Monograph Series No. 10

# RIVER WITHOUT BRIDGES

## A Study of The Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees



by Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
BEIRUT, 1969

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THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
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# PREFACE

*River Without Bridges* is a report of research in progress. The research is concerned with the Palestinian Arab refugees of 1967 in Jordan: their background, their experiences, their hopes. At the time of writing, in October 1968, the refugees of 1967 are still refugees. They have not been permitted to return to their homes in Israeli-occupied Jordan.

In this report, we present the results of interviewing carried out in Jordan in September 1967. During the summer of 1968, we interviewed an additional 135 refugees families. When the processing and analysis of these 1968 interviews are completed, a revised and expanded version of this report will be published.

We have been able to visit our respondents several times since September 1967. In December of that year, torrential rains forced the evacuation of Camp Zeezya. All its residents were moved to the valley of the River Jordan, where new camps were set up in places less exposed to severe weather.

The new sites, however, were close to the cease-fire line separating the armies of Israel and Jordan. Artillery duels were frequent, and the refugee camps became the target of Israeli artillery fire. In early February, when we visited the Zeezya refugees, we found them accustomed

to artillery fire. They were proud of living in the midst of the battle. In Camp Zeezya they had felt isolated, hopelessly removed from their homes. In the valley of the Jordan, they witnessed the beginnings of guerilla attacks on the enemy. Their spirits were raised. They knew the resistance fighters personally, and they admired them.

On February 23, 1968, Israeli air and ground forces attacked the refugee camp at Karameh. This attack forced the total evacuation of all refugees from the Jordan valley. Once again the Zeezya families moved. This time they returned to Camp Zeezya, on the wind-swept plateau. In July of this year, we visited them there and found the hope of return still uppermost in their minds.

This research project could not have been carried out without the help of many persons. For the inspiration for the research, and many of the arrangements for carrying it out, we are indebted to Doctor Munir Shamma'a, of Beirut. Both he and Professor Walid Khalidi, of the American University of Beirut, gave us invaluable advice.

We are indebted to the staff of the Jordanian Ministry of Information and especially to Mr. Ibrahim 'Izzeddin, formerly director of the Foreign Press Section of the Ministry and now attached to the Royal Diwan. Mr 'Izzeddin and his associates provided us with transportation and facilities essential to our stay in Camp Zeezya.

A group of students from the American University of Beirut accompanied us to Jordan and lived with us in Camp Zeezya. These students carried out research work in a difficult environment, and we are deeply grateful to them for their loyalty and good humor; they are: Bahija Fadli, Wadad Bashshur, Amira Habibi, 'Abla Qadi, Suha Zakhariyya, 'Afif Habash, Habib Hammam, Nader Khouri, and Diya' Kubrsi.

A number of Jordanian students aided us in the interviewing and in transportation to the camps. To them we express our thanks; they are: Samir Khalifeh, Nabil Mu'ashashir, 'Isa Mu'ashshir, Suha Bakhit, Alexandra Hakim, Rosa Madi, 'Oreyyeb Najjar, Rasha Faris, Huda Mu'ashshir, Zayd Sha'sha', Muhammad Sabbagh, and Muhammad Abu Qura.

We are also grateful to Michel Dib-Kandis for his help in tabulation.

Funds for the 1967 interviewing came from individuals and organizations in Lebanon and Jordan, and to these we express our gratitude.

To our wives, Erica and Hayat, we are grateful for assistance, encouragement, and inspiration. They joined us in Camp Zeezya, they carried out photography and interviewing, and they have helped us in more ways than can be mentioned.

One group of people, who cannot be named individually, we owe our heartfelt thanks. The refugee families that we interviewed are citizens of Palestine and now, unhappily, exiles from their homes. In the midst of adversity, they continue to display dignity and courtesy.

*Peter Dodd & Halim Barakat*

Beirut, October 1968

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## THE AUTHORS

PETER DODD received his Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University in 1962. After teaching at McGill University and the University of Michigan, he spent the year 1965-66 in Cairo engaged in research on Egyptian youth. In 1966 he joined the faculty of the American University of Beirut, where he is Associate Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. He has received research grants from the Social Science Research Council and the Canada Council. His articles have appeared in the *Journal of World History, Middle East Journal,* and *Middle East Forum.*

HALIM BARAKAT received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Michigan in 1966. Between 1964-66 he was an Assistant Study Director at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. There he worked, and co-authored a monograph on teachers' professional roles, their feelings of alienation, and diffusion of innovations into school systems. In 1966 he joined the faculty of the American University of Beirut, where he is an Assistant Professor of Sociology. He is also a writer of fiction and has published two novels and a collection of short stories in Arabic. Some of his short stories have been translated into French and German.

## CHAPTER I

# INTRODUCTION

In June and July of 1967, large numbers of Palestinian Arabs crossed the River Jordan, seeking safety on its Eastern bank. They left behind their homes in the villages and towns of the West Bank section of Jordan and, by doing so, became refugees. By the end of July, there were more than 200,000 of these 1967 refugees in the East Bank section of Jordan.* Many of them were housed in hastily constructed tent camps. Many more had found shelter in the towns of East Jordan: Amman, Irbid, Zarqa, Salt. Their living conditions were miserable and their future uncertain.

In this exodus from the West Bank, history seemed to have repeated itself. In 1948, even larger numbers of Palestinian Arabs had left their homes under conditions of war. The circumstances of their departure have never been clarified: whether they left by official order, out of fear of Israel, or by forcible eviction. In any case, these 1948 refugees have never been permitted to return to their homes. Equally, they have never given up the hope of return. Their situation has been one of the most serious issues disturbing the peace of the Middle East.

In two important respects, the exodus of 1967 differs from that of 1948. In the first place, the 1948 exodus took place over an entire year, beginning as early as November 1947. The 1967 exodus was

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* United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), *Report of the Commissioner-General for 1966-1967*, General Assembly, Official Records, 22nd Session-Supplement No. 13 (A/6713), 1967, p. 11.

in response to a single brief campaign, before the pressures of uncertainty had time to multiply. In the second place, the experience of the 1948 refugees has become well known throughout Jordan and the Arab world. Their continued displacement and great suffering are common knowledge in the most remote villages. The West Bank residents could expect the same fate if they left their homes. This knowledge, more than anything else, might have been expected to prevent an exodus in 1967.

Nonetheless, the exodus took place. Like the Biblical Exodus, it was a flight from hostile rulers. In many ways, however, it was different from the Biblical Exodus. First, the Arab refugees were never eager or willing to depart. While the Biblical Exodus could be viewed as a search for an identity or rootedness, the present exodus was a flight into exile and uprootedness. Second, there was no time to organize the departure. It was sudden and there was no prophet to lead it. Third, unlike the Biblical Exodus, there was no hope of a Promised Land ahead. For the 1967 refugees, there was only the prospect of dust, heat, and homelessness.

During the summer of 1967, much attention was paid to the physical misery of the Arab refugees, to their desperate need for shelter, food, and medical supplies. The conscience of the world was momentarily touched, and the immediate dangers of starvation and epidemic were avoided.

At the same time, little systematic attention was paid to more fundamental questions. Why did the refugees leave their homes? What sorts of people came, and who stayed behind? What were the homes that they left behind, and did they wish to return? What attachments did they have to their home communities?

To all these questions, the reports of journalists and photographers tended to give partial or misleading answers. The camera portrayed tired and bedraggled people making their way across a plank bridge. Their small bundles of possessions led many to believe that the refugees were poor people without houses or lands, a floating proletariat displaced by the hazards of war. It was possible to read article after article about "the refugees" without finding the story of any individual family: their home community, their experiences during the war, their hopes and fears. Seldom did one find any attempt to collect reliable information on the background and family structure of the refugees.

We, the authors of this report, viewed the exodus from Lebanon.

As sociologists, we were dissatisfied with the available information. We were also dissatisfied with the explanations that were offered concerning the reasons for the exodus. We decided to engage in research on the exodus and to interview the 1967 refugees.

To undertake this research, we went to Jordan in September 1967. With us was a team of research workers, advanced students at the American University of Beirut. We spent two weeks living in tents in Camp Zeezya, becoming acquainted with many of the 1967 refugees. We then moved to Amman where we continued our interviewing, this time with refugees not in tent-camps. During the course of this field work, we gathered case studies of 122 refugee families, about 800 persons in all. To this information has been added reports from other sources: officials, journalists, relief workers, and independent observers.

In this monograph, we present the findings of our research. We begin with a consideration of the background of the problem.

## CHAPTER II

## THE PROBLEM OF THE EXODUS

It has often been observed that it is easy to answer questions about human behavior, so easy that often many answers are provided to a single question. The difficult task is to decide which answers to accept and which ones to reject. This observation applies to the exodus of the Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank.

The question here is: Why did they leave their homes? Why did the exodus take place?

An obvious answer, and one frequently given, is that civilians in time of war always leave their homes and seek safety elsewhere. This "obvious" answer, however, ignores crucial facts: the experience of the Palestinian Arabs who left their homes in 1948.

In 1948, about 700,000 Arabs left their homes in areas that then became the State of Israel. Since that time, they have lived in neighboring countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. Over the years, many of the refugees have established themselves in their new countries, finding homes and occupations. About one-third of the number, however, have continued to live in refugee "camps," often on the margin of poverty. These refugees have never been permitted to return to their former homes. Nonetheless, most of them, both those in camps and those outside the camps, have kept alive the hope of return.

The experience of the 1948 refugees became common knowledge to all Arabs, especially those living in the West Bank area of Jordan. By 1967, this knowledge should have acted as a deterrent, keeping people from leaving their homes and becoming refugees. It might have been expected that the West Bank Arabs would *not* seek refuge, but would stay in their communities as long as possible.

Instead, approximately one-fifth of the population of the West Bank, more than 200,000 people, did leave their homes. Since the time of our fieldwork, in September 1967, the flow of Arab refugees into the East Bank has not ceased. As we write, in September, 1968, the total number of refugees in the East Bank is estimated at 400,000. This figure includes persons from both the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The knowledge of 1948 did not deter them. The question of why they left demands another answer.

Another common answer is that a panic swept over the West Bank. Moshe Dayan, the commander of the Israeli armed forces, wrote that the Arab civilians reacted in shock and panic:

> "Their first reaction was one of shock and panic. Streams of Jordanian civilians in flight poured across the river from the West Bank, held by Israel. Now, three months after the fighting, shock and panic have passed, but confusion and lack of confidence remain."
> (*Life*, U.S. edition, September 29, 1967, p. 120).

This explanation of the exodus does not tell us what the causes of the panic were. The word "shock" implies a reaction to an unexpected and strong stimulus. What was the stimulus? The approach of Israeli troops? If so, why should the approach of enemy troops lead to panic? Were there rumors about what might happen under Israeli rule? Were there actual incidents that might give rise to panic? Were the civilians frightened by the Israeli air attack and the use of napalm? In short, what was the nature of the situation, as perceived by the Arab civilians?

The explanation of panic does not tell us why the exodus was much heavier in some areas than in others. In the city of Jerusalem, for example, the fighting was intense and prolonged, but the number of refugees from the Jordanian city of Jerusalem is estimated at only 15% of the population. In contrast, many of the frontier villages and those in the Jericho area were completely or almost completely deserted, although no fighting took place in them.

The explanation of panic is often linked to an economic explanation of the exodus. The economic explanation states that the refugees were by and large people without steady jobs and without real property, a sort of floating population with few attachments to their communities. Such people, it is argued, would have no reason for standing fast in the face of danger and would be specially

liable to panic. They could quickly pack up their few possessions and move to safer territory. This explanation may be called the "riff-raff" hypothesis, since it suggests that the refugees come from the poorest and least stable section of society.

The "riff-raff" hypothesis has an important implication, not always recognized by the people who state it. It implies that the refugees have little reason to return to their homes. If they had little property and few attachments to their communities, there is no compelling reason for them to return. Surely they will be just as happy (or unhappy) on the East Bank as they were on the West Bank? In this way, the question of why they left their homes is linked to the question of return.

To test the truth of the "riff-raff" hypothesis, we shall present data on the social and economic status of the refugees, we shall show that this type of economic explanation does not account for the facts of exodus, and we shall offer a different explanation.

Among persons familiar with the Middle East, the "riff-raff" hypothesis sometimes takes a more sophisticated form. It is held that the 1967 refugees were already refugees *before* the war, living in UNRWA camps and receiving UNRWA rations. The exodus took place, according to this explanation, because the civilians were afraid they might not receive UNRWA aid in Israeli-occupied areas. They left the West Bank, it is claimed, in order to receive continued UNRWA aid in the East Bank.

This form of explanation is even advanced by some Arabs. It has a certain plausibility. Before the 1967 war, about forty per cent of the West Bank population was receiving UNRWA assistance, as having refugee status from the 1948 period. Many of these people did live in refugee camps and many of them did take part in the 1967 exodus. But these "old refugees," displaced by the 1948 war, are *less than half the number* of 1967 refugees. The explanation leaves out the exodus of "new refugees," persons who had never before received UNRWA aid.

Another fault in this explanation is that, at the time of the exodus, there was no assurance that UNRWA would take care of the refugees. Those who fled from the West Bank left behind them fertile areas for the semi-desert plains of the East Bank.

A fourth common answer asserts that the Arabs, although they lived in villages, still retained the "nomadic mentality." An attempt is usually made to support this assertion by pointing out that the

civilians of other countries did not leave their homes in times of war. The Arabs, on the other hand, did leave in great numbers. So the Arabs must still be nomadic in mentality. This reasoning ignores at least two facts. In the first place, our data show that the refugees in our sample had lived in their home communities all their lives. Their parents and grand-parents had also lived in these same communities. In this respect they show no nomadic tendency at all. Their residential mobility is less than that of comparable populations elsewhere. In the second place, the civilians of other countries have left their homes in times of war. The only difference is that the invaders have permitted these civilian populations to return to their homes if they wished to do so.

These are four possible explanations of the 1967 exodus: the "shock and panic" explanation, the "riff-raff" explanation, the "previous refugee" explanation, and the "nomadic mentality" explanation. On examination, each is found wanting. Instead of providing answers, each explanation raises further questions. These questions formed the basis of our study. The answers we obtained are presented here.

CHAPTER III

# METHODOLOGY

Much of the information required for this study could only be obtained from the refugees themselves. Nowhere else could we obtain information regarding their attachment to their home communities and the reasons for which they left these communities.

Interviewing refugees, in the summer of 1967, presented a number of methodological difficulties. In this section, we indicate these difficulties and the methods that we used to overcome them. The accuracy of information is affected by the way in which it is gathered, so that a description of our research methods is essential to an evaluation of our data.

The first difficulty was that of the disruption of society. At the time of our fieldwork, the Kingdom of Jordan was in an abnormal state. In the June War it had lost the richer part of its territory to Israel. Half of its population was under Israeli rule. The country had few defences to offer against renewed attack from Israel. The unoccupied section of the country, in the East Bank, was crowded with refugees. The social climate was filled with suspicion, exaggeration, and rumor.

Although the Jordanian government was doing its best to cope with the aftermath of war, it was almost impossible to obtain an accurate picture of the location of the refugees. Many of them were scattered throughout the towns and villages of the East Bank. Many were gathered together in tent-camps. The tent-camps, moreover, were in a state of flux. With the onset of autumn, some of them, such as the camp in Wadi Dlail, (the valley of the Lost) had to be evacuated. Others, like the transit camp near the King Hussein Bridge, were deserted. This transit camp had been set up in August

to process people going back to their homes in the West Bank. But Israel had stopped the flow of westbound returnees at the end of August. Only seven per cent of the refugees had been permitted to return, and the transit camp was empty.

A second major difficulty was the obtaining of accurate information from the refugees. They had been through disturbing experiences and were living in misery. In the camps, there was a steady procession of officials and journalists. Few of the journalists could speak Arabic and so were limited to superficial interviewing. They tended to look for sensational stories of distress and to neglect the individuality of the refugees. As one of our respondents told us, "they just come to look at our wounds."

Strangers in the camp, conducting systematic interviews, were viewed with suspicion. Even if the interviewer managed to get answers to his questions, there was no assurance that these would be true ones. Suspicion and inaccuracy could be increased by the differences in social class between interviewer and respondent. The refugees in the camps were all of lower and lower-middle class status, whereas our interviewers, as university students, were middle and upper-class in status.

The situation of the refugees, therefore, presented us with two difficulties directly related to our research. One was the location of the refugees and the selection of an appropriate sample of respondents. The other was the establishment of rapport with the respondents, so that they would give us accurate and complete information.

a) *Selection of the Sample*

At the time of our study, the 1967 refugees were scattered all over the East Bank district of Jordan. Eleven tent-camps had been hastily set up to accommodate as many persons as possible. Many refugee families, however, preferred to seek shelter in the towns and villages of the East Bank. In all, there were about 70,000 refugees in the tent camps and about 140,000 in the towns and villages.

We decided to concentrate on the refugees in tent camps first. Later, if possible, we planned to continue interviewing among the refugees not in camps.* This decision was made on the basis of

* In the summer of 1968, the authors continued the interviewing with non-camp refugees. A stratified quota sample of 135 refugee families living in Amman was interviewed. At the time of writing this report the data is being processed. It will be reported later.

the requirements of interviewing and sample selection. In the camps, the concentration of refugees enabled us to begin our work with social and medical assistance to the families. We could become acquainted with them, establish rapport, and gradually begin our interviewing. In the towns and villages, however, our efforts would have to be dispersed over a wide area and it would be difficult to separate non-refugees from refugees.

Like the rest of Jordanian society, the tent-camps were in a state of shock and disorder. Several of them had been set up in a hurry on sites that later proved undesirable, far from water or exposed to desert winds. It was proposed to move as many as possible to the Jordan valley, where the winters would be mild and water plentiful.* The camps on the plateau, north and south of Amman, were subject to especially severe dust and weather conditions. One that we visited was in a state of semi-disintegration. It was without facilities and half of the tents had already been moved.

After visits to the tent-camps, we selected the camp at Zeezya for intensive study. Forty kilometers south of Amman, Zeezya was the best equipped of the camps, with relatively adequate water supply and sewage. The Iranian Red Lion Society had assumed responsibility for food and medical care in the camp. Tents and blankets were available for the use of the research team. The proximity to Amman made it possible for some of our interviewers to commute from their homes.

For the purposes of our research, Zeezya was the most convenient and best equipped of the tent camps. Its population, however, was much like that of the other camps. The assignment of the families to the different camps was haphazard and no rules or criteria for assignment were used. The families had been assigned to Zeezya in June and early July. They had moved there from their temporary shelters in schools, mosques, and elsewhere. Many of them, before coming to Zeezya, had spent days and nights without shelter.

The families came from all the districts of the West Bank:

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* During the late fall of 1967, all the occupants of the tent-camps were moved to the valley of the Jordan river. The resumption of fighting in this area in February 1968 forced the evacuation of all civilians from the valley. The refugees were moved a second time, back into the East Bank hills and plains. At the time of writing, in September 1968, they are still there.

Nablus and Jenin, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Latrun, and Hebron. Our sample included families from 45 different communities.

A listing by the camp administration showed that Zeezya had 470 tents, arranged in rows on both sides of a main "street." In order to obtain a representative sample of the camp, we selected every third tent, a total of 156 tents. As interviewing proceeded, we discovered that some large families had more than one tent. Other families had moved away from the camp since the listing. The final 'Zeezya sample' added up to 100 families, occupying about 120 tents. There were no refusals: interviews were completed with all families that were contacted.

The "Zeezya sample" of 100 families is a representative sample of Zeezya camp. By extension, we feel that it is reasonably representative of the tent-camp population of refugees. It is difficult to prove this, since there are few over-all statistics regarding the tent-camp population, but the table below offers a comparison between the "Zeezya sample" and the parent population of all 1967 refugees. The parent population includes both the refugees in tent camps and those not in camps.

TABLE 1 : ZEEZYA SAMPLE : PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN WEST BANK BEFORE THE WAR. (All figures in percentages)

| | *Zeezya Sample* (N = 98 families) | | | *All 1967 Refugees** (N = 200,000 plus individuals) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 61) | *Total* (N = 98) | |
| Governorate of Jerusalem | | | | |
| Jerusalem District | 22 | 31 | 27 | |
| Jericho District | 51 | 21 | 32 | |
| Ramallah District | 11 | 7 | 8 | |
| Latrun | 0 | 5 | 3 | |
| Bethlehem | 0 | 5 | 4 | |
| | | | 74 | 58 |
| Governorate of Nablus | 5 | 18 | 14 | 29 |
| Governorate of Hebron | 8 | 12 | 10 | 13 |
| No information | 3 | 1 | 2 | |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

* Source: Official Report, Joint Ministry Commission For Refugees, Amman, August, 1967.

In Table 1, two comparisons are made. First, it compares the "Zeezya sample" to the whole population of 1967 refugees, as counted by the Jordanian government. The distribution of the place of residence of the Zeezya sample is seen to be roughly similar to the same distribution for all refugees. Both distributions show most of the refugees coming from the Jerusalem governorate, with Nablus second and Hebron third. The Zeezya sample includes proportionately more families from the Jerusalem governorate and fewer from Nablus than does the total population.

The other comparison is made between old and new refugees. By old refugees is meant families that were registered, before June 1967, as refugees from the 1948 war. These 'old refugees' make up 38% of the Zeezya sample. In the total population, 49% are classified by the Jordanian government as 'old refugees'. Our sample shows that 51% of the old refugees came from the Jericho area where the three main camps were located.

In two respects, therefore, it can be shown that the Zeezya sample is a reasonably representative cross-section of all the tent-camp population of the 1967 refugees. In the first place, it does not draw exclusively on persons from a single district or village. The families in the sample come from many different villages and towns (forty-five communities) in the West Bank. In the second place, the Zeezya sample is not composed exclusively of 'old' or 'new' refugees. The proportion of 'old' refugees is somewhat lower than that of the total population, but it is not unduly low.

The Zeezya sample is probably representative of the population of refugees in tent camps, 70,000 in number. The tables in this report are based on the Zeezya sample. With the above reservations, therefore, the tables may be taken as evidence regarding all tent-camp refugees.

There are, however, 140,000 refugees not in tent-camps. Limitations of time made it impossible for us to interview a representative sample of these non-camp refugees. In the summer of 1967, we did complete 22 interviews with non-camp refugee families and this gave us some insight into the nature of the non-camp population. In general, the refugees preferred to stay out of the camps if they possibly could. The conditions in the towns and villages of the East Bank, however crowded, were better than those in the camps. Furthermore, the families could retain a measure of independence and self-respect that would not be theirs in the camps.

For the refugee family, obtaining shelter in a town or village depended on one of two possibilities: either relatives could provide quarters for the family, or the family had the financial resources to pay for their quarters. Families without either of these two resources had to go to the tent-camps.

It is for this reason that the tent-camps received families which were among the poorest of the refugee families. Middle class families seldom if ever choose to live in the camps. Reports from officials concerned with refugee relief confirm this impression: middle class families prefer to live in conditions of extreme poverty rather than move to the camps.

The tent-camp population, therefore, is probably lower in socio-economic status than is the population of refugees outside the camps. This point should be borne in mind when considering the following data from the Zeezya sample. For instance, we shall present data concerning the property owned by the Zeezya refugees and the extent of their ties with their home communities. It is highly probable that the non-camp refugees, being higher in status, have more property and more extensive community ties than the respondents in Camp Zeezya.

b. *Fieldwork: The First Days in Zeezya*

The reduction of suspicion and the establishment of rapport with the refugees were essential requirements for our research. It was clear that the ordinary techniques of survey research were not appropriate for our purposes. It would not have been possible for interviewers to go into the camp, questionnaires and notebooks in hand, and begin direct interviewing. Such an approach would have been met with distrust and hostility. The information secured in this way would not have been accurate.

Early in our planning, therefore, we decided to go beyond the customary collection of interviews and to provide whatever assistance we could to the refugee families. To this end we included several medical students in our research team. From the social-science students, we selected only those who were interested in providing assistance to the families and seemed, in our judgment, capable of doing so. We were not certain of the type of assistance that we could offer. The students, inexperienced in this kind of activity, had to deal with feelings of anxiety and uncertainty.

Conditions in Zeezya were very difficult. There were physical

discomforts, intense heat in the daytime, constant dust storms, a penetrating cold wind at night. The refugee families were crowded into lightweight tents with insufficient protection against the dust and the cold. Their physical misery was distressing, but even more intense was the sense of psychological distress. The Arab states had suffered a humiliating defeat. The refugees themselves were evidence of the magnitude of the defeat. They were living on the hope of return to their communities. In August, the possibility of return had developed. The refugee families had filled out applications to return to their homes and these applications had been transmitted, via the International Red Cross, to the government of Israel.* In all, about 14,000 refugees were permitted to return: 7% of the total, or one family in thirteen. Then the flow of refugees was stopped, on the grounds that they presented too great a security problem.

In Zeezya, we introduced ourselves as a team of Arab professors and students in sociology and medicine. The purpose of our presence, we said, was to offer social and medical assistance to help the refugees in any way possible and to find out about their experiences. During the first three days of our stay, we did no interviewing. The members of the team explored the camp, helped in the distribution of food and clothing, and visited with the refugees in their tents. The team members began to introduce activities to the camp, in an attempt to liven the monotony of camp life. Some started football games for the boys. Others involved the children in drawing and painting. (Exhibits of these drawings were later held in Beirut and London.) Some of the team members wrote letters for families to relatives in the West Bank and elsewhere. The letters were a natural source of information about the refugee family. Medical students were needed and called upon, day and night. The girls of our team gave informal lessons in child care.

All the team members took part in visiting the refugees in their tents. The visits were both friendly and informative. We drank tea and talked about the refugees' problems, their experiences during and after the war, and their current situation. We exchanged views and opinions and even discussed politics. In this way, we gradually began the process of interviewing. Much of our information was

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* All the families in Zeezya filled out applications to return to their homes.

gathered during these times of relaxation.

During the early days, the research team gained acceptance by the refugees in Camp Zeezya. We discovered that the most immediate problem for the refugees was not so much physical misery as intense loneliness. They felt isolated and forgotten. William James* has observed this, of people suffering a disaster:

> "Surely the cutting edge of all our usual misfortunes comes from their character of loneliness. We lose our health, our wife or children die, our house burns down, or our money is made away with, and the world goes on rejoicing, leaving us on one side and counting us out from all its business."

The presence in the camp of sympathetic persons was a relief from the "cutting edge" of loneliness. The regular relief workers had little time for visits and discussions, but the members of our research team did have time for such visits. In return for our interest we were received with courtesy and hospitality.

*c. Interviewer Training and the Problem of Bias*

Assistance to the refugees was more than a device for data collection. Each member of the team felt deeply about the political situation. Each one felt that the tragedy of the refugees was his own tragedy. To many of us, assistance to the refugee families was an attempt to overcome our own feelings of powerlessness and helplessness.

In this situation, the question must be raised of possible sources of bias in the interviewing. When interviewers feel strongly about the topic they are discussing, there is a distinct possibility that their feelings will influence the course of the interview. In our training of the interviewers and in the preparation for the fieldwork, we attempted to locate these biases and to reduce their effect.

The training began in Beirut, before departure for Jordan. We discussed our preconceptions, so that we would be alert to them and able to keep them separate from the interviews. Interviewers were instructed to recall, as closely as possible, the actual words of

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* William James, "On Some Mental Effects of the Earthquake," "*Memories and Studies,* New York, 1911. Quoted in C.E. Fritz, "Disaster," in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet, *Contemporary Social Problems,* New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961, pp. 656-657.

the respondent. They were not to paraphrase or elaborate the respondent's statements. If some of these statements seemed illogical or suspect, they were to note this fact in the margins of the interview schedule.

In the first days of interviewing, the training was continued. Each completed interview was read through by an instructor, who would then discuss it with the interviewers. The interviewers could then return to the same tent, to improve and complete the interview.

One source of initial bias was the attitude toward the exodus. Some members of our team, when we were first planning the research, said that they felt the refugees were cowards who had fled in the face of the enemy. They argued that no one should have left their homes, regardless of the situation.

This bias disappeared when we began work in Zeezya. The interviewers became acquainted with the refugees as individuals and as members of families. They came to understand the conditions that led to the exodus. Often they discovered that the refugees had had good reason to leave their homes. They were impressed by the refugees' desire to return to their homes. They came to see the refugees not as cowards but as people caught in an immense national disaster.

Another source of initial bias was the expectation, on the part of interviewers, that they would hear stories of atrocities and terror. Some newspaper accounts had emphasized these stories, and the interviewers had been influenced correspondingly.

This bias was countered in two ways. One way was to make the questions as neutral as possible. The interviewers were to ask the families where they were and what they saw on each day of the war. They were not to ask any 'leading questions'. In the manner of a trial lawyer, they were to let the respondent tell his own story.

A second way of countering this bias was to check carefully any accounts of atrocities and violence. The interviewers were to distrust the more flamboyant accounts as possibly exaggerated. They could do this by asking for the names of people injured or killed, by asking for the exact location of the incident. Often it was possible to check on these incidents by independent interviews of members of the same family or with refugee families from the same community.

In these ways, the interviewers were encouraged to reduce sources of bias in their interviewing. There were many opportunities for discussion of the interviews, as the interviewing proceeded. The mem-

bers of the team took their meals together and spent their evenings in the area of the team's tents. At these times the interviews of the day often came up for review. The discussions helped to maintain the spirit of objective inquiry.

d. *Fieldwork: Interview Design and Procedure*

The interview schedule consisted of forty-five questions organized into ten major topics. The topics were: the composition of the refugee family, their previous residence and property, family income and sources of livelihood, the social bonds with their home communities, family educational level and plans for education, experiences and feelings before the 1967 war, during the war, and after the war, present situation, and attitudes toward the crisis and the future. A copy of the interview schedule appears in the Appendix.

All questions were open-ended. This reduced the pressure on the respondent, since he was not forced to make choices between different answers. It also permitted us to use a flexible style of interviewing, described below. The open-ended question does tend to increase the number of "not codable" answers, but its advantages in this situation seemed to outweigh its disadvantages.

The interview schedule also provided blank pages for recording additional information on points not covered in the interview. Interviewers could also record their observations on the quality of the interview and the circumstance in which it took place.

The questions were first developed in English, but all interviewing was carried out in Arabic. The interviewers recorded their interviews in either English or Arabic, being careful to retain key phrases and expressions in the original Arabic.

Some of the questions on the interview schedule dealt with areas that might be sensitive for the respondent. Among these were the reasons for the family's departure from its home, experiences during the war, and attitudes toward the Middle East crisis. In addition to the sensitive nature of the questions, the interviewing had to be carried out in difficult circumstances. Privacy did not exist in the camp. Every conversation was open to all members of the family, neighbors, and anyone else who wanted to listen. The adverse weather conditions have already been noted. Furthermore, the aftermath of war had left a situation where explosive feelings were close to the surface and where rumor and suspicion flourished.

In these circumstances, establishment of an atmosphere of con-

fidence and good rapport was exceedingly important. Often, in social research, confidence is increased by telling the respondent that every thing he says is confidential, to be seen only by the research team. In the refugee camp, however, assurances from a stranger would not be convincing. If the stranger proceeded to write down the words of the respondent, the situation would take on the character of a judicial inquiry and good rapport would vanish. The lower-class respondent is constantly on his guard against officials.

Faced with these problems, we decided to define the interviews as social visits. This definition of the situation is immediately intelligible to the Arab villager, for whom visits *(ziyaara)* and evening conversation *(sahra)* form an important part of life. The visit confers status upon the host, implying that he is the equal of the visitor. The visit takes place in an atmosphere of courtesy and good feeling, quite different from the formal interview.

Defining the interview as a visit had clear advantages, but it also had drawbacks. First of all, nothing could be written down during a visit. The interviewers had to recall the answers to the questions that were put. Secondly, the sequence of questions had to be flexible, so as to suit the requirements of courteous conversation. Thirdly, a visit was a time-consuming procedure, requiring ceremony and refreshments.

This type of interview imposed heavy burdens on the interviewers. They had to remember the answers to the questions and record them later, in the research team's tents. The first interviews conducted under this procedure often required three or four visits, since the interviewers covered only two or three topics at each visit. At the end of each visit, the interviewers went back to their tents and recorded the information that they had collected.

The interviewers soon developed skill in the "visiting-interview." The main problem, they found, was not in recalling the answers. These were often distinctive and clear. The problem lay in memorizing the questions. Once the interviewers were familiar with the interview questions, they could proceed more rapidly, completing the interview in a single visit.

Nonetheless, the type of interviewing limited the number of interviews that could be carried out each day. The loss in number of completed interviews had to be set off against the improvement in rapport and the quality of the information. It seemed better to have a small number of interviews completed under favorable conditions

than a large number of uncertain quality.

The number of interviews was further limited by our decision to have interviewers work in pairs. This team interviewing facilitated the recall of questions and of responses. The two interviewers could compare their recall of the responses while recording the interview. Furthermore, the use of two-person teams made it possible for the women members of the team to circulate freely in the camp. In the camp, it would not have been acceptable for young women to visit alone with strangers.

During the first week of our stay, the refugees were not usually aware that they were being interviewed. Later, they became used to our visits and our interest in their experiences. It was then possible to proceed with a more direct form of questioning. Never, however, was any information recorded in the presence of the respondents. The format of the "visiting-interview" was retained throughout the fieldwork. The rapport with the respondents was very good. Families welcomed the interviewers. There was no case of a refusal to be interviewed.

The interviewing of the 'Zeezya sample' was completed in two weeks. After this, the research team moved to Amman to interview non-camp refugees. In Amman, it was difficult to locate the respondents and to establish successful rapport with them. The "visiting-interview," while still possible, took place under more formal and restrained circumstances. The quality of the Amman interviews convinced us that our policy in Zeezya had been correct. Twenty-two interviews were completed in Amman before the research team had to return to Beirut for appointments there.

e. *Data processing: Verification, Coding, and Tabulation*

As soon as the interviews had been recorded, one of the sociologists would read them over, looking for errors and omissions. Wherever possible, we would check the statements made in the interview. One of the most useful checks was a geographical one. Using a large scale map of Palestine, we would locate the family's village and the route that they reported they had used to reach the East Bank. By taking into account their means of transportation and the time elapsed, we could assess the accuracy of their report. Another kind of check was made by comparing accounts from families in the same village or from neighboring villages. In this way, the quality of information in the interview was assessed. Additional information

and verification were obtained through further visits to the family.

Finally, after the fieldwork had been completed, codes were developed to classify the answers to the open-ended questions. The coding of the answers was done by members of the research team and their work was again checked by the sociologists directing the research.

## CHAPTER IV

# THE 1967 REFUGEES

A. *Introduction*

In the preceding section the methods used in this research were described in detail to help the reader evaluate the research. In this section, we present a description of the 1967 refugees, particularly of their socio-economic status and their ties to their home communities. We shall be concerned with the ownership of homes and of land, with the level of education, and with the length of residence in their home community. Most of these results are based on the "Zeezya sample" of one hundred interviews collected in the tent-camp at Zeezya. These results are applicable, with reservations, to the 70,000 tent-camp refugees. To give some idea of the differences between the tent-camp refugees and the 140,000 refugees who are not in camps, we present a comparison of the Zeezya sample with our sample of non-camp refugees. Another comparison that is of interest is that of the "new" refugees, who had never been refugees before, and the "old" refugees, who had left their homes in 1948 and never returned. This section includes a comparison of the "new" and "old" refugees, based on the Zeezya sample.

One tends to speak of "refugees" as a collective term, without reference to the individuals and the families that make up the refugee collectivity. It may be helpful, before beginning the description of the refugees as a group, to consider some individual cases. These are presented below in brief form, so as to give the reader a sense of the refugees as persons.

1. *The family of Naomi* come from Beit Noba, a village of 1400 people. Beit Noba is near the frontier between Jordan and Israel, in the Latrun sector west of Jerusalem. Naomi (in Arabic,

Ni'met) is an attractive girl of 23, engaged to a young Arab who is at present working in West Germany. Her father, 'Abdul Rahim Ali Ahmad, is an elderly man, a retired cook. Naomi's mother is younger than her father, a still vigorous woman of about 50. Other members of the family include Naomi's married sister, Amina, and her four small children, and Naomi's younger sister 'Aisha eight years old. All these people are now in Camp Zeezya, living in two adjacent tents. Their main worry is for the schooling of 'Aisha. (At the time of interviewing, there were no schools in Camp Zeezya). A few months before the war, they moved to their new four room house. The story of their departure from Beit Noba is told in section five.

2. *Khalid 'Abdul Halim*, 28 years old, was born and lived in Sebastia, near Nablus. He is married to 'Arabiyya, 20 years old, and they have two daughters. The elder daughter is one and a half years old. The younger one, three weeks old at the time of the interview, is named Zeezya, after the place where she was born. Khalid's father is dead, but his mother, Hajji Salimi, is with them in the camp. Hajji Salimi is a registered midwife and has helped to deliver many of the babies born in Zeezya. Also with them in the camp is Khalid's sister, Khairiyya, and her three-year-old son Tarik. Khairiyya's husband is in West Germany.

Khalid's main occupation is carpentry. He has had an elementary school education, reads the newspapers and listens frequently to the radio. Khalid is a Sunni Moslem, but not very religious. He likes people, is always hospitable and always neatly dressed. He enjoys Palestinian folk songs and plays a folk musical instrument (a type of flute called *shabbabah).*

Khalid was working in Amman at the outbreak of the war. On the Monday of the war he returned to his family in Sebastia. They left Sebastia on Thursday, June 8th, after it had been occupied by Israeli troops. Khalid feared that he would be interned, since he has been an army reservist. With two families and his mother dependent on him, he could not risk internment and decided to bring everyone with him to Amman. Since no quarters could be found in Amman, Khalid and his family had to move to the tent-camps.

3. *Taha* is an "old" refugee, a refugee from the 1948 war. Since then he has lived in Nu'eimeh Camp near Jericho. He is 38 years old, married, with four children between the ages of thirteen and three years. Two of his children are in school. In the camp,

they owned a two-room house built of mud bricks. For many years he worked for UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) and had recently started a chicken farm. He was pleased with his new community and had become active in civil defense.

On the third day of the war (Wednesday), with many airplanes overhead, Taha took his wife and children to the fields, with the intention of coming back to the farm. However, he was not able to return. He wants to go back very much, even under Israeli rule. He is politically sensitive and outspoken. Israeli rule means to him "threats, dishonor, and humiliation." He thinks that the Arabs should rearm themselves to regain their dignity and self-respect, and to regain their country. "As an Arab I can not live without pride, gallantry, and dignity. Your country is where you were born and no other country could be dearer to your heart."

4. *Sabri 'Abdul-Rahman Mahmoud*, about 40 years old, lived in Nabi Samu'il village. He is a construction contractor, married, and has nine children the eldest being 15 years old. They owned a home. When the Israeli army invaded the village, they left with the rest of the inhabitants to Beer Nabala, a nearby village, with the intention of going back. Two days later, they returned to the village hoping that the "Israeli rule will not be harsher than the Turkish and English rule," but they were forbidden to stay. They were informed that Nabi Samu'il had become a military base and that nobody would be allowed in. They discovered that some homes had been destroyed and others looted.

5. *Sami 'Oweida*, in his forties, has a secondary education, is married, and had 7 children. He lived in Jericho and was an official of its municipality. He had to leave with his family (an account of why he left and what happened to his family is found in a later section of this report) on Wednesday, June 7th. He and his family experienced an aerial attack by napalm on that day after they had crossed the River Jordan. Two of his daughters, Adla (19 years old, and just graduated from a secondary school) and Labiba (4 years old) died of napalm burns. He and his son Darwish (7 years old) were hospitalized and still carry the scars of their injuries.

Mr. 'Oweida was interviewed in Amman. The other four cases —the families of Naomi, Khalid 'Abdul Halim, Taha, and Sabri Mahmoud—are from the "Zeezya sample." The Zeezya sample consisted mainly of people from villages, small towns, and West

Bank refugee camps. Their occupations were similar to those of Taha and Khalid. In the crisis of war, they had few financial resources to support them and their families. Once they were cut off from their home communities and from their relatives, they became dependent on public charity. As refugees, they had to accept the subsistence provided by the tent camps.

This dependence and lack of money may seem to indicate that, *before* becoming refugees, these families came from the poorest sector of society. Such an inference is by no means justified without careful examination of the socio-economic status of the families in their home communities. Data on their original socio-economic status is presented below.

B. *Socio-economic status*

Information was collected in order to assess the socio-economic status of the refugees prior to June 1967. In Table 4-1, this information is shown for the Zeezya sample. Level of education and occupation are shown for the head of the family. Income was defined, in the interviews, as the total family income. Probably, however, families did not report income from members who were working in other towns or countries.

Table 4-1 gives a composite picture of the social status of the tent-camp refugee families. The largest occupational grouping is that of the peasant-farmers (34%). Next come the semi-skilled workers (19%), with such occupations as baker, retired soldier, plasterer. There are a number of manual workers (15%), many of them farm workers or laborers on construction. Many of the families come from villages where it is possible for the men to engage in seasonal labor outside the villages.

The salesman and shop-owner group (17%), includes many owners of small village stores. In our sample, there are few skilled and clerical workers (7%) and only one man who is classified as professional, a Muslim man of religion.

The occupational classification reflects the rural origin of many of the refugees. This is further borne out by the second part of Table 4-1 where the heads of households are classified by educational level. Over half, (57%) are illiterate. Of the remainder, one-fifth (22%) have had some elementary schooling, at least sufficient to provide them with literacy. A remaining fifth (21%) have had

TABLE 4-1 : OCCUPATION, EDUCATION AND INCOME OF REFUGEES. (All figures in percentages of total number, N, of valid responses in Zeezya.)

| A. *Occupation* | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 58) | *Total* (N = 95) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Farmer, peasant | 24% | 40% | 34% |
| Manual worker | 22 | 10 | 15 |
| Semi-skilled worker | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| Skilled worker, clerical | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Salesman, shop-owner | 22 | 14 | 17 |
| Professional (a mullah) | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Retired, unemployed; not classifiable | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Educational Level of Head of Family* | *Old Refugees* (N = 30) | *New Refugees* (N = 47) | *Total* (N = 77) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Illiterate | 70% | 49% | 57% |
| Some elementary schooling | 17 | 26 | 22 |
| Completed elementary schooling or more | 13 | 25 | 21 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| C. *Monthly Income of Family, In Jordanian Dinars** | *Old Refugees* (N = 28) | *New Refugees* (N = 50) | *Total* (N = 78) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-20 Dinars | 50% | 26% | 35% |
| 21-40 Dinars | 25 | 36 | 32 |
| 41 Dinars or more | 25 | 38 | 33 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

* (One Dinar = $2.80 U.S.)

elementary schooling or more.

The percentage of literate heads of households (43%) may be compared with literacy figures for similar groups in Jordan.* The district of Nablus has a literacy rate of 56% for men aged fifteen years or over. The district of Jerusalem has a literacy rate of 55% and that of Hebron 40%. Our sample has a literacy rate somewhat lower than that for the West Bank districts from which the refugee families come. This can be accounted for in two ways. First, our sample consists of heads of families, most of them aged thirty years or more. Literacy rates in this age group are lower than the rates for younger age groups. If a correction is made for the fact that our sample consists mainly of older men, it appears that the literacy rate in the Zeezya sample is approximately that for similar populations in the district of origin. Second, the tent-camp refugees are not representative of all the Jordanians of the West Bank. They are lower in socio-economic status than the non-camp refugees in Amman and other urban centers.

The income figures shown in Table 4-1 also suggest that our Zeezya sample is typical of rural populations in the West Bank. The median monthly income per family, as stated by our respondents, is about 30 Jordanian dinars ($84 U.S.), or 360 dinars per year ($1080). If one allows about seven persons per family, the per capita income is about 52 dinars per year. Jordanian per capita income for the nation as a whole is about 73 dinars.* The families in our Zeezya sample have an income somewhat below the national average, as might be expected of rural and small-town families. These families supplement their cash income with the produce of their lands. The reported median family income of 30 dinars per month, while low, is well above the level of poverty.

Information about housing and land-ownership is presented in table 4-2.

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* Literacy figures, from the census of 1961, are taken from *Statistical Guide to Jordan*. Amman: Department of Statistics, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1965, p. 17.

* This figure is derived from Table 36 in *Statistical Guide to Jordan, op. cit.*, p. 58. Total income of the private sector is shown as 146 million dinars, for a population slightly in excess of two millions.

TABLE 4-2 : HOUSING AND LAND OWNERSHIP IN COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN (Zeezya sample — all figures in percentages except N.)

| A. *Ownership of House* | *Old Refugees* (N = 30) | *New Refugees* (N = 56) | *Total* (N = 86) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Owned their house | 73% | 84% | 80% |
| Lived in rented house | 27 | 16 | 20 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Number of Rooms* | *Old Refugees* (N = 33) | *New Refugees* (N = 56) | *Total* (N = 89) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1-2 rooms | 67% | 45% | 53% |
| 3 rooms or more | 33 | 55 | 47 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| C. *Ownership of Land* | *Old Refugees* (N = 35) | *New Refugees* (N = 59) | *Total* (N = 94) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Owned no land | 69% | 22% | 39% |
| 0-10 dunums* | 12 | 22 | 18 |
| 11-20 dunums | 8 | 12 | 11 |
| 21 dunums or more | 8 | 34 | 25 |
| Owned land, amount not specified | 3 | 10 | 7 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

* (One dunum = 0.22 acres)

In their communities of origin, most of the refugees (80%) owned their homes. About one-fifth lived in rented homes. This rate of ownership is characteristic of the districts from which the refugees come. Ownership of one's house is common, rental is uncommon. It should be noted, however, that a precise definition of ownership was not requested in the interview. In the absence of such a definition, it seems likely that the respondent answering the question about home ownership defined ownership as *not* having to pay rent. Ownership, in this sense, means property belonging to oneself, to one's wife, or to close relatives of either the husband or the wife. The family would probably not pay rent for a house owned by a close relative. Such a house would be regarded as owned by the extended family, of which the respondent is a member, and hence as owned by oneself.

The houses in the villages are built of stone or of mud-brick. The older the village, the more likely it is that the houses will be made of stone. Mud-brick, on the other hand, is cheaper and more likely to be found in the new communities in the West Bank, such as the camps housing the 1948 refugees. Furthermore, these houses tended to be small in size. The majority of these houses (53%) had one or two rooms. Two-thirds of the old refugees (67%) lived in mud-brick houses of two rooms or less. The majority of new refugees (55%) lived in houses of three rooms or more.

Apartments are rare in the communities of origin. Only one family in the Zeezya sample reported living in an apartment. Equally, there are very few tent-dwellers. One family, refugees from the 1948 war, said they had lived in a tent prior to June, 1967.

Table 4-2 also shows the amounts of land owned by the Zeezya refugees in their home communities. More than half (61%) reported owning land. 19% owned less than ten dunums (2.2 acres). 11% owned between ten and twenty dunums (2.2-4.4 acres). 25% owned more than twenty dunums. The definition of land ownership is probably the same as that for house ownership, and means that land is owned either by the respondent or by a close relative.

The data presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, concerning the socio-economic status of the Zeezya families, indicate that these families are about average in status in the communities from which they come. This finding takes into account the fact that the families come mainly from the villages and small towns, not the cities, of the West Bank. Some of the families are above average in status, others are

below average. There is no indication, however, that these tent-camp refugees are markedly lower in status than the rest of the people in their communities of origin. They were not, prior to June 1967, an impoverished and property-less group of people.

This finding is relevant to our central question, why did they leave their homes? It rules out the answer that they left because they had little or nothing to lose. The "riff-raff" hypothesis must be rejected.

Before leaving this point, it must be asked whether the data presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 are accurate. Do they truly represent the pre-June status of these families or are there errors in the data? The most likely source of error would be an inflation of status by the respondent. The refugee family, it might be argued, would try to present itself in as favorable a light as possible. Therefore it would claim more property, a greater income and a higher status than it actually had.

It is our judgment that this type of error is not frequent in our data, for three reasons. In the first place, the differences between the old and new refugees showed up very clearly. The differences could be taken as a check of validity. A second reason for accepting the data on socio-economic status is the fact that the data on occupation and level of education are in agreement with the data on income and property. All point to the same conclusion: the average status of the Zeezya families. Data concerning occupation and level of education are less subject to falsification than the ones on property and income. It is harder for a man to deliberately falsify his occupation, a fact known to everyone in his home community (and one must remember that these interviews in the tent were a family occasion), than to falsify his income, a fact that few persons know. On education, the respondent is also likely to give a true answer, since the result of education is visible. It is difficult for an illiterate man to claim literacy.

The third reason is that the atmosphere of the interview was not one where deliberate misstatements were likely to occur. The respondents were not subject to the pressures of an official interrogation. The interviewers reported a feeling of openness and honesty in the interviews. (The interviews that we, the leaders, conducted, twenty in number, gave us the same impression.) The refugee respondents, with a few exceptions, impressed us as people who were freely giving us the information that they possessed.

For these reasons, the data presented in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 appear to give an accurate description of the socio-economic status of the Zeezya refugees. Insofar as the Zeezya sample is representative of the tent-camp refugees, it may be said that the tent-camp refugees were about average in social status, before June 1967.

C. *The Zeezya sample and the Urban Sample: a Comparison*

The refugees in tent-camps comprised about one-third of the total number of 1967 refugees from the West Bank. About two-thirds of these refugees, in September 1967, had found dwelling-places outside the camps, in the villages and towns of the East Bank district of Jordan. Many of the dwelling-places were little better than the tents of the tent camps, but the refugees preferred to remain outside the camps if they possibly could. The 70,000 persons in the camps were there as a last resort; 140,000 persons stayed outside the camps in whatever quarters they could find.

Financial necessity was the main reason for refugees remaining in the camps. Another reason was the lack of relatives with whom they could live. Any family who had a source of income, or who had relatives with whom they could live, chose to stay outside the camp. These people formed the population of 'non-camp refugees."

The data on the Zeezya sample refer to the population of tent-camp refugees, but they do not refer to the population of non-camp refugees. It is probable that the non-camp refugees are *higher* in socio-economic status than are the tent-camp refugees, since the non-camp refugees had sources of income that would enable them to stay out of the camps.

This point is important since the population of non-camp refugees is so very much larger than the population of tent-camp refugees. If it could be proven that the non-camp refugees are in fact higher in socio-economic status, then one could make the following statement about all the 1967 refugees from the West Bank:

> The 1967 refugees represent a cross-section of Jordanian citizens. They are, on the average, as well off as the persons who did not become refugees. There is no indication, therefore, that poverty or financial distress played a part in their decision to leave their homes.*

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* In our current research on non-camp refugees we plan to check on this statement.

We have indicated earlier the importance of this statement in refuting the "riff-raff" hypothesis and similar explanations of the 1967 exodus. We do not have enough data to prove this statement definitively. It was not possible for us, in the time at our disposal (the summer of 1967), to interview a representative sample of non-camp refugees.

We did interview, however, a small number of non-camp refugee families, twenty-two in all. These families do not compose a representative sample, but it may be of interest to compare the status of these non-camp refugees with the Zeezya sample. This comparison is presented in Table 4-3.

TABLE 4-3 : COMPARISON OF ZEEZYA SAMPLE AND URBAN SAMPLE

(N is number of valid responses. All other figures are percentages.)

| A. *Refugee Status Before June 1967* | *Urban* (N = 22) | *Zeezya* (N = 98) |
|---|---|---|
| Refugee of 1948 | 41% | 38% |
| Non-refugee | 59 | 62 |
| | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Educational Level of the Head of Family* | *Urban* (N = 22) | *Zeezya* (N = 77) |
|---|---|---|
| Illiterate | 14% | 57% |
| Some elementary schooling | 5 | 22 |
| Completed elementary schooling or more | 81 | 21 |
| | 100% | 100% |

| C. *Monthly Income of Family, in Jordanian Dinars (One Dinar = $2.80 US)* | *Urban* (N = 19) | *Zeezya* (N = 78) |
|---|---|---|
| 0-20 dinars | 21% | 35% |
| 21-40 dinars | 16 | 32 |
| 41 dinars or more | 63 | 33 |
| | 100% | 100% |

Table 4-3 shows three comparisons between the Zeezya sample and the urban sample of non-camp refugees. The first of these is the proportion of the sample that had already been refugees once, from the war of 1948. The proportion of previous refugees is almost the same in the two samples: 41% in the urban sample and 38% in Zeezya. The second part of the table compares the levels of education in the two samples. The urban sample is almost entirely composed of persons who have completed elementary schooling (81%), whereas the Zeezya sample has few such persons (21%). The illiteracy rate is low for the urban sample, 14%, whereas it is 58% in the Zeezya sample. The third part of the table compares the monthly income of the two groups. The urban sample reports much higher incomes: 63% received 41 dinars or more per month, whereas only 35% of the Zeezya sample have so high an income.

This comparison of the Zeezya sample and the urban sample suggests that the non-camp refugees, as represented by the urban sample, have higher socio-economic status than do the camp refugees of Zeezya. The urban sample is small and admittedly not representative of the non-camp refugees. Perhaps it is safer to say that there is no indication, in the data of Table 4-3, that the non-camp refugees are *lower* in status than are the camp refugees. One is led to the conclusion that the non-camp refugees are at least average in socio-economic status and that many of them may be above average.

D. *Ties with the Home Community*

The data on socio-economic status have indicated that the refugees did not come from the poorest sector of their home communities. Judging by their status, many of them had an established position in their communities. People with homes and lands usually have many ties with their communities and a deep affection for them.

There are many indications of this affection in the interviews. People such as Khalid'Abdul Halim speak with pride of their villages, of their particular qualities as communities and of their friends and relatives in the village. Khalid would not play his flute (the *shabbabah)* near his tent lest his wife, sister, and mother "be overcome with yearning for Sebastia and start to cry." One of the most deeply felt of the privations of refugee status is the separation from the home community. They feel they are living in a state of exile and uprootedness.

One of our respondents put it this way:

"Your country is like your child *(baladak mithl waladak);*
you cannot be separated from it for a long time."

The Palestinian Arabs, especially villagers and small-town dwellers, are person-oriented, and community-oriented, and family-oriented. Outside these spheres, they feel lost.*

It is possible from the Zeezya sample, to make an objective assessment of the proportion of refugee families who have these strong ties with their home community. Four items of information can be taken as objective indices of degree of integration into home communities. Two of these indices have already been described: ownership of homes, and ownership of land. The other two indices relate to more "structural ties:" the length of time that the family has lived in the community, and the presence of relatives in the community. A family that has lived in one place for a long time usually develops strong ties with its community, whereas a family that has moved around is less likely to have these ties. A family with relatives in the same village is likely to be integrated into that village, whereas a family without relatives nearby tends to be regarded as outsiders, especially in Arab communities.

Data on the structural ties of the Zeezya sample are presented in Table 4-4.

The distributions in Table 4-4 show the large percentage of refugee families having strong ties with their home communities. On the question of length of residence, over half the families (59%) had lived in their communities more than twenty years. The overwhelming majority of the new refugees (93%) had lived continuously for 21 years or more in their home communities. Almost all of these families had never lived anywhere else. Their village or town was the only community that they had ever known. Similarly the old refugees tended to live in the same place where they had settled in 1948. Our data show that 94% of them had lived from 11-20 years in the same place. These were old refugees, families that had moved

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* Westerners, whose orientation is to achievement rather than family, find it difficult to understand this fact. Thus, some of them think that were it not for the agitation of the Arab politicians, the refugees would have settled down and accepted reality. For them "reality" means exile and uprootedness.

TABLE 4-4 : TIES WITH THE HOME COMMUNITY
(Zeezya sample. "N" is number of families responding to the question. All other figures are percentages.)

| A. *Length of Time Lived in Home Community* | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 61) | *Total* (N = 98) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two years or less | 3% | 0% | 1% |
| 3-10 years | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| 11-20 years | 94 | 5 | 39 |
| 21 years or more | 3 | 93 | 59 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Families Having Relatives in Home Community* | *Old Refugees* (N = 26) | *New Refugees* (N = 48) | *Total* (N = 74) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Had no relatives | 31% | 4% | 14% |
| Yes, had relatives | 69 | 96 | 86 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

once, in 1948, during the period of the first Arab-Israel war. Since then, for nineteen years, they had stayed in the same community.

The second part of Table 4-4 shows the proportion of families with relatives in the same community. This proportion is very high, 86%, of the Zeezya families. 96% of the new refugees had relatives. These figures indicate the number of kinship ties between the families and other people in the community. This proportion is characteristic of Arab villages, where kinship links are both numerous and strong.

Both the subjective remarks in the interviews and the objective data in Table 4-4 refute the "nomadic mentality" hypothesis and point to the same conclusion: the intensity of the links between the families and their homes. They suggest the strength of the desire to return to these homes, (described in Chapter VI). They also suggest the loneliness and sadness of people cut off from communities to which they are so strongly attached.

E. *"Old" and "New" Refugees*

The West Bank sector of Jordan, prior to June 1967, had nearly half of its population classified as refugees from the 1948 conflict.

There were over 400,000 of these 1948 refugees. About a third of them lived in refugee camps, while the remaining two-thirds had established themselves outside of the camps. Many of these received a modest assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), to help them with their needs for food, health, and education. The value of this aid per person amounted to about $25 U.S. per year.

Many of these 1948 refugees took part in the 1967 exodus, thus becoming refugees for the second time. In all, about 100,000 of these "old refugees" moved from the West Bank to the East Bank area of Jordan. These "old refugees" accounted for about one-half of the 1967 refugees.

The rest of the 1967 refugees were "new refugees," people who had never left their homes before and who had never received UNRWA aid. There were over 100,000 of these "new" refugees, in the East Bank of Jordan in September, 1967.

The distinction between "old" and "new" refugees is an important one. Some of the "old" refugees had had experience of living in camps. These were used to contacts with officials, to waiting in line, to crowding and to lack of privacy. They were accustomed to the subordinate status of a refugee, to dependence on others for the essential requirements of life. In particular, they had had the experience of social isolation, of being cut off from relatives and friends and from one's usual social surroundings.*

In contrast, the "new" refugees were experiencing the shock of exodus and of camp life for the first time. At the time of our study, many of them were still bewildered by the routine of the refugee camp. In spirit, they were still back in the villages from which they had come. They could not believe that it would not be possible for them to return to their homes. They could not believe or accept that the Jordan had become a river without bridges.

The factor of previous experience, of having been refugees before,

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* By this we do not mean that the 'old' refugees had lived for nineteen years in a social vacuum. The 'old' refugees had adjusted to their situation in the West Bank. Many of them, like Taha, had started a new life and were attempting to establish themselves in their new communities. But their ties to these communities were not as strong as the ties of the 'new' refugees, who had never before experienced the trauma of exodus.

explains some of the differences between the "old" and the "new" refugees. In addition, the tables presented so far show the following: Firstly, the new refugees, prior to June 1967, had a higher socio-economic status (see tables 4-1 and 4-2) than the old refugees. 84% of them (compared to 73% of the old refugees) owned their houses. Similarly, 78% of the new refugees (compared to 31% of the old refugees) owned some land. By contrast, 49% of the new refugees and 70% of the old refugees were illiterate. Finally, the new refugees had a higher monthly income. Half of the old refugees (50%) and a quarter of the new refugees were in the lower bracket of monthly income (20 dinars or less), and while 38% of the new refugees earned 41 dinars or more per month, 25% of the old refugees did so.

In the second place, the new refugees had stronger ties to their home communities. Table 4-4 shows that 97% of the old refugees had lived less than 20 years in the home communities from which they had to depart during the June war, and 93% of the new refugees had lived all or almost all their lives in their home communities. Furthermore, while 69% of the old refugees had relatives in their home communities, 96% of the new had such relatives. Thus, by leaving these communities, the new refugees lost more and suffered a deeper psychological shock than did the "old" refugees. Further comparisons will be made between the old and new refugees, especially in the sections connected with reasons for leaving and the wish to return.

F. *Conclusion*

In this section, Chapter IV, we have presented data on the socio-economic status of the 1967 refugees and the degree of their integration in their home communities. We have introduced five individual families: those of Naomi, Khalid 'Abdul Halim, Taha, Sabri Mahmoud, and Sami 'Oweida. We have compared the data on the Zeezya sample of tent-camp refugees with data from a small "urban" sample of non-camp refugees. We have shown the strength of the ties linking the refugee families to their home communities. And we have introduced an important distinction, between the "old" refugee and the "new" refugee.

Three conclusions emerge from the findings presented in this section. The first is that the 1967 refugees, in our estimation, appear to be an average cross-section of the Jordanian West Bank population. There are both wealthy and poor among them. There is no

disproportionate number of poor people, and there is little basis for alleging that most of the 1967 refugees were poor people who left little behind them.

The second conclusion, suggested by the first, is that the 1967 refugees were well integrated into their home communities. The experiences of June 1967 led them to leave these communities, but there is no indication that they were marginal to these communities, lacking in close ties and therefore potential migrants.

The third conclusion is that both of the foregoing points apply with especial force to the "new" refugees. These people, more than 100,000 in number, had never before been refugees. They had never been on UNRWA ration rolls. These "new" refugees were higher in status and lost more in the war than did the "old" refugees, who had already been refugees in the 1948 conflict. The "new" refugees had stronger ties to their home communities and wanted desperately to return to their homes.

These conclusions bring out once more the central question of our research. Our findings so far suggest that these people were, prior to June 1967, well established in their home communities. If this is so, then why did they leave? What caused the exodus of June 1967? To this question we now turn. The next section, Chapter V, presents a description and an analysis of the exodus.

## CHAPTER V

# THE EXODUS : ITS DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSES

A. *Introduction : The Experiences of the Refugees*

In seeking to answer our question concerning the reasons for the exodus, we begin by looking at the events of June, 1967, and the civilian reaction to the events.

Tension in Jordan had been high since November, 1966. In that month Israeli army units carried out a retaliatory raid on the Jordanian village of Samu', near Hebron. Jordanian casualties were high and included civilian deaths and injuries. In May, 1967, a succession of events led to the mobilization of Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). On the morning of Monday, June 5, war broke out. The Jordanian air force, numbering some twenty airplanes, was wiped out in a few hours. With complete control of the air, Israeli army units moved forward and occupied the West Bank area of Jordan. By Wednesday night, the occupation was complete. The Jordanian army had withdrawn across the River Jordan to the East Bank, and a cease-fire was accepted by both Jordan and Israel on the following day.

In the villages along the frontier between Israel and Jordan, the first reaction of the civilians was to find a safe shelter, some place that would not be exposed to gunfire and aerial attack. Many civilians took shelter in caves and orchards. Others moved to villages that were less exposed to possible fighting: villages further back in the hills, away from the main roads.

This action of seeking shelter was common on Monday night and Tuesday morning. The civilians did not plan to leave their homes permanently. They moved out only for a few hours or a day, until the situation was clearer and it would be safe to return home. As it

turned out, it was not possible for many of them to return to their homes.

The case of the family of Naomi illustrates this pattern. In their frontier village of Beit Noba, district of Latrun, Naomi, her sister and her parents heard the fighting begin on Monday evening. The interviewer records that:

> "They heard shots and cannons. They could see fire below them in the direction of Jerusalem. All that convinced them that they should leave. The mother put two blankets on her head. They left without food; the mother was barefooted... They reached Beit 'Ur and could see the lights of Israeli jeeps and tanks behind them. The mother put her hand over the children's mouths, when the Israelis passed, so as not to be heard."

Two days later, they made their way back to the village, reaching it in the late afternoon. The interview record continues:

> "They saw their homes being demolished. Red soil was put over the place where houses had been. They said, 'just like a dream. It's as if we've never been there'."

The account of the destruction of Beit Noba was corroborated by a group of Arabic-speaking French missionnaries who visited the Latrun sector later in June. They found the Latrun sector tightly guarded, but managed to evade the guards and to visit the villages of Beit Noba, 'Amwas, and Yalo. They reported:

> "And there was what the Israelis did not want us to see: three villages systematically destroyed by dynamite and bulldozers. Alone in a deathly silence donkeys wandered about the ruins. Here and there a crushed piece of furniture or a torn pillow stuck out of the mass of plaster, stones, and concrete."*

There are three elements in the experience of Naomi and her family that are repeated in many of the refugee interviews. One is the surprise and the lack of preparation for departure. Naomi's mother took blankets but no food. They did not plan to stay away from home long.

A second element is the fear of Israelis. "The mother put her

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* Sister Marie-Thérèse, «Jérusalem et le sang des pauvres» in *Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien*, 47, Oct. 5, 1967. See also the accounts collected by Pierre Andreu, *ibid.*, 48, «Les réfugiés», pp. 47-48.

hand over the children's mouths, so as not to be heard." Israel is viewed by the refugees as cruel and ruthless. Some of them, in the interviews, referred to the tragedy of Deir Yassin as an example of what they feared in their own communities. In the village of Deir Yassin, in April 1948, Israeli irregulars killed 250 men, women, and children.

A third element is the attempt by Naomi and her family to return to their home. In Naomi's case, there was no home to return to. In the case of other families, they found the road blocked by Israeli troops. Some reported that they were rounded up by Israeli troops, put on trucks, and driven a long distance from their homes. Then they dismounted and were told to "go to Hussein."

These accounts are characteristic of refugee families from villages near the Israel-Jordan frontier. In other villages and towns, not near the frontier, occupation came somewhat later. It was preceded by aerial attack and reports of aerial attack. Air raids were frequent near the major highways, along which the Jordanian army was retreating. There was little shelter from the bombing and the Jordanian air force had ceased to exist.

There were instances of panic, where people left their homes and fled simply because others were doing so. This condition obtained in the Jordan valley in the vicinity of Jericho, where three large camps of 1948 refugees were located. The aerial attacks in this area were heavy and people left their homes without thought or planning. One woman, describing her state of mind, said that she "picked up a pillow instead of a child."

The sight of dead and injured persons added to the terror, as did the use of napalm. One example is the family of Mahmoud, residents of the town of Jericho. The interviewer recorded that:

> They left their home on Wednesday afternoon. Expected to return. Spent the night in the fields. The next morning (Thursday) they saw soldiers retreating and many people fleeing. Instead of returning as they had planned, they decided to follow the rest of the people. In the Ghor (Jordan valley) they saw people "like salt in the valley," many people dead, possessions left on the way.

The conditions of panic were severe in the camps of 1948 refugees, in the district of Jericho: Nu'eimeh, Ain-es-Sultan, and 'Aqabat Jabr. Thirty-five thousand people, refugees from the 1948 war, left these camps to become refugees once again. Few of these people

owned land, although many did own the small concrete and mud-brick houses that they had built and in which they lived. They had few ties with the camp communities in which they had spent nineteen years. The situational pressures created a state of terror and disorganisation in these camps, and people responded by flight.

Even in the Jericho area, not all persons responded uncritically to the fear of aerial attack. Sami 'Oweida was an official of the Jericho municipality. He remained at his post until the afternoon of Wednesday, June 7th, when the pleas of his family decided him to leave. His account is an interesting one, as it shows the intensity of the aerial attack and his own conflict between duty and family loyalty.

Mr. 'Oweida had responsibilities for some of the civil defense measures in the Jericho district. In the three days previous to the war, he had organized blood donations from a list of 650 volunteers. On Monday, June 5th, he continued with the work of organizing district civil defense. The interview transcript (from the urban sample) reads as follows:

> "On Tuesday, June 6th, planes started to come in waves. They came as low as the roof of a house... We did not mind the planes. We were thinking of Jerusalem. A group of young people wanted to go and fight in Jerusalem. But they could not reach it, and they had to return. In the afternoon people started to arrive from Jerusalem. We could not believe it. What had happened? Fear started to mount.
>
> "The Iraqi army entered the city of Jericho. We were happy and felt confident. But suddenly, as the Iraqi army units started to advance, planes came in wave after wave, constantly. The bombs hit hard. The planes came in low, so low, like the teeth of a comb, combing the land.
>
> "The Iraqi army units could not advance. The siren was blowing constantly... The planes did not cease coming in. I was told that Camp 88 (an army encampment) was all on fire. I went in a Land Rover followed by firemen and led them to the camp. Water was not effective on the fire. We did not know it was napalm. Everything kept burning. Burning soldiers threw themselves in front of the water hoses. But they kept burning, uttering piercing screams. We were never trained to combat such fire. Planes were constantly over Jericho.
>
> "On Wednesday the bombing continued. Dark planes used

to come in low, then they were followed by light planes and cannon fire... People were leaving. I refused to leave; so did my brother... My wife and children said: "Do you want to kill us?" My daughter 'Adla pleaded with me to go."

Eventually Mr. 'Oweida gathered his family together and they began the trip to the East Bank. The interview transcript continues:

"We left home at 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon. On the way to the bridge we saw no less than 200 bodies of soldiers and civilians. Whoever could do so covered the bodies with any kind of cover available.

"We crossed the King Hussein bridge, walking. Before we came to the tent factory, planes were coming overhead. I could see a bomb go through one of the windows of the factory. We tried to avoid big crowds, thinking that the planes would bomb the crowds...

"At that moment (about 4 p.m.) I saw a plane come down like a hawk directly at us. Directly. We threw ourselves on the ground and found ourselves in the midst of fire. Children were on fire. Myself, my two daughters, my son, and two children of my cousin. My other children were with their uncle a little way ahead. I tried to do something, but in vain. Fire was all around. I carried my burning child outside the fire. The burning people became naked. Fire stuck to my hands and face. I rolled over. The fire rolled with me.

At that moment another plane was coming directly at us. Directly. I thought it was the end of us. I could not lie on my face. My hands and face were burning. I lay on my back. I saw the plane come down over me. I even expected the wheels of the plane to go over me. I saw the pilot lean over and look at me.

Afterward we started to walk, hoping to get to Shouneh and to take a car to Amman.

My daughter Labiba (four years old) died that night. Two children of my cousin also died. My daughter 'Adla (17 years old) died four days later..."

Accounts such as that of Mr. 'Oweida's make vivid the conditions under which people in the Jericho area left their homes and became refugees. They make it plain that much of the panic and terror was a response to the attacks of Tuesday and Wednesday, June 6th and 7th.

Many of the refugees from the Jericho area had no contact with the Israeli soldiers. All they saw was a sky "full of airplanes." In many of the West Bank towns and villages, however, the civilians did not leave their homes until after the Israeli army had moved in and the occupation had begun. We asked the refugee families specifically whether they had actually seen any Israeli soldiers or civilians. Of the Zeezya sample 48% reported that they had seen and observed Israeli soldiers or civilians. About half of the sample, in other words, had had actual contact with the enemy forces.

This fact is relevant to the question of mass panic. It is clear that these families, at least, did not flee before an unknown enemy. They did not leave their homes *before* the enemy arrived. They observed the occupying forces arrive, and then decided to leave their homes. The old and new refugees differ in this respect. The majority of the old refugees (68%) left without seeing the Israelis. By contrast, 42% of the new refugees did so. This fact may be seen in Table 5-1, which summarizes the refugees' description of their experiences during the war.

The refugee families reported the behavior of the Israeli forces as frightening. This report is consonant with the families' decision to leave and must be evaluated accordingly. Of the families who had actual contact with the Israelis, most of them reported actions that were frightening and terrifying to the Arab civilians. These actions included the eviction of civilians from their homes, looting, the destruction of houses, the rounding up and detention of male civilians, the deliberate shaming of older persons and of women, and the shooting of persons suspected of being soldiers or guerilla fighters. Half of the new refugees (48%) as compared to 21% of the old refugees reported such terrifying contacts. Some families (8%) reported the behavior of the Israeli forces as being neutral and not frightening. One family reported receiving assistance from an Israeli soldier.

The Arab civilians who had contact with Israeli forces reported their behavior as terrifying. These perceptions and reports must be taken into consideration in a study of the exodus. Although their reports need to be substantiated by independent observers, they give a picture of great fear.

The refugees reported knowing of some specific cases of injury and death among their relatives and in their home communities. 15% of the refugees reported they had injuries and deaths among

TABLE 5-1 : EXPERIENCES DURING THE WAR
(Zeezya Sample — All figures in percentages except "N".)

| A. *Did you see any Israelis* | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 59) | *Total* (N = 96) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 32% | 58% | 48% |
| No | 68 | 42 | 52 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Description of Israeli Behavior* | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 58) | *Total* (N = 95) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly Negative | 11% | 27% | 21% |
| Negative | 8 | 21 | 16 |
| Neutral | 11 | 7 | 8 |
| Positive | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| No Contact | 70 | 43 | 54 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| C. *Injury or Death of Relatives* | *Old Refugees* (N = 37) | *New Refugees* (N = 58) | *Total* (N = 95) |
|---|---|---|---|
| None | 92% | 81% | 85% |
| Injury | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| Death | 0 | 10 | 6 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| D. *Injury or Death of Others in Community* | *Old Refugees* (N = 34) | *New Refugees* (N = 53) | *Total* (N = 87) |
|---|---|---|---|
| None | 82% | 64% | 71% |
| Injury | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| Death | 12 | 28 | 22 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

their relatives. 8% of the old refugees reported injuries, but none reported any deaths among their relatives; 19% of the new refugees reported deaths and injuries of relatives.

In an attempt to summarize the circumstances of departure from the home communities, we have classified the accounts of departure and flight as given by the refugee families. The classification has been made by 'cause of departure', and the results appear in Table 5-2.

B. *Direct Causes*

Four major direct causes of flight (connected with events and circumstances of the war) appear in Table 5-2: fear, the psychological pressures of Israeli occupation, the destruction of homes and villages, and the economic pressures arising from the occupation. The sources of fear have been further classified into four kinds of fear: fear of airplane attacks; fear of dishonor coming to the family through molestation of its women; fear of young men in the family being arrested; and fear of massacres such as the one at Deir Yassin.

TABLE 5-2 : CAUSES FOR LEAVING HOME, AS REPORTED BY THE REFUGEES*

| *Causes for Leaving Home* | *Number of Families* |
|---|---|
| 1. Fear | |
| Of airplanes | 57 |
| Of dishonor ("al-'ird") | 30 |
| Threats to members of the family | 22 |
| Of massacre ("Deir Yassin") | 8 |
| 2. Psychological pressures of Israeli occupation | 21 |
| 3. Destruction of villages; destruction of homes; eviction | 19 |
| 4. Economic pressures; source of income being cut off | 10 |
| TOTAL | 167 |

* This table is based on the Zeezya sample of 100 families. Numbers in the table are the number of families mentioning this cause as a reason for their departure from their home. The total number of causes exceeds 100, since many families mentioned more than one cause.

The most frequently mentioned fear is that of airplanes. Over half the families (57%) said that they had left their homes to escape bombardment. They spoke of the sky being filled with airplanes, of the bombing, of consequent terror. The account of Mr. 'Oweida gives a vivid illustration of such fear.

The fear of dishonor is also mentioned by a relatively large number of families. The honor of the womenfolk, *al-'ird*, is a central value to the Arab family. The defense of this honor falls upon the men of the family, and threats to honor are resented and punished. Honor is threatened not only by molestation of the women, but by insults and approaches to women made by strangers. The value of honor was seen as seriously threatened because the enemy was not Arab and would not observe Arab customs regarding the respect due to women. One of the refugees put it succinctly: "We ran away with our honor." To him, it was better to have fled than to have suffered the possible loss of honor. This factor will be discussed more fully as an indirect cause of flight.

A third source of fear is threats to members of family. Twenty-two of them mentioned these threats. The principal form of this threat is the arrests of young men. Sabri Mahmoud of Nabi Samu'il reported that during their stay in Beer Nabala young men were threatened and interrogated in front of their parents with machine guns pointed at them. Men used to hide most of the time. The wife of Sabri Mahmoud mentioned that she was very sick, but did not want her husband to go with her to the hospital in Ramallah, fearing that he might be arrested. Consequently they decided to leave for Amman on June 20.

The fourth fear, that of massacre, seems to have been somewhat less important to the refugees. Eight of them mentioned this fear.

The second class of causes in Table 5-2, psychological pressures, is based on the actual behavior of the Israeli troops rather than on fear of what *might* happen. Some of these actions have already been mentioned. They include the shaming of older persons, especially the older men of the family. They include searches for arms, often after midnight. Twenty-one of the Zeezya families reported psychological pressures. One of them, 'Abdul Latif Injasa, from Kharbatha, said that an Israeli officer told the Mukhtar that those men who served in the army or had military training "and their wives and children should leave the village for their own safety."

The third class of causes, destruction of homes and villages, has already been mentioned, in the description of the family of Naomi. Nineteen of the one hundred families in Zeezya said that this was a major reason for leaving their home communities. They lived in frontier villages such as Beit Noba, 'Amwas and Yalo. Some, for instance the family of 'Azmi Yusef Muhammad, came from Nabi-Samu'il where some homes were destroyed. Others, like Muhamad Hussein Mulhim, from 'Anabta, Nablus, said that they were evicted. The Israelis called on people to leave, using loud speakers, and had buses to transport them.

The last class of causes in Table 5-2 is that of economic pressures. In this we include families who said that a main reason for leaving their home was that their income was cut off. Eight of the ten families in this category depended on the earnings of family members working away from home, either in the East Bank or elsewhere. The heads of two other families said that there was no job for them. (One of these men was a bus driver on the route between Hebron and Amman.)

TABLE 5-3 : REASONS FOR LEAVING HOME, BY OLD & NEW REFUGEES*

| *Reasons for Leaving Home* | *Old Refugees* | | *New Refugees* | | *Total* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fear of planes | 28 | 48% | 29 | 27% | 57 | 34% |
| Threats to members of the family | 3 | 5 | 19 | 17 | 22 | 13 |
| Home or village destroyed | 5 | 9 | 14 | 13 | 19 | 12 |
| All other reasons | 22 | 38 | 47 | 43 | 69 | 41 |
| TOTAL | 58 | 100% | 109 | 100% | 167 | 100% |

* This table is derived from Table 5-2. It compares the responses of old and new refugee families on three of the causes for their departure from their homes: the fear of planes, the threats to members of the family, and destruction of homes. The numbers in the table are the numbers of families mentioning this cause as a major reason for their departure. These numbers add up to 167 because many families mentioned more than one cause.

Table 5-3 shows two differences between the old and the new refugees. First, fear of planes was greater among old refugees (48% vs, 27%.) Second, there were more threats to members of family

among new refugees (17% vs. 5%.)

The causes mentioned by the families may be called, from their point of view, the 'direct' causes of the exodus. These are the kinds of causes that figure prominently in their own accounts of the departure from their homes, and they are connected with the events that took place during or right after the war. They help us to understand the circumstances of the departure, but they do not constitute a full explanation of the exodus. In the first place, the actual circumstances may have been different from the circumstances as perceived by the refugees. In the absence of independent and objective observers, one cannot assess the size of this difference. One should note, however, the prominence of some perceptions and fears (such as the fear of airplanes and the concern with honor) and the relative infrequency of other fears, such as the fear of massacre and the worry about economic distress. One should also note that some of the refugees' reports, such as those concerning the destruction of villages, have received full confirmation.

These direct reasons were presented above separately for analytical purposes. However, these occurred at the same time and most families experienced them simultaneously.

C. *Indirect Causes*

Our research has also suggested some 'indirect' causes of the exodus. These are causes not directly mentioned by the refugees, but ones suggested by their accounts and by the accounts of others. These indirect causes are connected with the social structure and values of the communities from which the refugees departed. There are four of these indirect causes: the element of surprise, the lack of non-family loyalties in the villages, Arab values connected with honor and the family, and the atmosphere of doubt and mutual distrust.

1. *The element of surprise.* A theme that comes through many of the interviews is that of surprise. More than half of the Arab civilians did not expect that a war would take place, that it would break out with such suddenness, that the aerial attack would be so intensive. Nor did they have any thought of an Arab defeat. None of the respondents expected the Arabs to lose, and 81% expected the Arabs to win.

Many of the refugees had, in the days preceding the fifth of June, followed the development of the crisis. Many of them had spent their leisure hours listening to the radio. They were appre-

hensive about the possibility of war. Nonetheless, over half (52%) reported that they were surprised by the outbreak of war.

Added to this surprise was the effect of the swiftness and suddenness of the Israeli attack. Very few of our respondents were psychologically prepared for an enemy invasion. Many men (59%) of the families in our sample had no military training. They had great confidence in the strength of the Arab nations and expected that an outbreak of war could only lead to the "Day of Return," when the Arabs would regain their rightful position in Palestine.

Expectations concerning the war are reflected in the following quotations:

> "Yes, we were surprised by the war, although my husband had been called to the army. We did not realize that the Israelis would ever get to the West Bank. We had confidence in the Arab armies." (Wife of a stone-cutter, from Nebi Samu'il)

> "Yes, we were surprised. We thought Israel would not dare to attack." (bus-driver, from Toubas)

> "Yes, we were happy... no idea that the Jews would reach our village. At three o'clock that night (3 a.m. Tuesday, June 8th) the neighbors said that the Jews were on their way to our village. Our father ordered us to go back to sleep. He said it was impossible..." (the family of Naomi, from Beit Noba)

Another measure of the degree of surprise was the preparations that people had made for war. Many of the families (58%) had made no preparations whatsoever. 23% of them had obtained extra supplies of food. Few had made any provision for shelter, either in their homes or in the surrounding fields and orchards. Few families had time to send messages to family members who were away, to tell them of their decision.

The sudden, unexpected, and rapid defeat threw many people off-balance. A state of turmoil existed and very few knew what to do. It is relevant here to recall the case of the woman who picked up a pillow and ran away with it, thinking it was her child. The Arab civilians simply were not prepared for the war. Even those who had military training had no arms. But the greatest source of surprise was that the overwhelming majority expected the Arabs to win the war. The defeat was sudden and nobody was available to give advice to civilians or to lead civilian resistance.

TABLE 5-4 : EXPECTATIONS FOR THE OUTCOME OR WAR
(Zeezya Sample only)

| A. *Expectations for the Outcome of War* (Zeezya sample only) | *Old Refugees* (N = 17) | *New Refugees* (N = 31) | *Total* (N = 48) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expected Arabs to win | 71% | 87% | 81% |
| Had doubts about the outcome | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| Expected Arabs to lose | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Did not know | 23 | 10 | 15 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *Were You Surprised by the Outbreak of the War?* | *Old Refugees* (N = 36) | *New Refugees* (N = 60) | *Total* (N = 96) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 44% | 55% | 51% |
| No | 56 | 45 | 49 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| C. *Military Training* | *Old Refugees* (N = 36) | *New Refugees* (N = 60) | *Total* (N = 96) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 22% | 53% | 41% |
| No | 78 | 47 | 59 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| D. *Preparation for War* | *Old Refugees* (N = 33) | *New Refugees* (N = 59) | *Total* (N = 92) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Nothing | 60% | 58% | 58% |
| Buying Food Supplies | 18 | 25 | 23 |
| Civil Defense | 16 | 11 | 13 |
| Other activities | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

2. *The lack of non-family loyalties.* The great majority of our respondents in the Zeezya sample came from villages and small towns in the West Bank. There were few people from large towns and cities such as Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron.

In these villages, the main bond of social ties is through the family. Many observers have noted this fact about Arab villages and its corollary, the relative absence of other forms of social organization in the village. Political structure is imposed from outside. Occupations are not independent of the family, since most persons are engaged in agriculture on the family-held land. There is no religious organization, since the Islamic institutions in a village require little organization.

As a result, in time of disaster, there is no other decision-making group except the family. The individual is not held back by duties to his occupational group or to a political party. Once the family makes a decision to leave the home, there are very few other loyalties that will hold a person from departure.

This pattern of decision-making was common among the refugees. Family considerations had to come foremost. If these dictated flight, then the family group fled.

For the men, there did sometimes occur a conflict between civic duty as a citizen and family duty. An example is the case of Taha, a 1948 refugee who lived in Camp Nu'eimeh, Near Jericho:

> "I took my family to the fields, to be safe. Then I wanted to go back. But my brothers argued with me, saying that I cared nothing for my family's honor and for my womenfolk."

Taha stayed with his family. So, after much discussion, did Sami 'Oweida, in the case described earlier. Mr. 'Oweida, however, remained at his work throughout two days of bombardment. His case illustrates the cross-pressures of occupational and family ties, as it occurs for an urban resident. But such cross-pressures are rare in village society.

3. *Values connected with honor and the family. Al-'ird,* the honor of the family, has already been mentioned as a central value in Arab culture. Life in the village is organized in such a way as to emphasize and protect this honor. A family's prestige depends less on its wealth and material well-being than it does on the dignity of its womenfolk. The principal defenders of *al-'ird* are the woman's father and brothers. On them falls the duty of vigilance and the obligation to punish offenses against *al-'ird.*

Village women are not kept in seclusion in Palestinian culture, nor are they veiled. They are able to move without restriction in the village and its surrounding fields. This freedom is greater than that permitted to women in the traditional Arab cities and in countries such as Saudi Arabia. The greater relative freedom, however, has its costs. Should a stranger pass through the village, the woman must be circumspect in her behavior. By speaking to her or approaching her, the stranger threatens the honor of the family. Any levity is resented by the men of the family, and they will punish the stranger who goes beyond the narrow limits of custom.

Traditional modes of warfare threatened *al-'ird*, but the actions of warriors toward women were limited by two factors. One was the knowledge of the kind of honor and respect due to Arab women. An Arab enemy might violate the norms concerning *al-'ird*, but he would do so knowingly. There was little unpredictability to his behavior. In the second place, his behavior was limited by the knowledge that his actions would be revenged. A heavy obligation lay upon the men of the family of the offended woman. Until the offender had been punished, they could not hold up their heads in their own society. Accordingly, a violation of the norms concerning *al-'ird* could lead to years of feuding, of acts of revenge and counter-revenge.

In the West Bank in 1967, neither of these two limitations were effective on the Israeli soldiers. They did not show respect for the norms concerning *al-'ird*. The men of the family could not have an opportunity to punish violations of the norms. No village family could hope to pit its strength against the overwhelming power of the occupying army.

Accordingly, the Israeli occupation was seen by villagers as a major threat to their mode of life. It made sense for many of them to move out, in order to protect their honor, their sense of self-respect. In this situation, flight was less dishonorable than submission to alien occupants. Thirty families out of the Zeezya sample mentioned the fear of dishonor as one of the major reasons for leaving.

One of the respondents said that he decided to leave with his family when an Israeli soldier asked him about the ages of his daughters: "I was frightened that they might do something to them." When this man was asked why his relatives had stayed, he said "Because they don't have any daughters."

An example of the profoundly disruptive consequences of enemy

occupation may be seen in the following quotation from a man interviewed in Camp Zeezya:

> "In our village the women and the girls work in the fields while the men work in the town. Now the women could not go to work, nor could the men work in the fields, because then the women would be alone in the houses..."

This statement illustrates the way village life is organized around the protection of *al-'ird*. In normal times, the women can go out to work in the field without fear of insult. Any strange passerby will be carefully observed and his behavior controlled. The men can go about their work in town or nearby city, secure in their power to protect *al-'ird*, should the need arise. But in times of enemy occupation, the men must be continually near the women, to protect them against insult and to safeguard the dignity of the family.

It appears, therefore, that the patterns of behavior concerning *al-'ird* make the Palestinian Arab village especially vulnerable to insult by a non-Arab invader. In such times, the Arab villager may take his women to safety rather than encounter indignity.

One last point should be noted. The families who left their homes often left some member of the family behind, to look after the family home and property. The men of the family, those of military age, would leave and take with them the womenfolk and the children. Older men could stay behind, as caretakers and guardians. In some cases, older women could stay behind, too.

4. *Doubt and Distrust.* The theme of doubt and mutual distrust appeared in many of the interviews. The refugee families felt that the only people who could be trusted were their kinsfolk. Assurances coming from any other source, such as political leaders or the Jordanian government, were not to be relied upon.

The feeling of betrayal was very deep among the refugees. Their leaders had let them down. After years of promises and fine speeches, their leaders had brought upon them humiliating defeat. During the interviews, we asked the refugees who they thought was responsible for the Arab defeat. The commonest answer was "Arab traitors." These were seen as primarily responsible for the catastrophe. After them, the refugees blamed the governments of the West, especially the United States. Seldom did they explicitly refer to the military power of Israel, the timing of the Israeli attack and its tactics. Most salient in their minds was the fact that their own leaders had deceived them.

It is important to note that our interviewing was carried out just after the suicide of the Egyptian army commander, Marshal 'Abdul-Hakim Amer, and the revelation of anti-Nasser plots in the Egyptian high command. These news undoubtedly affected the refugee responses. But they brought to the surface a deep sense of betrayal, a loss of confidence in their own political leaders and institutions.

This loss of confidence is, in our opinion, a fourth indirect cause of the exodus.

D. *Conclusion*

In this chapter, we have given a description of the exodus of June, as it was described to us by the refugee families. We have presented the reasons that they gave us for their flight from their homes. In addition, we have suggested four indirect causes of the exodus. These indirect causes are cultural patterns and conditions that probably added to the magnitude of the exodus, although they did not cause it.

It is now time to attempt to answer our original question. Why did the exodus of 1967 take place? The answer is that the exodus was a response to the severe situational pressures existing at the time. The situational pressures were generated by the aerial attacks upon a defenseless country, including the extensive use of napalm, the occupation of the West Bank villages by the Israeli army, and the actions of the occupying forces. Certainly the most drastic of these actions was the eviction of civilians and the deliberate destruction of a number of villages. Other actions, such as threats and the mass detention of male civilians, also created situational pressures.

For a number of reasons, which we have termed indirect causes, the Arab villages were not well equipped to resist these situational pressures. They were caught by surprise, ill-informed and unfamiliar with the terrifying nature of aerial bombardment. Their family-centered social structure decreased attachment to community and to nation. They fled to protect their families, including, and by no means least, the honor of their womenfolk.

In view of the intensity of the pressures on the villagers, the exodus seems understandable. Perhaps we should be less impressed by the fact that 20% of the people left their homes than by the fact that 80% stayed to face the enemy occupation.

It is our opinion that the fears felt by the Arab villagers were

not unreasonable. They are intelligible and explicable. One does not need to view the exodus of June 1967 as a mass panic of superstitious and ignorant people. It seems more reasonable to see the exodus as the response of the Palestinian Arab villagers to the conditions of enemy attack and occupation.

In an earlier section of this report, we have presented our finding that the refugee families had strong ties with their home communities: ties of property, of affection, of kinship and of long residence. It is perhaps a measure of the strength of the "situational pressures" that the families left their homes in spite of these ties. The exodus took place in a time of great stress. To explain it as a panic does not do justice to the strength of community ties, nor does it explain the cause of the exodus.

## CHAPTER VI

# CONCLUSION : THE DESIRE TO RETURN

"... there is now ample evidence that most of the refugees from the recent war have no desire and little need to return."
The *New Statesman*, November 3, 1967

In Section Four, evidence was presented of the strength of the ties linking the refugee families to their homes and their home communities. Our conclusion, based on this evidence, was that the families, prior to June 1967, were well integrated into these communities. Their ties with their homes were numerous and strong.

In view of this finding, it may seem superfluous to ask whether the refugees wish to return to their homes. One must take into account, however, the effect of the war and of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Perhaps, for instance, their fear of Israel is so great that the refugee families wish to wait until the end of the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, statements in the Western press, such as the one quoted above from the *New Statesman*, give the impression that the refugees do not wish to return to their homes.*

In this section, therefore, we present evidence on the question of return. To understand the refugees' responses to this question, some background information is essential. In July, 1967, not long

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* The *New Statesman* report appeared only three days after our findings had been released to a press conference in Beirut. The *New Statesman* made no mention of our study, but the BBC on November 1st and the London *Times* on November 3rd did report our study correctly. When the *New Statesman* article appeared, we wrote to the editors pointing out its lack of accuracy. Although our letter was acknowledged it was never published.

after the June War, the government of Israel announced that it was prepared to permit refugees from the West Bank to return to their homes. The refugees were to make application for return through the International Red Cross, and these applications would be considered by the Israeli authorities.

The month of July was spent organizing the application procedure. Throughout Jordan application centers were set up and by the end of the month 175,000 persons had applied to return to their homes. These applications were transmitted to the government of Israel.

In August, after a number of delays, the process of return began. Transit camps were set up on both sides of the Jordan, and it was hoped that a substantial number of refugees might return to their homes. The Israeli government, however, stopped the flow of homeward bound refugees at the end of August, after admitting about 14,000. The procedure was never resumed.

Thus in September, when we interviewed the refugees in Camp Zeezya, only a small fraction had been permitted to return home. Everyone, however, had applied for permission to return. The question of return was uppermost in everyone's mind, and hopes for return had not dwindled.

The attitudes of the refugee families toward the question of return, divided into three categories, are shown in Table 6-1.

TABLE 6-1 : REFUGEES' DESIRE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES
(Zeezya sample only. Total number of families responding to this question is 88.)

| *Nature of Desire* | *Old Refugees* (N = 33) | *New Refugees* (N = 55) | *Total* (N = 88) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definitely wish to return | 64% | 82% | 75% |
| Wish to return, conditionally | 21 | 16 | 18 |
| Do not wish to return | 15 | 2 | 7 |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100% |

As Table 6-1 shows, the great majority of the refugee families wanted to return to their homes regardless of the circumstances.

Seventy-five per cent of the families expressed this wish. By contrast, 82% of the new refugees and 64% of the old refugees said they definitely wished to return. In spite of their fear of Israel, their concern about their womenfolk, the possible threats to members of the family, and the economic uncertainties, they wanted to return to their homes. One of these refugees expressed his wish as follows: "We want to return very much even if we have to sneak in and die there." We asked these people what prevented them from returning, and the answer, almost invariably, was "the permission." They meant the permission from the Israeli military authorities to return to their home communities (see Table 6-2).

There is a second category of families that also wanted to return, but placed some condition on doing so. About one-sixth of the families (18%) can be placed in this category. The condition that they mention most often is the end of Israeli occupation and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. One of the new refugees, from Beer Nabala, said:

> "Israeli soldiers are stationed in our village. This makes it impossible for me to leave my family by themselves if I go out, or to allow my wife or daughters to go to our fields. They cannot do that without passing by some army barracks."

Another refugee mentioned the economic effects of Israeli occupation. He had stayed in his village about two weeks after the war ended and reported that:

> "The things we produce such as vegetables and fruits became very cheap, whereas the things we had to buy, such as sugar and rice, became very expensive."

Table 6-1 also shows a small group of families, 7% of the total, that did not wish to return. The head of one of these families said he did not want to return because "I was involved in resistance. If I return I will be arrested." Another respondent put it this way: "I do not want to return because you can never be sure that your wife and sisters are safe."

It is clear, therefore, that the desire to return was strong in most of the refugee families. They were uncertain, however, as to when the return would take place. When asked this question, a large number (82%) said they did not know or "God knows."

Only a few, fifteen per cent, placed a probable time on the date of return. Of these most said "soon" or in "the near future." Three families thought that they would never be able to return.

TABLE 6-2 : OBSTACLES TO RETURNING

| A. *Obstacles to Returning* | *Old Refugees* (N = 33) | *New Refugees* (N = 58) | *Total* (N = 91) |
|---|---|---|---|
| No permission | 55% | 67% | 63% |
| Fear of Israeli Rule | 21 | 12 | 15 |
| Other (including combination of no permission and fear) | 24 | 21 | 22 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

| B. *When Do You Think You Will Return* | *Old Refugees* (N = 32) | *New Refugees* (N = 57) | *Total* (N = 89) |
|---|---|---|---|
| God knows; don't know | 88% | 79% | 82% |
| Soon or near future | 6 | 19 | 15 |
| Never | 6 | 2 | 3 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Most families, however, thought that they would return eventually. One of the most evocative responses was:

"Your country is like your child. (*baladak mithl waladak.*) You cannot be separated from it for a long time. Your country is where you were born and no other country could be dearer to your heart."

Another indication of the refugees' state of mind is the names that were given to the babies born in Camp Zeezya. These names include Zeezya, Jihad (struggle), Harb (war), and 'A'ida (the one who is returning). The names of these children reflect the hopes and experiences of the refugees.

The refugees, like most of the Arab world, were pessimistic about the chances for a peaceful solution. Only 15% of the refugees thought they would return soon. The great majority (82%) were not sure what would happen to them. Old refugees seemed to be more pessimistic. While 19% of the new refugees thought they would return soon, only 6% of the old refugees thought so.

However pessimistic, only 3% of the refugees believed they would

never return. They would not give up. Many of them felt that Israel would never permit them to return to their homes, and that another war would take place. This war would not be a war to destroy Israel, but a war to regain the land and homes of the Palestinian Arabs. Only one family spoke of revenge when discussing the probability of war, whereas others talked of a war to win back the rights of Arabs and their honor. As one respondent put it when asked what he thought Arabs should do in the future: "peace... if that is impossible then war. The important thing is our return to Palestine."

## APPENDIX

## *INTERVIEW SCHEDULE*

## SURVEY OF REFUGEES IN JORDAN

*Instructions to interviewers*

The aim of this survey is to collect facts about the circumstances surrounding the departure of the refugees from their homes in the Western Bank of Jordan. Such a task requires a great deal of tactfulness and close participation in the real every day life of the refugees. Our techniques for collecting data will be: participant observation and informal or flexible interviewing. The interviewers will present themselves as members of a team of Arab students from Lebanon and Jordan who have decided to come and help the refugees in any way possible, especially in so far as public health is concerned.

Assistance to the refugees should take precedence over collection of data. The two tasks are not contradictory, on the contrary, they are complementary. As a result of such assistance friendly relations can be established which will help in informal interviewing and free discussion of the questions below. Thus, it should be ensured that the first few days will be devoted to assistance and winning the confidence and friendship of the refugees. The answers should not be recorded on the scene, and the interviewees should not feel they are being questioned. These precautions have to be taken in order to secure maximum absence of bias on the part of the interviewee as well as the interviewer.

The data is to be collected about the family as a whole, not only about one particular person. Any member of the family can be sought as a source of information, but our target should be responsible members of the family.

Name of interviewer: ———————
Dates of interview: ———————
Location now: ———————

QUESTIONS :

Information on the family. (It may not be possible to get all of this information, but try to get as much as possible.)

I. *The Family*

1. Number of persons ———————

| | *Name* | *Age* | *Level of Education* | *Birthplace* | *Place lived most of life* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2. Father | | | | | |
| 3. Mother | | | | | |
| 4. Children | | | | | |
| 5. Other relatives | | | | | |

6. Is the father the head of the family? If not, who is? Why?

II. *Residence and Land*

1. Place ——————— Muhafaza ———————
2. How long lived there? ———————
   (If less than two years, Where did they live before ?) ———
   Why did they move? ———————
3. What kind of residence? ———————
   How many rooms? ——— Utilities: Water ———
   Rented or owned? ——— Electricity ———
   If rented, what monthly rent? ——— Indoor toilet ———
   Television ———
4. How much land did they use? ——— What use? ———
   How much owned? ——— How much rented? ———
5. What other property did they own (Houses, shops, etc.) ?
   ——— Estimate of its value? ———
6. Did they own an automobile? ———

III. *Occupation and Income*

1. What is the father's occupation? ———
   What training has he had? ———
   Can he operate any machines (automobile, tractor, etc.) specify. ———
2. Is there any one else in the family of working age? ———
   What are their occupations? ———

3. What was the father's occupation? _____ _____
   What education did he have? _____ _____
4. What are the main sources of family income? (Wages, rents, profits on business, sale of crops, etc). _____ _____ _____ _____
5. What is the approximate monthly income of the family? (It may be easier to get yearly income and divide by 12) _____

IV. *Structural ties*

1. What religion is the family? (Include sect) – _____
2. How religious are they? (If Christian, do they attend church. If Moslem, do they pray often, think of going on the pilgrimage, etc. Give evidence here of religious concern or lack of it.) _____ _____
3. What relatives of the family lived near them? (Get approximate number) _____ How did they get along with these relatives? _____ _____ _____
4. Is there evidence of satisfaction with their home community? _____ _____ _____
5. Did any member of the family hold a position in the community *(mukhtar, sheikh, majlis al-baladiyya, etc.)* _____ _____

V. *Additional information*

1. Do the children attend school? Where? What educational plans did the family have for the children? _____ _____
2. Who in the family is literate? _____ _____ _____
   Do they read a newspaper? What paper? How often? _____
   Do they listen to the radio? For news? _____ _____
3. Does anyone in the family speak languages *other* than Arabic? Who? What languages _____ _____
4. Have members of the family travelled outside Jordan? Who? Where to? _____ _____ _____

VI. *The War*

1. Were you surprised by the war ? If not, why not? _____ _____ _____
   What caused you to expect the war? _____ _____ _____
   Did you do anything to prepare for the war? _____
   Have you had any military training? How much? _____
2. Where were you on June 4th, the day before the war started? What happened to you that day?
3. What happened to you on the day the war started?

4. What did you experience the rest of that week (June 6-12)?
5. Did you see any Israelis? Soldiers or civilians? What did they do?
6. Were any members of your family injured or killed? Was anyone you know injured or killed?

VII. *Leaving Home*

1. When did your family and you leave your home? (Day and hour of the day)
   What did you think about?
   What happened right before you left?
   Where did you go then? How did you travel? How long did the trip take you?
2. Did all members of your family leave?
   If not, who stayed behind? (Get age, sex, occupation of those who stayed behind.)
   Why did they stay?
3. Did any other relatives stay behind? Who are they and how are they related to you? (Get approximate number and degree of relationship. Also age, sex, occupation if possible.)
   Why did they stay?
4. What happened to your community (village, town or camp)? Did you leave before, during, or after that happened?
5. What percentage of the people in your community left their homes?
6. What kind of people left? What kind of people stayed?

VIII. *Present situation*

1. Do you hear from members of your family who stayed behind?
   What is their condition?
   How about other relatives?
2. Does anything prevent you from returning to your home? What?
3. When do you think you will go back?
4. What do you think will happen to you and your family now?

IX. *Attitudes toward the Crisis*

1. Do you think that the Arabs could have avoided the war?
2. Why do you think the Arabs did not win the war?
3. Whom do you think is responsible for what happened?
4. What do you think the Arabs should do in the future?


PALESTINE
A map including selected Communities from which some of the respondents of the present study departed.
LEBANON
SYRIA
ACRE
HAIFA
LAKE TIBERIAS
NAZARETH
TIBERIAS
IRBID
JENIN
TUBAS
ANABTA
SEBASTIYA
TULKARM
NABLUS
QALQILYAH
TEL AVIV
JAFFA
LYDDA
RAMALLAH
AMMAN
YAZUR
AMWAS
BEIT-NOBA
JERICHO
JERUSALEM
ZEEZYA
BETHLEHEM
HEBRON
GAZA
DEAD SEA
TRANSJORDAN
BEERSHEBA
NEGEB
WADI ARDA
EGYPT
MA'AN
AQABA

*Camp Zeezya: tents and children. Half the population of the camp is under fifteen years of age.*

*Children washing after a dust storm.*

*Life in the camp: Right, a woman takes her family's ration of food.*

*Distribution of clothing. Above, a crowd collects to receive bundles.*

*Emotions run high over the distribution.*



*Growing up in Zeezya.*

*Naomi and her mother wearing the traditional dress of their village, Beit Noba.*

*The 'visit-interview'. Above, Naomi's mother tells Mrs. Barakat how they left their home in Beit Noba.*

*Right, an eavesdropper.*

*Naomi's cousin listens to the interview.*



*Halim Barakat reviews the record of the interview.*

*The geography of Palestina: interviewers locate the home communities of the respondents.*

*Victims of napalm: Sami 'Oweida, his wife and son visit their daughter in hospital. Two other daughters died of their burns.*

*Khalid 'Abdul Halim and his family. Before the war, a picnic near their home in Sebastia.*

*In Camp Zeezya. 'Arabiyya, Khalid's wife, and their daughter.*



*Khalid, his sister Khairiyya and her son, Tariq.*

*Khairiyya and Tariq. Left: before the war. Right: in Zeezya.*

*Khalid teases his mother, Hajji Saliima.*

*Khalid's daughter, three weeks old, is named Zeezya after the place where she was born.*




*Above: This sign outside Khalid's tent reads: "Registered Midwife, Hajji Saliima".*

*Hajji Saliima, Khalid and family on their way to 'Amman for the day. The suitcase contains possessions that they hope to trade or sell.*

*Mother with her new baby, in Zeezya.*

*Father and son. The mother was killed in an aerial attack.*

*Israel's policy is to prevent the refugees from returning to their homes. Below, women from Hebron mourn the death of the head of the family, shot while attempting to return to his home.*

*Below, mourners outside the tent.*



*The way home: Israeli soldier, automatic rifle and barbed wire at the King Hussein Bridge.*

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