well maintained. The great masses of the poor peasants had plenty of manpower that was left idle because they did not have hill land. With the present redistribution of the hill lands, the great manpower of the poor peasants is put to use on their own hill lands, so production can increase greatly.

Third, in the early days of the revolution, with the distribution of the grain held by the landlords and counterrevolutionaries, the poor peasants were able to get cooking grain free. In Bailu (the area where the landlords were concentrated) the grain was also distributed according to population, and the poor peasants have more than enough to eat right down to harvest time.

Fourth, all debts incurred before the revolution have been cancelled. In the third month, at the beginning of the revolution, the official documents coming down from above said that the bills of merchants or of associations must be paid, and that debts owed among poor peasants and farm laborers must be repaid. On the 19th of the sixth month (July by the solar calendar), Southwest Jiangxi (refers to the soviet government of southwestern Jiangxi) sent another document that said that none of them need be repaid. Originally, beginning with the third month, no debts were repaid, but although they were in fact not repaid, the above-named three forms of debts were in principle (in theory) still supposed to be repaid. After the sixth month, this principle was overturned. The poor peasants fully support this kind of action. Why did the poor peasants propose that even those three kinds of debts should not be repaid? First, as regards the bills to merchants, most of the big merchants had fled (of the thirty-five merchants in Bailu, the ten big merchants have all fled). Although the small merchants (such as the twenty-four small shop owners in Bailu) had some accounts outstanding for merchandise sold to workers and peasants, most of the small merchants owed money to the large merchants, to landlords, and to rich peasants. Although the impoverished workers and peasants did not have to repay bills to the small merchants, at the same time, the small merchants did not have repay debts owed to landlords and to rich peasants. Comparing the two, the small merchants still came out ahead, because the indebtedness of the small merchants to the big merchants, landlords, and rich peasants was somewhat larger than the accounts owed them by the impoverished workers and peasants. Second, association bills. For the purpose of arranging for weddings and repaying bills, friends and relatives would be invited to form an association. If these friends and relatives weren't middle peasants, they were rich peasants, so there was no harm in cancelling association debts. Although these associations had been formed to give friendly support, the poor peasants who had started the associations could not repay, so it is right to cancel their debts. Even if the money of a few of the associations was lent to rich peasants, cancelling the debts makes sense, because those rich peasants who borrowed from the associations took that money to lend to other poor peasants with interest, and now the poor peasants do not have to repay them. Moreover, all their personal property has been turned over to the public, and with one contribution after another their coffers are already empty, so

not making them repay is also right. This district does not have any of those associations set up by landlords and rich peasants to exploit the impoverished workers and peasants. Third, accounts owed by one impoverished worker or peasant to another. With the revolution, this question is answered like this, "You are impoverished, and I am impoverished too. What do I have to repay you with?" Thus, it is quite correct simply to cancel all indebtedness.

Fifth, table rice is cheap. In the first and second months of this year, the price of rice was 4.60 *yuan* per *dan*. In the third month, as the revolution began, it was 2.00 *yuan* per *dan*. From the sixth month to the present (September, solar calendar), it has been 0.70 *yuan* per *dan*, or six and a half times cheaper than the 4.60 *yuan* price. Now that fields have been distributed to the poor peasants, and they have planted and harvested the crop, the low price of rice is naturally rather disadvantageous, but for the several months time during the beginning of the revolution and before the harvest, low cost rice benefited the poor peasant.

Sixth, "freely taking" a wife (in Jiangxi, the peasants have turned the character *you* of *ziyou* into a verb to distinguish freedom to choose a marriage partner from the old compulsory buying and selling of marriages,[21] and this term is in common usage among all the peasants in the soviets). In the past, taking a wife required money, and for this reason a great many poor peasants could not get married, and even if they did, they either had to raise a child bride or wait until they were already pretty old. If your wife died it was extremely difficult to marry a second time. Today these difficulties have been totally eliminated.

Seventh, when someone dies it does not cost anything, he or she is just buried.

Eighth, the price of oxen is low. It is easy for those without an ox to buy one or to replace an ox that has died. The poor peasants suffer from a severe shortage of ox-power. Among the poor peasants in this district, only 15 percent of the families had an ox of their own, 40 percent of them shared one ox between two families, 10 percent shared one ox among three families, and 5 percent shared one ox among four families, while 30 percent had no ox at all. Under these circumstances, the low price of oxen benefits the poor peasants.

Ninth, with the elimination of obligatory social events and the breaking of superstition, it is no longer necessary to spend money on these items.

Tenth, since there is no opium or gambling, and at the same time there are no thieves, you won't lose things in the night, even if you don't close your door.

Eleventh, with the redistribution of the land, every family can raise pigs, not just to sell them for cash so that others can eat meat, but so they can eat meat themselves as well. In the past, very few poor peasants went to the butchershop to buy meat to eat. Today, many are beginning to buy meat for the table.

21. In the compound *ziyou* (freedom), *zi* has the meaning of "self," *you* has the meaning "to follow," and *ziyou* literally of "to follow one's own inclinations." Thus, for the peasants, if they themselves (*zi*) went out and found a wife, instead of relying on a matchmaker, they would be "*you*-ing" her.

Twelfth, and this is most important, they have taken political power. The poor peasants are the pillars of political power in the countryside, and have become the leading class in the villages. The poor peasants can be divided into five strata according to how much ox-power they have, as indicated in item eight above.

5. *Farm Laborers*

Farm laborers have been given shares of land, just like the poor peasants, and because the landlords and rich peasants have been overthrown, although some people hire temporary workers, no one hires permanent workers. Thus they insisted on shares of the fields. Having been given fields, they still had no ox-power or farming tools, and also it is very difficult to farm. This is a problem that has yet to be solved. The district and township governments did not give the plow oxen and farm tools confiscated from the landlords and rich peasants to the farm laborers, but rather sold them.

Fu Jiting's nephew, Zhu Daxi, was a farm laborer. There are seven persons in the household: four brothers, father, mother, and his wife (a child bride he is bringing up). He is the eldest brother, aged twenty-two. The second brother is nineteen. The eldest brother was a laborer hired by the year for a rich peasant named Zhong, with an annual wage of 39 *yuan* in small foreign dollars. The second brother watched the ox for another family and was paid 10 *yuan* per year. With a total income of 49 *yuan* they could buy a little more than 16 *dan* of rice, enough food for only two and a half persons. They relied on his mother and wife working, cutting reed straw that they sold to get a little bit of money for food. In the winter they ate two meals a day. They had a debt of over 30 *yuan*. They had no house of their own. They lived in a landlord's mountain shed and took care of the mountain for the landlord. His father was originally a farm laborer and is now over sixty years of age.

In this district, farm laborers could take off fifteen days a year. They began work after the Lantern Festival[22] in the first month. They did not get the special dinners of the 1st and 15th of the month.[23] The boss provided a quilt, but not clothes. When you got sick you had to buy your own medicine. You could be sick for three days without having a deduction taken from your wages, but a deduction from your wages was made after three days. Wages were given in bits and pieces. You worked from dawn to dusk, except for time to eat and rest, at least ten hours a day. In the winter, you split wood and peeled sweet potatoes in the evenings.

Ninety-nine percent of the farm laborers did not have wives, and they were

22. A festival on the night of the fifteenth of the first lunar month, when sweet dumplings made of glutinous rice flower were eaten.

23. A meal of meat customarily given to employees on these dates in each lunar month.

the most destitute class in the countryside. Not only did every landlord and rich peasant have a wife, some had several wives. Ninety percent of the middle peasants had wives and 10 percent did not. Seventy percent of the poor peasants had wives and 30 percent did not. Of the handicraft workers, 70 percent had wives and 30 percent did not. Ten percent of the vagrants had wives and 90 percent did not, somewhat more than the proportion of farm laborers who had wives. Only the farm laborers were 99 percent without wives. In the seventh month (August of the solar calendar), the government ordered those men who did not have wives "freely to take" a wife, and ordered those women who did not have a husband "freely to take" a husband. Consequently, there was suddenly an increase in cases of "freely taking an old man" and "freely taking an old woman." Since the seventh month, in the space of two months, most of the middle peasants and poor peasants who did not have wives have got married, so that very few of them do not have wives now. It is relatively difficult for a farm laborer "freely to take" a wife. Women dislike the fact that the farm laborers have no household utensils or equipment, and they also dislike the fact that they are seldom at home. Thus it is difficult for the farm laborer to solve the problem of getting a wife. Fu Jiting lives in Yangfang Village in the first township, where only one of the four farm laborers (two brothers each in two families) has "freely taken" a wife. Originally, another one of them was going to be able "freely to take" one, but the head of the social insurance department of the township government said that the two of them had had an affair in the past, so he would not permit them to register for marriage. Because of this, that woman was "freely taken" away by another man and this farm laborer is still without a wife. In the vicinity of Yongfeng Town, in the second township, there are six farm laborers, four of whom have "freely taken" wives. In Houjing Village where Wen Fengzhang lives, there is only one farm laborer, who today still does not have a wife.

After the redistribution of the land, there are no laborers hired on an annual basis, and temporary work has decreased by 70 percent, leaving only 30 percent. Wages have not increased, and the farm laborers have not requested that wages be raised. "With no work to do, how can you talk of increases!"

The problem of ox-power and farming tools for farm laborers following the redistribution of the land. Of the two families of farm laborers in Yangfang Village, one family with the name Chen has one older and one younger brother, both of whom are farm laborers. The older brother worked for a rich peasant named Chen on an annual basis, for yearly wages of 33 *yuan*. The second brother worked for a rich peasant named Zhong on an annual basis, for wages of 42 *yuan*. The father, now dead, was a tenant farmer, and their mother raised them by begging. As soon as they grew up they became farm laborers. The mother died leaving just the two brothers. The older brother is aged twenty-nine, and the younger brother is aged twenty-three. They have one room, a pot for cooking rice, no table or chairs. The farming tools they used to own in the past were sold

off. With the redistribution of land in the second month, the two brothers returned home, and the second brother "freely took" a wife. They have no capital. The second brother used to have over 100 *yuan* in cash, which he loaned to a poor peasant named Zhong. When all debts were cancelled, he could not collect on it, because there was no way that the poor peasant could return it. Fortunately, they have an uncle who is a middle peasant, who has loaned them ox-power and farming tools. The three persons were given shares of fields totaling 16.2 *dan*, which they took over and have been farming themselves since the distribution of the fields in the second month. The entire harvest is their own. After the first crop was harvested they planted a second crop. They had good crops. If they had an ox, one person could farm 100 *dan* of rice fields. Since the two brothers together are farming only something over 10 *dan* of fields, they have a good deal of spare time, in which they do temporary work and transport things for other people to earn a little money.

Yangfang Village also has a farm laborer family named Zhong in which there are also two brothers. The father and mother are dead. Together with a paternal uncle (Zhong Enjiang) and aunt and their two sons, one of whom has a wife, and two granddaughters, the household consists of a total of nine persons. The uncle and his two sons farmed fields that they rented from someone else, since they had no land of their own. They were in debt and every year did not have enough to live on. The two brothers worked for others as farm laborers. The older brother, Zhong Shengpo, is over forty and worked as a laborer for a rich peasant named Zhong on an annual basis. The younger brother, Zhong Shenghuai, aged thirty-six, worked as a laborer for a middle peasant named Zhong on an annual basis. Now that the land has been distributed in the second month, they can farm for themselves. They originally had a female ox that they rented from a middle peasant named Zhong Longtan, and they raised two calves. After the revolution, Zhong Longtan wanted these calves returned to him. The township government said to Zhong Longtan, "According to the method used in all the townships, oxen that were rented out have all been turned over. You alone want it returned. It cannot be returned now." Because of this, these oxen now belong to the family of Zhong Enjiang. After the two brothers were given shares of fields, they had no problem of ox-power, or of farming tools, because their uncle had them.

At this point, let us explain the situation with that middle peasant, Zhong Longtan. Zhong Longtan, over thirty years of age, has a mother aged sixty, and a wife who is over twenty—in all three mouths to feed. He had over 10 *dan* of rice fields of his own, and he rented 34 *dan* of fields from someone else. After paying the rent they had more than enough to eat themselves, and the rest they sold. They had three oxen that they rented out to three poor peasant families for an annual rent of 1.5 *dan*. When a calf was born both parties owned half of it. He has a lot of money to lend out. In the land redistribution of the second month, the three people received 24 *dan* in rice fields (8 *dan* per person), a little more than they had before, but they cannot rent land from someone else and so have no

surplus rice to sell, and the renting of oxen and loaning of money to other people have all been eliminated. He is a very straightforward person, is not counterrevolutionary, nor has he taken on any important work responsibilities. He is a kitchen helper in the Red Army Reserve Corps in his village.

After the revolution, the farm laborers did not have power in the government. The middle peasants and poor peasants generally looked upon the farm laborers as "illiterate, inarticulate, unenlightened, unfamiliar with public affairs," and not capable of taking charge of anything. In the district, there is not a single farm laborer on the district or township government committees. There is only one who is a Red Guard team leader.

6. *Handicraft Workers*

Categories of handicraft workers in this district: carpenters, masons, seamsters, iron workers, barbers, bamboo workers, rice hulling workers, rope-makers, stone cutters, painters, tin workers, loom operators, silversmiths, dyers, vat workers, lacquerware workers, pottery workers, and paper workers—some 18 categories. There were relatively more people in the four categories of carpenters, masons, seamsters, and bamboo workers, followed by those who were barbers, iron workers, and vat workers (who press oil). Then came all the rest. In this district there were no coppersmiths, munitions workers, shoemakers, or leather workers. As for oil vats, there was one in the first township, two in the second township, one in the third township, and twelve in the fourth township. For each oil vat there was one vat worker.

Wages: In the past, for one workday, a carpenter made 20 cents, a mason 20 cents, a seamster 15 cents, a bamboo worker 15 cents. A barber, in the first, second, and fourth townships, got 1 *dou* of rice per year, and in the third township, 15 cents per year, and all were fed where they worked. Iron workers got 25 cents. Vat workers in the second township got 10 *qian* for 1 *jin* of oil pressed, in the third township, 3 *qian* per *jin*, and in the fourth township, 2 *jin* for each *Dan* of oil pressed. Since there was little oil production in the first township, the situation is unclear. The wages in the third township were especially low because there was a lot of oil. Rice-hulling workers got 60 cents per *zuo*; it takes three days to hull one *zuo* of rice. Rope-makers got 22 cents, and stone cutters got 45 cents. Artists were paid per painting, whether of the despotic gentry and landlords, or of the gods. Tinsmiths were paid by the piece. Loom operators were paid 10 cents per *zhang* of summer cloth, and also 10 cents per *zhang* of spring cloth (summer cloth is linen, and spring cloth is 80 percent linen, 20 percent cotton). No one made cotton cloth in this district. Silversmiths were paid by the piece. "False accusations are made against a lot of them." Lacquerware workers were paid by the lot, as were pottery workers. Paper workers got 15 cents (making bark paper, only in the third township).

In the past, the four categories of carpenters, masons, seamsters, and bamboo workers worked at most two hundred days a year, and at a minimum something over a hundred days. Since the revolution, the number of days a year that masons and seamsters can find work has been greatly reduced, to probably only a few dozen. Carpenters and bamboo workers have only a little less work than before, there is not much difference. The barber business has expanded because the women are now all cutting their hair. Since the revolution, tinsmiths, painters, lacquerware workers, and paper workers have all disappeared because they are no longer needed (the paper workers made the fuses for firecracker strings used for weddings).

At the "start of the revolution," handicraft workers were given half shares of fields, but the craftsmen demanded that they be given full shares. The reason was that some had lost their jobs and the work had been reduced for others and could not be counted on. It is only by receiving fields of their own that their lives could be made stable. The peasants said, "At the start of the revolution, you received half shares of fields." To which the workers replied, "With half shares of fields, we will have to raise the price of our labor." The poor peasants and farm laborers did not want wages to rise, because, having received fields in the redistribution, they wanted farm implements made, and so were obliged to hire the craftsmen. The rich and middle peasants already had farm tools so they did not need to hire the craftsmen. It was only the poor peasants who particularly needed to hire craftsmen, so the poor peasants and farm laborers did not want the cost of labor to rise. The poor peasants said, "All right, you will be given shares of the fields, but you must not raise the price of your labor." The craftsmen further said that, after they received their shares of the fields, if they still worked a hundred days a year, they would be willing to turn over 2 *dan* of rice to the public. Barbers were not given land shares, because barbers worked long days at the homes of others where they were given their meals. In Ganxian, workers were given shares of land and lowered their labor charges. Carpenters and masons were willing to have their 20 cent wage reduced to 15 cents, and the bamboo workers were willing to have their 15 cent wage reduced to 12 cents.

Seventy percent of the handicraftsmen had wives. Thirty percent did not have wives. Since the revolution, the majority of those who originally did not have wives have "freely taken" one. Because the handicraftsmen have many acquaintances, and because they have a craft, and also because they are relatively bright and articulate and a great many of them are literate, they are somewhat better off in this respect than the farm laborers.

Craftsmen have a general labor union [*gonghui*] at the district level with branch guilds at the township level and branch offices in the villages. For example, Lingyuan in the first township has an all-crafts labor union with over twenty members who have organized a branch office.

In the country villages craftsmen generally also engage in farming. You cannot find 10 pecent whose sole occupation is their craft and who do not farm at all.

Eighty percent of handicraftsmen are in debt.

7. *Merchants*

Categories of merchants in this district: owners of oil and salt general stores, rice and fruit sellers (of whom there were a dozen or so different kinds), owners of teahouses, restaurant owners, butchershop owners, beancurd makers, and owners of opium houses. In this district, those who did not also farm, whose sole occupation was running small shops, constituted 3 percent of the population (three out of a hundred families).

In the fourth township of this district, there were in the past only three small merchants with 500 *yuan* of capital, all of whom were in Yongfengyu; there were none in the other towns. Small shops in the whole district: five shops in the first township, thirty-five shops in the second township (all in Yongfengyu), six shops in the third township, and none in the fourth township, for a total of forty-six shops. Of these forty-six shops, four had capital of 500 *yuan.* (Of the three shops in Yongfeng Town, one is a pharmacy run by a person from Zhangshu, and two are foreign-goods stores, branches of a store in Xingguo Town, none of which are landlords in this district. When the revolution broke out, they all fled, the shops were confiscated, and their goods were given to the poor peasants. One shopowner in Shankang was a landlord in his township, and the entire family fled and the shop closed.) One shop had 400 *yuan.* (This was in Shankang, a general store, a two-person partnership. One partner, Han Litao, farmed 20 *dan* of rice fields and the other partner, Han Lidong, farmed 60 *dan* of fields. After the revolution Han Litao fled. Han Lidong pretended to join the revolution, and was land office manager for the government, but has now been accused of being a member of the AB Corps, and is under detention by the district government.) There were three shops of 300 *yuan.* (All of these were in Yongfeng Town. Two were general merchandise and fabric shops, run by people from Xingguo Town; they were all counterrevolutionaries and have fled, and their shops have been turned into teahouses. There was one butchershop owner who also had 70 *dan* of rice fields; he joined the revolution, has kept the shop open, is the chairman of the village government, and is a very straightforward and honest person.) Two shops had 100 *yuan.* (One of these was in Shankang, a general store and inn; [the owner had] no ricefields, was a counterrevolutionary, someone killed him, and the business folded. One was in Xijiang, a general store [owner] and silversmith who farmed some 10 *dan* of fields, is not counterrevolutionary, and is still open for business.) Two shops of 50 *yuan.* (These were in the third township, one pharmacy in Zhukang whose owner had 20 *dan* of fields, is not counterrevolutionary, and the shop is now still open; one pharmacy in Jing'ao, whose owner also had fields, a counterrevolutionary who fled, and the shop folded). Twenty-four shops of 20 *yuan.* (There were four in the first township, two in Wuniangmiao and two in Jiaotianjiang, and twenty in the second township, all in Yongfeng Town.) There were ten shops with 10 *yuan.* (Nine of these were in the second township, all in Yongfeng Town, and one in the third township, in Qilinyi.) The above are those who worked solely as small shopkeepers and did not engage in other occupations.

In the villages, there were many who were primarily farmers and secondarily merchants (who depended 80 percent on farming and 20 percent on commerce), about 40 percent of the entire population (forty out of a hundred households). Most of these people were poor peasants, with a minority of middle peasants. Because they did not have enough to live on, they supplemented their livelihood with a little carrying-pole business, like those who went to Jiangkou, to Ganzhou, or Hukoumian, and brought back salt. They went there usually carrying some oil, which became their capital. There were also a great many who carried ducks to Jiayingzhou (in Meixian) to sell and came back with a little salt.

In this district, there were twelve merchants with capital of 50 *yuan* or more, nine of whom were counterrevolutionaries, and three of whom were not counterrevolutionaries.

Of the twelve merchants who had capital of 50 *yuan* or more, only the four who had 500 *yuan* hired shop clerks. Of these three had hired one shop clerk each, and one had hired two. None of the other eight had hired shop clerks.

The thirty-four that had 20 *yuan* or less were called merchants, but in reality they were poor shopkeepers, and for this reason none of them were counterrevolutionary, and their shops are all still open.

Of the thirty-four so-called shopkeepers with 10 to 20 *yuan* of capital, their businesses were as follows:

Inns	9	
Opium dens	4	
Candy shops	2	
Butcher shops	4	
Rice shops	4	
Wood products	1	
Ironsmith	1	
General stores	4	(all in Yongfeng Town)
Teahouses	5	(four in Yongfeng Town, one in the third township)

In the land distribution this time, among those merchants with a capital of 50 *yuan* or more, leaving aside those who were killed or fled, those who were not killed and did not flee, but whose shops were closed or went out of business were all given land. Only the three shops that were not counterrevolutionary are still open for business. One is that of the butcher in Yongfeng Town with 300 *yuan* in capital, who was billed for a contribution of 220 *yuan*, leaving him only 80 *yuan* in capital. He has fifteen mouths to feed, and he is not counterrevolutionary. Having originally had 60 *dan* of fields, in this land redistribution, the proprietor of the shop, Chen Shaolin, was given a half-share and the other fourteen members of the family were given full shares, so that in addition to

what they originally had, they even received a little more. Chen Shaolin's younger brother, Chen Shaoying, is a company commander in the Third Army (originally the Second Regiment), so his family is also revolutionary, and Chen Shaolin is chairman of the village government. One is the pharmacy with 50 *yuan* of capital in Zhukang, the owner of which was also given a half-share of fields while his family members were given full shares. One is the general merchandise and silver store with 100 *yuan* of capital in Xijiang, the owner of which is not counterrevolutionary, and whom the village government billed for a contribution (amount unknown). In the land distribution, the shopowner was given one half-share, and his family members were given full shares. In addition, of the thirty-four shops belonging to poor peasants, because the four inns in the first township and the one teahouse in the third township never had much business, the owners had always relied on farming to maintain their livelihood, so in this latest redistribution of the fields, even the shopowners all received full shares of land. But the twenty-nine shops in Yongfeng Town in the past had been solely engaged in their small business, except for the four opium dens that were closed down, the remaining twenty-five, the candy shops, butcher, the rice store, the wood products shop, the ironsmith's shop, the general stores, teahouses, and inns, and so on, not only continued to exist, but their business was no less than it had been in the past. Even so, they were still given shares of fields, half-shares to the shopowners and full shares to the other members of their households. Those who had no ox-power or farming tools borrowed them from their relatives.

Summarizing the above situation, those stores that had 50 *yuan* or more of capital (in reality, most were small shops), were hard-hit in the revolution, as a result of the overly leftist policies of the local government. The poor people who had small businesses of 20 *yuan* to 10 *yuan* benefited greatly in the revolution. In addition to the shares of fields they received, for all of them, their expenses were greatly reduced, it became easy to get a wife, they did not have to spend a fortune on funerals, and they raised their heads politically, just like the poor peasants. These poor small business people belong to the same class as the poor peasants, and it is for this reason that they received virtually the same benefits as the poor peasants.

8. Vagrants

This district had the following categories of vagrants:

1) Gamblers: some fifty or so in the entire district. There were about ten in the first township, about twenty in the second township, all in Yongfeng Town. The third township had six, and the fourth township had about twenty. In the past, nine out of ten of the gamblers smoked opium, but now they do not smoke opium. Of the more than fifty gamblers in this district, not one is counterrevolutionary. They were extremely happy when they heard that the local bullies were to be overthrown and the land redistributed. In the past, they had nothing to wear

when it got cold, and they were very ragged. Now they are well clothed. In the past, when they had money they would eat fish and meat,[24] and when they had no money they had nothing to eat. Today, although they have nothing fancy to eat, they do have food every day. Eight out of ten of the gamblers had no families. Now, having received shares of fields, they borrow ox-power and farming tools from their relatives. Because the gamblers were generally very generous it is now easy for them to borrow things. Of the ten persons in the first township, there is one who previously was a member of the finance committee of the fourth township government. When he gambled he usually gambled hard and well. His credit was good. When he became a member of the finance committee after the revolution, he did a very good job. Among the twenty gamblers from the second township, the four described below worked in the township government. "Skyman,"[25] Wang Zhenyong, was director of the propaganda office of the district government; he had a house but no family. The year before last, he joined the revolution and his house was burned down by the dogs of the Pacification Defense Corps. Chen Guntong joined the revolution the year before last and was a judge in the district government, and later, company commander of the Third Company of the army reserves. Yang Dahu, who joined the revolution the year before last, and became chairman of the township government during the revolution in the second month of this year, did a very good job. Later he went to work in the district government. Chen Shaoqi joined the revolution the year before last, and in the second month of this year became head of the land office for this township. Of the six gamblers from the third township, Lei Yonghuang has a family, gambled, and sold tobacco. He joined the revolution in the second month of this year and was made head of the finance office for the township government. He is very loyal.

2) Beggars: also called mendicants.[26] Four in the first township, five in the second township, four in the third township, and four in the fourth township, for a total of seventeen. These are people who had absolutely no way out, mostly single people alone who had no family. Of the seventeen, only four had families and in each case their whole families were beggars. Now that the land has been redistributed, they borrow ox-power and farm tools from relatives. Since the revolution none have worked in the government.

3) Water-pipe tobacco sellers: two in the second township, and one in the fourth township, for a total of three. Both of those in the second township have wives and sons. Their families rented fields to farm, but they themselves did not engage in a regular occupation, but rather sold tobacco for water pipes in the gambling halls. The one in the fourth township had no family and did not farm.

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24. I.e., they would live extravagantly, given their resources.
25. *Tianshangren*, a pseudonym—see below under government offices.
26. *Huazi* (also *jiaohuazi*), a term for beggar commonly used of Buddhist monks or Daoist priests who beg for alms.

Now they have all received shares of the fields. None have worked for the government since the revolution.

4) Diviners:[27] Just one, in the fourth township. Has no family, did not farm, just read the trigrams. Has been given a land share.

5) One who carries the Guanyin boddhisatva: One in the first township. Has received a share of fields.

6) Daoist priests: Three in the first township, all have families, did not farm, religious activities were their occupation. Two in the second township, all without families, did not farm. One in the third township, has a family, did a little farming. A total of sixteen Daoist priests, all of whom have been given land shares. Ceng Yunzhang of the second township is a Daoist priest who joined the revolution the year before last. He had no family and no fields. In the second month of this year, he was the general director of the Xingguo-Ganxian-Wan'an guerrilla forces, "Excellent planning, good execution, his troops have never been defeated." Now made part of the Twenty-second Army.

7) Buddhist monks: Two in the fourth township; each lived in a small Buddhist temple, and lived on rent they received. One from Gaoxing Town returned there after the revolution and was given a land share.

8) Play actor: Performed in the play, "The Wooden Skull." One from the third township. Had a family and farmed. Now a soldier in the Twentieth Army. Two in the fourth township; they have families, farm, and have worked in the village government. All three of the above have received land shares.

9) Fortune tellers:[28] One in the first township who himself has no wife, but has brothers. Last year, he joined the revolution, and since the second month of this year he has been head of the propaganda office of the township government. Two in the second township, one of whom is blind. Both have families and do farming. They themselves tell fortunes. This time they have received land shares. The blind man, Chen Xinpo, "A well-known fortune-teller, who was hired once by a *xian* magistrate to tell his fortune, and when he told it very skillfully was given ten *yuan*." Because he is blind he has been given a double share of fields, 14 *dan* of ricefields. Four in the third township, all of whom have families, of which three farmed the land and one did not. Of those who did farm the land, it was the family head who told fortunes. Three of them work for the government. One, called Zeng Qinglong, has no wife. One, called Qiu Dayang, joined the revolution in the second month of this year, and is now on the propaganda staff of the township government. Altogether there were seventeen fortune-tellers.

The nine kinds of vagrants listed above come to a total of ninety persons, who generally welcome the revolution. Not only is there not a single one of them who

27. *Dagua de*, specifically, those who read the trigrams/hexagrams of the *Yi jing* (Book of Changes); distinguish from "*suanming de*," below.

28. *Suanming de* .

is counterrevolutionary, but ten of them have participated in the district and township governments doing leadership tasks, and one was a leader of the guerrilla team. This is well worth noting.

Vagrants have benefited a lot from the revolution.

Other than these nine categories, this district has no other vagrants.

IV. The Current State of the Land Distribution

1. Dividing the Fields

First, the land distribution units: In all four townships, the village (*cun*) is the unit of land distribution. Because the townships are large in area and there are many mountain ranges, if the township were to be taken as the unit for dividing the land, some pieces of land would be far away and difficult to farm. The peasants would rather have a little less land in their own villages than have to move to another village far from their own. In villages that have less in fields and more in hill land each person receives less in fields and more in hill land. In villages that have more fields and fewer hills, each person receives somewhat more in fields and somewhat less in hill plots. "Well, it's close enough."

Second, the method of dividing the fields: the "orders from above" were that the redistribution be completed in three days. Actually, in the first and third townships it was completed in seven days, and in the second and fourth townships it was completed in eight days. (This was too short, too rushed a time period.)

The first township has fifteen villages, the second and fourth townships have seven villages each, and the third township has eight villages. At the start of the land redistribution, the district government sent propaganda personnel to each village to hold large mass meetings. It took the first half-day to get the information out and call the people together. The men all came. The women did not come. Children under ten did not come. The propagandist told the masses about the benefits of burning the old land deeds and of redistributing the fields, and how it would be done. In one day, one propagandist could convene mass meetings in two villages. At the mass meetings held in each village at that time, the feelings of the masses who attended were that the talking was fine, but they didn't know whether the program could be maintained or not. Some said, "Burning the papers (i.e., the land deeds), not having to repay debts, hooking up with (meaning, to trust in) the Red Army to divide the fields, all this is very well, but we're afraid we can't rely on it. If the land is divided now, we're afraid we'll still have to pay rents." At the mass meetings, a chairman of the village government was elected, plus one secretary, one head of the finance office, one head of the land office and two staff people, one head of the organization office, one

head of the propaganda office, one head of the food supplies office, one head of the military office, and one liaison person. In the first township, the Yangfang Village government was elected at a mass meeting in the morning of the 25th of the second month of the lunar calendar this year. The propaganda person left to go to another village and the people (out of more than 180 persons, counting men and women, the old and young, in the whole village, 60 or 70 attended the meeting that day) dispersed to eat lunch. In the afternoon it started again, the village government calling them to hold a meeting. The chairman of the village government, Zhong Enming (an independent laborer who had no land, worked as a cook, made and sold beancurd, and when a play performance was held someplace else, would go there to sell rice cakes) chaired the meeting this day. The resolutions were as follows:

1) Request contributions from the wealthy families to pay government expenses, under the responsibility of the finance office.
2) Stop all rice in the entire village from being shipped outside the village, under the responsibility of the food supplies office.
3) Bring together all weapons in the entire village, under the responsibility of the military office.
4) Survey the land and carry out distribution, under the responsibility of the land office.

The 26th to the 29th, a total of four days, was the land survey period. The head of the land office, Fu Jiting (one of those who attended this land survey meeting), was in charge of the land staff, Zhong Ensheng and Zhong Enren (both poor peasants). These two met with the four team leaders (the whole village was divided into four teams, ten families in a team) to look at the fields family by family, and to write down what family in what place had how much in rice fields. The survey was completed in four days, and then they knew how much land in ricefields there was in total. Dividing by the population of the entire village, they obtained the quantity of fields that each person should receive. On the 1st of the third month another mass meeting was called to report to the masses which family had how much land, and how many people, the total amount of fields in the whole village, and how much each person should receive. At the time, there were two people who said that the survey was not fair, that it reported them as having more land than they had. One was Fu Hualong, who had 230 *dan* of rice fields, all of which he farmed himself, had ten mouths to feed, owed a debt of over 300 *yuan*, and hired one person to look after the one large water buffalo he had. His fields were all poor land, and in reality he could harvest only something over 140 *dan*, which, because he had ten mouths to feed, was half surplus, from which over 40 *dan* had to be subtracted for interest payments on his debt and rent on the absentee landlord fields [one part of his fields], leaving about 30 *dan*, making him a middle peasant with a slight surplus. The other was Zhong Xianhui, who had over 70 *dan* of rice fields all of which he

farmed himself, and three mouths to feed. In the past he had money that he loaned out, but it was all used up building a new house last year. Every year he hired an agricultural laborer, and he had an annual surplus of rice over and above what they ate of more than 30 *dan*, so he was also a middle peasant. He had five brothers who had set up separate households, of whom, aside from himself, one had enough to eat while three were very destitute. Several dozen poor peasants, farm laborers, and workers all spoke up at the meeting to say that what Fu and Zhong had said was not true, that the survey of the land office was definitely not in error. There were also three rich peasants at the meeting who, upon hearing the judgment of the masses, did not open their mouths. Everyone accepted the results of the survey, and then they dealt with which family would "dig up" how much to give to whom, and which family would "fill in" how much from whom. Those that had to dig up land were themselves responsible for saying which piece of land they would turn over, and so they turned over the bad fields. This time, even though the struggle was not yet thorough, and those who received fields got bad fields, they were extremely happy and did not demand good fields. The meeting that day simply accomplished the task of "taking from the plentiful to make up for the scarce." After the redistribution was completed, the secretary of the village government put it down in the registry book and did not post a notice. From the 25th of the second month to the 1st of the third month, in the space of seven days, the redistribution of the land was completed.

After the redistribution was completed, "immediately turning over the farming" versus "turning over the farming in the fall" again turned into a struggle between the poor peasants and the rich peasants. In all the townships in this district, when the land was redistributed at the end of the second month, the fields had already been sown, it was not yet time for replanting the seedlings, and it was just the time for plowing the fields. Most of the fields were turned over immediately. But there were some rich peasants who thought they would like to take another look at the situation, and hoping that the Pacification Defense Corps would return and reject the redistribution of the fields, they said to the poor peasants: I've already put in the fertilizer and plowed the fields. The fields shouldn't be turned over to you this year. Let me farm them until harvest time and then turn them over. I'll give you 40 percent of the crop harvested. Some of the poor peasants accepted this suggestion of the rich peasants, thinking that getting 40 percent for doing nothing was a good deal. Some of the farm laborers and workers indeed had no way they could take over the land and farm it immediately. For this reason, about 10 percent of the whole district used the "40 percent" method and did not turn over the fields immediately.

2. *Dividing the Hills and Forests*

The fields were divided at the end of the second month and the beginning of the third month, but the hillsides were not redistributed until the end of the fifth month.

In Yangfang Village, dividing the hillsides began on the 27th of the fifth month. The orders from above did not arrive until this time (note how important the orders from above are). On the 27th of the fifth month, the township government sent a propagandist, Liu Dalun. (He was an intellectual who was an enthusiastic worker, but on the 17th of the eighth month it came to light that he was a secretary of the AB Corps and the district government executed him. On this day eleven members of the AB Corps were executed; I fear that, like Liu Dalun, they were wrongly executed.) He came to this village and again called a large mass meeting to tell them about how to divide the hill lands. The seven newly elected land staff decided to divide the hillsides. On this day, the propagandist also reported on the matter of the poor peasant loan office, and it was resolved to act accordingly.

Redividing the hillsides was even more difficult than dividing the ricefields. There were big hills, and there were small hills. Some had a lot of firewood, and some had very little firewood. Some had big trees, some had small trees, and some had no trees. Thus, to divide them up was difficult. The head of the land office and seven land personnel set out together to hike up every hill in the entire village and hammer out a method for dividing them based not on land area but on tea-oil trees. Taking one *Dan* of "peaches" (1 *Dan* of tea-seeds, worth two strings of cash, is called a 1 *Dan* of peaches)[29] as the standard, 30 big trees make 1 *Dan* of peaches, 60 medium-size trees make 1 *Dan* of peaches, and 120 small trees make 1 *Dan* of peaches. After all the peaches from the hillsides in the whole village had been counted, they were then distributed equally among the entire population and signs were set up marking the boundaries. It took four days to divide this village up clearly. The eight men from the land office had the authority to decide on the redistribution, "You can't go by what every individual says, for if you went by whatever each individual chose to say, it would never be untangled."

In Changjiao Village in the third township, there were five persons in the land office (the head of the land office and four staff personnel). The village government issued 2.20 *yuan* for their food supplies, and it took them over thirty days to divide it up clearly, "You can see, its hard to divide."

Although the hills were divided up, only the branches could be cut for wood; you were not permitted to cut down the tree itself unless you had permission from the government.

3. Dividing the Ponds

Taking the village as the unit, the ponds were divided among teams to raise fish according to their size. For a big pond five families would comprise one team to

29. According to a note to *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, "peach" (*tao* or *taozi*) was a term commonly used for the seeds of the tea-oil tree.

fish it, and for a small pond three families would comprise one team. With one team for one pond, each family would put in the same number of fish at the same time, and when the fish were caught they would be divided equally. In this district most of the ponds are not relied upon for irrigation, so there is only the fish problem, and no water problem. Aside from the fish ponds, there are also a few mountain ponds whose water is used for irrigation. Those mountain ponds that are fished have been divided according to the above method. Those that are not used for fish go with the fields. Whoever owns the field gets the pond.

Before the revolution, the fish belonged to whoever put them in, and there was no dividing them up. This year, the new owners can't really put fish in until after the original owner of the pond catches his fish this winter.

4. Dividing the Houses

It is, in principle, good to redistribute the houses. For poor peasants, it is often the case that one family of ten or more people have only two or three rooms. Generally speaking, 60 percent of the poor peasants do not have enough living space, and the good houses are all occupied by the rich peasants. One after another the poor peasants have said that they want the houses redistributed, but the government replies, "There aren't any directives from above." It is for this reason that the poor peasants don't dare go and occupy the rich peasants' houses. When Yangfang Village held a meeting and the poor peasants demanded that the houses be redistributed, the head of the land office replied, "those who have a lot of housing space should give some to those who have very little," but no resolution was passed. The rich peasants are unwilling to yield and the poor peasants dare not occupy them (this shows the importance of "directives from above").

In redistributing housing, the village should be taken as the unit, and those who have more housing should have their houses divided up and given to those in the vicinity who have less housing.

In this district, it is only the houses of those landlords, rich peasants, and rapacious merchants who have been killed or driven off because they were reactionary which, if they have not been burned (burning them was wrong), have been occupied by the poor peasants. But they have never been formally redistributed to anyone. As for those who have not been killed and who have not fled, even if they have a lot of extra housing, it has not been redistributed.

The houses of counterrevolutionary landlords and rich peasants that were burned (by the guerrilla teams) are: one in the first township, two in the second township, five in the third township, and four in the fourth township, for a total of twelve, three of which had belonged to landlords and nine to rich peasants. The houses of revolutionary workers and peasants that were burned (by the counterrevolutionaries) were: none in the first township, seven in the second township, eight in the third township, and eight in the fourth township, for a total

of twenty-three, of which one belonged to a middle peasant, twenty to poor peasants, one to a small merchant, and one to a vagabond.

5. Public Fields

In the second month redistribution, in all the villages of all the townships, some fields were retained as public fields. In the first township, Yangfang Village retained over 10 *dan* of fields, and Chagan Village kept over 30 *dan*. In the second township, Zhige Village retained 11 *dan*. In the third township, Changjiao Village has retained no fields because it doesn't have much land and there are still sixteen persons who have not yet received shares of fields, but the other villages have all retained fields. In the fourth township, Houjing Village has retained over 100 *dan* of rice fields, all of which are in the flood plain. Why should public fields be retained? One reason is that the remnant of fields left over after redistribution was not easy to divide up, so it was retained. For example, if each person's share was 7 *dan*, and 10 or more *dan* were left over, which if divided up would amount to less than 1 *tong*[30] per person, so redistribution was not convenient, and the residue was retained as public fields. Second, they could be used to provide government expenses. Third, they could be used as land shares for children born next year. When the land was redistributed again in the eighth month, there was a directive from above that the fields must all be thoroughly distributed, so they divided up the public fields too.

Actually, it is just as well not to retain public fields, first because although there will be births, there will also be deaths, so there need be no fear that, if sons are born, there will be no fields for them. Second, by collecting a land tax the government will have money to use and need not rely on public fields for its expenses. Furthermore, in the case of the second month distribution, the fields retained were all poor fields that were not very usable. Thus, it is better to divide them all and benefit the peasants more.

6. The Amounts of Fields Distributed

The villages were all different. For example, in the first township, in Yangfang Village, each person received 5.6 *dan* (in the second month distribution the shares were 8 *dan*, but actually they could only give out 5.6 *dan*), and in Chagan Village each person received 8 *dan*. In the second township, in Zhige Village each share was 7 *dan*. In the third township, in Changjiao Village, the shares in the eighth month were different from those in the second month. In the second month, there were four different amounts of land distributed in this village: some got 7 *dan*, some got 6.5 *dan*, some got 5.5 *dan*, and some got 4 *dan* 1 *tong*. Family surnames were taken as the unit of division, because those surname

30. A *tong* was about 1/2 *dou*.

groups with more land were not willing to give away fields to surname groups that had less land. Not until the eighth month was the village taken as the unit, at which time each person received 6 *dan*. In the fourth township, in Houjing Village, each person received 8.5 *dan* in the second month. In the redistribution in the eighth month, poor land that nominally produced 2 *dan* but actually yielded only 1 *dan* was counted as 1 *dan*, and also there were some persons who had returned from the outside, so the shares were only 7.5 *dan* per person.

In Xingguo, there is only one crop a year, and the amounts of fields listed above can yield enough to just get by on, if the young and the elderly give some to the others. Add to this the planting of various other crops and the raising of pigs, and they can also meet their oil and salt and cloth and miscellaneous household needs.

The major other crop grown in this district is sweet potatoes, which on average accounts for 40 percent of the food supply of the entire population. Breaking it down, relatively less is grown in the first township because the soil will not grow sweet potatoes, so they account for only 20 percent of the food consumption. In the second and third townships, the situation is very different, where on average 50 percent of the food consumed is sweet potatoes, going as high as 70 percent. By the end of the year, everyone adds shredded sweet potatoes to the rice. In the fourth township, on average, 40 percent of the food supply is from sweet potatoes.

V. The Land Tax

What is called the "public welfare fee", has already been collected by early in the eighth month (lunar calendar). Those with shares of 6 *dan* in fields are assessed 1 percent (6 *sheng* per person). Those with shares of 7 *dan* pay 1.5 percent (1 *dou* 1 *sheng*), and those with shares of 8 *dan* pay 2.5 percent (0.2 *dan*), and those with shares of 9 *dan* pay 3.5 percent (0.315 *dan*). There are no 9-*dan* shares in this district, so the highest public welfare tax rate in this district is 2.5 percent. In the first township, in Yangfang Village with a population of 182, each person had one 8-*dan* share (using the figure for the second month distribution); when taxed at the rate of 2.5 percent, this yielded a total of 36.4 *dan*. In Chagan Village with 397 people, each with a share of 8 *dan*, the total tax received was 79.4 *dan*. In the third township, Changjiao Village, where the shares were 5.5 *dan* per person, no tax was assessed (only shares of 6 *dan* or more are taxed). The entire district will probably collect about 1,000 *dan* in taxes.

Most of the taxes collected in the eighth month are still in the individual villages, with a portion having been sent to the township government, and none to the district government. When the eighth month tax was collected, the *xian* government directive stated that those who wanted to send rice could send rice and that those who wanted to pay the money equivalent could send the money equivalent, at the money equivalent rate of 30 cash per *jin* of rice. At the time, the market price was only 20 cash, so the peasants were unwilling to pay in money.

When the public welfare fee was first imposed, about 10 percent of the people disagreed with it, and when staff members arrived at their homes, they said, "First you tell us to resist rents and resist taxes, and now you start collecting taxes." When the public welfare tax was to be collected, the order from above was very abrupt. It gave a limit of three days to turn over the rice to the township governments, and the township governments convened a meeting of all the heads of the village land offices. The first township was divided into nine Red Guard big brigades [*dadui*], and one person from each brigade was to be a land office head. They resolved that there would be a meeting of responsible persons in each village, at the end of which the public welfare fee would be collected, without ever having held a mass meeting. When collecting the fee, the brigade was taken as the unit. For example, the Eighth Big Brigade was organized jointly by the three villages of Yangfang, Lingyuan, and Li'ao. The head of the big brigade, the land office heads, the heads of the three medium brigades, and the heads of the nine branch brigades would split up and go to these three villages to collect the tax (one medium brigade for each village). They would go to a house and weigh the harvest. There are 90 *jin* to the *dan*[31] That household would appoint someone to send the tax to the township government. This big brigade in total collected about 400 dan in public welfare fees. In the first township, Chagan Village sent out letters to all its households two days in advance requesting them to send the public welfare fee to the public granary. On that day all the households, one after the other, carried rice over to the public granary (the former welfare granary), where it was received by the responsible persons of this township (five persons), and within a single day the collection was completed, bringing in a total of over 700 dan of rice. They had said beforehand that any family that failed to bring in their public welfare fee on that day would have to pay the meal expenses for that day of the five responsible persons. Because everyone was afraid of having to put out this bit of money, they all brought in their public welfare fees very promptly.

VI. The Soviets

1. The District Government

Members of the the district government (the second month to the sixth month):

Chairman, Liu Shaobiao (from the second township, did not farm, some education, fairly literate, a tailor but later quit tailoring to take up gambling as his profession; joined the revolution the year before last, house burned by the Pacification Defense Corps; after the seventh month, when a new chairman was installed, he became a tailor).

Military Affairs, Xiao Zhichun (from the second township, did not farm, peddled ducks to Guangdong, gambled, caretaker of an ancestral temple, had no house of his own, not very literate, joined the revolution the year before last; since the seventh month has been chairman of the district government).

Finance, Hou Lixin (from the second township, a tailor, literate, since the seventh month has been head of the district labor union committee).

Organization, Liu Shaoming (from the second township, medical doctor, has no other occupation, a formerly well-situated family, the four brothers of which later set up separate households, he became a medical doctor, owed money; joined the revolution year before last, house was burned down by the Pacification Defense Corps; has been finance officer since the seventh month).

Propaganda, Zou Lisan (from Ganxian, a rich peasant, six brothers, middle school graduate; became head of the propaganda office, left for Ganxian in the seventh month).

Wang Zhenren (from the second township, nickname "Skyman," no job, makes his living by gambling; joined the revolution year before last, house was burned down by the Pacification Defense Corps; since the seventh month has been propaganda officer).

Fang Gongshu (from the eleventh district, a scholar, occupation uncertain, house was burned down by the Pacification Defense Corps, returned to the eleventh district in the seventh month).

Xiao Zhicheng (from the second township, gambler by occupation, fairly literate; joined the revolution the year before last, was attacked by the Pacification Defense Corps; has been in the district government offices since the seventh month, position unknown).

Chen Fangbao (from the second township, tailor and also gambler, illiterate; joined the revolution the year before last, arrested in the eighth month under suspicion of being a member of the AB Corps).

Judge, Zeng Libang (from the second township, a Daoist priest with no other occupation, family in very difficult straits; joined the revolution the year before last, later became director general of the Xingguo-Ganxian-Wan'an guerrilla brigade, now incorporated into the Twenty-second Army).

Culture, Zou Lidong (from the second township, formerly had 600 *dan* of fields, used up for his education, left with 100 *dan*, and a debt of over 300 *yuan*, was a bankrupt big landlord; a college graduate, joined the revolution last year, after the reorganization in the seventh month became culture officer).

Secretary-General, Xie Yingshan (from the *xian* seat, a scholar, aged fifty, with the reorganization in the seventh month became secretary-general).

Squad [*shaodui*] political officer, Xiao Shaowen (from the second township, a gambler by occupation, somewhat literate; joined the revolution the year before

31. The *dan* which appears here is the unit of measure, not the unit of weight (generally written *Dan* in this volume). It is assumed in some other texts that one *dan* or bushel of rice weighs roughly one *Dan* or picul, equivalent to 100 *jin* or Chinese pounds, but in this instance Mao uses the more precise figure of 90 *jin*.

last, with the seventh month reorganization went to southwestern Jiangxi.
Squad leader, Xu Changhan (from the first township, a rich peasant, was himself a "graduate"; last year the guerrilla corps forced him to make a contribution, he joined the revolution, and was arrested in the eighth month under suspicion of being a member of the AB Corps).
Huang Guan (a scholar, background unclear, since the seventh month reorganization his activities are also unclear).
Chen Guntong (from the second township, father was a local ruffian [*tugun*], now dead; himself a middle peasant and also gambler, illiterate; joined the revolution the year before last, the Pacification Defense Corps confiscated his fields, in the district government offices since the reorganization in the seventh month).
Yang Dacheng (from the second township, formerly a tailor, later gambled for a profession; joined the revolution the year before last, somewhat literate, following the seventh month reorganization became propaganda officer in the second township government).
Women, Liu Chaoying (from the first township, a working woman, illiterate; after the seventh month reorganization went to southwestern Jiangxi.

Of the eighteen persons listed above, six were gamblers by occupation (two of whom had previously been tailors), one was a tailor and gambler, one was strictly a tailor, one a medical doctor, one a Daoist priest, one a bankrupt big landlord, two rich peasants, one middle peasant, three scholars of unknown backgrounds, and one a working woman of unknown family background.

Of the eighteen persons above, the seven who are best at explaining things and have the most authority are Liu Shaobiao, Xiao Zhichun, Liu Shaoming, Wang Zhenren, Xie Yingshan, Chen Guntong, Zou Lidong, and Zeng Libang.

The district government is located in Yongfeng Town.

Between the second month and the ninth month, over twenty district-wide mass meetings were held, and the district representative congress met twice (representatives were elected at mass meetings held in each village). Before the sixth month, there were few district-wide mass meetings. With the deepening of the struggle since the sixth month, more were held. Since the fourth month, women and children have participated in the mass meetings.

2. The Township Governments

To take the township government of the first township as an example:

Chairman, Xie Jinming (poor peasant and pole-bearer, had an extremely small piece of land of his own).
Finances, Zhong Guochu (middle peasant).
Military Affairs, Yang Tingrong (poor peasant, had an extremely small piece of his own land).

Propaganda, Xie Zhongkai (poor peasant, had his own land, but owed money).
Xie Zhongmei (had his own fields that he farmed himself and also traveled to Guangdong, a middle peasant).
Xie Huahuan (rich peasant and graduate of the Xingguo *xian* School).
Chen Fangpo (poor peasant, farmed other people's fields, and fortune-teller).
Secretary, Yi Yonghong (father is a barber, very poor, he himself is educated).
Judge, Chen Yushu (from Liantang, has an education).
Land, Fu Jiting (poor peasant).

Of these ten persons, six were poor peasants, two were middle peasants, and one was a rich peasant, while one was a scholar who came from the outside.

The township governments have held far fewer mass meetings than the district, no more than ten. Before the fourth month, women and children did not participate, but since the fourth month they have participated.

The township representative meetings have met six or seven times, with thirty or forty persons attending each time, in each township, with one or two representatives from each village, and some nonrepresentatives attending from villages near the township government. Each meeting lasted three to four hours. The representatives attending the meetings talked quite a lot, and a temporary chairman was chosen.

3. Village Governments

From the second month to the fifth month there were village governments. A village government is really essential during land distribution.. After the lands are distributed it is possible to do without the village governments. Furthermore, to set one up requires money—even if food allowances are not given, administrative expenses do require some money. Since the deepening of the revolution and the distribution of the land, ten households have been formed into a team [*zu*], and there is a Red Guard brigade. If a village government is not desired, that's all right, too.

4. Defects of Government Personnel

First is bureaucratism, putting on airs, and an aversion to getting close to the masses. When one of the common people goes to the government and asks a question about something, are the government staff members happy about it and say a few words in reply, or are they not happy about it, and ignore that person totally, or even accuse him of "stirring up trouble"?

Second is after confiscating the things of the reactionaries, not issuing them to the poor people, but selling them for cash, while those who are not on close speaking terms with those in the government have no chance to buy them, and only those who are on intimate terms and can put in a few words with the

government personnel can buy them. Moreover, when they are sold only those with money can afford to buy them, while the farm laborers and the poorest of the poor peasants are left out.

Third is sending women to work in the government. The township governments always have one or two women and the district government always has three or four women. It is good to have women working in the government, but the government's hiring methods are wrong. If a woman is not good-looking, they don't want her even if she is articulate and capable. If a woman is good-looking, they want her even if she is inarticulate and incapable of doing the work. And the same is true when the township government people go down to hold meetings in the villages. They talk with the pretty women and won't say a word to those who are not pretty.

Fourth, and this is the most important item, violating public opinion. Government personnel do what a small minority has decided, and the elections to the representative assemblies are merely a matter of form. On one occasion the chairman said that all those who agreed with a certain person should raise their hands, and when some did not raise their hands, the chairman pointed to one of those who had not raised his hand and called him an AB Leaguer. Once the chairman of the meeting angrily interrogated someone who had not raised his hand as to why he did not do so. And then, sometimes only Communist Party members are allowed to work in the government, and those who are not members of the Communist Party, even if they are leaders of the masses, are not allowed to go work in the government (I have told those attending the meetings: These bad things are the conditions of the early stages of the land revolution, and one of the reasons they take place is because the composition of the district government is not so good, these must all be changed in the future, these bad things are wrong).

VII. Militarizing the Villages

1. The Red Guard Brigades

In the first township, nine companies; second township, three companies; third township, four companies; fourth township, four companies. Structure: eight to fifteen men to a squad; three squads to a platoon; three platoons to one company. In the villages within this district, one company usually has eighty to ninety men. For example, the Eighth Company of the first township is composed of the Yangfang First Platoon, the Lingyuan Second Platoon, and the Li'ao Third Platoon, with a total of more than ninety men.

The Red Guard brigades range in age from twenty-three to fifty.

The Red Guard brigades are all male.

In the beginning, they were divided between the standing Red Guard brigades and the reserve Red Guard brigades; later these were combined and were no longer divided between standing and reserve Red Guards.

Duties: To stand sentry day and night. Every village has sentries. Every village must have a sentry station at the entrance of its main road. Ordinarily, the Children's Corps and the Youth Corps stand sentry during the daytime. The regulations stipulate that there be five persons every day, two girls from the Children's Corps, two boys from the Children's Corps, and one sentry inspector from the Youth Corps. If the person from the Youth Corps can read and write, he must look carefully at the travel passes, and no matter who comes through, all must have a travel pass from village A to village B. At night, the Red Guard brigade takes over sentry duty, usually four men every night, two men to a shift, one shift for the first half of the night, and one shift for the second half of the night. When the situation in the environs is tense (as when the Qifang Pacification Defense dogs attacked the vicinity of Jun Village), the Red Guard unit takes over sentry duty both day and night, and furthermore the number of people on sentry duty is increased considerably. Although in the daytime there are still only four, in the evening there will be ten or more, or even twenty or more.

Each Red Guard company has a company commander, who must be one of the most hard-working persons in that township, and must also have some knowledge of military affairs; and a political officer, who must be one of the most hard-working persons in the township and must also be able to read documents.

Formerly the Red Guard brigades were obliged to conduct drills. When the Red Army reserve brigades were formed in the seventh month, they no longer had drills.

The Red Guard brigades are divided into the men's Red Guards and the women's Red Guards. For example, in the Eighth Company jointly organized by the three villages of Yangfang, Lingyuan, and Li'ao in the first township, there are two units, the men's Eighth Company and the women's Eighth Company. The ages of the women Red Guards are similar to the men Red Guards, but they are fewer in number, because there are fewer women than men, and subtracting pregnant women and women who are nursing, each company usually has only forty persons (the Third Company of the second township) or fifty persons (the Eighth Company of the first township and the Third Company of the third township). There are also some with fewer than forty persons, and there are some with more than fifty persons. The women Red Guards ordinarily do not stand sentry duty. In emergency situations, when the men Red Guards are out on campaigns (out fighting is called "out on a campaign"), then the women Red Guards stand sentry duty. The women's Red Guard brigades must also conduct drills, once a month, two to three hours each time. The company commander and the political officer are both women. When they conduct drills, the men's Red Guard brigade delegates someone to go there and act as drill instructor. Since the sixth month, when the men's Red Guards took their best men and formed them into the Red Army reserve brigades, the men's Red Guards were

left with only the elderly and the weak, each brigade having only ten or more people, no more than twenty or thirty, so after this they did not have drills. As for the men's Red Guards, each township has one township brigade leader, and one township political officer, both of whom are not permanently attached to the township government, but who live in their own homes, and go where they are instructed to go when something comes up. When there is an all-township drill, they must also go. In each of the villages, the Red Guards have twice conducted all-township drills.

2. Youth Vanguard Brigade

Wherever there is a Red Guard company, there is also a youth company in which there is no division between male and female, and their ages are sixteen to twenty-three. There is a company commander and a political officer. Each company is divided into three platoons, and each platoon is divided into three squads. It is just that they are fewer in numbers than the Red Guard companies; per company there may be twenty persons (Zhige in the second township), thirty persons (Changjiao in the third township), or fifty to sixty persons (the three villages of Yangfang, etc., in the first township). Those with twenty or thirty persons are called platoons, while those with fifty or sixty persons are called companies. Since the sixth month, those with courage have been picked out to be incorporated into the Red Army reserve corps and the district special agent battalion. The remaining youth brigade members continue to conduct drill exercises, twice a month. It is only the men's Red Guard brigade that, since the incorporation of its most courageous and best men into the Red Army reserve corps, no longer holds drill exercises.

The youth brigades, since their best members have been incorporated into the Red Army reserve corps and district special agent battalion, have been left with only a few persons, and actually some places no longer have a youth brigade (as in the case of the three villages of Yangfang, etc., in the first township, and Zhige in the second township).

3. Children's Brigades

No separation of boys and girls, ages eight to fifteen.

Where there is a Red Guard brigade and a youth brigade, there is also a laborers' children's brigade. There is a brigade leader for each village. There are no township brigade leaders. There is a district brigade leader.

The tasks of the children's brigades are first, to stand sentry duty; second, to inspect for opium and gambling; and third, to get rid of superstition and religion. The children's brigades inspect for opium and gambling and attack religion very forcefully, entirely without mercy, "truly and fairly doing their public duty." When mass meetings are held, they attend. Their weapons are primarily wooden guns, and some among them have spears.

All members of the children's brigades are studying in the people's schools. The people's schools were started in the seventh month, five in the first township, three in the second township, seven in the third township, and one in the fourth township, for a total of sixteen. The district government stipulates that each township have three schools and gives a food allowance for three teachers, 0.10 *yuan* per day in big foreign currency, plus 2.00 *yuan* per month for miscellaneous expenses, for a total of 5.00 *yuan* per month. Because the first township is large in size, it is allowed to run five schools. Because the third township has many mountains, three schools are not enough, so they themselves have added four more schools for a total of seven, but since they have only 15 *yuan* in expense funds, each school receives an average allotment of a little over 2 *yuan*. The number of students in the people's schools is as low as twenty and as high as a hundred students, generally forty or so. In the case of the joint school of three villages of Yangfang, Lingyuan, and Li'ao in the first township, which has over a hundred and twenty children between the ages of eight and fifteen, one building is too small to hold them all, and one teacher cannot teach them all, and consequently many children have not yet started to attend school. Of the hundred and twenty children, only about sixty are attending the school. Originally, the three villages wanted to have three people's schools, but because there are no teachers in these villages and they do not have the funds to pay the living expenses of someone brought in from the outside, they cannot operate three schools. In the third township, the school in Zhuzhaoan Village has only twenty-one students.

Every village has a common people's night school and one teacher for each school—someone from the village who can read a little and is given no living expenses. The teachers do their own work at home during the day and go to the poor people's night schools in the evening to hold classes. Fu Jiting from Yangfang and Zhong Dewu in Changjiao are both teachers. The number of students varies. In Yangfang there are forty. Their ages vary, elderly, middle-aged, and young all attend. Most of the night schools have women students, one third of the total. Some have no women, as in the cases of Chagan Village in the first township and Houjing Village in the fourth township, in neither of which are there any women attending the common people's night school. The children's brigades have exercise drills three times per week, all under the direction of the people's schools. "They drill very well."

4. The Inspection Brigades **[jiuchadui]**

The workers have organized inspection brigades, one company per township, with one company commander and one political officer. The inspection brigade of the second township has 105 persons. The four villages of Yangfang, Lingyuan, Li'ao, and Chashi (i.e., Chagan) in the first township have one platoon with twenty-six people.

5. *Red Army Reserve Corps*

Composed of the strong and courageous elements from the two organizations, the Red Guards and the youth brigades. Each township has two companies, eight companies in the whole district. Each company has several dozen to over a hundred people. The two companies from the first township have a little over a hundred persons each. In the recent campaign in Xinyu, all the men of the eight companies from the tenth district were present. After the reserve corps was formed in the seventh month, the attacks on Qifang, Langquan, Ganzhou, and the latest Xinyu campaign were all undertaken by the reserve corps. When the reserve corps goes out on campaigns, the sentry duty of the townships and villages is borne by the Red Guards, the youth brigades, and children's brigades. When the reserve corps returns it again helps out with the sentry duty. The eight companies of the entire district are organized into one regiment, with a regimental commander and a regimental political officer. Ordinarily, battalions are not set up. The first township has the First Company and Second Company. The second township has the Third Company and Fourth Company. The third township has the Fifth Company and Sixth Company. The fourth township has the Seventh Company and the Eighth Company. In the latest Xinyu campaign, they were organized into three battalions, the First, Second, and Third Companies forming the First Battalion, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Companies forming the Second Battalion, and the Seventh and Eighth Companies forming the Third Battalion, with battalion commanders and battalion political officers. A company has four pole-carriers, eight mess staff, one to four dispatchers, one orderly, one bugler (can't play the bugle), and no cavalry. Each company has two propagandists, one public speaker, and one person to write slogans. The battalion staff includes no propaganda personnel, no aide-de-camp, and no dispatchers. The regimental staff includes three propagandists, one aide-de-camp, and two dispatchers. The staffs of the three companies and of the battalion live together and eat together. Their weapons are spears and shotguns.

6. *The District Special Agent Battalion*

Three companies, formed in the seventh month, also selected from the Red Guards and youth brigades. Formed of younger and more courageous elements selected from the Red Guards and youth brigades, better than those of the reserve corps. They are organized and trained, but are not brought together frequently. Ordinarily, they are at home doing their own work. They are brought together for a big exercise drill three times a month, on the 2nd, 12th, and 22nd of the month. When something takes place, they are ordered to assemble and go out to fight. At present the two companies, the first and third, are out on campaign in the attack on Langquan, and the second company is at home, not mobilized. Their weapons are primarily shotguns, locally manufactured guns,

and locally made cannons, no automatic rifles, and a few spears. The battalion staff and district government are together. There is a battalion commander and a battalion political officer.

7. *The Red Army Independent Regiment*

In the whole of Xingguo *xian* a total of three independent regiments have been formed; all have been given to the Red Army. These too have been selected from the Red Guards and from the youth brigades, and are made up of members who are just as good as those of the special agent battalion. They are all young people and furthermore are volunteer soldiers.

Each regiment has over one thousand men. The regiments, battalions, and companies all have commanders and political officers, and are concentrated in the *xian* town, where they receive training and await deployment to be incorporated into the Red Army. They are all empty-handed, having no weapons.

Order to Lure the Enemy Deep into the Red Area, Wait Until They Are Exhausted, and Annihilate Them[1]

(November 1, 1930, 2 P.M.,
Yuanqian Village, Luofang, Xinyu *xian*)

1. The two enemy divisions of Gong and Luo are in the area of Gaoan and Shanggao; the two regiments of Zhang Huizan are in Zhangshu; Deng Ying's division is in Fengcheng; there is one enemy division in Wanshougong (whose designation is unclear); Peng Qibiao's battalion [2] is near Nanchang; Xu Kexiang has approached Hukou; the division of Tan Daoyuan and the battalion of Hu Zuyu are on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railroad; Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai's two divisions have reached south Hubei,[3] and the enemy from Hunan, the Li Jue division, have entered Yuanzhou.

2. The Front Army will carry out its original plan of luring the enemy deep into the Red regions and annihilating them when they are exhausted. It has been decided to move its main force to the east bank of the Gan River, seek opportunities to occupy Zhangshu and Fuzhou, promote work in various *xian* such as Xin'gan, Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, Yihuang, Chongren, Nanfeng and Nancheng, prepare supplies, and train troops.

3. The Third Army Group, which constitutes the central route army (commanded by Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] and Political Commissar Teng [Daiyuan]), should speedily cross the Yuan River and concentrate troops on the south bank. It should cross the river near a place directly opposite Xin'gan, on the 5th of this month punctually, advance toward Zhangshu and seize opportunities to take Zhangshu in accordance with our strategy, raise 200,000 [*yuan*] of funds, and mobilize the masses in the areas near the major roads from Zhangshu

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 181–83, where it has been taken from a printed document held in the Central Party Archives. It can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 175–77.

1. This is an order of the First Front Army of the Red Army, issued by Mao Zedong and Zhu De.

2. The reference is to the independent Fourteenth Battalion of the Guomindang, commanded by Peng Qibiao.

3. Cai Tingkai (1892–1968) and Jiang Guangnai (1888–1967) were both natives of Guangdong. At this time, they were commanders respectively of the Guomindang Sixtieth and Sixty-first Divisions, which together made up the Nineteenth Route Army.

to Fengcheng and Xin'gan. After that, the place for concentrating the troops is near Tengtian, Yongfeng.

4. The Fourth Army and the Twelfth Army will be the right route army and should concentrate their forces on the 3rd, inspect their work on the 4th, move to the town of Xiajiang on the 5th, and cross the river (under the command of Lin Biao and Yang Yuebin) on the 6th. They should further advance toward Fuzhou through Chongren, seize opportunities to take Fuzhou in accordance with our strategy, carry out work in Nanfeng, Nancheng, Chongren and Yihuang, raise the sum of 400,000 [*yuan*], and mobilize the masses there. The next place of concentration is near Zhaoxie city in Le'an. If the central route army is threatened by an enemy with superior forces, then the right route should advance the time for concentration and move toward the central route in order to cope with the enemy.

5. The Third Army (commanded by Huang Gonglue and Cai Huiwen) will be the left route with the task of disrupting the enemy in the areas on the west bank of the Gan River (including Anfu), keeping contact with the Twentieth Army and the central route, pinning down the enemy, and preventing them from attacking Ji'an.

6. The Twentieth Army should carry out work in the area of Jishui, Yongfeng and Xin'gan, and should maintain constant contact with General Headquarters.

7. The time for the work is one month, and all units must complete the work in their respective *xian* and districts on time.

8. The rear liaison line[4] stretches to Ji'an through Xiajiang and the Rear Office in Ji'an still remains.

9. The General Headquarters plans to cross the river at the town of Xiajiang, situated near the main road to Xin'gan opposite the Xiajiang *xian* town. Afterward, it will be with the central route (the Third Army Group).

It is so ordered.

Addendum:

(1) The priority in using work time should be raising funds. Meanwhile, the broad masses should also be mobilized and the training of our own troops should be stepped up.

(2) After the separation of troops, if any password or signal is lost, the unit may design its own, inform neighboring friendly forces, and report to the General Headquarters.

(3) During the work, all sides should use all methods to deliver reports to the General Headquarters.

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4. Here we follow the text in the *Mao Zedong ji*, which has the character *xian* ("line"), rather than *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, which has *qi* ("period"), followed by the Chinese equivalent of [*sic*].

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Investigations in Dongtang and Other Places

(November 8, 1930)[1]

On October 30, 1930, the Front Committee of the Red Army decided in Luofang to adopt the strategy of luring the enemy deep into our territory.[2] On November 6, the Red Army crossed the Gan River at Xiajiang, heading for Yongfeng and Nancheng. I traveled from Xiajiang to Ji'an to make arrangements for the withdrawal, and stayed overnight in Dongtang on November 7, arriving in Ji'an the next day. I conducted some brief investigations along the way. The investigation in Lijiafang helped me understand the organization and activities of the soviets at the village and township levels in those places in the land struggle. I had only foggy ideas about such facts before this investigation. This investigation enabled me to find out about the importance of redistribution of land using the village as the basic unit. There are several dozens of *xian* in southwest Jiangxi where land has been redistributed. The land laws promulgated by the higher-level governments call for redistribution taking the township as the basic unit. Officials in most higher-level organs also think that land is being redistributed using the township as the basic unit. They do not seem to know that the real situation is completely different. Everywhere redistribution takes place using the village as the basic unit. There are very few cases of redistribution using the township as the basic unit. The method of redistribution which uses the village as the basic unit favors rich peasants, and is disadvantageous to poor peasants; it should be changed.

1. Investigation in Dongtang

Dongtang Village is in the 15th township of Tongshui district in Jishui *xian*.

There are one thousand households, or three thousand people, in the township.

Land has been redistributed using the village as the basic unit.

Our source for this investigation is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 254–63, which reproduces the text as it was originally published in Yan'an in 1941.

1. This date does not appear at the head of the Chinese text, but it is implied by the first paragraph of Mao's own account of his movements, and given in *Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 323.

2. I.e., during the Joint Conference of the General Front Committee and of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee in Luofang (see, above, the note to the text of October 26, 1930).

There are 290 people in this village.

The village government has its chairman and secretary, both support themselves at their own expense.

During land redistribution, each person received 1 *dou* 3 *sheng* of land that yield about 2.5 *dan* of grain (every *dou* of land yields two *dan* of grain).[3]

In some other villages, each person got two *dou* of land. Two *dou* was the upper limit; nobody got more than two *dou* in this township.

The secretary of the village government, Hu Deshun, 48, also teaches in the community's school. He has eight mouths to feed. In addition to himself, he has five sons, his wife and his daughter-in-law. His eldest son works both as a tailor and a farm hand. He is 25. His second son, aged 19, is learning to be a carpenter, and is apprenticed in Yongfeng *xian*. He does not make any money. His third son is 14 and learning to be a bamboo-smith. He is also an apprentice and makes no money. His fourth son, 7, is going to school. His youngest son is three years old. Previously, he owned 1 *dan* 3 *dou* 8 *sheng* of land and could harvest 27 *dan* of grain, which was not enough to feed the family.[4] [He] relied on growing sweet potatoes, raising pigs, and money earned by his eldest son, as well as his own labor in the fields. He owed three hundred strings of cash. In the land redistribution this time, the eight of them received in all 1 *dan* 4 *sheng* of land, and had to give up 3 *dou* 4 *sheng* of land.

From the city of Ji'an to Jingtan, Tongshui and Futian, almost every family in this area about seventy to eighty *li* in diameter has women employed in weaving cloth; they produce a huge amount, using the yarns (foreign-made) supplied to the peasant families by businessmen, rich peasants and landlords. The process of the capitalist destruction of the family cottage industry is not over yet.

2. Investigation in Daqiao

[Daqiao] is under the jurisdiction of the ninth township of Jingtan district in Jishui *xian*; it is fifty *li* from Ji'an.

The district is divided into thirteen townships.

This township is divided into five villages.

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3. Here Mao uses the Chinese dry measures *sheng* (approximately a litre), *dou* (approximately a decalitre), and *dan* (approximately a hectolitre). Land in this village is being measured, not in terms of the harvest it will normally yield, but in terms of the amount of seed required to sow it. Thus one *dou* of land, having been sown with one decalitre of seed, will yield one hectolitre of grain at the harvest, or ten times the amount of seed used. In the balance of the text, land is measured sometimes in terms of seed required, sometimes in terms of yield.

4. It can be seen from this example, and others in the present text, that the actual yield of a piece of land does not necessarily correspond to the nominal yield used to measure it, but varies with the quality and location of each plot.

This village is called Daqiao.

The chairman of the township government is Sun Xiu'en.

For the 570 people in the Liu village of Jiaokeng township, each received nine *luo* of land, or four and a half *dan*.[5] For the 110 people in the Tang village of Jiaokeng township, each received land with a yield of nine *luo* of grain. For the fifty people in the Wu village of Jiaokeng township, each also received nine *luo* of land. The three villages, Liu, Tang and Wu, share the same village government, and every person got nine *luo* of land.

In Daqiao Village those surnamed Guo number 1,027, each of whom was given eight *luo*, or two *dou*, of land, which yields four *dan* of grain.[6] In Shenjiangyu, those surnamed Luo in two villages number 210 people, and share the same village government. Eight *luo* of land was redistributed to each person.

For the people of the Guo and Luo villages, each received eight *luo* of land because the quality of the land there is slightly better. The villagers in the three villages, Liu, Tang, and Wu, got nine *luo* of land each because the quality of the land there is a bit poorer. On average, for young and old, each person consumes ten *luo* (or five *Dan*)[7] of grain every year.

Second-crop rice can be grown on one-third of the land in each village; it cannot be grown on two-thirds of the land since there is no water. The land on which the second-crop rice can be grown and the land on which it cannot are packaged together during redistribution, with each person getting a bit of each kind. Getting eight or nine *luo* of land both refer to the combined harvest from the first and second crops of grain. Each person consumes ten *luo* of rice every year. Those who got eight *luo* are short two *luo*; those who got nine *luo* are short one *luo*. The method of making up for the shortfalls is, first, engaging in other employment, such as dying cloth, processing rice, working as carpenters, smiths and tailors. More than three hundred people go to other townships to find employment. Of these, more than 170 to 180 people go to Ganzhou to find jobs. Most of them process rice or work as tailors and small businessmen. About one hundred people go to Ji'an, most of them processing rice and dying cloth. Their families have all received redistributed land. This township does not grow non-rice crops. The second method is for housewives to weave cloth, as they do in most households. Each piece of cloth measures 12 *zhang*, or 130 *chi*, for which

5. Here Mao (or local usage) introduces yet another complication, by the use of the unit known as a *luo* (basket), equal to half a *dan*. At the same time, yield (rather than seed required) is being used as the measure of land.

6. Here both criteria (seed and yield) are being used simultaneously, and the grain produced is apparently twenty times the amount of seed.

7. As already indicated, two *luo* or "baskets" are equivalent to one *dan*. There are 100 *jin* or Chinese pounds in the unit of weight written *Dan* in this volume. Here it is apparently being assumed that when dealing with grain, the two measures are roughly equivalent (just as one litre of water weighs one kilogram). In Section V of the Xingguo Investigation, on the other hand, Mao gives the proportion as .9 *Dan* per *dan*.

they get paid 400 cash. It takes ten days for a fast worker to finish one piece. Each worker can make 1,200 cash every month. The slower workers and those hampered by their children cannot finish one piece in ten days. Rich peasants and small businessmen buy foreign-made yarns from Ji'an and distribute them among villages and households. The less-accomplished weavers may get 300 cash, or sometimes 200 cash, for one piece. Some even have to pay for unacceptable products. For one piece of cloth, they also make an additional two *liang* of yarn, which can be woven into two *chi* of cloth. One *chi* of cloth sells for 100–110 cash. Peasants depend on such additional yarn for making their own clothes. The monthly income of the weavers, 1,200 cash, is used as money for salt and cooking oil. The odd jobs and weaving mentioned above make up the main sources to augment the shortfalls in daily living expenses. Now there is not much cloth to be woven, nor are there enough odd jobs to be found. The workers who have gone to Ganzhou have not returned; of the 100 workers who have gone to Ji'an, about 50–60 have come back.

This township does not have a school yet.

Recently the district issued an ordinance that each township produce twenty conscripts as volunteers for the Red Army. Eighteen people from this township joined up. All of them volunteered. There is a send-off party today at the Wugang district government.

3. Investigation in Lijiafang

The nineteenth township in Rufang district of Ji'an *xian* is called Lijiafang (40 *li* from Ji'an).

This township has nine villages and six village governments.

Of the nine villages, six are large ones, and the other three are smaller ones.

Six larger ones are Lijiafang, Shangzhaotang, Cangxia, Xuyuan, Jinbi and Zhouyuan. Three smaller villages are Yejiafang, Xiaolijiafang and Yangpingzhou. The three smaller villages share the same village government as Lijiafang. Each of the remaining five villages has its own village government.

There are four officers in the village government: one chairman, one secretary, one land officer who is also the grain officer, and one messenger who is also the cook. The chairman, secretary and messenger-cook live and work in the village government; they eat at the expense of the government. The land-and-food-clerk lives at home and eats at his own expense. He eats at the government's expense only when he goes to the village government to take care of official business.

The expenditures of the village government consist of (1) the daily cost of food for three and the cost of food for an average of two visitors per day. Each person costs 0.1 *yuan* in big foreign dollars every day; the monthly total cost is fifteen *yuan*, (2) three *yuan* in office expenses for lamps, kerosene, paper and pens, (3) money for straw sandals, hair-cuts and tobacco for the Red Guards and

Young Pioneers when they are sent off on missions; the amounts vary from 500 cash to one string of cash (reimbursed to the full actual cost; extra money is returned and shortfalls are made up). There have been nine attacks on Ji'an. On longer missions they sometimes returned home after more than a month. In the past, such items cost three *yuan* per month. For previous missions the village government also paid for the cost of food. Later, the practice was changed, and the township government pays for the cost of food, with the village government paying only for incidental expenses. Of the three items above, the monthly expenditures amount to a total of 21 *yuan*.

The previous village government employed nine people to run its affairs: chairman, secretary, treasurer, buyer, land officer, food officer, arbitrator, transportation officer, and cook. All nine of them work in the village government and eat at the government's expense. This state of affairs continued between the time the revolution began in January of this year and March 19, between June 4 and September 4. Between March 20 and June 3, the reactionary garrison team occupied [the village] and abolished the village government. The head of the government fled to Futian. Since September 5, the practice has been changed; now four people regularly work in the village government; the expenditures were higher when there were nine people working here.

In the township government, starting on January 10 and ending on March 19, and starting on June 4 and ending on September 5, there were these administrators: chairman, secretary, buyer, treasurer, cultural officer, land officer, food officer, arbitrator, transportation officer and cook. There were also three women, three Young Pioneers (team leader, deputy team leader and instructor-secretary), and the head of the children's league. Altogether there were eighteen people, all of whom ate at the government's expense. Since September 6 the number of administrators has been cut to only seven: chairman, secretary, land and food officer, cultural officer, chairman of the women's committee, head of the Red Guards who is also the cook, and another secretary. The secretary has two jobs to do: act as the "commissar for confiscation" and "go to the countryside to propagandize about and expand the Red Army." The seven people mentioned above regularly work and eat in the township government. There are four members of the women's committee who come to eat in the government only when they have business to do there, and stay home when there is nothing for them to do. The job of the four members of the women's committee is to go down to the countryside to organize working women into the Red Guards, relief teams, and laundry teams, as well as persuade men to join the Red Army.

In February this year, eight people from this township joined the Red Army. On June 18, when the second attack on Ji'an was launched, two people from each village joined the Red Army. Altogether eighteen people joined up. In July, when the seventh attack on Ji'an began, another seven went. On August 13, after the ninth attack on Ji'an was underway, forty-six people went to join the Red Army and were grouped into an independent regiment; they received training at

the headquarters of the Second Independent Regiment in Datang. Altogether eighty people from this township have gone to join the Red Army; all of them were encouraged to go. But of the last group of forty-six people, four or five people wept and showed reluctance to join up; they were forced to go.

There are nine villages in this township: Lijiafang, with the surname Hu, 228 people; Xiaolijiafang, with the surname Li, 30 people; Yejiafang, with the surname Ye, 45 people; Yangpingzhou, with the surname Xiao, 24 people. These four villages have a total of 327 people (155 men and 172 women). In Shangzhaotang the surname is Liu, and there are 200 people. In Cangxia, with the surname Yan, there are 315 people (150 men and 165 women). In Xuyuan, with the surname Zhou, there are 300 people. In Jinbi there are 190 people. In Zhouyuan, there are 372 people (176 men and 196 women). In all, there are 1,704 people in the nine villages.

The first four villages, including Lijiafang, have a total of 921.1 *mu* of land.[8] In Lijiafang, each person got 2.7 *mu* of land, with a yield of seven *dan* of grain. In Yejiafang, each person received three *mu* of land, with a yield of six *dan* of grain. In Xiaolijiafang, each person was given two *mu* of land, with a yield of 5.5 *dan* of grain. In Yangpingzhou, each person got 2.5 *mu* of land, with a yield of 5.5 *dan* of grain. Lijiafang has a surplus of 17.9 *mu* of land, six *mu* of which was transferred to Xiaolijiafang; another six *mu* of land was transferred to Yejiafang. The remaining 5.9 *mu* of land is held "in public trust." In Yangpingzhou, the remaining 2.3 *mu* of land after redistribution is being held "in public trust." There is leftover land because it is difficult to redistribute the remaining balance. It is used as the public land of the village government; the grain rent derived from it is used as public funds. The rate of rent is 60 percent.

Shangzhaotang village has a total of 820 *mu* of land; each person was given 2.4 *mu* of land, with a yield of 2.5 *dan* of grain. There is a balance of 29.2 *mu* of land after redistribution; it is held "in public trust."

Cangxia village has altogether 690.3 *mu* of land. Each person received a plot of land with a yield of 7.8 *dan* of grain.

Xuyuan has a total of more than 820 *mu* of land. The method of re-distribution of land was: each person living at home received 3.5 *mu* of land. The land of this village is more fertile and each *mu* can yield five *luo* of grain (two *luo* equal one *dan*);[9] altogether, [this much land] can yield 17 *luo* of grain. Each worker received 1.75 *mu* of land, which is half of what a peasant got. Those who have gone elsewhere received 1.4 *mu* of land.

Jinbi village has a total of 489 *mu* of land. Each person was given 2.7 *mu* of

8. Here yet a third system of measurement of land, in terms of area, is introduced. As noted elsewhere in this volume, the *mu*, like most traditional Chinese measurements, varied somewhat, but was equivalent to approximately .15 acre. As will be seen from the figures below, yields varied from approximately 1 to 3 *dan* per *mu*.

9. Here once again it is being assumed that the two *dan* (unit of weight and unit of volume) are roughly equivalent in dealing with grain.

land, with a yield of six *luo*. Those who have gone elsewhere did not get any land.

Zhouyuan village has 510.8 *mu* of land altogether. Each person got 2.2 *mu* of land, with a yield of six *luo*. Those who have gone elsewhere were not given any land.

After the Red Army captured Ji'an, the chief, deputy chief, secretary, and a platoon leader of the reactionary guards detachment of this township, four individuals in all, were caught and sent to their executions at the district government of Tongshuping. Members of the garrison team joined the revolution in this township; none of them went to Ji'an. None of the three platoon leaders and ten squad leaders who stayed at home and did not go to Ji'an were executed. They were permitted to join the revolution.

The chairman of the township government, Yan Chunwen, has eight *mu* of land; each *mu* has a yield of only three *luo* of grain; the total yield is 24 *luo*, enough to feed four people. When land was first redistributed in July, those who worked within the township and outside of the township were all given land, and his family gave up 1.2 *mu* of land; the 6.8 *mu* of land left could yield twenty *luo* of grain, giving each person five *luo*. In August, after Ji'an was captured, another round of land redistribution was carried out. Those who had jobs outside did not get any land. Only those who lived in the township and those who did not have jobs elsewhere had a share of the redistributed land. Each person got 2.2 *mu* of land. His family had eight *mu* of land to start with; this time he also got 0.8 *mu* of land. He owed 500 strings of cash in the past and sold one daughter (seven years old) to somebody in Ji'an (the buyer was from Ganzhou and had the Hemao Bank in Ji'an) for 100 *yuan*, which he used to pay his creditors. He still owes 200 strings of cash. He also gave away another daughter (newborn) to the Catholic Church of Ji'an, for whom he did not get any money.

4. Investigation in Xiyiting

This is one of the villages under the jurisdiction of the 23rd township of Rufang district of Ji'an; it is 15 *li* from Ji'an.

Rufang district has more than thirty townships in all.

This township has nine village governments and a population of approximately six hundred people.

This village, Xiyiting, has a village government with five administrators: chairman, secretary, food officer, land officer and officer for women's affairs. They all eat at their own expense; the village government does not provide food. When they gather on official business (such as having meetings), they eat at the village government's expense.

The public funds of the village temple and other religious groups are pooled together and used by the village government.

The expenditures of the village government consist of the cost of missions of the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers (attacking Ji'an or having large meetings), and the cost of food for the soldiers of the independent regiment when they are sent off on missions (each soldier gets 0.1 *yuan* a day). When they are sent off on missions, they get only money for food, but not for straw sandals, haircuts, tobacco, and so on.

This township's government has 19 administrators: one chairman, two secretaries (one for the township government, the other for the Red Guards), one cultural officer, one buyer, one food officer, one land officer, one officer for the Red Guards, one for social security, two for women's affairs (one chairman of the women's committee, the other for organizational affairs), one cook, one transportation officer, one commander of the Red Guards brigade, three company commanders, one political instructor of the Red Guards and the head of the Young Pioneers. The township government came into existence on June 9 this year. Since the reactionaries in Ji'an often came to the township to make arrests, the township government lacked stability; it moved toward the rear as soon as the enemy came. Only after Ji'an was captured did the work of the township move ahead. The reactionaries took away ten people from the township and killed two of them. Eight were released after Ji'an was captured. After Ji'an was captured, more than twenty local reactionaries from this township in Ji'an were arrested; six serious offenders were executed; some of the rest were fined and released; some were sent to the custody of the district government of Tongshuping. Now they are extremely busy, with things like redistribution of land and grain, debt boycott and setting up schools.

At the moment, the township is redistributing land, using the village as the basic unit. Five villages have already completed the land redistribution. Orders have also come down from above that land must be redistributed once again, using the township as the basic unit. According to the views of different villages, those with more land want to use the village as the basic unit; those villages with less land want to use the township as the basic unit. Of the nine villages in this township, eight villages want to use the village as the basic unit; only one village wants to use the township as the basic unit.

The five villages where land has been redistributed are Tingtang, Banxikeng, Tashui, Xintang, and Duanshang. In Tingtang, each person received two *mu* of land (with a yield of four to five *luo* of grain). In Banxikeng, each person got 2.5 *mu* of land; in Tashui and Duanshang, each person was given two *mu* of land. In Xintang, each person got only 0.8 *mu* of land. Xintang has less land and asks that land be redistributed using the township as the basic unit. Xintang village has about 200 people, with the family name Huang. Although they have less land, it is good land (there is no flood); moreover, it has both mountains and land.

It is more than a month since Ji'an was captured; the land of the township has not yet been fully redistributed; it will take another five or six days to finish the redistribution.

The struggle to resist the payment of debts means to have creditors hand in

written receipts to burn. To date, of the nine villages only the village of Guantian has handed in receipts to the township government, and they have not yet been burned.

The chairman of the township government was replaced by the district government. The new chairman, Wang Yutang, has been here for only five days.

The former chairman, Liu Quansheng has 1.8 *mu* of land. He is a carpenter and supports two other people. He became chairman in June.

Previously, Ruhang and Fangguo were divided into two districts. Now they have been merged to form Rufang district. The new chairman of the township is from Ruhang district. The township was previously under the jurisdiction of Fangguo district. Wang Yutang is a carpenter and has five *mu* of land, with a yield of 18 *luo* of grain to feed four people. He himself is a carpenter and a farmer. More than seventy people from this district have gone to join the Red Army. More than forty of them were Young Pioneers. They are very brave teenagers.

The district government is located in Tongshuping. Its chairman is Chen Junbin, who works at the rice mill.

Circular of the Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army and of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee

Circular: The Problem of the Line for Expanding the Red Army

(November 11, 1930)

I. The Bold Expansion of the Red Army Is an Indispensable Condition for the Preparation of a Decisive Class War

At present the revolutionary upsurge in the entire nation is rising higher every day, the reactionary ruling class has gone completely bankrupt politically and economically, and its doom is at hand. When class contradictions transcend the contradictions within the ruling class itself, to save its own life, it is inevitable that the ruling class will temporarily reconcile its internal clashes, allocate some of its military forces to attack the revolutionaries, and make a final effort before its death. At this time there is only one solution, that is, to assemble all the revolutionary forces to prepare for a decisive class war. To achieve this objective, we definitely must expand the Red Army boldly, and call on the broad worker and peasant masses to participate passionately in the Red Army. Only thus can we guarantee victory in this decisive war.

II. One of the Major Tasks of the Party in Southwestern Jiangxi at Present Is to Call on the Worker and Peasant Masses to Join the Red Army

The Red Army's actions in surrounding and attacking Nanchang, occupying Changsha and then attacking it yet again, and occupying Ji'an, have promoted the development of the revolution. At the same time, they must necessarily promote awareness of the revolution on the part of the ruling class, and incite the ruling class to attack the revolution. The victory at Ji'an marks the beginning of victory in one province, Jiangxi, but for the ruling class it is the beginning of failure in one province. It was therefore inevitable that the ruling class should send its armies to attack Jiangxi in an attempt to wipe out the revolutionary

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Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 205–10.

forces, wrest Ji'an from the hands of the workers and peasants, and restore its ruling status in the whole country. At this moment, if we fail to intensify our efforts, initial victory in Jiangxi will certainly be delayed. Therefore we must necessarily step up our efforts of all kinds; we must divide up the land completely and evenly, and carry out resolutely the policy of letting the workers supervise capital, so as to arouse the worker and peasant masses to stand up and join the decisive class war for victory in one province. Apart from these tasks, Party headquarters at all levels must also call on the masses to carry out the work of expanding the Red Army. We must closely integrate our work of expanding the Red Army with the work of opposing rich peasants, opposing the AB Corps, completely and evenly distributing the land, letting the workers supervise capital, transforming the Party and Youth League, and transforming the government. All these actions must be carried on simultaneously.

III. Oppose the Policies of Commandism and Deception

In the past, the new recruits sent by various localities were affected by serious mistakes in the expansion of the Red Army made by the local Party and Youth League organizations. The first mistake was employing the commandist method in levying conscripts, or even forcing people to join the army. A man was sent to the army even if he was the only one to cultivate the land in order to feed a family of nine. Directives from superiors were carried out mechanically. Their only concern was to send a sufficient number, and to send the new recruits beyond the *xian* borders; they were entirely unconcerned about how the masses would react to this behavior. The consequences of having this kind of irresolute and unwilling new recruits in the Red Army extended even to using AB Corps hats to threaten the masses, claiming that those who refused to go were AB Corps elements. This is an extremely dangerous method which will alienate us from the masses. The second mistake was the policy of deception. Many new recruits only learn that they are being asked to join the Red Army when they are assigned to various divisions and regiments. All the new recruits from places such as Xingguo, Ji'an, Jishui, Taihe, and Yongxin declared with one voice that the township, district, and *xian* levels had deceived them. Instead of being told that they were about to become Red Army men, they were only told that they were going to Ji'an to catch reactionaries. Such a policy of deceiving the masses likewise alienates us from the masses. New soldiers recruited by the aforementioned two methods (commandism and deceiving the masses) will either weep and wail, and want to go back home, or, if they do join the ranks, will become deserters in great numbers before long. Using these methods of commandism and deception to expand the Red Army is assuredly a mistake made by Party organizations below the *xian* level, but it is also the case that in the past, the policies of the Special Committee for opposing commandism and deception were inadequate. Sometimes it would simply stipulate that so many men were needed, by such-and-such a date. It seemed that they were not concerned about what

methods the local Party organizations used; so long as the new recruits were procured, everything was fine. Comrades! we must be aware that the methods of commandism and deception are extremely dangerous methods which will alienate us from the masses. Not only will they directly provoke the opposition of the masses, and fail to contribute to the expansion of the Red Army, but they will actually obstruct the growth of the Red Army. Moreover, they provide excellent propaganda materials for the rich peasants and the AB Corps. The rich peasants and the AB Corps can bribe backward elements to spread rumors about how Communists are no good, and soviets are no good. Our Party organizations at every level must resolutely oppose this kind of erroneous line, and must make every comrade understand thoroughly that this kind of line is absolutely wrong.

IV. The Correct Line for Expanding the Red Army

First, in political terms, we must show the masses a way out. Our party organization at every level should encourage comrades who work for the government to tell the masses clearly about the present political situation (the different kinds of revolutionary forces in the whole country, the internal contradictions of the ruling class and its situation of collapse, and so on), and let the masses know that the revolution will certainly be victorious. At the same time, we should point out that if they embrace ideas of localism and conservatism, and are unwilling to expand the Red Army or to expand the struggle, they will certainly be defeated. To secure victory in land distribution, and solve the problem of the shortage of salt and the high price of cloth, we must definitely expand the Red Army and attack the enemy. In order to bring about the victory of the revolution in the whole country, and the rapid collapse and death of the enemy, we must proceed in this way to rouse the courage of the masses for struggle, so that they are willing to join the Red Army.

Second, we should point out to the worker and peasant masses that it is the duty of the workers and the peasants to join the Red Army. We must explain that the Red Army is the principal driving force of the Chinese revolution, that it is the armed organ of the workers and peasants themselves, which serves to carry out their class mission. If we want to guarantee the victory of the revolution, if we want to fulfill our task of overthrowing the ruling class, we must definitely join the Red Army, and all armed forces must be in the hands of the workers and peasants. At the moment in Hunan, Hubei, Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang and many other places the Red Army is being expanded. If, in Jiangxi, we wish to seize power first in one province, it is even more important to expand the Red Army. We must unite the strength of the several million Red Army men all over the country, and the worker-peasant insurrections, thoroughly liquidate imperialism and the warlord system, and strive for victory in the whole country; only thus can the worker and peasant masses achieve a final solution, and win peace. Therefore, for the worker and peasant masses to join the Red Army is for them to seek a solution themselves, and it is a task which their own classes should carry out.

Third, our comrades in the Party and Youth League have failed to lead the masses actively to join the Red Army. In the past, some comrades have not only been unable to adopt the standpoint of the revolution as a whole to lead the masses to join the Red Army, but have themselves manifested localist attitudes and conservatism. They have been unwilling to come and work in the Red Army, and when they did come to the Red Army they soon deserted. Because of these factors, they have not only been unable to carry out the task of expanding the Red Army, they have even hindered the expansion of the Red Army. This is a kind of extremely shameful flightism and liquidationism, they are criminals against the revolution. Comrades! We should assume our class mission, smash localist ideas, and actively mobilize the masses. If we are to lead the masses to join the Red Army enthusiastically, we must first join the Red Army ourselves. We call on our comrades in the whole Party to overcome these weaknesses of wavering, flightism, and hesitation, arm ourselves, and join the Red Army!

Fourth, we cannot obtain good results from the operation to expand the Red Army if we neglect publicity work aimed at women. In a family, women have an extremely close relationship with the men. If they cannot understand the significance and responsibility of expanding the Red Army, they will surely be unwilling to let the men in the family leave home to join the Red Army. Our Party and Youth League organizations in every locality should intensify propaganda work aimed at women, so that the broad masses of women will warmly support the revolution, recognize that it is a most glorious thing to let their husbands and sons join the Red Army, urge and encourage the men to leave home and join the Red Army, and understand the task of expanding the Red Army.

Fifth, the components of the Red Army reserve (the independent regiments) must be the poorest worker and peasant elements who are bravest and most resolute in combat (we must never let in rich peasants, and strictly guard against the AB Corps). They must be between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five, and the sick and weak should not be admitted.

Sixth, when organizing the Red Army reserves (the independent regiments), we should make it clear that they are being prepared to go to the front, and when the time comes actually to move them to the front, we should tell the masses clearly that now is the time when you are being sent to the front. We should never be unclear or deceptive, because only in this way can we cause the masses to make up their mind from the beginning that the number of recruits they recruit for the Red Army is a solid number.

V. Methods of Propaganda and Encouragement

A. Mobilize All Party and League Members to Carry out the Campaign for Red Army Expansion

After receiving this circular, every local Party organization must call a meeting of district committee leaders, taking the *xian* as a unit, to point out past mistakes and decide future methods. When the meeting is dismissed, each district committee will call a meeting of branch secretaries; after that, assemblies of Party and Youth League members will discuss this issue and take decisions.

B. Expand Propaganda Work

1. Organize propaganda teams: select appropriate people who are relatively good speakers to become propagandists, send them to every village and household to make propaganda, the more the better. They should, however, be trained, and propaganda meetings should be held on a regular basis.
2. Hold speeches in makeup: organize propaganda teams in makeup, and send them everywhere to make propaganda, and to perform all kinds of dramas about the expansion of the Red Army and its revolutionary actions.[1] This kind of organization should be set up on a *xian* or district basis.
3. Hold a propaganda week to promote the expansion of the Red Army. During this week we should hold many mass meetings, distribute many pamphlets, and stick up many posters.

C. Welcome and See off the Red Army

Whenever the Red Army crosses a boundary [between districts], the government should organize the masses and line them up to greet it and see it off. As a result, not only will the masses' belief in and admiration for the Red Army be stimulated, but the courage of the Red Army officers and soldiers will also be strengthened.

D. Set up Offices for Recruiting Volunteer Soldiers for the Red Army

Every township must set up such an office, and encourage the masses to become volunteer soldiers.

E. Increase the Training of and Propaganda Aimed at the Young Pioneers and Red Guards

District and township governments should strengthen this work, and encourage them to join the Red Army.

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1. At this time, Mao attached considerable importance to such theatricals, which are mentioned several times in this volume, notably in the Gutian Resolution of December 1929. As is well known, he continued to take an interest in drama as a vehicle of propaganda, in Yan'an and after.

F. Give Preferential Treatment to the Family Members of Officers, Soldiers, and Porters

All the people who are now working in the Red Army should be given the normal share of land. If there is no one in the family to cultivate it, the government must send someone to till it for them. Rich peasants are not allowed to join the Red Army, but they must be made to help family members of the Red Army men do the work. The lands of these families must not fall into disuse; moreover, we should be ready to help them solve all kinds of difficulties at any moment, so that those masses who have not joined the Red Army as yet will be willing to join the Red Army after witnessing [all these things].

(Reprinted by the School Commitee of the Third Branch of the Chinese Red Army School)

The Situation Regarding Land Redistribution in Western Jiangxi

(November 12 and 15, 1930)

These are the reports made by the delegates to the enlarged meeting of the Western Jiangxi Action Committee on November 12 and the enlarged meeting of the Provincial Action Committee on November 15, 1930. I made brief notes of them during the meetings. Brief as they are, one may get a glimpse into the land struggle in southwestern Jiangxi.

1. The Situation of Land Redistribution

Chunhua: the distance between townships here can be as great as ten *li*. In a township fertile and less fertile land is packaged together for redistribution. The first round of redistribution was carried out in December last year (1929). The second round was conducted this March. The original tiller was taken as the unit, drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. Now the third round is underway; it will draw on the fat to make up for the lean. The redistribution has just begun; it will take more than ten days to finish it.

Ruyan: The land of landlords and the local gentry was redistributed in December last year (1929), but the public land and the land of rich peasants was not redistributed. All land was confiscated in March this year and redistributed according to labor power. The third round was carried out in May. All land was confiscated, and distributed equally according to labor power, but the distribution was not completely equal. Individuals with more fertile land gave up some fertile land to others, and those with more barren land also gave up some barren land to others, but the redistribution was not equalized by dividing the land into three categories, A, B, and C. In most cases, the redistribution was carried out taking the village as the unit.

Shuidong: All three rounds of redistribution were carried out taking the township as the unit. The first round took place in the first month of this year, according to the principle of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. The second round was in June; it applied the principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, but still did not carry it out thoroughly, and many people

Our source for this text is *Nongcun diaocha* (Yan'an, 1941), pp. 99–106. This text is reproduced with very slight changes in *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 264–70.

were dissatisfied. Now the third round is being carried out. The land commissioners of all townships gather in the district, organize a land committee, and help each other with the redistribution, using the principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. After Ji'an was taken, more than a thousand people returned to the city, and they received land just the same. The redistribution is almost completed; of the seventeen townships, it has been carried out in thirteen.

Xiqu: Two rounds of redistribution have been carried out. The second round occurred in August this year. Although the land was divided into the three categories of superior, average, and inferior, and good and bad land were distributed equally, in reality this was not done thoroughly. The township served as the unit, and a township is too big. Some land is as distant as six to seven *li*, and peasants do not want it.

The district committee recently issued a circular prescribing that the third round of redistribution must be thorough, drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, and burning the old land titles. The district government sent five roving inspectors to help with the redistribution.

Rufang: The first round occurred in the first month of this year. Good and bad land were distributed equally, but it was not done thoroughly, and public lands were retained. Some places used the township as the unit, while others used the village. The second round took place in May. The masses seized the land of the leaders of the defectors,[1] and redistributed it to the poor. (These people [i.e., the defectors] had received land during the first round.) In the third (current) round, the three categories of land—superior, average, and inferior—are being distributed equally. Redistribution has not yet been finished in the three or four newly liberated townships around Nanyuemiao. It is completed in Xiyiting (?);[2] the village was taken as the unit.

Anfu: Redistribution has not been carried out this time in areas where there were no defections. It is being carried out first in areas where defection has occurred; a limit of ten days has been set for completing the redistribution, and it is being done thoroughly. Half of the land in the Seventh District has been redistributed; two-thirds of the land in the Fifth District has been redistributed; land in other areas of defection has not yet been redistributed. Of the nine districts in the whole *xian*, there were no defections at all in the First District. One-third of the Second District did not defect. Half of the Third District did not defect. One-third of the Fourth District did not defect. Three-fifths of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Districts did not defect. Half of the Eighth District did not defect. The whole of the Ninth District, that is to say the urban district, defected.

1. Regarding the problem of defections (*fanshui*), see, above, the resolution of October 19, 1930, which argues that it occurs where the land has not been divided up completely and equally.

2. This question mark in parentheses appears in the 1941 Chinese text, and has been retained in the 1982 reprint.

The entire area for thirty *li* around the city defected. The areas that did not defect failed to do so because they are adjacent to the Red areas of Yongxin, Lianhua and Yuanzhou. The areas that did not defect are all populated by "small, weak nationalities"[3] who were oppressed by larger villages. Land has been redistributed in all these places, drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. The principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean has, however, not been applied.

Donggu: The township is taken as the unit. Land was redistributed in July last year (1929), drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, and equalizing the distribution by dividing the land into three categories, A, B, and C. There was no second round. Later, because those who had joined the Red Army turned over their land to the government, such land in individual villages is now being given to the people in those villages to till. Disputes arose among the popular masses, so the land was equally distributed in July of last year, under the slogan of "equalizing both [quality and quantity]."

Xiajiang: In January and February of this year, the land of the village bullies and bad gentry was redistributed in the first round. In the second round, which took place in March, public land was redistributed. In the third round, carried out in April and May, the land of rich peasants was redistributed. Only then was redistribution truly carried out thoroughly, drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. The village served as the unit, and because land was plentiful and the people were few, there was some land that no one wanted. Two rounds of land redistribution were carried out in the newly-developed areas. The first round occurred two weeks ago; it was done rather carelessly. The second round is being carried out at the moment, and is scheduled to be completed within five days. Good and poor land are both being divided equally.

Shuinan: The first round took place in March this year, drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. The second round occurred in August. In the places bordering the White areas, the principle of drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce was applied, but not that of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. In the rest of the district, the principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean was applied. But the head of the Party bureau gave himself especially good land, and ordered the peasants to help with farming it.

Rulin: The first round occurred in March this year, drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce. In May, the entire district defected. In June, the guard detachment was overthrown, and the second round of redistribution took place.

3. The phrase used is *ruoxiao minzu*. In this context and region, Mao most likely is actually referring to small, weak kinship groups or lineages, rather than to actual "nationalities" or non-Han minority peoples. It is also possible that he is referring to weak communities of Hakka minority groups.

In a few townships, distribution was effectively carried out on the basis of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean. In most of the townships, redistribution was carried out in name but not in reality, because the AB Corps was in control there. The township was taken as the unit; only in special cases was the village used as the unit.

Yongxin: In the Special District of Xibei, the aged, minors, and the disabled who are unable to farm are given 50 percent more land than ordinary people. The decision of the first *xian* congress was also along the same lines. In addition, "working personnel" whose families do not have the ability to farm are also given 50 percent more land. This method has been applied in part of the Special District of Xibei, but it was vetoed by the West Route (*Xilu*)[4] working meeting of the Special Committee because it was motivated by ideas of charity. Some people mocked it as the "orphans' and widows' line." In Yongxin, land was redistributed throughout the whole *xian*. Two rounds of redistribution were carried out. The first round took place after Longquankou was taken; the second round was undertaken from the time of the decision by the West Route working meeting in June of this year until September. At present, land redistribution has still not been properly completed in the entire First District (the area of the *xian* town), half of the Fourth District (Nanxiang) and the entire Fifth District (Dongxiang), accounting in all for one-fifth of the *xian*. The peasants of Yongxin are willing to redistribute land using productive capacity as the criterion; this was accepted by the *xian* congress.

Jishui: Land redistribution has been completed in Futian and Fengshui; it has not been completed in Jintan.

"Redistribution based on the recipients." "Good land packaged together with unproductive land." "Distribute poor land first."

"Old Henaners" are a difficult problem.[5] In Gucun township, each person got only two *dan* of land.

Wan'an: The village was taken as the unit. In the second round, the principle of drawing on the fat to make up for the lean was already applied (?).[6]

Fenyi: Land was distributed taking the village as the unit. Redistribution was based on the grain yield, not on the amount of land. More than 2,000 houses were burned down by the counter-revolutionaries. There is not an old house within an area more than 30 *li* across.

4. An administrative region created by the CCP in western Jiangxi—its territory lay west of the Gan River and Ji'an city, and included the Jinggangshan area.

5. Old Henaners refers to people from Henan who settled in certain parts of Ji'an, Jishui and Yongfeng *xian*. They were a "problem" because, as indicated in the "Investigation in Mukou Village" dated November 21 which appears below, many of them became involved with bandits, and also because they frequently clashed with their non-Henanese neighbors.

6. As before, this question mark in parentheses appears in the Chinese text, presumably to indicate that Mao was not certain of the facts.

2. The Phenomenon of Abandoned Land

Donggu: The least each person got was 16 *dan* of rice paddies (one *dan* is around 80 *jin*). A great deal of land had no one to till it. Most of the hills were abandoned because the wages for tea-oil pickers were so high that the seeds of the tea-oil plants were left unpicked. There was no excavation[7] in the hills, either.

Chunhua: Rice paddies with a yield of 400 to 500 *luo*[8] were abandoned because: (1) the redistribution of March happened during the busy agricultural season; there was no private property, and the land redistributed was both poor and far away, so much land was abandoned; (2) more than 2,000 people had joined the Red Army or gone elsewhere to work (it is said that there were 2,700 to 2,800 such people); there was not enough manpower.

Shuidong: Abandoned land stretched for several *li* because this is a place—the area near the river—where the Red and White zones border each other. The reactionaries in the city of Ji'an frequently came to harass people; several hundred people were needed for guard duties every day. Three layers of guards were required. Sentries were often killed by the enemy at night.

Shuinan: Rice paddies with a yield of several hundred *dan* were abandoned, because they remained as public land, and peasants did not want to rent it to farm, so the land was left idle. "I have received several *dan* of rice paddies in the distribution; it is enough to eat, and I don't want to farm the public land."

Rulin: More than a thousand *dan* of rice paddies were abandoned, and ripe rice was left unharvested. This is because the land belonged to the guards detachment of the reactionary landlords and rich peasants. After these people were gone, the government did not redistribute the land to the peasants, so they had no responsibility for farming or harvesting there. (Rulin is a district close to the suburbs of Ji'an.)

Anfu: Six thousand *dan* of rice paddies were abandoned in Daopu and Chongwen districts. Because of the policy of retribution and slaughter, the peasants who had rebelled did not dare to return home. Another reason was that the land was not thoroughly redistributed, but was redistributed only in terms of quantity. These two causes both resulted from trouble-making by rich-peasant leaders. There is more land and fewer people in Anfu; people from Hunan, Yongxin and Henan are all farming in Anfu. As long as you fulfill the quota of grain contributed to the government on someone's behalf, that person will let you farm the land. Why are there fewer people here? It is because they do not pay attention to hygiene, so a lot of them die.

Xinyu: Several hundred *dan* of rice paddies were abandoned in three Red

7. *Wa*. The digging in question was presumably mining. (See below the reference to "hills with raw materials" and "hills with mineral deposits.")

8. A *luo* or "basket" is a measure of volume equal to half a *dan*.

districts because part of the people had gone to join the Red Army. Some of the land in the places on the border between the Red and White areas was also abandoned.

Fenyi: Several dozen *dan* of rice paddies were abandoned.

Yongxin: Generally speaking, there was no abandoned land here. The total quantity of abandoned rice paddies was less than a hundred *dan*.

Gannan: A great deal of land was abandoned in all the regions bordering on the Red and White areas.

3. The Problem of Land Redistribution to Workers

The peasants in Yongxin opposed the equal redistribution of land to workers. The Yongxin congress did not accept this view.

In one district in Taihe, workers who received redistributed land had their wages cut, but these were later restored.

The workers in Ji'an who worked for less than half the year received the same amount of redistributed land. Those who had worked for more than half the year got half the amount.

4. The Problem of Redistributing the Hills

The Yongxin congress decided that the hills producing tea-oil seeds should be redistributed equally on a per capita basis, taking the township as the unit.

The Ji'an congress (October 1930)[9] decided that the hills producing bamboo and timber should not be redistributed; they were to be managed by the township soviets and used by the peasants. Those who needed bamboo and timber must get permission from the government to cut down bamboo and trees. No permission is needed to harvest on cogon grass hills.

Hills producing tea-oil were redistributed equally in Yongxin, Xiajiang, Yanfu, Ruhang, Donggu, Taihe, and Xiqu. Rufang and Chunhua do not have such hills. Wan'an did not redistribute its hills.

Fenyi: On November 5 of this year (1930), the Provincial Action Committee dispatched Liu Lindong to join the *xian* action committee to work out a method for redistributing the hills, and to put it forward for passage at the second *xian* congress of workers, peasants and soldiers. The method was: "Hills worth more than 300 *yuan* each belong to the soviets; hills worth less than 300 *yuan* remain under the management of the original owners." In May and June of this year, however (before the "second congress"),[10] in obedience to orders from higher

9. This congress (*daibiao dahui*) may have been held simultaneously with the conference at which the resolutions of October 19, 1930, on the land problem, translated above, were adopted.

10. I.e., before the Second Congress of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee in August 1930.

levels (the Fourth Plenum of the Beilu Action Committee), the hills had already been redistributed equally, taking the township as the unit, even though the *xian* itself had not held any meetings. The decision was reversed in November, and the peasants were very dissatisfied.

There are seven types of hills: (1) tea-oil hills, (2) hills for growing miscellaneous grains, (3) hills with raw materials, (4) bamboo-covered hills (both small and large), (5) hills producing firewood (cogon grass and firewood), (6) hills with mineral deposits and (7) wild hills.

The Mistakes in the Land Struggle in Jiangxi

(November 14, 1930)

On November 14, 1930, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee held a meeting in Ji'an; I attended as the representative of the General Front Committee. After Comrades Chen Yi, Chen Zhengren and Ma Ming had given their reports, it was pointed out that since the "Second Plenum," there had been a consistent line of liquidating the land revolution within the Party in southwestern Jiangxi.[1] After discussion, the meeting unanimously agreed that a resolute struggle must be waged against this erroneous line. The following are the main points I noted down when Comrades Chen Yi, Chen Zhengren and Ma Ming gave their reports. There are many places here only I myself can make sense of.

In Rulin district, loyal comrades were purged while all the dyed-in-the-wool AB Corps elements were kept in place.

In the Red areas, rich peasants controlled the economy.

In Yongxin, rich peasants controlled the grain market. The government's policy of suppressing the rich peasants was correct.

Secretaries of district Party committees did not go down to the townships to make inspection tours.

The views of the Central Committee and the upper levels could not be transmitted to the lower levels.

"Exterminate all rich peasants and landlords."

"Land redistribution must be carried out decisively."

The rich peasants' policy of deceiving the poor peasants is, in terms of the white terror, a "white symbol."

When policies are not clearly pointed out, [the poor peasants] are hemmed in and deceived by the rich peasants, as in the committee of the fourth district of Yongxin (with Ma Ming as secretary).

The land on the Eastern Route has not been redistributed at all.[2]

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 271–74, which reproduces the version originally published in 1941 in Yan'an.

1. As explained above, in the Introduction, the Second Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, which met in June 1929, adopted a line including the view that "it is still a mistake to oppose rich peasants unconditionally." The reference here is not, however, to that Plenum, but to the Second Plenum of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee in August 1930, which likewise advocated less radical tactics than Mao in the land revolution.

2. This refers to areas controlled by the Donglu (Eastern Route) Action Committee, under the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.

On the Southern Route,[3] the land has not been redistributed except for Xingguo and Gan *xian*.

Zeng Renchao.[4]

Eighty percent of the Party in Ruijin consists of landlords and rich peasants.

There are over 80 Party members in Shangyou. Landlords and rich peasants account for more than 30 of them, including the head of the pacification corps. Land has not been redistributed for two months; even the confiscated and sealed-off rice of the local bullies has been released.

The masses of young people on the Eastern Route are brave, while the Youth League members are afraid of death.

Women have not joined the struggle.

"Everything must be redistributed represents the peasant mentality."

Rich peasants have more tea-oil hills, and poor peasants have less. It is in the interest of rich peasants not to redistribute the tea-oil hills.

Rural schools for ordinary people also serve the interests of rich peasants; few children of poor peasants go to school, because they have to work.

Rich peasants order the masses to fight battles to protect the interests of rich peasants. The officers of the Red Guards in Xinfeng are all rich peasants. "Keeping titles," "Transferring land," "Beatings," and "Fines."

The rich peasants in Xibei township, Xinfeng *xian*, encouraged Red Army soldiers to desert and return home. Their slogan is protecting the Red areas, but the rich peasants are an obstacle to the expansion of the Red Army.

The problem of preferential treatment for the families of Red Army soldiers. Yongxin does not give preferential treatment to those who voluntarily join the Red Army; they do not help with plowing the land. Only those who are sent out by the government get preferential treatment for their families.

In Xinfeng, preferential treatment is given to local families whose members joined the Red Guards and were killed or wounded in combat. They pay no attention to those who went to join the Twenty-second Army and were killed or wounded in combat. Rich peasants are making trouble.

Only rich peasants oppose freedom of marriage. To say that "peasants oppose it" is the kind of talk that does not make distinctions.

The second plenum negates the peasantry and the land revolution.

When Li Wenlin[5] went to the Southern Route on August 24, he did not give a

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3. This refers to the area under the control of the Southern Route (Nanlu) Action Committee, under the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.

4. Zeng Renchao (1890–1932), born in Jiangxi, had been a primary school teacher. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926, and served as secretary of the Party committee in his native *xian* of Xinfeng in 1928–1929. In October 1930, he became a member of the Southern Jiangxi Action Committee.

5. For details regarding Li Wenlin, see above, the relevant note to the Introduction. In August 1930, as indicated in the letter of October 14 to the Central Committee, he was appointed secretary of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee. In October 1930, he became secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee.

special report on the land revolution, nor was there any special discussion.

At the Southern Route Enlarged Conference on July 15, Chen Yi put forward eight proposals, such as an immediate redistribution of land and harvesting of crops, drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, unconditional redistribution of houses, redistribution of hills and forests, and redistribution of ponds. The Southern Jiangxi Revolutionary Committee issued a report. The rich peasants in Ruijin and Yudu cited Article 14 of the "Southwest Jiangxi land law," which said that the primary criterion should be the original tiller.[6] They kept saying that the land law must not be violated, and that whoever violated it was a counterrevolutionary. It even came to "fights." The revolutionary committee had no choice but to issue that announcement.

Two laborers played a role at the Enlarged Conference.

"He inherits the position; is he the chairman again?"

If you fear the Communist Party, "Don't just talk about it; cut off their heads."

"You could pay all the rent in the past; how come you are unable to farm this little bit of land!"

Wives of Red Army soldiers and the freedom of marriage.

"Are you going to join the Red Army or not? If you join the Red Army, I'm not going to marry you." "If it is reported that, while serving in the Red Army, you have been killed, am I still supposed to keep my chastity for you?" "Eight *yuan* for 80 *jin* of meat." "Yesterday I married him; today I'll marry the chairman. That is what's called freedom." "Chen Zhizhong's report at the joint meeting in Xihe dissipated Chen Yi's atmosphere." (Chen Yi had been holding meetings for nine days, and decided on a detailed land law. Chen Zhizhong came on the tenth day and abrogated it.)

"To confiscate the land of the landlords and redistribute it equally is a temporary tactic; it is not our goal. We have not yet put forward land laws that are marked by proletarian mentality."

On the Northern Route, Xie Hanchang[7] propagated the view: "It is a poor peasant mentality to use labor power as the criterion."

6. The Southwest Jiangxi Soviet Government was dominated by disciples of Li Lisan. The land law it adopted in the spring of 1930 included only drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, but not drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, i.e. giving some of the fertile lands of the rich peasants to the poor peasants. It also adopted labor power as the criterion for redistribution. Article 14, mentioned here, provided that when land under cultivation was redistributed, the harvest should belong to the person who had planted it—another provision advantageous to the relatively affluent peasants. For a detailed summary of this law, see Hsiao Tso-liang, *The Land Revolution in China, 1930–1934: A Study of Documents* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 12–14.

7. Xie Hanchang (1907–1931) was a native of Jiangxi, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926 and participated in the peasant movement. In July 1930, he was appointed head of the political department of the Twentieth Red Army. In April 1931, in the wake of the Futian Incident, he was denounced as a member of the AB Corps and killed.

The physical strength of poor peasants is not equal to that of rich peasants (poor peasants have nothing to eat). The sons of poor peasants have no physical strength either.

Li said to Cong,[8] "Nobody was sure about the second plenum, so it is better not to discuss the land question." "The Party in southwest Jiangxi builds on the basis of middle peasants and above."

It was said on the Western Route[9] (by Zhou Gaochao),[10]"Redistributing everything corresponds to a peasant mentality."

An enlarged meeting of the Southern Route Action Committee was convened in Xinfeng on October 28. Guo[11] transmitted [the policy of] "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, carry out equal distribution thoroughly," but after meeting for a day and half, there was no discussion, and no decision.

There are two lines in southern Jiangxi (said Chen Yi).

"The Yongxin line is not the rich peasant line. I object," said Ma.[12]

"I do not agree about deepening the land revolution," Duan Liangbi[13] said to Chen Zhengren.

"Enlarging and deepening at the same time is peasant consciousness pure and simple. Attacking Ji'an first and then Jiujiang will see off the revolutionary high tide in China," said the report of the Special Committee to the Central Committee.

8. Li is Li Wenlin. Cong is Cong Yunzhong, who was at this time the secretary of the Southern Jiangxi Action Committee.

9. The reference is to the area controlled by the Western Route (Xilu) Action Committee, under the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.

10. Zhou Gaochao (1903–1932), a native of Jiangxi, was at this time the secretary of the Xilu Action Committee.

11. Guo Chenglu (1906–1931), a native of Jiangxi, was at this time secretary of the Southern Jiangxi Action Committee. In January 1931, he was accused of being a member of the AB Corps and killed.

12. Ma refers to Ma Ming.

13. Duan Liangbi was at this time secretary of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee of the Communist Youth League.

The Problems of Dividing Up Green Crops and Renting Land

(November 15, 1930)

On November 15, 1930, the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee held an enlarged meeting in Ji'an. In addition to the standing committee members of the Provincial Party Committee, the participants included the chairmen of the *xian* soviets from Yongxin, Ji'an, Taihe, Wan'an, Jishui, Anfu, Fenyi and Xiajiang, and Comrade Chen Yi from the Twenty-second Army. I attended the meeting as the representative of the General Front Committee. A distinctive characteristic of this meeting is that it discussed the two problems of dividing up green crops and leasing land. On the problem of dividing up green crops, I advocated supporting the mass basis for dividing up green crops. On the problem of leasing land, I refuted the long-standing "leftist" theory that "rent should not be collected in the soviet areas," which is actually a theory of the rich peasants. I also opposed Jiang Hanbo's[1] method of distribution on the basis of labor power, pointing out that his mistake lay in helping rich peasants and hampering the poor peasants. This meeting was adjourned before it had completed its business because the enemy forces had already reached Xiajiang, and the leaders of the various *xian* had to return to make arrangements for resisting the enemy. As a result, such problems as "hills and forests," "ponds," "houses," "uncultivated land," "unemployment," and "debts," which we had intended to discuss, were not discussed. After the meeting, there were serious attacks by the enemy, and the Futian incident took place. As a result, the Provincial [Action] Committee has not yet issued the resolutions of this meeting. The following are a few brief notes I took myself at that day's meeting. Since they contain some important materials, I have kept them.

1. Chunhua Uses the District as the Unit for Land Redistribution

The third round of land redistribution in Chunhua district [of Ji'an *xian*] (October 1930) progressed to the use of the district as the basic unit. Data on population and productive capacity were gathered to see how much land each person

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 275–82, which reproduces the version originally published in Yan'an in 1941.

1. Jiang Hanbo (also known as Zhang Huaiwan) was a Jiangxi provincial Party inspector who became actively involved in a number of intra-party policy disputes in southwestern Jiangxi in 1929–30, including the debate on land policy referred to here. He was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party in February 1930.

should receive, and then land was redistributed within the townships. "Land that could be transferred was transferred; when it could not be transferred, people were moved." At present there are more than 30,000 people in the district of Chunhua as a whole, and each person has received an equal amount of land (everyone got 11 *dan* of rice paddies, each *dan* being taken as equivalent to 44 *jin*).

2. The Disadvantages of Using the Village as the Unit for Land Redistribution

The disadvantages of using the village as the unit for land redistribution are: (1) The larger villages are unwilling to transfer land to the smaller villages. (2) There are too many units, it is not easy for the district and township governments to exercise effective supervision, and many malpractices may emerge surreptitiously. (3) Within a single village, it is easy for landlords and rich peasants to use clan ideology to hoodwink the masses, who then fail to redistribute the land thoroughly or overthrow the local bullies completely. This view merits attention.

3. The Land Struggle Cannot Be Deepened at One Stroke

No matter what, land redistribution cannot be completed without several rounds. The first time, the rich peasants always concealed the good land, and it is impossible to survey the land properly, distinguishing among the three categories of superior, average, and inferior quality. In the first round, rich peasants and middle peasants always exercise leadership, and poor peasants have no power. "When the insurrection has gone on a little longer, the proletariat will rise up." This view is correct.

4. Yang Chengfu's Plan for the "Socialization of Agriculture"

The chairman of the Ji'an *xian* Government, Yang Chengfu[2] (who was originally secretary of the Chunhua District Party Committee, and concurrently chairman [of the district government]), proposed collective farming and collective consumption for the land in Chunhua District. This goal was to be reached in three steps: the first step was to redistribute the land, taking the district as the unit; the second step was to organize cooperatives; the third step was collective farming and consumption. This is completely wrong.

5. Jiang Hanbo's Method of Distribution on the Basis of Labor Power

The disadvantage of redistributing land taking labor power as the unit is that all orphans, widows, old people, young children, and women with bound feet, and

2. Yang Chengfu (1895–1932) was born in Ji'an. At this time, he was, as indicated by Mao, chairman of the Ji'an *xian* Soviet Government. In June 1932 he was accused of belonging to the AB Corps and killed.

everyone incapable of tilling the land will not have enough to eat. Poor peasants, who have plenty of labor power, are also no match for rich peasants, since poor peasants cannot compete with the strength of the oxen, farm implements, and capital of rich peasants. Moreover, rich peasants can rent land from orphans, widows, old people, young children, and women with bound feet. Consequently, taking labor as the unit for land redistribution benefits only the rich peasants.

The "Jiang Hanbo Method" for redistributing the land taking labor power as the unit has been carried out in the "border area" between Anfu, Ji'an and Fenyi, and in the township of Yanfu in Ji'an. It has, moreover, been carried out in an absolute fashion. Those who had labor power were given land; those without labor power were not given land, regardless of age. Vagabonds were given a share. In the case of those who had no labor power, it was farmed by those with labor power to produce food for them to eat.[3] A political commissar from the Third Army Group came to Ji'an and said to Wang Huai: the method of land redistribution in the border areas between Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi is based on labor power. Those who have no labor power are given half as much land; they are not provided for by the government.

When redistribution is based on labor power as the unit, the rich peasants, who get more land, will need their oxen and plows for their own use, so there is no way the poor peasants can borrow them. Only when redistribution is equal can poor peasants borrow the surplus farm implements of the rich peasants. That is why poor peasants demand equal redistribution.

6. The Problem of Dividing up Green Crops

Among the peasants in Ruijin and Yudu, some support the slogan "Divide up green crops unconditionally" put forward at the Tingzhou Conference. Some support the slogan "Do not divide the green sprouts" of the Pitou Conference; the argument of the latter is: "The land law must not be violated."[4]

The *xian* of the Northern Route redistributed land in May. The original tiller was compensated for his initial costs at a rate of 600 cash for each *dan* of rice. In Futian, rich peasants received no compensation for their land. Poor peasants got one string of cash for each *dan* of rice from their land.

Chunhua redistributed land in March. At that time, the rice-seedlings had not yet been transplanted. The land had merely been plowed once, and in some cases a small amount of fertilizer had been applied. After land redistribution, no compensation was paid for the initial investment.

3. This sentence appears to refer to the vagabonds just mentioned, and to imply that they received land because they were assumed to be able-bodied, but would be helped in this way if they could not or would not work.

4. I.e., the land law of the Southwest Jiangxi Soviet, discussed in a note to the previous text.

On the Northern Route, compensation for each *dan* of unhusked rice was 600 cash or one string of cash. The *xian* set the price of rice at four strings of cash per *dan* before May; the rate of compensation was one-sixth or one quarter [of the value of the crop]. At that time no land had as yet been redistributed. It was also a time of famine. The intention, in setting the price of rice at four strings, was to help poor peasants to keep down rice prices. But they continued to set the price at four strings per *dan* after the harvest; "This is not right."

Last year in Yongxin *xian*, during the fifth lunar month, the government of the Fifth District of the Xibei Special District stipulated that when land was redistributed at the time rice crops were about to ripen, the person who took over the land must pay the person who gave it up one *yuan* in silver for two *Dan*[5] of rice (200 *jin*, or one *dan*). For large rice paddies that harvest only one crop of rice each year, the fifth month is the month shortly after rice-seedlings are planted but before they have developed fully; the person who gives up such land receives one string of cash for each *dan* (two *Dan* of unhusked rice). The *xian* committee's decision was that land be obtained without compensation. But the Fifth District did not receive the instruction of the *xian* committee, because of difficulties of communication; so it acted according to its own decision.

The rich peasants in Yudu, Dongxiang, and the northwestern part of Ganxian demanded that each *dan* (actually eight *dou*) of unhusked rice be compensated for at the rate of two small foreign dollars (worth four strings of cash). The Party did not allow this, and the land was taken without compensation.

The proper policy should be "get land without compensation; redistribute both land and green crops." The families of landlords receive redistributed land all the same, in the interest of uniformity. Landlords have more money, so an additional levy is imposed on them. Vagabonds also get redistributed land because they are toilers. It is wrong for rich peasants to oppose redistributing green land to vagabonds. Middle peasants do not have much land that is redistributed away, so they are not affected. Although "upper poor peasants" who farm more land are affected, they benefit in other ways which should satisfy them. The majority of lower poor peasants, artisans and farm laborers support this method completely. Cases in which people do not have the ability to farm the land after green crops are redistributed may be handled according to the method of leasing.

7. The Integrated Equal Redistribution of Land

In the past, "villages" redistributed land equally using the "family" as the unit and the original tiller as the standard. As a result, this benefited rich peasants but

5. In this text, we distinguish as usual between the character *dan* which is a unit of weight, and the character *dan* (stone), also read *shi*, which is a unit of volume, by capitalizing the first of these. As will be seen yet again from the examples in this text, the meaning of these terms, and the relation between them, were extremely elastic.

not poor peasants. The appropriate policy should be: taking the township as the unit, divide the total amount of land originally farmed by the people of the township by the total population of the township (the total population of the township is calculated by adding together the numbers of those who originally farmed in the township, and those who originally farmed in other townships); draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce, and draw on the fat to make up for the lean; land that can be transferred should be transferred (villages with more land transfer some of the land to villages with less land); when land cannot be transferred, people are moved (when the distance is too great to transfer the land, only people can be moved). This method is called "the redistribution of the originally tilled total acreage."

8. The Non-Laboring Population and New System of Land Lease

When people without labor power lease their land to those who do have labor power for them to cultivate, the tenants pay rent in kind to the landowners. In Chunhua, Wan'an and Xinyu, tenants pay 40 percent of the crops as rent; in Fenyi and Ningdu, tenants pay 50 percent; in Yongxin, tenants pay one-third. In Futian (a district in Ji'an), land is divided into the three categories of superior, medium, and inferior; rent for superior land is 40 percent; for medium-grade land, it is 30 percent; for inferior land, it is 20 percent. This seems fairly reasonable.

Those who have no labor power and must lease out their land amount to 20 percent of the population throughout Chunhua, Anfu, Taihe, Xinyu, Fenyi, and Xiajiang. They make up more than 20 percent of the population in Ningdu; this is because more of the women there have bound feet. They account for only 5 percent of the population in Yongxin, since all the women there have normal feet. Those leasing out land are mostly orphans, widows, cripples, old people, and young children, as well as those who are engaged in revolutionary work. What has just been said refers exclusively to the population of those who have no one at all in the family with labor power, and must lease out their land. Those who have no labor power themselves, but have someone in their families who does engage in cultivation, so that they do not need to lease out their land, make up a large proportion of the population. Generally speaking, those without labor power account for 75 percent of the population, which is to say that only one out of four people is an able-bodied person with ample strength to do farm work. This is a big problem in China. It must be added, however, that what we have called absence of labor power refers to the inability to do farm work in the full sense. Half of the people just mentioned have some capacity for physical labor, such as herding cattle, chopping fire-wood, cooking rice, doing laundry, and cooking meals. Statistically:

25 percent have full labor power;
37.5 percent have half or some labor power;
37.5 percent have no labor power at all.

Everywhere the "leasing of land and payment in unhusked rice" described above is the so-called "system of dividing the rice." Only in Chunhua is the "system of collecting rent" employed. The defect of the system of dividing the rice is that when the tenants farm the land, they give primary attention to their own land, while treating carelessly or failing to use enough fertilizer on the land belonging to the landowner. When the crops ripen, they divide up the harvested rice equally, or split it 40–60 or according to other ratios. This system is not advantageous to the landowner. The system of collecting rent sets the amount of rent irrespective of the size of the harvest. As a result, the tenant will take care to make an effort, and to use enough fertilizer. That is beneficial, not only to output, but to the landowner.

The defects of the system of collecting rent are: (1) the rent is fixed; this is not advantageous to the tenants when natural disaster strikes; (2) if the Red Guards go out on sorties frequently, and thus reduce the number of days they spend working in the fields, this also hurts the tenants.

In sum, the system of dividing the rice benefits the rich peasants; the system of collecting rent benefits the poor peasants.

The appropriate policy should be as follows:

(1) After the poor peasants, farm laborers, and unemployed persons receive redistributed land, the government should confiscate the surplus draft animals and farm implements of the rich peasants and landlords, and distribute them among the farm laborers, poor peasants, and unemployed persons who lack draft animals, farm implements, and capital, for their private use. At the same time, the collective use of these implements should be encouraged by handing over to the cooperatives the possessions confiscated from the rich peasants and the landlords. There is another method, which is to allow individuals to borrow from rich peasants draft animals and farming tools temporarily, as a form of assistance. The government penalizes those rich peasants who deliberately refuse to lend these things; this is to provide assistance for poor peasants, farm laborers, and unemployed persons.

(2) As for those who are totally incapable of farming, they should be allowed, under the following conditions, to rent their land to rich peasants and middle peasants for farming:

(a) Abolish the system of dividing the rice; set a fixed rate of rent, which will not be reduced because of natural or man-made disasters.
(b) Set a minimum rate of rent (50 percent), so that the "exploitation" of the poor peasants and farm laborers by the rich peasants will not be excessive.

(c) Do not allow the rich peasants, under whatever pretext, to farm only their own land, and not that of others. When rich peasants are unwilling to rent land, the township government should allocate the land that must be rented within the township to the township's rich peasants and middle peasants for rental, and force them to till it.

9. The Problem of Unemployed Urban Workers Demanding Redistributed Land

There are more than 200 unemployed masons and carpenters in the city of Taihe, who demanded redistributed land, but did not get any. They were from other *xian*, and the peasants in the urban areas did not allow them to get redistributed land. Moreover, the sugar-cane workers outside the city near the south gate also demanded redistributed land.

Disputes have also arisen over this problem in Xingguo.

This problem merits further careful reflection.

Investigation in Mukou Village

(November 21, 1930)

The Red Army gave up Ji'an on November 18, 1930; on the 19th, Comrades Gu Bo,[1] Xie Weijun[2] and I traveled from Ji'an to Tengtian in Yongfeng *xian* to meet the main force of the Red Army. On the 21st we reached Baisha via Shuinan and had lunch in Mukou village. I investigated the class backgrounds of the members of the village government and the class backgrounds of the reactionary elements executed in the village. This investigation proves that middle peasants did not lose anything during land redistribution, but rather made some gains. Rich peasants and small landlords went over to the counterrevolutionary camp during the fierce struggle waged by the peasantry.

Mukou village is under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Township of Shuinan district of Jishui *xian*.

There are 200 people in the village as a whole.

In all, there are 46 able-bodied men capable of toil, all of whom have been inducted into the Red Guards.

The village government is set up in the ancestral hall.

The village government has nine functionaries: chairman, secretary, land officer, social security officer, Red Guards officer, food officer, arbitrator, officer for women's affairs and officer for youth affairs.

The chairman, Liu Xingnan (a small landlord), with a family of two,[3] had 56 *dan* of land (each *dan* of land yields three *luo* of rice; each *luo* of land yields 40 *jin*). He tilled more than 10 *dan* and rented out 40 *dan*. Because he liked gambling, he did not have money to make loans. Most of his land was redistributed away during the recent land redistribution. There are eight mouths to feed in the

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Our source for this investigation is *Nongcun diaocha* (Yan'an, 1941), pp. 95–98. *Mao Zedong nongcun diaocha wenji*, pp. 283–85, reproduces the original text with minor corrections.

1. Regarding Gu Bo, see above, the relevant note to the Introduction to this volume.

2. Xie Weijun (1907–1935), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. He participated in the uprising in South Hunan in 1928, and went up the Jinggangshan, where he served as a Party representative in a unit of Zhu De's Twenty-Eighth Regiment. At this time, he was head of the Political Department of the First Column of the Fourth Red Army.

3. This and all the subsequent figures for family size correspond to the total number of persons, *including* the head of the household.

family of the secretary, Peng Jiafa (a middle peasant). He had 48 *dan* of land and rented more than 20 *dan*, producing enough to eat. He did not have any debts. During the land redistribution, each of them got 7.8 *dan*, making 64 *dan* in all,[4] with 16 *dan* of redistributed land coming into the family. This is proof that middle peasants got redistributed land. The land commissioner, Liu Xingwen (a poor peasant), with a family of three, had 10 *dan* of land, and did not produce enough to eat. This time, he got more than 14 *dan* of redistributed land. He owed more than 60 *yuan* previously. "Social security commissioner" Wu Kailian (a poor peasant) has four mouths to feed. He had 16 *dan* of rice paddies and did not have enough to eat. He rented more than 20 *dan* of land from others. He got 15.2 *dan* of land this time. He owed debts in the past. Peng Jiaxiong (a middle peasant), the Red Guards commissioner, supported only himself in the past with 12 *dan* of rice paddies. Because he had to pay off high-interest debts, he sold six *dan*, keeping only six *dan*, which produced enough for him to eat. He also did odd jobs for others. He did not have a wife, and was unable to raise pigs. He liked gambling and owed 30 *yuan*. After the revolution, he "freely took" a wife.[5] His wife brought a thirteen-year-old son and a thirteen-year-old daughter-in-law. Now the four of them have received redistributed land, with each of them getting 7.8 *dan*; in all, they received 31.2 *dan*. He himself previously had only six *dan*; now he has 7.8 *dan*, an increase of 1.8 *dan*. This is another proof that middle peasants have received redistributed land. The food commissioner, Xu Chuanzhang (a poor peasant), supported himself. He had only two *dan* of rice paddies. It was not enough, so he worked on odd jobs for others. Now he has received 5.8 *dan*, but he still does not have a wife. The position of commissioner of justice is also assumed by the chairman, Peng Xingnan. The commissioner for women's affairs, Yang Jiuying (a middle peasant), had a family of five. They had 50 *dan* of land. Her husband and her father farmed the land, producing enough to eat, but no surplus. She did not owe any debts. This time she got six *dan* of rice paddies. This is another proof that middle peasants got redistributed land. Of the seven functionaries in the village government described above, there is one small landlord, three middle peasants and three poor peasants. The middle peasants here all got redistributed land.

Revolution began in this village two years ago; land was redistributed in January this year (land redistribution started originally in Donggu; this village was previously under the jurisdiction of Donggu). The members of the village government all eat at their own expense; the government has never provided any meals.

The village has killed a total of seven reactionaries: Peng Jiaguang, Peng

4. In the 1982 version, this rounded figure has been replaced by 62.4, and 16 becomes 14.4. We have followed the original, edited by Mao himself.

5. On "freely taking a wife" (*you laopo*), see above, the note to the section of the Xingguo Investigation regarding the poor peasants.

Jiashan, Peng Jiajun, Peng Peijun, Peng Changlong, Peng Changxi, and Wen Zhigui. Peng Jiaguang (a small landlord) supported a family of three, and had more than 30 *dan* of rice paddies. He ran a cloth store in Shuinan and rented his land to others to collect rent. The business of his store was not good, and every year he lost some of his capital. He profited by acting as a middle-man in collecting the taxes of the 38th precinct; he smoked opium and was something of a scholar; he was a notorious member of the bad gentry. Peng Jiashan (a rich peasant) was Jiaguang's younger brother; he supported a family of five. He had more than 40 *dan* of rice paddies, and money to make loans. Because he was grieved at the cancellation of debts, he colluded with bandits from Henan. He and his elder brother were arrested in July last year, and executed. Peng Jiajun (a vagabond) had three mouths to feed; he did not have any land, and owed debts to others. He joined the revolution and became an adjutant in the Donggu guerrilla detachment, where he also acted as quartermaster and supplies officer. Later he deserted, after taking three rifles, and became a bandit who attacked the local bullies for his own purposes. He was captured last year and executed. He generally liked to play cards. Peng Peijun (a rich peasant), with a family of four, had 120 *dan* of rice paddies. He hired two permanent workers to farm his land, and also rented out half of his land to be tilled by others. He had money to make loans. When the masses wanted to burn his land deeds during land redistribution, he wouldn't let them; so he was killed. Peng Changlong (a small landlord) had four mouths to feed, and owned 60 *dan* of land, all of which he rented out for others to farm. He made loans to others to buy oil[6] and hemp. He was a scholar, and taught school in Jishui *xian*. He was involved with the bandits from Henan; he was captured on the battlefront and executed. Peng Changxi (a small landlord) had three mouths to feed, and was the younger brother of Peng Changlong. He owned 60 *dan* of land, and made loans to buy oil and hemp. For each *yuan* he lent he got three *luo* of rice in return. He was executed in March two years ago. Wen Zhigui (a rich peasant) had a family of seven. He [farmed] 30 *dan* of rice paddies, and rented out more than 100 *dan*. He worked himself, and hired a worker on a yearly basis, and many temporary ones. He did not make loans. He also ran some small businesses on the side, transporting ducks and fruit for sale. He was executed because he colluded with the bandits from Henan and leaked information about the revolution. (The so-called bandits from Henan refer to those among the settlers from Henan in Jishui *xian* of Jiangxi who had become bandits.)

Of the above seven reactionary elements who were executed, small landlords and rich peasants accounted for three each; there was one vagabond. This proves that when the land revolution penetrates deeply, many small landlords and rich peasants will move in the direction of counterrevolution. It is a question, however, whether all of these seven people should have been killed.

6. The 1982 text has changed *boyou* to *boheyou* ("peppermint oil").

Letter to the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee

(November 24, 1930)

To the Provincial Action Committee, for transmittal to the Action Committees of the Left Route Armies and Western Jiangxi, and to the Eastern Hunan Special Committee:

1. On arriving in Shuinan,[1] I learned that preparations for dealing with the enemy in this area have already been carried out to a considerable extent. All townships have held mass meetings, and the whole region has convened meetings of activists. Preparations have also been made for strengthening the defenses and clearing the fields.[2] In particular, the propaganda work toward the White army soldiers has been done well. Slogans, declarations and folk songs are written everywhere inside and outside the buildings along the streets of Shuinan. A committee for the movement among the White soldiers has also been organized. In the light of these facts, the work of preparation for meeting the enemy must be considered as far better in Shuinan than in the district of Rufang, where nothing at all has been done, and in Ji'an, where most of the kerosene has not been moved, the moving of salt has not been completed, and propaganda work has not been actively pursued. Judging from the situation in the Rufang district and Ji'an, the situation of the work of readiness against the enemy in various areas such as the Western district, the Rulin district, the Chunhua district, Taihe, Yongxin, Lianhua, Anfu, Yongfeng, Xingguo, and especially in Yudu in the Eastern Route, has been more or less the same. Now it is time for the Provincial Committee to urge the Western Jiangxi and Eastern Jiangxi Action Committees, as well as the Eastern Hunan Special Committee, to issue another strict directive. This directive must point out that after the seizure of Ji'an, the erroneous notion that there would be peace on earth was widely held.[3] It must list the serious

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 224–26. This version is preferable to that in the *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 179–81, which is marred by a number of errors and omissions.

1. As indicated in the "Investigation in Mukou Village," translated above, Mao arrived in Shuinan in Jishui *xian* on November 21.

2. *Jianbi qingye*, a traditional phrase meaning to strengthen defense works, evacuate noncombatants, and clear the fields by hiding provisions and livestock.

3. *Tianxia taiping*. As indicated, above, in the text of November 21, the Red Army had evacuated Ji'an on November 18, after holding it for a month and a half.

lessons of the total destruction of the *xian* committee and *xian* government of Fengyi, the heavy losses of the *xian* committee and *xian* government of Xinyu, the breakup of the Xiajiang emergency meeting by the enemy,[4] Ji'an's shortage of salt, and the severe lessons of the falling into the enemy's hands of kerosene and over ten thousand *jin* of salt, and so on.

2. It is reported in the newspapers that the Third Regiment of the Sixtieth Division, coming from southern Hubei, arrived on the 5th, and that the Sixty-first Division is still advancing and attacking western Jiangxi from the direction of Suichuan and Lianhua. Apart from the fact that the *xian* committees and *xian* soviet governments of Yongxin and Anfu should prepare themselves with lightning speed to meet the enemy, the Eastern Hunan Special Committee in particular should also prepare quickly. As regards pinning down the troops of Jiang and Cai (which constitute the main forces of the enemy), the masses and the independent division of Eastern Hunan should assume a great responsibility. As soon as the enemy enters places such as Yongxin, Anfu, Taihe, and Ji'an, the Western Jiangxi Action Committee should guide the local masses everywhere to pin down the enemy. At the same time, the greatest efforts should be made to find a method for pinning down those enemy forces which have already arrived in Ji'an. It is essential that the four divisions of Jiang, Cai, Luo, and Li[5] be prevented from crossing to the east of the river. In this task, the Third Army of the Red Army has very heavy responsibilities. Much of the above-mentioned work should be directed both by the Action Committee of the Left Route and the Headquarters of the Left Route. Hitherto, it really appears that the Action Committee and the Headquarters of the Left Route have failed to carry out their responsibilities. They have issued neither a circular to direct the work, nor a notice to every locality asking them to report on the enemy's situation. This is really an extremely great shortcoming, which must absolutely be corrected in the future. In eastern Hunan, the Action Committee and the Headquarters of the Left Route should issue directions. That is to say that in relations between the Provincial Action Committee and the Eastern Hunan Action Committee, the Western Jiangxi Action Committee and the Eastern Hunan Action Committee, and the area under the jurisdiction of the Eastern and Southern Jiangxi Action Committees, it is also impossible, in this emergency situation, to be strictly confined by territorial divisions, and not to provide guidance. The recent enlarged meeting of the Western Jiangxi Action Committee, the joint meeting of the members of various *xian* committees of western Jiangxi, and the conference of representatives of farm laborers did not invite the representatives of Lianhua, Pingxiang, Xingguo, Ningdu and Yongfeng to attend (they should at least have been invited as auditors). This was truly most inappropriate.

4. The reference appears to be to the meeting held in Xiajiang on November 6, 1930, to prepare for the coming enemy campaign of encirclement and annihilation. Guomindang forces attacked on November 7, but did not achieve a significant victory.

5. The reference is to Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai, Luo Lin, and Li Jue.

3. Shuinan district still does not know about the fact that only the money for firewood and vegetables has been issued, and no money for oil, salt, and rice has been distributed. Similar situations exist in other places. No circular concerning the provision of oil, salt, and rice to the Red Army has been received. I asked the financial department to send two men to handle the issue of provisions for the Red Army, one of them to Yongfeng and Ningdu, the other to Chunhua, Shuinan, Pitou, Baisha, and Donggu. The responsible persons in the financial department promised to do it, but in fact completely failed to do it. Two days later, the Red Army arrived in these places and the problem of oil, salt, and rice still could not be resolved. In particular, it was the case that the salt sent to these areas to provide for the Red Army had to come from the salt of the provincial government, and was not bought with money. Regarding the issue of raising money, only 130 thousand *yuan* of the 1.2 million *yuan* has been obtained. (Not a single cash of these 130 thousand *yuan* can be used by anyone without an order from the General Front Committee. Please take note of this point.) Great efforts must be used to make money available. As soon as the Red Army arrives in the Red areas, all provisions must be received from the provincial government, and there is no other way out. It is hoped that the Provincial Committee will make a new plan regarding this matter, exercise strict supervision at all times, and avoid any negligence. This is a most important task! The Provincial Committee should convene a meeting of the responsible persons from the Provincial Soviet every day, so that they can exercise centralized guidance of everything.

4. We may reach Baisha today, and arrive at Tengtian tomorrow. It is hoped that every day the Provincial Committee, the Left Route Committee, the Western and Eastern Jiangxi Action Committees, and the Army Committee of the Twenty-second Army will each send an intelligence report to the General Front Committee. It is essential to make rapid transmission of information a priority. The recent report of the Eastern Hunan Action Committee (concerning issues such as the capture of over 500 weapons by the independent division) has been received here.

Mao Zedong

Order of the First Front Army of the Red Army About Concentrating Our Forces at Donggu, Nanlong, and Longgang, and Preparing to Attack the Enemy

(November 25, 1930, 2:00 P.M., at Shaxi)

1. One brigade of Gong's[1] division of the enemy troops in Ji'an crossed the river and arrived at Zhangjiadu on the 22nd. On the 23rd it advanced directly to the Pitou area (it is not clear whether there are other units following).

The vanguard troops of the enemy forces that invaded Yongfeng on the 19th approached Tengtianjie last night (the 24th); the vanguard troops of the enemy forces at Le'an (the Fiftieth Division) approached Liukeng on the 22nd.

2. The Front Army has decided to change the decision regarding concentration which was issued on the afternoon of the 24th; instead, it has decided to concentrate our forces in the Donggu, Nanlong, and Longgang area, and prepare to attack the enemy.

3. Our troops on the right wing (the Fourth and Twelfth Armies) should leave their present location in the area around Shangxi and Xiaxi tomorrow (the 26th), advance to Longgang, concentrate their forces, and await orders.

Our troops in the center (the Third Army Group), the Twenty-second Army as well as the unit of the Twentieth Army in Donggu (all under the command of the commander-in-chief of the Third Army Group Peng Dehuai and political commissar Teng Daiyuan) should, as soon as they receive this order, choose their own roads and march in different groups to concentrate their forces in Donggu and await further orders.

The Eighth Division of the Third Army should immediately leave its present location (Shanggu), advance to Nanlong, and await further instructions. The Thirty-sixth Division of the Twelfth Army should leave its present location for Longgang, and join its original unit.

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 227–28.

1. The reference is probably to Gong Bingfan (1902–1982), commander of the Guomindang Fifth Army.

4. The General Headquarters is planning to move to Nanlong tomorrow (the 26th), and exercise command there.

It is hereby ordered to act in accordance with the above four points.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Order to the First Front Army of the Red Army About Going to Huangpi and Xiaobu to Concentrate Our Forces

(Issued at the General Headquarters at Nanlong at 2:00 A.M. on November 27, 1930)

1. The two regiments of enemy troops belonging to the forces commanded by Gong which invaded Pitou on the 24th have retreated to Ji'an city.

The divisions of Jiang and Cai have already arrived in the vicinity of Yongxin.

It looks as if the enemy troops in Tingwujiang and Yongfeng may move to Tengtian.

It is still unclear what Tan Daoyuan's next move will be after he reaches Le'an.

2. The Front Army has decided to concentrate its main forces, launch an attack from the right wing, and wipe out the enemy armies one after another. The plan is for the concentration to be completed along the line from Huangpi to Xiaobu and Luokou by December 1; the date for the advance of each unit, and the localities where it is to concentrate its forces, are shown separately in the table.

3. The task of the Twentieth Army is to pin down the enemy troops on our left wing, so that it will be easier for our troops on the right wing to fight, and to strike a blow at the reactionary army's policy of cleansing the villages. If necessary it should also cooperate with our troops on the right wing to wipe out the enemy; part of it should be dispersed on the west bank of the river. The main forces should, however, be dispersed around Baisha, Shuinan, Zhonghao, Futian, Tantou, Shaxi, Donggu, Longgang and so on; if any enemy troops approach Taihe and Wan'an, forces should also be sent to the vicinity of Taihe and Xingguo. In addition, they should cooperate with the masses in building dummy fortifications on the various mountains near Donggu, so that enemy planes will be given a false impression of where our main forces are located (if a given unit is beyond the control of its commanders, the provincial government should command it directly).

Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 229–31. It also appears in Volume 17 of the same series, pp. 80–81.

Table Showing the Plans for the Concentration of the First Front Army of the Red Army in the Vicinity of Huangpi

Unit	DATES			
	Nov. 28	Nov. 29	Nov. 30	Dec. 1
	LOCALITIES TO BE REACHED			
Third Army (Eighth Division)	From Gaohou leave for Shanggu	Shanggu	Leave Shangu for Nanling via Hanxia	Leave Nanling for Huangpi
Forces of the right wing		Move to an appropriate place between Huangpi, Luokou, and Nantuan convenient to attack Dongchao and Nanyuan		
Twelfth Army (Thirty-sixth Division)		Move from Longgang to an appropriate place between Junfu and Xiaobu	Rejoin original unit	
Units directly attached to General Headquarters		Move from Nanlong to the vicinity of Junfu by way of Longgang	Move from Junfu to Xiaobu	Move from Xiaobu to Huangpi
Forces of the central route (Third Army Group)		Move from Donggu to Longgang	Move from Longgang to the area behind Junfu and Xiaobu	Move to Xiaobu
Forces of the left wing (Third Army)		Move from Futian to Nanlong	Move from Nanlong to Junfu via Longgang	Move from Junfu to Huangpi
Twenty-second Army		Move from Futian to Huangsha	Move from Huangsha to the area behind Junfuyu	Move from the area behind Junfuyu to Huangpi

4. The Eighth Division of the Third Army should move to Shanggu on the 28th, post guards in the direction of Shaxi and Tengtian,[1] and keep a close eye on these places, and assist the concentration of our forces, until it withdraws to Huangpi and rejoins its unit on the 30th.
5. We will be traveling with the General Headquarters.

Addendum:

A. The Third and Twenty-second armies should bring 15,000 *jin* of salt from Futian, and the Third Army Group should bring 15,000 *jin* of salt from Donggu; after the link-up this should be turned in.
B. This order should be kept strictly secret, and should only be transmitted to the division level and above.
C. After arriving at the stipulated destinations for concentrating their forces, the Third, Fourth, and Twelfth armies should send out scouts to the front to reconnoiter the situation of the enemy.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Red Letter Order No. 7 to the First Front Army of the Chinese Red Army to Move the Troops Towards Pingtian, Anfu, and Kanchaiguang, so as to Facilitate the Purchase of Provisions

(December 14, 1930, 10:00 A.M., at Huangpi)

1. Regarding the situation of the enemy, see intelligence reports nos. 1 and 2 by the staff office of General Headquarters.

2. To facilitate the purchase of provisions, the Front Army has decided to move the troops to the area of Pingtian, Anfu, and Kanchaigang.

3. The Third Army Group should leave its present location (Xiaobu) tomorrow (the 15th) and move toward the vicinity of Pingtian. Pay attention to collecting intelligence in directions such as the towns of Nanfeng, Yihuang, and Le'an.

The Fourth Army should leave its present location tomorrow (the 15th) and move to Kanchaigang.

The Twelfth Army and the Twenty-second army (both under the command of the Twelfth Army) should leave their present locations (Yangyi and Huangpi) for Anfu tomorrow (the 15th). The Third Army should remain stationary in its present position.

4. General Headquarters, together with the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee, will remain in Huangpi.

Addenda:

A. Those armies which have not fully carried out the plans for the first ten days of training should continue to carry them out, and should moreover make plans for a further ten days of training (this plan should pay attention to exercises at night, as well as emergency exercises at divisional level and above, defending strongholds, and crossing rivers).

B. Every army should call its own officers' meeting, examine the merits and shortcomings in the training during the past ten days, and discuss the matters laid

Our source for this letter is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 232–33. It also appears in Vol. 17 of the same series, p. 101.

down for discussion in the order issued yesterday (the 13th) by the meeting of senior officers.[1]

Four orders and two supplementary notes are issued as shown above.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

1. Following on from an enlarged meeting of the Front Committee held in Pitou in early December, General Headquarters convened a meeting of the Military Commission on December 13 to review the ten days of training previously carried out in the Red Army, and to lay down a plan for a further ten days of training.

A Letter of Reply by the General Front Committee[1]

(December 1930)

The true features of rebellion are now completely out in the open! We pointed out very early that the Futian Incident was a joint rebellion by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists.[2] No matter how that bunch of rebels waved the red flag and talked about revolution there, once the Futian Incident took place, they in fact enticed the White armies to attack Futian and Donggu speedily, thus exposing the masses of the region of Futian and Donggu to the bitter suffering of burning, killing, and oppression. In fact, they dragged the army to the west of the river, splitting the revolutionary forces. In fact, they initiated an uprising in the rear while the front was preparing to fight a decisive war, thus sabotaging the decisive class struggle. In fact, they sent letters and dispatched people everywhere to create rumors and sow discord, scheming to separate the masses from the Red Army. In fact, they undermined the provincial soviet government, and attacked XXXXXXX the facts as a whole. Before a resourceful person of the Liquidationist faction (108 characters are missing here) came to Huangpi as the representa-

Our source for this letter is the Chen Cheng Collection, Reel XIX, item no. 11 of the microfilm. We have also consulted the version in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 183–91, and the handwritten copy of the text which appears in Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934*, Vol. II, *The Chinese Documents*, pp. 264–69. Both of these versions cite the Chen Cheng Collection as their source, but they differ in a number of small but significant points both from the copy cited above, and from one another.

1. This document is a reply to, or refutation of (*dabian*), the letter of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee dated December 20, 1930, denouncing Mao for his behavior in connection with events in Futian in early December 1930. Regarding the extremely complicated and controversial issue of the Futian rebellion, see above, the Introduction. There is no evidence that Mao himself wrote this letter, but as the secretary of the General Front Committee, he must have approved it. Two earlier statements by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Huang Gonglue, dated December 17 and December 18, take a very similar line, but if they had likewise produced this letter, their signatures would surely have been on it. (For summaries of the December 17 and 18 texts, see Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934*, pp. 98–102.) Since no other document arguably reflecting Mao's views regarding the Futian Incident is available outside the Party archives, it seems appropriate to include this letter here.

2. The reference is presumably to the statements of December 17 and 18 by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Huang Gonglue, and possibly to earlier texts not available to us.

tive of the Red School, Cong Yunzhong exhorted him personally again and again to hand over this letter secretly to Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Peng Dehuai. Comrade Zhu De immediately made this letter available.[3] Thus the true features of the rebels were unexpectedly exposed. We must ask:

(1) When you come right down to it, who is framing comrades? The only crime with which Mao Zedong is currently charged by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists who oppose him is betraying comrades. They have created the rumor that "he wants to wipe out in one fell swoop all of the cadres in southwestern Jiangxi," scheming thus to frighten and shake a group of revolutionary comrades into opposing Comrade Mao personally, and to carry out the plot of the AB Corps and the Liquidationist faction to sabotage the revolution. The fact is that all the comrades who understand the Futian Incident in the Eastern Jiangxi Action Committee, the office of the Soviet Government in Eastern Jiangxi, the Southern Jiangxi and Southeast Jiangxi Action Committees, the *xian* committee and *xian* soviet government of Xingguo, the *xian* committee and *xian* soviet government of Wan'an, the *xian* committee and *xian* soviet government of Taihe, the soviet government of Ji'an City, the district committee of Shuinan, the *xian* committee and *xian* soviet government of Yongfeng, and the district committee and district soviet government of Xingtian, Shaxi, are now increasingly standing by the correct line of the General Front Committee, and are united in opposing the Futian rebellion. Comrade Mao has no imperial pretensions. Why should he want to "wipe out in one fell swoop" all the revolutionary comrades? The deception and blackmail of wiping them all out has in fact already failed. This time, over 4,400 members of the AB Corps have been discovered and arrested in the Red Army.[4] The AB Corps had already designated a general director, a commander-in-chief, and a head of the military group of the AB Corps in the Red Army. Five uprisings were launched according to plan, and the uprising flags were all made. If there had not been severe repression, the Red Army might already have ceased to exist. But from the bloody mouths of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists were heard unfounded and malicious accusations that "large numbers of cadres have been massacred." It is quite true that, from the perspective of you members of the AB Corps and of the Liquidationists, these people are really cadres. The confessions of the AB Corps ringleaders Liu Tianyue and Zeng Zhaohan, as well as of Long Chaoqing, Liang Dingyuan, Jiang Kekuan, Zhou Chi and others have proved many-sided confirmation that Duan Liangbi, Li Bofang, Xie Hanchang and others of the provincial general headquarters of the AB Corps of Jiangxi have been installed inside the Provincial [Action] Committee as the chiefs of the AB Corps elements. In order to save the

3. The reference is to the "Confidential Letter of the Rebels" of December 20, 1930, which Zhu De immediately made known to all concerned. (See Hsiao, *Power Relations*, p. 102.)

4. These arrests had, in fact, been carried out on Mao's orders at the end of November, a week before the Futian rebellion.

revolution in southwestern Jiangxi from crisis, the General Front Committee sent Comrade Li Shaojiu to Futian to make arrests. When Comrade Li arrived in Futian, Duan Liangbi, Li Bofang, Liu Wanqing, Xie Hanchang, Jin Wanbang, and others were in the midst of convening a joint meeting, from which only Comrades Chen Zhengren and Zeng Shan[5] were absent, so it was possible to capture them all at one stroke. Li Bofang, Duan Liangbi, Jin Wanbang, Xie Hanchang and others confessed in writing that they belonged to the AB Corps, adding that their AB Corps was more progressive and less feudal than the one run by Duan Xipeng.[6] How vicious are the AB Corps and the Liquidationists. They sneak into the revolutionary organs to engage in counterrevolutionary activities. If they are overthrown, they accuse others of framing loyal comrades. The decision to eliminate the ringleaders of the AB Corps in the Provincial Action Committee was made by the General Front Committee, and not by Comrade Mao alone. Furthermore, the General Front Committee at that time only pointed out three persons, Duan Liangbi, Li Bofang, and Xie Hanchang. Who cared to catch Jin Wanbang, Cong Yunzhong, Zeng Xing, Wang Huai, Zhou Mian, Liu Jinghua, Ren Xinshi and the others? According to the written confessions of Duan Liangbi, Li Bofang, and Xie Hanchang at that time, Xie Hanchang said, "Overthrow Zhu and Mao, destroy Li and Duan." This conspiracy was concocted as far back as June last year when Xie Hanchang was a member of the District Committee of the Xing[guo]-Yong[feng] border area. At that time, using the pretext that the troops of Jin Handing were oppressing the revolution in Xingguo and Yongfeng, he put on an outward show of passive resistance to the enemy, but inwardly he was already launching the evil plot of betrayal. He made a false allegation that he had ventured to carry out the conspiracy only after approval by Cong Yunzhong and Xiao Ren. This shows that the conspiracy had been hatched for a long time, and the Futian Incident was merely its open manifestation. If Duan, Li, Jin, Xie and others were loyal revolutionary comrades, then even if they were wronged temporarily, they would sooner or later be cleared. Why should they make false confessions and incriminate other comrades? It is understandable that other people may make false accusations. But how could members of the Provincial Action Committee and directors of army political departments like Duan, Li, and Xie, who have such important responsibilities, behave in this manner? As for the incorrect charge that Cong Yunzhong,

5. Chen Zhengren (1907–1972) was a native of Jiangxi. At this time, he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee. Zeng Shan (1899–1972) was born in Ji'an, Jiangxi. At this time he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, and chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government.

6. Duan Xipeng (1898–1948), a native of Jiangxi, had been one of the original organizers of the AB Corps in late 1926, as an instrument for combatting Communist influence in the Guomindang. Beginning in 1927, he spent most of his time in Nanjing in the entourage of Chiang Kaishek.

Wang Huai and Li Tianzhu belong to the AB Corps, because they wrote a letter to the Left Route Committee, from today's perspective, it is unfortunately true. The letter was in fact secretly forged by Cong Yunzhong, and Li Tianzhu is a saboteur of the Red Army School.[7] The fact is that the number of positions established by the AB Corps in the Third Army is particularly large. If the Third Army, acting upon the opinion of the Left Route Committee, had not crossed the river for consolidation, the present Third Army would certainly have fallen victim to sabotage by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists! Speaking about it, who would believe that they still want to slander others in order to frame them, and attempt once again to hide under the Red flag to prolong their counterrevolutionary lives? And now what? Currently, the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, in order to overthrow Mao Zedong and undermine the revolutionary forces, have gone so far as shamelessly to forge letters. They forged a letter from Comrade Mao to Comrade Gu Bo, requesting criminal charges against Zhu, Peng, Huang, Teng and other comrades, so as to arrest and execute them.[8] On the other hand, they secretly sent this letter to Zhu, Peng, and Huang, and repeatedly and shamelessly begged Zhu, Peng, Huang and Teng to make a comprehensive arrangement immediately to detain Mao, Zhou (Comrade Zhou Yili, representative of the Central Committee) and their running dogs. With this forgery of letters, sowing of discord and sinister desire of detaining people, who is it that is framing comrades, and seeking to wipe them out at one stroke?

(2) In the final analysis, who are the big conspirators? The second phrase used most often by the Liquidationists and the AB Corps in describing Comrade Mao is calling him a conspirator, alleging that Comrade Mao favors the political tactics of "drawing over one and attacking one." Judging from a petty bourgeois perspective, this phrase does to some extent imply conspiracy. But Bolshevik materialists should judge from facts whether it is correct to draw someone over or to attack someone. If the drawing over, and the attack as well, are for the sake of the revolution, why should this not be done? Formerly, did we not win over the Guomindang and attack Wu Peifu and Zhang Zuolin? Did we not also draw over Wang Jingwei and oppose Chiang Kaishek? Should not the proletariat hold firmly to the allied army of the peasants, in order to seize political power? Are we not seeking right now in the countryside to hold fast the middle peasants in order to oppose the rich peasants? What is wrong with all this? These actions are inevitable, no matter what words are used to describe them. You can call it establishing links, or winning over. They do not analyze the facts or the outcome, but are bent on creating rumors and opposing with subjective intent, and this in itself is enough to show their lack of sincerity. Actually, the AB Corps

7. Taking *Hongxiao* to be an abbreviation for *Hongjun xuexiao*, referred to below.

8. Most scholars, including those critical of Mao, regard the letter attributed to him, dated December 10, 1930, as a forgery. See Hsiao, *Power Relations,* pp. 104–105. A copy of this letter was enclosed in that of December 20, 1930, to Zhu De and others.

and the Liquidationists are now shouting the slogans "Down with Mao Zedong" and "Support Zhu, Peng and Huang," but Zhu, Peng, and Huang have already proclaimed that it is not a matter of supporting or rejecting an individual, but only of distinguishing between revolution and counterrevolution. The AB Corps and the Liquidationists now say, "We are ready to present our heads before you (referring to Comrades Zhu and Peng)." Faced by a formidable enemy, they do not use their heads to wage a life and death struggle against the warlords, but beg to die before Comrades Zhu and Peng. They do not work hard to fight the enemy in a final class struggle, but strive mightily to persuade Comrades Zhu and Peng to use extraordinary measures for detaining Mao and Zhou. These are truly most shameless schemes and venomous conspiracies of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists to draw over one, and attack one.

As a matter of fact, they forged a letter from Comrade Mao to Comrade Gu Bo, saying that Comrade Mao asked Comrade Gu Bo to subordinate himself to the AB [Corps], thus deliberately forcing him to confess that Zhu, Peng, Huang and Teng were also ringleaders of the AB Corps in the Red Army, and were cooperating with the White armies in their areas to carry out the arrests and executions. In this way [they sought] to prove that Comrade Mao had defected and was attempting to cause the masses to distrust the Red Army, the Red Army to become isolated from the masses, and the revolution to fail. But [where] is the original manuscript of this letter? They themselves say that they investigated the matter for a whole night and still could not locate it. They cannot find the original letter, but say that they offer their heads as a guarantee that it is authentic and not forged. This is an unforced confession, from which we can see that their efforts, despite all their scheming, lead only to nonsensical utterances. Naturally, such fabrications are not rewarded by a single smile from the readers. Even their technique of fabrication does not seem [X][X][X] believable. At the end of the letter the . . . .finished . . . and the date appears as "10/12." Comrade Mao never writes letters in this way [blank space indicating omission].[9] Sowing discord, they think nothing of alleging on the one hand a desire on Mao's part to force the confession of the crimes committed by Zhu, Peng, Huang, and Teng so as to arrest and kill Zhu, Peng, Huang, and Teng, while themselves seeking on the other hand to incite Zhu, Peng and others to kill Mao and Zhou. Not content with the vicious framing of comrades and "forging of letters", they also dispatched people secretly and passed on letters clandestinely. In the last analysis, who is really the big conspirator here? At present, the AB Corps and the Liquidationists are still rushing hither and thither to cook up rumors and deceptions and frame comrades. Hu Jiaju of the AB Corps and the Liquidationist faction rushed over to Taihe to agitate Comrade Li Senlin, the chairman of the *xian* soviet, and Guo Dexiang, a responsible comrade of the *xian* committee, saying that the General Front Committee wanted to arrest and execute them, in order to frighten them into opposing the General Front Committee. But Comrade Li had participated in the meeting on arresting the AB Corps ringleaders Duan, Li and Xie, and had listened to the report by Comrade Shaojiu. They had no doubts at all. Moreover, Comrade Zeng Quanya put it best when he said, if the General Front Committee wanted to arrest Li and Guo, why should they tell you, Hu Jiaju? To this, Hu had no reply at all. The rumors created by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists to the effect that the General Front Committee wants to wipe out at one stroke all revolutionary comrades in southwestern Jiangxi, like the forgery of letters, is a plot to create doubt and terror in every revolutionary comrade in southwestern Jiangxi, so that they can stir up trouble from within. They fail to understand that genuine revolutionaries will never be fooled by their dirty tricks. The AB Corps and the Liquidationists say, our only hope now is that this letter will be able to reach you (referring to Zhu, Peng and the other comrades). They also say that if this letter cannot reach you, and if unfortunately it falls into the hands of the traitors, we will have no recourse but to shed blood to repay the Party. It is truly unfortunate that this letter once again fell into our hands. You, the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, cannot produce the original of Comrade Mao's letter to Comrade Gu Bo, but we have found your original text, the original text giving full play to your conspiracy. (The original text is now being reproduced photographically.) It is a pity that your only remaining hope at the end of your days has once again been dashed. Are you really "shedding blood"? Or are you "sucking blood"? Conspirators of the Liquidationists and the AB Corps, you should not use the heart of a Liquidationist and AB Corps member to judge the mind of Bolsheviks such as Zhu and Peng!

(3) Are the actions of Liu Di not a conspiracy of the AB Corps? On the very first page, the true features of the Futian Incident are explained briefly and clearly. And yet the argument of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists to the effect that the actions of Liu Di were intended to save comrades was put forward after hearing Comrade Li Shaojiu's statement, "It is a political question." It is as though there was a righteous uprising in Futian, and absolutely no traitorous plot. AB Corps and Liquidationists, once again you are not being very intelligent! If indeed the General Front Committee wrongly arrested Duan, Li, and Xie, why did you not demand the convening of a meeting to conduct a detailed investigation and seek a solution? Even if they were in a hurry to save comrades at that time and had no time for other matters, then the release of the comrades should have meant the end of the issue. Why did you have to drag the troops to the west of the river? Why did you have to capture Army Commander Liu? Why did you have to frame Comrade Li Shaojiu? Why did you want the soviet government to get rid of Comrade Zeng Shan? Why did you have to attack the Red Army

9. An explanation for this rather obscure truncated passage is provided by Peng Dehuai's autobiographical notes, as edited and published after his death. According to Peng, Mao in 1930 wrote dates only in Chinese characters, and never used either Roman letters or Arabic numbers. See *Peng Dehuai zishu* (Peng Dehuai's Own Account) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp. 162–67.

School? Why did you have to send special representatives everywhere to hoodwink the masses into keeping away from the Red Army, saying openly, "We want to oppose Mao Zedong and the First Front Army. If the First Front Army comes, we should tell all the masses to leave, and also ask the organs of political power to leave. The Twentieth Army is the only army we can rely upon." They also say, since we have the masses, we are not worried that the Red Army will not get out of Jiangxi. (This was said by a special representative of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists called Wang Anguo in the District of Shuinan.) Moreover, why did you have to forge letters and stir up discord? Some people say that it was a misunderstanding. But why was one misunderstanding followed by another misunderstanding, and then again by a third, endlessly? We must reject this compromising argument about misunderstandings. Moreover, if they really aim at saving comrades, then why do they talk so much about the tactics of a protracted war and the policy of land redistribution not based on labor (letter from Deng Haochun to Yongfeng *xian*)? If it was a matter of tactics, why did they not hold meetings to discuss it, but insist on using guns and cannons? At present, we do not know whether Comrade Li Shaojiu said "it is a political issue," or not. If he said so, he is absolutely correct. Indeed, the treacherous conspiracy of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists to betray the revolution, to sabotage the Red Army by innumerable schemes, and to abandon the agrarian revolution is a serious political issue. Every comrade should pay attention to this matter, and make an effort to eliminate the rebels. The false display of feeling by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, who said, "We tried very hard to stop the betrayal," appears to have been exploited by the enemy. When the White armies attacked Donggu in the company of the running dogs, the contribution of the running dogs was already outstanding, so perhaps they should not be too modest.

(4) Was not the Second Plenum[10] manipulated by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists? We pointed out long ago that the Second Plenum might be a plot of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists. Because in reality, if you compare the February 7 Joint Conference (led by Comrade Mao) with the Second Plenum, no revolutionary comrade can fail to be suspicious of the Second Plenum. The February 7 Joint Conference resolutely put forward a proposal to redistribute the land.[11] (In the past, the agrarian revolution in southwest Jiangxi was only a topic of investigation and research for those gentlemen of the Communist Party, and the land to be distributed did not include that of Communist Party members.) The Second Plenum did not say even a single word about the agrarian revolution,

10. The Second Plenum in question is that of the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee in August 1930, which adopted a less radical land policy than Mao's. As already noted in various contexts, this committee, dominated by supporters of Li Lisan, had been in conflict with Mao for nearly a year.

11. See above, the "Land Law" of February 7, 1930, and the "Conclusion of the Joint Conference" of February 16, 1930. (As indicated in the latter document, the conference met in fact from February 6 to 9, 1930.)

the principal problem in the Chinese revolution. What it did talk about was simply opposing the agrarian revolution XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX[12] peasant consciousness, opposing the proposal of the February 7 conference for equal redistribution of the land, and liquidating the agrarian revolution. The February 7 Joint Conference resolutely opposed opportunism, and expelled the representative of opportunism, Jiang Hanbo. The Second Plenum resolutely developed the theories of the Liquidationists, and expelled Liu Shiqi, a representative of the struggle for equal land redistribution in southwestern Jiangxi. The February 7 Joint Conference was followed by the launching of the revolutionary struggle for the redistribution of land in southwest Jiangxi, and the establishment of a foundation for the revolution, whereas after the Second Plenum, the AB Corps and the Liquidationist faction developed, and counterrevolutionary plots were concocted. And now? Xie Hanchang personally admitted that the main purpose of the Second Plenum was to counter the February 7 Joint Conference, and that expelling Liu Shiqi meant opposing the February 7 meeting, and opposing Mao Zedong, for Liu Shiqi carried out the seven struggles in Jiangxi, and resolutely implemented the resolutions of the February 7 conference led by Comrade Zedong. The expulsion of Liu Shiqi was first decided by a secret meeting of Xie Hanchang, Li Bofang and a few other persons, and only then was it proposed at the plenary session. Xie himself confessed that he had the responsibility of persuading people at the plenary session. No wonder Xie and Li were so forceful in opposing Liu at that time. Xie also said that there was no reason which could be advanced for opposing the redistribution of land, so they had to use the pretext of "transforming peasant consciousness," and loudly shout that equal distribution was a concept of private ownership, incompatible with a socialist position. Thus an argument against the redistribution of land was drawn from the most [X] theories of socialism, with the aim of undermining the agrarian revolution. Xie also said that the policy of the Communist Party is to win over the masses of farm laborers and poor peasants, and to consolidate the alliance with the middle peasants, and that our policies are aimed at capturing the rich peasants, landlords and vagabonds. The leading roles at the Second Plenum were played by the chiefs of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, Li Wenlin, Duan Liangbi, Xie Hanchang, and Li Bofang, who performed the tricks described above. Was the Second Plenum manipulated by the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, or was it a formal meeting of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists? We are afraid that the word manipulation cannot describe the meaning adequately. Of course, we cannot say that all those who participated in the Second Plenum were members of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists. Indeed, some of them are genuine Bolshevik comrades such as Comrade Yang

12. The methods used for indicating omissions in this text vary from one version to the other. Here there are twenty X's in the copy in the Chen Cheng Collection. Presumably each X stands for one character.

Chengfu, who was so against the expulsion of Liu Shiqi that he was reduced to tears, because he was so angry that he could not say what he wanted. This proves that the Second Plenum was totally dominated by those so-called Party leaders, who are in fact the leaders of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists. From today's point of view, this is naturally not accidental. Since the February 7 meeting, rich peasants and landlords have been attacked ferociously. Therefore, the rich peasants and landlords have not only been forcefully opposing the redistribution of land in their actions, and developing the organization of the AB Corps and the Liquidationists; they have also been formulating a consistent counterrevolutionary theory. The Second Plenum has carried this task to completion. The February 7 meeting was a fierce attack by the proletariat and poor peasants against the landlords and rich peasants, while the Second Plenum was the counter-attack of the landlords and rich peasants.

(5) Who is causing damage to the middle peasants? We have always held that the task in the countryside is to unite the farm laborers and poor peasants, consolidate the alliance with the middle peasants, and struggle against the landlords and rich peasants. Formerly, the AB Corps and the Liquidationists opposed the equal redistribution of land, and demanded distribution taking labor power as the criterion. (In reality, this method reflects the interests of the rich peasants, for only they have capital and thus more labor power. So the rich peasants will have more shares of land. And how about the poor peasants? Since they have neither draft oxen nor farm implements, and also have little fertilizer and seeds, it goes without saying that they have very little labor [power]. Therefore, they will have a relatively small share of the land. And yet, poor peasant families, too, have old people and children, and their stomachs and mouths, too, need food to eat. Comrades of the Liquidationist faction and the AB Corps, you also engage in revolution, and must know the strange fact that these people also need to eat!) The AB Corps and the Liquidationists know that it won't do to oppose the interests of the poor peasants. So they suddenly take up an ultra-leftist position, saying that the poor peasants and farm laborers should be given good land, and the middle peasants should be given poor land. This is to show their particular support for the interests of the poor peasants and farm laborers. Looking at the matter superficially, it cannot be said that they are not revolutionary. But in essence, this is yet another plot. Is it not the case that, deliberately to give bad land to the middle peasants at present is deliberately to undermine the alliance with the middle peasants, deliberately to force the middle peasants to go over to the side of the rich peasants and aid the counterrevolution, and deliberately to isolate the poor peasants? In reality, a proposal which disrupts the alliance with the middle peasants is a proposal which sabotages the agrarian revolution. Is not giving good land to the poor peasants, just like the Guomindang's support for the interests of the masses, high sounding but devoid of substance? In sum, if they cannot abolish the agrarian revolution from the right, they want to shift to the left to abolish the agrarian revolution. Now a blow has been dealt to them from the

right, and they have also been exposed on the left. They are reduced to creating rumors that we have raised slogans that are opposed by the middle peasants.

Finally, we want to ask why Mao Zedong should be overthrown, and Zhu, Peng, and Huang be supported? Is it because of problems with Comrade Zedong as an individual? No, it most certainly is not. If it is a problem of Comrade Mao as an individual, why should Comrade Zhou Yili be captured? "Even if he has retreated ten thousand *bu*,"[13] Comrade Yili has just arrived in Jiangxi and what political tricks has he played? Whom has he seized? Whom has he beaten? So the Liquidationists and the AB Corps have rushed to concoct rumors. Well then, why should Comrade Mao Zedong be overthrown? Precisely because Comrade Mao represents the correct revolutionary line, and is truly leading the struggle and promoting the Chinese revolution at present. Because the AB Corps and the Liquidationists are scheming to sabotage the Chinese revolution, they must overthrow Mao Zedong. It is precisely because Comrade Yili represents the correct line of the Central Committee that he must also be arrested. Why do the AB Corps and the Liquidationists support Zhu, Peng and Huang? This is not at all a matter of supporting the revolution, for the revolution is not a question of supporting an individual or not. Nor do they loyally support Zhu, Peng, and Huang. Their plot is first to draw in Zhu, Peng, and Huang to overthrow Mao Zedong, first concentrating their forces to overthrow one person, and then overthrowing the others one by one. Comrades, at this crucial juncture of the decisive class struggle, Chiang Kaishek is shouting loudly "Down with Mao Zedong" from without, and the AB Corps and the Liquidationists are shouting "Down with Mao Zedong" from within the revolutionary ranks. How they echo each other's voices and copy each other's tastes!

13. It is not clear whether *bu* here means "steps," or whether it refers to the unit of length equivalent to 5 Chinese feet.

Eight Great Conditions for Victory[1]

(December 22, 1930)

I. The International Situation Is Conducive to the Final Class Struggle, and Is Unfavorable for Imperialism

A. The Clashes and Fears of the Imperialists

1. Italy has formed an alliance of seven countries with itself as the center. Italy has fierce clashes with France, so it has gathered together those countries hostile to France—Germany, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union—to form a bloc of seven countries to deal with France. France then became terrified that Italy and Germany might stand on the side of the Soviet Union. Germany says, if you (Britain, France, and the United States) do not cancel my reparations, I shall make friends with the Soviet Union. Italy says, if you do not permit me to build a big navy, I shall also be a friend of the Soviet Union. It is terrible for those big imperialist countries (Britain, France, and the United States) either to agree, or not to agree. All this shows that they have irreconcilable clashes among them.

2. Britain wants to set up a five-man dictatorship. The problems of strikes and unemployment in Britain have become very severe. Its foreign trade is not profitable. Its domestic industries and commerce are all screaming, as if great turmoil is about to burst out. So the British imperialists are in a panic, and want to organize a five-man régime to cope with the turmoil by the use of concentrated power.[2] This shows that the internal problems are indeed considerable! In the United States, goods are piled up and rotting, but seven million workers have no food to eat.

The United States has produced too much wheat, and cannot sell it. The capitalists only shout at the farmers who cultivate the land not to grow any more wheat. But there are seven million workers who have no money to buy wheat to

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 193–200.

1. This document was drafted in the course of the enlarged plenum of the Front Committee held at Huangpi in early to mid December of 1930. It was based on Mao's speeches at this meeting. Thus, the substance is his, though he did not actually draft the text.

2. The reference is presumably to the establishment of an inner cabinet by the British Government to deal with the General Strike of 1926.

eat, and who are unemployed and hungry. On the one hand, the wheat is piled up and rotting, and on the other hand, the workers are starving. You see how strange things are under imperialism. The United States also produces a lot of silver, which is stored and without borrowers. Thus, the price of silver has dropped steeply, and it is really a big disaster. Iron, steel and rubber are also difficult to sell. Therefore, over a hundred and thirty banks have collapsed within seven days. This is the so-called panic of overproduction. Now the whole world is in such a state.

In Japan, a big earthquake has taken place. Japan's industries started to panic a long time ago. They have long demanded a policy of retrenchment (using less money and doing less business). Now the big earthquake has occurred, destroying countless houses, factories, and bridges, and killing many people. With this big blow of an iron hammer, the Japanese imperialists are crying out fearfully in their distress.[3]

B. The Development of the World Revolutionary Tide

1. The German Communist Party is staging uprisings everywhere. The German Communist Party is clashing with the National Socialist Party (the die-hard party of the capitalists) all over the place, and it also has confrontations with the police everywhere. In the streets, shootings with handguns are common occurrences. Clashes have even occurred over a performance in a theater (one opposing the imperialist wars), with the Nazi Party opposing its performance and the Communist Party staging demonstrations in favor of performance. The streets are simply zones of guerrilla warfare. Probably the German proletariat will soon stage an insurrection.

2. The general strike of the mine workers in Britain. Ninety thousand mine workers have already begun to strike in Britain, and conditions are favorable for the expansion of the strike to the whole country. The Communist Party is growing among the striking workers. Over 200,000 representatives of the National Association of Mine Workers are under the leadership of the Communist Party. This situation cannot be taken lightly!

3. The Communist Party of the United States is working with great enthusiasm. In the past the U.S. Communist Party was not up to much. Now, with massive unemployment in the imperialist United States, the Communist Party has developed greatly, and the U.S. imperialists are so frightened that they have

3. The great Tokyo earthquake took place, of course, in 1923. A rebuilding festival had been held in March 1930, to celebrate the successful renewal of the city after the disaster, so the years 1923–1930 could have been seen as the period of the earthquake and its aftermath, but that would scarcely have justified the verdict that the Japanese were "crying out fearfully in their distress." Probably, as in the case of the "five-man dictatorship" in Britain mentioned above, Mao and his comrades simply did not know much about the chronology of events outside China.

organized a committee for the investigation of the Communist Party. According to the report of the investigating committee, there are over 500,000 Communist Party members. The Communist Party is already organizing large demonstrations, and working with great enthusiasm.

4. The Soviet Union has proclaimed the crimes of the imperialists. The five-year industrial plan of the Soviet Union is developing day by day. The imperialists are terrified, and are trying to disrupt it from within in collusion with the White Russians. They want to destroy all the machines in factories and on the railroads, thus making Soviet industry bankrupt, and then send troops to intervene. This big conspiracy has been discovered by the Soviet Union. Those criminals have confessed that Britain is an accomplice. The Soviet Union has told the whole world through the wireless about these confessions, and proclaimed the crimes of the imperialists. [People everywhere] have risen up to oppose imperialism, and they are all red in the face [with anger]. Now the Soviet proletariat are more united, and Communist Party members have organized patrols on horseback, which are busy patrolling factories and railroads.

II. The Domestic Situation Is Favorable for the Decisive Class Battle, and Is Unfavorable for Chiang Kaishek and Lu Diping

A. The Clashes within the Ruling Class (Seen from the Following Events)

1. The confrontations between Chiang and Zhang, Yan and Feng. Zhang Xueliang wants to reorganize twenty divisions, and Yan Xishan has reorganized the Tenth Army, handing over the military and political management to Xu Yongchang and Shang Zhen in name, but in reality controlling it in secret. Yan and Zhang sent representatives to hold meetings in Tianjin. Feng Yuxiang nominally wants to transfer Sun Liangcheng, Song Zheyuan and others back to Gansu and to concentrate in Shanxi, [X][X] in fact wants to attack Shaanxi. Zhang Xueliang also tries hard to curry favor with Shi Yousan, and Shi Yousan is meeting with various important personalities of the Zhang faction in Tianjin. What tricks are being played? The trick is that Zhang Xueliang uses great strength in pulling the subordinates of Yan and Feng over to expand his own forces. He also wants to start chaotic fighting among the warlords. Chiang Kaishek is still deploying heavy forces on the Longhai line,[4] and has located one field headquarters in Luoyang with Gu Zhujie as the commander. This is to

4. As noted earlier, the Longhai line was a major East-West rail artery extending from Xi'an across Henan to the sea in northern Jiangsu.

counterbalance Feng Yuxiang. A field headquarters was established in Zhengzhou with He Yingqin[5] as the commander, obviously targeting Shi Yousan and the subordinates of Yan. In addition, Sun Lianzhong has been sent to Yanzhou, Wang Jun has been deployed in Xuzhou and Jin Handing has been stationed in Haizhou. All these are reactions against Zhang Xueliang. There are troops all along the Longhai line. What is this trick? This is a preparation for new major fighting. There were Chiang, Feng and Yan in the past, and there is a Zhang Xueliang added now. We must use the decisive class battle to oppose these big chaotic wars that massacre the workers and peasants!

2. The issue of Guangxi remains unsettled. Chiang Kaishek has sent many men and horses of the Eighth Route Army to attack Guangxi. The outcome of the fighting is that the forces of Zhang and Guangxi have gained the upper hand, thanks to the defeat they inflicted on the forces from Yunnan. Chiang Kaishek could do nothing about it, and outwardly negotiated peace with them. Guangxi is, however, still dominated by Huang Shaoxiong of Guangxi, and this issue is still unresolved.

3. The small warlords of Sichuan and Yunnan are also preparing to fight with each other.

B. The Development of the Revolutionary Forces

1. A large uprising of one battalion of soldiers of the forces of Guo Rudong.[6]

Guo Rudong led troops to attack Hubei and by [X][X]. Who could have known that when the troops arrived there, a whole battalion would riot. The large uprising of one battalion of men indicates the extent of wavering and collapsing of the enemy forces. Chiang Kaishek was seized by panic, and had to dismiss Guo Rudong.

2. The revolutionary forces in northeast Hubei cannot be crushed.

The First Army of the Red Army has been in northeast Hubei from the beginning. In the past, Chiang Kaishek ordered Xiu Qianyuan to attack it, and now he will also send Xiao Zhichu, and planes as well. This shows that he has no way to deal with this revolutionary force.

5. He Yingqin (1890–1987), *zi* Jingzhi, was a native of Guizhou. He studied military tactics in Japan, and from 1924 on was closely associated with Chiang Kaishek in building up the Guomindang's armed forces, first at the Huangpu Academy and then in the course of the Northern Expedition. In 1929, he became chief of staff of the army, navy, and airforce, and in March 1930 he was named minister of war in the national government. In December 1930, when this document was composed, He had just been appointed to command the first "bandit suppression campaign" against the Communists.

6. Guo Rudong (1892–1958), *zi* Songyun, was a native of Sichuan who had been appointed to the command of the Twentieth Army by the Wuhan government in May 1927.

3. The strengthening of the revolutionary forces in north Hunan.

North Hunan has two armies, the Second and the Sixth Armies of the Red Army. He Jian has dispatched a lot of troops to attack them. But the Second and the Sixth Armies threatened Changde, went through Lizhou, and are now in Shimen. He Jian is again very busy, ordering Li Jue to attack, and also moving part of Chen Cheng's division to Huarong. The reactionary newspapers will certainly not mention the news of the victories of the Red Army. But judging from the fact that the reactionaries have reinforced their offensive forces, it is clear that they cannot beat the Red Army, and have even lost many guns to it.

The above-mentioned clashes within the ruling class, and the efforts of the revolutionary forces everywhere within the country to resist the warlords, are extremely helpful to us in winning battles.

III. Our Strategy Has Been Correct, and We Have Won in All Respects. The Strategy of the Enemy Has Failed in Every Respect

1. Luring the enemy deep into the Red areas. The enemy wants us to come to fight with him in the White areas, and we simply refuse. We want the enemy to come to the Red areas, and there is no way he can avoid coming. If we do not go there, we make all of his ships, trains and fortifications useless. Once he comes to the Red areas, our spears will be more effective. Coming to the Red areas, the enemy is like shrimp falling on the beach. It is immediately obvious that the enemy will be defeated, and we shall win.

2. Adopting the tactics of protracted war. This time, the enemy wants to fight a short war, and we just will not fight a short war. The enemy has internal conflicts. He just wants to defeat us, and then resume the in-fighting. Since he sets a limit of three months for "suppressing the bandits,"[7] we know his weakness, and just try to keep him in a stew. Now he has been stewing for two months or so, and he has made wrong moves every step of the way. We should make him stew until he has internal troubles, and then deliver a mighty blow to him. The uprisings of the AB Corps planted within our armies by the enemy have all been smashed by us. We have killed dozens of the top leaders of the Corps, and have got rid of over four thousand members of the AB Corps.[8] We will not fight a fast war with them, but will take some time to kill many small Chiang Kaisheks, eliminate spies in the Red Army, and unite more closely. The enemy is defeated once again, and we have already won a major victory.

7. *Jiaofei*, the official Guomindang designation for the campaign which Chiang Kaishek had just launched.

8. This is, of course, a reference to the Futian Incident, discussed in the previous text, on the eve of which Mao had 4,400 officers and men loyal to the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee arrested on the grounds that they were members of the AB Corps.

3. Besieging the enemy for a long time in a tight encirclement.

The enemy entertains the vain hope of encircling us tightly and besieging us for a long time, sending several armies to surround us by different routes from the east and west sides of the [Gan] river. That being the case, we should strengthen our defenses and clear the fields, and mobilize the masses to besiege him for a long time in a tight encirclement. When we fired into the enemies in Le'an at night from all sides, they ran into the mountains like rats and dared not come down. Because of our harassment, the enemies in Shijiabian fired their machine guns and rifles till dawn. As a result, they fought each other, killing several hundred of their own men. If we harass the enemies, they will sound the bugle call for assembly, tremble with fear, and dare not sleep for the whole night. If they want to fight us, they cannot see us, and if they don't fight, they fear that we will really fight them. You see who is besieging whom. After the enemies arrive in the Red areas, they will have no firewood, rice, oil, and salt, will have to send troops to search for them in the countryside, and after expending great efforts, they will fail to find enough to eat for one meal. You see once again who is besieging whom. We put up posters in a big way, and also make propaganda among the White soldiers. The enemy is extremely vacillating, so even before the fighting begins, the enemy will be defeated at every step and we will triumph at every step. The enemy is both frightened and wavering, and if we deal him a forceful blow, there is no way we can fail to win.

IV. We Have the Cooperation of the Masses, and the Enemy Does Not

We have obtained the assistance of the masses. Everywhere the revolutionary masses make efforts to help us in organizing stretcher teams, transportation teams and first aid, reporting on the situation of the enemy, and acting as guides and communication links. The enemy does not have all this. He has no one to serve as guides, to deliver letters, or to report the news; there are only those who destroy his transportation, catch his spies, and harass his rear. What is more, as soon as we start fighting, the masses climb the mountains and go everywhere to help us with the fighting. Thus, the enemy does not know how many troops we really have, and becomes terrified. After the defeat of the enemy, the masses rise up everywhere to seize weapons and take captives, so none of the enemy can escape out of the Red areas. That is what we mean when we say that the enemy does not have the masses, and we do have them. The enemy will certainly be defeated, and we will certainly be victorious.

V. Our Forces Are Concentrated and the Enemy's Forces Are Dispersed

This time, our First and Third Army Groups have combined in a big way, and concentrated their forces in a single place. Our strength and combat capacity are

adequate for the fight. Although twenty regiments of the enemy are a lot of troops, they are scattered from the west of the river to the east of the river, with a distance of several hundred *li* between them. The weapons of the troops of each route do not exceed 4,000 to 5,000 guns. If we smash a single route with our most concentrated firepower, his other routes will not be able to help even if they come. This is called concentrating our forces to destroy the enemy one by one, and these tactics cannot fail to be victorious.

VI. Our Troops Are United and the Enemy's Forces Are Wavering

The enemy soldiers have long been wavering. To this must be added the fact that, when they come to the Red areas, they will see our slogans reading: "Brothers from the White army, kill all those officers who oppress you," and "We welcome our brothers from the White army to join the Red Army." As soon as their eyes light upon this, they will think it over and become more vacillating. There were several instances in which enemies in Le'an sold their weapons to the people and ran away to find the Red Army. Our Red Army is an army led by the proletariat, conscious of why it is fighting, and united as one. If a Red Army of this class character launches a united attack on such a wavering White army, it cannot fail to win.

VII. Our Preparations Are Adequate, and the Enemy Is Seized by a Financial Panic

The Red Army never takes along a lot of provisions when fighting. The Third Army Group had only enough rice for one breakfast, and yet it smashed its way into Changsha. This is a peculiarity of our Red Army. Now we have prepared provisions for three months, and we can fight the enemies in a big way. This time, our officers, soldiers, and porters have donated money for the fighting, something which can be done only by our Red Army. The reason is that they offer money to fight their own war. The Red Army has this spirit, and large-scale preparations. As for the enemy, he is in a financial panic. Taxes are levied on houses, and also on shops, and then there is the salt tax. Public bonds have likewise been issued. All this money always goes into the pockets of the warlords, and the soldiers have no pay. We should certainly get as many enemy soldiers as possible to come, so we can destroy them in a big way.

VIII. We Have Topographic Advantages, and the Enemy Does Not

The region of Ningdu, Yongfeng, and Xingguo is a Red area. At the same time, there are many mountains and ridges, the roads are narrow, and the terrain is dangerous. Thus the enemy cannot engage in large-scale maneuvers, and his cannons are also useless. The Red Army not only moves fast, but is familiar with

the terrain. One of its forces may launch a frontal attack from the front of the mountain, and another force may encircle the mountain and attack from the rear, thus leaving the White armies with no place to go, and eliminating them completely.

The above conditions are the conditions for the certain victory of our decisive class war. We must, however, go bravely forth to fight. If we do not fight bravely, there is certainly no way we can fight victorious battles by sitting at home. If we take account only of one factor, for example that the White soldiers are wavering, we could be victorious. But the White officers are the die-hard running dogs of the warlords, the despotic gentry, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie, and they will certainly fight us, for only thus can they save themselves from death. Therefore, only if we fight against them resolutely and bravely can we win victory. Nevertheless, we have eight great conditions for victory, and the enemy has eight great unfavorable conditions. So we have more assurance of victory. Comrades, advance courageously to carry out your class responsibilities!

An Order to Ambush the Enemy Forces That Are Invading Xiaobu

(December 25, 1930)

1. Today (the 24th) the enemy in Shima has moved to Shangxi (fifty *li* from Xiaobu); the enemy in Zhongcun (note: these two localities are both linked to the forces of Zhang Huizan) has reached the line from Yuantou to Shangchao and Lufengling at 11:00 A.M. today (about two regiments). The prospect is obviously that they will invade Xiaobu tomorrow morning (the 25th). One company of our Third Army is still in Xiaobu. The enemy in Xiaotian (Mao's division)[1] has advanced to Wucun this morning, and the enemy in Yinshui (Tan's division)[2] has advanced to Dongshao this morning. Our Political Guards Regiment has already withdrawn to Matian. The enemy in Donggu has arrived at Nanlong today, but has not yet reached Longgang. The forces we sent to Junfu are still there.

2. The Front Army has decided that tomorrow (the 25th) we will first destroy the enemies that are coming to invade Xiaobu.

3. The Third Army Group will be on the right wing, responsible for attacking Xiaobu from the east and north (that is, the height to the south of Nufeng, the height to the north of Yanshupo, and the line from Younaoshang and Wushan to the vicinity of Hewu). Tomorrow morning (setting out around 6:00 or 7:00), they should reach a point about ten *li* from Xiaobujie by 10:00, and stop there (taking care to conceal their objective). Only after the enemies advancing from Yuantou have entered Xiaobu should we cut off their route from Yuantou, and then launch a fierce offensive and destroy them.

The Third Army will be on the left wing, responsible for attacking Xiaobu from the west (that is, Fujiangping and the area around the height to the south of Shukeng). They should set out at 8:00 tomorrow morning, and by 10:00 reach an area about ten *li* from Xiaobujie, and then stop, taking care to conceal their objective. They should wait till the enemies from Shangxi have entered Xiaobujie, cut off the enemies' route from Shangxi, and then launch a fierce attack and destroy them.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 1, pp. 187–89.

1. The reference is to the Eighth Division of the Guomindang Sixth Route Army, commanded by Mao Bingwen.

2. The Fiftieth Division of the Second Column of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army, under the command of Tan Daoyuan.

The Twelfth Army will constitute the center, responsible for attacking Xiaobu from the south (that is, the line from the height to the south of Hewu to the height to the north of Shuixi). They should set out from their present location at 7:30 tomorrow morning, advancing to attack Xiaobu. If the enemy has not yet entered Xiaobu, they should stop before Xiaobu (that is, the southern extremity of Xiaobu), at a distance of about ten *li*.

The Fourth Army is the general reserve force, and should arrive at Tiandongshi (on the way from Diaofeng to Xiaobu) at 10:00 tomorrow morning, stop, and await further instruction (this is the position to be taken up by the general reserve force).

The Political Guards Regiment of the Central Revolutionary Committee, which remains stationed at Matian, should post guards with great secrecy in the three directions of Dongshao, Luokou, and Nantuan, and pin down the enemy at Dongshao and Wucun, so that our main forces can go out, strike, and achieve complete victory.

4. The heavy baggage of all the armies is to be placed in the vicinity of Huangpi, under the command of the head of our adjutant's department.

5. Every unit should bring the noon meal with them.

6. General Headquarters and the Central Revolutionary Committee will move at 8:00 tomorrow morning from here to Tiandongshi, where the general reserve force will be stationed.

Addendum:

1. With reference to positions, you should use the outline maps drawn by the staff office of the Third Army, and issued by this Headquarters, and the Ningdu route map printed and issued by the staff office of this Headquarters.

2. Each army should decide on the location of its own first aid station. The temporary field hospital is in Laijiaping.

3. The telephone should not be dismantled for the time being. If enemy troops are spotted in Matian, the Political Guards Regiment may dismantle it when necessary, but should inform all units at once.

4. The Third Army Group should keep a close watch in the direction of Nantuan.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Red Letter Order No. 10 of the First Front Army of the Red Army

(December 26, 1930)

1. According to reliable reports, the enemy troops in Dongshao have already advanced toward Luokou, and it seems that they are going to march to the *xian* town of Ningdu. There are no enemy forces in Nantuan.

The enemy troops in Yuantou have already moved to Shupo (15 *li* from Xiaobu) this afternoon. Their vanguards are stationed as far forward as the locality of Jiakeng (7 *li* from Xiaobu).

The enemy troops in Nanlong have advanced to Wujinkeng, Xianrenfeng, and Yankeng. The one company sent out by our Third Army is still in Longgang. More than 1,000 bandit-pacification troops have arrived at Shaxi.

There is still one company of our forces from the Third Army in Xiaobu.

2. The Front Army has decided to advance to the vicinity of Xiaobu tomorrow, wait for the enemy troops which are going to invade Xiaobu from Shupo, surround them, and wipe them out.

3. The assignments and combat zones of each army, and of the Third Army Group are the same as those given in the Ninth Red Letter Order.

4. Every army (excluding the reserve forces) should send a small unit of troops tomorrow (the 27th) before dawn to occupy the vital points in its combat zone. The main forces should begin to move at 6:00 tomorrow morning, take up a forward position in the combat zone of their respective armies, and conceal themselves. They should wait till all the enemy troops advancing from Shupo have entered Xiaobu and encountered our Twelfth Army, which constitutes the main front, before launching a general offensive. We hope to destroy the whole of the enemy's forces (the one company from the Third Army should seize the opportunity to withdraw from the battle position of its army and rejoin its unit).

5. The heavy baggage and non-combatant personnel of each army should stop in the area of Yangyi and Huangpi and await further orders. They will be commanded by Deputy Chief Adjutant Yang of this headquarters. Wugongduan on the way to Nankeng[1] will be their rear.

6. The wounded from the left wing (the Third Army) should be transferred to

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 236–37; it also appears in Vol. 17, pp. 112–13 of the same series.

1. The text in Vol. 17 reads "Egongduan on the way to Nankang."

the general hospital in Yangji, and all the wounded from the other armies should be transferred to the general hospital in Laijiaping.[2]

7. General Headquarters and the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee will continue to advance to Tiandongshi and exercise command from there.

Addendum:

A. The forces of the Twelfth Army in front must wait till all the enemy troops have penetrated well into Xiaobu before launching a powerful counter-attack; above all, we must not wipe out the enemy's advance forces too early, thereby letting the enemy's main forces escape.

B. After the fighting is over, every army must immediately assemble its troops, in order to be prepared for the reinforcement of enemy troops from other places.

C. The Third Army should pay attention to posting guards in the direction of Hanxia and Shangxi.

D. The Political Guards Regiment should be stationed at Matian, and post guards in the direction of Dongshao, Luokou, and Nanjin to protect the right wing of our army.

E. Every unit, on arriving at the position where it is to prepare for battle, should immediately send one superior officer to General Headquarters in Tiandongshi to establish liaison and receive orders.

Commander-in-chief	Zhu De
Political Commissar	Mao Zedong

2. The text in Vol. 17 reads ". . . to the general hospital in Changqi."

Red Letter Order No. 11 of the First Front Army of the Red Army Regarding the Decision to Sweep Away the Enemy of the Left Wing, Zhang Huizan, and the Various Divisions of Xu, Gong, and Luo[1]

(December 28, 1930, 9:00 P.M., at Huangpi)

(1) The enemy forces of Tan Daoyuan are still held up in the region of Yuantou, Shangchao, Xiachao,[2] and Shupo, and are not advancing. The two regiments of Mao Bingwen which entered Dongshao have moved to Luokou. Their vanguard reached Pingtian yesterday. The actions of the forces following on behind are not clear, but they are probably advancing towards Ningdu.

The forces of Zhang Huizan have passed Shanhe and Tengtian and reached Tantou. Now they are advancing towards Shanggang and Longgang. The actions of Xu's division are not clear. The forces of Gong and Luo are in various places in Donggu, Nanlong, Fengpian, Futian and Pitou.

(2) The Front Army decides to change objectives, sweeping away the enemies currently on our left flank (the forces of Zhang Huizan and also the various divisions of Xu, Gong and Luo), and annihilating them one by one. It is planned to divide our forces into two routes, with the left route advancing along Junbu and Longgang and the right route advancing along Shanggu and Tantou to attack Donggu in order.

(3) The Third Army Group and the Fourth Army serve as the right route forces (command is entrusted to Commander-in-chief Peng Dehuai and Political

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Our source for this order is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 238–39. The text can also be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 201–202, but that version, taken from a documentary collection published in China in 1979, is slightly less complete.

1. As indicated in the communiqué of December 30, 1930, Zhang Huizan, the commander of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army, was shortly captured and executed. Xu is Xu Kexiang; Gong is Gong Bingfan; Luo is Luo Lin. Regarding these three generals see respectively the notes to the texts of July 4, 1927, August 31, 1930, and August 24, 1930.

2. Here the text in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* has Shanghu and Xiahu, while *Mao Zedong ji* has Shangchao and Xiaochao. In the light of the occurrence of Shangchao in the text of December 25, 1930, we conclude that the *Mao Zedong ji* version is probably correct as regards this point.

Commissar Daiyuan[3] of the Third Army Group), attacking Shanggu and Xiagu along Saixia. When they have secured these places, they should continue to advance and to attack in the direction of Tantou. Everywhere they should annihilate the enemies they find in each place, and then advance a bit toward Donggu. Tomorrow (the 29th) they should go into action from their present position. (They may draft the marching plan themselves and report on it.)

The Third Army and the Twelfth Army are the left route army (under the command of this Headquarters), attacking Longgang and then Nanlong along Junbu. After destroying all the enemies in the area, they should advance a little toward Donggu. They should go into action from their present position tomorrow (the 29th). (The plan of march is detailed elsewhere.) The Political Guards Detachment of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission (except the fourth company) will remain in Huangpi, place themselves under the command of the battlefield committee, and pin down the enemies in the Eastern region.

(4) The heavy baggage and noncombatant troops of the whole Front[4] Army are commanded by Chen Zongshi, the chief adjutant of General Headquarters of the Third Army Group, and will advance with the left route armies. (All units must take with them only four poles of food,[5] and necessary small pieces of baggage.) The fourth company of Political Work Troops covers the advance of the heavy baggage, and is commanded by Chief Adjutant Chen.

(5) The medical teams will each march with their respective units.

(6) General Headquarters will march with the left route armies.

Attention:

1. If there are no enemies in Shanggu and Xiagu, the right route armies should coordinate with the left route armies in annihilating the enemies in Longgang, and maintain their guard in the direction of Shaxi.

2. The rear guards of the right route armies should pay attention to the enemies in the direction of Yuantou and Shupo.

3. The important documents of all regiments and companies should be gathered together in the divisional headquarters.

4. At least half of the personnel of the political departments of each army should follow the troops and work in the battlefields; the other half should follow the heavy baggage.

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3. The reference is to Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), a native of Hunan, who was at this time Political Commissar of the Third Army Group.

4. Here there is a misprint in the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* version, which reads *fangxiang* ("direction") instead of *fangmian* ("front").

5. The character *dan* might be taken here to refer to the unit of weight sometimes translated "picul," and commonly represented in this volume by the word *Dan* written with a capital. It seems more plausible, however, that it has its basic meaning of "to carry on a pole." In other words, each unit could take along only what could be borne by four porters, each with a pole on his shoulder.

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1. As indicated in the communiqué of December 30, 1930, Zhang Huizan, the commander of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army, was shortly captured and executed. Xu is Xu Kexiang; Gong is Gong Bingfan; Luo is Luo Lin. Regarding these three generals see respectively the notes to the texts of July 4, 1927, August 31, 1930, and August 24, 1930.

2. Here the text in *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* has Shanghu and Xiahu, while *Mao Zedong ji* has Shangchao and Xiaochao. In the light of the occurrence of Shangchao in the text of December 25, 1930, we conclude that the *Mao Zedong ji* version is probably correct as regards this point.

Commissar Daiyuan[3] of the Third Army Group), attacking Shanggu and Xiagu along Saixia. When they have secured these places, they should continue to advance and to attack in the direction of Tantou. Everywhere they should annihilate the enemies they find in each place, and then advance a bit toward Donggu. Tomorrow (the 29th) they should go into action from their present position. (They may draft the marching plan themselves and report on it.)

The Third Army and the Twelfth Army are the left route army (under the command of this Headquarters), attacking Longgang and then Nanlong along Junbu. After destroying all the enemies in the area, they should advance a little toward Donggu. They should go into action from their present position tomorrow (the 29th). (The plan of march is detailed elsewhere.) The Political Guards Detachment of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission (except the fourth company) will remain in Huangpi, place themselves under the command of the battlefield committee, and pin down the enemies in the Eastern region.

(4) The heavy baggage and noncombatant troops of the whole Front[4] Army are commanded by Chen Zongshi, the chief adjutant of General Headquarters of the Third Army Group, and will advance with the left route armies. (All units must take with them only four poles of food,[5] and necessary small pieces of baggage.) The fourth company of Political Work Troops covers the advance of the heavy baggage, and is commanded by Chief Adjutant Chen.

(5) The medical teams will each march with their respective units.

(6) General Headquarters will march with the left route armies.

Attention:

1. If there are no enemies in Shanggu and Xiagu, the right route armies should coordinate with the left route armies in annihilating the enemies in Longgang, and maintain their guard in the direction of Shaxi.

2. The rear guards of the right route armies should pay attention to the enemies in the direction of Yuantou and Shupo.

3. The important documents of all regiments and companies should be gathered together in the divisional headquarters.

4. At least half of the personnel of the political departments of each army should follow the troops and work in the battlefields; the other half should follow the heavy baggage.

3. The reference is to Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), a native of Hunan, who was at this time Political Commissar of the Third Army Group.

4. Here there is a misprint in the *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao* version, which reads *fangxiang* ("direction") instead of *fangmian* ("front").

5. The character *dan* might be taken here to refer to the unit of weight sometimes translated "picul," and commonly represented in this volume by the word *Dan* written with a capital. It seems more plausible, however, that it has its basic meaning of "to carry on a pole." In other words, each unit could take along only what could be borne by four porters, each with a pole on his shoulder.

5. The Thirty-fifth Division (now in Yuexi) should leave Yuexi on the 30th and advance by shortcut to Nanlong and Longgang, attacking Longgang in coordination with the left route armies, and maintaining their guard in the direction of Nanlong.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

Red Letter Order No. 12 of the First Front Army of the Red Army to Attack the Forces of Zhang Huizan at Longgang

(December 29, 1930, 8:00 P.M., at Junbujie)

(1) The enemy division of Zhang Huizan is advancing toward us from Nanlong. At 10:00 A.M. today (the 29th), its vanguard (the Hundred and Third Regiment of Dai Yue's brigade)[1] reached Longgangyu, which is thirty *li* from here. The whereabouts of the forces following after are not clear. It is said that enemy forces have arrived in Tantou.

The division of Tan Daoyuan is still in Yuantou, Shangchao and Xiachao.[2]

The division of Mao Bingwen has moved to the region of Luokou, Pingtian and Dongshanba.

(2) The Front Army has decided to attack the enemy in Longgang with the left route armies tomorrow (the 30th), and the right route armies should send forces to assist in the destruction of the said enemy.

(3) The Twelfth Army (except the Thirty-fifth Division but including the Sixty-fourth Division) serves as the left wing. It should set out before 4:00 A.M. tomorrow, and advance towards Biaohu. With part of its forces, it must occupy Nanduan, Shuixi and Xiduan in the Manggong Mountains of Longgang, while the main forces cut the major road that leads to Tongnan (passing through Lanshi and Maoping). All of these positions must be occupied by 10:00 A.M.

The Third Army serves as the right wing. It should set out at 5:00 A.M. tomorrow morning, occupy the areas right of Mukeng and the key positions in Lingziling, and advance towards and attack Longgang (the offensive must start at 9:30 A.M.). The right and left wings should dispatch forces to establish effective contact. If the right wing has not sent troops, then the troops should be moved toward the right side and special attention should be given to the right wing.

(4) The time of the general offensive against Longgang is 10:00 A.M. on the 30th.

Our source for this text is *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 6, pp. 240–41. Another version can be found in *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 3, pp. 203–04.

1. As indicated in a note to the order of July 29, 1930, Dai Yue commanded the Fifty-Second Brigade of the Eighteenth Division of the Guomindang Ninth Route Army.

2. Once again, we follow *Mao Zedong ji* for these names, rather than *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, which has Shanghu and Xiahu.

(5) The right route armies should send out a force tomorrow morning, to arrive in the vicinity of Huanpu, after passing through Huilong. They should be in contact with the Third Army on the left and with the Twelfth Army on the right, advance and attack the northwest corner of Longgang (near Zhangjiache). Upon arrival, they should establish liaison with the Third Army and General Headquarters. If there are no enemies in Shanggu, the main forces should advance and attack towards the line of Huanpu and Zhangjiache, while a small detachment posts guards in the direction of Xiagu and Tantou.

(6) The small baggage, the shelters for the wounded, and the first aid posts of all armies may be located in places chosen by the units. The reception posts for captured enemy soldiers will be set up in Xiaobie.

(7) The heavy baggage will remain stationary in Yangzhai, awaiting orders. If an enemy presence is detected in Xiaobu, it will be moved in the direction of Yuexi.

(8) General Headquarters will move to the vicinity of Xiaobie tomorrow morning, and exercise command from there.

Addendum:

1. Before setting out tomorrow, all units should assemble for speeches by officers and soldiers. Political agitation should be well conducted, and the work of political agitation should also be carried out well in the reserves at all times.

2. The Twelfth Army should focus its attention on a forceful effort to cut off the reinforcements for the enemy in Nanlong.

3. Wounded from all armies should be moved to the reception center in Xiaobie.

4. All armies should pay attention to maintaining liaison between them, and to collecting intelligence.

5. All units should pay attention to collecting western medicine, and should not destroy radios.

It is so ordered.

Commander-in-chief Zhu De
Political Commissar Mao Zedong

News of the Victory of the Red Army (Extracts)

(December 30, 1930)

The Unprecedented Great Victory at Longgang

. . . The two brigades of the Eighteenth Division of the White army were completely wiped out.

. . . We captured the enemy's division commander Zhang Huizan, and brigade commanders Dai Yue and Wang Jiejun.

. . . We captured 5,000 weapons and took more than 9,000 prisoners .

. . . Unite the workers, peasants, and soldiers to continue our efforts to wipe out the enemy.

To all action committees, all *xian* committees, all *xian* soviets, Party organizations and soviets at every level, and all . . . :

. . . times they undertook to suppress the revolution in a big way, and they gradually closed in and encircled the Red region and the Red Army with a great show of strength, our workers . . . prepared to wipe them out in one breath. Today our First Route Army fought a fierce battle against the Fifty-second [Brigade] . . . and Wang Jiejun's brigade of the division of White Bandit Zhang Huizan. They fought for more than five hours, and of the four regiments . . . they did not let even one escape. We captured a total of more than 5,000 rifles, 30 machine guns. . . . [Of these] battalions, the number of officers, soldiers, and porters captured exceeded 9,000. White Bandit division commander Zhang Huizan, and brigade commanders Dai Yue and Wang Jiejun . . . were captured. This time, with so many captured rifles, not only has the strength of the Red Army been increased, but we can [take] a large number. . . . We captured Zhang Huizan, the most faithful running dog of Chiang Kaishek and Lu Diping. For what we have suffered during the past two years from Lu . . . we [X] took [X][X] revenge.[1]

We have translated this text from *Jiangxi dangshi ziliao*, Vol. 17, pp. 119–20.

1. In this communiqué, dated December 30, "revenge" refers simply to the humiliating defeat inflicted on the enemy forces, but the revenge against Zhang Huizan was subsequently carried much further. On January 28, 1931, he was executed by decapitation, and his head was transported to the Gan River and floated downriver to Nanchang. There the Guomindang leaders recovered it and used it as evidence of the cruelty of the Communists.

. . . (because we cleaned out the AB Corps) the soldiers were in very high spirits during the fighting . . . [Zhang Hui]zan said "the Red Army is both fierce and well disciplined." From this point of view, our plan of luring the enemy deep . . . has already achieved victory in the first stage. From the second stage, all the way to the decisive class war, . . . we can achieve our goal under the condition of hard fighting in the decisive war by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

. . . exerted great efforts to suppress the revolution, it had an ambitious plan, only . . . the White bandits . . . thought, moreover, that they could wipe out the Red Army. Consequently, they laid down a grand plan of campaign, allocated forty-four regiments of forces, divided into many different groups to crush the Red area and to besiege the Red Army. But grand as the enemy's plan was, it became in the end a plan to court death in the face of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. We had prepared long ago to wipe them out. The first battle, which took place today, shattered part of the enemy's general plan. The revolutionary workers and peasants must cooperate with the Red Army and continue our efforts. The enemy's doom is assuredly not far away. We have decided that the White bandit troops which have always been engaged in repressing the revolution will be wiped out completely in the Red area in which the decisive class war is being fought. Victory in the whole province, and even in the whole country, is beginning to emerge. We hope that everyone will make an effort to participate in the decisive war.

3. Now that the decisive class war is just beginning, continuous victory undoubtedly depends on the efforts of the revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Bolshevik Communist Party members, and the poor revolutionary workers and peasants must continue their efforts to attack the AB Corps and the Liquidationists, oppose the Provincial Action Committee and the Provincial Government of the AB Corps,[2] support the Provincial Action Committee and Provincial Government under the leadership of Comrade Zeng Shan, support the General Front Committee. We must strive to participate in the decisive war, carry out the policy of intercepting the enemy, stopping the enemy, harassing the enemy, raising revenue for the Red Army, helping the Red Army in its battles. This is the guarantee of the victory of the revolution. We sincerely hope that everyone will make great efforts!

Long live the victory of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Long live. . . .

Chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee Mao Zedong
December 30, 1930, sent from Longgang in Yongfeng *xian* at 6:00 P.M.

2. The reference is to the rival Party and government organs opposed to Mao in the Futian Incident, which he regarded as animated by, or under the control of, the AB Corps. See above, "A Letter of Reply by the General Front Committee," especially section (1).

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