



# PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION

COMMITTEES FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION

MARCH 1970

ONE SHILLING



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## SURVEY I THE ARAB SUMMIT AND THE "PEACEFUL" SETTLEMENT

*"What was amazing at the summit was that Arab higher strategy was not brought in for discussion. Nor did the conference even touch on defining the goal of unified Arab action. What was discussed was vague slogans, while exact calculations of Arab strength politically, militarily and economically were absent."*

That was what Haikal, editor of the semi-official Egyptian newspaper 'Al-Ahram', said about the ill fated Arab Summit conference held in Rabat in December. Does anyone ever expect the reactionary Arab regimes, led by Saudi Arabia, to take an active role in the struggle? Surely Egypt, leading the "progressive" petit-bourgeois regimes, should know better! Or was the conference another attempt to hide the inability of the Arab petit-bourgeois regimes to lead a protracted people's war against imperialism and Zionism?

The reports about the conference indicate that it failed because a number of Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, refused to commit themselves to the war effort of the "confrontation countries". In an attempt to outbid Egypt, they demanded that the latter stopped seeking a political solution to the problem, which they knew Egypt could not do. At that point Nasser walked out of the meeting. However, as yet neither Egypt nor any other country has come out with an explanation of the failure of the conference, which even failed to issue the customary communique about Arab unity, etc. Is it not the right of the Arab masses to know what happened?

The inability of the petit-bourgeois regimes to confront imperialism and Zionism is still manifested in their quest for a so-called peaceful settlement. The American plan for a settlement was published on the eve of the Summit conference. It entailed separate settlements for Sinai and the West Bank, a "united Jerusalem", a phased resettlement of the refugees, and mutual recognition of sovereignty. Egypt refused the plan, not in principle but because it treated occupied Arab lands separately. However, it is not ruled out as a basis for negotiation.

Jordan seems to accept the American plan and its Foreign Minister announced at the end of January that Jordan would be ready to accept some form of international control over Jerusalem — yet another concession which agrees with the American plan. (The Libyan Times; 1.2.70).

The defeated Arab regimes are still seeking a "face-saving" settlement to compensate for their failure. There are reports now that they are even seeking a face-saving de-escalation of the fighting.

The increasing intensity of the fighting across the Suez Canal and the bombing raids deep into Egypt have demonstrated even more strikingly the technological superiority of Israel over the conventional, and newly rebuilt, Arab armies. They have also demonstrated the unyielding will of the Egyptian people. It is time the people were armed; an act the regimes have proved incapable of carrying out.

The demands by al-Fateh and the Popular Front that the Arab regimes should arm the people, made on February 7th, were timely. They should help, if followed up by the sort of analysis made so far by the Democratic Front of the class nature of those regimes, expose to the masses the inability of those regimes to carry out a people's war.

## II THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

The failure of the Summit conference, the inability of the Arab armies to repel the Israeli attacks, and the resulting trap which the defeated Arab regimes find themselves in, open the way to developments which will not necessarily be in the interest of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples. Such developments could be new attempts to contain the Resistance Movement paving the way to mutual agreements on a political settlement. With this in view, the resistance movement is faced with the following tasks:

1. The formation of a national liberation front which includes all the patriotic guerrilla organizations.
2. The drawing up of a common political and military programme to face up to the threat of liquidation.
3. The carrying out of daily and intensive political education of the masses to expose all the stands taken by the Arab regimes which are contrary to right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Events have proved the bankruptcy of the "non-interference in Arab affairs" policy accepted by some of the guerrilla organisations. A spokesman for al-Fateh said in Amman (on the occasion of al-Fateh's fifth anniversary):

*"If these [ Arab] countries have so far relied on our patience and silence, let them remember that this will not last long and that we are reviewing our policy of avoiding side clashes, before it is too late."* (Free Palestine, January 1970)

The Democratic Front has been exposing to the Palestinian masses the bankruptcy of the policy of "non-interference", an exposure emerging from the analysis of the relationship between the Palestinian national struggle against the imperialist-backed Zionist state and the Arab struggle against imperialism and its allies: Zionism on one side and the reactionary Arab classes on the other.

Militarily, the Palestinian guerrillas, despite the not very favourable geographical features of Palestine, have increased and improved their operations. In the last month of 1969, 800 operations were carried out by the guerrilla organizations members of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command, the majority by al-Fateh.

However, the road to liberation will be very long. The political and military organization of the masses for a protracted people's war cannot be achieved overnight. Only when the Palestinian revolution has achieved its Arab depth; when the relationship between the two struggles mentioned above develops into a joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction on all fronts – only then will the revolution start achieving its aim of liberation.

On January 1st, 1970, al-Fateh started its sixth year of struggle. On February 22nd, the Democratic Front will start its second year of struggle. Comradely greetings!

THE STRUGGLE GOES ON!

Please send all your comments, suggestions and DONATIONS to:

C.S.P.R.,  
c/o Third World Solidarity Group,  
Manchester University Union,  
Oxford Road,  
MANCHESTER 13.

## LEBANON — A BACKGROUND

1. Any attempt to describe the situation in the Middle East must start with the fact that all the Arab states there were created and demarcated by the two great imperialist powers of the period succeeding the first world war, namely France and Great Britain. But, whereas this division had an aspect of 'reality', — i.e. the countries then divided had a measure of internal autonomy, economically, and even, an inheritance from the Turkish regime, politically, as in the case of Iraq and Syria; the situation is different in Lebanon. For there France, quite consciously, welded together a seemingly impossible amalgam of communities, giving it an autonomy which soon became transformed into a political independence, thus cutting it completely from the greater community of Arab Syria to which it originally belonged. What, wondered various bemused Arabs, were the wily occidental gentlemen after?
2. What France had in mind was to create an area for French influence which would not be subject to the convulsions that were then, and were still more strongly later, to shake the rest of the Arab east. The entity thus created was so designed that its function as a gateway to the exploitation of the Arab east would neither be externally nor internally imperilled. This was the origin of Lebanon as an entity. But the decline of French predominance as an imperialist power, and the occupation of Palestine, thus the closure to the Arab east of the great port of Haifa, together with the unstable political situation in Syria, soon made Lebanon the only gateway to the Arab east, and not only for the French but for Western capitalism in general. Thus the period of the Lebanese 'boom' coincides with, and is almost directly the result of the occupation of Palestine and the insecurity of Syria as a foothold for Western imperialism in its quest for the economic exploitation of the Middle East.
3. For this was the very purpose of Lebanon: economic growth in the role of the middleman which precludes the normal results of such a growth, i.e. homogenisation of the various sections of society — the emergence of the bourgeois 'citizen', and the nationalist, anti-imperialist struggles attendant on that. This purpose was fulfilled by the institutionalisation of the sectarian 'confessionalist' way of life.

The mainstay of Lebanese economy is the 'trade and banking sector' and the industries and services that derive from it and augment it. The function of this sector is to act as the mediator between Western capitalism and the Arab east. It serves as exporter to the West of capital from the oil states (to invest there), and it re-exports goods to the Arab hinterland. To be secure in doing so it must isolate the country politically from the rest of the Arab area with its turbulence and aspirations, i.e. to make sure that such aspirations and solidarity with struggles elsewhere in the Arab world should be rendered harmless to it in Lebanon. The system of 'confessionalism', alluded to above, serves towards this end:

4. 'Confessionalism' (religious sectarianism): The refusal of the Lebanese political system to recognise the 'citizen' as such — the 'homogenisation' that goes with the predominance of the capitalist market — is institutionalised in the National Pact of 1945, which insures the perpetuation of this division according to religious sect, by giving it political and governmental expression. Thus, as a Sunnite Moslem from Beirut, you would be represented by a Sunnite Moslem from Beirut in Parliament, the President of the Republic must be a Christian Maronite (not any old christian), the President of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite Moslem, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem etc., down to the unwritten law governing all appointments, allocating them in comparable fashion.
5. The effect of the above is that any movement towards solidarity with the struggle against imperialism in the Arab world soon finds itself strangled within the system: — i.e. that demands for such solidarity antagonises other communities (here mainly the Maronite christian, leading the broader christian community) and would mean nothing less than the destruction of the privilege, if not worse, for the leadership of that community, of that 'other half' of the country. Therefore the 'nationalist' leadership that the system tolerates and augments is that which accepts the system and contents itself with verbal support for the struggles elsewhere in the Arab world — at the same time protesting that Lebanon, a small and fragile country cannot do more. These are the heroes who think that their 'brother' Palestinians sometimes go too far, who are all for Palestine on condition that it does not harm that 'haven of peace' — Lebanon. They are not only part of the system but its leaders — their hands, reek with the blood of Palestinians and Lebanese, murdered so that



prosperity, wrung from the toil of the Arab masses in the East, continues. These are men like Karami, the Prime Minister, Janbulatt, the present Minister of the Interior, and other such professional wailers at the great funeral of Palestine.

6. Up to very recently the system of 'confessionalism', the cover and mainstay of the compradore went unchallenged in the Lebanese left. The communist party still exhorts the country merely to rid itself of the rule of 'cliques of millionaires' and place the 'national bourgeoisie' at the helm, so that all ills are solved, (including "disgraceful confessionalism"). But such reformist views hide the fallacy of all reformism which sees a cause in what is merely a symptom — the destruction of confessionalism and the progress towards taking an active part in the Arab struggle against Zionism and Imperialism would mean nothing less than the destruction of the very base of present Lebanese economy — but this, the C.P. does not even dare to dream of. It, together with the leadership which is pleased to call itself Pro-Palestine, as it once called itself Nasserist, have repeatedly pleaded with the Palestinians to respect the 'special position of Lebanon', the reality of its confessionalist structure which makes it necessary for it to stand by and watch the struggle.

7. The presence of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon had a shattering effect on the credibility of its system for its people. The movement, so alien to the Lebanese system so that the latter could not contain it, and so dangerous to its very existence that it could not ignore it, has exposed the leaders of the 'Nationalist camp' before their people, showing clearly that ultimately the leadership of the system, however different in words, is one in interests and deeds. The masses, so long deluded and mystified by this false 'nationalist' leadership suddenly found itself alone in the street — its erstwhile leadership in the ministries and Parliament, relying on police and army terror to protect itself and with it, the whole of the corrupt exploitative set up. At last the polarisation, so long slurred over by religious sectarianism is beginning to appear. On one side stand the people, slowly emerging from the medieval ideology of sectarianism, discovering that their demands for solidarity and active participation in the struggle against Zionism and imperialism cannot be fulfilled within the system. On the other side erstwhile leaders, their complicity, so long theoretical, so long a matter for the revolutionary left alone, demonstrated completely.

Nor could the system, with its army and police smash the new force of the Palestinians when it tried to do so. This was partly due to the resolution and tenacity of the Palestinians and their leadership, and the support of the Lebanese masses; and partly because of the fatal weakness of comprador when the tide begins to turn — its dependence on the Arab area, its parasitical rather than domineering nature. So when Syria closed the doors to all Lebanese trade, the system had to suspend hostilities and seek a compromise — but how long will it be before the system feels strong enough to attempt this again? For, indeed, not only the Arab masses, the Palestinian armed struggle at their vanguard, are fighting for their lives — Imperialism and its allies are too.

## CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN LEBANON

The following chronology outlines the main events that took place in Lebanon starting from the bloody clashes of April 23rd — 24th 1969 which accompanied the first onslaught of the Lebanese establishment on the Palestinian Guerrillas until the signing of the now famous, Cairo agreement. The text of the Cairo agreement was not published at the time.

Since then, there have been many minor clashes between the establishment and the Fidayeen over interpretations of the Cairo agreement and the situation is still tense. Certainly a third round will take place and perhaps a fourth and a fifth. The contradiction between the Lebanese ruling class and the guerrillas can only be solved by the overthrow of one of them. Thus, the progressive forces of the Lebanon are the objective ally of the Guerrillas.

"Palestinian Revolution" will keep up with the Lebanese events in its next issue as well.

23 April 69: The state of emergency is declared in Lebanon, after violent clashes between the security forces and Palestinians in Saida, Beirut and Bar Elias. These incidents cause 12 deaths.

24 April 69: In the course of a demonstration of refugees in Tyr, a woman is killed and three people are wounded. The head of the government, M. Rachid Karamé, announces his resignation to Parliament, at the end of a seven hour stormy sitting.

5 & 6 May 69: Clashes between the army and members of El Saika cause 4 deaths and many wounded.

20 May 69: M. Rachid Karamé is asked to form a new government.

1 June 69: The President of the Republic M. Helou stresses, in a message to the nation, the limits of assistance to the Palestinians.

24 June 69: In an official statement, President Helou declares himself in favour of the expulsion of the Commandos from Lebanon.

11 August 69: The Israeli Air Force bombed the bases of Palestinian commandos on Mount Hermon, in Lebanon. Reports from Beirut state that 4 civilians died and 3 were wounded in the course of the raid.

12 August 69: Lebanon calls for a meeting of the Security Council.

16 August 69: U Thant suggests sending U.N. observers on both sides of the common border between Israel and Lebanon.

26 August 69: Refugees attack a patrol of the Lebanese gendarmerie at Nahr El Bared camp near Tripoli. One gendarme is fatally wounded, and according to a statement by a spokesman of the PFLP "scores of Palestinians" are killed.

4 September 69: A group of Israeli commandos blow up some houses in a Lebanese village which had supposedly been used as a base by Palestinians.

5 September 69: The Israeli Air Force bombs Lebanese border villages, on Mount Hermon, which were supposed to have sheltered fedayeen.

8 September 69: The Lebanese Government and the Palestinian Organisations start negotiations.

4 October 69: Israeli troops make a reprisal raid in Lebanese territory.

12 October 69: A U.S. statement on the 'territorial integrity' of Lebanon is published in Beirut.

15 October 69: A Bazooka damages the PLO office in Beirut.

18 October 69: Clashes between Palestinian commandos and the Lebanese army take place near Majdal-Selm, in the South East of Lebanon (one soldier and one fedayeen are killed; 3 soldiers and 2 civilians wounded).

After new clashes between El Fatah and the Lebanese army, the PLO denounces 'manoeuvres aimed at the liquidation of the Palestinians'.

22 October 69: The Syrian authorities close the Lebanese Syrian border. New clashes occur in the Majdal-Selm area (1 soldier and 4 fedayeen are killed, 2 soldiers and 6 fedayeen are wounded).

23 October 69: The Lebanese border post at Masnaa is attacked by 50 fedayeen; the army counter-attacks with armoured cars; one Lebanese is wounded. 2 other Lebanese posts are attacked in the north at the same time. The fedayeen take 24 hostages with them, they will be freed soon after.

25 October 69: The village Yanta is occupied by the fedayeen; Yanta is at 15 km of the Syrian-Lebanese border. The Gendarmerie at Syr Deniye, near Tripoli is attacked by armed men. At Beirut a man is seriously wounded by a bullet as he walks past a Palestinian refugee camp.



26 October 69: Large-scale attacks take place in the Deir El Achayer area (near the central border) and near Rachaya-Ayha in the South East.

27 October 69: A group of PFLP Commandos throw bazookas in one of the oil tanks of the Tapline at Zahrani, near Saida.

28 October 69: New attack on Rachaya. The Gendarmerie post is occupied at Machta-Al-Hassan in North East Lebanon. A mortar attack takes place at Ayha against a Lebanese army post.

29 October 69: At Rachaya, the Lebanese forces who hold the village and the fort are attacked with rockets; three attempts are defeated.

30 October 69: There are clashes near Ayha. At the entrance of Saida (40 km south of Beirut) a military barrage is attacked. One soldier is seriously wounded. In the course of the morning the military airport of Koleyat, near Tripoli) is attacked with mortars and rockets. One soldier is wounded.

1 November 69: There is another attack on the border post of Masnaa.

2 November 69: There is no noticeable incident on the whole of Lebanese territory. The cease fire agreement is signed in Cairo.

## INTERVIEW

Like the first, the second onslaught of the Lebanese bourgeoisie on the Palestinian Guerrillas generated a great upsurge among the Lebanese and Palestinian masses. Strikes, demonstrations, street battles and armed attacks took place throughout the country. In the north, Tripoli (Lebanon's second major city) and many other towns and villages fell at the hands of the Lebanese insurgents and the police had to withdraw after shooting many demonstrators.

The following is an interview with the leader of the insurrection in the north. The text was published in Le Monde on 29th October 1969.

"Get this straight Abu Jaafar. The first theft or misdemeanour you come across, you execute the culprit. This is an order and I take full responsibility for it. Otherwise it would be hell. As you know, people here are hungry and they might be tempted to loot."

We are in Syr-Deniyek, the "capital of the Lebanese insurrection", at 30 km north of Tripoli, 900 m altitude, this town has 12,000 inhabitants. Farouk Mokaddem the leader of the movement has established his headquarters in the police station of this resort in the Akkar. He makes considerable use of the state telephone to give instructions to his men, to whom he has delegated full powers to insure the safety of the area. The leader of the guerrillas is visibly overburdened, amazed by the ease with which the handful of men he leads has taken over a part of North Lebanon.

"Only 3 of us took over this town which, admittedly, was guarded by only 7 policemen. We told them to put their papers away in the metal cabinets and to take the keys home with them. Their arms were put away in the home of a town notable. Then, the movement spread like wild fire: the police stations in all the villages fell one after the other like ripe fruit.

– All this happened with the help of Syria?

– You must be joking! We know the Syrians well, and haven't forgotten the Golan. They delivered the heights to the Israeli forces. Since the June 67 defeat, the Arab regimes are dead. If they still stand, it is by the now sovereign will of the Palestinian guerrillas. They are the base of a new Arab civilisation and the authentic spokesmen of the explosion among the young generations in all the Arab countries. I am one of those shamed, and I am trying to rehabilitate myself by joining Fatah.

Farouk Mokaddem who has chosen the war name Abu Nafezz rules this weird world which, according to him, represents one quarter of the Lebanese population.

“We aren't interested in destroying the integrity of the Lebanese territory. On the contrary, we want to turn this country into a self-respecting nation and not just playboyland.

– You have, however, challenged the established authorities.

– The Lebanese who are important are the poor whom I represent, those who sell their furniture to go and fight in the Golan. The Lebanon ‘de papa’ is dead, and so are all the Arab regimes that the June war has unmasked.

– What are your demands?

– We are the real ‘fighters in the dark’, we will make the Arab revolution for the benefit of others. We are the equivalent of the willaya guerrillas in Algeria, who gave their lives to clear the path to power for those who were waiting at the borders.

– In fact, you want the Palestinians to get more from Lebanon than they get from Syria.

– Let everyone look after his own business. The Syrians are free to ask their leaders for accounts. Personally, I believe that Lebanon has a part to play in the fight for the liberation of Palestine. If the army doesn't want to fight, all we are asking them to do is to let us take over at the front. What's criminal about that? There is no need to worry about the possibility of an Israeli invasion, we are wise enough to ‘dose’ our action.

Our immediate demands are clear: 1. The dismissal of the present army leadership and the trial of those responsible for the killings in Tripoli during the last few days; 2. The formation of a government which officially recognises total freedom of action for the fedayeen.

## THE DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION

### The Democratic Popular Front's Document\*

“Towards a Democratic Solution to the Palestine Problem” which entails the establishment of a Palestinian state free of national, religious or class oppression, has been translated into Hebrew and distributed in Israel by an Israeli left-wing, anti-Zionist organization.

\* This document is available, among other documents by the D.F., from C.S.P.R. in the form of a pamphlet.

## ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

### INTRODUCTION

This article is an attempt to study the socio-economic impact of Zionist colonisation on the Palestinian people. The economic, political and ideological sources of Zionism and its relationship to Imperialism will not be discussed. However it should be emphasized from the start that:

1. Britain wanted to control Palestine because of the latter's geographical position – on the east bank of the Suez Canal and on the route to British possessions in the East.
2. The ultimate aim of the Zionist movement was the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration, which promised that the British Government would 'facilitate' the 'establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people', was issued in November 1917, two weeks after the start of the British campaign launched from Egypt to occupy Syria, including Palestine.

At that time Palestine had a population of about 700,000 – over 90 per cent were Arabs. It was mainly an agricultural country, with some handicrafts and primitive industries based on agriculture, particularly the manufacture of soap from olive oil.

### THE LAND AND THE EVICTION OF PEASANTS

Central to an understanding of the subsequent history of Palestine is a knowledge of the distribution of land. This section will briefly discuss that distribution.

More than half the cultivable land (according to A. Granott in his book 'The Land System in Palestine' from which most of the information about the land will be taken) in the second decade of this century was owned by 250 landowning families. Those landowners had acquired their property in the second half of the last century and were of two kinds:

- a) Landowners who had no connection with Palestine and lived in towns like Beirut. They acquired large areas of land through their relationship with the Ottoman Sultan.
- b) Families resident in the towns of Palestine (Effendis as they were called) who, exploiting the indebtedness of the peasant because of the then prevailing tax system, acquired large areas of land by offering the peasants loans at very high interests which they could not repay and eventually had to sell their land to the Effendi.

When the Zionists started their intensive efforts to colonize Palestine after World War I, they approached the absentee landowners who, after the fall of the Ottoman Sultan, were more than ready to sell their vast possessions. Between 1920 and 1927, 80% of the land bought by the Zionists was from absentee landlords, 15% from large resident landlords. These figures became 45% and 36% for 1928-32 and 15% and 63% for 1933-36, respectively. By 1936 the absentee landlords had sold most of their land.

However, what happened to the tenants of this newly acquired land about whom nothing had been said? They were simply evicted – by force if necessary. It is practically impossible to get an estimate of the number of tenants evicted as a result of such land sales, and the reason for this is the collaboration between the Zionists and the landowners to conceal their numbers, as the following passage will show:

*'A vendor would come along and make a contract for sale and purchase with the Jews. We would know nothing of this until 4, 5 or 6 months later when the transaction would come to the office. We then instructed the Director Officer to report on the tenants. He would go out to the village and in some cases he would find that the whole population had evacuated the village already.'* (Director of Lands to the Commission on the 1929 Disturbances, Report, p.115)

However, it can be safely said that tens of thousands of tenants were evicted. As an illustration, in a series of deals with one landowning family, the Sursock, resident in Beirut, the Zionists bought about 50,000 acres of land in which there were twenty two villages with about 9,000 inhabitants.

They all were evicted and their villages no longer existed. (ibid, pg. 117-8; and Christopher Sykes, 'Cross Roads to Israel', N.E.L. 1967, pg. 102).

To come back to the distribution of land, according to a survey made in 1936 by the Director of Lands, after most of the land owned by landowners living abroad had been sold to the Zionists, the distribution of land among Arabs was as follows:

Of total landowners:

1 in 10,000 owned 19 per cent of land or 12,000 acres each;

1 in 500 owned 8 per cent of land or 1,500 acres each;

8 per cent owned 36 per cent of land or 50 acres each;

92 per cent owned 37 per cent of land or 7 acres each  
(Number of acres refers to average holdings)

In addition to this, 35 per cent of Arab population engaged in agriculture owned no land and worked on other landowners' lands.

### ZIONISM IN THE TOWNS

British occupation of Palestine made large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine possible. However, the determining factor for the number of Jews leaving Europe for Palestine was the intensity of anti-Semitism in Europe. Thus, as a result of the rise of anti-Semitism in Poland 34,000 Jews entered Palestine in 1925. This number was not to be reached again until after the rise of Hitler to power. Between 1932 and 1935, 140,000 Jews entered Palestine, thus doubling the number of Jews already there. Most of the immigrants went to the large towns.

At the same time there was another influx into the towns — that of Arab peasants, most of whom being tenants who had been evicted from the land. There was also a substantial number of poor peasants — many of whom owned less than the average for their category of 7 acres. (30 acres was estimated as the area giving a living) and had to work on the rich landowners' land. They, too, suffered from the sale of land to the Zionists by rich landowners:

To get an idea of the drift from the countryside to the towns, some figures may be useful:

The Muslim population of Haifa (most peasants were Muslims) rose from 9,000 in 1922 to 20,000 in 1931 and to 35,000 in 1942, a four fold increase in 20 years. That of Jaffa from 20,000 in 1922 to 35,000 in 1931 and 50,000 in 1942 (Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1943 and 45).

Jewish immigration into Palestine meant an inflow of capital most of which was invested in buying land, building houses and setting up factories. The policy of the Zionists, faithfully executed by the Histadruth, the Federation of Jewish Workers, was not to employ any Arab labour in Jewish factories, farms or on building sites. John Marlowe in his book "Rebellion in Palestine" comments on this:

*"To the Histadruth the Arabs were primarily a source of cheap labour from which the Jewish worker must be protected. The Jewish Capitalist, intent on keeping his costs down, must be made to employ expensive Jewish labour rather than cheap Arab labour and in order to make him do this the spirits of nationalism must be invoked." He then naively adds, "The Histadruth was the one Jewish organisation that could have changed the nationalist, the almost imperialist, orientation of official Jewish policy; instead it has in the course of time become the backbone of Zionist nationalism, even more persistent on the exclusion of Arabs from Jewish economic life." (p.87)*

The attitude of Zionist officials can be summed up in the following quotation:

*"(If) . . . the Jew creates openings for employment and immediately Arabs flock in and fill them up, then that would defeat its own ends and the Jewish development process would after a time automatically stop." (Jewish Agency official to the Palestine Royal Commission 1937)*

Thus the ultimate aim of creating a Zionist state was to override all other considerations.

However, Jewish capitalist economy in Palestine was to have its own rules as well. In the time of boom, when there would be a shortage of Jewish labour, Arab labour would be employed in

Jewish enterprises, mainly on building sites and in farms. As soon as boom conditions relaxed Arab labour would be kicked out of Jewish enterprises. Thus in 1931 Arab unemployment, i.e. those employed for less than three days a week, reached over 35,000 or 20% of Arab wage earners. (Report to League of Nations 1931 and 34). This was probably an underestimate as well. Some strong capitalist enterprises, like the Cement factory and the Electricity company which were the corner stones of the Zionist structure in Palestine, however did continue employing Arab labour because they were so vital to the Zionist structure that they were strong enough to resist pressure from the Histadruth to evict Arab labour - which was much cheaper as the following table will show:

#### DAILY WAGES IN MILS\*

	Arab labour	Jewish Labour
Agricultural labourers	80 - 120	150 - 220
Unskilled Bdg "	100 - 150	180 - 250
Cement factory	150	320

\* 1000 mils = £1

The above table refers to a longer working day for the Arab labourer (about 10 hours) than the Jewish labourer (8 hours).

The rise of Nazism had a decisive effect on the history of Palestine. As mentioned above, about 170,000 Jews entered Palestine between 1932 and 1935. What is more important is that many of them had money to invest. Between 1920 and 1932 the increase in authorised share capital (including old companies and newly founded ones) was about £6 million. Between 1933 and 1935, the figure was £11 million. It was estimated that in 1934 £10 million entered Palestine, and at least twice that figure in 1935. That period saw a boom in building industries and land sales and in setting up new industries - all these reaching a climax in the first half of 1935.

There was a shortage of Jewish labour, and hence Arab labour was employed, mainly on building sites, and Arab unemployment fell to 3,000 (or 1.4% of Arab wage earners) in 1934.

#### THE IMPACT ON ARAB ECONOMY

On the Arab side we see a dual process taking place: on the one hand Arab handicraft and industries were being ruined due to Jewish competition and lack of government protection. The export of soap - an industry centred in Nablus and Jaffa - fell from £230,000 in 1927 to £117,000 in 1931 and to £78,000 in 1935. This decline is reflected in the population of Nablus, of whom a large portion depended on the soap industry: Nablus had a population of 16,000 in 1922, 17,000 in 1931 and 21,000 in 1942, i.e. there was, taking into account the high natural rate of increase in population, a net drift of population from Nablus which was and remained predominantly Arab. Nablus was to become one of the centres of action against the British.

On the other hand we see the large land owners, resident in the towns selling parts of their land to the Zionists and reinvesting their money mainly in citrus groves. Thus an Arab agricultural capitalistic sector was emerging in Palestine - most of the labour in orange groves was wage labour. The export of citrus (most production went into exports and half of which was Arab) went up from 1.5 million cases, worth £450,000 in 1925/6 to 2.5 million cases, worth £750,000, in 1930/31 and to 15 million cases worth £4.4 million, in 1938/39. The bulk of investment, then, came in the period 32-35, as a result of land sales to the Zionists.

Both processes led to an increasing number of Arab labourers (ex-peasants) depending on

- a) Jewish economy
- b) Citrus season

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Before British occupation the class leading the movement for national liberation from the Turks were the landowners resident in the towns of Palestine, represented by their members who had had some education in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, or Paris. That class allied itself to Britain in the struggle against Turkey, with the understanding that they would achieve independence, within Syria.



after World War I. Amin Hussein, who became Mufti of Palestine in 1921, for example, toured the towns and villages of Palestine in 1917 asking the people to enlist in the units fighting with the British Army. When the war ended the British and French were intent on staying on. The British had issued the Balfour Declaration. For the landowners to break their alliance with Britain, with no alternative big power to ally themselves to, meant resorting to the masses: the poor peasants and tenants, which they clearly could not do. Furthermore, at the beginning of British occupation, those landowners were not getting much benefit from the sales of land to the Zionists (see about the land above). So the campaign was concentrated against Zionism and the Balfour Declaration. A series of delegations, conferences, peaceful demonstrations and token strikes were arranged by the leaders in an attempt to pressurise Britain into abandoning the Balfour Declaration and granting them some form of self-rule. The myth of the 'Bolshevik Jew' was played up as a threat to both Britain and the Arabs.

The policy of appeasing Britain lasted until 1931. That period also saw several spontaneous uprisings in 1920, 21 and 29, all being the result of the eviction of tenants and the worsening condition of the poor peasants. The peasant, seeing Jewish settlements being set up on land he used to cultivate, and, on going to the towns, finding no employment there while the Jews could work in jobs barred to him, and no one exposing to him the role played by British imperialism in what was happening to him, would concentrate his attacks against the Jews and Jewish settlements. All those uprisings were crushed by the British.

The early thirties saw a new development. The traditional leaders were becoming frustrated because of the unwillingness of Britain to grant them self rule or to stop the Zionist threat. The years 1930, 31 and 32 were years of bad economic conditions and low Jewish immigration. All those factors combined to result in the rise of an anti-British campaign. The Istiqlal (Independence) Party was formed. This campaign culminated in the 1933 uprising when demonstrations against the British were attacked by the police. Riots spread to most towns and as a result 26 Arabs were killed and 187 wounded. One British policeman was killed and 26 injured. Not one Jew was injured in those riots.

However, the economic boom from end of 1933 until the second half of 1935 saw to it that the political activity — except for rivalries within the leading class — died out. The rich were busy looking after their new investments resulting from increasing land sales to the Zionists. The poor worker got the chance of one or two days' employment on building sites or in the expanding orange groves.

### THE GENERAL STRIKE AND THE 1936-39 REBELLION

The economic boom discussed above came to a sudden and unexpected end in the second half of 1935 as a result of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the fear that the fighting would spread to Palestine. The details of the resulting slump are not important here. However, its results are very significant. The 'Apartheid-like' society emerging in the boom conditions came to an end. The Histadruth went into action. Arab workers were being kicked out of Jewish enterprises, and despite these efforts there was high Jewish unemployment reaching 10 per cent by the end of 1935 and was still going up. On the Arab side it was estimated that 75 per cent of the labour force had an employment of two days or less.

The end of the citrus season in March 1936 saw thousands of Arab workers (over 30,000 were employed in the citrus groves in the picking season) seeking employment in the towns, particularly Jaffa; but there were no jobs. Business in Jaffa port, which had been declining over the previous few years after the opening of Haifa harbour, was very low. The situation in Jaffa was explosive.

Among the poor (ex-peasants) in Haifa, poor pious men, of peasant origin, had been preaching armed struggle against Zionism AND British Imperialism. British interests could be clearly seen in Haifa: the vast investment in building the harbour for transit trade, the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, through which oil started flowing in 1934, and the British army used Haifa as a strategic point. Thus the 'anti-Britishness' in Haifa was more of a spontaneous reaction to British presence there than to an understanding of the nature of British imperialism.

In October 1935 one of those poor pious men, al-Kassam, a legendary name now, and some of his followers moved to the countryside to work among the peasantry. All the members of that



group, except a few, were annihilated by the British in November of that year. Another group, probably including some of al-Kassam's men clashed with the Police in April 1936.

The news of the clash triggered off the explosive situation in Jaffa. Riots followed. The shops were closed and soon a strike was proclaimed. Committees were formed to organize and enforce the strike.

The traditional leaders were discussing at that time the formation of yet another delegation to go to London to discuss the issue of a Legislative Council. However, seeing events overtaking them, they postponed the discussion about the delegation and decided to ride on the tidal wave of the strike, which had spread to most towns, lead it and control it. The Arab Higher Committee (A.H.C.) was formed. They put forward the demands of an abandonment of the Balfour Declaration, an end to Jewish immigration and self-rule for Palestine . . . the same demands of 15 years earlier. The calling off of the strike was conditional on a stoppage of Jewish immigration. Britain did not accept such demands.

Unlike what had happened in Egypt and Syria, the strike in Palestine could not put enough pressure on Britain to make some concessions. In Palestine, unlike Egypt or Syria, there was an alternative economy which did not go on strike and kept the country going. The Zionist structure played, by simply being there, an important role against Palestinian efforts to achieve some form of independence – a role it was meant to play. In addition Haifa, which was not so badly affected by the slump, did not go on strike; neither did the government employees. Thus the two fields where Britain would have been affected most played no role in the strike.

The approach of the citrus season (the Arab share would be about half the £4 million expected from exports, most of which would go to a few families who provided the political leaders, as discussed above) forced the Arab Higher Committee to give in. Using the pretext of intervention by the Arab Kings, they called the strike off in October 1936, six months after its start and just in time for the citrus season which would start in November.

Meanwhile the countryside was in rebellion. By September 1936 the British had over 20,000 soldiers in Palestine. The poor people in the towns played an important role in the rebellion. As a result the whole of the old part of Jaffa, about 500 houses in which the poorest people lived, was demolished by the British Army in June 1936.

Events were running out of the hands of the A.H.C. They infiltrated men into the countryside to assume the leadership of the rebellion. The calling off of the strike led to a weakening of the rebellion in expectation of good developments promised by the intervention of the Arab Kings. The rebellion continued due to the work of the pious men from Haifa, but on a very small scale, throughout 1937. It started accelerating again as a result of the announcement of a plan to partition Palestine.

By the second half of 1938 most of the countryside was controlled by the rebels. The British had about 30,000 soldiers backed by the R.A.F. and about 11,000 armed policemen and thousands of armed Jewish auxiliary police.

By the end of 1938 thousands of Arabs had lost their lives. Exact numbers are not known and most of the casualties were inflicted by the R.A.F. up to 20 aircraft going into action in some battles, 5,000 houses were blown up by the British, including the whole of the old part of Jaffa, half of Jenin and the whole quarters in some towns and villages. 150 Arabs were executed and over 2,000 imprisoned. The British Army and the police lost 250 dead and 550 wounded.

The rebellion had withered away by the first few months of 1939. The main reason for its failure was that although by taking up arms the rebels were paving a new path for the struggle against British Imperialism and Zionism, ideologically they were dominated by the town, i.e. by the defeatism of the landowners. This was clearly reflected in their strategy which was no more than attempts to harass the British Army and the Zionist settlements, as if aiming at achieving concessions from Britain. As mentioned earlier their 'anti-Britishness' was more of a reaction to the British presence in Haifa than of an understanding of the nature of British Imperialism. This could have only been achieved by developing a revolutionary ideology, which they could not do, because of their objective conditions, and no one can blame them for that. The ideological domination of the

of the leading class was also reflected in the relationship of most of the rebel leaders with the peasantry: the peasants were supposed to support them, provide them with men and money and obey them; in return the peasants got nothing at a time the majority of them, as explained above, were suffering from the class exploitation of the landowners living in the towns.

The strike, with the damaging effect it had on sectors of the Arab economy, particularly the small traders, and the failure of the rebellion, with the ruinous effect it had on the peasantry; combined with the tremendous profits reaped by the Zionist economy during World War II and the emergence of the United States as the dominant imperialist power in the Middle East, thus making a Zionist break with Britain possible, paved the way to the establishment of the Zionist State of Israel in 1948. The process of eviction which had started in 1920, with the eviction of the tenants from the land, culminated in 1948 with the expulsion of about a million Palestinians from Jaffa, Haifa, Lydda, Ramle and hundreds of other towns and villages.

Dhufar — Arab Gulf

## LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN THE ARAB GULF

The armed liberation struggle waged in Dhufar against British (and U.S.) imperialism and its local representatives is almost unknown to the outside world — though for imperialism, the stakes are incredibly high, mostly in oil. Perhaps precisely for this reason, the so-called progressive regimes of the Arab world, whose revolutionary seal is at times ingrained in political opportunism, have done more than just ignore the struggle: they have closed the Front's offices and imposed a complete propaganda blockade, thus ensuring that most of the Arab people have never heard of Dhufar. Nevertheless, the Dhufar revolution has been raging since June 9th 1965, and by mid 1969 the rebels controlled two-thirds of the area's countryside and were rapidly expanding military operations as well as political agitation along the coast where British-officered mercenary troops include Pakistanis and Iranians. In August-September 1968, for example, the revolutionaries repeatedly attacked the British air base of Salalah — and with success.

Actually, Dhufar is only one part of the whole area now in revolt which extends along the coastline of the Arabian Peninsula from the South Yemen border to half way up the western coast of the Arab Gulf. It includes: 1) Coastal Oman, comprising the Emirates of the Trucial coast (Dubai, Al-Shariga, Abu-Dhabi, Ra's Al-Khaymah, Al-Fujayrah, Umm Al-Qaiwain and 'Ajman) and the Sultanate of Muscat; 2) the Omani hinterland, which is mostly made up of the city of Nazwa and the Green Mountain; 3) the Sheikdom of Qatar and the island of Bahrain; 4) Dhufar.

Dhufar is one of the least known parts of the world: it is situated in the middle of the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula, to the east of South Yemen and south of the vast Saudi Arabian desert known as the "Empty Quarter". It is isolated from the rest of the Arabian peninsula. The population of Dhufar is 300,000 and it is one of the richest parts of the area: in addition to oil, it claims vast areas of agricultural land, and has good fish and meat resources. The oil is exploited by International Petroleum, British Petroleum, Esso, Standard and Gulf Oil companies, as well as other smaller firms. One of these — John Mickim Co. — struck oil in 1967 in a new area but was forced to close down after successful sabotage activities by the guerrillas.

This apparent wealth has not benefited the people, who have been kept in ignorance and poverty. The only school in the area is in Muscat (there is not a single school in Dhufar itself) and it is reserved for the sons of the ruling families. There is no hospital and no social services. The only road is a strategic one leading to the base in Salala. Stone houses can be found along the coast, but in the mountainous regions farmers and shepherds live in mud huts, huts made of tree branches or caves. The only contact with modern technology has been with guns and paraffin candles.

Dhufar itself was colonised by Britain in 1876 and annexed to the Sultanate of Muscat as the Southwestern region. . . The Political system is one of the oldest in the world. The Sultanate is

theoretically independent i.e. as far as Britain is concerned it does not fall in the category of colony or mandate. In reality for all intents and purposes, politically and militarily, it is part of the British colonial system. It is connected to Britain by a "treaty of friendship, trade and navigation". The treaty was ratified by the Sultan of Muscat and Britain. The Sultan of Muscat first appeared on the political arena in the 18th century when, with the help of Britain, he seceded from the Imamate of Oman. Towards the end of the 19th Century, Britain was able to fully dominate the area, after having eliminated French influence. Hostility between the Sultans of Muscat and the Imams of Oman has continued and various imperialist powers have played on it. This was clearly manifested by the U.D.I. of Oman in 1955 under Imam Galib Ben Ali, supported by Saudi Arabia (representing U.S. interests). Oman was then involved in a conflict with Great Britain over the Buraimi Oasis. British forces moved in, occupied Buraimi, and bombed Nazwa and the Green Mountain into surrender. Several other rebellions under the Imam have suffered the same fate. Now the Imam lives in Saudi Arabia and plots with Britain against the revolutionaries of Dhufar.

Since then, the oppression of the sultan of Muscat has been extended to the Omani hinterland. No foreigner can enter the country legally, except British officials and oil men, and no native is allowed to leave the country. Since the start of the armed struggle, travel between cities in Dhufar has been banned; Salala, the capital (pop. 10,000) is surrounded with barbed wire. Brutal British force prevents the people from discovering the benefits of modern technology ranging from irrigation facilities to transistor radios. The present Sultan personally owns vast agricultural areas which are cultivated by an army of privately owned SLAVES. He has ruled the sultanate since 1932, but has not been seen for a number of years. The National liberation movement believe that they have killed him on 26th April 1966 when they attacked his palace. Britain never announced his death, maybe because it would imply having to choose a new sultan among the competitors in his family.

The Trucial Omani coast was conquered by Britain in 1820 and divided into seven tribal units in competition with each other. Now that Britain is leaving the area militarily it is regrouping them and Qatar and Bahrein in the so-called Arab Gulf Federation which will make U.S. takeover simpler, and allow for an apparently more neat domination.

The Liberation Front of Dhufar (LFD) was formed at the end of 1964 by revolutionaries from the area who had left the country secretly and acquired knowledge of the outside world, educated themselves and become politically conscious. They created various political organizations, notably the Dhufar branch of the Arab Nationalist movement (ANM) which had branches throughout the Arab Middle East, and the Free Soldier of Dhufar, and the Dhufar Benevolent Society. The triumph of the South Yemen revolution lent new impetus to the Dhufar struggle and the emergence of Marxist factions within the ANM throughout its sections in the Middle East imposed a number of internal changes, adjustments and re-orientations in the LFD. A Marxist-Leninist faction emerged to take over in the second conference of the LFD in September 1968; they elected a new command, drafted a new national charter and adopted the following resolutions:

1. To insist upon organised revolutionary armed struggle as the only way to overcome imperialism, the reactionaries, the bourgeoisie and feudalism.
2. To change the name of the LFD to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) and link the struggle in Dhufar with that of the peoples in the other parts of the occupied Arab Gulf.
3. The PFLOAG denounces the fake federation of the Arab Gulf Emirates and asserts that the only revolutionary and effective step towards achieving the unity of the Gulf is the unity of the Revolutionary popular forces.
4. The PFLOAG resolves to adopt scientific socialism as a theoretical guide for the struggle of the poor masses and as a scientific method of analysis.
5. The PFLOAG extends its full support to the Palestinian people represented by its armed vanguards.
6. The PFLOAG supports the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the struggle against world imperialism and bourgeois and feudal regimes, and denounces the racist regime in Rhodesia and racial discrimination in the U.S.

The launching of the PFLOAG is most important because it makes very clear the links between Dhufar and the rest of the area and the fact that the struggle has to spread to the rest of the Gulf if it is to be victorious. The armed struggle, under the leadership of the PFLOAG bases itself on two main points: 1) the revolutionary forces are the poor masses — peasants, workers, soldiers, and the revolutionary intellectuals; 2) the revolution aims at liberating the country from imperialism in all its forms (military, economical and political) and at the overthrow of the puppet regime in Muscat and the other Gulf States.

As we stated above, the Marxist-Leninist takeover at the second conference of the LFD and the launching of the PFLOAG was influenced by the emergence of Marxist factions within the ARAB Nationalist Movement (ANM) throughout the Arab world. The Dhufar branch of the ANM is only one of the many branches which declared their independence from the old organization and severed all ties with it. In Palestine, the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed; in Iraq, the Arab Socialist Movement; in Lebanon, the Lebanese Socialist Organization; in Saudi Arabia, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Peninsula; in the Yemen, the Yemen Revolutionary Democratic Party and in South Yemen, the left wing of the NLF which is now in power.

The following text is a Proclamation commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Dhufar revolution, issued by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf:

The toiling masses of the Arab Gulf are celebrating the fourth anniversary of the armed revolution which erupted in the Dhufar mountains on June 9th 1965, initiating a new epoch in the history of the Arab Gulf and constituting a landmark in the course of the Arab Revolution.

On this historic occasion, we stress once more the revolutionary potential of the masses of the Gulf in their struggle against British imperialism and its puppet regimes. We are more firm in our belief that armed struggle waged by the most oppressed and destitute classes of society for their right to life, under the guidance of a revolutionary theory, is the genuine historic path towards achieving the essential aims and aspirations of the masses. However, the fourth anniversary of the June 9th revolution comes at a time when the Arab Gulf and the Arab world at large are passing through a delicate phase of their history — a fact that imposes through analysis of all the developments and objective conditions around us.

The Arab Gulf is such an important strategic oil producing region of the world that world imperialism will not easily withdraw from it, but is bound by its interests to resist by force of arms any revolutionary initiative that threatens its economic and strategic interests. This is what drives U.S. imperialism to replace British imperialism — after the latter declared its intention to withdraw from the Arab Gulf by 1971 — both as economic exploiter and military power. Whether Britain is sincere about its withdrawal or not, the fact remains that it is executing American plans in the Arab Gulf in the same manner as the racist state of Israel executes those of American capitalism. This is the reality of the Anglo-U.S. plan to set up the Gulf Federation: an open manoeuvre which has been violently rejected by the masses despite the fact that it was preceded by a propaganda campaign with the participation of newspapers usually associated with the progressive Arab states\*

This Federation is but an imperialist front designed to consolidate centres of influence and deal severe blows to the national liberation movement. Its declared aim — to preserve the "Arabism" of the Gulf — is but false pretence. For how can world imperialism, the sponsor of this Federation, be keen on preserving the Arabism of the Gulf when it has plotted against that of Palestine and delivered the country to Zionism? The Arab world faces a common danger, the recent developments in Palestine and in the international sphere designed to liquidate the Palestine problem by forcing the implementation of the Security Council resolution (of November 22nd, 1967) and the recognition of the Israeli colonialist structure are but part of an overall plan to subjugate the Arab world to neo-imperialism. The breach through which the imperialists are infiltrating to fulfil their dreams is the incapacity of the Arab bourgeoisie to sustain a consistent anti-imperialist struggle, due to its need to defend and preserve its acquired privileges.

The defeat of June 5th 1967, has concretely proved the failure of the policies of the Arab regimes on both ideological and strategic levels. These policies have now become totally discredited in the eyes of the toiling masses. However, we should not simply dismiss them verbally or by

\* reference here is to the Nasserite press which supported the Gulf Federation. (translator's note)



bureaucratic decision, but rather try to understand the objective conditions which led to the emergence of the Palestine Liberation movement, and study the extensive debates among its various organisations and the rigorous self-criticism which finally enabled this movement to entrench itself amongst the Palestinian toiling masses, take the leadership of the Palestinian revolution and ensure its continuity and progress. The military defeat initiated debates within the ranks of the revolutionary forces in the Arab world as it did among those most directly hit by the imperialist Zionist aggression. Those forces submitted themselves to thorough self-criticism, and some petit-bourgeois organisations collapsed under the strain\*. This debate was bound to reach the Arab Gulf where the Dhufar revolution carried its own self-criticism and decided to extend its activities to all the areas of the Gulf, emphasizing that the victory of the Revolution essentially depends on the level of social consciousness achieved by the masses. A congress of all the Front's military and civilian organisation convened on September 1st 1968, to launch the **Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf** which adopted a political line in full accordance with the one formulated by the Arab toiling masses and their revolutionary organisations after the June defeat. In a revolutionary democratic atmosphere, the Front adopted an operational plan for armed struggle; and the toiling masses, guided by their infallible class instinct, identified with our politico-military platform comprising the following revolutionary tasks:

1. Extending the armed struggle against British imperialism to all other regions of the Arab Gulf.
2. Calling upon all the patriotic, anti-imperialist forces in the Gulf to rise against imperialism and reaction.
3. Raising the level of consciousness of the toiling masses on the basis of a comprehensive educational programme.
4. Organising the masses to defend their class interests.
5. Implementing a provisional agrarian reform to reclaim land in the liberated areas which now cover two-thirds of Dhufar's countryside.
6. Providing medical services to our citizens who have been suffering from all sorts of diseases all their lives yet have received no such services. The Front has effectively undertaken the task of organising the masses by establishing militia units; by putting into effect an all-out war against illiteracy; by forming Administrative committees to handle problems of everyday life, and by training women to perform their role as organizers and militants. The Front has established strong and effective ties with the revolutionary regime in South Yemen, and seeks to establish close relations with the progressive Arab regimes. A campaign to spread class consciousness on the basis of scientific socialism is under way, and has been meeting with great success amongst the impoverished masses which have come to consider scientific socialism as the sole guide for their glorious, historic, revolution.

The revolutionary platform points towards opening up a wide front against the oil interests of the British and American corporations. That is why world imperialism employs reactionary forces in Saudi Arabia and Iran to launch a full scale attack against the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf. Iran reasserted its fallacious claims over Bahrein which, in themselves, are not the final aim of either Iran or Imperialism, but a mere stepping stone to the other regions of the Gulf. The Oman/Imamate tool of British imperialism, has escalated its military operation against the bases of the Popular Army for Liberation\*<sup>2</sup> and the civilians, in addition to its constant intrusions into air space of the Popular Republic of South Yemen – the rearguard of Dhufar's Revolution. This is not the first onslaught of the Imamate of Oman, backed by imperialism and reaction. As early as 1956, the Imam of Oman and his gang tried to gain control over the Omani Revolution, left the country and established contact with the Socialist camp and the progressive Arab states, pretending to be the true representatives of the Omani people and its revolution. The fact is that their differences with the Sultan of Muscat were a mere reflection of the differences that arose between the British and American corporations over the oil fields of the Buraimi oasis. This led Saudi Arabia to adopt the Imam of Oman who received arms and ammunition which were to be later used by Saudi reaction against the Yemeni revolution of September 26th 1962. Then this gang of the Imam of Oman started plotting against the June 9th revolution in Dhufar, moved by its class hatred, its concern for its feudal interests and its desires to maintain a paternalistic religious hold

\* reference here is to the Arab Nationalist Movement. (translator's note)

\*2 The military wing of the PFLOAG (translator's note)

over the Omani people. This feudal clique lost any pretence of being "revolutionary" as it used to call itself – when the masses launched the revolution in Dhufar, outflanking the Imamate and uncovering all its shady plots. The Imamate, in return, started to cast doubts on the revolution and its chances of achieving victory. However, the objective laws which govern all social processes soon moved the Dhufar revolution into becoming the true expression of the aspirations of the toiling masses in the Arab Gulf and the surest hope of the progressive forces in the region which are presently engaged in frank and clear talks with the revolutionary cadres in the liberated areas of Dhufar's countryside.

The conspiracy of silence against the Dhufar Revolution and all attempts to suppress its political and social perspectives have failed in front of the heroic perseverance of the fighting masses. Echoes of our revolution have now reached the world. Our revolution has become a guide for the revolutionary forces in other parts of the Arab Gulf and in the Arab world at large. Alongside the Palestinian revolution which resists the artificial state of Israel, the Dhufar Revolution is a sure base of struggle against imperialist interests. The June 9th revolution is well aware that it is presently in a national liberation phase which requires the unity of action of all patriotic forces which have a stake in fighting imperialism and the reactionary forces allied to it. We therefore call upon all sincere forces to understand the crucial circumstances of the Arab Gulf region and to shoulder their historic responsibilities towards the masses.

#### PUBLICATIONS BY C.S.P.R.

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| 1. Background to the Middle East Conflict                                    | (March 1969)    |
| 2. Palestinian Revolution No. 1  | (May 1969)      |
| 3. Bibliography on the Palestinian Resistance                                | (October 1969)  |
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Zionist Colonization and the Palestinian People.