

Plekhanov



*FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF MARXISM*

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G. V. PLEKHANOV

FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS
OF MARXISM



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PREFACE

Fundamental Problems of Marxism was brought out by G. Plekhanov in 1908. Together with his works *The Development of the Monist View of History*, *Essays on the History of Materialism*, and other writings, *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* is the finest "exposition of the philosophy of Marxism". In terms of time, it was Plekhanov's last major work dealing systematically with the philosophico-historical aspect of Marxism. It was written for the symposium *The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Death of Karl Marx*, but Plekhanov refused to have it published there, since he did not wish to appear in print together with P. Yushkevich and other revisionists, whose views he very properly considered incompatible with Marxism.

* * *

Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov was an outstanding disciple and follower of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, the founders of scientific socialism. For long years he conducted fruitful activities in spreading and substantiating Marxist revolutionary theory, winning widespread recognition in Russia and elsewhere as a leading propagandist of Marxism and an authority on the socialist movement.

The first Marxist in Russia, Plekhanov was the author of a number of outstanding works on philosophy, literature, art, atheism, and the history of social theories and social thought. In the twenty years between 1883 and 1903, when he joined the Mensheviks, he "wrote a large number of splendid essays, especially those against the opportunists, Machists and Narodniks".*

Following the year 1903 Plekhanov veered towards the Right, went over to a Menshevik stand, and became the theorist of the Russian brand of opportunism.

His political defection was the result of his failure to

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 358.

understand the essence of the new epoch of imperialism and his inability to creatively apply Marxism in the new conditions of political development. Another reason was his long residence abroad, the consequent isolation from the Russian revolutionary movement leading to his absorbing not only the positive experience of Western Social-Democracy's revolutionary struggle, but also the vices of the leaders of the Second International, with whom he was closely connected. All these factors contributed to Plekhanov's inconsistency, and were the source of his errors, and his departure from Marxism in such questions as those of the motive forces and the character of the proletarian revolution, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the hegemony of the proletariat, the State, and so on. The same causes led to his non-acceptance of the Great October Socialist Revolution; he considered that backward Russia lacked the cultural "level" required for socialism, and that the proletariat could hardly rely on backing from the peasants. The erroneousness of his views was to be revealed by the course of history.

Though he held a Menshevik stand on the basic issues of the politics and tactics of the working class, Plekhanov nevertheless waged a resolute struggle against all possible bourgeois-idealistic conceptions in philosophy and sociology, and came out in defence of the philosophical foundations of Marxism. After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution in Russia, and particularly in the years between 1908 and 1912, a new sharpness came into the struggle waged by Marxism, in the field of science and philosophy, against bourgeois ideology, Machism, and vulgarisation of Marxism. The anti-Marxists were out to revise and "annihilate" the philosophy of Marxism, scientific socialism, and the economic theory of Marx. These attempts to revise Marxism by means of idealistic and vulgar-materialist distortions were referred to by Lenin, and came in for attention from Plekhanov. The latter was the only leader of the Second International to defend the philosophy of Marxism, particularly in his *Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Materialismus Militans, Utopian Socialism of the Nineteenth Century*, and a number of other writings on philosophy. In these, he criticised Machism and the Russian adherents of Mach, as well as other brands of idealists; he unmasked the Shulyatikov type of vulgarisers of Marxism,

defended the materialist and libertarian traditions of Russian philosophical thought against attacks on the part of the *Uekhi* group and the "Religious Seekers", and upheld materialism in literature and art. Lenin had a high opinion of Plekhanov's activities, during these years, in the sphere of theory.

* * *

The proposition from which *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* proceeds and is consistently maintained and superbly defended, is that Marxism is an integral world-outlook, single and indivisible. Various ideologists of the bourgeoisie have tried to "supplement" Marxism, now with Kantian philosophy, now with that of Mach or other reactionary systems of philosophy. Plekhanov remarked ironically that Marx can be supplemented even with Thomas Aquinas, and that the Catholic world may at some time produce a "thinker" to perform this "feat in the sphere of theory". Plekhanov was indeed looking into the future, for the obscurantist neo-Thomists of today are doing all they can to "supplement" and "blend" Marx with the reactionary philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, to find some kind of denominator common to them, and to adapt Marxism to mystical theological theories.

Plekhanov turned to Ludwig Feuerbach, the immediate precursor of Marxism in the field of philosophy, and showed that Feuerbach's materialist solution to the basic problem in philosophy was accepted by Marx and Engels, and "became the foundation of their philosophy". Like Feuerbach, Marx and Engels recognised the unity, but not identity, of thinking and being, of the subject and the object. The Marxist theory of cognition, like that of Feuerbach, is materialist.

Marx and Engels were conscious materialists, Plekhanov wrote, thereby emphasising the groundlessness of all "reasons" brought forward to show the need to supplement Marxism with a leavening of idealism. Plekhanov's chief concern was to follow up the kinship of Marx and Engels's materialist views with those of Feuerbach, Spinoza and other materialists of the past. When he called Marx's materialism a kind of Spinozism, or equated the materialism of Marx and Engels with that of Feuerbach (see pp. 14-15 and 19-24 in this book), Plekhanov was off the mark, though it would not be quite right to regard this as an equating of Marx's materialism with

the philosophy of Spinoza or Feuerbach. Considerable space in *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* is given to an analysis of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*, this analysis being used by Plekhanov for what is on the whole a closely reasoned exposition of Marx's criticism of the limitedness of Feuerbach's contemplative materialism. Plekhanov's purpose is to trace that which in Marx "was quite different from the world-outlook of Feuerbach". It is from this standpoint that the views of Marx and Feuerbach are compared in this book. Plekhanov points out that Marx brought a new element into Feuerbach's concept of the interaction between object and subject: with Marx the subject is a being that acts, and not merely contemplates Nature. However Plekhanov is in serious error in his analysis of Marx's theory of cognition, whose distinctive feature is a consideration of the process of cognition in connection with practice, with the concrete socio-historical activities of people engaged in production. Therein lies the primary distinction between the Marxist and the Feuerbachian theories of knowledge, but Plekhanov speaks merely of the "masterly correction" made by Marx to Feuerbach's epistemology, and fails to emphasise that it was Marx who brought into the theory of knowledge, as its source and foundation, a dialectical understanding of social man's revolutionary and critical activities, and socio-historical practice.

Plekhanov sees the important shortcoming in Feuerbach's philosophy—the latter's ignoring of dialectics and his idealistic understanding of history. Plekhanov regards Marx and Engels's development of the correct method of cognition of the world as a signal achievement. Hegel's idealistic dialectics "was placed by Marx on a materialistic foundation", this being the fundamental distinction between Marx's dialectic and that of Hegel. Plekhanov also shows the difference between Marxist dialectic as a theory of development, and the vulgar "theory of evolution", of gradual stages, which denies revolutionary transitions and leaps in Nature and history. He cites Herzen's words that dialectic is "the genuine algebra of revolution. . . . With Hegel, however, this algebra remained entirely unapplied to the burning problems of practical life . . . it is quite different with Marx's materialist philosophy, in which revolutionary 'algebra' manifests itself with all the irresistible force of its dialectical method".

Plekhanov quotes a number of Marx's well-known statements on materialist dialectic in order to emphasise the importance of the latter as the most trustworthy weapon in the theoretical and practical struggle. "Here we have before us," Plekhanov writes, "a genuine 'algebra'—and purely materialist at that—'of social development' . . . which will lead to the downfall of the old mode of production, or, as Marx expresses it, of the old social order, and to its replacement by a new mode."

In the following sections of the book, Plekhanov shows the reader the most important aspects of the materialist understanding of history, and in the first place the causes of the development of social life, which causes he sees in the growth of the productive forces and in the changes they bring about in production relations. At the same time the author is interested in the part played by geographic environment in social development, seeing in that environment an indispensable condition of the life of society. He very properly takes account of the influence of natural conditions on the social process, in which connection he speaks of the indirect influence exerted by climate, and shows in detail that "the influence of the geographic environment on social man is a variable magnitude", which changes with each new step in historical development, together with man's greater power over Nature. At the same time Plekhanov is prone to exaggerate the importance of geographic environment, considering, as he does, that "the properties of the geographic environment determine the development of the productive forces. . . ." This led him to underrate the proposition that the state of the productive forces has its own sources of development, and is linked up with the history of society, so that it is mistaken to see these sources only in the conditions of the environment.

Marxism teaches that a knowledge of the economy is not enough for an understanding of the history of society; ideology and social consciousness too must be studied. To make this proposition clearer to the reader, Plekhanov provides him with a scheme of human society, of social being and social consciousness, summed up in a five-point formula (see p. 70).

This formula graphically shows the place of all "forms" of social development, and especially the dependence of

social consciousness on social being. Yet it has the defect of being sketchy, and, what is more important, it does not reveal fully enough the inherent links between any socio-political structure and ideology.

Of great value is Plekhanov's decisive rejection of the accusation levelled by Bernstein and other revisionists that Marxism is "one-sided" and imbued with "economic" materialism. He attacks any vulgarisation of the materialist understanding of history, and any tendency to explain the history of ideas as the direct outcome of economic influence. He shows in detail that Marx and Engels were far from ignoring the role of the superstructure, of the political and ideological factors of social life, and the latter's influence on the basis. Marx says that any social movement is explained by the economic development of society, but only in the final analysis, that is to say, it presupposes the intermediate effect of a number of other superstructural factors.

Prominent in the book is Plekhanov's defence, against any distortion, of Marx's tenet regarding the active role of the masses in the socio-historical process, and freedom and necessity. Plekhanov shows that history is made by men in consequence of necessity, and that therefore it is mistaken to contrapose objective necessity and the strivings of men.

"Once necessity is given, both its consequences and those human strivings that are an inevitable factor of social development are given too." Human strivings do not exclude necessity, but are determined by that necessity. Human activities and the appearance of aims in social man stem from the necessary course of economic development, in which the influence exerted by man plays an active part.

Plekhanov's *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* presents not only historical but topical and living interest. Today too attempts are being made to "refute" the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, and to falsify historical materialism in the spirit of "economic" materialism; idealist conceptions of social progress are being propagated. Though written half a century ago, this book is rendering service in unmasking both present-day bourgeois sociologists and present-day revisionists of Marxist philosophy.

V. Fomina

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF MARXISM

Marxism is an integral world-outlook. Expressed in a nutshell, it is *contemporary materialism*, at present the highest stage in the development of that *view upon the world* whose foundations were laid down in ancient Greece by Democritus, and in part by the Ionian thinkers¹ who preceded that philosopher. What was known as *hylozoism*² was nothing but a naive *materialism*. It is to Karl Marx and his friend Frederick Engels that the main credit for the development of present-day materialism must no doubt go. The historical and economic aspects of this world-outlook, i.e., what is known as *historical materialism* and the closely related sum of views on the *tasks, method, and categories of political economy, and on the economic development of society, especially capitalist society*, are in their fundamentals almost entirely the work of Marx and Engels. That which was introduced into these fields by their *precursors* should be regarded merely as the preparatory work of amassing material, often copious and valuable, but not as yet systematised or illuminated by a single fundamental idea, and therefore not appraised or utilised in its real significance.

What Marx and Engels's *followers* in Europe and America have done in these fields is merely a more or less successful elaboration of specific problems, sometimes, it is true, of the utmost importance. That is why the term "Marxism" is often used to signify only these two aspects of the present-day materialist world-outlook not only among the "general public", who have not yet achieved a deep understanding of philosophical theories, but even among people, both in Russia and the entire civilised world, who consider themselves faithful followers of Marx and Engels. In such cases these two

aspects are looked upon as something independent of "philosophical materialism", and at times as something almost opposed to it.* And since these two aspects cannot but hang in mid-air when they are torn out of the general context of cognate views constituting their theoretical foundation, those who perform that tearing-out operation naturally feel an urge to "substantiate Marxism" anew by joining it—again quite arbitrarily and most frequently under the influence of philosophical moods prevalent at the time among *ideologists of the bourgeoisie*—with some philosopher or another: with Kant, Mach, Avenarius, or Ostwald, and of late with Joseph Dietzgen. True, the philosophical views of J. Dietzgen have arisen quite independently of bourgeois influences and are in considerable measure related to the philosophical views of Marx and Engels. The latter views, however, possess an incomparably more consistent and rich content, and for that reason alone cannot be *supplemented* by Dietzgen's teachings but can only be *popularised* by them. No attempts have yet been made to "supplement Marx" with Thomas Aquinas. It is however quite feasible that, despite the Pope's recent encyclical against the Modernists,⁵ the Catholic world will at some time produce from its midst a thinker capable of performing this feat in the sphere of theory.⁶

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) My friend Viktor Adler was perfectly right when, in an article he published on the day of Engels's funeral, he observed that socialism, as understood by Marx and Engels, is not only an economic but a universal doctrine (I am quoting from the Italian edition): Frederico Engels, *L'Economia politica. Primi lineamenti di una critica dell'economia politica. Con introduzione e notizia bio-bibliografiche di Filippo Turati, Vittorio Adler e Carlo Kautsky e con appendice. Prima edizione italiana, pubblicata in occasione della morte dell'autore (5 agosto 1895)*, pp. 12-17, Milano, 1895³. However, the truer this appraisal of socialism "as understood by Marx and Engels", the stranger the impression produced when Adler conceives it possible to replace the *materialist* foundation of this "universal doctrine" by a *Kantian* foundation. What is one to think of a universal doctrine whose philosophical foundation is in no way connected with its entire structure? Engels wrote: "Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealistic philosophy and apply it in the materialistic conception of nature and history" (see the preface to the third edition of *Anti-Dühring*, p. xiv).⁴ Thus, despite the assertions of certain of their present-day followers, the founders of scientific socialism were *conscious materialists*, not only in the field of history, but in natural science as well.

Attempts to show that Marxism must be "supplemented" by one philosopher or another are usually backed up with reference to the fact that Marx and Engels did not anywhere set forth their philosophical views. This reasoning is hardly convincing, however, apart from the consideration that, even if these views were indeed not set forth anywhere, that could provide no logical reason to have them replaced by the views of any random thinker who, in the main, holds an entirely different point of view. It should be remembered that we have sufficient literary material at our disposal to form a correct idea of the philosophical views of Marx and Engels.*

In their *final* shape, these views were *fairly fully* set forth, although in a polemical form, in the first part of Engels's book *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (of which there are several Russian translations). Then there is a splendid booklet by the same author *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (which I have translated into Russian and supplied with a preface and explanatory notes; it has been published by Mr. Lvovich⁷), in which the views constituting the philosophical foundation of Marxism are expounded in a positive form. A brief but vivid account of the same views, related to *agnosticism*, was given by Engels in his preface to the English translation of the pamphlet *The Development of Scientific Socialism*⁸ (translated into German, and published under the title of *Ueber den historischen Materialismus in Neue Zeit*,⁹ Nos. 1 and 2, 1892-93). As for Marx, I will mention as important for an understanding of the *philosophical aspect* of his teachings, in the first place, the characterisation of *materialist dialectic*—as distinct from Hegel's *idealist dialectic*—given in the preface to Volume I of *Capital*, and, secondly, the numerous remarks made *en passant* in the same volume. Also significant in certain respects are some of the pages in *La Misère de la philosophie*¹⁰ (which has been translated into Russian). Finally, *the process of the develop-*

* The philosophy of Marx and Engels is the subject of W. Weryho's book *Marx als Philosoph*, Bern und Leipzig, 1894. It would, however, be difficult to imagine a less satisfactory work.

ment of Marx and Engels's philosophical views is revealed with sufficient clarity in their early writings, republished by F. Mehring under the title of *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx*,⁴¹ etc., Stuttgart, 1902.

In his dissertation *Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie*, as well as in several articles republished by Mehring in Volume I of the publication just mentioned, the young Marx appears before us as an idealist *pur sang* of the Hegelian school. However, in the articles which have now been included in the same volume and which first appeared in the *Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher*,⁴² Marx—like Engels, who also collaborated in the *Jahrbücher*—was a firm adherent of Feuerbachian “humanism”.* *Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik*,⁴⁵ which appeared in 1845 and has been republished in Volume II of the Mehring publication, shows us our two authors, i.e., both Marx and Engels, as having made several important steps in the further development of Feuerbach's philosophy. The

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Of considerable importance for a characterisation of the evolution of Marx's philosophical views is his letter of October 20, 1843, to Feuerbach. Inviting Feuerbach to come out against Schelling, Marx wrote the following: “You are the most suitable person for that, since you are the *direct opposite* of Schelling. His youthful and sincere thought—we must recognise everything that is good in our opponent—for the realisation of which he had no abilities except imagination, no energy except vanity, no excitants except opium, and no organ except an easily aroused feminine receptivity—this youthful and sincere thought of Schelling's, which remained a youthful and fantastic dream, has become for you the truth, reality, a serious and courageous cause. Schelling is therefore your *anticipated caricature*, and as soon as reality comes out against a caricature, the latter must vanish like a mist. That is why I consider you Schelling's necessary and natural opponent, called upon to be so by their majesties Nature and History. Your struggle against him is the struggle of philosophy itself against imaginary philosophy.” K. Grün, *Ludwig Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass*, I. Band, S. 361, Leipzig und Heidelberg, 1874⁴³. This seems to show that Marx understood “Schelling's youthful thought” in the meaning of a materialist monism. Feuerbach, however, did not share this opinion of Marx's, as will be seen from his reply to the latter. He considered that already in his first works Schelling “merely converts the idealism of *thought* into the idealism of the *imagination*, and attributes just as little reality to things as to the *Ich*, with the only difference that it had a different appearance, and that he replaced the determinate ‘*Ich*’ by the non-determinate Absolute, and gave idealism a pantheistic⁴⁴ colouring” (ibid., p. 402).

direction they gave to this elaboration can be seen from the eleven *Theses on Feuerbach* written by Marx in the spring of 1845, and published by Engels as an appendix to the aforementioned pamphlet *Ludwig Feuerbach*.⁴⁶ In short, there is no lack of material here; the only thing needed is the ability to make use of it, i.e., the need to have the proper training for its understanding. Present-day readers, however, do not have the training required for that understanding, and consequently do not know how to make use of it.

Why is that so? For a variety of reasons. One of the principal reasons is that nowadays there is, in the first place, little *knowledge of Hegelian philosophy*, without which it is difficult to learn Marx's method, and, in the second place, little *knowledge of the history of materialism*, the absence of which does not permit present-day readers to form a clear idea of the doctrine of Feuerbach, who was Marx's immediate precursor in the field of philosophy, and in considerable measure worked out the philosophical foundation of what can be called the world-outlook of Marx and Engels.

Nowadays Feuerbach's “humanism” is usually described as something very vague and indefinite. F. A. Lange, who has done so much to spread, both among the “general public” and in the learned world, an absolutely false view of the essence of materialism and of its history, refused to recognise Feuerbach's “humanism” as a materialist teaching.⁴⁷ F. A. Lange's example is being followed, in this respect, by almost all who have written on Feuerbach in Russia and other countries. P. A. Berlin too seems to have been affected by this influence, since he depicts Feuerbach's “humanism” as a kind of materialism that is not quite “pure”.* I must admit that I do not know for certain how this question is regarded by Franz Mehring, whose knowledge of philosophy is the best, and probably unique, among German Social-Democrats. But it is perfectly clear to me that it was the materialist that Marx and Engels saw in Feuerbach. True, Engels speaks of Feuerbach's inconsistency, but that does not in the least prevent him from recognising the *fundamental*

* See his interesting book *Germany on the Eve of the Revolution of 1848*, St. Petersburg, 1906, pp. 228-29.

propositions of his philosophy as *purely materialist*.* But then these propositions cannot be viewed otherwise by anybody who has gone to the trouble of making a study of them.

II

I am well aware that in saying all this I risk surprising very many of my readers. I am not afraid to do so; the ancient thinker was right in saying that astonishment is the mother of philosophy. For the reader not to remain at the stage, so to say, of astonishment, I shall first of all recommend that he ask himself what Feuerbach meant when, while giving a terse but vivid outline of his philosophical *curriculum vitae*, he wrote, "God was my first thought, Reason the second, and Man the third and last thought." I contend that this question is conclusively answered in the following meaningful words of Feuerbach himself, "In the controversy between materialism and spiritualism . . . the human head is under discussion. . . once we have learnt what kind of matter the brain is made up of, we shall soon arrive at a clear view upon all other matter as well, matter in general."** Elsewhere he says that his "*anthropology*", i.e., his "humanism", merely means that man takes for God that which is his own essence, his own spirit.*** He goes on to say that Descartes did not eschew this "anthropological" point of view.****

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Engels wrote: "The course of evolution of Feuerbach is that of a Hegelian—a never quite orthodox Hegelian, it is true—into a materialist; an evolution which at a definite stage necessitates a complete rupture with the idealist system of his predecessor. With irresistible force Feuerbach is finally driven to the realisation that the Hegelian premundane existence of the 'Absolute Idea', the 'pre-existence of the logical categories' before the world existed, is nothing more than the fantastic survival of the belief in the existence of an extramundane creator; that the material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality; and that our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialism." *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Stuttgart, 1907, S. 17-18¹⁸.

** "Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus", *Werke*, X, 129.¹⁹

*** *Werke*, IV, 249.²⁰

**** Ibid.

How is all this to be understood? It means that Feuerbach made "Man" the point of departure of his philosophical reasoning *only because* it was from that point of departure that he hoped the sooner to achieve his aim—to bring forth a correct view upon matter in general and its relation to the "spirit". Consequently what we have here is a *methodological device*, whose value was conditioned by circumstances of time and place, i.e., by the thinking habits of the learned, or simply educated, Germans of the time,* *and not by any specificity of world-outlook*.**

The above quotation from Feuerbach regarding the "human head" shows that when he wrote these words the problem of "the kind of matter the brain is made up of" was solved by him in a "purely" materialistic sense. This solution was accepted by Marx and Engels. It provided the foundation of

* Feuerbach himself has very well said that the *beginnings* of any philosophy are determined by the prior state of philosophical thought (*Werke*, II, 193).

** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) F. Lange states: "A genuine materialist will always be prone to turn his glance to the totality of external Nature and consider Man merely as a wavelet in the ocean of the eternal movement of matter. To the materialist Man's nature is merely a particular instance of general physiology, just as thinking is a special instance in the chain of physical processes of life." *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 2. Band, S. 74, Leipzig, 1902. But Théodore Dézamy too, in his *Code de la Communauté* (Paris, 1843) proceeds from the nature of man (the human organism), yet no one will doubt that he shares the views of French 18th-century materialism. Incidentally, Lange makes no mention of Dézamy, whilst Marx counts him among the French Communists whose communism was more scientific than that of Cabet, for instance. "Like Owen . . . Dézamy, Gay and others, developed the teaching of *materialism* as the teaching of, *real humanism* and the logical basis of communism." *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*, 2. Band, S. 240.²¹ At the time Marx and Engels were writing the work just quoted (*The Holy Family*), they as yet differed in their appraisal of Feuerbach's philosophy. Marx called it "materialism coinciding with humanism": "As Feuerbach represented *materialism* in the *theoretical* domain, French and English *socialism* and communism in the *practical* field represent *materialism* which now *coincides* with *humanism*."²² In general Marx regarded materialism as the necessary theoretical foundation of communism and socialism. Engels, on the contrary, held the view that Feuerbach had once and for all put an end to the old contraposing of spiritualism²³ and materialism (ibid., pp. 232 and 196).²⁴ As we have already seen, he, too, later took note of the evolution, in Feuerbach's development, from idealism to materialism.

their own philosophy, as can be seen with the utmost clarity from Engels's works, so often quoted here—*Ludwig Feuerbach* and *Anti-Dühring*. That is why we must make a closer study of this solution; in doing so, we shall at the same time be studying the *philosophical aspect of Marxism*.

In an article entitled "Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie", which came out in 1842 and, judging by the facts, had a strong influence on Marx, Feuerbach said that "the real relation of thinking to being is only as follows: being is the *subject*; thinking, the *predicate*. Thinking is conditioned by being, and not being by thinking. Being is conditioned by itself. . . has its foundation in itself."^{*}

This view on the relation of being to thinking, which Marx and Engels made the foundation of the *materialistic explanation of history*, is a most important outcome of the criticism of Hegel's idealism already completed in its main features by Feuerbach, a criticism whose conclusions can be set forth in a few words.

Feuerbach considered that Hegel's philosophy had removed the contradiction between being and thinking, a contradiction that had expressed itself in particular relief in Kant. However, as Feuerbach thought, it removed that contradiction, *while continuing to remain within the latter*, i.e., within *one of its elements*, namely, *thinking*. With Hegel, *thinking is being*: "Thinking is the subject; being, the predicate."^{**} It follows that Hegel, and idealism in general, eliminated the contradiction only *by removing one of its component elements*, i.e., *being, matter, Nature*. However, removing one of the component elements in a contradiction does not at all mean doing away with that contradiction. "Hegel's doctrine that reality is 'postulated' by the Idea is merely a translation into rationalistic terms of the theological doctrine that Nature was created by God,—and reality, matter, by an abstract, non-material being."^{***} This does not apply only to Hegel's absolute idealism. Kant's transcendental idealism, according to which the surrounding world receives its laws from Reason instead of Reason receiving them from the sur-

rounding world, is closely akin to the theological concept that the world's laws were dictated to it by divine Reason.* *Idealism does not establish the unity of being and thinking nor can it do so; it tears that unity asunder*. Idealistic philosophy's point of departure—the "*I*" as the fundamental philosophical principle—is totally erroneous. It is not the "*I*" that must be the starting-point of genuine philosophy, but the "*I*" and the "*you*". It is such a point of departure that makes it possible to arrive at a proper understanding of the relation between thinking and being, between the subject and the object. I am "*I*" to myself, and at the same time I am "*you*" to others. The "*I*" is the *subject*, and at the same time the *object*. It must at the same time be noted that I am not the abstract being idealistic philosophy operates with. I am an *actual* being; my *body* belongs to my *essence*; moreover, my body, as a whole, is my *I*, my genuine essence. It is not an abstract being that thinks, but that actual being, that body. Thus, contrary to what the idealists assert, an actual and material being proves to be the subject, and thinking—the predicate. Herein lies the only possible solution of the contradiction between being and thinking, a contradiction that idealism sought so vainly to resolve. None of the elements in the contradiction is *removed*; both are *preserved*, revealing their real *unity*. "That which to me, or subjectively, is a purely spiritual, non-material and non-sensuous act is in itself an objective, material and sensuous act."^{***}

Note that in saying this, *Feuerbach stands close to Spinoza*, whose philosophy he was already setting forth with great sympathy at the time his own breakaway from idealism was taking shape, i.e., when he was writing his history of modern philosophy.^{***} In 1843 he made the subtle observation, in his

* Ibid., 295.

** Ibid., 350.

*** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) By that time Feuerbach had already written the following noteworthy lines: "Despite all the oppositeness of practical realism in the so-called sensualism and materialism of the English and the French—a realism that denies any speculation—and the spirit of *all* of Spinoza, they nevertheless have their *ultimate* foundation in the viewpoint on *matter* expressed by Spinoza, as a metaphysician, in the celebrated proposition: 'Matter is an Attribute of God.'" (K. Grün, *L. Feuerbach*, I, S. 324-25.)

* *Werke*, II, 263.

** Ibid., 261.

*** Ibid., 262.

Grundsätze, that *pantheism* is a *theological materialism*, a negation of theology but as yet on a theoretical standpoint. This confusion of *materialism* and *theology* constituted Spinoza's inconsistency, which, however, did not prevent him from providing a "correct—at least for his time—philosophical expression for the materialist trend of modern times". That was why Feuerbach called Spinoza "the Moses of the modern free-thinkers and materialists".* In 1847 Feuerbach asked: "What then, under careful examination, is that which Spinoza calls *Substance*,²⁵ in terms of logics or metaphysics, and *God* in terms of theology?" To this question he replied categorically, "Nothing else but Nature"²⁶. He saw Spinozism's main shortcoming in the fact that "in it the sensible, anti-theological essence of Nature assumes the aspect of an abstract, metaphysical being". Spinoza eliminated the dualism of God and Nature, since he declared that the acts of Nature were those of God. However, it was just because he regarded the acts of Nature to be those of God, that the latter remained, with Spinoza, a being distinct from Nature, but forming its foundation. He regarded God as the subject and Nature as the predicate. A philosophy that has completely liberated itself from theological traditions must remove this important shortcoming in Spinoza's philosophy, which in its essence is sound. "Away with this contradiction!" Feuerbach exclaimed. "Not *Deus sive Natura* but *aut Deus aut Natura* is the watchword of Truth."²⁷

Thus, Feuerbach's "humanism" proved to be nothing else but Spinozism disencumbered of its theological pendant. And it was the standpoint of this kind of Spinozism, which Feuerbach had freed of its theological pendant, that Marx and Engels adopted when they broke with idealism.

However, disencumbering Spinozism of its theological appendage meant revealing its real and *materialist* content. Consequently, *the Spinozism of Marx and Engels was indeed materialism brought up-to-date.*²⁸

* *Werke*, II, 291.

** *Ibid.*, 350.²⁷

*** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) In *Die heilige Familie* (2. Band des Nachlasses) Marx remarks: "Hegel's *History of Philosophy* represents French materialism as the *realisation* of the substance of Spinoza" (S. 240).²⁸

Further. Thinking is not the *cause* of being, but its *effect*, or rather its *property*. Feuerbach says: *Folge und Eigenschaft*. I feel and think, not as a subject contraposed to an object, but as a *subject-object*, as an actual and material being. "For us the object is not merely the thing sensed, but also the basis, the indispensable condition of my sensation." The objective world is not only without me, but also within me, inside my own skin.* Man is only a part of Nature, a part of being; there is therefore no room for any contradiction between his thinking and his being. Space and time do not exist only as forms of thinking. They are also forms of being, forms of my contemplation. They are such, solely because I myself am a creature that lives in time and space, and because I sense and feel as such a creature. In general, the laws of being are at the same time laws of thinking.

That is what Feuerbach said.** And the same thing, though in a different wording, was said by Engels in his polemic with Dühring.*** This already shows what an important part of Feuerbach's philosophy became an integral part of the philosophy of Marx and Engels.

If Marx began to elaborate his materialist explanation of history by criticising *Hegel's philosophy of Right*, he could do so *only because* Feuerbach had completed his criticism of *Hegel's speculative philosophy*.³⁰

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) "How do we cognise the external world? How do we cognise the *inner* world? For ourselves we have no other means than we have for others! Do I know anything about myself without the medium of my senses? Do I exist if I do not exist outside myself, i.e., outside my *Vorstellung*? But how do I know that I exist? How do I know that I exist, not in my *Vorstellung*, but in my sensations, in actual fact, unless I perceive myself through my senses?" (Feuerbach's *Nachgelassene Aphorismen* in Grün's book, II, S. 311.)

** *Werke*, II, 334 and X, 186-87.

*** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) I particularly recommend to the reader's attention the thought expressed by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*, that the laws of external Nature and the laws governing man's bodily and mental existence are "two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality" (S. 157).²⁹ This is the selfsame *doctrine of the unity of being and thinking, of object and subject*. Regarding space and time, see Chapter 5 of Part I of the work just mentioned. This chapter shows that to Engels, just as to Feuerbach, space and time are not only forms of contemplation, but also forms of being (S. 41-42).

Even when *criticising* Feuerbach in his Theses, Marx often develops and augments the former's ideas. Here is an instance from the sphere of "epistemology".³¹ Before *thinking* of an object, man, according to Feuerbach, *experiences* its action *on himself*, *contemplates* and *senses* it.

It was these words that Marx had in mind when he wrote: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing (*Gegenstand*), reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object* (*Objekt*) or of *contemplation* (*Anschauung*), but not as *human sensuous activity, practice*, not subjectively."³² This shortcoming in materialism, Marx goes on to say, accounts for the circumstance that, in his *Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach regards theoretical activity as the only genuine human activity. Expressed in other words, this means that, according to Feuerbach, our *I* cognises the *object by coming under its action*.^{*} Marx, however, objects by saying: our *I* cognises the object, *while at the same time acting upon that object*. Marx's thought is a perfectly correct one: as *Faust* already said, "*Am Anfang war die Tat*". It may of course be objected, in defence of Feuerbach, that, in the process of *our acting* upon objects, we cognise their properties only in the measure in which they, for their part, act upon us. In both cases *sensation* precedes *thinking*; in both cases we first *sense* their properties, and only then *think* of them. But that is something that Marx did not deny. For him the gist of the matter was not the indisputable fact that sensation precedes thinking, but the fact that man is induced to think chiefly by the sensations he experiences in the process of his acting upon the outer world. Since this action on the outer world is prescribed to man by the struggle for existence, the theory of knowledge is closely linked up by Marx with his materialist view of the history of human civilisation. It was not for nothing that the thinker who directed against Feuerbach the thesis we are here discussing wrote in Volume I of his *Capital*: "By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature." This proposition fully reveals its profound meaning only in the light of Marx's theory of knowl-

* "Dem Denken," he says, "geht das Sein voran; ehe du die Qualität denkst, fühlst du die Qualität" (*Werke*, II, 253).³³

edge. We shall see how well this theory is confirmed by the history of cultural development and, incidentally, even by the science of language. It must, however, be admitted that Marx's epistemology stems directly from that of Feuerbach, or, if you will, it is, properly speaking, the epistemology of Feuerbach, only rendered more profound by the masterly correction brought into it by Marx.

I shall add, in passing, that this masterly correction was prompted by the "spirit of the times". The striving to examine the interaction between object and subject precisely from the point of view in which the subject appears in an *active* role, derived from the public mood of the period in which the world-conception of Marx and Engels was taking shape.^{*} The revolution of 1848 was in the offing. . . .

III

The doctrine of the unity of subject and object, thinking and being, which was shared in equal measure by Feuerbach, and by Marx and Engels, was also held by the most outstanding materialists of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Elsewhere^{**} I have shown that La Mettrie and Diderot—each after his own fashion—arrived at a world-conception that was a "brand of Spinozism", i.e., a Spinozism without the theological appendage that distorted its true content. It would also be easy to show that, inasmuch as we are speaking of the unity of subject and object, Hobbes too stood very close to Spinoza. That, however, would be taking us too far afield, and, besides, there is no immediate need to do that. Probably of greater interest to the reader is the fact that today any naturalist who has delved even a little into the

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Feuerbach said of his philosophy: "My philosophy cannot be dealt with exhaustively by the pen; it finds no room on paper." This statement, however, was only of theoretical significance to him. He went on to say: "Since for it (i.e., his philosophy) the truth is not that which has been thought, but that which has been not only thought, but seen, heard and felt" (*Nachgelassene Aphorismen* in Grün's book, II, S. 306).

** See my article "Bernstein and Materialism" in the symposium *A Critique of Our Critics*.

problem of the relation of thinking to being arrives at that doctrine of their unity which we have met in Feuerbach.

When Huxley wrote the following words: "Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous system", and went on to say that the operations of the mind "are functions of the brain",* he was expressing just what Feuerbach had said, only with these words he connected concepts that were far less clear. It was precisely because the concepts connected with these words were far less clear than with Feuerbach that he attempted to link up the view just quoted, with Hume's philosophical scepticism.**

In just the same way, Haeckel's "monism", which created such a stir, is nothing else but a purely materialist doctrine—in essence close to that of Feuerbach—of the unity of subject and object. Haeckel, however, is poorly versed in the history of materialism, which is why he considers it necessary to struggle against its "one-sidedness"; he should have gone to the trouble of making a study of its theory of knowledge in the form it took with Feuerbach and Marx, something that would have preserved him from the many lapses and one-sided assumptions that have made it easier for his opponents to wage a struggle against him on philosophical grounds.

A very close approach to the most modern materialism—that of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels—has been made by August Forel in various of his writings, for instance in the paper, *Gehirn und Seele*, which he read to the 66th Congress of German Naturalists and Physicians held in Vienna (September 26, 1894).*** In places Forel not only expresses ideas resembling Feuerbach's but—and this is amazing—marshals his arguments just as Feuerbach did his. According to Forel, each new day brings us convincing proofs that the psychology and the physiology of the brain are merely two ways of looking at "one and the same thing". The reader will not have forgotten Feuerbach's identical view, which I have quoted

* Plekhanov is quoting from the French translation of Huxley's *Hume, His Life and Philosophy*, i.e., *Hume, sa vie, sa philosophie*, p. 108. We are quoting from the original, p. 80.—Ed.

** Ibid., p. 82.

*** Cf. also Chapter Three in his book *L'âme et le système nerveux. Hygiène et pathologie*, Paris, 1906.

above and which pertains to the same problem. This view can be supplemented here with the following statement: "I am the psychological object to myself," Feuerbach says, "but a physiological object to others."* In the final analysis, Forel's main idea boils down to the proposition that consciousness is the "inner reflex of cerebral activity".** This view is already materialist.

Objecting to the materialists, the idealists and Kantians of all kinds and varieties claim that what we apprehend is only the *mental* aspect of the phenomena that Forel and Feuerbach deal with. This objection was excellently formulated by Schelling, who said that "the Spirit will always be an island which one cannot reach from the sphere of matter, otherwise than by a leap". Forel is well aware of this, but he provides convincing proof that science would be an impossibility if we made up our minds in earnest not to leave the bounds of that island. "Every man," he says, "would have only the psychology of his own subjectivism (*hätte nur die Psychologie seines Subjectivismus*) . . . and would positively be obliged to doubt the existence of the external world and of other people."*** Such doubt is absurd, however.**** "Conclusions arrived at by analogy, natural-scientific induction, a comparison of the evidence provided by our five senses, prove to us the existence of the external world, of other people, and the psychology of the latter. Likewise they prove to us the existence of comparative psychology, animal psychology. Finally, our own psychology would be incomprehensible and full of contradictions if we considered it apart from

* *Werke*, II, 348-49.

** *Die psychischen Fähigkeiten der Ameisen*, etc., München, 1901, S. 7.

*** Ibid., pp. 7-8.

**** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Moreover, on his return from exile, Chernyshevsky published an article "The Character of Human Knowledge", in which he proves, very wittily, that a person who doubts the existence of the external world should also doubt the fact of his own existence. Chernyshevsky was always a faithful adherent of Feuerbach.³⁴ The fundamental idea of his article can be expressed in the following words of Feuerbach: "I am not different from things and creatures without me, because I distinguish myself from them; I distinguish myself because I am different from them physically, organically, and in fact. Consciousness presupposes being, is merely conscious being, that-which-is as realised and presented in the mind." (*Nachgelassene Aphorismen* in Grün's book, II, S. 306.)

the activities of our brain; first and foremost, it would seem a contradiction of the law of the conservation of energy.”*

Feuerbach not only reveals the contradictions that inevitably beset those who reject the materialist standpoint, but also shows how the idealists reach their “island”. “I am I to myself,” he says, “and you to another. But I am such an I only as a sensible (i.e., material—G.P.) being. The abstract intellect isolates this being-for-onself as Substance, the atom, ego, God; that is why, to it, the connection between being-for-onself and being-for-another, is arbitrary. That which I think of as extra-sensuous (*ohne Sinnlichkeit*), I think of as without and outside any connection.”** This most significant consideration is accompanied by an analysis of that process of abstraction which led to the appearance of Hegelian logic as an *ontological* doctrine.***

Had Feuerbach possessed the information provided by present-day ethnology, he would have been able to add that *philosophical idealism* descends, in the historical sense, from the *animism*³⁶ of primitive peoples. This was already pointed out by Edward Tylor,**** and certain historians of philosophy are beginning to take it, in part, into consideration, though for the time being more as a curiosity than a fact from the history of culture, and of tremendous theoretical and cognitive significance.*****

These ideas and arguments of Feuerbach's were not only well known to Marx and Engels and given careful thought by

* *Die psychischen Fähigkeiten*, same page.

** *Werke*, II, 322. I highly recommend these words of Feuerbach's to the attention of Mr. Bogdanov. Cf. also p. 263.

*** “Der absolute Geist Hegel's ist nichts Anderes als der abstrakte, von sich selbst abgesonderte sogenannte *endliche* Geist, wie das unendliche Wesen der Theologie nichts Anderes ist, als das abstrakte endliche Wesen.” *Werke*, II, 263.³⁵

**** *La civilisation primitive*. Paris, 1876, tome II, p. 143. It should, however, be observed that Feuerbach made a truly masterly surmise in this matter. He said: “Der Begriff des Objects ist ursprünglich gar nichts Anderes als der Begriff *eines andern* Ich,—so fasst der Mensch in der Kindheit alle Dinge als freithätige, willkürliche Wesen auf, daher ist der Begriff des Objects überhaupt vermittelt durch den Begriff des Du das gegenständliche Ich.” II, 321-22.

***** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) See Théodore Gomperz, *Les penseurs de la Grèce*, trad. par. Aug. Reymond, Lausanne, 1905, tome II, pp. 414-15.³⁷

them, but indubitably and in considerable measure helped in the evolution of their world-outlook. If Engels later had the greatest contempt for post-Feuerbachian German philosophy, it was because that philosophy, in his opinion, merely resuscitated the old philosophical errors already revealed by Feuerbach. That, indeed, was the case. Not one of the latest critics of materialism has brought forward a single argument that was not refuted either by Feuerbach himself or, before him, by the French materialists*; but to the “critics of Marx” to E. Bernstein, C. Schmidt, B. Croce and the like—“the pauper's broth of eclecticism”³⁸ of the most up-to-date German so-called philosophy seems a perfectly new dish; they have fed on it, and, seeing that Engels did not see fit to address himself to it, they imagined that he was “*evading*” any analysis of an argumentation he had long ago considered, and found absolutely worthless. That is an old story, but one that is always new. Rats will never stop thinking that the cat is far *stronger* than the lion.

In recognising the striking similarity—and, in part, also the identity—in the views of Feuerbach and A. Forel, we shall, however, note that while the latter is far better informed in natural science, Feuerbach had the advantage of a thorough knowledge of philosophy. That is why Forel makes mistakes we do not find in Feuerbach. Forel calls his theory the *psycho-physiological theory of identity*.** To this no objection of any significance can be raised, because all terminology is conventional. However, since the theory of identity once formed the foundation of an absolutely definite idealist philosophy,⁴⁰ Forel would have done well to have straightforwardly, boldly and simply declared his theory to be *materialist*. He seems to have preserved certain prejudices against materialism, and therefore chose another name. That is why I think it necessary to note that *identity in the Forelian*

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Feuerbach called “cud-chewers” (*Wiederkäuher*) those thinkers who tried to revive an obsolete philosophy. Unfortunately, such people are particularly numerous today, and have created an extensive literature in Germany, and partly in France. They are now beginning to multiply in Russia as well.

** See his article “Die psychophysiologische Identitätstheorie als wissenschaftliches Postulat”, in the symposium *Festschrift I, Rosenthal*, Leipzig, 1906, erster Teil, S. 119-32.³⁹

sense has nothing in common with *identity in the idealist sense*.

The "critics of Marx" do not know even this. In his polemic with me, C. Schmidt ascribed to the materialists precisely the idealist doctrine of identity. In actual fact, materialism recognises the *unity* of subject and object, not their identity. This was well shown by the selfsame Feuerbach.

According to Feuerbach, the unity of subject and object, of thinking and being, makes sense only when man is taken as the basis of that unity. This has a special kind of "humanist" sound to it, and most students of Feuerbach have not found it necessary to give thought to *how* man serves as the basis of the unity of the opposites just mentioned. In actual fact, this is how Feuerbach understood the matter: "It is only when thinking is not a *subject for itself*, but the predicate of a real (i.e., material—*G.P.*) being that thought is not something separated from being."* The question now is: where, in which philosophical systems, is thinking a "subject for itself", that is to say, something independent of the bodily existence of a thinking individual? The answer is clear: in systems that are *idealist*. The idealists first convert thinking into a self-contained essence, independent of man ("the subject for itself"), and then assert that it is in that essence that the contradiction between being and thinking is resolved, for the very reason that separate and independent being is a property of that independent-of-matter essence.** Indeed, the contradiction is resolved in that essence. In that case, what is that essence? It is *thinking*, and this thinking exists—*is*—independently of anything else. Such a resolution of the contradiction is a purely formal one, which, as we have already pointed out, is achieved only by eliminating one of its elements, namely, being, as something independent of thinking. Being proves to be a simple property of thinking, so that when we say that a given object exists, we mean that it exists only

* *Werke*, II, 340.⁴¹

** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Ernst Mach and his followers act in exactly the same way. First they transform *sensation* into an independent essence, non-contingent upon the sensing *body*—an essence which they call an element. Then they declare that this essence contains the resolution of the contradiction between being and thinking, subject and object. This reveals the grossness of the error committed by those who assert that Mach is close to Marx.

in our thinking. That is how the matter was understood by Schelling, for example. To him, thinking was the absolute principle from which the real world, i.e., Nature and the "finite" spirit, followed of necessity. But *how* did it follow? What was meant by the existence of the real world? Nothing but existence in thinking. To Schelling, *the Universe was merely the self-contemplation of the Absolute Spirit*. We see the same thing in Hegel. Feuerbach, however, was not satisfied with such a purely formal resolving of the contradiction between thinking and being. He pointed out that there is no—there can be no—*thinking independent of man*, i.e., of an actual and material creature. Thinking is activity of the brain. To quote Feuerbach: "But the brain is the organ of thinking only as long as it is connected with the human head and body."*

We now see in what sense Feuerbach considers man the basis of the unity of being and thinking. Man is that basis in the sense that he is nothing but a material being that possesses the ability to think. If he is such a being, then it is clear that none of the elements of the contradiction is eliminated—neither being nor thinking, "matter" or "spirit", subject or object. They are all combined in him as the subject-object. "I exist, and I think . . . only as a subject-object," Feuerbach says.

To be does not mean to exist in thought. In this respect, Feuerbach's philosophy is far clearer than that of J. Dietzgen. As Feuerbach put it: "To prove that something exists means to prove that it is not something that exists only in thought."** This is perfectly true, but it means that *the unity of thinking and being does not and cannot in any way mean their identity*.

This is one of the most important features distinguishing materialism from idealism.

IV

When people say that, for a certain period, Marx and Engels were followers of Feuerbach, it is often inferred that, when that period ended, Marx and Engels's world-outlook

* *Werke*, II, 362-63.

** *Werke*, X, 187.⁴²

changed considerably, and became quite different from Feuerbach's. That is how the matter is viewed by Karl Diehl, who finds that Feuerbach's influence on Marx is usually highly exaggerated.* This is a gross mistake. When they ceased being followers of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels did not at all cease from sharing a very considerable part of his philosophical views. The best proof of this is the Theses which Marx wrote in criticism of Feuerbach.⁴³ The Theses in no way eliminate the fundamental propositions in Feuerbach's philosophy, but only correct them, and—what is most important—call for an application more consistent (than Feuerbach's) in explaining the reality that surrounds man, and in particular his own activity. It is not thinking that determines being, but being that determines thinking. That is the fundamental thought in all of Feuerbach's philosophy. Marx and Engels made that thought the foundation of the materialist explanation of history. The materialism of Marx and Engels is a far more developed doctrine than Feuerbach's. The materialist views of Marx and Engels, however, developed in the direction indicated by the inner logic of Feuerbach's philosophy. That is why these views will not always be fully clear—especially in their philosophical aspect—to those who will not go to the trouble of finding out just which part of the Feuerbachian philosophy became incorporated in the world-outlook of the founders of scientific socialism. And if the reader meets anyone who is much taken up with the problem of finding “philosophical substantiation” for historical materialism, he may well be sure that this wise mortal is very much deficient in the respect I have just mentioned.

But let us return to the subject. Already in his Third Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx tackled the most difficult of all the problems he was to resolve in the sphere of social man's historical “practice”, with the aid of the correct concept of the unity of subject and object, which Feuerbach had developed. The Thesis reads: “The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing . . . forgets that it is men that change circumstances and that the educator himself needs educating.”⁴⁴ Once this problem is solved, the “secret” of the materialist explanation of history has been

uncovered. But Feuerbach was unable to solve it. In history, he—like the French 18th-century materialists he had so much in common with—remained an *idealist*.* Here Marx and Engels had to start from scratch, making use of the theoretical material that had been accumulated by social science, chiefly by the French historians of the Restoration period. But even here, Feuerbach's philosophy provided them with some valuable pointers. “Art, religion, philosophy, and science,” Feuerbach says, “are but the manifestation or revelation of genuine human essence.”** Hence it follows that the “human essence” contains the explanation of all ideologies, i.e., that the development of the latter is conditioned by the development of the “human essence”. What is that essence? “Man's essence,” Feuerbach replies, “is only in community, in Man's unity with Man.”*** This is very vague, and here we see a border line that Feuerbach did not cross.**** However, it is

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) This accounts for the reservations always made by Feuerbach when speaking of materialism. For instance: “When I go backward from this point, I am in complete agreement with the materialists; when I go forward, I differ from them” (*Nachgelassene Aphorismen* in K. Grün's book, II, S. 308). The meaning of this statement will be seen from the following words, “I, too, recognise the Idea, but only in the sphere of mankind, politics, morals, and philosophy” (Grün, II, S. 307). But whence Idea in politics and morals? This question is not answered by our “recognising” the Idea.

** *Werke*, II, 343.

*** *Werke*, II, 344.

**** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Incidentally, Feuerbach too thinks that the “human being” is created by history. Thus he says: “I think only as a subject educated by history, generalised, united with the whole, with the genus, the spirit of world history. My thoughts do not have their beginning and basis directly in my particular subjectivity, but are the outcome; their beginning and their basis are those of world history itself” (K. Grün, II, S. 309). Thus we see in Feuerbach the embryo of a materialist understanding of history. In this respect, however, he does not go further than Hegel (see my article “For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel's Death”, *Neue Zeit*, 1890), and even lags behind him. Together with Hegel, he stresses the significance of what the great German idealist called the geographic basis of world history. “The course of the history of mankind,” he says, “is of course prescribed to it, since man follows the course of Nature, the course taken by streams. Men go wherever they find room, and the kind of place that suits them best. Men settle in a particular locality, and are conditioned by the place they live in. The essence of India is the essence of the Hindu. What he is, what he has become, is merely the product of the East-Indian sun, the East-Indian air, the East-Indian

* *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, V, S. 708.

beyond that border line that the region of the materialist explanation of history, a region discovered by Marx and Engels, begins; that explanation indicates the causes which in the course of history, determine the "community, Man's unity with Man", i.e., the mutual relations that men enter into. This border line not only *separates* Marx from Feuerbach, but testifies to his *closeness* to the latter.

The sixth Thesis on Feuerbach says that *human essence is the ensemble of the social relations*. This is far more definite than what Feuerbach himself said, and the close genetic link between Marx's world-outlook and Feuerbach's philosophy is here revealed with probably greater clarity than anywhere else.

When Marx wrote this Thesis he already knew, not only the direction in which the solution of the problem should be sought, but the solution itself. In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* he showed that no mutual relations of people in society, "neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that, on the contrary, they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term 'civil society; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy."⁴⁵

It now remained only to explain the origin and development of the *economy* to obtain a full solution of a problem that materialism had been unable to cope with for centuries on end. That explanation was provided by Marx and Engels.

It stands to reason that, when I speak of the *full solution* of that great problem, I am referring only to its general or *algebraic solution*, which materialism could not find in the course of centuries. It stands to reason that, when I speak of a *full solution*, I am referring, not to the *arithmetic* of social development, but to its *algebra*; not to the *causes of individual phenomena*, but to *how the discovery of those*

water, the East-Indian animals and plants. How could man originally appear if not out of Nature? Men, who become acclimatised to any kind of nature, have sprung from Nature, which tolerates no extremes" (*Nachgelassene Aphorismen*, K. Grün, II, S. 330).

causes should be approached. And that means that the materialist explanation of history was primarily of *methodological significance*. Engels was fully aware of this when he wrote: "What we need is not so much crude results as studies (*das Studium*); results are meaningless if they are taken apart from the development that leads up to them."⁴⁶ This, however, is sometimes not understood either by "critics" of Marx, whom, as they say, may God forgive, or by some of his "followers", which is much worse. Michelangelo once said of himself, "My knowledge will engender a multitude of ignoramuses." These words have regrettably proved prophetic. Today *Marx's knowledge* is engendering ignoramuses. The fault lies, not with Marx, but with those who talk rubbish while invoking his name. For such rubbish to be avoided, an understanding of the *methodological significance of historical materialism* is necessary.

V

In general, one of the greatest services rendered to materialism by Marx and Engels lies in their elaboration of a *correct method*. Feuerbach, who concentrated his efforts on the struggle against the *speculative* element in Hegel's philosophy, had little appreciation of its *dialectical* element, and made little use of it. "True dialectic," he said, "is no monologue by a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between the *ego* and the *tu*."⁴⁷ In the first place, however, Hegel's dialectic did not signify a "monologue by a solitary thinker with himself"; and, secondly, Feuerbach's remark gives a correct definition of the *starting-point of philosophy*, but not of its *method*. This gap was filled by Marx and Engels, who understood that it would be mistaken, in waging a struggle against Hegel's speculative philosophy, to ignore his dialectic. Some critics have declared that, during the years immediately following his break with idealism, Marx was highly indifferent to dialectic too. Though this opinion may seem to have some semblance of plausibility, it is controverted by the aforementioned fact that, in the *Deutsch-Französische*

* *Nachlass*, I, 477.⁴⁶

** *Werke*, II, 345.

Jahrbüchern, Engels was already speaking of the method as the soul of the new system of views.*

In any case, the second part of *La Misère de la philosophie* leaves no room for doubt that, at the time of his polemic with Proudhon, Marx was very well aware of the significance of the dialectical method and knew how to make good use of it. Marx's victory in this controversy was one by a man able to think dialectically, over one who had never been able to understand the nature of dialectic, but was trying to apply its method to an analysis of capitalist society. This same second part of *La Misère de la philosophie* shows that dialectic, which with Hegel was of a purely idealist nature and had remained so with Proudhon (so far as he had assimilated it), was placed on a *materialist foundation* by Marx.**

"To Hegel," Marx wrote subsequently, describing his materialist dialectic, "the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the idea' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demi-urgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."⁴⁸ This description implies full agreement with Feuerbach, firstly in the attitude towards Hegel's "Idea", and, secondly, in the relation of thinking to being. The Hegelian dialectic could be "turned right side up" *only* by one who was convinced of the soundness of the basic principle of Feuerbach's

* Engels was not referring to himself but to all who shared his views. "Wir bedürfen..." he said; there can be no doubt that Marx was one of those who shared his views.

** See Part II of *La Misère de la philosophie*, Notes I and 2⁴⁷ (Addendum to the German edition of 1910.) It should however be noted that Feuerbach too criticised Hegelian dialectic from the materialist viewpoint. "What kind of dialectic is it," he asked, "that contradicts natural origin and development? How do matters stand with its 'necessity'? Where is the 'objectivity' of a psychology, of a philosophy in general, which abstracts itself from the only categorical and imperative, fundamental and solid objectivity, that of physical Nature, a philosophy which considers that its ultimate aim, absolute truth and fulfilment of the spirit lie in a full departure from that Nature, and in an absolute subjectiveness, unrestricted by any Fichteian non-ego, or Kantian thing-in-itself" (K. Grün, I, S. 399).

philosophy, viz., that it is not thinking that determines being, but being that determines thinking.

Many people confuse dialectic with the doctrine of development; dialectic is, in fact, such a doctrine. However, it differs substantially from the vulgar "theory of evolution", which is completely based on the principle that *neither Nature nor history proceeds in leaps and that all changes in the world take place by degrees*. Hegel had already shown that, understood in such a way, the doctrine of development was unsound and ridiculous.

"When people want to understand the *rise or disappearance* of anything," he says in Volume I of his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, "they usually imagine that they achieve comprehension through the medium of a conception of the *gradual character* of that rise or disappearance. However, changes in being take place, not only by a transition of one quantity into another, but also by a transition of qualitative differences into quantitative, and, on the contrary, by a transition that *interrupts gradualness*, and substitutes one phenomenon for another".* And every time *gradualness is interrupted*, a leap takes place. Hegel goes on to show by a number of examples how often *leaps take place both in Nature and in history*, and he exposes the ridiculous logical error underlying the vulgar "theory of evolution". "Underlying the doctrine of gradualness," he remarks, "is the conception that what is arising already exists in reality, and remains unobserved only because of its small dimensions. In like manner, people, when they speak of gradual destruction, imagine that the non-existence of the phenomenon in question, or the phenomenon that is to take its place, is an accomplished fact, although it is as yet imperceptible... But this can only suppress any notion of arising and destruction... To explain appearance or destruction by the gradualness of the change means reducing the whole matter to absurd tautology and to imagining in an already complete state (i.e., as already arisen or already destroyed.—*G.P.*) that which is in the course of appearing or being destroyed."**

* *Wissenschaft der Logik*, erster Band, Nuremberg, 1812, S. 313-14.

** Regarding the matter of "leaps" see my pamphlet *Mr. Tikhomirov's Grief*, St. Petersburg, M. Malykh's Publishing House, pp. 6-14.⁴⁹

This dialectical view of Hegel's as to the *inevitability of leaps in the process of development* was adopted in full by Marx and Engels. It was developed in detailed fashion by Engels in his polemic with Dühring, and here he "turned it right side up", that is to say, on a *materialist foundation*.

Thus he indicated that the transition from one form of energy to another cannot take place otherwise than by means of a *leap*.* Thus he sought, in modern chemistry, a confirmation of the dialectical theorem of the transformation of quantity into quality. Generally speaking, he found that the rights of *dialectical thinking* are confirmed by the *dialectical properties of being*. Here, too, being conditions thinking.

Without undertaking a more detailed characterisation of materialist dialectic (its relation to what, by a parallel with elementary mathematics, may be called elementary logic—see my preface to my translation of *Ludwig Feuerbach*⁵¹), I shall remind the reader that, during the last two decades, the theory that sees only gradual changes in the process of development has begun to lose ground even in *biology*, where it used to be recognised almost universally. In this respect, the work of Armand Gautier and that of Hugo de Vries seem to show promise of epoch-making importance. Suffice it to say that de Vries's *theory of mutations* is a doctrine that the *development of species takes places by leaps* (see his two-volume *Die Mutations-Theorie*, Leipzig, 1901-03, his paper *Die Mutationen und die Mutations-Perioden bei der Entstehung der Arten*, Leipzig, 1901, and the lectures he delivered at the University of California, which appeared in the German translation under the title of *Arten und Varietäten und ihre Entstehung durch die Mutation*, Berlin, 1906.⁵²

In the opinion of this outstanding naturalist, *the weak point in Darwin's theory of the origin of species is that this origin can be explained by gradual changes*.*⁵³ Also of interest,

* "Bei der Allmählichkeit bleibt der Übergang von einer Bewegungsform zur anderen immer ein Sprung, eine entscheidende Wendung. So der Übergang von der Mechanik der Weltkörper zu der kleineren Massen auf einem einzelnen Weltkörper; ebenso von der Mechanik der Massen zu der Mechanik der Moleküle—die Bewegungen umfassend, die wir in der eigentlich sogenannten Physik untersuchen", etc., *Anti-Dühring*, S. 57.⁵⁰

** *Die Mutationen*, S. 7-8.

and most apt, is de Vries's remark that the dominance of the theory of gradual changes in the doctrine of the origin of species has had an unfavourable influence on the *experimental study of relevant problems*.*

I may add that, in present-day natural science and especially among the *neo-Lamarckians*, there has been a fairly rapid spread of the theory of the so-called *animism of matter*, i.e., that matter in general, and especially any *organised matter*, possesses a certain degree of *sensibility*. This theory, which many regard as being diametrically opposed to materialism (see, for instance, *Der heutige Stand der Darwinischen Fragen*, by R. H. Francé, Leipzig, 1907), is in fact, when properly understood, only a translation into the language of present-day natural science, of Feuerbach's materialist doctrine of the unity of being and thinking, of object and subject.** It may be confidently stated that, had they known of this theory, Marx and Engels would have been keenly interested in this trend in natural science, true *far too little elaborated as yet*.

Herzen was right in saying that Hegel's philosophy, which many considered conservative in the main, was a genuine algebra of revolution.*** With Hegel, however, this algebra remained wholly unapplied to the burning problems of practical life. Of necessity, the speculative element brought a *spirit of conservatism* into the philosophy of this great absolute idealist. It is quite different with Marx's materialist philosophy, in which revolutionary "algebra" manifests itself with all the irresistible force of its dialectical method. "In its mystified form," Marx says, "dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its

* *Arten*, etc., S. 421.

** To say nothing of Spinoza, it should not be forgotten that many French 18th-century materialists were favourably inclined towards the theory of the "animism of matter".

*** (Note to the German edition of 1910). See Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 1-5.⁵³

inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."⁵⁴

If we regard materialist dialectic from the viewpoint of Russian literature, we may say that this dialectic was the first to supply a method necessary and competent to solve the problem of *the rational causes of all that exists*, a problem that so greatly troubled our brilliant thinker Belinsky.* It was only Marx's dialectical method, as applied to the study of Russian life, that has shown us how much *reality* and how much *semblance* of reality *there was in it*.

IV

When we set out to explain *history* from the materialist standpoint, our first difficulty is, as we have seen, the question of the actual causes of the development of social relations. We already know that the "anatomy of civil society" is determined by its economic structure. But what is the latter itself determined by?

Marx's answer is as follows: "In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely, *relations of production* appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the *economic structure* of society, the real foundation on which arises a legal and political superstructure."^{**}

Marx's reply thus reduces the whole question of the development of the economy to that of the causes determining the development of the productive forces at the disposal of society. In this, its final form, it is solved *first and foremost by the reference to the nature of the geographic environment*.

* See my article "Belinsky and Rational Reality" in the symposium *Twenty Years*.

** See the introduction to *Zür Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*.⁵⁵

In his philosophy of history Hegel already speaks of the important role of "*the geographic foundation of world history*". But since, in his view, the *Idea* is the ultimate cause of all development, and since it was only *en passant* and in instances of secondary importance, against his will as it were, that he had recourse to a *materialist explanation of phenomena*, the thoroughly sound view he expressed regarding the historic significance of geographic environment could not lead him to all the fruitful conclusions that follow therefrom. It was only by the materialist Marx that these conclusions were drawn in their fullness.*

The properties of the geographic environment determine the character both of the natural products that serve to satisfy man's wants, and of those objects *he himself produces* with the same purpose. Where there were no metals, aboriginal tribes could not, unaided, emerge from what we call the *Stone Age*. In exactly the same way, for *primitive fishers and hunters* to go over to *cattle-breeding and agriculture*, the appropriate conditions of geographic environment were needed, i.e., in this instance, suitable fauna and flora. Lewis Henry Morgan has shown that the absence, in the New World, of animals capable of being domesticated, and the specific differences between the flora of the two hemispheres brought about the considerable difference in the course of their inhabitants' social development.** Of the redskins of North America Waitz says: "... they have no domesticated animals. This is highly important, for in this circumstance lies the principal reason that forced them to remain at a low stage of development."*** Schweinfurth reports that in Africa, when a given locality is overpopulated, part of the inhabitants emigrate and thereupon change their mode of life *in accordance with the new geographic environment*. "Tribes hitherto agricultural become hunters, while tribes that have lived from their flocks will turn to agriculture."**** He also points out that the inhabitants of an area rich in iron, which

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) In this case, Feuerbach, as I have already said, did not go further than Hegel.

** *Die Urgesellschaft*, Stuttgart, 1891, S. 20-21.

*** *Die Indianer Nordamerikas*, Leipzig, 1865, S. 91.

**** *Au coeur de l'Afrique*, Paris, 1875, I, p. 199.

seems to occupy a considerable part of Central Africa, "naturally began to smelt iron."^{*}

Nor is that all. Already at the lower stages of development, tribes enter into mutual intercourse and exchange some of their products. This expands the boundaries of the geographic environment, influencing the development of the productive forces of each of these tribes and accelerating the course of that development. It is clear, however, that the greater or lesser ease with which such intercourse arises and is maintained also depends on the properties of the geographic environment. Hegel said that seas and rivers bring men closer together, whereas mountains keep them apart. Incidentally, seas bring men closer together when the development of the productive forces has reached a relatively high level; at lower levels, as Ratzel rightly points out, the sea is a great *hindrance* to intercourse between the tribes it separates.^{**} However that may be, it is certain that the more varied the properties of the geographic environment, the more they favour the development of the productive forces. Marx writes: "It is not the mere fertility of the soil, but the differentiation of the soil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the seasons, which form the physical basis for the social division of labour, and which, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to the multiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modes of labour."^{***} Using almost the same terms as Marx, Ratzel says: "The main thing is, not that there is the greatest ease in procuring food, but that certain inclinations, habits and finally wants are aroused in man."^{****}

Thus, the properties of the geographic environment determine the development of the productive forces, which, in its turn, determines the development of the economic forces, and therefore of all other social relations. Marx explains this in the following words: "These social relations into which the producers enter with one another, the con-

* *Au coeur de l'Afrique*, Paris, 1875, t. II, p. 94. Concerning the influence of climate on agriculture, see also Ratzel, *Die Erde und das Leben*, Leipzig und Wien, 1902, II. Band, S. 540-41.

** *Anthropogeographie*, Stuttgart, 1882, p. 92.

*** *Das Kapital*, I. Band, III. Auflage, S. 524-26.⁵⁶

**** *Völkerkunde*, I. Band, Leipzig, 1887, S. 56.

ditions under which they exchange their activities and participate in the whole act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the invention of a new instrument of warfare, firearms, the whole internal organisation of the army necessarily changed; the relationships within which individuals can constitute an army and act as an army were transformed and the relations of different armies to one another also changed."⁵⁷

To make this explanation still more graphic, I shall cite an instance. The *Masai* of East Africa give their captives no quarter, the reason being, as Ratzel points out, that this pastoral people have no *technical possibility* of making use of slave labour. But the neighbouring *Wakamba*, who are *agriculturists*, are able to make use of that labour, and therefore spare their captives' lives and *turn them into slaves*. The appearance of slavery therefore presupposes the achievement of a definite degree in the development of the social forces, a degree that permits the *exploitation* of slave labour.^{**} But slavery is a *production relation* whose appearance indicates the beginning of a division into *classes* in a society which has hitherto known no other divisions but those of *sex* and *age*. When slavery reaches full development, it puts its stamp on the entire economy of society, and, through the economy, on all other social relations, in the first place of the *political structure*. However much the states of antiquity differed in political structure, their chief distinctive feature was that every one of them was a political organisation expressing and protecting the interests of freemen alone.

* Napoleon I said: "La nature des armes décide de la composition des armées, des places de campagne, des marches, des positions, des ordres de bataille, du tracé et des profils des places fortes; ce que met une opposition constante entre le système de guerre des anciens et celui des modernes." *Précis des guerres de César*, Paris, 1836, pp. 87-88.

** *Völkerkunde*, I, 83. It must be noted that at the early stages of development the enslavement of captives is sometimes nothing more than their forcible incorporation in the conquerors' social organisation, with equal rights being granted. Here there is no use of the surplus labour of the captive, but only the common advantage derived from collaboration with him. However, even this form of slavery presupposes the existence of definite productive forces and a definite organisation of production.

We now know that the development of the productive forces, which in the final analysis determines the development of all social relations, is determined by the *properties of the geographic environment*. But as soon as they have arisen, the social relations *themselves exercise a marked influence on the development of the productive forces*. Thus *that which is initially an effect becomes in its turn a cause*; between the development of the productive forces and the social structure there arises an *interaction* which assumes the most varied forms in various epochs.

It should also be remembered that while the *internal relations* existing in a given society are determined by a given state of the productive forces, it is on the latter that, in the final analysis, that society's *external relations depend*. To every stage in the development of the productive forces there corresponds a definite character of *armaments, the art of war*, and, finally, of *international law*, or, to be more precise, of *inter-social*, i.e., *inter alia*, of *inter-tribal law*. *Hunting tribes* cannot form large political organisations precisely because the low level of their productive forces compels them *to scatter* in small social groups, in search of means of subsistence. But the more these social groups are scattered, the more inevitable it is that even such disputes that, in a civilised society, could easily be settled in a magistrate's court, are settled by means of more or less sanguinary combats. Eyre says that when several Australian tribes join forces for certain purposes in a particular place such contacts are never lengthy; even before a shortage of food or the need to hunt game has obliged the Australians to part company, hostile clashes flare up among them, which very soon lead, as is well known, to pitched battles.*

It is obvious that such clashes may arise from a wide variety of causes. It is, however, noteworthy that most travellers ascribe them to *economic causes*. When Stanley asked several natives of Equatorial Africa how their wars against neighbouring tribes arose, the answer was: "Some

of our young men go into the woods to hunt game and they are surprised by our neighbours; then we go to them, and they come to fight us until one party is tired, or one is beaten."** In much the same way Burton says, "All African wars... are for one of two objects, cattle-lifting or kidnapping."*** Ratzel considers it probable that in New Zealand wars among the natives were frequently caused simply by the desire to enjoy human flesh.**** The natives' inclination towards cannibalism is itself to be explained by the paucity of the New Zealand fauna.

All know to what great extent the outcome of a war depends on the weapons used by each of the belligerents. But those weapons are determined by the state of their productive forces, by their economy, and by their social relations, which have arisen on the basis of that economy.****

* Plekhanov is quoting from the French translation of H. Stanley's *In Darkest Africa*, i.e., *Dans les ténèbres de l'Afrique*, Paris, 1890, tome II, p. 91. We are quoting from the original, 1890, Vol. II, p. 92.—Ed.

** Plekhanov is quoting from the French translation of R. Burton's *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*, i.e., *Voyage aux grands lacs de l'Afrique orientale*, Paris, 1862, p. 666. We are quoting from the original, London, 1860, Vol. II, p. 368.—Ed.

*** *Völkerkunde*, I, S. 93.

**** This is admirably explained by Engels in the chapters of his *Anti-Dühring* that deal with an analysis of the "force theory". See also the book *Les maîtres de la guerre* by Lieutenant-Colonel Rousset, professor at the *École supérieure de guerre*, Paris⁵⁸, 1901. Setting forth the views of General Bonnal, the author of this book writes: "The social conditions obtaining in each epoch of history exert a preponderant influence, not only on the military organisation of a nation but also on the character, the abilities, and the trends of its military men. Generals of the ordinary stamp make use of the familiar and accepted methods, and march on towards successes or reverses according to whether attendant circumstances are more or less favourable to them.... As for the great captains, these subordinate to their genius the means and procedures of warfare" (p. 20). How do they do it? That is the most interesting part of the matter. It appears that, "guided by a kind of divinatorial instinct, they transform the means and procedures in accordance with the parallel laws of a social evolution whose decisive effect (and repercussion) on the technique of their art they alone understand in their day" (ibid.). Consequently, it remains for us to discover the causal link between "social evolution" and society's economic development for a materialist explanation to be given to the most unexpected successes in warfare. Rousset is himself very close to giving such an

* Ed. J. Eyre, *Manners and Customs of the Aborigines of Australia*, London, 1847, p. 243.

To say that certain peoples or tribes have been *subjugated* by other peoples does not yet mean explaining why the social consequences of that subjugation have been exactly what they are, and no other. The social consequences of the Roman conquest of Gaul were not at all the same as those of the conquest of that country by the Germans. The social consequences of the Norman conquest of England were very different from those that resulted from the Mongol conquest of Russia. In all these cases, the difference depended ultimately on the difference between the *economic structure* of the subjugated society on the one hand, and that of the conquering society on the other. The more the productive forces of a given tribe or people are developed, the greater are at least its *opportunities* to arm itself better to carry on the struggle for existence.

There may, however, be many noteworthy exceptions to this general rule. At lower levels of the development of the productive forces, the difference in the weapons of tribes that are at very different stages of economic development—for instance, nomadic shepherds and settled agriculturists—cannot be so great as it subsequently becomes. Besides, an advance in economic development, which exerts a considerable influence on the character of a given people, sometimes reduces its warlikeness to such a degree that it proves incapable of resisting an enemy economically more backward but more accustomed to warfare. That is why *peaceable tribes of agriculturists* are not infrequently conquered by *warrior peoples*. Ratzel remarks that the most solid state organisations are formed by “semi-civilised peoples” as a result of the unifying—by means of conquest—of both elements, the agricultural and the pastoral.* However correct this remark may be on the whole, it should, however, be remembered that even in such cases (*China* is a good example) economically backward *conquerors* gradually find themselves completely subjected to the influence of a *conquered* but economically more advanced people.

explanation. His historical outline of the latest in the military art, based on General Bonnal's unpublished papers, closely resembles what we find set forth by Engels in the analysis mentioned above. At places the resemblance approaches complete identity.

* *Völkerkunde*, S. 19.

The geographic environment exerts a considerable influence, not only on primitive tribes, but also on so-called *civilised peoples*. As Marx wrote: “It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under the control of society, of economising, of appropriating or subduing it on a large scale by the work of man's hand, that first plays the decisive part in the history of industry. Examples are the irrigation works in Egypt, Lombardy, Holland, or in India and Persia where irrigation by means of artificial canals, not only supplies the soil with the water indispensable to it, but also carries down to it, in the shape of sediment from the hills, mineral fertilisers. The secret of the flourishing state of industry in Spain and Sicily under the dominion of the Arabs lay in their irrigation works.”*

The doctrine of the influence of the geographic environment on mankind's historical development has often been reduced to a recognition of the *direct* influence of “climate” on social man: it has been supposed that under the influence of “climate” one “race” becomes freedom-loving, another becomes inclined to submit patiently to the rule of a more or less despotic monarch, and yet another race becomes superstitious and therefore dependent upon a clergy, etc. This view already predominated, for instance, with Buckle.** According to Marx, the geographic environment affects man *through the medium of relations of production, which arise in a given area on the basis of definite productive forces*,

* *Das Kapital*, S. 524-26.⁵⁹

** See his *History of Civilisation in England*, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1865, pp. 36-37. According to Buckle, one of the four causes influencing the character of a people, viz., *the general aspect of Nature*, acts chiefly on the imagination, a highly-developed imagination engendering superstitions, which, in their turn, retard the development of knowledge. By acting on the imagination of the natives, the frequent earthquakes in Peru exercised an influence on the political structure. If Spaniards and Italians are superstitious, that too is the result of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions (ibid., pp. 112-13). This *direct* psychological influence is particularly strong at the early stages of the development of civilisation. Modern science, however, has, on the contrary, shown the striking similarity of the religious beliefs of primitive tribes standing at the same level of economic development. Buckle's view, borrowed by him from 18th-century writers, dates back to Hippocrates. (See the latter's *On Airs, Waters and Places* in the translation of the *Works*, by Francis Adams, brought out by the Sydenham Society, London, 1849, Vol. I, pp. 205-22.)

whose primary condition of development lies in the properties of that environment. Modern ethnology is more and more going over to this point of view, and consequently attributes ever less importance to "race" in the history of civilisation. "Race has nothing to do with cultural achievement," says Ratzel.*

But as soon as a certain cultural level has been reached, it indubitably influences the bodily and mental qualities of the "race".**

The influence of geographic environment on social man is a *variable magnitude*. Conditioned by the properties of that environment, the development of the productive forces increases man's power over Nature, and thereby places him in a new relation towards the geographic environment that surrounds him; thus, the English of today react to that environment in a manner which is not quite the same as that in which the tribes that inhabited England in Julius Caesar's day reacted to it. This finally removes the objection that the character of the inhabitants of a given area can be substantially modified, although the geographic properties of that area remain unchanged.

VIII

The legal and political relations*** engendered by a given economic structure exert a decisive influence on social man's entire *mentality*. "Upon the different forms of property, upon

* *Völkerkunde*, I, S. 10. John Stuart Mill, repeating the words of "one of the greatest thinkers of our time", said, "Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences." *Principles of Political Economy*, Vol. I, p. 390.

** Regarding race, see J. Finot's interesting work *Le préjugé des races*, Paris, 1905. (Addendum to the German edition of 1910.) Waitz writes: "Certain Negro tribes are striking examples of the link between the main occupation and the national character." *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, II, S. 107.

*** Regarding the influence of the economy on the nature of the social relations, see Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats*, 8. Auflage, Stuttgart, 1900; also R. Hildebrand, *Recht und Sitte auf den verschiedenen (wirtschaftlichen) Kulturstufen*, I. Teil, Jena, 1896. Unfortunately, Hildebrand makes poor use

the social conditions of existence," says Marx, "rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought and views of life."⁶⁰ *Being* determines *thinking*. It may be said that each step made by science in explaining the process of historical development is a fresh argument in favour of this fundamental thesis of contemporary materialism.

Already in 1877, Ludwig Noiré wrote: "It was joint activity directed towards the achievement of a common aim, it was the primordial labour of our ancestors, that produced language and the reasoning."⁶¹ Developing this notable thought, L. Noiré pointed out that language originally indicated the things of the objective world, not as *possessing* a certain form, but as *having received* that form, (nicht als "Gestalten", sondern als "gestaltete"); not as *active and exerting* a definite action but as passive and *subjected to that action*.⁶² He went on to explain this with the sound remark that "all things enter man's field of vision, i.e., become *things* to him, solely in the measure in which they are *subjected* to his action, and it is in conformity with this that they get their designations, i.e., names."⁶³ In short, it is *human activity* that, in Noiré's opinion, gives meaning to the initial roots of language.⁶⁴ It is noteworthy that Noiré found the first embryo of his theory in Feuerbach's idea that man's essence lies in the community, in man's unity with man. He apparently knew nothing of Marx, for otherwise he would have seen that his view on the role of *activity* in the formation of language was closer to Marx, who, in his epistemology, laid stress on human activity, unlike Feuerbach, who spoke mostly of "contemplation".

of his economic data. *Rechtsentstehung und Rechtsgeschichte*, an interesting pamphlet by T. Achelis (Leipzig, 1904), considers law as a product of the development of social life, without going deeply into the question of what the latter's development is conditioned by. In M. A. Vaccaro's book, *Les bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état*, Paris, 1898, many individual remarks are scattered which throw light on certain aspects of the subject; on the whole, however, Vaccaro himself does not seem fully at home in the problem. See also Teresa Labriola's *Revisione critica delle più recenti teorie sulle origini del diritto*, Rome, 1901.

* *Der Ursprung der Sprache*, Mainz, 1877, S. 331.

** Ibid., S. 341.

*** Ibid., S. 347.

**** Ibid., S. 369.

In this connection, it is hardly necessary to remind the reader, with reference to Noiré's theory, that the nature of man's activities in the process of production is determined by the state of the productive forces. That is obvious. It will be more useful to note that the decisive influence of *being* upon *thinking* is seen with particular clarity in primitive tribes, whose social and intellectual life is incomparably simpler than that of civilised peoples. Karl von den Steinen writes of the natives of Central Brazil that we shall understand them only when we consider them as the outcome (*Erzeugnis*) of their *life as hunters*. "Animals have been the chief source of their experience," he goes on to say, "and it is mainly with the aid of that experience that they have interpreted Nature and formed their world-outlook."^{**} The conditions of their life as hunters have determined not only the world-outlook of these tribes but also their moral concepts, their sentiments, and even, the writer goes on to say, their aesthetic tastes. We see exactly the same thing in *pastoral* tribes. Among those whom Ratzel terms *exclusively herdsmen* "the subject of at least 99 per cent of all conversations is cattle, their origin, habits, merits and defects".^{**} For instance, the unfortunate *Hereros*,⁶¹ whom the "civilised" Germans recently "pacified" with such brutality, were such "exclusively herdsmen".^{***}

If *beasts* are the primitive hunter's foremost source of experience, and if his whole world-outlook was based on that experience, then it is not surprising that the *mythology* of hunting tribes, which at that stage takes the place of philosophy, theology and science, draws all its content from

* *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, S. 201.

** *Ibid.*, S. 205-06.

*** Regarding such "exclusively herdsmen" see Gustav Fritsch's book *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas*, Breslau, 1872. "The Kaffir's ideal," Fritsch says, "the object of his dreams, and that which he loves to sing of, is his cattle, the most valuable of his property. Songs lauding cattle alternate with songs in honour of tribal chiefs, in which the latter's cattle again play an important part" (I, 50). With the Kaffirs, cattle-tending is the most honourable of occupations (I, 85), and even war pleases the Kaffir chiefly because it holds the promise of booty in the shape of cattle (I, 79). "Lawsuits among the Kaffirs are the result of conflicts over cattle" (I, 322). Fritsch gives a highly interesting description of the life of Bushman *hunters* (I, 424 *et seq.*).

the same source. "The peculiarity of Bushman mythology," Andrew Lang writes, "is the almost absolute predominance of animals. Except 'an old woman' who appears now and then in these incoherent legends, their myths have scarcely one human figure to show."^{*} According to Brough Smith, the Australian aborigines,—like the Bushmen, who have not yet emerged from the *hunting stage*—have as their gods mostly birds and beasts.^{**}

The religion of primitive tribes has not yet been adequately studied. However, what we already know fully confirms the correctness of the brief thesis of Feuerbach and Marx that "it is not religion that makes man, but man who makes religion". As Ed. Tylor says, "Among nation after nation it is still clear how, man being the type of deity, human society and government became the model on which divine society and government were shaped."^{***} This is unquestionably a materialist view on religion: it is known that Saint-Simon held the opposite view, explaining the social and political system of the ancient Greeks through their religious beliefs. It is, however, far more important that science has already begun to discover the causal link between the technical level of primitive peoples and their world-outlook.^{****} In this respect valuable discoveries evidently await science.^{*****}

* Plekhanov is quoting from the French translation of Lang's *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, i.e., *Mythes, cultes et religion*, trad. par L. Maillier, Paris, 1896, p. 332. We are quoting from the original, London, 1887, Vol. II, p. 15.—*Ed.*

** Worth recalling in this connection is R. André's remark that man originally imagined his gods in the shape of animals. "When man later anthropomorphised animals, there arose the mythical transformation of men into animals." (*Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche*, neue Folge, Leipzig, 1889, S. 116.) The anthropomorphisation of animals presupposes a relatively high level of the development of the productive forces. Cf. also, Leo Frobenius, *Die Weltanschauung der Naturvölker*, Weimar, 1898, S. 24.

*** *La civilisation primitive*, Paris, 1876, tome II, p. 322.

**** Cf. H. Schurtz, *Vorgeschichte der Kultur*, Leipzig und Wien, 1900, S. 559-64. I shall return to this matter later, apropos of another question.

***** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) I shall permit myself to refer the reader to my article in the journal *Sovremennyy Mir* (*The Contemporary World*.—*Tr.*) entitled "On the So-called Religious Seekings in Russia" (1909, September). In it, I also discussed the significance of the mechanical arts for the development of religious concepts.

In the sphere of the *ideology* of primitive society, *art* has been studied better than any other branch: an abundance of material has been collected, testifying in the most unambiguous and convincing manner to the soundness and, one might say, the *inevitability* of the materialist explanation of history. So copious is this material that I can here enumerate only the most important of the works dealing with the subject: Schweinfurth, *Artes Africanæ*, Leipzig, 1875; R. Andrée, *Ethnographische Parallelen*, the article entitled "Das Zeichnen bei den Naturvölkern"; Von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894; G. Mallery, *Picture Writing of the American Indians*, X Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, Washington, 1893 (reports for other years contain valuable material on the influence of the mechanical arts, especially weaving, on ornamental design); Hörnes, *Urgeschichte der bildenden Kunst in Europa*, Wien, 1898; Ernst Grosse, *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, also *Kunstwissenschaftliche Studien*, Tübingen, 1900; Yrjö Hirn, *Der Ursprung der Kunst*, Leipzig, 1904; Karl Bücher, *Arbeit und Rhythmus*, 3. Auflage, 1902; Gabriel et Adrien de Mortillet, *Le préhistorique*, Paris, 1900, pp. 217-30; Hörnes, *Der diluviale Mensch*⁶² in *Europa*, Braunschweig, 1903; Sophus Müller, *L'Europe préhistorique*, trad. du danois par E. Philippot, Paris, 1907; Rich. Wallaschek, *Anfänge der Tonkunst*, Leipzig, 1903.

The conclusions arrived at by modern science as regards the question of the beginnings of art will be shown by the following quotations from the authors enumerated above.

"Decorative design," says Hörnes,* "can develop only from industrial activity, which is its material precondition. . . . Peoples without any industry . . . have no ornamental design either."

Von den Steinen thinks that *drawing* (*Zeichnen*) developed from "*Zeichen*" (*making signs*), used with the practical aim of indicating objects.

Bücher has formed the conclusion that "at the primitive stage of their development, work, music and poetry were a fused whole, work being the chief element in this trinity, and music and poetry of secondary importance". In his

* *Urgeschichte*, etc., S. 38.

opinion, "the origin of poetry is to be sought in labour", and goes on to remark that no language arranges words making up a sentence in ordinary speech, in a rhythmical pattern. It is therefore improbable that men arrived at measured poetical speech through the use of their everyday language—the inner logic of that language operates against that. How, then, is one to explain the origin of measured, poetical speech? Bücher is of the opinion that the measured and rhythmical movements of the body transmitted the laws of their co-ordination to figurative, poetical speech. This is all the more probable if one recalls that, at the lower stages of development, rhythmical movements of the body are usually accompanied by *singing*. But what is the explanation of the co-ordination of bodily movements? It lies in the nature of the processes of production. Thus, "the origin of poetry is to be sought in productive activities".*

R. Wallaschek formulates his view on the origin of dramatic performances among primitive tribes in the following way:** "The subjects of these dramatic performances were:

1. The chase, war, paddling (among hunters—the life and habits of animals; animal pantomimes; masks***).
2. The life and habits of cattle (among pastoral peoples).
3. Work (among agriculturists: sowing, threshing, vine-dressing).

The entire tribe took part in the performance, all of them singing (in chorus). The words sung were meaningless, the content being provided by the performance itself (pantomime). Only actions of everyday life were represented, such as were absolutely essential in the struggle for existence." Wallaschek says that in many primitive tribes, during such performances, the chorus split into two opposite parts. "Such," he adds, "was the origin of Greek drama, which was also an animal pantomime at the outset. The goat was the animal that played the most important part in the economy of the Greeks, which accounts for the word 'tragedy' being derived from 'tragos', the Greek for 'goat'."

* *Arbeit u. Rhythmus*, S. 342.

** *Anfänge der Tonkunst*, S. 257.

*** Usually depicting animals too.—G.P.

It would be difficult to give a more striking illustration of the proposition that it is not being that is determined by thinking, but thinking that is determined by being.

IX

But economic life develops under the influence of a growth in the productive forces. Therefore the mutual relations of people engaged in the process of production undergo changes, and, together with them, changes take place in human mentality. As Marx puts it: "At a certain stage of development, the material *productive forces* of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. . . . No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.* Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve, since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions of its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation."⁶⁴

Here we have before us a genuine "algebra"—and *purely materialist* at that—of social development. This algebra has room both for "*leaps*" (of the epoch of social revolutions) and for *gradual changes*. Gradual quantitative changes in the properties of a given order of things lead ultimately to a *change in quality*, i.e., to the downfall of *the old mode of*

* (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Certain Marxists in our country are known to have thought otherwise in the autumn of 1905. They considered a *socialist* revolution possible in Russia, since, they claimed, the country's productive forces were sufficiently developed for such a revolution.⁶³

production—or, as Marx expresses it here, of the old social order—and to its replacement by a new mode. As Marx remarks, in broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated, as successive epochs ("marking progress") in the economic development of society.⁶⁵ There is however reason to believe that later, when he had read Morgan's book on ancient society, he modified his view as to the relation of the mode of production in *antiquity* to that of the *East*. Indeed, the logic of the economic development of the *feudal* mode of production led to a social revolution that marked the triumph of *capitalism*. But the logic of the economic development of *China* or *ancient Egypt*, for example, did not at all lead to the appearance of the *antique* mode of production. In the former instance we are speaking of two phases of development, *one* of which *follows the other*, and is *engendered by it*. The second instance, on the other hand, represents rather two *coexisting types* of economic development. The *society of antiquity* took the place of the *clan social organisation*, the latter also preceding the appearance of the oriental *social system*. Each of these two types of economic structure was the outcome of the growth in the productive forces within the clan organisation, a process that inevitably led to the latter's ultimate disintegration. If these two types differed considerably from each other, their chief distinctive features were evolved *under the influence of the geographic environment*, which in *one case* prescribed *one kind* of aggregate production relations to a society that had achieved a certain degree of growth in the productive forces, and in the other case, *another kind*, greatly differing from the first.

The discovery of the *clan type* of social organisation is evidently destined to play the same part in social science as was played in biology by the discovery of the *cell*. While Marx and Engels were unfamiliar with this type of organisation, there could not but be considerable gaps in their theory of social development, as Engels himself subsequently acknowledged.⁶⁶

But the discovery of the clan type of organisation, which for the first time provided a key to an understanding of the lower stages of social development, was but a new and

powerful argument *in favour* of the materialist explanation of history, not *against that concept*. It provided a closer insight into the way in which the first phases of social being take shape, and social being then determines social thinking. The discovery thereby gave amazing clarity to the truth that social thinking is determined by social being.

I mention all this only in passing. The main thing deserving of attention is Marx's remark that the property relations existing when the productive forces reach a certain level *encourage the further growth of those forces* for a time, and then begin to hamper that growth.* This is a reminder of the fact that, though a certain state of the productive forces *is the cause* of the given production relations, and in particular of the property relations, the latter (once they have arisen *as a consequence of the aforementioned cause*) begin themselves to influence that cause. Thus there arises an *interaction* between the productive forces and the social economy. Since a whole superstructure of social relations, sentiments and concepts grows on the economic basis, that superstructure first fostering and then hindering the economic development, there arises between the superstructure and the basis an *interaction* which provides the key to an understanding of all those phenomena which *at first glance* seem to contradict the fundamental thesis of historical materialism.

Everything hitherto said by "critics" of Marx concerning the supposed one-sidedness of Marxism and its alleged disregard of all other "factors" of social development but the economic, has been prompted by a failure to understand the role assigned by Marx and Engels to the *interaction be-*

* Let us take slavery as an instance. At a certain level of development it *fosters the growth* of the productive forces, and then begins to *hamper that growth*. Its *disappearance* among the civilised peoples of the West was due to their *economic development*. (Concerning slavery in the ancient world, see Professor Et. Ciccotti's interesting work *Il tramonto della schiavitù*, Turin, 1899.) In his book *Journal of the Discovery of the Sources of the Nile*, 1863, J. H. Speke says that, among the Negroes, *slaves* consider it dishonest and disgraceful to run away from a master who has paid money for them. To this it might be added that these same *slaves* consider their condition more honourable than that of the *hired labourer*. Such an outlook corresponds to the phase "when slavery is still a *progressive phenomenon*".

tween "basis" and "superstructure". To realise, for instance, how little Marx and Engels ignored the significance of the political factor, it is sufficient to read those pages of the *Communist Manifesto* which make reference to the liberation movement of the bourgeoisie. There we are told:

"An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the mediæval commune; here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable 'third estate' of the monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, corner-stone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."⁶⁷

The importance of the political "factor" is so clearly revealed here that some "critics" consider it even unduly stressed. But the influence and the force of this "factor", as well as the mode of its operation in each given period of the bourgeoisie's development, are themselves explained in the *Manifesto* by the course of economic development, in consequence of which the *variety of "factors"* in no way disturbs the *unity of the fundamental cause*.

Political relations indubitably influence the economic movement, but it is also indisputable that *before they influence that movement they are created by it*.

The same must be said of the *mentality* of man as a social being, of that which Stammer has somewhat one-sidedly called *social concepts*. The *Manifesto* gives convincing proof that its authors were well aware of the importance of the ideological "factor". However, in the same *Manifesto* we see that, even if the ideological "factor" plays an important part in the development of society, *it is itself previously created by that development*.

"When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the eighteenth century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with

the then revolutionary bourgeoisie.”⁶⁸ In this connection, however, the concluding chapter of the *Manifesto* is even more convincing. Its authors tell us that the Communists never cease to instil into the minds of the workers the clearest possible recognition of the hostile antagonism between the interests of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat. It is easy to understand that one who attaches no importance to the ideological “factor” has no logical ground for trying to instil any such recognition whatsoever in the minds of any social group.

X

I have quoted from the *Manifesto*, in preference to other works by Marx and Engels, because it belongs to the early period of their activities when—as some of their critics assure us—they were especially “one-sided” in their understanding of the relation between the “factors” of social development. We see clearly, however, that in that period too they were distinguished, not by any “one-sidedness”, but only by a striving towards *monism*, an aversion for the *eclecticism* so manifest in the remarks of their “critics”.

Reference is not infrequently made to two of Engels’s letters, both published in *Sozialistischer Akademiker*. One was written in 1890, the other in 1894. There was a time when Herr Bernstein made much of these letters⁶⁹ which, he thought, contained plain testimony of the evolution that had taken place in the course of time in the views of Marx’s friend and collaborator. He made two extracts from them, which he thought most convincing in this respect, and which I consider necessary to reproduce here, inasmuch as they prove the reverse of what Herr Bernstein was out to prove.

Here is the first of these extracts: “Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite group of parallelograms of forces which give rise to a *resultant*—the historical event. This may again itself be viewed as the product of a power which works as a whole unconsciously and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed.”⁷⁰ (Letter of 1890.)

Here is the second extract: “Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all these react upon one another and also on the economic basis.”⁷¹ (Letter of 1894.) Herr Bernstein finds that “this sounds somewhat different” than the preface to *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, which speaks of the link between the economic “basis” and the “superstructure” that rises above it. But in what way does it sound different? Precisely what is said in the preface, is repeated, viz., political and all other kinds of development rest on economic development. Herr Bernstein seems to have been misled by the following words, “but all these react upon one another and also on the economic basis”. Herr Bernstein himself seems to have understood the preface to *Zur Kritik* differently, i.e., in the sense that the social and ideological “superstructure” that grows on the economic “basis” exerts no influence, in its turn, on that “basis”. We already know, however, that nothing can be more mistaken than such an understanding of Marx’s thought. Those who have observed Herr Bernstein’s “critical” exercises can only shrug their shoulders when they see a man who once undertook to popularise Marxism failing to go to the trouble—or, to be more accurate, proving incapable—of first getting an understanding of that doctrine.

The second of the letters quoted by Herr Bernstein contains passages that are probably of greater importance for an understanding of the causal significance of the historical theory of Marx and Engels, than the lines I have quoted, which have been so poorly understood by Herr Bernstein. One of these passages reads as follows: “So it is not, as people try here and there conveniently to imagine, that the economic situation produces an automatic effect. No. Men make their history themselves, only they do so in a given environment, which conditions it (*in einem gegebenen, sie bedingenden Milieu*), and on the basis of actual relations already existing, among which the economic relations, however much they may be influenced by the other—the political and ideological relations, are still ultimately the decisive ones, forming the keynote which runs through them and alone leads to understanding.”⁷²

As we see, Herr Bernstein himself, in the days of his

"orthodox" mood, was among the people "here and there", who interpret the historical doctrine of Marx and Engels in the sense that in history "the economic situation produces an automatic effect". These also include very many "critics" of Marx who have switched into reverse "*from Marxism to idealism*". These profound thinkers reveal great self-satisfaction when they confront and reproach the "one-sided" Marx and Engels with the formula that history is made by men and not by the automatic movement of the economy. In quoting Marx, they are actually misquoting him, and in their boundless simplicity of mind, do not even suspect that *the "Marx" they are "criticising"* has nothing in common with the real Marx, with the exception of the name, since he is the creation of their own and really many-sided non-understanding of the subject. It is natural that "critics" of such calibre are utterly incapable of "supplementing" or "amending" anything in historical materialism. Consequently, I shall not deal with them any longer, and shall go over to the "founders" of that theory.

It is of the utmost importance to note that when Engels, shortly before his death, denied the "automatic" understanding of the historical operation of the economy, *he was only repeating* (almost in the same words) *and explaining what Marx had written as far back as 1845, in the third Thesis on Feuerbach, quoted above.* There Marx reproached the earlier materialists with having forgotten that if "men are products of circumstances... it is men that change circumstances". Consequently, the task of materialism in the sphere of history lay, as Marx understood it, precisely in explaining *in what manner "circumstances" can be changed by those who are themselves created by them.* This problem was solved by the reference to the relations of production that develop under the influence of conditions independent of the human will. Production relations are the *relations among human beings* in the social process of production. Saying that *production relations have changed* means saying that *the mutual relations have changed among people engaged in that process.* A change in these relations cannot take place "automatically", i.e., *independently of human activity*, because they are *relations established among men in the process of their activities.*

But these relations may undergo changes—and indeed often do undergo changes—in a direction far from that in which people *would like* them to change. The character of the "economic structure" and the direction in which that character changes depend, not upon human will but on the state of the productive forces and on the specific changes in production relations which take place and become necessary to society as a result of the further development of those forces. Engels explains this in the following words: "Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by *necessity*, the complement and form of appearance of which is *accident*."⁷³ Here human activity is itself defined as being not free, but *necessary*, i.e., as being *in conformity with a law*, and therefore *capable of becoming an object of scientific study.* Thus, while always pointing out that circumstances are changed by men, historical materialism at the same time enables us, for the first time, *to examine the process of this change from the standpoint of science.* That is why we have every right to say that the materialist explanation of history provides the necessary *prolegomena to any doctrine on human society claiming to be a science.*⁷⁴

This is so true that at present the study of any aspect of social life acquires *scientific significance* only in the measure in which it draws closer to a *materialist* explanation of that life. Despite the so vaunted "revival of idealism" in the social sciences, that explanation is becoming more and more common wherever researchers refrain from indulging in edifying meditation and verbiage on the "ideal", but set themselves the scientific task of discovering the causal links between phenomena. Today even people who not only do not adhere to the materialist view on history, but have not the slightest idea of it, are proving materialists in their historical researches. It is here that their ignorance of this view, or their prejudice against it, which hinders an understanding of all its aspects, does indeed lead to one-sidedness and narrowness of concepts.

Here is a good illustration. Ten years ago Alfred Espinas, the French scholar (and incidentally a bitter enemy of the present-day socialists), published a highly interesting—at least in conception—"sociological study" entitled *Les origines de la technologie*. In this book, the author, proceeding from the purely materialist proposition that *practice* always precedes *theory* in the history of mankind, examines the influence of *technology* on the development of *ideology*, or to be more precise, on the development of religion and philosophy in ancient Greece. He arrives at the conclusion that, in each period of that development, the ancient Greeks' world-outlook was determined by the state of their productive forces. This is, of course, a highly interesting and important conclusion, but anyone accustomed consciously to applying materialism to an explanation of historical events will, on reading Espinas's "study", find that the view expressed therein is one-sided. That is so for the simple reason that the French scholar has paid practically no attention to other "factors" in the development of ideology, such as, for example, the *class struggle*. Yet the latter "factor" is of really exceptional importance.

In primitive society, which knows no division into classes, man's productive activities exert a *direct* influence on his world-outlook and his aesthetic tastes. Decorative design draws its motifs from technology, and dancing—probably the most important of the arts in such a society—often merely imitates the process of production. That is particularly to be seen in *hunting* tribes, which stand at the lowest known level of economic development.* That is why I referred chiefly to them when I was discussing the dependence of primitive man's *mentality* on his *activities in the economy* he conducts. However, in a society that is divided into classes the *direct* impact

* The hunters were preceded by the *gatherers* (of fruits and roots—*Tr.*) or *Sammelwölker*, as German scholars now term them. But all the savage tribes we know have already passed that stage.

(Note to the German edition of 1910.) In his work on the origin of the family, Engels says that purely hunting peoples exist only in the imagination of scholars. Hunting tribes are "gatherers" at the same time. However, as we have seen, hunting has a most profound influence on the development of the views and tastes of such peoples.

of those activities on ideology becomes far less discernible. That is understandable. If, for instance, one of the Australian aboriginal women's dances reproduces the *work of root-gathering*, it goes without saying that none of the graceful dances with which, for instance, the fine ladies of 18th-century France amused themselves could depict those ladies' productive work, since they did not engage in such work, preferring in the main to devote themselves to the "science of tender passion". To understand the Australian native women's dance it is sufficient to know the part played in the life of the Australian tribe by the gathering of wild roots by the womenfolk. But to understand the minuet, for instance, it is absolutely insufficient to have a knowledge of the economy of 18th-century France. Here we have to do with a dance expressive of the *psychology of a non-productive class*. A psychology of *this kind* accounts for the vast majority of the "customs and conventions" of so-called good society. Consequently, in this case the *economic* "factor" is second to the *psychological*. It should, however, not be forgotten that the appearance of non-productive classes in a society is a product of the latter's economic development. Hence, the economic "factor" preserves its predominant significance even when it is second to others. Moreover, it is then that this significance makes itself felt, for it is then that it determines the *possibility and the limits of the influence of other "factors"*.*

Nor is that all. Even when it participates in the productive process in the capacity of leader, the upper class looks upon the lower class with a disdain they do not trouble to conceal. This, too, is reflected in the ideologies of the two classes.

* Here is an example from another field. The "population factor", as it is called by A. Coste (see his *Les facteurs de population dans l'évolution sociale*, Paris, 1901), undoubtedly has a very big influence on social development. But Marx is absolutely right in saying that the abstract laws of propagation exist only for animals and plants. In human society the increase or decline of population depends on that society's organisation, which is determined by its economic structure. No abstract "law of propagation" will explain anything in the fact that the population of present-day France hardly grows at all. Those sociologists and economists who see in the growth of population the *primary* cause of social development are profoundly mistaken (see A. Loria, *La legge di popolazione ed il sistema sociale*, Siena, 1882).

The French medieval *fabliaux*, and particularly the *chansons de gestes*⁷⁵ depict the peasant of the time in a most unattractive way. If we are to believe them, then:

*Li vilains sont de laide forme
Ainc si très laide ne vit home;
Chaucuns a XU piez de granz;
En auques ressemblent jâianz,
Mais trop sont de laide manière
Boçu sont devant et derrière.**

The peasants, of course, saw themselves in a different light. Indignant at the arrogance of the feudal seigneurs, they sang:

*Nous sommes des hommes, tous comme eux,
Et capable de souffrir, tout autant qu'eux.***

And they asked:

*When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the gentleman?*

In a word, each of these two classes looked upon things from its own point of view, which was determined by its position in society. The psychology of the contending sides was coloured by the class struggle. Such, of course, was the case, not only in the Middle Ages and not only in France. The more acute the class struggle grew in a given country and at a given time, the stronger was its influence on the psychology of the conflicting classes. He who would study the history of ideologies in a society divided into classes must give close consideration to this influence; otherwise he will be all at sea. Try to give a *bluntly economic* explanation of the fact of the appearance of the David⁷⁶ school of painting in 18th-century France: nothing will come of your

* *The villeins are ugly in shape.
No man has seen uglier.
Each of them is 15 feet in stature,
Some resemble giants,
But much too ugly,
With humps both in front and behind. (Tr.)*

Cf. *Les classes rurales et le régime domanial en France au moyen âge*, par Henri Sée, Paris, 1901, p. 554. Cf. also Fr. Meyer, *Die Stände, ihr Leben und Treiben*, S. 8, Marburg, 1882.

** *We are men, just as they are,
And capable of suffering, just like they. (Tr.)*

attempt except ridiculous and dull nonsense. But if you regard that school as an ideological reflection of the class struggle in French society on the eve of the great revolution, the matter will at once assume an entirely different aspect: even such qualities in David's art which, it would seem, were so far removed from the social economy that they can in no way be linked up with it, will become fully comprehensible.

The same has also to be said of the history of ideologies in ancient Greece, a history that most profoundly experienced the impact of the class struggle. That impact was insufficiently shown in Espinas's interesting study, in consequence of which his important conclusions were marked by a certain bias. Such instances might be quoted today in no small number, and they would all show that the influence of Marx's materialism on many present-day experts would be of the utmost value in the sense that *it would teach them also to take into account "factors" other than the technical and the economic*. That sounds paradoxical, yet it is an undeniable truth, which will no longer surprise us if we remember that, though he explains any social movement as the outcome of the economic development of society, Marx very often thus explains that movement only as the *ultimate outcome*, i.e., he takes it for granted that a number of various other "factors" will operate in the interim.

XII

Another trend, diametrically opposed to that which we have just seen in Espinas, is beginning to reveal itself in present-day science—a tendency to explain the history of ideas exclusively by the influence of the class struggle. This perfectly new and as yet inconspicuous trend has arisen under the direct influence of Marxist historical materialism. We see it in the writings of the Greek author A. Eleuthero-poulos, whose principal work *Wirtschaft und Philosophie. I. Die Philosophie und die Lebensauffassung des Griechentums auf Grund der gesellschaftlichen Zustände*; and II. *Die Philosophie und die Lebensauffassung der germanisch-romanischen Völker* was published in Berlin in 1900.

Eleutheropoulos is convinced that the philosophy of any given period expresses the latter's specific "world-outlook and views on life" (*Lebens- und Weltanschauung*). Properly speaking, there is nothing new about this. Hegel already said that every philosophy is merely the ideological expression of its time. With Hegel, however, the features of the various epochs, and, consequently, of the corresponding phases in the development of philosophy, were determined by the movement of Absolute Idea, whereas with Eleutheropoulos any given epoch is characterised primarily by its economic condition. The economy of any particular people determines its "life- and world-understanding", which is expressed, among other things, in its philosophy. With a change in the economic basis of society, the ideological superstructure changes too. Inasmuch as economic development leads to the division of society into classes, and to a struggle between the latter, the "life- and world-understanding" peculiar to a particular period is not uniform in character. It varies in the different classes and undergoes modification in accordance with their position, their needs and aspirations, and the course of their mutual struggle.

Such is the viewpoint from which Eleutheropoulos regards the entire history of philosophy. It is self-evident that this point of view deserves the closest attention and the utmost approval. For quite a considerable period there has been discernible in philosophical literature a dissatisfaction with the usual view on the history of philosophy as merely a filiation of philosophical systems. In a pamphlet published in the late eighties and dealing with ways of studying the history of philosophy, the well-known French writer Picavet declared that, taken by itself, filiation of this kind can explain very little.* The appearance of Eleutheropoulos's work might have been welcomed as a new step in the study of the history of philosophy, and as a victory of historical materialism in its application to an ideology far removed from economics. Alas, Eleutheropoulos has not displayed much skill in making use of the dialectical method of that materialism. He has *oversimplified* the problems confronting

* *L'histoire de la philosophie, ce qu'elle a été, ce qu'elle peut être*, Paris, 1888.

him, and for that reason alone has failed to bring forward any solutions other than the very one-sided and therefore most unsatisfactory. Let us cite his appraisal of Xenophanes. According to Eleutheropoulos, Xenophanes expressed, in the realm of philosophy, the aspirations of the Greek proletariat. He was the Rousseau of his time.* He wanted social reform in the meaning of the equality and unity of all citizens, and his doctrine of the *unity of being* was merely the theoretical foundation of his plans for reform.** It was from this theoretical foundation of Xenophanes's reformational aspirations that all the details of his philosophy developed, beginning with his view on God, and ending with his doctrine of the illusoriness of representations received through our senses.***

The philosophy of Heraclitus, the "Dark Philosopher", says Eleutheropoulos, was engendered by the reaction of the aristocracy against the revolutionary aspirations of the Greek proletariat. According to that philosophy, universal equality is impossible, for Nature herself has made men unequal. Each man should be content with his lot. It is not the overthrow of the existing order that should be aspired towards in the State, but the elimination of the arbitrary use of power, which is possible both under the rule of a *few* and under the rule of the *masses*. Power should belong to *Law*, which is an expression of *divine law*. *Unity* is not precluded by divine law but unity that is in accord with the latter is a *unity of opposites*. The implementation of Xenophanes's plans would be a breach of the divine law. Developing and substantiating this idea, Heraclitus created his dialectical doctrine of Becoming (*Werden*).****

That is what Eleutheropoulos says. Lack of space prevents me from quoting more samples of his analysis of the causes determining the development of philosophy. There is hardly any need to do so. The reader, I hope, will see for himself that this analysis must be found unsatisfactory. The process of the development of ideologies is, in general, incomparably

* *Wirtschaft und Philosophie*, I, S. 98.

** *Ibid.*, S. 99.

*** *Ibid.*, S. 99-101.

**** *Ibid.*, S. 103-07.

more complex than Eleutheropoulos imagines.* When you read his oversimplified notions on the influence of the class struggle on the history of philosophy, you begin to regret that he seems quite ignorant of the aforementioned book by Espinas: the one-sidedness inherent in the latter work, if superimposed on his own one-sidedness, might perhaps have corrected a good deal in his analysis.

Nevertheless, Eleutheropoulos's unsuccessful attempt to shed light on the history of philosophy testifies anew to the proposition—unexpected to many—that a more thorough assimilation of Marx's historical materialism would be useful to many contemporary investigators, precisely because it *will save them from one-sidedness*. Eleutheropoulos is acquainted with that materialism, but *poorly* so. That is borne out by the "*correction*" he has thought fit to introduce into it.

He remarks that the economic relations of a given people determine only "*the necessity of its development*". The latter itself is a matter of individuality, so that this people's "life-and world-understanding" is determined in its content, first, by its character and the character of the country it inhabits; secondly, by its needs; and thirdly, by the personal qualities of those who come forward from its midst as reformers. It is only in this sense, according to Eleutheropoulos, that we can speak of the relation of philosophy towards the economy. Philosophy fulfils the demands of its time, and does so in conformity with the personality of the philosopher.**

Eleutheropoulos probably thinks that this view on the relation of philosophy to the economy differs from the materialist view of Marx and Engels. He deems it necessary to give a new name to his interpretation of history, calling it *the Greek theory of Becoming* (*griechische Theorie des Werdens****). This is simply ridiculous, and all one can say in this connection is that "the Greek theory of Becoming", which in fact is nothing but rather poorly digested and clumsily expounded historical materialism, nevertheless *promises* far

* To say nothing of the fact that, in his references to the economy of ancient Greece, Eleutheropoulos gives no concrete presentation of it, confining himself to general statements which here, as everywhere else, explain nothing.

** Ibid., I, S. 16-17.

*** Ibid., I, S. 17.

more than is actually *given* by Eleutheropoulos when he proceeds from describing his method to applying it, for then he departs completely from Marx.

As for the "personality of the philosopher" and, in general, of any person who leaves an impress on the history of mankind, those who imagine that the theory of Marx and Engels has no room for it are in gross error. It has left room for that, but at the same time it has been able to avoid the impermissible *contraposing of the activities of any "personality" to the course of events, which is determined by economic necessity*. Anybody who resorts to such contraposing thereby proves that he has understood very little of the materialist explanation of history. The fundamental thesis of historical materialism, as I have repeated more than once, is that *history is made by men*. That being so, it is manifest that it is made also by "great men". It only remains to establish what the activities of such men are determined by. Here is what Engels writes in this connection, in one of the two letters quoted above:

"That such-and-such a man and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in a long run he will be found. That Napoleon, just that particular Corsican, should have been the military dictator whom the French Republic, exhausted by its own warfare, had rendered necessary, was chance; but that, if a Napoleon had been lacking, another would have filled the place, is proved by the fact that the man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot and all the English historians up to 1850 are evidence that it was being striven for, and the discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that it simply *had* to be discovered. So with all the other accidents, and apparent accidents, of history. The further the particular sphere which we are investigating is removed from the economic sphere and approaches that of pure abstract ideology, the more shall we find it exhibiting accidents in its development, the more will its curve run zigzag. But if you plot the average axis of the

curve, you will find that this axis will run more and more nearly parallel to the axis of economic development, the longer the period considered and the wider the field dealt with.”*

The “personality” of anyone who has won distinction in the spiritual or social sphere is among those instances of *accident* whose appearance does not prevent the “average” axis of mankind’s *intellectual* development running parallel to that of its *economic* development.** Eleutheropoulos would have understood that better had he given more careful thought to Marx’s historical theory and been less concerned with producing his *own* “Greek theory”***

It need hardly be added that we are still far from being always capable of discovering the causal link between the appearance of a given philosophical view and the economic situation of the period in question. The reason is that we are only beginning to work in this direction; were we in a position already to answer all the questions—or at least most of the questions—that arise in this connection, that would mean that our work was already completed, or approaching completion. What is of decisive significance in this case is not the fact that *we cannot yet cope with all* the difficulties facing us in this field; there is not, neither can there be, such a method that can remove at one stroke all the difficulties appearing in a science. The important thing is that it is incomparably easier for the materialist explanation of history to cope with them than it is for the idealist or the eclectic explanations. That is borne out by the fact that scientific thought in the sphere of history has been most strongly attracted towards the materialist explanation of events, has, so to say, been persistently seeking for it, since the Restoration period.**** To this day, it has not ceased from gravitating towards it and seeking it, despite the fine indig-

* *Der sozialistische Akademiker*, Berlin, 1895, No. 20, S. 374.⁷⁷

** See my article “On the Role of Personality in History” in my book *Twenty Years*.

*** He called it *Greek* because, as he put it, “its fundamental theses had been expressed by the Greek Thales, and later further developed by another Greek” (op. cit., p. 17), i.e., by Eleutheropoulos.

**** See my preface to the second edition of my Russian translation of the *Communist Manifesto*.

nation that comes over any self-respecting ideologist of the bourgeoisie whenever he hears the word *materialism*.

A third illustration of the present *inevitability of attempts to find a materialist explanation of all aspects of human culture* is provided by Franz Feuerherd’s book *Die Entstehung der Stile aus der politischen Oekonomie*, Part 1, Brunswick and Leipzig, 1902⁷⁸. “In conformity with the dominant mode of production and the form of State thereby conditioned,” says Feuerherd, “the human intelligence moves in certain directions, and is excluded from others. Therefore the existence of any style (in art—*G.P.*) presupposes the existence of people who live in quite definite political conditions, are engaged in production under quite definite production relations, and have quite definite ideals. Given these conditions, men create the appropriate style with the same natural necessity and inevitability as the way linen bleaches, as bromide of silver turns black, and a rainbow appears in the clouds as soon as the sun, as the cause, brings about all these effects”.* All this is true, of course, and the circumstance that this is acknowledged by a *historian of art* is of particular interest. When, however, Feuerherd goes on to ascribe the origins of the various Greek styles to economic conditions in ancient Greece, what he produces is something that is too schematic. I do not know whether the second part of his book has come out; I have not been interested in the matter, because it is clear to me how poorly he has learnt the modern materialist method. In their schematism, his arguments are reminiscent of those of our native-bred but second-rate Friches and Rozhkovs, who, like Feuerherd, may be well advised, first and foremost, to *make a study of modern materialism*. Only *Marxism* can save all of them from falling into *schematism*.

XIII

In a controversy with me, the late Nikolai Mikhailovsky once declared that Marx’s historical theory would never gain much acceptance in the scholarly world. We have just seen, and will again see from what follows below, that this statement is not quite correct. But first we must remove certain

* Ibid., pp. 19-20.

other misconceptions which prevent a proper understanding of historical materialism.

If we wanted to express in a nutshell the view held by Marx and Engels with regard to the relation between the now celebrated "*basis*" and the no less celebrated "*super-structure*", we would get something like the following:

- 1) *the state of the productive forces*;
- 2) *the economic relations* these forces condition;
- 3) *the socio-political system* that has developed on the given economic "*basis*";
- 4) *the mentality of men living in society*, which (the mentality—*Tr.*) is determined in part directly by the economic conditions obtaining, and in part by the entire socio-political system that has arisen on that foundation;
- 5) *the various ideologies* that reflect the properties of that mentality.

This formula is comprehensive enough to provide proper room for all "forms"⁷⁹ of historical development, and at the same time it contains absolutely nothing of the eclecticism that is incapable of going beyond the *interaction* between the various social forces, and does not even suspect that *the fact* that these forces *do interact* has provided no solution of *the problem of their origin*. This formula is a *monist* one, and this *monist* formula is thoroughly imbued with *materialism*. In his *Philosophy of the Spirit*, Hegel said that the Spirit is history's only motive principle. It is impossible to think otherwise, if one accepts the viewpoint of the *idealism* which claims that *being* is determined by *thinking*. Marx's materialism shows in what way the *history of thinking* is determined by *the history of being*. Hegel's idealism, however, did not prevent him from recognising economic factors as a cause "conditioned by the development of the Spirit". In exactly the same way, materialism did not prevent Marx from recognising the action, in history, of the "Spirit" as a force whose direction is determined at any given time and in the final analysis by the course of *economic* development.

That all ideologies have one common root—the *psychology of the epoch in question*—is not hard to understand; anyone who makes even the slightest study of the facts will realise that. As an example, we might make reference to French romanticism. Victor Hugo, Eugène Delacroix, and Hector

Berlioz worked in three entirely different spheres of art. All three differed greatly from one another. Hugo, at least, did not like music, while Delacroix had little regard for romanticist musicians. Yet it is with good reason that these three outstanding men have been called *the trinity of romanticism*; their works are a reflection of one and the same psychology. It can be said that Delacroix's painting "Dante and Vergil" expresses the same temper as that which dictated his *Hernani* to Victor Hugo, and his *Symphonie fantastique* to Berlioz. This was sensed by their contemporaries, i.e., by those of them who in general were not indifferent to literature and art. A classicist in his tastes, Ingres called Berlioz "the abominable musician, monster, bandit, and antichrist".* This is reminiscent of the flattering opinions voiced by the classicists regarding Delacroix, whose brush they compared to a *drunken besom*. Like Hugo, Berlioz was the object of fierce attacks.** It is common knowledge, too, that he achieved victory with incomparably more effort and far later than Hugo did. Why was that so, despite the fact that his music expressed the same psychology as did romanticist poetry and drama? To answer this question, it would be necessary to understand many details in the comparative history of French music and literature,*** details which may remain uninterpreted for long, *if not for always*. What is beyond doubt, however, is that the psychology of French romanticism will be understood by us only if we come to regard it as the psychology of a definite class that lives in definite social and historical conditions.**** "The movement of the thirties in

* See *Souvenirs d'un hugolâtre* by Augustin Challamel, Paris, 1885, p. 259. In this case, Ingres revealed more consistency than Delacroix, who, while he was a romanticist in painting, retained a predilection for classical music.

** Ibid., p. 258.

*** And especially in the history of the part each of them played therein, in expressing the temper of the times. As we know, various ideologies and various branches of ideology come to the fore at various times. For instance, in the Middle Ages theology played far more important a part than at present; in primitive society dancing is the most important art, whilst it is far from that nowadays, and so on.

**** E. Chesneau's book *Les chefs d'école*, Paris, 1883, pp. 378-79⁸⁰ contains the following subtle observation regarding the romanticists' psychology. The author points out that romanticism made its appearance after the Revolution and the Empire. "In literature and in art, there

literature and art," Jean-Baptiste Tiersot says, "was far from having the character of a people's revolution."** That is perfectly true. The movement referred to was *bourgeois* in its essence. But that is not all. The movement did not enjoy universal sympathy among the bourgeoisie itself. In Tiersot's opinion, it expressed the strivings of a small "élite" sufficiently far-sighted to be able to discern genius wherever it lay in hiding.** These words are a superficial, i.e., idealist, expression of the fact that the French bourgeoisie of the time did not understand much of what its own ideologists then aspired towards and felt in the sphere of literature and art. Such dissonance between ideologists and the class whose aspirations and tastes they express is by no means rare in history, and explains the highly numerous specific features in the intellectual and artistic development of mankind. In the case we are discussing, this dissonance was the cause, among other things, of the contemptuous attitude of the "refined" *élite* towards the "obtuse bourgeois"—an attitude which still misleads naïve people, and wholly prevents them from realising the arch-bourgeois character of romanticism.*** But here, as everywhere, the origin and the character of this dissonance can be ultimately explained only by the economic position, the economic role, of the social class in whose midst it has appeared. Here, as everywhere, only *being* sheds light on the "secrets" of thinking. And that is why here—again as everywhere—it is only materialism that is capable of giving a *scientific* explanation of the "course of ideas".

was a crisis similar to that which occurred in morals after the Terror—a veritable orgy of the senses. People had been living in fear, and that fear had gone. They gave themselves up to the pleasures of life. Their attention was taken up exclusively with external appearances and forms. Blue skies, brilliant lights, the beauty of women, sumptuous velvet, iridescent silk, the sheen of gold, and the sparkle of diamonds filled them with delight. People lived only with the eyes... they had ceased from thinking." This has much in common with the psychology of the times we are living through in Russia. In both cases, however, the course of events leading up to this state of mind was itself the outcome of the course of economic development.

* *Hector Berlioz et la société de son temps*, Paris, 1904, p. 190.

** Ibid.

*** Here we have the same *qui pro quo* as that which makes the adherents of the arch-bourgeois Nietzsche look truly ridiculous when they attack the bourgeoisie.

In their efforts to explain that course, the idealists have never proved able to watch from the standpoint of the "course of things". Thus, Taine thinks that it is the properties of the artist's environment that account for a work of art. But what properties is he referring to? To the *psychological*, that is to say, the general psychology of the period in question, whose properties themselves require explanation.* When it explains the psychology of a particular society or a particular class, materialism addresses itself to the social structure created by the economic development, and so on. But Taine, who was an idealist, attempted to explain the origin of a *social system* through the medium of *social psychology*, thereby getting himself entangled in irresolvable contradictions. Idealists in all lands show little liking for Taine nowadays. The reason is obvious: by *environment* he understood the general *psychology of the masses*, the *psychology of the "man in the street"* at a particular time and in a particular class. To him, this psychology was the court of last instance to which the researcher could appeal. Consequently, he thought that a "great" man always thinks and feels at the behest of the "man in the street", at dictation from "mediocrities". Now this is wrong in point of fact, and, besides, offends bourgeois "intellectuals", who are always prone, at least in some small measure, to count themselves in the category of great men. Taine was a man who, after saying "A", was unable to carry on and say "B", thus ruining his own case. The only escape from the contradictions he got entangled in is through historical materialism, which finds the right place for both the "individual" and the "environment", for both "the man in the street" and "the man of destiny".

It is noteworthy that, in France, where, from the Middle Ages right down to 1871, the socio-political development and the struggle between social classes assumed a form most typical of Western Europe, it is easier than anywhere else to discover the causal nexus between that development and that struggle, on the one hand, and the history of ideologies on the other.

* "L'oeuvre d'art," he writes, "est déterminée par un ensemble qui est l'état général de l'esprit et des mœurs environnantes."⁸¹

Speaking of the reason why, during the Restoration in France, the ideas of the theocratic school of philosophy of history were so widespread, Robert Flint has had the following to say: "The success of such a theory, indeed, would have been inexplicable, had not the way for it been prepared by the sensationalism of Condillac, and had it not been so obviously fitted to serve the interests of a party which represented the opinions of large classes of French society before and after the Restoration."^{*} This is true, of course, and it is easy to realise which class it was whose interests found ideological expression in the theocratic school. Let us, however, delve further into French history and ask ourselves: is it not also possible to discover the social causes of the success achieved by sensationalism in *pre-revolutionary France*? Was not the intellectual movement that produced the theoreticians of sensationalism in its turn an expression of the aspirations of a particular social class? It is known that this was the case: this movement expressed the emancipatory aspirations of the French *tiers état*.^{**} Were we to proceed in the same direction we would see that, for instance, the philosophy of Descartes gave a clear reflection of the requirements of the economic development and the alignment of social forces of his time.^{***} Finally, if we went back as far as the fourteenth century and turned our attention, for instance, to the romances of chivalry, which enjoyed such popularity at the French court and among the French aristocracy of the period, we would have no difficulty in discovering that these romances mirrored the life and the tastes of the *état* referred

^{*} *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, Edinburgh and London, 1874, p. 149.

^{**} (Note to the German edition of 1910.) In his polemic against the Bauer brothers, Marx wrote: "The French Enlightenment of the 18th century, in particular *French materialism*, was not only a struggle against the existing political institutions and the existing religion and theology; it was just as much an *open* clearly expressed struggle against *metaphysics of the seventeenth century*, and against all metaphysics, in particular that of *Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibnitz*" (Nachlass, 2. Band, S. 232).⁸² This is now common knowledge.

^{***} See G. Lanson's *Histoire de la littérature française*, Paris, 1896, pp. 394-97, which gives a lucid explanation of the links between certain aspects of Descartes's philosophy and the psychology of the ruling class in France during the first half of the seventeenth century.

to.^{*} In a word, the curve of the intellectual movement in this remarkable country, which but recently had every right to claim that it "marched at the head of the nations", runs parallel to the curve of economic development, and that of the socio-political development conditioned by the latter. In view of this, the history of ideology in France is of particular interest to sociology.

This is something that those who have "criticised" Marx in various tones and keys have not had the least idea of. They have never understood that, though criticism is of course a splendid thing, a certain prerequisite is needed when you undertake to criticise, i.e., *an understanding of what you are criticising*. Criticising a given method of scientific investigation means determining in what measure it can help discover the causal links existing between phenomena. That is something that can be ascertained only through experience, i.e., through the application of that method. Criticising historical materialism means making a trial of the method of Marx and Engels in a study of the historical movement of mankind. Only then can the strong and the weak points of the method be ascertained. "The proof of the pudding is in the eating," as Engels said when explaining his theory of cognition.⁸³ This applies in full to historical materialism as well. To *criticise* this dish, you must first have a taste of it. To taste the method of Marx and Engels, you must first be able to use it. To use it properly presupposes a far higher degree of scientific grounding and far more sustained intellectual effort than are revealed in pseudo-critical verbiage on the theme of the "one-sidedness" of Marxism.

The "critics" of Marx declare, some with regret, some in reproach, and some with malice, that to this day no *book* has appeared, containing a theoretical substantiation of historical materialism. By a "book" they usually understand something like a brief manual on world history written from the materialist viewpoint. At present, however, no such guide can be written either by an individual scholar, however extensive

^{*} Sismondi (*Histoire des Français*, t. X, p. 59) has voiced an interesting opinion of the significance of these romances, an opinion that provides material for a *sociological study of imitation*.

his knowledge, or by a whole group of scholars. A sufficiency of material for that does not yet exist, nor will it exist for a long time. Such material can be accumulated only by means of a lengthy series of investigations carried out in the respective fields of science, with the aid of the Marxist method. In other words, those "critics" who demand a "book" would like to have matters *started from the end*, i.e., *they want a preliminary explanation*, from the materialist viewpoint, of *that very historical process which is to be explained*. In actual fact, a "book" in defence of historical materialism is being written in the measure in which contemporary scholars—mostly, as I have said, without realising that they are doing so—are forced by the present-day state of social science to furnish a materialist explanation of the phenomena they are studying. That such scholars are not so few in number is shown convincingly enough by the examples I have quoted above.

It has been said by Laplace that fifty years elapsed before Newton's great discovery was supplemented in any significant degree. So long a period was required for this great truth to be generally understood and for those obstacles to be overcome which were placed in its way by the vortex [Cartesian—*Tr.*] theory and also perhaps by the wounded pride of mathematicians of Newton's* times.

The obstacles met by present-day materialism as a harmonious and consistent theory are incomparably greater than those that Newton's theory came up against on its appearance. Against it are directly and decisively ranged the interests of the class now in power, to whose influence most scholars subordinate themselves of necessity. Materialist dialectic, "which regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement and . . . lets nothing impose upon it", cannot have the sympathy of the *conservative class* that the Western bourgeoisie today is. It stands in such contradiction to that class's frame of mind that ideologists of that class naturally tend to look upon it as something impermissible, improper, and unworthy of the attention both of "respectable" people in general, and of "esteemed" men of learn-

ing in particular.* It is not surprising that each of these pundits considers himself morally obliged to avert from himself any suspicion of sympathy with materialism. Often enough such pundits denounce materialism the more emphatically, the more insistently they adhere to a materialist viewpoint in their *special research*.** The result is a kind of semi-subconscious "conventional lie", which, of course, can have only a most injurious effect on theoretical thinking.

XV

The "conventional lie" of a society divided into classes becomes ever more enhanced, the more the existing order of things is shaken by the impact of the economic development and the class struggle caused thereby. Marx very truly said that the greater the development of the contradiction between the growing productive forces and the existing social order, the more does the ideology of the master class become imbued with hypocrisy. The more the falseness of this ideology is revealed by life, the more elevated and virtuous does the *language* of that class become (*Sankt Max. Dokumente des Sozialismus*, August 1904, S. 370-371).⁸⁴ The truth of this remark is being brought home with particular force today, when, for instance, the spread of loose morals in Germany, as revealed by the Harden-Moltke trial,⁸⁵ goes hand in

* Regarding this, see, *inter alia*, Engels's above-mentioned article "Über den historischen Materialismus".

** The reader will remember how vehemently Lamprecht justified himself when he was accused of materialism, and also how Ratzel defended himself against the same accusation, in his *Die Erde und das Leben*, II, S. 631. Nevertheless, he wrote the following words, "The sum total of the cultural acquirements of each people at every stage of its development is made up of material and spiritual elements. . . . They are acquired, not with identical means, or with equal facility, or simultaneously. . . . Spiritual acquirements are based on the material. Spiritual activity appears as a luxury only after material needs have been satisfied. Therefore all questions of the origin of culture boil down to the question of what it is that promotes the development of the material foundations of culture" (*Völkerrkunde*, I. Band, I. Auflage, S. 17). This is unmitigated historical materialism, only far less considered, and therefore not of such sterling quality as the materialism of Marx and Engels.

* *Exposition du système du monde*, Paris. L'an IV, t. II, pp. 291-92.

hand with a "renaissance of idealism" in social science. In our country, even among "theorists of the proletariat", people are to be found who do not understand the social cause of this "renaissance", and have themselves succumbed to its influence, such as the Bogdanovs, the Bazarovs, and their like....

Incidentally, so immensely great are the advantages any researcher is provided with by the Marxist method that even those who have willingly submitted to the "conventional lie" of our time are beginning to publicly recognise them. Among such people, for instance, is the American Edwin Seligman, author of a book published in 1902 under the title of *The Economic Interpretation of History*. Seligman frankly admits that scholars have shied away from the theory of historical materialism because of the socialist conclusions drawn from it by Marx. However, he thinks that you can eat your cake and yet have it: "one can be an economic materialist" and yet remain hostile to socialism. As he puts it, "The fact that Marx's economics may be defective has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his philosophy of history."* In actual fact, Marx's economic views were intimately bound up with his political views. A proper understanding of *Capital* absolutely implies the necessity of previous and careful thought on the celebrated preface to *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*. However, we are unable here either to set forth Marx's economic views or to demonstrate the incontrovertible fact that they form merely an indispensable component of the doctrine known as historical materialism.** I shall add only that Seligman is sufficiently a "pundit" also to be scared of *materialism*. This economic "materialist" thinks it is going to intolerable extremes "to make religion itself depend on economic forces" or to "seek the explanation of Christianity itself in economic

* *The Economic Interpretation of History*, pp. 24 and 109.

** A few incidental words in explanation of what has been said. According to Marx, "economic categories are merely the theoretical expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of production" (*The Poverty of Philosophy*, Chapter II, Second Observation).⁸⁶ This means that Marx regards the categories of *political economy* likewise from the viewpoint of the mutual relations among men in the social process of production, relations whose development provides him with the basic explanation of mankind's *historical* movement.

facts alone".* All this goes to show clearly how deep are the roots of those prejudices—and consequently of the obstacles—that Marxist theory has to fight against. Yet the very fact of the appearance of Seligman's book and even the very nature of the reservations he makes give some reason to hope that historical materialism—even in a truncated or "purified" form—will in the end achieve recognition by those ideologists of the bourgeoisie who have not given up the idea of bringing order into their historical views.**

But the struggle against socialism, materialism, and other unpleasant extremes presupposes possession of a "spiritual weapon". What is known as subjective political economy, and more or less adroitly falsified statistics at present constitute the spiritual weapon mainly used in the struggle against socialism. All possible brands of Kantianism form the main bulwark in the struggle against materialism. In the field of social science, Kantianism is utilised for this purpose as a *dualist* doctrine which *tears asunder the tie between being and thinking*. Since consideration of *economic* questions does not come within the province of this book, I shall confine myself to an appraisal of the *philosophical* spiritual weapon employed by bourgeois reaction in the ideological sphere.

Concluding his booklet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels remarks that when the mighty means of production created by the capitalist epoch have become the property of society, and when production is organised in conformity with social needs, men will at last become masters of their social relations, and hence lords over Nature, and their own mas-

* *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 137. (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Kautsky's *Origin of Christianity*, as an "extremist" book, is of course reprehensible from Seligman's point of view.

** The following parallel is highly instructive. Marx says that materialist dialectic, while explaining that which exists, at the same time explains its *inevitable destruction*. In this, he saw its value, its progressive significance. But here is what Seligman says: "Socialism is a theory of what ought to be; historical materialism is a theory of what has been" (ibid., p. 108). For that reason alone, he considers it possible for himself to defend historical materialism. This means, in other words, that this materialism may be ignored when it comes to explaining the inevitable destruction of *that which is* and may be used to explain *that which has been in the past*. This is one of the numerous instances of the use of a double standard in the field of ideology, a phenomenon also *engendered by economic causes*.

ters. Only then will they begin *consciously* to make their own history; only then will the social causes they bring into play produce, in ever greater measure, effects that are desirable to them. "This will be mankind's leap from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom."⁸⁷

These words of Engels's have evoked objections from those who, unable in general to stomach the idea of "leaps", have been either unable or unwilling to understand any such "leap" from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of freedom. Such a "leap" seemed to them to contradict that view on freedom which Engels himself voiced in the first part of his *Anti-Dühring*. Therefore, if we would see our way through the confusion in the minds of such people, we must recall exactly what Engels said in the book mentioned above.

And here is what he said. Explaining Hegel's words that "Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood", Engels stated that freedom consists in exercising "control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity".* This idea is set forth by Engels with a clarity quite sufficient for people familiar with the Hegelian doctrine referred to. The trouble is that present-day Kantians only "criticise" Hegel, but do not study him. Since they have no knowledge of Hegel, they have been unable to understand Engels. To the author of *Anti-Dühring* they have made the objection that where there is submission to necessity, there is no freedom. This is quite consistent on the part of people whose philosophical views are imbued with a *dualism* that is incapable of uniting thinking with being. From the viewpoint of this dualism, the "leap" from necessity to freedom remains absolutely incomprehensible. But Marx's philosophy, like that of Feuerbach, proclaims the unity of being and thinking. Although, as we have already seen above, in the section on Feuerbach, Marxist philosophy understands that unity quite differently from the sense in which it is understood by absolute idealism, it [Marxist philosophy] does not at all disagree with Hegelian doctrine in the question we are concerned with, viz., the relation of freedom to necessity.

* Herrn Eugen Dührings *Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*, 5. Auflage, S. 113.⁸⁸

The gist of the whole matter is: precisely what should be understood by *necessity*. Aristotle* already pointed out that the concept of necessity contains many shades of meaning: medicine is necessary for a cure to be effected; breathing is necessary for life; a trip to Aegina is necessary for a debt to be collected. All these are, so to say, *conditional* necessities; we *must* breathe *if* we want to live; we *must* take medicine *if* we want to get rid of an illness, and so on. In the process of acting on the world about him, man has constantly to do with necessity of this kind: he *must of necessity* sow *if* he would reap, shoot an arrow *if* he would kill game, stock fuel *if* he would get a steam-engine operating, and so on. From the viewpoint of the neo-Kantian "criticism of Marx", it has to be admitted that there is an element of *submission* in this conditional necessity. Man would be *freer* if he were able to satisfy his wants without expending any labour at all. He always *submits* to Nature, even *when he forces her to serve him*. This submission, however, is a condition of his becoming free: by submitting to Nature, he thereby increases *his power over her*, i.e. *his freedom*. It would be the same under the planned organisation of social production. By *submitting* to certain demands of technical and economic necessity, men would put an end to that preposterous order of things under which they are dominated by the products of their own activities, that is to say, they would increase their *freedom* to a tremendous degree. Here, too, their submission would become a source of liberation to them.

Nor is that all. "Critics" of Marx, who have become used to considering that a gulf separates thinking and being, know of only one shade of necessity; to use Aristotle's wording, they imagine necessity only as a force that *prevents* us from acting *according to* our desires, and *compels* us to do that which is *contrary* to them. Necessity of *this* kind is indeed the opposite of freedom, and cannot but be irksome in greater or lesser degree. But we must not forget that a force seen by man as external coercion which is in conflict with his wishes may, in other circumstances, be seen by him in an entirely different light. As an illustration, let us take the agrarian question in Russia today. To the intelligent land-

* *Metaphysics*, Book V, Chapter 5.

owner who is a Constitutional-Democrat, the "forcible alienation of the land"⁸⁹ may seem more or less sad historical necessity—sad, that is to say, in reverse proportion to the size of the "fair compensation" given. But to the *peasant* who yearns for land, the reverse is true: the "fair compensation" will present itself as a more or less sad necessity, while "forcible alienation" is bound to be seen as an expression of his own unfettered will, and the most precious security of his freedom.

In saying this, I am touching upon what is perhaps the most important point in the doctrine of freedom—a point not mentioned by Engels only, of course, for its being self-evident to one who has gone through the Hegelian school.

In his philosophy of religion Hegel says, "*Die Freiheit ist dies: nichts zu wollen als sich*,"* i.e., "Freedom lies in willing nothing but oneself".** This observation sheds a strong light on the entire question of freedom, insofar as that question bears upon social psychology. The peasant who demands that the landlord's land should be transferred to him wants "nothing but himself"; the Constitutional-Democratic landlord who agrees to give him land no longer wants "himself" but that which history *compels* him to want. The former is *free*, while the latter wisely *submits to necessity*.

It would be the same, as with the peasant, for the proletariat, which converts the means of production into social property and organises social production on a new foundation. It would wish nothing "but itself", and would feel *quite free*. As for the capitalists, they would, of course, at best feel that they were in the position of the landowner who has accepted the Constitutional-Democratic agrarian programme⁹⁰; they could not but think that *freedom* is one thing, and *historical necessity*, another.

* Hegel's *Werke*, 12. Band, S. 98.

** (Note to the German edition of 1910.) Spinoza already said (*Ethics*, Part III, Proposition 2, *Scholium*) that many people think they act freely because they know their actions but not the causes of those actions. "Thus an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, or a timid child thinks it freely chooses flight." The same idea was expressed by Diderot, whose materialist doctrine was, on the whole, Spinozism liberated from its theological setting.

As it seems to me, those "critics" who have objected to Engels's stand have failed to understand him also, incidentally, for the reason of their being able to imagine themselves in the position of the capitalist, but being totally unable to imagine themselves in the proletarian's shoes. I hold the opinion that this, too, has its *social*—and ultimately *economic*—cause.

XVI

Dualism, to which ideologists of the bourgeoisie are now so prone, has another charge to make against historical materialism. Through Stammer, it imputes that historical materialism fails to take *social teleology* into account. This second imputation, which incidentally is highly akin to the first, is equally groundless.

Marx says, "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations."⁹¹ Stammer makes reference to this formula as proof that, despite his theory, Marx was unable to avoid teleological considerations; Marx's words, in Stammer's opinion, mean that men *consciously* enter into the mutual relations without which production is impossible. Consequently these relations are the outcome of *expedient action*.*

It is easy to see in which part of this argument Stammer makes a logical error which leaves its impress on all his further critical remarks.

Let us take an example. Savages who live by hunting are pursuing a quarry, an elephant, let us say. For this they gather together and organise their forces in a definite way. What is the *aim* of this, and the *means*? The aim is obviously to catch or to kill the elephant, and the means is, to join forces to pursue the animal. *By what* is the aim prompted? By the *wants* of the human organism. Now *by what* are the means determined? *By the conditions of the chase*. Do the wants of the human body depend on man's will? No, they do not; in general, that is the department of *physiology*, not of *sociology*. What then can we at present demand of sociology, in this connection? We can demand an explanation of the reason

* *Wirtschaft und Recht*, zweite Auflage, S. 421.

why men, in seeking to satisfy their wants—for instance, the need for food—sometimes enter into certain kinds of mutual relations, and sometimes into quite other kinds. *Sociology*—in the person of Marx—*explains this circumstance as the outcome of the state of their productive forces*. Now the question is: does the state of these forces depend on human will, or on the *aims* pursued by men? To this, sociology, again in the person of Marx, replies that it does not. If there is no such dependence, then that signifies that these forces are brought into being by virtue of a definite necessity, one that is determined by given conditions external to man.

What is the inference to be made? It is that if hunting is an *expedient activity* on the part of the savage, then this fact in no way detracts from the significance of Marx's observation that *the production relations arising among savages who are hunters* come into being by virtue of conditions that do not fully depend on that expedient activity. In other words, if the primitive hunter *consciously* strives to kill as much game as possible, it does not follow therefrom that the communism characteristic of that hunter's everyday life has evolved as *the expedient outcome of his activities*. No, this communism has arisen, or rather has been *preserved* of itself (seeing that it came into being long ago) as the *unconscious*, i.e., *necessary*, result of an organisation of labour in a way quite independent of the will of men.* It is this that the Kantian Stammler has failed to grasp; it is here that he has lost his bearings, and led astray our Struves, Bulgakovs and other *temporary* Marxists, whose names are known to the Lord alone.**

Continuing his critical observations, Stammler says, that if social development were to take place exclusively in virtue of *causal necessity*, it would be patently senseless to consciously try to further it. The following is the alternative, in his opinion: either I consider a given phenomenon a *necessity*, i.e., inevitable, in which case there is no need for me to help further it, or *else* my activity is essential for that phenom-

* "Necessity, in its contraposition to liberty, is nothing else but the unconscious." Schelling, *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, 1800, S. 424.

** This aspect of the matter is discussed in fairly great detail in various parts of my book on *historical monism*.⁹²

enon to take place, in which case it cannot be termed a necessity. Who would attempt to assist the necessary, i.e., inevitable, rising of the sun?*

This is an amazingly vivid revelation of dualism characteristic of people steeped in Kantianism: *with them, thinking is always divorced from being*.

The rising of the sun is in no way connected with men's social relations, either as cause or as effect. As a natural phenomenon, it can therefore be contraposed to men's conscious aspirations, which, too, have no causal tie with it. But it is quite different when we have to deal with *social* phenomena, with history. We already know that history is made by men; therefore, human aspirations cannot but be a factor of the movement of history. But men make history in one way and not in another, in consequence of a particular necessity which we have already dealt with above. Once this necessity is given, *then given too, as its effect, are those human aspirations which are an inevitable factor of social development*. Men's aspirations do not exclude necessity, but are themselves determined by it. It is therefore a grave logical error to contrapose them to necessity.

When a social revolution is brought about by a class striving for its liberation, that class acts in a way that is more or less expedient in achieving the aim desired; in any case its activities are the *cause* of that revolution. However, together with all the aspirations that have brought them about, these activities are themselves a *consequence* of a definite course of the economic development, and are therefore themselves determined by *necessity*.

Sociology becomes a science only in the measure in which it succeeds in understanding the appearance of aims in social man (social "teleology"), as a necessary consequence of a social process ultimately determined by the course of economic development.

Highly characteristic is the circumstance that consistent antagonists of the materialist explanation of history see themselves forced to prove the *impossibility* of sociology as a

* *Wirtschaft und Recht*, p. 421 et seq. Cf. also Stammler's article entitled "Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung" in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 2. Auflage, V. Band, S. 735-37.

science.⁹³ This means that the "critical approach" is now becoming an obstacle to the further scientific development of our times. In this connection, an interesting problem arises for those who are trying to find a scientific explanation of the history of philosophical theories. That problem is: to determine in what way this role of the "critical approach" is linked up with the struggle of the classes in present-day society.

If I endeavour to participate in a movement whose triumph I consider a historical necessity, then that means that I look upon my own activities as an indispensable link in the chain of conditions whose sum will necessarily ensure the triumph of a movement that I hold dear. It means nothing more nor less than that. A dualist will fail to understand, but all this will be perfectly clear to anybody who has assimilated the theory of *the unity of subject and object*, and has understood how that unity reveals itself in social phenomena.

Highly noteworthy is the fact that theoreticians of Protestantism in the United States of America seem unable to understand the contraposition of freedom and necessity that has been exercising the minds of so many ideologists of the European bourgeoisie. H. Bary says that "in America the most positive instructors in the field of energy (*professeurs d'énergie*) are little prone to recognise freedom of the will".* He ascribes this to their preference, as men of action, for "fatalist solutions". He is wrong, however, since fatalism has nothing to do with the matter. This is to be seen in his own remark about the moralist Jonathan Edwards: "Edwards's point of view . . . is that of any man of action. To anyone who has had an aim once in his lifetime freedom is the faculty of putting all his soul in the service of that aim."** This is well put, and closely resembles Hegel's "willing nothing but oneself". But when a man "wills nothing but himself", he is in no way a fatalist: it is then that he is precisely a *man of action*.

Kantianism is not a philosophy of struggle, or a philosophy of men of action. It is a philosophy of half-hearted people, a philosophy of compromise.

* H. Bary, *La religion dans la société aux États-Unis*, Paris, 1902, pp. 88-89.

** Ibid., pp. 97-98.

The means of removing the existing social evil, Engels says, must be *discovered* in the existing material conditions of production, not *invented* by one social reformer or another.⁹⁴ Stammler is in agreement with this, but accuses Engels of unclear thinking, since in his (Stammler's) opinion the gist of the matter lies in ascertaining "*the method with the aid of which this discovery must be made*".* This objection, which merely reveals Stammler's vague thinking, is eliminated by simply mentioning the fact that though the nature of the "method" is in such cases determined by a great variety of "factors", the latter can all be ultimately referred to the course of the economic development. The very fact of the appearance of *Marx's theory* was determined by the development of the capitalist mode of production, whereas the predominance of utopianism in pre-Marxist socialism is quite understandable in a society suffering not only from the development of the aforementioned mode of production, but also (and in greater degree) from the *insufficiency of that development*.

It would be superfluous to dilate on the matter. The reader will perhaps not complain if, in concluding this article, I will draw his attention to the measure in which *the tactical "method"* of Marx and Engels is intimately bound up with the fundamental theses of their historical theory.

This theory tells us, as we already know, that mankind always sets itself only such tasks that it can solve, for "the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation".⁹⁵ Where these conditions *already exist*, the state of things is not quite the same as it is where they are still "*in the process of formation*". In the former instance the time for a "leap" *has already arrived*; in the latter instance the "leap" is, for the time being, a *matter of the more or less distant future*, "an ultimate aim" whose approach is *prepared by a series of "gradual changes"* in the mutual relations between social classes. What role should be played by innovators during the period in which a "leap" is *still impossible*? It evidently remains for them to contribute to the "gradual changes", i.e., they must, in other words, try to bring about

* *Handwörterbuch*, V. Band, S. 736.

reforms. In this way, both the "ultimate aim" and reforms find their place, and the very contraposition of reform and "ultimate aim" loses all meaning, is relegated to the sphere of utopian legends. Those who would make such a contraposition—whether they are German "revisionists" like Eduard Bernstein, or Italian "revolutionary syndicalists" like those who took part in the latest syndicalist congress in Ferrara—will show themselves equally incapable of understanding the spirit and the method of modern scientific socialism. This is a good thing to remember at present, when reformism and syndicalism permit themselves to speak for Marx.

And what healthy optimism breathes in the words that mankind always sets itself only such tasks that it can solve. They do not, of course, mean that any solution of mankind's great problems, as suggested by the first utopian one meets, is a good one. A utopian is one thing; mankind, or, more precisely, a social class representative of mankind's highest interests in a given period, is something else. As Marx has very well said, "*With the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass whose action it is will therefore increase.*"⁹⁶ This is conclusive condemnation of a utopian attitude towards great historical problems. If Marx nevertheless thought that mankind never sets itself unachievable tasks, then his words are, from the viewpoint of theory, only a new way of expressing the idea of the unity of subject and object in its application to the process of historical development; from the viewpoint of practice they express that calm and courageous faith in the achievement of the "ultimate aim" which once prompted our unforgettable N. G. Chernyshevsky to exclaim fervently, "Come what may, we shall win".⁹⁷

The philosophy of Marx and Engels is not only a *materialist philosophy*; it is *dialectical materialism*. Objections are brought forward against this doctrine—first of all, to the effect that dialectic cannot stand up to criticism, and secondly, that materialism is incompatible with dialectic. Let us examine these objections.

The reader probably remembers that Herr Bernstein attributed what he called the errors of Marx and Engels to the injurious influence of dialectic. Customary logic adheres to the formula "Yes is yes, and no is no", while dialectic turns this formula into its opposite, viz., "Yes is no, and no is yes." In his aversion for this latter "formula", Herr Bernstein declared it capable of leading man into the most dangerous logical temptations and errors. The vast majority of readers who are considered educated have probably agreed with him, for the reason that the formula "Yes is no, and no is yes" seems to flatly contradict the fundamental and established laws of thinking. It is this aspect of the matter that we must now consider.

The "fundamental laws of thinking" are considered to be three in number: 1) The law of identity; 2) the law of contradiction, and 3) the law of the excluded middle.

The law of identity (*principium identitatis*) states that "A is A" (*omne subjectum est praedicatum sui*) or $A = A$.

The law of contradiction (*principium contradictionis*)—"A is not A"—is merely the negative form of the first law.

According to the law of the excluded middle (*principium exclusi tertii*), two opposing judgements that are mutually exclusive cannot both be wrong. Indeed, "A is either B or non-B". The truth of either of these two judgements neces-

sarily means the falseness of the other, and vice versa. There is not, neither can there be, any middle.

Überweg has pointed out that the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle can be united in the following logical rule: "*To every definite question, understood in the direct sense, as to whether a definite predicate attaches to a definite subject, we must reply either 'Yes' or 'No'.*"* We cannot reply both "Yes" and "No".

It is hard to raise any objection to the correctness of this rule. If, however, it is true, then the formula "*Yes is no, and no is yes*" must be recognised as unsound, and the only thing we can do is to laugh it to scorn, following the example of Herr Bernstein, and confess ourselves at a loss if we are asked how such indubitably profound thinkers as Heraclitus, Hegel and Marx could have found it more satisfactory than the formula "*Yes is yes, and no is no*", which is so solidly grounded in the basic rules of thinking mentioned above.

This conclusion, which is fatal to dialectic, may seem uncontestable; however, before accepting it, let us examine the matter from another angle.

The motion of matter lies at the root of all natural phenomena.** But what is motion? Here we have what seems to be a contradiction. If you are asked whether a body that is in motion is located at a particular place at a particular moment, you will be unable, however hard you try, to give an answer using Überweg's rule, i.e., the formula "*Yes is yes, and no is no.*" A moving body is at a particular place, and *at the same time it is not there.****

The only way in which a judgement of that body can be

* *System der Logik*, Bonn, 1874, S. 219.

** I am referring to the *objective* aspect of phenomena. "Une volition est, pour le cerveau, un mouvement d'un certain système de fibres. Dans l'âme c'est ce qu'elle éprouve en conséquence du mouvement des fibres." Robinet, *De la nature*, t. I, Ch. XXIII, partie IV, p. 440. Cf. Feuerbach's "Was für mich oder subjektiv ein rein geistiger Akt, ist an sich oder objektiv ein materieller, sinnlicher." *Werke*, II, S. 350.

*** This is something that even the most resolute opponents of the dialectical method cannot but accept. "Die Bewegung," says A. Trendelenburg, "die vermöge ihres Begriffs an demselben Punkte zugleich ist und nicht ist", etc. (*Logische Untersuchungen*, Leipzig, 1870, I, S. 189). It is almost superfluous to repeat here the remark, already made by Überweg, to the effect that Trendelenburg should have said "a body in motion", and not "motion".

formed is in accordance with the formula "*Yes is no, and no is yes*". It thus testifies incontrovertibly in favour of "*the logic of contradiction*". Whoever is unwilling to reconcile himself to this logic will have to proclaim, together with Zeno of Elea, that motion is nothing more than an illusion of the senses. Our compatriot Mr. N. G.,⁹⁹ also a very resolute enemy of dialectic but not a very serious one, does not seem to understand this. He says that if a body in motion, with *all* its parts, "is located in one place, then its simultaneous location in another place presents an indisputable emergence from nothing, for whence can it get to another place? Is it from the former? But the body has not yet left its former place". And if we assume, he goes on to say, that a body is located at a particular moment and at a particular place, but *not with all* its parts, we must remember that even in a state of rest the various parts of a body occupy different places in space.*

All this is very good, though stale. What, however, do the arguments brought forward by Mr. N. G. prove? *They prove that motion is impossible.* Excellent, this is something I shall not argue against; I shall, however, ask Mr. N. G. to call to mind Aristotle's remark, day by day invariably borne out by natural science, that by denying motion we immediately make any study of Nature impossible.** Is it this that Mr. N. G. was after? Was this the aim of the "authoritative journal" that published his profoundly scholarly essay? If neither of them was bold enough to deny motion, they should both have realised that Zeno's "aporia",¹⁰⁰ as réchauffée by Mr. N. G., has left them no conclusion but recognition of motion, as a contradiction in action, i.e., recognition of that which Mr. N. G. set out to disprove. Here are "critics" for you!

I would like to ask all those who do not deny motion: what are we to think of a "*fundamental law*" of thinking which contradicts a *fundamental fact of being*? Should we not regard such a "law" with a certain circumspection?

We seem to have found ourselves confronted with the alternative of *either* recognising the "fundamental laws" of

* "Materialism and Dialectical Logic", *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, July 1898, pp. 94 and 96.

** *Metaphysics*, I, VII, 59.

formal logic and denying motion, *or*, on the contrary, recognising motion and denying those laws. An alternative like this is, to say the least, an unpleasant one. Let us see whether it can somehow be avoided.

The motion of matter lies at the root of all natural phenomena. But motion is a contradiction. It should be judged in a dialectical manner, i.e., as Herr Bernstein would say, according to the formula "*Yes is no, and no is yes*". We must therefore admit that, as long as we are referring to this basis of all phenomena, we are in the domain of the "*logic of contradiction*". But molecules of matter that is in motion join to form certain *combinations*—things and objects. Such combinations possess a greater or lesser degree of strength, exist for a more or less lengthy period of time, and then disappear to be replaced by others. Only the motion of matter is eternal, and matter itself is indestructible substance. But once a certain temporary combination of matter has come into being as a result of the eternal motion of matter, and until that combination has disappeared as a consequence of that motion, the question of its existence must of necessity be answered in the positive. Therefore, if anyone will point to the planet of Venus and ask us whether it actually exists, we shall reply without any hesitation that it *does*. But if we are asked whether witches exist, we shall reply just as decisively that they *do not*. How is this to be understood? It should be understood as meaning that when we are dealing with individual objects we must, in our judgements about them, follow the aforementioned rule of Überweg, and in general be guided by the "fundamental rules of thinking". In *this* field predominance belongs to the "formula", so dear to Herr Bernstein: "*Yes is yes, and no is no*".*

* This formula also covers the *historical judgements*, referred to by Überweg (*Logik*, 196), as to, for instance, whether Plato was born in 429, 428, or 427 B.C., and the like. I would like here to recall the amusing reply made by a young Russian revolutionary, who came to Geneva in 1882, I think it was. He had been requested by the police to reply to several questions regarding his identity. "Where were you born?" he was asked by N. I. Zhukovsky, now deceased, who had arranged for his coming there. "Oh, in a number of gubernias," the over-cautious "conspirator" replied evasively. At this, Zhukovsky, flaring up, exclaimed, "Who's going to believe that?" This would be agreed to by the most zealous defenders of the dialectical method.

Here too, incidentally, the operation of this estimable formula is not unlimited. An affirmative reply must be forthcoming to the question of the reality of an object *that has already come into existence*. But when an object is just *in the process of coming into existence*, we may have good reason to be hesitant in replying. When a man has lost half the hair on his head we say he is very bald, but how are we to determine at which particular stage the loss of hair justifies the use of the epithet.

To every definite question as to whether a particular object possesses a particular property, the answer must be either *yes* or *no*. There can be no doubt about that. But what answer can be expected when an object is *in the process of change*, is *losing* a given property, or is only *in the process of acquiring it*? It goes without saying that in this case too a definite answer is obligatory: the gist of the matter is that only that answer will be definite which is based on the formula "*Yes is no, and no is yes*". No answer is possible in accordance with the "*Either-yes-or-no*" formula recommended by Überweg.

It may, of course, be objected that a property that is *being lost* has not yet ceased to exist, and one that is *being acquired* already exists, so that a definite answer in accordance with the formula "*Either yes or no*" is possible and obligatory even when the object under examination is *in a state of change*. This objection is erroneous, however. A youth on whose chin down is beginning to appear is no doubt growing a beard, but this is as yet insufficient reason to call him bearded. Down on the chin is not yet a beard, though it is *turning* into a beard. To become *qualitative*, a change must achieve a certain *quantitative limit*. He who forgets this forfeits the possibility of expressing any *definite* judgement concerning the properties possessed by objects.

"All is flux, nothing is stationary," said the ancient thinker from Ephesus.⁴⁰¹ The combinations we call objects are in a state of constant and more or less rapid *change*. Inasmuch as given combinations remain *given combinations*, we are obliged to judge of them in accordance with the formula "*Yes is yes, and no is no*". Inasmuch as they *change and cease to exist* as such, we must address ourselves to the *logic of contradiction*; even at the risk of incurring the displeasure of Messrs. the Bernsteins, the N.G.'s and the entire metaphysical

fraternity, we must say, "Both yes and no; they both do and do not exist."

Just as a state of rest is a particular instance of motion, thinking in accordance with the rules of formal logic (i.e., the "fundamental laws" of thinking) is a particular instance of dialectical thinking.

It was said of Cratylus, one of Plato's teachers, that he was not in agreement even with Heraclitus, who had said, "We cannot go down one and the same river twice." Cratylus asserted that it could not be done even once: whilst we are going down a river it is undergoing change and becoming a *different* river. In such judgements, the element of *extant being* (*Dasein*) is, as it were, cancelled by the element of *becoming* (*Werden*). This is an abuse of dialectic, and not proper use of the dialectical method. As Hegel has remarked, "*Das Etwas ist die erste Negation der Negation.*" ("The Something is the first negation of the negation").*

Those of our critics who are not entirely unfamiliar with philosophical literature are given to referring to Trendelenburg, who is alleged to have confuted all arguments in favour of dialectic. These gentlemen, however, have obviously misread Trendelenburg—if they have read him at all. They have forgotten (if ever they knew, of which I am not at all sure) the following trifle. Trendelenburg considers the "*principium contradictionis*" *applicable, not to motion, but only to those objects that it creates.*** That is true, but motion does not only *make* objects; as I have already said, *it is constantly changing them.* It is for that reason that the *logic of motion* (the "logic of contradiction") never relinquishes its rights over the objects created by motion. That is why, even when giving their due to the "fundamental laws" of formal logic, we must remember that they are significant only within certain limits, only in the measure in which they do not prevent us from giving dialectic its due too. That is how Trendelenburg presents the case, though he did not himself draw the appropriate logical conclusions from the principle he had expressed—one of the greatest importance to the scientific theory of knowledge.

* *Werke*, III, S. 114.

** Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, dritte Auflage, Leipzig, 1870, II. Band, S. 175.

I shall add, in passing, that very many sound observations, which speak in my favour, not against me, are scattered throughout *Logische Untersuchungen*. Strange as that may seem, it is very simply accounted for by the very simple circumstance that actually Trendelenburg was warring against *idealist* dialectic. Thus, for example, he saw dialectic's shortcoming in its "asserting the self-movement of pure thought, a movement which is at the same time the self-creation of being" (*behauptet . . . eine Selbstbewegung des reinen Gedankens, die zugleich die Selbsterzeugung des Seins sei*).*

This is indeed a big mistake, but anyone will understand that this shortcoming is inherent precisely in idealist dialectic. It is common knowledge that when Marx wanted to put dialectic "right side up" he began by rectifying this basic error, which stemmed from its old idealist foundation. Another example: Trendelenburg says that, in actual fact, motion in Hegel's system is the foundation of a logic which seems to need no premises for its substantiation.** This again is quite true, but again it is an argument in favour of *materialist* dialectic. A third example, and the most interesting of the three: according to Trendelenburg, it is mistaken to think that with Hegel Nature is merely applied logic. The reverse is true. Hegel's logic is not at all the creation of pure thought; it is the outcome of anticipatory abstraction from Nature (*eine antizipierte Abstraktion der Natur*). In Hegel's dialectic, almost everything is derived from experience, so that were experience to take away from dialectic all that the latter had borrowed from it, dialectic would be reduced to penury.*** That is precisely the case, but it is exactly what was said by those pupils of Hegel who revolted against their teacher's idealism and went over to the camp of *materialism*.

Many more such examples might be given, but they would distract me from my subject. I have merely wanted to show my critics that, in their struggle against me, they should refrain from quoting Trendelenburg.

To continue. I have already said that motion is a contradiction in action, and that consequently the "fundamental

* *Ibid.*, I, 36.

** *Ibid.*, I, 42.

*** *Ibid.*, I, 78 and 79.

laws" of formal logic are inapplicable to it. I must qualify this proposition so as to avoid giving ground for misunderstandings. When we are confronted by the problem of a transition from one kind of motion to another—let us say, from mechanical motion to heat—we too have to reason in accordance with Überweg's fundamental rule. This kind of motion is *either* heat, *or* mechanical motion, *or* else ... etc. That is clear. But if so, then the fundamental laws of formal logic are, within certain limits, *applicable to motion as well*. Hence it again follows that dialectic does not abolish formal logic, but only strips its laws of the *absolute value* that the metaphysicians have ascribed to them.

If the reader has paid due attention to what has been set forth above, he will easily understand what little "value" attaches to the idea at present so frequently repeated that *dialectic is incompatible with materialism*.^{*} The reverse is true; *our dialectic is based on the materialist understanding of Nature*, is upheld by that understanding, and would fall to the ground were materialism fated to fall. Conversely, without dialectic, *the materialist theory of knowledge* would be incomplete, warped, and even *impossible*.

With Hegel, *dialectic* coincides with *metaphysics*. For us, *dialectic* is built on the *doctrine of Nature*.

With Hegel, the *Absolute Idea* was, to use Marx's expression, the demiurge of reality. For us, the absolute idea is merely an *abstraction of motion*, which latter is the cause of all *combinations and states of matter*.

With Hegel, thinking progresses in consequence of the uncovering and resolution of the *contradictions* inclosed in *concepts*. According to our doctrine—the *materialist*—the contradictions embodied in concepts are merely reflections, *translations into the language of thought*, of those contradictions that are embodied in *phenomena* owing to the contradictory nature of their common basis, i.e., *motion*.

With Hegel, the course of things is determined by the course of ideas. For us, the course of *ideas* is explained by the course of *things*, and *the course of thought, by the course of life*.

^{*} "I think," says the sapient Mr. N. G. "that materialism and dialectical logic are elements which, philosophically speaking, may be considered incompatible" (*Russkoye Bogatstvo*, June, p. 59).¹⁰²

Materialism places dialectic "right side up", thereby stripping from it the veil of mystery that Hegel enshrouded it in. By doing so, materialism reveals the *revolutionary character* of dialectic.

"In its mystified form," Marx says, "dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form, it is a scandal and an abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing order of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, and of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed (*gewordene*—G.P.) social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."^{*}

It is quite in the order of things that materialist dialectic is a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie, which is imbued with the spirit of reaction; but the fact that even people who are in sincere sympathy with the revolutionary socialism sometimes turn away from materialist dialectic is ridiculous and very sad. It is the height of absurdity.

After everything I have said, I can, I think, merely shrug my shoulders in contempt with regard to the amazing fabrication concocted by Mr. N. G., who has ascribed to me the principle of "*the double organisation of the intellect*", a principle alleged to constitute the "premise" which alone can make our "dialectical logic at least a little verisimilar".^{**} Indeed, how very wide of the mark is our unverisimilar critic.

One more point deserves our attention. We already know that Überweg was right—and also in what measure he was right—in demanding of those who think logically definite

^{*} See the preface to the second German edition of Volume I of *Capital*.¹⁰³

^{**} *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, June, p. 64.¹⁰⁴ In his polemic with the disciples of Heraclitus, Parmenides called them "*two-headed*" *philosophers*, who saw things simultaneously in a double aspect—as existent and non-existent.¹⁰⁵ Mr. N.G. has brought forward as a philosophical proposition something that with Parmenides was merely a piece of whimsical but biting polemic. What progress, "with the aid of God", in the understanding of "prime problems" in philosophy!

answers to definite questions as to whether a given object possesses a given property. But suppose that we have to do, not with a *simple* object but with a *complex* one, which unites *diametrically opposite phenomena* within itself, and therefore combines therein properties that are diametrically opposed to one another. Is the demand made by Überweg applicable to judgements on such an object? No, it is not. Überweg, who was opposed to Hegelian dialectic just as resolutely as Trendelenburg was, held that in such cases the necessary reasoning should accord with another rule, viz., that of *the coincidence of opposites* (*principium coincidentiae oppositorum*). But the overwhelming majority of phenomena that come within the compass of the natural and social sciences are among "objects" of this kind. Diametrically opposite phenomena are united in the simplest globule of protoplasm, and in the life of the most undeveloped society. Consequently, an important place must go to the dialectical method in the field of the natural and social sciences. Indeed, these sciences have made tremendous strides since the time when such an important place was given in them to the dialectical method.

Perhaps the reader would like to learn how dialectic has won its position in biology. In that case, he should recall the controversy as to the nature of *species*, a controversy that was engendered by the appearance of the theory of transformism. Darwin and his adherents were of the opinion that the various species of one and the same genus of animals or plants are nothing else but differently developed offspring of one and the same primitive form. According to the doctrine of evolution, moreover, all genera of one and the same order also derive from one common form; the same applies to all orders of one and the same class. According to the opposite view held by Darwin's opponents, all animal and vegetable species are wholly independent of one another, and only individuals belonging to one and the same species derive from one common form. The same concept of species was formulated by Linnaeus, who said, "There are as many species as the Supreme Being originally created." This is a purely metaphysical view, because, in the metaphysician's view, things and concepts "are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of

investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all" (Engels*). The dialectician, on the other hand, regards things and concepts "in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending", to quote Engels again.¹⁰⁶ Since Darwin's time, this view has penetrated into biology, and will always remain there, whatever amendments the further development of science may bring into the theory of transformism.

To appreciate the great importance that dialectic has in *sociology*, it is sufficient to recall the way in which *socialism* has developed from *utopianism* into a *science*.

The utopian socialists held an abstract point of view towards human nature, and used the formula "Yes is yes, and no is no", in judging of social phenomena. Ownership of property is *either* in conformity with human nature *or* it is *not*; the monogamic family is *either* in conformity with human nature *or* it is not, and so on and so forth. Since human nature was supposed to be *immutable*, socialists were entitled to expect that, among the many *possible* systems of social organisation, there must be one *more* in keeping with that nature than *all others*. Hence the striving to find that *best of all systems*, i.e., the *one* most in keeping with human nature. Every founder of a school *thought that he had found such a system*; every founder of a school proposed *his own utopia*. Marx brought the dialectical method into socialism, thereby turning it into a *science* and dealing *utopianism* its death-blow. Marx makes no appeal to human nature; he knows of no social institutions that *either do or do not* conform to it. Already in his *Misère de la philosophie* we meet with the following significant and characteristic reproach addressed to Proudhon, "M. Proudhon does not know that all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature".** In *Capital*, Marx says that man, by acting on the world and changing it, at the same time changes his own nature.*** This is a dialectical point of view, which sheds new light on problems of social life. Let us take, for instance, the questions of private property. The utopians wrote a great deal and argued with one another and with the economists

* *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 31.

** *La Misère de la philosophie*, nouvelle édition, Paris, 1896, p. 204.¹⁰⁷

*** *Das Kapital*, III. Auflage, S. 155-56.¹⁰⁸

as to whether it should exist, i.e., whether it is in conformity with human nature. Marx gave this question a concrete character. According to his doctrine, *the forms of ownership, and property relations, are determined by the development of the productive forces*. A specific form corresponds to one stage of the development of these forces, while another form corresponds to another stage. There is not, there cannot be, any *absolute* solution, for everything is in a state of flux, of change; "wisdom becomes madness, and bliss anguish".

"Contradiction leads onward," Hegel said. Science finds striking confirmation of this in the *class struggle*, forgetfulness of which precludes any understanding of the development of social and spiritual life in a society divided into *classes*.

But why is the "logic of contradiction", which, as we have seen, is the reflection in the human brain of the eternal process of motion, called *dialectic*? I will not engage in a lengthy disquisition, but rather will quote Kuno Fischer:

"Human life can be compared with a dialogue in the sense that, with age and experience, our views upon people and things gradually change, like the opinions of speakers engaged in a conversation that is fruitful and rich in ideas. Experience consists precisely in such involuntary and necessary transformation of our views upon life and the world. . . . That is why, when he compared the course of the development of consciousness with that of a philosophical discourse, Hegel has called it *dialectic*, or dialectical movement. This term was used by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant in a sense that with each of them was important but different. In no system, however, has the term received so extensive a significance as in the Hegelian."*

* Kuno Fischer, *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, Bd. VIII, Heidelberg, 1901, S. 303.

¹ The reference is to the school of philosophy that arose in Asia Minor in the sixth century B.C. and adhered to a naive materialism and spontaneous dialectic. Philosophers of this school held that various kinds of matter formed the foundation of the universe. Thus, Thales considered water to be that foundation, Anaximenes—air, and Heraclitus—fire, etc. The various phenomena of Nature were the result of changes or modifications of that underlying principle.

p. 11

² *Hylozoism*—the philosophical doctrine that attributes to matter a species of life or sensation, and draws no distinction between living and non-living matter.

This doctrine sometimes (as with Spinoza, for instance) serves to express materialist views.

p. 11

³ The copy of this book, preserved in Plekhanov's library, has the following marginal remark, in Plekhanov's hand, standing against the quotation from Adler: "Adler has forgotten this."

p. 12

⁴ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 15.

p. 12

⁵ *Modernism*—a trend in Roman Catholic theology at the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. It comprised a system of views aimed at reconciling Catholic tenets and contemporary science. In September 1907 this trend was condemned in an encyclical issued by Pope Pius X.

p. 12

⁶ Plekhanov's words regarding the probability of attempts to "supplement Marx" by Thomas Aquinas have proved prophetic. The neo-Thomists, the present-day followers of Thomas Aquinas (neo-Thomism is the Vatican's official philosophy), have often made such attempts to "supplement Marx" with the purpose of hoodwinking the working people. One such attempt was made by the neo-Thomist Marcel Reding in his book *St. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Marx*, published in 1953, in which an attempt is made to show that both Karl Marx and Thomas Aquinas had one and the same teacher—Aristotle, and that there is much in common in their philosophical views. Reding sees this common feature in "the struggle for the

rehabilitation... of the material world", in the emphasis laid on the subordination of the particular to the general, and so on and so forth.
p. 12

⁷ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 335-76. For Plekhanov's preface and notes to this work see his *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, pp. 484-538.

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⁸ See the article "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 95-151.

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⁹ *Die Neue Zeit*—organ of the German Social-Democratic Party, which was published in Stuttgart between the years 1883 and 1923. It carried a number of articles by Frederick Engels, between 1885 and 1895. Engels often gave advice to the editorial board and sharply criticised it for its departures from Marxism. In the latter part of the nineties, following the death of Engels, the journal systematically published articles written by revisionists of Marxism. During World War I, it held a Centrist, Kautskian stand and supported the social-chauvinists.

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¹⁰ The reference is to Karl Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy*.

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¹¹ The full title of the first three volumes of this publication is: *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*, Hrsg. von Franz Mehring, Stuttgart, 1902, Bd. I, II, III. *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels von März 1841 bis Oktober 1850*.

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¹² *The Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* was published in German in Paris, with Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge as editors. Only the first issue, a double number, appeared in 1844, with the following articles by Marx: "On the Jewish Question" (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 378); "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 378); and the following writings by Engels: "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy" (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 499) and "The Condition of England. Past and Present by Thomas Carlyle" (Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 525-49).

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¹³ Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 27, S. 419-21.

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¹⁴ *Pantheism*—a philosophical doctrine that identifies God and Nature, considering the latter as the material manifestation of God. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries pantheism was sometimes the vehicle of materialist and atheist ideas, as for instance with Giordano Bruno and Benedict Spinoza.

p. 14

¹⁵ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956.
p. 14

¹⁶ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, pp. 13-15. Plekhanov had no knowledge of the other works of Marx and Engels dealing with problems of philosophy, such as their *German Ideology*, Marx's *Economics and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, and Engels's *Dialectics of Nature*.

p. 15

¹⁷ Plekhanov is referring to a book by the neo-Kantian F. Lange, *A History of Materialism and a Critique of Its Significance Today*.

p. 15

¹⁸ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 348.

p. 16

¹⁹ Here, as further, Plekhanov is quoting Feuerbach from *Sämtliche Werke*, Leipzig, O. Wigand, Bd. 1-X, 1846-1866.

p. 16

²⁰ Plekhanov is quoting Feuerbach's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie von Bacon von Verulam bis Benedict Spinoza*.

p. 16

²¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 177.

p. 17

²² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 168-69.

p. 17

²³ *Spiritualism*—a religious-idealistic doctrine in philosophy that considers the spirit (*spiritualis*) as the essence and foundation of the world. In the present context, it is synonymous with idealism.

p. 17

²⁴ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 168-69 and 126.

p. 17

²⁵ *Substance*—the unmodifiable foundation and essence of all things and phenomena. To the idealist, the substance is the spirit, the idea, God, while to the materialist it is matter. Dialectical materialism denies the existence of unmodifiable substance, and considers matter as being in a state of constant development and change.

p. 20

²⁶ The quotation is from Feuerbach's "Geschichte der neuern Philosophie", *Werke*, IV, 380.

p. 20

²⁷ The reference is erroneous. It should be *Werke*, IV, 392. The quotation is from the same book.

p. 20

- ²⁸ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 177. p. 20
- ²⁹ Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 137. p. 21
- ³⁰ *Speculative philosophy*—the general term used to signify idealist philosophical systems based on contemplative reasoning which is divorced from practice and experience. p. 21
- ³¹ *Epistemology*—the theory of knowledge: that department of philosophy that studies the sources, means and conditions of cognition. p. 22
- ³² Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 13. p. 22
- ³³ The quotation is inaccurate: *Sein* (Being) has been used instead of *Leiden* (Suffering), and the sentence order has been changed. Feuerbach's wording is: "Ehe du die Qualität denkst, fühlst du die Qualität. Dem Denken geht das *Leiden* voran." p. 22
- ³⁴ In referring to the Russian philosophers, including—in this particular instance—Chernyshevsky, Plekhanov laid undue stress on the influence exerted on them by West-European representatives of pre-Marxist materialism. This influence was patently exaggerated, the more so that the other aspect of the matter—the original and creative nature of Russian philosophy—was passed over in silence. Thus, Plekhanov considered Chernyshevsky a faithful disciple and follower of Feuerbach. In identifying the materialism of Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach, he thereby denied the independent and creative character of Chernyshevsky's views, and belittled the significance of his philosophical materialism. p. 25
- ³⁵ The reference is inaccurate. The page should be 249, not 263. p. 26
- ³⁶ *Animism*—the belief, which arose as far back as primitive society, that the forces and phenomena of Nature are endowed with souls. p. 26
- ³⁷ In the pages referred to by Plekhanov, Gomperz speaks of the fact that the necessity of finding an explanation for the existence of a multitude of closely related objects, particularly of species of animals and plants, leads man to a belief in primordial creatures that dwell in the land of spirits and are the prototypes of things. This tendency of the human mind, Gomperz writes, is the foundation of Plato's doctrine. p. 26
- ³⁸ "*The pauper's broth of eclecticism*"—an expression used by Engels in the preface to the book *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Clas-*

sical German Philosophy. Engels is characterising the German philosophy taught at German universities at the close of the nineteenth century.

- p. 27
- ³⁹ The full title is: *Festschrift I. Rosenthal zur Vollendung seines 70. Lebensjahres gewidmet*, Leipzig, 1906. p. 27
- ⁴⁰ The reference is to what is known as the philosophy of identity. Its principal representatives were Schelling and Hegel. p. 27
- ⁴¹ The reference in the text is inaccurate. Instead of II, 340, read II, 239. p. 28
- ⁴² Erroneous. The volume and page should read II, 308, not X, 187. p. 29
- ⁴³ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, pp. 13-15. p. 30
- ⁴⁴ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 13. p. 30
- ⁴⁵ See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Moscow, 1970, p. 20). Examination of the manuscript of the first version of the article shows that, after writing the words, "In his *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right* he showed that the mutual relations in society...", he intended to continue his thought, but then crossed out the words he had put down, and in their stead gave the quotation beginning with the words "legal relations" and inserted the words "he wrote there". The erroneous impression is created that the quotation refers to the *Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Right*. p. 32
- ⁴⁶ Plekhanov is quoting from Engels's "The Condition of England. *Past and Present* by Thomas Carlyle" (see Marx, Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 525-49). p. 33
- ⁴⁷ See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 116-21. p. 34
- ⁴⁸ See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 29. p. 34
- ⁴⁹ See Section 2 of the article "A New Champion of Autocracy" in G. Plekhanov's *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, pp. 413-21. p. 35
- ⁵⁰ Engels *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 83. p. 36

⁵¹ See Appendix.

p. 36

⁵² Plekhanov overrates the significance of the works of de Vries. Timiryazev, in his article "The Basic Features of the History of the Development of Biology in the 19th Century", wrote the following: "The attempt made by de Vries... has changed nothing in principle, and has added nothing to Darwin's propositions, even in the specific problem of mutation. Darwin, too, allowed the possibility of both sudden changes, made in leaps, and of more gradual and general changes. There is nothing that even at present makes it imperative to ascribe to the former, not only exclusive but even predominant significance."

p. 36

⁵³ The reference to Hegel's philosophy as "a genuine algebra of revolution" was made by Herzen in Chapter 25, Part 4, of *My Life and Thoughts*.

In quoting from Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Plekhanov has in view the characteristic of Hegelian philosophy made by Engels. See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 37-42.

p. 37

⁵⁴ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 29.

p. 38

⁵⁵ See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1970, p. 20.

p. 38

⁵⁶ See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 481.

p. 40

⁵⁷ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 159.

p. 41

⁵⁸ The year of publication is erroneous. The full title of Rousset's book is: *Les maîtres de la guerre: Frédéric II, Napoléon, Moltke. Essai critique d'après les travaux inédits de M. le général Bonnal*, Paris, 1899.

p. 43

⁵⁹ See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, p. 481.

p. 45

⁶⁰ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 421.

p. 47

⁶¹ The *Hereros*—the name of a tribe in South-West Africa. In 1884, they came under the rule of the German imperialists, who instituted a regime of brutal terror with the aim of enslaving the Hereros. They razed villages to the ground, put men, women and children to the sword, and drove the survivors into the desert areas of the country. It took the Germans over twenty years to overcome the heroic resistance offered by this tribe. The struggle reached its climax in the uprising that started in January 1904. In the August of that

year, the Herero forces were defeated and the pursuit of the insurgents was begun, ending in their savage annihilation in 1907, in the waterless desert of Omaheke. Lenin included the Herero rising in his "Essayed Summary of World History Data After 1870. War Against the Hereros" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, pp. 688, 700).

p. 48

⁶² *Diluvial man*—a general designation of extinct human races that existed before the end of the post-glacial epoch.

p. 50

⁶³ This assertion of Plekhanov's is typical of his Menshevik concept in the question of the nature and the motive forces of the Russian revolution. Since he thought that, in Russia, the revolution would follow the pattern of bourgeois revolutions in the West, Plekhanov, like most leaders of the Second International, held the mistaken view that an entire period of history must always separate the bourgeois revolution and the proletarian revolution. Lacking an understanding of the conditions of the new epoch—that of imperialism—Plekhanov thought that, in Russia, a predominantly peasant country, whose industrial development came later than elsewhere, the time was not yet ripe for a clash between the productive forces and the capitalist production relations. He therefore alleged that there were no objective conditions for the socialist revolution in Russia.

p. 52

⁶⁴ See Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1970, p. 21.

p. 52

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

p. 53

⁶⁶ Plekhanov is evidently referring to Engels's note to the third (1883) edition of *Capital*, which reads: "Subsequent very searching study of the primitive condition of man, led the author [i.e., Marx—Ed.] to the conclusion, that it was not the family that originally developed into the tribe, but that, on the contrary, the tribe was the primitive and spontaneously developed form of human association, on the basis of blood relationship, and that out of the first incipient loosening of the tribal bonds, the many and various forms of the family were afterwards developed." (See Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1972, footnote on p. 32). See also Engels's preface to the first edition (1884) of his *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 191-92.

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⁶⁷ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, pp. 110-11.

p. 55

⁶⁸ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1969, p. 125.

p. 56

- ⁶⁹ Plekhanov is referring to the pamphlet by Bernstein *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, which came out in March 1889. In particular, Bernstein asserted that "...at first Marx and Engels ascribed a far smaller share of influence to non-economic factors... than in their later works." p. 56
- ⁷⁰ Quoted from Engels's letter to J. Bloch, dated September 21-22, 1890. See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 18. p. 56
- ⁷¹ Quoted from Engels's letter to W. Borgius, dated January 25, 1894. See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 502. p. 57
- ⁷² Quoted from Engels's letter to W. Borgius, dated January 25, 1894. See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, p. 502. p. 57
- ⁷³ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 467. p. 59
- ⁷⁴ The concluding words are opposed to the title of Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That May Arise in the Capacity of a Science*. p. 59
- ⁷⁵ *Fabliau*—one of the short metrical tales of the mediaeval French poets, usually rough and humorous. They were written in lines of eight syllables, usually rhyming in pairs.
Chanson de geste (French: literally a song about exploits)—one of a class of old French epic poems. p. 62
- ⁷⁶ *The David school*. Plekhanov developed this thought in greater detail in an article entitled "French Dramatic Literature and French Painting of the Eighteenth Century from the Viewpoint of Sociology", in which he also discussed the social causes giving rise to the school of David. p. 62
- ⁷⁷ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 467-68. p. 68
- ⁷⁸ The full title of Feuerherd's book is: *Die Entstehung der Stile aus der politischen Ökonomie. Eine Kunstgeschichte von Franz Feuerherd, Erster Teil. Der bildende Kunst der Griechen und Römer*. Braunschweig und Leipzig, Verlag von R. Sattler, 1902. p. 69
- ⁷⁹ The manuscript of the earlier version of the article has "factors" instead of "forms". p. 70

- ⁸⁰ The full title of the book by Chesneau is: Ernest Chesneau, *La peinture française au XIX^e siècle. Les chefs d'école: L. David, Gros, Gericault, Decamps, Ingres, E. Delacroix*. 3^e édition, Paris, 1883. p. 71
- ⁸¹ Hippolyte Taine, *Philosophie de l'art*, 5^e édition, Paris, 1890, I, p. 116. p. 73
- ⁸² See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 168. p. 74
- ⁸³ Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 101. p. 75
- ⁸⁴ *Sankt Max*—a chapter from *German Ideology* by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Plekhanov is quoting from the journal *Documents of Socialism*. p. 77
- ⁸⁵ *The Harden-Moltke trial*—in 1907, Maximilian Harden, the well-known publicist (Harden was the pen-name of Witkowski) published a number of sensational articles on the corruption and vice among the *entourage* of Kaiser Wilhelm II (Lieutenant-General Moltke, F. Eilenburg, etc.). This resulted in a *cause célèbre* which did much to expose the Kaiser's clique. p. 77
- ⁸⁶ See Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, pp. 122-23. p. 78
- ⁸⁷ See Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, p. 336. p. 80
- ⁸⁸ See Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 136, 137. p. 80
- ⁸⁹ See Note 90. p. 82
- ⁹⁰ The Cadets' agrarian programme was adopted at the party's inaugural congress in October 1905. In an attempt to win the peasantry's support the Cadets introduced into their programme a clause on the possibility of extending peasant land ownership at the expense of state, monasterial and private lands redeemed at a "just" price. The programme even spoke of "forcible alienation" of landowners' land, with this end in view. However, the Cadets were the principal party of the liberal bourgeoisie, and their agrarian policy was directed towards preserving land proprietorship and developing capitalist relations in agriculture. "The Cadets," Lenin wrote, "want to preserve the landlord system of agriculture by means of concessions. They propose redemption payments by the peasants which already once before in 1861 ruined the peasants". (*Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 328.). p. 82

⁹¹ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1970, p. 20.

p. 83

⁹² See G. Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, Moscow, 1972.

p. 84

⁹³ The reference is to various currents in neo-Kantian philosophy, particularly in its Baden school. Rickert, Windelband and other of its representatives tried to prove that there are no objective laws of social development, so that the very science of society cannot exist. Unlike natural science, which, as they claimed, operates only with general concepts and ignores the particular, representatives of this philosophy asserted that the social sciences deal only with individual, non-repetitive events, and consequently are doomed to give merely external descriptions of the phenomena of social life. The neo-Kantians came out under the slogan of "criticism" (the term used by Kant to characterise his philosophy), and developed the reactionary and idealist aspects of Kant's doctrine.

These ideas in neo-Kantianism were widely used by enemies of Marxism in the struggle against historical materialism.

p. 86

⁹⁴ See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, pp. 133-34.

p. 87

⁹⁵ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, 1970, p. 21.

p. 87

⁹⁶ See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Holy Family*, Moscow, 1956, p. 110.

p. 88

⁹⁷ These words are to be found in Chernyshevsky's *Critique of Philosophical Prejudices Against Communal Ownership*.

p. 88

⁹⁸ This appendix is an extract from Plekhanov's preface to Frederick Engels's *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. These notes on dialectic and logic were included in the German edition of the book in accordance with Plekhanov's wish.

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⁹⁹ N.G.—pen-name of K. Zhitlovsky, author of the article "Materialism and Dialectical Logic" published in the magazine *Russkoye Bogatstvo*, Nos. 6, 7 (June, July), 1898.

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¹⁰⁰ *Aporia*—a logical difficulty that seems insurmountable. For instance, there was Zeno's *aporia*, the dichotomy that, to walk a certain distance half of that distance must first be covered, but, previous to that, a quarter, an eighth, etc. In view of the infinite divisibility of

space, a given distance cannot be covered. Zeno revealed the objective contradictoriness of motion, time and space, but from this he deduced erroneous conclusions "disproving" motion.

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¹⁰¹ The reference is to Heraclitus.

p. 93

¹⁰² Plekhanov is quoting from the article mentioned in Note 98.

p. 96

¹⁰³ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, p. 29.

p. 97

¹⁰⁴ Plekhanov is again quoting from the article named in Note 98.

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¹⁰⁵ Quoted from the poem by Parmenides, entitled *Of Nature*.

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¹⁰⁶ See Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 31, 33.

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¹⁰⁷ Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, p. 165.

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¹⁰⁸ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, p. 173.

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
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