





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


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ELECTION MANIFESTO
1985

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1985



"POWER TO THE PEOPLE"
"MUKONO UNOBAYA ZVIVI
ZVESE"
"INKUNZI EMNYAMA
EHLABA UBUBI BONKE"

VOTE BLACK BULL

VOTE PF-ZAPU

Number 12 1985

The Journal on Social Change and Development
is a collective publication which aims to promote discussion on current issues of importance to our readers. We welcome comments and contributions

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FUTURE FOCUS



The focus for our next 3 issues is:

Women

Food and Farming

Industry and Technology.

We welcome contributions for these issues.



We would like to apologise to our readers for the lateness of issue 12. We hope that in 1986 the appearance of the Journal will be regularised to every three months.



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EDITORIAL -

According to the provisions in the Lancaster House (Zimbabwe) Constitution, the first general elections were held at the end of June and beginning of July, 1985, five years after independence. The importance and undesirable racial representation was followed, to the letter. About 34 000 whites voted on the white roll and elected their 20 representatives in the House of Assembly, while close to 3 million voters cast their votes for candidates from 6 political parties contesting the 80 seats on the common roll. Two of the parties, NDU and NFU, which somehow only surfaced just before elections, were not taken seriously by any body, including, I suspect, the candidates themselves. Probably voters on the common roll felt the battle was really between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU (PF). General predictions on the outcome of the white as well as the common roll elections were made, while a number of speculations and questions were raised. That the ZANU(PF) government would be put back into power was unquestionable - the question was: - by how many seats?

Were the Common Roll electorate in choosing between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU, influenced in any way by the manifestos of these parties, or did these play no role at all? Cain Mathema gives a critical analysis of the ZANU(PF) and the PF-ZAPU manifestos to see which one promises the majority a better deal. Probably the answer lies in the results themselves. One may well ask why the electorate voted the way they did and what were the consequences. Professor Hasu Patel analyses the results and hopes to answer a number of questions, while Brian McGarry uses a different approach and speculates on what the results would have been had the provincial system used in 1980 been applied.

ZANU(PF) received a landslide victory. Unfortunately, some party supporters tarnished their image. For a few individuals, this period will always invoke painful memories. Cain Mathema's article on the violent aftermath castigates the misguided individuals who participated in this fruitless exercise.

Among the 80 black representatives in the House of Assembly are 9 female Members of Parliament. Joyce Kazembe interviewed 4 of them. Their expectations, hopes and views are contained in an article on the Woman's Page.

The Know Your Rights column will prepare readers for the next general elections, 5 years from now.

Making the Third World Column are two articles on elections elsewhere. We take a look at the Botswana 1984 general elections. Brian McGarry explains the process of Presidential elections in Tanzania.

We publish in this issue the first part of an article by Kempton Makamure on the concept of democracy. The second part will appear in issue 13.

As we promised in our last issue the final part of our Binga article is contained in this issue. Read on and find out how different government and non-governmental officials sometimes operate at grassroot level.

The sorry situation in South Africa and the regime's brutal and desperate moves are highlighted in an article by Robert Zulu, while a letter completes this issue.

Our heartfelt thanks to the contributors who have made the publication of this issue possible. I hope readers will enjoy issue 12.

JOYCE KAZEMBE
ISSUE EDITOR

THE 1985 GENERAL ELECTION IN ZIMBABWE: *Some Comments*

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The general election held in late June and early July 1985 resulted in a landslide victory for the ruling party, ZANU(PF), in terms of the percentage of total votes cast and of seats won in the House of Assembly. The election also resulted in the formation of a government in which one white minister was retained while another white minister was dropped, and in the demise of any participation of PF-ZAPU.

The 1985 general election was the first election organised by an independent Zimbabwe. As far as the organisation was concerned there were some problems and shortcomings. For instance, there were delays in the registration of voters; the Delimitation Commission Report (DCR) indicated that its delimitation exercise was a statistical and a speedy one so that there was no opportunity for objections or comments by the public (in fact the DCR suggested that a proper report needed about sixteen months for the completion of the voter registration); there were extensions in the nomination and election days themselves; there were delays in the actual procedures being implemented at some polling booths, at least on the first day, and in the transmission of results.

In spite of these problems, the fact remains that Zimbabweans deserve a great deal of credit for setting up an election organisation and acquiring managerial skills which, with improvement, will be extremely useful in the next general election. Thus the

recent general election was an important managerial skills acquisition device for ourselves and we can congratulate the organisers for a job well done.

Much of Zimbabwe and the world was keeping a watchful eye on the election in regard to the question of whether it would be free and fair, both because it was the first general election since independence and because before and during the election charges and counter-charges were traded between individuals and organisations about harassment, intimidation, etc. But here the Electoral Supervisory Commission Report (ESCR) indicated the general election was free and fair and it is correct to accept the finding of the ESCR. One important test about the freeness and fairness of the general election is that, save for a minor challenge by one of the candidates in the white roll seat, there were no legal challenges of the result by the losing individuals or parties.

Questions were being raised before and during the election as to whether the election would be peaceful, particularly in view of some inter-party violence over the years. One must also remember that elections are periods when the "political temperature" tends to rise for a while as candidates and parties and their followers/supporters sometimes get carried away by the "heat of the moment". There were prophets of doom, both indigenous and external, who were either predicting and/or wishing for a violent

election. Yet there was a remarkable degree of calm and peace throughout the country during the actual election days, for which the candidates and parties, followers and supporters and organisers deserve full marks; indeed Zimbabweans as a whole deserve self-congratulations on this score.

On the other hand, our pride in the peaceful nature of the election itself should not detract us from a feeling of shame because the immediate post-election violence (caused by a mixture of party hotheads and the lumpen element and the seeming slowness of the forces of law and order - all a matter of debate in the media) certainly marred our good reputation. It is to be hoped that such violence will not occur in future elections or immediately thereafter. The recent violence in Gweru suggests that much needs to be done to control inter-party violence which projects its ugly head now and then in spite of repeated calls by the highest of our political leaders for an end to this kind of violence.

The broad statistics in terms of seats and potential voters were as follows: (i) As in 1980 the common roll had 80 seats, although only 79 were actually contested on election days because of the untimely death of Cde R. Manyika. If all the seats in the three Mashonaland provinces are counted together there was an increase of one seat from 1980 (i.e. 31 instead of 30) while the two Matabeleland provinces had one seat less than in 1980 (i.e. 15 instead of 16). According to the DCR the common roll had 2 970 146 registered voters; (ii) As in 1980 the white roll seats remained at 20, with Harare and its environs having 11 seats and the rest of the country having 9. The white roll had 32 502 registered voters (DCR).

In terms of the election results the distribution was as follows: (a) In the white roll 33 734 valid votes were cast (plus

254 spoilt papers). Of these CAZ won 18 704 votes, i.e., about 56% of the poll, while 7 Independents, 1 PF-ZAPU and 4 IZG together received 12 812 votes, i.e. about 44%. This result astonished a great number of people in Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe's reaction was one of anger, and there was a great deal of debate in the media about the significance of this result which put I. Smith in a commanding position in that he gained 15 out of the 20 white seats. The Financial Gazette had predicted 18 IZG and 2 CAZ seats. There were suggestions that some embassies in Harare had predicted 12 CAZ and the rest for the Independents, and that the IZG had predicted 15 for themselves.

In Harare and its environs (which had 11 seats) 4 IZG and 1 Independent won 9 573 votes cast with all the 5 winning seats in the election. In the rest of the country (9 seats) CAZ won 10 081 votes cast while IZG won 5 457 votes cast. In the Hatfield, Highlands and Mazoe-Mutoko constituencies CAZ won by splitting the opposition vote which was greater than that of CAZ. In the Kadoma-Chegutu constituency CAZ won by a margin of 2 votes!


These figures were to be used repeatedly by many whites to show that in fact all whites had not voted for Smith nor was Smith the undisputed leader of the whites. Other explanations offered were: some had not registered as voters because they disapproved of the racially divided rolls; some who had registered had abstained because of poor choice presented; spoilt papers may have been important in some constituencies; apathy on the part of youth; the "old liberals" did not contest the seats; older voters voted for CAZ; Smith's campaign was slick and used the political middle ground; ICZ's campaign was lacklustre; CAZ had misrepresented its position to the electorate; some whites were not interested in "ex-RF turncoats"; whites were said to have engaged in an intra-white fight rather than a fight against government; whites

were against Government's declared intention for socialism and the one-party state rather than against reconciliation.

Even though the above explanations of the astonishing result make sense, nevertheless, the fact remains that Smith emerged with the majority of the white seats (15 out of 20) in the House of Assembly. Of course one could debate the extent of the difference between say IZG and CAZ because, put simply, both were against socialism and the one-party state, both were interested in protecting white interests in their own way, and as Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Dr N. Shamuyarira had suggested during the general election, the election was really a fight between progressive and reactionary forces, the latter including both CAZ and IZG! Nevertheless, the symbolism of Smith's victory was decisive and explains the Prime Minister's anger at the result. After all, it was Smith's UDI which had caused so much death and destruction. After independence he appeared to represent the continuing attempts by the old order to be recalcitrant and reassert itself in a patronising way; strangely Smith contested a seat in Bulawayo; and weren't the three bye-election losses by Smith's party the wave of the future?

The Prime Minister's anger at the result did lead to some perhaps mischievous and self-serving nonsensical perception that after all the policy of reconciliation was not rooted in moral and ideological commitment but simply on expediency and that the Prime Minister was going to become a racist. The fact of the matter is that reconciliation is a deeply-held value in itself and that Mugabe's Zimbabwe is not Idi Amin's Uganda, nor Hitler's Germany nor Botha's South Africa.

Smith's election victory did raise the "racial temperature" for a while. One of the important consequences is that whites will have to be circumspect in what they say and do in private and public; this applies especially to Smith personally and his CAZ MPs and Senators who in fact failed the first test by not arranging for some IZG candidates to be elected to the Senate with his 15 seat majority of the 20 House of Assembly seats (which is an electoral college for the 10 white Senate seats). Paradoxically, Smith's victory happily makes it a certainty that the 20 House of Assembly white seats and with them the 10 Senate white seats will be abolished constitutionally after the next two years. There were suggestions that the white



seats should be done away with even by suspending the relevant sections of the Constitution but clearly Government is rightly committed to upholding the Lancaster House Agreement which is our Constitution. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Cde. E. Zvobgo correctly indicated that an unconstitutional action to remove unpalatable aspects of the Constitution would be an unfortunate legacy to a future Zimbabwe. A post-election campaign for signatures for a petition to constitutionally remove the racially segregated roll is a welcome step in the attempt to maintain "race relations" and reconciliation.

In the common roll election 2 892 524 valid votes were cast, which were distributed as follows: ZANU(PF) 2 233 320 (approximately 77% of the poll, up from approximately 63% poll in 1980 general election); PF-ZAPU 556 996 (approx. 19% poll, down from approx. 24% in 1980); UANC 66 342 (approx. 2% poll down from approx. 3% in 1980); ZANU 35 490 (approx. 1% poll, down from approx. 2% in 1980); other parties 376 (0,013% poll, down from approx. 3% in 1980).

ZANU(PF)'s landslide victory ensured it 63 seats (up from 57 in 1980) in the Provinces of Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Masvingo (the former Victoria Province), Manicaland and Midlands - with 1 seat going to ZANU in Manicaland Province (Chipinge Constituency) and 1 seat in Mashonaland West province being deferred because of the death of Cde R. Manyika, which seat was later won by Cde. E. Nkala in an uncontested bye-election, thus making a total ZANU(PF) strength of 64 out of the 80 common roll seats. PF-ZAPU captured all 15 seats in Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South provinces. Two senior members of ZANU(PF) lost badly in Matabeleland South Province, i.e. Cde E Nkala in Insiza constituency and Dr C. Ndlovu in Bulilima-Mangwe constituency. Two other ZANU(PF) candidates pulled in high votes even though they lost, i.e., Cde J.Mbedzi in Beitbridge

constituency in Matabeleland South Province and Cde Amina Hughes in Bulawayo constituency in Matabeleland North Province. The general election saw the political demise of Bishop Abel Muzorewa personally and his party, UANC, with the routing of all other smaller parties. Overall, ZANU(PF)'s percentage poll in the various provinces outside Matabeleland ranged from approximately 89% to approximately 98% (the corresponding figures for PF-ZAPU being 0,807% to approximately 3,5%) while its performance in Matabeleland North was approximately 15% (PF-ZAPU approximately 83%) and in Matabeleland South was approximately 13% (PF-ZAPU approximately 87%).

One can make various comments about the above result. It is glaringly evident that ZANU(PF) is the majority party while PF-ZAPU is essentially a minority and regional party in the country. The Sunday Mail argued that this landslide victory of ZANU(PF) was because of superior organization. While this is true one should not exclude factors of personality and the contribution of the party to independence and its consolidation thereafter. Personality counted at the constituency level because of the use of "home" or "regional" base, which Minister E. Zvobgo accepted was a short-term measure. This had initially been brought about by the speed with which the 1980 general election had to be organized, a factor that persisted in the 1985 general election but which would be done away with in general elections hereafter. Personality also counted at the top leadership level particularly at the level of Prime Minister Cde R.Mugabe.

The last five years has seen the consolidation of the independent state transformed from its moorings in the settler colonial state (e.g. in the difficult but miraculous task of integration of the former three armies and the police force, air force, prison service, the civil service, the intelligence service etc., not counting the enormous task of reconstruction and resettlement and the widespread improvement in the "life-chances"

of the majority of Zimbabweans). Additionally, the period 1980-85 has seen the consolidation of the authority and powers of Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe, both as leader of ZANU(PF) and of Government, since it was under his leadership that the state was consolidated, the party triumphed in 1980 and 1985 general elections, and the highly successful party congress was held in 1984. This consolidation of authority and powers will be extremely useful for various decisions which will have to be made in the years to come in terms of the socialist transformation of the society, e.g., in the application of the Leadership Code, in increasing the role of the state in the economy, and the creation of a vanguard party.

In terms of the "ideological battle" in the general election, mention has already been made that both CAZ and IZG were opposed to socialism and the one-party state and were interested in the protection of white interests. All common roll parties except ZANU(PF) were opposed to the one-party state (although ZANU(PF) took the one-party state issue out of the general election) and only ZANU(PF) was explicitly talking of a socialist transformation of the society. Therefore in class terms one can conclude that, at least in ideological orientation, only ZANU(PF) was clearly the "party of the masses", i.e., of the workers and the peasants. The sweeping election victory means that more decided thrusts in the direction of a socialist transformation are to be expected in the next five years - and here the consolidation of the state and the authority of the Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe, both as leader of the party and of Government, will be quite useful.

The lone ZANU victory in Chipinge constituency in Manicaland Province robbed ZANU(PF) of a clean sweep of all 65 seats in the five provinces outside the two Matabeleland provinces. If a suggestion in the papers is true, that the vote in Chipinge constituency was not an anti-government or anti-ZANU(PF) vote but was a vote against the ZANU(PF)

candidate, then this opens the possibility of Chipinge sooner or later coming into the fold of ZANU(PF) and thus healing the split between ZANU (of Rev. Sithole) and ZANU(PF) which could have some beneficial consequences on Rev N. Sithole's future.

One unfortunate result of the general election is that ZANU(PF) gained no seat in the two Matabeleland provinces and PF-ZAPU gained no seat outside these two provinces. The BBC carried report/s to the effect that the people of Zimbabwe had voted along tribal lines, leaving out any other factors which may have motivated people to vote. Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe's correct retort to this kind of analysis by some Zimbabwe-based journalists of overseas media was that it did not explain for example, Bishop Muzorewa's defeat. One should also remember that there were "intra-ethnic" contests across the parties.

Nevertheless, the seeming coincidence between party strength and "ethnic-regional base" as one of the correlations is hard to escape. Of course, the constituency system has accentuated this coincidence because in the provincial system used in 1980 ZANU(PF) won 1 seat from Matabeleland North while PF-ZAPU won 1 seat in Mashonaland West and 4 seats in Midlands. But Minister of Transport Dr H. Ushewokunze was correct in saying that ZANU(PF) was more a national party, having won the majority of the seats from the majority part of the country while in comparison PF-ZAPU was the tribal and regional party. The 1985 general election suggests that Dr J. Nkomo and PF-ZAPU cannot make any headway outside Matabeleland and that increasingly the mantle of "ethnic-regional identification" has fallen on Dr J. Nkomo and his party. This is truly a sad development for a leader and party who/which, in spite of some crucial mistakes, has paid a heavy price for the liberation of the country.

One of the great tragedies of Zimbabwe is that the period 1980-85 has seen the deterioration in the relationship and the development of

further mistrust between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU, with the dissident problem being the most vexacious which, at one level, meant the ouster of PF-ZAPU from the Government of National Unity which persisted, with fits and starts, almost up to the 1985 general election.

His Excellency The President Cde C. Banana and leading ZANU(PF) figures suggested that more work needed to be done by ZANU(PF) in Matabeleland in organizational and ideological terms. No Government in Zimbabwe can be expected to foreswear the military option in curbing and eliminating the dissident problem. In fact the military, economic/developmental and ideological options have been tried but still some new mix is necessary because an alienated population largely in the south and south west of the country would be unaffordable both because it diminishes efforts at national unity and because, unfortunately, Zimbabwe has a common border with racist South Africa which has and will continue to destabilize the Front-Line States and "fish in troubled waters".



The recent announcement that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) will hold its summit in Harare in mid-1986 is a great honour for Zimbabwe and is a singular recognition of Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe as one of the leading figures in the so-called Third World. He will become Chairman of the NAM for three years from mid-1986. The NAM has become a "Front-Line Movement" and its Headquarters in Zimbabwe for three years may caution apartheid South Africa in its destabilization activities in the region. On the other hand, the Botha regime, which is coming under increasing and severe pressure internally and externally may become even more reckless in its destabilization activities. In such

a situation those who engage in illusions of secession will do no service to themselves or the country and the responsibility falls on all Zimbabweans to ensure that the dissident problem is eliminated and that all Zimbabweans are integrated in a common nationhood.

After the white roll election, Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe had stated that the next government would consist of ZANU(PF) only but flexibility was shown while some lessons were being brought home to sections of the people. For instance, the reinstatement of Mr C. Anderson, in his former post as Minister of State (Public Service) indicated that Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe was willing to work with those whites whom he perceived as able and willing to work within the new order even though there may be policy differences with such persons. The exclusion of former Minister of Agriculture Senator D. Norman was meant to convey to those whites who had voted for I. Smith and his party candidates - particularly the rural farming vote - that while they had the right to vote as they wished there was a price to pay for the lack of wisdom in their voting and that reconciliation could not be taken for granted but had to be worked for. The Presidential appointment (which in practice is by the Prime Minister) of Cde A. Hughes as Senator and also as a Deputy Minister, and of Cde K.G. Patel as Senator indicated that the Prime Minister and ZANU(PF) would reward loyal service to the party and also indicated that he wanted to have broad representation involving all race groups in the country, though on personal merit - the re-election of Cde J. Culverwell and his re-appointment as Deputy Minister of Education is also a restatement of this point.

The big gap in the new Government is the absence of PF-ZAPU members in contrast to the period 1980-85. This is a reflection of Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe's dejection at ZANU(PF) not having won a single seat from Matabeleland and of the downslide over the years in the relations and trust between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU, principally on the question of dissident activity

largely in Matabeleland but also in other areas. Government has repeatedly blamed elements, including the top leadership, of PF-ZAPU for the dissidents while the latter have rejected this and sometimes have blamed them on the security forces. The post-election crackdown on those who may be connected with subversive activities is a reflection of Government's loss of patience with those it sees as the backers/supporters of dissidents although care will have to be taken that in the legitimate exercise of defending the security of the state and the society the process of integration rather than alienation of people is enchanted.

In light of this, and the fact that PF-ZAPU is electorally confined to the two provinces of Matabeleland suggests that Dr J. Nkomo and PF-ZAPU generally will have to exercise great constraint in speech and action, both privately and publicly. Additionally, with time the hundreds of defections from PF-ZAPU (and other parties) to ZANU(PF) suggests that the former will continue to see a process of attrition of the party well into a bleak future, particularly if there is a move to the one-party state after the next five years.

In spite of this bleak future, there is some opening afforded by ZANU(PF) in the statements of Prime Minister Cde R. Mugabe and Minister of Home Affairs E. Nkala. For instance, in the explaining the reasons for the exclusion of former Senator D. Norman from government the Prime Minister indicated that co-operation with PF-ZAPU was possible provided it cleaned its hands of dissidents.

Minister Cde E. Nkala has spoken to the effect that Dr J. Nkomo would be made to remain in Zimbabwe until he assisted the government in solving the dissident problem. Further, a perennial and heartening

theme in Zimbabwe is the ease with which visible leaders of ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU can continue to mix at private and public functions, even with considerable joviality - a continuing "silver lining".

A most heartening development is the recently announced resumption of unity talks, suspended in 1983, between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU, whose success will require some bold and statesmanlike decisions on either side. Zimbabweans of all political persuasions should fervently hope that the unity talks will speedily result in some kind of mutually acceptable alliance or full-scale unity between ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU.

In conclusion, the general election of 1985 added strength to the electoral "Jongwe Juggernaut" of 1980 and thus immeasurably consolidated ZANU(PF). Additionally, just as the state was consolidated during 1980-85 so also the Prime Ministership has been consolidated further by the 1985 general election. This consolidation will be extremely useful in both the struggle for a socialist transformation which lies ahead and the pursuit of national unity in a broad-based post-independence nationalism. Paradoxical as it may appear, the latter constitutes an essential basis for the former, given the geographical contiguity with a hostile and destabilizing racist South Africa. Of course, the pursuit of national unity in a broad-based post-independence nationalism is not only the task of ZANU(PF) but also of minority parties such as CAZ and PF-ZAPU, and their leaders I. Smith, who continues to represent a racial interest although, hopefully, only until 1987, and Dr J. Nkomo, who unfortunately has come to represent an ethnic/regional interest. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of all Zimbabweans.

OCTOBER, 1985

THE ZANU (PF) & PF-ZAPU MANIFESTOS

and to working people of Zimbabwe

N.C.G. Mathema

Over five political parties showed a willingness to contest the 80 Common Roll seats in the House of Assembly in the first general election since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. Each party had, or should have had, an election manifesto, that is, what it promised to implement once elected. However, in this article, the writer is only going to discuss a few salient points in 2 manifestos: the ZANU(PF) and PF-ZAPU ones. These were/are the two main parties before and after elections, the two parties that once formed the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe prior to independence, the parties that led the final armed struggle against colonialism up to the Lancaster House Conference and the two main parties in the ZANU(PF) government of reconciliation immediately after independence.

What strikes one in these manifestos are the differences rather than the similarities between them. For instance, the ZANU(PF) manifesto is more detailed on all issues addressed, while on the other hand, the PF-ZAPU manifesto has no detail at all - it is made up of very short general statements. Of crucial importance are the ideological positions taken. The PF-ZAPU one does not have a single 'capitalism' or 'socialism' in it. It mentions nothing about the exploitation of one person by another and hence does not refer to the working class, the working people and/or the exploiters. It can therefore be used by any bourgeois politician. Still on the PF-ZAPU manifesto: it looks at the future in terms of nation building, peace, stability, national dialogue and reconciliation. It talks of restoring law and order through the rule of law, and the defence of the nation, plus respect of human rights as outlined in the constitution. There should not be political interference with law enforcement agents, be they the judiciary, the army or the police. The traditional role of chiefs should be restored. The manifesto (PF-ZAPU) looks at the future in terms of creating a conducive atmosphere for local and foreign investment. On the land issue, the PF-ZAPU manifesto proposes collective and individual land rights in Zimbabweans, while envisaging universal land husbandry to improve quality. The party sought to restore the viability of

the mining industry by, among other things, improving marketing procedures through better representation on the world market. There would be maximum utilisation of existing enterprises and the establishment of new ones, leading to adequate availability of raw materials and machinery and its parts for future replacement or repair. There is also a general tone on questions of education (well planned and rationalised where non-racial private schools play an important role!) and on health which the manifesto says should also be rationalised, with adequate supplies of every kind, from equipment to staff. Finally private health centres would play a vital role as well. This in short is nothing but a bourgeois election manifesto, which looks at the future in terms of relations of production as they exist today in Zimbabwe. It is a static election manifesto that fails to reflect the long history and experience of the armed struggle that PF-ZAPU has. It protects capitalism and neo-colonialism. The role of the state is not given, except the statement that law enforcement agents should remain neutral. Neutral to what? Certainly an ideological and propaganda position of the bourgeoisie, offering nothing for the working people of Zimbabwe, while enhancing the position of multinational companies. Today the main contradiction in the world is between socialism and capitalism. Hence to avoid socialism is to try and avoid the future, a future if the working people and the peasantry, who are given no alternative to what prevails today, economically. So much for the PF-ZAPU manifesto.

In contrast, the ZANU(PF) manifesto boldly says socialism is the goal, the future. Just by this one point it challenges and calls on every revolutionary and progressive Zimbabwean to act and work for the betterment of the working people and the peasantry. The leader of ZANU(PF), Cde Robert Mugabe, says in the preface of this document: *"At its Second Congress in 1984, the party resolved to bring about socialism on the basis of a scientific analysis of our situation."* Therefore, scientific socialism was set as Zimbabwe's goal, and the strategy to be used to achieve this during the transition period was defined

This would entail preserving and defending the national independence and sovereignty of Zimbabwe and also promoting the development of our national culture to enhance national consciousness, all leading to the unity of our people regardless of tribe, race, region, sex or origin. The manifesto seeks to forge and sustain a permanent alliance between and among workers, peasants and progressive and patriotic elements in our society, all recognising the leading role and responsibility of ZANU(PF). The national economy would need restructuring to achieve the goal of socialism, thereby ending capitalism, or in other words, the exploitation of man by man. This way, the primary goal of raising the standard of living of all Zimbabweans would be achieved, while the major means of production would be under national control.


Having reasserted its belief in scientific socialism, ZANU(PF) in its manifesto sets out the following objectives:-

- i) The establishment of a national economy, in which a greater proportion of wealth and the means of production are owned and controlled by nations, Strategic industries would be under the direct control and influence of the state.
- ii) Economic growth - to produce and increase the wealth of the nation in conditions of greater equitable distribution and enhance social control.
- iii) Creation of employment opportunities for the nation's growing labour force.

The manifesto goes on to say that ZANU(PF) will strive to create a balanced and integrated national economy managed along the lines of state management. This would call for state, co-operative and mass participation in the leading sectors of the economy, notably in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, banking, financing and foreign trade.

Education, is a fundamental human right, a basic right of every child of school-going age and of every adult outside formal institutions. The manifesto promises free primary education and adult literacy campaigns. It will be necessary to deepen the understanding of Marxism-Leninism and link this revolutionary theory with the everyday struggle of the working people. Finally, the ZANU(PF) manifesto says the party has to constantly improve its organisational principles and methods of working.

We could go on and give examples to show that the ZANU(PF) manifesto is a revolutionary democratic document, for the noncapitalist way of development, clearly on the side of the working people. What the writer has outlined above should be enough for that purpose.



As to the weaknesses in the ZANU(PF) manifesto, let us mention the few. The manifesto does not tell us how, in practice, the declarations will be implemented. For instance, which companies or industries will be taken over by the state and when? Within the next 5 years? What is also needed is for the manifesto to clearly spell out what government economic plans and budgets will be like. These would need to become law, so that it become a criminal offence to go against them. A monitoring and evaluation system responsible, together with a planning agency, for the implementation of plans and budgets with specific measurable objectives is essential.

Another weakness is that the manifesto fails to point out who, today, is the main enemy of Zimbabwe - who in my view is made up of the multi-national companies that control about 80% of our economy. What strategies are we going to use to dislodge these imperialist companies from our economy? We need to move away from just spelling out our aims to practicalities, showing how in fact we will achieve them. Moreover, it would be interesting to know how much the ZANU(PF) cells, branches and provinces actually understand this document, how many of them have seen and studied it and also how many copies have been distributed or made available to workers in factories, mines and farms. (The same applies to the PF-ZAPU manifesto)

The question now becomes: how much did the two manifestos influence those who voted for or against ZANU(PF) or PF-ZAPU? Be that as it may, the ruling party's manifesto offers a lot to the working people of this country. What is of crucial importance is for the progressives to take up the challenge and do their best to have the manifesto implemented, so that it does not remain an 'official' document gathering dust in drawers. All revolutionaries, patriots and progressives from both these two parties and from outside them should work together towards the implementation of this revolutionary democratic manifesto, which show that, in terms of what is said in public, those who are for capitalism are weaker. They cannot defend it in public, if they are within ZANU(PF). Of

course this does not rule out the fact that these same individuals are amassing wealth left, right and centre, right across the country. On the other hand the PF-ZAPU manifesto indicates that the left force in the party is very weak. The stage is now in the hands of those who produced the bourgeois manifesto.

Now the challenge facing all Zimbabweans who have the interests of anybody at heart; those who want to control and then kick out the multinationals, is to unite the best in all parties. Then, using an improved ZANU(PF) manifesto, this united group can help us to consistently move on to socialism, using practical and measurable plans carried out by the working people of Zimbabwe.

TANZANIA : ONE-PARTY ELECTIONS

By the time you read this, the results of Tanzania's presidential election will probably have been announced, and for a couple of months you will have known that Ali Hassan Mwinyi is the only candidate in the election, but this does not mean that the choice is not democate.

The choice of candidate started in the village branches of the one party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) early in the year, and by the end of June candidates proposed at lower levels were being discussed at provincial party meetings, and three main candidates had emerged. Mwinyi seemed the least well known of the three: the other two were Prime Minister Salim Salim and CCM seretary-general Rashidi Kawawa, so the result was not obvious beforehand.

Any visitor who gets into conversation with Tanzanians discovers that political debate is lively and a frequent part of conversation, not only at election times. Peasant farmers debate the effects of accepting an IMF loan and similar issues in an informed way on buses and in the street. They have a good idea what each presidential candidate stands for, and they chose candidates in party meetings, at the lowest level. These suggestions went up to the next level, where some were chosen to go forward and some were dropped, by representatives of the lower levels at district, province and finally national level. With everybody involved in the choice, and knowing their power, we can be sure that if the sole candidate was not acceptable to most of the voters, he would get a 'No' vote in the final election.

VIOLENCE & The Elections

N.C.G. Mathema

During the four days of Zimbabwe's first general elections after gaining independence everything was calm. There was peace right across the country and many leaders commented that the way we had conducted ourselves during the actual elections showed how politically mature we had become. Indeed the peace and calm during the elections suggested a maturity of some kind. It suggested that people belonging to different political parties in Zimbabwe too can stand together in the same queue peacefully, and still vote according to their political judgement, feelings and consciousness.

However, this peace and quiet was preceded and followed by violence, a violence that claimed the lives of some people, wrought injury to others and caused destruction of property.

What violence, what insecurity therefore took place before the elections? According to the Herald June 25, 1985, Edward Mazaiwana of the UANC complained to the Electoral Supervisory Commission the previous day that an attempt had been made on his life in Mufakose (Harare) just before he addressed a rally. Mazaiwana is reported to have said that two of his sons had been injured.

The Herald on the same day reported that 20 houses belonging to ZANU(PF) members in Glenview (Harare) were stoned the previous Saturday by unidentified youths, and that hundreds of dollars worth of damage was caused.

The Herald 24 June reported that Cde Joseph Msika of PF-ZAPU had said that some members of the Support Unit (which is a unit of the security forces) had pulled down PF-ZAPU election posters.

It was also reported in the Herald that 2 men appeared before the magistrate in Hwange following violence at Mukwita Village, Number 13 Colliery, where 13 people were injured. The two pleaded guilty of marching in a group of youths carrying sticks, knobkerries and iron bars, assaulting

people for not attending a political meeting. The report did not however say which party the youths belonged to.

On the 21st June it was reported in the Herald that Cde Ruth Chinamano was finding it difficult to hold campaign rallies because of anti-PF-ZAPU violence instigated by other political parties. She was reported as having said that she had been stopped from electioneering in Highfield by ZANU(PF) supporters. The Herald reported that women had stopped her from campaigning. Some of the women were even reported to have thrown missiles at Cde Chinamano's car. The incident led to the injury of three people, one seriously. Cde Chinamano then appealed to Margaret Thatcher (the British Prime Minister) and to President Banda to postpone the elections. The appeal to the British Prime Minister made no sense at all, as Zimbabwe is an independent sovereign state. One also wonders how she thought this appeal would be taken by the people of Zimbabwe - particularly the people of Highfield!

The Herald of 19 June reported that the house of PF-ZAPU's Chitungwiza candidate, Cde Oziyah Muchuchu was set on fire by a petrol bomb on the night of 17 June by a mob of youths. Cde Ushewokunze (the ZANU(PF) Secretary of the Commissariat & Culture and Minister of Transport) condemned the incident as having been caused by ZANU(PF) members who were not genuine. Another house belonging to a senior PF-ZAPU official in Seke Unit G was attacked, windows broken and the front windscreen of the official's car was shattered.

The big question is: why this violence before the elections? Was it calculated to intimidate supporters of other parties into voting a particular way? And did it influence the results of the elections at all? Were the perpetrators of the violence politically conscious people? Do they know who the real enemy of Zimbabwe is today? What is also of interest is that similar violence was not experienced amongst the white community, or amongst those allowed to vote candidates for the 20 reserved seats. Why therefore did this violence occur only amongst blacks?

After the elections some towns went through

a wave of violence against PF ZAPU and UANC supporters which left some people dead, many people injured, and many homes stoned. The violence was reported in towns like Harare, Chitungwiza, Redcliff, Bindura and Kwekwe. In Harare it was women members of ZANU(PF) who went on the rampage. They just went wild, and even ZANU(PF) members and supporters were beaten up and their property destroyed. Yet ZANU(PF) had won the elections. The Prime Minister, other ministers and other ZANU(PF) leaders later appealed for calm.

Again, one wonders what the purpose of this violence was, one wonders why these people were even calling for supporters of other parties in their areas to leave. Where were they supposed to go? Is there any political maturity in this kind of call? Why was it necessary to kill and injure people simply because they belonged to other parties. If they joined ZANU(PF) what difference would it make to those who were being beaten up and their property destroyed and to the country as a whole? Again, the violence was against black people. Not a single supporter of the CAZ was touched. Again it was working class people against working class people!

What is needed is more ideological education amongst the people of Zimbabwe, particularly among the workers. What we need is to be clear as to who the main enemy is in Zimbabwe. The main enemy in Zimbabwe is foreign capital; it is neo-colonialism, it is the multi-nationals who control 80% of our economy. If we fight among ourselves, we waste a lot of time, energy, money and lives over petty, unpatriotic, totally-empty-of-class-consciousness things and the multi-nationals will continue to loot Zimbabwe. They will continue to exploit us and keep the country under their control. For Zimbabwe to move forward, for Zimbabwe to achieve genuine independence, for Zimbabwe to move on to socialism those who perpetrated violence before and after the elections should not be members of the party that will lead us to socialism - for such people are certainly helping the forces of neo-colonialism and capitalism. The party for socialism must cleanse itself of such people, it must screen those who join it. On the other hand it must have the support of the people of Zimbabwe, particularly the working class and the peasantry. For socialism to be achieved in Zimbabwe, not everybody has to be a party member - actually once that happens, the party ceases to be

a party, it becomes the general public, and the general public is full of those who are on the side of those who control the economy of this country. It is full of those who want to see capitalism strengthened in Zimbabwe.

The thugs that perpetrated the violence before and after the elections should be sought for and arrested and charged with murder, looting, destroying property and disturbing the peace of the country. We cannot continue to live in the politics of the past where ordinary members of different political parties fight each other. When one sits down with them, one finds that they just do not know the differences are between them. Why do the people not take their cue from their leaders who meet in parliament together without exchanging blows? If the leaders can sit side by side in parliament and at receptions together, why is the "povo" not allowed to do the same?

The thugs could not be violent in the election queues because the police were there, and because the rules set down by Cde Tobias Mudede, the Registrar General, on the conduct of voting were followed. Cde Mudede should be congratulated for his firm stand. The political thugs need a firm hand from the law-enforcing agencies and from their leaders.

Now let us prepare for the next elections. Hopefully, by the time the next general elections come, the working people of this country will be more class conscious, and hopefully by that time it will be clear who is for socialism and who is not.



It can be instructive for people in Zimbabwe to take note of election experiences in neighbouring states. One of the most recent was that in Botswana in September 1984 - worth studying because after all it is a bordering country, and one whose politics have in recent months been sufficient to provoke destructive raids by the South African regime. But it is also instructive to make the comparisons between the election process in the two countries.

Botswana's 1984 elections were in fact the fifth at strict five year intervals since 1964. At one level there is seeming parallel with Zimbabwe, in that the ruling party, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), commands overwhelming support. Support for opposition parties has largely been confined to a few more peripheral areas and has reflected an ethnic (non-Tswana speaking) bias. But voting was not unambiguously in a tribal mould - voters in the north-east and far north, where opposition parties have managed to get the odd parliamentary seat, were fairly evenly split between BDP and other parties. Elsewhere in the more heavily populated central and south eastern areas, among the Tswana speaking people, the BDP has had overwhelming votes. The one exception has been in Kanye seats where the disaffected local ex-chief Bathoen still retains enough clout to be able to carry the seats for the Botswana National Front (BNF). So, in brief, Botswana for all its claims to 'liberal, multiparty democracy' could be considered to be more a kind of 'one-and-a-bit' party state. It has retained the forms of a competitive party system, and gained the kudos in the west for its 'democratic system' while the ruling group face no real alternative. A parliamentary opposition which, before 1984, could only muster two seats did not have to be paid much attention and didn't represent an 'alternative government'. Indeed

clearly many ordinary folk can't see any distinction between the ruling party and the state, just as in a one-party state - a tendency that was underlined last year when the government (and thus party) were seen as the provider of the famine relief supplies which kept so many people alive.

Still one difference with Zimbabwe has to be explained: in Botswana it would have been very easy, faced with only token, peripheral opposition to push towards a one-party state. Why did the BDP rulers actively resist that temptation, which other parties elsewhere have desperately sought after? The explanation is not obvious. In part it may be due to a subconscious desire to please crucial western donors or to placate the threatening presence to the South. Some have offered rather unconvincing explanations based on the culture of the people - an argument that tends to be circular for the only evidence that the Tswana have 'a democratic political culture' is the fact that they maintain the parties. It may be more to do with the character of the ruling group that tends to have merged the old cattle-owning aristocracy with representatives of a new professional managerial class. The aristocratic legacy, it is suggested, has bequeathed a political self-confidence and a rather arrogant assumption of their right to rule that at least has no problem in allowing a modicum of opposition without feeling threatened.

But what was fascinating about the 1984 elections is that they could contain the seeds of a change in this basic pattern of politics. At one stage in the run up to the election, the 'democratic' BDP were contemplating the "embarrassment" of what to do if they won all the seats. In the event, they got a shock. Only six seats went to the opposition, out of 32 in what is after all a small country (just over 20% - about the same

proportion as in Zimbabwe). But these gains were not scattered between 2 or 3 parties; the BNF got all but one including unseating the Vice-President and a Minister in the two seats in the capital, Gaborone.


This trend could mark the start of a permanent shift - possible if the BNF, which despite having one base in chieftdom politics has consistently presented an image of a left party, and made appeals to class, continues to gain support in the urban areas, where most of its strength now lies. If there were such a long term trend and not just a swing, one question to ask is whether the admittedly very open atmosphere of politics under Botswana's 'democratic multiple system' would in fact persist. It could be that the tolerance of the born rulers towards a token opposition might alter as opposition grows and especially when that opposition is articulating an appeal to the more dispossessed to reject development policies that have all too often benefited the privileged - the bureaucrats, small businessmen and, particularly, the cattle barons.

Yet one has also to ask what are BNF's prospects for continuing to expand its base of support. To do so it would first have to make common cause with the small parties of the north east - so far not on, perhaps because of the problems of fusing regionalist and ideological views of politics. But a second problem lies in the fact that the BNF itself has inherited a rather uneasy amalgam of these two bases of opposition to the ruling centre. This ambiguity in fact persists in part because of the BNF's own programme : it denies it is a 'socialist' party, despite some highly sophisticated even abstract rhetoric about class, saying that that would be premature and advocating a cross-class basis for a national democratic struggle. A further doubt about BNF's long term chances stems from a careful look at the election result. Studies by local scholars have shown that though BNF did well in all the towns, its support was not

from the poorest, most dispossessed - the young job-seekers, the low paid - if anything the ruling BDP shared that vote as well as the middle classes whereas the BNF did best among the slightly older, more established workers and even some white-collar employees. What was also striking was that the BNF has not yet found an effective basis for appealing to that class who constitute the majority of the urban as well as rural populations, the 'worker-peasants' - those who are not permanently urbanised and proletarianised but seek to combine livelihoods from migrant labour, in decreasing numbers to South Africa, while still having a stake in peasant farming or herding.

Whatever the future holds, the BNF inroads do mean that despite its ambiguities and the lack of a very concrete set of alternative policies, it has become a party to be reckoned with and one that those on the left in Botswana, and outside have to take seriously. Moreover a process is under way in Botswana, which has hardly been successfully accomplished anywhere in Africa yet one which could signify some kind of transition from tribal politics to class and ideology based politics. It will be fascinating to follow the further progress along this difficult road.





WOMEN M.P.'S

Joyce Kazembe

Who are the female Members of Parliament (MP's) in the House of Assembly? What are their expectations and views about the role they will play in the next five years? Have there been any noticeable changes in the situation of women in Zimbabwe since independence?

These questions are among a number directed at 4 of the 9 female MP's in the House of Assembly, during an interview with the writer. Eight are ZANU(PF) MP's, while one is PF-ZAPU. It is unfortunate that the only female PF-ZAPU MP could not be contacted for an interview. Some questions were very general while others were directed at a specific individual. Cdes J. Zvobgo, S. Mugabe, I. Mashonganyika and S. Mahofa were interviewed.

Out of the total number of candidates contesting the 1985 general election on the common voters roll approx. 21 were women, 9 of whom won in their respective constituencies. It was not so much the sex of the candidates that mattered but the party one stood for. This does not however dismiss the role played by each individual in their respective parties either at national or provincial level.

All 9 were deserving candidates in their own right, hence their nomination, and subsequent winning with convincing majorities in their respective constituencies. In the final analysis ZANU(PF) MP's are Cdes J. Zvobgo (Zvishavane), S. Mugabe (Makonde East), V. Chitepo (Mutasa), T.R.Nhongo (Bindura/Shamva), S. Mahofa (Gutu South), I. Mashonganyika (Glen View), N. Nhwatiwa (Makoni East), and R. Mungwashu (Murewa North); and the PF-ZAPU MP is Cde V. Lesabe (Mzingwane).

GENERALLY WHAT ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MP's?

All 4 interviewees stated that their first duty was to represent the interests of their respective constituents. This necessitated constant communication with them. One of their major responsibilities was to see that the standard of living of people in the rural areas was improving by encouraging local participation in development projects. This would entail educating the people on the importance of commitment to such development, an exercise calling for political and ideological understanding of self-reliance. Income-generating activities would ensure a constant source of income for most of them.

They stated that government policy on rural development is very clear. Over 70% of the population is rural based and this area was a priority if government is to deliver the goods, as promised in the ZANU(PF) manifesto. The electrification of growth points would speed up development and it is up to the MP's to remind the nation in general that they have to bear with the government's policy of equitable distribution of resources, which calls for sacrifices on the part of the urban population. Cde S. Mugabe raised a very pertinent point - she hopes to see a well planned layout of villages so as to allow easier laying of water pipes. Cattle paddocks would be in one area in order to cut down the number of hours spent herding cattle. It is the task of the MP's to liaise with local officials and government functionaries at local level.

MANY WOMEN IN THE RURAL AREAS COMPLAIN THAT THEY GET A VERY SMALL % OF INCOME FROM AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION THOUGH THEY SPEND A LONGER PERIOD IN THE FIELDS THAN THEIR HUSBANDS. IS THIS THE CASE IN YOUR CONSTITUENCIES?

Cdes Zvobgo, Mugabe and Mahofa expressed their concern about the exploitation of women in the rural areas. Though there are some couples who decide on how income should be spent, in most cases the husband decides, often to the detriment of the family. The only way to correct the situation is to educate the men on the socialist and humanitarian concept of equality. Women must also be more assertive and demand equal treatment. Government had set the pace by passing the Legal

Age of Majority Act, which conferred equal status to both men and women. For the Act to be effective, an extensive programme to educate women on their rights, and men as well, is necessary, countrywide. Of course, women could alleviate their economic plight by starting income generating activities

CDE MASHONGANYIKA, WHAT IS THE RELATIVE POSITION OF WOMEN IN URBAN AREAS? WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN IN GENERAL AND GIRLS IN PARTICULAR?

Women in urban areas also need a lot of help. Women in rural areas are usually occupied in agricultural production but the majority of women in town are usually full-time housewives who spend a lot of time at home, with no income. This explains why there is so much illegal cultivation. Sending them to the rural areas is no solution, as this splits families. My aim is to encourage them to get involved in viable income generating projects which could restore to them their self-respect, and help remove this total dependence on their husbands, which does not augur well with equality. I am glad that Harare Municipality has decided to give plots to women's co-operatives for cultivation in and around Harare. I hope they will exploit this positive development. Women must learn to stand on their own feet.

We must realise that things have changed. Children are now exposed to all sorts of temptations. Therefore, it is up to the individual parents to monitor the activities and education of their children. This also depends on the relationship between and among the members of the family. This is determined by how much communication there is from one to the other. Girls

should be encouraged to be more serious about education. Whether we want to believe it or not, marriage is no longer what it used to be, nor the ultimate goal for a girl. Not everybody will get married by a man who disturbs their school career, and even if a few are, divorce is an everyday occurrence today. So what happens to a girl with no profession or other source of income? She can live with her parents and fatherless child(ren) if she is lucky, or end up in the streets. Anybody over 18 should know that he/she is legally and potentially responsible for his/her own fate, which is the more reason why boys and girls should be taught to be morally upright and not ruin their lives by frivolous behaviour.

CDE ZVOBGO CAN YOU ADD TO THE VIEWS OF CDE MASHONGANYIKA? IN ADDITION WHAT PROBLEMS ARE PECULIAR TO WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOW DO YOU THINK THEY CAN BE SOLVED?

On the question of education and behaviour of boys and girls, it must be stressed that government and parents are spending a lot of money educating the young, as a future investment in human resource development. Children should know this. Many girls are getting pregnant because they know next to nothing about the consequences of promiscuity. In the end they get expelled and society ends up with two problems:- fatherless children and uneducated girls. I have my doubts about expelling girls from school and I have raised the issue in the House. Two wrongs do not make a right. While I do not condone girls for getting pregnant, I feel they should be allowed back into school - maybe different ones - to continue with their education. Expelling them ruins their lives forever and very likely the lives of innocent children as well. What riles me is that



DIVISION OF LABOUR IN AFRICA

| | | |
|------------------------------|----|----|
| Domestic work | 95 | 5 |
| Processing and storing crops | 85 | 15 |
| Weeding | 70 | 30 |
| Harvesting | 60 | 40 |
| Caring for livestock | 50 | 50 |
| Planting | 50 | 50 |
| Ploughing | 30 | 70 |

 WOMEN
  MEN

Percentage of each type of work done by women and men in Africa.

Source: United Nations Handbook on Women in Africa, Economic Commission for Africa, 1975


most of those responsible are working men, sugar daddies who usually get away with it. Why they can't be heavily punished beats me. Surely legislation could take of that? On the other hand while I don't advocate providing girls with contraceptives across the board, parents must realise that life has changed and their daughters could end up on their doorsteps with babies on their backs. If their daughters are active sexually (lets not run away from it, they are, in many cases) I would advise them to seriously consider putting them on contraceptives. Some argue this would make them more promiscuous. But they are promiscuous with or without the pill. Why not avert an illegitimate child and let girls complete their education?

Your second question on women in employment is trampled ground. As a female MP in the last Parliament and also as the Secretary for Information and Publicity in the ZANU(PF) Women's League I was one of the people who put in views to the tax commission. The tax laws here are not conducive to maximum participation by women in the labour force. I hope something positive will come out of the report. Government should understand women's problems and work with women NGO's in their efforts to raise the consciousness of women as equal participants in development. I wish to encourage women in employment to join trade unions for collective action which would highlight those problems peculiar to women. While I applaud the passing of the Minimum Wages Act, the problems faced by women on the minimum wage scale remains unsolved. Working women must employ someone to look after the children at home or send them to day centres. Either way the cost is prohibitive. They either underpay their own employees which is usually the case and is illegal, or they get a relative to do the work (their mothers) or just leave employment. I wish to see day care centres; at the places of work. I wish to bring this up, but I also realise the enormous financial resources needed for such an undertaking. While a few of us could stay at home and still live comfortably, most of the women in the factories are working for survival, and can hardly make ends meet. I am also concerned about the accommodation of domestic and agricultural workers who are not allowed to bring their children into the masters/mistresses home. These people live in cramped quarters - something that does not go well with our speeches about socialism, if we contrast

and compare their way of life with ours. This is particularly terrible on some commercial farms. Government must step in and ask for a better deal for these workers.

LASTLY, CDE ZVOGBO, YOU SERVED IN THE LAST PARLIAMENT. WHAT DIFFERENCES HAVE YOU NOTICED BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PARLIAMENT?

In the first parliament most of the members were new and had no idea about procedures in the House. Now new MP's get lessons on this. Today MP's are more aware of what the problem areas are and as a result, they make more contributions to the deliberations in the House. As each MP represents a specific constituency, he/she feels more responsible as members can be called upon to give an account of what is happening by constituents. This accountability fosters a spirit of responsibility and representativeness. Another notable change has been the attitude of male MP's towards female MP's and women's issues. As is customarily the practice male MP's showed the attitude that women could not say much that was sensible, and this cry about oppression of women was all hot air. I am glad to say that now female MP's are accorded the same respect as other MP's and nearly the whole House listens seriously when issues concerning women are discussed. After all, these problems are also national problems as they affect nearly $\frac{1}{2}$ the population. Now female and male MP's interact amicably and there is less aggression on the part of the males, who seem to go on the defensive when women's issues are discussed. Our task, as female MP's is to show that we want to work together on the same footing, as partners in development. Actually female MP's have more responsibilities than their male counterparts: first as women who feel strongly with women and children, and as ordinary MP's catering for males, females and children. It is a challenge and as female MP's it is a challenge we are willing to take. I therefore call upon women from all walks of life to use us to the maximum, and to co-operate and unite with us to raise the consciousness and the economic, social and political status of women.



...as a voter

This short summary is too late for the 1985 general election, but readers who want a guide can keep it for the next elections. Some of the election rules might change, but the principles are always useful.

Every adult citizen has a right to vote, although the law applies some restrictions similar to those in most other countries. People who are certified insane or detainees who are in jail for more than 6 months are excluded. People can be banned from voting for a period if they are found guilty of electoral irregularities or are expelled from the Assembly or Senate because they are found guilty of any offence. In Zimbabwean law 'adult' means everyone over 18 years of age.

If you are to exercise your right to vote, you must register as a voter. Those who regulate the elections must have some way of telling who is entitled to vote so that the elections can be organised in an orderly manner: with accurate lists of voters, constituencies can be delineated which contain roughly equal numbers of people will vote at each. The lists also help them to check on who has voted, to prevent anyone voting more than once.

Registering voters was a heavy task for government officials and for the voters this year, because

government's records of citizens are not yet as complete as in many countries. For example, our last census may have missed a number of people altogether, so when voter registration started, government could not be sure how many people there are in the country, let alone know how many of them would be entitled to vote. We can hope that when national registration is complete and everyone has a card, jobs like compiling voters rolls will be a lot simpler. So it was reasonable that anyone wanting to register as a voter had either produce a national registration card, or show proof that she/he had applied for one.

Even if a system is found for registering voters automatically, without the voter needing to do anything, the voters still have a right to check that the voters' roll is complete. When the government announced this year that registration had been completed and people were welcome to inspect the rolls, very few people took this opportunity. In future elections, you might be excluded from voting if your name is not on the roll: this happens in most countries. Therefore it is important to check that you have not been left off by mistake.

Every voter who is old enough may stand for election to parliament. In most countries the minimum age for a member of parliament is somewhat higher than the minimum voting age. Here, candidates for the House of Assembly must be 21, and for the Senate they must be 30 years of age, except for the reserved white seats where they must be 40. It is reasonable that a candidate is usually asked to pay a deposit and show that a certain number of people support him or her before he/she is allowed to register as a candidate.

In a multi-party system, each party should be given equal opportunity to campaign for votes. Sometimes the way a party chooses its candidates is not very democratic, but the voters can still

choose on the election day between the candidates offering themselves. If we go over to a one-party system it will be more important to ensure that the party selects candidates in a way that reflects the will of the people. An important question to ask will be: who chooses the candidates; the local party members, or the Central Committee?


In the election, the best way to ensure that voting is free is a secret ballot. It works like this:

At the polling station, voters report first to the supervising officials who check the voter is on the roll. This year, because registration was possibly not complete, people were allowed to vote if they could prove that they were citizens and lived in the constituency where they wanted to vote. Some people who work and lodge in the cities but had registered somewhere else were able to vote in town. This made checking that voters did not vote twice or more difficult, so voters' hands were marked with an indelible ink that shows up in ultraviolet light. Then, by asking you to put your hand under an UV lamp the officials could see whether you had already voted or not.

When the officials are satisfied that you are allowed to vote, they give you a ballot paper. You take this to the polling booth and mark your choice on it, fold it and put it in the ballot box. There should be no other mark on the paper, so when votes are counted no one can tell which paper is yours. There are other methods of voting which are not secret, or not so secret as this. People may be asked to vote by a show of hands, or by lining up behind the candidate of their choice, or there might be a separate ballot box for each party, or even a separate polling booth. If other people can know how someone has voted, he/she might be afraid to vote as he/she really wants. It doesn't matter if their fear is ill-founded; they are still acting out of fear, and are not free.

Our people value the secret ballot very highly, and this probably explains the very high proportion of spoiled papers in some constituencies. The number was especially high where ZANU(PF) and ZANU-Sithole (called simply ZANU on the ballot papers) both put up candidates. Presumably, confused voters did not want to let anyone know how they wanted to vote by asking for help, but you can ask without telling what your choice is. For example, if there are these two names on the ballot paper: A. Mandebvu (ZANU-PF) B. Mandenga (ZANU), you do not need to ask: "Where do I mark to vote for Mugabe's man?"; you can say: "Which of these is for Mugabe and which is for Sithole?" or since each party's symbol is marked against the candidate's name, you could ask what each symbol means. The choice you make between them is still your secret.

Your vote is your share in the power to rule the country. The safeguards of its freedom and secrecy are necessary for you to use your power as you believe is best.



S. A.: THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Robert Zulu

The masses in South Africa are increasingly making the country ungovernable and apartheid unworkable. In the black townships apartheid structures have collapsed.

There are visible effects of the growth of



organised popular power. Many black police have been forced to flee from the townships to seek refuge in white towns and suburbs. Organised resistance of the people has forced the enemy to bring in the South African Defence Force to help do the work of the police. Every popular campaign expressing the aspirations of the people for freedom and social justice, whether peaceful or otherwise has met with police violence combined with administrative legal measures. The situation in South Africa can best be described as a crisis situation which will only be solved by the dismantling of apartheid and the bestowal of power into the hands of the majority. Central to that democracy is the principle of one man, one vote, in a unitary South Africa.

Indeed the darkness that had shrouded that country for so long is now lit by flames that are drawing the oppressed nearer to their cherished goal. We can with confidence declare that what we are witnessing is the beginning of the end of apartheid. For their part the racists in South Africa have distinguished themselves as a clique of diehard racists. They have responded to that situation by imposing martial law. Botha's statement of the 15th August 1985 systematically rejected each and every measure whose implementation could have been construed by some as possibly contributing to the solution of the South African problem. He prescribed the same solution which produced the crisis prevailing in South Africa. He reiterated his determination to continue with his Bantustan system and his determination to keep Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners in jail. He promised more brutal repression, boasting of the might of his fascist army. He wanted to give the impression of a dictator, very much in control of the situation. Bishop Desmond Tutu, the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize-winner, correctly described his attitude as being that of

a politician seeking votes at a time when the country is heading for disaster. Botha's speech shattered all illusions that apartheid can reform itself.

Even his supporters, notably the United States of America, were taken aback by the height of arrogance displayed by the regime. Although America and other Botha supporters are not going to put veritable pressure on the regime, they are themselves under pressure from their own people, and are therefore beginning to make utterances so as to be seen to be opposing apartheid. To the people of South Africa, Botha's statement emphasised one important aspect, i.e. the Botha regime has to be destroyed as a matter of greatest urgency.

If Botha had intended to intimidate the struggling masses, the reverse is true today. Botha's statement seemed to have made the oppressed even more determined in their resolve to overthrow the regime and gain their independence. Responding to Botha's statement the President of the African National Congress, Cde Oliver Tambo, declared:

"The imperatives of the apartheid system compel the Pretoria regime to march blindly to its own downfall, leaving a scorched earth in its trail. We who are its victims are ready to make any and all sacrifices to achieve justice and a democracy based on the principle of one man, one vote, in a unitary South Africa".

Shortly before Botha's statement, the incarcerated leader of the African National Congress, Cde Nelson Mandela, stated in an interview 'that the time for National Convention is past. What can only be discussed is the transference of power to the majority'.

The oppressed have also, through action, demonstrated their will to be free. Thousands gathered in a march to demand the release of the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. The regime responded to this by arresting the organisers of the march including the Rev. Allen Boesak, President of the World Alliance of Churches. This action sparked off international condemnation of the regime.

In another incident, the regime and the bosses harassed, intimidated and even expelled about 5,000 workers in an attempt to curb a mineworkers strike which would have involved about 90,000 workers. Although the National Union of Mineworkers which was organising the strike had to suspend the strike because of harassment, the strike did go on for about two days.

The blacks seem determined to engulf the whole country in turmoil. They argue that for too long they have been the ones who have to bury. Addressing an estimated crowd of 35,000 people converging to bury 18 victims of police brutality during the unrest in Duncan village in the Eastern Cape, the President of the border region of the United Democratic Front (UDF), Cde Steve Tshwete said, *"The oppressors should not bluff themselves into thinking that unrest will be confined to the townships. It will not be long before fires are burning in Oxford Street in East London and other cities (white areas)"*.

Informed sources say the African National Congress, the Liberation Movement waging armed struggle against the regime is seriously considering inflicting heavy casualties among enemy personnel. The sources go on to say that the ANC argues that the enemy has not made any distinction between what is referred to as "hard" and "soft" targets. The same arguments were repeated by the ANC President Cde Tambo in a press interview after the organisation's historic Consultative Conference in Zambia, when he pointed out that the regime has been attacking soft targets, like the raid in Botswana and other places in Southern Africa.

The organisation's head of international department, Cde Johnny Makhathini, is quoted in the Herald, during his brief visit to Zimbabwe, as having stated, *"The time has come when we will no longer avoid interesting targets because one, two or three civilians may be caught up in the*


crossfire." All this is an indication that the crisis that is now engulfing South Africa will result in a lot of bloodshed. The crisis that the regime is experiencing is not only a political crisis.

The regime is experiencing serious economic crisis. South Africa's short-term foreign debt payments are estimated at 12 billion dollars in cash reserves and an estimated 1985 balance of payments surplus of 2.5 billion dollars.



The economic crisis has set the Governor of South Africa's Central Bank scurrying throughout the Western world to seek aid in an attempt to salvage the ailing economy.

Clearly the situation spells doom for South African racists; it heralds the beginning of a new era of independence for the oppressed masses. However, this should not lead to illusions that the South African regime is about to collapse. With the kind of support that it receives from the western world, it can still sustain its abhorred system of apartheid. But the writing is clearly on the wall. Like the former racist premier, John Vorster, declared after the 1976 uprisings *"what we are witnessing is the whirlwind that comes before the storm"*.



THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF BINGA AND THE OVERDEVELOPMENT OF AID

part II

Trish Swift &
Martin de Graaf

Development in Binga: Confusion and Promises

What have been the responses from the Government and non-Government agencies to the many problems in Binga? It is hard to get a clear picture of all development programs in the district, as so many agencies have some kind of involvement. And such involvement varies from (broken) promises, real activities and plans, to failed projects and initiatives which are never followed up. In fact it seems that confusion, lack of co-ordination and, above all, lack of local control are characteristic for the development situation in this area. So the following sketch of Governmental and non-Governmental programs might be incomplete and will be out of date as soon as this is printed. We welcome any update, correction or comment.


Government programs:

The Government of Zimbabwe has never formulated anything like a comprehensive or integrated development approach to the problems of the district. However various ministries offer their services, as they are doing in other districts of the country but usually without having special or extra facilities to work in such a difficult environment.

So for example, the Ministry of Transport is involved in the construction and maintenance of state roads. In spite of what many think, the people of Binga have more kilometers of state roads than is the

case in some other districts. While the people of Buhera have only 1.6 km of state road per 1 000 inhabitants, the Binga people have 7.5! This compares even more favourably with a district like Hurungwe (0.8 km!) and still very well with the neighbouring district of Gokwe (2.3 km). Of course, we should realize that many of these roads are in poor condition and that the main urban and commercial centres are very far from where most people live. Hwange is the nearest town with a reasonable range of supplies and facilities, and this is between 200 and 300 km away from the majority of people. Bulawayo is between 300 and 500 km. But Binga is getting serious attention from this Ministry and by 1987 Binga town will be connected by tar road. Whether this solves the problems of the many people who live far from the roads or who have goods to transport is another matter. Obviously roads without regular bus services and without any services to move goods or animals don't solve the needs for transport and communication of the majority of the people.

A similar picture of official attention which is not always the proper or complete answer to people's problems can be observed in the field of education. The district now has 52 primary schools, most in extremely poor condition and 2 secondary schools. The Ministry of Education's ultimate goal is to have 125 primary and 9 secondary schools! It should be noted however that 60% of the teachers are untrained, many are from outside of the district (that is not Tonga-speakers) and that the curriculum is not at all relevant to the real demands of life in Binga. In spite of the brave attempts of a number of teachers to start some "education with production", the thrust of teaching is still towards academically oriented education, preparing for non-existent jobs in the formal sector and transferring knowledge-without-skills. The sun-burned schoolgardens might unintentionally prove to the children how futile it is to grow vegetables when even basic inputs such as water and fencing are not available...



The two hospitals and a quickly growing number of clinics have contributed to short-term improvements in people's health. Infant mortality has gone down greatly, thanks to the primary health care programme carried out with considerable support from Save the Children (UK). However the supply of medicines at the hospitals and clinics leaves very much to be desired, as does the manpower situation. There is no ambulance in the district and only through private initiative (e.g. Dr. Messman, a missionary doctor who uses his plane for visiting outlying stations) do many Tongans have some access to medical care. And of course, the official facilities do not really help in a situation where structural malnutrition, lack of (clean) water and sanitation and the many (preventable) diseases like malaria, bilharzia and diarrhoea account for so many unnecessary deaths. As long as these causes are largely rejected the Government's solutions might not be effective.

The same could be said in regard to the Ministry of Agriculture: Agritex is present and, in its own way, active. The number of extension workers has expanded considerably over the last few years to at least 20 staff. But quantity will not be the answer if the special circumstances and unique social and ecological problems are not being taken as

the starting point. The usual Master Farmers' course, run by Agritex might not be very appropriate when the first priority should be food-production. Agritex is mainly involved in the delivery of its standard package of extension services and has not adjusted its approach much to this district. Traditional food-crops are relatively neglected in contrast to cash crops and food-crops needing expensive inputs. Again most Agritex workers are Ndebele and only very few speak Tonga. Agritex reluctance to be involved in projects on a more flexible basis doesn't help to strengthen confidence and encourage joint learning between a community or farmers group and the extension worker. And, as in the case with all ministries, the District Council cannot really control the work of Agritex, which to some extent functions as an empire on its own.

This seems to be even more true of the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs. One would expect such a ministry to be especially active in such a district and to take local control and participation very seriously. However, reportedly the District Officer generally visits the district on the monthly pay-day and otherwise seems to spend most of his time in Dete, where he resides. In line with this, the Ministry seems to do most of its planning at the

Harare level. A fishermen's co-operative programme was parachuted into the district without any serious consultation of or control by the District Council. Fishermen were pushed into a co-operative structure without them ever having asked for it and nets and boats were issued irrespective of local circumstances and regulations (leading to confiscation and fining by another Ministry) More recently an FAO-funded programme intended to support women's food-production was initiated through the efforts of a number of high-powered international consultants flying in and out of the district, but never seriously consulting the involved women. No wonder until recently FAO-functionaries have been the main "beneficiaries" of this so-called "Peoples Participation Project".

As yet the Ministry appears to have been unable to support and initiate strong and viable community groups and projects, nor does it seem to have been very successful in organising a massive adult literacy program in the local language. Hardly any training is being done. And at one time \$500, collected by local women and entrusted to a Ministry's official disappeared.

Summarizing, one could say that is not so much the quantity of Government intervention in the district which is to be blamed for the disappointing lack of progress, it seems to be more a matter of quality, direction and lack of peoples' participation. The various Ministries run their usual programmes basically controlled by structures outside of the district and not very responsive to local groups and bodies. The lack of co-ordination and intergration is not an unusual thing in Zimbabwe, but especially damaging in a difficult and fragile environment like Binga. Every now and then Central Government introduces systems for improvement of co-ordination, but, as in the case of VIDCOs and WADCOs, the very way of imposing such systems from outside might make them ineffective for channeling participation and giving control to local people, particularly where no local budget is made available. The District

Administrator has, as one of his many tasks, responsibility for co-ordination of the many ministries at district level. But the high turnover at this post (at least five different administrators since Independence!), the very limited resources at his disposal and the strong position of largely autonomous ministries make his job very difficult. The present D.A. is clearly a very dedicated and competent man, but overburdened (he had to assume responsibility for Hwange District as well for half a year) and caught in the middle of sometimes contradictory pressures. It is made even more difficult by the highly sensitive political situation in Matebeleland. Perhaps the approach of the Ministry of Local Government (to which the District Administrator belongs) is best illustrated in speech earlier this year on the "politics of Development", given by the then Provincial Administrator of Matebeleland North to the District Councillors of Binga. In this speech he told them "...to behave as a chameleon and to change with times. The council office was not a ZAPU office but a development office... Do not canvass for Nkomo's party as others were doing. In Lupane and Tsholotsho they did and people were dying. The Prime Minister said it daily that after the elections there would be a one-party state.....Those who did not change with the time will experience what those in Noah's time experienced. People were told to get into the ark, but they refused. The floods came and they drowned. Government wanted development, politics for development.." The speaker, though himself a Tonga and ZANU(PF) candidate in the election might not have realized how poignant the image of the flood could be for the (predominantly ZAPU) councillors: they experienced one already some 25 years ago... The relationship between the council and Provincial Government did not improve after the elections when the councillors were detained (without charges) for almost two weeks, when, the same official now Provincial Governor, felt that not enough

Tonga people had come to the opening of the new Council Offices by him.

The District Council

This brings us to another channel for development: the District Council. In the official picture the Council is supposed to direct development, to take the major political decisions at this level and, most of all, to express the views and needs of the people. To start with the last task: some years ago the Council adopted an extremely ambitious development plan, wherein many demands were presented to Central Government. These varied from 100 village health workers, tarred roads to Karoi and Kamativi (total 545 km!), permanent training centres in all rural service points, tractors, a district telephone system, 19 clinics and 119 new primary schools. The plan did not really explain how the people of Binga would contribute or how they would control this. Neither did the plan explain why Binga should have so many more resources than similar districts. The plan became another landmark in the history of high expectations and deep disappointments of the Tonga People. Meanwhile the Council has hardly been able to control the development activities in the district. The 21 councillors, live scattered over the district, have minimal education, very limited access to relevant information and hardly the means to carry out their tasks. Every three months or so, they come to Binga to attend endless meetings over endless agendas, prepared by the District Administrator, Council Chairman and Executive Officer. The political situation affects the Council's work (e.g. the last election of councillors was delayed repeatedly), internal conflicts and suspicion can undermine the atmosphere (e.g. through rumours about the embezzlement of funds for the construction of the new high school) and, most important: the Council doesn't really have control over most of its own budget. Most Government money reaching Binga is earmarked

for specific purposes (such as clinics, schools, etc.) and the Council can only freely decide about a bit of the income from local licenses, sale of hides and skins, etc. The really meaningful amounts of money for development purposes are controlled by Ministries or non-Government Organizations and the Council doesn't have the staff, means of power to direct those organisations.

Non-Government Organisations

To the best of our knowledge the following non-Government Organizations (NGOs) have some kind of involvement in the district: Zimbabwe-based organisations ORAP, CADEC Hlekweni and Christian care and international organisations such as FAO, Africare, International Voluntary Services (IVS), Danish Volunteer Service (DVS), OED (Austrian Volunteer Service), Redd Barna, (The Norwegian Save the Children Organisation NOVIB and Save the Children-UK. We also know of considerable University involvement through the Sebungwe research project, as well some of the local churches, notably the Catholic Church. The list might not be complete: even the project-officer working for the Council to help in co-ordinating all those NGOs has trouble keeping track of all outside intervention and discovers new ones every now and then.. We can see considerable differences in the way the various agencies operate. Some organisations take care to work closely with the local authorities and aim at strengthening the District Council's control over development in the district. e.g. Save the Children Fund-UK has, in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the District Council established an innovative primary health care program, including local training of Village Health Workers, support to school gardens and support to the local agricultural training centre and so on. Locally based personnel liaises directly with the District authorities and ensure adjustment of the programme to the situation. However it is not clear what will happen once Save the Children Fund-UK will withdraw its very

considerable material and manpower support. Likewise IVS is helping the Council to establish and run the agricultural training centre: the Council is ultimately responsible for the project (and has devoted a relatively large amount of its resources to the centre), councillors select the trainees from the communities, and any revenue from the centre's vegetable garden will return to the Council. IVS-personnel and their local counterparts are answerable to the Council. However, it's not clear how the Council can continue this program once outside support comes to an end. This also applies to the DVS project officer who works directly under the Council while the OED-supplied secondary school teachers at Kariangwe, are fully part of the local structure.

A rather different situation exists in such programs as those sponsored by FAO and Africare. The very considerable sums of money in these programs (the FAO program has to spend half a million dollars) flow from the respective international agencies, to some extent through the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs, to local staff or local beneficiaries. No meaningful Council approval is required or asked for. Collaboration with ministries sometimes happens, sometimes doesn't happen. This can lead to a situation where the Department of National Parks and Wildlife is arresting fishermen who have been issued with nets by another ministry, or where the recommendations of a technical ministry on the ecology of fishing in the lake are not taken into account...



Similar confusion and conflicts have occurred in relation to a project supported by Zimbabwe Trust and Christian Care, where different people or institutions had conflicting claims on boats which were brought into the district. Some boats have been confiscated, some boats disappeared and the final outcome of this project is not at all what was originally intended.

But even working closely with the District Authorities doesn't always guarantee a successful project. For example: NOVIB offered extensive assistance for a Food for Work Program in 1983, to fight the consequences of the Drought. A lorry and immense quantities of food (amounting to \$183 000) were made available to the Council, on the condition that the food would be distributed only to those who worked in community projects. Apart from serious logistical problems, the project suffered from unpopularity because the food could only be eaten on the spot: by those who had worked. The hungry children or other relatives at home were excluded, which created bitter resentment. And when the NOVIB-representatives at that time left the country considerable sums remained unspent, while raised expectations (especially on NOVIB support for small-scale irrigation schemes) were never met. Currently NOVIB is considering more effective and developmental support to the district council and Binga farmers. Local reluctance in regard to well-intended aid is not as strange as it might appear at first glance: when Barna recently approached the council with the offer to build 12 Community Centres, not many councillors were keen to accept that offer and the accompanying condition to mobilize the local communities to provide labour and sand. Again: no local people had been seriously consulted, so they would probably perceive this as another outside demand. Expectations were also raised by other visitors to Binga: the French Government sponsored research and preparation of a goat-breeding programme to take place in Chungu. An expert spent a great deal of

time in discussions with local goat-owners and the Council and gave the impression that much help would be forthcoming to improve the situation with funds, marketing advice and training. The expert left on holiday, mid 1983, and that is the last that was heard of the project.... Similar stories can be told about USAID suggesting an interest in solar-powered pumps, the EEC raising expectations regarding drinking water supplies and irrigation, the Danish Government proposing a feasibility study on the fishing industry. Or, to mention local organisations: Christian Care starting a very interesting project at Manjolo without continuing support and supervision, or raising expectations in regard to the provision of donkeys (in itself an excellent idea!), but running into trouble with some Councillors and the then District Administrator.

There could be more examples given of the problems that many NGO-supported projects have run into, but the general tendencies might be clear: confusion, lack of co-ordination, problematic relationships with ministries or the Council, initiatives for which no long-term support was secured, and most of all: lack of local control.

CONCLUSIONS


It seems that development in Binga will remain a difficult if not impossible process as long as projects are undertaken in isolation from the people themselves. At this stage the people in Binga have not had the opportunity to develop their own structures to express their needs and to control the activities from outside agencies, whether governmental or private. The relatively isolated groups of Tonga people find themselves scattered over the district, dependent on the willingness of officials to inform and consult them and without any real influence over the resources which those officials sometimes bring. Decision-making in development programs is usually in the hands of officials, often based in Harare or even outside of the country. No participatory structures

have evolved over the last few years which might enable the Tonga people to decide about their own development. It is too early to assess the impact of WADCOS and VIDCOS, but the top-down strategy of introducing these structures and the heavy hand of Government people in running them are not encouraging signs. Some elements might be crucial in further efforts for the development of the district.

Above all the understanding of the fact that real development can only be the development of people, which based upon the real and unique situation of the people in Binga, should lead to a more comprehensive and realistic strategy. Such an approach should encourage and support.

- (1) a concept which cuts through the technical divisions between ministries, the incidental specialisations of NGOs and the ups and downs of international aid.
- (2) a definition of development and change which makes sense to the people involved, instead of a projection of technical and political aspects of organisations which have their base outside of the district.
- (3) the evolution of groups, associations or some other system of real community representation which would reflect the social realities of the Tonga people and the special difficulties and opportunities in the district.

Such structures should be in command of development projects at the community level. Of course this would imply real decentralisation of decision-making and, for any activities, a much smaller scale of operation. But only when the people themselves have real control over resources and their own development, will such development be appropriate to their situation and will last beyond the short-lived support by an external agency. These concepts require another approach to planning: real respect for what people think and want, more sensitivity to local constraints less emphasis on administration and (part) political issues, more real collaboration and co-ordination between NGOs and Government, a longer time perspective and special resources controlled by the people themselves.



THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS IN AFRICA

by Kempton Makamure

The historical process in post-colonial Africa has thrown up a number of serious political and social problems that 'independence' has not solved. In the economic field, the African economic conditions reflect a growing impoverishment and destitution of the peasantry and the working classes. This economic malaise is measured by the fact that hunger and a general unavailability of basic items of livelihood is the pathetic and perennial condition of the long suffering African masses. In the social sphere, Africa has seen a speedy social differentiation along and corresponding to the further development of capitalist relations of production locally together with dependence of these relations upon the international capitalist system centred in Western Europe, Japan and the USA. This is what is generally described as the phenomenon of neo-colonialism. It was pioneered by the USA and its essence was classically described by the Indian patriot, Jawaharlal Nehru in 1933 as follows:

"This devious method is called economic imperialism. It does not show on geographical maps. A country, judged from geographical manuals or an atlas, may appear to be free and independent. But if you delve somewhat deeper, you discover that it is being held in the vice of another country or, to be more exact, of its bankers and big businessmen. This in-

visible empire is ruled by the United States of America."

The neo-colonial nature of African statehood (what others call 'flag independence') has ensured that the real operative bourgeois class in Africa is the foreign international bourgeoisie of the transitional corporations such as LONRHO, Unilever, Union Carbide, etc. The national bourgeoisie who have emerged and exist in some African countries do not control the commanding heights of their countries' economies in the manner that the Indian national bourgeoisie do in India. The African national bourgeoisie is, therefore, in the main, marginal to the national economy. The social class that has emerged as politically significant is the petty-bourgeoisie, comprising the bureaucracy, the professional intelligentsia, the military top-brass and the comprador elements. The material basis for the emergence of this class and for its domination of the local state apparatus and its politics, is to be found precisely in the original fact of neo-colonialism. The African petty-bourgeoisie are hopelessly dependent for their material and social situation upon western imperialism and make the nations they lead compete ruthlessly with each other for special favours from imperialists in the USA, Britain, Federal Germany, France and Japan. While the imperialists compete for the lucrative markets of their goods and other services, they, at the same time, sometimes combine like a pack of lions to loot their African victims.

The social and political conditions of neo-colonialism are sustained by a special form of state system - the surrogate state. This is derived and grew from the colonial state system left behind to 'African management' by the departing colonial administrators. This is why it is based upon a bureaucratic bourgeois administration.

The neo-colonial state system of

post-independence Africa has, however, developed to be something more. It is now a state that expresses the general will and interests of the alliance of the international bourgeoisie and the local African petty-bourgeois elite. It is for this reason that problems associated with the systems and forms of government in Africa should not be seen simply as and generally made out to be merely 'African' problems. The African political problems today are the natural product of the crisis of a state form based upon the class alliance of the local African petty-bourgeois and comprador bourgeois elite and international monopoly capitalists. From this we must advance the enquiry further and pinpoint what in practice and concrete terms characterises this form of state. A careful and honest reading of the political map of reactionary Africa (i.e. excluding the socialist orientated people's democratic republics of Angola, Mozambique and, recently, Ethiopia) yields the following general characteristics:

1. A political leadership and a civil service that is alienated from African workers and peasants but which invariably always acts and speaks 'in the name of the people'. The leadership is largely drawn from the technical and professional petty-bourgeoisie.
2. Undemocratic constitutions founded on reactionary nationalism and resting upon institutions in which the people are managed and controlled as an unconscious mass, without any possibilities of people's participation in management of state affairs.
3. Political parties of either the populist and opportunist kind or those of the reactionary nationalist variety. Populist opportunist parties normally operate on the platform of pan-Africanist slogans and seek to hide their links with imperialism wherever possible. The parties of reactionary nation-

alism, on the other hand, openly operate with the backing of imperialism and are hostile to mass interests, in particular, to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

4. Military dictatorships. These are to be found in those states of Africa where the petty-bourgeois ruling class in a crisis, being unable to rule effectively due to their anarchic looting of the national economy or to unbridled corruption and sometimes due to their inability to contain the internal contradictions arising within the ranks of their own class.
5. Crude methods of political control. The lack of popular accountability in many cases leads inevitably to the development of vicious methods of dealing with popular opposition. Such methods find their highest expression in the institution of the 'Death Squads', whose task is to kidnap, kill and torture patriotic democrats, including those of the liberal school. The 'Death Squad' is a desperate of the neo-colonial state developed and nurtured by imperialism to assist and preserve neo-colonial fascism. It was fashioned by US imperialism in Latin America; the US used it and made it one of the major props of the bloody and torturous Shah regime in Iran. Its introduction into Africa was dramatically demonstrated by the murders of Tom Mboya and John Kariuki in Kenya. Death Squads are made up of hired state thugs or assassins.

The five aspects, therefore, characterise the general main features of the state forms in post-colonial, neo-colonial Africa. It is precisely these features which explain why these political systems cannot resolve the current crisis of mass poverty and degradation in Africa. They were never designed and meant to benefit the workers and the peasantry of these countries. While the main anti-

colonial slogan of the continent-wide independence struggle was: 'Africa for Africans!', neo-colonial independence edited this slogan to: 'Africa to Africans for Europeans!'


The general political and economic crisis in Africa has, at the ideological level, led to the advancement of a variety of explanations and suggestions to cure the crisis. More recently, some African intellectuals have been advancing and advocating in varying tongues the introduction of 'democracy' as the answer to the economic and political crisis. It is this question of 'democracy' and the African crisis that needs to be examined more carefully. A correct understanding of the nature and form of the democratic struggle is a key factor to the handling and prosecution of that struggle. African revolutionaries are, therefore, duty bound to pose this question concretely and unambiguously throughout the whole course of the struggle. Thus, while it is an encouraging thing that the slogan for the democratic organisation of African political systems is being increasingly raised in various intellectual circles on the continent, it is, however, absolutely necessary to clarify and concretise this call for democracy.

The first fact to identify is that ideological representatives of the various classes suffering from the current economic and political crisis in Africa are all clamouring for democracy; but they are, it ought to be realised, not talking of the same thing. For example, some sections of the petty-bourgeoisie in Tanzania are advocating for a multi-party system and an open economy not because they wish to benefit through 'democracy' the popular masses of Tanzania. They do so because the tyranny of personal rule within the present Tanzania state system fails to resolve (as the multi-party western democracies do) the internal contradictions within the ruling class of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and prevent sections of this class from enjoying an

equal chance at individual capitalist accumulation. Therefore, the so-called demand for democracy is none other than a simple demand for an open system of capitalist accumulation in Tanzania. In Kenya, on the other hand, some sections of the petty-bourgeoisie are dissenting from a ruling class of compradors who are running and have gone to the other extreme of managing the country entirely in the interest of international capitalists and ruthlessly suppressing opposition from any quarter. In Zambia, dissident petty-bourgeois elements are disenchanted with a system where the management of the economy has led to chronic shortages of consumer goods and where the personal rule of the leader does not allow for a flexible change of direction to resolve the problems of the middle-class in the economy. In Zimbabwe, petty-bourgeois nationalists leading the opposition parties are opposing a proposed One-party system of government not on principles, but simply on the calculation that they will have no chance under the One-Party system of gaining personal power. They are scared of what petty-bourgeois One-Party systems in other African states have done to opposition leaders. Thus, all in all, in such countries like Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, the clamour for 'democracy' amongst sections of the petty and comprador bourgeois elite is not for a people's democracy but for bourgeois democracy which will not bestow any benefits in political and economic terms to the peasantry, the semi-proletarians and the proletarian classes in these countries. But why should it not be sufficient for the African people to clamour for 'democracy' in general where they suffer military rule or the personal rule of their leaders in One-Party neo-colonial states? Why should it not be correct revolutionary strategy for African revolutionaries today to support the establishment of bourgeois democracy as a step forward towards the struggle for socialism?

This article will be continued

THE DISABLED CHILD



In every Zimbabwean tradition a child is a most welcome and valued being. For that matter there are ceremonies at every milestone of the child's development stages, right from the time parents get married, the woman becomes pregnant, at birth weaning, and marriage again. These are periods when parents with blessings for both themselves and the pre-natal or post-natal one.

However this cycle is often disturbed when to their horror parents find that the child they have been so enthusiastically waiting for is a handicapped one. How come and why? These are always questions not answered. The couple begins to feel guilty of something they cannot explain, not even understand and sometimes they feel it is a curse from God, for a misdeed they cannot even remember. Some people feel so ashamed that they go to the extent of committing suicide, since they cannot face the entire reality of life with the handicapped child. In such a case parents will be considering the physical qualities of a child, and accompanying these considerations is an endless stream of questions. Will the child become self-reliant, and if so, how? Another idea is that the child will not contribute to the domestic needs of the family.

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN OF THE PAST:

In the past, the handicapped child received three alternative types of treatment: (a) Where it received a very sympathetic attitude, it was literally hidden in houses where social stimulation and communication were non-existent; (b) it faced a very hostile attitude in every conceivable way and (c) some people went to the extent of killing the handicapped child by drowning it.

HANDICAPPED CHILDREN OF TODAY:

The Jairos Jiri Association has done a tremendous job in helping the handicapped children. This Association has built centres in major towns where handicapped people can live doing some kind of work which enables them sometimes to earn money. They are taught to grow vegetables and mend shoes, take courses in carpentry and participate in various other income generating activities. Although there are other charity organizations which help the handicapped. The association is well known for the role it plays. There has also been a noticeable change in attitudes towards the handicapped. They are beginning to be accepted in society as any other children. They now get enrolled in formal schools provided the distance they walk is not detrimental to their health.

Parents have the obligation to see that their children do well in society. For a child to be self-reliant is what every parent aspires when he or she struggles to educate the child. Handicapped children are not socially useless - they can at least learn to be self-reliant if they are given opportunities to do so.

K. P. MARE

WHAT IF.....?

- an alternative strategy (and it's not too late yet).

The election results make the country look as if it is divided into one-party provinces. This is not entirely accurate, but even if it was, reconciliation is still possible.

Most of the comrades who fought for independence were not fighting for Cde. Mugabe or for Dr. Nkomo; they were fighting for a socialist Zimbabwe. There are many members of the two main parties who agree on what they mean by socialism, although this may not be the ideology of some opportunists within each party. The time has come for the country to move toward socialism, and this needs the cooperation of all dedicated socialists, whatever their present or past party affiliations.

We should be aiming to form one party of all socialists. This party would include the majority of members of ZANU (PF) and of PF-ZAPU, but some could not be included: Those who do not share socialist ideals must be left out, and leaders who are not acceptable to the people, or who antagonise a large minority, should be encouraged to step down.

ZANU (PF) as the largest party and the clear leader, is strong enough to make the first concessions to show their goodwill. They missed a chance in the elections; some of their members who failed to win their chosen constituencies could have been dropped. They do not have the support of the people, on which a political career depends. If this had been done, ZANU (PF) could much more easily ask any other party who wanted to join them later to drop leaders who do not agree to a merger.

This may sound like 'what might have been', but there are still other ways of working for unity by cooperation.

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