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TRANSLATIONS ON NORTH VIETNAM

No. 934

Hoc Tap, No. 3, 1971



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Complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party published in Hanoi.

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A MAJOR EVENT IN THE DEMOCRATIC ACTIVITIES OF THE DRV

[Editorial; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 1-10]

Through twenty-five years of fighting and building up under party leadership, the party structure of our state has been continuously solidified and strengthened. The National Assembly, which is the senior element of the power structure, was born and expanded during the People's Revolution. It completed all phases of the revolution, has accomplished its mission well, and has recorded great accomplishments.

The first session of the National Assembly established the first democratic and national constitution, which serves as the foundation of the system in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It led our country in the victorious resistance against France, carried out land reform successfully, adopted a socialist constitution, outlined the road for North Vietnam in the building of socialism, and struggled with a view toward bringing about peaceful reunification of the country.

The second session of the National Assembly decided on the creation of the technical and material bases of socialism in North Vietnam, created conditions under which North Vietnam could make rapid, forceful, and steady progress toward socialism, and establish a solid foundation for the struggle to bring about the reunification of the country and the liberation of South Vietnam.

The third session of the National Assembly was the one responsible for the defeat of the war of destruction waged by the air force and navy of the U.S. aggressor. Under wartime conditions, it continued to build socialism in North Vietnam and to ensure support for the resistance of our comrades in South Vietnam in their fight against the imperialist United States and its lackeys.

The National Assembly has performed well in its mission as the legally constituted agency of the state. In addition to such basic laws as the constitution and the law on land reform, the National Assembly has adopted

and disseminated many important laws and resolutions designed to protect and develop the peoples' rights to liberty and democracy, to act as a dictatorship when dealing with the enemy and to strengthen the organization and activities of the state administration. The National Assembly and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly have supervised state enforcement agencies and, within the confines of that effort, have closely coordinated with the Council of Ministers, thereby enabling the administration to operate uniformly and to promptly resolve all internal and external affairs of the state. During the period of the war of destruction waged by the U.S. aggressor, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly was granted some additional authority by the National Assembly to resolve important state problems. The National Assembly and the Standing Committee of the National Assembly actively contributed to strengthening the unity between us and other socialist and peace loving countries in the world. The National Assembly has maintained a fine tradition by always serving the interests of the Fatherland and the nation above all and by constantly maintaining unity within the National Assembly and between the National Assembly and the Government. Those are the salient features of the National Assembly.

The third session of the National Assembly was elected in 1964. There should have been another National Assembly election by the people in 1968 as prescribed by the constitution. But because of the war, the National Assembly, based upon the constitution, issued a resolution extending the term of the third session of the National Assembly and authorized the Standing Committee of the National Assembly to decide when conditions would allow for the conduct of a fourth session of the National Assembly.

In accordance with the decision of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, the people will hold an election of the fourth term of the National Assembly in April 1971 and immediately following that, will elect Peoples' Councils at all echelons. This is a major event in the political lives of the people. It is intimately related to the strengthening of the Peoples' Democratic State and it manifests the superiority of our system, manifests the collective ownership rights of the people, and increases our prestige in the international arena. The fourth session National Assembly elections respond to a current political obligation of the people, that is, to assist in and accelerate the anti-United States resistance for national salvation and to lead the building of socialism in North Vietnam ahead one more step.

Our Peoples' Democratic State is a fruit of the great revolution conducted by the people. The activities engaged in by the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils at all levels play an especially important role within the activities of the Peoples' Democratic State. Paragraph IV of the constitution says: "All power in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam belongs to the people. The people shall use their power through the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils at all levels, which are elected by and responsible to the people."

In a capitalist system, the congress is just window dressing and a place to argue, while all important affairs of state are decided behind the scenes by the monopolistic capitalists. Lenin pointed out that in the democratic

capitalist system, "The merchants and bankers gain more control over capitalist congressman as the system expands." Therefore, "the workers all understand, know, see, and feel very clearly that congressmen are the agents of someone other than them, a tool of oppression for the capitalists to use against the proletariat, and an agency of the enemy class, and of the minority exploiters." (1) Under the neo-colonialist regime of the United States in South Vietnam at present, the "National Assembly" is merely a tool of the lackeys of the United States used to oppress the people and support the U.S. war of aggression. It is also the place in which the lackeys of the United States compete with each other for power and status.

Our National Assembly is symbolic of the desires and hopes of the people. It represents all of the people in deciding upon the important political, economic, cultural, and social issues in our country. The power of the state is the power of the people centralized in the National Assembly. The National Assembly is the only agency authorized to make laws or elect state leaders. The laws of the National Assembly (including the constitution) are the supreme law of the land and every agency is required to strictly carry them out. The National Assembly supervises the efforts of the Council of Ministers, the Peoples' Supreme Court, and the Peoples' Supreme Procurate. The Peoples' Councils at all echelons represent the local people and apply the power of the people within the scope of the locality. Therefore, the National Assembly and the peoples' Councils occupy a position of special importance relative to the implementation of the peoples' right of collective ownership. Only under a truly democratic system could the National Assembly and the Peoples' Council play such a role.

Under our system, the state administration in general and the power structure in particular, are of a profound class and broad mass nature. In regard to the class nature of the state, Lenin said: "The exploiting classes must attain a ruling status in order to maintain their exploitation, that is, to protect the special interests of a very small minority against the great majority of the people. The exploited classes must attain ruling status in order to totally destroy exploitation, that is, to protect the interests of the great majority of people against the very small minority of modern slave masters, the landlords and capitalists." (2) The preamble of our constitution says: "Our state is a Peoples' Democratic State founded upon a worker-peasant alliance led by the working class. The leadership of the working class is illustrated in every respect: lines, policies, ideology, and organization. The National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils make decisions about important state policies of the party. They transform the will of the working class into the will and revolutionary action of the people and enable all of the people to become more closely tied to the working class and to steadily follow the working class toward the ultimate goals of the revolution.

The National Assembly and Peoples' Councils at all echelons symbolize the unity among all of the people and symbolize a national united front. Our people includes many social classes, ethnic groups, religions, political parties, and political organizations. They are enjoying their collective

ownership rights in North Vietnam while conducting a sacred anti-United States resistance for national salvation aimed at total liberation of the nation and the peaceful reunification of the country. The state administration must reflect those conditions among all of the people if it is to have the strength and prestige necessary to unite and fight victoriously. The class and mass nature of the state speaks loudly for the superiority of our system.

In the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils elections, we should allow everyone to clearly understand the role and nature of the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils within our state. We should ensure that the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councilors sufficiently represent all classes of the people and symbolize the new vitality of our society, as well as the growing strength of socialism. We should select and elect to the National Assembly those who are representative, are capable of shouldering the current political responsibilities, possess revolutionary ethics and qualities, closely relate to the masses, and enjoy the faith of the masses. The fourth session of the National Assembly must include a great many representatives of the workers, the collectivized peasants, and the socialist intellectuals, all of which are the basic elements of North Vietnamese society. It must also include representatives of other elements within the Vietnam fatherland front, such as; ethnic groups residing in our country, democratic political parties, reformed national capitalists, and overseas Vietnamese who have come home. We must also ensure that there is appropriate representation for the Peoples' Army, cadres from South Vietnam assigned to North Vietnam, women, the young people, representatives at the national and local level, old representatives, new representatives, and so forth.

The National Assembly and Peoples' Councils elections represent an opportunity to improve and develop the collective ownership rights of our people.

Our socialist democracy is the most perfect and fullest democracy. It is completely different in nature than the "piecemeal, hard-pressed, and spurious democracy, which is a kind of democracy reserved only for the wealthy and the minority," (3) that is, the capitalist class. Under our system, manual laborers and those who work with their brains are truly free of all oppression and exploitation. They truly control their own destinies, control the country, and use the country to build a full and happy life. The constitution has confirmed the citizen's right to freedom and democracy. The National Assembly has passed many laws to guarantee the full enjoyment of those rights. The guarantee for the peoples' democracy nature of our state is the socialist ownership system of the essential means of production. Oppression, exploitation, and special rights and interests are strictly prohibited by law.

Our Peoples' Democratic State on one hand strengthens the dictatorship with regard to counter-revolutionaries, while on the other hand, it establishes the political, economic, and social collective ownership rights of the people. The state develops the collective ownership rights of the workers and collectivized peasants relative to production and distribution and it increases

the control held by the people over the management of the economy. The state ensures that the broad masses enjoy an ever-increasing participation in the management of the state machinery. The state guarantees real equality rights for its citizens on the basis of an ever-expanding socialist economy.

Under our system, the interests of the state and the interests of the people are the same. As a result, the rights and obligations of the citizens are interwoven with each other. As the people more clearly recognize their right of collective ownership they more enthusiastically fulfill their responsibilities. Those include: military obligation, an obligation to work, an obligation to contribute to the state, and an obligation to study. As the people make greater and more conscious efforts to fulfill their obligations to the state, they create conditions under which to enjoy the rights guaranteed by the state. These two aspects are inextricably interwoven.

The bond between the people and the government and the ever-growing participation by the people in the management of the state are special characteristics and at the same time, a source of strength for the state. The expansion and development of the peoples' right of collective ownership is not merely an obligation of the state but rather an issue related to the very existence and development of the state.

During these National Assembly and Peoples' Council elections, we should increase the political awareness and sense of collective ownership among the people, strengthen unity, be politically, ideologically, and spiritually united within our society, and enable the people to enthusiastically participate in the production and the war and to fulfill their obligations.

The National Assembly and Peoples' Councils elections must be carried out in a truly democratic form and precisely in accordance with the election law.

Our system is a genuine democratic system. Our people have the right to vote their worthy representatives into the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils and they have the right to impeach unworthy representatives (even if their term has not yet ended). The democratic nature of the National Assembly elections are illustrated in the various parts of the election law. The fundamental principles of the election system as stipulated by the election law of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are: general election, fair election, direct participation, and a secret ballot. Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam without regard to national origin, race, sex, social status, religion, beliefs, property status, educational level, occupation, or length of residency from the age of 18 up has the right to vote for National Assembly representatives. Those 21 years of age or older have the right to be a candidate for the National Assembly. Every registered voter has an equal ballot. The citizens vote directly for their representatives and are not required to go through any intermediary. The voter has the right to select his representative on his own and no one can place an obstacle in his path.

In order to ensure strict compliance with those principles, the election law makes specific stipulations regarding election units and procedures with a view toward ensuring that the citizen enjoys every advantage and convenience in exercising his right to vote. With regard to naming candidates, the election law stipulates: all peoples' organizations, political parties, and peoples' groups can individually or jointly (through the fatherland front) nominate candidates. This broad stipulation further demonstrates a true democratic nature and proves that the nomination of candidates is the task of all of the people. The election law stipulates that individual citizens have the right to become candidates. In accordance with the stipulations of the election law, the roster of nominees must be published beforehand in order that it can be examined by the people. If there are errors of shortcomings, the people have the right to appeal and the election board must resolve any problems within three days. The election law further provides severe punishment for action in violation of the election law. Anyone who uses deceit, bribery, or pressure to prohibit another from exercising his free right to vote or become a candidate may be punished by up to 2 years in prison. If the offender belongs to a government organization or an organization responsible for the election, he may be confined for up to 3 years. Any citizen has the right to make an accusation against another for irregularities during the election.

The above-mentioned stipulations must be complied with strictly while preparing for and conducting the elections.

A good election law is only one side of the issue. On the one hand, it is necessary to enable every citizen to become aware of his rights and obligations. In order to carry out the National Assembly elections well, it is necessary that every citizen be aware of the value of his ballot. President Ho said: "Although the ballot of the individual voter is small, its value is extremely large." (4) "Casting a ballot in a general election is both a precious right and a sacred obligation of a voter." (5)

Cadres acting in an official capacity for the elections must strictly implement every part of the election law and election regulations and they must develop the peoples' collective ownership spirit in the selection of candidates for the National Assembly. All echelons must promptly deploy a sufficient number of cadres, and concentrate their wherewithall in support of the election. In order to ensure that the elections are carried out well, we must increase the sense of vigilance among the people, maintain law and order, and guard against enemy sabotage.

Vietnam is one country and the people of Vietnam are one people. The first National Assembly in our country was the result of a general election from North to South Vietnam conducted on 6 January 1946 and it represented the people of the entire country. But the imperialist United States and its lackeys carried out their plot to divide our country and to transform South Vietnam into a new colony and a military base for the U.S. aggressor. Because of the situation at the time, the first session of the National Assembly in a meeting at the end of 1959 decided to extend the term of the

Assembly representatives which had been elected by the people of South Vietnam on 6 January 1946. That was a demonstration of the ironclad desire for the unification of the country among our people.

Now, the revolution in South Vietnam has acquired new expansion. The Conference of National Representatives of South Vietnam was convened in June 1969 and decided to establish the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Government Advisory Council. As soon as it was born, the Republic of South Vietnam attained world-wide sympathy and support. So far, the Republic of South Vietnam has diplomatic relations with more than 20 countries and is one of the four participants at the Paris Conference on Vietnam. The international position of the Republic of Vietnam grows constantly. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam has also officially established a representative agency in Hanoi.

In the face of the new expansion in the revolution of South Vietnam, the third session of the National Assembly, during its seventh meeting which took place from 2 March 1971 until 4 March 1971, decided that the term of the National Assembly representatives elected by the people of South Vietnam in the general election on 6 January 1946 would end with the conclusion of the term of the third National Assembly. That was a proper and brilliant resolution appropriate to the situation both in North and South Vietnam and responsive to the requirements of the revolution in our country.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are the fruits of the long struggle full of sacrifice and adversity waged by the people throughout the country. We believe that South Vietnam will surely be liberated, that North and South Vietnam will surely occupy one house and that the people of Vietnam will surely obtain a National Assembly for a unified country.

The representatives to the National Assembly elected by the people of South Vietnam in the general election of 6 January 1946 have worked constantly throughout the past 25 years to serve the Fatherland and the people. Those representatives have made major contributions to the revolution of our people and some of them have bravely given their lives in the line of duty. Our people remember the contributions of those representatives. The people hope that the representatives to the National Assembly elected by the people of South Vietnam on 6 January 1946, and whose term will expire with the expiration of the third session of the National Assembly will continue to manifest their capabilities in the support of the Fatherland and the people.

The results of the election must not only be illustrated by the conduct of a good election but also by the activities following on the part of the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils. All echelons of party committees must strengthen their leadership over the activities of state agencies and strive to create conditions under which they can complete their mission without passing the responsibility to someone else. Developing the role of the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils is primarily helping to

manifest the superiority of our system and respecting the collective ownership rights of the people. We must ensure that the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils fully exercise their function: to truly discuss and decide upon issues relative to the national welfare and livelihood of the entire country of individual localities; to control the activities of state agencies elected by them, and in that way, praise accomplishments and criticize shortcomings; impeach those representatives who prove unworthy; modify or repeal inappropriate decisions made by state agencies if for example, they run counter to the law, with a view toward upholding a sense of responsibility and guaranteeing the strict enforcement of party and state policies; and motivate the people to carry out the work of the state in every respect.

It is necessary to ensure that the activities of elected agencies are regular, plentiful, and effective. The process of transforming party policies into decisions by the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils that have the effect of law and into conscious activity by the people must be a process of research and truly democratic discussion within the National Assembly and Peoples' Councils undertaken with a view toward arriving at a unanimous decision of the policies and a determination to organize, educate and motivate the people to carry them out. At the same time, it is also a process wherein the representatives to the National Assembly and the members of the Peoples' Councils consolidate the ideas and intelligence of all classes of the people so as to improve every aspect of work conducted by the state.

Election to the National Assembly and the Peoples' Councils is a great honor. In order to be worthy of that honor, those who are entrusted with a responsibility of representing the people surely will constantly cultivate qualities and talents, stay close to the people, listen attentively to the ideas and understand the hopes of the people, and study and review the labor experiences and the struggle of the masses in order that they can actively contribute to decisions concerning problems related to the national welfare, livelihood, and destiny of the Fatherland. Following the example of President Ho, the representatives of the people in the National Assembly and on the Peoples' Councils at all echelons surely will perform in accordance with the promise made to the people by President Ho: "Constantly strive to be worthy as the loyal servants of your compatriots. Be honest and impartial representatives and strive wholeheartedly to serve the Fatherland, the people, and socialism."

The National Assembly and Peoples' Councils election is a major holiday for the people. All of the people should actively prepare for and enthusiastically participate in the election. All party members must take part in the election. Let us transform the fourth session National Assembly election into a widespread political motivation effort among the people with a view toward accomplishing 1971 state plans, building up and defending North Vietnam, and striving to support the front lines in order that they can defeat the U.S. aggressor and its lackeys. The fine results of the election will surely stimulate the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building of socialism in our country while at the same time, increasing the prestige of the state in the international arena.

(1) Lenin: The Proletariat Revolution and the Rebel Kousky, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1968, pp 27-29.

(2) Lenin: Collected Works, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1959, Volume II, Part I, page 195.

(3) Op. Cit., page 253.

(4) (5) Speech in Hanoi Peoples' Congress saluting the candidates to the third session of the National Assembly, Hanoi, 14 April 1954.

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CARRY OUT THE PARTY LINE ON BUILDING UP AND EXPANDING LOCAL INDUSTRY

[Article by Nguyen Van Tran; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 11-22]

1- Properly Evaluating Past Successes in Building Up and Expanding Local Industry

While building socialism in North Vietnam, the party has always devoted attention to building up and expanding local industry, considering it as a strategic responsibility and a longterm course of action within the framework of the industrialization of socialism in our country. The resolution of the Third Party Congress, as well as resolutions issued by Party Central Committee Conferences clearly pointed out the line, direction, responsibility, and policy relative to building up and expanding local industry.

In spite of the many problems encountered in shifting from a small production to a large, socialist production, problems added to by the destruction of war, local industrial production had continuously expanded since North Vietnam began the period of socialist construction because of the presence of proper party lines and policies. From 1955 to 1964, the gross output of local industry showed a 4.4-fold increase, including an 8.5-fold increase in state operated local industry and a 3.3-fold increase in light and handicraft industry. During the years of the war of destruction waged by the U.S. aggressor, local industry production levels not only held but continuously increased because the party promptly shifted the economy in a manner appropriate to the wartime situation. There was an 8.7 percent increase in the gross output of local industry in 1968 as compared with 1964, including a 40.5 percent increase in the output of state operated local industry alone.

There are more than one thousand state operated local industry installations and more than two thousand light industry and handicraft cooperatives in North Vietnam, spread out on a relatively even basis in all provinces. The technical and material bases of local industry have been greatly strengthened. The number of technical cadres and workers in local industry has also shown

a better than threefold increase over 1964. Party committees and local governments at all echelons have begun to become involved in both agriculture and industry and through actual production experience, have acquired a great deal of leadership and management experience in local industry. Local industry has produced many production materials and consumer goods. It has served the needs of production and the lives of the people, created additional sources of export goods and stimulated the expansion of agriculture and other sectors of the local economies.

We acquired additional favorable conditions for the expansion of local industry after the imperialist United States was forced to unconditionally halt the bombing and attacks against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In 1970, many important changes took place in the economy of North Vietnam. Industrial production in general, as well as local industry production in particular, made encouraging progress. The gross output of local industry in 1970 was 3.3 percent above goals, and some sectors made significant increases: food increased by 11.1 percent; pottery and glass increased by 8.1 percent; and construction materials increased by 7.3 percent. Increases were registered in the output of many kinds of goods, such as: cloth, various types of paper, common pottery, rush mats, sugar, bricks and tiles, and so forth. They worked in many localities to reinstitute the production of some goods while expanding the production of new goods to support both internal and export needs. We also made many efforts in 1970 to arrange and adjust local industry elements so that they would be appropriate to the new situation. At the same time, we completed some construction projects remaining from the previous year and moved many enterprises into production. Progress was made in leadership and the management of production in many local industry elements. During the productive labor campaign, nearly all local industry elements reorganized labor, eliminated personnel not directly engaged in production, established some labor quotas, paid salaries according to piecework, and increased the number of productive working days and hours. Many elements overcame to some degree waste in the use of materials and capital while the employment of equipment and machinery was better. They exploited many sources of substitute materials and fully utilized surplus materials to produce new kinds of goods. As a result of those kinds of efforts, the cost of some local industry goods was lower in 1970 than it was in 1969: writing paper decreased by from 6.7 to 13 percent; sugar by 10 percent; and rice bowls by from 13 to 40 percent. The labor productivity of one worker or production employee in state operated local industry increased by 0.7 percent as compared with 1969. Included in that figure is the increased labor productivity of some sectors which were significant, such as: pottery by 4.3 percent; paper by 58 percent; furniture by 15.9 percent and so forth. Many commercial elements had greater earnings and profit levels were higher. The number of commercial elements in which money was lost was greatly reduced and the rate of loss was much lower. Generally, the building up and expansion of local industry in North Vietnam recorded many great accomplishments in the past and contributed to the strengthening of North Vietnam, the great rear area of the anti-United States resistance for national salvation of the entire country. Just as the 19th meeting of the Party Central Committee recognized: "In the past 10 years, the people of North Vietnam have won great

victories and our power is greater in every respect than it was. Through the great challenge of war, the socialist system became more stable and the socialist economy was protected, and in some cases continued to expand. The superiority of our system and the vitally important effect of North Vietnam upon the resistance of the entire country has been forcefully manifested." It is clear that the success of the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation, as well as the success of the building of socialism in North Vietnam, is in part due to the active contribution made by local industry. The success of the building up and expansion of local industry has more than an economic importance. It is also important from a standpoint of politics and national defense. It has more than just the immediate effect of increasing the power of North Vietnam in that it creates a foundation for forceful expansion of the economy in the future. That is a fact that we must assert.

However, we must admit that there are many shortcomings and major problems still to be faced in local industry. The salient point has been that expansion in local industry is still slow and lacks stability when compared with the amount of money and energy which the party, the government, and the people have devoted to local industry in the past. The economic effectiveness of local industry is still slight. Local industry has not yet properly exploited the potential of the localities and it has not yet responded to the many needs of production and the lives of the people in the localities.

These remaining problems in local industry are caused by various factors. North Vietnam is going through the process of shifting from a small production to a large socialist production and there are still many areas of imbalance in the national economy. We have also had to cope with many years of violent war and at present must continue the war against the U.S. aggressor. That situation surely has an effect upon the expansion of local industry. Our performance in organizing and managing the economy in general, as well as understanding and managing local industry in particular, is still poor. That also has an effect upon the expansion of local industry. In addition to those objective factors, we must also recognize that party lines and policies on building up and expanding the local economy are not adequately understood at all echelons and in all sectors from the national to the local level. In organizing and leading toward the implementation of party policies on local industry still demonstrates some shortcomings. These are illustrated mainly in the following areas: the party has asserted that the expansion of local industry is a strategic obligation and a longterm course of action within the framework of the line on the industrialization of socialism, which requires close coordination between the expansion of local and national industry, between state operated and cooperative industry, and among the various localities. However, in fact, we have given light industry scant attention and we have at times overemphasized one aspect of local industry without any coordination between local industry and national industry and between state operated and cooperative industry. It has also been a general practice to devote little attention to the cooperative industry and handicraft industry sectors. As a result, when problems are encountered, nervousness sets in and there is vacillation in some places at some times along with

a failure to persistently carry out the party line. The party emphasizes that local industry must be commensurate with the special characteristics of the localities. It must manifest the strengths of each locality and it must especially be oriented toward the support of agriculture. But in fact, the expansion of local industry in the past of many localities has been of an inflexible nature and not balanced with, or tied to the local economy. The party policy is to develop a spirit of creative activity in the localities, and to create conditions under which the localities can exercise their right of collective ownership while maintaining a responsibility to organize and manage the local economy well. But in fact, many localities are still dependent and passive. They have not yet truly based themselves upon the specific conditions in the locality but rather strive to get many more enterprises and better equipment and to carry out the economic buildup without balancing the various aspects, without considering economic effectiveness, and so forth. Those subjective shortcomings are the major reasons why local industry expands slowly, lacks stability, and fails to achieve the desired economic results.

The anti-United States undertaking for national salvation in North Vietnam has presented us with extremely heavy obligations. It demands that we make great efforts. The 19th conference of the Party Central Committee reviewed the experiences in carrying out the Vietnamese revolution in the past and outlined the missions of the entire party and all of the people for the future. That conference asserted: "By fully applying the common party line in the initial steps of the transitional period to socialism and in the environment of a resistance, the course of economic expansion must illustrate the priority line on the expansion of heavy industry on the basis of agricultural and light industry expansion. Build up the national economy while expanding local economy. Combine economics with national defense." The resolution issued by the 19th conference of the Party Central Committee gave us greater faith in the proper revolutionary lines in the party and it helped us to acquire a better theoretical basis to clearly understand and persistently carry out the policy on building up and expanding local industry. Every cadre and party member, especially engaged in sectors related to local industry, should fully understand the party line and rely upon actual past experience in striving to overcome shortcomings and weaknesses in order to accelerate the expansion of local industry, bring about practical economic results, help to create forceful change in the national economy, and lead the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building of socialism for all of the people to total victory.

2- Fully Understanding the Strategic Meaning of the Expansion of Local Industry

We are carrying out the industrialization of socialism in a country which has traditionally been a poor and underdeveloped agricultural nation. We have not yet passed through a phase of capitalist expansion, industry is still small, the distribution of labor is still at a low level, and the ability to accumulate capital within the national economy is still very much limited. Therefore, in the process of constructing the material and technical bases for socialism, we have encountered many problems relative to capital

investments. Meanwhile, the socialist system and real social needs demand that we strive to progressively improve the living standards of the people, which are still very low and fraught with problems and shortages because of the war.

That situation has presented the party with a problem which must be resolved: in the process of industrializing socialism, we must use capital most appropriately and do everything possible to economize, while attaining good economic results. Only in this way can we rapidly construct the material and technical bases necessary for socialism and quickly transform our country from a backward agricultural nation into a socialist country with a modern industry, modern agriculture, and progressive education while satisfying the urgent needs relative to the living conditions of our people.

The strategic meaning of local industry lies in the fact that it allows for the mobilization of all of the peoples potential in conjunction with the use of the vital capital resources of the state. It can quickly resolve the myriad needs of production and the lives of the people which national industry would have difficulty in promptly and fully resolving. As a result, the state can appropriately use its capital while striving at the same time to help and coordinate the economy and technology with other countries so as to build the key industrial bases which have a decisive effect upon the improvement and the expansion of the national economy. The strategic meaning of local industry also lies in its ability to assist in the rapid creation of a balance between industry and agriculture (throughout the country as well as in individual localities). It stimulates the process of the new distribution of labor, increases socialist labor output, and creates additional resources for the accumulation of capital necessary to meet the needs for the expansion of national level industry. The expansion of local industry, along with the expansion of national industry, also helps to create a stable foundation for national defense.

Primarily for those reasons, the party has always emphasized the strategic position of local industry and considered the building of the national economy along with the expansion of local economies as one of the basic points of the party within the framework of economic expansion during the transitional period toward socialism in North Vietnam. Every doubt about the rate of expansion in local industry and every passive or vacillating idea regarding the expansion of local industry is without foundation. In fact, during the past several years, some localities have overbuilt industry and have not devoted enough attention to the specific conditions of the locality because they failed to fully understand the party line. The reorganization, and even the dissolution of a few local industry installations is necessary and aimed at rectifying specific shortcomings generated in the process of carrying out the party line of the expansion of local industry. But that fact does not mean that the party line of the expansion of local industry is wrong. It is not only because of the war that we emphasize the expansion of local industry. During the period of the war of destruction waged by the U.S. aggressor, the building up and expansion of the national level industry was partially restricted and we provided additional manpower and materials to

accelerate the expansion of local industry. Now, while accelerating the building up of national industry, we must accelerate the expansion of local industry and persistently carry out the party line on industrial expansion.

A problem which arises while building up the national economy while building up local economies is that we must resolve the relationship between national level industry and local industry and between state operated and cooperative industry. We must rectify specific shortcomings which arose in the past in order to ensure that the national economy develops in a balanced and forceful manner. We all know that the process of shifting from a smaller production to a large socialist production follows a totally different pattern of economic expansion than does the shift from a smaller production to a large capitalist production. The salient feature in the birth of large capitalist production is its spontaneity. Free competition and the dog-eat-dog pattern permeates the entire process of the expansion. The process of forming a large capitalist production is a process of concentrating the wealth in the hands of a small group of capitalists. At the same time, it is a process of bankrupting and impoverishing those who are deprived of all the means of production and can only survive by selling their labor power. The process of expanding from a small production to a large socialist production in our country will follow an entirely different pattern: it is not spontaneous but rather under the centralized and united leadership of the state and follows a pattern of balanced expansion for the national economy. Here, there is no free competition or dog-eat-dog tactics but rather mutual cooperation and competition for mutual expansion.

In our economy, national industry and local industry, state operated local industry and cooperative light industry and the handicraft industry are not at odds with each other but rather form a united front through a plan for common expansion. The relationship between the forces of industrial production is not one of free competition or dog-eat-dog but rather one of mutual assistance, stimulation, and more and more mutual expansion. In its leadership role, the national industry will expand and provide local industry with an ever-increasing amount of equipment, spare parts, materials, and power. It will help local industry obtain better technical results, to train cadres and workers, to gain experience in organization and management, and so forth. Those are the things which have a decisive effect upon the expansion of local industry. It is necessary to assert that local industry can only expand forcefully and with stability on the powerful foundation of national industry. With a relatively broad and abundant power base, local industry will expand and respond to the urgent needs of production and the lives of the people. This will create conditions for national industry to concentrate on the most important and decisive projects. Therefore, the expansion of local industry not only does not limit but rather accelerates the process of modernization for the entire national economy.

In the process of building up and expanding the local economy, we must calculate the economic effectiveness of the entire national economy in order to obtain an appropriate distribution of labor between national and local

industry and between state operated and handicraft industry with the idea of tightly economizing on capital investments in mind. Every dong invested in industry must help to create additional production capabilities for the national economy and must bring about effective economic results.. We must absolutely not expend capital on the construction of projects which do not stimulate the expansion of related sectors of the economy but rather present obstacles to expansion.

In that spirit, "With regard to those kinds of goods which local industry has provided or can provide beyond quantitative and qualitative requirements, there should be no new national level industry established. On the other hand, in those fields where national enterprises are available, necessary materials for them must be reserved on a priority basis and new local industry elements should not be opened." Additionally, "We must fully apply and develop all available capabilities of the cooperative sector while at the same time, progressively expanding state operated local industry. We must be fully aware of the position, effect, and course of progress in the cooperative sector, and overcome narrowmindedness, hastiness, and the idea of expanding state operated industry as a substitute for the cooperative. In general, state operated local industry should expand only in those fields where materials are centralized and abundant, where there is a great need, where the technology is rather complex, and where the requirement for investment capital is great. State operated local industry elements must be automated and semi-automated rather than established with handicraft production methods in mind." (1)

Actual experiences in building up and expanding local industry in the past has shown that some sectors and some localities did not fully understand the spirit of the resolution issued by the political bureau. Overexpansion and a failure to coordinate between national and local industry and between state operated and cooperative industry has created no small amount of problems for our industrial production bases. Some provinces have constructed many local industry bases without determining whether conditions existed which could guarantee normal activity; they have exceeded the capabilities of national industry to provide power, coal, and other types of materials; and they have ignored conditions relative to materials and the consumption of goods in the localities. The general inclinations of the localities is to devote attention to state operated local enterprises while giving scant attention to handicraft. In many localities where they have light industry and handicraft industry production bases, as well as production experiences and traditiona, they have not devoted attention to those elements in helping to create the conditions necessary for expansion but have rather expended capital on the construction of state operated enterprises which produce the same kinds of goods at a higher cost and of less quality. As a result, newly constructed state operated local enterprises bring about no particular advantage to the local economy but rather waste investment capital and create obstacles to rather than stimulating, the expansion of light and handicraft industry.

We must overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings and reorganize the forces of production. Although the results obtained by the metals and

machinery sector in the reorganization of forces engaged in the production of machinery are initial steps, they are important because they prove that we are completely capable of coordinating the distribution of production labor among various production elements making the same goods so as to ensure that national industry, local industry, light industry, and handicraft industry all forcefully expand.

3- Developing the Strength of the Localities and Making Local Industry Better Serve Agricultural Expansion

The expansion of local industry must be closely tied to the special characteristics of the locality with a view toward developing its strengths, its advantages in skills and traditional occupations, its labor capabilities, and so forth. The expansion of local industry must also be appropriate to the patterns of the process of shifting from a small production to a large socialist production.

Looking at the actual situation, we note that the building and expansion of industry in many localities is not appropriate to the above-mentioned special characteristics. With an inflexible and mechanical attitude, every province establishes a similarly structured industry, which puts them in competition with one another, while the strengths of the localities are not developed, and the urgent needs of the general economy are not resolved. For example: the provinces of the mountain regions have not yet devoted sufficient attention to the exploitation of forestry; the coastal provinces have not devoted sufficient attention to the exploitation and processing of marine products; and the provinces in the delta have not yet devoted sufficient attention to the processing of subsidiary crops and the various other types of agricultural produce. The tendency toward self-sufficiency, caused by the failure to properly understand the concept of in-place rear services, has created problems in materials and markets.

We must promptly overcome those erroneous tendencies and clearly recognize the strengths of each locality while at the same time recognizing that local industry is one element of the overall national industry so that appropriate plans can be made for its expansion. Generally, local industry must include two different types of production bases engaged in the production of large quantities of ordinary and simple goods which are difficult to transport, such as some types of ordinary agricultural tools, bricks, tiles, ready made clothing, wooden goods, pottery, woven goods, and so forth. Goods produced and consumed in the same place are the most profitable and every province must expand the production of these goods. It is not necessary for every province to build up the production of special goods, which are the specialty of individual localities, such as the processing of various types of special local products, high quality, metal consumer goods, industrial goods for export, porcelain, paper, and so forth. There must be close coordination among the various localities and on the basis of exploiting the skills and appropriate distribution of labor, they must progressively become more specialized in their production and help each other to expand.

In addition to developing the strengths of each locality, the general effort of local industry must be aimed at better support of agricultural expansion. As stated in the resolution of the 19th conference of the Party Central Committee: "The anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building up of socialism demands that agriculture provide sufficient food and grains to meet the needs of the army and the people. We must guarantee materials for industry and produce a large quantity of agricultural goods for export in order that they can be exchanged for materials, equipment, and machinery. We must also provide enough manpower for the war, supporting the war effort, industry, and other sectors. Given the situation in our country, the expansion of agriculture is not only necessary to ensure the living standards of our country and to serve as a foundation for industrial expansion, but it is also aimed at providing a stable in-place rear service to support national defense."

Our agriculture has still not completely escaped the single-crop, small scale variety with its low labor output. This has a great effect upon the general rate of the expansion of our national economy. Therefore, we must concentrate all of our efforts and rapidly create the material bases necessary for the overall expansion of agriculture, including many jobs on a large scale. We must rapidly establish a new distribution of labor so as to allow the output of cultivation and stockraising to constantly increase, to allow agriculture to provide an ever-growing quantity of agricultural goods, to respond to the needs of the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building of socialism, and to truly become a strongpoint for industry with regard to sources for capital, food, grains, materials, labor, and the markets.

In order to attain those goals, in addition to the effort of the agricultural sector itself, it will be necessary to have the strong influence and great support of industry. One of the large and urgent missions of industrial sectors today is that they must strive to support and stimulate the expansion of agriculture. While doing that, the industrial sectors must help to create the material conditions necessary to speed up the industrialization process.

Under the conditions extant in North Vietnam today; that is, where the forces of industry under direct management is still small, the capability of agriculture to accept modern techniques is still slight, and the requirement for consumer goods among the peasants is still for simple, ordinary things, the role of industry in the localities relative to the technical revolution in agriculture, as well as the responsibility for the production of consumer goods necessary to expand trade between industry and agriculture with a view toward stimulating agricultural expansion, is of special importance.

In order to support agricultural expansion, local industry must first of all promptly provide good quality tools, made to the proper specifications, (including ordinary agricultural tools, improved agricultural tools, and small machinery), basic and improved transportation equipment, various types of ordinary construction materials, (such as brick, tile, lime, and rock),

and some fertilizer, pesticides, and so forth to meet the technical revolution in agriculture. In addition, wholehearted attention must be devoted to organizing, guiding, and helping the agricultural cooperatives to safeguard, use, and repair various types of improved agricultural tools, with a view toward increasing the value of their utilization.

Local industry must accelerate the production of consumer goods in order to provide an ever-growing quantity to the people and thereby, help to expand trade between industry and agriculture. This is a problem with major political and economic ramifications because the trade of goods between industry and agriculture is a vitally important form and a clear illustration of the policy on the industrial-agricultural alliance within the current economic program of the party. The trade of goods between industry and agriculture is also a factor which stimulates the technical revolution in agriculture and encourages the constantly increasing production of agricultural goods. The exchange of goods between agriculture and industry also acts to primarily expand markets and generate capital accumulation.

Industry must also widely expand the network of agricultural goods processing with a view toward increasing the value of agricultural produce while helping to improve diets and stimulating a change in the structure of agriculture toward over all expansion. The expansion of agriculture demands a concomitant expansion in industrial processing. Because agriculture has not yet expanded on a large scale, the expansion of industrial processing in the the localities under various forms and under different scales has been most appropriate.

Local industry must still stimulate the widespread expansion of handicraft within the agricultural cooperative. We all know that the industrialization of socialism is closely tied to the new-socialist distribution of labor. In North Vietnam, the great majority of socialist labor is still engaged in agriculture with its low labor output. That is why when addressing ourselves to a new distribution of socialist labor, we must first of all speak of a redistribution of labor in agriculture. We have shifted and are in the process of shifting, some agricultural labor to industrial production, exploitation of the coastal areas, exploitation of the mountain regions, and the expansion and exploitation of new sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, we cannot extract millions of workers at once from agriculture. Moreover, not all types of labor can be had from rural areas. Therefore, the widespread expansion of light industry and handicraft production in agricultural cooperative and the on-site employment of labor which is excess to agriculture are effective measures by which to stimulate the new, socialist distribution of labor and the increase the production of socialist goods.

In the past, although we have asserted that the primary obligation of local industry was to support agriculture, nearly all localities devoted their attention to the expansion of the machinery network only with a view toward satisfying the requirements in agriculture for various types of tools, while devoting little attention to the production of consumer goods and the

establishment of food processing elements as an aid to the handicraft industry in the countryside. That is a primary shortcoming which we must overcome in order that local industry can better serve agricultural expansion in the future.

4- Improving Organization and Management in Local Industry

In order to ensure that the expansion of local industry in the future is forceful and stable, it is urgently required now to improve organization and management in local industry.

All echelons of party committees and local governments must develop the concept of collective ownership and a spirit of self-reliance. They must become involved and better understand industry and strengthen their sense of responsibility for the expansion of industry in their localities.

All echelons of party committees and local governments, through their leadership and management of the local economy, must on the one hand study and outline plans for shortterm economic expansion, and at the same time, they must effectively guide those plans with a view toward the best possible response to the urgent needs of the localities. On the other hand, they must be totally concerned with the long run and they must formulate future plans, at least with regard to major aspects and future expansion for the economy in their localities. In order to do this, they must invest a significant effort to the statistical analysis of strengths and skills available. This will allow them to determine the special characteristics and particular capabilities of the locality and serve as a basis for the establishment of a general plan of expansion for the local economy and each sector in the locality. In addition to those things, it is necessary to coordinate them with the deployment of industry throughout the country so that there will be an interaction with the deployment of industry in each locality, thereby confirming industrial groups for the future in each locality.

If a longterm course of action and plan is not asserted on the basis of a full understanding of the special characteristics, skills, and available labor within each locality the goals in the struggle can not be seen, it is impossible to boldly and effectively propose measures for economic expansion, and we will not be able to avoid running in circles and encountering confusing contradictions between immediate and longterm plans and between one sector and another. In order to avoid this, it is necessary to obtain guidance and assistance of specialized sectors at the national level. However, the party committee and local government echelons are responsible for providing overall leadership and management to local industry. Party committee echelons and local governments must base themselves upon Party Central Committee and Government policies, as well as the special nature of the localities, when outlining specific policies and plans for the establishment and management of industry in their localities, for which they bear full responsibility to the party, to the state, and the people in the localities.

On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen management of the enterprises in every respect, to overcome the effect of laxity in management, and to rapidly move local enterprises into commercial production with tight economic auditing. The party and the state are presently studying and experimenting with a system of management in the state operated enterprises. It will be some time before specific conclusions are reached in this regard and when they are reached, it will also be necessary to study their application to state operated local enterprises in an appropriate manner.

Therefore, rather than waiting, it is necessary to rely upon the foundation provided by the regulation on enterprise management promulgated by the state on the conduct of some effective measures, such as: strengthening labor discipline; ending liberal practices; ensuring that the number of working days and hours complies with the system; reorganize warehouses and rearrange materials, spare parts, and so forth so that they are orderly; guard against all damage and loss; strengthen statistical efforts; improve basic records; ensure that basic records provide a foundation for the classification of economic activities within the enterprise; reorganize accounting and financial efforts; employ proper guidelines and principles; ensure that all required funds are submitted to the state; fight against waste and corruption; establish standards and technical/economic quotas for labor, materials, and fuel in order to provide a basis for economic accounting, the paying of salaries according to piecework, and other aspects of management within the enterprise; establish and fully implement a system of management and techniques; fight against reckless working habits; ensure the quality of goods produced; maintain machinery well, and so forth.

Carrying out the above-mentioned things well does not require the adoption of the new management system. Rather it allows for clear cut progress in the management of local industry enterprises and also provides a primary foundation for the acceptance of a new economic management system in the future.

With regard to industrial elements which are part of the collectivized sector of the economy, we must devote special attention to improving planning and production management. The present and general inclination of many localities is to approach the problems of planning and production management in handicraft with a simple and inflexible view that follows the planning and production methods employed in the state operated sector. That is erroneous because state operated enterprises are economic units founded on the basis of public ownership of the means of production while handicraft and light industry cooperatives belong to the system of collectivized ownership. Planning for production in the cooperatives is not at all similar to that done in state operated enterprises. In order to stimulate the cooperatives to expand production we cannot simply rely upon administrative measures but must devote attention to economic and financial policies and forcefully employ economic incentives and a system of economic cooperation. The organization of production in light industry and the handicraft industry may follow many and various forms: cooperative, production team, private producers, family economies, and so forth, while light industry and handicraft

production also includes many jobs from production to repair and support. Therefore, we cannot use a state agency to directly manage this sector of the economy as is true in the case of the state operated sector of the economy. It is clear that in the management of the cooperative, the highest power belongs to the Cooperative Member Congress. The high-ranking management agencies of the cooperative are responsible for guiding and helping the cooperative to expand based upon the policies, laws, and systems promulgated by the state and they do not have the power to intervene into the internal affairs of the cooperative. It is necessary to develop the leadership role of state operated national level enterprises and state operated local enterprises in the cooperative production of various groups of goods. One or many state operated enterprises may encompass many cooperatives, production teams, and individuals within a production plan; and may provide technical assistance for mutual contracts and the supply of materials and equipment. With regard to the high-ranking management agencies in the cooperative, it is necessary to elevate the role of the district, provincial capital, and ward echelons regarding leadership over light industry and handicraft production because these are the echelons which primarily provide direct leadership over production elements. The province and municipal echelons provide guidance and control over general problems.

In the final analysis, with regard to improving organization and management in local industry, we must devote attention to research aimed at perfecting policies on local industry. The party and the government has always published many systems and policies aimed at encouraging the expansion of local industry. In general, those policies and systems have been very proper. although they have not been fully implemented, and in some places, have been arbitrarily implemented.

All echelons of party committees and local governments must once again look at the systems and policies in force and they must fully understand the basic spirit of, and properly implement, those policies. Of course, within policies on local industry, especially with regard to the handicraft industry, there are some points which are no longer appropriate to the new situation, such as: the policy on prices, the systems on processing and ordering goods, the issuing of materials, and the distribution of goods. We must carry out research in order to continuously perfect those policies and create conditions to stimulate the expansion of local industry.

The building up and expansion of local industry is a major party policy. Under the brilliance of the resolution issued by the Party Central Committee, local industry has been rapidly built up and expanded and is progressively manifesting its effect upon the national economy. However, the period of building up and expanding local industry is still short and our experience is still slight. Therefore, in carrying out party lines, there are still shortcomings in one area or another; this is difficult to avoid. We must properly evaluate the success of the building up of local industry in the past and more fully understand party lines, in order to persistently achieve, and rapidly rectify shortcomings, and continue the stable forward movement of local industry.

(1) Resolution Number 105 issued by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on 12 August 1964.

LOCAL INDUSTRY AND NEW EXPANSION IN LOCAL ECONOMIES

[Article by Le Hong Tam; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 23-34]

Within the structure of socialist production, there are relationships between the various production sectors. One of special importance is the relationship between agricultural production and industrial production. The extent of these relationships is closely tied to the level of expansion by production forces and their forceful reaction to expansion by production forces.

A relationship between industrial production and agricultural production exists even under natural conditions of the economy. Marx pointed out that "In the beginning, agricultural labor and industrial labor are inseparable and the latter is dependent upon the former. Surplus labor and surplus goods from agriculture, collectives, or other areas, including a mixture of agriculture and industrial labor, go together. Hunting, fishing, and cultivation cannot occur without appropriate tools. Weaving, spinning, and so forth were all in the beginning ancillary activities to agriculture." (1)

That is why industrial production exists at this time, although it is still subordinate to agricultural production and one of the "ancillary activities to agriculture." However, the subordinate position of industrial production relative to agricultural positions in no way eliminates the essential nature of agricultural production because it is obvious that without industrial production, agricultural production could not occur. The subordinate position of industrial production relative to industrial production, as mentioned here, means only that the level of expansion is still low among the forces of production within socialist production. The extent of the relationship between industrial production and agricultural production remains at a point where the level of industrial production is subordinate to agriculture and the effect of this relationship upon agricultural production is only strong enough to allow agricultural production to be carried out.

The forces of socialist production are constantly expanding, and together with that expansion, a socialist distribution of labor is continuously taking place. This will lead to the expansion of relationships in socialist

production, broaden the scope of their effect, and completely change their nature relative to the forces of production.

If agricultural production was previously the only sector of socialist production, and in order to carry out production the peasants had to produce their own tools, process their own food, and make their own necessities of life, specialists are gradually appearing who produce industrial goods and bring their products for trade with those engaged in agricultural production. As the production of goods takes place, local markets form. This is the mark of new expansion by the forces of production and from this period, the socialist distribution of labor has become a forceful incentive to the expansion of socialist production.

An illustration of forceful expansion in agriculture is an increase in labor output (brought about by effective and specialized working tools). Cultivation area is also expanded and as a result, the volume of agricultural produce increases and there is a greater variety of produce. At the same time, the number of people engaged in agricultural work can be gradually reduced.

Such expansion in agriculture is primarily due to industrial production, and especially the production of working tools, which has also produced greater expansion in the distribution of socialist labor, even though it continues to remain at handicraft production levels during this period. However, it is important that the essential nature of industrial production has grown from a point where it had only a minimal effect upon the conduct of agriculture to a point where it has a decisive effect upon the expansion of agricultural production.

But that is not all. The essential nature of industrial production lies not only in the extent of its effect upon the expansion of agriculture but rather in industry itself, which has expanded the socialist distribution of labor and gradually become a fundamental material production sector of society along with, and independent of, agriculture. Industrial production has expanded not only in scope but in structure. The vital means of production sectors- weaving, processing of agricultural products and food, medicines, and stationery- which work for those engaged both in agricultural and industrial production have all expanded. The expansion of agricultural and industrial production demands an expansion by the construction and construction materials sector. As the volume of trade increases, markets constantly expand and thereby generate an expansion of the sector involved in the production of transportation equipment. Naturally, such an expansion by industry demands a concomitant expansion in industrial sectors producing working tools, raw materials, and materials.

We must recognize that within socialist production at this time, there are not only two basic production sectors, agriculture and industry, but must also recognize that the relationship between these two sectors has expanded more than before. If industry was previously subordinate to agriculture, and between these two sectors there appeared to be only a one-way effect, industrial production has now not only become independent of agricultural production but between the two there is a closer relationship. They not

only have a decisive effect on each other's survival, but of equal importance, of each other's expansion. Within all of socialist production, the most decisive factor in expansion is the industrial sector engaged in the production of the means of production.

It is primarily on the basis of the expansion of industrial production and the relationship between industrial production and agricultural production mentioned above that the prosperity of the economy has been created, even during a period in which industrial production was still at the workcamp and handicraft level.

When the technical revolution took place in industrial production and machinery replaced manual labor and doubled labor productivity, the expansion of the forces of production entered a period of great progress. Industrial automation became the leading production force of socialist production. On the one hand, it decisively and continuously expanded in the scale of production and its own technological level. On the other hand, it created technological and material bases for other production sectors (agriculture, communications and transportation, and so forth). This was a period of industrialization for the national economy and a period in which automated industrial production became the extremely forceful incentive to the expansion of the forces of production, as well as industrial sectors engaged in the production of modern means of production: The manufacture of machinery and the materials with which to manufacture machinery and heavy equipment. Or in other words, heavy industry factors became decisive factors of expansion carried out in accordance with the modernization of socialist production.

The process of a patterned expansion by the forces of production as presented above was asserted by Marxist political economics. The problem presented to us is to creatively apply, as well as recognize, that pattern to the specific conditions and special characteristics of our national economy. Because as Marx pointed out, "...Even when a society discovers that it is at the mercy of a natural pattern, it cannot quickly overcome this or use decrees to eliminate that phase in its natural expansion, but it can shorten the growth period and reduce the pain inherent in the developmental process of that phase." (2)

Everyone knows that when North Vietnam began the transitional period to socialism, history had left our country as one with a backward and underdeveloped agricultural economy. Just as President Ho, the beloved leader of our people said, "...The salient feature during the transitional period from a backward agricultural nation to socialism is that we are not passing through a period of capitalist expansion.

"Imperialist France left us with a poverty stricken economy. In agriculture, small production occupies a great majority and technology is extremely backward. Industry is small and erratic. Industry and agriculture have also been heavily damaged during 15 years of war. When they withdrew from North Vietnam, the French colonialists made great efforts to destroy the economy.

"Therefore, our most important mission is that we must build up the technical and material foundation of socialism and lead North Vietnam gradually to socialism with a modern industry and agriculture and a progressive system of education and science." (3)

Having passed through the actual experience of 15 years of building up North Vietnam, we more clearly recognize the special characteristics of North Vietnam during the transitional period to socialism and are more profoundly aware of the pattern of expansion in the socialist economy of North Vietnam. The line on economic expansion in its initial stages, as Le Duan, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, mentioned in his work entitled, "Move Ahead to Win New Victories for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism Under the Glorious Banner of the Party," is primarily the conclusions drawn from reviewing the experiences of building up socialism in North Vietnam during the past 15 years. Those conclusions help us to more clearly see the direction and initial progress required to create the necessary balance for an appropriate expansion of all sectors of the national economy, to manifest advantages, to overcome difficulties, and to lead the small productions in our country gradually to a large, socialist production.

Within the line on economic expansion in the initial stages, the problem of "building up the national economy while expanding local economy" is an important issue. To accomplish the "building up of the national economy while expanding local economy," we can concentrate forces upon building up a modern, major industry, primarily heavy industry, and a modern system of communications and transportation in such a way and on such a scale that it will effectively and forcefully prod the entire national economy to expansion. At the same time, we can also develop all of our potential in order to rapidly create an initial prosperity for the economy in our country, even during the initial stage of the industrialization period, through the prosperity of local economies brought about by a balanced expansion and mutual stimulation between local industry and agriculture. This prosperity is absolutely necessary because it is the primary condition of a balanced expansion among the forces of production within the national economy. This prosperity also creates conditions necessary to achieve capital accumulation at a high enough level for industrialization and meet the urgent need to improve the still-low living standards of the people.

The stimulating relationship involved in the simultaneous expansion of the national economy and local economies is, while due to the expansion of local industry aimed primarily at stimulating the expansion of agriculture and satisfying the people's needs for consumer goods, to create new progress in the local economies. The national economy and modern major industry will then progressively introduce modern technology into the local economies during the process of their buildup. Therefore, the building of technical and material bases for the local economies, primarily in industry, is simultaneously carried out because local industry and the national economy will cause a forceful and rapid expansion of agriculture. A local economy with an expanding agriculture and industry also create the economic conditions

necessary for the expansion of the national economy. Agriculture will rapidly become a stable base for the expansion of industry. It will allow us to mobilize an ever-growing labor force and supply of grains, materials, and capital with which to build up industry.

Particularly with regard to local industry, it has the conditions necessary for rapid expansion because a national economy is providing an ever-increasing quantity of machinery and technical materials and it is closely allied with agricultural production and other sectors of the local economy. It can rapidly eliminate handicraft and scattered production methods in order to begin using methods designed for greater expansion. This means that from a technical standpoint, the manual labor, semi-automated and automated stages will be shortened and carried out simultaneously. From an economic standpoint, it is possible to move more quickly to centralized production on a larger scale while at the same time, specialized and cooperativized production methods based on an appropriate distribution of labor in line with the principles of expansion in industrialized production can also be more quickly carried out. With such expansion, the effect of local industry on the local economy, primarily agricultural production, will double and will allow the local economy to achieve rapid and stable progress.

The above-mentioned ideas are different than a chain reaction but the result will be a change in the quality of the national economy in a relatively short period of history.

It is obvious that with a policy of national economic expansion to be carried out simultaneously with local economy expansion, during which local industry must be forcefully expanded and effectively and directly stimulate the expansion of agriculture, the party has fully and actively applied the pattern of expansion by production forces, that is, it has stimulated this process so that it would take place quickly and advantageously. In other words, the shift from the backward or agricultural economy to a socialist economy with modern industry and agriculture will be more advantage and will be completed in a relatively short period of history. During this process, the living standards of the people can continue to improve progressively.

We have presented in a general way the essential nature and important position of local industry relative to the building up and expansion of the national economy, especially during the initial stages of the industrialization of socialism.

Within the framework of local economy expansion, the expansion of local industry has become a vital requirement.

Local industry has expanded in the past at a fairly high speed and the average annual growth between 1955 and 1964 was 17.9 percent. During the years of the war of destruction, during which the policy on shifting the economy was in force, local industry was especially expanded through the use of capital investments much greater than in previous years. We presently have more than one thousand local industry enterprises of medium and small

size and they are engaged in both the production of the means of production and consumer goods. In addition, it is necessary to count the forces of handicraft production, which number approximately one-half million workers.

However, we must admit that local industry enterprises have not yet obtained great economic effectiveness and the result obtained by local industry have not yet matched the energy and capital which the government and the people have expended. The expansion which has taken place in more than 10 years in local industry has still not created a major change in the local economy.

A province in the delta, such as Hai Hung, has more than 1.6 million people but in 1967 when the agricultural population comprised up to 89.7 percent of the people, the gross output of industry was only 19.5 percent of the combined gross output of industry and agriculture. Industrial production is even less at the district and township level. In a district where the agricultural production is among the best today, such as in Thanh Oai, in Ha Tay Province, only 15.36 percent of the population is engaged in industrial production. Included in that figure is 5.1 percent, or 871 people, who have moved completely out of agriculture and shifted over to industrial production within handicraft industry cooperatives.

It is clear that within the local economies at present, agricultural production continues to play the major role while industrial production lacks expansion. It is also clear that the balance necessary to stimulate the local expansion has not yet been established.

As stated above, when presented with the problem of local industry expansion, the party fully applied the pattern of expansion by production forces and based itself upon the stimuli of a socialist distribution of labor in industry. Therefore, within the local economy where agriculture still played the major role, the expansion of local industry had to be first of all aimed at the goal of expanding agricultural production. This also means that local industry must have a direct effect upon increasing labor output in agriculture in order that agriculture may on this basis carry out intensive cultivation, expand in many sectors, and at the same time, reduce the number of workers in the agriculture sector and thereby increase the number of workers shifted to other production sectors with a view toward carrying out a new, socialist distribution of labor in the local economy. President Ho said, "Local industry must be aimed at support of the people and production. It must make those things which can be made from locally available materials in order that upon production the goods can be sold within the locality. It must comply with the principle of producing a great many goods quickly, well, and cheaply." (4) Local industry together with various sectors of national industry, must help to provide agriculture with the means of production cheaply so as to have an effect upon increasing labor output in agriculture. On the other hand, local industry must expand those sectors devoted to the processing of agricultural produce and the production of consumer goods in order to satisfy the needs of the people in the localities. The attraction

of agricultural produce to industry for processing and the production of consumer goods for trade with the peasants has an economic meaning in that it stimulates agricultural production along intensive cultivation lines and expands many sectors, thereby increasing the available quantity of produce as well as the variety. In other words, this stimulates an increase in labor output, as well as in the socialist distribution of labor in agriculture and the local economies. If local industry expands along the above-mentioned lines, it will surely have the effect of stimulating the economy to greater expansion. Agriculture can provide industry and other sectors of the economy with a greater volume of labor, grains, and agricultural produce. At the same time, it can become an ever-growing market for industry and local industry can acquire the conditions necessary to achieve capital accumulation through the exchange of goods in rural markets and thus expand production.

Because of the ever-growing effect of the national economy and local industry, a socialist distribution of labor occurs more and more frequently in the local economy and frees a constantly increasing number of agricultural workers for assignment to other sectors of the economy. However, under the actual conditions of the national economy during the present phase, the various sectors of the economy, at both the national and local levels, have not attracted all possible production labor from agriculture. Moreover, the redistribution of socialist labor in the countryside continues to take place in accordance with that pattern. Within this process, there are elements of agricultural labor which could be released from agricultural production and transferred to other production sectors. There are elements of agricultural labor which have not completely separated from agricultural production and which can only devote parttime to participation in industrial production. Lenin said, "Only with automated industry is it possible for industry and agriculture to separate completely." (5) That means that only when the industrialization of socialism has been completed and when industry has become a large scale, automated operation can the distribution of socialist labor between the two production sectors, agriculture and industry, be totally implemented. Therefore, when compared with the effectiveness of the national economy during the initial stage of the industrialization period, we must recognize the need for the formation and expansion of many sectors and handicraft jobs in the countryside, from secondary family occupations among peasants, to vocational and semi-vocational handicraft production elements.(*).

Therefore, while guiding the expansion of local industry, we must be fully concerned with the expansion of industrial production and with the capability of the handicraft industry to supplement state operated industry, thereby helping state operated industry to create strong industrial production forces within the local economy.

Of course, handicraft production has a lower rate of labor output than does automated industrial production. But when we do not yet have enough capital to expand many state operated enterprises or to fully apply the source of labor which could be shifted from agriculture and while in agriculture there is always an element of labor which can devote some time to

other production tasks, why should we not expand the handicraft industry to create additional material goods for society and increase sources of income for the peasants? The advantages of the handicraft industry under the specific local economic conditions extant at present are primarily: it fully utilizes the labor resources of the countryside; it mobilizes the capital resources of the people; and it exploits the abundance, but small scale and scattered raw materials resources available to produce goods, including the means of production and consumer goods which state operated industry is as yet unable to provide. Although labor productivity in the handicraft industry is low, it is one source from which to enrich local economy if it is forcefully expanded. Let us examine Thanh Oai District for example. The number of people engaged in handicraft production (including semi-vocational production) in recent years occupies only 13.36 percent of the population but the value of their output was equal to from 40 to 50 percent of the combined total output of industry and agriculture for the entire district. They not only attained a yield of five tons of paddy per hectare in this district but also expanded handicraft. The value of goods produced by vocational handicraft workers in 1956 was up to 550,000 dong, of an average of 843 dong per person, which was many times greater than that attained by agricultural workers. If handicraft production was expanded as demonstrated as the above-mentioned example in all localities, it is clear that it would actively contribute to the expansion of local economies.

Therefore, while providing guidance to the expansion of local industry we must not only aim at increasing labor output in agriculture so that this foundation can create the conditions necessary for the expansion of a socialist distribution of labor in the localities, but must aim at fully utilizing the labor resources of the countryside in handicraft production.

In order to accomplish this, we must satisfactorily resolve two issues: the first is to provide the handicraft industry with small mechanical tools, and the necessary raw materials and materials which the handicraft elements cannot make or find in the locality; secondly, we must acquire a balance in the distribution of labor between the handicraft industry and state operated local industry in order to avoid irregular or inappropriate occurrences in production, the supply of raw materials and materials, the sale and distribution of goods, and so forth.

That distribution of production labor was stipulated in a resolution issued by the Council of Ministers on accelerating expansion in light and handicraft industry: "The principle of distribution of labor between state operated industry and the handicraft and light industry must be based on overall calculations of the economic effect. In general, where in the production sector light industry and handicraft has surpassed or can surpass, quantitative and qualitative requirements, they should be used to the fullest extent possible. State operated industry must concentrate its expansion in those production sectors where the economic effect is important, a large volume of production is required, a great deal of investment capital is demanded, and the technology is complicated. In those fields where state operated industry and the handicraft and light industries must exist and

expand together, it is necessary to have a clear cut distribution of labor and close cooperation in order to avoid conflict between them. In these cases, we should study the application of the product groups forms in order to properly resolve those problems of distribution of labor and cooperation." In accordance with the spirit of the above-mentioned resolution, we specifically suggest the following:

1 - In addition to producing consumer goods and responding to the production needs of other sectors of the economy, state operated local industry must, in conjunction with national level industry, assume the responsibility for the supply of the means of production, small machinery, and the raw materials and materials necessary for the expansion of the handicraft industry to the advantage of the local economy.

2 - State operated local industry as an industrial production force under the public ownership of all of the people and with its higher technical standards, must effectively lead handicraft production within the local economy. That leadership will be illustrated in two areas: first, it will control a sector or the key production links in the manufacturing process of important products; secondly, it will effect an appropriate distribution of labor with the handicraft industry along the lines of a combined production sector made up of the forces of production in both the handicraft and state operated enterprises. In other words, it will follow the single product group principle, under which the state operated enterprise is the key production force responsible for helping to stimulate the handicraft production elements in the sector to expansion.

By resolving the relationship between the state operated local industry and the forces of production engaged in the handicraft industry in the local economies as mentioned above, we have fully applied a few principles which Marx learned when he was studying the effects of machinery on the socialist distribution of labor and expanding the scope of industrial production sectors in the initial stages of the technical revolution. Marx said, "If machinery is employed during the initial or middle stages where a labor objective must be reached before the stage is completed, the handicraft jobs or manual labor workcamp which receive the benefit of these machines will acquire a great deal more materials and will attract a greater quantity of labor"... "Machinery used for small objectives gradually increases the volume of raw materials, semi-finished products, working tools, and so forth... The industrial sectors using those materials, and so forth, gradually break up into many different sectors. As a result, the socialist distribution of labor acquires a more forcefully stimulated momentum, that is, the stimulus provided by the orthodox manual labor workcamp." (6)

In providing guidance to the expansion of local industry, we must also resolve the relationship between state operated local industry and national level industry. This requires that two questions be answered: What shall be the principles which determine the limit of state operated local industry and those of the national level industry and in what sectors shall the state operated industries expand? What goods should it produce? What shall be

the scope of its technological capability? In short, how can we best effect a balanced expansion of both state operated local industry and the national industry?

First of all it is necessary to assert that state operated local industry and national industry are the two elements which make up our socialist industry. State operated local industry is under local management in order that it may directly stimulate a balanced expansion in the local economy. The simultaneous expansion in both national and local industries is undertaken to expand the forces of production. In order to guarantee the expansion of both of these sectors of the economy, it is necessary to design and implement a truly appropriate decentralization of management. The borders between national industry and state operated local industry are as pointed out by Le Duan: "The national economy includes the most vital sectors. It plays the role of the leader and it prods the entire national economy. Each locality bases itself upon lines and policies, general courses, and general plans provided by the national level to actively manage and build up the local economy. The economy of each locality is both a part of the overall economic structure of the country and an appropriately balanced part of the structure within the locality. It illustrates the general courses, plans, and policies at the national level while at the same time, reflecting the creativeness and uniqueness of the locality." (7) The relationship between national industry and state operated local industry is a "socialist cooperation relationship between the various parts of one socialist distribution of labor system encompassing the entire country. The framework of this relationship includes many parts: mutual exchange and assistance regarding technology, raw materials, distribution, the cooperative construction of economic and cultural projects for mutual advantage, and so forth. These relationships must be carried out under guidance from the national level and cannot be at odds with state plans, but must rather abundantly supplement them." (8)

In examining the actual situation at present, we note that the construction of state operated local enterprises, whether small or medium sized, as well as the production activities of these enterprises, could not be carried out without the assistance of national level industry. This assistance includes resolving technical problems, providing machinery, organizing production, and supplying the technical materials necessary but unavailable from local industry resources. There are also specific requirements for assistance levied upon the national level industry by state operated local industry, primarily upon the heavy industry sectors. In other words, satisfying the requirements for expansion in state operated local industry is one of the missions of the national level industry. On the other hand, the expansion of state operated local industry will create additional markets for the national level industry and effectively stimulate expansion in the national level industry. That is one aspect of the relationship between state operated local industry and the national level industry.

The second aspect of this relationship which we must resolve concerns the establishment of limits with regard to production objectives, with regard to scope of production, and technical standards. This relationship can only

be satisfactorily resolved by relying upon the principles of distribution of labor, specialization, and production cooperation within the confines of each industrial sector, as well as reliance upon the requirement for the appropriate distribution of production forces in each sector of the entire field.

We know that the above-mentioned principles of industrial production are aimed at various economic goals, such as: economization of investments, economization of production expenditures; and the attainment of high labor output in each enterprise within an industrial sector. In that way, the expansion of each industrial sector, in production scope and technical standards, will be very advantageous. These principles are also applicable to the enterprises in a sector deployed to various localities. It helps to avoid a situation in which a locality is required to produce all of the types of products it needs without regard for which scale of production would be the most profitable. Also on the basis of these principles, it is possible on the one hand to exploit all sources of skills in various localities to mutual advantage. On the other hand, it is possible to use technical labor, which is still scarce, in a concentrated manner.

In order to make this problem more clear, we can use the following example: agriculture requires many water pumps but because of the special nature and use in different areas, we need many different types and sizes. Low water level piston pumps with high volume circulation can be used for specialized production in the delta provinces. High water level piston pumps can be used for the specialized production of the mountain provinces. High output pumps used by primary pumping stations will be manufactured by national industry.

The principles of specialized distribution of labor and cooperative production are not only applicable to local industry enterprises and national industry within the framework of one industrial sector. The combination of these principles with the requirements for the appropriate distribution of industrial production forces throughout the field also presents problems requiring the application of these principles to the expansion in both the local industry and national industry sectors by applying them to the actual situation, we see that local industry will expand in the exploitation and initial processing for production of goods for which raw materials and materials are available in the locality, although the scale will be small and scattered, in order that it can provide these goods to the national level and to other localities. Local industry will receive raw materials and materials from national level industry in order that it can employ the abundant labor resources of the locality in the processing of goods at various levels of completion for national industry in cases where the manufacturing techniques are not complicated, a great deal of capital investment is not required, and so forth. As a result, on one hand, it is possible to increase the sources of materials, raw materials, and goods provided to the national industry and reduce capital investments in the national industry. On the other hand, there is a full employment of materials, raw materials, and labor resources of the localities, thereby contributing to local economic expansion.

Briefly, we can say that the expansion of state operated local industry must on the one hand be based upon the specific requirements necessary to effect a socialist redistribution of labor and expand the production forces of the local economy to new heights, both with regard to the scope of production and technical standards. On the other hand, it is necessary to rely upon the principle of expanding all industrial sectors, that is, the distribution of labor, the specialization, cooperative production within each industrial sector, and the requirements for an appropriate distribution of production forces in each sector of the field in order that the expansion of state operated local industry is regular and balanced with that of the national industry.

Therefore, it is clear that the expansion of state operated local industry in each locality must fit a general pattern for the expansion of state operated industry throughout the country during each planning period.

The expansion of local industry in accordance with the ultimate pattern of industrial production will gradually lead to a centralization and expansion of all production elements in those locations where communications and transportation are convenient and will create the "nucleus" for the formation of rural towns. Elements of the commerce, communications and transportation, education, cultural, and public health sectors, and so forth, will form around these centers. The rural towns will take shape in the process of expanding the local economy, not only as an economic phenomenon of the locality but also as a place to resolve the cultural, social, and day to day living needs of the peasants. They will also have a direct effect upon the expansion of production forces. When economic, cultural, and social activity is centralized in the rural towns, economy management and administration will also acquire the centralized bases necessary to develop their effectiveness upon the expansion of the economy and the improvement of the living conditions for the people in the locality.

If the expansion of local industry leads to the formation of rural towns and changes the fate and lifestyle of the countryside, changes in the structure of the production in the economy will ultimately lead to changes in the social structure. There will be an ever-growing number in the members of the working class living in the agricultural locality and this will have an important effect on the building of socialism in our country.

The expansion of local industry in conjunction with the construction of rural towns will help us to avoid the ever-growing estrangement and conflict between the rural areas and the cities, which has taken place in many countries during the industrialization of capitalism. It will bring our rural and urban areas closer together and create conditions under which we can eradicate the estrangement between rural and urban areas in our country.

The forceful expansion of local industry to stimulate the local economy toward new expansion is a major policy with a strategic importance to the expansion of the national economy. In his sacred will left for the entire

party and for all the people, President Ho reminded us that we must "expand the economy and culture with a view toward constantly improving the living conditions of the people." The forceful expansion of local industry is presently one on the primary important measures to help satisfy the ever-growing production and life needs of the people and it ensures that we are complying with President Ho's will.

The party determines policies on the expansion of local industry and local economies based upon its awareness of economic patterns rather than upon any subjective desire whatever. However, while the proposal of proper policies is only the result of an awareness of patterns, the implementation of policy is the application of patterns in the process of providing leadership under actual conditions. This is a problem of vital importance to our efforts. If in guiding the expansion of local economies we follow the pattern of expansion of production forces and skillfully apply those patterns to actual economic and social conditions, local industry will surely expand forcefully in a relatively short period of time, the face of the countryside will change, and the local economies will prosper.

(1) Marx: "Das Kapital," published in Vietnamese by Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1963, Volume 3, Part 3, p 31.

(2) Op. cit., 1959, Volume 1, Part 1, p 13.

(3) Ho Chi Minh: "Thirty Years of Party Activity" Collected Works, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1966, p 772.

(4) Ho Chi Minh: "Talks With Compatriots and Cadres of Bac Giang Province," The Appeals of President Ho, Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1962, p 195.

(5) Lenin: "The Expansion of Capitalism in Russia," Collected Works, Published in Vietnamese by Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1962, Part 3, p 689.

(*) We had occasion to talk about this problem in an article entitled "On the Expansion of Handicraft Production," published in Hoc Tap, June 1969, (L. H. T.)

(6) Marx: Op. cit., 1960, Volume 1, Part 2, p 179.

(7) (8): Le Duan: "Move Ahead to Win New Victories for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism under the Glorious Banner of the Party," Hoc Tap, February 1970, p 78.

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PROPERLY INTEGRATING OLD AND YOUNG CADRES

[Article by Le Duc Binh; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 35-42]

Properly integrating old and young cadres is a big problem within the party's cadre policy. It is an objective necessity and a requirement of the new cause and party development. Le Duan said: "The pattern of development in the revolution, as well as the party, demands that the party properly integrate cadres who have fought for many years with young cadres in order to mutually ensure strengths while at the same time, helping one another to overcome difficulties. This is because both categories of cadres have definite strengths and weaknesses." (1)

The objective necessity for integrating old and young cadres is illustrated by the following:

First, national liberation and the building of socialism and communism are long-term revolutionary causes which demand many succeeding generations struggling continuously. During the course of this long-term revolution, classes of old and new cadres and old and young cadres have formed. Old cadres have made many great contributions to the revolution but this force alone is not enough. There must be large numbers of young cadres as replacements in order to bring the party's great revolutionary cause continuously forward. Young cadres are the people who carry on and push the cause of the old cadres and who can only mature under the thoughtful guidance and attention of the old cadres.

The maintenance of the successive and uninterrupted nature of party leadership has a very important significance with respect to the developmental process of the revolution. The party stresses the maintenance of the splendid traditions and valuable experiences of previous periods of activity. At the same time, it continuously develops and supplements it under the new conditions of the revolution. If for some reason, the party's leadership process is interrupted, the traditions and experiences of previous periods not carried over to later periods, or the later period does not carry on and develop the experiences accumulated during the previous period, the revolution will run into difficulties. Properly integrating old cadres with young cadres

is an organizational prerequisite if the successive and uninterrupted nature of the party's leadership is to be maintained and the favorable development of the revolutionary cause is to be ensured.

Secondly, each category of cadres, whether young or old, generally has strengths and weaknesses. President Ho said, "Old cadres represent a valuable asset to the party. They have experience in leadership, have been trained, and have met many challenges in actual combat. However, there are some old cadres who have reached a stopping point. They do not make progress or they stick to the old ways and have no empathy with the new. Young cadres however, although they do not have the strengths of the old cadres, are enthusiastic, readily accept new ideas, and accept the difficulty of study. As a result, they make rapid progress." (2) Therefore, either category of cadres will demonstrate weaknesses. To rely upon only one category of cadres would create problems in strongly building up the agencies of the party and the state and it would be difficult to improve the quality of activities undertaken by those agencies. However, if we know how to properly integrate old and young cadres and to use the strengths of one category to supplement the strengths of the other, it is completely possible to organize administrative and management machinery at all echelons and in all sectors with stability.

Given the specific conditions in our country at present, properly integrating old and young cadres also ensures the integration of political cadres with technical cadres. Nearly all old cadres are political cadres. They have stable political standards, experience in political and ideological leadership, and a capability to organize and mobilize the masses. Many of them have over the years made great efforts to expel and to accumulate definite knowledge and experience in economy management, culture, and state management. But in general, they have lacked the necessary systematic cultural, scientific, and technical knowledge. Young cadres for the most part are scientific and technical cadres who possess fairly high educational standards although they have not yet matured politically and lack leadership experience.

The direction of the party is to train cadres so that they are both politically skillful and specialized. That is also a goal in the struggle of each of our cadres. But because of specific historical conditions in the process of building a corps of cadres for the party, in addition to some cadres who are both politically skillful and specialized, there are many cadres who are very weak in specialized and vocational knowledge, although they are strong politically. On the other hand, there are many cadres who do very well with their vocation but whose political standards are limited.

Therefore, in order to strengthen the overall leadership capabilities of party and state agencies, it is necessary at this time to integrate political cadres with technical cadres, albeit at varying levels depending upon the nature and function of each type of agency.

Thirdly, the integration of old and young cadres is also a prime necessity for the advancement of both categories of cadres.

As we know, each category of cadre, both young and old, has strengths and weaknesses. The proper integration of old and young cadres and the establishment of unity between them, will create conditions under which they can study together and help each other to supplement strengths and overcome weaknesses. In the process of working together, young cadres can study a great deal under the old cadres: political stability, political and ideological leadership experience, experience in mobilizing the masses, a sense of respect, maturity, and so forth. On the other hand, old cadres can exploit the strengths of young cadres, such as: cultural knowledge, science and technology, a seething revolutionary ardor, a fine sense of combat, empathy with new ideas, and so forth.

Therefore, the integration of old cadres with young cadres is not due to a sentimental relationship or designed to foster one category of cadre over another but primarily generated by a desire to strengthen the party and accelerate the revolution, as well as for the advancement of both categories of cadres.

In the selection and assignment of cadres, it is necessary to properly resolve the relationship between fully understanding the standards for cadres and integrating young and old cadres.

There are those who believe that in the selection of cadres it is only necessary to understand cadre standards and that it is not necessary to address the problem of integrating young and old cadres because this only gives rise to partiality or conflict, or it creates additional complications and confusion.

The problem of old and young cadres has been objectively generated and it cannot be avoided in the process of expanding the revolution and the party. The problem cannot be avoided but must be faced and resolved properly and in a manner appropriate to the interests of the revolution as well as the personal interests of the ranks of cadres. Moreover, the proper integration of old and young cadres is not in conflict with fully understanding the standards for party cadres. These two problems are united and complement one another. By skillfully integrating young and old cadres, it is possible to perfectly organize leadership agencies at all echelons and at all sectors and to enable those agencies to fully acquire the stipulated standards and make the best possible response to the political obligations of the party. On the other hand, there is another problem area: when examining and evaluating cadres, and when selecting and promoting them, concern is only given to whether they are old or young cadres and primary consideration is not given to standards for party cadres.

When evaluating cadres, it is necessary to rely upon standards and to examine their actual work record to be accurate. To say that old cadres and young cadres have particular strengths or weaknesses is only to speak in generalities. It is not necessarily true that old cadres are conservative or slow any more than it is true that young cadres have a seething ardor or empathize with new ideas, and so forth. When evaluating cadres, it is

necessary to analyze specifically each case and to base the evaluation upon standards for party cadres. It is totally erroneous to have a determined opinion about one category of cadres or another.

When promoting cadres, it is necessary to comply with the requirements of political obligations and to select those who qualify in regard to the standards. Whichever cadre meets all standards for quality and capabilities and who has the capability to perform the mission best should be promoted while those who do not meet the standards should not be promoted, whether young or old, new or old, male or female, worker or intellectual, and so forth. To speak of integrating young or old cadres does not mean to assign and promote key cadres so as to acquire a proper mixture without regard to standards. It is necessary to avoid the tendency to promote an old cadre because he is an old cadre who has been active for a long time and risen to the party echelon without carefully examining his performance relative to standards. Considering the process as a standard or using the process as a substitute for the standard is an improper viewpoint with regard to the selection and promotion of cadres. On the other hand, when they see that higher authority is calling for attention to the promotion of young cadres and scientific and technical, some people understand and carry out this concept mechanically and as a formality. As an example: in some places they plan not to promote a capable cadre because he is relatively old while giving consideration of a less qualified cadre because he is younger.

It is necessary to fully understand standards for cadres and to rely upon these standards for selection, assignment, and promotion of cadres. At the same time, on the basis of ensuring that stipulated standards are met, it is necessary to skillfully integrate old and young cadres. A failure to fully understand standards for cadres means that the selection and assignment of old and young cadres will not be correct. On the other hand, if we do not know how to skillfully integrate old and young cadres, it will be difficult to organize the leadership structure in the various sectors and at the various echelons so that they will have men with qualities and capabilities appropriate to the demands made by the political mission during each period of the revolution.

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In order to carry out the integration of old and young cadres, it is necessary to do well in the basic training, advanced training, utilization, and job distribution for each category of cadres. Le Duan said, "The party must be concerned with the long term training of the ranks of cadres. At the same time, it must be concerned with the basic and advanced training and bold promotion of many more young cadres with fine revolutionary qualities, abundant capabilities, and the ability to move forcefully ahead who are appearing in the revolutionary campaign." (3)

Each category of cadres, young and old, have different special characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a specific direction and specific methods for the appropriate basic training, advanced training, and utilization of each of those categories of cadres.

In its long and glorious history of struggle, the party has acquired a fairly large corps of cadres who have fought in the revolution continuously for many years since the Nghe-Tinh Soviet, the Democratic Front, the August Revolution, or the anti-French Resistance. Those cadres who have passed through such long struggles and challenges represent a valuable asset to the party and the revolution and we must rely upon and develop that asset in order to accelerate the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building of socialism. If we understand this situation differently or if we take lightly the position and effectiveness of old cadres during the current phase of the revolution, we will be guilty of deviation.

The party is very concerned with training old cadres, improving their standards and creating conditions under which they can continue to manifest their great effectiveness in the new phase of the revolution. In order for theoretical, political, cultural, scientific, and technical training for old cadres to be effective, it is necessary to employ forms and measures appropriate to their working conditions, age, and health. For those cadres who are not very old, whose capabilities for study is still good, and who accept things well it is necessary to have a relatively basic and long term program. For those cadres who are old and whose capability for acceptance is limited, training must still be conducted to improve their standards, but programs must be shorter, more effective, and employ more active and simple forms.

If a situation exists in which some competent cadres are underachieving, in addition to other reasons, one reason is that their training has not been good: in some places they are anxious about their job and are not determined to allow cadres to study while they have the ability to do so. They lack an overall design and specific plans and there are inappropriate points within the contents and programs on training. If an active effort is made in training, many old cadres would surely still excel and better perform the mission assigned to them.

In order that old cadres can manifest their effectiveness, it is also necessary to utilize them properly and assign them to the right job.. Knowing how to assign cadres to the right place and the right job, depending upon their specialties, and knowing how to organize the leadership structure and integrate the individual with the group will create conditions under which each cadre can manifest his effectiveness and perform his mission well. This is generally true with regard to the utilization of cadres, and with regard to the utilization of old cadres it must be so. Some men are assigned to jobs and positions not in keeping with their capabilities and it is difficult for them to develop. However, after studying the problem and transferring them to other jobs or positions which are more appropriate, they manifest their capabilities and specialties. In some cases, the inappropriateness arises from assignment to the leadership structure somewhere, for example, in a professional or economy management agency where the cadres in charge are

are old, political cadres resulting in many problems. However, after assigning additional technically qualified cadres to the leadership agency, it helped the other old cadres to overcome their weaknesses and manifest their strengths.

Those cadres in failing health whose capabilities are limited and who cannot guarantee the accomplishment of their mission must be given lighter jobs. That is in the common interest of the revolution and also appropriate to the individual interests of the cadre involved.

The living conditions and health of old cadres must receive complete attention. Many of them have fallen into bad health through their long and difficult struggle. As a result, maintaining and protecting the health of old cadres and fully carrying out policies and systems designated by the state relative to old cadres is an action requiring total concern.

Those who are old and infirm must retire in accordance with policies. Living conditions of retired cadres must require perfect care. With regard to those who are infirm and whose capabilities are limited, they must be assigned to lighter jobs but they must continue to receive satisfactory care and material treatment.

Along with the forces made up of old cadres, we must know how to exploit and develop the forces made up of young cadres.

We must know how to select and make great efforts to train young cadres. We must organize basic and advanced training for young cadres on a large scale, systematically, and fundamentally in order to acquire a force of cadres capable of responding to the requirements of immediate missions and preparing for the future.

The seething production and combat campaign carried out by the people represents an abundant and extremely valuable source of cadres. We have thousands upon thousands of emulation soldiers, valiant killers of Americans, "two-skills" soldiers, and so forth in all military units, the assault youth, enterprises, workcamps, and cooperatives. They have been trained through challenges, have fine qualities, and for the most part are still young. It is necessary to uncover and select the outstanding elements and to provide adequate conditions necessary for them to undergo basic and advanced training in culture, politics, science, and technology in a relatively fundamental and systematic manner. Some localities have actively organized advanced training for young cadres in accordance with that concept such as: Hai Hung Province which opened the To Hieu School, and Quang Binh Province, which opened the "Two Skills" School and obtained fine initial results.

Scientific and technical cadres represent a large number of young cadres requiring attention. For more than the past 15 years, we have trained thousands of technical cadres at the university level and many thousands of technical cadres at the middle school level. The great majority of them have come from the working people and possess fine ideological and political qualities. So far, the number which has gone to school for from 5 to 7

years and more is fairly large and many of them have engaged in actual production in units at the grass roots level where they have been trained and matured quite quickly. Some technical cadres who were traditionally workers, soldiers, or members of the assault youth have been selected for schools. By selecting from among the scientific and technical cadres the outstanding elements who are capable and who have a bright future, and by helping them with training in actual experience and carrying out advanced political and management training for them, we will create an abundant resource from which to reinforce the ranks of leading cadres and management cadres in all sectors and at all echelons.

We must boldly promote those young cadres who have met challenges, possess qualities and capabilities, have the strength to move forcefully ahead, and maintain a good relationship with the masses.

Actual experience in many places has shown that in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to persistently struggle to overcome conservatism, narrowmindedness, and the remnants of feudalism. We must also fight against the idea of disdaining young cadres, seeing only weaknesses and not seeing strengths and their progress, and evaluating them based upon their age, the length of time they have been party members, the process itself, and so forth.

In general, any cadre has weaknesses and shortcomings along with his strengths and this is not peculiar to young cadres. Demanding that individual cadres be totally perfect is unrealistic. The problem lies in knowing how to distinguish between strengths and weaknesses, that is, which are fundamental and essential and which are not fundamental or essential and in knowing how to utilize cadres in the proper place and the proper job commensurate with his strengths and weaknesses as well as knowing how to integrate the individual with the group to mutual advantage.

Young cadres are often considered by some people as having lacked challenges and training. That is not entirely correct. During the current urgent and seething revolutionary struggle of our people, many young cadres have been profoundly trained to challenges, in combat as well as in production, and on the front lines as well as in the rear area. They have clearly demonstrated their ideological qualities and political stability.

There are places in which the leadership and management machinery has been allowed to deteriorate for a long time and they cannot perform their mission well. It has been suggested that the reason is an inability to find cadres qualified to properly organize the machinery. In fact, in many cases, conservatism and narrowmindedness has primarily injured expansion and the bold promotions of new values rather than a lack of cadres.

Lenin highly valued the young and severely criticized narrowmindedness and a disdain for the young: "We need the voices of the young. I am inclined to summarily execute those who dare say they do not have people. There are as many people as there are grains of sand on the desert. It is only necessary

to utilize young people more widely and boldly, more boldly and widely, and even more widely and boldly, and without fear. This is wartime. Young people that is students and even more, young workers, will decide the results of the entire struggle. Let us discard the old inflexible habits, the custom of respect for high rank, and so forth. With all deliberate speed, we must assemble all people with a revolutionary spirit and an active spirit and get them to work. Do not be dismayed by their lack of training and do not fear that they lack experience and development..." (4)

Those words were spoken by Lenin during the first revolutionary period in Russia in 1905. Here and now, during a seething revolutionary period, the number of young cadres is great and they are rapidly maturing. Those guiding words from Lenin are more precious than ever to us.

Of course, boldly utilizing and promoting young cadres does not mean that we should act recklessly and promote everyone without regard to standards. Boldness does not mean that we should at once turn over excessive responsibilities to those unqualified to handle them or promote them to positions beyond their capabilities.

Along with tendencies toward conservatism and narrowmindedness, there are places in which rashness has occurred and they have promoted young cadres irregularly.

Those cadres who possess the necessary qualities and capabilities, and who have a good future should be promoted quickly. But in general, they should progress from the bottom to the top. Promoting them quickly helps them to acquire the conditions under which they can strive to excel, develop their talents, and rapidly mature. However, they should progress from the bottom to the top in order that they can become gradually familiar with leadership efforts, mature with stability, and meet the conditions under which they can be challenged. Of course, in the case of some outstanding cadres, who have fully met challenges, it is still possible to skip steps in their promotions but the primary consideration must still be given to standards.

With regard to young technical cadres, the selection, training, and promotion of some of them to management and leadership jobs is necessary but we must select those who are capable to act in a leadership and management capacity. Avoid the problem of promoting skillful technical cadre into administrative management positions and rather create conditions under which they may become steeped in and develop their specialized, technical jobs.

The concept relative to young cadres may of course change at various echelons and at various sectors. The age of cadres at the grass roots level will be lower than that of the next immediate echelon and technical and vocational management cadres can and must be younger than cadre in general, and so forth.

Properly implementing the party policy on old and young cadres is very necessary so as to manifest the effectiveness of both categories of cadre and properly integrate them.

3

Unity among cadres in general, and among old, new, aged, and young in particular, is a problem of significant importance within cadre efforts and the building up of the party.

The party has proper policies on each category of cadres, young and old, and the skillful integration of both categories. It is an important foundation in strengthening the unity among old and young cadres.

On the other hand, the party considers it important to educate them, build up a spirit of unity, compassion, and mutual respect between young and old cadres, and to overcome erroneous concepts and attitudes in dealings with them.

Many old cadres have demonstrated the proper awareness and attitude and as a result, have set a good example for young cadres, and had an active effect upon strengthening internal unity and training and utilizing young cadres.

Those comrades have struggled for many years in the class and national revolution and have experienced a great deal of sacrifice and adversity. Yet they have never demanded compensation, retained their revolutionary ardor, and steadfastly strived to complete every mission assigned by the party. In spite of the fact that they have recorded many accomplishments and made a great contribution to the revolution, those comrades are not self-satisfied. On the contrary, faced with an ever-growing mission in the new phase of the revolution, they have made great efforts to become more involved in their work, studied to improve their standards, and constantly moved ahead in accordance with the requirements of the revolution.

Many old cadres have considered it a glorious responsibility to train the young and new cadres in order that they could continue the revolution. Those comrades have diligently led and helped the young cadres and willingly passed on their knowledge and experience to them. In spite of the fact that they are completely different with regard to age, length of time in the party, and working methods many old cadres have maintained a democratic and fair attitude in their relationships with young cadres. They have always respected the organization and the group. Those cadres know the shortcomings and weaknesses of young cadres in order that they can correct them while at the same time, they humbly study the strengths of young cadres.

Our people have a saying: "Where the sons are better than the father, the house is happy." The fact that this generation progresses more rapidly than the previous one is an illustration of the great expansion of the revolution and it is a happy thing in the building of the country. Because of the rapid

progress and maturity gained by the younger generation, the older people are enthusiastic and proud as the revolution becomes ever more powerful. Those comrades willingly encourage and support young cadres and help them to increase their capabilities in work.

Some old cadres, recognizing their failing health, limited capabilities, and inability to meet the requirements of the present heavy mission have voluntarily suggested to the party that their position be given to a healthier and more capable individual. They then accept a lighter mission and a lesser position. The entire lives of these comrades have been contributed to the party and the revolution and now, once again they are proving that they possess brilliant revolutionary qualities and impartial ethics and that they always place the common interests of the revolution above all.

In the area of unity between young and old cadres, the old cadre bears a heavy responsibility because of his position and prestige. By demonstrating such an exemplary attitude, many comrades have actively contributed to a stronger internal unity.

Of course, it is also necessary that young cadres demonstrate a proper awareness and attitude.

The young now have advantageous conditions under which to study and rapidly progress only because the previous generation endured the sacrifices of war. Young cadres have only been able to mature as they have because the old cadres led and helped them. "When you drink, remember the source." Young cadres have always respected and revered old cadres and made great efforts to study the abundant experience of the old cadres so that they would be worthy as the people who would continue the glorious undertaking of their ancestors.

Young cadres must develop their strengths while at the same time, recognizing their weaknesses so that they can strive to overcome them. Young cadres must train themselves much more in the production and war campaigns. They must stay on top of the actual situation, blend with the masses, and constantly strive to improve their political, cultural, technical, and vocational standards.

Humility is a very necessary virtue if young cadres are to make constant progress. Even with a number of talents, if they are complacent, arrogant, and do not have the support of their comrades and the masses, they cannot do anything.

President Ho often taught us:

"Old, new, aged, young, female, and male party members must have mutual compassion and help one another to make progress...

"The party must skillfully integrate young and old cadres. There should be no disdain for young cadres. A few old cadres have become infected with arrogance and consider themselves as individuals who have performed great deeds. Or they adopt a 'bossy attitude' toward young cadres and party members. They brush aside anything said by the young as 'the egg knowing more than the

duck' or 'the bamboo shoots knowing more than the bamboo'. The present is a glorious period. Society and the world is expanding rapidly. Therefore, older cadres who disdain younger cadres are wrong. Young cadres should not be arrogant but must humbly study the older, more experienced cadres." (5)

We are determined to comply with his teachings.

The party has a corps of old cadres who have been trained through long challenges and it has a large corps of young cadres who are rapidly maturing. The party has proper policies on each category of cadre and is concerned with training and educating both young and old cadres, as well as knowing how to skillfully integrate them. By fulling understanding the proper positions and policies of the party on the question of young and old cadres, we will make an active contribution to building an ever-stronger corps of party cadres and best meet the requirements of the anti-United States undertaking for national salvation and the building of socialism.

- (1) Le Duan: "Move Ahead to Win New Victories for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism Under the Glorious Banner of the Party," Hoc Tap, February 1970, p 101.
- (2) Ho Chi Minh: "On Building up the Party," Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1970, p 159.
- (3) Le Duan: Op. cit., p 101
- (4) Lenin: "Collected Works," Su That Publishers, Hanoi, 1965, Volume 8, pp 160, 161.
- (5) Ho Chi Minh: Op. cit., p 151.

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PARIS COMMUNE: THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

[Article by Le Ngoc; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 43-53]

The revolution which broke out in Paris on 18 March 1871 is now 100 years old.

While the world bourgeoisie class was resorting to every means to obfuscate or distort its historic significance, the proletariat and progressive mankind were celebrating the Paris Commune with deep pride. With admiration for the predecessors who had courageously struggled and made noble sacrifices, the international proletarian class vowed to carry on the revolutionary cause of the Paris Commune combatants by studying and applying the lessons learned from their creative acts.

From 1848 to 1870, under the reign of Louis Bonaparte, the rapid development of French capitalism made any revolution which erupted in Paris bear the proletariat character. In 1870, Louis Bonaparte attacked the left bank of the Rhine River in an attempt to expand territory and reclaim the border lost in 1814. The Prussian army seized the opportunity of his defeat to shift from a defensive war to a war of invasion of France. The complex political situation was unique for the mass struggle movement in that the class struggle movement was linked to the patriotic struggle against foreign aggression.

The two big classes in French society had an entirely different attitude toward the country's political situation. The bourgeois class knew full well that an armed Paris was in fact an armed revolution and that a French victory over the German aggressor army would in fact be a French working class victory over the French bourgeoisie. In the face of national duty and class interests, the national defense government of the bourgeoisie, which consisted of "Bismarck's prisoners," secretly chose the ignominious, traitorous path. After many statements of "Don't give up a single stone from our fortress," the French bourgeoisie on 28 January 1871 signed the surrender while the resistance forces were still fairly strong, this freeing them to suppress the revolutionary masses.

After the surrender of the bourgeoisie, the National Guard, comprised mostly of workers, was the only armed force opposing the invading army which was besieging Paris. Giaz, the French Premier, decided to send troops to disarm them. This lifted the class struggle from a position of secondary importance to primary importance. In opposition to the bourgeoisie, the proletariat decided to select the path of struggling for the restoration of France, undeterred by illness from long starvation and unafraid of the Prussian cannons which were pointed toward them. Nearly 300,000 National Guard troops, together with the laboring people of Paris, rose up to destroy Giaz's plan to disarm the workers and overthrew not only the monarchial form of class rule but class rule as a whole. The Giaz government fled to Versaille. Ruling power in Paris belonged to the revolution. Paris cheered "Long live the Commune."

The Commune issued a decree abolishing the standing army and organizing the people's armed forces; disbanding the old police force, the tool of mass oppression; building a new police force to serve the Commune; smashing the old regime's tool of moral oppression; separating Church from State, schools from churches.

The Commune Council was elected by popular vote. The members of the Commune, magistrates, and judges were all responsible to the people, could be impeached, and had the same salary scale as the workers.

The Commune seized the property of the Church, assigned workers to manage enterprises which were not producing, appointed their own man as director of the railroad sector, found work for the unemployed, abolished night work in bakeries, abolished pawnshops, and so on.

The Commune instituted a required education policy at no expense to the student; let workers live in the elegant homes of the capitalists who had fled.

The Commune destroyed the Vendome column, the symbol of French chauvinism. Many international combattants involved in the uprising were given positions of leadership by the Commune.

Implementation of the Commune's policies was only started because from the beginning of May the Commune had to devote its energies to resisting the Versaille army. When the enemy army had moved into half of the eastern part of the city, the workers' resistance became stiff. After eight straight days of battle the last combattants defending the Commune were dead. A wave of extremely barbarous persecution followed for five consecutive years. Nearly 100,000 people were killed, captured, or imprisoned. Paris was nothing more than a giant slaughterhouse.

The Paris Commune failed for many reasons. Many proletariat combattants died. Compensating for that loss, the Commune served as the greatest example of the proletarian revolution in the 19th century, marked a step forward for the proletarian revolution in the world, had a tremendous effect on the struggle

of the international working class and, most of all, left behind many invaluable experiences.

A prolonged ideological struggle took place which centered on adoption of the Commune's legacy. While struggling against opportunism in determining whether the Commune had followed a pragmatic approach, Marx, Engels, and Lenin drew lessons of experience which were used to further perfect scientific socialism.

The realities of the Paris Commune epitomized the revolutionary role of force in society.

In 1847, Marx and Engels specified the state thought which is: "the proletariat has been organized into the ruling class." With the experience of the Paris Commune this thought was further developed by Marx. At the very time the Paris revolution was going on, Marx stated: "The imminent objective of the French revolution will no longer be to shift the bureaucratic and military machinery from one hand to another as before, but to smash this machinery. And this is the prerequisite for all true people's revolutions on the continent."¹ Two days after the last combatants of the Commune had died on the Belleville hill, Marx said: "The working class cannot simply seize the existing state machinery and use it to reach its objective."

This was one of the primary and fundamental lessons of the Paris Commune. Marx and Engels used these great thoughts as important supplements to the Communist Manifesto.

Continuing to review the experience of the Paris Commune and to apply it in new historic conditions, Lenin emphasized force more than ever. Opposing the revolutionary theory of the "peaceful" development of rightist opportunism, Lenin affirmed that the forceful revolution was not only essential on the continent but also essential in England and the United States.

In the present world situation, the idea of revolutionary force has even more theoretical and topical significance.

Today, the world revolutionary forces have far surpassed the counter-revolutionary forces. The changing balance of forces has given many new advantages to the struggle of the proletarian class and could make many new forms of struggle appear. But on the other hand, the class struggle is more severe by nature due to the fact that reactionary forces are writhing insanely in their death throes prior to perishing. Maintaining the rule of capitalism in the remaining part of the world is not simply the private work of reactionary forces in each country but is the general work of international imperialism, first of all the U.S. imperialists, the international gendarmes.

Life poses two problems:

1. The proletariat should have a policy of seeking all the advantageous elements of the era, using all forms of struggle, and adeptly striving for new struggle forms.

of many countries and, in particular, reviewing the revolutionary experiences of our country, our Party has considered revolutionary force to be composed of "two forces (the military force and political force) and encompassing two forms of struggle (military struggle and political struggle) and coordination between these two forms."

Our Party's concept of force not only stems from the basic concept of historical materialism which considers "the revolution to be the work of the masses," but also reflects a period in which the masses are most involved in political life. This concept also charts the law on the development and expansion of forces, the dialectical influence between the political force and military force, and overcoming difficulties caused by the lack of coordination between these two forces. This concept of force permits the use of all social activity and all levels of masses. It also permits creating a combined force of an entire mass bloc which is strong enough to resist protractedly and defeat in a short period of time an enemy that is much better equipped than they. A small country which has "defeated two large imperialists" is a strong reality confirming the correctness and creativeness of our Party's concept on force.

The realities of the Paris Commune also repudiated anarchism, which wanted to immediately abolish the state within 24 hours, and asserted that the proletariat must build and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat state to serve as the tool for building and defending prolonged socialism and communism over an historic era. After destroying the government of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat of Paris devoted all its attention to building, consolidating, and defending the new government.

In only 72 days of controlling Paris, the proletariat did innumerable significant things which more than a half a century before people had only talked about. The Commune abolished the bureaucratic regime and standing army and instituted an "inexpensive government." The popular elections, impeachment at any time, wage system, etc., marked the shift from the democratic regime of the bourgeoisie to the democratic regime of the proletariat, one of the most noble democracies in history. It easily coordinated the interests of the workers with those of the people and took away all special rights and privileges of the state officials to "protect their representatives and officials."⁴

With their decisions, the Commune combattants reformed Paris according to the concept of the proletariat which was entirely different from the old world in Versaille. "Paris is truth! Versaille is all lies!" With our present knowledge we know these thoughts are extremely great! The secret of this historically significant victory was that the Commune was "a government of the working class," a form of state organization of the proletariat which was "not a representative body" but "an action collective, both executive and legislative." It was a form of organization which could unite all the laboring people and permit the working class to easily and fully exercise its right of political leadership.

Marx and Engels, while praising the courageous struggle and creative wisdom of the Commune combatants, still thoughtfully and sternly pointed out to them the mistakes which led to the failure of the Commune.

The Commune combatants did not realize that socialism could only be the result of the struggle to abolish the production relationships of capitalism, to build the production relationships of socialism, and to rapidly increase social production strength. Consequently, they stopped halfway and did not connect the measures for restoring political purity with "depriving those who deprive." Along with outlining these mistakes of the Commune, Marx advanced the thought on the primary function of the dictatorship of the proletariat which is to build a new social system and only let the proletariat know that this important task cannot be carried out by "unusual rules" but "through many long-term struggles and through an entire series of historical processes, processes which will totally change the situation and people."⁵

The history of the Paris Commune proves that the inevitable class struggle must lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle does not end but arduously continues with new forms, new methods, and new objectives.

To successfully protect the revolution and the interests of the majority, the proletariat cannot but "severely" and "mercilessly" suppress the browbeaten enemy. To avoid a "white terror," the revolution must absolutely be a "red terror." There is no "perfect" democratic regime for everyone under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is regrettable that the proletariat of Paris did not realize this and, thus, was "overly generous" by not fighting the enemy to the end. The enemy was overthrown but was not annihilated and had time to regain morale and strength in preparation for the bloody "week in May." Engels sternly criticized the Commune combatants who used too little power. The execution wall of the Commune combatants at the Pere-Lachaise cemetery and the many bloody persecutions of the reactionary class were warnings of a concealed or open scheme of the bourgeoisie to restore the corrupt capitalist regime. It reminds us again of a truth: "The victorious party cannot but use its weapons to frighten the reactionary clique in an effort to maintain its ruling power."⁶

Lenin paid great attention to the experience of the Paris Commune. During the era of imperialism, from the realities and the requirements of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism, Lenin comprehensively developed Marx's theory on the proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat.

Extremely loyal to Marxism-Leninism, our Party correctly solved the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Firmly grasping the thought of continuous revolution, our Party has, since 1954, used the people's democratic state in North Vietnam to perform the task of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to further expand its function consistent with new international conditions. Our Party on the one hand feels that only by coordinating the functions with each other can there be a correct and perfect standpoint on the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, it defines the position of each function in its entirety. Force is still one of the most important functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Le Duan pointed out that not to overestimate the force of resistance, but loss of vigilance against the exploiting class and other counterrevolutionary forces -- especially in our country which is waging resistance against the United States for national salvation, and in the arduous struggle between the capitalist and socialist systems -- is "a dangerous rightist mistake, a crime against the revolution."

While defining the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat's force commensurate with its revolutionary role and consistent with the comparative forces in our country, the Party has devoted considerable attention to building a new form of economy and society because only in this way, and primarily in this way, can we create the conditions necessary for ensuring total and thorough victory for socialism. Thus, Le Duan pointed out the struggle to settle the question of "who beat who" in North Vietnam is "primarily the struggle to boost small production to large socialist production" by "endeavoring to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, develop to a high degree the leadership role of the Party, the organization and managerial role of the state, and the collective ownership spirit of the laboring masses with a view toward successfully carrying out the three revolutions, the key one of which is technique." This is the direction for building socialism by taking advantage of all the positive elements under the dictatorship of the proletariat in North Vietnam. Building a new socialist regime in North Vietnam with the highest technical achievements of mankind is an "extremely difficult" and the "most difficult" task. However, it has "more basic" and "more thorough" class struggle significance than overthrowing the exploiting class because to complete this task is to abolish the economic reasons dividing society into classes and restoring classes. We can complete this task and only when it is completed will "capitalism be unable to rear its head and communism be truly invincible" ⁹ as Lenin taught.

The Paris Commune left an extremely important lesson, that the revolutionary struggle of the working class and laboring people can only be successful when they are led by a vanguard party.

Without the leadership of a new-style party, the Paris Commune would not have overcome the influences of petty bourgeois thinking and could not have charted out in a unique way the correct policies on the basic questions determining the success of the revolution. Following the failure of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels considered the task of helping the French proletariat combatants to overcome this shortcoming of the revolutionary movement to be one of the primary tasks.

Since the Paris Commune, the special characteristic of the proletarian movement has been increasingly expanding and winning more and more tremendous victories each day. This reality proves the great vitality of Marxist-Leninist theory regarding the new-style party. At the same time, it also demands that the leadership of the party be strengthened to better utilize the advantageous factors brought about by the strong politics of the revolutionary movement.

One of the valuable lessons from the Paris Commune is the lesson on the worker-farmer alliance.

To strengthen and protect the new government, the Commune combattants relied on the organizations of the workers, women, and middle strata. The Commune also was mindful of the farmers who were the people who were upset with the capitalist regime and dissatisfied because they had to bear most of the 5 billion franc indemnity the capitalist class paid to Bismarck for the return of 100,000 prisoners. The Commune sent an appeal to the farmers: "What Paris wants -- land to the farmers," "our success is your sacrifice alone." However, because it lacked time and Paris was blockaded, the Commune did not accomplish the worker-farmer alliance Marx had advocated decades before. The Commune had to wage the struggle against the counterrevolutionary forces in isolation.

The failure to achieve the worker-farmer alliance was one of the shortcomings causing the failure of the Commune. Gaining experience from the Paris Commune and developing Marxism in the new situation, Lenin especially emphasized the importance of the worker-farmer alliance in the proletarian revolution. That to achieving the worker-farmer alliance, the Russian October Revolution of 1917 achieved glorious success. In Vietnam, our Party has creatively applied Marxism-Leninism and established a strong worker-farmer alliance which served as the basis for the National United Front. As a result, our country's revolution has moved from one victory to another.

The realities of the Paris Commune, to a certain extent, have proved the connection between the national question and the general question about the proletariat revolution.

Since the birth of Marxism the national question has been examined and solved a new way. The national question has, from a question connected to the struggle to win the political rights of the bourgeoisie, become a question connected to the general question on overthrowing imperialism and on the proletariat revolution. When the bourgeoisie became the force impeding the development of society and not representing the people, the proletariat, history's rising class, was not only the force leading the proletariat revolution but was also the force leading the revolution of national liberation.

The history of France in the last half of the 19th century clearly indicates that the national banner had switched from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the hands of the proletariat, thus substantiating the Marxist concept concerning the relationship between the class question and the national question.

If the 17th and 18th centuries, during the struggle against the feudal regime, the rising bourgeoisie represented national unity, at the end of the last century the bourgeoisie no longer maintained their unity under the cloak of nationalism once the proletariat became an independent political force. Observing the changes in the Franco-Prussian war, Marx and Engels appealed to German workers to struggle to block Bismarck's invasion and appealed to the French people to keep bourgeoisie patriotism from becoming confused and instead struggle against the reactionary character of the so-called "National Defense government." The leaders of the Paris Commune did not heed this and pressed the bourgeoisie to resist. But each time, the masses came forward to demand that the National Defense government resist, that government withdrew another step until finally signing the traitorous peace treaty.

The history of the Paris Commune proves the truth of Marx's teaching and destroys the naive confidence in the national spirit of the bourgeoisie. It constitutes evidence for condemning the French bourgeoisie at that time who "humiliated the people" and epitomized the role of the proletariat, the most resolute and loyal combatants struggling for national interests.

Applying the relationship between the national question and class question to the new historic situation, Le Duan found that the questions of national independence, democracy, and socialism were closely related. This concept of our Party will illuminate many theoretical and practical questions for us. This concept also leads us to a very important conclusion: today, there can only be true national independence, democracy, and socialism under the leadership of the proletariat.

Along with the development of history, scientific socialism has developed. Our Party has accumulated considerable experience through more than 40 years of courageous struggle and has achieved many tremendous victories. Our Party has made some reviews of profound theoretical value which have further enriched the theory of the proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat.

The bourgeoisie soaked Paris in a bloodbath. They killed many combatants of the Paris Commune but could not kill their ideals and influence. If the failure of the Paris Commune marks the period when the "proletariat could not manage France" and the "bourgeoisie could not manage France either," then today, the working class, with the far-reaching successes in building socialism, has proved itself capable not only of destroying the old social order but of building a new, even more splendid social regime.

With the encouragement and assistance of the socialist camp, the proletariat and other revolutionary forces have disintegrated the colonial system in large chunks and are carrying out the struggle to achieve and maintain national independence. They are also aggravating the contradictions of capitalism, thus laying the foundation for a revolution which is rumbling within the capitalist countries themselves.

The Vietnam working class and people, under the leadership of the Party and President Ho, during more than 40 years of struggle have achieved one victory after another and are building the initial foundation for socialism in North Vietnam. They are also defeating the ringleader imperialist, plunging them rapidly into an entangled and total crisis and encouraging and pushing the world revolutionary movement.

Although it has experienced many difficulties and adversities and sometimes heavy setbacks, the international proletariat, through one century of struggling to carry on the cause of the Paris Commune, has matured in all respects, accumulated considerable experience, and is continuing to develop its theory.

The changing balance of forces now permits the revolutionary forces to apply the strategy of attacking imperialism. The reactionary forces are entirely unable to stop the proletariat class from building socialism on part of the earth and from continuing to struggle to win the remainder of the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marx-Engels: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1962, Volume 2, p 755.
2. Ibid; p 828.
3. Stalin: Problems of Leninism, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, pp 51-52.
4. Marx-Engels: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1962, Volume 1, p 770.
5. Ibid; p 840.
6. Ibid; p 1027.
7. Le Duan: "Under the Glorious Banner of the Party, for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism, Advance Toward Winning New Victories," Hoc Tap, February 1970, p 61.
8. Ibid; p 65.
9. V. Lenin: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, Volume 2, Part 2, p 195.

ON THE BOOK 'FORTY YEARS OF PARTY ACTIVITIES'

[Article by Le Thai Hoa; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 54-68]

On the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Party, the Su That Publishing House has published the book Forty Years of Party Activities compiled by the Department for Research on Party History. In an effort to help cadres and party members study Party history, we wish to present some historical subjects which are carried in this book.

The book consists of four parts: the first part (1925-1945) covers the period of preparation for the founding of the Party, the 1945 August Revolution, and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the second part (1946-1954) covers the period of struggling to protect the revolutionary government and the resistance against the invading French colonialists; the third part (1954-1965) covers the period of carrying out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam and the people's national democratic revolution in South Vietnam; the fourth part (1965-1969) covers the period in which the Party leads the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation, the liberation of South Vietnam, the defense of North Vietnam, and the advance toward the peaceful reunification of the country.

I

In the first part, the book affirms that the history of our Party began in 1925, the year President Ho created the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association in an effort to effectively prepare for the founding of a new-style party of the Vietnam working class.

Any revolution, to be successful, must have a class which has a correct political line consistent with the law of the era's development. It must also have tight organization and close leadership. In Vietnam, before our Party was conceived, the movements against the French colonialists to achieve national independence broke out continuously but were successively defeated. The reasons for the defeats were many, but the book places particular emphasis on the fact that following the surrender of the landlord and feudal class, which represented

the Nguyen dynasty, to the French imperialists, "our people had no revolutionary path suited to the new era of history, the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, nor did they have a leadership force capable of bringing the national liberation revolution to success." (page 10)*

The Russian October Revolution broke out, breaking through the imperialist system at its weakest point and rocking its safe rear base, the colonial system. This caused the national liberation revolution in colonial and vassal countries to become an integral part of the world proletarian revolution. This situation enabled the Vietnam working class, a class which came into being before the Vietnam bourgeoisie class, which was oppressed and exploited by the imperialists, feudalists, and bourgeoisie in the country, and which represented the most advanced production force and operated in the economic center of the enemy, to "naturally become the only class capable of winning political superiority in the country." (page 11) From that moment, the leadership of the Vietnam working class over the Vietnam revolution became a historic sine qua non. Only with the leadership of the working class could the Vietnam revolution be successful. Famous patriots of Vietnam at this time, such as Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chu Trinh, etc., still did not realize this objective sine qua non. It was here that the genius of the great patriot Ho Chi Minh came to be known. The book states: "Nguyen Ai Quoc, alias President Ho Chi Minh, was the first Vietnamese to realize this capability and position of the Vietnam working class. In the 1920's, after having studied various revolutionary lines in Eastern and Western countries, he came to the conclusion that 'there is no other path to national salvation and national liberation than the proletarian revolution.'¹ He worked hard to introduce Marxism-Leninism into Vietnam and made preparations for the Vietnam working class to form its party." (page 11)

We all know that communist parties were formed in many Western and Eastern countries in 1920 and 1921, immediately following the birth of the Comintern in 1919. The national struggle and class struggle grew severe in Vietnam in 1924. However, Ho Chi Minh did not advocate the immediate establishment of a communist party because he was firmly aware of the specific conditions in our country at that time. Instead, he established the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association, a transitional organization for helping patriotic Vietnamese to come into contact with Marxism-Leninism and apply it to their people's liberation movement. Facts have proven that the founding of the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association rather than the immediate establishment of the communist party in Vietnam in 1925 was a great innovation by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam revolutionary movement. The book states: "For Vietnamese revolutionaries, the shift from establishing patriotic schools along old lines to the establishment of patriotic schools along Marxist-Leninist lines was not a simple task." (page 12) The book explains: "In an economically backward colonial country such as ours at that time, there was no socialist tradition, neither among the farmer class, the petty bourgeoisie, or the working class." (page 12) Under these circumstances, "the establishment of a proletarian party would certainly not avoid unexpected situations and could have led to

* The sections with the page numbers following are excerpts from Forty Years of Party Activities, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970.

division within the seething patriotic movement at that time." (page 12)

With the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association, President Ho helped the Vietnamese revolution shorten part of the path to victory. Through the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association Uncle cleverly concretized Marxism-Leninism in the minds of the Vietnamese patriots at that time and gradually improved their understanding until Marxism-Leninism was accepted by them. In fact, the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association brought together virtually all the patriots who tended to be progressive at that time and helped the Vietnamese patriots switch from various patriotic viewpoints to the patriotic stand of the working class without interruption or going a roundabout way. Thanks to this, the Vietnam revolution made quick, sure strides forward. We all know that in 1930, following several years of preparation, our Party came into being and, in the 15 years which followed, the Vietnam revolution was successful in the country. Just as President Ho said: "Not only our Vietnam working class and people, but the laboring class and oppressed people elsewhere can take pride in the fact that this is the first time in the revolutionary history of colonial and semicolonial peoples when a party only 15 years old has led a successful revolution and seized nationwide political power." (page 37)

II

Thanks to Uncle's careful preparations and those of the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association, our Party on coming into being defined the correct, fundamental political line for the Vietnam revolution. This line was presented in the first principal works of the Party -- Brief Program and Strategy and Political Thesis. This basic political line was that the Vietnam revolution must go through two stages. The first stage is waging the bourgeoisie democratic revolution under the leadership of the working class in order to overthrow the imperialists and feudalists, and achieve national independence and land to the tiller. Both the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks were closely related to each other. The primary forces of the revolution were the workers and farmers. The Party had to achieve the worker-farmer alliance and use the revolutionary force of the masses to achieve political power.

"After basically completing these tasks, the revolution will shift to the second stage which is to advance Vietnam straight to socialism without going through the capitalist stage of development." (pages 16-17)

Under the enlightenment of Marxism-Leninism and the correct line of the Party, the first members of the Party carried out the struggle unyieldingly "with a view toward defeating the concepts of class obliteration..., helping the workers and farmers avoid the harmful effects of reformed nationalism, of provocative and destructive Trotskyism, and of narrow, petty bourgeoisie nationalism." (page 17) With this struggle "Our Party carried aloft the banner of nationalism and democracy and firmly maintained absolute leadership over the working class for the Vietnam revolution." (page 17)

President Ho pointed out that "Marxism-Leninism, combined with the worker movement and patriotic movement, led to the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party at the beginning of 1930."² Thus, to prepare for the birth of the

Party, attention could not be focused solely on the worker movement with no attention being given to the patriotic movement. Forty Years of Party Activities covers a subject which, in essence, has formed the pattern of the Vietnam revolution. This is the correct coordination of the class question with the national question and patriotism with proletariat internationalism. These were the questions President Ho clearly raised at the very outset. The book states: "The national element and class element are intertwined in his outlook. He became the soul of the coordination between patriotism and proletariat internationalism." (page 12) The book portrays this as an important theoretical basis which President Ho prepared for the founding of the communist party in Vietnam.

Through each period of history the book particularly emphasizes that the creative, independent political line and skilled leadership art of the Party took our country's revolution from one success to another. This is the result of our Party applying Marxism-Leninism appropriately to the special characteristics of Vietnamese society, the history of Vietnam, and Vietnamese people and due to developing to a high degree the potential strength of the Vietnamese people. But our Party's history also proves that, in the process of leading the revolution, knowing how to correctly coordinate the national, democratic, and class questions in order to bring the revolution to victory is not simple. The Party's Political Thesis of 1930 affirms that in our national, democratic revolution, the two basic strategic tasks, combatting imperialism and feudalism and achieving "national independence" and "land to the tiller," are closely related to each other. Posing this in that fashion is absolutely correct. Strategically, these two basic tasks cannot be separated but must be carried out simultaneously. But realities also indicate that these two tasks in the Vietnam revolution cannot be carried out uniformly. Thus, the Sixth Conference of the Party Central Committee asserted: Of the two basic contradictions of Indochinese society during the stage of national, democratic revolution, the contradiction between the Indochinese peoples and the invading imperialists is paramount, emphasizing that national liberation is the primary task of the Indochinese revolution. "All the problems of the revolution, including the land problem, must aim toward this objective for solution." ³

Forty Years of Party Activities portrays the Sixth Conference of the Party Central Committee as opening the way for the Party's very creative reorientation of strategic guidance in the people's national, democratic revolution. The Seventh Conference of the Party Central Committee in November 1940 developed the resolution of the Sixth Conference. At the Eighth Conference of the Party Central Committee in May 1941, this reorientation of strategic guidance was completed. This conference asserted that the immediate revolution was the national liberation revolution and that the people's revolutionary forces should be concentrated on the Japanese-French fascists because "at this point, if the question of national liberation is not settled and independence and freedom for the entire nation not demanded, the entire nation and people will not only forever be subjected to a life of serfdom but will never be able to reclaim age-old class rights." (page 29)

While placing the national liberation question in first priority, the task of combatting feudalism was gradually coordinated with the task of combatting imperialism. First of all, while overthrowing imperialist domination our people at the same time overthrew the lackey ringleader, the feudal officials and gangsters in the countryside. They totally abolished the government of the imperialists and feudalists in our country and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, our people's independent and democratic state and the first worker-farmer state in Southeast Asia. After assuming power and during the initial period of the resistance against the invading French colonialists, our Party led the farmers in the struggle against the landlords to demand reduction of the land rent and interest with a view toward partially bolstering the farmer force. But when the resistance became violent and the reduction of the land rent and interest could not satisfy the farmers' requirements and bolster the resistance forces, the Party urged the farmers to rise up and overthrow the entire landlord class, abolish the feudal production relationships in the countryside, and bring "land to the tiller." This step was immediately carried out during the last years of the resistance when enough conditions existed for the national liberation task to be "integrated into the land revolution."⁴ The book states: "Land reform was accelerated on the antifeudal front. The farmers rose up to overthrow the landlord class with a revolutionary assault fervor, thereby bringing about a great leap forward for the resistance forces. The resistance against the French colonialists reached a violent stage; the slogans "national independence" and "land to the tiller" could be carried out simultaneously, thus representing the coordination of the armed struggle with the political struggle on a large scale and creating a combined force which brought about the great victory at Dien Bien Phu." (page 61)

Realities prove that, in our national, democratic revolution, not only was the national struggle very strong but the class struggle was very violent. The implementation of land reform during the resistance was a great source of strength to our army and people which enabled them to win a victory of decisive significance in the winter-spring campaign of 1953-1954, the peak of which was the historic victory at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954.

After North Vietnam was entirely liberated, the land reform campaign continued to expand and was completed throughout North Vietnam, achieving far-reaching and fundamental success.

During the people's national, democratic revolution in Vietnam, the correct coordination of anti-imperialism with anti-feudalism was a matter of extreme importance strategically. With precise, concrete documentation, Forty Years of Party Activities proves that the "correct coordination of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism was necessary to ensure the success of the people's national, democratic revolution. Had these two tasks been separated the revolution would have had difficulty and may have even failed. The improper coordination of these two tasks would have been a rightist or leftist error."⁵

Our Party frequently says that the "farmer question is the primary factor in the national question and the land question is the basic factor in the democratic revolution."⁶ Under the yoke of imperialism and feudalism the farmers' requirement was national independence and land to the tiller. Realities of 40

years of Party activities point out that, besides the Vietnam working class, there was no single class in Vietnamese society which could have fully covered those two great requirements of the farmers in its political program and resolutely lead the farmers in the struggle to achieve those two requirements. The significant matter determining the success of the revolution was that through correctly coordinating the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks in the people's national, democratic revolution our Party "successfully built a strong, stable worker-farmer alliance which served as the main force of the revolution and was the crucial element ensuring the sole leadership of the Party of the working class."7

The Vietnam revolution entered a new historic period following the successful resistance against the French colonialists. This was the period of carrying out the two great revolutions of the era -- the people's national, democratic revolution in South Vietnam and the socialist revolution in North Vietnam. Of great importance in this period was the need to clearly recognize the strategic task and revolutionary position in each zone and the dialectical relationship between these two revolutions in order to determine the correct strategic line and policy. Forty Years of Party Activities states that from the very outset our Party has clearly asserted that the struggle to liberate South Vietnam and to complete the people's national, democratic revolution in the country is the task of the entire nation and people in both zones of our country. In carrying out this task, North Vietnam has the most decisive role while South Vietnam has the direct decisive role of overthrowing the domination of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. The strategic policy set forth was to "build up North Vietnam and take care of South Vietnam" and "liberate South Vietnam and defend North Vietnam." Once the U.S. imperialists massively introduced the expeditionary and satellite armies into South Vietnam and waged a limited war in South Vietnam and war of destruction in North Vietnam, this strategic policy became "North Vietnam is the great rear and South Vietnam is the great frontline" against the United States for national salvation. Only by so doing could we develop to the fullest the revolutionary potential in each zone of our country and deal the U.S. imperialists heavy defeats, thereby ultimately ensuring our victory and the enemy's defeat.

As for the socialist revolution in North Vietnam, the book discusses our country's revolution by saying that "following the successful resistance against the French colonialists, liberated North Vietnam moved from the people's national democratic revolution to the stage of socialist revolution" (page 72) without experiencing another political revolution. This means that political power vis-a-vis the revolution no longer matters. But to achieve the objectives of the socialist revolution, all organizations which held a key position in this revolution had to be suitably readjusted and set up. First of all, the leadership of the Party, with its status as the leadership force of the entire society, was strengthened. The people's democratic state began to perform the historic task of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The basic content of the worker-farmer alliance in the previous stage was to carry out the slogan "national independence" and "land to the tiller" and to win the farmers' individual right to ownership of the land which had been seized by the landlords.

The content of the worker-farmer alliance in the socialist revolution is to put the farmer on the socialist revolutionary path with a view toward wiping out poverty and backwardness, achieving the farmers' right to collective ownership of land and the entire society, and carrying out socialist industrialization.

The Party has pointed out that "our biggest characteristic in the transitional period is to advance directly from a backward agricultural country to socialism without going through the capitalist stage of development."⁸

In this situation, correctly determining the methods and suitable forms, steps, and speed of the socialist revolution is especially important. The book points out that in North Vietnam, after having basically completed the people's national, democratic revolution and restoring the economy following the war, the Party advocated immediately carrying out large-scale socialist reform in an effort to establish socialist production relationships. Facts prove that this was a creative decision by our Party.

After the Party's Third Nation-wide Congress of Representatives, North Vietnam moved into the period in which building the material and technical base of socialism was the central task. At the same time, it continued to complete socialist reform and to strengthen and perfect new production relationships. The book emphasizes that the people's democratic power must be used as the historic task of the dictatorship of the proletariat to achieve this objective and task. At the same time, attention must be devoted to stepping up the socialist revolution with respect to production relationships, ideology, culture, and techniques. To concretize the line of the Party Congress on building up the economy, the Party Central Committee has held symposiums to discuss agricultural development, industrial development, state planning, circulation and distribution of goods, prices, and so on. Through this, the Party Central Committee has further analyzed the position, relationship, and effect of the three revolutions. "We must step up the revolution in production relationships, the technical revolution, and the ideological and cultural revolution. These aspects must be carried out simultaneously with none overlooked. But we must concentrate efforts on stepping up the technical revolution, the key..."⁹

As Le Duan said, "The socialist revolution in North Vietnam is a process in which our Party and people firmly understand and use the dictatorship of the proletariat to simultaneously carry out the three revolutions -- the revolution in production relationships, the technical revolution, and the ideological and cultural revolution of which the technical revolution is the key..."¹⁰ And after further citing the policy, measures, and specific results during the first years of carrying out the socialist revolution, the book recalls the extremely important observations of President Ho and the Party Central Committee: "During the past 10 years North Vietnam has made great strides unprecedented in the nation's history. The country, the society, and the people have all changed."¹¹ "After more than 10 years of carrying out the socialist revolution, North Vietnam has become the firm base for the Vietnam revolution throughout the country with its superior political system and strong economic forces and national defense."¹²

Regarding the struggle to liberate South Vietnam and advance toward the reunification of the country, Forty Years of Party Activities points out the extremely perfidious schemes of the U.S. imperialists who want to turn South Vietnam into a neo-colony and military base of the United States, keep the socialist influence from spreading into Southeast Asia from China and North Vietnam, and use Vietnam to test the strategy, tactics, and new weapons of the United States in an effort to suppress the revolutionary movement in various countries and prepare for world war. For this very reason, after peace was restored, North Vietnam was entirely liberated, and socialism was under way, South Vietnam became the center of acute contradictions: the contradiction between the entire Vietnamese population and the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys; the contradiction between the peace-loving forces and warmongering forces; the contradiction between the socialist camp and imperialist camp. The effect of these contradictions was to make South Vietnam the place most susceptible to revolution and the place where the Vietnam revolution in general and the South Vietnam revolution in particular, pitted against the U.S. imperialists, had historic purpose. The question was is it likely that a small, underpopulated country such as ours could defeat the neo-colonialism of the imperialists. What must the strategy and stratagems of the revolution be? If the imperialist war does not break out will the South Vietnam revolution expand? How can victory be achieved? How must the interests of the people be coordinated with the interests of the world revolution to achieve victory, defend North Vietnam, and protect our camp and world peace? The book reflects the very accurate and creative lines and policies of our Party which were aimed toward correctly solving the whole series of questions above and bringing the revolutionary cause of the South Vietnamese people vigorously forward.

The book points out that, under the skilled leadership of the National Liberation Front, the South Vietnamese revolution was waged with the concept of winning gradual victories, defeating each scheme and war plan of the U.S. imperialists, smashing their aggressive determination, and winning complete victory. Since the spontaneous uprising in 1959 and 1960, the South Vietnamese people have waged the revolutionary war and liberation war, resisted the "special war," and combatted the U.S. imperialists' largest and most brutal limited war.

The Vietnam revolution led by our Party is an integral part of the world revolution. The book points out: "Because our Party knows how to coordinate the revolutionary movement in the country with the revolutionary movement of the international working class (including the struggle movement of the working class and laboring people in the imperialist country which occupies their country) and the liberation movement of oppressed peoples, it has won many allies abroad for the Vietnam revolution and strengthened our country's revolution so it can achieve victory and make a suitable contribution to the international revolutionary movement." (pages 125-126) The realities of the Vietnam revolution prove entirely that "in the present era, the national liberation revolution is an integral part of the international proletarian revolution. The national liberation revolution must develop into a socialist revolution. Only by so doing can complete victory be achieved."¹³ This is the law of the national liberation revolution in our country. This is also the law for the development of the national liberation revolution in colonial and vassal

countries. The U.S. imperialists have resorted to every extremely brutal means in an attempt to tie the yoke of neocolonialism around the neck of the South Vietnamese people. But they have been forced to taste one defeat after another and will surely have to get out of South Vietnam because the South Vietnamese people have correctly followed the path traced by President Ho and our Party.

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Our Party has achieved this glorious victory not only because of the correct revolutionary line but also because of correct revolutionary methods. The Party's revolutionary methods stem from fully understanding the objectives and requirements of our country's revolution, clearly recognizing the specific balance of forces between us and the enemy during each revolutionary period, thoroughly understanding and using all the forces, and developing to the fullest the potential strength of the Vietnamese people, workers, and farmers, the people's two buttressing forces. The revolution is a mass cause. Therefore, the Party uses mass mobilization as the basis. Through each period, our Party has cleverly selected forms of organization and struggle, and propaganda and inspirational slogans suited to the revolution's specific situation with a view toward rallying the masses, indoctrinating them, and effectively involving them in the revolutionary front and, from the economic and political struggle, advancing the armed struggle when conditions permit.

From the moment it was founded our Party launched a surging revolution throughout the country the peak of which was the Nghe-Tinh Soviet. Through this tremendous revolution, the slogan "national independence" and "land to the tiller" became the hope and trust of the masses. The prestige and influence of the Party took root and spread widely among the people. "The 1930-1931 high tide of revolution and the Nghe-Tinh Soviet proved that only the Vietnam working class and its vanguard unit, the Indochinese Communist Party, could lead the people's national, democratic revolution in Vietnam. It also proved that under the leadership of our Party the working class and farmer class, united with all other strata of people, were able to overthrow the domination of the imperialists and feudalists and establish the people's revolutionary government. The method for accomplishing this objective was the revolutionary force of the masses." (page 20) This conclusion of the book on the 1930-1931 high tide of revolution not only reflects the correctness of the political line but also clarifies the correctness of our Party's revolutionary methods.

The Party's methods became more and more flexible and creative during the period of the Indochinese Democratic Front (1936-1939) and the national liberation campaign (1939-1945).

During the 1936-1939 period, the Party revised and developed the revolutionary methods tested in the 1930-1931 revolutionary force. The result was that countless masses, especially awakened workers and farmers, united and courageously struggled against every cruel maneuver of the enemy. Marxism-Leninism was spread widely. The Party had great influence on the people and was trusted, loved, and supported by them. In the Indochinese Democratic Front campaign our

Party mobilized, indoctrinated, and built a "mass political army" composed of millions of urban and rural people and formed a broad political movement. At the same time, it trained a rank of cadres for our country's revolution. The book acknowledges that the 1930-1931 revolution and the 1936-1939 Indochinese Democratic Front campaign were two general prelude in preparation for the later victory of the August Revolution.

During the 1939-1945 period, the book cites the political sensitivity of the Party when World War II broke out. On the one hand, the Party pointed out that the national liberation was the primary task of the Indochinese revolution. On the other hand, the Party advocated shifting the focal point of the effort to the countryside and promptly directed agencies and cadres operating legally or semilegally to quickly withdraw into secrecy, mostly withdraw to the countryside, to rely on the countryside, to carry out the work, and to vigorously develop the revolutionary forces in the countryside and cities. During this period the Party "applied an extremely flexible strategy to divide the enemy and win over every force it could for national salvation and national liberation." (page 30)

The book pays high tribute to the strategic policies which the resolutions of the Party Central Committee conferences laid down during the first years of World War II. These resolutions, especially the resolution from the Eighth Conference of the Party Central Committee, had a decisive effect on the success of the 1945 August Revolution.

As for the methods our Party used which led to the success of the August Revolution, the book emphasizes:

"Through 15 years of continuous combat (1930-1945), our Party mobilized, awakened, and organized all strata of people, motivated the tremendous force of the workers and farmers, and brought the worker-farmer alliance into existence. On the basis of the strong worker-farmer alliance the Party combined all the patriotic forces in one broad National United Front, the Viet Minh Front, and began to build up the revolutionary forces in the mountains, countryside, delta, and cities. The Party built the people's armed forces, combined the political struggle with the armed struggle, and combined limited guerrilla warfare with partial insurrection in the countryside. And when the opportunity came, it promptly encouraged the masses to carry on a general insurrection in the countryside and cities, overthrow the government of the imperialists and lackey feudalists, and return political power to the people." (page 36) This revolution was profoundly popular in nature. It was a "model of a national liberation revolution led by the working class which was successful in a colonial and semifeudal country as the result of an armed uprising of the masses and skilled coordination of military battles with various forms of political struggle by the masses in an attempt to win political power and establish a people's government. It pierced the colonial system of imperialism at one of that system's weakest links and made an important contribution toward disrupting that system." (pages 36-37)

Thousands of difficulties came as soon as our revolutionary government was formed and while the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was in its infancy. The struggle to safeguard political power and protect the fruits of the revolution during this period was "a very fierce test for our Party and government." (page 44) Here the book cites the role of the Party and President Ho who "led the people of our country through many dangerous rapids, protected the revolutionary government, and developed real ability." (page 44)

When the French colonialists intentionally caused war, the nation-wide resistance began. This war was an unbalanced one. As the book states: "The enemy had naval, army, and air forces with modern weapons. We only had a newly-organized army with little experience and shortages." (page 46) But with the status of a people who had won independence and freedom, our people, who would "rather die than lose the country or be subjected to slavery," waged an all-people, comprehensive, prolonged, and self-sufficient resistance under the leadership of the Party. This resistance went through three stages: defense, active containment, and general counteroffensive.¹⁴ It moved from a position weaker than the enemy to an even position and then stronger position than the enemy, ultimately achieving victory. In this resistance, the people throughout the country rose up to fight the aggressors, heightened their indomitable, steadfast, and thoroughly revolutionary spirit, developed revolutionary assault thinking, coordinated armed combat with political struggle, and used the armed form of struggle primarily.

The current people's national, democratic revolution in South Vietnam is the height of the development of our previous people's national, democratic revolution in combatting the neocolonialism of the U.S. imperialists. With specific historical events, the book proves the outstanding features of the revolutionary methods in use in South Vietnam: "Using the revolutionary force of the masses to rise up in the countryside, building and developing the revolutionary forces in the countryside as well as the cities, utilizing the political forces and military forces in combination, firmly maintaining and continuously developing the offensive strategic posture, fighting the enemy by military, political, and military proselyting means, coordinating the military and political struggles in all three areas (mountains, delta, and cities),¹⁵ coordinating the masses' uprising with the war of revolution, and so on." Under the leadership of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam the South Vietnamese people have flexibly and creatively utilized these revolutionary methods, successively smashed the military and political plans of the United States-puppets, opened a new stage, and brought ever greater victories to the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation.

We are extremely proud to know that the political lines and revolutionary methods of the Party over the past 40 years have thoroughly permeated the revolutionary spirit of the working class and are carrying on and developing the patriotic traditions and heroic character of our people. "Our Party's revolutionary lines and methods, full of the spirit of independence, of autonomy, and of creativeness, reflect the staunch, indomitable, courageous, and intelligent virtues of our people and the bearing of Vietnamese who are masters of their destiny." (page 106)

III

In the concluding portion, Forty Years of Party Activities discusses the factors which will bring our people's revolutionary cause to complete victory. These factors are the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party; the worker-farmer alliance; the all-people bloc of solidarity based on the worker-farmer alliance; the people's armed forces; and the people's democratic dictatorship and international solidarity. Of these factors the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party has the most decisive effect. The historical realities of our country's revolution prove this entirely. Our Party, headed by the beloved Ho Chi Minh, is the "firm leader of the extremely arduous and heroic revolutionary battle of our people and the sole organizer of all the victories in our country's revolution." (page 122) Thus, relying on its combat process, our Party has built itself into a new-style party of the working class. The principles for building such a party in our country are clearly recorded in the 1930 Political Thesis of the Party which Forty Years of Party Activities summarizes as follows:

"The key to the success of a revolution is that there must be a communist party ideologically based on Marxism-Leninism which correct political lines for leading the revolution, which is organized on the basis of democratic centralism, which has strict discipline, which has close relationships with the masses, and which matures during the course of revolutionary struggle." (page 17)

As it set out to build a new-style party of the working class in a colonial country, our Party held strong views on the working class and resolutely and patiently educated the members of the Party to firmly take the stand of the working class in examining and resolving all revolutionary matters in an inherently colonial and semifeudal country. In preparing for the founding of the Party, the Vietnam Young Revolutionary Comrades Association advocated that its members, who had come from petty bourgeoisie intellectual backgrounds, enter mines, factories, and plantations. (page 13) This policy not only stepped up the revolutionary campaign within the working class but also trained a rank of cadres without a working class background to have a resolute working class viewpoint and to be loyal to the revolutionary cause of the working class and people.

Revolutionary activities in a colonial and semifeudal country which knows how to vigorously turn to the working class and take the working class stand in determining suitable revolutionary strategy are a strength. But to vigorously turn to the working class and from that point on neglect national rights, only be aware of the narrow rights of the class, and fail to devote attention to the primary force of the people in a colonial and semifeudal country composed of both workers and farmers is wrong. The book points out that the great strength of our Party is that right from the outset, in the works of the Party and in fact, our Party regarded the farmers as a primary force which, together with the workers, formed the main force of the people's national, democratic revolution. The forces of the Party were developed from among the

workers and farmers. The party chapters in the countryside, along with party chapters in enterprises, were the important grass-roots organizations of the Party. Following this correct guideline, our Party developed through each period in the countryside and cities and became a party with a strong mass character.

In a colonial and semifeudal country with a small and very backward production economy, it was impossible to ensure that workers comprised the majority in the Party. In our Party, the number of members from a working class background was not great. The number of party members from a farmer and petty bourgeoisie background was. The process of heightening the awareness of party members in a country such as ours was not simple. National awareness and class awareness were closely intertwined and mutually affected each other. This conformed to party members with a worker and poor tenant farmer background.

" Our Party feels that the condition determining the character of the Party is not primarily the backgrounds of the party members but the political line and practical activities of the Party's revolutionary struggle. Therefore, in Party development work, alongside of drawing outstanding workers into the Party with a view toward improving its organization, our Party devotes considerable attention to indoctrinating and training cadres and party members in ideology and the proletarian stand in the fires of revolutionary struggle. Through each historical period, Forty Years of Party Activities points out the Party's regular attention to ideological indoctrination and political and theoretical education. Thanks to being armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, imbued with the communist philosophy of life, and carrying on and developing the staunch, indomitable traditions of the people, "the members of the Party have demonstrated extreme loyalty, courage, and intelligence and stayed close to the masses in order to lead them in production and combat. This is the result of the correct policies in developing a strong Party politically, ideologically, and organizationally and guarantees that the Party will fulfill its historic destiny as the leader of all the people in defeating the invading U.S. aggressors and in successfully building socialism." (page 105)

For communists the interests of the Party and the revolution are supreme. Thanks to this, Party discipline is executed in a conscientious fashion. Under the leadership of the Party, each party member is fully aware that he must overcome all obstacles in order to achieve single-minded unity in the Party. This lesson on single-minded unity was demonstrated clearly in the Party founding conference on 3 February 1930 convened and presided over by Ho Chi Minh who at that time was a representative of the Comintern.

Throughout the 40 years of Party activities, even though there have at times been instances of disunity which were limited and temporary in nature, the tradition of single-minded unity has been the outstanding feature of our Party. The book excerpts President Ho's instructions on unity in the Party, recalling in particular the advice given in his testament: "All comrades, from the Party Central Committee down to the party chapter, must preserve the single-minded unity of the Party as the apple of their eye."

The special feature of Party activities before and after political power was won had a great effect on Party development. Forty Years of Party Activities states: "Our Party, in its illegal status, operated secretly before the August Revolution. But After the August Revolution, our Party became a ruling Party which led the sacred resistance of the entire people against the invading French colonialists. The great majority of the cadres and party members had been tested and trained in the realities of resistance. However, the fact that the Party held power easily gave rise to bureaucracy, authoritarianism, and estrangement from the masses among a number of cadres and party members. In this situation, some people joined the Party for ulterior motives." (page 49) Thus, it was necessary to make cadres and party members remember that "Groups (i.e., our Party - LTH) are not organizations for bureaucrats or for getting rich. It must complete the national liberation task, enrich the fatherland, and make the people happy." 16

Since North Vietnam was entirely liberated and began advancing toward socialism, the responsibilities of the Party, with its status as the force leading the entire society, have continuously increased. The Party must organize and lead the revolutionary cause of our people to victory. In North Vietnam, the Party must lead the task of building a completely new society unprecedented in the people's history. We must thoroughly change old habits, ways of life, and thinking and prejudices that have been rooted deeply for thousands of years. We must abolish the exploiting class, change old production relationships, and develop new production relationships without oppression and exploitation in order to bring North Vietnam forward from a small, backward production economy directly to socialism so it becomes a modern industrial, modern agricultural, cultural, and advanced scientific country. President Ho said: "The Party should be stronger than ever during the socialist revolution. Reform is impossible if party members do not reform or improve themselves. The socialist revolution demands that party members and cadres have a very firm proletarian class stand and high socialist awareness. It demands that cadres and party members cleanse themselves of the influence of the exploiting class's thoughts, cleanse themselves of individualism, and train collectivism." 17

Many cadres and party members have been tested and trained in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism. Since North Vietnam entered the stage of socialist revolution, cadres and party members in North Vietnam have embarked on a new struggle. This is the struggle between the socialist path and capitalist path. The book affirms that: "With the attention of the Party and President Ho to education, the great majority of cadres and party members still retain the noble virtues of a communist in the new historic stage." (page 75) However, the book also acknowledges that: "A number of cadres and party members also have bureaucratic and authoritarian habits and violate the democratic rights of the people, sometimes even violating certain socialist laws. Some cadres are not really devoted to the life of the people." (page 106) These shortcomings are even more serious when we see that this is a shortcoming of party members and cadres of a ruling party. Our Party and President Ho were very concerned with this. We are considerably moved when we recall the advice of President Ho: "Our Party is a ruling Party. Each party member and cadre must be imbued with revolutionary ethics and be thrifty, uncorrupt, just, and

impartial. Our Party must be kept clean and be worthy to be the leader and loyal servant of the people." 18

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For the first time we have a brief historic book on the 40 years of Party activities. This book cites the historic and ideological content of the great works and the internal relationship between these works. Through this, it points out that "Our Party is a new-style proletariat party which has a firm grasp of the ever-victorious banner of Marxism-Leninism. It is a proletariat party which represents the loyalty, vital interests, and just aspirations of the working class, laboring people, and all peoples. It is a tightly organized Marxist-Leninist party with a tradition of single-minded unity and close association with the masses." 19

The actual experience of our country's revolution proves that: "Only the working class is the most courageous, most revolutionary, and constantly willing to fight the colonial imperialists. With the vanguard revolutionary theory and the experience of the international proletariat movement, our working class has proved itself to be the most fitting and most trustworthy leader of the Vietnamese people." 20

Today, the U.S. imperialists are doing their utmost to inject new life into the landlord and comprador bourgeoisie class defeated by the revolution. The entire history of our Party and the historical changes in recent years eloquently proves that the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, master and servant, have been and are headed toward complete defeat.

The more we read the Party history, the prouder we are of our Party and President Ho, the founder, leader, and trainer of our Party, and the revolutionary successes our people have achieved under the leadership of our glorious Party.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 705.
2. Ho Chi Minh: For Independence, Freedom, and Socialism, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 210.
3. Resolution of the Party Central Committee's Sixth Conference, November 1939. Party Documents (1939-1945), Su That Publishing House, 1963, p 60.
4. Resolution of the Comintern Executive Committee's Seventh Enlarged Conference.
5. Truong Chinh: Advance Under the Party Banner, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1963, p 89.
6. Le Duan: "Enthusiastically Advance Under the Great Banner of the October Revolution," Hoc Tap, November 1967.

7. Le Duan: "Under the Glorious Banner of the Party, for Independence, Freedom, and Socialism, Advance Toward Winning New Victories," Hoc Tap, February 1970.
8. Ho Chi Minh: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 772.
9. Resolution of the Tenth Central Committee Conference on trade and prices, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1965, p 18.
10. Le Duan: Speech on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, Hoc Tap, February 1970, p 18.
11. Report by President Ho at the special political conference on 27 March 1964, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1964, p 9.
12. Resolution of the Party Central Committee's Twelfth Conference, December 1965.
13. Ho Chi Minh: "The Great October Revolution Opened the Way for the Liberation of All Peoples," Hoc Tap, November 1967, p 14.
14. "Strategically, our people's long resistance against the invading French colonialists went through three stages. There are varying opinions presently on the name and starting point of the third stage... Research continues on this." Excerpt from Forty Years of Party Activities, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 62.
15. Le Duan: Speech on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, Hoc Tap, February 1970, p 16.
16. Changing Working Methods, 1947, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1955, p 33.
17. Ho Chi Minh: Selected Works, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 637.
18. President Ho's testament.

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HOA BINH SOCIALIST LAO DONG YOUTH SCHOOL: A GOOD WORK-STUDY SCHOOL

[Article by the Culture and Education Subsection, Hoc Tap; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, Vietnamese, No 3, March 1971, pp 69-83]

I. Specific, Outstanding Achievements

The Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School is a school that uses the "study while engaging in labor productivity" education method and has outstandingly completed the task it has been entrusted with -- training youth cadre to serve the building of socialism in the home province in the best manner without any expense to the state.

The development process of the school has had many advantages. The school has education policies and aims to train the new man in the party way. The school has been visited by, encouraged, and received valuable words of guidance from President Ho, First Secretary Le Duan, Premier Pham Van Dong, and many other party and government leaders. The Executive Committee of the Hoa Binh Provincial Party organization has provided firm and determined guidance to the school. The school has received encouragement and aid from many national and local agencies and organizations. Generally speaking, the people and the youth of the province -- growing out of a fondness for study and progress -- have showed backing for the school and enthusiastically supported the school's student selection plan.

However, at the same time the school has encountered many difficulties. The greatest difficulty was that the "study while engaging in labor productivity" education model was completely new and there was no prior experience to draw from. Some of the cadres that were entrusted with the

responsibility of the school only had some leadership experience in organizing assault youth during the resistance against the French and had no experience in education. With regard to teachers, initially the school only had some youth who had graduated from level-10. Afterward it acquired a number of graduates from pedagogy schools but naturally they did not have any experience in the "study while engaging in labor productivity" education method. In 1962, when the school transferred to a permanent site, there arose many conflicting opinions. There was the opinion that this type school should be abandoned and return to the type of school where study was primary combined with only a part-time labor because it was believed that labor for self-sufficiency was detrimental to study. There was the opinion that the school should become a state farm where labor was primary combined with supplemental education. And, other new problems came up that had to be solved -- decide on the direction and content of the study program, decide on the direction and content of the production program, arrange the school's management apparatus for the best and most worthwhile arrangement, additional investments for the school to buy equipment, and so forth.

During this time (17 August 1962) the school was honored by a visit from President Ho. His valuable instructions:

"You must study well, work well, strive continually and continually advance" guided and encouraged the school to follow the path of studying while engaging in labor productivity. Since then, following the words of President Ho and with the close leadership of the Hoa Binh Provincial Party Committee, the school moved boldly, built up a stable base and developed firmly.

Now, looking back over 12 years of activity by the school, we can clearly see that the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth school has successfully completed the tasks that were entrusted to it and has recorded specific, outstanding achievements in struggle to realize the party's education policy of "attaching study to labor productivity." The school has become a model of a school that "studies while engaged in labor productivity" suited to the actual conditions in Hoa Binh Province, responding to the need to train cadres to serve the development of the economy and the culture of the tribesmen in the province while responding to the need to build self-sufficiency, build up the school, and contribute to the making of material wealth for the society.

After 9 school years, the number of people that have been trained is over 3,000, comprised as follows:

Muong Tribesmen	2,189 (including 742 girls)
Kinh Tribesmen	429 (including 218 girls)
Thai Tribesmen	296 (including 83 girls)
Tay Tribesmen	105 (including 43 girls)
Dao Tribesmen	32 (including 13 girls)
Meo Tribesmen	5

This number can be broken down by location as follows:

--Working in cooperatives: 1,726 people including 756 girls.

--Working in district and provincial agencies: 511 people including 178 girls.

--In the military: 157 people including 6 girls.

--Studying in vocational middle schools: 524 people including 124 girls.

A unique form of the school is to have its students assigned to work in various places and various work posts and they have received high praise and respect from the party committee echelons, the government, and the people. An outstanding feature is that the students of the school have a concept of labor productivity and service to production, a spirit of collective mastership and a sense of discipline, and are ready to accept any task. Through study and training, the students of the school have elevated their patriotism, love of country, love for socialism, hatred for the U.S. imperialists and their lackies, and hatred for exploitation and parasites. In addition, they have raised their concept of equality between the tribesmen and equality between men and women. With regard to culture, the students in classes before 1964 studies level-I; from 1964 to 1967 level-I and level-II; from 1967 on levels-I, II and III. The quality reached in the examinations of all levels were good and in this aspect, the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School ranked with the best schools in the province. With regard to work ability and technical levels, generally speaking, the students that have completed Levels I and II of the school have grasped the theory and gained experience to carry out the planting of four main crops -- manioc, corn, potatoes, and rice -- and the growing of three major varieties of livestock -- buffaloes, cattle, and livestock. They know labor and life management, they know accounting, can achieve production plans, they know how to gain experience, and know how to set labor norms, and so on.

At the present time, 40 percent of the local students have returned to the localities to work on party and government tasks and 38 percent work on youth group tasks. Every district in the province has a former student of the school that has been elected to district party executive committees. Many students who have been selected to attend vocational middle schools or colleges have scored good marks. In addition, some people who have been held back to strengthen the cadre and instructor ranks in the school have shown that they are worthy of the task that has been entrusted to them.

Carrying out the production tasks, during the initial phase (1958-1961), with the main work of accepting contracts to build bridges and roads and build dikes for agricultural water as required by the state, the school successfully completed them. And, not only became self-sufficient in eating and studying expenses for nearly 1,500 students and instructors but also accumulated over 350,000 dong to build up the school. Thanks to the rational organizing of labor and the improvement of technology, the school organized a day consisting of a work session and a study session and saved the state 600,000 dong.

In the period since 1962, the school moved into a period of stable building and into agricultural production, forestry, and industrial processing. From an area of hills and thickets that had never been developed, the school initiated reclamation and restoration projects and planted 77 hectares of manioc, 20 hectares of corn, 8 hectares of peanuts, 5 hectares of potatoes, 1 hectare of rice, and improved 170 hectares of hilly area planted in Aleurites cordata for grazing.

With regard to grain plants, thanks to experience and the application of intensive cultivation methods, the school raised manioc yields from 32 quintals per hectare in 1962 to 190 quintals per hectare in 1969; sweet potato yields from 40 quintals per hectare in 1965 to 110 quintals per hectare in 1969; and rice from 49 quintals per hectare to 81 quintals per hectare in 1969. The output of the various types of grain plants increased per capita from 300 kilograms in 1962 to over 650 kilograms in 1969.

With regard to animal husbandry, after many failures, now the school has a herd of over 500 buffaloes and a herd of over 200 pigs.

Each section has a patch for vegetables and fruit trees, hundreds of chickens, ducks, geese, and pigeons planted and tended by the students and teachers in an effort to improve their way of life.

Using the harvested manioc as a raw material, the school has, through its own efforts, built a workshop to grind manioc flour, a workshop to distill alcohol that has a yearly output of 300,000 liters (with a capacity of 500,000 liters), and a workshop to make noodles and water colors. If the machinery, forging, and carpentry workshops and the means of transportation (four tractors, five trucks, and 1 motorboat) are counted the general worth of the school's property is over 1,390,000 dong. In addition, there are hundreds of bamboo houses used as living quarters, classrooms, conference rooms, animal pens, and workshops and there are scores of kilometers of roads connecting the installations of the school.

Counting from 1963 to 1968, the total value of products made by the school was over 2,460,000 dong. Merchandise taxes paid to the state bank was 400,000 dong. As of now the school has 80,000 dong in payments to the bank and to purchase equipment. Thanks to a developing and stabilized production, the students not only became self-sufficient but their living conditions also improved. Each student in the school receives an average from 23 or 24 dong each month along with food, books, pen and ink, lamp oil, and each year he is provided with a set of clothes. This does not include travel expenses and gas and oil allowances paid to the student each year so he can visit his family during Tet.

The aforementioned specific, outstanding achievements in both training and labor productivity by the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School during the past 12 years proves that the struggle direction of the school is correct.

II. Best Formula for Achieving the Party's Education Goals, Policies, and Aims

The party has outlined the goals of education to be "to educate the younger generation to become the worker-owners of the state, to have an awareness of socialism to have culture and technology, to be healthy, and be the totally developed person to build a new society."*

Contrasted against the education goals of the party, the results brought about in the students trained at the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School during the past years have been good.

* Official Records; published by the Central Committee of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party, 1960, Volume I, page 73.

In reality, the quality of the student trained here is not the result of any one aspect of the activity but it is the overall result of many aspects of activity, primarily the "combining of education with labor productivity." The school has a basic advantage in that the teachers and students live together in a large collective and have close-knit organizations and a way of life. Every day, the teacher and the student work together, study together, have military training together, and so on. Study by the student as well as teaching by the teacher is not limited to the classroom and the laboratory but done everywhere, at all times, in rich practices outside the classroom, and in labor productivity and other activities.

Labor productivity here is different from the work done by the student when he is home. Labor productivity at the school is work with total self-consciousness and with a higher degree of organization and technology. The process of labor productivity is a process of putting into practice the knowledge that has been learned; it is a process of testing the theories through application by the student body. Work at the school is not only aimed at fulfilling the requirements of producing material wealth in order to have self-sufficient study and fulfill obligation to society, but it is also aimed at study objectives, solidifying and increasing the level of knowledge in the classroom, forging a strong body, shaping ideology and sentiment, developing the thinking of the student, and causing the student to become infatuated with study so he can understand the course of study.

The Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School has successfully used five education principles of the party.

First of all, the nature and goals of the school's study while engaging in labor productivity concept demands a close coordination of political and ideological education with cultural and scientific education.

The students here need deeper political and ideological education because only then can they build a good concept of study and a good concept of labor productivity. Moreover, political awareness is the first requirement for training a totally developed person. For this reason the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School has given first priority consideration to political and ideological education. These are regular courses of study in the program. On the other hand, political and ideological education here is not something that is restricted to the classroom where political and ideological education is

conducted but it is also conducted by all the other teachers of other subjects and in their other contacts with the students.

With regard to organization, the unity of training in every activity of the school from the party committee and board of directors through the party chapter and committees in charge to the student organizations and installations (each class is, at the same time, a production unit, self-defense platoon, and a Lao Dong Youth Group chapter) guarantees close coordination between political and ideological education and the other aspects of education -- cultural, work, and military training.

The study while engaging in labor productivity education formula demands and creates favorable conditions for applying the principle of theory connected with reality and study going hand with action. The experience of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School shows that connecting theory with reality here does not stop with using realities to illuminate theory and does not have the simple application of using things learned in actual production but is used to solidify and broaden the student's understanding. Said in another way, study and action not only go hand in hand with each other to form a unified, unconflicting form but they also aid each other and develop each other.

When the teacher has finished a chapter in the classroom he has fulfilled only one-half of the lesson plan. Afterwards, he must communicate it into actual production or work to supplement it, completing the task of imparting knowledge to the student.

The rational uniting of theory with reality and study with action is realized through many courses of study, but mostly through the natural science studies (mathematics, chemistry, biology, and technology). At first, the teacher is not familiar with this method of teaching, but after gaining experience and using this method in actual conditions, he has good results. The student is very interested in this method of teaching right from the first. Studying in this manner and then afterwards and manifesting an active and creative nature in their work by using the slogan "study, question, understand, act."

From then on, the relationship between the teachers and the students is increasingly close, the association between the teacher and the pupil is increasingly close. Here, because there is study in the classroom, work in the out-of-doors, and participation in self-defense, study does not only flow one way -- from the teacher to the student -- but in many subjects and in many respects, the teacher must study the pupil. For

example, the teacher might study the student's revolutionary feelings, enthusiasm for study and work, gain experience from the student's production of their criticism and self-criticism, and so forth. Every problem and every doubt that the student displays helps the teacher find solutions, thereby raising his level of knowledge and teaching ability. On the other hand, feelings of intimate comradeship, like the truly equal and democratic relations between the teacher and student, creates favorable conditions for developing the unity between the teacher and student.

The experiences of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School also shows us that the uniting of modern science with the classical knowledge of the people and the experiences of the masses is a requirement that has not been slighted in the study while engaging in labor productivity formula of education. And, it is needed even more in a study while engaging in labor productivity school. Because, in these schools, the imparting of knowledge is not only carried out through instruction in the classroom, but also through its application in actual production. In the realm of production, especially agricultural production, our ancestors have accumulated a great deal of valuable knowledge. On the otherhand, when applying new knowledge to production, the masses always have lots of useful experience. Because of this, the school advocates that the students use modern scientific knowledge in conjunction with the traditional experiences of the people in order to carry out labor productivity. At the same time, the school encourages the student to gain experience in his efforts toward realistic labor productivity in an effort to solidify and supplement his knowledge. During periods when there are subjects for the whole school or for each section, each class studies to summarize its experiences. Many experiences of the school have been disseminated to the localities within the province and have been appriased as very useful by the localities. For example, there is the technology on intensive cultivation of manioc, technology on preparing green fertilizers, methods for making terraced fields, protection of forests as a prevention to erosion, and so on.

The final form organized within the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School also assures unity between school education and social education. Through the process of building and developing, the school has received help from many national and local agencies and organizations in terms of technical equipment and advice on construction, motivation, and encouragement. After several courses, the school was praised and had won the confidence of the people in the province.

In general, the families that had members chosen to attend the school were enthusiastic and proud. All the attitudes and behavior mentioned above has had the effect of directly or indirectly motivating the teachers and students of the school. Specifically in the scope of the school, the form of organizing Lao Dong youth chapter in the study organizations to thoroughly understand every aspect of the work from studying and production to the material welfare and morale of the students has assured close unity between the role of the teachers and the role of the Lao Dong Youth Group chapter. The Lao Dong Youth Group is a basic unit to execute every policy of the school with regard to study; work; labor productivity; motivating the teachers and the students to emulate in study, labor and training; stepping up the struggle for self-criticism; and fostering a feeling of class love and comradeship between the teachers and the students and between students. Every policy of the party that is carried out in the country or the province are reflected in the school, such as the policy of resistance against America for national salvation, opposition to the U.S. imperialist air force's war of destruction, the policy to continue to build socialism during the war, the policy to develop the local economies, carry out the national policy, and so forth.

In summary, based on the actual experiences of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School, we can reaffirm that the study while engaging in productive labor is a very good education form to achieve the goals, policies, and aims of the party. It also assures the quality, speed, and model for training the new man, the totally developed man to build a new society.

III Some Experiences and Successes of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School

In its 12 years of rich and varied activities, the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School has had a great deal of experiences in many aspects, from putting party education policies and principles into effect, organizing guidance in study and production, and utilizing normal schools to educate the mountain tribesmen to technical methods for intensive cultivation, animal husbandry, processing, and so forth. But as far as we are concerned, there are five decisive and successful experiences for a study while engaging in labor productivity school.

Experience number one: Determine and maintain the training goals of the school during each period.

If you want to determine the training goals of a school during a certain time period, in addition to basing them on the education goals, policies, and principles of the party, they must also be based on the tasks and requirements to develop the local economy and culture during the specific time and based on the special characteristics of the training objectives of the people in the province.

The school was established in 1958 at a time when North Vietnam had just concluded a period of economic restoration and was entering a period of socialist reform and building socialism. Specifically, Hoa Binh Province had begun a mobilization to cooperativize agriculture and preparing to build socialism with a view toward developing the economy and culture and from that base raise the material well-being and morale of the tribesmen in the province.

The training objectives of the school are to train Lao Dong Youth Group members of the tribesmen in the province of whom the majority are Muong tribesmen. (This is except for the first two classes which were held to train Lao Dong Youth Group members in the installations). Although they are Lao Dong Youth Group members, nearly all of them do not understand specifically about socialism and cooperatives and they are not familiar with the collective way of life and a large collective way of life with discipline, law, and order. As far as culture is concerned, a majority of these tribesmen have only completed a level-1 or level-2 education and many of the people in the higher areas are not literate.

With regard to labor skills, because they are all working people they are familiar with manual labor. However, it is simple work and not labor that requires technology.

The training requirement during this period was first to teach socialism to the students, helping them to understand the movement to collectivize agriculture and the ability of the mountainous areas to progress to socialism; familiarize the student with organized labor productivity and, with regard to those who had technology, familiarize them with the collective way of life, so they would understand organization and labor management; and educate the student in culture in accordance with the level-1 supplemental culture program; teach them to read and write; teach them the fore mathematical operations; to do percentages; how to read directives; and how to write reports.

During the period around 1962 the localities within the provinces completed cooperativization and the cooperatives

struggled to solidify the new relations of production and step up production. This situation demanded that the students not only have an awareness of socialism and a general understanding of the organization of cooperatives but also required that some of the installation cadre have a ability to work and management ability, knowledgeable about farming and animal husbandry, and "speak with the mouth and do with the hands" in order to increase the labor efficiency of the cooperative. Using this as a base, the new relations of production could be solidified. In an effort to respond to this basic requirement, cultural education must be raised to level-II and level-III and not allowed to remain at level-I. Because of the daily increasing training requirement and the ever-widening training standards, the school was no longer as mobile as before and had to become stabilized in a location that had favorable conditions for the developing of agricultural production, forestry, and industrial processing in an effort to become economically self-sufficient and serve the new study needs.

The school stabilized its goals to be to train a new man to take part in the building and developing the local economy. Therefore, the contents of the study programs that had an influence on the school's production were linked with the tasks and directions of developing the economy in the province. The central task of the province was "to develop agricultural and total forestry production and have industrial processing." Therefore the central study program and the production plan of the school was also directed toward agricultural production (planting four main crops: manioc, corn potatoes, and rice and raising three principle animals: buffaloes, cattle, and pigs), forestry production (planting Alewrites Cordata), and industrial processing (using manioc as a raw material to distill alchol and make noodles). The labor productivity of the school not only allowed the teachers and students to meet three requirements -- study, self-sufficiency, and accumulation and fulfilling their duty to the state -- but also they gained experience in applying technology to production and serving the production requirements of the localities in the province.

Thanks to closely following the production direction of the province, the students trained by the school could return to the localities and engage in production immediately.

One more basic goal of the school is to train a group of young cadres to serve as the nucleus for a people's movement of the mountain tribesmen to progress in socialism. The youth of any of the tribesmen are progressive, easily assimilate new things, and enthusiastically struggle for new things. However, the youth of the mountain tribesmen are born and raised in villages that are at great distances from each other.

There are few conditions for contact, living in large collectives, receiving higher education, or becoming familiar with machinery, science, and technology. When they are brought to the school to study and engage in labor productivity for a relatively long period of time, not only do they have cultural, scientific, and technical studies and become acquainted with improved tools and machinery but there are conditions for training them in the way of life of the large collective with organization, law and order, discipline, and love of class as well as training them in the complications of organizing and managing the work of scores or hundreds of people. The conditions for such overall training only exist in a school using the study while engaging in labor productivity education formula.

In the past 12 years, the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School has trained nearly 3,000 students for the tribesmen in the province. Over one-third of the students were girls. Currently enrolled in the school are: 492 Muong, 25 Thai, 14 Tay, 13 Meo, and 5 Dao. This is a very valuable asset to help the tribesmen of the province rapidly build up and develop their economic and cultural lives, carrying out the party slogan "have the high areas progress with the low and the mountains progress with the plains" and "struggle for true equality between the tribesmen."

Thanks primarily to sticking close to the political tasks of the province, the school has set and reached the training goals in responding to the need to developing the economy and culture of the localities and the tribesmen of the province. The best evidence of these results is that the prestige of the school grows daily and it is able to attract the youth and the tribesmen in the province. Its recruitment of students is warmly received. Not only are the youth of the tribesmen from the lower areas anxious to attend the school but the youth from the high areas are enthusiastic as well. And, when they attend the school they are content and enthusiastic about study and labor productivity.

Experience number two: Being mindful of both study and labor productivity, correctly resolving every relationship between study and labor productivity, develop the effect, and step up and develop both aspects.

Generally speaking, when talking about the study while engaging in labor productivity formula, we are mostly concerned that the two aspects may adversely affect each other and interfere with each other bring about a situation where one aspect stifles the other or neither aspect is good. The Hoa Binh

Socialist Lao Dong Youth School has not slipped into this state. On the contrary, it has been able to raise high the slogan:

"Study gets better, labor becomes skilled;
Labor becomes skilled, study gets better."

First of all, at the school, there was the problem of concept and specific organization methods. In order to meet the training goals, the teachers and students clearly see that the study while engaging in labor productivity is the best formula. When the school was first established, in order that the teachers and students would have a sense of responsibility and fully participate in labor productivity, the Hoa Binh Provincial Party Committee decided that the school should be self-sufficient in every living and schooling expense right from the first class and on the basis of its accumulation and surplus, the school could gradually build up and develop its career. The building up of the school has shown us that if labor productivity is not set in a serious manner it can easily create a psychology of dependency and half-measures among the cadres, teachers, and students. But, if there is emphasis only on labor productivity, it will change the school into a work site or a unit of assault youth. For example: at first, while working on the bridge building project without experience in labor organization, the school had to let the teachers and students work two sessions per day to assure that the work would be completed and that the school would become self-sufficient. Cultural and political studies were done in the evening and at night and as a result, there were only a few hours for studying. Study and labor was tense. After gaining experience, improving labor organization, and improving their skill at earth moving, the teachers and students only needed to work 4-hour sessions to achieve the same results. Thanks to this, they could attend a study session during the day. Adding 3 or 4 hours of self-study at night, the ratio of hours of study (7 or 8 hours) to the hours of work (4 hours) was reasonable. Following that, when the school was located at a fixed site and entered agricultural, forestry, and industrial processing production, the school was determined to maintain the system of a 4-hour work session and 7 to 8 hours of study per day.

However, the only problem was not striking a rational balance between study hours and work hours. A more important problem was how to apply the knowledge that had been learned in order to daily improve labor technology and raise labor efficiency where labor intensity was slipping every day and the number and quality of work hours were growing less each day. The school set up a principle: The higher the level of study, the more skilled must be the labor. Specifically,

the production plan of the self-defense platoon, and the total material and spiritual life of all the students in a class.

Therefore, every aspect of work in the class is centered on the Lao Dong Youth Group organization. The youth group is the support, the nucleus for realizing every work policy of the school or the field of study. Here the Lao Dong Youth Group is truly a place for training in all respects for each group member and it has significance for each student, because nearly every student of the school is a member of the Lao Dong Youth Group.

When three or four group members join to form a group, they are also a study group, a production group, and a self-defense group. In every group there is a healthy person, a weak person, a studious person, a person who does not do so well in studies, helping each other in their studies, labor, and training so that all could complete their tasks in every respect. This form creates a feeling of comradeship and friendship between the students that grows deeper each day.

Thanks to united management from the grassroots, the study plan, labor plan, and military plan are closely coordinated with each other. When contradictions between study requirements and production time arise, the guideline is initiative, not missing a production opportunity and at the same time assuring study hours.

The way of life follows completely the principle of democratic centralism of the Lao Dong Youth Group assuring the development of collective ownership and a sense of organized discipline in all the group members and in the students. Every work principle of the school or field of study is brought down or proposed by the executive committee of the party chapter for discussion prior to being put into operation. Every group member and student actively contributes his opinion on the various aspects of the class, production unit, or self-defense. Every person clearly understands that he is the true owner and has the responsibility and power to take part in the management of the school. Here, the Lao Dong Youth Group is truly a "communist school for youth."

Experience number four: Work while building up the ranks of the teachers to respond to the requirements of the school.

In any school, the teacher plays a major role. But in a study while engaging in labor productivity school, the role of the teacher is even more outstanding.

The studying while engaging in labor productivity school is a school where the teacher and the student live collectively. Every activity from study, work, military training, and meetings to eating, recreation, and relaxation have an effect on the whole -- training the totally developed new man. But every student is only in school for a period of one class. Who has the necessary conditions and who has accumulated the best conditions from the earlier classes and can impart them to the later classes? Who is responsible for the continuity of the production plan from class to class? It can only be the teacher. Moreover, the teacher is in daily contact with student. He is in the classroom, works, and engages in military training with the student (except for specialized activities, lesson plan preparations, or labor union activities). Therefore, the role of the teacher is very important. As a result, the requirements on the teacher in the study while engaging in labor productivity school are higher and more comprehensive than in other schools. The teacher in these type schools must have good ethics and good character (he must have a revolutionary enthusiasm, patriotism, love of socialism, love of country, love for the locality which he serves, be an outstanding example in teaching, studying, and living habits, have a concept of collective living, the customs of the masses, and so on); have a good teaching ability (have a good grasp of scientific and cultural information, know how to relate theory to reality, know how to relate learning to action, know how to relate to the student, have enthusiasm for work, know how to organize and manage labor, have a good grasp of production technology, and so on); and have the ability to motivate and unite the masses and organize and manage the material and spiritual lives of the students.

Naturally when it was first established, the school was not able to supply a group of teachers who fulfilled the aforementioned requirements. The school could only use the "study while working" and "work and build up a rank of teachers to meet its own requirements" methods. This problem had a decisive significance with regard to fulfilling the political responsibilities of the school and on the task of not ceasing to raise the teaching quality.

The Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School's experience of building up its ranks of teachers shows that if the teachers of a school wish to fulfill the responsibility with which they are entrusted, first of all they must be enthusiastic and have pride in their valuable and glorious work. And, from there they must decide for themselves the "working while studying" concept and make efforts to approve the movement to build up the school

and daily improve themselves in an effort to meet the standards of a teacher of the younger generation, the generation to build socialism for the people of the home province.

In addition to self-study and self-improvement, the teacher must truly be involved in the school's cadre, teacher and staff collective. They must love, help, and study each other and together struggle to advance in the "two good" (good study and good work) movement and to build up the school's production teams and units.

If he wishes to progress, the teacher must stay close to the students blend with, and study every aspect of the student. Working and studying with the student can provide the teacher with many ideas and opinions that can improve his teaching and, at the same time, it can provide him with experience he can use to enrichen his teaching methods.

Naturally, the maturation of the teaching staff at the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School during the past years has not detracted from the concern of the school's party organization, especially with regard to the political and ideology aspects. The earlier teaching staff was comprised of youth who had graduated from the 10th grade, a number who had graduated from pedagogy schools, and a number of students of the school that had stayed to work at the school. At first, a majority of the teachers were not familiar with the "study while engaging in labor productivity" teaching formula. But, through practice and self-improvement, they grew with the school. Now the school has many teachers that have good ethics and character, good levels in culture and pedagogy, and who are able to guide production. Many have been admitted into the party and all the earlier teaching staff have become Lao Dong Youth Group members. Every year, a majority of the cadres and teachers are selected as emulation soldiers or as progressive workers. This speaks of the quality of the cadres and teachers of the school.

Experience number five: Improving the contents of the training program, teaching methods, and the student's study methods.

The contents of the training program outlined for a class has great significance. It is the struggle principle for the teacher and student following the correct education line and policy of the party with a view toward realizing the training goals of the school. The objective of the school's training is

primarily the youth of the tribesmen of the province from age 16 on up. Generally speaking they are healthy but when they first come to the school, there is great disparity in their political and cultural levels. The requirements to develop the economy and culture in the localities within the province through the course of a class can change a great deal or only a small amount. Moreover, this is a new concept in schools; there are no ready-made programs that are appropriate. For this reason the school had to research the programs of other schools then, based on its own needs, the requirements of the locality, and the training objectives, devise its own program. The program is not static; it is broadened and improved with each passing class.

While improving the program, the school is mindful of providing the student with knowledge and equipment so that he can learn and, at the same time, maintain the basics and prepare for immediate classes or for advanced studies.

After several improvements, the school's current teaching program is comprised of four main courses -- political science, culture and science, production technology, and the principles of management. The school has learned that the required time to complete the program for each class is as follows: level-I classes, 4 months; level-II classes, 6 months; and level-III classes, 8 months.

In addition to improving the program contents, the school is mindful of encouraging the teachers and students to develop their creativity and not to cease to improve their teaching and study methods. The experience of the school in carrying out education has shown that the close coordination of classroom study with outside learning has a very definite effect on the ability of the student to learn. At the present time, nearly all the older teachers use this teaching method. For example, a teacher of theory takes the class down to a workshop and teaches the lesson on the spot or a teacher of mathematics takes a class out on a hill for the class, teaching them how to compute an area while laying out an area to be planted. The writing teacher, through work sessions in the field, has taught the students how to observe and describe the new way of life or explained to the student abstract writing and so on. In summary, the teachers seek ways to use the eyes and ears of the student to help him understand the lesson. On the part of the student, in addition to going deep into understanding the knowledge, he also makes an effort to exchange ideas in the classroom and question the teacher and exchange ideas with him.

Improving the program and improving the teaching methods of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School assures daily improvement in the quality of study by the student. This is clearly illustrated in the results of tests and examinations as well as the daily increases in labor efficiency in the school's production sector.

IV Direction of Progress

A school organizes and manages many aspects from study and production to life. Moreover, working and gaining experience and relying on its own efforts is primary in the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School, so naturally limitations are unavoidable.

For example, as stated in the general report of the Hoa Vinh Province Party Committee, the problem of quality of the training at the school needs further research so there can be steps to improve it. With regard to study, the number of good and skilled students is still small and the general quality of study also needs to be raised. Probably, further attention could be made to take advantage of the schools advantages in that the students and teachers live together, although labor productivity and the number of hours set aside for study are not small. The quality of the teachers could be increased because the number of skilled teachers is small. With regard to training, possibly additional research could be made to develop the effect of collective living and the effect of the activities of the Ho Chi Minh Lao Dong Youth Group and the self-defense units with respect to the students. Creating conditions so the student can come in contact with the movements of the society, study and hear reports on the progress in the province and the country would surely help them make increased efforts to raise their levels of ideology, sentiment, and understanding. Cultural and literary activities to help the student increase his feelings and appreciation of beauty should also receive attention. It is possible the student's knowledge of technology and management could be increased through broadened production experiments to serve study, a system of rotating guidance responsibility in carrying out technology methods and in management task, and so on.

The school's problem of production direction and goals could be further researched in terms of economic viewpoints. Although the school's primary goal is not production, there is a need to not only assure that production is effective but also that manpower and material are not wasted and that available abilities are exploited. In this respect the school has a great advantage because it has a relatively large work force comprised of thousands of youths who are not involved with family matters

and can concentrate solely on study and production. With adequate territory and an abundant labor source, is it not possible that production requirements to serve study and living conditions could be higher. In reality, if the school has successfully carried out intensive cultivation of manioc and manioc processing, then the school must have great capabilities for raising other grain and industrial crops; for animal husbandry; and for developing industrial processing; and so on.

In addition, the Hoa Binh Provincial Party Committee pointed out another shortcoming of the school -- it has done much work but the summaries of its experience are few. Therefore, the popularization and development of the central role of the school in culture and scientific technology has not been carried out with regard to the locality.

Currently, on the basis of past achievements, the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School is enlarging its standard of training, taking the students from the general schools and opening university level classes. At the same time, the school is planning to broaden the production scale commensurate with the training standard in order to better serve training. With a spirit of revolutionary offensive, working while studying, without self-satisfaction, surely the school will do research in an effort to more thoroughly understand the education goals and policies of the party; gaining work experience; developing its strong points and overcoming its weak points; and surging forward to complete the new tasks.

With regard to our cadre education and training sector the experiences of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School demands our attention. It is clear that the school has set a shining example, a model combining study with labor productivity. When he visited the school in March 1969 First Secretary Le Duan made the following observation, appraising the school's methods: "The school has built model people combining study and work into one. Here is the building of socialism. This is the fastest way to advance to Communism.*

* Notes on the conversations between First Secretary Le Duan and the teachers, students, cadres, and officials of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School on 18 March 1969. (Documents in the school's archives.)

In an effort to provide closer coordination between education and labor productivity in the school, recently the Office of the Premier issued Directive 237-TTg on organizing labor productivity in the general schools, universities, and vocational schools.

The statements of First Secretary Le Duan concerning the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School, the directive from the Office of the Premier, and the successful experiences of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Group School and many other schools encourages the entire education and training sector to more effectively carry out the basic education principles and aims of the party on "combining study with labor productivity." This is the requirement to assure the continued raising of the quality of training of the totally developed new man, the socialist man, and the requirement for the economic and cultural development of our country at the present time.

Naturally, we cannot duplicate the experiences of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth School. The thing that should be studied in the teachers and students of the school is their deep awareness of the basic education principles and aims of the party on "combining study with labor productivity" and determination not to fear difficulty and hardship and their studying while working to carry them out through these aims. While with regard to direction and specific organization in combining study with labor productivity, there is a need to consider by the nature and task of each type of school (general, supplemental education, university, vocational middle school, and so on), consider the age group (youth, teenager, or children), consider whether it is for boys or girls, and also consider the production conditions of each locality in strictly executing the directive of the Office of the Premier and creatively applying the experience of the Hoa Binh Socialist Lao Dong Youth Group School.

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"VIETNAMIZATION" POLICY: CERTAIN DEFEAT FOR THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS

[Article by Huong Nam; Hanoi, Hoc Tap, No 3, Vietnamese, March 1971, pp 84-89]

In his 2 years in power, U.S. President Nixon has frienzedly carried out the "Vietnamization" of the war policy, seeing it as the main policy for the solution of the Vietnam problem.

From "De-Americanization" to "Vietnamization"

In the spring of 1968, the general offensive and uprising of the army and people of South Vietnam dealt a heavy blow to the U.S. aggressors, forcing them to review their entire policy in Vietnam. The scale of the limited warfare, in Vietnam had reached its peak, the number of American troops had reached half-a-million, yearly expenditures were more than 30 billion dollars, and the number of causalities had reached approximately the number of U.S. casualties in the Korean War. Although the United States has a great economic and military potential, because the United States had stretched its forces thinly throughout the world in an effort to carry out an international police role and because the war of aggression in Vietnam was strongly denounced by U.S. and world opinion, the Johnson administration saw the difficulty in increasing the level at which men and material were being poured into the war of aggression in Vietnam. Moreover, during the general election year, internal contradictions within the ruling groups in the United States became more and more acute. The opposition demanded a reduction in the commitment and a change in national "priorities." This situation forced Johnson to reject Westmoreland's request for an additional 200,000 men; called the defeated general back home; limited, then halted the bombing of North Vietnam; and agreed to sit down and talk at Paris. At the same time,

he announced that he would "de-Americanize" the war with a view toward gradually shifting the "main burden" to the puppet army while the U.S. troops would "aid in creating a shield behind which the people of South Vietnam (meaning the puppet clique -- author's note) could live and develop." (From a Johnson speech of 31 March 1968).

What was Nixon's attitude during this period? At the end of 1966, an off-year election year in the United States, while Johnson was madly "escalating" the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, Nixon "the hawk" was clamoring for "the use of maximum force to conclude the war the sooner the better." (Speaking to the people on television on 6 November 1966.) Basically a shrewd politician, during the 1968 general election campaign, Nixon quickly changed his course, criticized the democratic administration and promising to end the war if he won the confidence of the U.S. voters. How and when he would end it, Nixon did not clearly say. In the circle of Nixon's close friends, a comprehensive policy on the Vietnam problem -- a crafty and shrewd policy -- was studied and decided on. That was the "Vietnamization" policy.

Nixon's Scheme on "Vietnamization"

At the end of 1968, Kissinger, now an advisor on foreign affairs to Nixon, wrote; "... the Tet Offensive marked the limits of U.S. efforts. From that point on, although our efforts have results everywhere, the current strategy cannot achieve its goals in the time period and with the level of forces which the politics of the American people will permit." ("Negotiations on Vietnam," an article in Foreign Affairs, January 1969.) Only now is this hard-to-understand statement clear. The scheme of the Nixon administration, illustrated by this statement, is, although defeated, to maintain the old goals and strive to realize these goals through a different strategy, a different policy with more economical methods in terms of men and material so that the U.S. people would accept and not cause serious political opposition.

The goal which the Nixon administration stubbornly maintains and will not change is to hold on to South Vietnam, carry out neo-colonialism in South Vietnam, and prolong the division of Vietnam. The new strategy is to go on the defensive, abandon "search and destroy" and move to "sweep and hold." Relying on this defensive posture, the United States is making efforts to carry out the "Vietnamization" policy. Relying on the puppet army to replace a portion of the U.S. Army, reduce the level of the war with a view toward reducing the number of casualties among the U.S. expeditionary forces, reducing the

expenses of the war, reducing the opposition of the U.S. people and at the same time, maintain the position of the puppet administration creating a "position of power" for the United States at Paris, aimed at forcing the Vietnamese people to accept U.S. conditions.

Pointing out the faults of the "de-Americanization" plan of the Johnson administration, U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird said, "De-Americanization" only had an effect when the Paris conference brought favorable results for the United States. According to Laird, the "De-Americanization" plan will become passive because the "modernization" of the puppet army will not be enough for it to cope with the armed forces of the people of South Vietnam. On the other hand, according to Laird, "Vietnamization" will assure the withdrawal of the American troops while strengthening the puppet army and weakening the forces of the resistance. Even though the negotiations were not producing results, the "Vietnamization" plan will cause the war in Vietnam to "gradually subside," the basic goal of the United States. Because of this, Laird has boasted that "Vietnamization is the only road, the best road for the United States to orderly disengage from the war and finally withdraw from Vietnam."

Contents and Progress of Vietnamization

In his speech of 3 November 1969, and later in his message of 18 February 1970, Nixon stressed that "Vietnamization" was the first application of the "Nixon Doctrine" in Asia, a part of the "new" total strategy of the United States. Nixon summarized the contents of the "Doctrine" in three principles:

1. "The United States will hold all its commitments in accordance with the treaties," meaning that it will continue to maintain the neo-colonialists position in Asia, in which it is the leader.

2. The United States "will supply a nuclear shield" if the area is threatened by a nuclear power. This is a familiar argument of the U.S. imperialists, bringing up nuclear weapons in the hopes of intimidating the liberation movements of the people of Asia.

3. "In cases concerning other types of aggression, we (i.e., The United States -- author's note) will provide military and economic aid when it is requested and we feel that it is appropriate. However, we hope that the country being directly threatened will shoulder the responsibility of providing the manpower for the defense of that country." This means

that the United States will continue its international police role suppressing the national liberation movements in Asia, but in a "selective" fashion, primarily using armed forces comprised of people from the area -- in Asia, Asians would be used while the United States supplied money and weapons; if need be, relying on the reserve forces and support from the air force and navy, and only using armed intervention in carefully "selected" places.

The specific contents of the "Nixon Doctrine" on Vietnam, meaning the "Vietnamization" plan, was outlined in a comprehensive manner by U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird on 26 September 1969. "Vietnamization has a much greater significance than modernizing the armed forces of South Vietnam (i.e., the puppet army -- author's note) in order to permit them to continue to undertake greater military responsibility. Vietnamization is the shifting to the Vietnamese (i.e. the lackey clique -- author's note) the responsibility for all aspects of the war and responsibility for managing their affairs to have a stronger government, a stronger economy, a stronger police force,..."

Therefore, "Vietnamization" is first of all a military plan. The United States will strengthen the puppet army in terms of men, equipment, and command so that it can replace the U.S. Army and undertake a greater share of the war and so the United States can withdraw greater numbers of U.S. troops without adversely influencing the balance of forces on the battlefield.

With regard to politics, the United States will strive to have the puppet clique "manage their own affairs," meaning a strengthening of the lackey administration. Along with strengthening the puppet army, the United States has stepped up "pacification" activities, police operations, solidified control in the areas where they have control, and stretched out into the liberated areas to herd and scoop up the people. At the same time, they are trying to solidify the Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration, putting the most bellicose, tyrannical, and corrupt individuals in the main positions while suppressing the opposition, going along with demagoguery, and painting the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique as democracy.

With regard to the economy, in an effort to reduce U.S. expenditures, they have ordered that the puppet administration make every effort to exploit the people through increased taxation, levying in "austerity" tax, destroying the value of the North Vietnam dong, and so on. On the other hand, they flaunt "land reform" in hopes of deceiving and distorting the struggle of the South Vietnam farmers and, at the same time, create landlords to create a base of support for their rule.

With regard to foreign relations, they stubbornly maintain their aggressive stand, demanding that "both sides withdraw," demanding general elections within the framework of the puppet administration and under the occupational yoke of the U.S. Army and rejecting the 10-point overall solution and the 8-point clarification of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. In a speech of 3 November 1969, Nixon bragged that the "Vietnamization" plan is a "Plan that will end the war regardless of what takes place at the negotiation table." It is clear that Nixon sees the Paris talks as valueless, serving only as a screen for the "Vietnamization" of the war plan.

With the aforementioned contents, the Nixon Administration figures to move self-interestedly to achieve predetermined goals. First withdrawing dribbles of U.S. troops, then depending on the speed of the strengthening of the puppet army, gradually withdraw the U.S. forces from combat placing the heavier burden on the puppet army. The United States plans to complete this by mid-1971. After that, if the situation permits, they will continue to transfer to the puppet army a portion of the support tasks through the navy and air force. Therefore, according to American newspapers, by the end of 1971, the United States hoped to have only 240,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. According to Nixon's plan, these troops would be professional troops, "Volunteers" to replace the present draftees. The cost of the war will be reduced to around 12 billion dollars per year, equivalent to the yearly increase of the gross national product as calculated by the U.S. authorities. The number of U.S. casualties per week would be around 100, about the same as are killed each week in automobile accidents. U.S. newspapers feel that at this level, the war would not affect the U.S. economy, not create problems for the hopes of the American people, and would become a war that "politically, the American people could live with." In this way, the Nixon administration could indefinitely prolong the war, indefinitely prolong the military occupation of South Vietnam as is the case in South Korea. If the puppet army and administration grow in strength and the resistance weakens, the war will "gradually fade away" and the United States would only require a few thousand "advisors", achieving the highest goal of their "Vietnamization" plan.

Contradictions That Cannot be Overcome

For the past 2 years, the Nixon administration has tried to carry out the aforementioned contents and steps. In the process, they have revealed the basic contradictions of the "Vietnamization" plan. The contradictions have become more

and more acute and cannot be overcome. The first is the contradiction between the fact that the United States must reduce the level of the war and the hopes of the United States to win a "position of strength" in an effort to force U.S. conditions on the Vietnamese people. Being defeated, they are forced to withdraw troops and cut expenses but they want to win territory from a victorious adversary on the battlefield. This is the greatest dream in the history of any war.

Troop withdrawal is the number one requirement in the process of reducing the level of the U.S. imperialists involvement in the war because this is the strongest demand of the people of the United States and the world. Troop withdrawal demands that the puppet army be strong to replace the U.S. troops. This is the second great contradiction of the "Vietnamization" plan. The U.S. Army is the support of the puppet army. It was the main strategic force in the "limited warfare" in South Vietnam. When the puppet army was defeated, the U.S. Army jumped in. Now the U.S. Army has to withdraw and the Nixon administration hopes to bring the puppet into the role of a main strategic force to replace the U.S. Army in hopes of winning a "position of strength." This can only be a dream.

In conjunction with the strengthening of the puppet army, the Nixon administration has made efforts to solidify the puppet administration. But the solidification is designed to serve the "Vietnamization" scheme, preparing it to contend with the political power of the resistance forces. The Thieu-Ky-Khiem puppet administration, a tool to carry out the "limited warfare" at a high level, does not currently fit the plans of its U.S. bosses. Although the Nixon administration continues to support the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, it is trying to steer the clique into their new schemes and at the same time, preparing different lessons in reserve. Because of this, the contradictions between the puppets and the Americans and the contradictions between the puppets themselves grow deeper and strongly affect the morale of the puppet army and administration. Particularly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops is causing confusion in the social and economic life of the temporarily occupied areas of South Vietnam.

Decline in the morale of U.S. soldiers has also occurred. The "Vietnamization" of the war plan wants to maintain a large force of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, but U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam only want to leave. No one wants to be the last

U.S. soldier to die in South Vietnam. Director of the U.S. Selective Service, Tarr, after visiting U.S. soldiers in South Vietnam commented: "As the war is reduced, the morale of the American soldier declines and as the American soldier's morale declines, the capability of the unit also declines."

Finally, there is the contradiction between the reality of the "Vietnamization" plan and the deceitful way it is portrayed by Nixon. And the difference in Nixon's words and actions has become clear, creating a very serious "credibility gap." With regard to these serious contradictions, no matter how much the Nixon administration props up, patches up, or covers up, they will continue to burst out and cannot be overcome. From a strategy of counter offensive to a strategy of defense, they have crawled back to hold the cities, exhausting all their potential to mobilize and carry out what Nixon calls the main parts of the "Vietnamization" plan -- strengthening the puppet army and widening the "pacification" program through the use of severe and cruel methods, creating thousands of heinous crimes in our country. They brag about the victories of the "Vietnamization" plan, but after 2 years of executing the plan, their hands and feet must accept completely different stories. Concerning the "strengthening of the puppet army," puppet General Do Cao Tri had to face up to the sad situation of desertion in the puppet army in Military Region 3 (Tia Sang newspaper, 26 October 1970). With regard to the "pacification" situation, Nixon's "pacification" strategist, British General Thomson, after a 5-week tour of South Vietnam, was forced to accept that "pacification has not destroyed the disruptive Viet Cong apparatus in South Vietnam" (New York Times, 3 December 1970). In a report before a "conference of congressmen to discuss the responsibilities of the people and the war," on 20 and 21 February American professor Conco related the words of a U.S. officer that went on a "pacification" operation in South Vietnam: "We are told that the population of the village was 80 percent Viet Cong guerrillas; when we had completed the sweep operation, the number of Viet Cong had risen to 95 percent."

Not only in the liberated areas, where the U.S. and puppet troops sweep, right in the cities and temporarily controlled areas that they consider bases for carrying out the "Vietnamization" plan, gales of struggle are attracting a broad spectrum of the people to oppose the U.S. and puppet ruling yoke. They are demanding that the United States withdraw its troops and demanding that a national union government replace the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration to carry out the self-government right of the South Vietnamese people.

Confronted with this situation and fearing that he would have to suffer the unexpected blows of the resistance forces in South Vietnam, Nixon sent the troops into Cambodia, widened the war in Laos, and bombed and shelled the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These adventurous acts do not show a "position of strength" but only expose the weakness and defeat of the U.S. imperialists.

The Bankruptcy of Deceitful Ideas

The "confidence crisis" of the Nixon administration grows deeper every day. Bringing out the "vietnamization" policy, the Nixon administration at the same time launched crafty and demagogic ideas in the hopes of distorting American opinion that is demanding that Nixon settle the Vietnam problem. Along with the defeat of the "Vietnamization" plan, the ideas of the Nixon administration are becoming bankrupt, exposing their deceitful faces.

Nixon said that "Vietnamization" would end the war, but in reality, "Vietnamization" is prolonging and expanding the war.

Nixon said that "Vietnamization" would reduce casualties and cut expenses, but through the years and months of prolonging the war, the total number of casualties and expenditures have risen, changing the Vietnam war into the costliest war in terms of men and material for the United States since World War II.

Nixon said "Vietnamization" would accelerate negotiations, but because of Nixon's stubborn attitude, the Paris talks have dragged out for 2 years with no progress. Negotiations, in Nixon's estimation, are only a screen for "Vietnamization." With the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Nixon administration destroyed the agreement to end acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which started the 4-sided conference in Paris on Vietnam.

Nixon said that "Vietnamization" would guarantee the commitment to maintain the position of the United States in Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the world, but "Vietnamization" has only caused the United States to become weaker, lose prestige and cause inestimable damage to the United States.

Nixon said that "Vietnamization" is a measure to assure the honor of the United States, but "Vietnamization" during the past 2 years has led to untold crimes that have been condemned by all mankind.

Whether "de-Americanization" or "Vietnamization," the more the Vietnam war is prolonged, the more serious is the defeat, the more internal contradictions it causes, and the weaker will become the position of the United States in the world and the more smeared the honor of the United States.

There is only one true method of "de-Americanization," the rapid, unconditional, and short-period withdrawal of U.S. and troops of countries in the U.S. camp from Vietnam.

There is only one method of "Vietnamization," that is to allow the Vietnamese people to solve their own affairs. At the present time, South Vietnam is an internal matter, and later it will be the unification of the Vietnam fatherland, without the intervention of the U.S. imperialists. This is the only path which the 10-point overall solution and the 8 points of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam outlined in a concrete and reasonable manner. Stubbornly refusing this correct solution in order to pursue a war of aggression through the "Vietnamization," the Nixon administration only sinks deeper into the ditch from where there is no escape. Carrying out the sacred testament of President Ho, our army and people are determined to persist in and step up the resistance against America for national salvation until total victory and completely smash the U.S. imperialist's "Vietnamization of the war" plan.

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