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No. 2, 1966

- North Vietnam -

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This publication contains the complete translation of the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), No. 2, 1966. Complete bibliographic information accompanies each article.

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LET US TRY TO ACHIEVE THE 1966 STATE PLAN
TO BRING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE U. S. TO VICTORY

[Following is a translation
of an editorial in the
Vietnamese-language periodical,
Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No.
2, February 1966, pages 1-7.]

Last year, our people throughout the country overcame many difficulties and scored great victories in the fight against the U.S. for national salvation.

In the south, the Liberation Army and our compatriots scored big successive victories, thus defeating the U.S. imperialists in their "special war." The political and armed forces of the people of the south grew up fast and proved that they were totally capable of defeating the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys.

In the north, our army and people strongly fought back in the war of destruction waged mainly by the air force of the U.S. pirates, thus destroying the so-called "absolute superiority of the U.S. Air Force." All the activities in the north were shifted to another direction in order to suit the situation of war. In the economic field, the building of the material and technical base of socialism continued to be carried out under the conditions imposed by the U.S. pirates' war of destruction, and already reached great achievements. Agriculture continued to be developed, with increase of productivity through intensive cultivation being our main concern, and helped to satisfy relatively well the needs of our army and people for foods and foodstuffs. Industry showed a lot of efforts to serve agriculture and other branches in the people's economy. Communication-transportation on important roads was basically maintained. In general the people's living was still stable. Health protection, education, and cultural work continued to be speeded and well served our people's fight against the U.S. for national salvation.

Those victories prove that the line adopted by our party is a correct one. Those victories also demonstrate the strength of our socialist system. The struggle of all our people for the good cause will certainly be victorious. That is our iron belief. It also reflects the principal conclusions we have drawn from our people's actual struggle against the U.S. for national salvation for the last year.

The achievements of our army and people in the north in both production and combat in 1965 were extremely great. However, in the past year, we still had some shortcomings and weaknesses: certain branches did not shift

the direction of their wartime work well enough, or failed to understand fully the party line prescribed for their work in the new situation; organizational work failed to be shifted and to keep pace with the need of the political task. The failure to pay proper attention to the building and development of local industry and mechanical industry in the past years also created some difficulties for the shifting of direction in economic construction aimed at serving production and combat in the new situation.

As we enter the year 1966, we resolve to develop further our achievements and advantages, to overcome our shortcomings and weaknesses in our work, to make the economy of the north develop fast so as to serve effectively the continuous work of building the material and technical base of socialism and to defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors.

This year the north of our country enters the second year of the war of resistance against the U.S. for national salvation. In order to defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors and to continue leading the north to socialism, in addition to strengthening and consolidating national defense, we must do our best to build and to develop the economy, to carry out successfully the 1966 state plan.

The 1966 state plan has been drafted to satisfy the three following basic needs:

1. To guarantee the needs of the war for defeating the U.S. piratical aggressors.
2. To guarantee that the socialist economy of the north continue to grow stronger in the situation of war.
3. To guarantee the people's living in the time of war.

In order to defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors, we need to have a sound economy in war, i.e., an economy that suits the conditions of war and is capable of satisfying the basic needs of war.

In this case, we need develop fast not only agriculture, but also industry; we need not only a highly productive and well-protected central industry, but also a fast-developing and well-protected local industry; we need materials not only for our immediate needs, but also for our reserves to cope with any unforeseen situation; we need not only abundant, fast, good, and inexpensive production, but also very good distribution, very high spirit of fulfilling one's duty to the state and thrift-practicing. Only by being able to do so can we create the necessary material conditions for defeating the U.S. piratical aggressors.

Agricultural production plays an important role in the war of resistance against the U.S. for national salvation. Therefore, we need to continue developing agriculture in^{an} all-out, stronger, and steadier way, with increase of productivity through intensive cultivation being our main concern, in order to get an annual average of five tons of rice per hectare in the areas

where rice is the main crop. The key to a fast increase of agricultural production is to carry out properly the campaign for improvements of cooperative management and for technical improvements, particularly to speed the technical revolution in agriculture.

Industrial production must serve agricultural development well and at the same time contribute to securing communication-transportation, serving the people's living, national defense, and exports. To do so, we must on the one hand actively protect the existing factories; repair and restore in time the establishments damaged by the enemy's fire; do our best to develop the existing capacities of central and local industries and handicraft. On the other hand, it is necessary to build some extremely needed central industrial factories and to try to develop local industry, to make every local area basically capable of satisfying its needs, particularly the needs for capital goods in agriculture, communication-transportation means, and the ordinary consumer goods.

To secure communication-transportation is an extremely important task in our people's fight against the U.S. for national salvation; it is necessary to mobilize all their forces for fulfilment of this central unexpected task.

The commercial and financial branches have the tasks of concentrating all their efforts upon speeding production development, strengthening national defense, guaranteeing the people's living, contributing to stabilizing the situation and consolidating the socialist production relation.

In wartime, the need for labor is extremely urgent. The aim of labor work now is to try to raise labor productivity; to mobilize and to utilize rationally the labor forces for the purpose of maintaining the correct relation between production and combat, guaranteeing equilibrium in the distribution of manpower between agricultural production and production in other branches of the people's economy, between material production labor and non-material production labor; to create a new distribution of labor in society, which will suit the present situation and our country's future need for economic development. To overcome the labor difficulties, we must solve a decisively significant problem--to speed the technical revolution, to improve labor organization for an increase of labor productivity in the branches of the people's economy, particularly in agriculture, basic construction, communication, and water resources. It is necessary to overcome the wrong idea that under the conditions of war to increase labor productivity is impossible; this idea would lead to careless work, lower standards, and a tendency to use more and more people to do an increasing amount of work.

The direction, task, and goals of the 1966 state plan all reflect our people's determination to defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors and the leadership concept of our party in regard to economic construction in the north. This concept calls for a determination to fulfill all our tasks, a confidence

in the sure victory of all our people and in the growth of the socialist north, with no fear of difficulties and hardships.

The 1966 state plan, drafted by the Central Committee and the Government, is aimed at mobilizing our manpower and resources, trying to develop production so as to satisfy the war needs, continuing to build socialism in the north, striving to satisfy all the primary needs of the people in their daily living, improving the people's health for long-lasting production and combat, and through production and combat making our economy stronger.

The state plan this year is a wartime one. As it has been hard to carry out the state plan in peacetime, it is much harder to carry it out in wartime. Therefore, we must think of all the difficulties that the U.S. aggressors' war of destruction can create for us, and at the same time consider the U.S. imperialists' ability to dare to conduct a localized war against the north. In the course of carrying out the plan, we need to know the real situation, to review constantly all needs and abilities, and to adjust our plan in time so as to concentrate our efforts on fulfilling the major tasks, maintaining the major balances in the economy, coping with any situation in a flexible and effective manner. We must maintain and develop the spirit of collective ownership, the spirit of revolutionary advance; with disregard to any changes of situation, we must satisfy at any cost the three basic needs of the 1966 state plan and guarantee even greater victories in the fight against the U.S. for national salvation.

We need to recognize the fact that our state plan is the people's plan to be carried out by the people. The creative force of the masses is extremely great. By knowing to rely on the masses and developing to the highest extent the spirit of self-sufficiency, we are totally capable of overcoming all difficulties created by the war so as to fulfill the state plan. This spirit of self-sufficiency is clearly seen in the task of developing agriculture to solve effectively the problem of foods and foodstuffs; in the task of building local industry and economy to solve the logistical problem on the spot, and to make every province and area capable of being self-sufficient and self-reliant to the highest extent in regard to the primary needs of production and combat, as well as of the daily living of the people in that area.

Naturally the assistance of the fraternal socialist countries to our people is extremely precious. However, if we just rely on the fraternal countries to provide us with the materials used to fulfill the state plan, we shall be making a big mistake. We need to know to rely on the people, to develop the spirit of self-sufficiency in order to fulfill the plan. Our country as a whole does not just rely on foreign aid. The branches and provinces do not rely on the central authorities. Districts and villages do not rely on the provinces. All echelons, branches, and local areas must fully understand the spirit of self-sufficiency, which is the major aspect of their building and carrying out their plans.

At present, to fight wastes and to practice thrift is a very urgent

revolutionary task. In carrying out the state plan, we must fully understand that task. A kilogram of iron or steel, a kilogram of raw material transported to a factory, or work site, each represents the results of work and combat, and is soaked with the sweat, sometimes even blood, of our workers and soldiers in the factories, in the field, and on the roads. We must cherish such raw materials and materials, and must use them in the most economical way to bring about the best results. In the matter of thrift, to save labor is a very great problem. We must resolutely struggle against any waste of manpower, which is to be considered a very grave intolerable shortcoming at the present time. We save in production, we also save in consumption. For the work of building and defending the socialist north and supporting the liberation struggle of our own fellow countrymen in the south, we are ready to bear all sacrifices and hardships, to work harder, to consume less, to be ready to fulfill the duty of every individual regarding production and combat.

A problem with which our party and Government are deeply concerned is how to reduce to the lowest rate the difficulties and hardships the war may create for our people. This clearly reflects the service given the people by the party and Government and further enhances the serving-the-people meaning of the state plan. One of the basic needs of the state plan this year is to guarantee the major needs of the people's living; therefore, in addition to mobilizing more and more, we must care to improve the people's health. We must increase production fast, and at the same time organize well the distribution of foods and goods so that everybody would feel assured while doing productive and combat work. In the supplying of foods and goods, we must pay special attention to the army, those who regularly fight against the enemy, the workers who do heavy manual work, and proper attention to children and the old. A big victory in the whole work of shifting the direction of our economy last year was to stabilize the cost of living and to guarantee the people's living. This year we must struggle to maintain and to develop further that victory.

The state plan this year represents the revolutionary optimism of our people and their absolute confidence in the growth of the socialist north and in the fight against the U.S. for national salvation. Because we have confidence in the future, in the middle of the war we still continue building. After the enemy destroys, we shall build--more and faster than before. Although the war creates some damages, on the other hand it also pushes us ahead to satisfy the needs of the new situation; as a result, a number of economic branches will grow stronger in the war. Through the war of resistance against the U.S. for national salvation, our countryside will grow stronger and will progress faster, for the revolutionary enthusiasm and technological capacities of the farmers will be raised higher, with the presence in the countryside of an important number of workers and cadres. All these factors help to create the favorable conditions for agriculture to make a big leap forward right during the time of war. Local industry and communication-transportation will also develop fast to serve in time all the needs of production and combat.

While concentrating our efforts on fulfilling the immediate economic

tasks, we must at the same time pay attention to speeding our surveying, investigating, research, and planning work and the drafting of a long-term plan; training cadres and workers on a large scale; and doing well all the preparatory work that would be needed to speed the socialist industrialization after the restoration of peace.

The immediate revolutionary task requires that we move faster our leadership and guidance work, and make every branch and echelon recognize its responsibilities and develop fully its efficiency in carrying out the state plan. We need to improve early classification of economic management, to change the organization and system of economic management to suit the war situation. The central leadership and guidance will be more concentrated and unified. Under the central guidance, the cities and provinces (under central authority) will have more power and all the physical conditions necessary to fulfill their economic and financial managerial responsibilities and to control both industry and agriculture. The district level plays a particularly important role in regard to guidance in agricultural production. The districts must manage agriculture well and know to control industry to a definite extent. The consolidation and strengthening of the village level are also an important matter. In order to manage production well, we must pay attention to all three aspects: management of materials, management of labor, and management of the living. We must have appropriate changes of policies and working systems to suit the war situation.

Our people have the great tradition of deep patriotic sentiment. Enjoying the results brought about by the socialist revolution, our people are even more deeply attached to socialism. The love for our country and for socialism is the moral driving force behind each and every one of us to push us to fulfillment of all the glorious revolutionary tasks. In order to mobilize the people's forces for faster production and combat, we need to carry out more widely the political and ideological education, thus enabling every person to heighten further his revolutionary enthusiasm. On the other hand, we need to combine closely the ideological revolution with the technical revolution, to make the people more determined to fight the U.S. for national salvation and also familiar with scientific and technological knowledges, and to provide them with the material conditions necessary for patriotic emulation, increase of labor productivity and fighting power.

To strengthen party leadership is the decisive factor determining the victory of the state plan. In this matter, the base-level party organizations are in a very important position. We must consolidate the party chi bo in the production and combat establishments, actively build the "four good" chi bo, and make the chi bo the real nucleus of the leadership setup among the masses to help them to fulfill the state plan. The youths in the "three readinesses" movement play an important role in carrying out the state plan. We must make sure that the Youth Labor chapters in the establishments assume a shock-force role in the emulative effort aimed at fulfilling the state plan. Women are a big force in production and in the fight against the U.S. for na-

tional salvation. We need to improve their force, to heighten their political and technological capacities, to help them to solve their difficulties in daily living, to speed the "three resourcefulnesses" movement, and to make them develop their abilities and actively contribute to the fulfilment of the state plan.

In the situation of war, the struggle for fulfilment of the state plan must certainly be difficult. But we also have many basic advantages: our party has the correct leadership line; our people have a high degree of revolutionary enthusiasm, and also a great deal of experiences in doing both productive and combat work; our people have the precious assistance from the fraternal countries. Therefore, we strongly believe that the state plan this year will certainly be fulfilled successfully.

For the fight against the U.S. for national salvation, all the army and people in the north now strive hard to work each twice as much, to speed further production and combat, and to score bigger victories in 1966.

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LE DUC THO: BUILD UP PARTY, DEFEAT U.S.

[Following is a translation of an article by Le Duc Tho in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap, Hanoi, February 1966 , pp. 8-24.]

For a year our entire country has been placed under war circumstances due to the fact that the U.S. imperialists have stepped up the aggressive war in the south and extended the war of destruction to the north. Recently, in addition to massively increasing the number of troops sent to the south, the U.S. imperialists have driven the aggressive war in the south into a new strategic phase above and beyond the framework and scale of a "special war." At present, they are frantically carrying out military activities on the one hand and playing deceptive tricks about peace negotiation on the other, in order to conceal their aggressive wicked intentions. Simultaneously with expanding the aggressive war in our country, they are stepping up the "special war" in Laos and continuously provoking Cambodia and violating its territory--thus creating an extremely serious situation in Indochina and southeast Asia.

To resist the U.S. imperialists' counterrevolutionary aggressive war, our people throughout the country have united as one and risen up to conduct a revolutionary war with determination to fight and vanquish the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen. Our anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation has not only a decisive effect on our nation's destiny but also in immense international significance. We are fighting not only for our sacred national rights but also for the sake of safeguarding peace and security of the people in southeast Asia and the world. In defeating the U.S. imperialists in the south, we will weaken the arch-imperialist as well as the most dangerous enemy of all of mankind at the present time, thus creating more favorable conditions for the liberation of the oppressed people. Shining brightly with a just cause, this struggle has won the strong sympathy and support of the socialist camp and of all progressive mankind, is achieving great success, and will surely head toward complete success.

Vietnam and southeast Asia are areas where the most acute contradictions of the world of today are concentrated to a high degree. The enemy invading our country is the most aggressive and warlike imperialist having the most powerful economic and military potential among the imperialist camp. Therefore, on its way to complete success our anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation inevitably cannot avoid experiencing many difficulties and complexities.

Fire is used to test gold and difficulties used to test strength. The present hard war is a great trial for our nation and party. It requires of our people in both regions a high degree of sacrifice and struggle and of our party a steady and valiant leadership. As a large rear for the entire country, the north is in an extremely important position and has extremely heavy duties toward the south, which is on the frontline. We must be determined to build and safeguard the north, simultaneously perform production and combat, and mobilize all forces.

On the one hand, we must defeat the U.S. imperialist war of destruction in the north. On the other, we must wholeheartedly exert every effort to support and aid the revolution in the south to defeat their aggressive war. At the same time, we must eagerly take precautions against the enemy plot to extend the regional war throughout our country.

Whenever the situation and political tasks change, the task of building the party ideologically and organizationally must be timely and vigorously shifted to insure the successful carrying out of the newly set tasks.

From past to present, the party-led revolution in our country has gone through various stages of the road of struggle: Sometimes it has emerged from underground to become open, or has given up open activities for clandestine ones; or it has abandoned political struggle and started armed struggle, or has shifted from armed struggle to political struggle which it considered as the main one; and so forth. The historic experiences gained by our party have demonstrated that whenever there is a shift from open to clandestine activities or from peace to war, there will be the utmost difficulties and complexities. Therefore, it is necessary for us to exert very great efforts to bring about a timely shift in the task of building the party ideologically and organizationally, and also to step up this task in order to insure the successful carrying out of the anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation.

Uniformity of Thought and Action on the Basis of the Party Political Lines

At each revolutionary turn, the most important problem is to strive to associate Marxist-Leninist theories with the revolutionary realities in the country and to set forth in a timely way correct political lines along which to unify the minds and acts of the entire party and people. To date, each time the situation and revolutionary tasks have changed, generally

speaking our party has succeeded in setting forth correct political lines and correct struggle slogans and tactics, thus continuously advancing our country's revolution.

At the present time, we are all the more proud of the clear-sighted and sharp leadership provided by the party. Our party has immediately assessed the situation, analyzed the enemy plots and abilities, and clearly set forth political tasks and the struggle lines and methods. Never in such a short period as in the past few months has our party Central Committee made such a series of substantial and important resolutions on the new situation and tasks, the shifts in the economic branches, the people's war and all-people's national defense, and the shifts in the ideological and organizational tasks in the new situation. These correct resolutions have in time shed light on the struggle trend of the entire party and people and are encouraging us to advance toward ever greater success.

Also, through the present change in the situation and tasks we have realized ever more clearly the revolutionary nature of our cadres and party members and their traditional unity and uniformity of thought. The absolute majority of our cadres and party members have a steadfast stand and views. They believe in the party lines and are united around the party Central Committee headed by respectable and beloved President Ho. They are overcoming all difficulties and hardships, wholeheartedly making sacrifices, valiantly struggling, and leading the masses of people to score many glorious achievements in all fields of activity. During the recent past, our cadres, party members, and people have set so many brilliant examples of revolutionary heroism during both combat and production.

War requires very great subjective efforts, the shaping up of a determination to fight and vanquish the U.S. imperialists, and the mobilization of all forces in the entire country for use in the war to safeguard the north, liberate the south, and advance to the unification of the fatherland. To this end, our party--the leading force in war--must be truly stable, and have close ranks, achieve full understanding between high and low echelons, and have uniformity of thought and actions.

The basis for unity and uniformity of thought in the party is the party line and policy, which is a product of the association of Marxist-Leninist theories with the revolutionary realities in Vietnam. Since the situation and revolutionary tasks have been subject to deep changes, it is necessary for all cadres and party members to fully understand and adequately apply the party lines and policy which are reflected in the recent resolutions of the Central Committee.

We must continue to educate all cadres and party members to enable them to clearly understand the situation, their duties, and the new revolutionary requirements so that they can shape a correct view of the balance of power between the enemy and us, of opportunities and difficulties, and

of the possible changes in the situation, and so that they can fully realize the new trend and policy of the party concerning politics, economy, national defense, and domestic and foreign affairs. We must indoctrinate cadres and party members in both patriotism and socialism to enable all of them to shape a correct view of the class struggle and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads under the present circumstances in the north.

The party lines and policy can be fully realized and adequately executed only if we possess a high revolutionary struggle spirit. We must strongly develop revolutionary heroism, the determination to fight and defeat the U.S. aggressors, display a high sense of self-sufficiency, a boldness in thought and action, a fearlessness concerning sacrifices and difficulties, and strive to overcome all difficulties to fulfill satisfactorily all tasks in production and combat.

The difficulties experienced previously were not yet the greatest ones. The closer the enemy gets to destruction, the more madly it will writhe. Our entire party must, therefore, be adequately prepared ideologically to cope with all eventual changes in the situation and with all plots and tricks of the enemy so that we can vanquish the U.S. aggressors under all circumstances.

Faced with great changes in the situation and with the revolutionary tasks, a small number of comrades have developed erroneous thoughts and views. Concerning the combat task, they have made an incorrect assessment of the balance of power between the enemy and us and of the enemy ruses. Now, they entertain subjectivism and pacifism, slacken their vigilance, and fail to get ideologically ready for combat. Now, they see only difficulties and do not see opportunities; display pessimism, perplexity, and a reluctance to protracted resistance; fail to realize clearly the deceptive peace negotiation plot of the enemy; and rely on outside aid.

With regard to the task of building socialism in the north, a number of comrades do not yet believe very firmly in the party advocacy of a shift in the economic construction trend in the new situation. With regard to the present class struggle in the north, they have vague ideas, slacken vigilance, or view it in a mechanical and stiff manner. While the majority of cadres and party members display high revolutionary enthusiasm for the tasks newly set forth by the party, a number of comrades still fear sacrifices and hardships, shrink from difficulties, and lack an exemplary vanguard spirit in production and combat.

As a result, these comrades have not yet understood fully the party lines and policy nor developed the vanguard character which as party members they should display in combat.

We enter a phase of decisive fighting against the enemy, and the revolution in our country is in a position of stormy offensive. Under the present circumstances, petty bourgeois instability and perplexity are

usually and principally reflected in rightist views concerning the problem of assessing the situation of the enemy and our own, and applying the party lines and policy. At the same time, individualism in turn emerges and takes new forms. Since we had previously paid attention to eliminating rightist views and individualism, it is all the more necessary now for us to hold more firmly to this course of action. Only by so doing can we mobilize all the forces in the party, develop highly the vanguard nature and fighting spirit of cadres and party members, and lead the entire people to advance to score the greatest success scored during the war. Of course we must at the same time prevent and overcome the leftist deviations which may occur. To do so also falls within the essential content of the struggle against petty bourgeois views and the influence of bourgeois views in order to strengthen the proletarian stand of cadres and party members in the present situation.

At the present time, almost all our party members and people reflect a uniformity of thought and are confident in the party lines and policy. However, the party lines and policy are not yet deeply imbued in the daily concrete task of the various echelons and branches. A number of organizations and comrades still inadequately understand the idea that the north is the large rear and the south a large frontline; still commit acts that fail to reflect fully the duty of the rear toward the frontline; still fail to associate very tightly the two tasks of production and combat; still somewhat dissociate these two tasks or make much of one of these two tasks and make light of the other; still do not firmly hold to the relations between the struggle against the destructive war and the precautions against the regional war; still fail to execute rapidly and correctly the policy of shifting the economic trend; and still fail to readjust their working manners in accordance with wartime requirements.

Such a state of affairs is due primarily to an insufficiently serious attitude toward party instructions and resolutions. Such an attitude is reflected in the fact that the party instructions and resolutions are discussed and studied only perfunctorily; that even certain important resolutions of the high echelons are not submitted to the various party echelon committees for collective study; that while disseminating the resolutions and guiding low echelon cadres and party members to study these resolutions, the leading cadres themselves subjectively make light of the resolutions and fail to study them carefully; that in studying the resolutions, no comparison is made with one's own thoughts and acts, which also are not carefully reviewed; that ideological struggle and criticism and self-criticism are not thoroughly carried out; and that execution is still performed at one's convenience and with a fear of difficulties. These facts prove clearly that a number of organizations and cadres still have a low organizational, disciplinary, and revolutionary fighting spirit.

A proletarian party is a revolutionary struggling party which requires a high degree of unity and uniformity of thought and action. The uniformity of thought and understanding must lead to uniformity of action and must be

reflected in practical activities. The strength of the unity and uniformity in the party principally lies there. All party members must correctly implement the party resolutions. This is a meter to measure the party unity as well as the organizational and disciplinary sense and the sacrifice and fighting spirit of party organizations, cadres, and party members. This is also the surest guarantee for our success.

After analyzing the reasons for Soviet Russia's success during the period of armed intervention of the imperialist countries, Lenin pointed out: "A thorough reflection on the remote causes of that marvelous historic story--the story of the victory of a weakened, exhausted, and backward country over the most powerful countries in the world--leads us to the conclusion that these causes are to be found in an unprecedented centralization system, discipline, and sacrifice spirit." Likewise, during the present, anti-U.S., national salvation war, we must essentially further consolidate the party bloc of unity and uniformity of thought and action and insure that all party policies be completely understood by everybody and be thoroughly and rapidly executed with a high sense of discipline and sacrifice and with an indomitable struggle spirit.

The anti-U.S. national salvation resistance of our people has a vast position on the international stage and has a strong effect on the revolutionary movement among the world people. Therefore, this resistance has been receiving extensive sympathy and support from the socialist camp and progressive forces throughout the world. As a matter of fact, a world people's united front against U.S. imperialism for support to Vietnam has taken shape and continued to develop deeply and broadly. Recently, our activities in the field of foreign relations have not kept pace with the times and have not been astute. It is necessary for us to step up the political and diplomatic struggle more actively, cleverly, and in a more timely manner; win over all forces that can be won over and unite all forces that can be united in order to drive U.S. imperialism to a high degree of isolation; and win an ever greater support from the world people, including the U.S. people, for the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle of our people. At the same time, we must strengthen unity with and positively support the revolutionary struggle of the international working class and of the national liberation movement. We must also unite with and support all the forces in the world that are struggling against U.S. imperialism--currently the most dangerous enemy--for the sake of the success of the cause of peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism. The most important task in uniting all revolutionary forces of the world people is to unite the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

In the international communist and workers movement, many dialectical problems having a great significance have been raised in the past few years and are still being raised, and the internal ideological struggle still goes on within this movement. Filled with an adequate sense of responsibility and duty as a component of the international communist movement, our party

constantly upholds the Marxist-Leninist banner and has and is contributing eagerly its views on the international communist movement's problems of revolutionary strategy and methods. At the same time, our party eagerly safeguards and further consolidates the unity and uniformity of the socialist camp and international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and international proletarianism.

Together with the brotherly parties, our party carries on the struggle against revisionism--the principal danger--and simultaneously against dogmatism with a view to safeguarding the purity of Marxism-Leninism and safeguarding the revolutionary principles set forth in the two Moscow manifestoes of 1957 and 1960. We must constantly uphold the principle of independence, equality, mutual respect and assistance, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs in the relations between friendly parties and between the socialist countries. We must correctly associate patriotism with international proletarianism. We must soundly coordinate national interests with the common interests of the socialist camp and the world revolutionary movement.

To date, the development of the situation has demonstrated ever more clearly the soundness of our party's views concerning international problems. It is necessary to go on educating cadres and party members to enable them to firmly hold and completely understand our party's views on international problems, to overcome all manifestations of an inadequate organizational and disciplinary sense, and to eliminate the tendency to speak as they please and at random.

The revolutionary realities in our country are developing intensively and, at the same time, are also giving rise to many important problems concerning lines, strategy, and methods--problems which require solution. This is a responsibility which our party must assume, as we ourselves and alone can realize most clearly the problems concerning the revolution in our country. From the very substantial revolutionary realities in our country it is possible to draw precious experiences which not only will help improve our party leadership but also will contribute to the common experimental treasury of the international communist and workers movement. The entire party must develop the spirit of independence of thought, boldly created by basing itself firmly on the general truths of Marxism-Leninism and on the positive revolutionary realities in our country, and struggle against automatism and sheer imitation.

Meanwhile, the international communist movement also provides innumerable and rich experiences and lessons concerning success, obstacles, and mistakes. We must modestly seek to understand and study these experiences of the brotherly parties so as to be able to apply them soundly in the revolutionary realities in our country.

That is our party's duty to our nation and also to the international communist and workers movement.

To Change the Trend of the Organizational Machinery to Make it Consistent with the Political Task

For more than 10 years now, in the process of the change from war to peaceful construction and in the gradual advance from a backward and dispersed economy toward a modern and centralized economy, we have quickly built and developed the state managing machinery and the economic and cultural managing machinery. Basically, this machinery has met with the obligations of each phase of peaceful construction. Nevertheless, in the process of the building of the machinery of the various branches and echelons during the past years--as a result of the facts that the position of each echelon has not yet been well determined, that the functions and tasks of each branch and organ have not been clearly set forth, that the division of labor and responsibility among the various branches has not been clearly determined, that the division of managerial level between the central echelon and the regional and basic echelons has not been improved rationally and in time--this machinery still has complicated, bulky, and duplicative points, and is not yet well balanced between the central and regional echelons and among a number of branches.

This situation, which was already illogical, has become more illogical in the face of the new wartime requirements of the country.

We must improve and build a sound, light and effective machinery, capable of implementing the various proposals and policies of the party and state in a quick and most effective manner. To simplify the machinery does not mean that we take a step backward or make a stop in the task of developing the economy and culture. On the contrary, the revolution in our country is still progressing; our struggle against the Americans and for national salvation is being carried on under very favorable conditions; and internationally and domestically, we are carrying out the war against the U.S. bandits along with the building of socialism and with the development of socialist economy and culture. If the simplification of the machinery is carried out on the basis of a wavering and negative attitude toward the situation it will gradually lead to erroneous acts. We simplify the machinery by relying on the change of the situation from peace to war and on the requirements of the advance of our revolution, assuring the continuous development of the building of socialism in every aspect. These two requirements are consistent with each other. In war, the machinery cannot be complicated and bulky. The readjustment of part of our force for fighting tasks and the development of the war situation, which is ever larger and more violent, do not permit us to maintain forever a huge centralized machinery, especially in the central echelon. Moreover, the complicated and bulky machinery, which shows no balance between the upper and lower echelons, makes the leadership become dull, centralized, and involved in red tape, and unable to develop the latent abilities of the regional and basic echelons; this state of affairs is incompatible not only

with the time of war but also with the time of peace, not only with the immediate requirements but also with the requirements of progress later on. Therefore the simplification of the organizational machinery does not mean to weaken it, but to increase its effectiveness.

In the simplification of the machinery, we should properly solve the relations between the central and the regional and basic echelons, as well as the relations among the various branches, aimed at assuring the various productive and combat tasks.

Between the central and the regional and basic echelons, our common line is to simplify to the utmost the machinery of the central echelon and to strengthen the machineries of the regional and basic echelons, on the basis of a clear determination of the position of each echelon and the improvement of the division of the managing level, in consonance with the new situation and tasks.

The various central echelon branches should centralize their consideration toward their main functions, that is, help the party Central Committee and government set forth, study, and solve in time questions referring to the great lines, policies, trends, and measures, the system and common regulations on economic and technical management and so forth, and supervise, encourage, and guide the enforcement of these regulations. It is necessary to overcome the bureaucratic tendency to assume all tasks, the red-tape centralization, the tendency to directly control all basic organizations of minor importance, to preserve the (right?) to decide many concrete things while in fact one is unable to follow closely the situation, especially in time of war.

As of now, the improvement of the division of managing level has not yet been done urgently. This is due to the fact that this complicated matter requires a thorough examination and a number of comrades in the various branches still have regionalistic and individualistic thoughts and a tendency to assume all tasks, and they are reluctant to reduce the size of their machineries, to reduce their authority.

They have no confidence in the ability of the regional and basic echelons, and they are unable to see all the requirements for a change in the trend of the machinery in wartime. It is necessary for us to overcome those erroneous thoughts.

We should at the same time prevent the erroneous tendencies of dispersion, of entrusting the lower echelons with authority and responsibility beyond their practical ability, thus causing obstacles to the united centralized leadership of the central echelon, and the tendencies that the central echelon branches entrust piece work to the regional echelons, or the regional echelons do not pay due consideration to the opinions of the central echelon branches. The improvement of the division of managing level is aimed at developing democracy for problems the solutions of which require

further development of democracy. It is also aimed at furthering centralization for problems the solutions of which require strengthening of the centralized leadership. The development of a positive spirit and the sense of initiative on the regional and basic echelons aimed at further exploiting their latent ability does not lessen the effect and role of the central echelon branches. On the contrary, it creates favorable conditions for these branches to better carry out their functions, and more strongly to develop their leadership and guidance effect with respect to the regional and basic echelons.

It is necessary to be fully conscious of the important position of localities and basic echelons in the system of leading and directing the implementation of lines and policies of the party and state in order resolutely to perfect the machinery of localities and basic echelons. Each province, with its land and its population, has great demands and potential for development of the economy and consolidation of national defense. Each province must be able to build a developed local economy, must at the same time master agriculture and industry more profoundly, take care to develop local industries, and get agriculture and industry to coordinate more closely and help each other more satisfactorily within the province. This is in accordance with the demands of wartime and will enable each province and zone to become self-sufficient to the highest degree in wartime. It is also in accordance with our future trend of progress.

The provincial level has also a very great role in building armed and semi-armed forces and in directing and serving the fighting in the present war of destruction, and even in a local war if the enemy runs the risk of waging it. With this important role, the provincial echelon must be strongly perfected. The central echelon must assist in building and perfecting a body of core leading cadres in the provinces and improving the comprehensive leading abilities of provincial party committees. Branches of central echelons must supply cadres for the provinces and help the latter train cadres, especially technical cadres and cadres in charge of industrial and economic management. While carrying out the division of management echelons along with the increase in responsibilities, they must help the provincial echelons strengthen their machinery, their body of cadres, and their means so the provinces can fulfill their responsibilities.

The realities of production and fighting have increasingly asserted the important role of district echelons. District echelons connect provincial echelons with basic echelons and are directly responsible for directing the basic echelons. District echelons must be responsible for directing agriculture. Because of the change in the trend of economic building in war, many districts have built and will build or will be entrusted with the management of a number of handicraft bases, small mechanical engineering workshops, and transport and communication, fishing and salt-producing bases, and so forth.

Furthermore, besides the leadership over production, the leadership over the fighting and combat readiness is also a central task of district echelons.

Some time ago, partly because they failed to understand the role of district echelons, considering them as intermediary echelons responsible only for controlling and moving the work along, the higher echelons did not pay attention to helping and perfecting district echelons; as a result, the machinery of district level ran unsmoothly and lacked cadres, personnel, and necessary means to work. Provincial party committees and branches of the provincial level must have firm control over district echelons, must help them improve cadres and perfect the organization of district echelons, and must improve their own work methods in accordance with the demands for perfecting district echelons.

Whether any production and combat task eventually becomes a strong mass movement and is successfully fulfilled depends on basic echelons, thereby making positive contributions to the perfection of basic echelons. Basic party organizations are comprehensive and uniform leaders at the basic level. Therefore, the main task is to consolidate basic party organizations through the implementation of the campaign for building chi bo and "four good" basic party chapters. District party committees and party committees of higher levels of basic party organizations must understand the strong and weak points of each basic echelon, establish close contact with and help it, and set forth struggle trends and measures suitable for each basic echelon. They must pay special attention to the consolidation of basic party organizations in important and strategic places such as in the armed forces, in transport and communication, commercial, and medical units, in enterprises, on state farms, at forest exploitation sites, in coastal, border, and mountain areas, and so forth.

Because of the division of economic management, of the dispersion of agencies, and of the setting up of new units and organizations, many basic party chapters need to be reorganized and improved in the organizational field. With regard to these basic party chapters, higher level leading agencies must help them achieve their reorganization rapidly and entrust the care of these chapters to recipient areas. These areas must promptly seek to understand the situation and closely lead the basic party chapters entrusted to them.

In the reorganization and improvement of the basic party organization system in a number of branches, a number of practical specifications in the statute need to be complemented and corrected in accordance with the demands of the new situation. The party Central Committee has already issued resolutions concerning the points to be corrected. We must correctly implement all specifications and at the same time, through the realities of work, must study and promptly disclose other irrational points in the organizational field in order to suggest that they be complemented and corrected in accordance with the war situation.

In addition to building the machinery of each level in accordance with its rôle, we must rationally organize the machineries of branches so that they will be consistent with the rôle of each branch and will have an equilibrium between production and combat and other tasks, and between the insurance of immediate demands and the insurance of long-range demands. It is necessary to perfect the machinery of leading the fighting and the armed and semi-armed forces while at the same time perfecting the machinery of leading production branches and branches directly serving national defense such as agriculture, heavy industry and local industries, transport and communication, postal service, food, commerce, and so forth. In each of these branches, it is necessary to examine carefully and perfect the machineries in the most important sections. The improvement of the machineries of the various branches must be carried out on the basis of key points, and must be examined in a comprehensive manner, thus making each branch contribute positively--each according to its position and function--to the struggle against the U.S. imperialists and for national salvation and harmoniously coordinate the activities of the various branches.

While perfecting the machineries to serve the immediate requirements, one should not neglect the organizations in charge of permanent requirements such as the scientific and technical research organizations, the organizations in charge of basic investigation, or in charge of training cadres. The simplification of the machineries, the rational classification of the organizations of the various echelons and branches in accordance with the position and functions of each echelon and branch will help further develop the strength of the organizational machinery, assuring that the lines and policies of the party are clearly understood and quickly carried out by the various echelons from the upper to the lower echelons.

To Readjust, Expand, and Improve the Cadres' and Party Members' Ranks in View of the New Situation

The new situation and political tasks require a vigorous shift in the cadre policy with regard to the assignment of their strength, their training, their improvement, and their promotion, in order to cope with the great and complex requirements of war. Due to requirements of the national defense task and of the shift in economic construction trend, we must readjust the present apportionment of the cadres' ranks and know how to concentrate their strength on links having a decisive effect on war victory. We must resolutely concentrate cadres where they will influence the national defense task and frontline requirements, as well as communications and transportation which are the central incidental tasks at the present time. We must also strengthen localities, especially the mountainous areas and local industries. The most complex and difficult problem in apportioning the cadre force is to settle satisfactorily the contradictions between the need to strengthen the national defense forces and the need to build the

economy, between the need to strengthen localities and basic organizations and the need to perfect machinery at the central level, between immediate requirements and long-range ones, and between the promotion of central tasks and the execution of other tasks.

This requires us to keep a very firm hold on the party political task; to understand clearly the position and duty of each branch and organ; and to manage closely the cadre force. Any rough and superficial understanding of the party political task and any patchy and unplanned method for assigning cadres without definite lines, without weighing pros and cons and without overall examination will lead to an embarrassed and passive state which will make it impossible to meet requirements of the political task.

It is also necessary to overcome resolutely regional and individualistic views in assigning cadres. On the part of the branch or organ asking for cadre reinforcement, the individualistic view is reflected in its request for too large a number and too high a quality, without consideration for the tasks of other branches and organs. On the part of the branch or organ responsible for supplying cadres, the individualistic view is reflected in a search for all pretexts for withholding cadres and in a tendency to supply cadres not in the fixed number or at the specified standards.

In readjusting the cadre force at this time, we must also rationally solve the relations between the assignment of cadres to meet new requirements and the cadres' specialties due to the present situation and revolutionary task. The assignment of tasks to cadres cannot yet be really stabilized; nor can it avoid being subject to readjustments of force even on a somewhat large scale.

However, it is necessary to strive to limit the perturbation of the cadre ranks and insure that long-standing specialized and professional cadres, especially technical and economic managing cadres having much experience in their branches and professions, are not transferred to inappropriate areas and tasks.

Though very important, the assignment and readjustment of the available cadre force is only an aspect of the cadre policy at present. What is more significant basically is the necessity to train and improve party and government cadres and to increase and improve their ranks.

To be able to fulfill his duties, each cadre must continuously heighten his revolutionary enthusiasm and knowledge. The requirements for and concrete substance of revolutionary enthusiasm and knowledge also are subject to being changed and heightened in accordance with the political task during each revolutionary phase. During the past phase of peaceful construction, the revolutionary enthusiasm of each person was assessed mainly on the basis of his spirit and attitude while performing productive labor, collective economic construction, and the struggle between the capitalist and socialist roads. Today the new situation and tasks require

cadres and party members to display a high revolutionary enthusiasm in performing both production and combat, to exert wholeheartedly every effort for the cause of building and safeguarding the north as well as of liberating the south, and to display constantly a valor in struggle and a readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of the anti-U.S. national salvation cause.

It is necessary to possess not only a high revolutionary enthusiasm but also an adequate revolutionary knowledge and an ability to fulfill satisfactorily complex tasks given out by the party. Simultaneously with taking a firm hold of the party lines and policy, each cadre must strive to progress and to heighten his knowledge of economic management, science, techniques, specialities, professional matters, the people's war, and all-people national defense.

In wartime, we must continue to step up the building of material and technical bases for socialism and to strive to develop the economy and closely associate economic construction with national defense consolidation. Since economic leadership appeared to be difficult and complex in peacetime, it will be all the more difficult and complex in wartime. Due to the shift in the economic construction trend and to the improvement of work assignments at different managing levels, the localities must go further into economic leadership. Therefore, despite war circumstances and instead of neglecting it, we must take greater care to improve further the standard of knowledge of economic management and techniques, especially among leading cadres at different levels and cadres in the various economic branches.

To lead combat and national defense consolidation, we must take a firm hold of the party lines concerning the people's war and all-people national defense and possess the necessary knowledge of the tactics and techniques employed to fight the enemy and of the methods for providing against and avoiding the damage caused by the enemy. In this respect, our cadres' knowledge is still inadequate because many of them were trained and matured recently during the peaceful construction phase and also because even the old knowledge and experiences of cadres who formerly participated in the anti-French resistance do not yet cope adequately with the requirements of leadership for the present war. Therefore, it is necessary to inculcate cadres with the essential military knowledge, especially leading cadres at various levels and cadres in the armed and paramilitary forces.

To heighten the cadres' standards, it is necessary to use various methods, such as providing training and refresher courses at schools or for those on duty organizing correspondence courses, watching over their study, and improving and appropriately complementing their school curriculums. Simultaneously with studying Marxist-Leninist dialectics and the experiences of the brotherly parties, special attention must be paid to recapitulating experiences gained in our country. Leading cadres in various branches must eagerly participate in recapitulating our economic management experiences in order to formulate curriculums and teaching documents that prove practical

and consistent with our characteristics and circumstances. It is necessary to recapitulate the extremely rich experiences drawn from the anti-U.S. struggle in both the north and south.

The revolutionary war is a large school in which to train cadres. The sharper the struggle becomes and the fiercer the trials turn out, the more adequately the body of cadres will be trained and the more rapidly they will mature. The anti-U.S. national salvation cause requires a very large cadre force. Nevertheless, during wartime, we can select and promote a great many capable cadres. Very many emulation heroes and combatants and distinguished elements endowed with valor and talent have emerged and are emerging from the bases of workers, peasants, and other laboring strata during the process of production and combat. This constitutes an abundant source which we must know how to exploit and improve in order to be able to augment the cadre ranks, to strengthen the element coming from the basic strata, and to heighten the quality of the cadre ranks.

The various echelons and branches must take a firm hold of the cadre force at their disposal, help train and improve cadres in the struggle realities, and boldly use and promote them on the basis of the class policy and cadre standards set forth by the party. Attention must be paid to promoting young cadres, appropriately associating cadres of long standing with new cadres, and eagerly improving and boldly promoting female cadres. To this end, the entire party must shape up a revolutionary viewpoint concerning this subject and resolutely overcome conservative and narrow-minded views and also the feudalist concept of hierarchy and echelons. Moreover, to make bold and well-deserved promotions, it is necessary to entertain close relations with the masses and low levels and to take a firm hold of each cadre. In many cases, red tape and failure to establish close relations have made it impossible to discover good cadres and to reach any decision in promoting cadres.

Along with enforcing the policy toward cadres, we intensify the application of the policy toward party members, improve their quality, and enlarge their ranks.

We must turn party members into men who have a firm ideological stand, who have a high revolutionary combativeness, keep a firm hold on party policies, continuously cultivate intimate relations with the masses, can unite the masses, and can lead and urge the masses to struggle for the party line. In our party there are still a number of party members who still lack the spirit of voluntarily setting the good example. They walk behind the masses instead of in front of them. They enforce party resolutions in a passive way.

Besides a number of party members who, although being educated and helped by their chi bo, refuse to make progress, there are many comrades who, after being helped by their chi bo, have obviously made progress and

become "four good" party members. This situation shows that the fact that the majority of average and weak party members have not become "four good" party members is mainly due to the fact that the policy toward party members has not been enforced thoroughly and deeply. Party members' education does not strictly and systematically follow a plan. Party members' management is not close. Many chi bo do not know the ideas, feelings, and life of their members. They do not assign concrete tasks to their members, or they fail to supervise the execution of these tasks, and so forth. In the campaign for building "four good" chi bo, many chi bo have acquired very good experiences in educating their members, in assigning tasks to them, and in supervising the tasks fulfilled by them. These experiences should be disseminated widely in order to further promote the execution by the chi bo of the policy toward party members.

Along with educating and improving party members, we must pay attention to stepping up the task of developing the party. The force of our party members is not uniformly distributed. This situation is aggravated by the recent appointment of party members to new tasks created by the war. In some provinces, the newly recruited party members are insufficient to fill the vacancies left by the old timers who are assigned to other areas. Moreover, due to the requirements of the combat task or the task of serving combat, party members who are assigned to other areas are usually young, healthy, and enthusiastic. We must rationally distribute and assign our force of party members in order to insure that production and combat tasks are fulfilled.

We must strictly follow the procedure of explaining the specialties of the party members who are assigned to other areas. On the other hand, we must pay attention to stepping up the task of developing the party. We must develop the body of party members on the basis of mainly insuring their quality and the class line. In the wide and turbulent production and combat campaign of the masses, many outstanding elements have emerged and will emerge. A fact to be noted is that the youths and women are trained and have grown quickly. We must concentrate our efforts on them in order to select those who have the required qualifications and admit them into the party. As Lenin rightly said: "Workers and peasants who join the party during this arduous and difficult period are the best and most trustworthy cadres of the revolutionary proletariat and of the nonexploiting portion of the peasantry." At the same time, through the realities of production and combat we must resolutely eliminate from the party those party members who are too weak and who cannot make progress after being educated. The present revolutionary war is a good opportunity for testing party members and selecting and admitting new party members with the view of developing the body of party members, improving their quality, and increasing the party's combativeness.

To Strengthen the Sense of Urgency, Versatility,
Democracy, and Discipline

During the previous period of peaceful construction, we were critical of the tendency to work bureaucratically, sluggishly, perfunctorily, leisurely, and so forth. In wartime, this struggle not only is not less significant, but becomes even more urgent. We must do our best to achieve a revolutionary change in our work methods in accordance with the wartime requirements. We must work with revolutionary methods, as Lenin appealed to the bolshevik party organizations to do during the most critical moments of the civil war and the war against armed aggression by the imperialist countries.

In wartime, we are required to work urgently and quickly. We must struggle to surmount all difficulties and resolutely enforce all instructions and resolutions from higher authorities with a high sense of organization and discipline. The tendency to work sluggishly and slowly or to work only when it suits oneself is harmful to the necessity of centralizing leadership to the highest degree in wartime as well as to the efforts for achieving the greatest victories in war. Concerning the instructions and resolutions from higher authorities, the lower echelons have the right to and must discuss and study them. These debates, however, must not aim only at setting forth difficulties as a pretext for refusing to carry out these instructions and resolutions; but they must aim at finding measures for overcoming difficulties and satisfactorily fulfilling the mission. The lower echelons must urgently and correctly carry out the resolutions of the higher authorities. On the other hand, the higher authorities must give proof of a high sense of responsibility toward the lower echelons and promptly answer the demands and proposals of the latter. They must not work sluggishly and leisurely.

During the war, we will improve the system of assigning the managerial task among various echelons and give the lower echelons more authority and power. This is necessary. We must take precautions against and check the erroneous tendencies leading to violations of the principles of centralized and unified leadership of the party and state, to a lack of the sense of organization and discipline, and to unsatisfactory enforcement of the system of making reports and applying for instructions.

On the other hand, to lay emphasis on the system of centralization and discipline fully does not mean to encourage people to adopt paternalistic and dictatorial ways and the habit of giving commands. On the contrary, war requires that the eagerness, enlightenment, and initiative of each man, each organ, and each locality be developed to the maximum. To do so, it is necessary to develop democracy fully inside the party. Along with maintaining the principles of centralized and unified leadership in the problems concerning policies and line, it is necessary to actually develop democracy

so that the various localities can adopt concrete policies and measures in a versatile way and in accordance with each area and circumstance. Democratic work methods must be adopted.

The higher authorities must closely follow the lower echelons and party members, have sincere discussions with them, and listen to their views--not only identical, but also opposing views. This must be considered one of the important qualifications of leading cadres through the various phases of reeducation. We recognize that in a number of areas leading cadres are authoritarian and dictatorial, ignore internal democracy, and slight their comrades and the community. This is the main cause of the serious state of disunity in a number of branches and localities--a state which is harmful to their tasks.

At each echelon, each branch must adhere to the principles of collective leadership and personal responsibility. Those who maintain that in wartime it is impossible to fully apply the principle of collective leadership are wrong. The more difficult and complicated the problems, the greater the necessity of relying on the community and developing the community's intelligence in order to restrict the errors and damages. Naturally, war does not allow us to hold meeting after meeting and engage in long debates. But the great and important problems at each echelon must of necessity be discussed by a certain community which will make appropriate decisions. At the same time, it is necessary to uphold the system of personal responsibility. When the community has decided on the line and direction of the tasks, these tasks must be clearly assigned. The responsibility and duties of each one must be clearly assigned. As for each of us, we must adopt the attitude of daring to think, daring to do, daring to make decisions, and daring to assume responsibility for the tasks assigned us by the community. The fear of responsibility and the reliance on the community of a number of our comrades is one of the reasons the tasks are fulfilled belatedly, with low efficiency. Lenin taught us that "any way and under any circumstances, collective leadership must go along with personal responsibility. And this responsibility must be clearly defined for each person and for a certain task which has been clearly specified. The shortage of persons who dare to assume responsibility and who excuse themselves on the grounds that leadership is exercised by the community is the greatest danger for all those persons who actually do not have many experiences concerning practical collective leadership."

In addition, war requires us to resolutely eliminate bureaucracy, and reduce red-tapism and the number of meetings, to go deeply into work realities and close to basic organs and the masses, to immediately disclose characteristics of the situation, and to rapidly settle problems. It is necessary to realize clearly that this work method not only proves necessary if timely aid is to be provided for the low echelons, but also practically increases the leadership abilities of the high echelons themselves.

There are in our present tasks so many men and complex problems concerning which the leading organs themselves do not have enough experience. Meanwhile, the realities of production and combat are extremely vivid and the experiences of the masses extremely rich, and innumerable typical examples of creativeness have been set everywhere. Therefore, leading organs and cadres must go downward to sharply disclose good examples and valuable experiences of the masses and to study, analyze, and recapitulate these experiences. Only by so doing can they positively heighten their own standards and move forward to meet the requirements of the leadership for war. To improve work methods, to eliminate bad habits, and to shape up scientific and revolutionary work systems is no simple task. A truly revolutionary spirit is necessary for bringing about a revolutionary change in work methods.

Strengthening the Party's Tasks Concerning the Masses

The human and spiritual factors are the ones determining victory in a war. The invincible strength of the revolutionary war, of the people's war lies in the fact that it has the active participation and support of the majority of the popular masses. In leading our anti-U.S. mission for national salvation to victory, our party's tasks are to unite the masses and to mobilize a major portion of the masses to stand up and carry out the war with energetic spirit and high awareness, and with the full concept that they are the masters of their own fate.

Party organizations must carry out intensive propaganda among the masses about the new situation and new tasks, must fully develop the warm love for the fatherland and for socialism, must instill in them revolutionary traditions and advocate revolutionary heroism, and must mobilize everybody to struggle eagerly in all respects: working, producing, and national defense.

The task of propaganda and mobilization of the masses must be specially attended to among the armed forces and paramilitary forces, among the youths and women, and must be carried out in depth in the coastal zones, in the minority peoples' areas, and in those areas where there are compatriots practicing Catholicism. The party committees must pay special attention to the strengthening of the mass organizations such as the young workers, trade union, the women's association, and must strictly direct the campaigns of "three ready," "three responsibility," and so forth through which the masses can be grouped, educated, and mobilized.

It is necessary to stress the role and duties of chi bo and party members in campaigning among the popular masses. Chi bo is the basic organization of the party, is a bridge connecting the party with the masses, and is the one directly organizing the mobilizing the masses to execute the party's line and policy. The task of campaigning among the masses must be

considered as the basic and daily task of chi bo. The member must always associate closely with the masses, investigate the masses' aspirations and suggestions, and strive to propagate deeply among the masses the party's policy by volunteering to set good examples, attracting the masses to struggle for the party's line and policy. This is also one of the basic duties of a party member as defined by the party regulations.

One of the widely known successful experiences of the "four good" chi bo is that it has strengthened the proselyting of the masses, the propaganda and education of the masses, and that it has consolidated the kith-and-kin relationship between chi bo and the masses. Each member has an assignment to be carried out among the masses and has to take charge of a certain number of people. He is responsible for the constant investigation of these people's thoughts, aspirations, and welfare. The chi bo and members not only attend to the progressive portion of the masses, but also get along and closely follow the less progressive and backward portions of the masses without any prejudice against them, and must patiently convince and educate them.

In strengthening the masses' proselyting, the key problem is to extend full democratic treatment to the masses. Every problem must be truthfully discussed with the masses. They must arouse their voluntary will and conscience and must know how to lead them at the same time as they teach them. Only democratic treatment can unite the masses and develop their energy and initiative.

We must sternly point out that the number of our comrades who are corrupted by bureaucratic and commandism habits, who are not patient enough in campaigning among the masses, and who violate democratic principles, is quite critical in the relationship with the masses. A number of cadres and members who do not fully understand their duties in serving the masses know only their responsibility to their superiors without showing their responsibility toward the masses. In fulfilling the tasks assigned by their superiors, they do not know how to rely on the masses, yet they even think that without resorting to commandism measures they cannot accomplish their assignments.

With regard to bureaucratic and commandism defects and to the lack of democratic treatment of the masses, we must recognize that we have not had a strict attitude toward their judgment and treatment. When investigating and evaluating the assignments of lower echelons and cadres, the party members usually concern themselves with the supervision and investigation to find out whether their assignments and norms are fulfilled, and not with the methods they employ in executing these tasks.

In the fulfillment of their assignments and norms, if low echelons violate the orders and coerce the masses, usually they are not sternly criticized, for these are deemed as defeats in methods, while in ideology

they are deemed as good and energetic. Moreover, in some cases, due to the bureaucracy, high echelon cadres do not fully grasp the situation so that their instructions do not conform to reality, thus compelling the low cadres and members to coerce and dictate orders to the masses.

Our party has become a party in power. The party's prestige among the masses is very great, and the party's responsibility for their welfare is very heavy. We have many conditions favorable to the development of the party's influence among the masses and to the consolidation of the relationship with the majority of the popular masses. The absolute majority of our cadres and members are loyally devoted to the revolutionary mission of the masses; they maintain their industrious and simple life and have the confidence and love of the masses.

Meanwhile, we must be fully aware that to a party in power the greatest peril is separation from the masses. The party and state cadres who concentrate in their hands great political and economic power may be bogged down and become bureaucrats possessing special rights and privileges, thus deviating from the masses' basic interests if they are not usually educated and closely controlled. Otherwise the bureaucratic working method characterized by the habit of giving instructions and orders to the masses and not by the thorough understanding of the party's basic task--which is to activate, propagate, and persuade the masses--will have good conditions in which to take hold. The old bureaucratic working attitude characterized by subordination to higher authorities instead of taking responsibility before the masses will easily grow. We must not take the abovementioned erroneous trend lightly. It is an error, vague as to the class position, loose as to the revolutionary will, and separated from the party's proletarianism.

We must regularly indoctrinate the cadres and members in the importance of serving the masses and on the habit of working according to the masses' line. We must be determined to surmount the bureaucratic and commandism practices and must always maintain and unceasingly promote the party's good relationship with the masses. Each cadre and each party member must always bear in mind President Ho's teaching: "The revolutionary virtue is to associate oneself with the masses to make one bloc, to believe them, to understand them, and to listen to their suggestions. By words and deeds, party members, youth workers, union members, and cadres must win the people's confidence and respect, must closely unite the masses around the party, and must organize, propagate, and mobilize the masses to carry out with enthusiasm the party's policy and resolutions." There lies our party's immense power. There also lies the origin of the success of our people's struggle against Americanism for national salvation.

Our people's revolutionary war against Americanism for national salvation at present determines the fate of the nation and the future of the country, while at the same time it occupies an important position in the

revolutionary movement of world peoples opposing imperialism led by the U.S. imperialists, for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism. Therefore, our party--the organizer and leader of this revolutionary war--is taking charge of a glorious and heavy historical mission.

In fulfilling this mission, our party must be strongly built and consolidated. The ideological and organizational problems being posed in the building of the party at present are wide and large. The satisfactory solution of these problems is a pressing demand designed to strengthen the combativeness and the capability of the party's leadership in the war so as to lead the struggle against Americanism for national salvation to complete victory. The tasks of building the party in ideology and organization which are being posed not only are significant in completing the struggle against Americanism for national salvation, but also conform to the long-range demands in building the party. In the big flame of revolutionary war, our people will surely be refined and will rapidly mature.

Under the correct leadership of the party Central Committee led by President Ho and with deep cognizance of their own responsibilities to the fatherland and the nation, all party organizations and all cadres and party members must strive to rise higher and must be determined to consolidate the party to be stronger ideologically and structurally.

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NOTHING CAN STOP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ON THEIR WAY TO VICTORY

[Following is a translation of an article by Nguyen Van Vinh in the Vietnamese - language periodical, Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No. 2, February 1966, pages 25-39.]

New Characteristics of the War

After three years' tests in South Vietnam, with all the strategies, tactics, weapons, new techniques, and the most ruthless maneuvers, the U.S. imperialists' "special war" has been basically lost: the puppet army and government, the principal support of the U.S. imperialists in the "special war," were destroyed and seriously disintegrated; the "strategic hamlet" system, considered the "backbone" of the "special war," was basically destroyed; the heliborne and amphibious tactics, which the enemy believed to be "more mobile and active" than those adopted by the guerrillas, went bankrupt; the urban areas and other temporarily-occupied areas, which they considered their safest rear, were encircled, reduced in size, and very much disturbed by the growing political struggle movement of millions of people in cities and rural areas; the U.S. imperialists' neocolonial face was unmasked in front of the people of the world; the enemy's efforts to encircle and to blockade the struggle of the people in the south and to drop their special forces in the north to do destructive work were all miserably defeated.

It was apparent that with the downfall of the Ngo Dinh Diem family the U.S. imperialists' neocolonialism was coming nearer and nearer to total bankruptcy, and with the "retirement" of Taylor the U.S. imperialists' "special war" was basically lost. As for the revolutionary forces of the people in the south, led by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), they were growing very fast; destroyed all the strategies and tactics, and the most ruthless war maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys; pierced the enemy's encirclement, and proudly stood in the world arena, with millions of peace- and good cause-loving people behind.

Like a gambler who was losing all the time, the U.S. imperialists, with their hands trembling, again played another game: at the beginning of 1965, they began sending to the south tens of thousands of U.S. combat troops with the hope to save the puppet army and government from being disintegrated and to regain the initiative; speeded the air war against the north; and in April, 1965, released the "peace negotiations" smokescreen. By doing so they thought they could, in a short time, compel our army and people in both parts of the

country to sign an armistice agreement which they would draft beforehand.

However, the truth, as it occurred, was entirely against the dark desires of the U.S. imperialists: the army and people of the south won great victories in all fields. At the very moment when the U.S. imperialists were throwing in U.S. troops to save the puppet army, the army and people of the south were further speeding the destruction and collapse of the puppet army and government: more than 200,000 puppet troops were destroyed and disintegrated, including forty-three battalions and four armored companies being completely destroyed; the puppet government was dangerously disintegrated. As to the U.S. troops, although they had all the naval, army, and air forces and the most well-trained first units, they not only were unable to achieve their political task--to check the disintegration of the puppet army and government--but also suffered heavy military losses themselves: all the U.S. and satellite countries' arms and armed services suffered heavy losses. More than eight companies of the 3rd Marines Division were destroyed at Van Tuong and in all the coastal bases they had to defend. The 173rd Airborne Brigade lost a battalion at Dat Cuoc, and two companies at Ben Cat and in the D zone. The 101st Airborne Brigade lost a company at Thuan Ninh near An Khe. The 1st Cavalry Division, the cherished first child of McNamara and the "top card" which the U.S. imperialists intended to throw into the Tay Nguyen battlefield to regain initiative, lost an important portion of its strength and permanently buried its morale around the Chupong area of the invincible Tay Nguyen because of the action of the iron soldiers of the Liberation Army, the soldiers who had won the famous Pleime battle. The U.S. 1st Infantry Division, established in World War I and known by the name of "big red brother," which the U.S. imperialists intended to throw into the jungles of Thu Dau Mot Province to destroy the Liberation Army forces there, received from the latter thundering blows and lost many battalions at Bau Bang, Nha Mat.

In all the big military bases of the U.S. imperialists, whether they are located on the coast, in the jungles, or in cities, the attacks by the Liberation Army troops that caught the U.S. soldiers in surprise and penetrated right inside of such bases and the guerrillas' encirclements in the outer perimeter dealt heavy blows at the U.S. war facilities and the lives of U.S. troops, and created more difficulties for the U.S. transportation and logistical efforts to support the war in the south.

In addition to the enemy's serious defeats on the battlefield of South Vietnam, the war of destruction in North Vietnam, waged primarily by the U.S. imperialists' air force, was facing serious defeats, too. The myth about "the terrible power of the U.S. air force," intensified by the U.S. psychological warfare, was broken by the realities in the people's war in the north: nearly 900 U.S. aircraft of many modern models were shot down by our many kinds of weapons. The U.S. imperialists thought that fighting an air-force war in the north would frighten our people in both parts and weaken our unity and mutual support. But they were mistaken: their silly acts of adventure would only make all our people hate them to the highest extent and be more determined to unite more closely and to support one another unconditionally

in our work of liberating the south, defending the north, and moving toward reunification of the country.

While the U.S. imperialists' mask hiding the aim of the "peace offensive" campaign was falling, the correct stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the NFLSV in regard to the Vietnam problem was lighting up the entire world like a torch of the good cause. Those who love independence, democracy, peace, and socialism throughout the world, and even the progressive people in the U.S., were unanimously supporting our stand and firmly protesting the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression, thus making them passive and isolated, more so than they had never been before.

The fact that the U.S. imperialists sent hundreds of thousands of additional troops from the U.S. and the satellite countries to the south and intensified the war of destruction by air force in the north has changed the scale and form of the war. The U.S. imperialists have changed the "special war" into a localized war in the south, which still retains its "special" factor, for they are still in a position whereby they cannot at will go beyond any limits, or use any forces in the war; and must still maintain the role of the puppet army and government, and their rule through neocolonial practices in the south.

The change of the scale and form of the war comes mainly from the change of the forces which the U.S. imperialists use to conduct the war. They used to rely mainly on the puppet army in the "special war," but now they must rely on two big strategic forces--the U.S. troops (including troops from the satellite countries) and the puppet army. The latter is not only the U.S. imperialists' military support, but also their political support. As to the U.S. troops, they have become the hard-core force of the puppet army and at the same time the strategic mobile force in the aggressive war.

Although the scale, form, and forces of the U.S. imperialists' war in the south have changed, the nature and political purpose of the war remain the same; this still is a neocolonial aggressive war aimed at realizing the U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam. In spite of the fact that they have increased ten times the number of their aggressive troops in the south in a year, the situation is such that they are still busy trying to carry out the maneuvers which they were trying to achieve but failed in the past few years--to seek every means to check the disintegration of the puppet army and government; to try to control and to concentrate the people in one way or another; to try to regain initiative and to seize back some of the lost areas; to seek every means to weaken and to destroy the revolutionary forces; to try to encircle and to blockade the liberation war of the people in the south.

In short, the new characteristics, and at the same time the new phase, of the war in South Vietnam today are: the "special war" strategy adopted by the U.S. imperialists in the south has been defeated; the U.S. imperialists have sent a large number of troops from the U.S. and the satellite coun-

tries to the south, and have thus changed the scale, form, and forces of the war; they have intensified the war of destruction by air force in the north and launched a diplomatic "unconditional negotiations" offensive; however, they have suffered serious military, political, and diplomatic defeats inflicted by the army and people in both parts of our country.

Our People Certainly Win

The U.S. imperialists have great material capabilities and war potentiality. Despite their serious defeats, they still do not give up their aggressive plot in the south. This is a truth. In the days to come, they could further increase their troops to make the number of troops from the U.S. and the satellite countries in the south total up to 300,000 or more. This is a possible occurrence. However, under whatever circumstances, our army and people throughout the country will certainly defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors; this is a realistic possibility.

As the U.S. imperialists waged their "special war" in the south, in regard to the theory and prospect of the situation, we affirmed the ability of the people in the south to win in that kind of war waged by the U.S. Today, everybody can clearly see that our affirmation has come true: the U.S. imperialists' "special war" strategy in the south has failed. At that same time, we anticipated the possibility of the U.S. to send more troops to the south, to intensify the war, and pointed to the ability of our army and people to defeat the enemy in any kind of their war. However, at that time, as we suggested this ability, in addition to some realities on which we based our analysis (for instance, our experiences in the past in defeating the French and in resisting the tactical forms, air force, and modern weapons used by the U.S. in the "special war" in the south), we only affirmed our ability to win under such circumstances on the basis of theory, for at that time our army and people had not directly fought any U.S. Army units in the south, nor had we directly fought the war of destruction waged by the U.S. air force in the north. By now we have had a year of experiences in fighting the U.S. troops. By now we have had all the realities that would prove our ability to defeat the U.S. imperialists in any kind of war. We have had the very lively realities of nearly a year's fighting and defeating the troops of the U.S. Army and other arms in the south, and winning in the war of destruction waged by the U.S. air force in the north.

Our people certainly win because we have the absolute political and moral advantages, the correct leadership line, the unity strength from the people, the invincible people's war, and the agreement and strong support of the people of the world. As to the U.S. imperialists, no matter how stubborn and ruthless they are, they certainly lose. In addition to the basic reasons we often point to, for instance the unrighteous nature of their war, the characteristics of the present age, and the general balance of world power now unfavorable for them, there also are the following direct reasons, which all point to their unavoidable defeat in Vietnam:



First, even if the U.S. sent to the south 300,000 troops or more, it could not change the balance of power to such a point that it would help it to switch from defeat to victory.

In fact, if the U.S. imperialists later sent hundreds of thousands of troops from the U.S. and the satellite countries to the south while the rate of casualties, losses, and disintegration of the puppet army would about equal the rate of increase of U.S. troops and the liberation armed forces in the south would have more favorable conditions to increase their sizes fast, the balance of power in the south would not change to the advantage of the U.S. The realities that took place in the south in the last year very clearly proved that fact: although the U.S. sent large numbers of troops to the south, the balance of power between the forces of the U.S. and the puppet army, and the liberation armed forces of the south would basically remain the same; if ever there were changes in the balance of power in the south, such changes would have been beneficial for the NFLSV, but not the U.S. imperialists.

It is necessary to indicate here a concept of the balance of power between us and the enemy. Generally speaking, the force that a country can use in a war always consists of: the number of men and their morale being mobilized for the front line; the ability to supply materiel for the war, including the quantity and quality of the weapons that can be sent to the front; the support of other countries for the war of that country. If we consider only the economic potentiality of war and weapons, the enemy in the south are stronger than we are; therefore, in this regard, we must take weakness to fight strength. But if we consider all the factors that contribute to the force that the enemy and we can use in the war in the south, or even in all of Vietnam, we can say that we, not the enemy, are strong. Indeed, because of the fact that their aggressive, unrighteous war does not have the support of the U.S. people and the people of the world, that they fight this war tens of thousands of miles away from their land, and that at the same time the U.S. must cope with the situation in many other places in the world, the U.S. imperialists, in spite of their advantages--to have more men, money, and weapons than we--can mobilize only a portion of their force to throw into the Vietnam war. As to the puppet army and government, they are being seriously weakened. The number of troops from the satellite countries, sent to Vietnam under the pressure and because of the campaigning and flattering of the U.S., is also a limited force. All those three forces do not have an ideal for their combat. It is just because of such big weaknesses that the U.S. imperialists cannot do anything other than fighting the war in accordance with their old bourgeois military view, that is to rely on weapons and techniques to fight quickly and to win quickly.

As to our side, because we fight a just war, a war of self-defense on our own land, we have not only the armed forces, but also tens of millions of patriotic people who take part in the war in different ways. Our armed forces also consist of the main force, the local troops, and the militiamen-guerrillas--an armed force that gains absolute superiority over the enemy

in terms of quantity and quality.

Because our war is a just one, because our army and people have an absolute advantage in their morale, and because we have three kinds of troops, we can fast add to and develop our revolutionary armed forces by relying on the rich source of manpower provided by the masses. Our armed forces have the ability to use both modern weapons and rudimentary weapons, which actually are the type of weapons that can inflict many casualties upon the enemy in the self-defense combat in the hamlets and villages. It is on that basis that our people in the south have been fighting the people's war in a way that the enemy cannot cope with. Moreover, the people in the south receive the total support of the people in the north and the increasing support of the socialist camp and the peace- and justice-loving people of the world, including the U.S. people.

On the basis of an analysis of the forces and war views of both sides, we can clearly see that, even if the U.S. imperialists send to the south 300,000 or more troops from their country and the satellite countries, they are totally unable to regain initiative, to seize back the lost areas, and to change the war situation for their own advantage. On the contrary, they will suffer more serious defeats.

In the case the U.S. imperialists dare to send to the south 400,-500,000 U.S. and satellite troops, a figure comparable to the so-called "United Nations force" taking part in the the Korean war more than ten years ago, what will be the balance of power between us and the enemy in Vietnam?

In Korea, where the U.S. sent in as many as 400,-500,000 U.S. and "U.N. force" troops, they did not have to leave many troops to guard the rear of South Korea, but were able to send all those U.S. troops and the "South Korea army" soldiers to the 38th parallel to fight the Sino-Korean troops. But the situation in South Vietnam today is entirely different. The political and armed forces of the revolution in the south are very strong. Even if the U.S. imperialists sent 400,-500,000 troops to the south, they would not be able to check the development of the revolutionary movement there, and would find it even harder to concentrate their forces and to set up a defense line against North Vietnam and Laos so as to encircle and to isolate the patriotic war of our southern compatriots. In a hypothetical situation, if the U.S. imperialists dared to send infantry troops to invade the north, the balance of power between us and the enemy would be even more different. North Vietnam is strongly defended, and resolutely protected by the socialist countries. To invade North Vietnam under such conditions and while their troops still suffer defeats in South Vietnam would lead the U.S. imperialists to an unavoidable situation, to be finally defeated by the gigantic forces of their adversary in this part of the world, although they might keep mobilizing more and more forces to throw into the bottomless abyss of the war.

Second, the U.S. imperialists and their clique of lackeys and traitors can never "pacify" South Vietnam. This is a truth in the war in South Vietnam.

As a rule, in any war, when the invaders destroy or push back their adversary's troops to seize a part of the territory and to set up their administration, this seized area immediately becomes the enemy's rear. The sources of manpower and resources in this area, willy-nilly, become or basically become the enemy's source of supplementary supplies. But in many parts of our country, in the war of resistance against the French in the past, particularly in South Vietnam today, although the enemy had a very large army, although they used so many ruthless maneuvers to suppress the people, they were unable to find a safe place to stand. From the plot to "pacify" the whole of the south in the Staley-Taylor plan to the "pacify important points" plan by McNamara, Cabot Lodge, and Taylor, sometimes they used divisions to pacify in a couple of years a few districts and villages at the gate of Saigon-Cholon, or around the U.S. bases, but they failed in all cases. The guerrillas and Liberation Army troops in Saigon-Cholon and other places not only were active around the enemy's vital cities, but also struck thundering blows right in the heart of the strongly defended cities and enemy bases. At the same time, the people in those places resolutely struggled against the policies of the lackey government, against taxes and fines, against the house-seizing policy, and particularly against the enemy's effort to compel young people to join the army. It is clearly seen that the enemy cannot freely utilize the sources of manpower and resources right in the areas they control and can no longer sleep well and eat quietly in their offices, barracks, and even houses.

The reason behind this situation is first the political understanding and patriotism of the people in the south, who hate the enemy to a great extent; do not fear sacrifices and hardships, and do not let them deceive and indoctrinate them. The liberation armed forces of the south, the offspring of the patriotic movement there, fully know the enemy and are constantly protected by the people; as a result, they have been fighting the enemy not only in daytime but also at night, not only outside but also inside the cities, and at the places where the aggressive war and people's massacre are conducted everyday like the U.S. Embassy, the Saigon police headquarters, etc.

In the history of all the wars, no adversary is considered winning if he does not have an on-the-spot rear, if he does not pacify the populated areas he has seized and uses the sources of manpower and resources there for the war. In South Vietnam, a common situation has been lasting for years: the enemy cannot pacify the rear, nor control the people in the areas they control. For this reason, the enemy will certainly be defeated.

Third, the army and people of the south certainly have the ability to destroy and to disintegrate a large part of the puppet army and government.

Although the U.S. has brought a large number of U.S. and satellite troops to the south and has thus changed the scale and form of the war, the role of the puppet army and government in the south is still important; they constitute the support, both military and political, of the U.S. imperialists in the war, help to hide their aggressive image, fight as mercenaries for

the U.S., and lighten the death burden of the U.S. troops. Therefore, to destroy and to disintegrate a greater part of the puppet army (and puppet government) has an important strategic significance.

Can the army and people of the south destroy and disintegrate a greater part of the puppet army and government? This question should not have been asked at all because there have been enough realities to prove that they can. The reason why the Ngo Dinh Diem regime collapsed was the fact that the puppet army and government had been beaten to disintegration in most rural areas. The reason why the U.S. "special war" strategy failed was the fact that the puppet government had been to a large extent disintegrated and that the puppet army, trained and commanded by U.S. advisers and actively supported by U.S. air power and tanks, had been seriously damaged, destroyed, and weakened.

In 1965 alone, up to one-third of the infantry battalions of the puppet army were completely destroyed. Of the ten puppet-army divisions, five (2nd, 22nd, 5th, 25th, and 27th divisions) have been beaten many times and have suffered heavy losses. More than one-half of the battalions of these division were destroyed. The other five divisions were also beaten several times. As to the strategic reserve force of the puppet army, which consists of twelve airborne and marines battalions, more than one-half were completely destroyed. As the enemy always try to fill their losses with the troops being pulled from the lower ranks, this gives rise to the fact that all their units are not maintained at full size all the time, that their quality is not uniform, and that their fighting power is very low. The security and civil guard forces in the provinces, districts, and villages were seriously beaten and disintegrated, and reduced to defending the provincial and district chief towns. In some places they tried to operate outside, but the majority of these forces just stayed inside their posts.

The new question today is whether the puppet army can survive as the U.S. troops enter the stage.

The presence of U.S. troops does provide the puppet army with more strength; in many cases and in some places, the U.S. troops try to support the puppet army, particularly with their air force. But in general the fate of the puppet army remains basically the same.

In the jungle battle areas, the deadly ground of the puppet army, now there are the U.S. troops; however, ever since the latter came to the rescue of the puppet army in the jungle areas, the puppet army has suffered greater losses than ever. In 1964, before the entry of U.S. troops, not even ten puppet-army battalions were completely destroyed. In 1965, after the entry of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops, nearly forty puppet battalions were completely destroyed on the jungle battlefields. In some cases it was not the U.S. troops coming to the rescue of the puppet troops, but the puppet troops saving the U.S. troops like at Pleime.



In the delta, the presence of U.S. troops in fact does not help much the puppet army. It is still the puppet troops who are to hold the remaining "strategic hamlets," defend the hamlets and villages in the temporarily occupied area, keep the district and provincial chief towns. The U.S. troops, no matter how numerous, cannot fulfill these tasks for the puppet army. Consequently, the puppet-army net, which becomes more and more fragile and narrow, cannot cover the puppet regime in Saigon; on the other hand, the puppet army itself will be beaten and reduced to disintegration by the combined political and armed forces of the army and people of the south. Although the U.S. may bring to the south 250,-300,000 troops or more, its troops can hold only a few dozens of chief towns in the south (at present, with more than 220,000 troops, the U.S. is able to occupy only about ten provincial and district chief towns in the south); more than 200 remaining provincial and district chief towns are still temporarily occupied by the puppet army, a force that more and more proves itself incapable of withstanding the stronger and stronger political and armed attacks of the army and people of the south.

Fourth, the army and people of the south, the army and people of Vietnam are completely capable of fighting and defeating the U.S. aggressive troops.

This is a new problem. But in Vietnam at the present time, when we talk about defeating the U.S. troops, we talk about what we have done and will be doing. In addition to the reasons we mentioned above for our victory, we can further analyze our ability to beat each U.S. arm and military service.

If the Seventh Fleet is included, there are at present more than 270,000 U.S. troops taking part in the Vietnam war, mostly in the south with only a part of the enemy's air force being active in the north.

The U.S. naval force taking part in the Vietnam war is remarkable the way it has five floating airfields (carriers) of the 7th Fleet, which itself is reinforced, for the departure of about 400 fighters to strike the inland targets in the south and the north. As to its other activities, such as patrolling along the coast, aiding the U.S. Army in its activities near the coast, helping in the landing of U.S. troops and unloading of supplies destined for the U.S. forces, etc., those are only indirect ones that have no decisive significance. Consequently, in the land war, as we rely on tens of millions of patriotic people, who stand erect in our jungles, delta, and cities, live and fight with everything available right in our country, and need not to be supplied and to send reinforcements across any ocean, the enemy's navy, no matter how large, does not carry any significant weight to us.

The U.S. air force is presently a remarkable supporting force, in terms of firepower and fast troop transportation, the U.S. imperialists have in the south. But we also need to understand the practical value of each type of enemy aircraft:

As to the strategic B52s, the U.S. has so far used all the two strategic

air (command) divisions in the Pacific on the battlefield of the south, and these aircraft have dropped bombs hundreds of times. But if we considered the number of bombardments and the quantity of bombs they have dropped, as compared with the damages they have created, we would find that these are the type of aircraft that miss their targets the most and inflict much less casualties than other types of aircraft. The effect of the so-called "complete destruction" attacks by these aircraft would be valuable against big cities having a lot of industries and population and being unprotected by modern weapons; but if they were used to bomb the cities in North Vietnam, they would be easily shot down because they are big and slow. As to the battlefield of the south, where the population in the rural areas is very thin and now has the tendency to be scattered even more, and where the stationing of the liberation armed forces of the south is done according to very wise distribution of density, and the army and people of the south adopt antiaircraft measures based on their many experiences, the use of the B52 aircraft to bomb and to attack in the south clearly bring less results than the cost of their operations. (Regarding cost, an hour of operation of a B52 costs 1,053 dollars, while the cost of an hour of operation of the tactical aircraft is about fifty dollars.)

As to the other types of enemy aircraft operating in Vietnam, there are about 2,870, which operate mostly in the south, and consist of about 1,072 helicopters, 1,093 fighters, and 710 others.

The main purpose of the fighters is to strike separately, or to support troops on the ground by their firepower. These aircraft have committed a lot of crimes against the unarmed people in the south; however, because of the people's antiaircraft work which gets better and better, their harmful effect has been clearly decreasing. Regarding the liberation armed forces, the enemy's fighters can to some extent affect their way to fight, time of the battle, time to attack and to terminate the battle, the methods of having initiative in the battle and cleaning up the battlefield, but otherwise cannot prevent the big battles of the Liberation Army, aimed at destroying many battalions and regiments on the enemy side. Let us ask, what were the results of the attacks a few months ago in which 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped in the Duong Minh Chau area, and 3,000 in the Boi Loi area of Tay Ninh Province? "Only a few people were killed," according to the report made in the enemy's follow-up operations. In regard to the Ba Gia, Van Tuong, Thuan Ninh battles, particularly the Pleime battle recently, the enemy's fighters and artillery were completely unable to save the U.S. and puppet troops from serious defeats; and the enemy had to "doubt the effect of air firepower" and were so surprised by "the ghost-like survival and fighting power" of the Liberation Army.

To fight the enemy aircraft, in addition to strengthening the people's and troops' antiaircraft work, in addition to using the people's political struggle to compel the enemy to stop the air strikes and to pay for the damages, the army and people of the south also dealt deadly blows at the enemy air force. In 1965 alone, more than 900 enemy aircraft of all types were

destroyed in the south, many right in their bases. If we compare the enemy losses of pilots, maintenance personnel, and aircraft with the losses of lives and properties suffered by our people in the south as the result of the enemy's air operations, we shall find that in many ways the enemy lose more in this type of fighting.

As for the north, the enemy's bombers and fighters did inflict some losses of properties and lives upon our people, and did create definite obstacles to our communication-transportation. However, as we have recognized and as the past year has proved, the enemy air force cannot assure victory for the enemy in the war, nor can it destroy our economy, which is mainly agricultural, our local industry and handicraft, and our communication-transportation.

Helicopters have the remarkable effect of increasing the mobility of the enemy's land troops; in regard to other tasks, such as transportation, first-aid, support with firepower, etc., they play only a definite role. But the failure of the "heliborne" tactic in the "special war" already gave an answer to the question about the mobile-transportation effect of the helicopters on the puppet army.

In regard to the U.S. land troops numbering hundreds of thousands in the south, we must have a correct evaluation that is needed for a correct attitude toward them.

It is natural that the sending of hundreds of thousands of troops to the south can make the war more bitter and last longer, and the difficulties and losses that our people in the south must face greater. But, from another point of view, the sending of more U.S. troops to the south is an opportunity for us to destroy more enemy forces.

Indeed, the U.S. troops who enter the war to come to the rescue of the puppet army will be destroyed themselves. The more U.S. troops are destroyed, the more the U.S. people will see the truth and be determined to struggle against the U.S. imperialists' aggressive policy, the more the latter's aggressive design will be smashed, and hence the U.S. imperialists will accept their losing the war.

In the history of war of the U.S., the latter usually waited until the situation would soon change for its good before it sent troops into a war. In World War I, it had been waiting until the Germans were about to lose the war to send its troops in. In World War II, it had been waiting until the Red Army of the Soviet Union won decisive battles and almost defeated Hitler's troops to open a "second front" in Western Europe, and until it knew for sure that the Red Army of the Soviet Union and the people's Liberation Army of China were about to destroy all the Japanese troops in northeastern China and in northern Korea to drop its atomic bombs so as to grasp all the advantages. In Korea more than ten years ago, in the Congo and the Dominican Republic recently, the time the U.S. troops were sent in was also the time when they

were able to check a situation dangerous for them, or when the situation began changing in their favor.

Being subjective as usual, the U.S. imperialists thought that sending a few hundreds of thousands of combat troops to the south and intensifying their air strikes against the north would make the situation change in their favor and allow them to regain initiative, to compel the Liberation Army in the south to be on the defensive and to resort to scattered guerrilla activities, and to force the Vietnamese in both parts of the country to surrender. However, the background of the sending of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops to the south was different. They brought combat troops to the south not when the army and people there were being weakened, but when the puppet army and government were being seriously disintegrated; when the "special war," which had come to the highest point of its development, was basically lost; and when the army and people of the south, who fought a hundred times and won a hundred times, already developed their solid forces everywhere, with the revolutionary movement being on the rise more strongly than ever from Quang Tri to Ca Mau, from the rural areas to the cities. That was the reason why, right after having arrived in the south, a larger part of the U.S. troops had to switch to the defensive.

Except for the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division which did not suffer any casualties yet because it has not dared to fight after its recent arrival at Pleiku, all the U.S. arms and services and satellite troops received heavy blows. The realities gathered in nearly twenty big battles launched against the U.S. troops since they actually took part in the war in the south prove that the Liberation Army of the south is totally capable of defeating the U.S. troops.

In the recent victories over the U.S. troops, the Liberation Army of the south adopted many different tactics and ways to fight (surprise attack on U.S. military bases, active defensive at Van Tuong, random battle at Thuan Ninh, open attacks at Nui Thanh and Bau Bang, ambush at Dat Cuoc, specific attack and destroying of reinforcement at Pleime, Dong Duong, etc.); defeated the enemy in both daytime and nighttime, in the monsoon and dry seasons, in a few hours or in a month, on the jungle or semi-jungle battlefields, as well as in the delta and cities, with different sizes of the units used. The fact that the glorious victories of the Liberation Army of the south are so common and that all the U.S. troops, without exceptions, find it so hard to avoid defeats leads to the conclusion and affirmation that the army and people of the south are totally capable of defeating the U.S. troops under whatever circumstances.

As we go into the evaluation of some U.S. Army units, we shall see more clearly:

The 1st Airborne Cavalry Division, a unit of a very new arm, being best equipped and transported with the highest degree of mobility, considered by the U.S. as the major card in the game to hold the initiative in Tay Nguyen,

has been so far beaten by the soldiers of the Liberation Army, whose mobility is rendered possible only by their feet, and was scared to death at Pleime, where its troops fled in total confusion and left behind their dead. The truth is that as the "heliborne" tactic was unable to save the puppet army and was broken many years ago, the tactic of the cavalry division could never save the U.S. troops, who came from a far-away place, are not familiar with the terrain and jungles of the south, and do not have any better morale than that of the puppet army.

The U.S. troops, no matter how modern their equipment can be, can never move as fast and remain as ready to fight as the army and people of the south, who are resolutely fighting for a revolutionary ideal; are ready to fight right where they are; are present everywhere; have a wide network of militiamen, guerrillas, and local troops; and at the same time enjoy many advantages, such as to be able to deal heavy blows just like the main-force well-trained troops who are always ready to destroy the enemy. That is a truth which the realities on the battlefield of the south have proved.

The 1st Infantry Division, being trained in conventional fighting method, has no ideal for fighting, has a lot of mechanized units but enjoys no greater mobility than the puppet army, has to fight on an unfamiliar terrain, and is known to have a very poor morale; consequently, it can never withstand the all-winning units of the Liberation Army. In the recent battles at Bau Bang and Nha Mat, the combat units of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division were immediately cut up by the attacking prongs of the Liberation Army and destroyed in just a few hours.

After a few seriously lost battles, this division has not yet found any method to lessen its lack of initiative and to cut down its losses. It is hesitating to take a definite decision while facing these calculations: to remain on the defensive at its base while any operation would have to be carried out under the assumption that it could not lose, and while any attack would have to be without an equal enemy force; during the battle to try to stay away from the Liberation Army and to call in aircraft and artillery for an indiscriminate bombing or shelling. But unfortunately for it, the Liberation Army troops nowadays are accustomed to fighting the enemy all the time--while they are either defending or attacking--with disregard to the size of the enemy force, just to "hold the adversary's belt while delivering blows" and not to let him stay away. This fighting concept and behavior have been clearly reflected in the slogan, "look for the Americans to destroy, and seek the puppet soldiers to beat."

The U.S. airborne brigades have hardly had an opportunity to apply their parachuting tactic, for after the big blow at Thuan Ninh, they have realized that such a tactic could scare only an adversary who is afraid and has only a weak rear. But in the south, wherever they drop their troops, they will find a hostile rear and a lot of guerrillas, trenches and holes with spikes planted at the bottom, and troops who will beat them and destroy them. As a result, the parachuting tactic became useless right after it has

been put into application in South Vietnam. At present, their paratroops seldom jump; they either land from helicopters or go by foot to launch sneaky attacks. The U.S. paratroops are worse combat troops than those from other U.S. arms.

An entire division and a brigade of marines have been brought to the south. This kind of troops now only do the work of housekeeping to guard the U.S. military bases along the coast. According to the rules of the U.S. army, the marines are supposed to carry out landing missions and fast attacks for the seizure of islands and coastal battlefields and to prepare for the landing of infantry units. But in the south, the coastal battlefields have all been seized by the guerrillas. After their heavy defeat at Van Tuong, the U.S. marines now only guard some coastal bases and do patrolling outside their bases. However, hardly have they fulfilled their tasks, for any base guarded by them would be beaten from within and fired from without, with the jaws of the guerrillas' pincers continually crushing it. From time to time the U.S. marines would extend their defensive activities outside their bases, but they always suffer heavy losses.

The so-called logistical bases used by the U.S. in its aggression in the south have been set up mostly in the coastal areas of the Center and in the southern part of the Center.

Because the U.S. imperialists have to go tens of thousands of kilometers to come and invade our country in the south and because they have to rely on logistical supplies of tremendous dimensions from their own country so as to fight the war (in the aggressive war in Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists cannot have any industrial rear close to our country as they had been using Japan as a springboard from which to invade Korea), it is vital for them to have a series of military and logistical bases on the spot to provide direct supplies to a war that is fought so far away from the U.S. Therefore, the strategic value of the U.S. bases in the south is primarily logistical in nature. Moreover, in these bases there are some airfields, but because the latter are under continual attacks, the U.S. imperialists are thinking that later they must mainly rely on the floating airfields on the sea to maintain security.

It is just because the above-mentioned bases have primarily logistical value, they have a big weakness, that is, in spite of the presence of 34,000 troops guarding the Danang base, 10,000 troops guarding Chu Lai, etc., they cannot maintain absolute protection for such bases. In the face of an adversary who has wisdom, courage, and initiative and is everywhere as the Liberation Army in the south, the U.S. military and logistical bases cannot guarantee security against the daring and clever attacks by the Liberation Army.

If those logistical bases always suffer heavy losses and are unable to supply enough to the increasing U.S. forces and the hundreds of thousands of puppet troops, who have lost their sources of supplies from local areas,

while the roads used for the transportation of materiel and supplies from the coastal bases to the inland areas remain mostly cut off, nobody can imagine all the difficulties and chaotic situations connected with supplies, transportation, and logistics which the enemy will be facing, nor can anybody believe that, under such conditions, the U.S. statement that it will fight in the south for decades, with 500,-700,000 or even 1 million U.S. troops, is a sound and ripe one.

In short, considering the basic reasons for our sure victory and for the enemy's unavoidable defeat, and reviewing the value of each U.S. and puppet arm and military service, we can see more clearly the sound basis on which rests our belief in total victory.

All Our People Unite, Overcome All Difficulties, and Move toward Bigger Victories

We have clearly seen the plots and abilities of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in the south; evaluated the war efforts, and the actual strength and weaknesses of each of their arms and military services; and at the same time clearly seen the abilities and victory factors of our army and people in both parts of the country. It is so evident that the prospect of our great and final victory has been affirmed.

However, in the time to come, the U.S. imperialists will further intensify their big war efforts to try to cling to the south and to destroy the north. Although they are wearing the "goodwill" mask to perform "peace" acrobatic acts everywhere, in reality they are getting prepared to increase the coming budget for the aggressive war in Vietnam to nearly 13 billion dollars a year, that is three times as large as their budget last year and nearly one-half of the total expenses in three years of the Korean war; they are bringing one brigade after another into the south, and spreading chemical poisons and using poisonous gas to an extent that never existed in the south before; they are continuing to strike the north more violently. As to our people in both parts, supported by the socialist camp and the peace- and justice-loving people in the world, we will be fighting the sacred war of resistance in a tireless and brave effort to defeat the aggressors and traitors. Consequently, the war in both parts will be more violent.

While the U.S. imperialists are increasing 2-3 times their aggressive war efforts in our country, on our side we must try to strengthen our sacred war of resistance in both parts ten times stronger. As we clearly see the nature and plot of the enemy, we cannot have any illusion whatsoever about them.

We are determined to defend and to build the north at any cost, to secure communication-transportation, and to guarantee production increase in any difficult situation. On the other hand, we do our best to struggle, rely first on our own strength, and at the same time try to get a stronger support from the socialist camp and the people of the world so as to make our defense

of the north the strongest possible; on the other hand, we will be ready to bear all hardships and sacrifices, and will not budge in the face of any destruction caused by the enemy.

We are ready to support without any spared efforts the brave struggle of our compatriots in the south, aimed at defeating the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys, liberating the south, defending the north, moving toward reunification of the country. The U.S. (and satellite) troops have so far come to invade and to kill our compatriots in the south; they also use their air force to destroy and to kill the people in the north. Many U.S. citizens burned themselves to protest against the U.S. imperialists' aggressive war and to support our good-cause struggle. Many of our friends abroad have volunteered to be ready to come to Vietnam to fight. We, the patriotic Vietnamese, we must clearly see our sacred duty--to sacrifice everything so as to chase away the aggressors for the salvation of our families, our country, and our fellow countrymen.

The urgent situation and task lying ahead demand that we have high revolutionary thinking and fighting spirit, a good organizational concept and very rigid discipline, and a working method that suits the time of war. Each and every one of us must have the energy of being able to fill the sea and to move the mountain, and offer all his energy and strength for the fight against the U.S. piratical aggressors. Each and every one of us must completely carry out President Ho's teaching--fulfill any task, overcome any difficulty, defeat any enemy.

We are waging an earth-shaking patriotic war. We are carrying out a miniature revolution of the whole of the world revolution today: to liberate the nation, to build and to defend the socialist system, to contribute actively to the defense of world peace, and to speed the revolutionary work of the people of the world. We are holding weapons in our hands to fight the most savage enemy of mankind--the U.S. imperialists.

The glory belongs to our people. Final victory certainly belongs to us.

All our army, and all our people, in both the north and the south, closely united with one another, are determined to do our very best to defeat the U.S. piratical aggressors.

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OUR ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE HAVE WON, ARE WINNING,
AND WILL SURELY AND COMPLETELY WIN OVER THE U.S. AGGRESSORS

[Following is a translation of an article by Brig. Gen.
Van Tien Dung in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc
Tap, Hanoi, February 1966 , pp. 40-50]

The Contemptible Aggressive Nature, Plots, and Actions
of the U.S. Imperialists

Since 7 February 1965, the U.S. imperialists have continually used their air force and navy, especially their air force, to wage a war of destruction against the north of our country; caused the north of our country to face a war situation, although this was different from that in the south in its degree, scale, and form; and turned the north of our country into their second battlefield, their main battlefield being South Vietnam.

Their war of destruction against the north is part of their current war of aggression in the south. It is aimed at extricating them from defeat in the south. But their plot does not aim at invading only the south. Their unchanged plot aims at turning our entire country into their new-style colony and base for war of aggression in Indochina and southeast Asia. Their plot of invading Vietnam is part of their plot of dominating the world, a plot that they have carried out since the end of World War II.

While our people throughout the country were undertaking the 1945-1954 resistance against the French colonialists, the U.S. imperialists helped the French imperialists and planned to replace them in order to prolong and enlarge the war in Indochina and turn the Indochinese countries into their new-style colonies and bases for war. The Geneva accords were signed in 1954, frustrating the above-mentioned plot of the U.S. imperialists. But the U.S. imperialists tried to sabotage the implementation of the provisions of these accords. Taking advantage of the difficult situation the French were facing in Algeria, they supplanted the French and occupied the south

for themselves alone. They used the puppet troops and authorities in the south as their personal agents. They hoped to use military and administrative measures to turn the south into their colony and use the puppet troops and authorities as tools for attacking and invading the north.

While they were oppressing and terrorizing our southern compatriots and actively making preparations for the puppet troops and authorities to "fill the Ben Hai River" and "march northward," they continually sent Rangers and spies to the north to engage in sabotage activities. Although they were forced to use the puppet regular forces--the ones which were destined to attack the north--to deal passively with the revolutionary movement of the southern people, the U.S. imperialists actively carried out the Staley-Taylor plan and made preparations for invading the north. At the same time, they intensified their sabotage of the north. The present Johnson plan consists also of pacifying the south and preparing to attack the north. It is clear that their gradually aggressive plot and plan always consists of occupying the south, and attacking the north in order to occupy it. Thus, their war of aggression against the north is only part of their old aggressive plot.

Yet they had to hastily wage the war of destruction against the north even though they had not occupied the entire south, because they wanted to extricate themselves from serious defeats in the south. Waging the war of destruction against the north was an act reflecting the passiveness and confusion and adventurous spirit of the U.S. imperialists. They had to do it because they were being defeated. In waging the war of destruction against the north, they aimed at extricating themselves from a dangerous situation in the south. Thus this war of destruction was an integral part of the war of aggression in the south. With their bellicose, aggressive, stubborn, and venturesome nature, the U.S. imperialists may daringly wage an all-out aggressive war against the north at a moment when they are suffering heavy defeats in the south. Therefore, the war of destruction against the north may be only a preparatory step for an all-out aggressive war against the north.

In waging the war of destruction against the north, the U.S. imperialists stupidly hoped that after several months of attacks, the northern people would suffer heavy damages; social construction projects would be destroyed; political, economic, cultural, and social activities in the north would be driven into confusion; the northern people, faced with heavy damages, would give up their determination to carry on their anti-U.S. national salvation task; the southern people and liberation troops would be isolated and unable to exterminate the lackeys of the Americans; and the puppet troops and authorities would escape the danger of being exterminated, stabilize their morale, and recapture the initiative in attacking the southern people and troops. In order to attain this stupid hope, the U.S. imperialists used their planes to attack continuously night and day not only military targets, communication lines, and economic installations, but also populated areas, cities, towns, and villages. They savagely dropped bombs on hospitals,

dispensaries, schools, churches, pagodas, temples, markets, dikes, dams, meteorological centers, cultural works, civil works, and so forth. U.S. warships continuously prevented our fishermen from carrying out their activities by chasing and firing at fishing boats, firing at villages in coastal areas, at islands, and so forth. They also engaged in piratical activities, brazenly provoked foreign ships, and prevented them from entering our territorial waters.

But these crazy acts of their war of destruction could not help them escape defeats in the south. Thus, between July and the end of 1965 they had to introduce many combat units--divisions and brigades of U.S. and satellite troops--into the south to massacre our southern compatriots. At the same time, they used the "unconditional negotiations" smokescreen to try to hide their contemptible aggressive face and to deceive and soothe the world peoples and the U.S. people who were angrily condemning them. Their hasty introduction of U.S. and satellite troops into the south reflected not only the bankruptcy of their strategy of using puppet troops, puppet authorities, U.S. advisers, U.S. weapons, and dollars to invade Vietnam, but also the bankruptcy of the basic plots of their war of aggression in the north.

Continuously undertaking the war of destruction against the north, massively introducing hundreds of thousands of U.S. and satellite troops into the south, and quickly increasing their total strength--U.S. expeditionary troops, satellite troops, and puppet troops--to over 700,000 men of their ground, air, and naval forces in order to daily massacre our southern compatriots, the U.S. imperialists completely laid bare their contemptible, cruel, and stubborn aggressive face. All the bloody crimes which they committed in both the north and south of our country laid bare the aggressive and bellicose nature of the U.S. imperialists--the irreconcilable enemy of our entire nation.

Our Great Victories and the Heavy Defeats of the U.S. Imperialists

Because of their stubborn nature, the U.S. imperialists admit defeat only when being dealt decisive blows. Realities prove that so long as their aggressive spirit is not yet smashed, the U.S. imperialists--like a gambler who has lost his head after losing much money--are becoming increasingly violent and crazy the more they lose. Frustrated in their plot to prolong and enlarge the war in Indochina in the past, the U.S. imperialists continually violated the 1954 Geneva accords and made preparations to attack the north. Frustrated in their plot to use puppet troops and authorities to enslave our people in the south through military and administrative measures, the U.S. imperialists launched the special war with a view to enslave the southern people and make preparations to attack the north.

When the puppet troops and authorities faced the danger of complete disintegration, the U.S. imperialists daringly used their air force and navy to attack the north. Realizing that their war of destruction against the north could not save their lackeys in the south, the U.S. imperialists hastily introduced combat units of the U.S. and satellite forces into the south and spread the "unconditional negotiations" smokescreen to deceive public opinion and hide their new acts of war. When the U.S. combat units were hit severely, they hastily launched the "peace-offensive campaign" with a deceitful 14-point program as a scheme to gain time and enlarge and step up further their war of aggression in Vietnam--which is in the process of being defeated. The aggressive nature, plots, and actions of the U.S. imperialists toward our people force our people resolutely to oppose them. Since they use counterrevolutionary war to enslave our people and trample on our national rights, we must use revolutionary war to exterminate them. Our compatriots throughout the country have been and continue to be united, millions as one, to undertake this revolutionary war in order resolutely to protect the north, liberate the south, achieve national unification through peaceful means, and fulfill our international duties.

Last year, developing the "determination-to-fight-and-win" tradition of our people and learning from the indomitable fighting spirit of the southern compatriots, the northern armed forces and people heroically and resourcefully undertook the people's war and self-defense war, conducted the resistance and concurrently built the country, and defeated the war of destruction of the U.S. aggressors. All the northern people unanimously rose up and used their strength and courage to fight the enemy. The more they fought, the stronger they became. They achieved victories in all fields: resistance and national construction.

In the military area, regular troops, local troops, and self-defense militiamen forced the firm core of the movement to arm all the people for the struggle against the enemy. The fire network of the anti-aircraft units formed the core of the fire network of the movement of struggle against U.S. planes by all the people and armed forces. The navy and coastal artillery units formed the core of the movement of struggle by all our people and armed forces against U.S. warships when they entered our territorial waters. Over 800 of the most modern U.S. jets were downed in the north. This was the result of close cooperation between the armed forces and people and among the three forces. The fact that self-defense militiamen in independent combat operations used rifles and infantry machineguns to down 50 U.S. jets (Quang Binh 13, Nghe An 7, Ha Tinh 6, Thanh Hoa 5, Son La 5, Nam Ha 3, Yen Bai 2, Nghia Lo 2, Quang Ninh 1, Ha Bac 1, Ninh Binh 1, Hoa Binh 1, Haiphong 1, Vinh Linh 1, and Lang Son 1 by November 1965--HOC TAP) was an important contribution to lowering the prestige of the U.S. Air Force, hundreds of the best U.S. pilots have been punished or are sitting in prisons for war prisoners, smitten with remorse. Scores of Rangers' ships were sunk into the China Sea. Hundreds of Rangers

and spies were arrested or punished on the spot, and so forth. All the foregoing were our great victories in the military field. We defeated the U.S. imperialists in the military field in the north.

We have drawn very valuable experiences from the realities of the struggle against U.S. planes and warships. We have satisfactorily solved the problem of techniques for countering the war of destruction; satisfactorily settled the relations between the struggle against war of destruction and the preparation for combat readiness for defeating the U.S. imperialists in case they dare expand the regional war to the north; satisfactorily settled the relations among combat, combat preparations, and socialist construction in all fields; and satisfactorily settled the relations between the duty of protecting the socialist north and the duty of wholeheartedly supporting the south and fulfilling our international responsibility. These were very important victories which laid a firm foundation for future military and political victories.

The U.S. imperialists hoped to use the superiority of their air force to wage their war of destruction against the north. At the same time, they spread the "unconditional negotiations" smokescreen, applied the policy of "simultaneously hitting and threatening," and stepped up their psychological warfare to intimidate our armed forces and people and shake their determination to oppose the Americans for national salvation. But last year's combat realities demonstrated that our people's firm determination to oppose the Americans for national salvation became increasingly firmer and stronger. The bloody crimes of the U.S. imperialists in both the north and south of our country only caused our people to realize more clearly their cruel and savage aggressive nature, feel greater hatred for them, and have greater confidence in our revolutionary line and people's war line and in our certainly victorious power.

After resisting the war of destruction for one year, the northern people have had greater confidence and pride in the superiority of the socialist system. Our people have clearly realized the U.S. imperialists' evil intention of destroying our socialist system, destroying the revolutionary results which we have sacrificed much of our blood and bones to achieve, upsetting our people's life, and causing heavy losses in the lives and property of our people.

Thus, our people have heightened their patriotism and revolutionary spirit, resolutely fought the enemy while stepping up socialist construction in accordance with war conditions, and urgently built the north into the large, firm, rich, and powerful rear and base for the national revolution. We have eliminated in time the consequences of the criminal war of destruction of the U.S. aggressors. They destroyed one thing, we rebuilt 10 things. They carried out destruction during the day, we rebuilt during the night, and vice versa. They carried out destruction night and day, we rebuilt day and night. All our people have continuously upheld the spirit of

self-sufficiency and self-reliance, overcome all misfortunes created by nature and the enemy, and been determined to successfully construct socialism even during the combat against the U.S. aggressors.

Here were the great victories we achieved last year: We accumulated a number of experiences concerning satisfactory settlement of the relations between resistance and national construction; we frustrated all the U.S. aggressors' sinister plots aimed at upsetting or stopping the activities of our good socialist regime. The U.S. imperialists believe that we could not stand their war of destruction for three successive months. But they were wrong. With their imperialist viewpoints and methodology, they can never understand the great vitality which derives from love for the fatherland and socialism and from the legitimate objectives of the sacred revolutionary war of our Vietnamese people. Our people have overcome all difficulties in their life and production caused by the continual attacks of the U.S. imperialists and made complete preparations in the ideological and organizational fields for overcoming any difficulty which the U.S. imperialists may cause. The northern people not only are determined to protect and build the north and defeat the U.S. aggressors in the north, but they also have continuously strengthened their support to the southern compatriots to defeat the U.S. aggressors in the south itself. The "rifle in one hand and the hammer in the other, the rifle in one hand and the plow in the other" movement of workers and peasants, the "three readiness" movement of the youth, the "three responsibility" movement of women, and so forth have reflected our people's patriotism and absolute revolutionary spirit.

By threatening the north, the U.S. imperialists hope to recover the morale of the South Vietnamese puppet armed forces and administration, thus enabling them to cope with our liberation armed forces and people in South Vietnam. However, while the U.S. imperialists have been incessantly striking the north day and night, our armed forces and people in South Vietnam have constantly increased their hatred for them and have never been more determined to destroy the U.S. imperialists to liberate themselves, protect the socialist north, defend the revolutionary base of the fatherland, and advance toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The precipitate introduction of masses of U.S. troops into South Vietnam by the U.S. imperialists is a passive act in their position of defeat. This act reveals that the U.S. imperialists' plot to go ahead with the sabotage war against the north and their strategy of pursuing the war together with the South Vietnamese puppet armed forces and administration have been doomed.

The victories in Nui Thanh, La Chau, Van Tuong, Thuan Ninh, Bau Bang, Dau Tieng, Plei Me, Dong Duong, and so forth with the destruction of tens of thousands of U.S. troops of various army branches and armed services demonstrated the invincible strength of our armed forces and people in South Vietnam and have at the same time crushed the U.S. imperialists' boasts about the "strong fighting potential" of the U.S. armed forces. These victories have caused the U.S. imperialists to worry about the swift

maturity of the South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces, have stimulated the "determination-to-fight-and-win" spirit of the armed forces and people throughout our country, and have evoked enthusiasm among our friends the world over.

The great victories scored by the people throughout our country during the past year have demonstrated eloquently that our people in the north are determined to defeat the aggressors along with constructing socialism successfully and to devote all efforts to supporting the South Vietnamese liberation revolution, and that the South Vietnamese people are determined to defeat the neocolonialist U.S. aggressive war, liberate the south, and protect the north. Based on the widespread political struggle movement, the guerrilla warfare movement has developed vigorously and steadily, and everywhere, the South Vietnamese key units and troops have incessantly matured and have won many battles, in which thousands of crack U.S. troops have been neatly destroyed. The great military and political victories scored by our armed forces and people in both the south and the north during the past year have once more asserted the rules set forth by President Ho when answering the Japanese AKAHATA correspondent: "A people who are closely united and who struggle resolutely can certainly defeat the violent, wicked imperialist aggressors with their great number of weapons."

The people's war of our entire country is a revolutionary war, an entirely just war opposing the aggressive, unjust, immoral war waged by the violent and extremely wicked U.S. imperialists. The U.S. imperialists are the deadly enemy of our people and, at the same time, an international gendarme, and are the enemy no. one of the world's people. Our people fight the U.S. imperialists not only for their own benefit but also for contributing positively to the world people's revolutionary struggle and for the sake of peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism. As a result, the peace- and justice-loving people in the world, including the U.S. people, have sided with us, thus positively supporting our people's struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggressors. The world's people have been extremely indignant at the U.S. imperialists' aggressive acts against our people. Even the allied countries of the Americans themselves dare not openly support the U.S. imperialists. Some of these countries have gone as far as taking advantage of the U.S. imperialists' dilemma in Vietnam to intensify their competition with the U.S. imperialists in many other areas. Never in history have the U.S. imperialists met such protests or been so isolated as they are now. Actually, the world people's front for support of the Vietnamese people's struggle against the U.S. imperialists has been formed. The people of socialist countries, first of all, the CPR and Soviet peoples, have positively provided our people with assistance in all fields. The political and armed struggles conducted by the people of various countries still enslaved by the U.S. imperialists to oppose them to liberate themselves and to support our people have also been developing. These are our great victories and the U.S. imperialists' heavy defeats.

All great victories scored so far by the armed forces and people throughout our country constitute a firm and stable base for us to surge forward to score greater victories. These victories are proof of and reaffirm our certainly victorious fighting strength in the task of opposing the Americans for national salvation. In order correctly to assess our own victories and the enemy defeats, it is necessary for us to have an overall viewpoint, to view all of our victories in all areas in the south, the north, and the world, and, at the same time to view all enemy defeats in all areas, both in the north and the south, the United States itself, and the world.

The heavy and repeated defeats suffered by the U.S. imperialists, both in the north and the south, are the continuation and development of the defeats suffered so far by them in Vietnam. Later defeats are always heavier than those which precede them, though the U.S. imperialists always remain stubborn and rash after each defeat. These defeats have occurred in conformity with the rules of defeat imposed on an aggressive war in the present era. These defeats are leading the U.S. imperialists to complete defeat in Vietnam and will also, at the same time, lead them to no less disastrous defeats in various areas in the world.

In Order to Score Ever Greater Victories

As all of us know, it is primarily due to the clearsighted leadership of our party that our armed forces and people have scored great victories. Our party is a truly Marxist-Leninist party, which has been forced in a revolutionary struggle in general and an armed struggle in particular. Our party has drawn up correct revolutionary lines in order to exert leadership over the Vietnamese revolution, to lead the north toward socialism, to liberate the south, to advance toward the reunification of the fatherland, and to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, wealthy, and strong Vietnam. In the face of U.S. imperialists' aggressive nature, plots, and acts, our party has set forth the lines and the task of opposing the Americans for national salvation. These are the sole, correct lines, the lines of survival for our Vietnamese people.

Since the U.S. imperialists have used antirevolutionary violence to enslave our people, our people must use revolutionary violence to oppose them. The war being pursued by the U.S. imperialists in Vietnam is an aggressive war designed to turn the southern and then the northern parts of our country into their new-type colonies and their bases for waging their aggressive war in Indochina and southeast Asia. This war is an entirely unjust and immoral war. On the contrary, our people's resistance to oppose the Americans for national salvation is a just, revolutionary, and progressive war. The nature and objectives of our war have encouraged and mobilized our people--millions as one--to stand up and resolutely struggle

and vanquish the U.S. aggressors, and they have at the same time stimulated revolutionary people throughout the world to stand up to oppose the U.S. imperialists and to support our people. These facts have brought to the armed forces and people throughout our country an absolute political and spiritual superiority over the U.S. imperialists' armed forces. The more we fight, the greater this superiority will be. On the contrary, the more the U.S. imperialists' armed forces fight, the more their fighting spirit will deteriorate. This is a basic factor, which decides our victories and the enemy defeats in all fields of struggle.

In the north, under the party leadership, our people have scored important achievements in socialist construction and have succeeded in eliminating the exploitative production relation of the capitalist and feudal regime and in establishing a production relation in which there are no scenes of exploitation of people by people. This has made our people ever more determined to struggle to the end to protect and develop their revolutionary achievements. With their experiences in protracted revolutionary struggle, with their national tradition of indomitable struggle, and benefiting from timely leadership in all fields by all party echelons, all our armed forces and people are constantly vigilant in the face of the U.S. imperialists' aggressive nature and plots and have incessantly heightened their confidence in the party's correct leadership, in the invincible strength of the people's war, in their own great force, in the assistance from the brother countries, and in the complete success of the task of resisting the Americans for national salvation. As a result, our armed forces and people have overcome all difficulties and obstacles created by the U.S. imperialists, have fully developed the strength of the people's war in order to defeat the U.S. imperialists in the very first battles, and have been ready to fight a protracted war until final victory is achieved.

Thanks to the fact that the armed forces and people throughout the country have political and spiritual superiority, have the "determination to fight and to win" tradition, have experience in protracted armed struggle under the circumstances--under which the enemy is stronger than us in equipment and techniques--and have always understood thoroughly the class viewpoint, the masses' viewpoint, and the realistic viewpoint of our party, the military science of our people's war has revealed itself to be much superior to the U.S. armed forces' rotten, bourgeois military art. With such a military science, though they have no combat experience, our comrade pilots have defeated the enemy right in the first battle and have caused the crack U.S. pilots to become panic-stricken. The men and women comrade self-defense militia forces--those people born during and after the October revolution--have downed on the spot many up-to-date U.S. jet aircraft with rifles. Precisely because they know how to develop in a creative manner the military science of the people's war--a military science which was built during the resistance against the French colonialists--the South Vietnamese Liberation Armed Forces and compatriots destroyed tens of thousands of crack U.S. troops in the first battles fought in Van Tuong,

Bau Bang, Plei Me, and so forth. Everywhere, both in the south and the north, the military science of our armed forces and people has shown itself to be a highly scientific, creative, resourceful, revolutionary military science with the following characteristics: the use of weak forces to defeat stronger forces, independence from reliance on weapons, fighting with any means. The armed forces, together with the people, fight the aggressors right on the territory on their fatherland and in the climatic conditions in their country and are animated by the spirit of "determination to fight and to defeat the U.S. aggressors." This military science is one of the causes of success of the armed forces and people throughout our country in the recent past and is, at the same time, the direct cause of defeat of the U.S. expeditionary troops in South Vietnam and of the U.S. Air Force in the northern part of our country.

What practical conclusions must we draw in order to score incessantly greater victories in our task of opposing the Americans for national salvation in the days to come? We draw the following conclusions:

1. It is necessary to strengthen incessantly the leadership of all party chapters of all echelons over all fields of combat and socialist construction. All basic party organizations must constantly be the organizations charged with exerting leadership over ideology, organization, and planning and must be the core force, the vanguard force, in the fight against the aggressors--in the air, on the ground, on sea--and in the fields of production, of serving the task of fighting the aggressors, and of serving production.

2. All our armed forces and people must constantly strengthen their confidence in the lines opposing the Americans and favoring national salvation and always understand thoroughly the U.S. imperialists' aggressive nature, plots, and acts in order to deepen incessantly the hatred for the U.S. imperialists and heighten the revolutionary spirit, patriotism, and revolutionary heroism and, at the same time, to doom all psychological warfare activities of the U.S. imperialists.

3. All our armed forces and people must constantly understand thoroughly our party lines on the certainly victorious people's war and devote efforts to building all armed forces into the three types of forces, which will serve as the backbone for all our people's fight against the aggressors. All party chapters must pay attention to leading more closely the building and fighting of all armed forces in their localities. Proper attention must be paid to the armed forces' activities in the fields of ideology, organization, and military principles with a view to helping the armed forces continuously and fully understand the military ideology and line of the party.

4. All our armed forces and people must continuously and fully understand our revolutionary duties and satisfactorily settle the relations among the following duties: fighting to protect the north, building the north into the firm and powerful rear for the national revolution, wholeheartedly supporting the southern revolution, and fulfilling international duties. To protect the north, it is necessary to settle satisfactorily the relations between the resistance against the war of destruction and the preparations for readiness to defeat the U.S. imperialists' regional war when they dare to expand it to the north.

5. In the resistance against the war of destruction, it is necessary to settle satisfactorily the relations between exterminating the enemy and protecting our own forces. Concretely it is necessary to organize dense gunfire networks everywhere, especially in important areas, for fighting U.S. planes and warships. At the same time, it is necessary to build good shelters for the people and the forces not directly involved in combat. It is necessary to eliminate in time the consequences of the enemy's war of destruction and quickly return all activities to normal in order not to impair the potentialities of the localities and state. It is necessary to combat all subjective views and the fear of difficulties and sufferings in the fight against the enemy or in the organization of the people's anti-aircraft defense.

6. While fighting the enemy, it is necessary to fully understand the military art of our people's war. It is necessary to base oneself continuously on the principle of using a weak force to defeat a stronger one and to overcome all tendencies and rely on weapons (as heard), to use a strong force to strike at a strong force, and to apply mechanically and dogmatically fighting techniques. It is necessary continuously to keep a firm control on the enemy's concrete actions and in time recapitulate experiences and set forth the necessary lessons in order continuously to raise the ratio of U.S. casualties. It is necessary to develop continuously military democracy and mobilize the creativeness and resourcefulness of the masses for fighting on the basis of their determination to defeat the U.S. aggressors.

7. Under the uniform leadership of party chapters, all branches and units must uphold the sense of responsibility and the spirit of solidarity and cooperation in order automatically to help each other before, during, and after each battle as well as in construction and production tasks. They must thoroughly understand the concept of an overall approach: localities must yield to the entire front and isolated battles or operations must yield to strategy.

8. It is necessary to heighten continuously the degree of mastery over existing weapons and equipment of our armed forces and people and heroically and resourcefully develop the efficiency of these weapons and equipment to the maximum in order to defeat the U.S. aggressors. It is necessary to carry out satisfactorily the technical revolution in production and combat. It is necessary to uphold the sense of saving in production and combat.

During the past year the soldiers and people of the North of our nation have won great victories in the process of resisting the American bandits' war of destruction by air and sea, and the soldiers and people of the South have won glorious victories and have struck mortal blows against the American expeditionary army, the army of vassals and puppets, and the puppet administration. The American imperialists are being heavily defeated in both parts of our country. The American imperialists, while on the "ladder" of defeat, are still capable of further "escalating" and intensifying their attacks on the North. We must remain wide-awake and be prepared to inflict even more painful and heavy defeats on the military front of their war of destruction. The soldiers and people of the North always go all out to support the revolution to liberate our compatriots in the South, and are always ready to join them in completing their sacred struggle to resist America and save the nation. The soldiers and people of our entire nation have been victorious, are now victorious, and are certain to win a complete victory over the aggressive American bandits.

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UNITE PARTY BUILDING WITH THE CAMPAIGN TO
IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT

[Following is a translation of an article by
Vu Oanh in the Vietnamese-language periodical
Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No. 2, February 1966,
pages 51-58.]

The Position of the Party Base Organization
in the Countryside in the New Situation

The Party base organization in the countryside is the unit which directly leads the peasant masses in carrying out all revolutionary tasks at the base level. It is a bridge between the Party and the peasant masses. Only if the Party base organizations are strong can the mass movement be strong and the cooperatives good, and only then can agricultural production develop. If the Party organizations are weak, the mass movement cannot be strong, and cooperatives and agricultural production cannot be good. The actualities of the past several years have shown that where Party branches and cells are strong, a high percentage of laboring peasants participate in cooperatives, and production develops strongly and in the proper direction; and that, on the other hand, in places where Party branches and cells are weak a low proportion of the peasants participate in cooperatives, and production either does not develop or develops slowly and not in the proper direction.

We know that the building of agricultural cooperatives is a strong, vast, and profound campaign to destroy the old production relationships in the countryside, change at its very source the age-old custom of individual livelihood of millions of peasants, and bring the peasants onto the path of collective, socialist livelihood. In reality, that is a struggle between the

paths of socialism and capitalism in the countryside which takes place in many different forms. Therefore, there must be ideologically and organizationally strong Party cells and branches which manifest the viewpoints of the proletarian class, for only then can we lead the peasants and the small, individual producers in entering upon the path of socialism. As Lenin said, "The strength of the customs of millions and tens of millions of people is most fearsome strength. Without a party of steel which has been tempered in struggle, without a party which has the confidence of all loyal elements of the above-mentioned classes, and without a party which understands the psychology of the masses and knows how to influence that psychology, that campaign cannot be carried out victoriously." (1) After the essential completion of agricultural cooperativization, the struggle between the two paths is manifested most concentratedly in the struggle between individual and collective benefit, and continues to develop in a complex manner. If, during this period, the Party base organizations do not give firm leadership, the agricultural cooperativization movement may be seriously weakened. That has been the actual situation in various places. Only after the Party cells in such places were strengthened did the cooperatives become stable and develop. As Chairman Ho said, "Only if the cell is good can the management committee be good, and only if the management committee is good will the cooperative members unite and produce enthusiastically, and only then will the cooperative become strong and develop well." (2)

At present, our agricultural production must be of strong service to the struggle to resist America, save the nation, and build socialism. It must resolve the food problem well, while assuring the provision of sufficient raw materials for industry and of agricultural goods for export. That situation requires that the Party organizations in the countryside must fully understand the Party's line of agricultural development, have a high degree of awareness, have strong revolutionary spirit, and have knowledge of technology and production, in order to lead the masses in developing agriculture comprehensively, strongly, and stably, on the basis of cooperativization and technical improvement. The technological revolution is at present a matter of decisive importance in the development of production. Only if Party cells and branches in the countryside are strong can they activate the masses to build material and technical bases, improve production implements, and apply advanced technical methods, in order to promote intensive cultivation and increased productivity in agriculture. At present, our agricultural production is still dependent on nature, so we must always fight droughts, floods, and diseases. Only if the Party base organizations in the countryside are strong, and only if cadres and Party members are highly determined to overcome difficulties, can the masses be positively and actively activated to oppose nature and win victories on the

production front. If the Party base organizations in the countryside are weak, even if upper echelons send hundreds of cadres to assist them, they cannot solve their problems. Many facts prove that ~~of~~ places with similar soil conditions, cultivation practices, and natural conditions, ~~in those~~ with Party cells which have revolutionary thinking and which boldly apply new management methods and advanced technology, the productivity of rice and other food crops is high, and production continues to develop; but in places where Party cells are weak and think conservatively, production does not increase, and all sectors do not develop. This proves that the leadership of the Party base organizations have a direct and decisive effect on the cooperatives' development of production.

At present, the new mission of the revolution demands that the Party's base organization not only lead production well, but also that they lead the fighting well, in order to defeat the enemy in all situations. If, at present, we lack strong Party base organizations consisting of brave and able cadres and Party members, we cannot win great victories on the production and fighting fronts. The very difficult and glorious struggle to resist America and save the nation requires that we urgently strengthen the Party base organizations, so that they can lead the masses in producing and fighting.

Only if the Party's base organization in the countryside is good can all Party policies be carried out well and all tasks progress without interruption. On the other hand, if the Party's base organization is weak, the work will not go smoothly. During the previous campaigns to improve management, in some places, because the Party's base organization was not strong, the directions and methods brought forth in the campaign were not fully carried out. In some cooperatives, various policies were not fully executed. In some places, indeed, cadres and Party members continued to commit errors which had been criticized, such as seeking ways to set aside more than the stipulated amounts of land, not strictly meeting obligations toward the state, etc.

Therefore, if we are to perfect the new production relationships in the countryside, strengthen the collective economies of the cooperatives, achieve well all policies of Party and State, and do a good job of the major campaigns which serve the present central political mission of resisting America and saving the nation, we must pay greater attention to strengthening the Party's base organization in the countryside. In the immediate future, we must closely combine the work of building "four goods" cells and branches with the campaign to improve cooperative management.

How Should Party Building be Incorporated in the Campaign to Improve Cooperative Management?

The incorporation of Party building in the campaign to improve cooperative management is an essential, objective requirement, for good Party work is a necessary condition for carrying out the campaign well and developing its victories. Furthermore, the carrying out of the campaign affords a good opportunity to strengthen and develop the Party. For this is a great political campaign in the countryside and manifests in a concentrated manner the Party's stands, viewpoints, and policies toward the strengthening of cooperatives and the development of production. We can, in the course of this campaign, raise the cooperatives' management levels, raise the level of socialist awareness, strengthen the class stands of cadres and party members, and increase the leadership capabilities of the Party's base organizations.

The actualities of the previous campaigns to improve cooperative management have helped many Party echelons to have more profound and complete knowledge of the work of building the Party during the campaigns. Many local leadership cadres have paid attention to making careful studies of the situation of Party bases in the countryside, in order to guide the work of building the Party. Therefore, the work of building the Party during the campaign to improve cooperative management has attained good results.

Some local echelons, however, still regard the work of Party building lightly. When leading the campaign, these comrades usually pay attention only to improving cooperative management and techniques, and do not pay adequate attention to strengthening the Party's base organizations, the element which determines the victory of the campaign and of all other work in the countryside. The reasons for this situation are that those comrades are still more or less influenced by purely economic viewpoints, and that they do not yet fully understand the content of the Party work, but believe that the Party work is purely professional work and do not see that that work includes political, ideological, and organizational work, and even encompasses the strengthening of the leadership capabilities of the Party's base organizations with regard to cooperatives and production. Because of such inadequate knowledge, during the first and second cycles of the first campaign to improve cooperative management, some Party echelons regarded the work of Party building lightly. When cadres went to assist the cooperatives they did the members' work for them and were concerned only with purely professional and technical matters, and not with strengthening the capabilities of the base echelon. When the cadres left, therefore, the Party cells and branches were very confused. It is, of course, correct

to pay attention to strengthening and developing the cooperatives, and to promoting production. But if that work is to be well done, we must be concerned first of all with strengthening the Party's base organizations, in order to strengthen their leadership capability with regard to cooperatives. As comrade Le Duen said, "Agricultural production has changed to a new means of production, so there must be a sharp transformation in leadership, first of all in the leadership of base echelons: cells, management committees, and production unit leaders and assistant leaders. We must strengthen the cells organizationally and ideologically, so that they can lead the cooperatives well." (3)

During the next few years the building of "four goods" cells and branches will be the principal element of the party-building work in the countryside. It must be tied in with the major tasks and campaigns in the countryside. Only thereby can the content of party building be rich and practical, and only then can it improve the quality of leadership of cells and branches. The campaign to build "four goods" cells and branches is also intended to achieve one of the requirements of the campaign to improve cooperative management, as brought forth in the instructions of the Party Central Committee. Those two campaigns must be closely united, and must supplement and stimulate each other. We should not believe that the campaign to build "four goods" cells and branches should not be related to the work of the cooperatives or to the production and combat missions, or believe that that campaign is only an internal matter, and fail to see that the strengthening of the cooperatives' leadership and the promotion of production and combat are missions of great importance with regard to the present campaign to build "four goods" cells and branches. We must overcome purely specialized or professional viewpoints, and the belief that the improvement of cooperative management only involves the changing of a number of managerial practices of a professional nature, or of certain technical methods. To improve cooperative management and technology is actually to strengthen the Party cells' leadership of that work, in order to achieve the Party's line of agricultural development.

How, then, should we combine the building of cells and branches with the campaign to improve cooperative management?

During the previous stages of the campaign to improve technology and cooperative management, the cells organized study of the Eighth Resolution of the Party Central Committee regarding socialist industrialization, and the resolution of the Political Bureau regarding the campaign to improve cooperative management, improve technology, and develop production. On that basis was carried out an ideological struggle revolving around the question of the "two paths" in the countryside; the local production directions were closely studied and such phenomena as greed, waste,

and lack of responsibility toward the collective benefit were criticized. In the course of study, awareness of serving socialist industrialization was increased, and therefore new production directions appropriate to the needs of the revolution and to the local land conditions were built. Cadres and party members developed their vanguard role in productive labor and in all other tasks at the local level, and caused the masses to be more confident in, and unite around, the Party cells.

We are at present carrying out the campaign to improve cooperative management at a time when the entire nation is at war, at different degrees in each part. Our entire nation has the mission of resisting America and saving the nation. The present campaign is based on the great needs of the revolution and on the results and experiences of the first campaign. Therefore, the present requirements of the political and ideological work must also be higher than in the past.

In the present campaign to improve cooperative management, the political and ideological work must serve to cause the cadres, party members, and masses to have a high degree of determination, so that no matter what the circumstances we can advance agricultural production and assure sufficient food to enable our troops and people to be victorious, to provide reserves with which we can fight for a long time, and to assure the providing of sufficient agricultural raw materials for industry and of agricultural products for export. We must cause them to see clearly the important position and urgent nature of our agricultural production in the struggle to resist America and save the nation, strengthen the will to fight and win on the agricultural production front as well as on the fighting front, be prepared to overcome all difficulties, develop to a high degree the spirit of self-reliance, and search for all ways to achieve high productivity in cultivation and animal husbandry. We must activate everyone to study production science and technology, in order to increase the productivity of rice, other food crops, and animal husbandry, and especially to achieve a yearly production of five tons of paddy rice per hectare.

At present, many good transformations are occurring in the ideology of cadres and Party members. In the course of our struggle against the enemy's war of destruction, our cadres and Party members have, generally speaking, been activated ideologically; many of them have skilfully led the masses in producing and fighting. But that does not mean that we can be satisfied and neglect the ideological work. On the contrary, we must strengthen the ideological work even more, and constantly strengthen the proletarian stands of our cadres and Party members, in order to meet the new needs of the revolution. The political and ideological work must reveal and develop good thoughts and actions, and

examples of heroic sacrifice in productive labor and combat, while guarding against and overcoming mistaken thoughts and actions which may occur in the course of production and combat; we must especially prepare to cope with even more difficult, complicated situations.

The experiences of the first campaign to improve cooperative management prove that political and ideological education must be lively and closely related to the actualities of production and combat. We must, on the basis of clearly understanding the new situation and needs of the revolution, and of clearly understanding the Party's line of agricultural development, re-study the direction of production and the direction of building the cooperatives' material and technical bases; we must teach proletarian standpoints and viewpoints to cadres and Party members, and we must carry out criticism and self-criticism, in order to struggle to overcome the phenomena of slowness, the lack of revolutionary spirit in production and combat, and the lack of desire to advance.

The ideological work and the organizational work are two aspects of the work of party-building, and must always be closely related. When there are correct thinking, correct directions, and clear struggle goals, the organizational work plays a decisive role in the victory of the campaign. Therefore, the various Party echelons must give adequate attention to the organizational work. In the present campaign to improve cooperative management, the Party's organization work must be of strong service to the needs of agricultural development, and must especially be of good service to the building of the cooperatives' material and technical bases and boldly introduce technology into agricultural production, in order to increase the productivity of cultivation and animal husbandry.

The training of cadres, the distribution of labor among the various echelons, the altering of organization, etc., must first of all be done in consideration of the above-mentioned requirements. We must strengthen the cadres and Party members with regard to the new requirements and organizations brought forth by the campaign. As regards the base echelon and the leadership cadres of cooperatives, we must make strengthening them, increasing their leadership capabilities, and forging their standpoints, ideology, and working methods, the principal content; only when it is really necessary should there be organizational changes. Only thereby can we specialize the cadres and stabilize and strengthen organization, and only thereby can the cadres gain rich experience with which to lead the movement. We must base ourselves on the actual work at the local level in strengthening cadres. Furthermore, we must boldly promote female and young cadres, and make certain that the key cadres of cooperatives are people who

are concerned with the cooperatives, that they are capable, and that they have the confidence of the cooperative members. The training and strengthening of cadres is closely related to the strengthening of Party organization, cooperatives, and mass organizations. We must, therefore, have plans for on-the-spot training and strengthening, while organizing schools to train large numbers of cadres for the cooperatives. Only thereby can we meet the immediate and long-range needs of the movement. Furthermore, we must continue to arrange Party organization (including the Labor Youth League), so that it can be appropriate to the cooperative production unit, and advance to a situation in which all cooperatives have leadership cells, and in which all production units are led by Party teams. If this is to be done we must continue to promote the work of Party development.

To do a good job of the above is actually to build cells and branches in accordance with the "four goods" requirements, to heighten the class nature and advance-guard nature of the Party, to strengthen the leadership and combat capabilities of cells and branches, and to strengthen the Party's leadership in the countryside, while assuring the victory of the campaign to improve cooperative management, improve technology, and develop production comprehensively, strongly, and stably.

Strengthening the leadership capabilities of the various Party echelons, especially the district echelon, is an urgent immediate need of the party-building work.

In the course of several years of carrying out the improvement of cooperative management, the improvement of technology, and the development of production, the base-level cells and branch committees entered deeply into the leadership of the cooperative management work, began to enter deeply into the technical leadership of the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, other food crops, and animal husbandry, and further clarified the Party's line of agricultural development; they thereby built new production directions for the cooperatives. The provincial and district echelons grasped more firmly the production situation and characteristics of each region, and grasped firmly the Party's base-level situation and the situation of the cooperatives. Leadership of the various branches so that they served agricultural production achieved good results. The local echelons, especially the district echelons, saw clearly that if they were to lead agricultural production well, they themselves had to grasp the situation of the villages and cooperatives, and give close leadership everywhere, in order to gain general leadership experience; that they had to strengthen their investigation and management, uncover weak points, have positive methods for advancing the movement strongly; that they should not be pessimistic and vacillating in the face of

difficulty; and that they should not be subjectively satisfied with their initial victories.

Today, the urgent and difficult production and combat missions require that the various Party echelons further strengthen their leadership capabilities. They must grasp more firmly the cooperative management work and the production work; give better leadership to the mission of developing local agricultural production; make further investigations, in order to correct distortions in the execution of the policies of the Party and the State; recapitulate the experiences of advanced cooperatives in order to extract lessons regarding revolutionary determination and enthusiasm, lessons regarding cooperative management, and lessons regarding the introduction of technology into production; and observe the cooperatives closely, in order to assist cells and Party members to complete the campaign.

As regards the ideological work, we must pay attention to the Party's mass work. We must activate everyone to increase their patriotism, their love for socialism, and their determination to overcome all difficulties, attain high productivity, and build strong cooperatives. We must overcome the diseases of bureaucratism and dogmatism on the part of some cadres and Party members, fully assure the cooperative members' right to be masters of their cooperatives, and cause them to participate in all tasks of the cooperatives. We must give close leadership to the "three readys" movement of youths, and to the "three responsibilities" movement of women, in order to further the competitive movement to produce while fighting. We must, in the course of the present campaign to improve cooperative management, and in the course of producing and fighting, strengthen the mass organizations, especially the Labor Youth League and the Women's Union.

Some Opinions about Leadership Methods

Party building is a permanent task of all Party echelons, and of all cadres and Party members. It must be closely bound to the political mission, to the major campaigns, and to all local tasks. Therefore, even when preparing to carry out the campaign to improve cooperative management, the various Party echelons, especially the district committees, have had plans for grasping the situation of the Party's base organization in the countryside, in order to guide each area in drawing up plans to build cells and branches before and during the campaign. The campaign is a process of closely uniting the work of cooperative management with the work of building cells and branches, in which the Party echelons play the decisive role. When determining the directions and requirements of cooperative management improvement in each area and region, therefore, there must be a Party-

building plan which is appropriate to each Party branch. When leading the campaign we must pay attention to investigation and supervision, and uncover in good time the phenomena of regarding the Party-building work lightly and separating that work from the campaign. When making preliminary and final recapitulations of the campaign, we must include the Party-building work, in order to correctly evaluate the results and draw up plans for continuing the struggle after the campaign.

The experiences of the previous campaign show us that the bringing about of a transformation in the various echelons' awareness of the Party-building work during the campaign is no easy matter, but must undergo ideological struggle within the Party echelons before it can be assured. The key leadership cadres of the various echelons must enter deeply into the work of building cells and branches, study the experiences of outstanding examples in order to gain experience with which to lead the Party-building work, as well as production and cooperative management. Furthermore, the propaganda and education committees and the organization committees of the various echelons must be positive and show initiative in helping the various echelons to direct the Party-building work. We must follow closely the political missions and requirements of each step of the campaign, in order to combine Party-building with ideology and organization, and enable the Party-building work to meet the needs of the new situation, while, in the course of the actualities of production and combat, strengthening the Party's organization and causing base-level cells and branches to become stable leadership units in the countryside.

- (1) Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," Collected Works, Vietnamese-language edition, The Truth Publishing Company, Hanoi, 1959, volume II, part II, page 339.
- (2) From a speech delivered by Chairman Ho before Fifth Congress of the Central Committee, July 1961. Nhan Dan, 20 August 1961.
- (3) Le Duan, "Improve Cooperative Management, Improve Technology, Promote Agricultural Production," Hoc Tap, No. 2 1963, page 13.

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INTENSIVE RICE CULTIVATION IN THE NORTH

[Following is a translation of an article by Vu Tho in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No. 2, February 1966, pages 59-67.]

Rice, our nation's most important food crop, each year provides our people with a very great quantity of food. If we are to stably resolve the food problem, therefore, we must, in addition to promoting the development of non-rice food crops, endeavor to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice.

At present, in the situation of both fighting the American imperialists and building socialism in the North, the need to promote the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice and resolve the food problem is becoming more and more urgent, and has a greater significance than ever, for the North must fulfil its mission of being the great rear area of the entire nation.

Many people have responded to the Party's stand regarding the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice: to achieve a yearly production of five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale. There are still some people, however, who see only our difficulties, and do not see our advantages, and therefore do not positively endeavor to achieve high rice productivity.

Has the American imperialists' ever-expanding war of destruction created difficulties for us? It has! We do not deny that. We must, indeed, be fully prepared for further difficulties which the enemy may create for us, so that we can guard against

and overcome them. We understand that in the circumstances of a fierce war between us and the enemy, the struggle on the production front is also full of hardships and sacrifice. But we firmly believe that we will overcome those difficulties and further develop agricultural production, for socialist production relationships have been established in the countryside, and they are becoming stronger and stronger. Because of those advanced production relationships, the agricultural cooperatives can fully mobilize the labor and capital of the peasant masses and, step-by-step, build material and technical bases for agriculture, apply advanced technology, and achieve intensive cultivation and increased productivity. The new production relationships in the countryside form a basis on which we can overcome or limit the difficulties caused by nature or by the enemy, and on which we can achieve the policy of the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice on a large scale, under wartime conditions. The experiences in combat and production of the people of Quang Binh and Vinh Linh, of the cooperatives of Dai Phong, Vinh Linh, Dong Phuong Hong, etc., have proved that. With their ardent patriotism and love for socialism, the people of the above localities have overcome difficulties created by nature and by the enemy, and won a great victory in the 1964-1965 winter-spring season. In Quang Binh, the food production plan was surpassed by 8,000 tons, and production was 10,000 tons greater than that of the 1964 spring season. In Vinh Linh, rice productivity increased 21%, and the volume of rice production 22%, over 1964.

Are the material and technical bases of our collectivized agriculture still poor and backward? They are indeed! We admit that so that we may make great efforts to advance. But we must also note that after more than 10 years of construction, the material and technical bases of agriculture in the North have undergone great changes. The irrigation system is capable of irrigating nearly 80% of the rice acreage, and more than 30% of the acreage of other food crops and industrial crops. Seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and veterinary medicine bases have been built. Industry has served agriculture in many ways, and is developing more and more its role in stimulating the development of agricultural production. With the new, increasingly strong production relationships, and with increasingly strong material and technical bases, our peasants are entirely capable of achieving a yearly production of five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale.

The achievement of a yearly production of five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale is our immediate goal. But in reality, we are capable of increasing productivity even further. The rice-production experiences of many cooperatives have proved this. In 1964, five districts in the North achieved an average yearly productivity of from 47 to 52 quintals per hectare. During the 1964 spring season, 260 cooperatives achieved from 24 to 30

quintals per hectare, and 1,300 cooperatives achieved from 20 to 24 quintals per hectare. During the recent winter-spring season, 10 districts in the lowlands and midlands achieved a productivity of from 24 to 27 quintals per hectare. In the provinces of Thai Binh, Hung Yen, Ha Bac, Hai Duong, Vinh Phuc, Nam Ha, and Ninh Binh, more than 200 cooperatives achieved a productivity of from 25 to 30 quintals per hectare, and more than 100 cooperatives achieved a productivity of more than 30 quintals per hectare. The provinces in the mountain region and in the area formerly known as Zone 4 also had examples of high and stable productivity. The acreage with high productivity constantly expands. Production units have achieved high productivity principally because the cadres and cooperative members have had a high degree of determination and have corrected the weak points in their technical methods.

The direction of intensive cultivation and increased productivity has gradually penetrated to the base level, and is becoming the conscious action of the peasant masses. All over the countryside there has appeared a competitive movement to study and keep up with the advanced units, to study technology, and to create experimental fields with high rice productivity. We must give timely leadership to that movement, in order to win greater and greater victories on the agricultural production front, contribute positively to the struggle to resist America and save the nation, and continue to advance the North toward socialism.

If we are to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, we must first of all pay attention to the comprehensive and balanced development of agriculture. We all know that if animal husbandry is not developed we cannot have large quantities of fertilizer for rice. If rice lacks sufficient fertilizer its productivity cannot be high and its production great. Low rice production adversely affects the development of other food crops, industrial crops, and animal husbandry. Only if we do a good job of arranging the cultivation sector of agricultural production can we resolve well the relationship between cultivation and animal husbandry, have conditions with which to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, and strongly develop the other agricultural production sectors. For that reason we are carrying out economic regionalization in agriculture, determining the rice-growing centers, and confirming the production direction of agricultural production cooperatives. During the past several years the productivity and production of the various crops, especially rice, have risen, the composition of production has begun to change, the acreage of non-rice food crops and industrial crops has constantly expanded, and the relationship between animal husbandry and cultivation has advanced. At present, however, the production directions of many localities and cooperatives are not in accordance with the Party's

line of agricultural development. Imbalance between cultivation and animal husbandry is still prevalent in many areas. The increasing of production without assuring crop rotation and soil improvement still occurs in many localities. The mountain region has many conditions for developing industrial crops, animal husbandry, and forestry, but because its level of intensive cultivation and productivity are low, it is deficient in foodstuffs, and is therefore unable to develop industrial crops, animal husbandry, and forestry. That situation demands that the leadership echelons and sectors having to do with agriculture help the various localities and agricultural cooperatives to overcome the above-mentioned deficiencies, in order to build a correct production direction. Only with a correct production direction can there be correct directions for building material and technical bases, for investing labor and capital, for technical guidance, for building fields and paddies, and for organizing and training cadres. That is the most important means of assuring the achievement of the intensive cultivation of rice, and of high, stable productivity on a large scale.

The rebuilding of fields and paddies so that they meet the needs of improving production and technology on a large scale is an urgent matter. Those who have visited the fields of the cooperatives of Phuong Tru (Vinh Phuc), Dong Phuong Hong (Thanh Hoa), Dai Xuan (Hai Duong), etc., have seen that the building of fields and paddies is a new step forward with a very important significance with regard to the building of the cooperatives' material and technical bases, so that they can achieve intensive cultivation and increased productivity, and change the way of livelihood of the peasant households. Only if fields and paddies are rebuilt can fields be made contiguous, and not be broken up into small plots surrounded by embankments, as they have been in the past, and only then can we stabilize the boundaries of the various production units and the land for each crop area, each animal husbandry area, each experimental field, etc. If this is done there will be conditions favorable for managing and inspecting the fields, caring for the crops, making rational use of the land, and improving the soil. Only by rebuilding the fields and paddies can we apply such advanced technical methods as scientific irrigation, and only thereby can we fight erosion, have conditions for rational road building, and use improved implements and transportation means, thereby reducing the labor in the transportation sector and investing more labor in the sectors which serve to increase the productivity of plants.

Rice paddies with high and stable productivity are fields in which the water problem is well resolved. Our Party takes the stand that cooperativization must be accompanied by irrigation. That is a creative stand which is appropriate to the actual situation of our nation. In the course of many years of irrigation

work, and especially during the two-year irrigation movement, the acreage with irregular productivity has gradually declined. In order to build fields and paddies with high productivity, we must struggle even more arduously, if we are to show initiative in achieving scientific irrigation. If this is to be done, we must continue to promote the movement to build small irrigation works, and build and adjust the irrigation and drainage systems. We must inaugurate a movement to build regional and field dikes, in unison with leveling and building fields.

Soil improvement and the constant increasing of soil nutrients is one of the important basic aspects of building fields. If we are to achieve an average yearly productivity of five tons of rice per hectare on a large scale, we must not only improve fields with low yields, but must also constantly enrich the fields which have always been good and highly productive.

Fertilizer is a basic requirement for good soil; it plays a decisive role with regard to the productivity and yield of plants. According to the calculations of technicians, if we are to assure a yearly productivity of five tons of paddy per hectare, each hectare must have eight tons of animal fertilizer and 70 kilograms of nitrogenous fertilizer per season, or 11 tons of animal fertilizer. If, in the present circumstances, we are to meet that need for fertilizer, we must rely principally on the masses and inaugurate a mass fertilizer movement. The principal sources of fertilizer are at present animal fertilizer and green fertilizer. The quantity of animal fertilizer is determined principally by the number of domestic animals. We must, therefore, create the necessary conditions for rapidly developing the herds of domestic animals and endeavor to attain an average of 2.5 hogs, weighing more than 40 kilograms each, per cultivated hectare. In the rice-growing centers, we must increase that ratio even further. In addition to promoting pig-raising, we must improve the raising of cattle, in order to increase their draft power, increase their birth rate, and obtain fertilizer. We must build and repair pig pens, cattle pens, latrines, and fertilizer-processing sheds, in order to assure that the fertilizer is of high quality, and end the practice of letting pigs, cattle, and water buffalo roam freely, especially in the mountain region. Animal fertilizer is important, but it is limited. We must, therefore, endeavor to develop sources of green fertilizer, which is organic fertilizer with a high nitrogen content, and of which the conditions of our country allow year-round production. We have much experience in producing green fertilizer; especially important are the experiences of Thai Binh in growing water lentil, and the experiences of Vinh Phuc in growing various types of green fertilizer. Those good experiences must be widely studied and applied.

Seeds also play an important role in the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice. Appropriate investment in seed selection, and good use of seeds, are methods of intensive cultivation which begin at the beginning, are inexpensive, and are economically highly efficient.

The rapid improvement of agricultural technology, the investment of additional labor per land unit, and the improvement of implements in order to increase labor productivity, are necessary for increasing the productivity of rice. During the past several years, many cooperatives and localities have made clear progress in agricultural technology. But that progress has not been uniform. The application of technical agricultural methods has been investigated and confirmed, but they are still dependent on the zeal and preference of cooperative management committees and local echelons, and are not yet regarded as matters of production discipline. In our nation, the assurance of timely production is a very important matter which exerts a great influence on rice productivity. If there are optional working methods, and if the previously-decreed technical standards are not correctly carried out, we cannot assure the requirements of intensive cultivation and increased productivity brought forth by our Party.

Rice, like all other plants, germinates and grows in accordance with certain laws, and is greatly influenced by external conditions. Whether the application of technology is right or wrong, fast or slow, determines the results of harvests. On the basis of the growth characteristics of rice, and of the requirements of rice during each period, we must determine the order in which field work is to be done -- and that order must be adhered to -- and we must determine the technical requirements of each technical method. In the immediate future we must begin to determine some principal systems with regard to time, seeding, plowing and harrowing, transplanting, weeding, fertilizing, irrigation, harvesting, etc. When establishing production systems and technical standards, we must base ourselves on science, on the experiences of the masses, and on the local characteristics. Only thereby can we come forth with production systems and technical standards which are appropriate to the circumstances and capabilities of each cooperative, each field, and each type of rice, and only then can we truly unite the dissemination of science and technology with the experiences of the masses, so that the masses will accept and achieve the new methods. The establishment and achievement of production systems and technical standards is a step forward in the introduction of science and technology into agricultural production. That is an indispensable requirement for the cooperatives' organization of collective labor. Production systems and technical standards constitute the principal bases on which members of cooperatives may make investigations and assist one another in creating a new awareness of organization

and discipline in production.

The improvement of cultivation systems and the application of advanced technical methods can achieve good results only if they become a conscious movement of the peasant masses. Therefore, in addition to strengthening the ideological education of cooperative members, we must find leadership methods which are correct and capable of persuading and encouraging the peasant masses to advance along the path of technical improvement. Actual experience has shown that the best, most effective method is to expand the movement to create experimental rice fields, in order to combine advanced science with the age-old production experience of the local cooperative members, and establish methods of intensive cultivation and increased productivity which are appropriate to the specific local situation, thus gaining knowledge which can be applied extensively. When working experimental intensive cultivation fields we must assure the localization of scientific principles and advanced technical methods, and make scientific the good production experiences of our peasant families. If this is done, the experimental fields will serve as practical schools for teaching the peasants and persuading them to change their working methods. They will increase the peasants' confidence in their localities' capabilities for attaining intensive cultivation and high productivity, and will be places where agricultural leadership cadres, scientific and technical cadres, and peasants rich in production experience can exchange opinions and study together.

If we are to achieve high and stable productivity we must invest more work-days per land unit. Only by investing more labor can we promote the rebuilding of fields and paddies, build irrigation works, improve the soil, produce fertilizer, select seed, etc., and only thereby can we have better conditions under which to improve agricultural systems and technology, and assure the good achievement of production systems and technical standards. According to present calculations, if we are to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, every worker of age must contribute a minimum average of 250 work-days a year to collective production, and the number of work-days invested per hectare of rice must be from 300 to 400 per season. Furthermore, we are now entering strongly into the intensive cultivation of rice at a time when we must provide a very great labor force for the struggle against the American imperialists. The labor situation, therefore, is becoming very urgent. If, in our present economic and technical situation, we are to have sufficient labor to serve production and combat well, we must on the one hand endeavor to organize and use labor in general, and especially the labor of women, in a more rational manner, making full use of primary and secondary labor forces. And, on the other hand, it is also essential that we positively improve implements, apply improved and semi-mechanized implements extensively, and strongly promote the providing of small machines to cooperatives.

One thing that must be clearly understood is that labor is still plentiful in the countryside, especially in the lowlands. With those latent capabilities, labor in the countryside is not only sufficient to meet the needs of developing production, but also to meet the ever-increasing needs of combat. Investigations in a number of localities, including places which engage directly in the fighting, such as those in the area that was formerly Zone 4, prove that although the seasonal labor situation is urgent, there is no labor shortage, as some comrades stress. The principal reason why there are times when the labor situation is tense is that we do not organize our work rationally. In the immediate future, we must, in order to serve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, make extensive use of improved plows and harrows, plows pulled by teams of water buffalo, hand-held grass rake model 64A, and improved transportation vehicles and boats, while gradually equipping cooperatives with such small machines as water pumps, husking machines, feed grinders, rice threshers, etc. In order to achieve the above-mentioned tasks well, we must go all out in resisting fear of difficulty, conservatism, and lack of persistence in improving technology and building material and technical bases. We must also oppose such phenomena as failure to boldly mechanize certain aspects of cultivation or certain areas in which mechanization is both necessary and possible. If the various echelons, sectors, and cooperatives all resolutely seek all ways to achieve the Party's stand regarding the improvement of implements -- to make extensive use of improved and semi-mechanized implements and to equip cooperatives with small machines -- then even in wartime conditions the cooperatives can have all the labor needed to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice on a large scale.

Our Party's Central Executive Committee is resolutely leading the peasants in achieving intensive cultivation and increased productivity, with the immediate goal of attaining a yearly productivity of five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale, in order to strongly serve the struggle to resist America and save the nation. The various Party echelons and economic sectors must have a new way of thinking and a new style of working, in order to achieve the goals set by the Party Central Committee. Each province, each district, and each cooperative must build for itself a very strong desire to advance and a high degree of determination, must employ all means to limit and overcome the difficulties created by nature and by the enemy, and must make full use of all conditions, all facilities, and all capabilities of their localities, in order to promote the advance of agricultural production and win great victories in the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice. The industrial, commercial, communications and transportation, financial, banking, and other sectors must be clearly aware of their responsibilities in assisting the agricultural sector to achieve the Party's

present stand of increasing rice productivity to five tons per hectare. Each sector must enter deeply into the actualities of agricultural production, in order to come up with concrete plans and methods for serving agriculture, and positively achieve those plans and methods with a spirit of initiative, and not sit down wait for lower echelons to make requests or for the managerial sectors to place orders.

Our people's present mission is to resist America and save the nation. To produce while fighting is to achieve that political mission. Production must be regarded as a combat mission. The achievement of five tons of paddy per hectare must be regarded as a military order. Cadres, Party members, and the masses must be thoroughly imbued with that spirit. Only thereby can we create a high degree of determination and a strong desire to advance, and only then can we be victorious.

Our peasantry is very rich in patriotism, is very confident in the Party's leadership, is very persevering and forbearing in productive labor, highly esteems the results of its socialist labor, and is fully determined to defend, strengthen, and further develop those results. If the Party echelons and cadres descend to the base level, resolutely rely on the masses, discuss things thoroughly with the masses, hold democratic debates, resolve problems concretely, and perfectly organize the achievement of goals, we can advance agricultural production strongly and stably, and the requirement of achieving five tons of paddy per hectare will not be an impossibility. A fact which we must consider is that in the countryside our peasants have formed a new class, the collective peasant class. This collective peasant class has united, and is uniting, around the Party, and is devoting its energy and wealth to the struggle to achieve the Party's policies. Unfortunately, however, the diseases of bureaucratism and commandism are causing many of our cadres and Party members to become separated from the masses and from reality. They do not see the new developments, so they have failed to mobilize and make good use of the collective peasantry in order to achieve the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, and to achieve the Party's other policies in the countryside.

The need to develop agriculture in the new situation requires not only the strengthening of the Party's leadership and guidance at the base level, but also requires a real transformation in the leadership work of the various echelons and sectors, from the central level on down, and especially at the district level. The district committees must be true leaders of agricultural production, organize cooperative production movements, and guide the peasants in advancing strongly into the technological revolution, in order to increase the productivity of rice, of other crops, and of domestic animals. The confirmation

of the mission and position of the district echelon, and the resolute strengthening of that echelon so that it can be capable of leading and guiding agricultural production, constitute a new step forward in the strengthening of the leadership of our Party and State with regard to agriculture and agricultural production cooperatives.

The scale of cooperatives is now being expanded, the improvement of agricultural technology and the application of advanced agricultural methods are being promoted, the State's material and technical assistance to agriculture is increasing, and the cultural, technical, and socialist-awareness levels of the peasants are being raised. That situation demands that there be tighter leadership of agriculture. We must resolutely eliminate agricultural leadership methods of an administrative or handicraft nature. All echelons must give closer leadership and guidance to agriculture. The district echelon must firmly grasp the villages and cooperatives. All district committee members responsible for villages must understand all operational and managerial tasks of the cooperative, give concrete assistance to the cooperatives, and give the cooperatives assistance in drafting plans, achieving intensive cultivation, utilizing land, small machines, and irrigation works, and in developing technology, resolving material needs, organizing distribution, using labor, distributing products, carrying out financial management, etc. In the guidance of agriculture in general, and of intensive cultivation in particular, the most important matter is the guidance of production technology. If, at present, we do not understand science and technology, we cannot guide agricultural production. This is a new requirement which all agricultural leadership cadres must fully understand, so that they can be highly resolved to raise their scientific and technical levels, while resolutely guiding the masses in carrying out a technological revolution in agriculture. Only by being resolved to carry out a technological revolution in agriculture can we pay attention to studying and applying the good production experiences of advanced cooperatives, be concerned with training agricultural science and technology cadres, and have a correct attitude toward utilizing and assisting the existing agricultural science and technology cadres. The actualities of the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice during the past several years have proved that. In cooperatives and localities in which cadres have resolutely studied agricultural science and technology, strengthened their guidance of the dissemination and application of science and technology to agricultural production, and been concerned with building more and more material and technical bases for the cooperatives, rice productivity has constantly increased, and agricultural production has developed strongly and stably. On the contrary, in cooperatives and localities in which cadres fail to pay adequate attention to the matter of agricultural technology, rice pro-

ductivity cannot increase and agricultural production cannot develop strongly. It is very clear that at present, determination to resist America and save the nation, and determination to defend the North and continue to advance the North to socialism, must be manifested in determination to lead the achievement of the intensive cultivation and increased productivity of rice, and of the achievement of a yearly productivity of five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale; and it must also be manifested in determination to grasp science and technology and resolutely carry out the technological revolution in agriculture. This also serves as a standard for judging whether the class standpoints of our cadres and Party members in the countryside, and the leadership of the Party units there, are good or bad.

Finally, if we are to strongly develop agricultural production and cause it to achieve high productivity, we must pay special attention to strengthening and perfecting the new production relationships in the countryside, including the expansion of the scale of cooperatives, the advancement of cooperatives from low to high levels, the correct resolution of the relationship between the collective economy and the family economy, the acceptance of individual peasants into the cooperatives, etc. If we do not pay adequate attention to this matter there can be no basis for furthering the building of material and technical bases for cooperatives, and strongly introducing science and technology into agriculture, and therefore we cannot promote the achievement of intensive cultivation and increased productivity, and develop the cooperatives' production.

In recapitulation, if all Party echelons pay attention to improving their leadership and guidance of agriculture in the above-mentioned spirit, it is certain that we will advance agricultural production, rapidly achieve five tons of paddy per hectare on a large scale, stably resolve the food problem, and assure the victory of our people's struggle to resist America and save the nation.

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PROMOTE THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION IN AGRICULTURE

[Following is a translation of an article by
Tran Duc in the Vietnamese-language periodical
Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No. 2, February 1966,
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Five years have passed since the essential completion of agricultural cooperativization. Agriculture in the North of our nation is being transformed in all ways and is gradually entering into the technological revolution in order to develop production. What are the characteristics of this revolution? What are its basic directions and contents? What is its specific course in the new situation? These are questions which should be discussed. We have below boldly brought forth some opinions which we ask the readers to consider.

The Characteristics and Position of the Technological Revolution in Agriculture

The technological revolution in agriculture in the North of our country attacks nature in a tropical area. With our advantages with regard to climate, sunshine, temperature, etc., we have many capabilities for developing agriculture. Nature treats us well, but it will also create many difficulties and complications for us as long as our agriculture is greatly dependent on nature. The technological revolution in the agriculture of a tropical area is a very new matter for us and for the whole world as well. At present, we are seeking to discover the natural laws of development in a tropical region, so that we can carry out the technological revolution in agriculture in a manner appropriate to its natural characteristics. The process of technological revolution in agriculture is also a process of

"tropicizing" agricultural science and technology, of reforming and conquering nature, of utilizing to the highest degree the advantageous conditions and limiting and eliminating the difficulties and impediments created by nature in a tropical region, and of building and developing a prosperous and modern tropical agriculture.

The technological revolution in our agriculture take place under the conditions of backward agricultural production, of a very low land-per-person ratio, of a small and weak technical base, and of technology which is not very advanced. But we have a plentiful supply of agricultural labor, and our army of collectivized workers and peasants is very rich in revolutionary spirit and is courageous and creative in productive labor. That technological revolution will take place on the basis of our young agriculture developing gradually, with the cooperation and assistance of the socialist camp, which has modern industry and advanced science and technology. In that situation, the technological revolution in our agriculture must pass through a stage of technical improvement and technical equipping, of going from small to large and from primitive to modern, and of combining the primitive with the modern. On the one hand, we must develop to a high degree the creative labor of the peasants, make full use of latent capabilities, improve primitive technology, and achieve a new organization of labor. On the other hand, we must develop industry's role in serving agriculture and endeavor to build a new technical base for agriculture. Those two aspects are closely related, and will gradually modernize our agriculture.

The technological revolution in agriculture, as regards our over-all economy, is being carried out at a time when many nations have completed the first technological revolution and have advanced to the second technological revolution, and are entering the age of atomic power, automated production lines, and synthetic materials. Our mission is to, on the one hand, advance rapidly, strongly, and stably on the path of achieving the first technological revolution while, on the other hand, endeavoring to apply the newest findings of world science and technology. Only thereby can we hope to achieve the international level of science and technology during the next few decades. In agriculture, the features of the second world-wide technological revolution are not as clear as those of industry. Therefore, we must follow even more closely the new advances of agricultural science and technology in the world, especially the newest findings regarding tropical agriculture.

The technological revolution in our agriculture has been tied in with the revolutions in production relationships and in ideology and culture, and with the gradual advancing of agricultural development from small, individual production to large,

socialist production. After the new production relationships had been strengthened, our Party's policy was to concentrate its efforts in achieving the technological revolution, while promoting the revolution in production relationships and the ideological and cultural revolution. Since the essential completion of the socialist reform of agriculture, to say that "the technological revolution is the key" has been to say that it is the key which opens the door for agricultural development, and that it creates conditions for the advancement of the revolution in production relationships and of the ideological and cultural revolution. Therefore, the two-year irrigation movement, the movement to build fields and paddies, and the initial efforts to introduce small machinery into agriculture have promoted the expansion of the scale of cooperatives and the further strengthening and perfecting of the new production relationships, while causing everyone, especially cadres, to study culture and technology and to struggle ideologically to accept new technology. The revolutions in production relationships and in ideology and culture have, in turn, furthered the advance of the technological revolution. The constant strengthening and perfecting of the new production relationships are creating conditions for, and are necessitating, the promotion of the technological revolution, in order to develop the forces of production so that they can be appropriate to the new production relationships. Some people believe that the North of our nation has not yet entered the technological revolution because our agriculture still essentially lacks machinery. And there are people who think that a small number of cooperatives are achieving the technological revolution, and that most are only in the stage of technical improvement. The path of social development does not consist entirely of great leaps forward; it usually is a path which combines methodical development with leaps forward. Under socialism, many small steps lead to a great leap, and many attacks become a revolution. Under our conditions, this is even more clearly manifest, for we are advancing from a very low agricultural productivity, so merely the improvement of agricultural techniques or the improvement of labor implements leads to a jump in productivity. The rice productivity in thousands and tens of thousands of cooperatives has increased from two to three quintals per hectare per season for the past several years, and hundreds of cooperatives have achieved a yearly productivity of from 50 to 60 quintals per hectare. This leap forward in agriculture has been achieved principally by manual labor and by the improvement of technical methods. The building of irrigation works, the building of fields and paddies, soil improvement, the use of vehicles and boats in place of carrying poles, the use of improved plows, harrows, and rakes, the use of small machines to pump water, thresh rice, husk rice, process agricultural products, etc., constitute the content of the technological revolution which is

being carried out seethingly in the countryside.

The new situation requires that we further promote the technological revolution in agriculture, in order to strongly develop agricultural production and meet the great and urgent needs of the struggle to resist America and save the nation, and of the continuance of socialist construction under wartime conditions. If we do not concentrate our efforts in promoting the technological revolution in agriculture we cannot achieve intensive cultivation and increased productivity on all cultivated land and with regard to all types of crops and domestic animals, and therefore we cannot stably resolve the food problem and have sufficient food to defeat the American bandits, or meet the raw material needs of industry and the export needs. And only by endeavoring to promote the technological revolution in agriculture can we increase labor productivity in agriculture, in order to achieve intensive cultivation and develop the various sectors and trades, while assuring the provision of a large labor force to meet the needs of national defense and of agriculture. The promotion of the technological revolution in agriculture in the new situation clearly has an important significance with regard to the building of a strong rear area and the strengthening of our latent economic and defense capabilities, so that we can have plentiful reserves of men and materiel with which to supply the front lines.

Can we promote the technological revolution in agriculture while having to cope with the enemy's war of destruction? The experiences of producing while fighting of Vinh Linh, Quang Binh, and other provinces during the past year have shown that only with skilful production can we assure the fighting, and that if we are to have skilful production we cannot but promote the technological revolution. An important element of that revolution is the spirit of resisting America and saving the nation, which has mobilized the masses to work in the fields as enthusiastically as they fight. Because of our labor organization and management, our improvement of agricultural technology, and our building of material and technical bases during the two-year irrigation movement, our peasants have been able to do their work on time, increase the productivity of crops, and have victorious spring and fall harvests. The enemy has created difficulties for us, but in the process of struggling to overcome those difficulties we have come of age and have created new capabilities for promoting the technological revolution in agriculture. The ever-increasing need for labor has stimulated the improvement of management and technology. Our industry, especially local industry, is making great efforts to advance, in order to meet the needs of the technological revolution, and will develop its great service to agriculture. The more the enemy destroys our irrigation works and lines of communication, the more we promote the work of building

area and field dikes, the expansion of small irrigation works, the improvement of transportation facilities, the building up of local materiel stocks, etc. In recapitulation, the new situation and the new capabilities have stimulated the cooperatives and localities into developing innovations in management, technology, organization, and leadership, with which in peacetime they were less concerned. The actualities of Vinh Linh, Quang Binh, and many other places allow us to believe that we are entirely capable of promoting the technological revolution even under the circumstances of producing while fighting, if we firmly grasp the slogans of paying adequate attention to production leadership under all conditions, to relying on the masses and the cooperatives, to developing the spirit of initiative and creativity, and to overcoming all difficulties, in order to promote the technological revolution in agriculture.

The Direction and Content of the Technological Revolution in Agriculture

The long-range goal of the technological revolution is to modernize agriculture. That is the common goal of all agricultural sectors -- cultivation, animal husbandry, forestry, fishing, and secondary occupations -- and it is the direction of struggle of the cooperatives, state farms, and forestry camps. The technological revolution in agriculture must be based on the viewpoint of comprehensiveness, which means that we must not only see its relationships to the other revolutions, but all those within the technological revolution itself as well, and we must deal with each sector. Only thereby can we, when discussing both the immediate and long-range problems, assure balanced development among the various sectors. There are, of course, certain relationships among all sectors, but we must grasp the important positions of the key sectors.

The immediate goal of the technological revolution in agriculture is to struggle on the food-production front, so that our soldiers and people can eat their fill and defeat the American bandits, while providing the products needed for industry and export. That direction serves the immediate missions, while not neglecting the long-range goal of socialist industrialization.

On the food-production and industrial crop-production front we must struggle to achieve high and stable productivity. The present situation of rice-production varies from region to region: some regions have relatively high and stable productivity, while in some regions productivity is both low and irregular; in some regions productivity has begun to stabilize but is still low, while in some regions productivity is high but irregularity has not been overcome. In that complicated situation it is not correct to stress only the increasing of productivity; nor is

it correct to speak only of stabilizing productivity without struggling to increase it.

In order to stabilize and increase productivity, we must do a good job of the irrigation work. Our cooperativization is tied in irrigation; since the essential completion of cooperativization we have strengthened it with "irrigationization." The two-year irrigation movement has concluded, but that does not mean that we have ceased to carry out the irrigation work. We must continue to struggle arduously on the irrigation front for a long time to come, and we must concentrate our leadership in continuing to advance irrigation work with a new content; we must irrigate rice, other food crops, and industrial crops; achieve drainage on tens of thousands of hectares; control the Red River and many other rivers; and combine the irrigation work with such work as erosion-prevention, forestation, pisciculture, communications, and the expanding of the electricity network in the lowland countryside as well as in the mountain region. We regard the irrigation work not only as a method of the front rank, but also as a matter of policy; it is an important part of cooperativization, one in which we must concentrate capital, cadres, basic construction, implement improvement, and materiel supply.

Connected with irrigation is the fertilizer work. The North of our nation has always had year-round cultivation and four seasons of green vegetation, but our soil has often been depleted and washed out, thus becoming deficient in organic material, nitrogen, phosphorous, and lime. Therefore, the development of animal and green fertilizer, alongwith the production of such inorganiz fertilizers as nitorgen, phosphorous, and lime, will result in the constant strengthening and improving of our fields and paddies, a situation which is the opposite of the phenomenon of unpunished depletion now taking place on farms in capitalist countries. In addition to its irrigation and fertilization work, the State must cooperate with the cooperatives in improving seed stock and creating strains which are highly productive and highly resistant. Only thereby can we rapidly achieve high productivity. The production of chemical or organic insecticides is an urgent requirement for stabilizing and increasing productivity.

Animal husbandry is a large agricultural sector with great possibilities for rapid development, for it is starting at a low level. In the distant future, animal husbandry will provide much meat and milk, many eggs, and many other products for socialist industrialization. But in the near future, and for the next few years, animal husbandry must, first of all, provide draft power and fertilizer for cultivation. The basic direction for achieving abundance is to combine cultivation with animal

husbandry, so that they can propel each other forward on the path of intensive cultivation and increased productivity.

The technological revolution is a large-scale attack on nature. Nature is a complete organic body, so the reform and utilization of nature must be done from a comprehensive viewpoint, and the technological revolution must be carried out comprehensively. Furthermore, because of the needs of economic construction, of the people, and of the development of the cultivation and animal husbandry sectors themselves, agriculture must be developed in all ways. The technological revolution must be carried out even in forestry, fishing, and the secondary occupations, and not in cultivation and animal husbandry alone. The directions of forestation, pisciculture, and secondary occupations, the direction of improving technology and building material and technical bases in each sector, the laws of interdependence of plants and bacteria in forestry development, and the laws of the breeding and growth of marine animals, must be studied and applied.

If, in the technological revolution, we are, from a basic and long-range point of view, to have a great transformation in labor productivity, we must achieve a revolution with regard to implements. This revolution must be carried out under the circumstances of most of the work in the countryside being done by hand and primitive implements, of the number of yearly work-days being low, and of labor productivity being very low. Therefore, the direction of our revolution in implements is to improve primitive implements in order to advance gradually to semi-mechanization and mechanization, gradually cause handicraft labor to become machine-using labor with high productivity, and, in the process of advancing, combine improved primitive implements with semi-mechanized and mechanized implements. The tendency to demand the hasty application of mechanical implements and neglect the improvement of primitive agricultural implements is not realistic; but, on the other hand, if we stop at the improvement of primitive implements and do not boldly advance to semi-mechanized and mechanized implements, we cannot meet the ever-increasing needs of developing production.

We have learned from our experiences of the past few years that in the movement to improve implements we must do our utmost to avoid the tendency to attempt too much, and that we must concentrate on such urgent elements as transportation, weeding, and harvesting, in order to achieve great transformations in labor productivity. Our policy is to invest more labor in achieving intensive cultivation and increased productivity, and in developing the various sectors and trades, while positively improving various types of implements in order to reduce the labor invested in the non-essential sectors and invest more labor in the essential

sectors, in order to improve the quality, and assure the quantity, of the seasonal work, and in order to improve labor conditions with regard to excessively toilsome and heavy work. Our peasants are very adroit and have accumulated many skills in the course of thousands of years of handicraft labor, and they have a tradition of intensive cultivation. Therefore, we must, on the path of progressing to the mechanization of agriculture, make the fullest use of old capital, cleverly harmonize the best parts of handicraft labor with those of mechanized labor, and control and develop those good features even after agriculture has been modernized.

Our agricultural mechanization begins not with tractors but with small machines employed widely in such stationary work as pumping water, threshing rice, processing agricultural products, husking rice, sawing timber, crushing rock, molding bricks, making tiles, etc. Such labor is usually toilsome, and some tasks must be carried out even at critical times, so if we transform manual labor into machine-using labor we will save much labor, which we can invest in intensive cultivation and in developing the various sectors and trades. It is not difficult to design and manufacture such machinery, so our central industry, and even our local industry, can produce it. As far as the co-operatives are concerned, if they receive the assistance of the State in the training of cadres and workers, and in the borrowing of capital, the purchasing and employment of such machinery can be achieved widely in a relatively short period.

At present, some comrades do not have real confidence in our capabilities to provide small machinery and do not correctly evaluate the role of such machinery; therefore, they are hesitant and do not resolutely promote the providing of small machinery to the cooperatives. The development of the small machinery network in the countryside is a very important policy, one which manifests our determination to struggle to further the technological revolution in agriculture. Since we are not yet able to equip agriculture extensively with large machines, the wide dissemination of small machinery creates the initial technical bases for agriculture, and signifies an important step forward, the gradual transformation of part of handicraft labor into machine-using labor. That is something new, and has the revolutionary significance of being a small leap forward. The wide dissemination of small machines not only creates a new labor productivity and increases agricultural production, but also creates a faster working pace, promotes assembly-line production in agriculture, and stimulates the new division of labor. It will bring about new ways of thinking and new methods of working for cadres and workers, and change the custom of doing things in the old way. The dissemination of small machines is no casual matter; it is an essential part of the technological revolution in the countryside. By improving technology, improving and utilizing such simple

implements as foot-operated rice threshers, improved transportation vehicles, improved plows and harrows, improved rakes, etc., we will accumulate experience and prepare the way for a new step toward mechanized, power-driven implements. The extensive development of small machines during that stage will prepare the way for the spread of large machines, and will gradually advance agriculture to production on a larger scale. This, of course, is a new, difficult undertaking, so we must be fully determined and go all out to achieve the Central Committee's policy regarding the development of the small machine network in the countryside. We must have concrete plans and perfect preparations with regard to cadre training, machinery, motors, parts, and repairs; and we must go all out to assist the cooperatives during the initial period of utilizing small machines and pay attention to advancing from the simple to the complex. While developing the use of small machines, we must draw up plans for expanding the cooperatives' production on the basis of the productivity of small machines, and have plans for adjusting and making more rational the use of labor in the cooperatives' collective economy and in the secondary family economy of the cooperative members.

During the past several years there has been a tendency to demand the wide-spread use of tractors in agriculture, and now there is a tendency to advocate the reverse. We must guard against and overcome both tendencies. We must make good use of the existing tractors, concentrate them in the appropriate areas, and have comprehensive plans for increasing economic efficiency, while continuing to make careful studies of the mechanization of the plowing and harrowing of paddies, work in which we have attained satisfactory initial results.

In addition to the matters mentioned above, the technological revolution in agriculture must cope with other basic matters, such as forestation in seacoast areas, on hills, and even in fields and paddies, in order to serve agriculture and the lives of the people, protect harvests, improve the soil, and ameliorate the climate. We must use coal as fuel in agriculture, and use straw to improve the soil; we must exploit the alluvium of the Red River and use it on fields on a large scale, etc. There must be long-range plans for these matters, and there must be plans to achieve them step by step, so that we may have a vast program for reforming nature in the North.

Long Range and Immediate Focuses and Steps

The content of the technological revolution includes many aspects: irrigation, mechanization, electrification, chemicalization, and "scienceization." That is the content of a modern agriculture, a comprehensive system the parts of which cannot

stand alone or be separated from one another. The technological revolution must be carried out selectively; the order in which tasks should be undertaken should not be determined by the needs and development capabilities of each agricultural sector, but should be determined in consideration of the over-all circumstances of the technological revolution in the North.

The actualities of agricultural production during the past several years have fully proved that the line of agricultural development of making irrigation a first-rank means is entirely correct. But if we are to achieve irrigated agriculture we must not only build irrigation works and area and field dikes, but must also extensively develop the use of electric-powered and gasoline-powered pumps; therefore, irrigation encompasses both electrification and mechanization. Irrigation is a means of the front rank, and is the focal point of the technological revolution at the present time; only if mechanization and electrification are adequately developed can we promote the irrigation work.

Tied in with the irrigation work is the fertilizer work, in which we make organic fertilizer the principal concern, while increasing the production of inorganic fertilizer and various types of insecticides, veterinary medicines, herbicides, and animal feed. In other words, we intend to gradually achieve the chemicalization of our tropical agriculture. Some nations with much land and relatively few people have modernized their agriculture by achieving mechanization and then chemicalization; and some nations with many people and little land have first chemicalized their agriculture and then mechanized it. In view of the development needs and capabilities of agriculture, and in view of the capabilities for investing capital and carrying out the technological revolution in industry, is the path toward agricultural modernization in the North to achieve irrigation first, then chemicalization, and only then mechanization(1) and electrification? By investing in chemicalization we can attain rapid results and can recover our capital in a short period of time; but investment in the production of tractors must be relatively greater, the construction period is long, and the results attained may be to increase crop productivity, but the principal result will be to increase labor productivity. We should not, however, await the irrigation and chemicalization of agriculture before achieving mechanization and electrification. We are now creating conditions for, and are beginning to achieve in part, the mechanization and electrification of agriculture, which we will carry out extensively once we are well along in the irrigation and chemicalization of agriculture. To achieve scientific agriculture is to consciously apply natural laws, especially biological laws, to agriculture, in order to improve cultivation techniques, animal husbandry, forestation, and pisciculture. Since we have not yet electrified and mechanized agriculture, the achievement of scientific

agriculture serves to increase productivity greatly. If we build an army of technical cadres, cleverly combine theory with the traditional production experiences of the masses, and gradually build the material and technical bases needed to assure the direction of intensive cultivation, we can, within a short period of time, achieve relatively high productivity.

As regards the North as a whole, we can focus our efforts as discussed above, but as regards some regions with special characteristics, we must focus our efforts appropriately: for example, in regions with relatively dense populations and relatively good alluvial soil, such as a number of districts along the seacoast in Ninh Binh and Thai Binh, can we, until we achieve the extensive chemicalization of agriculture, carry out mechanized plowing and harrowing, following the irrigation work?

Each area can carry out the technological revolution rapidly or slowly, according to its needs with regard to the development of agricultural production, to the situation of basic construction and of the building of material and technical bases for agriculture, and to the technological revolution in the area's industry. For example, the rice-growing centers and industrial-crop-growing centers, and the animal husbandry centers in the lowlands, the midlands, and the mountain regions, will advance more rapidly than other areas. The agricultural areas near cities, because of the need to supply agricultural goods, because of the capabilities of industry in the cities to provide material and technical bases for such areas, and because of the ability of those areas to assimilate technology, the technological revolution can also advance more rapidly than in other areas. On state farms, the technological revolution can also be carried out more strongly and rapidly than in cooperatives. The direction of the technological revolution and the building of material and technical bases there must, of course, follow the common direction of the agricultural economy, which is to achieve intensive cultivation and increased productivity, make irrigation a first-rank method, stress improved primitive implements and semi-mechanized implements, combine their use with the use of mechanical implements, etc.

Whether the technological revolution in agriculture is carried out rapidly or slowly also depends on the level of use and management of the existing material and technical bases, and on the building of new material and technical bases for agriculture. Although at present the material and technical bases in some places are weak, because of good management and skilful production, such places have been able to promote the technological revolution and develop production at a faster pace than some places with stronger material and technical bases. Therefore, in addition to building new material and technical bases, we must stress the

good use and management of the existing material and technical bases, and hold high the spirit of self-reliance of each cooperative and locality, in order to further promote agronomic and animal husbandry technology and attain high productivity.

Train Cadres and Build Scientific and Technical Networks

To discuss the technological revolution without mentioning the training and utilization of technical cadres is to fail to consider the actualities of that revolution. This is a matter of great importance, and may be called the key to the technological revolution, for without technical cadres the technological revolution cannot be advanced.

During the past 10 years we have trained thousands of agricultural technology cadres, but these cadres are still too few to meet the needs of our 30,000 agricultural cooperatives. The principal reason for this is that we have not correctly understood the position and importance of the building of an army of scientific and technical cadres to serve as the backbone of the technological revolution in agricultural.

We still have a long way to go, and we are late, so we must advance more rapidly in the training of cadres, have clear directions, have specific contents, and have appropriate methods.

In training cadres we must consider both the short-range and long-range needs, and must pay attention to training all levels of cadres, from technicians to elementary, middle-level, college, and post-college cadres. If we pay attention to only the immediate needs, and not to the long-range needs, not only for the North but also for the entire nation, we cannot resolve the basic problems of our country's agriculture, a tropical, complicated, very new agriculture. This is a matter of necessity for us, one which we must resolve by ourselves, and one which no one else can do for us. On the other hand, if we pay attention only to the long-range needs and fail to consider the immediate needs, we also cannot further the advance of the technological revolution. Therefore we must, in a short period of time, concentrate on giving good training to scores of thousands of technicians and tens of thousands of lower-level and middle-level cadres, in addition to systematically training college-level technicians and scientific cadres for agriculture.

As regards the content of study, we must stress both technology and economic management, for if we know technology but not economic management, it will be difficult to introduce technology into the cooperatives. And if we are skilled in economic management but not in technology, we cannot achieve skilled management,

for the content of economic management includes technical management. The study programs of lower-level and middle-level cadres should not be all-inclusive, but should focus on the local production directions, which means that they should study only the principal local plants and domestic animals. Schools must rely on agricultural research and leadership organs, rely on the recapitulation of the experiences of heroes, warriors, and advanced cooperatives, and use science to illuminate specific experiences and to analyze, synthesize, and further perfect them. We must inaugurate a seething technical study movement among cadres and the masses, in the form of on-the-job training and night study, and include technology in cultural study curricula, as some provinces are now doing. Only thereby can we, in a short period of time, and in addition to the regular technical training, disseminate technology widely among the masses and cadres, so that it can be applied immediately to production.

In-school training must also be entirely different from that of the past; middle-level and lower-level agricultural schools are schools for training cadres who actually apply their knowledge, who practice what they preach, who must endure difficulties and hardships, who must retire late and arise early, and who must share the lives of the peasants. Middle-level schools should be placed near experimental farms, have close ties with advanced cooperatives, and have land on which their students can produce according to the local production direction, attain high productivity in plants and animals, and grow good seed stock with which to supply the cooperatives in the area. Advanced cooperatives should have lower-level schools and short-term courses in technology and management, so that these subjects can be studied on the spot, and so that high productivity can be attained.

Studying while working is a new method of training cadres, and amounts to a revolutionary transformation in cadre training; it causes students to gain knowledge effectively, so that when they leave the school they can begin producing immediately, without having to pass through a period of groping. In order to assure the good execution of this method, the schools themselves must build their material and technical bases, with appropriate assistance from the State. In addition to land for carrying out agricultural production, schools of applied agriculture must be equipped with minimum teaching aids, such as improved implements, small machines, veterinary medicine clinics for animals, etc.

In distributing cadres trained in agricultural schools, we must pay attention to three needs: teaching, research, and leadership. We must pay much more attention to teaching. If they are to teach well, teachers must be good, and only if teachers are good can cadres be well trained. We must create conditions for them to participate in labor at the schools, always be in touch with reality, and study the experiences of advanced

production units. Sending cadres to the base level is the best way to have them rapidly come of age in the course of studying daily production, and is also a way to create conditions for rapidly introducing advanced technology into state farms and cooperatives.

In addition to strengthening the State's system of agricultural science experimental stations and farms, in order to serve the long-range direction of agricultural development, we must strengthen the scientific and technical teams in agricultural cooperatives and promote the agricultural leadership cadres' movement to create experimental fields in cooperatives. In our research into agricultural science and technology, we must base ourselves principally on the realities of our country, but we must also have plans to follow closely and study the newest findings of agricultural science, especially in the fields of biology and physics, all over the world, and apply them appropriately to the circumstances of our country. We must endure difficulties and enter deeply into the production experiences of the masses, in order to select the best features of Vietnam's agriculture. We must teach the cadres to be courageous in study and research, in the fields as well as in the laboratories. We must give our utmost attention to the problems of agricultural technology, in order to meet the immediate and long-range needs, for our agricultural technology advances more slowly than that of other nations. But we should not regard scientific matters lightly, for only by going deeply into the realm of science in order to discover the laws of nature in a tropical area (about which we now know little) can we build and develop our agricultural technology, and enable it to take great leaps forward. Science must be an undertaking of the masses, and when engaged in scientific work it is essential that we follow the mass line. This truth is even more clear with regard to tropical agricultural science, which is very complicated and new. If there is no co-operation between scientific and technical cadres of the various echelons and sectors, whether they are trained in our country or abroad, and if there is no mutual assistance and confidence, we cannot build a lasting scientific base in our tropical country.

Some Matters Regarding Leadership

The technological revolution is the glorious undertaking of millions of people making a large-scale attack on nature, so it is essential that it be led by the Party. Only if it is led by the Party can the technological revolution in our country be victorious. In order to lead the technological revolution in agriculture, the Party Central Committee has brought forth great lines, directions, policies, and stands. The provincial and district echelons have the responsibility of carrying them out.

The provincial echelon is the echelon which guides both industry and agriculture. The technological revolution in agriculture is tied in with the technological revolution in industry, so if we are to advance agriculture it is essential that we strengthen our leadership of industry. The cooperativization of agriculture is a revolutionary accomplishment brought about by the dictatorship of the proletariat, so the mission of the workers is to enter into agriculture and go to the cooperatives, so that they can understand the needs of agriculture and the aspirations of the peasant masses; they should not sit passively and wait for peasants to "place orders." Industry must serve agriculture in many ways, from providing agricultural implements, machinery, fertilizer, insecticides, etc., to providing equipment for baking lime and baking bricks, resolving the peasants' fuel problems, etc. In the new situation, we must especially stress the development of local industry, so that it can be of good service to agriculture. We must develop innovations, heighten the spirit of daring to think and do, and overcome the tendencies to "wait and see" and to depend on the assistance of the central organs.

The provincial level must also make full use of the scientific and technical network, and strengthen the training, distribution, and rational use of technical cadres, in order to serve agriculture and develop the exemplary role of state farms and forestry sites with regard to cooperatives, after a distribution of managerial responsibility has been carried out.

In order to help the provincial echelon to do a good job of leading agriculture, the district echelon must firmly grasp the cooperatives and help them resolve their difficulties and develop their production. In order to achieve the technological revolution in each district, we must have plans for building such movements as the movement to build area and field dikes, the fertilizer-production movement, the collective pig-raising movement, etc.; but we should not undertake many movements at the same time. In each such movement, the leadership of the district committee must be very concentrated; the comrades in charge must roll up their trouser cuffs and work in the paddies with the masses, and, in the course of such work, gain experience with which to improve leadership and perfect organization. This is a new working method, one for which the districts are preparing in the present campaign to improve agricultural cooperative management and technology in the lowlands and midlands.

Leadership of agricultural technology must be very concentrated, especially in the present circumstances, when materials are scarce and technical cadres are few in numbers. We must follow closely the experiences of the Hung Yen provincial committee, which is transforming small electric pumping stations

into centers for technical guidance and cadre training; each station has an agricultural engineer, and agronomy, animal husbandry, mechanical, and electrical cadres. The mission of the stations is to assist the cooperatives in the area to promote the technological revolution and achieve five tons of paddy per hectare. The transformation of electric pumping stations into centers for technical guidance and agricultural cadre training is an innovation in a country which makes irrigation a front-rank method, and which uses irrigation to strengthen cooperativization after cooperativization has been essentially completed, but before tractors can be extensively produced and utilized.

In cooperatives, the Party cells are the units which lead the technological revolution. The building of "four goods" cells must be tied in with the achievement of the technological revolution; Party members must be exemplary shock troops in the attack on science and technology.

At the various echelons, from the central level to the cooperatives, we must endeavor to build an industrial style in agricultural leadership, which means that it must be urgent and concentrated, and we must oppose all manifestations of indolence, arbitrariness, etc. Our agriculture has entered upon the path of socialism, so it must be led in the style of the working class.

After we have lines, policies, and methods, and have organized their achievement, the important matter is to further investigations among the central-level sectors, strengthen the central organs' investigations of the localities, and strengthen the provinces' and districts' investigations of the cooperatives. Investigations should be made to lay bare the situation, search our reasons for shortcomings, and come up with methods for correcting them. One of the important factors is the ideological factor. A considerable impediment to the technological revolution is conservatism, which is usually camouflaged in many forms; at times it is the need to consider the local characteristics and customs of the masses, and at times it is the belief that we cannot rely on technical cadres because they are not experienced! One of the sources of this way of thinking is the influence of small production; when cadres who are accustomed to the ways of individual livelihood enter into the technological revolution, it is not easy for them to immediately become enthusiastic over what is new in the movement. We must, therefore, resist conservatism and further the mass movement in technology.

Whether the campaign to improve cooperative management and technology now taking place in the North will lead to a revolutionary high tide in agricultural production will depend on whether or not the technological revolution is broad and deep.

INTRODUCTION OF SMALL MACHINES INTO AGRICULTURE

[Following is a translation of an article by Vo Quy Huan in the Vietnamese-language periodical Hoc Tap (Studies), Hanoi, No. 2, February 1966, pages 81-89.]

Some Initial Results

During the past several years we have introduced small machines into the stationary production tasks of a number of agricultural cooperatives. This has had the good result of contributing to the promotion of production, increasing the actual income of cooperative members, and reducing the hard labor of peasant families. Many cooperative members have become familiar with machinery and have studied machine operation. After the introduction of machines and motors, in some places the rays of electric lights spread throughout hamlets and villages, and conditions were created for improving the people's cultural life and bringing a new outlook to the countryside.

At present, nearly 700 cooperatives have been equipped with powered machinery (powered by internal combustion engines or electric motors), in order to mechanize such tasks as rice threshing, rice husking, animal feed pressing and chopping, rush processing, etc. (not to mention water-pumping installations). Because the level of leadership and organization, the level of machine management and utilization, the size and types of machines (internal combustion or electric-powered), and the scale of cooperatives and the value of work points, vary from place to place, the results attained have also varied. Generally speaking, however, all cooperatives have attained higher productivity, and their work has become less toilsome. For example, the average production of a person using a rice thresher is from two to three

times greater than that of a person operating a foot-powered thresher, and is even higher in comparison to places which flail rice. The cost of threshing one ton of paddy is from 20% to 60% less, and the time required for rice harvests has also been greatly reduced. In many cooperatives, in rice-threshing alone from 1,000 to 3,000 work days have been saved, and from each quintal of straw an additional 5-10 kilograms of inferior paddy rice has been obtained for use as animal feed. Because they have rice-threshing machines, many cooperatives have restored and developed the growing of rice with stiff stems and high productivity, which they in the past did not like to grow, for the threshing of that variety of rice required a great deal of very toilsome labor. Furthermore, because harvesting is done rapidly and the fields are cleared early, plowing and harrowing have been done on time. And because there is a saving in labor, intensive cultivation and irrigation can be promoted and full use can be made of the cultivated acreage.

A rice husking machine powered by a 15-20 hp motor can husk from five to six tons of paddy a day, and can replace about 100 people. The ratio of rice and bran obtained from a quintal of paddy is higher than that attained by manual husking, and the cost of husking is from 1.20 to 1.50 dong per quintal, while the cost of husking rice by manual methods is from four to five dong. With machinery to do the work for them, cooperative members do not spend as much time processing rice, and they have more time to rest, study, relax, care for animals, etc.; this is especially important for women who are pregnant or have children to care for.

The average productivity of a person using a machine to press animal feed is usually from 50 to 60 times greater than that of people who do the work by hand. In the pressing of inferior rice and bran alone, cooperatives save thousands of work-days a year. The cost of this work is also much less. In the pressing of dried manioc, beans, and shelled corn, the productivity is from 20 to 30 times greater than that attained by hand pressing, the fineness of the machine-ground feed cannot be attained by hand, and the cost of pressing is from 1.5 to 2.5 dong per quintal. With pressing machines, cooperatives have been able to convert such materials as peanut shells, corn husks, and manioc peels into animal feed. Pressing machines not only create sources of cheap feed for developing animal husbandry, but also contribute to the good resolution of the processing of non-rice food crops into tasty foodstuffs for human consumption.

By splitting rush by machine instead of by hand, we can increase productivity from 8 to 12 times. The productivity of motor-powered rush splitting machines is from four to six times greater than that of foot-powered machines. Because the processing time is short, the rush is white and attractive. Because they have machines, the handicraft sectors using rush as a raw

material are promoted, there are more consumer goods for our people, and there are more goods for export.

Some provinces which recapitulated the results of their use of small machinery in 1963 and 1964 learned that by using small machines they saved work-days which they could invest in intensive cultivation and in expanding production. In the Hong Ky Cooperative (Thanh Hoa) the cooperative members are able to invest more labor in production than they could before they had machinery, and they have added 27 hectares of spring rice and 55 hectares of fall rice. The cooperative has also increased its production of foodstuffs by completely harvesting the spring rice, the fall rice, non-rice food crops, and such industrial crops as tobacco, peanuts, and mulberry. Therefore, the incomes of the cooperative members have increased greatly. Furthermore, because they use machinery, their working methods have been improved and the way has been opened for the cooperatives to advance organizationally and managerially.

Although small machinery initially requires large amounts of capital, the economic results attained by such machinery are not insignificant. Within two or three years, therefore, a cooperative can recover its investment. For example, the Hong Ky Cooperative, a hamlet-sized cooperative with 264 households and 567 hectares of cultivated land, was equipped with an internal combustion engine, eight rice-threshing cylinders, a rice husker, an animal-feed press, a small electric generator, and a fan, at the cost of about 15,000 dong. Each year it has made profits of about 10,000 dong. The Dai Dong Cooperative (Ha Tay), with 168 households and 260 hectares of paddies, was equipped with only a 1,000 dong rice threshing machine equipped with a conveyor belt and powered by a pump motor. During the recent spring harvest it saved 1,150 work-days worth .77 dong each, and 350 buffalo work-days worth two dong each, and obtained two tons of paddy rice from the straw; the total saved, not counting the cost of operating the machine, was 1,700 dong.

Actualities have proved that nearly all of the cooperatives which have used small machines in stationary production have affirmed that their working conditions have been improved, the lives of their members have been improved, and the atmosphere in the cooperatives has become happier and more enthusiastic. The use of small machinery has also exerted a good political influence: it has caused peasants to see the path of development of agriculture in our country, and to see the extremely important position of socialist industrialization in the North and the ties between industry and agriculture. The use of small machinery has become an urgent need for cooperatives, in order to further the development of agricultural production in accordance with the needs and missions of the new situation. Only by introducing small machines

into agriculture can we strongly develop the superiority of cooperatives, contribute to the promotion of the technological revolution in agriculture, and rapidly build a socialist countryside in the North of our country.

During the past several years the number of cooperatives equipped with small machines has increased, but this work is proceeding too slowly. As of now, only about 2.2% of the cooperatives (not counting small water-pumping installations), have been equipped with small machines. Considering each province separately, the highest level of machine-equipped cooperatives is now 4.5%, and the lowest is .5%.

Some Deficiencies and Obstacles

The term "small machinery," as it is usually used in industrial nations, refers to small machines that are small in output, size, and weight, in distinction to medium-sized, large, and heavy machinery. Whether a machine is small, large, or medium-sized depends also on the type of machine and the standards of each nation. Included in small machinery are very precise, highly technical machines. Under the agricultural conditions of our nation, our viewpoint toward small machinery is that it is equipment with small output, of uncomplicated construction, of medium weight, with productivity which is appropriate to small production, and which is relatively simple to operate, is easily repaired, is made of ordinary materials, is inexpensive, and is appropriate to the levels and capabilities of cooperatives in the present stage of development.

Some cooperatives have the viewpoint that small machines are machines that are small in size and weight, and do not consider their output, composition, or technology, so there have been such distorted phenomena as using Soviet DKU pressing machines with an output of one ton per hour and four-to-five tons per hour, at a time when the cooperatives raise about 100 hogs (in the Soviet Union, these machines are usually used in animal-husbandry installations with from 5,000 to 10,000 hogs). Some places experimentally use Japanese-made vegetable-chopping machines with very high productivity (in 10 minutes they can chop enough vegetables to feed 100 hogs for a day); although this machine is small, it is not appropriate to our cooperatives' present characteristics and conditions of use.

The use of small machinery in the cooperatives' stationary production is a necessary step on our path of agricultural mechanization. For a not very short period, while handicraft and semi-mechanized production comprise a large proportion of all production, and while large-machine production is unable to develop strongly, small-machine production is a step forward,

and is a preparatory step for a strong transformation in over-all production. During the stage in which our production tools advance from manual tools to mechanized tools, semi-mechanized tools are machines which are not motor-driven, which means that they are driven by manpower or animal-power. Small machines are machines which are motor-driven, and represent a step in the transformation from incomplete machines to relatively complete machines, with which to advance to modernization. Therefore, carried out parallel to the development of improved and semi-mechanized implements, the development of small machinery opens the way to, and contributes importantly to, the mechanization and electrification of agriculture. Actualities have proved that improved and semi-mechanized implements create conditions for advancing to mechanization, and that mechanization furthers the development of improved and semi-mechanized implements. For example, if we advance from hand-rotated rice threshers to foot-powered rice threshers, then to rice threshers powered by gasoline or electric motors, then such tasks which serve threshing as harvesting, transportation, winnowing, etc., must also be improved, so that they can keep up with the demands of rice threshing. It is clear that among the various tasks, the various kinds of equipment affect one another, assist one another, and promote one another's development; therefore, many kinds of new equipment must be introduced into the various tasks of agricultural production.

We must, therefore, endeavor to find out why, since our peasants need small machines, and since we have the actual capabilities to meet that need, the equipping of cooperatives with small machines has not developed. What shortcomings and obstacles have held back the rate of development of small machinery?

This is a very complicated matter which which is related to our awareness of the Party's line of technological revolution in agriculture, and to the application of that line in actual work. Having made preliminary recapitulations of the use of small machines in cooperatives in a number of provinces, we have noted the following:

First of all, a fairly large number of our cadres do not yet fully understand the position of agriculture in the socialist industrialization of the North of our nation. Actualities have shown more and more clearly that if we do not have a developing agriculture to supply food, raw materials, and labor to industry, and if the countryside does not become a vast market for industry, industry cannot develop strongly. But if we are to strongly develop agriculture we must, as regards the strengthening and perfecting of the new production relationships, endeavor to build the cooperatives' material and technical bases, and achieve the technological revolution in agriculture. In this technological revolution, the mechanical element is the most basic. In the

present situation, our mechanization of agriculture is still beset with many difficulties in motive power, fuel, machinery, specialized workers, technical cadres, etc. In the immediate future, therefore, the use of small machines is extremely important. Many believe that the mechanization of agriculture must revolve around plowing and harrowing, harvesting, and transportation, tasks which require large amounts of labor and exert direct influences on intensive cultivation and the expansion of production; therefore, they do not pay adequate attention to the use of small machines in stationary production, and do not see that stationary production is also very important, usually accounting for a rather large proportion of all work invested in agriculture. For example, in many places irrigation still accounts for as much as 15%-20% of all work involved in growing one mu of rice; and the work required to process rush and hemp is from 30% to 80% of the work required to grow one mu of rush or hemp. Therefore, during the next few years we must, in addition to gradually expanding experimentation in the mechanization of non-stationary production, tasks which are still beset with many difficulties, achieve the mechanization of some stationary tasks, which is work appropriate to the present capabilities and levels of our industry and agriculture.

Because agricultural production has developed relatively well during the past few years, some cadres and cooperative members have become satisfied with their results, and believe that the rice productivity attained during the past two years is quite high, and difficult to surpass. Therefore, they do not resolutely invest in small machinery for stationary production in order to have large amounts of labor to invest in the intensive cultivation of crops. On the other hand, many other comrades, while guiding the equipping of cooperatives with machinery, over-simplify the situation; they hear that it is profitable to use machines and hastily buy some, but fail to make careful studies or consider the economic efficiency of the machines, so when they encounter difficulties they do not try to overcome them, but quickly conclude that such machinery is not appropriate to the local agricultural conditions. Other cadres have the disease of "formism"; when equipping cooperatives with machinery they do not consider the results or how the machinery should be used.

Because they do not fully understand the role of agriculture with regard to industry and to the over-all national economy, many comrades in the industrial sector do not give much thought about how to be of good service to agriculture. Such phenomena as selling bad machines, not testing them carefully for the cooperatives, selling machines at high prices, failing to find out what the machines are to be used for, and failing to assist the peasants to operate and repair the machines, still persist. Although we may encounter many difficulties in equipping

agriculture with small machines, the cadres of the industrial sector should not sit down and wait for agriculture to "place orders," but must positively go to the base level, fully understand the needs of the localities, and serve those needs well.

Secondly, there is not yet concentrated and comprehensive leadership of this work, and there is no organization responsible for unifying and coordinating the work. At present, many sectors and organizations are engaged in this work, but responsibilities, rights, and division of labor are not really clear, and there is no coordination among the various parts. That situation prevails in all localities. As regards the supply and distribution of raw materials, finished materials, and fuel, and the organization of repair work and the training of managerial cadres and cooperative members to be responsible for machinery, it has not been clearly determined which organs are responsible for accomplishing such tasks; the resolution of such work must usually pass through many channels, and requires a great deal of unnecessary red tape, so many obstacles are created for the guidance of their achievement.

The determination of models and the introduction of each kind of machinery to cooperatives have not been done well, so there has arisen the situation of buying machines on sight, without examining their appropriateness to the needs of the cooperatives. Trial production should, of course, be concentrated in one installation for the purpose of studies and experiments, but three or four places have obtained models for trial production. If, before their final form has been determined, they are subjectively changed, the results attained will be few, expenses will be great, and cooperative members will become discouraged and will lose hope.

Motors are the decisive elements of small machinery, but their output (size and horsepower) has not been determined and made appropriate, so machines are manufactured in different sizes (from 5-6 hp to 20-25 hp). With regard to power, some places should use electricity, and some should use internal combustion engines. Since this has not been determined, many cooperatives have been confused; some places are waiting for high-tension lines to be laid through their areas before developing the use of small machinery; some places have bought machinery but do not yet have electricity, so they allow their machines to remain idle for years; and some places try to obtain internal combustion engines when they have insufficient capital or raw materials. That situation both creates difficulties for cooperatives and limits their capability to develop the use of small machines.

We have provided several kinds of machines and motors to cooperatives, but their quality is not yet good and their prices are high. And prices vary greatly from province to province

(for example, rice huskers cost 900-1,000 dong in one place, and from 1,700 to 2,500 dong in another). Trail machines which are not good and which have not been tested have been sold to co-operatives; the machines had to be repaired many times, thus a situation has arisen which has created difficulties and expenses for the cooperatives.

Manufacturers and producers have not only failed to go to the local level to grasp needs and study the local production characteristics, in order to design and improve machinery which is appropriate to the needs of the peasants; but they have also failed to give their assistance in guiding the peasants in using, adjusting, and repairing the machines, and to supply spare parts and accessories to the users. Agricultural production is production which is very seasonal; tardiness in one sector will adversely influence a cooperative's sowing or harvesting. If machinery which is not good and long lasting performs poorly or breaks down during busy periods, difficulties will be created for the mobilization of manpower, and the cooperatives' income will be adversely affected. The organization and planning work, and the guidance of local planning and manufacture, have not been well done. Those deficiencies manifest an insufficiently strong will to serve agriculture, and insufficiently close relationships between industry and agriculture. Such existing capabilities as provincial and district mechanical installations, tractor teams, pumping machines, production technology offices, agricultural implement offices, planning offices, etc., have not been fully utilized, and these organizations have not achieved a division of labor or cooperated in carrying out the equipping of small cooperatives with small machinery.

Some policies and systems, such as taxation and profit-calculation in some enterprises with regard to machinery, the borrowing of capital, and some cooperatives' work-point-calculation policies with regard to cooperative members who are machine operators, still have their irrational points. The matter of managerial cadres and mechanical workers has become a great difficulty to which we must give our attention and resolve, while the use of small machinery is still expanding.

The third reason is a technical matter. The number of small machines in cooperatives is not very great; they have not been well used, output and fuel have been wasted, the economic efficiency of the machinery has not been fully developed, many machines break down quickly, and the life of the machinery is too short.

There are many reasons why a machine wears out quickly or breaks down. In addition to the above-mentioned deficiencies, in manufacture, there are such deficiencies in the use, maintenance,

and repair of machines as the subjective and technically incorrect building of machines, failure to firmly anchor the machines to their bases, so that when they run they shake excessively. In some places the machines are anchored down on all sides and cannot move laterally, but they can still move vertically. If the power train of a machine is not installed symmetrically and in balance, the machine will vibrate and rapidly break down, and much fuel or electricity will be consumed. Such phenomena as the axle mounting of a threshing machine being worn down as much as 10 millimeters during one season, broken pulleys, and wooden machinery frames becoming loose, occur constantly. Furthermore, when assembling the machines, many places still fail to pay attention to the safety of the people operating and using the machines.

Because our technical level is low, there are many deficiencies in the use of machines. Some places are afraid to let their machines run at the designated speed (as marked on the machine) and usually operate them at slower speeds or at excessively slow speed (below the allowable rate), so some machines quickly break down, and a great deal of fuel is consumed. Nearly all cooperative members responsible for machines do not have the essential knowledge about the intimate relationships among the output, operating cycles, and productivity of machines, so that they can make the fullest and most rational use of the machines when operating them. They also lack the working method of inspecting the machines, lubricating them, and listening to them in order to find out whether they are operating normally or not. They do not watch the temperature of the machines, and often do not know anything is wrong until the axle mounting is burning up and smoking. Machines which are not covered or carefully cleaned, and machines in which the axle heads are full of straw and the bearings are covered with dust, thus causing the machines to run heavily, consume a great deal of fuel and lubricants, and wear out rapidly. Machinery which is not repaired and well maintained after it is used is machinery which will operate badly during the coming season. If we do not pay attention to overcoming the above-mentioned situations, they will adversely affect the rate of expanding the use of small machinery in the cooperatives.

The repair of equipment is all but unorganized; most of the repair work is done by the cooperatives themselves. In the cooperatives near cities or industrial enterprises, the repair work is in part assured. As for the other cooperatives, they are experiencing great difficulties with regard to repairs and replacement parts. There are many pleas for repairs. The manufacturing enterprises do not pay attention to providing various kinds of replacement parts, have not determined the rate of part wear in relation to the time of use, and have not set life-expectancy limits. The production of many machine parts is not unified, so there have been cases of people having to take a

machine tens of kilometers to an enterprise for repair because only one small part was broken.

In recapitulation, in addition to introducing small machines into cooperatives, we must pay attention to resolving well and in time the above-mentioned problems; if we fail to do so, when the number of cooperatives equipped with small machines increases from hundreds to tens of thousands, there will be a great waste of the peasants' wealth and labor, and the development of small machines will be greatly limited.

Promote the Equipping of Cooperatives with Small Machines

We are endeavoring to, within a few more years, equip nearly all cooperatives with small machines. According to statistics, we now have about 32,000 cooperatives, of which 22,414 are in the lowlands and midlands, and 9,921 in the mountain region. We are now making studies to gradually consolidate the small cooperatives into large cooperatives with from 100 to 200 hectares. Our struggle goal is to, by the end of 1967, complete the equipping of agricultural cooperatives with 10,000 small machines. If we are to achieve that goal we must have correct awareness, great determination, and positive and comprehensive methods.

Under the circumstances of producing while fighting and preparing to fight to resist America and save the nation, the promotion of agricultural production is extremely important. We are determined to, under all conditions, strongly develop agricultural production, in order to strengthen our latent economic and defense capabilities. If this is to be done we must, in addition to improving management, endeavor to improve the cooperatives' techniques. The Party Central Committee has the policy of equipping each cooperative of from 100 to 200 hectares with a 10-20 hp motor, in order to develop the network of small machines, and regards them as "initial technical equipment bases for agricultural cooperatives which we must struggle resolutely to build well, with the all-out efforts of our industry and the assistance of the fraternal nations."(1)

In a cooperative, the use of small machinery in stationary production tasks has the practical effect of contributing to the raising of labor productivity and the saving of manpower, especially during urgent seasonal periods, creating conditions for achieving the rational distribution of labor, and serving intensive cultivation and the development of production. We must cause every cadre and cooperative member to see clearly the importance of small machinery to the mechanization and modernization of our country's agriculture, so that they can resolutely overcome

difficulties, study the experiences of other cooperatives, and gradually utilize small machinery in the appropriate tasks, thus achieving high economic efficiency.

As regards organization, the important points that must be resolved are the distribution of labor, the clear division of responsibility among organs responsible for guiding all aspects of the work, the coordination of activities among the various sectors and ministries, the promulgation of systems and policies, the creation of plans to develop the use of small machinery, the study and production of machines and motors, the supplying of finished and raw materials, the organization of repair, the guidance of machine use, the training of machine operators, etc.

We must pay attention to doing a good job of testing and of selecting equipment models of sizes and output that are appropriate to each kind of cooperative. On the basis of the machinery now in use (including both domestically-produced and imported machinery), we must make initial conclusions about the good points and bad points of each kind of machine, in order to select those models which are relatively appropriate to the economic needs and technology of the various production tasks in the cooperatives. The machines which prove to be good will be chosen as models for manufacture and trial production, then they will be produced in large numbers, according to need. The machines which meet only the minimum needs of production, and in the use of which there are still important weaknesses, must be improved, then manufactured on a trial bases and reinvestigated. Machines which are not appropriate must be eliminated.

In addition to making selections, the engineering organs and manufacturing enterprises have the permanent responsibility of following closely the use of the machines in production, and of studying their improvement in order to raise the level of advancement of the machines. The selection of machines does not have to be done all at once. Each year we should, in accordance with the actual results of the use of machines, make further selections and study their improvement. Technical progress advances rapidly during the design and utilization stages. The users themselves may immediately discover various weakpoints in the machines used under the agricultural conditions of our country. Therefore, machines must be constantly improved and must incorporate innovations, this year's model must be different from last year's, the number of types and models must increase constantly, and quality must constantly improve. Furthermore, in determining the economic efficiency of a type of machine, we must avoid making hasty decisions or basing ourselves only on machine users who are not yet expert, then coming to the conclusion that a certain machine is not appropriate to the local characteristics.

As regards utilization and the organization of repair work, we must establish regulations for using and maintaining the machines, and we must constantly observe and assist the small-machine installations which are now operating. In the immediate future we can organize the repair of small machines on the spot, in coordination with mobile repair teams operated by the provinces. The mobile repair teams have the mission of going to the production bases themselves in order to make repairs and assist the cooperative members responsible for machinery to repair and operate the machines well.

The training of technical workers and cadres is very important for assuring that the machines run well, operate uniformly, and have high output. The aim should be to train young cooperative members with from seven to ten years of popular-school education. We must pay attention to making full use of and strengthening the military personnel who serve as vehicle drivers, military engineers, and ordnance personnel in the army. We can send retirement-age machine workers in state-operated enterprises to the cooperatives in order to assist and supervise the young workers who have just been trained. The sending of some young cooperatives to central-level and local state-operated enterprises for study and supervision is a very good method to train machine workers for the cooperatives. The work-point policy with regard to cooperative members responsible for machinery must be appropriately resolved; there must be incentives for technically-trained people, but we must also pay attention to ideological education, in order to assure unity between cooperative members who are peasants and those who are responsible for machinery. Furthermore, we must pay attention to guiding the cooperatives in doing a good job of all aspects of the management work, and when they begin to obtain machines, the cooperative management work must undergo many changes. We must reorganize labor and promote the improvement of implements in the relevant sectors, so that the efficiency of the machines can be increased and so that work done by machines can always mesh with work done by hand. Such production management work as managing the sowing and transplanting plan, managing the crop-tending plan, managing the harvesting plan, etc., must also be improved, and there must be plans for developing the necessary sectors and trades, in order to make full use of all advantages brought about by the machines.

Finally, in order to assure that the use of small machines develops rapidly and is of good service to the direction of agricultural production, we must pay attention to strengthening the education and ideology work, develop the spirit of daring to think and do, overcome conservatism and timidity, and avoid such tendencies as over-simplification, "formism," not making careful calculations and preparations, and not paying attention to economic efficiency. We must overcome the tendency to regard

lightly the improvement of implements and the use of semi-mechanized implements in the relevant sectors, for only thereby can we cause the various production elements to work harmoniously, and only thereby can we rationally organize our labor force.

The objective realities of cooperativized agricultural production demand that we strongly introduce small machines into the stationary production tasks, for small machines have contributed to increasing the productivity and quality of labor, to increasing the volume of agricultural goods, to lowering production costs, to increasing the incomes of cooperatives, to improving working conditions and the lives of the cooperative members, and to preparing a base advantageous for advancing to the expansion of mechanization and electrification in the countryside.

- (1) Le Duan, "Transform the Leadership of the Various Echelons and Sectors and Endeavor to Build an Economically and Defensively Strong North," Hoc Tap, No. 10, 1965, page 3.

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