

The Jarring Mission

Richard
H. H. H.
1872

Introduction

This booklet outlines the work of the Jarring Mission as told in U Thant's reports to the Security Council and in other objective sources, including extracts from British newspapers. It gives the texts of the important documents and statements relevant to the problem of implementing the Security Council resolution of 22 November, 1967. Also included are passages from the speeches of the Leader of the Opposition and the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons debate of 24 March, 1969.

Chronology and Contents

		<i>Page</i>
1967		
22 Nov	Resolution 242 adopted unanimously	3
22 Dec	U Thant's first report	4
1968		
Jan-Dec	Further U Thant Reports	4-7
24 Mar	Karameh resolution	5
27 Apr- 2 May	Jerusalem Military parade resolution	5
21 May	Status of Jerusalem resolution	6
15 Dec	"Observer" leading article	8
1969		
2 Jan	The Soviet Plan	9-11
5 Jan	Israel rejects Soviet proposals	11
17 Jan	Four Power talks proposed	11
5 Feb	U.S. agrees to Four Power talks	12
March	Israel opposes Four Power talks	13
24 Mar	Commons Debate	13-17
9 April	Dr. Jarring suspends mission	19
10 April	King Hussein's Six Points	17
1 July	Four Power talks adjourned	19
3 July	Jerusalem's status—resolution reaffirmed	17-18
17 July	U.A.R. letter to Security Council	19-20
19 Sept	U Thant's Report to 24th General Assembly	20

THE RESOLUTION

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 242 (1967) on 22 November 1967. All 15 members of the Council* cast positive votes for the resolution. The resolution read as follows:—

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

* The Security Council members were Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Japan, Mali, Nigeria, USSR, United Kingdom, United States.

U THANT'S FIRST REPORTS

The Secretary-General promptly appointed Dr. Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, an experienced diplomatist and a talented linguist, as his Special Representative. After consultations in New York, Dr. Jarring established his headquarters in Nicosia, Cyprus on 10 December. Almost immediately, he went on his first round of visits—Beirut, Jerusalem, Amman, Cairo. On 22 December U Thant reported to the Security Council—

" . . . During each of these visits he met the Head of State and other high officials. Ambassador Jarring reports that in all the countries he visited he was received with the utmost courtesy and with expressions of willingness to co-operate with his mission. He further reports that all the Governments visited welcomed the prospect of his early return to continue the conversations. Ambassador Jarring also reports that each of the Governments visited agreed that the details of the conversations with him should be kept confidential . . . "

In the next three weeks or so Dr. Jarring visited Jerusalem four times, Cairo twice, Amman and Beirut once each. On 17 January 1968 U Thant reported—

" . . . It would be premature at this time for me to report to the Council on the substance of Ambassador Jarring's talks thus far with the Governments concerned, since these talks are continuing at the wish of the parties and have not reached the stage at which any conclusions can be drawn. It may, however, be stated in general that the talks have covered two types of question. The first of these is concerned with the large and fundamental problems, which are of course, the most difficult ones and which are referred to in Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The second type of questions are the kind of secondary problems, the solution of which would contribute to an improvement of the general atmosphere by relieving certain unnecessary hardships which have essentially resulted from the hostilities in June 1967. Such questions include the release of the ships stranded in the Suez Canal, the exchange of prisoners of war and certain measures of a humanitarian character . . . "

" . . . The Governments visited have also expressed the wish that the round of talks with Ambassador Jarring should continue, and he and I both take the same position. At the same time we are mindful of the time factor."

U Thant's third report, dated 29 March, covered rather more than two months and mentioned seven visits to Cairo, six to Amman and nine to Jerusalem. Dr. Jarring also went to U.N. Headquarters for four days for consultations with the Secretary-General—

" . . . In his efforts to promote agreement between the Governments concerned, Ambassador Jarring has found a basic difference of outlook between the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Jordan on the one hand and the Government of Israel on the other, which have been described in some detail by the parties themselves in Security Council documents and at recent meetings of the Council."

"The efforts of Ambassador Jarring have been directed towards obtaining an agreed statement of position concerning the implementation of the resolution, which could then be followed by meetings between the parties under his auspices. So far these efforts have not resulted in agreement. Moreover, they have been interrupted by recent events. However, Ambassador Jarring is now renewing his contacts with the parties and a further report may be submitted when the results of these contacts are known."

The "recent events" mentioned by U Thant included the Israeli military action on the Jordanian village and refugee camp at Karameh. On 24 March the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 248 (1968) —

The Security Council . . . Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents, **Recalling further** resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place.

- (1) **Deplores** the loss of life and heavy damage to property;
- (2) **Condemns** the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;
- (3) **Deplores** all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;
- (4) **Calls upon** Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237 (1967); . . .

The next Security Council vote came on 27 April. Adopted unanimously, resolution 250 (1968) said—

The Security Council . . . Considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem will aggravate tensions in the area and will have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area.

Calls upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968 . . . "

The parade was, nevertheless, held and resolution 251 (1968) of 2 May put Israel's defiance on record . . .

The Security Council . . . Deeply deplores the holding of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968 . . .

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

On 21 May the Security Council adopted the extremely important resolution 252 (1968) on the status of Jerusalem. The voting was 13-0, with the United States and Canada abstaining—

The Security Council

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 and 2254 of 4 and 14 July 1967 . . .

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the report of the Secretary-General,

Having heard the statements made before the Council,

Noting that since the adoption of the above mentioned resolutions, Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,

Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

- (1) **Deplores** the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;
- (2) **Considers** that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;
- (3) **Urgently calls upon** Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem . . .

Meanwhile, Dr. Jarring, based on Nicosia, was travelling almost incessantly between Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem and Beirut, all through April and the first half of May. He then returned to U.N. Headquarters and, for five weeks, had frequent contacts with the permanent representatives of those involved in the problem. On a "vacation trip" to Europe at the end of June and early July he met the Foreign Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan in Stockholm, The Hague and London respectively. U Thant reported to the Security Council on 29 July—

" . . . In the light of his most recent discussions, Ambassador Jarring has arrived at the conclusion, which I fully endorse, that it will be important and advisable for him to pursue further his efforts to promote agreement among the parties. In the near future, he will return to the Middle East for renewed contacts with the parties concerned.

"Ambassador Jarring is due great credit for the patience, persistence and statesmanship he has demonstrated in carrying out his extremely vital mission. He has applied to this task qualities of dedication, wisdom and tact which he has in rare degree."

The Secretary-General was more informative in the introduction to his Annual Report to the General Assembly, published on 26 September—

"... The basic situation in the Middle East in relation even to the beginnings of a settlement remains much the same as it was eight months ago. Until now, the one clear point of agreement among all concerned has been that Ambassador Jarring should continue his efforts.

"One party has insisted upon 'direct negotiations' by which is meant, apparently, a face to face confrontation of the two sides; the other side has rejected, initially at any rate, the direct procedure, but has been willing to carry on substantive talks concerning the implementation of the resolution indirectly, with Ambassador Jarring as the intermediary. All of his efforts will be unavailing unless he is able to carry on some form of dialogue with the two sides involving matters of substance..."

When the General Assembly opened Dr. Jarring was back in New York after yet another round of visits in the Middle East to the Governments concerned. On 3 December U Thant's fifth report to the Security Council contained the following—

"... With the arrival of foreign ministers of the parties for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, Ambassador Jarring began a series of frequent meetings with them individually, which were at first mainly of an informal nature, but which, following the delivery by the foreign ministers of their speeches in the general debate, assumed a more formal character and concluded with written communications from the foreign ministers of Israel and of the United Arab Republic restating the positions of their respective Governments. In November, the foreign ministers returned to their countries. Before departing they repeated the readiness of their Governments to continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring and to enter into further discussions with him when he may deem it appropriate."

The "written communications" mentioned by U Thant were the subject of a UPI message carried by The Financial Times datelined New York, October 23—

"Egypt has formally declared that Israel's withdrawal from captured Arab territory and agreement to settle the refugee problem 'would lead to the achievement of peace in the Middle East,' it was learned to-day.

"The declaration is contained in a two-page memorandum sent ... to the UN's Middle East peace envoy, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, by the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad.

"Its delivery followed by several days a memorandum on the Israeli position sent to Dr. Jarring by the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban..."

"Riad's letter asked Dr. Jarring to 'clarify' Israel's position on two points—her readiness to implement the November 1967, Security Council resolution and to withdraw her forces from all Arab territory captured during the June war."

Some information about Dr. Mahmoud Riad's contacts with Dr. Jarring had been given a little earlier, in a despatch dated May 16, by The Times New York Correspondent—

"A spokesman for the Egyptian delegation quoted a letter from Mahmoud Riad, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, to Dr. Jarring . . . The letter said that the United Arab Republic was ready to continue the contacts which Dr. Jarring had been conducting with the parties and that it would welcome a time-table presented by him for carrying out the Security Council resolution . . ."

As 1968 drew to a close the lack of progress towards a settlement was all too apparent and the world's anxiety was growing ever more acute. Thoughtful journalists as well as political leaders were thinking more and more in terms of some sort of action by the Four Powers, as the following leader from *The Observer* of 15 December shows —

"The Middle East remains the most dangerous area in the world. Like the Balkans before 1914, it is the place where old-fashioned national conflicts between local States could most easily drag Great Powers into war. Recently military action by Israel and the Arabs has been escalating at an alarming rate, while the efforts to bring about a political settlement of the 1967 war through the United Nations mediator, Dr. Jarring, have produced scarcely any progress.

"Increasing violence makes the need for peace-making more urgent, but also more difficult. It undermines the position of those on both sides who are genuinely seeking a peaceful solution. It strengthens those who believe that force is the only answer—a desperate fight to a finish or a Spartan fortress existence.

"On the Arab side, the military escalation has been accompanied by a significant political phenomenon: a Palestine Arab resistance movement has emerged, offering new leadership to the Palestinians and in Jordan. Its power and influence is increasing throughout the Arab countries, especially among the young, and at the same time a sense of Palestinian nationhood is growing. It will become increasingly difficult for Arab Governments to agree to peace terms which the Palestinian guerrillas reject, and the guerrillas' terms are of the most radical kind: not merely the withdrawal of Israel from the territories she occupied in June 1967 but also the replacement of the Jewish State of Israel by a multi-racial Palestinian State severed from the international Zionist movement.

"For the time being the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments still declare themselves ready to accept the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November last year, which has been the basis of Dr. Jarring's mediation. Israel has also continued talks on the basis of this resolution. But the talks have made little or no progress, because each side puts its own interpretation on the resolution and is hampered by domestic divisions of opinion. Israel is trying to get a permanent peace treaty, without giving back all the territory she conquered. The Arabs are trying to get a complete Israel withdrawal, with an agreement less definitive than a final peace treaty.

"The Security Council resolution, being a diplomatic compromise, is ambiguously or vaguely worded here and there. But the spirit of it is quite clear and reflects unmistakably the view of the majority of the UN as shown in the previous debates of the General Assembly. The majority of the international community was concerned with the maintenance of four basic principles, implicit and explicit in the UN Charter, that disputes between member States must be settled peacefully and not by force; that a member State

cannot make territorial gains from another member State by conquest; that no member State should try to destroy or threaten the existence of another member State; that there should be freedom of innocent passage through international waterways.

"The plain sense of this was that most members of the UN believed that Israel should withdraw completely from her conquests; that the Arabs should conclude a permanent and complete peace; and that outstanding questions, such as the refugees or the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba, should be settled by negotiations carried out not under duress by either side.

"A settlement on these lines, with direct physical guarantees by the Great Powers, must surely still be the only sensible aim of international diplomacy. But the pressure and encouragement of the Great Powers are essential to overcome the misgivings and distrust on both sides and the real domestic problems which the Israel and Arab Governments have to deal with. It is still possible that with such backing Egypt and Jordan might be able to ensure acceptance of a definitive peace treaty—one which brought the complete withdrawal of Israel's forces from the occupied territories, while the Israel Government could also accept a similar exchange if the safeguards were powerful enough. But time is running out. In Jordan, already, this might involve a civil war to crush the guerrilla organisations as the Irish Government had to deal with IRA extremists after the settlement in Britain.

"One way to avoid such a clash or to limit its scale would be to find some method of giving the Palestinians for the first time an opportunity to express their views freely on their own future. For unless a settlement is accepted by them it is unlikely to last, even if King Hussein and his Army, with the agreement of President Nasser, are strong enough to impose it temporarily.

"Although the UN is still the proper instrument for seeking a settlement, the main responsibility for making it work in the Middle East, as elsewhere, lies with the Great Powers. The longer the Great Powers wait to exert their full influence, the more difficult it will be for them to make that influence effective. What could be done by joint persuasion now might involve a hazardous military intervention in a few years' time—with the formidable risk of their finding themselves on opposite sides."

The Soviet Government took the first initiative by circulating on 2 January 1969 to the Governments of Britain, France and the United States detailed proposals for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. The following text is as published in *The Times* on February 28—

Israel and Israel's Arab neighbour-countries who will be ready to take part in the implementation of such a plan, shall confirm their agreement with the resolution of the Security Council of November 22 1967, and shall state their readiness to implement all of its provisions.

In doing so they agree that by means of contacts through Dr. Jarring a time schedule and procedure for the withdrawal of Israel troops from the territories occupied during

the conflict in 1967 will be established, and at the same time an agreed plan for the fulfilment by the parties of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution will be outlined, bearing in mind the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, with which each state in this area can live in security.

The purpose of these contacts could be agreement upon concrete measures for implementing the said Security Council resolution.

1.

Agreement shall be reached on simultaneous statements by the Government of Israel and the Governments of Israel's Arab neighbour-countries, who will take part in the implementation of this plan: on their readiness to proceed to a cessation of the state of war between them and to achieve a peaceful settlement after withdrawal of Israel troops from the occupied Arab territories.

In this connexion Israel shall state its willingness to start the withdrawal of its troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict during the summer of 1967 on the date specified.

2.

On the day the withdrawal of Israel troops begins, carried out by stages under the supervision of United Nations representatives, the said Arab countries as well as Israel shall deposit with the United Nations the appropriate documents concerning the cessation of the state of war, respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this area and their right to live in peace, within secure and recognized boundaries, that is in accordance with the said resolution of the Security Council.

In accordance with the understanding which shall be reached through Dr. Jarring, provisions shall also be agreed upon which concern secure and recognized boundaries (with corresponding maps attached), the safeguarding of freedom of navigation in the international waterways in this area, just settlement of the refugee problem, safeguarding of the territorial inviolability and political independence of each state in this area (possibly with the aid of measures which include the establishment of demilitarized zones).

It is intended that this understanding be regarded in accordance with the Security Council resolution as one whole entity, pertaining to all aspects of the settlement in the whole area of the Middle East, as a "package".

3.

During the course of the succeeding month (or as agreed) Israel troops shall withdraw from a part of the Arab territories to certain intermediate lines on the Sinai peninsula, on the west bank of the Jordan river (as well as from Syrian territory, from the El Quneitra area).

On the day when Israel troops reach the intermediate lines in the peninsula agreed to in advance (for example, 30 to 40 km. from the Suez canal) the Government of the United Arab Republic will bring troops into the Suez canal area and begin the clean-up of the canal for resumption of navigation.

ISRAEL REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSALS

4.

During the course of the second month (or as agreed) the Israel troops shall withdraw to the line they held prior to June 5 1967, after which the administration of the corresponding Arab country shall be completely restored in the vacated territories and its troops and police forces be introduced.

On the day when the second stage of Israel troop withdrawal begins, the United Arab Republic and Israel (or the United Arab Republic only, in the event that its government agrees) shall state their consent to the stationing of United Nations troops near the line prior to June 5 1967, on the Sinai peninsula, at Sharm-Ash-Shaikh and in the Gaza strip; that is, the situation in this area which existed in May 1967, shall be restored.

The Security Council shall adopt a decision on sending United Nations troops in accordance with the United Nations Charter and affirm the principle of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the gulf of Aqaba for the vessels of all countries.

5.

After completion of the Israel troops' withdrawal to the lines of interstate demarcation, either through the mediation or the signing of a multilateral document, the documents of the Arab states and Israel deposited earlier shall finally enter into effect.

The Security Council, basing itself upon provisions of the United Nations Charter, shall adopt a decision on guarantees for the Arab-Israel boundaries (the possibility of guarantees by the Four Powers—permanent Security Council members—is also not to be excluded).

The Israeli reaction was prompt. "Israel Rejects Soviet Appeal", said one of the headlines to a story datelined Jerusalem January 5 which appeared in the Guardian—

"Israel has told the United States and Britain that the latest Soviet proposals for peace in the Middle East cannot be regarded as a basis of a framework for discussion . . ."

"The Israeli position was discussed today at a weekly Cabinet meeting, when Mr. Aha Eban, the Foreign Minister, told his colleagues that the Soviet proposals did not amount to a specific peace plan."

"Mr. Eban explained that the Russian proposals demanded a Israeli withdrawal without peace or secure borders. They did not include provision for free navigation and did not envisage the foundation of Israeli-Arab relations on a firm contractual basis."

The firm proposal that the Big Four representatives in the Security Council should meet to discuss peace efforts in the Middle East came from a spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry on January 17. A release from the UN Press Services the next day gave U Thant's reaction—

"Asked whether a meeting of the Big Four would give the needed impetus to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, U Thant said: 'From my point of view, what is important

is that their endeavours either collectively or separately to contribute to peace in the Middle East must be only within the context of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Only within the United Nations context . . . that is most important.

"Asked whether he still believed, as he had stated in his letter of 7 October to the Foreign Ministers of France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States, that a meeting of the Big Four would be useful in giving guidance to the Jarring mission, the Secretary-General said 'Definitely'"

President-Elect Nixon had given high priority to the Arab-Israel problem, sending Mr. William Scranton, former Governor of Pennsylvania, to the Middle East on a mission of inquiry. During his tour Mr. Scranton made some outspoken comments. In Tel Aviv for instance, he said that he could not understand Israel's insistence on direct peace talks with the Arabs as distinct from contact through a mediator. Mr. Scranton got back to New York on December 11, and the next day Mr. Adam Raphael cabled to The Guardian—

"Though Mr. Nixon has stressed that he places a high priority on achieving stability in the Middle East, his foreign policy advisers have been puzzled by some of Mr. Scranton's more outspoken remarks. In particular, they are at some pains to dissociate the new Administration from a statement made by Mr. Scranton in Jordan that the United States would now adopt 'a more even-handed American policy in the region', a comment that has caused apprehension in Israel.

"His remarks are Scranton remarks, not Nixon remarks", said Mr. Ron Zeigler, the President-elect's Press spokesman . . .

"Mr. Scranton, questioned on his return at Kennedy Airport about what he meant by a more even-handed policy, said: "The impression in the Middle East is widespread that the US is interested only in Israel's point. I don't think this is true of the present Administration or of Americans. I think we have other interests . . ."

One of President Nixon's first big decisions after taking office concerned the Four Power talks idea. On 5 February The Times reported—

"The United States is ready to take part in four-power talks with the Soviet Union, Britain and France to promote a settlement in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations.

"President Nixon yesterday met his National Security Council for a review of the situation and has apparently given approval to the French request for the 'big four' meeting.

"Washington sources emphasised, however, that the Nixon Administration has no desire to impose a solution on Israel and Arab leaders. Its object is to strengthen the United Nations approach".

ISRAEL OPPOSES FOUR POWER TALKS

The Four Power talks did not start till early April, being preceded by many bilateral contacts. Meanwhile, Israel's dislike of the idea of any sort of Four Power intervention to help Dr. Jarring was made very plain. For instance, Mr. John Wallis of The Daily Telegraph, in a despatch published on 31 March—

"The Israeli Government yesterday firmly declared its opposition to the plan for a four-Power meeting to discuss a Middle East settlement. In its strongest statement yet on the subject, it added that Israel would not accept any recommendation from the meeting contrary to her interests . . ."

There was no let-up in Israeli opposition to the Four Power talks. When the Israeli Prime Minister visited London in June The Guardian headlined its Diplomatic Correspondent's report of her Press conference, "Mrs. Meir Scornful of Big Power Talks". Mr. Terence Prittie wrote, on June 18—

"The Israeli Premier, Mrs. Golda Meir . . . was as apprehensive as ever about the Four Power talks . . ."

"Israel remained unalterably opposed to 'others talking to others about our problems and the problems of the Arabs'. Her Government did not know when the Four were likely to reach agreement, and she did not think that the Four knew either . . ."

"The Israeli view, in fact, remains that the Four Power talks are weighted against Israel and that direct Arab-Israeli talks should take place instead. Mrs. Meir has not, however, convinced the British Government, which is still relying on a successful outcome to the Four Power talks".

Towards the end of March there was a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons. Both the Leader of the Opposition and the Foreign Secretary devoted important passages in their speeches to the Middle Eastern situation and the prospects for the Four Power consultations. From Hansard—

"Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley) . . . Perhaps the Foreign Secretary could report on the progress of the Four Power approach to the problem. It seems to me that there are now several considerations which might work in favour of a settlement, although this may take a long time. Perhaps there are some signs that President Nasser recognises that it is in his interest to regain somewhat greater independence and certainly that it is in the interest of the United Arab Republic and the other Arab States which are providing the resources to make up the deficit on Canal dues.

"It must be in the long-term interest of Israel to reach a settlement of these disputes. It is in the immediate as well as the long-term interest of the super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, not to be dragged into war by a further outbreak of conflict in this inflammable area. It is in the Soviet Union's interest, perhaps even more than that of America, to have the Canal open, since the Soviet Union wishes to use its influence in the Gulf and in the Indian Ocean by both political and military means. It is a British

interest generally to achieve stability in the area from the point of view of our trade and, in particular, our oil supplies.

"The United Nations resolution, which was sponsored by Her Majesty's Government after the six-day war, is in itself ambiguous. Whether it was designedly so or not, I do not know, but the fact of its ambiguity does nevertheless give scope for negotiation between the parties about the various aspects of it. Dr. Jarring has not been able to achieve a settlement or even to bring the two sides round the table. Perhaps it is right to accept that they will not come to the same table. It is really this which led to the proposal for a Four Power attempt to reach a settlement.

"In my view, the Four Powers are not likely to be able to impose a settlement, though for political reasons those concerned may wish it to appear so and be able to claim it as so in order to have a settlement which they can tell their people was imposed against their will but which they think it advisable to accept. However, that does not alter the principle that any settlement, if it is to last, must be agreed and accepted by those concerned. If it were to be imposed by the Four Powers there are many small Powers today which would be gravely apprehensive at the idea of the Four Powers imposing their view on particular disturbed parts of the world.

"This matter requires intense diplomatic activity now, to deal sector by sector with the problems revealed by the United Nations resolution, the acceptance and timing of each depending on acceptance of the whole package when it has been completed. Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Heights, the West Bank, Jerusalem, refugees, access through the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, recognition, in the case of Israel, and security, the international use of forces in some areas—all these must be dealt with as particular aspects of the problem. Merely to list them shows the formidable nature of the effort to reach a settlement.

"There is no need for us in this country or the House to be violently partisan on either side. Ours is a general interest in a settlement of the problem and in peace and stability in the area. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will let us know what the Government are going to do in concert with other Powers in order to obtain a fair and just solution".

"The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Michael Stewart)

... I must turn now to the last subject with which the right hon. Gentleman dealt—perhaps, adding together size and urgency and potential danger, the greatest of the lot—the situation in the Middle East. There is here an urgent need for settlement because with each day that goes by there is the risk of another incident, killing innocent people, inflaming tempers, making a final settlement more difficult. The tragedy of this is that it ought not to be too difficult to take the United Nations Security Council Resolution and spell it out in the form of a workable calendar, timetable, package—call it what you like. I believe there are a considerable number of well-informed and well-intentioned people in the world who could write out such a package or calendar which all the parties to the dispute, although they would probably complain about bits of it, would know would be better for them than letting the thing drift on as it now is.

"Why then does it drift on? I believe because there are two balancing suspicions—the Arab suspicion that Israel has no intention of withdrawing at all from the territory she occupies, and the Israeli suspicion that whatever she does or signs or agrees to, the Arabs will not abandon the idea of one day destroying the State of Israel. I am not saying for one moment that either of those suspicions is justified—indeed, I do not believe they are—but it is a tragic fact that those suspicions are held on both sides.

"Both sides could do something to reduce that burden of suspicion. If Israel would say, without cavil or qualification, that she not only accepts but will carry out the whole Resolution, this would reduce some of the suspicion. If the Arab countries would put it clearly beyond doubt that if a settlement is reached on the basis of the whole Resolution, they accept the words "just and lasting peace" in the Resolution without qualification and that any idea of destroying the State of Israel which may have been held in the past is permanently abandoned, this seems to me to be an early first step. This requires no more than saying explicitly what I think both parties know they must agree to in the end, if there is to be any settlement—saying it explicitly and saying it early. We have urged this on them for some time. I trust the counsel will in time be taken.

"Beyond that—for this is only the beginning of the matter—we have to recognise that the United Nations Resolution, is I believe, now the essential basis of a settlement. It is the one fixed point in the argument. We may take some pride in the fact that it was my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown) whose initiative caused this Resolution to be accepted. The Resolution having been passed, we felt it was certainly right to give Dr. Jarring a chance to turn it, by consultations with the parties, from a Resolution into a practicable detailed plan. Unhappily, despite his best efforts, he has been unable to do so, I believe basically because of these two suspicions one on each side that I mentioned. It is for that reason that I think it is necessary for the Four Powers to act.

"In May of last year I agreed with Mr. Gromyko that we and the Russians must consult together about this, and there have been already a number of bilateral consultations between the various pairs that one can pick out of the Four. So the time has not been lost. But I must say that I regret that I am not able to tell the House today that the Four Powers talks have actually begun. However, I do not believe they will now be long delayed. When they do meet, our view is that they must meet without conditions and without limitations of agenda.

"I know it is sometimes said: Will this get us anywhere? Have not Israel and her Arab neighbours got to sit down round a table themselves if there is to be any hope? I think the refusal of Arab countries to enter into direct talks is one that is extremely difficult for people in this country to understand. We are so used to the concept—and it is a very sensible concept—that if there is a dispute—the parties, whatever they think of each other, should at least sit down to discuss it. On the other hand, I am bound to say that I do not think it is reasonable for Israel to say that certain parts of the problem—Jerusalem, for instance—are not negotiable.

"It seems to me in this situation that we cannot expect direct talks at present. This, again, reinforces the need for the Four to come in. What will they have to do? Certainly

they will get in touch with the parties concerned—Israel and the Arab States. They will continue to urge certain courses of action on them. They will encourage them in particular to go to Dr. Jarring with suggestions on the substance of the dispute, which in effect they have not yet done.

“But, for my own part, I do not believe the work of the Four can stop there. I think the Four will have to start on the job of actually making the package, time table or calendar, which is the heart of the matter, and making that will mean that both Israel and her Arab neighbours will have to make some concessions to the other side’s point of view. The Four, or anyone who tries to make such a timetable or package, will have to interpret some of the phrases in the Resolution which are not yet defined and, indeed, could not be defined. For example, there is reference to the refugees. The Resolution does not say exactly what ought to be done about them. I believe that it is incumbent on Israel to be rather more forthcoming on this problem than she has so far been. But if Arab countries want her to do it is all the more important that they make it clear beyond any doubt that the idea of destroying or waging future war on Israel is abandoned. It is one thing for Israel to admit people on humanitarian grounds. It is another to ask to admit people who she fears may be a deadly peril to her security in the future.

“There is another matter on which it may be necessary to interpret the Resolution. When one deals with the reference to boundaries there may well be a need for a United Nations Force. If there is, I believe that it will be necessary to make it clear that it is not a Force that can be withdrawn at the request of one side alone.

“Finally, the question of whether there can be a solution imposed by the Four Powers has been raised. If by ‘impose’ one means something that both sides, or even one side, bitterly hated but were told they must accept, I do not think that such a solution would work. Even if one made it work to begin with, it would not last, and no one would be prepared to guarantee it. On the other hand, there is clearly the necessity to have some degree of very urgent persuasion by the Four Powers, because if that were not necessary a settlement would have been reached long ago. The real solution, therefore, stands somewhere between 100 per cent free acceptance by the parties concerned, which, if it could be achieved, would have been achieved already, and 100 per cent imposition, which is impossible.

“What one can hope for, with patience, is a settlement that in the end will be accepted by the parties concerned with a certain limited amount of grumbling all round, and a situation in which, therefore, some of the Governments concerned will be able to tell their populations that the responsibility for the bits of the settlement they do not like lies on the backs of the Four. The shoulders of the Four must be big enough to bear that, provided that the degree of dissatisfaction is quite moderate. I think that one could draw up such a settlement, about which every party to the dispute would say ‘This is not all we hoped for’, but would know quite certainly that it was infinitely better than allowing the struggle to continue. Such a settlement could be found. The Four will try to find it, but the parties concerned are not thereby stripped of their responsibility to help in finding it.

“When we consider the situation in the Middle East now, with the waste of that great earning asset, the Canal; with the constant killing and border incidents; with the dread in

KING HUSSEIN'S SIX POINTS

which the whole of that part of the world lives; I should have thought that if there is any wisdom or compassion in the countries concerned they will all make up their minds that some concessions must be made. If the talks of the Four can be the channel through which that is done, and a settlement is achieved, it will be a great advance for humanity and a great boon to the people of that region."

On April 10, when the Four Power talks were in their early stages, King Hussein addressed the National Press Club in Washington. His speech ended with his six points—

1. *The end of all Belligerency.*
2. *Respect for and acknowledgement of the Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area.*
3. *Recognition of the right of all to live in Peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of war.*
4. *Guaranteeing for all the freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.*
5. *Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of all States in the Area through whatever measures necessary including the establishment of Demilitarized Zones.*
6. *Accepting a just settlement of the Refugee problem.*

"In return for these considerations our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June '67 war, and the implementation of all the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution. The challenge that these principles present is that Israel may have either peace or territory, but she can never have both."

The Guardian's Foreign Staff described the Israeli reaction on April 12 under the headline "Israelis scoff at Hussein's Offer"—

"King Hussein of Jordan's six-point plan for peace in the Middle East . . . was given a sceptical reception yesterday in official circles in Tel Aviv . . .

"It was pointed out that . . . it demanded complete withdrawal of all Israeli forces from all occupied territories, including Jerusalem. This, according to some comments, was not an offer Israel could treat earnestly . . .

"In London, however, it was thought that Hussein's apparent offer to recognise Israel and to support the right of free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal represents the clearest reaffirmation so far of the principles laid down by the 1967 Security Council resolution.

"His statement has, therefore, been readily welcomed in London . . ."

JERUSALEM'S STATUS REAFFIRMED

Some time later the Jordan Government had to bring Israeli policy and actions in Jerusalem once again to the attention of the Security Council. The Council on 3 July, unanimously adopted a second resolution on the status of Jerusalem — Resolution 267 (1969), reaffirming resolution 252 and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by military conquest, and censuring in the strongest terms all the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City.*

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 252 of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 and 2254 of 4 and 14 July 1967 respectively concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem . . .

Having heard the statements of parties concerned in the question,

Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

(1) Reaffirms its resolution 252 (1968);

(2) Deplores the failure of Israel to show any regard for the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions mentioned above;

(3) Censures in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;

(4) Confirms that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status;

(5) Urgently calls once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect;

(6) Requests Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution;

(7) Determines that in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without further delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter.

(8) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.

** Resolution carried unanimously, but the United States abstained on a separate vote on the paragraph calling on Israel to rescind all measures tending to change the status of Jerusalem.*

But to return to Dr. Jarring. He had paid yet another visit to the Middle East early in the year but, when the Four Power representatives began to meet, the temporary suspension of his work was announced. Reuter reported from UN Headquarters on 9 April—

"Dr. Jarring is interrupting his mission to resume his post as Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union. A UN spokesman said that Dr. Jarring was relinquishing his Middle East post 'for the time being' . . . The spokesman added that Dr. Jarring would be 'immediately available for any renewed effort in connection with his mission in the Middle East whenever developments may require it'."

The Four Power representatives held fifteen meetings in thirteen weeks, and adjourned on 1 July. From UN Headquarters, The Financial Times Correspondent wrote—

"A brief Press statement, issued following the 15th session of the talks—which lasted barely an hour—said that 'because of important consultations on the Middle East taking place among the four Governments, the date of the next meeting of permanent representatives will be set at a later time.

"Meanwhile, the Ambassadors entrusted a working group of their deputies with the task of continuing the consultations. But informed sources said that no top level meetings should now be expected until late August. The Ambassadors' deputies, meanwhile, would probably mark time until some positive results came out of the Middle East bilateral discussions between Russia and the US in Washington.

"But diplomatic circles here expressed the fear that the talks might just die out if the Americans and Russians cannot reach a compromise or if events in the area overtake diplomatic manoeuvres . . ."

So hopes of breathing new life into the Jarring Mission seem to depend on American-Soviet exchanges and upon the work that can be done in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In July the Security Council was preoccupied, not only with Israeli behaviour in Jerusalem but also with cease-fire infringement along the Suez Canal. In that context a letter from Mr. Abdullah el-Erian, the Acting-Representative of the U.A.R. at the United Nations, was addressed on 17 July to the president of the Security Council—

" . . . Israel has adopted an obstructive attitude against all of the efforts exerted to reach a peaceful settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242; efforts carried out by Ambassador Jarring, as well as those actually undertaken by the Four Powers to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In taking such an attitude, Israel is seeking to impose its own terms and realize its expansionist aims in utter disregard of the dangers that threaten peace in the area.

"In the meantime, the United Arab Republic has always exerted all efforts in a positive and practical way for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission. It has, moreover, supported all international efforts for achieving a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East.

"The United Arab Republic has accepted the Security Council resolution 242, it has declared its readiness to implement its provisions. Furthermore, and in contrast to Israel's policy, it has supported international efforts as long as they aim at the implementation of the Security Council resolution, being convinced that the continuation of the Israeli policy in the area will definitely lead to an explosive situation which would endanger peace in the area.

"Israel, however, has persistently rejected the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is to be noted in this respect that Israel rejected the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem adopted unanimously on 3 July 1969 and that the campaign she launched against the Council itself is a clear attack against the United Nations Organization and its organs and an evidence of Israel's disregard of the will of the world community . . ."

In his annual report to the 24th General Assembly of the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant has issued a sombre warning about the Middle Eastern situation. He wrote, *"It is no exaggeration to say that, failing some early progress towards a settlement, there is a very real danger that this great and historical region, the cradle of civilization and of three world religions, will recede steadily into a new dark age of violence, disruption and destruction"*.

It was against this background that the Four Powers resumed their efforts, at Foreign Minister's level, to help Dr. Jarring in his immensely important task.





مكتب جامعة الدول العربية بلندن

LONDON
ARAB LEAGUE OFFICE
1-11 HAY HILL