Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Natural Science Research Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

(February 5, 1940)

(Beginning omitted.) Just as Comrade Chen Yun was making his speech, Comrade Mao Zedong, our respected and beloved leader, arrived. People applauded warmly and rose to pay their respects. When Comrade Chen Yun had finished his talk, Comrade Mao Zedong went to the rostrum in the midst of thunderous applause and began by saying:

I am all in favor of today’s meeting to found the Natural Science Research Association, because natural science is a good thing. It can solve problems related to the necessities of our daily lives, such as food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, so everyone should approve of it and study it. Some people maintain that China has never had natural science. That is incorrect. In China, from the very beginning of human existence, people have had the need for food, and food can only be provided by production, so there were sprouts of natural science, which gradually developed later on. It is true, however, that in the past natural science was not developed so as to constitute a system, that is all.

He also said:

Natural science is an instrument which people employ to achieve freedom. To obtain freedom in society, people make use of social science to understand and transform society, and to make social revolution. To obtain freedom in the natural domain, people must make use of natural science in order to understand, conquer, and transform nature. Natural science should be employed under the guidance of social science to transform nature, but the development of natural science is obstructed in capitalist societies. So this irrational social system must be transformed.

The border region, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, has undergone a social transformation. The relations of production have been changed, thus creating the preconditions for the transformation of nature. The productive forces have thus been increasing daily. This is borne out by the production cam-

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, March 15, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 143–44, where it is reproduced from that source.
Strengthen Unity and Progress¹

(February 7, 1940)²

A year has passed since New China News in Yan’an became the newspaper of the Communist Party organizations. In my opinion, this small newspaper is the best one in China. The main reasons are, first, that it is run by the Communist Party and, second, that it operates in a context of democratic politics. Without the existence of these two prerequisites at the same time, it would be impossible for it to be run so well. The direct efforts of the comrades working for the newspaper are another important prerequisite. It is also impossible to run it well without their initiative and creativity. But there is no limit as to how “well” it can be run. This year is its second year, and I hope that it will improve further.

Resistance, unity, and progress—these are three major principles which the Communist Party put forward last July 7 on the second anniversary of the War of Resistance. The three form an organic whole, and not one of them can be dispensed with. If the stress is solely on resistance to the exclusion of unity and progress, then such a so-called “War of Resistance” cannot be relied on, and cannot last. A War of Resistance without unity and progress, although at present it is still a War of Resistance, will ultimately turn into capitulation or end in defeat. We Communists hold that the three must be combined. For the sake of the War of Resistance, it is necessary to oppose capitulation, oppose Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact [with Japan], oppose his puppet government, and oppose all the Chinese traitors and capitulators concealed in the anti-Japanese ranks. For the sake of unity, it is necessary to oppose splittist activities and internal friction, to oppose attacks on the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other progressive forces from behind the front of resistance to Japan, to oppose disruption of the anti-Japanese base areas at the front,³ and to oppose the disruption of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which is the rear area of the Eighth Route Army, to oppose the denial of legal status to the Communist Party and the avalanche of documents for “restricting the activities of alien parties.” For the sake of progress, it is necessary to oppose retrogression and the shelving of the Three People’s Principles and of the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, to oppose the refusal to carry out the injunction in the Director General’s Testament to “arouse the masses of the people,” to oppose the internment of progressive young people in concentration camps, to oppose the suppression of what little freedom of speech and of the press there was in the early days of the War of Resistance, to oppose the scheme to turn the movement for constitutional government into the private concern of a few bureaucrats, to oppose the attacks on the new army, the eradication⁴ of the League of Self-Sacrifice, and the massacre of progressives in Shanxi, to oppose the activities of the Three People’s Principles Youth League in kidnapping people along the Xianyang-Yulin Highway and the Longhai railway, to oppose such shameless practices as taking nine concubines and making fortunes of 100 million yuan out of the national crisis, and to oppose the unbridled brutality of the corrupt officials and the rampages of the local bullies and bad gentry. Without opposing all these, and without unity and progress, the so-called “War of Resistance” will be just empty talk and victory a vain hope. What will be the political orientation of New China News in its second year? In my view, it will be to stress unity and progress, and to oppose all the vicious practices which are detrimental to the War of Resistance, so that further success can be achieved in our cause of resistance to Japan.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of New China News, I write this article to express my sincere hope, and I wish to work with our compatriots throughout the country toward its realization.

This document was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 7, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji: Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 145–46, where it is reproduced from this source. The version in the Selected Works includes only the second paragraph, in slightly revised form.

1. Strengthen Unity and Progress → We Must Emphasize Unity and Progress
2. February 7 → February 10
3. At the front → Behind the enemy lines
4. Eradication → Persecution
Introducing The Chinese Worker\footnote{1}

(February 7, 1940)

The publication of *The Chinese Worker* meets a need. Led by its own political party, the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese working class has for the past twenty years waged heroic struggles and become the most politically awakened section of the nation's people and the leader of the Chinese revolution. Rallying the peasantry and all revolutionary people against imperialism and feudalism, it has fought to establish a new-democratic China and to drive out Japanese imperialism, and its contribution has been outstanding. But the Chinese revolution has not yet triumphed, and great efforts are still needed to unite the working class itself and to unite the peasantry and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the entire revolutionary people. This is a tremendous political and organizational task. The responsibility for its accomplishment rests on the Chinese Communist Party, on the progressive workers, and on the entire working class. The ultimate liberation of the working class and the people as a whole will be achieved only when socialism is realized, which is the final goal the Chinese proletariat must struggle to attain. But before the stage of socialism can be reached, it is necessary to pass through the stage of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution. The immediate task of the Chinese working class, therefore, is to strengthen unity in its own ranks and unite the people, to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and to struggle for a new China, a China of New Democracy. *The Chinese Worker* is being published with just this task in view.

Using simple language, *The Chinese Worker* will explain the hows and whys of many issues to the workers, report the realities of the working-class struggle in the War of Resistance Against Japan and sum up the experience gained, and in this way it will endeavor to fulfill its task.

*The Chinese Worker* should become a school for educating the workers and for training cadres from their midst, and the readers will be its students. It is necessary to educate many cadres from among the workers, knowledgeable and capable cadres who do not seek empty fame but are ready for honest work. It is impossible for the working class to attain liberation without large numbers of such cadres.

The working class should welcome the help of the revolutionary intellectuals and never refuse it, for without their help the working class itself cannot go forward, nor can the revolution succeed.

I hope that the journal will be well edited and that it will publish a good deal of lively writing, carefully avoiding wooden and trite articles that are flat, insipid, and unintelligible.

Once started, a journal must be run conscientiously and well. This is the responsibility of the readers as well as of the staff. It is very important for the readers to send in suggestions and write brief letters and articles indicating what they like and what they dislike, for this is the only way to make the journal a success.

With these few words I express my hopes; let them serve as an introduction to *The Chinese Worker*. 

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1. *The Chinese Worker* was a monthly founded in February 1940 in Yan'an and published under the auspices of the Trade Union Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Speech at the Founding Meeting of the Yan’an Young People’s Association for Promoting Constitutional Government

(February 19, 1940)

(Dispatch to this paper) (Omission) First the person in charge of preparatory work reported on the course of the preparatory work. Then Feng Wenbin, the chairman, delivered the opening speech. After that, Comrade Mao Zedong, the person most beloved by the young people, spoke to the young people roughly as follows:

Now the diehards want retrogression, while the nationwide campaign for constitutional government demands progress and will see to it that progress takes place shortly.

He went on to say:

New-democratic constitutional government is constitutional government of the broad masses of the Chinese people.

In conclusion, he said:

In fighting Japan, we need young people; for constitutional government, we also need young people. Young people must not only do things but also take the lead. Young people are in the vanguard of the campaign for constitutional government, and it is essential that there should be young people in the National Assembly. Today’s meeting of the young people of Yan’an marks the correct orientation for young people throughout the country. The young people of Yan’an must work hard to arouse the young people of the whole country to struggle to push forward the movement for constitutional government.

This report of Mao’s speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 24, 1940. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, p. 147, where it is reproduced from that version.

New-Democratic Constitutional Government

(Speech at the Rally of the People of All Circles in Yan’an for the Inauguration of the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government)

(February 20, 1940)

Comrades!

It is highly significant that representatives of all circles in Yan’an are gathering here today for the meeting to inaugurate the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government and that everyone has taken an interest in constitutional government. What is the purpose of our meeting? It is to facilitate the full expression of the popular will, the defeat of Japan, and the building of a new China.

Democratic Resistance to Japan

Resistance to Japan, which we all support, is already being carried out, and the question now is only one of persevering in it. But there is something else, namely, democracy, which is still not being carried out. Both are of paramount importance to China today. To be sure, China lacks many things, but the main ones are independence and democracy. In the absence of either, China’s affairs will not go well. And while there are two things lacking, there are also two superfluous ones. What are they? Imperialist oppression and the oppression of the feudal forces.¹ It is because of these two superfluous things that China has become a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal country. The principal demands of the people of the whole country today are for independence and democracy, and therefore the oppression of imperialism and the feudal forces must be destroyed. These things must be destroyed resolutely, thoroughly, and without the least mercy. Some say that only construction is needed, not destruction. Well, we should like to ask: Should

¹. Feudal forces → Feudalism
Wang Jingwei be destroyed or not? Should Japanese imperialism be destroyed or not? Should the feudal system be destroyed or not? Unless you destroy these bad things, this pile of dog shit, you can give up thinking about construction. Only by destroying them can China be saved and construction be undertaken; otherwise, it will all be an idle dream. Only be destroying the old and the rotten can we build the new and the sound; otherwise, a lovely flower on cow dung is an atrocious sight. Combine independence and democracy and you have resistance to Japan on the basis of democracy, or democracy in the service of resistance to Japan. Without democracy, resistance to Japan will definitely fail. Without democracy, resistance to Japan cannot be maintained. With democracy, we shall certainly win even if we have to go on resisting for eight or ten years.

**New-Democratic Constitutional Government**

What is constitutional government? It is democratic politics. I agree with everything that our old Comrade Wu [Yuzhang] has just said. But what kind of democratic politics do we need today? New-democratic politics, new-democratic constitutional government. This is not the old, outmoded, European-American type of so-called democratic politics, which is bourgeois dictatorship, nor is it the newest type, the Soviet type of democratic politics, which is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Democracy of the old type, which has been practiced in other countries, is on its way out; it is unsuited to the needs of our times and has become reactionary. Under no circumstances should we accept such a reactionary thing. The Chinese diehards still want such a thing, but they can never have it. For the Chinese people as a whole do not want such a government and would not welcome a one-class dictatorship by the bourgeoisie. China’s affairs must be decided by the vast majority of the Chinese people, and the monopoly of government by the bourgeoisie alone must be absolutely rejected. Then what about socialist democracy of the newest type? Of course, it is very good and will prevail in all advanced countries throughout the world. But today this type of democracy is not yet practicable in China, and we must therefore do without it for the time being. Not until certain conditions are present will it be possible to have socialist democracy. The kind of democratic politics we need today is neither democracy of the old type nor democracy of the new type, but New Democracy, which is suited to the trend in the world and to the conditions of present-day China. The constitutional government to be instituted is new-democratic constitutional government.

What is new-democratic constitutional government? It is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. Li Yuanhong once said, “If there is food, let everyone share it.” I think this can serve to illustrate New Democracy. Just as everyone should share what food there is, so there should be no monopoly of power by a single party, group, or class. This idea was well expressed by Mr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang:

The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Guomindang’s Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Comrades, in studying constitutional government we must read all sorts of books, but above all, we must study this manifesto, and this passage should be learned by heart. “Shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few”—this is the essence of what we describe as New Democracy, as the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. Such is the constitutional government we need today. And it is the form which a constitutional government of the anti-Japanese united front should take, and the constitutional democracy of Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary Three People’s Principles.

**The Need for Promotion**

Our meeting today is called a meeting for the promotion of constitutional government. Why do we have to “promote” or “urge” it? If everybody were advancing, there would be no need for urging. Why do we trouble to hold this meeting? Because some people, instead of marching forward, are lying down and refusing to move. Not only do they refuse to move forward, but they would turn backward,

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2. The Chinese diehards still want such a thing. 

3. And will prevail in all advanced countries throughout the world

4. Nor democracy of the new type → Nor yet democracy of the socialist type

5. Instituted → Promoted

6. Someone. Li Yuanhong (1864–1928), zì Songqing, a native of Hupei, became head of the new revolutionary government in October 1911 much against his will. He was elected vice-president to Sun Yat-sen, and then to Yuan Shih-k'ai, when Yuan succeeded Sun in early 1912. He subsequently participated, reluctantly once again, in Yuan’s attempt at restoration of the monarchy in 1915. Following Yuan’s death in 1916, he became president, but was forced to resign in August 1917 by the powerful leader of the Anhui faction of militarists, Duan Qirui, whom he had dismissed from the premiership.

7. New Democracy → New-democratic constitutional government
pulling tails and acting like Shen Gongbao in [the traditional novel about] the investiture of the gods, and they would rather die than move forward; these people are diehards. They are so stubborn that we have to hold this meeting to give them an "urging." Where does the term "urge" come from? Who first applied it in this connection? As I explained at the Youth Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government yesterday, not I, but that great man, Mr. Sun Yatsen, who said: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution." Read his Testament and you will find the following words: "Most recently I have recommended the convocation of the National Assembly ... and its realization in the shortest possible time must in particular be urged. This is my heartfelt charge to you." Comrades, not an ordinary "charge" but a "heartfelt charge." A "heartfelt charge" is not just the usual kind of charge, so how can it be lightly ignored? Again, "the shortest possible time"; first, not the longest time, second, not a relatively long time, and third, not just a short time, but "the shortest possible time." If we want the National Assembly to come into being in the shortest possible time, then we have to "urge" it. Mr. Sun Yatsen has been dead for fifteen years, but to this day the National Assembly he recommended has not been convened. Fiddling every day with political tutelage, certain people have senselessly fiddled away the time, turning "the shortest possible time" into the longest time, and yet they are forever invoking Mr. Sun Yatsen's name. How Mr. Sun's ghost would rebuke these unworthy followers of his! It is perfectly clear that without "urging," there will be no moving forward; "urging" is needed because many Shen Gongbaos are moving back and many others are not yet awakened.

As some people are not moving forward, we must urge them. We must urge others because they are slow. That is why we are calling many meetings to urge the establishment of constitutional government. The young people have held such meetings, and so have the women, the workers, the schools, government organizations, and army units. It is all very lively and very good. And now we are holding this general meeting for the same purpose, so that all of us can go into action to urge the speedy application of constitutional government and the immediate application of Mr. Sun Yatsen's teachings.

Some say: "You are in Yan'an while those people are in various other places. What is the use of your urging them if they take no notice?" Yes, there is some use. Things are moving, and they will have to take notice. If we hold more meetings, write more articles, make more speeches, and send more telegrams, they will find it impossible not to take notice. I think our numerous meetings in Yan'an to promote constitutional government have a twofold purpose. One is to study the problem, and the other is to push people forward. Why do we have to study? Because if they do not go forward and you urge them, and they then ask why you are pushing, it is necessary to be able to answer. To do so, we have to make a serious study of the hows and whys of constitutional government. This is exactly what our old Comrade Wu has been talking about in some detail. All schools, government organizations, and army units, and all sections of the people should study the problem of constitutional government confronting us.

Once we have studied it, we can push people forward. To push them forward is to urge them on and, as we push in all fields, things will gradually move ahead. The many little streams will merge into a great river to wash away all that is rotten and filthy, and new-democratic constitutional government will emerge. The effect of such pushing will be very great. What we do in Yan'an is bound to influence China as a whole.

The Task Is Difficult

Comrades, do you imagine that once the meetings have been held and the telegrams dispatched, the diehards will be bowled over, will start moving forward, will submit to our orders? No, they will not be as docile as that. A great many of them are graduates of special training schools for diehards. Diehards they are today, and diehards they will remain tomorrow and even the day after. What does diehard mean? "Hard" means to be inflexible and "die" means to be dead set against progress today, tomorrow, and even the day after. Such are the people we call diehards. To make them listen to us is no easy matter.

As far as the constitutional governments the world has so far known are concerned, whether in Britain, France, the United States, or the Soviet Union, a body of basic laws, that is, a constitution, has generally been promulgated after a successful revolution to give recognition to the actual establishment of democracy. But China's case is different. In China the revolution has not yet succeeded and, except in areas like our border region, democratic government is not yet a fact. The fact is that China today is under semicolonial and semifeudal rule, and even if a constitution11 were promulgated, it would inevitably be hindered by the feudal forces and obstructed by the diehards, so it would be impossible to carry it out smoothly. Thus the present movement for constitutional government has to strive for a democracy that is not yet achieved, rather than to affirm a democracy that has already become a fact. This means a struggle,12 and it is certainly no light or easy matter.

Those who have all along opposed constitutional government are now paying it lip service. Why? Because they are under pressure from the people, who want to fight Japan, and they have to temporize a little. They are even shouting at the top

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8. Regarding Shen Gongbao, see above, the relevant note to the text of December 9, 1939, "The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement."
9. 1 → We
10. Shen Gongbao → People
11. A constitution → A good constitution
12. A struggle → A major struggle
of their voices, "I have always stood for constitutional government!" and making a
terrific din. For years we have been hearing the words "constitutional government," but
so far we have seen no trace of it. These people say one thing and do another
and may be called double-dealers in constitutional government. Their "always stood
for" is truly an example of their double-dealing. The diehards of today are pre-
cisely such double-dealers. Their constitutional government is a swindle. In the
not-too-distant future you may get a constitution and a president into the bargain.
But as for democracy and freedom, heaven alone knows when they will give you that.
China has already had a constitution. Did not Cao Kun promulgate one? But
where were democracy and freedom to be found? As for presidents, there have been
a number of them. The first, Sun Yat-sen, was good, but he was edged out by
Yuan Shikai. The second was Yuan Shikai, the third Li Yuanhong, the fourth Feng
Guozhang, and the fifth Xu Shichang, indeed a great many, but were they any
different from the despotic emperors? Both the constitution and the presidents were
fakes. At present the so-called constitutional and democratic politics of countries
like Britain, France, and the United States are in fact murderous governments.
The same is true of South America, where many countries display the republican
signboard but in fact have no trace of democracy. Similarly with China's present-
day diehards. Their talk of constitutional government is only "selling dog-meat

13. Cao Kun (1862–1938), zJ Zhongshan, was born in Tianjin and trained at the Tianjin
Military Academy, and occupied a series of high posts under Yuan Shikai and during the
struggles following Yuan's death. In 1920, after the defeat of Duan Qirui (see note 21
below), Cao, as leader of the Zhili faction, became a dominant figure in Beijing. After the
resignation of Xu Shichang as president in 1922 (see note 15 below), and the brief return to
power of Li Yuanhong in mid-1922, Cao forced Li to resign in 1923, in order to secure the
presidency for himself. He persuaded the members of the National Assembly to vote for
him with the promise that they could draft a new permanent constitution. This text, adopted
soon after Cao took office in October 1923, was called the "Cao Kun constitution." A year
later, with the defeat of Cao's most important military subordinate, Wu Peifu (see note 21
below), Cao in turn was forced to resign, and his political career came to an end.

14. Feng Guozhang (1859–1919), zJ Huafu, a native of Hebei, became vice-president
following Yuan Shikai's death, and then acting president in 1917 after Li Yuanhong was
drafted from office. He was the leader of the Zhili clique, which opposed the Anhui faction
of Duan Qirui, who had once again become premier. Under pressure from Duan, he agreed
to retire when his term of office ended in October 1918 and he was succeeded by Xu Shichang.

15. Xu Shichang (1855–1939), zX Jeun, a native of Henan, was a protégé of Yuan
Shikai, though he did not support Yuan's attempt to restore the monarchy. In 1916 he had
attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Duan Qirui and Li Yuanhong and came
to be regarded as an impartial elder statesman. In September 1918 he was elected to the
presidency by the National Assembly, becoming the first civilian to occupy that office. He
soon found himself a prisoner of Duan Qirui and his faction, and his popular support was
further eroded when he took a strong stand against the May Fourth demonstrations. In June
1922 he resigned under pressure from Cao Kun and Wu Peifu.

16. Murderous ➔ Man-eating
17. South America ➔ Central and South America

under the label of sheep's head." They display the sheep's head of constitutional
government while selling the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship. I am not attack-

18. Stalin ➔ The Soviet people

19. Since August 23 last year when the Soviet Union and Germany signed the pact ➔ Since that September last year when war broke out between Germany on the one side and Britain and France, on the other
rock in his hands has fallen on his own toes. To this day, he is still smarting from it. Similar instances abound in China. Yuan Shikai wanted to crush the toes of the common people but in the event hurt himself, and he died just three days after becoming emperor. Duan Qirui, Xu Shichang, Cao Kun, Wu Peifu, and all the rest wanted to repress the people, but finally they were all overthrown by the people. Whoever tries to profit at others’ expense will come to no good end.

I think that, unless they move forward, the anti-Communist diehards of today can be no exception to this rule. On the high-sounding pretext of unification, they are planning to liquidate the progressive Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, the progressive Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the progressive Communist Party, and mass organizations. They have any number of schemes of this sort. But I believe the outcome will be not the liquidation of progress by diehardism but the liquidation of diehardism by progress. Indeed, to escape liquidation the diehards have no alternative but to move forward. Hence we have often advised them not to attack the Eighth Route Army, the Communist Party, and the border region. If they must, they had better make a resolution starting as follows: “Determined as we are to liquidate ourselves,” we, the diehards, assume the responsibility for attacking the Communist Party and the border region.” The diehards have had plenty of experience in “suppressing the Communists,” and should they now want to have another go, they are free to do so. If after eating their fill and having a good sleep, they feel like doing some “suppression,” that is up to them. However, they should please draw up a resolution which states: “As the Communist Party is too small, it is necessary to expand it greatly, and as the Eighth Route Army has too few guns, it is necessary greatly to increase its guns; and our diehards are responsible for suppressing the Communist Party.” This is a resolution that is unalterable. The “suppression of the Communists” in the past ten years invariably turned out in conformity with this resolution. Any further “suppression” will also conform to it. Hence I advise them not to go in for “suppression.” What the whole nation wants is not “suppression of the Communists” but resistance, unity, and progress. Therefore, anyone who tries to “suppress the Communists” is bound to fail.

In short, retrogression eventually produces the reverse of what its promoters intend. There is no exception to this rule either in modern or in ancient times, in China or elsewhere.

The same is true of constitutional government today. If the diehards keep on opposing it, the result will certainly be the reverse of what they intend. The movement for constitutional government will never follow the course decided on by the diehards, but will run counter to their intentions, and it will inevitably take the course decided on by the people. This is certain, for the people throughout the country demand it and so do the current of China’s historical development and the whole trend of world affairs. Who can resist it? The wheel of history cannot be turned backward. However, the work we have undertaken requires time and cannot be accomplished over night; it requires effort and cannot be done in a slipshod way; it requires the mobilization of the great masses of the people and cannot be done effectively by a single pair of hands. It is a very good thing that we are holding this rally here today; after our meeting we shall write articles and send telegrams to all parts of the country, and we shall also hold similar meetings in the Wutai mountains, the Taihang mountains, North China, Central China, and all over the country. If we go on doing this and keep it up for several years, that will be just about right. We must make a good job of it, we must win democracy and freedom, and we must establish new-democratic constitutional government. If this is not done and the diehards are allowed to have their way, the nation will perish. This is the way we must work to avoid national subjugation and genocide. For this purpose everyone must exert himself. If we do so, there is great hope for our cause. It must further be understood that, after all, the diehards are only a minority, while the majority consists not of diehards but of people all capable of moving forward. With the majority pitted against the minority, plus the efforts we exert, the hope will be even greater. That is why I say that, difficult though the task may be, there is great hope.
Declaration of the Association of All Circles in Yan’an for the Promotion of Constitutional Government

(February 20, 1940)

To the National Government, the People’s Political Council, the Chinese Guomindang, all parties and factions, armies, organizations of the popular masses that are fighting Japan, and all newspaper offices for their inspection:

The Yan’an Association of All Circles for the Promotion of Constitutional Government held its inaugural meeting on February 20. Here we solemnly proclaim the views of this association regarding constitutional government. We respectfully request that the government adopt them and put them into practice. We hope, moreover, that people in all walks of life will join us in promoting them, so that a truly democratic government can be realized, as the future of the War of Resistance hinges on it.

1. The significance of putting into effect constitutional government at present lies in following the will of the people, and thoroughly defeating Japanese imperialism. It has been twenty-nine years now since the founding of the Republic of China, but, though it is called a republic, in reality it is a dictatorship. We do not have to discuss the generation of Yuan Shikai, Feng Guozhang,1 Duan Qirui, and Cao Rulin.2 Since the Guomindang has been in power, because it has been following the same old track it has also failed to make any improvements. The reason lies in the fact that it has indulged in a lot of empty talk about political tutelage, but failed to take as its only guide calling upon the will of the people and resisting imperialism. The statement of the First National Congress of the Guomindang in 1924 contains the following passage: “The so-called democratic system, as it exists today in various countries, frequently extends only to the bourgeoisie and has therefore been turned into a tool for the oppression of the common people. The ‘people’s rights’3 advocated by the Guomindang is enjoyed also by the common people; it is not something privately possessed by a minority.” What admirable words! If this manifesto had been put into effect, the tragedy of the civil war could have been avoided, and the foreign invasion could have found no entry. Unfortunately, famous dicta such as this have actually been laid aside and neglected, while the ruthless application of one-party dictatorship has been described by the high-sounding term of political tutelage. The fact is that, throughout China, from the south to the north, from great cities to the remote hinterland, not a single person has been enlightened nor a single wrong addressed in the course of all this tutelage. On the contrary, the only result of these many years of political tutelage has been merely that we see corrupt officials running amuck, the local bullies and bad gentry committing endless iniquities, the moral standards of the state and the vitality of the nation utterly destroyed, and opportunities created for disaster to enter from abroad. It was not until the beginning of the War of Resistance that the whole nation rose up in indignation and fought to save the country. The problem of paramount importance at the moment is how to make full use of the popular will and utterly defeat Japanese imperialism. There are those who argue, on the contrary, that the establishment of constitutional democracy has nothing to do with unleashing the popular will and driving out the Japanese invaders. They do not see constitutional government as an instrument for saving the nation from extinction and ensuring its survival, but merely as a clever expedient for deceiving public opinion. Consequently, the people’s campaign for constitutional government is banned, the people’s freedom of speech, assembly, and association is curtailed, and they declare that political tutelage, which all our compatriots believe should be abolished, will continue. They deem it unnecessary that the representatives to the National Assembly who were elected before the start of the War of Resistance should be reelected, and they consider that the Organic Law of the National Assembly, with which people are dissatisfied, still applies.4 We, the members of this association, declare our firm opposition to all the points listed above, which run counter to the will of the people and do not answer the needs of the War of Resistance. The members of this association venture to say that if that is how constitutional government is to be carried out, no problem, whether domestic or foreign, will ever be solved. Without a thorough change in accordance with the will of the

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1. Feng Guozhang (1858–1919) became vice-president and then acting president in 1916–18 after the death of Yuan Shikai.
2. Cao Rulin (1876–1966), a strongly pro-Japanese politician, was one of the principal targets of the students during the May 4th demonstrations.
3. Sun Yat-sen’s term for democracy, corresponding to the second of the Three People’s Principles.
4. The reference is presumably to the Organic Law of the National Assembly, which had been promulgated on May 4, 1936, but was not put into effect because of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Mao’s point about the reelection of representatives to the National Assembly is somewhat more obscure, since there had been no body with this title in China for more than twenty years. Mao may have been thinking of the Legislative Yuan, which had drafted several proposals for constitutional government between 1934 and 1936, and some of whose members (appointed rather than elected) might have been included in the new assembly. In fact, no National Assembly was elected until 1948.
people, it will be absolutely impossible to win the support of the people or to benefit the War of Resistance. This is the first thing this association wishes to proclaim to our compatriots.

2. The Electoral Law of the National Assembly must be thoroughly revised, and representatives reelected. Although some of the representatives elected before the War of Resistance are fair-minded people, the so-called election was by and large fraudulent. This is because Chu Minyi, today a Chinese traitor, was the one who directed the election, while the party headquarters secretly shielded his actions. There were all sorts of secret dealings, which have incurred ridicule from people both at home and abroad. Among the representatives, there are many Chinese traitors, enemy spies, corrupt officials, and local bullies and bad gentry. The constitution produced by an assembly of such delegates must necessarily be some worthless bureaucratic document, and the application of a constitution under such an assembly will definitely be the same old one-party dictatorship with a different label. If there is something you want to do, just go ahead and do it. Why bother to disguise it as constitutional government? The members of this Association declare their resolute opposition to this practice. At the same time, they would like to propose to the government that the Electoral Law of the National Assembly be thoroughly revised and the representatives reelected. That has to be done, as it is called for by the necessity to persevere in unity and in the War of Resistance. Otherwise it would be like heading north when you actually want to go south, thus incurring ridicule from people who truly know about the matter and in no way bringing good fortune to the nation or to the state. That is the second thing that this Association wishes to proclaim to the people of the nation.

3. The Organic Law of the National Assembly must be thoroughly revised. The National Assembly should be the organ of supreme power. In the present Organic Law, however, the office of the National Assembly is specified as nothing beyond the making of the constitution and determining the date of its entry into force, and its mission terminates at the end of the session. It was designed in this way to avoid the actual establishment of constitutional government and to prevent the National Assembly from becoming an organ of power responsible for the salvation and development of the nation. The evil influence behind it was the obsession of one-party dictatorship. The comrades of this Association absolutely cannot accept the Organic Law of the National Assembly, which does not fit with the needs of the War of Resistance. We demand that it be thoroughly revised and that the National Assembly be designated as the supreme organ of state power. First, apart from making the constitution and determining the date of its entry into force, the National Assembly should be designated as the organ for carrying out the constitution. Second, the National Assembly should be entrusted with the authority to decide on the overall orientation of domestic policy and foreign affairs. Third, the National Assembly should have the right to select, supervise, and dismiss the members of the government. Fourth, the National Assembly should have the authority to make laws for the state. Fifth, the National Assembly should have a standing organ to perform tasks when the Assembly is not in session. Only thus can the needs that have arisen in the present critical situation be met, and the National Assembly avoid turning into something which merely serves to maintain appearances. If it is argued that the organ that has the right to enforce the constitution should be determined by the constitution, so the Organic Law should not entrust the National Assembly in advance with the right to enforce the constitution, that is an argument that deceives oneself as well as others. It was Mr. Sun Yat-sen who specified that the National Assembly was the supreme organ of state power, when he said, “After the promulgation of the Constitution, the Center’s right to rule is to be exercised by the National Assembly. The National Assembly is authorized to select and dismiss the government officials and to formulate and revise the state laws.” Aside from the National Assembly, is there a second organ which deserves to be the executive body of the constitution? Sincerity is indispensable if anything is to be accomplished. To practice democracy without sincerity is as good as not talking about it at all. Sincerity in opening up the government, in practicing democracy, and in rousing people to manage their own business of safeguarding themselves as well as the country, without taking these as temporary expedients, is an initial prerequisite for summoning the National Assembly. That is the third thing this Association wishes to proclaim to the people of the nation.

4. An all-embracing and thoroughgoing campaign for constitutional government should be unfolded throughout the country. People are entitled to the freedom to discuss constitutional government and to participate in the election of the representatives to the National Assembly. All parties and factions that are fighting Japan are entitled to the right of existence and the freedom to participate in the election of representatives to the National Assembly. Constitutional government without participation by the popular masses, popular masses without the freedom of speech, assembly, and association, anti-Japanese parties and factions without the right to legal existence and legal activity denote constitutional government in empty words and devoid of any actual effect. As long as this practice remains unchanged, the constitution, however comprehensive and well-phrased its articles, will be nothing but a bunch of meaningless printed characters. No matter how certain people may boast that they promoted constitutional government a long time ago, this is nothing but a camouflage for the monopoly of political power by a single party or faction. On the other hand, if they are truly sincere in changing the old course of doing things and have the determination to turn over a new leaf together with the people,

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5. Chu Minyi (1884–1946), who had long been associated with Wang Jingwei, became secretary general of the Executive Yuan in Nanjing when Wang became premier in 1932 and retained the post until 1935, when Wang was wounded in an assassination attempt and resigned. When Wang Jingwei broke with Chiang Kai-shek and sought peace with Japan, Chu became secretary general of Wang’s “Reformed Guomindang.” From 1940 to 1944 he served as foreign minister of Wang’s collaborationist régime, and in 1946 he was executed in Nanjing as a traitor.
they will necessarily start by allowing the people as well as all anti-Japanese parties, factions, and mass organizations the freedom to discuss constitutional government and to elect their representatives to the National Assembly. That is the fourth thing that this association wishes to proclaim to our compatriots.

The four issues discussed above are proposals of this Association as well as the common will of people all over the country. The members of the Association are convinced that carrying out democracy and constitutional government is the general trend of events both at home and abroad and will therefore achieve its ends despite obstacles of all kinds. At a time when the enemy of our nation is driving deep into the country, the democratization of the state is truly the fundamental guarantee for the salvation and preservation of the nation. The combined efforts of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as well as all the other anti-Japanese parties, factions, and people will no doubt gradually lead to the prospect of democracy and constitutional government. That is, once again, something of which the members of this Association are profoundly convinced, and something that they wish to state to the people of the entire country. At the moment when this association is established, we have put forward with utmost sincerity our propositions and are seeking for advice from the people of this world. People with aspirations, arise!

February 20 of the 29th year of the Chinese Republic

The Yan’an Association of All Circles for the Promotion of Constitutional Government

Chairman of the Board of Directors Wu Yuzhang


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**Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won**

(March 5, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. There is the necessity and the possibility that the armed struggle against friction may decline for a time in the major regions of the northwest and of North China. This is because we have already basically put down Chiang [Kaishek]’s military offensive, while at present Chiang is in no position to carry out a large-scale campaign to “suppress the Communists.” We have won great victories in Shanxi, Hebei, and the border region. The question of winning the upper hand in North China has basically been resolved. Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and Wei cannot ignore these facts. Consequently, there is the possibility that their side’s armed offensive may be halted temporarily and that they may seek a harmonious understanding with us for a time. During the past two weeks, Chiang, Cheng, Yan, and Wei, together with Jiang of Shaanxi and Zhu of Gansu, have more or less revealed this intention.

2. The present task for our side is to strive for internal peace in the major regions, so that we may be able to concentrate our forces to consolidate our existing positions within half a year. This task is of very great significance. If we are able to consolidate twenty-three xian in the border areas to make them really like the border region; consolidate northwestern Shanxi and the eastern part of Suiyuan in the Shanxi-Suiyuan region; consolidate the area north of the Linfen, Tunliu, Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe, and Daming line in southeastern Shanxi and in Hebei,

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 517–20, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek, Cheng Qian, Yan Xishan, and Wei Lihuang. Regarding Cheng, see the relevant note to the text of January 11, 1940. Regarding Yan Xishan, see Vol. V, p. 61, note 8, and above, the note to the text of December 6, 1939. Wei Lihuang (1897–1960), a native of Anhui, had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the campaigns of 1931–1934 against the Communists in Jiangxi. At this time, he was commander of the First War Zone, and governor of Henan.

2. Jiang of Shaanxi is Jiang Dingwen (1895–1974). Regarding him, see above the relevant note to Edgar Snow’s September 24 interview with Mao. Zhu of Gansu is Zhu Shaoliang, commander of the Eighth War Zone. See above, the relevant note to “The Current Situation and Our Policies,” January 11, 1940.
as well as part of Shandong; and consolidate the area west of the Tianjin-Pukou railroad, east of Kaifeng, south of the old Yellow River, and north of the new Yellow River\(^3\) in the Hebei-Shandong-Henan-Anhui Border Region within half a year—then there will be some possibility that the united front may take a turn for the better. (Of course, the diehards will hate us all the more.) Besides, if our military counteroffensive does not stop for a while in the major regions, even though our military actions are still defensive in nature, the intermediate factions may regard us as extreme and excessive. There will then be the possibility that we might lose the sympathy of the intermediate factions. Therefore, whether from the point of view of consolidating our forces or from the point of view of striving to win the sympathy of the intermediate factions, it is necessary to halt temporarily the military struggle between the two sides.

3. Now that it is necessary and possible for the military struggle between the two sides to come to a halt, our specific steps should be: (a) Seriously restore our ties with Yan Xishan; look for concrete ways to work out a compromise between the new and old armies and to bring the New Army and the Sacrifice League again under the command of Yan Xishan\(^4\); (b) Strive to get Chiang, Yan, and Wei to recognize that the Jundu, Fenying, Linfen, Tunliu, Huguan, Linxian, Zhanghe, and Daming line should constitute the battle line between the two sides.\(^5\) Their units, such as those under Zhu Huaibing,\(^6\) located north of that line should be transferred southward, and our forces south of that line should be transferred northward. We shall only keep two lines of army service stations, one from Huanqu to

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3. In June 1938, in order to impede the progress of the Japanese armies, the Chinese authorities broke open the Yellow River dikes. The river swept across the path of the advancing Japanese and found a new outlet to the sea south, rather than north, of the Shandong peninsula. (For a brief account of the circumstances, see the *Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 13, p. 555.) This change in the course of the river still persisted in 1940; hence the distinction between the “old” and the “new” Yellow River.

4. Regarding the old and new armies, see above, the text of December 6, 1939. The Sacrifice League, or League for Sacrifice to Save the Country, had been founded in September 1936. Outwardly, it was a bureaucratic organization controlled by Yan Xishan’s officials, but in reality it was an anti-Japanese mass body under the direct leadership of members of the Chinese Communist Party.

5. The line of demarcation suggested by Mao, running from Jundu through intermediate points to Daming, lies in southeastern Shanxi. In naming these and other places, Mao was seeking to define areas assigned to Guomindang units and to the Communist forces. This was part of the scaling down of conflict at the end of the “First Anti-Communist Uprising” and was intended to restrain Peng’s Eighth Route Army from pushing its tactical advantage too far. This document shows how detailed and specific Mao could sometimes be in his directives to lower levels. It should be read in conjunction with the more general statement of the line of demarcation suggested by him.

6. Zhu Huaibing (1892–1968), a native of Hubei, had participated in the 1911 Revolution. After graduating from the Baoding Military Academy in 1917, he held a variety of military and political posts in the 1920s and 1930s. In April 1938, he was appointed commander of the Ninety-seventh Army, a position he still occupied in March 1940.

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7. Shi Yousan was at this time deputy commander of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region and commander of the Sixty-ninth Army (see also above note, January 30, 1940). Gao Shuxun was at this time commander of the New Eighth Army of the Thirty-ninth Group Army. Ding Shuben, a native of Anhui, was at this time commissioner of the Guomindang government in the Puyang Special Region.

8. Pang Bingxun was deputy commander of the Hebei-Chahar Military Region and commander of the Twenty-fourth Army Group. Fan Hanjie was at this time commander of the Guomindang’s Twenty-seventh Army. Wang Jingguo was commander of the Thirteenth Group Army of the Guomindang Second War Zone.

9. Yuan Xiaoxuan was at this time head of the operational office of the Eighth Route Army in Luoyang.

10. As noted earlier, Jiaqiang is an alternative *ming* for Wang Jiaxiang.
On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas

(March 6, 1940)

1. This is a time when the anti-Communist diehards of the Guomindang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in North China and Central China and other places, while we for our part must set them up, and in the anti-Japanese base areas it is already possible for us to do so. Our struggle with the anti-Communist diehards over this issue in North China, Central China, and the Northwest can help to promote the establishment of unified front organs of political power throughout the whole country, and it is being followed attentively by the whole country. Therefore, this problem must be handled carefully.

2. The nature of the political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese period is that of a national united front. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance to Japan and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. It differs from the counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie, as well as from the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants of the Agrarian Revolution period. A clear understanding of the character of this political power and conscientious efforts to put it into practice will help greatly to push forward democratization throughout the country. Any deviation, either to the Left or to the Right, will create a very bad impression on the people of the whole country.

3. The convening of the Hebei Provincial Assembly and the elections to the Hebei Administrative Council, preparations for which have just been started, will be of exceptional importance. Equally important will be the establishment of new organs of political power in northwestern Shanxi, Shandong, areas north of the Huai River, the xian of Suide and Fuxian, and eastern Gansu. We must proceed according to the principles noted above and do our utmost to avoid any Right or Left deviations. At the moment the "Left" deviation of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger.

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao for the Central Committee in the light of discussions at a meeting of the Politburo held earlier on the same day. (See Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 175.) Our source is the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 741-43. No contemporary text is available.

4. In accordance with the principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front concerning political power, as regards the allocation of posts to individuals, there should be one-third Communists, one-third non-Party Left progressives, and one-third intermediate elements who are neither Left nor Right.

5. It is necessary to ensure that Communist Party members play a leading role in the organs of political power. Therefore we must see to it that the Party members who occupy one-third of the positions are of truly superior quality. Provided only that this condition is fulfilled, the Party's leadership will be assured, and there will be no need for a larger representation. What we call leadership is neither a slogan that needs to be shouted from morning until night, nor an arrogant demand for obedience. It consists, rather, in using the Party's correct policies and the example we set by our own work to convince and educate people outside the Party, so that they willingly accept our proposals.

6. Non-Party progressive elements must be allocated one-third of the places, because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. Such a measure on our part will be of great importance in winning over the petty bourgeoisie.

7. Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate elements is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Winning over these strata is an important step in isolating the diehards. At present we must not fail to take into account the strength of these strata, and we must be circumspect in our relations with them.

8. Our attitude toward non-Communists must be one of cooperation, whether or not they have party affiliations and whatever these may be, so long as they favor resistance to Japan and are willing to cooperate with the Communist Party.

9. The allocation of places described above represents the true policy of the Party, and we must on no account be half-hearted about it. To execute this policy we must educate the Party members who work in the organs of political power, overcome the narrowness manifested in their reluctance and uneasiness in cooperating with non-Communists, and encourage a democratic style of work, that is, consultation with non-Party people and winning majority approval before taking action. At the same time, we must do all we can to encourage the non-Party people to express their views on various problems and must lend an attentive ear to their suggestions. We must never think that, because we hold military and political power, we can force unconditional compliance with our decisions and on that account shun the effort to win the non-Party people over to our views so that they carry them out gladly and wholeheartedly.

10. The above figures for the allocation of places are not rigid quotas to be filled mechanically; they are in the nature of a rough provision which every locality must apply according to its specific circumstances. At the lowest level, the ratio may be somewhat modified to prevent the landlords and evil gentry from sneaking into the organs of political power. Where such organs have been in existence for some time, as in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, the central Hebei area, the Taihang mountain area, and the southern Hebei area, there should be a reexamination of our
policy in the light of this principle. And this principle should be observed whenever a new organ of political power is established.

11. The policy on suffrage of the government of the anti-Japanese united front should be that every Chinese who has reached the age of eighteen, and who is in favor of resisting Japan and of democracy, should enjoy the right to vote and be elected, regardless of class, nationality, sex, creed, party affiliation, or educational level. The organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front must be elected by the people. Their form of organization should be that of democratic centralism.

12. The administrative policy of the organs of political power of the anti-Japanese united front should take as its point of departure opposition to Japanese imperialism, protection of the people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-Japanese social strata, improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peasants, and suppression of Chinese traitors and reactionaries.

13. Non-Party people who participate in our organs of political power should not be expected to live, talk, and act like Communists; otherwise, they may feel dissatisfied or ill at ease.

14. All regional and subregional bureaus of the Central Committee, all area Party committees, and all heads of army units are hereby instructed to give a clear explanation of this directive to Party members and to ensure that it is fully carried out in the work of our organs of political power.

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**Telegram of Condolence Mourning the Death of Cai Yuanpei**

(March 7, 1940)

For the perusal of the family members of Mr. Cai Jiemin, Austin Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong:

We are shocked to learn that Mr. Jiemin, a giant in the world of learning and a model for man, has breathed his last. This telegram conveys our sincere condolences, and urges you to restrain your grief.

Mao Zedong
bows respectfully

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This document was first published in the Chongqing Xinhua ribao, March 8, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bajian, Vol. 6, p. 149, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), hao Jiemin, was a Hanlin scholar, a revolutionary activist before 1911, and the leading liberal educator of early Republican China. It was during his tenure as chancellor, from 1916 to 1926, that Beijing University became the center of the Chinese renaissance and the May Fourth movement. In 1928, he became the first president of Academia Sinica, but in 1935 he resigned all official posts and issued a public statement denouncing the political and intellectual controls exercised by the Guomindang government. Already in retirement and in poor health when the war broke out, he made his way to Hong Kong, where he lived in partial seclusion. Cai was the translator of Paulsen’s work on ethics which Mao had studied assiduously while at school in Changsha in 1917–1918 and had been chancellor of Beijing University when Mao spent some time there in 1919 and 1920. (See Volume I, passim.) In a letter of September 22, 1936, to Cai, translated in Volume V of this edition, urging him to support resistance to Japan, Mao recalled having heard Cai “expound his marvelous ideas in the classrooms of Beijing University” during the May Fourth period.
Uphold Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(March 9, 1940)

To Comrades Wu and Li,¹ and for transmittal to Comrades Liu and Yuan² in Luoyang:

1. We have taken notice of all your telegrams. Now is definitely not the time to turn small ruptures into big ruptures. When negotiating [with people] outside [the Party], you must remain calm, firm, and quietly await instructions. Concerning the problem of southeastern Shanxi, Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] have replied to you about reestablishing unity. As for the question of the overall policy, Zijiu³ can go to Xi’an to meet with the venerable Lin⁴ on the 18th of this month and receive instructions. In about a week, the venerable Lin will leave Yan’an for Xi’an.

2. When Yuan sees Mr. Wei,⁵ he can inform him that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party firmly upholds the long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and has never varied in this respect. He can express our deep respect for Messrs. Chiang [Kaishek], Cheng [Qian], Wei [Lihuang], and Yan [Xishan], who are leading the War of Resistance. It is only with that group of people who will not talk of cooperation, and talk only of friction, that we are dissatisfied. We express our profound dissatisfaction with the unfair treatment of the Eighth Route Army, with the refusal to recognize the border region, with the refusal of North China to recognize the anti-Japanese political power, with the fact that the freedom of parties and factions is not recognized nationwide, with the oppressive policy adopted toward constitutional government, and with the deprivation of any freedom of public opinion. We hope that Mr. Wei will convey to Mr. Chiang our hopes that these points will be dealt with justly, and be resolved reasonably.

Mao Zedong
the 9th, noon

Also inform Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], and Yang [Shangkun]

Our source for this text is Wenshian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 5 (pp. 165–66 of the annual volume).

1. The reference is to Wu Yunfu (1904–1969), and Li Tao (1905–1970), both of whom were natives of Hunan and had joined the Communist Party in 1926. Wu was subsequently given training as a radio specialist, played a leading role in radio communications during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet, and participated in the Long March. During the period of the anti-Japanese war, he served as secretary of the Military Affairs Commission and in various other capacities. At this time, he was assigned to the Eighth Route Army Liaison Office in Xi’an and was subordinate to Lin Boqu. Li served in the Political Department of various Red Army units during the Jiangxi period, participated in the Long March, and assisted Zhou Enlai with negotiations during the Xi’an Incident. At this time, he was head of the Communist Party liaison offices in Xi’an and Wuhan.

2. Liu is Liu Shaoqi. Yuan is Yuan Xiaoxuan, referred to above in the text of March 5, 1940, p. 431.

3. Zijiu is Liu Zijiu (c. 1901–1988), who was head of the Henan Party Organization Department during the early years of the war.

4. The venerable Lin (Lin lao) is Lin Boqu; for his biography see the relevant note to Mao’s letter of August 26, 1939, to his sons. In addition to his role in Xi’an, Lin was also chairman of the border region government in Yan’an.

5. The reference is to Wei Lihuang. Regarding him, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 5, 1940.
Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front

(March 11, 1940)

1. The present political situation is as follows: (a) Japanese imperialism has been dealt a heavy blow by China’s War of Resistance and is already incapable of launching any more large-scale military offensives, so the relation of forces between the enemy and ourselves has now reached the stage of strategic stalemate. But the enemy is still holding fast to its basic policy of destroying China and is pursuing it by such means as undermining the anti-Japanese united front, intensifying the “mopping-up” campaigns in the rear areas, and stepping up economic aggression. (b) Britain and France are finding their positions in the East weakened by the war in Europe, while the United States is continuing its policy of “sitting on the mountaintop watching the tigers fight,” so that an Eastern Munich conference is out of the question for the moment. (c) The Soviet Union has gained new successes in its foreign policy and is maintaining its policy of giving active support to China’s War of Resistance. (d) The pro-Japanese section of the big bourgeoisie, already having completely capitulated to Japan, is ready to play the puppet. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie may continue to resist Japan, but its proneness to conciliation remains serious. It follows a dual policy. While desiring to remain united with the various non-Guomindang forces to cope with Japan, it is doing all it can to suppress them, and especially the Communist Party and the other progressive forces. It forms the diehard section of the anti-Japanese united front. (e) The intermediate forces, including the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups, often take a middle position between the progressives and the diehards because of their contradictions with the main ruling sections of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and with the working class and the peasantry, on the other. They form the middle sector of the anti-Japanese united front. (f) Recently, the Communist-led progressive forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie have grown much stronger and in the main have succeeded in creating base areas in which anti-Japanese democratic political power has been established. Their influence is very great among the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie throughout the country and is also quite considerable among the middle forces. On the battlefield the Communists are fighting roughly as many Japanese troops as is the Guomindang. They form the progressive section of the anti-Japanese united front.

This is the present political situation in China. In these circumstances the possibility still exists of preventing the situation from deteriorating and of changing it for the better; the Central Committee’s resolutions of February 11 are entirely correct.

2. The basic condition for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is the extension and consolidation of the anti-Japanese united front. The tactics required for this purpose are to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and combat the diehard forces; these are three inseparable links, and the means to be used to unite all the anti-Japanese forces is struggle. In the period of the anti-Japanese united front, struggle is the means to unity and unity is the aim of struggle. If unity is sought through struggle, it will live; if unity is sought through yielding, it will perish. This truth is gradually being grasped by Party comrades. However, there are still many who do not understand it; some think that struggle will split the united front or that struggle can be employed without restraint, and others use wrong tactics toward the middle forces or have mistaken notions about the diehard forces. All of this must be corrected.

3. Developing the progressive forces means building up the forces of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie, boldly expanding the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, establishing anti-Japanese democratic base areas on an extensive scale, building up Communist organization throughout the country, developing national mass movements of the workers, peasants, youth, women, and children, winning over intellectuals in all parts of the country, and spreading the movement for constitutional government among the masses as a struggle for democracy. Steady expansion of the progressive forces is the only way to prevent the situation from deteriorating, to forestall capitulation and splitting, and to lay a firm and indestructible foundation for victory in the resistance to Japan. But the expansion of the progressive forces is a serious process of struggle, which must be ruthlessly waged not only against Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors but also against the diehards, because the diehards are opposed to the growth of the progressive forces, and the middle sector is skeptical. Unless we engage in resolute struggle against the diehards and, moreover, achieve tangible results, we shall be unable to resist their pressure or dispel the doubts of the middle sector. In that case the progressive forces will have no way of expanding.

4. Winning over the middle forces means winning over the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and the regional power groups. They are three distinct


1. See the document dated February 1, 1940, “Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks.”
The middle forces tend to vacillate and are bound to break up, and we should educate and criticize them appropriately, with special reference to their vacillating attitude.

The winning over of the middle forces is an extremely important task for us in the period of the anti-Japanese united front; but it can be accomplished only under certain conditions. These are: (a) that we have ample strength; (b) that we respect their interests; and (c) that we are resolute in our struggle against the diehards and steadily win victories. If these conditions are lacking, the middle forces will vacillate or even become allies of the diehards in the latter's attacks on us, because the diehards are also doing their best to win over the middle forces in order to isolate us. These middle forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the decisive factor in our struggle against the diehards; we must therefore be prudent in dealing with them.

5. The diehard forces at present are the forces of the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie. Divided at the moment into the group that has capitulated to Japan and the group that favors resistance, they will gradually become still further differentiated. Within the big bourgeoisie, the group favoring resistance to Japan is now different from the group that has already capitulated to Japan. It pursues a dual policy. It still advocates unity against Japan, but at the same time it follows the extremely reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces in preparation for its eventual capitulation. As it still favors unity against Japan, we can still try to keep it in the anti-Japanese united front, and the longer the better. It would be wrong to neglect our policy of winning over this group and cooperating with it and to regard it as having already capitulated and as being on the verge of launching an anti-Communist war. But at the same time, we must adopt tactics of struggle to combat its reactionary policy and carry on a determined ideological, political, and military fight against it, because all over the country it pursues the reactionary policy of suppressing the progressive forces, because instead of carrying out the common program of the revolutionary Three People's Principles it stubbornly opposes our efforts to do so, and because it works hard to prevent us from going beyond the limits it has set for us, that is, it tries to confine us to the passive resistance it practices itself and, moreover, it tries to assimilate us, failing which it applies ideological, political, and military pressure against us. Such is our revolutionary dual policy to meet the dual policy of the diehards, and such is our policy of seeking unity through struggle. If in the ideological sphere we can put forward correct revolutionary theory and strike hard at their counterrevolutionary theory, if in the political sphere we adopt tactics suited to the times and strike hard at their anti-Communist and antiprogressive policies, and if in the military sphere we take appropriate measures and strike back hard at their attacks, then we shall be able to restrict the effective range of their reactionary policy and compel them to recognize the status of the progressive forces, and we shall be able to expand the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate their forces. What is more, we shall be able to induce those diehards who are still willing to resist Japan to
prolong their participation in the anti-Japanese united front and shall thus be able to avert a large-scale civil war of the kind that broke out before. Thus the purpose of our struggle against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front is not only to parry their attacks in order to protect the progressive forces and enable the latter to go on growing. It is also to prolong the diehards' resistance to Japan and to preserve our cooperation with them and avert large-scale civil war. Without struggle, these progressive forces would be exterminated by the diehard forces, the united front would cease to exist, there would be nothing to hinder the diehards from capitulating to the enemy, and civil war would break out. Therefore, struggle against the diehards is an indispensable means of uniting all the anti-Japanese forces, achieving a favorable turn in the situation, and averting large-scale civil war. All our experience confirms this truth.

There are, however, several principles that must be observed in the struggle against the diehards in the period of the anti-Japanese united front. First, the principle of self-defense. We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. The military attacks of the diehards must be smashed—resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely. Second, the principle of victory. We will not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the diehards and must not take on too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows at the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one diehard attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the diehards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them. On no account should we fight on ceaselessly day after day or be carried away by success. Herein lies the temporary nature of each struggle. Only when they launch a new attack should we counter with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are to fight "on just grounds," "to our advantage," and "with restraint." By keeping to this kind of struggle, waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, and we can also make the diehards think twice before attacking us again, compromising with the enemy, or starting large-scale civil war. Thus a favorable turn in the situation will become possible.

6. The Guomindang is a heterogeneous party which includes diehards, middle elements, and progressives, but taken as a whole it must not be equated with the diehards. Some people regard the Guomindang as consisting entirely of diehards because its Central Executive Committee has promulgated such counterrevolutionary friction-mongering decrees as the "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties" and has mobilized every ounce of its strength for counterrevolutionary friction-mongering in the ideological, political, and military spheres throughout the country. But this is a mistaken view. The diehards in the Guomindang are still in a position to dictate its policies, but numerically they are in a minority, while the majority of the membership (many are members in name only) are not necessarily diehards. This point must be clearly recognized if we are to take advantage of the contradictions among them, follow a policy of differentiating between their sectors, and do our utmost to unite with the middle and progressive sectors of the Guomindang.

7. On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas, we must make sure that the political power established there is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. No such political power exists as yet in the Guomindang areas. It is the political power of all who support both resistance and democracy, that is, the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the Chinese traitors and reactionaries. It is different from the dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie and is also somewhat different from a strictly worker-peasant democratic dictatorship. Places in the organs of political power should be allocated as follows: one-third to the Communists, representing the proletariat and the poor peasantry; one-third to the Left progressives, representing the petty bourgeoisie; and the remaining one-third to the middle and other elements, representing the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry. Only Chinese traitors and anti-Communist elements are disqualified from participation in these organs of political power. This general rule for the allocation of positions is necessary; otherwise it will not be possible to maintain the principle of Anti-Japanese National United Front political power. This allocation of places represents the genuine policy of our Party and must be carried out conscientiously; there must be no half-heartedness about it. It provides a broad rule which has to be applied according to the specific conditions, and there must be no mechanical filling up of quotas. At the lowest level the ratio may have to be somewhat modified to prevent domination by the landlords and evil gentry, but the fundamental spirit of this policy must not be violated. We should not labor the question of whether the non-Communists in these organs have party affiliations or what their party affiliations are. In areas under the political power of the anti-Japanese united front, all political parties, whether the Guomindang or any other, must be granted legal status so long as they cooperate with and do not oppose the Communist Party. On the question of suffrage under this political power, the policy is that every Chinese who reaches the age of eighteen and is in favor of resistance and democracy should have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, party affiliation, sex, creed, or educational level. The organs of anti-Japanese united front political power should be elected by the people and then apply to the National Government for confirmation. Their form of organization must be based on democratic centralism. The fundamental point of departure for all major policy measures in the anti-Japanese united front organs of political power should be opposition to Japanese imperialism, opposition to confirmed Chinese traitors and reactionaries, protection of the
people who are resisting Japan, proper adjustment of the interests of all the anti-
Japanese social strata, and improvement of the livelihood of the workers and peas-
ants. The establishment of this anti-Japanese united front political power will exert
a great influence on the whole country and serve as a model for anti-Japanese
united front political power on a national scale; therefore this policy should be
fully understood and resolutely carried out by all Party comrades.

8. In the struggle to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces,
and isolate the diehard forces, we must not overlook the role of the intellectuals,
whom the diehards are doing their utmost to win over; therefore it is an important
and indeed an essential policy to win over all progressive intellectuals and bring
them under the influence of our Party.

9. In propaganda, the following guidelines should be stressed:
   a. carry out the “Testament of the Director General” by arousing the masses for
      united resistance to Japan;
   b. carry out the Principle of Nationalism by firmly resisting Japanese imperial-
      ism and striving for complete national liberation and the equality of all the
      nationalities within China;
   c. carry out the Principle of Democracy by granting the people absolute free-
      dom to resist Japan and save the nation, by enabling them to elect govern-
      ments at all levels, and by establishing the revolutionary democratic political
      power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front;
   d. carry out the Principle of the People’s Livelihood by abolishing exorbitant
      taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing land rent and interest, enforcing the
      eight-hour workday, developing agriculture, industry, and commerce, and
      improving the livelihood of the people;
   e. carry out Chiang Kaishé’s declaration that “every person, young or old, in
      the north or in the south, must take up the responsibility of resisting Japan
      and defending our homeland.”

All these points are in the Guomindang’s own published program, which is also
the common program of the Guomindang and the Communist Party. But the
Guomindang has not been able to carry out any part of this program other than
resistance to Japan; only the Communist Party and the progressive forces are able
to carry it out. It is a simple enough program and is widely known among the
people, yet many Communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the popular
masses and isolating the diehards. From now on we should keep attention focused
on the five points of this program and popularize them through public notices,
manifestos, leaflets, articles, speeches, statements, and so on. In the Guomindang
areas it is still only a propaganda program, but in the areas reached by the Eighth
Route Army and the New Fourth Army it is already a program of action. Acting
according to this program we are within the law, and when the diehards oppose
our carrying it out, it is they who are outside the law. In the stage of the bourgeois-
democratic revolution, this program of the Guomindang is basically the same as
ours, but the ideology of the Guomindang is entirely different from that of the
Communist Party. It is only this common program of the democratic revolution
that we should put into practice, and on no account should we follow the ideology
of the Guomindang.
Think About What Concessions Need to Be Made to Avoid a Split in the Unity of the Two Parties

(March 15, 1940)

Comrades Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehui]:

Chiang [Kaishek] and Wei [Lihuang] have already ordered the main forces of Pang Bingxun, Fan Hanjie, Liu Kan, and Chen Tie ¹ to assemble in vicinity of Tainan and have, moreover, sent a dispatch transferring six more divisions from the Longhai railroad across the river. You elder brothers are requested to pay careful attention to the importance of this matter and think about what concessions need to be made to Chiang and Wei in order to avoid letting it shatter the unity of the two parties. Please consider the problem of giving up the Lingchuan-Hejian-Linxian line.²


Print and Circulate Widely the Open Telegram in Condemnation of Wang and for National Salvation

(March 15, 1940)

The open telegram of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in condemnation of Wang and for national salvation was published on the 15th.¹ Each

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan*, pp. 52–53, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Wang Jingwei had concluded a secret agreement with Japan on December 30, 1939 (for details see the relevant note to “Overcome the Danger of Capitulation,” January 28, 1940), and had set up a puppet government in Nanjing in March 1940. On March 15, 1940, Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, respectively commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, together with Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, respectively commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army, had published their open telegram in condemnation of Wang and in favor of national salvation in the name of all the officers and men of the two armies. In view of the importance attached by Mao to this document, the full text is translated below:

The whole nation is shocked and angered at the appearance of Traitor Wang on the political scene. It has been three years since we led our troops driving deep into the enemy rear and fighting to safeguard our native land. We have come to understand profoundly that it is a scheme of the invaders and puppets to undermine our internal unity, so as to achieve their purpose of overthrowing our state, destroying our nation, and trampling upon our people. Recently, in all the places that they have reached, the invaders and puppets have had the audacity to hoist illegally the blue-sky-and-white-sun flag, forming puppet armies and setting up puppet governments, and calling for peace and opposition to the Communist Party. It is all too clear that what they mean by peace is capitulation, and by opposition to the Communist Party, the destruction of China. There is, however, a certain number of frenzied and perverse individuals who respond positively. With the increasing scale of the European war and the collusion between the world conspirators and the Japanese and their puppets in an attempt to establish the so-called anti-Communist front in the East, our War of Resistance Against Japan is in an extremely critical situation. At a time like this, a small number of people in our country, lacking in understanding of important principles, are either inciting capitulation or opposing communism. Opposing Communism is, however, a preparatory stage for capitulation, for anticommunism at its extreme will eventually result in capitulation, and, before capitulation, it is necessary to advocate anticommunism. This has been clearly demonstrated by the disastrous track followed by Wang Jingwei. As far as the present-day situation is concerned, the crisis that
locality must, upon receiving it, immediately print and distribute a number of copies. Send a copy to every organ, every school, every army unit, every newspaper office, every mass organization, and every well-known personage. In particular, large numbers of copies should be sent to friendly armies, making sure that the commanders of all armies, divisions, brigades, and regiments are reached in every possible way. All our open publications are to print it without exception, and you must see to it that there are no mistakes about this.

Turning the Military Posture in North China into a Defensive One so as to Establish a Politically Reasonable and Advantageous Position

(March 16, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I have read carefully your telegram dated the 13th. Judging from the general situation, it is necessary to avoid clashing once again with the Central forces in the Linchuan-Linxian area. If the other side presses on, we should retreat northward. If the other side presses on again and again, then, when our forces stage a counterattack, they are in the wrong. Otherwise, it would be very harmful to us politically. At present, the center of gravity of the struggle should be moved to the region through which the Huai River flows, for Li Pinxian is now sending troops to put pressure on the areas of Xuefeng and Hu Fu.2 Chiang Kaishek has already taken note of those areas and is trying to sever the communications between us and the New Fourth Army. The way out for our forces in the future is the Central Plain. If we do not fight over it now, it will be more difficult in the future. It is thus proposed that the 344th Brigade be moved to the area between Longhai and the Huai River to assist Peng Xuefeng in establishing a base area and to support Hu Fu. In the future, some units shall be moved deep into northern Jiangsu so as to link up

threatens our War of Resistance is not caused by the frenzy of the Japanese invaders and their puppets, but is brought about by the existence of capitulationist and anti-Communist elements within our resistance front. When the enemy is already close at hand in the Zhongtiao Range, from radio broadcasts is heard the prattle about the impending split in the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and imminent civil war in China. Alas! What a way to talk! The enemy's strength is our weakness, and what grieves us gladdens our enemy. We people, who have been fighting in one battlefield after another, have given no consideration to the safety of our lives, but have been concerned only that the whole country should continue to unite, frustrate the enemy schemes, eliminate friction, oppose the civil war, get the 450 million people to unite as one, persist in the War of Resistance, and strive for final victory. The territory of China is so vast, and the mass of its population so great, that while Japan and the traitors are weakening and Europe is locked in a fierce war, we are bound to win the War of Resistance and succeed in building up China, if only we can strengthen our unity, do not undermine the great wall of our defense by our own hands, continue to strive, and do not cause ourselves to lose heart. Our virtue is not extraordinary, but we swear that we will mobilize our whole army, shed our last drop of blood for our native land, drive out the invaders and the puppets, and recover our lost territory. To achieve this end, we will not flinch even if we are called on to go through fire and water. It is our sincere hope that the progressive personages in all circles as well as all our fellow countrymen will work with collective wisdom and concerted effort for the salvation of the nation. We send you with this telegram our respect and best wishes.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 523–24.

1. Li Pinxian (1892–1987), a native of Guangxi, had participated in the Wuchang Uprising which marked the beginning of the 1911 Revolution, and in the Northern Expedition. In October and November 1939 he was governor of Anhui, commander of the Twenty-first Group Army, commander of the Anhui Security Bureau, and head of the Guomindang's Anhui Provincial Party Bureau. He was identified with the Guangxi faction and was thus under the overall command of Li Zongren. Li Zongren (1891–1969), zì Delin, a native of Guangxi, had been the dominant figure in his native province since 1924, sometimes in alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, sometimes in opposition to him. In August 1937, he had been appointed commander of the Fifth War Zone, composed of northern Jiangsu, northern Anhui, and southern Shandong. Following Japanese attacks in 1938, he moved into western Anhui and eastern Henan and established his headquarters in northern Hubei.

2. Xuefeng is Peng Xuefeng; Hu Fu was the nom de guerre of Liu Shaoqi.
the areas occupied by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Such action will also serve to create a new problem in the east. This will force Chiang and Wei to turn their attention to the east and reduce the attention they pay to North China. In this way, North China may indeed be consolidated. At the present, it is extremely necessary that the struggle in North China come spontaneously to a halt. Otherwise, there is the danger that we would be put in a passive position. Once our forces get into a passive position politically, Chiang Kaishek will then engage in a political counteroffensive. They will make propaganda in a big way, accusing us of being unreasonable. Then we will be put in a very disadvantageous situation. Our previous reasonable position will have been lost. Chiang will also take advantage of the Zhu Huaibing Incident and expand on it. He Yingqin has already made a report once to the Standing Committee of the People’s Political Council. Next month, the People’s Political Council will hold its fifth session. It is now sending the Inspection Group which is now in Luoyang and other places to Sichuan. It will definitely try to make a big fuss out of the whole thing. We should prepare now to cope with the new political offensive by Chiang Kaishek. Therefore, we must immediately stop all military operations and turn our military posture into a defensive one. If their forces press on, our forces will retreat without firing a shot, obeying orders. Only in this way will it be possible to establish a politically reasonable and beneficial position. Please give consideration to this and send me a reply.

[Mao] Zedong

4. At this time, Zhu Huaibing was the commander of the Guomindang Ninety-seventh Army. In February and March 1940, Chiang had ordered him to join with various other Guomindang forces and launch a three-pronged attack on the Eighth Route Army, but this was defeated by the Eighth Route Army.

Consolidate North China and Expand in the Five Provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei

(March 19, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai, and inform Zhu [De] and Yang [Shangkun]:

I have taken note of your telegram and am replying as follows:

1. It is very correct to do your utmost to enlarge the forces. The emphasis should be put on North China as far as consolidation is concerned. I have read all your plans, and they are all correct. As for expansion, the emphasis should be put on the five provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei. For the moment, please pay particular attention to Shandong. We already have a foundation in that province, but we lack a leadership core there. When the enemy’s new offensive reaches there, please consider and resolve the question of the leadership core. We should also make southern Shandong responsible for expansion in northern Jiangsu. As for expansion in the three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, Henan in particular is a region that plays the role of an axis in the protracted War of Resistance, and at present strenuous efforts to get prepared should be made, even though there is no possibility of expanding there in a major way.

2. For a certain time now and in the future, cadres from Yan’an should be supplied mainly to Central China. At the same time, we should prepare some for use in the Northwest, some for the South, and some for the Northeast. As for North China, it will be mainly instructors and teaching materials that are provided.

3. There may be the possibility that we may approach our friends to ask them to provide us with people to work in our weapons factories, but we must await the result of the negotiations. I am afraid they cannot necessarily be relied on. In the main, we will have to rely on people from within the country.

4. In the border region, we are developing the production campaign. We are preparing so that if the worst comes to the worst, we can become self-sufficient. Cao Junwu is now responsible for the Ministry of Finance and Economy and cannot

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 525–27, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. See above, the note to the text of March 19, 1939.
be moved. We can, however, release Li Liuru\(^2\) for your place. The only problem is that he is ill and will be able to come only after he has recuperated a bit. At the same time, I am also working to identify others. I will inform you later of the results.

5. It is very correct that you at the front pay attention to banking and taxation, but production is the most fundamental thing. In those areas that are relatively stable, please consider not only calling on the popular masses to increase production, but also mobilizing government organs, schools, and military units (provided that their work, study, and combat are not affected) to engage in production. You yourselves should also participate personally in production. There is already quite a lot of experience here in the rear, and it will be provided to you for reference.

6. On the job study for cadres is important. It should be turned into a movement (provided that it does not hamper work or combat). There should be an organ and a method for administering study. In relatively quiet organs, the system of two hours of study should be adopted. The Central Committee has already established a Department of Cadre Education. The experience of the rear may also be provided to the front.

7. It is very correct to avoid meeting Lu Zhonglin.\(^3\) The only effective way to deal with people of this kind is to uphold one’s position and engage in a resolute counteroffensive without any appeasement. You should deal with Shen Honglie of Shandong in the same way.\(^4\) At present, Shen is engaged in persistent attacks on us. Please take care to engage in a resolute counterattack.

8. It has been decided to hold a meeting of the Politburo at the end of April to discuss many important questions. Headquarters and the Northern Bureau have already decided to send Zhu Rui to participate. There is still more than a month between now and the time of the meeting. Please consider whether or not you will be able to come to Yan’an at that time.

Mao Zedong

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\(^2\) See above, the relevant note to Mao’s letter of January 22, 1939. As indicated there, Li was the head of Mao Zedong’s personal Secretariat. At this time, he was also deputy head of the Economic and Financial Department of the Central Committee.

\(^3\) See above, the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1939. In accordance with Chiang Kaishék’s orders, he had created friction with the Eighth Route Army.

\(^4\) As indicated above in a note to the text of March 19, 1939, Shen Honglie was at this time governor of Shandong.

Solidify the Communications Between the Center and Southeast Shanxi as Well as Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei

(March 19, 1940)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Teng [Daiyuan], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], and Nie [Rongzhen]:

In order to solidify communications between the Center and southeastern Shanxi as well as Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei:

1. It is requested that comrades He, Guan, and Nie Rongzhen be responsible for assuring communications between northwestern Shanxi and the military district. The military district shall designate the units which will move westward to reach the Datong-Tongguan railroad.\(^1\) He and Guan shall designate the units to move eastward, which will get in touch with the forces of Nie’s military district now moving westward. If this route is not solidified, there is the danger that the whole of North China may be completely set apart from the rear of Yan’an. We hope you will telegraph us about your deployments.

2. There has been great difficulty in communications between the Center and southeastern Shanxi, as a result of obstruction at Huanqu and the temporary inability to establish the line of military service stations in southwestern Shanxi (the original reason being that the Ninetieth Army of the Central Forces got there). It is requested that Peng, He, and Guan send out reconnaissance squads northward and establish a line of communications between northwestern and southeastern Shanxi, crossing the Datong-Tongguan railroad between Yuci and Pingyao. Please inform us of your views.

Military Affairs Commission


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\(^1\) This was the line from Datong southwestward to the great bend in the Yellow River along which the Japanese army had advanced in 1937–1938.
The Tasks of the New Fourth Army's Political Work

(March 19, 1940)

Comrade Guoping:¹

1. We have taken note of your telegram dated the 10th and received much comfort from it. We hope that you will send us telegrams more often in the future to tell us how the Central Committee's line is being carried out with regard to the various aspects of the political work.

2. Please notify us one by one how you propose to ensure that the most important political tasks from a positive standpoint are effectively carried out, including the resolute and extensive establishment of independent, self-reliant, anti-Japanese democratic governments in the enemy's rear; the establishment of financial organs; the collection of contributions and taxes for resisting Japan; the establishment of economic organs; the development of agriculture, industry, and commerce; the founding of various kinds of schools; the training of large groups of cadres; the carrying out of the plan to expand our forces, so as to expand the first, second, and third detachments to approximately 100,000 men and rifles within one year, and expand the fourth, fifth, and sixth detachments and Li's detachment² to 150,000 men and rifles within one year; develop united front work so as to win over vari-

² 3. For a biography of Tan Zheng, see above, the text of February 19, 1939. Although this telegram is signed by Wang and Tan, it was, according to the Junshi wenji, drafted for them by Mao.

¹ Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 530–31, where it is reproduced from Mao's original manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

2. This telegram is addressed to Yuan Guoping (1905–1941), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he participated in the struggle against the five campaigns of "Envelopment and Suppression," and he was a veteran of the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army.

3. The reference is to the advance column commanded by Li Xiannian. Li Xiannian (1909–1992), a native of Hebei, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. During the Jiangxi period, he was part of the Fourth Front Army under Zhang Guotao and arrived in Yan'an in 1937 only after enduring great difficulties. At this time, he was commander of the Hubei-Henan Assault Column of the New Fourth Army. On Li Pinxian, see the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.
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Comrade Guoping:¹

1. We have taken note of your telegram dated the 10th and received much comfort from it. We hope that you will send us telegrams more often in the future to tell us how the Central Committee’s line is being carried out with regard to the various aspects of the political work.

2. Please notify us one by one how you propose to ensure that the most important political tasks from a positive standpoint are effectively carried out, including the resolute and extensive establishment of independent, self-reliant, anti-Japanese democratic governments in the enemy’s rear; the establishment of financial organs; the collection of contributions and taxes for resisting Japan; the establishment of economic organs; the development of agriculture, industry, and commerce; the founding of various kinds of schools; the training of large groups of cadres; the carrying out of the plan to expand our forces, so as to expand the first, second, and third detachments to approximately 100,000 men and rifles within one year, and expand the fourth, fifth, and sixth detachments and Li’s detachment² to 150,000 men and rifles within one year; develop united front work so as to win over vari-

ous middle forces and isolate the forces of the diehards; expand the work of carrying out sabotage against the enemy and actively disintegrating the enemy and puppet.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 530–31, where it is reproduced from Mao’s original manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This telegram is addressed to Yuan Guoping (1905–1941), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he participated in the struggle against the five campaigns of “Encirclement and Suppression,” and he was a veteran of the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army.

2. The reference is to the advance column commanded by Li Xiannian. Li Xiannian (1909–1992), a native of Hebei, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. During the Jiangxi period, he was part of the Fourth Front Army under Zhang Guotao and arrived in Yan’an in 1937 only after enduring great difficulties. At this time, he was commander of the Hubei-Henan Assault Column of the New Fourth Army. On Li Pinxian, see the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.

3. For a biography of Tan Zheng, see above, the text of February 19, 1939. Although this telegram is signed by Wang and Tan, it was, according to the Junshi wenji, drafted for them by Mao.
Assist the New Fourth Army in Establishing Anti-Japanese Base Areas in Eastern Anhui, North of the Huai, and in Northern Jiangsu

(March 21, 1940)

Zhu [De], Peng [Dehui], and Yang [Shangkun], and for the information of Chen, Luo, Xu, Zhu, Liu, Deng, Peng, Hu, and Xiang:

Concerning assistance to the New Fourth Army:

1. Chairman Li Pinvxian of Anhui, under instructions from a certain quarter, is adopting a completely reactionary policy. He engages in a resolute attack on the New Fourth Army in eastern Anhui and north of the Huai, in an attempt to eliminate completely the units under Zhang Yunyi, Peng Xuefeng, and others, sever the lines of communications between our New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army, and put our New Fourth Army south of the Yangzi in a position in which its retreat is cut off. Under such circumstances, our Eighth Route Army has the urgent task of firmly and rapidly assisting the New Fourth Army, smashing the reactionary attacks by Li Pinvxian, establishing a democratic anti-Japanese base area in eastern Anhui, north of the Huai, and in northern Jiangsu, and consolidating the line of communications between the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army.

2. Apart from the specific deployments on which Zhu and Peng have asked to make decisions quickly, we now inform you as follows regarding the overall situation in that area.

a. Li Pinvxian has been bought off by a certain quarter. In going to Anhui this time, he was given full powers by a certain quarter to adopt completely anti-Communist policies.

b. After arriving in Anhui, Li immediately reorganized the provincial government and disbanded all progressive organizations. More than three thousand student trainees who refused to accept repression willingly came to the New Fourth Army in batches. Not a single xian is free of incidents of arrests and executions. The Anhui regime has now already become extremely anti-Communist.

c. In order to liquidate the New Fourth Army by force, Li Pinvxian, besides transferring two divisions to eastern Anhui and north of the Huai, is also bringing an army from northern Hubei. Its 172nd Division is now moving from western Hubei to western Anhui.

d. Between March 4 and 7, Director Li Benyi of the Administrative Office of North Anhui, in obedience to Li Pinvxian’s orders, led a force of more than two thousand men to make a three-pronged attack on our New Fourth Army stationed in south Dingyuan and the command center on the north side of the [Yangzi] river, with the purpose of eliminating that command center and killing comrades Hu Fu and Zhang Yunyi. As a result of resolute counterattacks waged by the various routes of our forces, his forces were defeated. Several hundred guns were seized, and several hundred captives were taken.

e. A unit from the Guizhou forces, and other units from various forces, with a total strength of six regiments, have reached a certain place in eastern Anhui. A brigade from their 183rd Division, which was originally attacking north of the Huai, is now reportedly turning in the direction of eastern Anhui.

f. Our New Fourth Army in eastern Anhui now already has nine regiments totaling approximately fifteen thousand men. Because these forces neglected in the past the task of establishing base areas, even in the dozen or so xian north of the Yangzi, south of the Huai River, east of the Huainan railroad, and west of the Grand Canal in which our forces are active, these places are still occupied by diehard anti-Communist régimes and their anti-Communist armed forces. But in the past two weeks, that is, after defeating the attack in three columns by Li Benyi, we have begun to eliminate resolutely the anti-Communist factions, and to establish anti-Japanese democratic governments. We have also captured many arms in anticommunist localities, so as to cope even more resolutely with Li Pinvxian’s massive attacks.
g. In the area north of the Huai River, since Li Pinxian sent forces to attack Commissioner Shen Zijin\(^5\) of the intermediate faction, a unit of reinforcement from the Guizhou forces has been sent and is now advancing. There are already fourteen regiments in our forces led by Peng Xuefeng, which are preparing to defend themselves. We also have there already some democratic anti-Japanese governments, which are more consolidated than those in eastern Anhui.  

h. The feelings of the popular masses in favor of resisting Japan and opposing the diehards in the areas of eastern Anhui and north of the Huai are very intense. Neither the Guizhou armies nor the local troops among Li Pinxian’s attacking forces have consolidated their positions, but the New Fourth Army is also a recent creation. Hence they need to be assisted by the Eighth Route Army, for only thus will they be able to defeat thoroughly the advancing forces and consolidate this extremely important strategic region for resisting Japan.

Military Affairs Commission

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\(^{5}\) Shen Zijin was at this time commissioner of the Sixth Prefecture of the Guomindang government of Anhui Province.

**Our Tactics in Dealing with the Diehards**  
(March 25, 1940)

In our struggle against the attacks launched against us by the diehard faction, and before a given diehard element has openly become a puppet soldier or Chinese traitor, it is inappropriate to point out a particular person and say that he has surrendered to the Japanese invaders or to designate someone as a Chinese traitor and to state this publicly and so inform the Guomindang. If we behave in this way, not only will society be unable to understand, so that we will lose the sympathy of the intermediate faction and anger the Guomindang, but we will also jeopardize our united front work, in which once the campaign against friction has come to an end, we will again speak of unity with the diehard faction. Therefore, in the future, we should not publicly and specifically condemn anyone as a Chinese traitor, except for those who have openly turned into puppet soldiers or surrendered to the enemy. In particular, we must be extremely prudent as regards the armies of the central government. If any of them create friction against us, we should merely collect evidence of their friction and report and always remember never to put a label on someone lightly. In addition, we should make our cadres understand that the so-called cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party consists mainly of cooperation with the army of the central government. In strengthening the work of unity and persuasion directed toward every army, all of our cadres should lay particular emphasis on the work of unity and persuasion aimed at the army of the central government. Now with the military struggle against friction in the entire Northwest and North China over, it is very urgent that every unit should stress this kind of united front work, every military and political leading comrade should be responsible for guidance and planning.

Secretariat of the Central Committee and Military Affairs Commission

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This document was drafted by Mao for the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Military Affairs Commission. Our source is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 277–78, where the text is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
The Present Military Tactics in Central China

(March 29, 1940)

Comrades Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Hu Fu, and Xiang Ying:

1. Eastern Anhui, [the region] north of the Huai [River], and northern Jiangsu in Central China are a region the diehard faction will definitely try to seize. Their goal is to cut the lines of communications between our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army so as to get the New Fourth Army into a dangerous situation.

2. We are in complete agreement with the determination of Zhu and Peng to transfer the 344th Brigade to the south of the Longhai railroad to reinforce Central China and to move Chen's detachment to the Jiaodong Peninsula. The 344th Brigade should break camp quickly, and use its radio to contact Hu Fu.

3. Since the diehard faction, after engaging in friction in North China, has suffered a severe defeat, and since we have moreover sent reinforcements to south of the Longhai railroad, the center of friction will now move to Central China.

4. In the armed friction in Central China, our military tactics should be as follows:

Take the Huai River and the Huainan railroad as the dividing line. Avoid armed struggle to the west of this line. The area to the east of this line should be firmly kept in our hands. First eliminate the local diehard faction. Try to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Guizhou forces. With regard to Han Deqin's forces, under reasonable and advantageous conditions, when they advance to the places where our forces are stationed, eliminate them resolutely. Chen Yi's forces should step up their effort to expand to northern Jiangsu.

5. Under the circumstances in which friction with the New Fourth Army is daily becoming more acute in Central China, it is possible that the diehard faction will make use of its stronger military forces to attack the area where the New Fourth Army headquarters are located. Therefore, the headquarters and the south Anhui forces should have advance preparation in order to ward off surprise attacks. If the worst comes to the worst, they can move closer to the Chen detachment in southern Jiangsu, and then redeploy to northern Jiangsu.

Military Affairs Commission


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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 535–36, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to a detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army operating in western Shanxi and commanded by Chen Shuju.

2. Han Deqin (1892–1988), zì Chužhen, a native of Jiangsu, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy. He participated in the second and third campaigns of "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Communists during the Jiangxi Soviet period. At this time, he was deputy commander of the Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone and also commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Security Department. He was the principal adversary of the Communists in that part of Jiangsu north of the Yangzi River.

3. Here the reference is to the First Detachment of the New Fourth Army, commanded by Chen Yi. In November 1939, the First and Second Detachments of the New Fourth Army had been combined to form the South Yangzi Command Headquarters, with Chen Yi as commander.
Our Current Policy in North and Central China

(April 1, 1940)

To Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Xu [Xiangqian] and Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], [Peng] Xuefeng, Hu Fu [Liu Shaqi], Xiang Ying, and Chen Yi:

Our present policy in North and Central China:

1. A certain party is currently amassing a large army north of the Yellow River and in the Luliang mountain range. Our task is to exert every effort to ease relations with them and to avoid all words or actions that would be provocative to that party. Our army will thus hold a strictly defensive line, of deep trenches and high ramparts, and be prepared for any contingency. Toward military provocations exercise extreme patience and do not fire back. Write a lot of letters, leaflets, and posters that are sincere, firm, and not provocative, with the objective of creating good feelings that will stabilize our front and restore peace and tranquility in the Shanxi and Hebei region. Military clashes are not to occur, unless approved by the Central Committee.

2. A certain party is currently attacking the New Fourth Army in central Hubei, eastern Anhui, and north of the Huai River. Our New Fourth Army should firmly and in a planned manner carry out defensive warfare. In the eastern Anhui and north of the Huai River areas, it must hold out alone for three months and await the arrival of reinforcements before mounting a large-scale counterattack.

3. The task of our Eighth Route Army is to transfer enough forces to go south into Central China to reinforce the New Fourth Army, to fight back the reactionary attacks, eliminate the capitulationist anti-Communist forces, and establish a new great anti-Japanese base area. This base will include the areas north of the Huai River, east of the Huainan railroad, north of the Yangzi River, and west of Dahai. Its leaders and troop forces will be coordinated under the general direction of Zhu and Peng. Its schedule will be divided into three periods. In the first period, one main column by rapid march will arrive in eastern Anhui in about one month. In the second period, the 344th Brigade must arrive in the vicinity of the Huai River within two months. In the third period, quite a large force of troops (no fewer than 15,000 men) must reach the Yangzhou environs in northern Jiangsu. The total troop strength for periods one, two, and three must be between forty thousand and fifty thousand, for this urgent great task to be accomplished.

4. Our troops in Jiaodong, in southern Shandong, must move actively to eliminate all the most reactionary capitulationist anti-Communist forces, to expand the anti-Japanese base area, and while fighting hard to become the central force, they must work hard to make contact with all units that will still cooperate with us against Japan and even with those bad units that have not yet attacked us, and not fire a single shot at them.

5. Both in North China and in Central China, the repeated instructions of the Central Committee to take the offensive politically, to call together all friendly troops, to oppose civil war, to support Chiang Kaishet and attack Wang Jingwei, to unite in the War of Resistance, must be strictly followed.

6. The overall objective is to beat back the reactionary attack, to expand the anti-Japanese forces, to overcome the threat of capitulation, and fight to turn the situation around for the better.

7. Concrete arrangements should be planned in all places in accordance with this general policy.

Central Committee and
Military Affairs Commission

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 537–39, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives.
Is the New Fourth Army Able to Cope with the Attacks by the Guomindang?

(April 3, 1940)

Comrade Xiang Ying:

Please inform us by telegraph of your views on each of the following points: (1) When the army headquarters and the southern Anhui forces are subject to sudden attack from certain quarters, is there a way for them to break out of the encirclement and avoid major losses? Which method is more advantageous, to fight a guerrilla war southward or to move east to join forces with Chen Yi? Will it be already absolutely impossible to cross the [Yangzi] River to move northward? (2) Are cadre who are Party members fully prepared mentally to cope with possible sudden attacks from certain quarters? (3) Among the various friendly troops in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu, are there high-level or middle-level progressive officers or units who persist in resisting Japan and sympathize with our Party? If sudden incidents occur, is it possible that they might provide cover for, or act in unison with, our forces? How is our united front work within the friendly troops nearby? (4) What is the intention of certain quarters in the Third War Zone? What is the attitude of the Central forces under Gu Zhutong\(^1\) and others? What is the attitude of Huang Shaoxiang\(^2\)? Is the local Party under the leadership of the Southeast Bureau prepared, mentally and in reality, to preserve cadres, accumulate strength, and cope with sudden incidents?

[Mao] Zedong

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 540–41, where it is reproduced from the handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Gu Zhutong (1893–1987), zi Mosan, a native of Jiangsu, participated in the 1911 Revolution and taught in 1924–1925 at the Huangpu Military Academy, where he established a lasting relationship with Chiang Kai shek. He fought against the Communists in the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" of 1933–1934. At this time, he was governor of Jiangsu and commander of the Third War Zone, south of the Yangzi, with headquarters in Suzhou. His forces posed the greatest threat to Xiang Ying and those elements of the Fourth Army south of the river.

2. Huang Shaoxiang is an alternate name for Huang Shaohong (1895–1966), a native of Guangxi, who participated in the 1911 Revolution and subsequently graduated from the Baoding Military Academy. A veteran military leader associated with the Guangxi faction, he was at this time governor of Zhejiang and deputy commander of the Third War Zone.

Deployments and Strategies for the Expansion and Consolidation of Base Areas in Central China

(April 5, 1940, 5:00 p.m.)

Dehuai, Kecheng, Chen, Luo, Xuefeng, and Hu Fu:\(^1\)

Han Deqin has withdrawn back to north of the Huai River after his offensive in eastern Anhui was defeated. Li Pinxian has the intention of halting his attack on eastern Anhui under threat of attack in the direction of the Dabie Mountain Range by the five regiments of the Li Xiannian column. Chiang Kai shek also has the intention of terminating the military conflict and negotiating with us regarding the conditions with a view to getting all our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army forces to the north of the Yellow River, designating the north of the Yellow River as the defense sectors for our two armies.\(^2\) But first of all, the enemy-occupied area in North China is expanding constantly. Our struggle is becoming increasingly hard. We cannot survive without entering Central China. Second, with any possible sudden turn of events of national importance, our forces absolutely cannot be restricted to north of the Yellow River and not move to China proper. Hence, Central China is our most important lifeline. Third, this time Chiang orders Han Deqin, Li Pinxian, Li Zongren, Wei Lihuang, and all the different forces in Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangsu to attack our New Fourth Army. They are the provocateurs. Hence, we still should take advantage of this opportunity to move necessary forces southward. The 344th Brigade under the command of Huang is now recuperating where it is. After getting in touch by radio with Hu Fu and

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 542–44, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Dehuai is Peng Dehuai. Kecheng is Huang Kecheng (for a biography, see above the relevant note to “Views of Military Work in Shandong,” December 6, 1939). Chen is Chen Guang. Luo is Luo Ronghuan. Xuefeng is Peng Xuefeng. Hu Fu is, as noted earlier, the name used by Liu Shaoqi at this time.

2. This is the first mention in the documents translated in this volume of an effort by the Guomindang to compel all Communist forces to move north of the Yellow River. An order to this effect was issued by the Nationalists on October 19, 1940; see below, the various texts responding to this threat, notably the telegram of November 9, 1940, from Zhu De and others to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, which had been drafted by Mao.
Xuefeng, it should move to the north shores of the Huai River following the instructions of Zhu and Peng. Hu Fu will have arrived there first and will wait for the 344th Brigade. After it arrives, it shall be deployed and work arranged following the views of Hu Fu. The Peng-Wu column shall also follow the views of Hu Fu and Kecheng to start moving to northern Jiangsu. It shall bit by bit move southward near Xuzhou and first occupy the various xian north of Yanchen and Baojin. The watchword for the 344th Brigade and the Peng-Wu column moving southward remains to rescue and assist the New Fourth Army and support friendly forces in resisting Japan. If by that time Li Pinxian has withdrawn his forces used for attacking eastern Anhui, restored the office in Lihuang, released Madame Zhang\(^3\) as well as all our Party members under arrest, and returned our military funds, then for the time being our forces need not move south of the Huai and will for the first step take Yanchen, Baojin, Bangbu, and Mengchen as the border. If Han and Li go on the attack, eliminate them. If they are willing to concede the area north of that line to be our defense sector, then we make a temporary compromise with them. If Peng and Wu do not have enough forces, the 344th Brigade should give them assistance. The only thing is that we cannot but fight over the whole of northern Jiangsu, eastern Anhui, and the area north of the Huai. We must establish a democratic base area to resist Japan within a year in all the areas north of the Yangzi River, east of the Huainan railroad, north of the Huai River, east of Kaifeng, south of the Longhai railroad, and west of the sea. Entrust full responsibility to the 344th Brigade, the Peng-Wu column, the Xuefeng column, the Luo-Dai\(^4\) column, and Ye Fei’s\(^5\) unit under Chen Yi in collaboration with the local Party. All military actions shall be commanded by Generals Zhu and Peng and comrade Hu Fu. Hu Fu shall be responsible for all the specific deployments, political slogans, construction of governments, development plans, and policy on the united front. The decisions shall be made after consultation with Kecheng and Xuefeng and shall be reported to Zhu, Peng, and the Central Military Affairs Commission.


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3. Madame Zhang refers to Han Bi, the wife of Zhang Yunyi, who had been arrested by Guomindang military police.
4. Luo and Dai are Luo Binghui and Dai Jiying. Luo Binghui (1897-1946), a native of Yunnan, had joined the Communist Party in 1929. In 1930 he participated in the assault on Nanchang by the forces of Mao Zedong and Zhu De. During the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic he was commander of the Ninth Army Corps. In the course of the Long March, he followed Zhang Guotao to the west and arrived in Yan’an only in the spring of 1937. At this time, he was commander of the Fifth Detachment, and Dai Jiying was the commander of the Fourth Detachment of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi.
5. Regarding Ye Fei, see the note below to the text of May 4, 1940.

The Policy That Should Be Adopted Toward the Intermediate Forces

(April 12, 1940)

Chen and Luo, Xuefeng, Hu Fu,\(^1\) and inform Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai] (for transmittal to Zuo and Huang), Xu and Zhu, Liu and Deng,\(^2\) and Xiang Ying:

The policy in a certain quarter is to get all the intermediate factions to struggle against us, thus causing injury to both sides, and causing us to give offense to the various intermediate factions and putting us in an isolated position. Therefore, we must adopt the following policy toward Yu Xuezhong, who is near Chen and Luo, He Zhuguo and Sun Tongxuan,\(^3\) who are near Xuefeng, the Sichuan army, the Guizhou army, and the Northwest Army, who are near [Li] Xiannian, and the Guizhou army, which is near Hu Fu:

1. Send people over directly, or indirectly ask people to convey the message, or openly send letters and leaflets to express our position: that we are totally unwilling to get involved in friction with them. We should ask them to consider the overall situation and preserve friendships so as to avoid injuries to both sides while the third party benefits. Such appeals should be constantly repeated.

2. When they are attacking us, under pressure by the orders from a certain quarter, we should first make some concessions, on condition that our fundamental interests are not harmed, so as to demonstrate our sincerity. We should strive for compromises and patching up our relations before things go too far.

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 545-46, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript conserved in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Chen Guang, commander, and Luo Ronghuan, political commissar, of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, Peng Xuefeng, commander and political commissar of the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army, and Liu Shaoqi (whose pseudonym at this time was Hu Fu).
2. Zuo Quan and Huang Kecheng were, respectively, deputy chief-of-staff of the Eighth Route Army and political commissar of the Second Column of the Eighth Route Army. Xu Xiangqian and Zhu Rui were, respectively, the commander and the political commissar of the First Column of the Eighth Route Army. Liu and Deng are Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping.
3. He Zhuguo was at this time the commander of the Second Army of the Guomindang cavalry. Sun Tongxuan was the commander of the Third Army Group, and of the Twelfth Division.
3. When they attack us in total disregard of everything, hurting our fundamental interests, we should resolutely deal a heavy blow at some of their units to serve as warning. Afterward, we still strive for mutual compromise.

4. It is only when the intermediate factions turn into firm, immutable diehards like Lu Zhonglin and Shi Youzan that we shall adopt the policy of breaking with them completely and wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, and cleanly. The nature of this policy is also to serve as warning to other intermediate factions, to make them fearful, so they will refrain from engaging in friction.

It is left to you to decide how the above orientation should be carried out concretely in view of the circumstances. When the central forces attack us, we should adopt the same policy. This is because among the various ranks of officers in the central forces, only some officers and the system of political instruction are diehards. Most are intermediate factions, and there are also some progressives. We absolutely must not regard all central forces as diehards.

Central Secretariat and
Military Affairs Commission

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_Mao Zedong_
Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces, and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Diehards

(May 4, 1940)

1. In all regions behind enemy lines and in all war zones, stress should be laid not on particularity, but on identity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. While each region has its individual peculiarities, they are all identical in that all are confronted by the enemy and all are engaged in the War of Resistance, whether in North, Central, or South China, in the areas north or south of the Yangzi River, or in the plains, the mountain or lake regions, and whether the force involved is the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or the South China Guerrilla Forces. It follows that in all cases we can and should expand. The Central Committee has pointed out to you this policy of expansion time and again. To expand means to reach out into all enemy-occupied areas and not to be bound by the Guomindang’s restrictions but to go beyond the limits allowed by the Guomindang, not to expect official appointments from them or depend on the higher-ups for financial support but, instead, to expand the armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly, independently arouse the masses in those areas to action, and build up united front organs of political power under the leadership of the Communist Party. In Jiangsu Province, for example, despite the verbal attacks and the restrictions and oppression by anti-Communist elements such as Gu Zhutong, Leng Xin, and Han Deqin, we should gain control of as many districts as possible from Nanjing in the west to the seacoast in the east, and from Hangzhou in the south to Xuzhou in the north, and do so as fast as possible and yet steadily and systematically; and we should independently expand the armed forces, establish organs of political power, set up fiscal offices to levy taxes for resistance to Japan and economic agencies to promote agriculture, industry, and commerce, and open up schools of various kinds to train large numbers of cadres. The Central Committee previously instructed you to enlarge the anti-Japanese armed forces to 100,000 men, with as many rifles, and to set up organs of political power promptly in the regions behind the enemy lines in Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces before the end of this year. What concrete measures have you taken? Opportunities have been missed before, and if this year they are missed again, things will become still more difficult.

2. At a time when the anti-Communist diehards in the Guomindang are obstinately persisting in their policy of containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party in preparation for capitulating to Japan, we should stress struggle and not unity; to do otherwise would be a gross error. Therefore, whether in the theoretical, the political, or the military sphere, we should as a matter of principle firmly resist all verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards designed to contain, restrict, and oppose the Communist Party, and our attitude toward them should be one of firm struggle. This struggle must be based on the principle of fighting on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, that is, on the principles of self-defense, victory, and truce, which means that every concrete struggle at present is defensive, limited, and temporary in nature. We must take tit-for-tat action and conduct a determined struggle against all the reactionary verbal attacks, propaganda, orders, and laws of the anti-Communist diehards. For instance, when they demanded that our Fourth and Fifth Detachments be moved to the south, we countered by insisting that it was absolutely impossible to do so; when they demanded that the units under Ye and Zhang be moved to the south, we countered by asking permission for a portion of these units to move to the north; when they charged us with having undermined their conscription plans, we asked them to enlarge the recruiting area for the New Fourth Army; when they said we were carrying on wrong propaganda, we asked them to stop all their anti-Communist propaganda and to rescind all decrees and orders that cause friction; and whenever they launch military attacks against us, we should smash them by counterattacks. We are on just grounds in carrying out this tit-for-tat policy. And it is not only the Central Committee of our Party that should take action whenever we are on just grounds, but every unit of our army should do so.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xuanji, 2nd edition (1991), pp. 753–58. No contemporary text is available.

1. The South China Guerrilla Forces was the name given at this time to a number of Communist-led guerrilla detachments in Guangdong.

2. On Gu Zhutong, see the relevant note to the text of April 3, 1940. Leng Xin (1900–1987), a native of Jiangsu, graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in the first class. In 1939, he became commander of Guomindang guerrilla forces in the Third War Zone. On Han Deqin, see the relevant note to the text of March 29, 1940.

3. Ye is Ye Fei (1914–1999), a native of Fujian, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1932. After the main force of the Red Army embarked on the Long March, Ye was involved in setting up the eastern Fujian base area and led guerrilla warfare there for three years. In 1938–1939, he served as a regimental commander in the Third Detachment of the New Fourth Army. At this time, he was commander of the First Detachment under the northern Jiangsu headquarters. In the notes to the first edition of the Selected Works (p. 731 of the Chinese edition, and p. 436 of the English edition) Zhang Yunyi, who is referred to below, the second edition indicates that the reference is to Zhang Daoyong (alternate name Taoyong). Since the revised edition has been more carefully edited on the basis of a wider range of sources, we assume this is correct, but have been unable to find more information about this commander.
What Zhang Yunyi did to Li Pinxian and what Li Xiannian did to Li Zongren are both good examples of strong protests from the lower levels to the higher-ups. This kind of strong attitude toward the diehards and the policy of struggling against them on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, are the only way to make the diehards somewhat afraid of repressing us, to reduce the scope of their activities in containing, restricting, and combating the Communist Party, to force them to recognize our legal status, and to make them think twice before causing a split. Therefore, struggle is by far the most important means of averting the danger of capitulation, of achieving a turn for the better in the situation, and of strengthening Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Within our own Party and army, persistence in the struggle against the diehards is the only way to heighten our fighting spirit, give full play to our courage, unite our cadres, increase our strength, and consolidate our army and Party. In our relations with the intermediate sections, persistence in the struggle against the diehards is the only way to win over the wavering and give support to our sympathizers—there is no other way. Similarly, struggle is the only policy which can ensure that the whole Party and the whole army are mentally on the alert against a possible nationwide emergency and are prepared for it in their work. Otherwise, the mistake of 1927 will be repeated.

3. In appraising the present situation, we should clearly understand that, although the danger of capitulation has greatly increased, it is still possible to avert it. The present military clashes are still local and not national. They are acts of strategic reconnaissance by our opponents and not yet “Communist suppression” on a large scale; they are steps preparatory to capitulation and not yet steps immediately preceding capitulation. Our task is persistently and vigorously to carry out the threefold policy laid down by the Central Committee, which is the only correct policy, namely, to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, and isolate the diehard forces, for the purpose of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation. It would be perilous not to point out and correct any Left or Right deviations in appraising the situation and in defining our tasks.

4. The battles of self-defense fought by the Fourth Detachment and the Fifth Detachment against the attacks of Han Deqin and Li Zongren in eastern Anhui and those fought by Li Xiannian’s column against the diehards’ attacks in central and eastern Hubei, the determined struggle carried on by Peng Xuefeng’s detachment north of the Huai River, the expansion of Ye Fei’s forces north of the Yangzi River, and the southward movement of more than 20,000 men of the Eighth Route Army to areas north of the Huai River and to eastern Anhui and northern Jiangsu—all these were not only absolutely necessary and correct in themselves, but were indispensable for making Gu Zhutong think twice before attacking us in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. That is to say, the more victories we win and the more we expand north of the Yangzi River, the more Gu Zhutong will be afraid to act rashly south of the Yangzi River, and the easier it will be for you to play your role in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. Similarly, the more the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the South China Guerrilla Column expand in northwestern, northern, central, and southern China, and the more the Communist Party grows throughout the country, the greater will be the possibility of averting the danger of capitulation and bringing about a turn for the better in the situation, and the easier it will be for our Party to play its role in all parts of the country. It is wrong to make the opposite appraisal or adopt the opposite tactics in the belief that the more our forces expand, the more the diehards will tend toward capitulation, that the more concessions we make, the more they will resist Japan, or that the whole country is on the verge of a split and Guomindang-Communist cooperation is no longer possible.

5. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is our policy for the whole country in the War of Resistance Against Japan. The establishment of democratic anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear is part of this policy. You should firmly carry out the Central Committee’s decisions on the question of political power.

6. Our policy in the Guomindang areas is different from that in the war zones and the areas behind the enemy lines. In the Guomindang areas our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength and bide our time, and to avoid rashness and exposure. In conformity with the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, our tactics in combating the diehards are to wage steady and sure struggles and to build up our strength by using all Guomindang laws and decrees that can serve our purpose as well as everything permitted by social custom. If a member of our Party is forced to join the Guomindang, let him do so; our members should penetrate the bao jia and the educational, economic, and military organizations.

4. On Zhang Yunyi, see the relevant note to the text of March 21, 1940. In the spring of 1940, Li Pinxian and Li Zongren of the Guangxi clique launched a large-scale assault against the areas of Anhui and Hubei where the New Fourth Army was active. According to the notes to Mao’s Selected Works, Zhang Yunyi and Li Xiannian “firmly resisted their actions aimed at sabotaging the resistance to Japan, and carried out a resolute battle to defend themselves.”

5. The reference is to the excessively conciliatory attitude toward the Guomindang, which the notes to the Selected Works blame on Chen Duxiu, but for which Stalin was primarily responsible.

6. In March 1940, in order to repulse Guomindang attacks on the New Fourth Army mentioned above, the Central Committee ordered units of the Eighth Route Army to move southward. In the summer of 1940, these units, totaling more than 20,000 men, arrived in the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu border area, and established the Huai-Hai Anti-Japanese Base Area in northern Jiangsu, in cooperation with the forces of the New Fourth Army led by Peng Xuefeng (see the note to the text of March 21, 1940) and other units.

7. A traditional system of mutual surveillance, reestablished by the Guomindang government at this time.
everywhere; they should develop extensive united front work, that is, make friends, in the Central Army and among the miscellaneous troops. In all the Guomindang areas the Party’s basic policy is likewise to develop the progressive forces (Party organizations and mass movements), to win over the middle forces (seven categories in all; namely, the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, the miscellaneous forces, the intermediate sections in the Guomindang, the intermediate sections in the Central Army, the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and the small political parties and groups), and to isolate the diehard forces, in order to avert the danger of capitulation and bring about a favorable turn in the situation. At the same time we should be fully prepared to deal with any emergency on a local or national scale. Our Party organizations in the Guomindang areas must be kept strictly secret. In the Southeast Bureau and in all the provincial, special, xian, and district committees, the entire personnel (from Party secretaries to cooks) must be strictly scrutinized one by one, and no one open to the slightest suspicion should be allowed to remain in any of these leading bodies. Great care should be taken to protect our cadres, and whoever is in danger of being arrested and killed by the Guomindang while working in an open or semi-open capacity should either be sent to some other locality and go underground or be transferred to the army. In the Japanese-occupied areas (in Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhu, Wuxi, or any other city, large or small, and also in the countryside), our policy is basically the same as the one in the Guomindang areas.

7. The present tactical directive was decided upon by the Politburo of the Central Committee at its recent meeting, and comrades of the Southeast Bureau and the military subcommission are requested to discuss it, relay it to all cadres in the Party organizations and the army, and to carry it out resolutely. Comrade Xiang Ying is to relay the directive in southern Anhui and Comrade Chen Yi is to relay it in southern Jiangsu. Discussion and relaying should be completed within a month of receiving this telegram. Comrade Xiang Ying has the overall responsibility for arranging Party and army work in the whole area in accordance with the line of the Central Committee, and should report the results to the Central Committee.

8. As noted elsewhere, the “miscellaneous forces” (za pai jundui) were those armies which did not belong to the Guomindang Central Army. Though often regarded as inferior, they were in some cases very good fighters and could also be more easily influenced because they were not under Chiang Kaishé’s direct control.

9. The Southeast Bureau was the representative organ of the Central Committee in charge of work in southeast China at this time. Its area of competence included the whole of Zhejiang and Fujian and parts of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi.

The Main Direction of Expansion of the New Fourth Army Is the Broad Areas of Southern and Northern Jiangsu

(May 5, 1940, 5 p.m.)

Comrades Xiang Ying and Chen Yi:

1. We agree that the army headquarters, the rear organs, and the main force in southern Anhui should be moved to southern Jiangsu. We ask only that you take note that the forces in southern Anhui should not be too weak. Moreover, a light and easily movable command center should be established to facilitate holding and expanding the positions in southern Anhui.

2. The main direction of expansion of the main force of the New Fourth Army’s First, Second, and Third Detachments is not areas near the Central Forces, such as Liyang, Lishui, Langxi, or Guangde, but the broad areas of several dozen xian in the rear of the enemy in southern and northern Jiangsu extending to the sea, and particularly the area to the north of the Yangzi. Please deploy your forces, allocate commanders, and locate your command centers, in accordance with this orientation. You should deploy only a part of your forces and the personnel of your organs in the area of Langxi, Guangde, Liyang, and Lishui. Also, it is necessary to seize political power in that area at an appropriate time.

3. Control the majority of ferry points in the area between Wusongkou and Zhenjiang, between Zhenjiang and Nanjing, and along the south and north shores of the river to the west of Wuhu. Mobilize the masses to set up political power. Establish local guerrilla forces. Be sure not to let the enemy sever communications across the river. You should entrust the Fourth and Fifth Detachments with the task of restoring Wuwei xian.

4. Quickly order Ye Fei to expand his forces and set up political power on the north shore of the river, ignoring the opposition of Gu Zhutong, Han Deqin, and Li Mingyang.

Central Secretariat

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 547-48, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Regarding Li Mingyang, see the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940.
To Xiao Xiangrong¹

(1940)

Comrade Xiangrong:

The textbook for soldiers is very well written. I have read lessons 1, 2, and 4, and they can be printed. I hope you will send me lesson 3, so that I can have a look at it. Some revisions should be made. You should add the distinctions between the big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, between the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie and the big bourgeoisie that is not pro-Japanese (i.e., the British and American factions), and between the big landlords and the middle and small landlords and enlightened gentry. In a book that is just now being printed by the Propaganda Department, I have already revised the part of chapter 2 of “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” that deals with this.² Please ask Comrade Luo Mai³ to let you read it. In lesson 3, you should speak mainly of the attitude of each class toward the anti-Japanese war, for only then will it have real meaning. Please take note of this too.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 161–62. There it is dated simply 1940, and we have been unable to find any other references to it indicating the day or even the month when it was sent. Mao must have written it between March 11, 1940, when he made the report mentioned in his postscript, and September 5, 1940, the date of the letter which appears immediately after this one in Shuxin xuanji, and probably earlier rather than later, because the edition of “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” in book form, published later in 1940, was still at the proof stage. We have therefore placed it, quite arbitrarily, in May.

1. Xiao Xiangrong (1910–1976), a native of Guangdong, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. During the Jiangxi period, he occupied various important posts in the Political Department of the Red Army, and he participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Eighth Route Army’s General Political Department and editor-in-chief of the Military-Political Magazine.

2. Regarding these modifications, see above the relevant note to “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” which appears under the date of December 15, 1939.

3. Luo Mai was the pseudonym of Li Weihan, whose biography can be found above, in the relevant note to the text of May 20, 1939. At this time, he was deputy head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and would therefore have been involved in the publication of a work such as this.

4. See above, the translation of this text.
Strategic Deployments in North and Central China

(June 1, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], and Zuo [Quan], and inform also Chen [Guang] and Luo Ronghuan, and [Huang] Kecheng:

1. To assure the occupation of North China is the fixed policy of the enemy. The enemy’s “scorched earth campaign” has added to the difficulties suffered by our forces and made it difficult for us to expand. There are also increasing problems with the finances and with the food, rifle, and ammunition supplies of our forces.

2. The Guomindang’s policy is to lock us up in the rear of the enemy and make us fight a war of attrition with the enemy, prevent us from moving southward, and sever the routes by which our forces can move to our own rear.

3. Therefore, as regards strategic deployment, we have the following views:

a. Along the northern line, that is, areas such as central Hebei, Hebei-Chahar-Shanxi, and northwestern Shanxi, the primary orientation is to persist in struggle rather than to expand our forces. This is because if we are to expand our forces [there], we will have problems with supplies and guns. We would only add difficulties to persisting in our struggle. Therefore, a portion of the main force in this area should move southward, but the local forces there should be very greatly strengthened, and the guerrilla war should be greatly expanded. In the main force in these areas, the rule that 60 percent of the men must have guns should be observed, and the phenomenon of many men and few guns should be avoided.

b. Along the south line, that is, the areas of southeastern Shanxi, southern Hebei, Shandong, and so on, except for Shandong, it is difficult to have major expansion. Kecheng’s column and the detachments of Peng and Zhu¹ should immediately move to Central China. Their original defense sector shall be taken over by the 129th Division, and the forces being moved southward from the northern line.

c. Central China is an area the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party must fight over. Although the situation is not very tense right now, it is the best opportunity for our forces to move southward. We will not be able to move southward if there is some slight result from the negotiations. The Zhu-Peng detachment and the Huang Kecheng column should set out immediately. Huang should command in person all the forces, or at least two brigades, in the move southward. If there are some small losses in North China, they can be compensated. But if we should miss the opportunity in Central China, the whole position will become more difficult in the future. We request that [Peng] Dehuai consider the above and reply by telegram.


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¹ The reference is to the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan Detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, with Peng Mingzhi as commander and Zhu Diao in as political commissar.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 549–50, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
Talk at the First Annual Session of the Yan’an New Philosophy Society

(June 21, 1940)

(Special to this paper) . . . On the afternoon of the 21st, on the occasion of the first meeting of the annual conference called by the Cultural Club . . . the chairman invited Comrade Mao Zedong to give us his instructions. The entire hall immediately resounded with enthusiastic applause. Smiling, he stood up and said:

Today, with the opening of this conference, I am really delighted. Thinking back to the year before last, it has been two years since that day when the founding meeting of the New Philosophy Society took place. The work has yielded results. This year, with the convening of this conference, it will definitely be even better. Theory is very important. The Chinese revolution has been going on for a number of years, but is still very backward in theoretical activities. This shortcoming is highly regrettable. We must be aware of the fact that, unless a revolution raises the level of revolutionary theory, it cannot possibly succeed. In the past, we have paid far too little attention to this, and from now on, we should intensify our theoretical studies. Now the human factor is better than it was in the past, for a good many cultural workers and philosophers have come together here. Only by recognizing that our theoretical level is still very low, that the theoretical level of the entire country is still very low, can we all assume responsibility for overcoming this phenomenon. We ask the entire nation to work hard in this regard, asking first of all that people in Yan’an work especially hard. With the convening of the annual conference, the future of the New Philosophy Society is bright.

Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Political Situation on the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the War of Resistance

(July 5, 1940)

Fellow countrymen of all China, officers and men, and comrades in the War of Resistance of all parties and factions!

On this third anniversary of the great War of Resistance, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party expresses, with the utmost sincerity and warmth, national-revolutionary salutations to compatriots of the whole nation, the officers and men on the battlefield, and the comrades in the War of Resistance from all parties and factions. It sends immeasurable condolences to the martyrs who have given their lives for the country over the past three years and extends heartfelt regards to our wounded officers and men as well as our compatriots who have been killed.

The three heroic years of the War of Resistance have proved that Japanese imperialists will inevitably collapse, China will assuredly never perish, and final victory will certainly belong to our Chinese nation. This is because Japanese imperialism has already been greatly weakened in our three heroic years of the War of Resistance, the will to carry on China’s War of Resistance to the end has already been firmly established in the minds of the whole nation, and changes in the current international situation are basically favorable to China.

At the same time, however, an unprecedentedly difficult period in the War of Resistance has arrived. Japanese imperialism has just stepped up its offensive against China and announced its Eastern Monroe Doctrine. Some people on China’s anti-Japanese front are beginning to waver, while, as regards international plots, it is possible that the German and Italian policy of reconciliation may replace the British, American, and French policy of a Far Eastern Munich.

Japanese imperialism’s intensified offensive against China is operating in concert with the airplanes and big guns of Hitler and Mussolini, in an attempt to achieve

This report was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, June 26, 1940. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bijuian, Vol. 6, p. 153, which reproduces this version.

This manifesto, first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, July 5, 1940, was drafted by Mao (see Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 196). Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 249–54.
the objective of their imperialist war: to redivide the world and enslave the world's people. On the other hand, under the suicidal policy of opposing the Soviet Union and the Communist Party and making concessions to Germany, Italy and Japan consistently applied by the British, American, and French imperialists, France has suffered the horrible disaster of being conquered, Britain has suffered serious defeats, and the interests of the United States are being seriously threatened both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. The great imperialist war has already progressed to a new phase, and the conflicts among imperialist powers are not over. In addition, an unprecedented economic and political crisis brought about by the imperialist war is now just having an impact on the existence of all mankind and will inevitably lead to the outbreak of world revolution. The revolutionary crisis is now beginning to ferment deeply among all the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations. We are living in a new age of war and revolution. All imperialist wars are wars that massacre people. The great, powerful, and prosperous socialist country, the Soviet Union, is alone in not having been drawn into the whirlpool of the imperialist war and is the only genuine helper of all the world's oppressed peoples and oppressed nations. The reliable friends of China's War of Resistance are none other than the Soviet Union and people all over the world.

In the new international situation today, the Japanese imperialists, struggling with all kinds of domestic and foreign crises, are taking their last-ditch chance by attempting methods that will increase pressure and difficulty such as blockades to cut off our international lines of communication, frontal attacks, and air bombardments, to achieve their goal of creating splits inside China and forcing China to surrender. Under this kind of increased pressure and increased difficulty, some of the wavering elements in China will inevitably waver even more and take the road of surrendering to the enemy. These people are muddleheaded and weak-willed, unable to endure difficulties and hardships, and unable to see clearly the prospects of the War of Resistance. As soon as difficulties are encountered, they are tempted to waver. These people are the most dangerous elements in the anti-Japanese front.

Fellow countrymen of the whole nation, officers and men, comrades from all parties and factions resisting Japan! Now is a time when the danger of capitulation and the difficulties of the War of Resistance in China are unprecedented. We must not cover up such dangers and difficulties. The Chinese Communist Party regards it as its duty to warn the whole nation of these dangers and difficulties, as well as to point out that the whole country should strengthen its unification and overcome such dangers and difficulties.

Wang Jingwei's capitulation has come to nothing, and he and the members of his clique have now already become the most despicable playthings in the hands of the Japanese imperialists. The capitulation of the French bourgeoisie has turned all the people of France into the slaves of Hitler. With capitulation, there is absolutely no way out. The Chinese Communist Party has complete sympathy for the plight of the French people. The Chinese Communist Party firmly believes that, under the resolute leadership of the French Communist Party, the great nation of France will not perish. The French people's struggle will be coordinated with that of the Chinese people to overcome the foreign oppressors.

Fellow countrymen of all of China, officers and men, comrades from all parties and factions resisting Japan! All attacks from the enemy must be resisted, all difficulties must be overcome, all conspiracies to surrender must be opposed, and all capitulationists must be struggled with to the end. The unity of the whole country must be strengthened, internal friction must be eliminated, the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be adjusted, and the danger of civil war must be eradicated. The Anti-Japanese National United Front must be strengthened, the people of the whole country must fight the War of Resistance against aggression to the end under the leadership of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, and the promises of every party and faction must be carried out.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party hereby declares to compatriots of the whole country and comrades of friendly parties that we have carried out our own promises all along. Our declaration of September 22 of the twenty-sixth year of the Chinese Republic pledged to strive for the thorough realization of the Three People's Principles, put an end to land revolution, abolish the policy of insurrections, change the Red Army to the National Revolutionary Army, turn the soviets into local democratic governments, and so on. We have already conscientiously carried out all these promises and have never violated them. Policies carried out in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and in anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy rear have been entirely in keeping with the policy of the Three People's Principles and not a single one goes beyond the scope of the Three People's Principles. We would like to state once again that we shall carry out the policy of the Three People's Principles from beginning to end, throughout the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and construction of a democratic republic. Any accusation that the Chinese Communist Party has broken its promises is completely malicious slander. On this issue, we demand that the Chinese Guomindang also honor its own promises and conscientiously bring about all those political and concrete conditions it has consented to the people and our Party for the benefit of unification and the War of Resistance.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that, during the period of unification and the War of Resistance, as well as during cooperation between the Nationalist and Communist Parties, any policy of internal insurrection or sabotage is absolutely impermissible. We have consistently supported the policy of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government to carry the War of Resistance through to the end and have never broken our promise not to rebel or engage in sabotage. All reports that the Communist Party will once again adopt the policies of rebellion and sabotage of the past civil war period are nothing but rumors spread by wicked people. At the same time, we demand that the Chinese Guomindang also give up its policy of sabotage in dealing with the Communist Party, in order to guarantee the consistent unity and long-term cooperation between the two parties.
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that we shall keep within bounds the armed forces fighting Japan under our command and limit their operations to the war zones, the enemy rear, and the twenty-three xian in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. They will do nothing in all other areas that might provoke conflicts with friendly forces. Moreover, they will coordinate operations with friendly forces fighting Japan in the war zones and in the enemy rear. We ask, however, that friendly forces fighting Japan also restrain the troops under their command and refrain from any actions toward the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army that would lead to conflict in order to guarantee unity as one on the anti-Japanese front. At the same time, we ask that the National Government make a strong effort to support the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all guerrilla forces fighting Japan, because the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and all the guerrilla forces fighting Japan are still the forces situated on the very frontline of national defense. Moreover, in the past three years the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have fought more than ten thousand heroic battles both large and small, persisted in the War of Resistance in the vast areas behind enemy lines, and put pressure on 40 to 50 percent of the enemy forces in this country. But they are in the most perilous position, their lives are the hardest, and they are most lacking in ammunition.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declares that we shall continue to carry out the resolution "not to develop any Party organizations in the friendly forces," passed by the Sixth Plenum of this Party in November of the twenty-seventh year of the Republic. Some local Party headquarters which have not implemented that resolution strictly shall be rectified. The policy of our Party toward all the friendly forces that are fighting Japan is to unite with them and strengthen them, and not to split or undermine them. But we demand that the Chinese Guomindang and all friendly forces that are fighting Japan also treat the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army with the same kind of policy in order to dispel suspicion and to be of one mind in the War of Resistance, and so that all the armies can, under the overall command of the supreme commander, together take on the responsibility of fighting the enemy.

The colleagues of this Party consider that in order to overcome the unprecedented danger of capitulation and the unprecedented difficulties of the War of Resistance it is imperative to change many of the practices in the present War of Resistance; it is imperative to implement freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association in the War of Resistance; it is imperative to set free all imprisoned Communist Party members and patriots; it is imperative to acknowledge the legal right to exist of all anti-Japanese parties and factions; it is imperative to convene a democratic national assembly; it is imperative to put an end to the harmful ways of secret agents; it is imperative to alter the policies of finance and economy, the policies of culture and education, and the policy of military service that are out of keeping with the times; it is imperative that the focus of the War of Resistance be placed on self-reliance and should not rely on any dependable foreign assistance.

Fellow countrymen of the whole nation, officers and men, comrades from all parties and factions resisting Japan! The unprecedented danger of capitulation and the unprecedented difficulties of the War of Resistance have arrived and we must simply overcome these dangers and difficulties. The Chinese Communist Party resolutely believes that it is entirely possible to surmount these dangers and difficulties, as there exist in China all the conditions needed to overcome any danger or difficulty. The Chinese government and the Chinese people need only be adept at taking advantage of them. China is a country vast in area, rich in resources, and huge in population, in no way comparable to Abyssinia or Spain, even less to Holland or Belgium, and not comparable to France, while Japan, on the other hand, is far inferior to Germany. China still maintains a large army of several million, has unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the majority of the country's population, can take advantage of the contradictions among imperialists, and has the support of the powerful Soviet Union and the world revolutionary struggle. In the entire one hundred years since the Opium War, China has experienced countless calamities and accumulated rich experiences; the heroic struggle of Mr. Sun Yat-sen in particular serves as a good example for our entire nation. At this time, when the nation is in a period of extremely serious difficulty and disaster, we must definitely carry out the great teachings bequeathed to us by Mr. Sun Yat-sen and apply his revolutionary Three People's Principles and the three major policies of uniting with the Soviet Union, uniting with the Communist Party, and helping the peasants and workers. We must carry out his last testament, smashing all sentiments of pessimism, vacillation, and despair, and carrying on the struggle unwaveringly and persistently so that the danger of capitulation will surely be overcome, the War of Resistance will inevitably triumph, the building up of the country will certainly succeed, and the future of the Chinese nation will be infinitely bright.

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Carry the War of Resistance through to the end!
Remain united to the end!
Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
Unity to the Very End

(July 5, 1940)

The nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party falls precisely at the same time as the third anniversary of the War of Resistance. In commemorating the anniversary of the War of Resistance today, we Communists feel our responsibility all the more keenly. To fight for the survival of the Chinese nation is a responsibility which falls on the Chinese Guomindang, on all the anti-Japanese political parties and factions, and on the people of the whole country, but, as we see it, an even heavier responsibility falls on us as Communists. The Central Committee of our Party has already issued a declaration on the present situation, the essence of which is a call for resistance and unity to the very end. We hope that this declaration will meet with the approval of the friendly parties and armies, and of the people of the whole country. But at the same time the Communists must conscientiously carry out the line laid down in it.

All Communists must realize that only through resistance to the very end can there be unity to the very end and vice versa. Consequently, Communists must set an example both in resistance and in unity. Our opposition is directed solely against the enemy and against obstinate capitulationists and anti-Communists; with all others we must unite in earnest. And the obstinate capitulationists and anti-Communists are in a minority everywhere. I made an investigation of the composition of one local government, and found that, out of 1,300 staff members, only 40 to 50 or one twenty-sixth, or 4 percent, were confirmed anti-Communists, while a majority of the others wanted unity and resistance. Of course we cannot tolerate these obstinate capitulationists and anti-Communists, because that would amount to allowing them to sabotage resistance and wreck unity. Therefore we must resolutely oppose the capitulationists and, in self-defense, firmly repel the attacks of the anti-Communist elements. Failure to do so would be Right opportunism and would harm unity and the War of Resistance. But toward all those who are not absolutely set in their capitulationism and anticomunism, our policy must be one of unity. Some are two-faced, others are acting under compulsion, and still others have temporarily gone astray. For the sake of continued unity and resistance, we must win over all these people. Failure to do so would be Left opportunism, and this, too, would be harmful to unity and to the War of Resistance. All Communists should realize that, having initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must maintain it. Now that the national crisis is deepening daily, and the world situation is undergoing a great change, we must shoulder the very heavy responsibility of saving the Chinese nation. We must defeat Japanese imperialism and build China into an independent, free, and democratic republic, and to do so we must unite the greatest possible number of people, with or without party affiliations. Communists should not enter into unprincipled united fronts and must therefore oppose all such schemes as corroding, restricting, containing, and repressing the Communist Party, as well as opposing Right opportunism within the Party. But, at the same time, every Communist must respect the Party's united front policy and must therefore unite, on the basis of the principle of resistance, with all those who are still willing to resist Japan and must oppose Left opportunism within the Party.

To this end, as far as political power is concerned, we advocate a political power of the united front. Thus we do not approve of one-party dictatorship by any other party, nor do we advocate one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party; we stand for the joint dictatorship of all political parties and groups, people in all walks of life and all armed forces, that is, for united front political power. Whenever Communists establish organs of anti-Japanese political power in the enemy rear after destroying the enemy and the puppet régimes there, they should adopt the "three thirds system" as already decided upon by the Central Committee of our Party, so that Communists take only one-third of the places in all government or people's representative bodies, while the remaining two-thirds are taken by members of other parties or groups or by nonparty people. Anybody may take part in the work of the government so long as he is not a capitulationist or an anti-Communist. Every political party or group shall have the right to exist and carry on its activities under the anti-Japanese political power, so long as it is not in favor of capitulation and is not anti-Communist.

As regards the question of the armed forces, our Party's declaration has made it clear that we shall continue to observe the decision "not to develop our Party organizations in any friendly army." Those few local Party organizations which have not strictly observed this decision should immediately put the matter right. A friendly attitude should be adopted toward all armed forces that do not initiate armed friction with the Eighth Route Army or the New Fourth Army. Friendly relations

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1. The nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party falls precisely at the same time as the third anniversary of the War of Resistance. The third anniversary of the War of Resistance and the nineteenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party occur precisely at the same time.
2. The Communists
3. 4 percent
4. Members of other parties or groups
should be restored even with those units that have created "friction," once they stop doing so. This is our united front policy with regard to the armed forces.

As for our policies on other matters, whether financial, economic, cultural, educational, or eliminating traitors, we must follow the united front policy by adjusting the interests of the different classes and must oppose both Right and Left opportunism.

As regards the current international situation, the imperialist war is expanding to engulf the whole world, and the extremely grave political and economic crises to which it has given rise will inevitably cause a world revolution to break out. We are in a new era of war and revolution. The Soviet Union, which has not been drawn into the maelstrom of this imperialist war, is the supporter of all the oppressed people and all the oppressed nations of the world. These factors are favorable to China’s War of Resistance. But, at the same time, the danger of capitulation is more serious than ever before because Japanese imperialism is intensifying its attacks on China in preparation for aggression against Southeast Asia, and this will certainly induce some of the vacillating elements in China to capitulate. The fourth year of the War of Resistance is going to be a most difficult one. Our task is to unite all anti-Japanese forces, oppose the capitulationists, surmount all difficulties, and persist in nationwide resistance. All Communists must unite with the friendly parties and friendly armies to accomplish this task. We are confident that, through the united efforts of all members of our Party, of the friendly parties and armies, and of the whole people, and the steadfast and unchanging national policy of waging the War of Resistance of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government, we shall succeed in preventing capitulation, in conquering the difficulties, in driving out the Japanese aggressors, and in recovering our lost territories. The prospects for our War of Resistance are indeed bright.

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5. We must follow → For the sake of resistance to Japan we must follow
6. Cause a world revolution → Cause revolutions in many countries

Decision of the Central Committee Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy

(Third anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan)

(July 7, 1940)

I. The Present Situation

The present international and domestic situations both show that we have entered a new period of great change.

1. The special characteristic of the present international situation is the struggle on three fronts. The first is the front of German, Italian, and Japanese imperialism. The second is the front of British, French, and American imperialism. The third is the peace front of the Soviet Union. The imperialist war in which most of the states on both imperialist fronts are striving to divide up the world anew has already progressed to the stage of a life and death struggle, while the peace front led by the Soviet Union, because of the great national strength of the Soviet Union and its correct policy, has not been pulled into the imperialist war but, rather, stands outside the war. This is the most basic characteristic of the present situation.

2. The two great opposing imperialist fronts are the result of Germany’s attack, Italy’s joining the war, France’s surrender, and the fact that Britain has already withdrawn from the European continent, leaving a seriously unbalanced situation. At present both sides are reorganizing their forces in preparation for a monumental new clash. Germany and Italy are preparing to attack Britain, while Britain has taken over the French colonies in preparation for resisting Germany and Italy. Japan is preparing to join the German-Italian front in the Pacific, and the United States is arming intensively right now and preparing to embark on the road to war. The imperialist wars have a tendency to be European wars that spread out to engulf the whole world, and there is no end to the clashes among the imperialists.

3. The Soviet Union, which stands aside from the imperialist war, is now engaged in resolving the problem of consolidating its security on the Polish sea front,

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 155–62, where it is reproduced from a collection published in China in 1979. Although the decision is not signed by Mao, Nianpu indicates (Vol. 2, pp. 196–97) that it was based on a speech he gave on July 6. We thus feel justified in including it here.
in the Balkans, and on the Near Eastern front, and is even now preparing a great revolutionary force in order to deal with the vast changes in the world and to fight to secure permanent world peace.

4. The imperialist war, which has disrupted the entire world order with unprecedented intensity, is now rapidly revolutionizing the great masses of the people in the capitalist countries and the oppressed peoples in the colonies. Revolution is now brewing seriously throughout the world, especially in Europe and India. The Second International is rapidly going bankrupt, the faith of the masses in the Communist Party is rapidly increasing, and the faith of the people of the world in the Soviet Union is rapidly rising high.

5. Since Japan has cut our southwestern international road and is actively carrying out a frontal attack, in an attempt to use even greater pressure to split China internally and force China to surrender, this has created a new environment on the front of China’s War of Resistance. There will soon be a period of unprecedented difficulty and an unprecedented threat of capitulation. But, at the same time, there is also an increased possibility that the threat of capitulation can be conquered, and the situation can take a turn for the better.

6. The origin of the threat of capitulation today is no longer the Eastern Munich policy of Britain, the United States, and France but, rather, the Japanese pressure and the encouragement that the German and Italian victories give Japan and a possible appeasement policy. The diehard faction of the Guomindang has also greatly weakened itself with its anti-Communist policy. Because of this, a further split in the Guomindang and the rise of a new Wang Jingwei faction were unavoidable, and the feeling that there was no way out inevitably increased among people throughout the country.

7. And yet a great many favorable conditions exist internationally and domestically that will help us carry out the task of overcoming capitulation and securing a turn for the better. These conditions are: (a) Britain, the United States, and France are no longer seduced by the most important factor in a Chinese capitulation. Although Britain and the United States are willing to sacrifice China in order to preserve the South Seas, Japan can no longer listen to them. We can make use of the conflict between the two imperialist fronts, Britain, the United States, and France against Germany, Japan, and Italy, especially the growing contradiction between Japan and the United States in the Pacific. (b) Japan has its own internal and external difficulties, and its strength has been greatly weakened during the three years of our War of Resistance. (c) The incomparable power of the Soviet Union and the development of the world revolutionary movement are reliable friends of the Chinese War of Resistance. (The foregoing are three external conditions.) (d) Our party’s strength in the War of Resistance has increased greatly, and this is the main determining factor in overcoming capitulation and securing a turn for the better. (e) The broad intermediate forces still maintain a positive attitude toward the War of Resistance (these intermediate forces include the majority of Guomindang members, the majority of the officers of the Central Army, the majority of the miscellaneous forces, the middle bourgeoisie, the medium and small landlords and the enlightened gentry, the upper levels of the petty bourgeoisie, and the various anti-Japanese minor parties and factions). (f) The internal contradictions among the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, and the contradiction between them and the middle and petty bourgeoisie, make it impossible for them to unite to carry out capitulation or to carry out an anti-Communist campaign. (The foregoing are three internal conditions.) Together these conditions give us a real possibility for avoiding the threat of a unified capitulation and of a unified Communist annihilation campaign and are gradually turning the situation around for the better. The pessimism about the current situation must be overcome by recognizing these conditions.

8. The increased threat of capitulation and the increased possibility of a turn for the better will be revealed in the divisions within the anti-Japanese battalions. First of all will be the divisions in the big landlord–big capitalist class, some of whom, because of pressure from Japan, and the difficulties of the War of Resistance, fearful of the Communist Party and the masses, will inevitably break off and become a capitulationist faction. The rest of them, for various reasons (especially our policies) will make a turn for the better, will turn into a relatively positive anti-Japan faction. Although this portion of the big landlord–big capitalist class can only make a turn for the better under conditions that do not harm their basic class interests and cannot make a thorough turn for the better, it is nevertheless possible to lengthen the period of anti-Japanese cooperation. Next, divisions may also develop among the intermediate forces. Our task is to fight for all possible turns for the better, to fight to lengthen the period of cooperation with the main forces of the Guomindang, and to isolate and drive out all capitulationist factions.

9. The year ahead will be an unusually difficult year. The entire Party must become very active and turn itself into the core of the nationwide anti-Japanese organizing force, conscientiously and clearly carry out the central policies, and achieve the objective of overcoming the difficulties, overcoming the threat of capitulation, and fighting to achieve a turn for the better in the current situation.

II. The Party’s Policies

Based on the above analysis of the international and domestic situation, the entire Party should carry out each and every one of the Party’s policies as listed below:

1. The main thing is not to emphasize the threat of the Eastern Munich policy of Britain, the United States, and France, but to emphasize the danger that some people, under Japanese pressure, may become pessimistic, lose hope, and actually capitulate. It is not to cover up the real truth like some in the Guomindang, who say such things as “Everything will work out for the good of China” but, rather, to point out the difficulties in the War of Resistance and the unprecedented gravity of the threat of capitulation and call upon the people to fight to overcome these difficulties and this threat.

2. Point out that the reason Britain and France have failed is that they are anti-Soviet and anti-Communist. Point out the tragic lesson of the French capitulation, that if China should now become anti-Soviet and anti-Communist, it would
inevitably follow the disastrous track taken by France. The anti-Communist policies of the past have already greatly weakened the anti-Japanese forces, and unless this policy is changed, there is no hope of victory against Japan.

3. Emphasize the conditions that are favorable to the War of Resistance. Especially emphasize the great strength of the Soviet Union, and the advantages of the world revolutionary situation. Emphasize that the resistance forces in China are in no way to be compared with those of France. Make propaganda regarding the achievements of the Chinese people in three years of heroic struggle, in order to strike a blow at the feelings of pessimism and isolate the capitulationist faction.

4. Emphasize self-reliance. To this end, we must demand that the Guomindang change its way of doing things in the War of Resistance. For example, it should immediately convene a democratic national assembly, abolish its anti-Communist policy, change its workstyle of relying on secret agents, change its erroneous financial and economic policies, its cultural and education policies, its military conscription policy, and so on, and publicize the fact that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are model examples of self-reliance.

5. Emphasize uniting as one. It was entirely necessary for us to emphasize the struggle for self-defense during a period of time in the past, for otherwise it would not have been possible to beat back the anti-Communist high tide of that period and bring about a renewed awakening of the diehard faction. Now that the anti-Communist high tide is receding, we should once again emphasize uniting. Past struggles, too, were precisely for the purpose of achieving unity. Party members must be made to understand that the present emphasis on uniting in no way means a halt to all struggle. So long as the anti-Communist policy of the Guomindang does not stop for a single day, we cannot stop struggling from a position of self-defense. But now the main firepower of our struggle should be directed against the real capitulationist faction, rather than against the ordinary diehards. At a time when the anti-Communist high tide has already receded and some of the diehards have shown the beginnings of a turn for the better, we should emphasize unity in dealing with them, to make it easier to get an extension of the period of cooperation.

6. The development of our military strength (this is absolutely essential) is limited to the war zone, to the area behind the enemy lines, and to the territory within the twenty-three xian of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and we shall take no actions whatsoever in the Guomindang rear areas that could lead to conflict. There are certain units that are unwilling to penetrate the enemy's rear but, when the situation is very grave, want to move into the Guomindang rear areas and think of returning to the guerrilla life of the civil war period. This is a mistaken way of thinking.

7. There are some Party members who, in accordance with the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, which in the end was not upheld, laying down the policy of not developing Party organizations in any friendly armies (including the Central Army and miscellaneous forces), have completely ceased all organizing activities, in order to help establish the credibility of the Party and expand the work of making friends, in the attempt to get 2 million friendly troops to continue the War of Resistance. Those areas in which this work of making friends has yielded no results whatsoever should be severely criticized by the Party.

8. Let it be announced to the Guomindang and to the whole country that we have not turned our backs on our declaration of September 22, 1937 (that in order to fight for the thorough realization of the Three People's Principles, we have stopped land revolution, abolished the policy of insurrections, turned the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army, and turned the soviets into local democratic governments). In the past, in the present, and in the future, we have carried out and will resolutely carry out this promise of ours. But the Guomindang has turned its back on its promises, for example, on the question of the right of political parties to exist legally, on the question of recognizing the border regions, and on carrying out the Three People's Principles and the Program for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction. All of these promises have been violated. We must demand that the Guomindang fulfill its promises and smash the fraudulent declaration that "the Communist Party has turned its back on its promises."

9. Rectify leftist errors in carrying out the united front policy. For the past year, a great many leftist errors have occurred in the struggle against friction. For example, in the military struggle some places were unable to maintain the principle of self-defense; Chinese traitors were beaten indiscriminately; in our financial and economic work, there were ultraleftist policies enroaching on the property of merchants through excessive fines and punishments, and so on. The principle of the political power of the union of the various classes was not put into practice, and there was a go-slow in applying the directive of the Central Committee on the political power of the "Three-Thirds System." Long-term plans were not made for the base areas, no care was taken of the base areas, and human and material resources were wasted. These people displayed skepticism toward the Central Committee directive on "recruiting large numbers of intellectuals" and did not carry it out.¹ In dealing with the diehard elements, they simply struggled with them without trying to unite with them. They regarded the Guomindang as made up entirely of diehards and failed to understand that the majority of Guomindang members belong to the intermediate faction, and that there are many progressives, so the diehards constitute only a very small minority. They even go so far as to treat diehards as if they were Chinese traitors, and intermediate elements as if they were diehards, and to demand that the intermediate elements act just like progressives, not recognizing the position of the intermediate elements. They showed a lack of confidence in non-Party cadres, did not get close to them, and were not accustomed to working together with non-Party cadres. They even went so far as to execute diehards who had been arrested and execute spies and so on. All these

¹ See above, the directive of December 1, 1939.
phenomena are expressions of the left deviationist errors which result from narrow-minded thinking. If they are not corrected, they will damage the Party’s united front policy. But at the same time, we should not show leniency to rightist errors, such as feeling pessimistic about the current situation, unprincipled accommodation to the Guomindang, having a negative attitude toward establishing anti-Japanese bases or toward the development of the anti-Japanese forces, failing to be alarmed by the Guomindang secret agent policy, confusing the differences between the principles of communism and of the Three People’s Principles, concern among the cadres with getting rich, greed and corruption, bureaucratism and routinism at work, and even fear of self-criticism, and so on. If these are not corrected, the Party will lose its independence and its revolutionary future.

10. Strengthen education on the united front for the whole Party. Party members must be made to understand that united front education is an important part of class education. While Party members must understand how to realize the independence of the proletariat, it is also necessary that they be made to understand how the proletariat can join in a united front with other classes to defeat the common enemy. These two points are inseparable aspects of Party education, and neither of them can be casually discarded. In the Party, even today, there are still a number of cadres who do not understand questions of tactics within the united front. They simplify complex issues, and all kinds of errors result from this. For this reason, the entire Party must strengthen tactical education and overcome the phenomenon of cadres who oversimplify. Such tactical education should be introduced into the formal curriculum for cadre education and made an important criterion for a passing grade.

11. Continue the work of consolidating the Party. At present, the basic organizational direction is consolidation rather than expansion and an emphasis on quality rather than on quantity. We must strictly examine cadres and eliminate secret agents within our ranks, in order to defend ourselves effectively against the Guomindang policy of infiltration. We must clean out three kinds of people: spies (those elements sent by the enemy and by the Guomindang, and those who have been bought), opportunists (those who have infiltrated the Party for the sake of their personal interest, as evidenced by serious corruption and degeneration, and divorced themselves from the masses), and excessively backward elements (nominal Party members who do not attend meetings, do not pay Party dues, and do no work at all). Toward other elements, we must intensify our educational efforts. We must see to it that Party members understand the two different principles of "Within the Party be strict, outside the Party be generous" and know that these two different principles complement each other in practice. At present, the opposite phenomenon exists: within the Party, we are, on the contrary, generous, and outside the Party we are, on the contrary, strict. This phenomenon must be corrected.

12. Strengthen organizational work within each and every base area. Now there are some base areas, such as the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, in which there has been good organizational work, and in which military affairs, politics,
At Present in Central China We Should Indeed Develop Our Efforts Toward Northern Jiangsu

(July 12, 1940)

[Zhou] Enlai, Hu Fu, Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Huang] Kecheng:

We have taken note of Enlai’s telegram, and we all agree with it.

1. Ye and Guan’s troops have scattered the diehard forces. Chen Yi has already arrived in northern Jiangsu, and has ordered Su Yu to take command of the headquarters south of the Yangzi, as well as of the Second and Sixth Regiments, and to cross the river. Our troops to the east of the Tianjin-Pukou railway line in northern Anhui are also on their way to provide assistance.

2. At present, the tactics of the struggle in Central China should be to concentrate all our forces to deal with Han Deyin and the other diehard troops in northern Jiangsu and truly to develop [our position in] northern Jiangsu. In terms of your tactics toward Li Poxian, you should adopt a defensive posture while, at the same time, trying to reach a détente so as to be on guard if Chiang Kaisheng and the Guizhou faction should combine against us. Do not cut off the passages from Anhui to transport private goods from the enemy-occupied territory. Furthermore, please tell Xuefeng to protect the road used by Yu Xuezhong to transport revenue and ammunition. Do not prevent them from passing. If they get in touch with us, our forces should take responsibility for the protection.

3. Since Chen Yi and Su Yu have marched northward, our troops in southern Jiangsu are relatively weaker, and no one is in command. Ask Comrade Xiang Ying to make suitable arrangements, so as to maintain our troops’ original territory. Be prepared also to move the army headquarters as well as the main forces in southern Anhui to southern Jiangsu at the proper time.


Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 551–52, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Ye is Ye Fei, commander of the Advance Column of the People’s Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, under the headquarters of the New Fourth Army for the area south of the Yangzi. For his biography, see above the relevant note to the text of May 4, 1940. Guan is Guan Wenwei (1903–1993), deputy commander of the same column, a local Party leader who had been fighting for several years in the area with his own semiguerilla forces.

2. Su Yu (1907–1984), a native of Hunan, joined the Communist Party in 1927 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising. He went to the Jinggangshan with Zhu De and held various commands during the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic. In 1935, he was sent to southern Zhejiang to lead guerrilla war there. In 1939, he became deputy commander of the New Fourth Army Headquarters south of the Yangzi, and, at this time, in July 1940, he was appointed deputy commander of the New Fourth Army Headquarters for northern Jiangsu.

3. See above, the relevant note to the text of April 5, 1940.

4. See above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.

5. On Yu Xuezhong, see above, the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940.
The Current Situation and Our Party’s Policy

(July 13, 1940)

I. Problems of War and Revolution

1. Regarding the fact that the Soviet Union did not enter the war:
   In the two groups of imperialist countries, when war could not be prevented, their people rose up against the war, and the Soviet Union did not enter the war. This realization of the plan not to enter the war is a result of a struggle by the Soviet Union for the past twenty years; it is a result of the support for the Soviet Union by people all over the world; it is a result of the Soviet Union’s skill at taking advantage of the contradictions between different imperialisms. It is the greatest victory of the world strategy of the proletariat, because it not only protects the Soviet Union but also guarantees the victory of the world revolution.
   This victory was accomplished after the signing of the agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union, and between the Soviet Union and Finland. Since then, the task has been to consolidate it.

2. Regarding the two big imperialist fronts:
   When we talk about the two big fronts and two big united fronts of imperialism, we do not mean to say that there are no contradictions and struggles among the allied countries on each side. There are contradictions and struggles, and very serious ones. For example, there are contradictions and struggles between Britain, the United States, and France and between these three countries and the other small countries. Again, there are also contradictions and struggles between Germany, Italy, and Japan and between these three countries and the other small countries.
   Nor do we mean to say that each front is fixed and unchangeable. Quite the contrary. They are not fixed and are going to change; moreover, changes have already occurred.

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Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 286–92, where it is reproduced from a copy of the text bearing Mao’s corrections.

1. This is a summary of the main points of the conclusions which Mao presented at a meeting of high-level cadres in Yan’an to discuss the resolution of July 7, 1940, translated above.
The present is an era of great upheaval and great change in the world, it is not an era of so-called "peace" and "capitalist stability." That era came to an end long ago, and it can never be reestablished in the future either.

If we fail to see this, it is because we do not have a correct appraisal of the following points:

a. Overestimating the counterrevolution. (i) Because of the war, the contradictions between the imperialist countries, instead of being reduced, have developed further; (ii) People have lost confidence in the bourgeoisie and in the capitalist system in every country; (iii) The Social Democratic Party has lost support; (iv) The destructive character of the war, and so on.

b. Underestimating the revolutionary forces. (i) the existence of the Soviet Union; (ii) the existence of the Chinese revolution; (iii) the upsurge of the Indian revolution; (iv) the existence of Communist parties in Europe and various countries.

3. The revolution is unavoidable:

a. If Germany and Italy defeat Britain and France, that will amount to breaking two imperialist chains. Moreover, it is possible that the new imperialist chains may be broken as soon as they are put on, or even before they are put on. The capitalist front may be broken in three places—Europe, India, and China. This would be as though the entire capitalist front had been broken.

b. In Europe, a pure October Revolution is impossible. The only possibility there is an October Revolution plus the Soviet Red Army. Nevertheless, such an opportunity has not arisen yet.

c. At the moment, instead of a world revolution, the eight-hour workday in the Soviet Union and a world revolutionary situation have reached maturity, but there is not yet a world revolution. Now we must still take advantage of the imperialist war; it is now the eve of the world revolution.

II. Problems Relating to China

1. About the change for the better

a. Initial change for the better—external cooperation between the two parties and two armies, the purpose of which is to awaken the broad popular masses, and isolate the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

b. Thorough change for the better—possible only when a political régime of a united front consisting of all the parties, factions, social groups, and armies, with the participation of the Communist Party, has been established.

c. Get rid of pessimism—the possibility both of an initial change for the better and of a thorough change for the better exists. Our allies are extremely extensive; at the present, the national bourgeoisie is still our ally.

d. Get rid of illusions—a thorough change for the better is impossible while the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are in power.

2. About the retreat:

At the moment it is a partial tactical retreat in the midst of a strategic offensive (a policy of concealment). But in strategy, as regards the overall orientation, it is still offensive (tactics of a broad and extensive united front).

3. The question of the national revolution and the democratic revolution:

a. Resisting Japan and revolution are the same thing.

b. A national revolution is different from a democratic revolution, and yet they are one. In general, we can divide the revolution into two periods, that of a partial resistance war and that of a complete resistance war, but both of them fall within the process of the War of Resistance. At present it is an entire revolutionary period of resisting Japan and eliminating the Chinese traitors; there is no additional period of pure agrarian revolution. The problem is resisting Japan and eliminating Chinese traitors, not a pure agrarian revolution.

c. “The fundamental question in every revolution is the question of political power.”

Slogan: Down with Japanese imperialism, establish a democratic republic—“War of Resistance and building the country.”


There are four types of united fronts—(i) In the areas controlled by the Guomindang: a united front of those who are not in power and those who are in power. (ii) In the areas controlled by the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army: a united front of us and the other parties and classes within the régime. (iii) The united front between the Guomindang régime and our régime. (iv) In the big cities occupied by the enemy: a united front at the lower levels.

d. At present it is a régime of a partial united front; in the future it must become a nationwide régime of the united front. Without such a régime, there will be no victory in the resistance against Japan.

e. The national revolution and the democratic revolution take place simultaneously; it is not the case that the democratic revolution takes place only after the national revolution is over.

The Wutai maintains type—in the early and middle periods of resistance against Japan.

Nationwide—during the final period of resistance against Japan.

Opposing friction—a democratic revolution in the midst of the national revolution.

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2. This heading is put in quotation marks because it is taken from Stalin, who borrowed it from Lenin in Section IV of his "Foundations of Leninism."

3. The reference is to the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar Hebei) Anti-Japanese Democratic Régime, which was established in the Wutai mountains.
4. About the intermediate faction:
   a. In terms of the whole world: the oppressed nations are the intermediate faction between imperialism and the proletariat, but they are part of the allies in the proletarian revolution.
   b. In terms of the different camps in the War of Resistance (as distinguished from the enemy camp): the diehard faction or the big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China are the ruling class, the wavering class, and not an intermediate faction. If we regard them as an intermediate faction, we will confuse the sight and hearing of the people.
   The middle bourgeoisie and the upper petty bourgeoisie—the intermediate faction.
   The lower petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat—the progressive faction.

5. About the emphasis on unity and struggle:
   a. We have always emphasized unity, and we will continue to do so in the future—in order to deal with every faction which supports the War of Resistance.
   b. We have always emphasized struggle, and we will continue to do so in the future—in order to deal with all the capitulationist factions.
   c. We emphasize both unity and struggle—to deal with all the diehard factions that resist the Japanese, but also oppose the Communists.
   d. Sometimes stress unity and at other times emphasize struggle—make our decisions on the basis of the attitude of the diehard faction, depending on whether its main theme is unity or anticommunism.
   e. The purpose of struggle is unity—for the sake of extending the time of cooperation.
   f. At present, the emphasis as regards every aspect (political, military, cultural) should be laid on unity. But in dealing with every aspect, there is simultaneous struggle as well. Because the anti-Communist policy of the diehard faction in the Guomindang remains unchanged.
   g. Even at present, in some places the struggle against friction may also take the form of an upsurge in certain localities, as in northern Jiangsu.

6. About the sources of deviations:
   Rightism—comes from the influence of the landlords and bourgeoisie.
   "Leftism"—comes from the influence of the peasants and petty bourgeoisie.
   Objective ones—the aforementioned two.
   Subjective ones—insufficient education (insufficient self-criticism).

7. About the border areas:
   The two base areas that have set their feet on the right track—the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar Border Region—because of the efforts of the Party, the government, and the military.

Shortcomings: insufficient revolutionary order; too few united fronts; too much bureaucracy.

To be strengthened: the Central Committee, the border regions, and the efforts of everyone.

8. About study:
   a. We are in a new era of war and revolution.
   b. Everything is in the process of changing. We must not use rigid formalist viewpoints but, rather, lively dialectical viewpoints to examine every change.
   c. Take the decisions we are making on this occasion, for example, in which there are many new things. This does not mean that we were wrong in the past; it means, rather, that the objective world has changed, and consequently the subjective world has to adapt itself to these changes: internationally, the superiority of Germany, Italy, and Japan, the fact that the Soviet Union remains outside the war, the revolutionary ferment; domestically, new difficulties, a new danger of capitulation, the possibility of an initial change for the better, the decline in the anti-Communist upsurge (it has already been falling for three months), the development of "leftist" dangers, and so on.
   d. The united fronts during three periods: the period of the Great Revolution, the period of the Civil War, and the period of the War of Resistance.

There were successes during both of the first two periods, but both saw mistakes as well—Chen Duxiu's absolutism (everything for the sake of unity, negation of struggle) and the absolutism in the final period of the Civil War (down with everything, no correct tactics toward certain potential parts [of the revolutionary front]). Now we should expand our successes and avoid mistakes.

We must intensify tactical education on how to win over allies while at the same time maintaining our own positions. Neither self-importance nor formalism is useful.

Claims that someone has mastered a certain thing by a certain year or month, or that someone is a genius, are all deceptions. The useful thing is to employ a Marxist viewpoint to study concrete circumstances and concrete tactics, and to work hard.
Our Opinions About Political Work in the Field by the Eighth Route Army

(August 13, 1940)

Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Luo [Ruiqing] and Lu [Dingyi], Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen] and Zhu [Liangcai].

At your meeting, you should discuss in detail the July 7 decision of the Central Committee, as well as the various recent instructions of the Central Committee and the General Political Department. Apart from this, we also have the following suggestions:

1. In the War of Resistance, the political work in the military forces under the leadership of the Communist Party should have an independent character. This independence is based on the Party’s policy, as well as on the independence of the Communist Party in the national struggle. Consequently, it is wrong to blur the principle of independence in our political work and to ignore the bad influence of the tradition and practices of the Guomindang army on us. Nonetheless, what we call the independence of our political work in no sense requires that we copy all the practices of the Civil War period. On the contrary, we should determine the various concrete policies of our political work in accordance with the environment of the national war. We must turn the political work of the army into a powerful weapon for realizing every single one of the Party’s policies.

2. The political organs of the army, and the military officers at every level, particularly the military and political cadres, must understand and master the Party’s policy and tactics. We must recognize that the understanding and mastery of the Party’s policy and tactics by the cadres in the army is far from adequate. Hence we must strengthen tactical education among the cadres, so that it will become one of the most important items in the education of the cadres. The military must observe the strictest discipline in relations with the population. In places where our political power and local Party [organizations] have not yet been established, the political organs of the army should be totally responsible for setting up political power and the local Party, and, during the process of establishing them, the Party’s policies must be strictly carried out. In districts where political power and the local Party have been completely established, the army should not interfere in the work of the local political power and of the Party. Instead, it should respect them and become a model in observing the laws and decrees. We should wage a rigorous struggle against behavior in the army which violates discipline in dealing with the residents, does not take good care of the base area, wastes manpower and material supplies, or shows disrespect for the government and the local party, as well as every action that departs from the Party’s policy.

3. In order to sustain the bitter struggle in the enemy’s rear, we must unite all the cadres in the entire Party. Thus it is necessary to stipulate clearly the following relationships:

a. As regards relations between the Party in the military and the local Party, the Party in the army should be held responsible more often and more strictly; when a dispute occurs, the Party in the military should be reprimanded more.

b. As regards relations between the cadres from outside the local area and the local cadres, we should demand more from the cadres from outside the local area and reprimand them more often.

c. As regards relations between the veteran cadres and the new cadres, we should demand more from the veteran cadres and reprimand them more often.

d. As regards relations between the regular army and the local armed forces, and between the old units and the new units, we should demand more from the regular army and the old units and reprimand them more often.

4. Taking into consideration the dispersed circumstances of the units, and the present situation of political work, we should pay attention to the following in the mode of leadership and workstyle of our political work:

a. Its overall character. We oppose those who care only about partial interests and selfish departmentalism.

b. Its progressive character. Study more, summarize more, and oppose conservatism and the failure to seek progress.

c. Its complexity and diversity. Oppose those who simplify everything, who are formalistic, and who perform their duty in a perfunctory way.

d. Its planned and organized character. Oppose those who are impetuous, act blindly, and do reckless things.

e. Its unity. Strive to unite dispersion and concentration, spontaneity and obedience to orders.

f. Its practicality. Oppose those who are unrealistic, extravagant, and exaggerate their achievements.

Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 553–55, where it is reproduced from a copy preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Zhu Liangcai (1900–1989), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. Beginning in the Jiangxi period, he served as political commissar in a number of Red Army units and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was deputy head of the Political Department of the Shansi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region. Information about all the other recipients of this telegram can be found in notes to documents translated above.

2. This is a telegram to a meeting of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army for Field Operations and of cadres of the Shansi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.

3. That is, the “Decision Concerning the Present Situation and Party Policy” translated above.
g. Its meticulousness. Oppose those who are crude and careless and pay attention only to appearances.

h. Its militancy. In an attempt to ensure that political work is truly adapted to the combat environment.

5. As regards the work to root out the traitors from the enemy and puppet troops, the General Political Department has already sent out instructions in a telegram.

Regarding work with the cadres, work with civilians, propaganda and education work, and so on, the General Political Department will send out instructions in subsequent telegrams.

Mao [Zedong]  Zhu [De]

The Future Tasks of the Shandong Base Area

(August 28, 1940)

Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], and for transmittal to Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], and Li Yu:

1. Great successes have been achieved by the 115th Division and the Shandong Column, as well as in local work in Shandong.
2. We think that in the future Shandong should work hard at the following tasks:

   a. Strengthen and expand the 115th Division and the Shandong Column, so that the two units become one. Firmly support the base area in Shandong, and in the future, when it becomes necessary, prepare to move another unit to expand into northern Jiangsu. Hence, Shandong is your fundamental base area, but Central China is the direction in which you should be prepared to expand. Consequently, it is your joint task to make the utmost efforts to strengthen the Shandong Column, promote local cadres from Shandong, and regularize the Shandong Column.

   b. For the purpose of long-term planning for the War of Resistance in Shandong, you must carry out correct policies, especially the financial and economic policies. Although Shandong has already proposed the policy of unified revenue and spending, nonetheless, according to the students in the Military and Political Institute who are from Shandong (though they left there six months ago and are not familiar with the latest developments), every unit still raises and spends more revenue, and the burden on the popular masses is very heavy. What is more, there are no strict rules, and some members of the popular masses have escaped to enemy-occupied territory. There are still some units that are guilty of waste (for example, the Fourth Detachment). Consequently, the subbureau, the 115th Division, and the Shandong Column should organize a unified financial and economic committee, so that financial income and spending can be truly put in order. The Party, the government, and the army in each district should organize similar committees. The policies should be centralized and unified, but their application should be decentralized.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 556–57, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to the Military and Political Institute of the Eighth Route Army, which was formally set up on January 1, 1941.
c. Develop the united front in Shandong, adopt the principle of pure self-defense, reduce military friction. This does not mean, however, that we must stop the struggle against the capitulationist elements. On the contrary, it demands that we try even harder to win over the intermediate faction politically and to isolate the diehard elements.

d. We should be more active in our operations against the enemy, squeeze the enemy’s territory, reduce the territory occupied by the enemy, and expand the territory under our control.

e. As regards our policy toward the capitulationist troops under Shi Yousan, Shen Honglie, Miao Chengliu, and others, we should adopt the overall policy of separation and disintegration. The only thing is that the troops engaged in this separation should appear to be leftist troops, not belonging to the Eighth Route Army, but peripheral to the Eighth Route Army.

3. In order to unify the leadership in Shandong, the subbureau and the division headquarters should draw close to one another. Please discuss this, and decide on a specific location.


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To Fan Wenlan

(September 5, 1940)

Comrade Wenlan:

I have read your outline, and am really delighted. If you can write this, it will certainly be very useful, because this is the first time that Marxism has been used to settle accounts with classical studies. Because the reactionary restoration of antiquity by the big landlords and big bourgeoisie is now running rampant, the first task of the thought struggle at present is precisely to oppose such reaction. Your continuing work in historical studies will certainly have a great influence on this struggle. Because of illness I did not hear your third lecture and do not know whether or not you criticized the erroneous sides of Kang [Youwei], Liang [Qichao], Zhang [Binglin], and Hu [Shi]. I do not know whether or not you mentioned

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 163–64, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

1. Fan Wenlan (1893–1969), a native of Zhejiang, graduated from Beijing University in 1917 and thereafter spent two years in Japan in private study of works by Japanese Marxists, including Kawakami Hajime. On returning to China, he taught at various institutions in North China. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, he published commentaries on the Twenty-Five Histories, the Confucian classics, and other classic writings. At the time of the December Ninth movement, he was arrested for complicity with Communists involved in those demonstrations and was released only after the intervention of Cai Yuanpei and Wang Jingwei. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, he began to participate in the Communist underground movement in Henan, where he was then teaching, and joined the Chinese Communist Party in September 1939. He arrived in Yan’an in January 1940 and was shortly thereafter appointed director of the Department for Historical Research of the Marxist-Leninist Academy.

2. The reference is to an outline of a lecture which Fan had delivered at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of the New Philosophy regarding a brief history of Chinese classical studies. This outline was further developed in the course of 1940 and published in vol. 2, nos. 2 and 3 of Zhongguo wenhuaxue, under the title of “The Evolution of Chinese Classical Studies.”

3. Kang Youwei (1858–1927), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), Zhang Binglin (1869–1936), and Hu Shi (1891–1962) were prominent intellectuals, all of whom had influenced Mao significantly in his student days. (See the numerous references to them in Volume I of our edition, and also the relevant note to the text of February 22, 1939 above.) Following his conversion to Marxism in late 1920 or early 1921, he viewed them differently, and at this time he wished their non-Marxist interpretations of early Chinese history to be refuted.
people such as Liao Ping, Wu Yu, or Ye Dehui. The more these persons of modern times are criticized, the greater will be the influence on the academic world.

I have not studied history at all. If I can learn a little from your research, I shall be very happy indeed.

With respectful salutations,

Mao Zedong

A Notice Regarding the Investigation of Landlords, the Bourgeoisie, and Guomindang Army Officers

(September 6, 1940)


1. Distinguish between the big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, and, taking the individual as the unit, investigate from several dozen to a hundred in every category and every province. 

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 298–99, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Ye Jianying (1897–1986), a native of Guangdong, attended the military academy in Yunnan, and on graduation served under Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou. He joined the Communist Party in July 1927 and participated in the Nanchang Uprising, as well as in the “Canton Commune” of December 1927. From 1928 to 1930, he studied in the Soviet Union. Returning to China, he served in various important Red Army posts during the Jiangxi period and participated in the Long March. In the aftermath of the Xi’an Incident, he participated in Zhou Enlai’s negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. At this time, he was chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army and a member of the Standing Committee of the Southern Bureau of the Central Committee. He also played a leading role in the Party’s united front work in Wuhan and Chongqing.

2. Li Kenong (1899–1962), a native of Anhui, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. From 1928 to 1931, he served in the Party’s intelligence apparatus in Shanghai, under Zhou Enlai and Gu Shunzhang. When Gu was arrested and betrayed his comrades to the Guomindang, Li was sent to the Jiangxi base area, where he served in the Political Security Bureau, ranking second only to Deng Fa. He participated in the Long March and was one of those chosen to participate in the negotiations with the Guomindang following the Xi’an Incident, together with Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. At this time, he was head of the Eighth Route Army’s liaison office in GuiLin.

3. Rao Shushi (1903–1975), a native of Jiangxi, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In 1929, he became secretary of the Communist Youth League for Northern Manchuria. In 1935 he went to the Soviet Union as the representative of the All-China Federation of Labor Unions to the Red International of Trade Unions. At this time, he was deputy secretary of the Southeastern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

4. The investigation described in this notice was plainly not a social survey, as in the case of many of Mao’s investigations of the 1930s translated in earlier volumes, but the creation of extensive biographical files for intelligence purposes. Zhou Enlai was the most prominent Communist in Chongqing, where he could order that such an effort be rapidly
2. The big bourgeoisie have a comprador character; they have connections with foreign capital. Big banks and big commercial enterprises, as well as large-scale industry associated with foreign capital, belong to this category. They are the major powerholders at present, and include people such as Chiang Kaishek, Kong Xiangxi, Song Ziwen, and Yu Qiaqing.5

3. The national bourgeoisie are controlled by the big bourgeoisie. They have few connections with foreign capital, and basically they do not have any political power at present. They advocate uniting for the War of Resistance and include such people as Chen Guangfu, Mu Ouchu, Kang Xinru, and Fan Xudong.6

4. Distinguish the big landlords from the enlightened gentry. Once again, taking the individual as the unit, investigate several dozen to one hundred in every category.

5. Investigate by province. Let Enlai please be responsible for the investigation in the five provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, and Hubei. Kenong will be responsible for the investigation in the three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian, as well as in Hong Kong. Xiao Yao7 will be responsible for the investigation in the four provinces of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu, as well as in Shanghai. Kenong’s and Xiao Yao’s reports must be sent to Enlai by December 1 so that he can bring them to Yan’an, and they can be used for the Seventh National Party Congress.

6. Everyone must have his own file, which should include place of birth, age, family background, résumé, faction, financial activities, hobbies, political orientation, attitude toward us, and so on.

7. As regards the investigation of army officers, there should be four items: commanders-in-chief, army commanders, division commanders, and regimental commanders. Everyone must have his own file, which should also include résumé, faction, financial activities, political orientation, attitude toward us, and so on.

8. The aforementioned investigation should be called the list of eminent persons. We will start first with economic and military circles. In the future we might add political and cultural figures as well.

Mao

undertaken. Ye Jianying, Li Kenong, and Rao Shushi all had experience either of intelligence work or of liaison with the Guomindang or with the Soviet Union. Thus each of them was well situated to gather the sorts of intelligence for which Mao was calling.

5. Kong Xiangxi (1881–1967), commonly referred to in English-language accounts as H.H. K’ung (from the Wade-Giles romanization of his name, K’ung Hsiang-hsi), was a native of Shanxi who served as minister of finance from 1933 to 1944 and as president of the Executive Yuan in 1938–1939. Song Ziwen (1894–1971), commonly known in his lifetime as T.V. Soong, was a native of Guangdong, and was minister of finance from 1928 to 1933. At this time he was Chiang Kaishek’s personal representative in the United States. Chiang and Kong were married to two of the Song sisters, so these three influential figures were brothers-in-law. Yu Hede (1867–1945), zc Qiaoging, was a native of Zhejiang. He was a wealthy businessman and banker who had been chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in the 1920s, and who had provided financial support to Chiang Kaishek.

6. Chen Huidi (1881–1976), zc Guangfu, was a native of Jiangsu. In 1915, he founded the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, which extended its operations into the interior of China and into the field of agricultural credit, instead of confining its activities to the foreign concessions like most other banks. In 1938–1940, he negotiated credits for China from the United States and also served as chairman of the Foreign Trade Commission of the Ministry of Finance, then headed by Kong Xiangxi. Mu Xiangyue (1876–1942), zc Ouchu, was born in Shanghai. Though he lacked formal education, he succeeded in gaining admission to the University of Illinois and then to Texas A & M, from which he earned an M.S. degree in 1914, specializing in the study of the textile industry. On his return to China, he established a cotton mill in Shanghai and played an important role in the development of the textile industry in China. At this time, he was director of the National Government’s cotton, yarn, and cloth control bureau. Kang Xinru (1890–1969), a native of Sichuan, had founded numerous periodicals and newspapers beginning in 1912. At this time, he was also a banking executive in Chengdu. Fan Rui (1883–1945), zc Xudong, a native of Hunan, had studied in Japan and also spent some time in Europe. Beginning in the 1920s, he played an important role in the salt and chemical industries. In 1938, he became a member of the People’s Political Council.

7. Yao is an alternative xing for Rao Shushi. Presumably Mao refers to him as Xiao Yao or “Little Yao” because he was born a decade later than Mao and the others addressed here.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai and Others Concerning the Military Troop Movements of the Chiang and Guangxi Forces in Central China and Our Countermeasures

(September 19, 1940)

1. According to information from Xi'an, the three divisions under Li Xianzhou now deployed in the border area between Anhui and Henan are ready to move east to the assistance of Han. There are reports that they will cross the Huai River and advance toward Tangshan. Apart from the 138th Division and part of Li's troops, seven regiments in all, the Guangxi forces attacking eastern Anhui have now been strengthened by the addition of the 172nd Division. Tang Enbo's forces probably constitute the general reserves. He is first sending three regiments reorganized to constitute three reconnaissance detachments, which will advance to Taihe, Fuyang, and Huangcheng, in eastern Henan and western Anhui, at the beginning of next month. His main force is undergoing training and consolidation in western Henan, getting ready to move east. The information from various sources all indicates that Chiang and the Guangxi forces are determined in their offensive in Central China.


1. Li Xianzhou (1894–1988), a native of Shandong, graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in the first class of 1924. He was associated with the Anhui faction, which was influential in Anhui and parts of Henan.

2. The reference is to Han Deqin; for his biography, see the relevant note to the text of March 29, 1940.

3. Tang Enbo (1899–1954), a native of Zhejiang, studied at the Military Academy in Japan, and on his return to China became a staff officer in the National Revolutionary Army. He participated in the "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns against the Communists during the Jiangxi period and fought against the Japanese at the battle of Tai'erzhuang. At this time, he was commander of the Thirty-first Group Army in the Hubei-Henan region.

4. As the conflict between the New Fourth Army and Han Deqin was moving toward crisis in Jiangsu, Mao is here expressing his concern about the possibility that the anti-Communist forces under Li Xianzhou and Tang Enbo might move eastward from Anhui into Jiangsu, in order to attack the rear of the New Fourth Army and reinforce Han Deqin.

5. Peng is Peng Dehuai. Zuo is Zuo Quan; as indicated in a note to the text of June 12, 1939, he was at this time deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army.

6. Yang Dezhi (1911–1994), a native of Hunan, had joined the Red Army in 1928, fought against the Encirclement and Suppression campaigns in Jiangxi and participated in the Long March. Beginning in early 1939, he established a military base in the border region known as the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region.

7. Regarding Peng and his area, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 21, 1940.

8. Chen and Luo are Chen Guang and Luo Ronghuan; see above, the relevant note to the text of December 6, 1939, on military work in Shandong.

9. Zhang Aiping (1910–2003), a native of Sichuan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1928 and the Red Army in 1929. He held various regimental-level commands during the Jiangxi period and participated in the Long March. During the anti-Japanese war, he was secretary of the Military Commission of the Zhejiang Party Committee, and of the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Party Committee as well as political commissar of the Jiangsu-Anhui Column of the Eighth Route Army.

10. Ye and Xiang are Ye Ting and Xiang Ying. See above, the note to the text of January 29, 1940.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Arrangements in Dealing with the Attacks by the Chiang and Guangxi Forces

(September 22, 1940)

1. Five divisions of the Guangxi army, Li Xianzhuo’s three divisions, and Zhou Yan’s three divisions are gathering in the west of Anhui; one division of the Guangxi army has crossed over to the east of the railway in Huainan; Tang Enbo’s nine divisions have been marching for days and are gathering in Nanyang, ready for an eastward move in a matter of days. It is estimated that the various troops are all heading for the new Yellow River and Huainan area before they start their attack on Peng Xuefeng and Zhang Yunyi, which we guess is timed for the middle of next month. When the time comes, apart from ordering Peng Xuefeng and Zhang Yunyi to support the east of Anhui and Huaihe with guerrilla warfare temporarily, our main force in northern Jiangsu will waste no time in disposing of Han Deqin.

2. It would be advantageous for the troops in the south of Anhui and the army headquarters to move to southern Jiangsu before taking actions to dispose of Han Deqin. Let us know about your preparations and how many days you need.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others Regarding the Direction in Which the New Fourth Army Headquarters and the Forces in Southern Anhui Should Move

(October 8, 1940)

1. Chiang has given orders to Gu [Zhitong] and Han [Deqin] to wipe out the New Fourth Army stationed on both the south and the north of the Yangzi River, and large-scale military friction is likely to take place on either side of the river. The battle between the main forces will be fought in northern Jiangsu and south of the Yangzi. Han attacked Chen Yi’s army and suffered a loss of more than two thousand men. Then there is Gu and Leng [Xin]’s division, which has reached the river and appears ready to cross over to the north to assist Han. Li Pinxian and others, on the other hand, might also coordinate their operations in support, but this is a secondary aspect.

2. Most difficult is the fighting in southern Anhui and the army headquarters. Our opinion is that the army headquarters should be moved to the area of the Third Regiment. In the event of attacks from diehard armies making it hard to carry on long-term resistance, the Yangzi may be crossed to the north, or if it is still possible to move to southern Jiangsu, then a transfer to southern Jiangsu may be made. To go deep into the Huanghai Range toward the south and engage in guerrilla warfare is most disadvantageous, both politically and militarily. If [X] is resolved to move to northern Anhui, the Fourth Regiment should send a unit to Wuwei to provide support.

3. Northern Jiangsu is to concentrate all forces on beating back Han’s attack and disposing of Han’s forces. Toward diehards such as Li Pinxian, He Zhuguo, and the like, attempts should be made to ease tensions, but attention should be paid at the same time to the Japanese bandits’ mopping-up [campaigns]. The Japanese

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujun, Vol. 6, p. 167, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. See note 2 to the text of March 5, 1940.
2. The Chinese term is zhi, which presumably stands for zhudui, a guerrilla unit equivalent to a regiment in the regular army.
3. The name is omitted in the Chinese text.
bandits are likely to take advantage of this friction and wage a mopping-up campaign from all sides in our areas in Central China.

4. The New Fourth Army troops in southern Jiangsu should maintain their original areas by means of guerrilla warfare.

No Matter Which Unit Attacks Us You Must Wipe It Out Resolutely

(October 9, 1940)

To Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and for the information of Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

No matter which unit attacks us, it is necessary to wipe it out resolutely. Only by destroying anti-Communist forces such as these is it possible to attack the Japanese bandits. Your deployments and your resolution are absolutely correct; pay no attention to any unreasonable criticism from the Guomindang. The great victory of Chen’s forces¹ has braced the morale of our troops and struck fear into the hearts of those bandits. Our only concern is that Han and Leng² still have additional strength, and we must concentrate our forces and do battle with equanimity. It is absolutely appropriate for Huang Kecheng to go southward to provide reinforcements.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 558–59, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives.

¹. The reference is to the victory of New Fourth Army forces under Chen Yi over a Guomindang force of 30,000 men commanded by Han Deqin at the beginning of October 1940.

². The reference is to Han Deqin and Leng Xin.
Our Current Policy Orientation Is to Reduce Friction and Emphasize Unity

(October 11, 1940)

[Peng] Dehuai, Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang], and Luo [Ronghuan]:

Our current policy orientation is to reduce friction and to emphasize unity. In addition to telegraphing Hu Fu, Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] to reduce the tension in relations with Han [Deqin] and Li [Pinxian], tensions should also be reduced in relations with Shen [Honglie] and Qin [Qirong] in Shandong. As long as Shen's and Qin's forces have not attacked us, we will not make moves against them either. Both sides should maintain the status quo, and each should guard its present positions. Only when the other side attacks us will we retaliate. Please consider this and reply by telegram.


Operational Principles of the New Fourth Army

(October 12, 1940)

To Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, Chen Yi, and Huang Kecheng:

With regard to operational principles for the New Fourth Army:

1. Under instigation by Britain and the United States, Chiang [Kaishek] may join the British-American front, and there is the possibility of the entire southern region's turning into a world of darkness. Because Chiang takes an anti-Japanese stand, however, we cannot start any guerrilla warfare in the areas under Guomindang control in the south. The defeat of Zeng Sheng's troops in the East River area is proof of this. Therefore, headquarters should seize this opportunity to cross the river immediately and make eastern Anhui its base area. This may certainly not be delayed any longer. As for the combat troops in southern Anhui, some of them should be moved northward, and the rest should stay and persist in guerrilla warfare.

2. Han [Deqin] has been thoroughly defeated and is suing for peace, which is clearly for the purpose of gaining a respite and awaiting reinforcements. At this time Huang Kecheng should, under the pretext of providing reinforcements to Chen Yi, send troops to Dongtai to join with Chen's troops, and with his main forces take the vast area to the north and to the east of Xinghua (the Eighth Route Army is responsible for the area north of the Dongtai River), thereby forcing Han to give up his policy of opposing us, to recognize our anti-Japanese base areas, and to stop the operations of his troops attacking western Anhui. On the other hand, Chen Yi will not refuse peace negotiations and, at the same time, will consolidate

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 562–63, where it is reproduced from Mao's manuscript original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. On March 8, 1940, an advance guerrilla detachment led by the Chinese Communist Party in the Fourth War Zone, consisting of a newly organized battalion commanded by Zeng Sheng, and the Second Battalion, in all nearly 700 men, was encircled by the Guomindang 186th Division in Guangdong. They succeeded in escaping from the encirclement and retreated toward Haifeng and Lufeng, but this was the Guomindang rear area, and they were obliged to flee into the forests and mountains. By July and August, only about a hundred of them remained.

2. At the beginning of October 1940, Han, who was chairman of the Jiangsu provincial government and commanded more than 30,000 troops, had been decisively defeated by a force of only 7,000, led by Chen Yi and Su Yu.
Pay Attention to Recruiting National Capitalists and Their Representatives to Participate in the Construction of the Base Areas

(October 14, 1940)

To Hu Fu, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, and for the information of Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and [Peng] Xuefeng:

You are quite right to pay attention to recruiting Tao Xingzhi and the other members of the Life and Education Society to take part in the cultural and educational work in northern Jiangsu. This is the principal aspect. At the same time, however, you should also pay attention to the fact that the Vocational Education Society, under the leadership of Huang Yanpei, Jiang Wenyu, and others, has considerable influence among the intellectuals in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, because Huang and Jiang are not only celebrities in cultural and educational circles, but also well-known representatives of national capitalists who are engaged in industry and business. Therefore, you should also attract members of the Vocational Education Society and people in all the related areas to participate in our cultural, educational, financial, and economic enterprises. Meanwhile, through Han Guojun, Li Mingyang, Li Changjiang, and other members of the local gentry and cultural circles, you should be in touch with Jiangsu and Zhejiang national capitalists other than those in northern Jiangsu, such as Zhang Yilu, Huang Yanpei, Jiang Wenyu, Chu Fucheng, Mu Ouchu, and so on, explain to them the true story about the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 300–301, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Huang Yanpei (1878–1965), who was born near Shanghai, obtained the juren degree in 1902. During a period in Japan before the 1911 Revolution, he developed an interest in the study of vocational education, which remained his central concern thereafter. In the 1930s, he was critical of the Guomindang, and, in the early 1940s, he became a strong advocate of constitutional government. We have been unable to find information about Jiang Wenyu.

2. Han Guojun (1857–1942), zi Zishi, a native of Jiangsu, had obtained the xici degree at the age of twenty-one. During the decade following the 1911 Revolution, he served as governor of several provinces. He also played an important role in economic and military affairs until very late in his life.

3. For a note regarding Mu Ouchu, see Volume II, p. 158. All the individuals mentioned here were influential figures, though some were leaders of local elite circles, while others had regional or even national reputations.
Northern Jiangsu Incident, and ask them to send or recommend people to participate in the work of the local government, of public opinion institutions, and of economic, cultural, and educational construction in northern Jiangsu. We have been in touch with Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying] by telegraph. If they refer people to northern Jiangsu in the future, these people should be received and cooperated with in business, to serve as concrete examples of winning over Jiangsu and Zhejiang national capitalists. This will benefit the development of the united front.

Mao Zedong

Methods for Handling Captured Anti-Communist Officers and Soldiers

(October 18, 1940)

As for the question of captured anti-Communists, in principle it is not permitted to execute any officers, soldiers, spies, special agents, and traitor elements of the domestic anti-Communist factions attacking us whom we capture, no matter how reactionary they are and how heinous the crimes they commit. This policy is the best way to isolate and disintegrate the anti-Communist factions, and the entire Party and army from top to bottom should be made to have a widespread and thorough understanding of it. The method for handling this matter is that all reactionary elements and those who are of no use should be treated well and set free, and any soldiers who can join our army and those who can be useful to us should be kept, and it is forbidden to humiliate them (by beating, verbal abuse, [forced] writing of confessions, and so on) or to take revenge on them. If there are specific elements who for some important reason must be executed, permission must be obtained from institutions above the rank of division or equivalent institutions in the army, from above the rank of subbureaus and district Party committees in the Party, or from the highest-level government institutions in each base area. Those below the brigade, below the district committee, and below the administrative commissioner level have no right to authorize executions. Detailed regulations on this issue are set out in a separate communication of the Central Committee, but each area is to act for the time being according to this general regulation and general order.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 564–65, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
Be on Guard Against Making “Leftist” Mistakes While Carrying Out the Policies
(October 18, 1940)

To Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng (by way of Hu Fu), [Peng] Xuefeng, [Li] Xiannian, and for the information of Peng [Dehuai] and Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Yang [Xuifen] and Song [Renzhong], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and Zhu Rui:

Because we failed to see to it that our middle-level and lower-level cadre understood thoroughly, and because the upper levels failed to take precautions in advance and to investigate in a timely fashion, many places made ultraleftist mistakes, which are mainly expressed in overly leftist land policy, labor policy, financial policy, policy to eliminate traitors, policy toward intellectuals, policy toward captives, and policy toward members of the Guomindang, as well as in the organization of our political régime. The result has been that our social base has shrunk, fear has been aroused among the neutral forces, and the Japanese bandits, the Chinese traitor Wang [Jingwei], and the diehards have been given an opportunity to win over the masses and assemble reactionary forces. Waiting until the mistakes have taken shape before correcting them has already caused us to suffer great losses. The work in Central China is developing at present (as it is in Shandong), and you must prevent your subordinates from making leftist mistakes in carrying out the policies. You must be aware that the major danger at present is “leftist” mistakes, and you must make timely investigation of your subordinates’ work and correct any leftist actions. Otherwise, between attacks by both the enemy and the diehards, it will be impossible for our Party and our army to achieve the great victory of development and consolidation and to maintain our base areas for a long time. We hope that you will sharply draw to this matter the attention of the entire Party and the entire army; it must not be underestimated and ignored.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Estimate Regarding the Current International Situation, and Policy for Dealing with a Possible Guomindang Attack
(October 25, 1940, midnight)

Zhou [Enlai]:

1. There is certain to be large-scale action on the part of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the near future. If Germany does not attack Britain, it will turn toward Africa and India, and Britain will soon have more than it can handle. Japan will adopt a policy of first occupying the South Seas and then sweeping up China, and as soon as the four territories of Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, and the Dutch East Indies fall into Japanese hands, the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction will, in turn, have more than it can handle. America’s preparations are not complete, so it might not enter the war right away. If Germany attacks Britain, the U.S. Navy will simultaneously have to take care of the Atlantic and be unable to concentrate its forces to deal with the Pacific. So when Japan attacks various places in the South Seas, a war between Japan and the United States will not necessarily result. At that time Chongqing’s pro-British and pro-American faction will look on in helpless anxiety. Their present intense infatuation is rather one-sided. To drop the war for independence and join the Anglo-American alliance is the wish of the Chongqing pro-British and pro-American faction, but they also fear that Britain and the United States are unreliable. If Japan occupies the South Seas but war between Japan and the United States keeps failing to break out, and Britain is severely defeated by Germany, Italy, and Japan, they still have the possibility of going over to the Pétainist line. So they are now still vacillating between the British-American line and the Pétainist line, they still dare not offend the Soviet Union too much, and they find it difficult to make the decision to be completely anti-Communist. Since the big bourgeoisie is vacillating, the national bourgeoisie, the upper level of the petty bourgeoisie, and a number of middle-of-the-road factions are also vacillating. Given circumstances like these, there is a lot of hidden meaning behind all this for us.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 566–68, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

Our source for this directive is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 562–63, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The time is indicated by a character signifying between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.
2. We must, however, take into account the most difficult, the most dangerous, the blackest of possibilities, and make that situation the starting point of all our dispositions, rather than taking an optimistic situation as our starting point. The blackest of situations would be a long unsuccessful Japanese attack on Singapore, leaving Singapore under the control of the U.S. Navy, and an unsuccessful German attack on Britain, which would increase the danger that the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction would abandon the war for independence and join the Anglo-American alliance, and also the danger that the majority of middle-of-the-road factions would go along with Chiang Kaishek.

It is also necessary to consider these possibilities: that the U.S. Navy might concentrate its forces and defeat the Japanese Navy; that Japan might surrender to the United States; that the Japanese Army might pull out of China; that the United States might arm the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction financially and militarily so that China would be turned from a Japanese colony into an American colony; and that the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party would turn into a large-scale civil war. This is the blackest of all possible scenarios. But we would not fear even such a situation, because our party has already been tempered, the Chinese people are going through deep waters and burning flames, and within the ruling class multiple contradictions and many serious difficulties have appeared, such that world revolution is bound to break out, and the Soviet Union is in support of world revolution.

3. There is an intermediate situation in which Japan and the United States are locked in a stalemate, China and Japan are in a stalemate, as are the Guomindang and the Communists, and there is also a stalemate in Europe between Britain and Germany, so that the whole world and all of China remain superficially unchanged. We must also be prepared to deal with such a situation, and we are able to do so.

4. In short, we must be prepared to deal with all situations; we must have a way to deal with any kind of situation. At present we should prepare to face the blackest of situations. Our policy is to deal firmly with the attacks of the Guomindang. Militarily we adopt a defensive position; if it does not attack, we do not make rash moves. Politically we emphasize unity against Japan, explaining to the Guomindang and the middle-of-the-road factions and the broad masses of the people the dangers of both the Pétain line and the Anglo-American line, emphasizing an independent autonomous war against Japan, and explaining that the present anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attacks are preparations to abandon the independent war and enter the Anglo-American alliance. In the Guomindang areas, the Party will carry out a total and thorough withdrawal, and a policy of total self-reliance will be carried out in the base areas (the border areas have already made preparations). After holding out for another year, the world situation will be greatly changed. The present is a time for preparation and waiting for opportunities. (This telegram should be further transmitted to [Peng] Dehuai, Hu Fu, and Xiang Ying.)

Zedong

On How to Prepare for Any Dark Circumstances Given the Present International Situation

(October 25, 1940)

1. Germany is still preparing to attack England, and even if England is not attacked, Egypt, Turkey, Arabia, and Iraq are certain to fall into the hands of the German army, and Japan is certain to attack Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, and the Dutch East Indies. In short, Britain’s luck is about to run out. Whether or not the United States enters the war soon, Britain’s luck has definitely run out. Even if the United States enters the war soon, it will not save Britain from running out of luck, and, for this reason, the Chinese pro-British and pro-American faction will also be out of luck.

2. When the war between Japan and the United States becomes intense, there is a possibility that Japan will give up Yichang and Wuhan, to allow the conflict between the Guomindang and the Communist Party to reduce the anti-Japanese forces.

3. The new anti-Soviet, anti-Communist movement that the Guomindang is now starting is, on the one hand, a preparatory step toward abandoning the independent war and joining the Anglo-American alliance, and its objective is to clear the road for joining the Anglo-American alliance and facilitate winning over the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, it also has the function of demonstrating to Japan that the Guomindang is willing to assume responsibility for suppressing the Chinese national revolution on Japan’s behalf, in the attempt to get Japan, in exchange, to make concessions to the Guomindang. At the same time, frightening Japan with the threat of joining the Anglo-American alliance is an attempt to get Japanese concessions. Thus the anti-Communist activities of He Yingqin et al. are especially intense, and Japan is seeking to win over Chiang and He.

4. We must be prepared for the fact that Chiang Kaishek may become a de Gaulle or a Pétain. We must be prepared for his declaring us counterrevolutionary and thereby starting an all-out anti-Communist campaign. We must be prepared to deal with the darkest situation, and we are not afraid of any dark eventuality.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 173–74, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. This was a telegram addressed to Zhou Enlai.
Instructions on the Current Situation

(October 1, 1940)

Concerning the current situation:

1. The struggle in China for the past month between England and America, on one side, and Japan, Germany, and Italy, on the other, has been extremely fierce. The latter group demands that the Chinese government cease the Sino-Japanese War and join the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy, while the former demands that China give up the independent war and join the alliance of England and America. At present, the battle has turned white-hot and Chiang [Kaishek] has changed his attitude considerably as a consequence.

2. Britain's opening up of the Yunnan-Burma Road and America's loans to China and withdrawal of its nationals from China are all signs by which England and America express their determination to oppose Japan and demand that China not go over to the side of Germany, Japan, and Italy; the British and American ambassadors stay in Chongqing and perform their office in person so that they can keep a tight grip on Chiang Kaishek and prevent him from running off.

3. The closure of the two airports in Yuncheng and northern Hubei, Abe's return home, the withdrawal of troops from Nanning and Longzhou, and the official establishment of Haitong Press in Chongqing are, on the other hand, signs of concessions from Japan, a beginning of Germany's mediation effort and a tendency which is likely to take a sudden turn and then develop rapidly.

4. Chiang Kaishek is now waiting for the highest bid. On the one hand, he is ready to join the Anglo-American alliance; on the other, he is prepared to ally himself with Japan, Germany, and Italy. If the U.S.-Japanese war breaks out soon and victory is assured, he is willing to join the Anglo-American alliance. In the past month, he has made use of the strength of the alliance of Japan, Germany, and Italy and he will before long take advantage of the Japanese concessions to exact yet a higher price from Britain and America.

5. If a war between the United States and Japan, which is of a decisive nature, does not break out soon (which is the more likely case), or if it does break out but the United States is not certain of victory (there is no certainty within two years), if Britain is utterly routed by Germany, Japan, and Italy this winter or next spring (very probable), if Japan is to retreat from Wuhan and other places, limits its occupation to the coastal areas and North China, and declares that they remain under Chinese sovereignty and are to be governed by Chiang's appointees (highly likely), if the Chinese bourgeoisie can make a huge fortune by joining the alliance of Germany, Japan, and Italy and opposing Britain and America, he would want to surrender to Japan. This is the path that Chiang Kaishek is most likely to take.

6. The current upsurge of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist tide is preparation for ceasing the independent war and joining the Anglo-American alliance, but it is still more a preparation for ending the anti-Japanese war, surrendering to Japan, and joining the alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan. We must not be taken in by Chiang Kaishek's propaganda. His uniting with England and America is propaganda, but capitulation to Japan is the reality.

7. Two strategies are needed to obtain concessions from Japan: coercion and luring by promising gain. That is why Chiang is, on the one hand, making a show of joining the Anglo-American alliance as a means of coercion, while, on the other hand, instigating an anti-Communist upsurge as a lure. Chiang Kaishek knows that Japan needs a consolidated rear, a China "at peace," before it can move south, and the Communist Party has today become the most decisive factor undermining Japan's rear. So Chiang Kaishek offers to take up the task of consolidating the rear on Japan's behalf in exchange for Japan's concessions to him. At the same time, Europe's Germany and Italy also need to exchange resources with Asia, and Chiang Kaishek's opposition to the Communists is advantageous to Germany and Italy, so this anti-Communist upsurge is mainly a preparatory step in capitulation to Japan, Germany, and Italy.

8. In July and August, when Chiang Kaishek was prepared to move his capital to Tianshui in the event of the fall of Chongqing, he was getting ready to get closer to the Soviet Union, make peace with the Communists, and adopt some political reforms. He had already begun to waver in September and changed drastically in October. This was a result of the alliance of Germany, Japan, and Italy, and Britain and America's growing enthusiasm toward Japan.

9. (Omitted [from the Chinese text])

10. Whatever situation prevails, however, the fierce struggle between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is unavoidable. Regardless of whether it is to Japan, Germany, and Italy or to Britain and America that Chiang Kaishek surrenders, it will strike a heavy blow to our Party. He is surely determined to carry out his plan of using armed forces to drive the New Fourth Army and the Eighth

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 177-79, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. It should be noted that this set of instructions and positions is suspended by the message to Zhou Enlai issued on the following day. This was a time of rapidly changing circumstances and consequent uncertainty on the part of Mao and the Yan'an leadership.

2. The reference is to Abe Nobuyuki (1875–1953), who had been prime minister in 1939 and at that time advocated the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government. He had recently served as special envoy to China.
Route Army north of the old Yellow River and heavily besieging them, so we must immediately figure out countermeasures.

11. No matter how serious the situation, we are nonetheless surely able to break through it. This kind of confidence should be built up throughout the Party. We have to, on the one hand, hold fast to our base areas in North China and Central China and, on the other, repel the attacks from Chiang Kaishek; such is the serious situation in which we find ourselves. How to break through the situation in a methodical, planned, and orderly fashion is the problem we seek to solve today.

12. We look forward to hearing your opinions.

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**Telegram from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Others on Intensifying Preparations to Smash Chiang Kaishek's Serious Attack**

(November 1, 1940)

1. Chiang Kaishek has already informed us that those elements of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army now in Central China and Shandong must all move to North China before November 20. According to reliable reports, Chiang has already ordered Tang Enbo, with nine divisions under his command, and Li Pinxian, with three divisions under his command, to leave immediately for Henan and Anhui, and prepare to attack you once the deadline has passed. There are undoubtedly already deployments in southern Anhui and central Hubei set for attack.

2. You should immediately intensify all aspects of military and political preparation, reinforcing the troops, strictly carrying out training, gathering assets, intensifying the creation and consolidation of bases, strengthening united front work within friendly armies, reinforcing political work within the military ranks, and planning in advance how to smash this serious attack by Chiang Kaishek. It is of utmost importance to carry out propaganda in advance among the masses within [the border areas] about how evil anticommunism is.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong Ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 175, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*.

1. The November 20 deadline had been set forth in a telegraphic order sent to the Communist leadership on October 19, signed by Bai Chongxi and He Yingqin. This was the so-called hao order (hao being the telegraphic code designation for that date), which constituted the Guomindang’s response to the New Fourth Army’s defeat of Han Deyin and the expansion of its influence in Jiangsu and Anhui. This order directed that all Communist troops, whether south or north of the Yangzi, be moved within one month to a staging area north of the Yellow River. For the context, see above, the Introduction.
2. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above the note to the text of September 19, 1940.
3. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.
To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Analysis of the Situation of Chiang Kaishek Opposing the Communist Party and Our Arrangements

(November 2, 1940)

The Central Committee has met several times, and each time reached the same conclusion that the ongoing anti-Communist campaign is different from that of the last time and it will greatly affect our future if it is not dealt with properly. So the statement and instructions have been suspended even though they have already been drafted. Today's conference discussed your proposition of the first of this month and still advocated relaxation on the surface and resistance in actuality; it was agreed that the statement is to be held up for a while and only a brief instruction is to be circulated within [the Party] as well as a reply to the "October 19" telegram from He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi]. The ongoing anti-Communist campaign was instigated by the Guomindang and the danger of capitulation remains grave. Let the various middle-of-the-road elements talk, comment, and conjecture. We shall not put forward any positive proposals before the time is ripe, and it will not hurt to wait a little bit before we speak. There are now twenty days to go before the deadline set in the "October 19" telegram from He and Bai. We plan to draft the reply telegram in the next few days and dispatch it around the 10th; there is no need for an earlier reply. As to the statement on the current situation, although we have made a basic assessment of the situation and actually drafted the resolution, we want to wait and see the developments following the Japan-USSR negotiations and the American general elections, and the development of relations between Japan and Chiang, before we decide to issue it. All the comrades [present at the meeting] agreed without reservations with you and the South China Bureau on deployments in the south and on matters such as propaganda and refutation. As for military deployments in Central China and North China, maneuvers of small numbers of troops will get started in the next few days, while those involving a large number (150,000 as planned) is under discussion with Old Peng:1 similarly we deem it proper to go slow about it and do not see any reason for haste. If

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 181, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
1. Peng Dehuai.
To Zhou Enlai on the Internal Circumstances and the Need to Oppose Capitulation and Strive to Bring About a Turn for the Better in the Current Situation

(October 3, 1940)

Pan Youxin’s opinion is correct. It is also our assessment that Chiang [Kaishek] still finds himself at a fork in the road and is still in a bargaining stage in his negotiations with Germany and Japan. Only what things are today is quite a different matter from what they will be tomorrow. To estimate objectively, it is not very likely that Chiang will seek alliance with Britain and America; it is much more likely that he will ally himself with Germany and Japan. Because both the pressure and the attraction from Germany and Japan are great, the pressure being cutting off his artery and attacking Chongqing, and the attraction being recovering the occupied territories, making a fortune in a world war, and joining efforts to fight the Communists. On the other hand, Britain and America cannot do much within the next two years, and Chiang does not have two years to wait. Even after two years, England and America are not absolutely certain of victory. It is possible that the two sides would be locked in a stalemate, fighting for two or three years with no final outcome, and that then a revolution would break out and finish them off. Another possibility is that the British Empire would be defeated quite soon, the whole of the old continent would be occupied by Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the United States would feel isolated, powerless, and frustrated, and would have to wait until revolution breaks out on the old continent to attack Europe and Asia as a way of intervening in the revolution. All in all, over the next two or three years Chiang Kaishek cannot triumph by relying on England and America. Only pressure from the Communist Party, the Chinese people (including various middle-of-the-road factions and people such as Chen Cheng, Tang Enbo,1 and so on), plus the Soviet Union, can stop the Chiang clique from capitulating. If these three forces of pressure cooperate well, the possibility for such a turn for the better exists, and there is still time for it. What Chiang Kaishek fears most is internal revolt and the Soviet Union. On this we can take advantage of him. He wants to suppress the Communist Party, so we must oppose the suppression of the Communist Party. If we are not afraid of civil war even under the slogan of opposing civil war, when his Communist-suppression troops advance, we shall send out 150,000 crack troops (300,000 will support the various base areas) who will go to his rear and fight a few big triumphant battles and then raise the demands of dismissing He Yingqin (the strategy of purging the close company of the ruler), withdrawing the Communist-suppression armies, sticking to the national policy of waging a war of resistance, restoring internal peace, carrying out the Three People’s Principles, reforming political structure, allowing the people the freedom to fight Japan, releasing anti-Japanese political prisoners, convening a national people’s congress, and so on (basically as in the eight points put forward by Zhang and Yang). If Japan by then has already moved south, relations between the United States and Japan are tense, and Japan is even unable to fend for itself; if the various middle-of-the-road factions in the country and the middle forces within the Guomindang come forward to offer assistance (such as organizing pacification groups and severing battle lines); if some people in the country or some people within Chiang’s clique take this opportunity to rebel, in activity not disadvantageous to Chiang (these people are now urging Chiang to fight the Communists, with the intent to cause disturbances and put Chiang under fire so that they can find a chance to take his place; He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] are people of this sort); if at that time the Soviet Union comes forward and makes some adjustments, this sort of turn for the better is possible. It may just be the case that a real turn for the better for China is not a sure thing even at that time, in the same way that childbirth involves great pain. But it is also possible that Chiang Kaishek will become another Pétain, and ultimately a second Wang Jingwei, which would mean a final disintegration. This sort of possibility may even be greater; it is hard to tell. Now that he has formed armies to suppress the Communist forces, however, we naturally cannot just sit by and wait to be murdered. We cannot just sit by without acting while he sets up dozens of blockade lines running far and wide, beginning in Ningxia in the west and extending to the eastern coast (a new 10,000 li Great Wall), and while he sets us up for destruction under the attacks of both Japan and his own forces. Therefore, when the Communist-suppression troops set out we must strike out and break through, to make a change in the situation and cause a turn for the better. If Chiang has become a Pétain at that time, it will prove that we have been right in countering the attack, and we will change our banner of purging the close company of the king (or petitioning with armed force) into the banner of fighting the Chinese traitors, and fight to the finish. This would be a national revolutionary war in the form of a civil war (fighting to counter friction in the past and present are of the same nature). Only we must do it with extreme forbearance. It has been the correct and necessary thing to do to delay the actions of Tang Enbo and Li Pinxian as best

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 183–185, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Chen Cheng (1897–1965), a native of Zhejiang, was at this time the commander of the Guomindang Sixth War Area. Tang Enbo (1899–1954), likewise a native of Zhejiang, was commander of the Thirty-first Group Army.
we can at present, to agree to move our southern Anhui troops northward, to assent to a peaceful solution, to appeal for the avoidance of civil war, and to adopt an accommodating attitude. Our current policy is of a dual nature. On the one hand, we are doing everything in our power to make the situation take a turn for the better and avoid civil war, and, on the other hand, we are getting ready to deal with capitulation and civil war. The emphasis is on dealing with capitulation and civil war, which is the way to avoid losses and avoid being taken in by Chiang. The whole Party's central task is to prepare immediately to cope with a dark situation. In this way we shall avoid following in Chen Duxiu's disastrous footsteps. But on the two matters of an explosive statement and petitioning with armed force, we must have a firm and sure grasp of the timing; there is no room for rashness or error. One mistake today would leave behind endless troubles in the future. Now is a turning point in history, a juncture when the Chinese revolution is making an abrupt turn, and a moment when the big bourgeoisie will either back out from or remain in political power, so it must be met with intense effort. The above is an outline of my humble opinion; please take it into consideration.

Military Dispositions for Dealing With the Joint Attack on the Communists by Chiang Kaishek and the Japanese

(November 3, 1940, 7:00 to 9:00 A.M.)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. The present anti-Communist high tide is preparation for direct capitulation. The so-called unifying with England and America in resisting Japan is nothing more than a smokescreen put up by Chiang Kaishek. Chiang has given orders for Tang Enbo to lead a force of 100,000 to attack northeastern Anhui and for Li Pinxian to lead a force of 50,000 to attack eastern Anhui. It is estimated that the first step of their plan is to drive our army north of the Longhai railroad and set up a number of horizontal and vertical blockade lines (there are five blockade lines around our border region); the second step is to coordinate with the Japanese invaders to wipe out our army. A serious danger exists that China and Japan might reach a compromise and that Japan and Chiang might join together in “Communist suppression.” Although other possibilities exist, capitulation is the most probable. At present it is extremely necessary to make such an estimation.

2. The central problem at the moment is the concrete strategy for combating capitulation and anticommunism. There are presently two options: The first is a political offensive and a military defense. This means to counterattack the anti-Communist troops only in areas close to our base areas, and that our army does not force its way into their rear; that we do not counterattack in their rear area until Chiang's capitulationist inclination is revealed to the whole nation. Should this strategy be adopted, it would be sufficient to move 50,000 of our men south, while the main force may remain on the various anti-Japanese fronts. If this strategy were adopted, it would have one political advantage, which is that it would deprive Chiang of his political excuses. But it would pose a political disadvantage on the other hand, which is that we could not prevent capitulation with our actual strength. Militarily it is disadvantageous, because our troops are bound to suffer severe losses from joint attacks by the Japanese and Chiang once Chiang has successfully

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 569–71, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The time is indicated by a character signifying this two-hour period.
completed his network of blockade lines. The second is a political offensive as well as a military offensive. This means that our army would not wait until Japan and Chiang join forces to attack us but that, instead, we would select at least 100,000 to 150,000 crack troops from among our 500,000 men and have them break into their rear in different directions, while the rest of our forces (the majority) would stay where they are and resist Japan. If this plan were adopted, it would have a political disadvantage, because it gives Chiang political capital. In another way, however, it could have a political advantage, because it might prevent capitulation (but not necessarily). Militarily it is advantageous, because it provides initiative, and could prevent the most severe joint attacks by both Japan and Chiang (a joint attack is unavoidable, but its severity can be reduced).

3. No matter which strategy we adopt at present, if capitulation becomes a fact, the outcome can only be a fierce civil war (national revolutionary war in the form of a civil war), so it is necessary to consider the overall military deployments right now. It is planned to divide the entire military command into three columns. The left column is to consist of the armies south of the old Yellow River, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, which will strike out from the area on the Hubei, Henan, and Shaanxi borders. The right column is to consist of the armies north of the Fenli line, the Zhengtai line, and the Cangshi line, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, which is to strike out from the area on the Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan borders. The central column is to consist of the armies stationed in between these two areas, its crack troops totaling about 50,000 men, who will strike in the direction of the left column or that of the right column, depending upon future conditions.

4. It is of utmost importance to our future whether or not the concrete strategy we have chosen at present is correct, so it is necessary to give it careful consideration. We hope to be informed of your opinion so that we can discuss it (Commander Zhu [De] will be going to Suide in a few days).


Letter from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Regarding the Northward Movement of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui

(November 3, 1940)

The Central Committee has decided that the "telegram of the 19th"1 from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi will be answered in the names of Zhu, Peng [Dehuai], Ye, and Xiang adopting a conciliatory attitude so as to delay the outbreak of the anti-Communist war. It has been decided to yield on the matter of southern Anhui and agree to move [the army] north. We look forward to your immediate response.

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2. Regarding the change in the course of the Yellow River in June 1938, see above, the note to the text of March 5, 1940.
Mobilize All Forces to Carry Out the Work of Gaining the Support of Friendly Armies

(October 4, 1940)

Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], Hu Fu, [Zhang] Yunyi, Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Li] Xianian:

1. Based on the experiences of the campaign against friction in North China (while the three divisions under Zhu Huaibing were fighting the Eighth Route Army, thanks to our united front work at the front, one of the divisions remained neutral), in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (while the security forces were at war with us, because of our communication work, the Third Preliminary Division looked on and did not make any movements at all), and in Huangqiao in northern Jiangsu (as a result of Chen Yi’s united front work, the two Lis and Chen Taiyin remained absolutely neutral), in the armed struggle against friction it is not only of great significance but also very possible to intensify the work of trying to win the sympathy of the friendly armies toward us or trying to make them remain absolutely neutral.

2. Under the present situation in Central China, on the one hand, the troops of the Guomindang have an advantage in numbers over us and, on the other hand, there are many local and miscellaneous troops from all kinds of factions gathered there. If, as a result of our efforts to win over friendly armies, not only many miscellaneous troops remain neutral or take actual sympathetic actions toward us, but within Tang Enbo’s and Li Pinxian’s troops an anti–civil war movement show-

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 306–9, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives. The same text appears in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 72–75.

1. The reference is to Li Mingyang and Li Changjiang, who were, respectively, commander and deputy commander of the Guomindang guerrilla forces in the area in question. Nominally subordinate to Han Deqin, they were very much out for themselves. Regarding Li Mingyang, see the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1940. Li Changjiang (1890–1956) was a native of Jiangsu, who had been engaged in fighting the Japanese together with Li Mingyang since 1937.

2. Chen Taiyun (1898–1951), a native of Guizhou Province, graduated in the first class from the Huangpu Academy. At this time, he was commander of the Guomindang’s Tax and Garrison Regiment in Jiangsu.

3. Hanqing was the zi of Zhang Xueliang.

4. Feng Zhi’an (1896–1954) was the commander of the Guomindang Thirty-third Group Army. Sun Lianzhong (1893–1990) was the deputy commander of the Fifth War Zone, and commander of the Second Group Army.
To Li Kenong and Others on Mobilizing All Forces Inside and Outside the Party to Stop the Campaign to Suppress the Communists and Capitulate to Japan

(November 6, 1940)

At present Japan and Germany and the pro-Japanese and pro-German faction have surrounded Chiang [Kaishek] and are pressuring Chiang to mount an anti-Communist war and capitulate to the Japanese bandits. We should urgently call upon members of the Guomindang and people everywhere and in sincere and moving words explain that suppressing the Communists means the end of the Party and the end of the country, that capitulation to the Japanese bandits would inevitably mean the toppling of Chiang, bringing only harm and no benefits. We should mobilize the majority of the members inside and outside the Party to come forth to become involved in the positive and moving activities listed above. When talking about this, do not curse Chiang or the Guomindang; curse only the pro-Japanese faction. Demand that everyone pay attention to the question of their own survival or destruction. We, the Communist Party, love and defend Chiang, love and defend the War of Resistance and unity. They simply must not annihilate the Communists or capitulate. If we wait until they have annihilated the Communists and capitulated, have destroyed the Party and the country, then we cannot help them even if we want to. All Party members and all those opposed to Japan must be told that if only everyone will unite and act positively, it will still be possible to stop the campaign to suppress the Communists and capitulate, that it is not too late, that there is still time. Please, by all means, inform the Central Committee regarding the conditions in the various localities.


Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 193, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
To Zhou Enlai, on Strengthening Domestic and Foreign Contacts to Stop Capitulation and Division

(November 6, 1940)

The important intelligence report of the 3rd, I read only this morning. There may be some advantage and no harm if Chiang [Kaishek] joins the British-American group, but it would be only bad, with no advantages, if he joined the German-Italian-Japanese group. We should no longer emphasize our opposition to joining the British-American group, though we should not promote it either (because it is an imperialist war group). At present, not only should the three forces of the Communist Party, the Chinese people, and the Soviet Union unite, but we should also have diplomatic contacts with Britain and America, in order to prevent capitulation and to strike a blow at the pro-Japanese, pro-German activities. According to the intelligence report of the 3rd, if the four forces mentioned above are able to join together and coordinate actions, there is still a possibility of turning things around for the better. Suppressing the Communists would mean the end of the Party and the end of the country, and capitulation to the Japanese bandits would inevitably mean splitting China four or five different ways and the toppling of Chiang. Please take this opportunity to go around calling upon all sides of the Guomindang in sincere and moving words to attempt to save the situation. Please also consider whether or not you should request a meeting with Chiang [Kaishek] and Chen [Cheng] at the appropriate moment. In all areas of activities we should mobilize the majority of the people to get involved (both Party and non-Party). The activities of Madame Chiang are worthy of attention.1 On the Guilin side, please tell [Li] Kenong to do this too.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 195, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982.

1. This message is part of the orchestration of a major campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to influence policy and sway public opinion, in concert with the reply of November 9 to the Guomindang order of October 19. It should therefore be read in conjunction with the numerous other documents issued between November 6 and 16, which form a consistent pattern.

To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Main Points of the Reply to the Telegram from He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi]

(November 6, 1940)

The draft of the reply to the telegram from He and Bai has already been drawn up. It says at the beginning that their “telegram of the 19th” has been received; as the matter is of vital importance and the nation is in an extremely critical situation, we have, taking the interest of the whole country into account and with a view to the salvation of the nation, discussed it through telegrams many times. Having reached a consensus, we are sending this telegram specially in reply and hope it will be submitted to the supreme commander for his instructions to follow. The remaining part is divided into (a) operations; (b) defense stations; (c) size of the army; (d) provisions; and (e) the overall orientation of unity and resistance to Japan. Five points in all. Point A explains that our army has always taken it as its one and only mission to carry out the national policy, obey orders, and persist in the War of Resistance; it then reviews briefly our past experience; finally it says that it is true, as their respected telegram has pointed out, we have had some incidents of discord with other armies, and it has been a painful experience for us; every time that happened, we reported in written form to the higher authorities the causes of the discord and put forward proposals as to how they could be eliminated. The incident in northern Jiangsu, which occurred not long ago, has been related in detail in our telegram sent on the 21st. The incident in southern Shandong has commanded our serious attention because of the complexity of the causes, so we ask them, apart from subjecting the subordinate troops to the orders, to send men over for a thorough investigation. Point B states in a brief manner that we have every reason to obey the orders from the Center, but it is also proper to describe to the higher authorities the awkward situations we subordinates are landed
in. Our troops stationed in Central China are composed mostly of local people who have joined in the army to defend their homeland, so it would be hard to persuade them to go far away from home; that is why we proposed to the Center through Zhou Enlai and sought the approval that we move only the main forces to the north while letting the local troops stay where they are. We have just received the telegram ordering us to complete the maneuver within a stated time. Yet we request that the Center permit us to give consideration to public opinion and sentiment at the same time that we carry out the order, so that apart from the original main forces, a painstaking effort can be made to persuade the more concentrated local troops to obey orders and move northward. We also request an extension of the time limit so as to allow more time for the persuasion to take effect, and to prevent the occurrence of any further mishaps. Point C explains the reasons we were compelled to expand our army in waging a war of resistance behind enemy lines. The fact is that, of an army 500,000 strong, only 45,000 are provisioned, and no one, however clever, can make bricks without straw, so there was no other alternative but to request an expansion of the given size of our army. The Center has, accepting a fait accompli, approved the expansion in its draft resolution; only we wish to have it carried out at an earlier date so as to strengthen the morale of the army. Point D relates the fact that we have received no ammunition or medicines for fourteen months and asks for such supplies, and other such matters. Finally, point E states that war in the Pacific is pressing closer and closer each day, which affords a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for a war of resistance. In the meantime, Japan has intensified its effort to lure us into surrender; Germany is trying hard to make peace; certain people at home have stirred up an anti-Communist high tide to clear the way for capitulation and joined with foreign forces in instigation, with the intent of putting an end to the War of Resistance by the so-called joint Sino-Japanese Communist suppression. We are giving our all on the battlefield, ready to lay down our lives for the interests of the nation; what we want is only a nation in unity and resistance, free from the disaster of capitulation and disintegration. It is requested that this be passed on to higher authorities and adopted. Please let us know quickly what you think so that we may revise and send it out within the next few days.

Regulations of the Military and Political Committees (Draft)

(November 7, 1940)

To Peng, Yang, and Luo, Lu, and Zuo.¹

Please discuss and make suggestions regarding the following document so that we can make the final announcement.

1. The guerrilla warfare environment and the separate operations of various military units demand a certain degree of collective leadership and a certain degree of collective command.

2. For this purpose, a military and political committee is to be set up at army, division, brigade, regiment, and column, detachment, and subdistrict levels (all military and political committees organized in the past jointly by the military and the local Party and administration must be renamed as the Party military and political committee so as to distinguish them), to serve as the organ of collective leadership at each level.

3. The military and political committee at each level is to be made up of the commander, the political commissar, the political director, and the chief of staff, as well as the main leaders at the next lower level, the total number of people not to exceed nine or ten. Suggestions are to be put forward at each level, and appointments made by higher levels. Chairmanship of the military and political committee is generally to be held by the political commissar.

4. The military and political committee is the planning organ for carrying out instructions from higher levels, deciding on the main policies of a given unit, and arranging as well as discussing work tasks. It may discuss and decide upon all military, political, Party, and logistical tasks having to do with its own unit. The

¹ Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 576–78, where it is reproduced from a copy held in the Central Archives. These regulations were formally promulgated on February 7, 1941. The changes in the final version as compared to this draft were relatively slight, and, unlike the text which appears here, it does not bear Mao’s signature, so we have not included it in this volume.

1. This telegram was addressed by Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai; Yang Shangkun, then secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee; and Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi, and Zuo Quan, who were, respectively, head and deputy head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army in the field and deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army.
military and political committee, on the other hand, is not the executive body, and its decisions should be handed over to the various departments to be carried out. Decisions regarding military work, for example, should be handed over to the commanding headquarters to be carried out, and decisions regarding political work should be handed over to the political department for execution, and so on. The military and political committee should be discussing the more important issues; it is wrong to hand over all the minutaie and minor issues to the military and political committee for discussion.

5. The military and political committee should approve the promotion and transfer of cadres. Punishment of Party members, acceptance of membership into the Party, and other such matters, however, are still to be discussed and decided upon by the Party Affairs Committee.

6. Decisions of the military and political committee are not to be issued in the name of the military and political committee but, rather, should be issued by the commanding organs or the political organs, depending on the nature of the respective decision. Reports from lower levels to higher levels should, likewise, not be made in the name of the military and political committee, but should rather be made separately by each department.

7. When, in discussion of certain issues, the military and political committee encounters debate and cannot reach an agreement, a report should be submitted to higher levels for decision. With regard to urgent matters, however, the commanding officer and the political commissar still retain final decision-making authority, although they should report the various dissenting opinions to higher levels.

8. The military and political committee at each level is to meet at least once a month and at most twice a month. Failure to convene a meeting without good reason is not permitted.

9. It should be explained to the cadres that the military and political committee is established for the purpose of adapting to the scattered circumstances of guerilla warfare and achieving the result of collective leadership and unity among the cadres, but that the army is still a centralized organization, and subordinates should absolutely carry out orders from their superior commanders, political commissars, and higher-level departments. Lower-level military and political committees do not have the right to discuss refusing to carry out orders, and different departments at the same level should, likewise, carry out orders from above. The phony democratic sentiment, which holds that absolutely everything must go through the military and political committee, is wrong and should be prevented and corrected. The establishment of the military and political committee by no means weakens the system of individual responsibility.

10. The authority to explain and revise these regulations rests with the Central Military Commission.

11. These regulations are approved by the Secretariat of the Central Committee.


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To Zhou Enlai, on the Arrangement of Various Tasks Following the Sending Out of the Telegram of the 9th

(October 9, 1940)

1. The wording of the "telegram of the 9th" was finally fixed today, and it has already been sent for encoding. Tomorrow it can be sent to your office simultaneously by the war report station and by telegraph, and your office can turn it over to He and Bai. We have not sent it directly, so when you receive it please correct any mistaken characters.

2. A distinction should be clearly made between the military units north and south of the Yangzi River. It has been decided that the main forces south of the Yangzi are to move north as a demonstration of concession, and it has been decided to request that the forces north of the Yangzi not be redeployed for the time being. Using the words "for the time being" is to say as to give Chiang [Kaishek] face, and phrasing it "not to be redeployed" is so as to quash Chiang’s illusions. In your office’s external propaganda, please stress the various reasons against redeployment (the telegram has already listed them: first, the ancestors’ tombs; second, it is certainly not wrong to go along with Chiang’s “Letter to Fellow Countrymen in the Occupied Areas”; third, there would be no protection for the families; fourth, the five calamities of North China).2 Also, the telegram of the 9th, in your heartfelt words, hints that if the other side attacks our side will have to defend itself, putting it in terms of the saying about the snipe and the clam and the fisherman.3 Please also publicize this externally, in the hopes of stopping their attacks.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 201–2, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. As in the case of the telegram dated October 19 from He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, often referred to in the texts translated above as the "hao telegram," the reply sent to the Guomindang on November 9 is here called in the Chinese text the "jia telegram." The use of these character to designate respectively the 19th and the 9th of the month is purely conventional, and we have therefore not translated or transcribed them here.

2. The five calamities are listed in the telegram from Zhu De and others, also dated November 9, which follows.

3. The reference is to a Chinese saying frequently quoted by Mao, to the effect that when the snipe grapples with the clam, only the fisherman benefits. See above, the texts of June 10 and September 28, 1939.
3. On the tenth, Ye Xiuyi will go to Shangrao (in Jiangxi) to meet with Gu. The plan is to talk about such conditions as expenses for moving the troops, supplements for military necessities, guaranteed safe passage, and a short stop in southern Jiangsu.

4. It is reported that Li Zongren is about to go from Guangxi to Lihuang for a meeting. If he passes through Chongqing, please have a sincere talk with him. Whether or not Tang Enbo has moved, we have just sent an inquiry to Luoyang and have not yet received a reply. Please investigate in Chongqing and report. Whether or not Tang has moved will be an indication of whether or not Chiang is resolved to attack. We judge that, before our telegraphic reply expressing our attitude has been sent, Tang would probably just make preparations to move and would not actually move. Therefore we should find a way to act that will cause him not to move. Please consider whether or not we can indicate to Zhang Chong that if Tang advances east it will be very difficult to avoid hostilities, that if the southern Anhui forces move north it will also be hard to avoid unexpected turns, and that our side will not take responsibility for any of this. Can you inform the two Mas and others of the seriousness of the situation and ask them to find a way to ease the situation and keep the two armies of Tang [Enbo] and Tan from moving east? (Tan Lianfang’s two divisions reached Shangcheng and Gushi two weeks ago, and they are still resting and reorganizing. Tan and his two division commanders, Zhang and Lin, have all gone to Lihuang for meetings.)

5. Hu Fu (Liu Shaoqi) has already reached Yancheng and right now is meeting with [Huang] Kecheng and Chen Yi in preparing to deal with attacks by Tang and Tan. They plan, if Tang and Tan attack, to move to take care of Han Deqin immediately, which is also a matter of serious concern for Chiang and Gu [Zhuotong]. Please consider making an appropriate gesture that might put off their attacks.

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4. Xiuyi is the zì of Ye Ting.
5. A xiàn in western Anhui.
7. Tan Lianfang (d. 1958) was at this time the commander of the Guomindang 84th Army.

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**Telegram from Zhu De and Others to He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi**

(October 9, 1940)

To Chief of Staff Ye Jianying of the Eighteenth Army Group in Chongqing, to be forwarded immediately to Chief of the General Staff He Jingzhi and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Bai Jiansheng for their inspection:

We have received and respectfully read the telegram (of October 19) from you two gentlemen, which was forwarded to us by Chief of Staff Ye. Since this is a matter of crucial importance arising at a critical moment for our national survival, and in consideration of the overall interests and to save the nation from peril, after discussions among all of us via telegram, we have reached a consensus and are hereby sending you our response and respectfully await your further instructions. We beg of you as well to transmit this message to the Generalissimo for his honorable examination and venerable direction.

1. With regard to operations. All troops in our army have always regarded as their sole task adhering to national policy, obeying orders, and persisting in the War of Resistance. Over the course of the past four years, we have resisted great numbers of enemy troops and regained large amounts of lost territory, and all such battle victories are there for the whole nation to see. They have also been the object of clear orders from the Supreme Command, issued repeatedly, for commendation. The recent Hundred Regiments Offensive in North China is such an example. Two and a half months have passed since its beginning on August 20, and it has just entered the second stage. We have received explicit orders from the Supreme Command on this, which spurred us on to no end, making the entire army feel moved and inspired. Another example that also took place in the most recent

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Our source for this telegram is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 310–15, where it is reproduced from the text published on November 17, 1940, in *Xin Zhonghua bao*, with corrections based on the documentary collection *Liuda yilai*.

1. Although Mao’s signature does not appear on this telegram, a note to the text in *Mao Zedong wenji* confirms that he drafted it. For Mao to have signed it would not have been appropriate, for that would have implied lowering himself to the same level as He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, to whom this reply to their telegram of October 19 is addressed. Not having either Chiang’s or Mao’s name on these two documents also left both sides room for maneuver.
period is the campaigns in eastern and southern Anhui, in which the enemy’s offensives were shattered. Such things are enumerated here not because we dare to brag about our own meritorious achievements but, rather, out of a desire to make clear that our resolve to follow national policy and obey orders and to fight to the finish to defend the nation and the country actually is in effect throughout the entire army, from top to bottom, and that even the slightest deviation would not be permitted. There was once an instance of discord between one unit and that of another army, as pointed to in your honorable telegram, and mention of it causes heartfelt sorrow. We have long since gone on record repeatedly to explain clearly the reasons for its occurrence and the measures to ameliorate it. As for the recent incident in northern Jiangsu, we have explained everything in detail by telegram on the 21st to the Supreme Command. The southern Shandong incident also had complex causes which merit special attention. Apart from ordering our troops in this region to obey your orders and to act with restraint, our intention is to ask the Center to select and dispatch an impartial high official to make a thorough investigation. If the blame is found to belong with our army, we will certainly not shield them but are, rather, willing to accept punishment under the laws of the land. If blame is found to lie with the other side, we pray that it will be handled in like manner so as to clarify responsibility in the matter. As the ancients are known to have said, hearing both sides provides clarity, whereas hearing only one yields darkness. In any event, the highest value of using reason lies in arriving at justice. Especially when fighting a resistance war under extreme duress in the enemy’s rear, more friction means that many more difficulties, so that no one, unless he fails to take the interests of the whole into consideration and makes it his business to create friction, is unwilling to do away with disputes and unite to face the enemy. For this reason, we advocate a thorough investigation into the facts of the case in the hopes of putting a final end to disputes for the sake of the War of Resistance. In the event that we are fortunate enough to be granted your approval, we entreat you to see to the implementation.

2. With regard to defense stations. As for the measures enumerated in the Center’s guidelines, ever since they were relayed by Comrade Zhou Enlai between July and August we have taken them as the Center’s will and, as such, that which must be followed. Yet a subordinate’s difficulties that he is reluctant to mention are better reported to his superiors. The fact is that most of the troops in the enemy’s rear in Central China are local people organized for the purpose of resisting the enemy bandits and defending their homeland. They are so tied to the tombs of their ancestors, their farmland and dwellings, their parents, wives, and children that for them to put aside what the enemy is doing right in front of their eyes in brutally raping, burning, and pillaging, and to go instead to far away North China would be something difficult in the extreme. As for the Supreme Command’s in-

structions as conveyed in the Lushan talk and the open letter to the people in the occupied territories, they have been following them to the letter with utmost sincerity. For them to be suddenly ordered to leave their native places and forced onto the road is a miserable thing indeed. Ever since the Pingjiang massacre and the Queshan massacre, all over in the rear areas of the New Fourth Army, such as in southern Jiangxi, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, eastern Hubei, western Anhui, and southern Henan, their family members and the rear personnel have been flagrantly trampled upon without the slightest protection. And now that the various troops in Central China are about to be moved north, they are extremely afraid of following the same disastrous course, so that to a man they turn pale at its very mention. All the more because the North China region has been struck at once by the five calamities of flood, drought, windstorms, insect invasions, and enemy aggression, the people are subsisting on leaves, and many are starving to death. In this area both the military and civilians are having severe difficulty carrying on; some have asked to be moved south, and some have asked to be transferred elsewhere. For our part we have been making efforts to stop this, urging them to stick it out through the hardships, and it truly would be extremely difficult to accommodate any troops. For all these various reasons, Enlai was asked to inform the Center and to request permission for the various units both north and south of the Yangzi to remain where they are to fight the War of Resistance. Once the enemy has been driven out of the country and the War of Resistance has been victorious, there will naturally be transfers of troops so as to have concentrated defense sites. Now we have received the telegram with instructions to move north by a certain date. We have weighed the matter over and over in our minds and believe that there is carrying out orders and there is deferring to public opinion and sentiment, and request that the Center take both into consideration. As far as the regular forces south of the Yangzi are concerned, our intention is to make every effort to persuade them to take the interests of the whole into consideration and move north as ordered. Still we sincerely hope that the Center will extend the time limit so that explanations may be made in depth and so that further untoward incidents, which would only add to our already considerable guilt, can be avoided.

3. The reference is to Chiang Kaishek’s talk of July 17, 1937, from Lushan, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in which he called for a resolute war of resistance in response to the Japanese aggression. For Mao’s reaction at the time see, in Volume V, the text of July 23, 1937.

4. In this letter, dated August 13, 1938, Chiang declared that, in thirteen months of war, military, strategic, spiritual, and diplomatic victories had been achieved and he called on the people of the occupied territories to struggle resolutely to the end.

5. For details on this incident, which took place on June 12, 1939, see the relevant note to the text dated August 1, 1939, “The Reactionaries Must Be Punished in Accordance with the Law of the Land.”

6. The Queshan massacre involved a surprise attack by Guomindang forces on a Communist guerrilla column in Shandong, in which more than 400 soldiers were killed.

2. “Center” refers, of course, to the central authorities of the Guomindang.
As for the troops north of the River, for the time being we wish to request that they be exempted from transfer, to hold them responsible for strictly maintaining military discipline, to make agreements with friendly armies, to intensify counterattacks on the enemy, to cooperate with the fighting at the front, all of which is so as to avoid acting in undue haste and inviting more trouble. We have expended exhausting efforts in this matter. Wishing to take the interests of the localities into account, we were afraid that we might be going against orders from the Center; desiring to follow orders, we feared that we might lose the local people’s hearts and minds. And the victory of the War of Resistance depends entirely upon the support of the people, which is something of which you two gentlemen are well aware, as your lofty vantage point affords you a far-sighted vision. Right now is a time when both Chinese traitors and puppet troops are acting outrageously and rumors are rife, so it is most advantageous to coordinate on all sides and unite against the enemy so as to avoid being tricked by the enemy and bringing on ourselves the disaster of fragmenting into a million pieces. What must not be allowed is becoming pressed to the limit so that mutual agitation arises, which would lead to mutual defeat and damage to both sides. Such a situation is not the original wish of the Center, and it likewise violates our original intention. We would be the snipe and clamb to the enemy’s fisherman, the result would be in violation of our intent, and by that time it would be too late to regret. These words are straight from our hearts, and we wanted very much to share them with you two gentlemen. The two of you gentlemen have minds as open as a valley and always have the overall situation at heart, so you are surely capable of maintaining harmony and stability in remedying the current difficult situation, and we need not go on at length here.

3. With regard to the authorized strength of the army. Because our forces are isolated in the enemy’s rear, if we are to maximize our destruction of enemy troops and fulfill the strategic tasks entrusted to us by the Generalissimo, we have to act according to the Three People’s Principles as well as the principles expressed in the Guidelines for the War of Resistance and Building the Country, to rouse the popular masses and organize guerrilla forces. For this reason we have exceeded our original recruitment figures, but this close interrelationship between the task and the organization [of troops] is something that can hardly be avoided. Yet of our current 500,000 troops, only 450,000 are provisioned, and no one, however clever, can make bricks without straw, so we have had no choice but to seek help from the popular masses. As a result, in places in the enemy’s rear where there are only enemy bandits and no friendly armies, after driving out the bandits we have set up anti-Japanese political régimes, created anti-Japanese base areas, used the clothing and food of the popular masses to provide them with their own armed forces to resist the cruel and vicious bandits and defend their own homelands, so there is truly no cause for much criticism in all this. Our clothing is spare and our food meager, but we fight with all our might and have suffered the worst possible hardships known in this world. Yet we are not legally recognized, nor are we assisted by the rear areas, and such spiritual suffering is painful in the extreme. This is why we took action to ask for permission from the Center to expand our military organization. Also with the interests of the whole in mind, the Center granted us permission to expand as necessary, as indicated in the proposal, and, upon hearing the news, our army was deeply pleased and jubilant. What we seek here is that it be carried out at the earliest possible date, and we also request that figures for expansion be appropriately increased so as to provide comfort to the minds of the officers and soldiers at the front, and also to train for the nation a reliable force in the War of Resistance. Not only is it the case that the bow lost by a man of Chu will be found by a man of Chu, but it is also true that we harbor no intention here of comparing relative merits. Our true purpose is, rather, to defend the country and our homelands, which is precisely why we trust in the judgment of a great leader.

4. With regard to supplies. The hardships in the enemy’s rear are as described above, but what we lack in particular is ammunition, medical supplies, and so on. For the last fourteen months our army has not been issued a single bullet or a single dose of medicine. There are those with only four or five rounds of ammunition left in their guns, and some whose wounds have been treated with medication only once or twice, so that we have had to rely mainly upon hand-to-hand combat, and leave the wounded to their own devices. Although we are well aware that the Center also finds itself in dire circumstances, we are compelled to report to higher levels the special difficulties of our troops in the hope that we may attain some modicum of assistance in the midst of our trials. As for various other supplies, we have previously made a detailed list and submitted it, and we respectfully request that these be dealt with together.

5. With regard to the border regions. The case of the twenty-three xian in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region has been left in a state of indecision for more than four years now. Recently, however, more than 200,000 troops have been stationed around the border region, and civilians have been mobilized to build five blockade lines. They start from Ningxia in the west, go along the Jingshui River in the south, and end on the banks of the Yellow River in the east, and cover several provinces. The project is on a huge scale and the expenditures are enormous, amounting to the building of another Great Wall. Yet the young students traveling a long way from the north and personnel from our army going back and forth have

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7. This document, promulgated by a provisional congress of the Guomindang in March 1938, dealt with military, political, economic, and diplomatic policies in the war against Japan and contained a guarantee of basic rights to the citizens.

8. This is an allusion to a story recounted in the Shuo yuan of the Han dynasty writer Liu Xiang about a king of Chu who lost a bow. His attendants looked everywhere for it, but the king said, “The bow of a man of Chu will be found by a man of Chu, so why bother looking for it?” This has become a commonly used expression meaning that such losses and gains are of no importance so long as both parties are on the same side.
been detained, assassinated, or confined in concentration camps. These roads have become the object of alarm and suspicion; nobody talks about a large-scale attack, only about preparing for a compromise. Such talk goes against our grain, but it is most difficult to refute. But because the case is still pending, and there is the blockade on top of that, weakness lends wings to rumors, suspicions can easily arise, and it seems hardly surprising that it should be so. It stands to reason that we should sincerely implore the Center to provide a resolution to the suspended case and put an end to the blockade so as to eliminate the doubts of the troops and the people and strengthen the basis of our cooperation. These are truly simple things to accomplish.

6. With regard to the grand plan of uniting for a war of resistance. We believe that, as far as the War of Resistance is concerned, today is truly a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to win final victory. Given that an expanded and prolonged imperialist war has already become a reality, the Japanese bandits are busy dealing with the serious situation in the Pacific, so if a national policy of uniting to fight a resistance war can be maintained without compromising halfway or courting the disaster of fragmentation, then under the leadership of our highest leader and the Central Government, our Chinese nation is bound to be able to find the way toward independence and liberation. Because of the various international and domestic conspiracies taking place over the past few months, however, we strongly feel that there are words we cannot keep to ourselves. We have heard it said repeatedly that the Japanese bandits are scheming for China to surrender, that they are trying both soft measures and tough ones, applying lures and pressure at the same time. Germany, on the other hand, has adopted a policy of persuasion, wishing to seduce China into joining the three-nation alliance. A certain number of people inside the country, moreover, are again plotting a so-called anti-Communist upsurge in an attempt to pave the way for surrender. There are those working hand-in-glove both within the country and without in an attempt to bring to an end the War of Resistance by means of a so-called joint Sino-Japanese "suppression of the Communists," to replace the War of Resistance with a civil war, to replace independence with surrender, unity with fragmentation, and to turn light into darkness. The situation is so perilous and the plot so vicious that everyone is discussing it, and people's hearts are filled with terror. This critical situation is truly unprecedented in its severity. We have been doing battle from place to place all our lives and do not begrudge spilling our blood and dying ten thousand deaths for the sake of our country. We seek only unity within the country, not courting fragmentation, continuation of the War of Resistance, and sticking to national policy. For this reason we are doing our best to act according to all instructions from the Supreme Command and to speedily overcome the weaknesses of our subordinates. We also implore the Center to clarify its guidelines with regard to the current situation and trends, refuse to participate in the international conspiracy, check the forces of reaction within the country, and refute the rumors about a joint "Communist suppression," civil war, and surrender, so as to ease the minds of all the nation's
To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying on the Problem of Asking Gu Zhutong at the Negotiations to Stop the Two Armies of Tang and Tan from Advancing Eastward

(November 10, 1940)

When [Ye] Xiyi meets Gu, please ask that Gu send a telegram to Chiang [Kaishek] to stop the armies of Tang Enbo and Tan Lianfang from advancing eastward. Otherwise this will lead to hostilities, for which the other side will be responsible. Two divisions of Tan’s army have already reached Shangcheng and Gushi [in southeastern Henan], and Tan and all of his division commanders have gathered in Lihuang in preparation for an attack on eastern Anhui. Nine divisions of Tang’s army at Nanyang are planning to move eastward, and the situation is very tense. Please question Gu as to the motivation for, on the one hand, talking peace in northern Jiangsu and in southern Anhui ordering us to move northward while, on the other hand, deploying a large army of 200,000 to advance eastward. Does this mean that the other side is already preparing to effect a split? During the negotiations Xiyi should place this overall situation in the number one position. All the rest are secondary questions.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Peng Dehuai on Work Arrangements Following the Telegram of the 9th

(November 13, 1940)

In accordance with the Central Committee’s November 7 directive and the political position taken in the “telegram of the 9th” in reply to He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi], jointly signed by Zhu, Peng, Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] (this telegram will be sent out to you within the next few days), the decision has been taken to wage a defensive battle in self-protection against the military attacks launched by the Guomindang in Central China. With regard to our military forces, except for redeploying the troops of Chen [Yi] and Luo [Ruiqing], all units in North China will not move for the time being. Apart from this, in Chongqing and other places united front activities shall proceed for the purpose of gaining a politically reasonable and advantageous position and keeping the War of Resistance going for a period of time. This possibility has not yet been altogether lost.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 203, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. I.e., Ye Ting. (See above, the first text of November 9, 1940.)
Directive on Launching a Large-scale Antisurrender and Anti-Civil War Movement to Counter Chiang Kaishek’s Anti-Communist High Tide

(November 15, 1940)

1. In accordance with the Central Committee’s November 7 directive on the current situation and the political stance adopted in the “telegram of the 9th” in reply to He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi], jointly signed by Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai], Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying], with regard to Chiang Kaishek’s present anti-Communist attack, it has been decided to adopt a policy of concessions in southern Anhui (i.e., to move northward) and a policy of self-defense in Central China and on a nationwide basis to launch a large-scale movement against surrender and civil war. This is in order to win over the middle-of-the-road forces, to strike a blow against the plots and provocations of He Yingqin’s pro-Japanese faction, to neutralize Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Communist assault, and to keep the resistance to Japan and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party going for a period of time so as to gain for ourselves a reasonable and favorable position in the country as a whole.

2. Chiang has already resolved to put pressure on Central China, so we must therefore prepare ourselves actively for self-defense. But Chiang also faces some difficulties in his attacks:

First, if we adopt a moderate attitude, He Yingqin will be deprived of a pretext for his provocations (although other pretexts can always be found), and Chiang Kaishek and Bai Chongxi will have to take into consideration the position of the middle-of-the-road forces. For this reason we should make known very widely the contents of the November 9 telegram so as to deprive Chiang, He, and Bai of their political capital.

Second, Chiang Kaishek is very much afraid of the Eighth Route Army’s moving southward and especially of our striking out suddenly from Xi’an. So we should spread propaganda to the effect that, if the other side attacks the New Fourth Army, the Eighth Route Army cannot sit idly by and watch without going to its rescue and request that the other side halt the actions of their twenty-nine divisions, because otherwise the Eighth Route Army will not let the New Fourth Army take a beating. This sort of attitude should be appropriately disseminated all around as an offensive stance toward the diehards [X][X][X], so that they will have something to fear and not dare act foolishly.

Third, Chiang Kaishek is afraid that we will not move from southern Anhui but, rather, disrupt his rear area. For this reason we must, on the one hand, make earnest preparations for moving our southern Anhui troops northward so that this can be offered as a condition in exchange for the other side to ease up on its attacks and, at the same time, demand that the other side promise to halt all military actions in Central China in exchange for our side’s withdrawal of its troops from southern Anhui.

Fourth, both Chiang Kaishek and Gu Zhutong are afraid that we might wipe out Han Deqing. Hence we should spread the following impression all over: that we have resolved the Northern Jiangsu Incident peacefully in accordance with orders and will let bygones be bygones, but if Tang [Enbo], Li [Pinxian], Huo [Shouyi], and Mo (Dehong) do not halt their attacks, we will have no choice but to attack Han Deqing. This impression should be created especially by beginning directly with Han himself and with Gu Zhutong, as an indication that we can continue to protect Han Deqing’s safety, but in exchange for halting the attacks of Tang, Li, Huo, and Mo.

Fifth, Chiang Kaishek faces another difficulty in his attacks, which is that until he has actually settled on any conditions with the Japanese (if conditions were agreed upon, the whole situation would be greatly changed), his theater of operations for Communist suppression is full of inconveniences. His large forces advancing eastward will have difficulty getting through the two Japanese blockade lines, the Huainan railroad and the Tianjin-Pukou railroad; his large forces advancing northward would also have trouble getting through the enemy’s fortress at Huohe and the enemy bases to the north. If they were to use only small units, such

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 207–9, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
1. See above, the translation of this text.
2. This directive was issued in the aftermath of the Communist victory at Huangqiao and of the “October 19 message” it called forth, when the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi was seeking to calm the situation and consolidate its gains, and the danger to Xiang Ying and the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui was growing. Mao is here offering to move the southern forces north of the river in return for cessation of the Guomindang moves against the improved position of the Communists in central and northern Jiangsu.
3. Regarding Tang Enbo, see above, the relevant note to the text of September 19, 1940.
4. Regarding Li Pinxian, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1940.
5. Huo Shouyi, a native of Liaoning, had served under Zhang Xueliang and was a divisional commander in the Northeast Army.
6. Mo Dehong (1894–1951), a native of Guangxi, had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the campaigns of “Encirclement and Suppression” against the Red Army. He was the commander of the 138th Army.
as those of Huo, Mo, and others, our guerrilla detachments would be more than sufficient to deal with them. For this reason, with regard to all forces that are approaching near at hand, such as those of Huo, Mo, He [Zhuguo], Sun [Tongxian], and Ma [Biao], our propaganda should stress that there should not be civil war in the face of a great enemy. In addition, united front work is to be intensified. When their smaller units (such as those of Huo and Mo) attack, we will use only our multitudinous guerrilla forces to pester them (such guerrilla forces play a role primarily as propaganda teams) and avoid doing battle with them face to face and damaging our relationship with the Guizhou faction and the Northeast Army, so as to leave room to bargain with them in the future. At the same time, it should be explained that eastern Anhui is a defense station assigned to the New Fourth Army by the late Chairman Liao, and that northeastern Anhui was recognized by the commander of the guards as a guerrilla area for Peng’s forces. In sum, in these areas we want to ensure that our military forces and the people have plenty of plausible arguments and the attackers haven’t a leg to stand on.

3. If we do a good job in all these respects, it will be possible to beat back the anti-Communist high tide this time, even though we certainly should not figure that Chiang will give up his policy of suppressing us (this is absolutely impossible) and must even be prepared to deal with the darkest possible scenario, which is surrender and a pincer attack. Please give serious thought to the above opinions and act accordingly.

It Is of the Greatest Importance to Conduct United Front Work Among the Huangpu Faction of Military Men

(November 16, 1940)

In the recent Northern Jiangsu Incident, the Tax and Garrison Regiment did not participate in the anti-Communist battles, although the majority of the officers in this regiment are graduates of the Huangpu [Academy]. In the past, when there was a confrontation with Zhu Huaibing in North China, one division also did not participate in the anti-Communist warfare, and there were likewise some Huangpu graduates among the officers in that division. Comrade Wang Shiyig, head of our liaison office stationed with Yan [Xishan]’s forces, is able to do very good united front work with the senior cadres in the Central Army there (Hu Zongnan) who are Huangpu graduates. All this shows that the long-standing idea in our Party and our army that Huangpu graduates are uniformly to be regarded as an anti-Communist clique is wrong and is harmful. Given the current critical situation, it is a matter of urgency that this way of thinking be changed, that advantage be taken of every opportunity to conduct united front work with military men who are Huangpu graduates. They should not be provoked but, rather, should be inspired with the idea of the supremacy of the nation so that they will refuse to surrender to the Japanese and so that they will adopt a neutral or passive attitude toward the anti-Communist fight. This has great significance in reversing the current perilous situation.

Mao Zedong
Zhu De
Wang Jiaxiang

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 581–82, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Commanded by Chen Taiyun; see above, the relevant note to the text of November 4, 1940.

The Tasks of the Troops in North China
This Winter

(November 16, 1940)

To all units in North China and Shandong:

Under the present situation, important domestic incidents are about to take place, and the enemy's "mopping-up" operations this winter will be even more cruel. The tasks of the troops in North China this winter are as follows:

1. Persist in the War of Resistance and fight against the enemy's winter "mopping-up" operations.

2. Carry out a winter military recruitment campaign and add enough soldiers to the presently existing units. It would be even better if we could establish supplementary battalions. But in the work of recruiting soldiers, attention should be paid to manpower in the base areas, and more recruitment should be done in border areas and densely populated regions.

3. Efforts are to be made to gain time for rest and reconsolidation of the ranks. Carry on fighting and reconsolidation at the same time and have all or most of the troops rested and reconsolidated during the intervals of fighting against the "mopping up." Make sure that our main forces are able to sustain the fighting at the same time as they maintain their energies so as to deal with possible sudden incidents.

4. Strengthen the political work and transmit in depth the Center's evaluation of the current situation and its various policies. Make sure that all officers and soldiers unite as one and prevent the occurrence of such sentiments as pessimism, disappointment, and hopelessness because of increased difficulties of resistance in the enemy's rear and tensions in the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists. Be on guard, at the same time, against possible opportunistic sabotage within our army by Japanese bandit agents and Guomindang spy agents and prevent the repeated occurrence of ultraleft mistakes.

5. Strengthen the unity of the cadres and the unity of the Party. In a difficult environment, cadres must be dealt with in a correct relationship. Those who are indeed irresponsible and consequently unable to fulfill their duties should certainly be criticized and punished, but those who cannot discharge their duties be-

cause of objective difficulties or capabilities should not be further attacked. We must bear in mind the lessons learned when opposing the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign in the Central Soviet Area, where many of the cadres who were unable to fulfill their tasks because of objective difficulties were attacked and made to feel utterly hopeless. Now with increased difficulties, the spirit of sharing a common fate and common hardships with the cadres must be emphasized.

Mao Zedong
Zhu De
Wang Jiaxiang
Tan Zheng

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 579–80, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
Deployment for the Campaign in Northern Jiangsu

(November 19, 1940, between 9:00 and 11:00 p.m.)

To Hu [Fu], Chen [Yi], and Huang [Kecheng], and for the information of Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

We have taken note of your telegram.

1. It is possible that the general situation will change. Right now we are trying to stop the attack of Tang [Enbo] and Li [Pinxian].

2. For the short period of time immediately ahead, your general orientation is to consolidate the troops actively and wait calmly for changes. As long as the troops can fight, passivity can be turned into activity. The Huangqiao campaign is proof of this.

3. The main forces of the Fifth Column should be placed between Han [Deqin]'s and Huo [Shouyi]'s troops to cut off their communications. Under no circumstances can they be allowed to join together. If this can be achieved, the attitude of Huo's division may change for the better, and Han Deqin will also compromise.

4. In order to achieve this objective, you should set out at once to prepare for a local battle. That is, the main forces of the Fifth Column are to set out from Donggou and Yilin, take the two points of Fenggucun and Cheqiao by storm, and after that proceed to take the areas of Pingqiao, Yangnian, Huangpu, and Anfeng, and fight through to link up eastern Anhui and northern Jiangsu. You must complete preparations within five days after the arrival of this telegram and then wait for the order to attack. At present, Hu Zongnan has concentrated four divisions and is planning to attack our border region in central Shaanxi. After Hu has begun his attack, we will have reason to attack the aforementioned areas. The movement of Hu's divi-

sion southward and the advance of Mo's division eastward are your direct reasons. All of you, and especially Kecheng, should concentrate all your energies on waging this battle.

5. The fundamental orientation is still to win over Han and oppose Tang and Li. Following victory in the aforementioned battle, it is possible that Han will compromise.

6. To the west of the Tianjin-Pukou railway line, a resolute guerrilla war should be launched to halt the expansion of Mo Dehong. Capable people should go there and take command. Luo Binghui should return to eastern Anhui at once.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji. Vol. 2, pp. 583–84, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. See above, the relevant note to the text of October 9, 1940, and the discussion of this episode in the Introduction.

2. The places named here are in Jiangsu and run roughly south to north in the vicinity of the Grand Canal. Controlling them would effectively prevent the unwanted link-up between Huo Shouyi's forces from Anhui and those of Han Deqin, whose headquarters were located in Xinghua, directly east of Lake Gaoyou.

3. Mao intended to use the expected attack by Hu Zongnan against the border region as justification for the action to be taken in Jiangsu. In fact, Hu's attack never materialized.
To Zhou Enlai and Others on Smashing Chiang Kaishek’s Anti-Communist Conspiracies

(October 21, 1940)

1. As long as Chiang Kaishek has not compromised with Japan, a large-scale suppression of the Communists is not possible. All of his tactics are to scare us into making concessions. Sending the “October 19” telegram was for intimidation, He [Yingqin]’s speech at the commemorative meeting was for intimidation, and the eastward advance of Tang [Enbo] and Li [Pinxian] was also for intimidation. Hu Zongnan’s consolidating four divisions to attack the central Shaanxi plain was for intimidation, and ordering Li Kenong to close his office was a scare tactic as well. He may very well do more things in addition to scare people. Besides intimidation, there is one more trick up his sleeve, which is to blockade. There are no other reliable measures (although it is of course still possible to attack Zhang Yunyi and Peng Xuefeng). Many middle-of-the-roaders have been scared by him and have all asked me to make concessions, so I have needed to find good ways of explaining things to them.

Aside from expressing conciliation in the text of the “November 9” telegram, and a very small concession on southern Anhui (actually we have been intending to move northward for a long time, but are now delaying for another month or two on purpose), we will not yield even an inch. Anyone who attacks us will be crushed. We have already prepared an iron hammer, and, as soon as the political conditions are ripe, we are sure to deal him a heavy blow. At present all our propaganda literature is for the purpose of ripening this political condition.

2. Aside from He Yingqin’s having other schemes up his sleeve (to instigate civil war), Chiang Kaishek must have secretly told Bai Chongxi about his magic weapon (intimidating the Communists into making concessions), so Bai is making a show of being serious about this. Actually Bai does not want to fight. He is really afraid that fighting might actually break out. So we should make use of this weakness to frighten Bai. We should use our own magic weapons to frighten, in turn, all those other than Bai who are trying to scare us. Our magic weapons are the expressions of indignation on the part of the lower-ranking officers and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; their requests to be transferred southward; that we have not been issued any ammunition for fourteen months; that there is no food to eat in North China; that if Tang and Li move eastward, there is bound to be a great conflict and the peace of northern Jiangsu would be broken; that northern Shaanxi has suffered severe famine this winter and the famine victims have requested to be moved to other places for food, and so on.

These [X] [X] [X] political offensives should also be put before those naive middle-of-the-roaders so as to arouse their concern so that they will influence that old scoundrel, Chiang Kaishek.

3. Hu Zongnan has already given orders to the Twentieth-Eighth Division, the Twenty-Fourth Division, the Preparatory Third Division, and the Eighth Division to prepare to attack the gourd-shaped region between the three points of Yijun, Chunhua, and Zhengning.1 There will probably be a sudden attack within one or two weeks. Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] has already sent a telegram to Hu Zongnan and asked him to call a halt to it, at the same time as he has prepared a portion of the army to counterattack it. As soon as Hu starts something, we will respond by launching a partial battle in northern Jiangsu. In order to frustrate Han [Deqin]’s and Huo [Shouyi]’s purpose of opening up Anhui and Jiangsu, we will suddenly occupy a place between Zhunyi and Baoying.2 If we succeed, Huo will definitely turn friendly and Han will be subdued. The immediate rationale is that Huo Shouyi attacks our Peng Mingzhi,3 and that Mo Dehong attacks our Zhang Yunyi. Right now we need to make this rationale widely known.

4. Only when we couple soft measures with hard ones and work along both lines can we crush Chiang Kaishek’s schemes, stop He Yingqin’s surrender, and win over the middle-of-the-roaders to our side. Neither soft tactics alone nor hard tactics alone will enable us to reach our goal.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 211–12, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

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1. These are three xian towns in west-central Shaanxi and neighboring Gansu, where Guomindang forces under Li Zongren were probing.
2. Zhunyi and Baoying are in Jiangsu, near the Grand Canal.
3. Peng Mingzhi (1907–1993), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in the Nan chang Uprising. At this time he was commander of the Seventh Brigade of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army.
All Our Units in Southern Anhui Must Move Away by the End of December

(November 24, 1940, 2:00 A.M.)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

1. You must prepare to complete moving away all troops by the end of December.
2. Xiyi [Ye Ting] must lead one unit to set out at once.
3. Everything must be completely taken care of within twenty days.


The Essence of Chiang Kaishek’s Current Anti-Communist Policies and Our Basic Orientation

(November 30, 1940, between 1:00 and 3:00 A.M.)

To Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying], and for transmittal to [Peng] Dehuai, Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], and Xiang Ying:

We have taken note of your telegram of the 29th. This time our plan is to send two telegrams. One is to He Yingqin, specifically asking him his rationale for halting distribution of military provisions [to us]. This telegram was already dispatched directly to He yesterday and is being sent at the same time to you and in a circular telegram to the whole nation. Please let us know when you receive it. The other telegram is to Chiang [Kaishek]. I hesitated over this for two days, but, after receiving your telegram, decided to send it out today, also directly to Chiang and to you as well, and then dispatch a circular telegram after a slight delay. This time Chiang, He, and Bai [Chongxi] all worked hand in glove, using such measures as the telegram of [October] 19th, transferring troops, halting provisions, manipulating the atmosphere, and threatening our liaison offices. All were aimed at frightening us into making concessions, and they actually have no other magic weapons. Li Renchao’s estimate is absolutely correct and is what we have always said, which is that they can neither surrender nor “suppress the Communists.” This possibility still exists. He only has scare tactics—he is trying to scare Japan, and he is trying to scare us too. Except for these hooligan’s tricks, he has no other way out. Chiang’s current characteristic is lack of stability both internally and externally (beset by both internal and external crises). Under his rule, nothing is stable, be it military and political affairs, financial and economic matters, culture, or popular sentiment. These crises are unprecedented in Chiang’s history, and this is the internal instability. He has no line of defense against the enemy or against us, and this is the external instability. For the purposes of resolving these crises and stabilizing the internal and external lines of defense, they have formed the alliance of Chiang, Guangxi, and He (the anti-Communist united front of the big bourgeoisie, whereas He and Bai have other objectives). Their central strategy is an offensive defense or

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 585, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original preserved in the Central Archives.
pursuing the goal of defense through the use of offensive measures, but absolutely not an overall strategic offensive, because this is impossible. All their scare tactics and possible partial attacks against us have an offensive character. And they are building blockade lines along the Jing River, the Wei River, the Yellow River, the Huai River, and the Huainan railroad to achieve their goal of strengthening external lines of defense, so as to create an anti-Communist atmosphere, restrict our activities, organize an anti-Communist alliance (on the basis of the alliance of Chiang, Guangxi, and He), and achieve their goal of strengthening the internal lines of defense. He is able to accomplish both of these things, which broadly speaking means achieving his goal of defense. In essence, Chiang is the same as he was in the past. He remains unchanged. He still has the dual policy of resisting Japan and opposing the Communists, but toward Japan he is absolutely on the defensive (no offensive position whatsoever), while toward us he maintains an offensive position of defense. Thus the three points of (1) instability, (2) a dual policy, and (3) offensive defense sum up Chiang’s essence at present. Under these circumstances, our basic orientation is one of outward moderation but resistance in reality, some softness and some hardness, and giving tit for tat. Moderation is to win over the masses; resistance is to protect ourselves. Softness is to give him a chance to save face; hardness is to strike fear into his heart. As regards actual troop movements, only two regiments of the 115th Division will be involved; the rest will not be moved at all. But there should still be active preparations everywhere. Apart from dealing with local attacks, over 70,000 crack troops can be moved at any time to inflict a fierce and heavy blow on anyone who dares to launch a large-scale attack against us. The better prepared we are, the less likely they are to attack us, in accordance with the principle that where there is precaution, there is no danger. In reality, the scale of this anti-Communist attack cannot be greater than last time, but only smaller, because we have become stronger and they have become weaker. This last point should not be passed down to lower levels, to avoid laxity at lower levels. Feng Yuxiang’s estimate is wrong. The idea that, if provoked, he will tear off his mask and strike out at random emanates from those who are frightened by Chiang’s hooligans. Actually, Chiang is someone who excels at making calculations. He uses his hooligans only to scare people, but not to make policy.

Mao Zedong

To Zhou Wen

(November 30, 1940)

Comrade Zhou Wen:

I have read both Qunzhong bao and Dachong xizuo. Your work is significant and fruitful, and all of us are very pleased.

The characters on the cover of Dachong xizuo are not very well written. How would it be if you could please have them redone?

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 165, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Zhou Wen (1907–1952), original name He Kaiqiong, was a native of Sichuan. After arriving in Yan’an in 1940, he became head of the Education Department of the border region government and head of the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses.

2. The newspaper referred to here as Qunzhong bao (The Masses) is the Biana quanzhong bao (Border Region Masses), launched in March 1940 and aimed at a mass readership of workers and peasants. Dachong xizuo (Exercises in Composition for the Broad Masses), first published in August 1940, was a periodical intended to provide guidance to basic-level correspondents and beginning writers in improving their writing skills. Both were produced by the Society for Reading Materials for the Broad Masses.
To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong and Zhu De Concerning Agreement to the Actions and Deployment of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui

(November 30, 1940)

1. Your deployment for the 29th was quite correct.
2. The action in northern Jiangsu will not hurt the whole situation. A gap merely needs to be opened up between Huai’an and Baoying so as to cut off Han [Deqin] and Huo [Shuoyi] and join up Jiangsu and Anhui. Gu [Zhitong] and Han [Deqin] will scream a little, so you’ll just have to put up with that and be done with it.
3. There has been a break between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek], and a coming together between Japan and Wang [Jingwei], so the overall situation will be taking a new turn. Toward us Chiang will be even more at a loss. Your move northward will give him some more leeway. Judging from the overall situation, Chiang and Gu will not give you problems. If you start to move now in groups, and finish by the end of December, it will not be too late.

Speech at the Meeting Called by the Central Bureau of the Border Region Regarding Economic Self-Sufficiency

(December 3, 1940)

On the afternoon of December 3, the border region’s Central Bureau held a 1941 production mobilization meeting in its auditorium. . .

Comrade Mao Zedong is most concerned about the Production Movement. It is he himself who first called the Production Movement into existence. On this occasion, he found time to come here in the midst of his very busy schedule. When the chairman announced that Chairman Mao was invited to say a few words, thunderous applause resounded.

In his speech, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out:

Now, the work in the base areas can no longer be done crudely and carelessly. This must be replaced by work that is meticulously organized. The task of economic construction must, therefore, be put forward in a manner adapted to current circumstances.

He went on to say:

You must be considerate of others, get to know the people around you thoroughly, treat them each as a separate individual, and unite with them, for only thus can we make the revolution advance toward victory. Today, as we carry out economic construction, we must also understand this truth. An isolated loner can accomplish nothing.
To Xiang Ying Regarding Whether the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui Has Made Various Preparations to Cope with Sudden Emergencies

(December 3, 1940)

Please tell me what you think concerning the following:

1. When under attack by certain forces, do the military department and the southern Anhui troops have concrete ways to break through the enemy encirclement and avoid severe losses? With regard to these ways, is it more advantageous to move southward to wage guerrilla warfare or to join forces eastward with Chen Yi? Is it absolutely impossible to move northward by crossing the River?

2. Are the cadres within the Party fully prepared psychologically to confront the possible attack by a certain force?

3. Are there any high-ranking and middle-ranking progressive officials and troops among the friendly armies in southern Anhui and the regions south of the Yangzi who, determined to resist Japan and sympathetic with our Party, during a sudden emergency might provide cover for our troops or act in concert with our troops? How is our united front work among the friendly armies nearby?

4. What is the intention of a certain party [i.e., the Guomindang] in the Third War Zone? What is the attitude of the Central forces, such as Gu Zhutong, and so on? What is Huang Shaoxiong's attitude? Has the local Party, under the leadership of the Southeastern Bureau, made mental and practical preparations to deal with sudden incidents by reserving cadres and preserving strength?

The Various Policies That Should Be Carried Out in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas

(December 13, 1940)

To the Central China Bureau, and for the information of the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the Southeastern Bureau, the Southern Bureau, and the Southern Committee:

1. When organizing organs of political power and organs reflecting public opinion in northern Jiangsu, the “three-thirds” system should be resolutely carried out. Communist Party members should constitute only one-third, and it could even be fewer than one-third at the beginning. Enlist the participation of all leaders of every party and faction, and of those not affiliated with any party or faction, who are not actively anti-Communist. The middle and leftist factions of the Guomindang should be included. Members of the national bourgeoisie, such as Han Guojun, as well as enlightened landlords, should all participate. A few representatives of the rightists may also be allowed. In this way a united political power of all parties, factions, social groups, and armies can truly be organized, making every effort to avoid our being responsible for everything. This will have a great influence throughout the country.

2. Vigorously avoid ultra-leftism in the labor policy. Carry out only minor reforms for now. For example, reduce the fourteen-hour workday to thirteen hours or twelve hours, but do not implement the eight-hour system, so as to guarantee that the capitalists can still make money.

3. With regard to the land policy, a partial reduction in rent and interest should be carried out so as to win over the basic masses of the peasantry, but the reduction should not be too great. Do not make it impossible for peasants to borrow money because of the reduction in the interest rate. Do not confiscate the land of the landlords by canceling old debts. At the same time, peasants should be required to pay rent and interest, landlords’ ownership of the land should be guaranteed, and in principle management by the rich peasants should not be changed. It must be made clear within the Party as well as to the peasants that this is not the time to

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, p. 219, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Shaoxiong is an alternative ming for Huang Shaohong.
carry out a land revolution and the ultraleftist mistakes that have occurred in North China should be avoided.

4. We agree with Hu Fu’s ideas on tax collection methods. As long as no better methods have been devised, for the time being taxes should be collected by the old methods, except that exorbitant taxes and levies should be appropriately reduced.

5. The principle of the policy to eliminate traitors should be to suppress the few most reactionary elements who are hated by all, making great efforts to avoid killing too many people. No organs or groups except for the government are permitted to arrest and punish people at will.

6. The economic policy is to develop industrial and agricultural production as well as trade circulation to the greatest possible extent, to make every effort to avoid disrupting production and commerce, and to call upon the capitalists in Shanghai to set up enterprises in northern Jiangsu.

7. As for cultural and educational policies, only the cultural autocracy of the comprador big bourgeoisie should be eliminated, allowing the liberal thought of the national bourgeoisie to exist, and allowing liberal intellectuals and educators to run newspapers and schools.

8. In sum, at present your policy should be only to eliminate the autocracy of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the large feudal landlords, and to make initial improvements in the people’s livelihood. On the one hand, human rights, political rights, and property rights, as well as freedom of speech, association, and assembly for the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie are to be guaranteed. On the other hand, human rights, political rights, property rights, and freedom of speech, association, and assembly of all capitalists and landlords, with the exception of the Chinese traitors, should also be ensured. As long as they do not engage in armed uprising, any party or stratum has freedom of activity. The Guomindang should be allowed to exist and a progressive Guomindang should be organized.

9. The above-mentioned policies should be carried out throughout Central China (and, of course, the same is true for North China).

10. We look forward to frequent telegrams informing us as to how you are concretely carrying out these various policies.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Propose to the Guomindang That It Should Stop Its Attack on the New Fourth Army

(December 15, 1940)

The Southern Bureau and the Southeastern Bureau should raise the following to Gu Zhutong, He Yingqin, and the special committee of the [People’s] Political Council, respectively: north of the Yangzi in the three provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Hubei, massive attacks are being launched against the New Fourth Army; the army headquarters of the New Fourth Army and its three detachments in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu have been completely surrounded by central government troops, and there is news that an attack is about to begin. Please have them halt the attacks north of the Yangzi and withdraw the encirclements in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. The purpose of making this kind of proposal is to let a certain party know that we are prepared and to mitigate their initiatives in southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu. It is particularly necessary to mitigate Gu Zhutong’s initiatives in southern Anhui while the Eighth Route Army moves southward for reinforcements.

Secretariat of the Central Committee

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 589–90, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
The Southern Anhui Troops Must Cross the River with Utmost Speed

(December 16, 1940, 7:00 to 9:00 A.M.)

To Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi], and for transmittal to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

1. We have taken note of all your telegrams. Dispositions are to be made according to Hu Fu’s telegram of the 15th.1

2. Viewed from the standpoint of the overall situation, a large-scale “suppression of the Communists” is impossible, but a partial offensive is inevitable. The struggle in Central China is a long-term, protracted struggle, so we must possess determination and patience.

3. The troops in northern Jiangsu must train, consolidate, and expand their ranks in a hurry for a short period, and then have a unit of the main forces serve as reinforcements in eastern Anhui.

4. The southern Anhui troops must cross the Yangzi with utmost speed and become the core force for maintaining eastern Anhui. A large group of their cadres is to be assigned both to northern Jiangsu and to eastern Anhui to construct base areas.

5. Two regiments of the 115th Division are urged to hasten southward.


The Situation in Chongqing Is Serious.
Xiang Ying and Zeng Shan Should Not Leave the Army for the Moment

(December 18, 1940)2

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

1. The situation in Chongqing is serious. Neither Xiang nor Zeng should leave the army for the time being.

2. [Ye] Xiyi and a portion of the staff are to go northward; it is hoped that arrangements for this will be made quickly.

3. Secret documents must be burned and attacks strictly prevented.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 593, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 241, cites both this document and another of the same date, which reads as follows:

Your secret documents and reports should all be burned. You should absolutely not keep a shred of paper or a single word, in order to prevent its falling into enemy hands when you cross the blockade line. The code books should be carried personally by a trustworthy person.

The authors and recipients are the same as those of the text translated above. We have not presented this second document separately, because there is no assurance that the passage quoted in Nianpu is complete, though it may well be.

2. The reference is to Zeng Shan (1899–1972), a native of Jiangxi, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. At this time, he was deputy secretary of the Southeast Bureau of the Central Committee.
To Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on Arrangements to Meet Ye Ting on the Other Side of the Yangzi

(December 20, 1940)

1. According to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]'s report: Army Commander Ye and some of the cadres are planning to cross the Yangzi. You need to make careful arrangements along the banks of the Yangzi.

2. Transportation having been cut off, even if there are people in Yan'an they cannot be sent. Not until after the Seventh Congress would we be able to dispatch a group of people to make a detour through North China. The Center has already told the Northern Bureau to send a group of cadres to go southward.

3. When negotiating conditions with Han [Deqin] it will not do to be too harsh, and it is necessary to respect the interests of Li's and Chen's various units. The Xinghua and Gaoyou regions should be reserved for Han; our troops should stop outside the areas of Xinghua and Gaoyou. All fighting in northern Jiangsu should stop completely, in an effort to seek compromise and consolidate the positions already obtained.

Ye Ting Should Cross the River Quickly

(December 20, 1940, between 9:00 and 11:00 p.m.)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

[Ye] Xiyi had better cross the River as soon as possible and should not ask Chiang [Kai-shek]'s approval. If Chiang opposes it, then it is best not to cross the River. Careful arrangements have to be made along the River. Contact must be made quickly with Hu Fu and [Zhang] Yunyi so that they may prepare on the other side of the River.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, p. 223, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. These two towns are located just north of Yangzhou, in the middle of Jiangsu.
Do Not Declare That the Battle of the Hundred Regiments Has Been Concluded

(December 22, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Do not declare openly that the Battle of the Hundred Regiments¹ has been concluded. Chiang Kai-shek is about to launch an anti-Communist upsurge, and we still need to use publicity about the Battle of the Hundred Regiments to oppose him.


Work Hard to Strengthen the Bases in Northern Jiangsu

(December 23, 1940, between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M., in Yan’an)

Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi], Chen Yi, [Huang] Kecheng, [Peng] Xuefeng, and [Zhang] Yunyi:

1. We have taken note of both Hu Fu’s and Xuefeng’s telegrams.
2. At the moment the focus is on northern Jiangsu and, secondarily, on Huaihai and eastern Anhui. Therefore, Chen’s and Huang’s troops, as well as the additional two regiments of the 115th Division, should all concentrate in northern Jiangsu now, intensify reconsolidation and expansion, and work hard to strengthen the base areas in northern Jiangsu. They should, moreover, be prepared to get rid of Han Deqin first when Chiang Kaishan really begins to attack us in Huaihai and eastern Anhui (the Central Committee will make the final decision) and only as a second step march to Huaihai and eastern Anhui. This was suggested in Hu Fu’s last telegram, and we think that it is appropriate.
3. At the moment Huaihai and eastern Anhui must be sustained by Xuefeng’s and Yunyi’s troops alone. Whether the enemy or the diehard troops attack, they should all be handled with guerrilla warfare, and no reinforcements or assistance is to be expected. In North China reinforcement is impossible; nor is it appropriate.
4. Before Chiang Kaishan truly surrenders, a large-scale attack on us is impossible, since he does not have a convenient battlefield. Therefore, on the one hand, you should seriously prepare for Chiang Kaishan’s attack, never relaxing for a minute your own preparations. But, on the other hand, you should also be aware of Chiang Kaishan’s difficulties. He has numerous difficulties, among them the lack of a convenient battlefield, and with the enemy’s occupation of Woyang and Mengcheng, this difficulty has increased. So you may well take advantage of this opportunity to prepare everything actively, including expanding and reconsolidating the troops, and strengthening and developing the base areas.
5. As your forces become more expanded, better trained, and stronger, and your base areas become more developed and consolidated, no attack need be feared.

¹ Our source for this text is Baituan dazhan lishi wenxian ziliao xuanbian (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1990), p. 14.
2. Regarding the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, see above, Part III of the Introduction to this volume.
In this way, careful expansion and reconsolidation of the troops and careful development and consolidation of the base areas constitute reliable capital in shattering any attack.

6. At present the enemy is attacking to the west of the Wohe River, and this presents a favorable opportunity for Xuefeng to expand his area and reconsolidate the troops, and to develop and consolidate the base areas. In the eastern Anhui region, aside from using one strong unit to deal with the invasion of Mo Dehong’s troops and also sending capable personnel to take command, arrangements should also be made according to these overall guidelines.

7. To recruit soldiers and consolidate the base areas, it is necessary to mobilize the ordinary masses and to mobilize the ordinary masses it is necessary to bring some benefit to the masses and necessary to suppress the reactionary elements. This task has two aspects to it. One aspect is that it is necessary to pay attention to the united front policy with regard to parties and society and to be on guard against ultraleft tendencies. The other aspect is that, toward reactionary elements who stand in the way of our mobilizing the ordinary masses, it is necessary to apply resolute suppression (which of course does not mean to kill every one of them), as otherwise it would be impossible to mobilize the masses and consolidate the base areas. As for the local bandits, they must be suppressed and eliminated.


To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About How the New Fourth Army Must Move Immediately in Groups

(December 24, 1940)

Start moving in groups immediately; otherwise, once the battles begin, the non-combatant personnel and supplies will certainly be dispersed.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 227, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian. The date has been corrected on the basis of Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 228.
A General Notice Concerning the Attitude of
All the Guomindang Factions and the
Circumstances of Our Deployment

(December 25, 1940)

1. Chiang Kaishek’s internal and external situations are such that he can only adopt a position of offensive defense, making a lot of noise but fighting very little. So it is best to stall with a telegram in answer; let’s stall until the end of January and see.

2. Hu Zongnan completely lacks any intention to fight, and from this we can tell about the rest of the Central Army as well. If Bai Chongxi softens as well, the other side will be forced to make an about-face themselves.

3. Both He Yingqin’s faction and the CC Clique want to fight, and both are pro-Japanese. But if the Central Army and the Guangxi Army are not willing to fight, then the pro-Japanese factions can do nothing. So it is hoped that some means will be found to inform the leading generals of the Central Army and the Guangxi Army about the pro-Japanese factions’ scheme to have the whole world plunged into chaos.

4. Nan Hanchen has already done some work in Xi’an. Hu and his subordinates have feted Nan four times and have gone out of their way to please him, telling him to his face that they do not want to fight.

5. According to our intelligence, Tang Enbo’s troops also have little interest in fighting. As for the Guangxi Army, until now only four regiments of its 138th Division are positioned east of the Huainan Road and they are utterly dispersed; the 172nd Division is still halted near Shouxian; the other four divisions are stationed respectively at Huqiu, Liu’an, Shangcheng, and Gushi, and there is no sign whatsoever of their moving eastward. Although Li Xianzhuo is prepared to advance toward Dangshan, there is still no certain information as to when they will start moving.

6. Now the warfare in northern Jiangsu has come to a halt. It is hoped that it will be explained to Liu Weizhang that Li Xianzhuo and Mo Dehong should be asked to refrain from advancing eastward; otherwise, a great conflict cannot be avoided.

7. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Brigades of our 115th Division have already reached northern Jiangsu, and they are now being concentrated, trained, and systematically reorganized together with Huang Kecheng’s and Chen Yi’s various forces. After a month or two, their combat capability will surely be greatly increased. Then the main forces will advance westward and teach the Guangxi Army some lessons, in the hope of indicating to Bai Chongxi that if he wants to maintain friendship he should please withdraw Mo’s division.

8. Yang Dezhi’s brigade may reach Huaibei in a month; southern Anhui’s three regiments have moved northward, which is enough to deal with the attacks of Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi [Army]. As long as Chiang does not surrender, it is impossible for him to launch a large-scale attack. He has always just talked a good game but done very little fighting.

9. Wang Shiyi has returned to Yan’an from Yan [Xishan’s] domain. It is alleged that the office personnel and radio station captured by the Central Army have been released and transferred east of the River along with Yan, and the secret codes have not been lost either. It was rumored that this incident occurred because our forces attacked Taiquan Village. What actually happened is that around dusk on the 27th of last month, in that village one family’s four cattle were being driven home, but in the darkness could barely be seen, and the 61st Division defense troops mistook them for an attack of our cavalry unit from the town of Linzhen. All of a sudden the whole lineup started shooting, and the cattle started to run ahead. At least one regiment of the Yunyan-Taquan line fortress-defending troops began retreating toward Yichuan, creating quite an uproar all over the town. Division Commander Zhong was so upset that he detained our office personnel. Wang Shiyi happened to be where Yan was at the

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan. Vol. 6, pp. 231–32, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Despite the title, this document refers entirely to North China and Central China above the Yangzi. Mao believes that He Yingqin and the CC Clique cannot fight because they have little direct command over troops in the field, and furthermore the Guangxi armies under Bai Chongxi and others block the way across Anhui to the main Communist units farther east in Jiangsu. The CC Clique was a conservative organization, led by the two brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, which supported Chiang Kaishek and opposed communism.

2. Nan Hanchen (1895–1967), a native of Shanxi, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1926. In the 1930s, he played a variety of political roles, in Shanghai and elsewhere, and was also involved in banking and trade. Following the Xi’an Incident, he was a member of a Communist Party delegation in Xi’an. In 1940, he went to Yan’an, where he became deputy head of the Central Committee’s Department for United Front Work.

3. For a note on Tang Enbo, see above, Mao’s telegram of November 1, 1940.

4. The places mentioned here are located in central and eastern Anhui.

5. Regarding Liu Fei, see Weizhang, see below the note to the telegram of December 30, 1940 to Zhou Enlai.

6. On Wang, see the relevant note to the text of November 16, 1940.
time and was not arrested. On the basis of this misunderstanding, the division released them after four days of detention and declared that it was a misunderstanding. It seems that the Central Army has thus already lost its wits, so how could they fight? This incident wreaked havoc all the way to Xi'an and Chongqing, but was actually nothing more than an attack by four cattle.

Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning the Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek on the New Fourth Army's Route for Moving Northward

(December 25, 1940)

According to Xiang Ying, "Gu Zhutong has suddenly commanded the New Fourth Army to change its course and to cross the Yangzi at Fan[chang] and Tong[ling], while Li Pinxian is making arrangements to blockade north of the River. Moreover, the southern Anhui diehard troops again have us secretly surrounded so as to block our comings and goings. Along the southern banks we must break through the enemy's blockade and in the middle of the River we must avoid attacks by the enemy's boats. Unless we give ourselves plenty of time to sneak across the River in groups, we will not be able to cross at all, and will be unable to move forward or backward," and so on. Please discuss with Chiang immediately the following points and quickly let us know the results:

1. The move northward must be in two routes, southern Jiangsu and Fan[chang] and Tong[ling].
2. We need two months to sneak across little by little in groups.
3. The southern Anhui troops should not surround or block the comings and goings.
4. The northern Anhui troops are to retreat from the four xian of Chaoxian, Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[shan], and Zhang Yunyi is to dispatch a team to receive them and cover them as they cross the river.
5. Ensure that there will be no attack from Li Pinxian.
6. Expeditiously distribute ammunition and moving expenses.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 233, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*.

1. Fan[chang] and Tong[ling] are two regional towns close to the Yangzi in Anhui Province, north of New Fourth Army headquarters at Yunling. The four xian of Chaoxian, Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[shan] are located north of the Yangzi, to the northwest of Wuhu.
2. Regarding Zhang Yunyi, see above, the relevant note to the text of March 21, 1940.
Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Policy in the Current Situation

(December 25, 1940)

1. Since the conclusion of the agreement between Japan and Wang Jingwei, the receipt of loans from the United States and Soviet assistance, and the launching of the struggle against capitulation by our Party, the present capitulation crisis has been overcome. Although such a danger may arise again in the future, the War of Resistance prevails in the current situation. Consequently, our military and Party personnel should not stress anticapitulationist propaganda at present as much as we did in the past. To do otherwise would not only be distasteful to the Guomindang, but would also give rise to misunderstandings among the people and the friendly armies. (The telegraphic code of what follows is not clear.)

2. As the Guomindang is still pursuing a dual policy of anticomunism and fighting the resistance war, we too therefore continue to adhere to a dual policy of unity and revolutionary struggle. In opposing communism, the Guomindang, apart from strengthening high-handed measures in the areas under its control, will inevitably launch military attacks against our forces in Central China. They have also built a great wall in the Northwest, creating a blockade against us. We must therefore fight against their attacks in Central China and their blockade in the Northwest. In particular, we must wage a resolute struggle of self-defense against their military offensives and smash them. The following reasons must be emphasized in opposing the other side’s efforts to force us to withdraw north of the Yellow River within a specified time:

   a. It has been decided that our troops south of the [Yangzi] River will be transferred north as a conciliatory gesture.

   b. Because of the serious natural calamities in North China, some of the units there must move south to obtain food. The transfer of troops from Central China to the north would be tantamount to starving them to death.

   c. The areas of maneuver for the guerrilla war need to be expanded; to confine these forces to one area would necessarily lead to their annihilation.

   d. Since most of the armed units in Central China are organized by the people to defend their homelands, it would be extremely difficult for them to relocate. Besides, all such organizations have been organized in accordance with instructions given in Chairman Chiang’s speech at Lushan (that all localities, whether southern or northern, and all people, whether old or young, have the responsibility to resist Japan and save the nation), and in the various public notices to compatriots in the enemy-occupied areas, so they are by no means without legal basis.

   e. As the entire New Fourth and Eighth Route Armies are pinning down half the enemy forces and have been praised by the people of the country for their outstanding service to the country, they should by right be rewarded, not punished.

   f. The armed units in southern Anhui have already moved north as ordered. The units north of the [Yangzi] River have real difficulties moving and are not deliberately defying orders.

   g. The cause of friction lies in the anti-Communist orders issued by the Guomindang (on measures for preventing alien party activities and so on) and in the anti-Communist activities initiated by the pro-Japanese faction (Shi Yousan’s proof) and does not come from our Party and our army.

   h. It is highly unfair to give insufficient pay and provisions to the soldiers and to authorize too small an army (only three divisions for 500,000 men). It is even more unreasonable to force the New Fourth Army and the guerrilla troops to relocate to the north. As for not having been issued military provisions for a long period of time and not knowing where our troops will be located, this is truly incomprehensible, and we therefore request continued issuance of pay.

   i. The personnel of the New Fourth Army left behind in areas formally controlled by it, such as southern Jiangxi, northern Fujian, western Fujian, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region, the Southern Hunan Border Region, and the Hubei-Henan Border Region are all being massacred and have not the slightest protection.

   j. The relocation of the troops in Central China to the north will delight only the Japanese bandits and will be disadvantageous to persisting in the War of Resistance and to the defense of Central China.

2. Shi Yousan (1891–1940) had been appointed commander-in-chief of the 39th Army Group in April 1940. In June of the same year, he had signed an “anti-Communist agreement” with the Japanese. This aroused dissatisfaction among his subordinates, one of whom took him into custody on December 1 and buried him alive.
The above ten major reasons must be pointed out at every opportunity in order to resist the evil Guomindang policy of squeezing us into a narrow area north of the Yellow River and creating pretexts. (Unclear)

3. In the present high tide of anti-Communist attacks, the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But some cadres within our Party fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the civil war. It must be understood that under no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan and that many of the policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated. In particular, many ultra-left policies of the late Soviet period are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then, arising as they did from the failure to understand the fundamental point that the Chinese revolution is a bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolonial country and the protracted nature of the revolution. For example, the notion that the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression [campaign] and the countercampaign against it constituted the decisive battle between two roads; 7 elimination of the capitalist class (the Left putschist policies) 9 and of the rich peasants (by allotting them poor land); elimination of intellectuals, the physical elimination of the landlords (by not allotting them any land); the Left-deviation policies in the suppression of counterrevolutionaries; the monopolizing by Chinese Communist Party members of the organs of political power; the focus on communism as the objective in education; 11 the ultra-left military policy; 12 and the policy within the Party of attacks on comrades through the abuse of disciplinary measures. These ultra-left policies were exactly the reverse 13 of the Right opportunism of Chen Duxiu in the latter period of the Great Revolution. 14 It was all alliance and no struggle in the latter period of the Great Revolution, and all struggle and no alliance (except with the basic sections of the peasantry) in the latter period of the soviets—truly striking demonstrations of the two extremist policies. And both of these policies can cause 15 great losses to the Party and the revolution.

4. Today's Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but is a policy that combines alliance and struggle. Specifically, it means:

a. All the popular masses 17 favoring resistance (that is, all workers, 18 peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and merchants) must unite in the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

b. Within the united front our policy must be one of independence and initiative, that is, both "alliance" 19 and independent "struggle" are necessary.

c. As far as military strategy is concerned, our policy is guerrilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative in our own hands within the framework of a unified strategy; but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost 20 when the conditions are favorable.

d. In the struggle against the anti-Communist diehards, our policy is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, to strike at and draw in and draw in again after striking at, to be tough but not to the extent that it breaks the united front, and to be soft but not to the extent that we give up our stand.

e. In the enemy-occupied and Guomindang areas our policy is, on the one hand, to develop the work 21 and, on the other, to have well-selected cadres working underground. With regard to the forms of organization and struggle, our policy is to have well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, to accumulate strength, and to hide our time.

3. The parenthetical comment "unclear" (bu ming) at the end of this last paragraph of the Chinese text as reproduced by Guo Hualun may mean either that the document he is following is not altogether legible or that he professes not to understand how Mao could make the preceding statement about the Guomindang's "evil policy."

4. But some cadres within our Party fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the civil war. But many of our cadres fail to realize that the Party's present policy must be very different from its policy during the Agrarian Revolution.

5. The policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated. The policies adopted during the ten years of the Agrarian Revolution cannot just be duplicated today.

6. The late Soviet period → The latter period of the Agrarian Revolution

7. Two roads → The two roads of so-called counterrevolution and revolution

8. Elimination → Economic elimination

9. The Left putschist policies → The ultra-left policies on labor and taxation

10. Elimination of intellectuals → The attack on intellectuals

11. Education → Popular education

12. The ultra-left military policy → The ultra-left military policy (of attacking the big cities and denying the role of guerrilla warfare); the putschist policy in the work in the White areas

13. These ultra-left policies were exactly the reverse → The ultra-left policies were manifestations of the error of "Left" opportunism, or exactly the reverse

14. Great Revolution → First Great Revolution

15. The latter period of the soviets → The latter period of the Agrarian Revolution

16. Can cause → Caused

17. Popular masses → People

18. All workers, → All anti-Japanese workers

19. "Alliance" → Unity

20. A unified strategy; but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost → A unified strategy; guerrilla warfare is basic, but no chance of waging mobile warfare should be lost

21. To develop the work → To develop the united front to the greatest possible extent
f. With regard to the alignment of the various classes within the country, our basic policy is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces, isolate anti-Communist diehard forces, and attack pro-Japanese forces.

g. With respect to the diehards, ours is a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them insofar as they are still in favor of resisting Japan and of isolating them insofar as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party. Moreover, the diehards have a dual character with regard to resistance to Japan, and our policy is to unite with them insofar as they are resolute, and to struggle against them and isolate them insofar as they vacillate (for instance, when they collude with Japan and show reluctance in opposing Wang Jingwei and other Chinese traitors). The diehards' antimunism also has a dual character, which explains the tension over the past six months in the Guomindang with regard to Guomindang-Communist relations, and their recent adoption of a temporary and very modest reconciliation [on the other hand]. This is what Chiang [X] needs.

h. Even among the Chinese traitors and pro-Japanese elements, there are those with a dual character, toward whom we should likewise employ a revolutionary dual policy. Insofar as they are pro-Japanese, our policy is to struggle against them and isolate them, and insofar as they vacillate, our policy is to draw them nearer to us and win them over. A distinction is to be made between two-sided elements of this sort and staunch Chinese traitors such as Wang Jingwei, Wang Yitang, and Shi Yousan.

i. A distinction must be made between pro-Japanese big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie who oppose resistance to Japan, on the one hand, and pro-British and pro-American big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie who advocate resistance, on the other. A distinction must also be made between, on the one hand, two-faced big landlords and members of the big bourgeoisie who advocate anti-Japanese resistance yet vacillate and who advocate unity yet are anti-Communist and, on the other hand, members of the national bourgeoisie, middle and small landlords, and enlightened gentry, all of whose two-sided nature is less pronounced. We build our policy on these distinctions. The diverse policies described above all stem from these distinctions in class relations.

j. Imperialism is dealt with in the same way. Although the Communist Party opposes all imperialisms, a distinction must be made between Japanese imperialism, which is now committing aggression against China, and the imperialist powers that are not doing so now; between German and Italian imperialism, which are allies of Japan and have recognized “Manchukuo,” and British and American imperialism, which are opposed to Japan; and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday, which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China’s resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today, which have abandoned that policy and are now supporting China’s anti-Japanese resistance. Our tactics are still guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one. Our foreign policy differs from that of the Guomindang. The Guomindang claims, “There is only one enemy and all the rest are friends”; it appears to treat all countries other than Japan alike, but in fact it is pro-British and pro-American. For our part we must draw certain distinctions. First, between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries; second, between Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other; third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments; and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy at present. We build our policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Guomindang, our basic guideline is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Guomindang does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another.

To correct the lopsided views of many Party cadres on the question of tactics and their consequent vacillations between ultraleft and ultraright, it is necessary to help them acquire an all-around and integrated understanding of the changes and developments in the Party’s policy, past and present. The ultraleft viewpoint is creating trouble and is still the main danger within the Party. In the areas under Guomindang rule, there are many people who cannot seriously carry out the policy of having well-selected cadres working underground for a long period, of accumulating strength and biding time, because they underestimate the gravity of the Guomindang’s anti-Communist policy. At the same time, there are many others who cannot carry out the policy of expanding the united front because they oversimplify matters and consider the entire Guomindang utterly hopeless and are therefore at a loss what to do. A similar state of affairs exists in the Japanese-occupied areas.

In the areas under Guomindang rule and the anti-Japanese base areas, rightist views that were once prevalent to a serious extent have now been basically
overcome; those who held such views used to stress alliance to the exclusion of struggle and overestimate the Guomindang’s inclination to resist Japan, and they therefore blurred the difference in principle between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, rejected the policy of independence and initiative within the united front, appeased the big landlords and big bourgeoisie and the Guomindang, and tied their own hands instead of boldly expanding the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces and conducting resolute struggle against the Guomindang’s policy of opposing and restricting the Communist Party. But since the winter of 1939 an ultraleft tendency has cropped up all over as a result of the anti-Communist friction engineered by the Guomindang and of the struggles we have waged in self-defense. This tendency has been corrected to some extent but not completely, and it still finds expression in concrete policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine and define our concrete policies now.

As the Central Committee has already issued a series of directives on concrete policies, now only a few points are given here by way of summary.

On the subject of organs of political power. The “three-thirds” system, under which Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of political power and many non-Communists are drawn into participation, must continue to be carried out resolutely. In areas such as northern Jiangsu, where anti-Japanese democratic political power has just begun to be established, the proportion of Communists may be even less than one-third. Representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the enlightened gentry who do not actively oppose the Communist Party must be drawn into participation both in the government and in the people’s representative bodies, and those Guomindang members who do not oppose the Communist Party must also be allowed to participate. Even a small number of right-wingers may be allowed to join the people’s representative bodies. On no account should our Party monopolize everything. We are only destroying the dictatorship of the big comprador bourgeoisie and the big landlord class, not replacing it with a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party.

On the subject of labor policy. The livelihood of the workers must be improved if their enthusiasm in the fight against Japan is to be fully aroused. But we must strictly guard against being ultraleftist; there must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. Under present conditions in China, the eight-hour workday cannot be universally introduced and a ten-hour workday still needs to be permitted in certain branches of production. In other branches of production, the workday should be fixed according to circumstances. Once a contract between labor and capital is concluded, the workers must observe labor discipline and the capitalists must be allowed to make some profit. Otherwise factories will close down, which would be bad for the anti-Japanese resistance effort and would hurt the workers themselves. Particularly in rural areas, the living standards and wages of the workers should not be raised too much or else it would lead to opposition from the peasants, unemployment among the workers, and a decline in production.

On the subject of land policy. It must be explained to Party members and to the peasants that now is not the time to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution and that the series of measures taken during the Agrarian Revolution in the past cannot be applied today. Our present policy should, on the one hand, stipulate that landlords reduce rent and interest, for this serves to arouse the enthusiasm of the basic peasant masses for resistance to Japan, but the reductions should not be too great. As a general principle, land rent should be reduced by 25 percent, and if the masses demand a greater reduction, the tenant-farmer may keep up to 60 or 70 percent of his crop, but not more. Reduction in interest on loans should not be so great as to render credit transactions impossible. On the other hand, our policy should stipulate that the peasants pay rent and interest and that the landlords retain their ownership of land and other property. Interest should not be so low as to make it impossible for peasants to obtain loans, nor should the settlement of old accounts be such as to enable the peasants to get back their mortgaged land gratis.

On the subject of tax policy. Taxes must be levied according to income. Except for the very poor, who should be exempt, all people with an income shall pay taxes to the state, which means that the burden shall be carried by more than 80 percent of the population, including the workers and peasants, and shall not be placed entirely on the landlords and capitalists. Arresting people and imposing fines on them as a means of financing the army must be forbidden. We may use the existing Guomindang system of taxation with appropriate alterations until we have devised a new and more suitable one.

On the subject of anti-espionage policy. Confirmed Chinese traitor elements and anti-Communist elements must be resolutely suppressed; otherwise the anti-Japanese revolutionary forces cannot be adequately protected. But there certainly must not be excessive killing, and no innocent person should be incriminated. Vacillating elements and reluctant followers among the reactionaries should be dealt with leniently. Corporal punishment must be abolished in the treatment of all criminals; the stress must be on the weight of evidence, and confession should not be taken on trust. Our policy toward prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet, or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Those elements among them who were coerced into joining [the reactionary forces] but who are more or less inclined toward the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should all be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. They should not be insulted or deprived of their personal effects, nor should recantations be exacted from them; without exception they should be treated in a kind and sincere manner. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the hard core of reaction. As for renegades, except for those who have committed heinous crimes, they should be given a chance to turn over a new leaf provided they discontinue their anti-Communist activities; and if they come back and wish
to rejoin the revolution they may be accepted, but must not be readmitted into the Party. The general run of Guomindang intelligence agents must not be identified with the Japanese spies and Chinese traitors; the two should be clearly differentiated and handled accordingly. An end should be put to the state of confusion in which any [governmental or nongovernmental] organization or group can make arrests. To establish revolutionary order in the interests of resisting Japan, it must be stipulated that, with the exception of army units in combat action, only government judicial or public security agencies shall be empowered to make arrests.

On the subject of the people’s rights. It must be laid down that all landlords and capitalists not opposed to the resistance against Japan shall enjoy the same rights of person and property, the same right to vote, and the same freedom of speech, assembly, association, political conviction, and religious belief as the workers and peasants. The government shall take action only against saboteurs and elements who organize riots in our base areas and shall protect all others and not molest them.

On the subject of economic policy. Industry and agriculture should be actively developed, and the circulation of commodities promoted. Capitalists from outside should be drawn into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here if they so desire. Private enterprise should be encouraged and state enterprise regarded as only one sector of the economy. The purpose in all this is to achieve self-sufficiency. Care must be taken not to damage any useful enterprise. Both our tariff and our monetary policies should conform to our basic line of expanding agriculture, industry, and commerce, and not run counter to it. The essential factor in maintaining the base areas over a long period is the achievement of self-sufficiency through a conscientious and meticulous, not a crude and careless, organization of the economy.

On the subject of cultural and educational policy. This should center on promoting and spreading the knowledge and skills needed for resistance to Japan and a sense of national pride among the masses of the people. Bourgeois-liberal educators, men of letters, journalists, scholars, and technical experts should be allowed to come to our base areas and cooperate with us in running schools and newspapers and doing other work. All intellectuals and students who show enthusiasm for resisting Japan should be accepted into our schools, given short-term training, and then assigned to work in the army, the government, or in mass organizations; they should be boldly drawn in, given work, and promoted. We should not be overcautious or too afraid of reactionaries sneaking in. Unavoidably, some such elements will creep in, but there will be time to comb them out in the course of study and work. Every base area should establish printing shops, publish books and newspapers, and organize distribution and delivery agencies. Every base area should also, as far as possible, set up on a large scale schools for training cadres, and the more and bigger, the better.

On the subject of military policy. There must be maximum expansion of the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, because they are the most reliable armed forces of the Chinese people in pressing on with the national War of Resistance. We should continue our policy of never attacking the Guomindang troops unless attacked and do everything possible to make friends with them. In order to help build up our army, no effort should be spared to draw those officers who are sympathetic to us into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, whether they are members of the Guomindang or are without party affiliation. Something must be done now to change the situation where Communists dominate everything in our armies by sheer numbers. Of course, the “three-thirds” system should not be introduced into our main forces, but so long as the leadership of the army is kept in the hands of the Party (this is an absolute and inviolable necessity), we need not be afraid of drawing large numbers of sympathizers into the work of building up the military and technical departments of our army. Now that the ideological and organizational foundations of our Party and our army have been firmly laid, not only is there no danger in drawing in large numbers of sympathizers (definitely not saboteurs, of course), but it is indeed an indispensable policy, for otherwise it will be impossible to win the sympathy of the whole country and expand the revolutionary forces.

All these tactical principles for the united front and the concrete policies formulated in accordance with them must be firmly applied by the whole Party. At a time when the Japanese bandits are intensifying their aggression against China and when the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are pursuing high-handed policies and launching armed attacks against the Communist Party and the people, the application of the tactical principles and concrete policies outlined above is the only way to press on with the resistance to Japan, broaden the united front, win the sympathy of the entire nation’s people, and bring about a turn for the better in the situation. In rectifying errors, however, we must proceed step by step and must not be so hasty as to cause discontent among the cadres, suspicion among the masses, counterattacks by the landlords, or other undesirable developments.
Organize Reserve Shock Units to Deal with the Critical Situation in Central China

(December 25, 1940, between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.)

Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi], Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

The situation in Central China is very critical. We will not be able to deal with large-scale campaigns unless we organize shock units in reserve. Therefore, we agree with what is suggested in the telegram of the 21st from Hu and Chen, to organize all troops in northern Jiangsu into two columns. Huang Kecheng’s troops, 1 the Peng-Zhu Detachment, 2 the two regiments of the Fifth Brigade of the 115th Division, and Tian Shouyao’s Detachment 3 should be organized into one column, with Chen Yi serving as commander, Huang Kecheng as political commissar, and Lai Chuanzhu as deputy commander. The New Fourth Army in northern Jiangsu should be organized into the other column, with Su Yu as commander and Liu Yan 4 as political commissar. Division of the four military districts and the appointments of Zhang Aiping, Chang Yuqing, Ye Fei, and Wei Guoqing as the respective commanders of these military districts are to be done according to what has been planned. It is hoped that Chen and Luo will immediately notify the Fifth Brigade to submit to the command of Chen and Huang, in accordance with this regrouping. After the reorganization, the troops are to undergo consolidation and training for one to two months, and fully prepare everything necessary to deal with the attack of Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi forces.


From Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Xiang Ying About the Necessity of Destroying All Secret Documents

(December 26, 1940)

As to whether or not to carry out the destruction of secret documents, you should anticipate the special difficulties that might be encountered during the move. You may suffer attacks and you may suffer losses, so the situation needs to be regarded more seriously. Upon this basis, aside from making every possible effort to overcome difficulties, all secret documents must be completely destroyed as soon as they have been read. [X][X] 1 should be carried on the person of the most trustworthy comrades, and the question of how to handle things when danger is encountered should be figured out beforehand. This directive applies not only to the military headquarters; the entire southern Anhui army should be ordered to carry it out without exception. Not leaving any trace whatsoever of secret documents is most important.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 598–99, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Huang Kecheng was at this time the political commissar of the Fifth Column of the Eighth Route Army.

2. The reference is to the First Detachment of the Fifth Column, of which Peng Mingzhi was the commander and Zhu Xiaoxin the political commissar.

3. The reference is to the Second Detachment of the Fifth Column, commanded by Tian Shouyao.

4. Regarding Liu Yan, see the note to the text of May 9, 1941.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 235, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. In a passage very similar to this one, cited in a note to the text of December 18, 1940, the characters missing there stand for "code books," and that is very probably what has been omitted here.
You Must Resolutely and Methodically Achieve the Goal of Moving Northward

(December 26, 1940)

Xiang [Ying], Zhou [Zikun], and Yuan [Guoping]:

Your various telegrams have been received. In the face of difficulties you have sent telegrams several times asking for directives, but a year ago the Central Committee already gave you the directive, which was to develop northward and behind enemy lines, and you have been making excuses all along not to carry this out. Recently it has been decided to move north altogether, and, as for how to make the move northward and how to overcome the difficulties in the course of moving, you must find a way yourselves, and you must be determined. Although now, on the one hand, we have lodged a protest with the Guomindang and are requesting that they extend the deadline and issue provisions and ammunition, you must not harbor any illusions whatsoever toward the Guomindang and must not rely upon the Guomindang to help you with anything at all. Anything in the way of help that might be obtained should be regarded as unexpected. You must be determined and resourceful in breaking through the darkest and most disadvantageous circumstances to reach the goal of moving northward. If you are so determined and resourceful, then despite suffering some losses the basic core may still be preserved and the future for development remains bright. If, on the other hand, you waver and hesitate, lacking both your own solutions and directions, then you will be in great danger in the face of attacks from both the enemy and the diehards. Nowhere in the country is anyone as hesitant, wavering, unresourceful, and undetermined as you. If the Guomindang attacks you during your move, you have to be prepared and determined to defend yourselves, which is a directive we gave you long ago. We are unclear as to what sort of directives you want from us. Do you, after all, have any directives of your own? Now you have raised the question whether to delay or to leave. What is it that you yourselves think of this? Do you advocate delay or leaving? You are doomed to suffer tremendous losses in the future if you are so utterly lacking in definite opinions and in direction.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 600–601, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

To Ye Ting and Others from Mao Zedong and Zhu De About How the New Fourth Army Should Still Be on the Alert When Crossing the River

(December 27, 1940)

On the 23rd, Qu Shounian¹ said in a communication to Mo Dehong: “For the purpose of giving a send-off to the New Fourth Army from south of the River in its move north of the Yellow River to fight in the War of Resistance and recover [lost] territories, their route is hereby designated as the southern section of the [Bei] Ping-Han [Kou] line, along a certain route on the northern bank of the Yangzi River. In addition to reporting this to the Central Committee and the senior officers, please inform all the other commands as well. At the same time, it is essential that all officers and soldiers deployed in southern Henan and eastern Hubei as well as the popular masses in the various localities be notified also. These instructions are to be followed in all cases.” But while crossing the river the New Fourth Army needs to remain on alert against the Guangxi Army to avoid being attacked. At the same time it is crucial that Zhou and Ye be asked to make representations to Chiang [Kaishek], and persuade him to order Li Pinxian not to make trouble in the areas of Chaoxian, Wuwei, Hejian, and Hanshan for the New Fourth Army while it moves northward.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol 6, p. 237, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

¹. Qu Shounian (1902–1957), a native of Guangdong, had participated in the Northern Expedition and in the Nanchang Uprising. In 1931, he became a division commander in the Nineteenth Route Army, to which he returned in 1936 after a period studying military tactics in Germany. At this time, he was commander of the Forty-eighth Army of the Twenty-Fourth Army Group.
To Ye Ting and Xiang Ying from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Agreement That the New Fourth Army Should Cross the River from Eastern Anhui in Groups

(December 29, 1940)

1. It is agreed that the river be crossed in groups directly from eastern Anhui. A portion of supplies are to go via southern Jiangsu.
2. Capable cadres may be sent to lead the first few groups, Xiyi (Ye Ting) may cross the river with the middle groups, and there will be separate directives from the Center for Xiang Ying’s movements.

To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Delayed Reply to Liu Weizhang’s Telegram and Other Matters

(December 30, 1940)

1. The earlier draft of a reply to Liu Weizhang’s telegram will not be dispatched as yet, as everyone takes the view that it would be better to delay it for a while. Since they oppose the Communists, let them go on doing it; since they are suppressing the Communists, let them go on doing so, all of which will only provoke widespread indignation and discontent throughout the country. We can make our position known at that time and need not be in a hurry to do so now.
2. The “telegram of the 8th” must be refuted, but that can also wait to be done until January or February of next year.
3. The “telegram of the 8th” contains a terrible number of erroneous characters. For one thing, please send it out again through the battlefield telegram station, and, for another, please notify Liu Weizhang for him to send us a telegram through official channels. Because of sabotage by the telegraph office, there may be fewer mistakes if they send it themselves.
4. Mutual concessions in northern Anhui need not be mentioned; mentioning this may cause the Guangxi clique to look down upon us. Once our main forces are restored, we shall deal them a blow.
It Is Best That the Forces South of the River Move to Southern Jiangsu in Groups

(December 30, 1940)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

[Chen Enlai's telegram states, among other things: It would be dangerous for the forces south of the river to cross the river in different locations. Although Chiang [Kaishek] has agreed verbally to yield in northern Anhui, it would not be easy to give up the four xian of Chao[xian], Wu[wei], He[xian], and Han[shan]. Li Pinxian is already plotting a deployment to attack us. It is still best to move to southern Jiangsu in groups. We agree with Enlai's opinion that it is best to move to southern Jiangsu in groups.

Smash the Guomindang's Offensive and Bring About a Change for the Better in the Situation

(December 31, 1940)

To the Central China Bureau, the Southeast Bureau, the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the Southern Bureau, the Southern Committee, and senior officers of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army:

1. Chiang Kaishek has already made up his mind to send Li Xianzhou, Tang Enbo, and Li Pinxian to attack our troops in Central China and Shandong, and Tang's and Li's troops are now advancing eastward. Our Party and army have the duty to launch a self-defense campaign to shatter this attack and to make efforts to change the current situation for the better.

2. Apart from ordering our troops south of the Yangzi River to move north immediately, and sending one unit from North China to reinforce our troops in Central China, the whole Party and all troops in Central China and Shandong must be mobilized without delay to struggle hard for the purpose of sustaining the anti-Japanese base areas and shattering the attacks by the diehard faction.

3. As for military command, until Commander-in-Chief Ye Ting arrives north of the River, it should be unified under Deputy Commander-in-Chief Chen Yi and Political Commissar Liu Shaoqi, after Ye Ting arrives north of the River, it should be unified under the command of Ye Ting, Chen Yi, and Liu Shaoqi. All units must absolutely obey their orders without violation or delay.

4. The Shandong Subbureau will be put under the leadership of the Central China Bureau, and the Central China Bureau will unilaterally command Shandong and Central China.

5. All places throughout the country (North China, Central China, the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Southeast) must resolutely oppose this attack by the Guomindang as well as its high-handed policy nationwide. We must point out that the danger of this operation by the Guomindang lies in the fact that it is weakening the forces of the War of Resistance day by day, which will not only hurt the Communist Party but will hurt even more the Guomindang and the people of the whole

Our source for this telegram is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 602, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 603–6, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.
country. It will only benefit the enemy and the pro-Japanese factions. If not stopped, it will surely become a nationwide civil war. Considering the fact that the soldiers of the anti-Communist troops are unwilling, most of the officers are under coercion, and many of the senior generals are wavering, we should therefore not only pay attention to dealing blows to the anti-Communist troops but also pay attention to winning them over, to united front work, and to using our tactics flexibly.

6. It is surmised that the slogans of attack among the anti-Communist troops may be about resisting the Japanese in the enemy's rear, rather than about attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. For this reason, it is worth considering that when they begin to attack, our army's tactics should remain to strike when we are attacked and to try peaceful means before resorting to force. The Central Committee will have further instructions on this point when the time comes, and you may voice your opinions.

7. Taking into consideration the fact that the struggle in Central China is a protracted one, rather than one that can be resolved in a short time, it is therefore necessary to link the struggle against friction closely with the expansion and strengthening of the base areas and with the expansion and strengthening of the armed forces. In this struggle the strength of the anti-Communist forces should gradually be weakened, our forces should gradually be enlarged and tempered, finally to shatter the anti-Communist troops. For this reason, we should be on alert in dealing with this situation but must, at the same time, make long-term, patient plans, without being too impatient and without attempting to win a complete victory in a short period of time.

8. Taking into consideration the various international and domestic conditions, it is certain that the anti-Communist attacks and high-handed policy of the Guomindang will fail and have no future whatsoever. Therefore, the entire Party and army must raise its confidence of victory, should not be intimidated by the attacks and high-handed policy of the Guomindang, and must overcome potential pessimistic sentiments.

9. The task of the Central China Bureau at present is actively to carry out arrangements and strengthen forces to shatter this attack. The present task of the Southern Bureau, on the other hand, is to make use of various contradictions to shake the determination of Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang. Even though Chiang and the Guomindang are making a big show of attacking, they are actually very much afraid of a civil war and afraid of a fundamental breakup of the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists. For this reason, there is still the possibility that their determination could be shaken.

10. With regard to the urgent demand of Chiang and the Guomindang that we make clear our final attitude and respond to Chiang's order, the Central Committee has decided to calmly ignore it. Ever since the telegram of [November] 9 from Zhu [De], Peng [Dehui], Ye, and Xiang [Ying] was dispatched, no matter how they should curse and attack us, for the time being the Central Committee and Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang are simply to ignore them. When the time comes that they have angered the heavens and incurred the wrath of the people with their troublemaking, and are unable to back down, then we shall come forward with our statement and make clear our attitude. This is distinct from the fact that the lower levels [of leadership] and local Party organizations should make clear their attitude at all times, but is precisely the best way to deal with the Guomindang at present. Because Chiang Kaishek may be in a great hurry, but we are in no hurry at all.

Secretariat of the Central Committee
Ye Ting Should Cross to the North of the River Within Two Weeks

(January 2, 1941, midnight)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

I trust that you have received our telegram of between 9 and 11 p.m. on the 1st. Xiyi\(^1\) should cross to the north of the river within two weeks so that, together with Hu Fu [i.e., Liu Shaoqi] they may bring about a unified command of all our troops and shatter the imminent anti-Communist attack. I await your reply as to what happens.

Mao Zedong

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\(^1\) Xiyi is Ye Ting’s zi.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 607, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
Mao Zedong and Zhu De to Ye Ting and Xiang Ying Concerning the Immediate Move of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui to Southern Jiangsu

(January 3, 1941)

It is absolutely correct that all your troops are to move resolutely to southern Jiangsu and that they should set out immediately.

The New Fourth Army Should Not Stay Too Long in Maolin

(January 7, 1941)

Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying]:

We are in receipt of your telegram of early morning on the 5th. It is not advisable that you stay long in Maolin. As soon as you have found out about the situation in the area around Xuancheng and Ningguo, it would be appropriate to move eastward. It is to your advantage to break through the encirclement lines of the diehard armies before they have completed their deployment.

Mao [Zedong]    Zhu [De]

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 608, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was dispatched between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M.
Mao Zedong and Zhu De Inquire of Liu Shaoqi About the Situation of Xiang Ying and Others

(January 9, 1941)

You said that Xiang Ying and Yuan Guoping had left the army, but we have not yet received news of this. It is expected that you will let us know immediately when they left, where they are now, how things are with Xyi Ye Ting and Xiao Yao, and how things are with the army. We had a report from Ye Ting and Xiang on the 5th that they set out on the night of the 4th and reached somewhere between Taiping and Jingxian in the early morning of the 5th. Things are unclear after that.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi Concerning the Leadership of the New Fourth Army

(January 11, 1941)

We are in receipt of the report by Ye Ting and Yao Rao Shushi, which you forwarded to us. Ye and Yao are absolutely correct, and we hope you take advantage of being nearby to help them whenever necessary and give them encouragement. Only make no mention at this point of Xiang Ying’s removal from office. Make sure that the other instructions are passed to Ye and Yao without delay.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 249, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Yuan Guoping was the head of the Political Department of the New Fourth Army. See the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1940.

2. As noted several times above, Yao was an alternative surname for Rao Shushi, and Mao frequently referred to him as “Xiao Yao” or “Little Yao,” though Rao was only eight years younger than Mao.

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 251, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Liu Shaoqi, Ye Ting, and Others About How the Entire New Fourth Army Should Obey the Command of Ye Ting and Rao Shushi

(January 11, 1941)

The leadership of Xi Yi [Ye Ting] and Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi] is absolutely correct. It is expected that the entire Party and the entire army will obey the command of Ye and Yao and carry out the task of moving northward. Although you are in a difficult environment, it is still possible to preserve the backbone force by fighting guerrilla style and to reach southern Jiangsu.

A Dispatch to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning the Departure of Xiang Ying and Others from the Army When the New Fourth Army Was Breaking Out of the Encirclement

(January 11, 1941)

The report from Ye Ting and Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi] on the 9th reads, “Today, on the 9th, we were advancing northward and again encircled. We are gathering all our forces to fight a fierce battle with the enemy and to try to break through the encirclement in groups and then move to the north. Early this morning Xiang [Ying] and Yuan [Guoping] led a section of the army and left without informing anyone, and it is unclear where they went. We are resolved to stay to the end for the sake of the safety of the entire army,” and so on. We have told Ye Ting and Rao Shushi to take command of the entire Party organization and the entire army in resolutely carrying out the task of moving north, and you are hereby informed of this matter.
It Will Be Best If the Troops in Southern Anhui Break Out of the Encirclement and Advance to the East or to the North in Groups

(January 12, 1941)

To Ye [Ting] and Yao [Rao Shushi] (and for transmittal to Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi]):

Does your present situation allow for breaking out of encirclement? If this is possible, it seems best that you break through and then advance in groups eastward or northward (to given destinations, splitting into several branches and advancing along different routes, with no time limitations, the principle being to preserve actual strength and to accomplish the task). It is urgently requested that you consider the matter and come to a decision. Because the negotiations in Chongqing probably cannot be relied upon, you should at the same time pay attention to talking with the commanders of the besieging armies, and please keep us informed of the situation by telegram.


Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Ye Ting and Others to the Effect That Ye Ting Is to Command the New Fourth Army

(January 12, 1941)

We are greatly relieved to know that you have led the main force of the army in successfully breaking out of encirclement. We hope that morale will be strengthened and that you will persevere to the end. Get to southern Jiangsu rapidly. Xiyi [Ye Ting] is to make all decisions within the army, with Xiao Yao [Rao Shushi] assisting him. The whole army is to obey Xiyi's orders. As for Chongqing, we are in the midst of negotiations. But you must not pin your hopes on this. In everything you must depend upon yourselves.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 609, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, p. 259, where it is reprinted from Wannan shibian.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang
Inquire of Ye Ting and Others About the Circumstances of the Breakthrough

(January 13, 1941)

1. We are very happy and relieved to learn that you have led two of Fu Qiutao’s 1 regiments in breaking out of encirclement. It is hoped that you will rapidly reach southern Jiangsu.

2. How many men have broken through? How many rifles? Where are they now? How are things with them? How many men and rifles were besieged in Maolin? Who was the commander? Let us know as soon as possible for use in the negotiations.

Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying About How Serious Representations Should Be Made to the Guomindang Authorities

(January 13, 1941)

The six regiments under the command of Xiyi’s [Ye Ting’s] headquarters are still being besieged in the area of Maolin south of Jingxian and have not yet come out. They are now running out of ammunition and food supplies, in an extremely dangerous situation, and it is possible that the entire force will be annihilated. Although two of Fu Qiutao’s regiments have broken out and reached the hilly areas in Ningguo, they have not yet broken out of the larger lines of encirclement. Please make serious representations to Chongqing that we are appealing to the whole nation for support and so on. Please make the most serious representation to the authorities that if their encirclement is not lifted immediately we shall send troops in reinforcement right away, and that responsibility for this split falls on their shoulders. Please distribute without delay the circular telegram we issued today.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 261, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*.

1. Fu Qiutao (1907–1981) was at the time commander and political commissar of the new organized First Detachment of the New Fourth Army’s General Instruction Unit.

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 263, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*. 
**Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang**

**Concerning Countermeasures Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident**

(January 13, 1941)

1. We have lodged a most serious protest with the authorities. It was clearly stated that if they do not [X] lift the encirclement, responsibility for the split will be theirs.

2. We shall immediately prepare for a major political and military counterattack on a national scale.

3. Tell Comrades Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and Yao [Rao Shushi] without delay to try and break out of encirclement if possible, or to hold fast to their positions if they cannot break through, and that thus there will eventually be a way out.

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**Plan to Surround Han Deqin and Shen Honglie in Reprisal for Chiang Kaishek’s Massacre of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui**

(January 13, 1941)

To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi]; Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]; Zhu [Rui]; Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]; Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], and Yao [Rao Shushi] (transmitted by Hu and Chen); Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying];

1. We agree to the plan in the telegram of the 12th from Hu [Fu] and Chen [Yi] that northern Jiangsu prepare to surround Han Deqin and Shandong prepare to surround Shen Honglie. Preparations must be completed within ten days after receipt of [this] telegram, and then orders must be awaited to attack. Zhu, Chen, and Luo are responsible for Shandong, and Hu and Chen are in charge of northern Jiangsu. This is in answer to Chiang Kaishek’s plans to massacre ten thousand of our men in southern Anhui.

2. Zhou and Ye are right now lodging a protest in Chongqing, and we are sending out a public telegram of protest under the names of Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang. Ye and Xiang are expected to contact by telegram the troops encircled in Maolin and tell them that, if breaking out of encirclement proves impossible, they should hold out for another ten days, after which a way out might be found.

3. If Chiang Kaishek annihilates our troops in southern Anhui, we should wipe out Han Deqin and Shen Honglie resolutely, thoroughly, and completely, putting an end once and for all to the problem of Central China.

4. To meet any serious emergency, North China should speed up the organization of reserves.

5. To meet any serious emergency, our offices in Chongqing, Guilin, Xi’an, and Luoyang must immediately prepare against attacks from Chiang Kaishek.

6. Open propaganda should be carried out regarding the Southern Anhui Incident, and deployments to wipe out Han and Shen should be kept strictly secret.


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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong jisi. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 265, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. This character, missing in the original, probably stands for “immediately.” See the previous text, also dated January 13.
**Circular to Ye Ting and Others Concerning the Circumstances of the Negotiations with Chiang**

(January 14, 1941)

We have received a report from [Zhou] Enlai that says: “Once on the 12th and once on the 13th Chiang [Kaishek] sent a telegraphic order to Gu Zhutong to lift the siege and approved the move to southern Jiangsu,” and so on. You are being specially informed of this matter. It is hoped that you can hold firm for another two or three days, and a way out will be found.

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1. Chiang Kaishek has issued orders to cease fire and lift the siege in southern Anhui. Please inform us immediately as to whether or not the fighting has stopped.
2. If the fighting has not ceased, please encourage all the troops to hold firm, and there will certainly be a way out.
3. Please find out and report to us without delay the number of our men who have been killed, wounded, or arrested, and the name and rank of our cadres who have been killed, wounded, or captured, so that representations may be made to Chiang.

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**Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang**

**Inquire of Ye Ting and Others Whether or Not Chiang’s Forces Have Ceased Fire and Lifted the Siege, and About the Situation of the New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui**

(January 14, 1941)

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Our source for this document is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 269, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*. 

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 271, where it is reproduced from *Wannan shibian*. 

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Circular to Liu Shaoqi, Ye Ting, and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Status of Zhou Enlai’s and Ye Jianying’s Negotiations with Chiang Kaishek

(January 14, 1941)

The report from Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying] reads as follows: “Zhang Chong conveyed our protest to Chiang yesterday by telephone regarding the encirclement and attack against the New Fourth Army. Chiang says: ‘(1) The Center will definitely not create difficulties for the New Fourth Army in its northward move. As to this instance of conflict, I hear that it was the New Fourth Army that fired the first shot. (2) We hope that the New Fourth Army will continue its move northward. (3) If there is no passage there, it is also permissible to move toward northern Anhui, and Li Pinxian is to be ordered not to create difficulties. (4) I have given orders that a hundred thousand bullets and soldiers’ pay and provisions be provided after the New Fourth Army has crossed the river. (5) Please tell Zhou and Ye, and ask them to communicate this to the front, that one should not exaggerate the magnitude of the incident.’ We are now writing directly to Chiang to lodge a protest and to tell him resolutely that, without passing through southern Jiangsu, it is impossible for the army to cross the river. The Central Committee is requested to inquire of Ye and Xiang which route they will take to enter southern Jiangsu, so that more specific representations may be made,” and so on. You are hereby specially informed of this matter. Hold firm for a few more days, and there will be a way out.

Circular to Zhou Enlai and Others from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang About the Circumstances in Which Guomindang Forces Killed More Than 7,000 of Our Men

(January 14, 1941)

According to reliable sources, Shangguan Yunxiang1 did away with more than seven thousand of our men as of two o’clock in the afternoon of the 13th,2 and a firm order has been given to do away with another thousand.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 275, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Shangguan Yunxiang (1895–1969), a native of Shandong, attended military schools from an early age and rose in the ranks of the Guomindang army, particularly the “Bandit Suppression” forces.

2. The time is given here with a character meaning between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m.
To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying About Negotiating with Chiang Kaishek an Immediate Ceasefire and Lifting of the Siege

(January 14, 1941)

1. We have read [your] report of the 13th and have passed it on to Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying].

2. The question now is not which route to take but, rather, a question of saving lives. If the attacks are not halted, the whole army will be annihilated. Please ask Chiang [Kaishek] immediately to order a cease-fire and a lifting of the siege.

3. Because he was unable to break out from under siege, Xiang [Ying] has returned to the ranks and is resolved to cast his lot with the whole army, live or die.

4. It is Fu Qiutao’s two regiments that have broken through, but in fact they have not broken out of the larger encirclement lines. The main forces under Ye, Xiang, and Yao [Rao Shushi] are still where they were in Maolin, besieged by tens of thousands of troops. They have been in bloody battle for eight days, and the situation is extremely dangerous.

Make Political and Military Preparations for a Great, Comprehensive Counterattack to Rescue the New Fourth Army

(January 14, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Lu [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zihua],1 Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen Yi, Zhou [Enlai] and Ye [Jianying]:

1. Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying], following orders to lead ten thousand men of the New Fourth Army northward, have been surrounded by seventy thousand men sent by Chiang Kaishek in the area around Maolin, south of Jingxian. They have been fighting a bloody battle for eight days and eight nights from the 6th to the 13th, and they are resolved to cast their lot with the whole army, live or die. Although one unit under Fu Qiutao did fight its way out of the smaller encirclement lines during the night of the 12th, the main forces have not been able to break through, and there is the danger of the entire army’s destruction.

2. The Central Committee has decided to begin political and military preparations immediately for a comprehensive counterattack to rescue the New Fourth Army and smash the anti-Communist high tide.

3. Aside from the fact that northern Jiangsu and Shandong have been ordered to make all preparations immediately and await orders to annihilate Han Deqin and Shen Honglie, and we have at the same time issued a circular telegram of the most solemn protest and are in direct negotiations with Chiang Kaishek, all our troops in North China must comply with the previous order2 and organize reserve forces in advance to prepare to meet the most serious incident.

Mao Zedong Zhu De Wang Jiaxiang

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 612–13, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Regarding the Contents of the Emergency Telegram from He Yingqin to All Guomindang Units

(January 15, 1941)

He Yingqin's emergency telegram to all troops reads as follows: "Over the last few days, the advance of bandit suppression armies has been very successful in all war zones. The bandit chiefs, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, have both been captured. To guard against any retaliatory measures, all forces must take strict precautions and allow the bandits no opportunities," and so on.

To Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying Concerning Political and Military Preparations for an Overall Counterattack

(January 15, 1941)

1. All of Chiang Kaishek's talk about virtue and morality is a pack of lies and should under no circumstances be trusted.

2. The Central Committee has decided to launch an overall political counterattack and, militarily, to muster all necessary forces to smash their attack.

3. Propositions for compromise and concessions put forth by middle elements such as Sun and Feng are harmful. Only a fierce, resolute, and all-around counterattack can defeat Chiang Kaishek's provocations and attacks. We must not fear splits and launch a fierce counterattack. We must immediately put an end to the moderate attitude we adopted in our telegram of the 9th.

4. Gu Zhutong declared: "All administrative offices, news agencies, rear offices, warehouses, and repair shops, as well as all illegal organizations established by the New Fourth Army all over are to be shut down, their arms confiscated, and their personnel detained," and so on, and ordered Shangguan Yunxiang to execute this directive. Shangguan has been very resolute this time about annihilating Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying].

5. Between 1 and 3 p.m. on the 13th, Shangguan Yunxiang said: "More than 7,000 of the bandits on Lujiao mountain, Dongliu mountain, Fenglixi, and around Licun were killed or captured by us on the 13th. The more than a thousand remaining bandits are still struggling where they were. One o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th has been set as the deadline by which they are to be wiped out completely."

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 281, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 283, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. The references are to Sun Fo and Feng Yuxiang.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang
Inquire of Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi About the
Number of Men and Rifles of the
New Fourth Army in Southern Anhui

(January 17, 1941)

What is the actual number of men and rifles in the army in southern Anhui? You said there were nine regiments, and Zhang Dingcheng¹ said there were only three regiments. Shangguan Yunxiang claims to have captured 7,000 of our men, with a section of the army (presumably Fu Qitao's) having broken loose. Is this true or not? Please let us know right away.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 285, where it is reproduced from Wannan shubian.

¹ The reference may be to Zhang Dingcheng (1898–1981), a native of Fujian, who commanded the Seventh Division of the New Fourth Army at this time.

Talk Given By the Spokesman of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party Regarding the Southern Anhui Incident

(January 18, 1941)

The New Fourth Army stationed south of the Yangzi was moving northward in compliance with orders when it was suddenly attacked on orders from the government, which led to the enormous tragedy of troops fighting against Japan being annihilated. This news caused shock both at home and abroad. Our reporter interviewed the spokesman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, especially regarding this matter. What he said follows:

This tragic incident was by no means an accident but was, rather, the planned handiwork of pro-Japanese conspirators and anti-Communist diehards. From the time when the armed forces were mobilized to fight a war of resistance, the Red Army guerrillas in the various southern provinces were soon grouped together to form the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army. Over the past three years or more, this army has fought successively in various place north and south of the Yangzi River, resisting a powerful enemy and rendering one unusual meritorious service after another. This is widely known not only by the people of our country but also by people around the globe. An army like this, which has made contributions in resisting Japan, should by all rights be protected and cherished. Yet those in authority, just at a time when a powerful enemy approached and the nation was increasingly in peril, failed to uphold the righteous principle of putting the nation and the War of Resistance first. Under the sway of prejudices arising out of ten years of fighting the Communists, they have always looked upon the army led by the Chinese Communist Party as an alien military force, so that incidents of humiliation, cruelty, encirclement, and attack against us have been legion. Toward the New Fourth Army, of course, there has been no exception to this rule. Said army's detachment in Central Hubei under Li Xiannian was attacked many times by Cheng Ruhuai² and others; the detachment under Chen Yi

This text was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, January 18, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 259–63, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1957. The text is not signed by Mao, but his participation in the meeting at which it was decided to publish this talk is discussed at length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 257.

² Cheng Ruhuai (1890–1991) was at this time a commander of guerrilla forces in Hubei.
in southern Jiangsu has been constantly harassed by Leng Xin; the troops under Guan Wenwei in northern Jiangsu have been harassed by Han Deqin; the troops under Luo Binghui in eastern Anhui and Peng Xuefeng north of the Huai River have been oppressed by Li Pinxian. In Pingjiang and western Henan, said army’s rearguard personnel and wounded officers and soldiers were on repeated occasions murdered in cold blood; there have been the widely known Pingjiang massacre and Queshan massacre. The wife and small children of Zhang Yunyi, said army’s chief of staff, were arrested and held in confinement. These are all actual incidents that have taken place over the past few years and are still fresh in people’s memories. Things have become further aggravated in the past few months. Large-scale offensives have been launched in northern Jiangsu, eastern Anhui, Central Hubei, and so on, under the name of “bandit suppression,” and there has long been a foul atmosphere throughout the whole Yangzi and Huaihe area. On top of all this, on October 19 of last year He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi sent a telegram, as general and deputy general chief of staff, to Commander Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander Peng [Dehui] of the Eighteenth Group Army and to army commanders Ye [Ting] and Xiang [Ying] of the New Fourth Army, ignoring actual facts and stressing what they called army politics and army discipline, in order to compel all units of the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army to gather north of the Yellow River by a fixed deadline. Taking into consideration the interests of the whole nation, Zhu, Peng, Ye, and Xiang agreed to move the New Fourth Army troops stationed south of the Yangzi northward and gave their reply in the telegram of the 9th. By the end of December, Army Commander Ye [Ting] and others of the New Fourth Army had made all necessary preparations for moving the troops. Just as they were about to set out, unexpectedly the Guomindang’s organs for shaping public opinion all over openly disseminated the news that these troops were moving north, an act tantamount to giving away secrets to the enemy. At the same time we heard that the authorities issued orders to Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang to attack, and told them to “round up the whole gang in one fell swoop and capture alive Ye and Xiang.” Outwardly, however, they said they had ordered all troops to assist in the passage, that no obstacles would be created, and so on. Believing that the word of the responsible authorities was to be trusted, on the 4th of this month Army Commander Ye and others resolutely began the move of approximately ten thousand men of the New Fourth Army’s headquarters and its troops. It was altogether unexpected that they should be attacked just after they had begun their move. When they reached the area of Maolin Village, between Jingxian and Taiping, they suddenly met with a large-scale encirclement and attack by Tang Yunshan’s Fifty-second Division, Rong Jiush’s 108th Division, Duan Maolin’s Seventy-ninth Division, Fan Ziyi’s 144th Division, Zhan Zhongyan’s Fortieth Division, Tian Zhongyi’s New Seventh Division, and Wang Jingxiu’s Tenth Division, a total of more than seventy thousand men, all under the command of Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang, who advanced separately and attacked together. Army Commander Ye and his men were forced into battle in haste and had to try and find a way out while in the midst of fighting; at the same time, they sent a telegram to the authorities demanding an explanation. Throughout the seven days and nights in which these troops were surrounded and engaged in bloody battle, the authorities maintained the fiction that they had questioned Gu Zhutong by telegram about what was going on and the lie that they had ordered Gu to lift the siege and offer passage. In fact they had instead secretly ordered their forces to carry out the plan of rounding up and annihilation. By the 13th, the fierce battle had gone on for eight days and nights, and our New Fourth Army, which was attacked while following orders to move northward, had run out of ammunition and food supplies and was sacrificed completely, thereby fulfilling the goal of the authorities to round up and annihilate! Yesterday, on the 17th, the Military Commission of the national government formally issued a general order declaring the New Fourth Army to be traitorous and directly acknowledging that the southern Anhui New Fourth Army’s forces had been exterminated, that said army’s commander, Ye Ting, had been wounded and captured, that Deputy Army Commander Xiang Ying was in flight and was being apprehended, that the New Fourth Army’s designation had been cancelled, that Ye Ting would be handed over to a military court for trial, and so on. With this grand and stately document, their true colors of plotting to destroy the anti-Japanese forces have been revealed nakedly before the people of the whole country. It just so happened that on that same day, the 17th, Japan’s Domei Press sent a startling dispatch from Nanjing. Said communication is summarized as follows: “The Chongqing government has issued a strict order for the Communist forces in the areas south of the lower reaches of the Yangzi to move north of the river before December 26. To make the Communist forces move north of the river sooner, the chief commanding officer of the Third War Zone has started to surround and attack the New Fourth Army and the other Communist armies near Dongliu. Some of the Communist forces have retreated north of the river in disorder on the 10th from near Digang. Since the 14th, the various troops of the Japanese Army have also mounted attacks on the New Fourth Army near Xuancheng and Jintan, and the pacification forces of the ‘National Government’ are assisting the Japanese Army in battle.” At this point, the true story of a tragedy, that of a huge scheme to wipe out the anti-Japanese troops and destroy dissident forces, has become clearly known to all. What was called “moving north within the deadline” was actually nothing other than a trap to snare our army into encirclement to be annihilated. What was called “army discipline and state law” was but an excuse for designating them as traitors and handing them over to the court after the round-up and annihilation. All their glib and high-sounding talk in the past about strict army discipline and sacred laws of the state amounts to no more than a lie to cover up their destruction of the dissident forces and murderous schemes. The New Fourth Army is an anti-Japanese army and its move north was an action taken in compliance with orders, yet it met with the tragic fate of being rounded up and annihilated. Where, then, is army discipline? And what of the laws of the state? There is really no room for argument here, as the one who
gave the order is the one who violated it and the one who made the laws is the one who trampled upon them.

Just when the New Fourth Army south of the Yangzi was being brutally attacked and exterminated, the authorities again ordered Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian, Li Xianzhou, Wang Zhonglian,2 and Han Deqing, with troops of more than two hundred thousand men, to mount a large-scale offensive against the New Fourth Army north of the river. Thus the plan of “striking them all in one fell swoop” was not limited to the areas south of the river. In the Northwest, at the same time, the troops surrounding the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region also numbered more than two hundred thousand men. The special agents organ in Xi’an, in addition to blockading and harassing the administrative office of the Eighth Route Army, a few days ago actually seized the water carrier for the office and coerced him into going back and putting poison in the drinking water. Meanwhile, the military police department in Guilin compelled the administrative offices of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to retreat immediately. As for Communist Party members and other progressive elements in various places throughout the country, they have long ago started making investigations and namelists in preparation for another “strike at them all in one fell swoop,” so are they not probably just about ready to get down to it?! Judging from these various facts, the past tragedy of the civil war might be repeated, and there is a possibility that the valiant cause over the past three and a half years of the national war against Japan could be abandoned in midstream. The shameless crime of annihilating the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui is but part of the entire scheme that has been exposed and only the beginning of the open fulfillment of the entire scheme of the pro-Japanese conspirators and the anti-Communist diehards to replace the War of Resistance with civil war, and to replace unity with splitting. This crime of boosting the enemy and absolute lawlessness will not be tolerated by the hundreds of thousands of our Communist Party members, nor by the hundreds of thousands of officers and men of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and neither will the soldiers and civilians and patriotic fellow-countrymen throughout the nation, and all who champion justice throughout the world, sit back and do nothing. We appeal to all patriotic soldiers and civilians and fellow-countrymen all over the nation, and we call upon fair-minded people throughout the world who sympathize with the cause of the Chinese nation’s liberation to unite as one and struggle together toward the following goals:

1. Severely punish the chief culprits who plotted to exterminate the New Fourth Army troops in southern Anhui!

2. Set free all captured officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army and protect the lives and safety of Army Commander Ye and other military and political cadres!

3. Offer compensation to the New Fourth Army officers and men killed and wounded in southern Anhui, and to their families!

4. Stop the war of suppressing the Communists waged by hundreds of thousands of troops in Central China!

5. Demolish the anti-Communist blockade lines in the Northwest!

6. Stop the criminal acts of brutally murdering and arresting Communist Party members and other patriotic personages all over the country, and release all patriotic political prisoners!

7. Eliminate He Yingqin and all other pro-Japanese elements!

8. Oppose all schemes and plots that undermine the War of Resistance and that undermine unity!

9. Strictly reorganize the battle array against Japan and carry the War of Resistance against Japan through to the end!

We are convinced that the majority of the soldiers, civilians, and fellow-countrymen from all parties and factions as well as those without party affiliation will value the destiny of the nation and country above all else, stand with us on the same frontlines to oppose the small number of pro-Japanese elements and other scum of the nation and frustrate their shameless scheme of fighting internally and pacifying externally and of capitulation and selling out their country. The Chinese nation is faced with the most serious crisis since the start of the War of Resistance. We Communists as well as the majority of soldiers and civilians throughout the country understand full well the responsibility we should assume and the measures we should take in this adverse and perilous situation.

2. At this time, Wang Zhonglian (1903– ) was the commander of the Eighty-fifth Army.
Circular from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning the Circumstances of Chiang Kaishek's Orders to Attack Us in All War Zones

(January 18, 1941)

1. Chiang Kaishek has declared: “Zhu [De] and Ye [Jianying] have not obeyed the orders to move the troops under their command, so we should combine the forces of the Party, the government, and the army and compel them to submit. Only we must prevent these forces from fleeing helter-skelter toward the Dabie mountains and western Henan, which would upset the overall situation. We should stay clear of the difficult and cope with the easy, stay clear of the main force and strike at the weak points, and find opportunities to destroy them,” and so on.

2. He Yingqin has declared: “The New Fourth Army south of the Yangzi, defying orders, has not moved northward, and Commander Gu [Zhuotong] has received orders to send troops to destroy it altogether. It is estimated that more than ten thousand have been killed and more than two thousand captured. Ye Ting, commander of said army, was wounded, and Xiang Ying, its deputy army commander, killed in battle. Strict defense should be mounted against the alien army’s retaliating from Shaanxi and Shanxi,” and so on.

3. Chiang has ordered all war zones to start an extermination campaign [against us]. Li Zongren has appointed Tang Enbo commander-in-chief of the northern Huaihe zone, Li Pixian commander-in-chief of the southern Huaihe zone, Wang Zhongliang commander-in-chief of the Central Huaihe zone, and Feng Zhi’ an1 commander-in-chief of the western Xiangyang zone, and ordered them to start attacking and to finish up within two months.

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To Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Political, Military, and Organizational Measures That Should Be Adopted

(January 19, 1941)

(1) The overall policy of the Central Committee will be sent separately. (2) Food is being collected in the border areas. (3) Under present conditions it is very difficult to expand munitions factories. The construction of a third acid factory is under negotiation. (4) Chiang’s plan is to defeat our forces one by one, attacking the New Fourth Army first and then the Eighth Route Army. No attack is likely for now in the northwest, and we have no reason to rouse Hu Zongnan’s attention, so no new military deployments shall be made in the border areas. (5) In North China, please follow the steps prescribed in our original plan, except that the urgency is to be increased. (6) In Central China we plan to carry on protracted guerrilla warfare, on the principle that it is to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the anti-Communist forces. (7) By declaring the New Fourth Army rebels and putting Ye Ting on trial, Chiang Kaishek seems to have made up his mind to break with our Party. The background influence seems to be mostly from Germany and Japan. We have decided to take the necessary political, military, and organizational measures. Politically, we shall fully expose Chiang’s scheme (though making no mention of his name for the time being). Refer to the editorial and the statement made by the spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party in Xin Zhonghua bao on this. Only a defensive posture will continue to be taken so as to mobilize the masses of the people under the slogan of persisting in the war against Japan and opposing the civil war. Militarily, we shall first fight defensive warfare and fight our way, when necessary, to Gansu and Sichuan. Organizationally, we plan to make preparations to remove our various administrative offices.

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 287, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

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To Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi from Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang Concerning Political, Military, and Organizational Measures That Should Be Adopted

(January 19, 1941)

(1) The overall policy of the Central Committee will be sent separately. (2) Food is being collected in the border areas. (3) Under present conditions it is very difficult to expand munitions factories. The construction of a third acid factory is under negotiation. (4) Chiang’s plan is to defeat our forces one by one, attacking the New Fourth Army first and then the Eighth Route Army. No attack is likely for now in the northwest, and we have no reason to rouse Hu Zongnan’s attention, so no new military deployments shall be made in the border areas. (5) In North China, please follow the steps prescribed in our original plan, except that the urgency is to be increased. (6) In Central China we plan to carry on protracted guerrilla warfare, on the principle that it is to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the anti-Communist forces. (7) By declaring the New Fourth Army rebels and putting Ye Ting on trial, Chiang Kaishek seems to have made up his mind to break with our Party. The background influence seems to be mostly from Germany and Japan. We have decided to take the necessary political, military, and organizational measures. Politically, we shall fully expose Chiang’s scheme (though making no mention of his name for the time being). Refer to the editorial and the statement made by the spokesman of the Chinese Communist Party in Xin Zhonghua bao on this. Only a defensive posture will continue to be taken so as to mobilize the masses of the people under the slogan of persisting in the war against Japan and opposing the civil war. Militarily, we shall first fight defensive warfare and fight our way, when necessary, to Gansu and Sichuan. Organizationally, we plan to make preparations to remove our various administrative offices.

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1. This sentence is not altogether clear, but it apparently refers to the preparation of acids to be used in making explosives.
To Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi on the Change in the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party After Chiang Kaishek Issued His “January 17” Order, and Our Countermeasures

(January 20, 1941)

1. Chiang Kaishek has pushed us to a position altogether antagonistic to him, and we no longer have anything to say to each other.

2. The Central Committee has decided to abolish our various administrative offices step by step and recall their personnel in the same manner. The Eighth Route Army General Headquarters will no longer submit any reports on paper or by telegram to Chiang.

3. The Military Commission in Yan’an has issued orders in a statement. Please distribute it extensively after you have received it.

4. The relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party as it is now is of no use at all to us and to the revolution. But the split was caused by Chiang, so it is rather to our advantage.

5. The problem is [X]' disagreement and has not been resolved after much toing and froing during the past three months. As a result, we are politically very much on the offensive at the moment, while, militarily, we have to assume a defensive posture for the time being. We must, however, make active preparations for the offense, so that we will be able to take the offensive effectively after four to six months. During the period of preparation, no large military deployment will be made in border areas or in northwestern Shanxi in order to avoid creating shocks. Eighth Route Army personnel are not to make anti-Chiang comments for now.

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Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Southern Anhui Incident

(January 20, 1941)

I. Order

Order of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Yan’an, January 20, the 30th year of the Republic):

The New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army has won fame both at home and abroad by its distinguished service in the War of Resistance. Army Commander Ye Ting has an outstanding record in leading the army against the enemy. Recently, however, while it was moving northward in accordance with instructions, this army was treacherously attacked by the pro-Japanese clique, and Commander Ye, wounded and exhausted in the fighting, was thrown into jail. Informed of the whole course of the Southern Anhui Incident by telegrams from Chen Yi, commander of the First Detachment of said army, and Zhang Yunyi, the army’s chief of staff, the Commission expresses its great wrath and its deep solicitude for our comrades. In addition to the adoption of separate measures to deal with the towering crimes of the pro-Japanese clique in sabotaging the War of Resistance, attacking friendly armed forces, and launching a civil war, the Commission hereby appoints Chen Yi as acting army commander of the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, Zhang Yunyi as deputy army commander, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar, Lai Chuanzhu as chief of staff, and Deng Zhihu as head of the Political Department. Acting Commander Chen Yi and

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 291, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Eleven characters are missing here in the available text.

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 265–73, which reproduces it from a documentary collection published in China in 1942, indicating as usual the variants between that version and the text as it appears in Vol. 2 of the Selected Works.

1. Friendly armed forces → The people’s armed forces

2. Deng Zhihu (1896–1972), a native of Longyan in Fujian, was at the time head of the New Fourth Army’s Political Department.
his associates are hereby instructed to devote their efforts to strengthening the army, reinforcing unity within its ranks, ensuring good relations with the people, carrying out the Three People's Principles, adhering to the Testament of the Director General, and consolidating and expanding the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the struggle to defend our people and our country, to carry the War of Resistance forward to the end, and to guard against attacks by the pro-Japanese clique. It is so ordered.

II. Statement

Given that the National Government Military Commission’s order of January 17 declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous, cancelling its designation, and placing its army commander, Ye Ting, on trial in court is indeed a sudden and grave turn of events in the anti-Japanese ranks, a Xinhua News Agency correspondent conducted a special interview with the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the significance of the incident and their measures in response to it. Said Commission’s spokesman made the following statement:

The recent incident had been brewing for a long time. Present developments are but the opening phase of a national emergency. Since the formation of their triple alliance with Germany and Italy, the Japanese bandits have redoubled their efforts to engineer changes within China so as to find a quick solution to the Sino-Japanese War. Their purpose is to use the Chinese themselves to suppress the anti-Japanese movement and consolidate the rear for Japan’s southward drive, so that it will be free to drive south in coordination with Hitler’s offensive against Britain. A considerable number of ringleaders from the pro-Japanese clique have long entrenched themselves in party, government, and army organizations and have been carrying on agitation day and night. The preparations for their plot were completed by the end of last year. The attack on the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui and the reactionary order of January 17 are only the first open signs of this plot. Incidents of the gravest nature will now be staged one after another. What are the details of the plot of the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique? They are as follows:

1. To publish the two telegrams of October 19 and December 8 to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Ye Ting, and Xiang Ying over the signatures of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, in order to arouse public opinion.

2. To start a press campaign on the importance of observing military discipline and military orders, in preparation for launching civil war.
3. To wipe out the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui.
4. To declare that the New Fourth Army has mutinied and cancel its official designation.
5. These four steps have already been taken.
6. To appoint Tang Enbo, Li Pinxian, Wang Zhonglian, and Han Deqin as Communist-suppression commanders of the various route armies in Central China, with Li Zongren as supreme commander, in order to attack the New Fourth Army units under Peng Xuefeng, Zhang Yunyi, and Li Xiannian and, if this comes off, to make further attacks on the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army in Shandong and northern Jiangsu, with the Japanese troops acting in close coordination.
7. This step is now being taken.
8. To find a pretext to declare that the Eighth Route Army has mutinied, cancel its official designation, and order the arrest of Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai].
9. This move is now in preparation.
10. To close down the liaison offices of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing, Xi’an, and Guilin, and arrest Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao.
11. This move has also begun, with the closing down of the liaison office in Guilin.
12. To close down the New China Daily.
14. To make wholesale arrests of prominent people opposing resistance to Japan and suppress the anti-Japanese movement in Chongqing and in the provinces.
15. To destroy Communist Party organizations in all provinces and make wholesale arrest of Communists.
16. To proclaim the recovery of lost territories by China upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Central and South China and at the same time to carry out propaganda on the necessity of concluding a peace with honor.
17. Japan to launch most ferocious attacks on the Eighth Route Army by bringing up its troops originally stationed in Central and South China as reinforcements to the north, and to carry out a joint attack by Chinese and Japanese forces in order to annihilate the whole Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.
18. Continue last year’s state of ceasefire between the Chinese and Japanese armies on all fronts in order to turn it into one of general truce and peace negotiations while ceaselessly attacking the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

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3. Statement → Statement by the Spokesman of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to a Correspondent of the Xinhua News Agency (January 22, 1941)
4. Incident → Anti-Communist Southern Anhui Incident
5. Party, government, and army organizations → Party, government, and army organizations of the Guomindang
6. New Fourth Army → New Fourth Army units
7. The recovery of lost territories by China → A so-called “recovery of lost territories” by the Guomindang government
8. A peace with honor → A so-called “peace with honor”
9. Carry out a joint attack by Chinese and Japanese forces → Cooperate with the Guomindang army
10. The Chinese and Japanese armies → The Guomindang and Japanese armies
15. The two countries of China and Japan\(^{11}\) to sign a peace treaty and China to join the triple alliance.

Active preparations are now being made for all these moves.

Such in general outline is the treacherous plot of Japan and the pro-Japanese clique. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out in its manifesto of July 7, 1939: “Capitulation presents the greatest danger in the current situation, and anticomunism is, in fact, the preparatory step to capitulation.” Last year’s July 7 manifesto declares, “Unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulties in the War of Resistance are upon us today.” Zhu [De], Peng [Dehui], Ye [Ting], and Xiang [Ying] pointed this out even more concretely in their telegram of November 9 of last year: “Certain people at home are engineering a so-called new anti-Communist onslaught in an attempt to clear the way for capitulation. They want to put an end to the War of Resistance by what they call Sino-Japanese cooperation in suppressing the Communists. They want to substitute civil war for the War of Resistance, capitulation for independence, a split for unity, and darkness for light. Their activities are most sinister and their designs most pernicious. People are telling each other the news, and all are horrified. Indeed, the situation has never been so critical as it is today.” Thus the Southern Anhui Incident and the order of January 17 of the Military Commission in Chongqing are merely the beginning of a series of incidents. The order of January 17 in particular is full of grave political implications. The fact that those who issued this counterrevolutionary order dared to do so openly, risking universal condemnation, shows that they must have determined upon a complete split and out-and-out capitulation. Because without the backing of their masters the political representatives of the flabby class of big landlords and big bourgeoisie in China cannot move an inch, let alone embark on an undertaking as this which has shocked the whole world. In the present circumstances, it seems very difficult to make those who issued the order change their minds, and it will probably be impossible to do so without emergency action by the whole nation and strong diplomatic pressure from abroad. Hence the urgent task of the whole nation now is to watch developments with the utmost vigilance and prepare itself against any sinister eventuality that the reactionaries may precipitate; there must not be the slightest negligence. As for China’s future, the matter is quite clear. Even if the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique are able to succeed in their plots, we Chinese Communists and the Chinese people will never allow them to keep up their tyranny indefinitely; not only are we duty bound to step forward and take control of the situation, but we are also confident of our ability to do so. However dark the situation, however thorny the road, and whatever the price exacted on that road (the [loss suffered by the] New Fourth Army\(^{12}\) in southern Anhui is part of that price), the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese clique are certainly doomed. The reasons are as follows:

1. The Chinese Communist Party can no longer be easily deceived and crushed, as it was in the 16th year of the Republic. It is now a major party standing firmly on its own feet.

2. The majority of members of other parties and groups in China, including the Guomindang, who are apprehensive of the disaster of national subjugation certainly have no wish to capitulate and fight a civil war. Some of them are hoodwinked for the moment, but they may come to their senses in due course.

3. The same is true of China’s troops. Most of their opposition to the Communists is under compulsion.

4. The vast majority of the nation’s people have no desire to be slaves without a country.

5. The imperialist war is on the eve of a great change. However rampant they may be for the moment, the parasites who depend on imperialism will soon find out that their bosses are not reliable. The whole situation will change when the tree falls and the monkeys scatter.

6. The outbreak of world revolution\(^{14}\) is only a question of a very short time, and it is certain that this revolution will support the Chinese revolution in the struggle for victory simultaneously.

7. The Soviet Union is the preeminent great force\(^{15}\) in the world and will definitely help China fight the War of Resistance to the very end.

For all the reasons stated above, we hope that those who are playing with the fire will not get too dizzy. We hereby serve them with this formal warning: You had better be careful. This sort of fire is no playing. Look out for your own heads! If this group of people calms down and gives the matter some thought, they will have to take the following steps promptly and in earnest:

1. Rein in on the brink of the precipice and stop the provocations.

2. Recind the reactionary order of January 17 and publicly admit that they are completely wrong.

3. Punish He Yingjin, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang, the three chief culprits in the Southern Anhui Incident.

4. Release Ye Ting and reinstate him as army commander of the New Fourth Army.

5. Return all the men and arms captured in southern Anhui to the New Fourth Army.

6. Compensate all the officers and men of the New Fourth Army who were wounded and the families of those who were killed in southern Anhui.

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11. The two countries of China and Japan → The Guomindang government and Japan
12. The New Fourth Army → The New Fourth Army units
13. The 16th year of the Republic → 1927
14. The outbreak of world revolution → The outbreak of revolution in many countries
15. The preeminent great force → The strongest force
7. Withdraw the troops sent to Central China for suppression of the Communists.
8. Demolish the blockade line in the Northwest.
9. Release all patriotic political prisoners throughout the nation.
10. Abolish the one-party dictatorship and introduce democratic government.
11. Carry out the Three People’s Principles and observe the Director General’s Testament.
12. Arrest all ringleaders of the pro-Japanese faction and bring them to trial in accordance with the law of the land.

There will, of course, be a return to normal if these twelve points are put into effect, and we Communists and the whole people will certainly not push matters to extremes. Otherwise, “I am afraid that the Ji Sun [family]’s troubles will not come from Chuanyu, but will rather be found within the screen of their own court.” In other words, [they] will inevitably be “lifting a rock only to drop it on their own toes, and then we would be unable to help them even if we so wished. We value cooperation, but they must value it, too. To be frank, there is a limit to our concessions; the stage of concessions is over as far as we are concerned. They have inflicted the first gash, and a very deep one at that. If they still care for their own future, they should come forward of their own accord and dress the wound. “It’s not too late to mend the fold even after sheep have strayed.” It is a matter of life and death for them, and we feel obliged to give them this final piece of advice. But if they remain impudent and keep up their wrongdoings, the people of China, having reached the end of their forbearance, will dump them on the muck heap and then it will be too late for repentance. As for the deployment of the New Fourth Army, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order on January 20, appointing Chen Yi as acting army commander, Zhang Yumin as deputy army commander, Liu Shaoqi as political commissar, Lai Chuanzhu as chief of staff, and Deng Zihui as director of the Political Department. With more than 90,000 troops remaining in Central China and the southern part of Jiangsu, the New Fourth Army, though subjected to pincer attacks by the Japanese bandits and the anti-Communist troops, will certainly fight on despite all hardships and will never cease to render loyal service to the nation. Meanwhile, the units of its brother army, the Eighth Route Army, will not sit by and watch it suffer these pincer attacks, but will certainly take steps to give the necessary assistance—this I can say bluntly. As for the statement made by the

spokesman of the Military Commission in Chongqing, the only possible comment is that it is “self-contradictory.” While the Chongqing Military Commission stated in its order that the New Fourth Army had mutinied, the spokesman said that its aim was to move into the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle in order to establish a base there. Just suppose we accept what he says. Can a move into the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou triangle be regarded as a mutiny? That blockhead of a Chongqing spokesman did not stop to think. Against whom would one mutiny in that area? Is it not an area under Japanese occupation? Then why should you prevent them from moving into that area and instead try to wipe them out while they were still in southern Anhui? Ah, of course. That is, after all, what loyal servants of Japan would do. Otherwise, are they not afraid of offending their Japanese masters? Yes, it’s true, if they did not eliminate the New Fourth Army in southern Anhui, their Japanese bosses would be angry and would say, “My sons, how useless you are. Just let me give you a few dozen lashes on your backsides.” Ouch! Is it not going to be rather painful? Better to carry out the order. Hence their plan to mass seven divisions in an annihilation campaign arose; hence their order of January 17 was issued; hence Ye Ting was put on trial. Hence this and hence that, and there will be a whole series of acts to be put on in future. All right, so the backsides will be spared a beating, but do they want to be praised into the bargain? I still call that Chongqing spokesman an idiot, however, for he spilled the beans on their fathers’ plans. Without being pressed he voluntarily let the cat out of the bag and revealed the plans of the Japanese to the whole country and the whole world.

16. The Director General’s Testament. 17. This is a quotation from the Analects of Confucius, Book XVI, Chapter 1 (see Legge, Vol. I, p. 309). Ji Sun was a minister in the state of Lu, who was planning to attack a neighboring minor state called Chuanyu. Confucius made the remark in chiding two of Ji Sun’s underlings for going along with his foolishness in creating strife “within the family.”
Dispatch to Liu Shaoqi Regarding the Estimate of the Situation After the “January 17” Order

(January 23, 1941)

1. [Paragraph 1 is missing in the original, as noted by the editors of the 1982 collection.]

2. Chiang Kaishek’s order of January 17 marks the beginning of a sudden emergency on a national scale, the start of all-around capitulation, and the breakup of the whole country. Our estimate made before December 17 is no longer applicable.

To Zhou Enlai on the Need to Adopt an Antagonistic Attitude Toward Chiang Kaishek, and Not to Fear a Breakup

(January 25, 1941)

Now that they have declared us mutinous, we must no longer adopt a hesitant attitude. We must absolutely not tolerate any more, and we must not fear a breakup, or else we will commit serious mistakes. Consequently, the whole of the orders as well as the statement made from Yan’an, including the wording, are completely correct. Now that we have clarified our position, it is left to Chiang Kaishek to cope with the situation. He will either comply with our twelve articles, so that the two parties can once again come to a compromise, or bring about an overall split. You should make it known to all parties concerned that Chiang Kaishek has pushed us into an antagonistic position. Unless Chiang Kaishek cancels his order of the 17th and takes other necessary measures, we will have no alternative but to stand in opposition to him, for we are left with no other way. You should hurry back to Yan’an. The remaining is detailed instructions from the Secretariat.

Our source for this dispatch is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 295, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. The reference is to the texts of January 20 translated above.
To Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai on Tactics for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek

(January 25, 1941)

1. Regarding our handling of the Southern Anhui Incident and the Chongqing Military Commission’s January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army is mutinous, see the January 20 order and speech by the Yan’an Military Commission. We must firmly insist that this was planned by the Japanese bandits and the pro-Japanese faction (and not mention Chiang). We also firmly assert that the so-called army discipline and military orders compelling us to move north, and all the other counterrevolutionary actions happening in various places, such as arrests and killings, were the work of the pro-Japanese faction on orders from the Japanese bandits. In this way we can acquire an advantageous position politically, and Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang will be forced into a defensive position. It is not that Chiang has already made peace with Japan, but we can still make use of the contradictions between Chiang and Japan, even though they are very small.

2. Our strategy of January 20 is adequate to deal with either one of two situations: if Chiang is already prepared for a complete split, we shall meet his split with a split; if he is not ready to effect an all-out split, we shall secure temporary relaxation of tension by means of staunch opposition.

3. Our conciliatory attitude over the past three months (the telegram of the 9th and the troop withdrawal from southern Anhui) has won sympathy from the middle-of-the-road faction, but has given Chiang an opportunity to attack us. This attitude should be put to an end immediately, and a shift should be made to a position of staunch opposition and resolute struggle.

4. The step taken on January 17 was a very unwise move on Chiang’s part. We must take a firm hold of this and follow through in hot pursuit, without the slightest hesitation or compromise.

5. If a change is to be made, Chiang must first rescind the order of January 17 and make some other necessary indications; otherwise we certainly cannot make any changes.

6. Chiang’s scheme is to defeat us bit by bit, looking upon the [attack on the] New Fourth Army as a local incident. We, however, cannot follow suit, and must regard it as a national incident.

7. Politically assume the offensive and militarily employ a defensive stance for the time being.

8. But Chiang has not yet made mention of the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party, so we too shall refrain from mentioning the whole of the Guomindang or the Central Army. Personnel of the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party will not appear openly. We shall wait and see how Chiang acts and then act accordingly. In this sense we remain on the defensive.

9. Within three months Germany is sure to attack Britain and Japan may very well resume its attack on China. The world situation is bound to change, and Chiang’s arrogance might be abated. If Britain should be defeated fundamentally, however, and Roosevelt is unable to do anything about it, Chiang would be more likely to surrender.

10. What the middle-of-the-roaders say must not be disbelieved out of hand or altogether believed. Only by adopting a stand of resolute struggle without the least compromise can we truly win over the middle-of-the-road elements. Otherwise the vacillating stance of the middle-of-the-roaders is objectively to Chiang’s advantage.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, vol. 6, p. 297, where it is reproduced from Wannan shiban.
To Zhou Enlai Regarding the Policy for Dealing with Chiang Kaishek

(February 27, 1941)

1. We agree with the method of a gradual retreat.

2. We must, however, take into consideration the possibility of Chiang’s arresting all of our men, and we must be prepared to deal with such a wholesale arrest.

3. The twenty-five men withdrawing from Xi’an, led by Li Hua, all had completely legal passports but were detained by the Sixteenth Army when they reached Tongguan. Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] has already sent a telegram to Xiong and Hu, asking them to order the release of our men. The outcome remains unknown.

4. Negotiations cannot be resumed if the twelve articles are not carried out; this position is absolutely correct.

5. It is still possible to make use of the contradictions between Chiang and Japan. Li Zongren has given orders to all army groups in deployment against the enemy such that the enemy forces stationed in Xinyang and Yingshan moving north to concentrate in Xin’andian total more than twenty thousand men, a hundred big guns, thirty armored cars, and twenty airplanes. These numbers, moreover, continue to increase, and they intend to invade northern Henan. Tang Enbo’s main forces are deploying a defense north of Queshan. Mo Dehong has ordered his various troops in Shangcheng to deploy against the enemy, as the main forces of the enemy army in Central China have concentrated near Xinyang, taking advantage of our elimination of the bandit armies. If the enemy makes a large-scale attack, it must be the work of the Japanese bandits in concert with the pro-Japanese elements, the aim being to threaten Chiang into surrender, and also a measure to bring Chiang to ruin.

6. Our orientation is to seize upon the Southern Anhui Incident and the “January 17” order and refuse to let them go. Chiang is the one who instigated the split, and it is Chiang who pushed us to a point where we cannot but stand in opposition to him. The armed forces under our leadership have been declared mutinous, and there is no way at all for us to maintain any relations whatsoever with Chiang. Unless he rescinds the “January 17” order and carries out the twelve articles, there is no room for us to negotiate with him, as Chiang himself has thoroughly destroyed any such possibility. The fate of the staff of our administrative offices is in their hands, and they will decide whether to beat them or kill them. In any event, each of us is prepared to be put to death. If they still subscribe to the belief that when two armies encounter each other, no envoy should be killed, they will release our men to return to Yan’an; otherwise, they will do as they please with them. Before they declare a complete split (that is, cancel the designation of the Eighth Route Army and declare the Chinese Communist Party mutinous), we shall keep a few staff members in our administrative office, in the hope that they come to their sense. All this should be explained openly to Zhang Chong and others.

7. The circular telegram on inauguration of New Fourth Army commanders and the circular telegram denouncing the pro-Japanese elements will be sent to you later today.

8. If it is inconvenient to have the administrative office send out these kinds of documents from Yan’an, then use indirect means to distribute them secretly, so as to protect the safety of the administrative office.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 299–300, which reproduces it from Wannan shibian.
Directive of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on Guidelines for the Action of the New Fourth Army After the Southern Anhui Incident

(January 28, 1941)

1. The Military Commission in Yan’an has publicly announced the leadership appointments for the New Fourth Army, issued a talk denouncing Chongqing, and sent on your behalf a circular telegram of inauguration and a telegram denouncing the pro-Japanese elements. Have you received all of this? Please distribute them widely.

2. After the Southern Anhui Incident and after Chiang Kaishek’s January 17 declaration that the New Fourth Army was mutinous, there must be an alteration in our policy toward the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, as represented by Chiang Kaishek. From a policy of fighting them and winning them over at the same time, it must change to one of isolating him completely and exposing his reactionary schemes as much as possible both inside and outside the Party. Nevertheless, until Chiang announces a complete break (by declaring the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party mutinous), we shall not raise anti-Chiang slogans for the time being, but employ words such as “the authorities” or other circumlocutions instead of Chiang Kaishek’s name. But there will be no change at all in the application of the “three-thirds” system and the various policies embodied in the Central Committee’s December 25 directive. The principle with regard to the united front also remains unchanged.

3. Zhang and Deng should find ways to send people across the river to give guidance to the forces that have scattered in southern Anhui. At present, except for those who cross the river, a force should also be gathered together around Wuhu to resist the Japanese so as to facilitate development southward in the future.

4. Guerrilla warfare should be planned right away in western Anhui, eastern Hubei, and in Henan. In the areas around Tongcheng, Shucheng, and Qianshan in western Anhui, Zhang and Deng are responsible for strengthening the columns of guerrilla troops so as to be able to advance before long toward the Dabie mountains. Xiannian is responsible for making arrangements in the areas around Xishui and Huangmei in eastern Hubei and in the areas under enemy attack in western Shanxi (the enemy has already occupied Miyang). Xuefeng should organize two guerrilla detachments of crack troops so that they may be sent to operate in western Shanxi at the appropriate time. In southern Jiangsu, it is hoped that Hu and Chen will quickly gather the forces that have moved east from southern Anhui, operate in southern Jiangsu for the time being, and prepare to head for the Tianmu mountains in the future.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 301–2, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 261–62, this telegram was addressed to Liu Shaoqi, the newly appointed political commissar of the New Fourth Army; the acting commander-in-chief, Chen Yi; the director of the Political Department, Deng Zihui; and the other commanders, including Zhang Yunyi, Peng Xuefeng, Li Xiannian, and Huang Kecheng.
Letter to Xiao San

(January 29, 1941)

Comrade Xiao San:

I have read the poems, and find them very interesting. Since the newspaper won’t print them, issue them on the street corners instead. I hope you’ll come have a chat with me when you have the time. Salutations!

I’m returning the originals to you herewith.

Mao Zedong

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Dispatch to Zhou Enlai Regarding Circumstances in the Development of the Current Situation

(January 30, 1941)

1. There is no difference in principle between the Central Committee speech and the Military Commission speech, except that the Central Committee speech, delivered on the 18th, mainly explained only the Southern Anhui Incident, whereas the Military Commission order and speech, delivered on the 20th, raised the overall issues and indicated sharply that it was in opposition to the order and the speech of the Chongqing Military Commission. If you feel there is no harm in issuing both talks in Chongqing, then go ahead and issue both; otherwise, it is all right to issue only the Military Commission order and talk.

2. There still could be a period of transition between the beginning of a breakup and a complete split, the speed and duration of which depend upon various conditions both at home and abroad. Our orientation is not to spur it on, but we must be prepared for its happening fast. Before Chiang declares a complete split, a small number of staff members should remain in our administrative office to handle day-to-day affairs. For this reason, it may yet last a considerable length of time. The idea of [X][X][X] to prolong the time is correct. The fact is that we cannot dispatch troops until after six months at the earliest; at present we can wage only a defensive battle.

3. It would be very disadvantageous for the Soviet Union to supply any more arms to Chongqing. Please ask the military attaché to find a way to stop it.

4. According to a United Press broadcast, the Japanese army has occupied Miyang and is likely to attack Nanyang. Tang Enbo has withdrawn the troops from Xincai and concentrated them in Shangcai in preparation against the enemy.

5. According to news from Xi'an, Hu Zongnan has promised to send a telegram to Tongguan telling them to release Li Hua and more than twenty others. We shall see what happens.

6. The border regions are stepping up military and economic preparations.

7. So long as the Guomindang has not declared a complete split, we will not cut off all dealings with them. With regard to relations between the two parties,

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This letter was first published in Wenxian he yanjiu, 1982, no. 1, p. 3. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 9, p. 385, where the text is reproduced.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 303–4, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
however, we must insist on our twelve conditions and not discuss further any other issues (such as moving north, expanding the army, border areas, and so on).

8. In his talk on the 27th, Chiang moved over to a protective (or defensive) posture. This makes clear that all parties are dissatisfied, and he is beginning to be troubled by a guilty conscience. It has been decided today that I shall make a speech opposing him.

To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing

(January 31, 1941)

Anying and Anqing, my sons:

It was a long while ago that I received a long letter from Anying, a letter from Anqing, a photo album from Anying, and some scattered photos; in a word, several letters and photos. I am very sorry that I have not replied to any of this; I know you have been anxiously expecting to hear from me.

I am very pleased that you have made progress. Anying’s writing is coherent and flawless in syntax, and the handwriting is pretty good too. To have the will to improve is a very good thing. There is just one thing on which I would like to make a suggestion to you both, which is that, while you are still young, you study more of the natural sciences and concern yourselves less with politics. Politics should be given some attention, but at present it is advisable to concentrate on natural sciences as your major subject and supplement this with the social sciences. In the future you may reverse this and make the social sciences primary and the natural sciences secondary. In sum, pay attention to science, as science is the only true knowledge and can be put to infinite use in the future. There is one thing good about other people’s complimenting and praising you, which is that it spurs you on to make progress. But it has one disadvantage as well, which is that you can easily become conceited, dizzy with success, and complacent, so there is the danger of forgetting to plant your feet on the ground and to be realistic. You will have your own future, be it good or bad, which will depend upon you yourselves and your direct environment. I do not wish to interfere in your affairs. My opinions are meant only as suggestions; it is for you yourselves to deliberate and make your own decisions. In other words, I love you and hope that you do better and better.

Anying asked me to write some poetry. I can’t come up with anything because I’m not in any sort of poetic mood. As for sending books, the year before last I had my old comrade from Xi’an, Lin Boqu, send a whole pile of books to your youth group. I hear they failed to reach you, and this is really a pity. I have selected a few more to send you this time; you’ll have to wait for a bigger batch.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 166–67, where it is printed from the manuscript.
My health is not quite so good this year, and I am dissatisfied with myself. I'm reading less too, because of too much work. How are you getting on? You are on my mind a lot.

Mao Zedong

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**Congratulatory Telegram to the British House of Commons**

(January 1941)

Special report to this paper: The British House of Commons convened on January 12. We are told that Comrade Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, has sent a telegram of congratulations on this occasion. The gist of the telegram is as follows:

The Chinese Communist Party wishes to extend its warm fraternal salutations to the House of Commons of the British people, who are fighting valiantly for democracy and peace in the midst of the cruel and ever-expanding European war, and wish them success. The great Chinese nation has been fighting a War of Resistance Against Japan for three and a half years now. Relying on the strength of even greater unity, it will carry the War of Resistance through to the end so as to win the nation's complete liberation. We hope to strengthen and consolidate to a greater degree the international unity between the peoples of China and Britain.

This text first appeared in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 13, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 305, which reproduces it from this source.
At Present the Command Center in Central China Should Focus on Three Basic Strategic Areas

(February 1, 1941)

To Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], and for the information of [Peng] Dehuai:

At present the command center in Central China should focus on three basic strategic areas. The first basic strategic area is the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region. The method is to have Peng Xuefeng, 1 Zhang Yunyi, 2 and Li Xiannian 3 push westward gradually from their respective locations, with the objective of reaching western Hubei, western Henan, and southern Shaanxi and establishing guerrilla base areas there within one year, making use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek] and also taking advantage of the present attacks by the Japanese bandits in the direction of northern and western Henan (the Japanese bandits have started an offensive campaign from Woyang in the east and Xinyang in the south, besieging Tang [Enbo], Li [Xianzhou], He [Zhuguo], and the troops of the Guangxi faction; Tang, Li, and He are likely to suffer huge losses). First of all you should order Peng Xuefeng to prepare several detachments of crack troops, and when the main forces of Tang, Li, and He are dealing with the enemy toward the west and are weakly defended in Huaxia, have them cross the Huai River and expand toward the area between the Huai River and the Beiping-Hankou [railroad] line. If this plan were to succeed, it would be a tremendous strategic victory and would clear the way to the south for our troops in North China. The designation as the New Fourth Army should be restored to the troops under Peng Xuefeng; if the North China troops move south in the future they will also use the New Fourth Army designation. The New Fourth Army has now been proclaimed by Chiang Kaishek a mutinous army, so it is not bound by any laws (some founding members of the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 621–24, where it is printed from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Peng Xuefeng was at the time commander of the Eighth Route Army’s Fourth Column.
2. Zhang Yunyi was at the time deputy army commander and Second Division commander of the New Fourth Army.
3. Li Xiannian was serving at the time as commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army’s Hubei-Henan Advance Column.

4. Huang Kecheng was at the time commander and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army’s Fifth Column.
5. Mo Shujie was at the time army commander of the Guomindang Army’s Eighty-fourth Army.
to only over two thousand casualties and more than three thousand captives. Xiang’s troop originally totaled ten thousand, so it seems that about three thousand of them may have broken through or been dispersed. You should be sure to send people to guide them and gather them together. Those who have reached southern Jiangsu should operate in southern Jiangsu and should not cross back over the river. Wireless communication should be strengthened in southern Jiangsu; there should be at least five transceivers there. A transceiver should be set up right away in southern Anhui as well. Since Zeng Xisheng would prefer to engage in guerrilla fighting rather than do what he has been doing, you may have him lead the troops that are now in Wuwei and order him back to southern Anhui in the future. If possible and when necessary, you may also consider sending Sun Zhongde across the river with Zeng Xisheng. As for eastern Zhejiang, meaning the delta area between Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Ningbo, our forces have always been weak there. The General Command Headquarters should open up one more strategic base here and build up through the Shanghai Party organizations a guerrilla base area in the region (with the small amount of armed forces originally existing in Songjiang and other places as a foundation). The Central China Bureau must pay attention to directing the Party organizations in Shanghai. The fourth strategic base in South China is the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area, where there are three small base areas holding small amounts of arms and where the popular masses are very good [and supportive]. You should start right now to learn about the region. Little Yao [Rao Shushi] once made a detailed report on it, and we could send it on to you if you do not have it. This region at present is to intensify underground work in preparation for armed uprising in the future and for restoring the open base areas of the past. The above constitutes the cardinal task for the four strategic bases in South China. Third is the Jiangsu-Shandong War Zone. This is the primary base area in Central China at present, where the main forces are, and where the greatest effort has been made. It is also the place where we should prepare to destroy, within a year, large numbers of anti-Communist armed forces that are amassed. But you should regard this place as the starting point for western and southern expansion. With regard to the overall task, its function is to produce cadres and as a place from which to send troops westward and southward, just like the central Shaanxi plain [guanzhong] during the founding Han emperor’s time. We now have three large strategic bases: North China, Jiangsu-Shandong, and the south (Fujian-Guangdong). The task for North China is to deal with Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou; your task is to take care of the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi Border Region and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area; the south’s task is to manage to the north and south of the five ranges. Given the circumstances in which Chiang Kai-shek is attacking only the New Fourth Army at present (his tactic of destroying [our forces] one by one), in addition to your proposal to form four divisions, Huang Kecheng’s and Peng Xuefeng’s units should be added to each form a division of the New Fourth Army, making six regular divisions altogether. Although the overall situation has changed greatly, the contradictions between Japan and Chiang can still be utilized, and they remain the most fundamental of all the contradictions we can make use of. No matter what sort of trouble Chiang Kai-shek is making, he will only make the kind of trouble that will be his own ruin. The Central Committee’s resolution on the new situation after January 17 will be sent to you within a few days.


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6. Zeng Xisheng had previously been head of the Second Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Military Commission. In 1940 he was transferred to the New Fourth Army’s Military Department, and later that year led the effort to gather together the troops dispersed in the Southern Anhui Incident.

7. Sun Zhongde was at the time deputy commander of the Sixth Brigade of the New Fourth Army’s Second Division.

8. This refers to the Central China New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army General Command Headquarters, established in November 1940.
Only by Restoring Unity Within the Country
Will It Be Possible to Overcome the
Offensive of the Japanese Bandits

(February 2, 1941)

To Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu] (in Chongqing), Liao [Chengzhi]¹ and Pan [Hannian]² (in Hong Kong), Liu Xiao³ (in Shanghai), [Chen] Tanqu⁴ (in Dihua),⁵ Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], [Li] Xiannian, [Zhang] Yunyi, [Peng] Xuefeng, Zhu Rui, Luo [Ronghuan] and Chen [Guang], Li [Yu] and Luo [Shunchu],⁶ Peng [Dehua] and Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], [Song] Renqiong,⁷ Nie [Rongzhen] and Peng [Zhen], Lū [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zhihua], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Xiao Ke,⁸ and Gao [Gang] and Xiao [Jingguang] (copy and forward):

1. Taking advantage of Chiang Kaishék’s concentrating all his efforts to fight the Communists, the Japanese bandits have gathered a force of more than five divisions and regiments and divided it into several routes to surround about 150,000 troops under Tang Enbo, He Zhuguo, Li Xianzhou, and Li Pinxian east of the Beiping-Hankou railway. The enemy’s main force is the Xinyang route, which has hurried northward and is engaged with Tang Enbo’s main force in fierce battle. The xiàn of Miyang, Wuyang, Xiping, and Shangcai have already been occupied. Telecommunication with Yexian has been blocked; Wei Lihuang has gone to Yexian in haste to supervise; the government offices in Luoyang have been moved to Lushu. At the same time, the enemy in Suxian has crossed the Huai River and occupied Mengcheng and Woyang and is now engaged in pitched battle with He Zhuguo and Li Xianzhou. It is also reported that the enemy in Kaifeng is coming down south via Weishi. The Central Army around Tongguan marched by night to the front for reinforcement. The enemy is also hitting out in the Jìngzhōu and Dāngyáng areas so as to pin down the Sichuan army and the northwest army and prevent them from being able to reinforce in the north.

2. The present Battle of Henan¹⁰ is the biggest battle since the Battle of Yichang.¹¹ Whatever its military outcome, politically it is a heavy blow to Chiang Kaishék, because he instigated the Southern Anhui Incident, which created a deep rift between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and so the enemy was given a chance to step in. Chiang Kaishék has been in high spirits and has looked down upon Japan and concentrated his efforts on fighting the Communists with all his might ever since the three countries formed an alliance. The contradictions between Japan and the United States have intensified, and Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union have been assisting China. Just after Chiang Kaishék singlehandedly created the rift between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (after destroying the New Fourth Army in the Southern Anhui Incident and issuing the order declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous on January 17), the enemy started a large-scale offensive during the second half of January. So obvious are the consequences of Chiang Kaishék’s fighting the Communists. In our propaganda in various places it should be emphasized that such counterrevolutionary policies on Chiang Kaishék’s part of concentrating solely on internal suppression can only create opportunities for the enemy, and that, if not changed, it will inevitably lead to national extinction. Also to be raised emphatically are the twelve conditions for a solution to the current situation put forward by our Party’s Central Committee. Only if Chiang Kaishék immediately realizes the error of his ways and puts into effect the proposals made by our Party’s Central Committee can

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 625–28, where it is printed from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

¹ Liao Chengzhi (1908–1983) was a native of Guangdong. Since 1937 he had been the Chinese Communist Party representative in Hong Kong, and he remained there until the fall of Hong Kong to the Japanese in December 1941.

² Pan Hannian (1906–1977) was a native of Jiangsu. At this time, he was the head of the Eighth Route Army office in Shanghai.

³ Liu Xiao (1908–1988) was a native of Hunan. At this time he was secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and head of the Department for Urban Work of the Central China Bureau.

⁴ Chen Tanqu (1896–1943) was a native of Hubei. In 1939, after a period in Moscow, he became the Communist Party representative in Xinjiang. He was arrested in 1942 on the orders of Sheng Shicai, and executed in 1943 at the same time as Mao’s son, Mao Zemin.

⁵ Today known as Unumchi.

⁶ Luo Shunchu (1914–1981) was a native of Fujian. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he occupied various positions, including that of chief of staff of the First Column of the Eighth Route Army.

⁷ Song Renqiong (1909– ), a native of Hunan, was at this time chairman of the South Hebei Administrative Office of the Chinese Communist Party.

⁸ Regarding Xiao Ke (1908– ), see note 2 to the text of May 9, 1941.

¹⁰. The Battle of Henan, also known as the Battle of Southern Henan, took place from January 24 to February 10, 1941. The Japanese Army launched a large-scale attack on southern Henan on January 24, and the Guomindang Army adopted the tactic of moving around its main forces under Tang Enbo so that the Japanese were unable to engage them in battle directly. In this way the Guomindang Army was able to recover territories occupied by the Japanese.

¹¹. This is the battle in which the Guomindang Army lost the area of Yichang to the Japanese in June 1940.
there once again be a restoration of domestic unity, which Chiang Kaishek has already begun to break apart. Only when domestic unity is restored can the Japanese bandits’ attack be resisted and our nation be saved from destruction.

3. After we expressed our unyielding stand and he met with the enemy’s large-scale attack, Chiang Kaishek offered us a cheap method of compromise, which consisted of conditions such as allowing an extension on the date for our Central China forces to move northward, reorganizing the New Fourth Army into the Eighth Route Army’s newly designated First Army, and so on. This has been firmly rejected by Comrade Enlai, and in the end Comrade Ye Jianying is being sent back to Yan’an for discussions. His flight left Chongqing today and should arrive tomorrow. Chiang’s eagerness to seek compromise in a crisis can already be perceived in a general way. We must maintain the stance of sharp struggle, and we certainly will not compromise with him unless our necessary conditions are met. It is of utmost importance to disseminate widely the twelve points regarding the way to resolve the current situation and to make them known to everyone in all circles of society, so as to create public opinion which will be helpful in finding a solution.

We append the twelve conditions proposed to Chiang Kaishek by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the settlement of the current situation.12

Central Secretariat

On the 1st13 (Jianying has arrived in Yan’an as of the morning of February 2)

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12. We omit the balance of this last paragraph, which consists of a verbatim repetition of the twelve conditions which appear toward the end of the “Order and Statement of the Revolutionary Military Commission” dated January 20, 1941, translated above.

13. The editors of the Junshi wenji indicate that this telegram was drafted on February 1, but finalized and sent out on the 2nd.

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The Offensive Posture of the Japanese Army and Our Policies Toward the Guomindang

(February 2, 1941)1

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Hu [Fu, or Liu Shaoqi] and Chen [Yi], [Peng] Xuefeng, [Huang] Kecheng, [Zhang] Yunyi, Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Yu] and Luo [Shunchu], [Li] Xiannian, Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu] (in Chongqing):

1. It is possible that the enemy will take Luoyang, and it is possible as well that the main forces of Tang [Enbo], Hu [Zongnan], and Wei [Liujiang] may be scattered. The two forces of Hu and Wei in the Zhongtiao mountains, and the Guangxi Army forces in the Dabie mountains may all end up in a very difficult situation. One unit of Hu’s troops in the northwest may go to assist Henan, and the anti-Communist high tide may recede. The contradictions between China and Japan remain the main thing.

2. Our overall policies:
   a. With respect to the political aspect, continue the offensive, tit-for-tat, chase closely from behind, insist on the twelve demands, do not let up with regard to the Southern Anhui Incident of January 13 and the reactionary order of January 17. Under appropriate circumstances, we will not refuse to compromise, but we definitely will not back down at present (Zhou and Dong are responsible for this aspect of things).
   b. With respect to military matters, the Eighth Route Army will remain where it is, without relaxing in its preparations, and the New Fourth Army will spare no effort in striving all out toward Henan. (Kecheng should immediately switch to the designation of the New Fourth Army; the New Fourth Army has become an army with a highly honored reputation among the people of

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 629–30, where it is printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten original, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. It is indicated by a conventional character that this telegram was dispatched between 9:00 and 11:00 p.m.

2. Refers to the forces of the Guomindang Army’s Twenty-first Group Army, stationed in the Dabie mountains at the time.

3. See above, the text dated January 20, 1941.
the entire country, which is something won with the price of the Southern Anhui Incident.)

3. As for the united front, Peng and Zuo and Liu and Deng with regard to the various armies in Zhongtiao, Xuefeng with regard to the troops in Henan, and Xiannian with regard to the forces in Hubei and Henan, should all pay great attention to developing friendships and together beating back the Japanese bandits’ invasion. This is a rare opportunity not to be missed to respond to evil with good.

4. In the two provinces of Jiangsu and Shandong, we will not attack anyone unless we are attacked, but we will resolutely destroy anyone who does attack us.


An Analysis of the Situation as Regards the Japanese Attack, and of the Political Tendency of Chiang Kaishek

(February 7, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

1. The scale of the enemy army’s attack this time is very extensive and the fighting is fierce, apparently of an even larger magnitude than the Battle of Yichang. This has been brought on entirely by the anti-Communist schemes of Chiang [Kaishek], He [Yingqin], and Bai [Chongxi].

2. Tang [Enbo]'s group army\(^1\) suffered considerable losses, three of his armies have turned back toward western Henan, and Nanyang fell on the 4th. Li Xianzhou is still on the western bank of the Huai River, where the battle is also fierce. A section of the enemy forces attacked and occupied Xiangcheng by way of Shangcai, threatening Li from the back; another section attacked and occupied Taihe by way of Haozhuo, impinging upon Li’s front. It is estimated that Li, too, will withdraw westward if defeated. The main force of the Guangxi army, now concentrated in the Dabie mountains, has been cut off from the rear, thus becoming a force in the enemy’s rear. This is a heavy blow to the Guangxi faction, and it is estimated that Mo Dehong’s troops are also likely to retreat westward in the future. Fan Hanjie’s troops have been transferred south from the Zhongtiao mountains. These troops will be forced to cross the river if Luoyang is in danger. The earlier plan that Pang Bingxun’s troops move to southern Hebei to cut us off from Hebei and Shandong has to be abandoned, of course. Of Hu [Zongnan]’s troops, Li Tiejun’s army\(^2\) was transferred eastward in great haste by night, and the Eighth Division is retreating from Zhengning to Binzhou,\(^3\) probably in preparation for moving eastward. The forces surrounding the border areas have been weakened. As for the development

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 633–36, where it is reproduced from a manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Refers to the Guomindang Army’s Thirty-first Group Army, under the command of Tang Enbo.
2. The Seventy-sixth Army, commanded by Li Tiejun, which was under the Guomindang Army’s Thirty-fourth Group Army, whose commander-in-chief was Hu Zongnan.
3. An old xian name, now Binxian in Shaanxi.
of the war situation in Henan, it is possible that another unit will be transferred. In sum, the “Communist suppression” plan has been smashed fundamentally.

3. Chiang Kai-shek did know that the enemy would attack some time within the months of January, February, and March. The reason he instigated the Southern Anhui Incident, issued the order of January 17, and deployed a large army to attack the New Fourth Army north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui and in central Hubei, was solely that he wanted to stop the enemy offensive by fighting the Communists. I’m fighting the Communists, [he thinks,] and when the clash between the Guomindang and the Communists is greatly exacerbated, Japan will probably just watch the tigers fight from atop the mountain, I should think. If we drag this on for a few months, then Hitler will order Japan to go farther south, and China will be at peace. What he doesn’t know is that the Japanese think quite differently. First, time does not allow a wait. The Guomindang-Communist conflict is all very well and good indeed, but you’re tricking me to buy some time. I’d rather take advantage of the conflict between the two parties and use it as a chance to attack, undermine your strength, and solve the China problem easily that way. Tojo said in his speech on the 30th, “The Chiang régime is locked in an internal conflict and thus unable to carry on a war of resistance, but Japan will in no way rely upon the fact that the Guomindang and the Communists are squabbling but, rather, upon our own strength to solve the China issue.” So the attack in Henan is to Chiang like a huge bucket of cold water that washed away all his illusions. Second, the Japanese would not like us to go to North China. Tojo declared openly, “North China is Japan’s base area, and if Chiang Kai-shek drives the Communist forces from Central China to North China, that would undermine Japanese interests.” This is something we failed to realize in the past.

4. When doing external propaganda, please emphatically point out the “words straight from our hearts” passage in our telegram of the 9th [of November 1940] (altogether 102 characters, from “Right now is a time when both Chinese traitors and puppet troops are acting outrageously and rumors are rife” to “wanted very much to share [these words] with you two gentlemen”), so that the Guomindang and the middle-of-the-roaders might realize that what we predicted is, unfortunately, right on the mark in terms of the present dangerous situation that has come about between the Guomindang and the Communists and between China and Japan. They have insisted upon becoming “pressed to the limits so that mutual agitation arises, [leading to] mutual defeat and damage to both sides,” which has in turn led to “[our being] the snipe and clam to the enemy’s fisherman, the result being in violation of our intent, and by that time too late to regret.”

5. Military fighting against the Communists has actually come to an end (although attacks are still going on in eastern Anhui and the Guanzhong border areas), but please pay attention to how Chiang Kai-shek and various others handle relations between the Guomindang and the Communists. According to my observations, they will have no choice but to seek a compromise. The enemy attacks are so fierce, the January 17 order is so unpopular, all his plans have failed, and the [People’s] Political Council is about to be convened, so he must necessarily find a way to compromise or things will be even more to his disadvantage. Is this sort of estimation appropriate? What is your opinion?

Mao Zedong
Tendencies of the Various Parties after the New Fourth Army Incident

(February 7, 1941)

Since Chiang Kaishek, He Yingqin, and others wiped out several thousand men of the New Fourth Army’s forces in southern Anhui on January 13, and the Military Commission of the National Government in Chongqing issued the counterrevolutionary order declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous, abolishing the New Fourth Army’s designation, and bringing Ye Ting to trial, the effect has been enormous changes in China’s political situation. Following is a comprehensive summary of the situation in each of the parties involved:

1. With regard to the Guomindang Center in Chongqing: It is making great efforts to mobilize public opinion against the Communists, forcing newspapers throughout the country to publish news and editorials slandering the New Fourth Army and asserting in its propaganda both in China and abroad that this is a matter of army discipline and not a political issue, a local problem and not a matter of overall importance, a matter of internal affairs rather than foreign affairs. In his January 27 speech Chiang Kaishek likewise tried to play down the gravity of the incident and pull the wool over the eyes of people at home and abroad by using the issue of enforcing military discipline. In areas under Guomindang rule, large numbers of Communist Party members and progressive elements are being arrested, conspiracy frameups are being perpetrated, a recantation campaign is being created, and staff members of various administrative offices are being watched and detained. Militarily, a large army of 200,000 troops has been gathered under Tang Enbo and Li Pinxian to attack the New Fourth Army in Central China, and secret orders were issued to strike at the Eighth Route Army in Central China in the same way as was done with the New Fourth Army. Near the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, efforts are being stepped up to establish blockade lines and launch local attacks. These methods of theirs are all intended to use pressure to force us into submission. But there are differences of opinion within the Guomindang. He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi favor a direct strike, and the two of them sent a telegram to the generals at the front inquiring about their views on the problem of the Communist Party. In a telegram of reply, Chen Cheng advocated a comprehensive attack. It is said that He and Bai sent a telegram to Fu Zuoyi ordering him to make arrangements for an attack on the Eighth Route Army. He Jian and Chen Jitang advocated killing Ye Ting. Feng Yuxiang denounced He Yingqin and accused him of plotting, but made no mention of Chiang. Sun Ke expressed doubts. Yu Youren indignantly stated that He had deceived him. Zhang Chong (the Guomindang Central Committee’s designee to negotiate with us) indicated that there was nothing to be done and did not have the heart to face people. Some members of the Guomindang are concerned about a split, and some senior party members even said that this could lead to self-destruction. Many Guomindang members are also worried and angry, saying that this matter has been taken too far. There are also those who express fear.

2. The various small parties and middle-of-the-road elements are extremely disappointed with the Guomindang and feel deeply the need for unity in favor of democracy and against a civil war. Zhang Bojun of the Third Party, Zuo Shunsheng of the Youth Party, and others intend to organize a united movement for democracy and have asked to unite actively with the Chinese Communist Party to resist Guomindang oppression. Madame Sun [i.e., Song Qingling], He Xiangning, Liu Yazi, and other members of the Guomindang Central Committee, along with other notable personages, sent a joint letter to Chiang pointing out the schemes of He Yingqin’s pro-Japanese faction and expressing the profound hope that Chiang would not be hoodwinked by these base traitors, would ward off disaster before it is too late.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Jujian, Vol. 7, pp. 15–18, where it is reproduced from Wannan shiban. Nianpi, Vol. 2, p. 267; indicates that sections 5 and 8 as they appear below were actually written and added to the document by Mao. The basis of the text was not written by him, but, according to a note to our Chinese source, Mao and Ren Bishi revised the whole thing.

1. Ren Bishi (1904–1950), a native of Hunan, was at this time the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Fu Zuoyi (1895–1974), a native of Shanxi, was at this time deputy commander of the Guomindang forces in the Eighth War Zone.

3. He Jian (1887–1956) was a native of Hunan. At this time he was chairman of the Pensions Committee of the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission.

4. Yu Youren (1879–1964) was a native of Shanxi. At this time he was head of the Guomindang Control Yuan.

5. Zhang Bojun (1895–1969), a native of Anhui, had been a member of the People’s Political Council until he was expelled in 1941 for his criticism of the Guomindang government’s handling of the New Fourth Army affair.

6. Zuo Shunsheng (1893–1969) was a native of Hunan. At this time, he was head of the Secretariat of the China Democratic League.

7. He Xiangning (1880–1972), the widow of Liao Zhongkai, had resigned her posts in the Guomindang in protest against Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Communist policies. She was living at this time in Hong Kong, where she supported the anti-Japanese democratic movement.

8. Liu Yazi (1887–1958), a native of Suzhou, was a poet and scholar who had passed the shengyu examination at the age of fifteen. At the time of the New Fourth Army Incident, he had sent a telegram to Chongqing condemning this action, and as a result had been expelled from the Guomindang.
late, and would carry out the Director General’s Three People’s Principles and Three Great Policies. Many representatives of the national bourgeoisie, such as Huang Yanzheng, have, on the one hand, shown sympathy for the New Fourth Army victims, and, on the other hand, expressed their disappointment regarding the future of the War of Resistance. Huang Yanzheng intends to meet Chiang and state the following three points: (a) The hope that Chiang will stop before going too far; (b) Military discipline is certainly important, but it is also essential to pay attention to winning popular support; and (c) A plea for Chiang to turn his attention outward. He has said to others that, regardless of the rights and wrongs of what has happened in the past, the manner in which the authorities have handled the affair is absolutely wrong, and he hopes that a big problem will be turned into a small one, and a small problem will become no problem at all. There are some among the middle forces who want the Chinese Communist Party to take an intransigent attitude, and there are some who are pessimistic and wavering. Most of the miscellaneous armies and local forces feel that the dissolution of the New Fourth Army marks the start of the dissolution of local forces. In saying, “By exterminating miscellaneous forces with miscellaneous forces, the Center refuses to tolerate the existence of miscellaneous forces,” they have voiced their fears and their sympathy toward us.

3. In financial circles, all prices have been rising even faster since the incident, the foreign exchange rate has fallen, the banks are not doing any business, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation has announced its closing, and bankers such as Chen Guangfu⁹ have stopped investing in the interior.

4. The broad popular masses and progressive forces have expressed indignation toward the Guomindang and sympathy with the Communist Party, considering that the Guomindang is sabotaging the unity of the War of Resistance and that China will be destroyed if there is a civil war. On reading the news, many young students, workers, and office employees wept, felt depressed, or became angry, and many progressive elements in the schools fled.

5. The entire position of the Chinese Communist Party is evident in the orders and statement of the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, issued on January 20, which included twelve demands. The whole Party unanimously supports these, and spirits are extremely high. People outside the Party, such as Feng Yuxiang, have said that the country’s problems can be solved only by the Communist Party’s twelve demands. Zhang Yijun and other members of the Political Council were very pleased on reading this document. The middle elements, who used to be afraid that an intransigent attitude on the part of the Communist Party would give rise to a split, are now in favor of our Party taking a hard line. Chiang [Kaishek], He [Yingqin], and Bai [Chongxi] originally reckoned that we might be intimidated into submission, assuming that, because the Soviet Union does not want a split, the Chinese Communist Party surely would not dare take a hard line. Seeing how things are contrary to their expectations, they are now flustered. Chiang several times sent his representatives Zhang Chong and Zhang Zhizhong¹⁰ to discuss with Zhou Enlai a method of compromise, and also sent Ye Jianying back to Yan’an.

6. With regard to Britain and the United States, except for a few people (such as the American ambassador, his naval attaché, and his secretary, who all believed what He had to say and asserted that the New Fourth Army was not really fighting Japan), along with some reactionary journalists who held that this was a local problem within China having nothing to do with Britain and the United States, the majority of those outside believe that the matter has a direct impact on the future of China’s War of Resistance and the interests of Britain and the United States. They have written articles and sent telegrams demanding that the authorities of Britain and the United States exert pressure on the Chinese authorities so as to keep the incident from expanding. A dispatch from a certain American reporter in Hong Kong said: The New Fourth Army did not disobey orders and, after talking with various key personages in Chongqing, he felt strongly that the situation in China is extremely serious and hoped that Britain and the United States would take note of it. He also called their attention to the fact that, after the entire Chinese Communist army had moved into Hebei, the Guomindang armies would certainly negotiate buffer zones with the Japanese army, thereby making it easier for the Japanese army to advance southward. A certain foreigner in Chongqing declared that foreigners, even old ladies in church groups, were all saying angrily that the New Fourth Army was indeed resisting Japan, no matter what argument is given. An editorial in Hong Kong’s English-language newspaper, the South China Morning Post, pointed out:

a. It is reported that the areas from which the New Fourth Army withdrew have been occupied by the armies of Wang Jingwei already.

b. The Chinese Communist forces are acknowledged universally already as a part of the anti-Japanese forces all over China that cannot be overlooked.

c. No matter how you look at it, the Chinese Communist Party is far stronger than the feudal national leaders with respect to China’s basic needs and hopes as well as with regard to their foresight.

d. The Guomindang has to strengthen its own internal discipline to be viable.

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⁹ Chen Guangfu (1881–1976), known in the West as K.P. Chen, had founded and developed the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, using modern Western methods. In the 1930s, he established branches in many parts of China’s interior, while avoiding the Northeastern provinces. At this time he was chairman of the Currency Stabilization Board, established in China after the United States and Great Britain had granted substantial credits to the Central Bank of China in 1940.

¹⁰ Regarding Zhang Chong, see the note on the text dated November 9, 1940. Zhang Zhizhong (1890–1969) was a native of Anhui. At this time, he was the head of the Political Department of the Guomindang Military Affairs Commission.
The British ambassador has been to see Chiang to persuade him to put an end to internal conflict. It is said that Britain and the United States have indicated to the Guomindang that, even though the Communist Party opposes capitalism, the (Guomindang) Center should still handle problems in the interest of China’s overall situation and not act with undue haste in order to avoid creating an emergency situation. It is reported that the visit of America’s Curry to China was related to investigation of the problem of the New Fourth Army, and that American loans as well as air traffic between China and India have both been hindered as a result of the New Fourth Army Incident. A dispatch from the German news agency states: The New Fourth Army was the best army in resisting Japan; Britain and the United States may have been involved in the attack on it by the main army when it was moving in compliance with orders; current internal conflicts in China are intense and might end in collaboration between Chiang and Wang. The reporter estimated that if war breaks out between the United States and Germany, Japan is bound to withdraw from the alliance and, when that time comes, Japan and the United States will ally at the expense of China. The Koreans were extremely indignant when they heard that Ye Ting had been captured, saying that, once civil war begins in China, Koreans will have lost all hope of liberation.

7. As for the Japanese bandits, they expressed jubilation. A celebration meeting was held in Nanjing at which Wang Jingwei made a speech saying that Chiang Kaishik had done nothing good in recent years, that only this one thing he had done quite nicely. Taking advantage of the fact that Chongqing was mustering all its forces to fight the Communists, especially after the January 17 order was issued, Japan began to move seven divisions and regiments on the 18th and launched a large-scale offensive in the direction of Henan on the 24th. Now that the Guomindang armies hastened to meet the enemy attack, many commanders felt that they had been greatly deceived by the pro-Japanese element He Yingqin.

8. Summing up all aspects of the situation to this day, for multiple reasons, such as the fact that Chiang Kaishik’s actions have been terribly wrong, our reasonable and intransigent attitude, Japan’s attack on Henan, diplomatic pressure from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, internal contradictions within the Guomindang, the middle-of-the-roaders’ sympathy toward us, the indignation of the masses of people toward Chiang, and so on, the basis for a compromise has begun to be laid, civil war can now be avoided, and there are signs that the changes in China’s current situation can develop in our favor.

Set Up an Artillery Headquarters and Put It Under the Direct Command of the Military Commission

(February 7, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]:

As regards the problem of artillery troops, in order to save and train our artillery troops, the artillery regiment of General Headquarters (leaving one unit at the front), the mountain gun troops in Nie [Rongzhen]’s military region,¹ and He [Long]’s division² should concentrate near Yan’an for training and set up an artillery headquarters under the direct command of the Military Commission. Otherwise, if the Japanese bandits’ blockade lines become denser in the future, our artillery regiments at the front may be unable to pass through. On the other hand, until there is a complete split between the Guomindang and the Communists we will be unable to fight our way out, and we probably cannot break through this year.³ And when the artillery troops move westward, there will be no artillery available for use in North China.


Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 631–32, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Nie’s region refers to the Eighth Route Army’s Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, whose commander-in-chief was Nie Rongzhen.
2. He’s division refers to the Eighth Route Army’s 102nd Division, under the command of He Long.
3. The editors of Junshi wenji indicate that a misprinted character and an omitted character in this sentence have distorted the original text, which reads, “On the other hand, only before there is a complete split between the Guomindang and the Communists can we fight our way out, and we probably can break through this year.” We accept their emendations, which make far more sense.
Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party at Present, and Our Tactics

(February 14, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

We have taken note of all your telegrams.

1. Our estimates are in agreement. Opposition to the Communists will not change, but the tide may ebb and the “Communist-suppression” campaign may come to a standstill (this can only be called a possibility).

2. As long as the current high tide does ebb and the “Communist-suppression” does come to a standstill, it would be difficult [for them] to instigate another high tide or to carry out another “Communist-suppression” (unless there were a surrender). Thus now is a crucial turning point in the situation.

3. The enemy will necessarily attack Chiang [Kaishek]. The estimate of a certain gentleman\(^1\) is correct, and making use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang remains at the core of our policy.

4. But to make concessions to Chiang would be dangerous (as you have said). Now is the time to force Chiang to make concessions to us, not a time for us to make concessions to him. Things will be easier once we have tided over this present period.

5. Chiang has never been so besieged as he is now with reproach both from within and without, and we have never before won over such a broad section of the masses as we have today (both at home and abroad).

6. Chiang will not launch a counterattack on the enemy; his primary idea is still to preserve his actual strength. But the likelihood that Japan will attack Chiang is great, so Chiang will be forced to meet the challenge and thus will be unable to preserve his strength after all.

7. At present there is a stalemate between the Guomindang and the Communists,\(^2\) but it will not last long. The time when the enemy launches a large-scale attack will be the day when the deadlock is broken (but if the enemy does not attack the stalemate will continue).

8. Only at that time, if Chiang expresses to us an easing up of tensions, can we respond with a similar attitude. But now is not that time. To let the stalemate exist for now is favorable; the more deadlocked we are, the more it is to our advantage and to Chiang’s disadvantage.

9. The present deadlock exists only politically (deadlocked in terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists). Militarily, as far as we are concerned, there is no stalemate because we have not attacked him.

10. If Chiang again orders Tang [Enbo]’s group\(^3\) to attack Huabei, he will be creating the deadlock himself, and eventually, when the enemy army strikes again, he will suffer even greater losses. If Chiang does not attack Huabei again, then he could undo his own military deadlock right now and be left with only the political deadlock. If Chiang is smart, this is what he should do.

11. Our political offensive (the twelve demands) has prevailed over Chiang’s political offensive (the telegrams of the 19th and the 8th, the Southern Anhui Incident, the order of the 17th, the deadline for moving north, the disciplinary order, the attack in Central China, and so on). Our offensive has achieved results, and more is yet to be gained.

12. Our purpose is not to get Chiang to acknowledge our twelve demands or some of the twelve demands, as he will never do so (of course we should not say this to the masses inside and outside the Party and should still demand that Chiang acknowledge them), but to defeat their offensive with an offensive.

13. The situation has changed. Before January 17, he was on the offensive and we were on the defensive. Things turned inside out after the 17th, and he has landed in a defensive position, wherein lies our greatest victory.

14. Only a military offensive would prevent Chiang from resisting Japan and would be a very wrong policy. A political offensive, on the contrary, would only push Chiang to fight Japan and would not prevent him from doing so. Therefore, it is absolutely correct to talk about a military defensive and a political offensive, the two being both opposite and complementary.

15. In terms of the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists, a military defensive and a political offensive will also only bring the two parties together rather than split them apart. If a powerful attacking force is beaten into a

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 329–31, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. “A certain gentleman” refers to Tsuikov (1900–1982), who served at the time as military attaché to the Soviet embassy in China and principal military adviser to the National Government.

2. Here the version of this text in *Mao Zedong ji*, *Bujian*, Vol. 7, pp. 23–25, adds the parenthetical remark “as Chen Bulei has said.” Chen Bulei (1890–1948) was, at this time, Chiang Kaishek’s confidential assistant.

3. This refers to the Guomindang Army’s Thirty-first Group Army, whose commander-in-chief was Tang Enbo.
defensive position to the point that it can no longer attack, there would be the possibility for the Guomindang and the Communists to come to a temporary easing of tensions.

16. Relations between the Guomindang and the Communists, which suffered a breach ripped by Chiang Kaishek’s own hand, can be mended only by our hands. Our hands means the political offensive, which is the twelve demands. There is no other effective way aside from this.

17. Please explain the above points to a certain gentleman, and ask his opinion.

18. As soon as [a report on] the enemy’s and our troop strengths and deployments in North China and Central China is ready, you will be informed.

Mao Zedong

Abridged Text of a Telegram from Mao Zedong and Six Other Councilors to the Secretariat of the Political Council

(February 15, 1941)

To the Secretariat of the People’s Political Council, for your perusal:

Regarding the government’s handling of the New Fourth Army, our Party’s Central Committee has lodged a strong protest and put forward twelve demands as a way of dealing with the aftermath, which are, (1) to stop provocation; (2) to rescind the order of January 17; (3) to punish He Yingqin, Gu Zhutong, and Shangguan Yunxiang, the three chief culprits in the Southern Anhui Incident; (4) to release Ye Ting and let him continue to act as army commander; (5) to return all men and rifles to the New Fourth Army; (6) to compensate all New Fourth Army officers and men who were casualties of the Southern Anhui Incident; (7) to withdraw the Communist-suppression troops from Central China; (8) to dismantle the blockade lines in the Northwest; (9) to release all patriotic political prisoners throughout the country; (10) to abolish the one-party dictatorship and practice democratic government; (11) to carry out the Three People’s Principles and follow the will of the Director General; (12) to arrest the leaders of all pro-Japanese factions and have them tried under the national law. The government is requested to accept these points. Until the government has deliberated and made a decision, Zedong and the rest of us would find it difficult to attend. You are hereby notified and respectfully requested to give the matter your attention!

Mao Zedong    Chen Shaoyu    Qin Bangxian    Lin Zuhan
Wu Yuzhang    Dong Biwu      Deng Yingchao

Printed in abridged form

The Policy of Military Defensive and Political Offensive in Dealing with Chiang

(February 17, 1941)

Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long], Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen], Peng [Zhen], Liu [Zhengcao], Cheng [Zihua], Zhu Rui, Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Chen [Yi], and Hu [Fu, i.e., Liu Shaoqi]:

(1) The central starting point of the Party’s policy at present is to make use of the contradictions between Japan and Chiang. There are still serious contradictions between Japan and Chiang, so it is necessary to make use of them. Therefore, we have adopted a policy of a military defensive and a political offensive. The longer the duration of this policy, the more favorable it is to us; the shorter, the more unfavorable. (2) All armed forces under the leadership of our Party, including the New Fourth Army, should by and large wage defensive warfare only and abstain from offensive warfare against the anti-Communist armies. They should not attempt to launch guerrilla warfare against Chiang in the far rear. (3) The Eighth Route Army in particular should take advantage of Chiang’s policy of differentiation (that of not involving the Eighth Route Army in the New Fourth Army question). The middle and lower levels may voice their support for the New Fourth Army, but apart from that the headquarters should keep quiet (this attitude represents, on the one hand, a gesture of restraint and, on the other, a protest), and militarily take a defensive posture. (4) Now that the New Fourth Army is without legal status, it could make a big scene. So as not to reduce the contradictions between Japan and Chiang but, rather, to expand them, however, they should not go to the far rear but, rather, take as their principle, for the time being, restricting their operations to enemy-occupied areas and their adjacent areas. When the Henan enemy has retreated, Peng Xuefeng should temporarily give up his effort to cross the new Yellow River, and the task of the main forces to develop toward Henan should be changed for now to preparation and not be carried out. (5) The same applies to preparations for the Eighth Route Army reserves, for now it is also a matter of preparation and not carrying out. The faster, the better as far as preparation is concerned, just in case; the slower, the better in terms of implementation, in order to meet the most favorable international and domestic conditions. Therefore, in stepping up preparations for the reserve forces, it is necessary to guard against impetuosity that may arise in the ranks. It is necessary to have people at higher levels in the armed forces understand that we must, on the one hand, be prepared to deal with a possible sudden event (such as an overall split), and, on the other, in our own actions we must avoid causing too early a split. It must be understood that the later the breakup, the more favorable it is, the sooner the breakup, the more harmful. (6) Therefore, at present only a policy of military defensive and political offensive fits in with the above requirements. Strategic military offensive is correct only when the necessary conditions are ripe. What is meant by necessary conditions is, first, that Chiang declares a complete split and surrenders (he will not declare an overall split unless he surrenders); second is the arrival of a most favorable moment internationally. Only when these conditions are met will we have the initiative; otherwise we will land in a politically and militarily passive position. We must take hold of this kind of initiative. (7) Please make military arrangements according to the orientation outlined above. These guidelines were decided upon by the Central Committee.


Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, no. 3, 1985, p. 7 (pp. 170–71 of the annual volume).
Inquiry of Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu as to Whether They Have Proposed the Twelve Articles to the Political Council

(February 20, 1941)

1. As for submitting the twelve articles to the Political Council, have you done so yet or not? If you have, please inform us regarding the document, so we can publish it openly.

2. As for the order appointing seven division commanders of the New Fourth Army, please disseminate it in Chongqing as soon as you have received it.

3. We are thinking of sending Zhang Chong a telegram in reply in [Ye] Jianying’s name. Is this necessary?

Circular to Zhou Enlai Containing an Estimate of the Situation Regarding Chiang Kaishek’s Anti-Communist Activities

(February 26, 1941)

Chiang Kaishek can bully and act violently against our secret Party organizations and our administrative offices, but, apart from that, there is nothing he can do. In northern Jiangsu, Han Deqin is finished, and Wang Maogong, Leng Xin, and the others certainly cannot go, because of the developments after our battle with Li Changjiang. In western Anhui, our advance regiment has reached Tongcheng and Qianshan. In the Dabie mountains, our Li Xiannian is expanding to eastern Hubei, which is more than the Guangxi Army can handle. North of the Huai River, Li Xianzhou will definitely be unable to penetrate on a firm footing. In southern Anhui, we are sending Zeng Xisheng1 across the river to gather the remnants and build a base area around Wuhu, and a section of Xiang Ying’s forces are operating in Xiaofeng on the Zhejiang border. During March or April, Germany is sure to attack Britain, and Britain is bound to be defeated. At that time, Chiang will surely be in a great panic. So the situation both at home and abroad is more favorable to us by the day. Chiang Kaishek’s fighting the Communists is a given, but a large-scale offensive is not possible. The time when Chiang Kaishek is thrown into confusion is near at hand.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 31, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. Zeng Xisheng (1904–1968) was a native of Hunan. Following the New Fourth Army Incident, he became political commissar of the reorganized Seventh Division.
Order of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding Appointments

(February 28, 1941)

The following military and political responsible persons for all divisions under the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army are hereby appointed:

1. Su Yu as commander of the First Division of the New Fourth Army, Liu Yan as political commissar, and Zhong Qiguang as head of the Political Department.
2. Zhang Yunyi as commander of the Second Division of the New Fourth Army, Luo Binghui as deputy division commander, Zheng Weisan as political commissar, and Guo Shushen as head of the Political Department.
3. Huang Kecheng as commander of the Third Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar, and Wu Wenyu as head of the Political Department.
4. Peng Xuefeng as commander of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently the political commissar, and Xiao Wangdong as head of the Political Department.
5. Li Xiannian as commander of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar, and Ren Zhibin as head of the Political Department.
6. Tan Zhenlin as commander of the Sixth Division of the New Fourth Army, and temporarily concurrently political commissar.
7. Zhang Dingcheng as commander of the Seventh Division of the New Fourth Army, and Zeng Xisheng as political commissar.

To Zhou Enlai and Dong Biwu

(March 1, 1941)

Zhou and Dong:

Please subscribe to each of the following daily newspapers for us, starting March 1: Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily), Suodang bao (Clean Sweep), Xin shubao (New Sichuan News), Xinmin bao (New People's News), Shishi xinhua (The China Times), Xin Zhongguo ribao (New China Daily), Huaguang ribao (Light of China Daily), Guojia shehui bao (National Socialist News), and various Yunnan newspapers. In addition, please purchase for us as soon as possible the following publications from the Chinese National Economic Research Institute on Zhongsi Road in Chongqing: Reference Materials on the Sichuan Economy, The Economy in Guizhou, Japanese Work on the Chinese Economy, The Military Force of the Various Powers, Yearbook on the Chinese and Foreign Economies (1931 and 1940 editions), and Chinese and Foreign Economic Digest (all issues from the beginning).

Please ask the said institute to send these publications directly to us. Please also send by registered mail the copy of the Commercial Press edition of The Question of Industrial Capital in China, which we asked you to purchase for us previously.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 7, p. 33, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. As indicated here, Zhong Qigong (1909–1991), a native of Guangdong, became at this time the head of the Political Department of the First Division of the New Fourth Army.
2. Zheng Weisan (1902–1975) was a native of Hubei.
4. Tan Zhenlin (1902–1983) was a native of Hunan, who had joined the Communist Party in 1926 and participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927.
5. Zhang Dingcheng (1898–1981) was a native of Fujian, who had joined the Communist Party in 1927.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuzi xuanji, pp. 168–69, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
To Zhou Enlai on the Question of Definitely Not Attending the Political Council

(March 2, 1941)

1. I trust that the instructions of March 1 have reached you. ¹
2. Last night at the meeting of the Secretariat your telegrams were discussed. ²
After long and careful consideration, we have concluded that Chiang is exerting every possible pressure to force us into submission, and that, if we were to attend, our reasonable and favorable political offensive position of the past would collapse altogether, our whole position would be lost, he could brush aside and ignore all our conditions, and we would be left without any recourse whatsoever. Therefore we certainly cannot attend unconditionally, but they will never accept the terms guaranteed in the open order, so we must resolve not to attend.
3. If we fail to attend, there is nothing he can do about it:
   a. Everyone in the whole country knows that he was wrong in the Southern Anhui Incident, so for us to protest by not attending would hardly be doing something wrong.
   b. We have set forth conditions for a compromise (a temporary measure) which they did not accept, so they are in the wrong.
   c. If because of this he should instigate even greater splitting action (by supporting the government’s order of January 17, issuing orders for suppression, arresting our representatives, and so on), he would be even more in the wrong and this would be even more detrimental to their side.
   d. The international situation has reached a point that is unfavorable to the other side (the war between Britain and Germany and the conflict between Britain and Japan).

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 7, pp. 35–36, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. According to Nianpu, Mao drafted a telegram on March 1 for the Central Committee Secretariat to Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Deng Yingchao, on refusal to attend the Political Council in Chongqing if negotiations with the Guomindang failed. Presumably these are the instructions referred to here.
2. The available Chinese text has two characters missing here, but these are supplied in Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 278–79, where the content of Zhou Enlai’s two “urgent” telegrams of March 1 is also summarized. The essential point of Zhou’s message was that a clear decision on attendance or nonattendance was indispensable.
To Zhou Enlai on the Relationship Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(March 4, 1941)

1. (Omitted)
2. Chiang will continue to increase the pressure on us, so please be prepared.
3. Chiang’s speech emphasized the seriousness for China of the Japanese southward advance, which probably means that China and Britain will sign an agreement to wage war. Once the Guomindang is dragged into the British circle, surrender becomes more difficult, and Communist-suppression becomes more difficult, so this is favorable to us.
4. The Political Council passed the resolution in support of Chiang as retaliation for our refusal to attend the session, but this resolution might have been adopted even if we had attended, which would have amounted to throwing the heave after the hatchet and to falling into a major trap, so it is absolutely right for us not to attend. As soon as the European war gets going in a big way, the Guomindang’s arrogance will abate.
5. We have heard nothing about troop reinforcement in Yichuan, but there is the possibility. In Central China there is nothing to be done. After the two divisions of the Ninety-second Army under Hou and Ma occupied Woyang and Mengcheng, the enemy bombed them from across the river, and Hou and Ma withdrew. Please inform Elder Brother Liu that our 344th Brigade of Peng’s forces is still between the Wo River and the new Yellow River.

Reply of the Seven Communist Members of the Political Council Restating the Reasons They Cannot Attend the Current Session

(March 8, 1941)

(Dispatch of the ninth from the Xinhua News Agency, Yan’an) The Second Session of the People’s Political Council opened in Chongqing on March 1. All seven Communist members of the Council failed to attend. The reasons they cannot attend the session were given in the telegram of February 5 from the seven councilors to the Political Council and also in the official letter of March 2 from Dong Biwu and Deng Yingchao, both councilors, to the Political Council. On March 6, the Political Council sent a telegram to the seven Communist councilors urging them to attend. Having received the telegram, the seven councilors sent a telegram in reply on March 8, elaborating the reasons they were unable to attend. The telegram reads as follows:

To the Secretariat of the People’s Political Council, and for transmittal to all councilors for their perusal:

We are in receipt of your telegram of the 6th and are deeply touched by and filled with admiration for the concern about unity that you gentlemen show. During the past four years, your colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party have been making mentally and physically exhaustive efforts to uphold the national War of Resistance and internal unity, and this has long been commonly acknowledged among our fellow countrymen. You gentlemen have also witnessed that the Communist Party Council members have never failed to attend any session of the Political Council in the past. Only this session is an exception because there are obstacles preventing our attendance. The Communist councilors were appointed by the government, but recently the government has regarded the Chinese Communist Party as its foe, obliterating the armies under its command, arresting and killing its members, and banning its newspapers. The Southern Anhui Incident and the order of January 17, in particular, point to its anomalous deviation since the start of the War of Resistance, which has had an enormously disastrous impact upon domestic unity. Following the order of January 17, the enemy and the puppets applauded, our fellow countrymen were enraged, and the nations friendly to us were shocked, all anticipating an impending breakup between the Guomindang and the Communist

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 37, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.
1. This omission is indicated on the available Chinese text.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 281–82, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 13, 1941.
Party. Recognizing this dangerous situation, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party could not but take proper measures to avert the crisis and preserve the unity, so it proposed to the authorities twelve conditions as a solution after the fact. Over a month has elapsed during which we have had no response whatsoever, and instead the political oppression and military attacks against us have been intensified further. The New Fourth Army has been labeled a rebel army, the Eighth Route Army called a bandit army, and the Communist Party dubbed a traitorous party. Along the road between Yan’an and Chongqing, appalling slogans such as “Down with the Communist Party,” “Pay equal attention to resisting Japan and suppressing the bandits,” and “ Suppressing the bandits is not civil war” have been written all over walls in large characters by official governments and regular armies. Given this situation, unless there is a change, even if Zedong and the others should want to attend the session, to do so would be not only embarrassing and unreasonable, but also for various reasons impossible. With this in mind we sent a telegram on the 15th to the Secretariat of the Political Council in which we briefly stated our position and our hope to be understood. Subsequently quite a few fellow councilors busied themselves in an attempt to mediate.

To express our gratitude for their good intentions and to give priority to the interests of the whole nation, Zedong and the others decided to compromise and have [Dong] Biwu and [Deng] Yingchao, both councilors in Chongqing, put forward twelve demands as a temporary expedient, requesting that the government accept them as a solution so that the Communist councilors could attend the meeting. We notified the Secretariat of the Political Council of this at the same time, but we have not had any response from the government on any of this. The conditions for an after-the-fact solution and a temporary expedient that Zedong and the others have put forward and asked that the government authorities, which appointed us as councilors, act upon, constitute the prerequisite for our attendance at the current Political Council session. The government, of course, has the freedom to accept or to reject them, just as Zedong and the others have the freedom to attend or not to attend. Zedong and the others remain unchanged in our concern with and care for the Political Council. If it is possible during the current meetings, through the promotional efforts of the various gentlemen and a prompt decision by those in government, to adopt the various measures put forward by Zedong and the others, then as soon as there is an agreement and a guarantee of its implementation, the Communist councilors at Chongqing will attend the conference as required, even though the session is coming to a close at this time. Otherwise we shall have to wait until the problem is resolved. Zedong and the others accepted the government’s invitations only for the sake of unity and resistance to Japan. Ever since the Southern Anhui Incident, the deep rift it created in the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has not been eliminated for a single day. As long as these circumstances prevail, then, Zedong and the others find it difficult to attend any meeting called by the government. Herein lies the root cause for the fact that Zedong and the others are dealing with a rather different situation from you gentle-
Telegram to Comrade Browder from Comrade Mao Zedong Protesting the Class-Based Verdict Against the American People by the Supreme Court of the United States

(March 1941)

(Xinhua News Agency, New York, Airmail Dispatch on March 10)

To [Earl] Browder: The decision by the U.S. Supreme Court has revealed the cruelty of the ruling class in domestic affairs during a time of imperialist war. We, along with the proletariat and other progressive people of the United States and other parts of the world, protest this class-based verdict against the American people. We are convinced that the Communist Party and the American people will unite around the slogan "Free Browder" to struggle for peace and democracy. In our struggle for victory in the War of Resistance, for unity, and for progress, we shall strengthen our militant unity with the Communist Party of the United States and the American people.

Mao Zedong

A Dispatch To Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimates of the Present Political and Military Situation

(March 12, 1941)

1. Our offensive (the twelve demands twice put forward and our nonattendance) finally compelled Chiang Kaishek to make a direct reply, which brought the problem into the open nationwide (our twelve conditions made it into all the Guomindang newspapers, and this in turn exposed Chiang Kaishek’s true features). Chiang had wanted to minimize the issue, but now it has become larger (from a military issue it has expanded into a political issue and a question of parties and factions). All this is the outcome of our offensive.

2. Chiang’s speech on the 6th and the Political Council’s resolution employ again the dual policy of hard and soft tactics. The telegram on the 8th from the seven of us Council members also involves the dual policy of hard and soft tactics. This kind of seesaw struggle will continue, or in other words, drag on, possibly for another year.

3. Chiang’s speech on the 6th seems to have the same intention as Cheng Qian’s talk announcing our ten principal crimes, which was carried in Xi’an newspapers in April of last year. That is, a kind of Ah-Qism: by cursing us out he saves face and can use this as an excuse to call off the troops. Electing [Dong] Biwu as a standing member of the Political Council and freeing [our] people in Xi’an recently seem to be an indication of this kind of calling off of troops.

4. We should keep up our offensive, however, until the conditions in our temporary solution have been in fact accepted (mainly in terms of expanding the army, defense sectors, the New China Daily, and fewer arrests on the roads).

5. We plan to make no defensive replies to Chiang’s speech of the 6th or to the Political Council’s resolution, and to ignore them but, rather, to use the occasion of the Guomindang’s Eighth Plenary Session to have our Central Committee send...

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 39–40, where it is reproduced from Wannan shibian.

1. See above, the demands of January 20, 1941 (pp. 651 and 652) reiterated on February 2, 1941 (p. 674).

2. Regarding Cheng Qian, see the note to “The Current Situation and Our Policies,” January 11, 1940.
them a telegram restating the necessity of the two sets of twelve demands, as a
direct assault. What do you think of this idea?

6. Of the smaller parties and factions, the National Socialist Party and the Youth
Party have for the time been turned into tools of Chiang Kaishek, but the groups
headed by those such as Huang Yanpei and Zhang Biaofang, who truly represent
the national bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry, remain middle-of-the-road.

7. Hu Zongnan has ceased his attacks on Guanzhong, and so we have in fact
increased our area by one more district, and it is now quiet all around the border
regions. In eastern Anhui the Guangxi Army was completely shattered by the Japa-
nese bandits. Li Xiannian is expanding in eastern Hubei, and Mo Shujie’s Eighty-
fourth Army is busy trying to deal with the situation. Chen Daping in central Hubei
and Li Xianzhou north of the Huai River also find themselves unable to do much.
Things are quieting down on all sides. In a couple of months, when the European
war gets going in a big way and things become tense in Southeast Asia, it is likely
that Chiang Kaishek will have to make some concessions to us. This despicable
scoundrel is in fact one who bullies the weak and fears the strong.

Telegram in Reply to Mr. Situ Meitang
and Others

(March 14, 1941)

To the head supervisor of the General Office of the Hong Men Society\(^1\) of North
America in New York, U.S.A., Mr. Situ Meitang, Mr. Ruan Benwan, and the de-
partment chief, Mr. Lü Chaoran, for the perusal of these three gentlemen, and to
be transmitted for the perusal of all our fellow countrymen in America:

We have received and have respectfully read your telegram of January 8, and
we are full of admiration for the concern for the motherland and the appeal for
unity therein. Today, China definitely cannot fight two wars at the same time, one
domestic and one external. It is necessary to abolish completely the anti-Communist
schemes of the Guomindang authorities, banish the pro-Japanese elements, unite
all forces, and engage in combat with the Japanese bandits before we can hope to
win the War of Resistance. But cooperation between the Guomindang and the
Communist Party has encountered a serious crisis since Chiang Kaishek ordered
the extermination of the New Fourth Army and issued the counterrevolutionary
order on January 17 declaring the New Fourth Army mutinous, revoking that army’s
designation, and handing over said army’s commander, Ye Ting, for trial in court.
The rampages of the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist elements within the
Guomindang have inflicted direct and tremendous damage to the national War of
Resistance. At this critical moment, when the nation is being threatened with ex-
tinction, unless the pro-Japanese elements are banished, unless the anti-Commu-
nist elements give up their plan to fight two wars at the same time, unless the
one-party system is eliminated, unless political democracy is exercised, unless the
Three People’s Principles are put into practice, and unless the will of the Director
General is carried out, then the future of the Chinese nation will be ruined in the
hands of such people. The Chinese Communist Party has consistently put the
interests of the nation above all else and has stuck to its policy of a national united
front without the slightest deviation, only it is forced to seek a way to punish the
monstrous crime of the pro-Japanese and the anti-Communist elements of sabo-
taging the War of Resistance, and so proposed to the government authorities mea-

\(^{1}\) The reference is to the secret society of this name.
sures for the aftermath of the current situation as well as temporary measures, each containing twelve articles. We beg that you gentlemen come to unanimous agreement and give your support, in the hope that these measures will be put into effect quickly so as to benefit unity and benefit the War of Resistance.

Mao Zedong

To Zhou Enlai Expressing Agreement That Zhou Enlai’s Office Should Write an Article in Reply to Chiang Kaishek’s Speech of the 6th

(March 15, 1941)

1. We agree that your office should write something in reply to the speech of the 6th, and the Central Committee will not put out any more documents about the Eighth Plenum.

2. Xin Zhonghua bao in Yan’an has published an editorial commenting on the Political Council in general and on the reactionary policies of the current authorities, without referring to Chiang’s speech.

3. When you issue the document, it would seem advisable also to make general comments (such as restating the crucial importance of the twelve articles, and so on), without mentioning Chiang’s speech or making any defensive response.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 43, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1982.
Preface to Rural Surveys

(March 17, 1941)

Publication of this material has been delayed until now, and the Xunwu investigation has again been lost.

The present policy of the Party is not one of Agrarian Revolution as during the civil war, but is a policy for the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The whole Party should carry out the Central Committee’s directives of July 7 and December 25, 1940, and the directives of the forthcoming Seventh Congress. The following material is being published, on the one hand, to preserve the historical record and, on the other hand, to help comrades find a method for studying problems. Many of our comrades still have a crude and careless style of work, do not seek to understand things thoroughly, and may even be completely ignorant of conditions at the lower levels, and yet they are responsible for directing the work. This is an extremely dangerous state of affairs. Without a really concrete knowledge of the actual conditions of the classes in Chinese society, there can be no really good leadership.

The only way to know conditions is to conduct social investigations and to investigate the conditions of each social class in real life. Extremely extensive investigation is impossible and unnecessary, but to focus on a few cities and villages according to a deliberate plan, using the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism, that is, the method of class analysis, and make a number of thorough investigations is the most basic method for finding out about conditions. Only thus can we acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge of China’s problems.

To do this, first direct your eyes downward, and do not just hold your head high and gaze at the sky. Unless a person is interested in turning his eyes downward and is determined to do so, he will never in his whole life really understand things in China.

Second, hold fact-finding meetings. Certainly, no all-around knowledge can be acquired merely by glancing this way and that and listening to hearsay. Of the materials I obtained through fact-finding meetings, those on Hunan and those on the Jinggangshan have long ago been lost. The Xunwu investigation was brought to Yan’an and has disappeared again. The materials published here consist mainly of one Xingguo investigation, one Changgang Township investigation, and one Caixi Township investigation. By looking at these three, the reader can understand the method by which material may be found. Holding fact-finding meetings is the simplest, most practicable, and most reliable method, from which I have found much benefit; it is a better school than any university. Those attending such meetings should be truly experienced cadres of middle and lower ranks or ordinary people. In my investigations of five xian in Hunan Province and of two xian in Jinggangshan, I approached responsible cadres of middle rank; in the Xunwu investigation I approached cadres of the middle and lower ranks, an older poor xiucei, a bankrupt ex-president of the chamber of commerce, and a petty official in charge of xian revenue who had lost his job. All these people gave me a great deal of information that I had never even heard of. The man who for the first time gave me a complete picture of the rottenness of Chinese jails was a petty jiaier I met during my investigation in Hengshan xian, Hunan. In my investigations of Xingguo xian and Changgang and Caixi Townships, I approached comrades working at the township level and ordinary peasants. These cadres, the peasants, the xiuceis, the jiaiers, the merchant, and the revenue clerk were all my esteemed teachers, and as their pupil I had to be respectful and diligent and comradely in my attitude; otherwise they would have paid no attention to me and, though they knew, would not have spoken or, if they spoke, would not have told all they knew. A fact-finding meeting need not be large; from three to five or seven or eight people are enough. Ample time must be allowed, and an outline for the investigation must be prepared; furthermore, one must personally ask questions, take notes, and have discussions with those at the meeting. Therefore, one certainly cannot make an investigation or do it

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8. Problems → Social problems
9. Have long ago been lost → Have been lost
10. Xiucei (literally “cultivated talent”) was the term commonly used for those who succeeded in the lowest of the three levels of the imperial examinations. Even though these were abolished in 1905, there were still many surviving xiucei in 1930, when Mao conducted this investigation.
well, without zeal, a determination to direct one's eyes downward, and a thirst for knowledge, and without shedding the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and becoming a willing pupil. It has to be understood that the masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant, and without this understanding it is impossible to acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge.

I should like to repeat that the main purpose of publishing this internal Party reference material is to indicate a method for finding out the conditions prevailing at the lower levels; it is not to have comrades memorize the specific material and the conclusions drawn from it. Speaking generally, the infant bourgeoisie of China has not been able, and never will be able, to provide comprehensive or even rudimentary material, 11 as the bourgeoisie in Europe, the United States, and Japan has done. We have therefore no alternative but to do the collecting ourselves. Speaking specifically, people engaged in practical work must at all times keep abreast of changing conditions, and this is something for which no Communist Party in any country can depend on others. Therefore, everyone engaged in practical work must investigate conditions at the lower levels. Such investigation is especially necessary for those who know theory but do not know the actual conditions, for otherwise they will not be able to link theory with practice. Although the assertion that "Without investigation there is no right to speak" has been ridiculed as "narrow empiricism," to this day I do not regret having made it. What is more, I still insist that without investigation there cannot possibly be any right to speak. There are many people who "the moment they alight from the official carriage" make a hubbub, spout opinions, criticize this and condemn that; but, in fact, ten out of ten of them will meet with failure, for such views or criticisms, which are not based on thorough investigation, are nothing but ignorant twaddle. Countless times our Party has suffered at the hands of so-called "imperial envoys." Such "imperial envoys" rush here and there, and are all over the place. When it comes right down to it, Stalin was right when he said that "theory that is not linked with practice is no more than empty theory." He is, naturally, right again when he says, "Practice that is not linked with theory is also no more than groping in the dark." No one should be labeled a "narrow empiricist" except the practical one who gropes in the dark and lacks perspective and foresight.

Today I still feel keenly the necessity for thorough research into Chinese and world affairs; this is related to the scantiness of my own knowledge of Chinese and world affairs and does not imply that I know everything and that others are ignorant. It is my wish to go on being a pupil, learning from the masses, together with all other Party comrades.

11. Comprehensive or even rudimentary material → Relatively comprehensive or even rudimentary material on social conditions.

Circular to Zhou Enlai Regarding Our Estimate of International Relations and Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(March 17, 1941)

1. Chiang is eager to save the situation, apparently because of current international relations.

2. The objective of Matsuoka's 1 trip to the West is to conclude two treaties, between Japan and Germany and between Japan and the Soviet Union, respectively. If the two treaties are signed, the great war will break out soon. Britain and the United States want to prevent Japan and the Soviet Union from concluding a treaty, and have ordered Chiang to effect a reconciliation with the Chinese Communist Party. It appears that Chiang, also fearful of a rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union, is turning to us for assistance. Japan, on the other hand, taking advantage of deteriorating relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is seeking help from the Soviet Union to subdue Chiang.

3. If Japan and the Soviet Union sign an economic treaty only, and not a political one, Chiang might possibly accept all our conditions as a temporary solution. But if Japan and the Soviet Union conclude a political treaty, it is then possible that both the relationship between the Guomindang and the Communists and that between China and the Soviet Union will deteriorate for a time.

4. (Omitted.)


1. The reference is to Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), who was at this time the foreign minister of Japan. He was strongly pro-Axis, and did indeed conclude the two treaties mentioned by Mao—and a great war did indeed break out. He was arrested after the war as a "Class A" war criminal, but died before a verdict could be reached.
The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught

(March 18, 1941)

1. The second anti-Communist onslaught, which was touched off by the telegram of the 19th of He [Yingqin] and Bai [Chongxi] (dated October 19 last year), reached its climax in the Southern Anhui Incident and Chiang Kaishek’s order of January 17; the rearguard actions in this onslaught are Chiang Kaishek’s anti-Communist speech of March 6 and the anti-Communist resolution of the [People’s] Political Council. From now on, there may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world’s two major imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle, that section of China’s big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-American and which is still opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight temporary relaxation in the present strained relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Besides, the Guomindang cannot keep these relations strained to the pitch of the past five months because of the situation within the Guomindang (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities, between the CC Clique and the Political Study Clique, between the CC Clique and the Fu Xing Society, and between the diehards and the intermediate sections, and also contradictions within the CC Clique and the Fu Xing Society themselves), because of the domestic situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to the Guomindang’s tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party), and because of our Party’s own policy (of continuing the protest movement). At the moment, therefore, Chiang Kaishek needs a slight temporary easing of the tension.

2. The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Guomindang and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in certain changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two parties. All this has compelled Chiang Kaishek to reconsider his own position and attitude. In stressing national defense and preaching that party politics are out of date, he is posing as a “national leader” who is above domestic contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and party, his aim being to preserve the rule of the big landlord class, the big bourgeoisie, and the Guomindang. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile if it is only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy.

3. At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of conciliation and concession which our Party adopted out of consideration for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of November 9 last year) won the sympathy of the people, and we again won the support of the whole people when, after the Southern Anhui Incident, we turned to a vigorous counteroffensive (as indicated by our two sets of twelve demands, our refusal to attend the Political Council, and the nationwide protest campaign). This policy of ours, the policy of waging struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, was entirely necessary for repulsing the latest anti-Communist onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful. Until there is a reasonable settlement of the major points at issue between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we must not show any slackening in our campaign of stern protest against the Southern Anhui Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Guomindang, and against their political and military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify our propaganda for the first twelve demands.

4. The Guomindang will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party and other progressives or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule; therefore our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Guomindang will continue its attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui, and in central Hubei, and our armed forces must not hesitate to repel them. All base areas must strictly carry out the Central Committee’s directive of December 25 last year, intensify inner-Party education on tactics, and rectify ultraleft views, so that we can unalteringly maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the country, including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous estimate that a final split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party has either already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views arising therefrom.


1. The CC Clique was a secret organization created in 1927 by the Chen brothers, Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, who played during the ensuing years a dominant role in the Guomindang. The Political Study Clique was a small group of prominent men, two of whom were Chiang Kaishek’s sworn brothers. The Fu Xing Society was composed largely of middle-ranking military officers. Members of all three of these organizations were intensely loyal to Chiang Kaishek.
To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Nonparticipation in the Committee of Parties and Factions Before the Issue of the New Fourth Army Is Resolved

(March 21, 1941)

1. The Central Committee has not yet discussed the question of the committee of parties and factions, so please do not give them any reply yet.

2. Please consider whether it may not be more appropriate to refrain from participation in the committee of parties and factions until the issue of the New Fourth Army is resolved, because Chiang means to bind us hand and foot by having us join the committee.

Opinion Regarding the Strategic Arrangements in Shandong and Central China

(April 5, 1941)

To Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], and for transmittal to Peng [Dehua] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoqi]:

1. We are in receipt of the telegram of the 25th from Zhu, Chen, and Luo. Given the situation that sharp contradictions still remain between Japan and Chiang [Kaishek], there is no possibility that the anti-Communist armies will launch a large-scale attack on us. This point provides our Party with favorable conditions in which to strengthen and expand our base areas in Shandong and Central China.

2. But the triangular struggle between the enemy, the diehards, and us in Shandong and Central China is a protracted one, and none of the three parties will be able to resolve the problem quickly.

3. Although Chiang Kaishek has sent Hou Jingru’s Twenty-first Division under Li Xianzhou (and not He Zhuguo) north of the Longhai railway line to coordinate with Yu [Xuezhong] in Shandong and Han [Deqin] in Jiangsu, and this unit continues to try and find a way to advance (it is still south of the Wo River right now), because it is faced with too many difficulties, namely, obstruction by both Peng [Xuefeng]’s forces and the Japanese bandits, it would be very hard to achieve its goal. Pang Bingxin’s intention to enter Hebei and Han [Deqin]’s and Huo [Shouyi]’s to enter Shandong are the same as this (Pang, and Han and Huo, are still where they were originally).

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 637–38, where it is printed from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Hou Jingru was at this time commander of the Twenty-first Division of the Guomindang Ninety-second Army.

2. Yu and Han were, respectively, commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army’s Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone. Han served concurrently as chairman of the Jiangsu provincial government.

3. Peng was commander and concurrently political commissar of the New Fourth Army’s Fourth Division.

4. Pang was at the time chairman of the Guomindang’s Hebei provincial government and served concurrently as well as deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army’s Hebei-Chahar War Zone and commander-in-chief of the Twenty-fourth Group Army.

5. Huo was division commander of the Fifty-seventh Army’s 112th Division, in the Shandong-Jiangsu War Zone.
4. Therefore, in making strategic deployments you must be in accord with the basic situation described above, make long-term plans, and not be swayed by the information of the moment.

5. Peng Xuefeng’s task is to prevent the anti-Communist troops from marching northward. You should order the troops in southwestern Shandong to make efforts to weaken Feng Zigu’s and the other anti-Communist forces and to reconsolidate and expand our own forces and construct base areas that are more stable. As for moving the rest of the troops westward and southward, it is necessary to be very careful so as to avoid having too many things to attend to at once.

6. The Central Committee has approved the suggestion of the Central China Bureau that leadership of the Party and the army north of the Longhai railway line should revert to the Northern Bureau and the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, and that south of the Longhai railway line should be under the Central China Bureau and the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army. The bureau in Central China is still called the Central China Bureau.


Views Expressed by the Chinese Communist Party on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact

(April 16, 1941)

1. The Soviet Union, in pursuance of its long-standing policy of peace and neutrality, signed a neutrality pact with Japan on April 13. This is another great victory of Soviet foreign policy. The significance of this treaty lies first of all in the fact that it has secured peace on the Soviet Union’s eastern frontier and has guaranteed the peaceful development of socialist construction. Such peaceful development in the Soviet Union is also in the interests of all the laboring people and the oppressed nations in the world.

2. The Soviet-Japanese treaty has greatly elevated the Soviet Union’s international position. The Soviet Union has increased its prestige both in the East and in the West. This is disadvantageous to all reactionaries, but advantageous to all peace-loving people and oppressed nations.

3. The Soviet-Japanese treaty does not limit the Soviet Union’s support for China in its independent and just War of Resistance Against Japan. As long as the policy of the Chinese government is to persist in its independent war of national liberation, as long as the Chinese government uses Soviet aid to fight the Japanese aggressor, and not against our own compatriots, as has occurred, for example, in January of this year with the destruction of the New Fourth Army units in southern Anhui, and the current large-scale attacks on the New Fourth Army in Anhui and Hubei, as long as [the Chinese government] doesn’t do things like this, we are persuaded, on the basis of our knowledge of the policy of the Soviet Union, that they will continue to support China. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is one of independence and self-reliance; they will never bind themselves hand and foot in supporting the just actions of oppressed nations for the sake of the imperialists. This time, the Japanese did not attain their goal of limiting Soviet aid to China, and they were disappointed in this. For foreign aid, the Chinese people place their

6. Feng was head of the xian government of Peixian, under the Guomindang’s Jiangsu provincial government.
hopes first and foremost in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has not disappointed China with this treaty, and it will never disappoint China.

4. As for the clause in the Soviet-Japanese declaration about mutually refraining from invasion of Outer Mongolia or Manchuria, this is par for the course, because so-called Manchuria has long since become a tool of Japan in harassing the borders of the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The two battles fought at Zhanggufeng and Nuomengkan are evidence of this. In signing the peace and neutrality treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union would have to settle this problem at the same time. In pursuance of its policy of peace and neutrality, the Soviet Union, whether it has a treaty with Japan or not, is not prepared to invade the four Northeastern Provinces. Japan, however, has repeatedly invaded Outer Mongolia, even though Outer Mongolia has a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Japanese declaration guarantees that Outer Mongolia will not be violated. This benefits not only Outer Mongolia but also China's efforts to seek liberation. Recovery of the four Northeastern Provinces is, as a matter of fact, our own business. We should never, as some opportunists do, dream of a war between the Soviet Union and Japan that will enable us to reap the benefits without making any efforts of our own. Such people wrongly blame the Soviet Union when they hear that it has promised not to invade Manchuria. They are cowards, lacking in resolution. We must recover all our own lost territories by fighting to the banks of the Yalu River and driving Japanese imperialism out of China. This is the sacred task of the whole Chinese people. The socialist Soviet Union is certain to assist us in this task.

5. After the signing of the Soviet-Japanese treaty, China must maintain the three basic orientations of fighting the War of Resistance, unity, and progress. First, no wavering about fighting the War of Resistance is admissible. Second, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must continue. Such divisive acts as dissolving the New Fourth Army must stop and never occur again. Third, all kinds of reactionary domestic policies must cease. Only if we follow these principles can we rely on foreign aid and expect to win the war against Japan. To act otherwise would be to betray our people and would lead to foreign enslavement. We, the Communist Party, sincerely hope that the Guomindang authorities will conduct a searching self-examination and handle the current situation properly. This is necessary not only in the interests of the Guomindang but also for the sake of national liberation.

Postscript to Rural Surveys
(April 19, 1941)

The experience of the work of the Soviet political power is the best and most pertinent point of reference for the current work of the political power of the anti-Japanese united front. This, however, refers to the aspect of how to link ourselves with the masses and mobilize them against the enemy, not to the aspect of the tactical line. As for the Party's tactical line, there is a difference in principle between present and past. In the past it was to oppose the landlords and the bourgeoisie; now, it is to unite with all those landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who are not against resisting Japan. Even in the latter stage of the soviet period, it was incorrect not to have adopted differing policies toward the reactionary government and political party which were launching armed attacks on us, on the one hand, and toward all the social strata of a capitalist character under our own rule, on the other; it was also incorrect not to have adopted differing policies toward the differing shades of groups within the reactionary government and political party. At that time, a policy of "all struggle" was pursued toward every section of society other than the peasantry and the lowest stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and this policy was undoubtedly wrong. In terms of agrarian policy, it was also wrong to repudiate the correct policy adopted in the early and middle periods of the soviets, whereby the landlords were given allotments of land in the same way as were the peasants so that they could engage in farming. The Party's policy is now, during the entire historical period of resistance to Japan and constructing a democratic republic, of necessity a different one. It is not "all struggle and no alliance."


1. The experience of the work of the Soviet political power
2. The experience of the period of the ten years of civil war
3. The experience of the present period of the War of Resistance Against Japan
4. Bourgeoisie
5. Countervoluntary bourgeoisie
6. Soviet period
7. Ten-year civil war
8. Lowest stratum of the petty bourgeoisie
9. Lower strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie
10. Soviets
11. Ten-year civil war
12. Engage in farming
13. Engage in farming and would not become displaced or go up into the mountains as bandits and disrupt public order
neither is it “all alliance and no struggle” (like the Chen Duxiuism of 1927). Instead, it is a policy of uniting with all social strata opposed to Japanese imperialism, of forming a united front with them, and yet of waging struggles against them, struggles that differ in form according to the different degrees in which their vacillating or reactionary side manifests itself in capitulation to the enemy and opposition to the Communist Party and the people. The present policy is a dual policy which synthesizes “alliance” and “struggle.” In labor policy, it is the dual policy of suitably improving the workers’ livelihood and of not hampering the development of capitalist production. In an agrarian policy, it is the dual policy of requiring the landlords to reduce rent and interest and of requiring the peasants to pay rent and interest. In the sphere of political rights, it is the dual policy of allowing all landlords and capitalists the same human rights, political rights, and property rights as the workers and peasants and yet of guarding against possible counterrevolutionary activity on their part (acts of sabotage against resistance to Japan and against the people). The state-owned and cooperative economy should be developed, although at present it is mainly not state but, rather, people’s enterprise, and a free capitalist economy should be given the chance to develop so as to be used against Japanese imperialism and the semifeudal system. This is the most revolutionary policy for China today, and to oppose or impede this orientation is a mistake. To preserve the Communist purity of Party members scrupulously and resolutely and to promote and guide the development of capitalism within the social economy are both indispensable historical tasks for us in the period of resisting Japan and building a democratic republic. In this period, it is inevitable and not to be feared that some Communists may be corrupted by capitalism and the bourgeoisie. The struggle against political and ideological corruption within the Party should not be mistakenly carried over to the arena of the social economy. We must draw a clear line of demarcation between the two. The Chinese Communist Party is working in a most complicated environment, and every Party member, especially every cadre, must be tempered to become a fighter who understands Marxist tactics. A one-sided and oversimplified approach to problems can never lead the revolution to victory.

Written after proofreading the text, April 19, 1941
An Analysis of the Attitudes of the Various Political Forces in Britain, the United States, and China After the Japanese-Soviet Treaty
(April 20, 1941)

Zhou [Enlai]:

1. We are in receipt of your telegram of the 19th, and the analysis therein is quite correct. Under attack by Germany, Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union will soon take a turn for the better, and the United States will basically follow Britain’s footsteps; they certainly cannot give offense to the Soviet Union. Under the influence of Britain and the United States, the wavering elements in the pro-British and pro-United States faction, the diehard faction, the middle-of-the-road faction, and the progressive faction in China will all try to curry favor with the Soviet Union. Only the very obstinate elements in the diehard faction are in danger of being drawn toward capitulation by the pro-Japanese faction. This is very much worthy of attention, but right now it is not yet likely to happen.

2. The overall orientation of Britain and the United States is to deal first with Germany and then with Japan, and they definitely do not dare adopt a tough attitude toward Japan. It is even possible that they may concede the Dutch East Indies to Japan or even halt assistance to China. This sort of possibility exists as long as Germany occupies Suez and further intensifies the bombing of London and attacks in the Atlantic, posing a real threat to Britain’s survival, and as long as Japan agrees not to make war on Britain. When this situation emerges, great confusion, realignment, and wavering will occur among the wavering elements of what you referred to as the pro-British and pro-American faction, the diehard faction, the middle-of-the-road faction, and the progressive faction. They will become the objects of vociferous competition between the pro-Japanese faction and the Communist faction. The time for this to occur may be between this fall and this winter.

Our orientation is to strive to have Chiang and the main body of the Guomindang move in the direction of being pro-Soviet, accommodating the Communists, and reform, on the condition that their régime be maintained and our status be recognized. At that time, Britain and the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union may have entered into mutual nonaggression pacts (such an agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union may very well be signed before long).

3. [We are] prepared to issue a document on political intelligence within a day’s time and shall incorporate your point explaining narrow nationalism.

4. Chen Ruting’s regiment has decided to rebel within a day or so. They will still be under the rubric of the 92d Army (to be called the independent brigade of the Ninety-second Army) and will move to Zhang Aiping’s zone for training. Please be prepared to deal with possible inquiries from the Guomindang, answering to the effect that this is the Ninety-second Army’s own business; that we counterattack anyone who attacks us and are friendly toward anyone who adopts a friendly attitude toward us; and that it is right for us to assist Chen’s regiment, since it is friendly to us, but it is still the Ninety-second Army, not the Eighth Route Army.

5. Please ask the Guomindang whether it still plans to provide pay for the Eighth Route Army. If so, fine; otherwise, we will raise funds from the whole country and the whole world (including the Soviet Union), launch a general fund-raising campaign (we are truly prepared to do so), and act like beggars begging for food, because the Guomindang has pushed us into a corner, and we are about to starve to death.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 332–33, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

1. The time of dispatch of this telegram is indicated by a conventional Chinese character signifying between 9 and 11 p.m.

2. Zhou Enlai had sent a telegram to Mao and the Central Committee Secretariat on April 19, in which he analyzed the attitudes of various factions in Chongqing toward the Japanese-Soviet pact. For extracts see Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, p. 333, n. 2.

3. The 425th Regiment of the 142nd Division of the Guomindang Army’s Ninety-second Army, Chen Ruting (1906– ) was a native of Shandong. Following this action, he became in 1942 the chief of staff of the New Fourth Army.

4. Zhang Aiping at that time commanded the Third Detachment of the Eighth Route Army’s Fifth Column.
Telegram of Birthday Congratulations to Comrade Foster

(April 1941)

Mao Zedong, congratulating [William Zebulon] Foster, chairman of the Communist Party of the United States, on his sixtieth birthday, sent him a telegram, which reads as follows:

To Foster:

Our congratulations to you on your sixtieth birthday. Your leadership of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. and of the labor movement has made the American proletariat a powerful revolutionary force. At a time when war and Wall Street’s reactionary schemes are destroying peaceful life and violently damaging the civil rights of the American people, the working class and all progressive people will unite ever closer around the Communist Party of the U.S.A. that you lead and carry on a triumphant struggle for peace and democracy.

Mao Zedong

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To Zhou Enlai Concerning the Problem of Continuing the Unity Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party to Resist Japan

(April 26, 1941)

1. When you meet Chiang, you may put forward a request to come back to Yan’an to attend the conference, ask him to send you here by plane, and ask him for his views on our conference.

2. Say that our Party wishes to continue to unite with the Guomindang to resist Japan, only we hope that the Guomindang will change its internal policies and that it will issue pay to the Eighth Route Army and provide a reasonable solution to the problem of the New Fourth Army.

Our source for this telegram is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 49, where it is reproduced from *Xin Zhonghua bao*, April 24, 1941.

Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Broad Area from Shanghai to Fuzhou

(April 30, 1941)

[Liu] Shaoqi, Chen Yi, Xiao Yao.1

The enemy has taken Ningbo, Fenghua, Wenzhou, and Fuzhou. If these places are occupied for a long period of time, you should pay attention to organizing guerrilla warfare in each place. Where there is a local party organization, direct the local organs in organizing it, and send a few people to help them. Where there is no local party, you should send people to organize it. From Wusong via Shanghai, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and all the way to Fuzhou, extensive guerrilla warfare can be developed. Military leadership along the Shanghai-Hangzhou line should not be entrusted to Tan Zhenlin2 alone, as by himself he cannot take care of too much, and it is necessary to set up a separate strategic unit (this region is very promising for future development), which could be designated as the Eighth Division’s region.3 What are your views, and how will you organize this? Please think it over and let us know by telegram.


The Administrative Program in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

(May 1, 1941)

In order to strengthen the border region further, develop anti-Japanese political, economic, and cultural construction, and achieve our goal of persisting in a protracted resistance war and improving the well-being of the people, on the basis of the Three People’s Principles of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, the Testament of the Director General, and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s principle of the anti-Japanese united front, while elections are being held for the Second Consultative Conference of the border region, the Chinese Communist Party Central Bureau of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region proposes the following administrative program to the 2 million people in our border region. If Communist Party members are elected as administrative personnel, they will strictly abide by this administrative program and resolutely carry it out.

1. Unite every social class and all anti-Japanese parties and groups within the border region, and bring into full play all possible manpower, material power, financial resources, and human intelligence in the battle to defend the border region, defend the Northwest, defend China, and drive out Japanese imperialism.

2. Maintain unity with friendly parties and armies and with the people as a whole outside the border region; oppose surrender, divisiveness, and retrogressive behavior.

3. Increase the fighting capacity of the armed forces in the border region, guarantee their material supplies, improve the recruiting system and the mobilization system for rear services, and increase and improve the close unity between the army and the people. At the same time, strengthen the organization and training of the Anti-Japanese Self-Defense Army and the Young Pioneers, and perfect their leadership systems.

4. Strengthen the work of preferential treatment for family members of anti-Japanese soldiers, carry out thoroughly the regulations on preferential treatment, and make sure that family members of the Eighth Route Army and family members

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong jushi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 639–40, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The surname Yao (here “Little Yao”) stands once again for Rao Shushi. (See above the relevant note to the text of September 6, 1940.)

2. See above the relevant note to the text of February 28, 1941.

3. At the time, the New Fourth Army had seven divisions, numbered one through seven. The eighth was never established.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 334–38, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, May 1, 1941. According to a note in this source, Mao either wrote or rewrote the greater part of this document.
of friendly armies in the border region are guaranteed material support and spiritual comfort.

5. Our party wishes to join in an electoral alliance with all parties, factions, and all mass organizations. It has been determined, in addition, that Communist Party members shall constitute only one-third of the total candidates, so that all parties and factions as well as those with no party or factional affiliations will all be able to participate in the activities of the organs expressing the people's will and in the administrative management of the border region. When a Communist Party member is elected chief executive of a certain administrative organ, it should be ensured that two-thirds of the staff positions in this organ are held by those outside the Party. Communist Party members should practice democratic cooperation with these non-Party people and must not act willfully or domineeringly.

6. Guarantee the human rights, political rights, and financial rights of, as well as freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, belief, residence, and migration for, all those who are anti-Japanese (landlords, capitalists, peasants, workers, and so on). No institutions, military forces, or groups except judicial and public security organs carrying out their duties under the law may arrest, question, or punish anyone. The people, on the other hand, have the right to make accusations by any means whatsoever against the unlawful actions of any public servant.

7. Improve the judicial system, resolutely abolish corporal punishment, and emphasize evidence rather than verbal confession. As for Chinese traitors, except those who absolutely and steadfastly refuse to repent, regardless of how they have behaved in the past, they should all be dealt with under a policy of leniency, striving for transformation through persuasion, giving them a political way out and a way out in life. They are not to be killed, humiliated, forced to confess, or to write statements of repentance. Similar methods are to be applied in dealing with all elements conspiring to sabotage the border region, such as traitors, anti-Communist elements, and so on.

8. Carry out honest governance, severely punish corrupt acts by public servants, and prohibit all acts of robbery on the part of public servants. Communist Party members who violate the law are to be punished with severity. At the same time, carry out the principle of promoting honesty by providing an adequate salary, guaranteeing all public servants and their families the material necessities of life and ample cultural and recreational activities.

9. Develop agricultural production; carry out mass mobilization in spring plowing and autumn harvest; resolve the hardships of the poor peasants with regard to draft animals, agricultural implements, fertilizer, and seeds; open up 600,000 mu of wasteland this year; and increase grain output by 400,000 dan to reward immigrants from outside.

10. In regions where land has already been distributed, a private land ownership system is to be guaranteed to all peasants who have received land. In regions where land has not yet been distributed (for example, Sudue, Fuxian, and Qingyang), the landlords' ownership of the land and the creditors' credit are to be guaranteed, only the tenant farmers' rent and the interest rate on loans must be reduced. Thus tenant farmers pay a fixed amount of rent to the landlords, debtors pay a fixed interest rate to the creditors, and the government makes reasonable adjustments to the relationship between landlords and tenants and between debtors and creditors.

11. Develop industrial production and commercial circulation; reward private enterprises; protect private property; welcome investment from outside the region; carry out free trade; oppose monopoly rule. At the same time, promote the enterprise of people's cooperatives, and assist the development of handicrafts.

12. Adjust the relationship between employees and employers, implement the ten-hour workday system, increase the productivity of labor, strengthen work discipline, and appropriately improve the lives of the workers.

13. Carry out a rational taxation system. Except for the very poor, who should be exempt from taxation, all residents must be subject to a progressive tax that varies according to the amount of property owned or income received, so that the majority of the people can share the expenses of the War of Resistance Against Japan. At the same time, strengthen financial institutions, make adjustments to financial relationships, protect legal currency, and strengthen the border region's currency, so as to benefit the development of the economy and the abundance of financial resources.

14. Continue to push forward the policy of eliminating illiteracy, expand education in the new characters, perfect the formal school system, widely promote national education, improve the lives of elementary school teachers, carry out adult education programs, strengthen the education of cadres, encourage popular books and newspapers, reward independent research, treat intellectuals with respect, promote movements for scientific knowledge and literature and the arts, welcome scientists and artists, protect refugee students and youth who have dropped out of school, allow matriculating students the right to democratic self-governance, and carry out the system of two hours of study for public servants.

15. Promote health management, increase and improve medical equipment, and welcome medical personnel, for the purpose of alleviating people's illnesses, and at the same time offer relief to victims of natural disasters and refugees from outside the region.

16. Based on the principle of equality between men and women, raise the political, economic, and cultural status of women in society, bring into play women's economic initiative, protect female workers, pregnant women, and children, and persist in the voluntary, monogamous system of marriage.

17. Based on the principle of equality among all nationalities, carry out the policy of equal political, economic, and cultural rights with the Han people for the Mongolian and Muslim peoples, establish Mongolian and Muslim autonomous regions, and respect the religious beliefs and traditions and customs of the Mongolian and Muslim nationalities.

18. Welcome overseas Chinese nationals to the border region to study, to take part in the resistance to Japan, or to establish enterprises.
19. Provide vagrant elements in society with opportunities to cultivate the land, find employment, and receive education. Correct the harmful tendency on the part of public servants and people in all walks of life to discriminate against vagrants. Toward secret societies, carry out a policy of winning them over, uniting with them, and educating them.

20. Toward enemy soldiers and officers and soldiers of the puppet army captured in battle, carry out a policy of leniency in all cases, regardless of the individual's situation. Those who wish to participate in the War of Resistance should be accepted and treated favorably. Those not wishing to do so are to be released, and under no circumstances may they be killed, humiliated, forced to confess, or forced to write statements of repentance. Those who are recaptured after having been released, regardless how many times they have been captured, are all to be dealt with in this manner. If there are those within the nation who launch offensives against the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, or any anti-Japanese forces, they are to be dealt with in a similar fashion.

21. On condition that he respects Chinese sovereignty and obeys governmental laws, any foreigner is allowed into the border region as a visitor, to participate in the work of resisting Japan, or to conduct entrepreneurial, cultural, and religious activities. Any such person coming to the border region as a result of repression by a foreign government for having committed revolutionary action, regardless of whether he is from a colonialist country or from a colony, will in all cases be given earnest protection by the government of the border region.

Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught

(May 8, 1941)

As the Central Committee's directive of March 18 has stated, the second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an end. What has followed since is the continuance of the War of Resistance Against Japan in new circumstances, international as well as domestic. The additional factors in these new circumstances are: the spread of the imperialist war, the upsurge of the international revolutionary movement, the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan, the defeat of the Guomindang's second anti-Communist onslaught, and the consequent decline in the political standing of the Guomindang and rise in that of the Communist Party, and, furthermore, the latest preparations by Japan for a new large-scale offensive against China. It is absolutely necessary for us to study and learn the lessons of our Party's heroic and victorious struggle against the recent anti-Communist onslaught, for the purpose of uniting the people throughout the country to persevere in the War of Resistance and for the purpose of continuing effectively to overcome the danger of capitulation and the anti-Communist countercurrent of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie.

1. Of China's two major contradictions, the national contradiction between China and Japan is still primary and the internal class contradiction in China is still subordinate. The fact that a national enemy has penetrated deep into our country is all-decisive. As long as the contradiction between China and Japan remains acute, even if the entire big landlord class and big bourgeoisie turn traitor and surrender, they can never bring about a 1927-type situation, with a repetition of the April 12 and the May 21 Incidents of that year. The previous anti-Communist upsurge was appraised as another May 21 Incident by some comrades, and the present upsurge as a repetition of the April 12 and May 21 Incidents, but objective facts

We have translated this document from the second edition (1991) of Mao Zedong xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 781–86.

1. The reference is to Chiang Kai-shek's massacre of the Shanghai workers on April 12, 1927, and the massacre of peasant militiamen in Changsha on May 21, 1927. See the Introduction to Volume II, pp. li and lv.
2. The reference is to Guomindang probing operations in the fall and winter of 1939–1940. See above the Introduction to this volume.
have proved these appraisals wrong. The mistake of these comrades lies in forgetting that the national contradiction is the primary one.

2. Under these circumstances, the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie, who direct all Guomindang government policy, remain classes with a dual character. On the one hand, they are opposed to Japan, and, on the other, they are opposed to the Communist Party and the broad masses of the people represented by the Party. And both their resistance to Japan and their anticommunism, in turn, bear a dual character. With regard to their resistance to Japan, while they are opposed to Japan, they are not actively waging war or actively opposing Wang Jingwei and the other Chinese traitors, and sometimes they even flirt with Japan’s peace emissaries. With regard to their anticommunism, they are opposed to the Communist Party, having gone so far as to create the Southern Anhui Incident and to issue the order of January 17, but, at the same time, they do not want a final split and still maintain their carrot-and-stick policy. These facts have been confirmed once again in the recent anti-Communist onslaught. Chinese politics, which are extremely complex, demand our comrades’ deepest attention. Since the pro-British and pro-American big landlords and big bourgeoisie are still resisting Japan and are still using the carrot and stick in dealing with our Party, the policy of our Party is to “do unto them as they do unto us,” stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy. So long as the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie do not completely turn traitor, this policy of ours will not change.

3. A whole range of tactics is needed to combat the Guomindang’s anti-Communist policy, and there must be absolutely no carelessness or negligence. The enmity and brutality of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie represented by Chiang Kaishek toward the people’s revolutionary forces were not only demonstrated by the ten years of anti-Communist war in the past, but have been even more fully demonstrated in the midst of the war against Japan by the two anti-Communist upsurges, and particularly by the Southern Anhui Incident during the second anti-Communist upsurge. If a people’s revolutionary force is to avoid extermination by Chiang Kaishek and to compel him to acknowledge its existence, it has no alternative but to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against his counterrevolutionary policies. The defeat resulting from Comrade Xiang Ying’s opportunism during the recent anti-Communist onslaught should serve as a grave warning to the whole Party. But the struggle must be waged on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint; if any of the three is lacking, we shall suffer setbacks.

4. In the struggle against the Guomindang diehards, the big comprador bourgeoisie must be distinguished from the national bourgeoisie, which has little or no comprador character, and the most reactionary big landlords must be distinguished from the enlightened gentry and the general run of landlords. This is the theoretical basis of our Party’s endeavor to win over the intermediate sections and establish organs of political power on the “three-thirds” system, and it has been repeatedly stressed by the Central Committee since March of last year. Its correctness was proved afresh during the recent anti-Communist onslaught. The stand we took before the Southern Anhui Incident, as expressed in our “November 9 telegram,” was entirely necessary for our shift to the political counterattack after the incident; otherwise we could not have won over the intermediate sections. Because unless they had been taught time and again by experience, the intermediate sections would have been unable to understand why our Party must wage resolute struggles against the Guomindang diehards, why unity can be gained only through struggle, and why there can be no unity whatsoever if struggle is abandoned. Although the leading elements in the regional power groups belong to the big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie, generally they should also be regarded and treated as intermediate sections, since there are contradictions between them and the big landlords and big bourgeoisie who control the central government. Yan Xishan, who was most active in the first anti-Communist onslaught, took a middle stand in the second, and although the Guangxi clique, which took a middle stand in the first onslaught, came in on the anti-Communist side in the second, it is still in contradiction with the Chiang Kaishek clique and not to be identified with it. This applies with still greater force to other regional power groups. Many of our comrades, however, still lump the different landlord and bourgeoisie groups together, as though the entire landlord class and bourgeoisie had turned traitor after the Southern Anhui Incident; this is an oversimplification of China’s complex politics. Were we to adopt this view and identify all the landlords and the bourgeoisie with the Guomindang diehards, we would isolate ourselves. It must be realized that Chinese society is big in the middle and small at both ends, and that the Communist Party cannot solve China’s problems unless it wins over the masses of the intermediate classes and unless it enables them to play their proper role according to their circumstances.

5. Because some comrades have wavered on the point that the contradiction between China and Japan is the primary one and hence have wrongly appraised class relations in China, they have at times wavered on the policy of the Party. Proceeding from their appraisal of the Southern Anhui Incident as another April 12 or May 21 Incident, these comrades now seem to think that the Central Committee’s policy directive of December 25 last year is no longer applicable, or at least not altogether applicable. They believe that we no longer need the kind of political power that includes all who stand for resistance and democracy, but need a so-called political power of the workers, peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie, and that now is not the time for the united front policy of the period of the War of Resistance but, rather, for a policy of land revolution as during the ten-year civil war. The Party’s correct policy has become blurred in the minds of these comrades, at any rate for the time being.

6. When these comrades were instructed by the Central Committee of our Party to be prepared against a possible split by the Guomindang, that is, against the worst possible development, they forgot the other possibilities. They do not understand that, while it is absolutely necessary to prepare for the worst possibility, this does not mean ignoring the favorable possibilities; on the contrary, such preparation for
the worst is precisely a condition for creating favorable possibilities and turning them into reality. On this occasion, we were fully prepared against a split by the Guomindang, and so the Guomindang dared not lightly bring about a split.

7. There are even more comrades who fail to understand the unity of the national struggle and the class struggle, and who fail to understand united front policy and class policy, and consequently the unity of united front education and class education. They hold that after the Southern Anhui Incident special emphasis should be placed on what they call class education, as distinct from united front education. Even now they do not understand that for the whole period of the anti-Japanese war our Party has a single integral policy—the national united front policy (a dual policy) which integrates the two aspects, unity and struggle—toward all those in the upper and middle strata who are still resisting Japan, whether they belong to the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie or the intermediate classes. This dual policy should be applied even to the puppet troops, the Chinese traitors, and the pro-Japanese elements, except for those who are absolutely unrepentant, whom we must resolutely crush. The education that our Party conducts among its own members and the people in general likewise embraces both these aspects, that is, it teaches the proletariat and the peasantry and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie how to unite, in different ways, with the different strata of the bourgeoisie and the landlord class for resistance to Japan, and at the same time how to conduct struggles against them in varying degrees according to the varying degrees in which they compromise, vacillate, and are anti-Communist. United front policy is class policy, and the two are inseparable; whoever is unclear on this will be unclear on many other issues.

8. Other comrades do not understand that the social character of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas in North China and Central China is already new-democratic. The main criterion in judging whether an area is new-democratic in character is whether representatives of the broad masses of the people participate in the political power there and whether this political power is led by the Communist Party. Therefore, united front political power under Communist leadership is the chief mark of a new-democratic society. Some people think that New Democracy can be considered as accomplished only if there is a land revolution like that of the ten-year civil war, but this is wrong. At present the political system in the base areas is a political system of the united front of all the people who are for resistance and democracy, the economy is one from which the elements of semicolonialism and semifeudalism have been basically eliminated, and the culture is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses of the people. Therefore, whether viewed politically, economically, or culturally, both the anti-Japanese base areas that have only enforced the reduction of rent and interest and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, which has gone through a thorough land revolution, are new-democratic in character. When the example of the anti-Japanese base areas is extended throughout the country, then the whole of China will become a new-democratic republic.

The Current Situation and Our Overall Orientation

(May 9, 1941)

To Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]; Chen [Yi], Liu [Shaoqi], and Lai [Chuanzhu]; He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying]; Nie Rongzheng; Xiao Ke; Lu [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zhihua]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]; Song [Renqiong]; Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang], and Luo [Ronghuan]; Li [Yu] and Luo [Shunchu]; Su [Yi] and Liu [Yan]; [Huang] Kecheng; Zhang [Yunyi] and Deng [Zhihui]; [Peng] Xuefeng, [Li] Xiannian, and [Tan] Zhenlin:

1. The enemy is gathering forces in an attempt to attack Henan, Shaanxi, and Yunnan, fight through the Beiping-Hankou railroad, and cut off the two communication lines in the Southwest and the Northwest. As for Henan and Shaanxi, it is said that more than four divisions and regiments of troops have been mobilized, and, in recent days, the traffic has been very busy along both the Ping-Han and the Tong-Pu [Datong-Tongguan] lines. It is quite possible that battles will break out within a few days.

2. It is our estimate that, through the process of this campaign, the anticomunist sentiment of the Guomindang will be greatly reduced, and there is hope that the situation will take a turn for the better. The Soviet aid to China has not changed, and recently more than a hundred planes and two hundred cannons have arrived. There is also the possibility that relations between China and the Soviet Union will improve. Both Tang Enbo and Hu Zongnan are ready to fight the enemy. The

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 349–51, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript.

1. Regarding Lai Chuanzhu, see the note to the text of March 16, 1939.
2. Xiao Ke (1905- ), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and took part in the Nanchang Uprising. At this time, he was commander of the Hebei-Chahar Forward Army.
3. Regarding Li Yu, see the note to the text of December 6, 1939 (p. 267).
4. Regarding Su Yu, see the note to the text of July 12, 1940. At this time, he had become commander of the New Fourth Army's First Division and commander of the Central Jiangsu Military Area Command.
5. Liu Yan (1905–1946), a native of Taoyuan in Hunan, served at the time as political commissar of both the New Fourth Army's First Division and the Central Jiangsu Military Area Command.
Guomindang has asked us to cooperate in the campaign, again with the sole purpose of goading us into action, claiming that if the Chinese Communist Party does not compromise with Japan, it should launch an offensive in northern China and stop the enemy’s advance.

3. Our overall orientation is definitely not to be moved by its goading tactics. We must continue to hold to our army’s present posture, to strengthen all base areas, and to develop patiently our work in the three areas of dealing with the enemy, the puppet troops, and the traitors (this is extremely important). According to what the local conditions permit, certain of the enemy’s and the puppets’ strongholds that cut deeply into our region are to be taken over. In the areas close to Henan and Shaanxi, there should be a considerable number of troops coordinating with the friendly armies in fighting, and united front work should be promoted vigorously in the meantime. But do not take this opportunity to actually expand into the Guomindang areas, so that the forces under Chiang [Kaishek] and the Guangxi clique will fight the enemy with their minds at ease. For the time being, attacks on the troops of Han [Deqin], Shen [Honglie], Yu [Xuezhong], and Gao [Shuxun] should be stopped. When war breaks out, the call to “unite all people in the country against the attack of Japanese imperialism” should be emphasized.

4. The Central Committee has already sent a telegram to Comrade [Zhou] Enlai to tell the Guomindang that our response to their request for our army to coordinate in the fighting is that this is a matter of course, and presents no problem. At the same time, items such as the following are to be raised: (a) an immediate resolution to the problem of the New Fourth Army; (b) immediate provision of pay and ammunition; (c) a halt in opposition to the Communist Party; (d) sending Zhou [Enlai] back to Yan’an by plane for the meeting, and so on.

5. It is hoped that our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army will make all deployments in a cool-headed manner in accordance with the orientation laid out above.


Unite to Wage War Against the Enemy in a Planned Way in Coordination with Friendly Armies

(May 14, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

I trust that you received my last telegram. Right now the Guomindang is extremely worried, hoping desperately for our assistance. It is our estimation that under this blow by the Japanese bandits, the Guomindang will have no choice but to ingratiate itself with us, the positions of the Guomindang and the Communist Party will undergo fundamental change, and our Party will hold more and more of a leadership position in the War of Resistance as time goes by. For this reason, our basic orientation is to unite to deal with the enemy and to coordinate in the fighting, but we certainly will not become excited because of the Guomindang’s goading measures. Instead we will take careful consideration of the situation and coordinate efforts in a planned fashion. [Zhou] Enlai wanted to include southeastern Shanxi, northwestern Shanxi, Wutai, central Hebei, southern Hebei, and Shandong in the scope of coordinated efforts, but in my opinion the main coordination areas should be southeastern Shanxi and southern Hebei, with the rest as secondary coordination areas (that is, carry on the fighting as under usual circumstances). Please think this over, make a concrete plan, and let us know so that we can tell Enlai and the principal adviser. I look forward to your reply. (Send all combat reports as much as possible to Xi’an, Chongqing, and Yan’an.)

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 641–42, where it is reproduced from the handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. “This blow” here refers to an attack on May 7 by the Japanese Army on Wei Lihuang’s forces of the Guomindang army in the Zhongtiao mountain area of southern Shanxi.

2. This refers to Tsuikov, who had served since December 1940 as military attaché to the Soviet embassy in China and principal military adviser to the Guomindang government.
Notice Regarding Publication of Jiefang Ribao and Improving the Work of the New China News Agency

(May 15, 1941)

Beginning on May 16, Xin Zhonghua bao (New China) and Jinri xinwen (Today's News), published in Yan'an, will be combined and published as Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily). The work of the New China News Agency will also be improved and put under the management of a single committee. All policies of the Party will be made known to the whole country through Jiefang ribao and the New China News Agency. Jiefang ribao editorials will be written by comrades of the Center or other key cadres. All locations should pay attention to receiving radio broadcasts from Yan'an. Aside from being carried in the newspapers and publications, important articles should be used as materials for discussion and education within the Party and in schools, offices, and army units. In addition, it is extremely important to expand the use of telegraphic receivers so as to enable reception everywhere as a way to promote widespread propaganda.

Both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Are Attacking the Enemy Fiercely in His Rear

(May 15, 1941, at noon)

Section Chief Wu [Yunfu] and Section Chief Yuan [Xiaoxuan]:

1. In the event that the enemy crosses the river, you will have to prepare to relocate. Aside from moving the clumsy objects to appropriate locations, Yunfu must stay with office director Xiong [Bin], ask for his instructions at all times, and request his protection. Xiaoxuan must be with Chief Officer Wei [Lihuang].

2. Tell everyone that both the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are attacking the enemy fiercely in his rear and coordinating in the fighting with friendly armies at the front, and that they certainly will not make a fuss over the Guomindang's anti-Communist hatred. Only they are short on pay and ammunition, and hope for the government's assistance. The friendly armies around the border region have marched to the river to defend against the enemy's rear, and the garrison troops of the Eighth Route Army in the border region persist in their unity and are still holding their original defense posts.

3. Let us know by telegram at all times about the Guomindang's movements.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 643–44, where it is reproduced from Mao's handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. Wu Yunfu was head of the Eighth Route Army's administrative office in Xi'an, and Yuan Xiaoxuan held the same position in the Luoyang office.

2. Xiong Bin was then head of the Xi'an field headquarters office of the Guomindang government's Military Commission.

3. Wei Lihuang was then serving as chief commanding officer of the Guomindang Army's First War Zone.
Introductory Editorial to the Yan’an Jiefang Ribao

(May 16, 1941)

What is the mission of this paper? One phrase says it all: Unite the people of the whole country to defeat Japanese imperialism.

This is the general line of the Chinese Communist Party, and also the mission of this paper. Given the current situation internationally and domestically, this mission is even more critical.

The questions at hand are the following: Is the world one in which imperialist bandits slaughter one another, or is it one in which the world’s people enjoy peace? Does China belong to Japanese imperialism, or does China belong to the Chinese people? Now that the imperialist war has turned into a world war and Japanese imperialism is attempting to destroy China once and for all, these questions face us sharply.

There is not a single imperialist country that has not been brought into the war (the United States has actually already entered the war), and the war has turned the entire globe into a slaughterhouse. Unless the world’s people rise up in strong opposition to war and strive for peace, the world is in danger of destruction and humanity is in peril of extinction. Now the struggle of people all over the world against imperialism and war has begun, and this is where it lies true light for the world. The Communist Parties in various countries stand in the forefront of this struggle, which is one that will help the Chinese people’s own struggle. The Chinese people have the duty to ally themselves with the people of the world.

Having failed to solve the problem of China through four years of war, the Japanese imperialists are now attempting to effect a “final solution” to it. Any view that makes light of Japanese imperialist attacks is incorrect. Belonging under the rubric of this sort of attitude are friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, the anti-Communist high tide, and the two separate wars. What we advocate is unity between the Guomindang and the Communists, abolition of friction, and fighting a single war. It must be understood that only by waging one war, the war specifically against Japanese imperialism, can the attacks by Japanese imperialism be repelled, can Japanese imperialism be driven out. China’s foreign policy necessarily has to be a pro-Soviet policy, despite the fact that at the same time it should not abandon its diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States. China’s domestic political policy has to be one of democracy. All reactionary policies that are anti-Communist, antipopular, and antidemocratic must be abolished.

The present moment is a critical juncture for China’s survival. All anti-Japanese parties and groups and anti-Japanese people must unite as one against the primary enemy, Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party stands on the forefront of this struggle. It has been this way in the past, it is this way at present, and it will continue to be this way in the future. The policy of the Chinese Communist Party has always been one of a national united front against Japan. The Chinese Communist Party harbors good intentions toward others, and it gives the opportunity for self-reflection and repentance to anyone who has committed errors during the anti-Japanese war and strikes a resolute blow only at those who betray the national interest and yet absolutely refuse to repent. And this is totally necessary, because if national traitors who betray the interests of the nation yet are staunchly unwilling to repent are not hit hard, then the national War of Resistance will surely meet defeat.

The mission of the Communist Party is the mission of this paper. All our colleagues on the paper firmly believe that, as a result of the concerted struggle of the world’s people and the Chinese people, the world will surely become a bright new world belonging to people of the world, and that China will become a China where the Chinese people enjoy independence and sovereignty. We will be able to smash to bits any Japanese imperialist plots. Unity, unity, unity; this is our weapon, and this is also our slogan. On the occasion of this paper’s inauguration, we wish to make this expression of utmost sincerity to our fellow countrymen.

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 55–57, where it is reproduced from the version published in Jiefang ribao at the time.
Please Take a Look and See Whose Realm Our Land Is Today

(May 18, 1941)

Those calculating the moves of Japanese imperialism often just start from the subjective needs of those in Japan who are extremists, or fascists, in dealing with the United States, and forget about factors that exist objectively and are actually primary in determining trends in Japan. Ever since the establishment of the tripartite pact [between Germany, Italy, and Japan], members of the Guomindang have been doing this, and some others have been doing the same.

There are three major features in the present-day world situation: First is Germany’s great victory; second is China’s developing War of Resistance Against Japan; third is the Soviet Union’s policy of peace. In studying international questions in general and in estimating the problem of Japan in particular, we must not stray from these three characteristics. Anyone who turns a blind eye to these three major characteristics or underestimates their importance will inevitably draw incorrect or somewhat incorrect conclusions.

German imperialism has already conquered the whole of Europe with the exception of the Soviet Union and is expanding to Africa and the Near East, continuing to launch massive bombardments on the British Isles, and developing its submarine warfare in the Atlantic. All this indicates a trend toward global hegemony on the part of German imperialism. Britain and America, who are contending with them for hegemony, cannot but fight them with all their might. America’s rapid preparations to enter the war are the result of this situation. Given these circumstances, the imperialist plan of Britain and the United States is to concentrate their forces against Germany. They figure that, as long as the British Isles can stand their ground, they can then make use of their naval superiority and recover their control in the air, which would compel Hitler to spread the fires of war eastward and become locked in a war of attrition with the Soviet Union. If the heavens cooperate, then sooner or later the anti-Soviet faction within Germany will be around and a war between Germany and the Soviet Union will break out, causing their “plan” to be “successful.” To prevent Hitler from going westward, to prevent the Soviet Union from staying out of things, and to create another European Munich: such is their overall design. In the Far East it is to make use of the internal contradictions within the tripartite alliance, break up the Tokyo-Berlin axis, buy over Japan to their side, and once again create a Far Eastern Munich; to make use of the contradictions between China and Japan and between the Soviet Union and Japan to force Japan westward and northward, coordinating with their western policy of forcing Germany eastward. All this constitutes the “masterfully wise counsel” of the British and American imperialists. The more Germany is victorious, the more the British and American gentlemen are spurred to make painstaking efforts to discover the weaknesses of Germany and Japan. And what is behind all this has everything to do with the Soviet Union. Every time the British and American gentlemen are in crisis, they invariably try to find a way out at the Soviet Union’s expense. This is a pattern they devised long ago. As for Japan, Germany’s victory has given Japan’s entire ruling class the impetus to take advantage of the situation, because Germany has occupied the efforts of Britain and America and is leading them increasingly toward the Atlantic and not toward the Pacific. On this matter, each of the three factions within the ruling body of Japan (the fascists who are pro-Germany and pro-Italy, the faction that wants to maintain the status quo who are pro-Britain and pro-America, and the intermediate faction which stands between these two)—although, with regard to the distribution of political power, they each try to take advantage of every change in the world situation that is unfavorable to the others so as to achieve their own goals, when it comes to making use of the contradictions in the West (between Britain and Germany, between America and Germany, and between the Soviet Union and Germany) so as to achieve the goal of Japanese expansion—they are as one and can unite with one another. Because they find it advantageous to have Hitler take up the heavy burden of Britain and the United States, and to have Hitler divert the Soviet Union’s attention to the west so that they themselves can sit on the mountaintop and watch the tigers fight, and then reap the spoils in the end. Of the three countries in the alliance, unlike Italy, which serves as an out-and-out lackey to Hitler, Japan has a semi-independent nature. Japan refuses to obey those orders which only conform to Hitler’s wishes and run counter to Japan’s wishes, such as the one to launch a war in the Pacific immediately, as Japan’s war against China, its national strength, and the internal conflicts among its rulers make it impossible to do so. In the past few months, and especially in the past week, this matter has given rise to a number of forces in which Japan works hand in glove with Britain and the United States. These forces can be explained only in that Britain and the United States on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, wish to avoid temporarily (but not permanently) a Pacific war. The only difference is that one side is concentrating its forces against Germany and the other side is concentrating against China and with regard to the West is sitting on the mountaintop watching the tigers fight so as to reap the spoils later. But this matter is like a bucket of cold water to some of the ruling personages of the Chinese Guomindang, because ever since the formation of the tripartite alliance, they have

This editorial was first published in Jiefang ribao, May 18, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 297–301, which reproduces this text. The editorial was unsigned, but Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 297, confirms that it was written by Mao.
been hoping every day for a war between Japan and the United States to save them. Their Roosevelt refuses to take note of their supplications, and Japan’s intentions run counter to their wishes as well. This is how we think the changes in the world situation occasioned by a German victory should be viewed.

Many people have underestimated the anti-Japanese war that is developing in China. Some people even feel that Japan might be able to ignore China and just go ahead and advance southward to start a war between Japan and the United States. What they fail to realize is that things are just the opposite, and what basically determines Japan’s moves is China, precisely this China that stands as a giant before Japan, that is awakening and getting stronger by the day, that is waging a War of Resistance. China is now a raging fire of national revolution. Holding high the torches here are several hundred million people, and the Communist Party stands at the very forefront of the ranks of torchbearers. During the two and a half years since Japan’s rulers occupied Wuhan, they have been carrying out a policy of concentrating forces against the Communists and slackening against the Guomindang so as to lure it into surrender. But this policy has failed. The Communists become more and more solid as they fight, and the Guomindang has not surrendered either. What is lamentable is that the ruling personages of our allied party have failed to reform their politics and strengthen unity during this period, but have, instead, instigated two anti-Communist high tides in the past two and a half years, imitating the ways of the Japanese by focusing forces against the Communists and slackening efforts against Japan. They might as well be saying: We’re using all our might against the Communists, so you Japanese can go all out to make war on the Americans and stop launching attacks on us. But Japanese imperialism won’t listen to such things. What it wants is all of China. [The Japanese] want not only “opposition to the Communists,” but also “extermination of the party.” The Japanese say: If you want us to stop advancing, you will either have to surrender or to start a full-scale war between the Guomindang and the Communists; just the Southern Anhui Incident by itself is not enough. And, sure enough, since the Southern Anhui Incident the Japanese have made tremendous efforts to incite a war between the Guomindang and the Communists. But because of the Communist Party Central Committee’s efforts to protect the nation as a whole, and because the principal leaders of the Guomindang also refused to be deceived by the Japanese, Japan’s scheme to cause a rift went bankrupt, and it was forced to muster military forces and reluctantly launch a risky attack. This is the source of the recent sudden mounting of tension in the war situation. We can say with certainty: because of the unity between the Guomindang and the Communists and because of the daily expanding people’s War of Resistance against Japan, the flames of opposition to Japanese imperialism will only rage higher and higher, and Japanese imperialism will meet its doom in the great fire of China. Naturally, this state of affairs does a great favor to Britain and the United States, as it contains for them Japan’s southward advance and facilitates their concentration of forces against Germany. It is not by any means that they care about China. They are imperialists who will harm others to benefit themselves. As long as Japan does not launch war in the Pacific, they are willing to offer Japan all sorts of things, such as rubber, oil, cotton, machines—whatever it wants. And, on top of all that, Roosevelt and Churchill have even made it part of their bag of tricks to sacrifice China and the Dutch East Indies. To talk of the new danger of a Far Eastern Munich is certainly not wholly impossible neurotic chatter. As long as China stands up for itself and keeps on going, however, Japan may be pointing its spearhead toward the West, but we shall cast mountains of torches toward the East and bring on a glorious decisive battle and are entirely capable of triumph over Japan. The great nation of China has bound Japan hand and foot, so it must avoid a war in the Pacific for the time being. It is China that basically determines Japan’s moves, just as it is Japan that basically determines China’s moves; these are but two sides of the same coin.

With regard to the Soviet Union’s peace policy, it can be said to be a brake on the whole world, and its power will defeat the plots of all imperialists and reactionaries. Whether it be Britain and America’s pipe dream of Hitler’s war flames burning in the East, or any other plots against the Soviet Union, all these things will eventually be seen as a heap of metal beaten into scraps. [Rudolf] Hess’s flight indicates the failure of the most recent scheme of Britain and the United States. A mutual understanding has been established between the Soviet Union and Germany. The danger of a new European Munich has been averted. This is a victory Stalin gained by resorting to “the East wind.” It is like this in the West, and so it is in the East. Even if Britain and the United States were to come up with a new Far Eastern Munich and mobilize all their disciples and followers in Japan and in China, they could achieve nothing; the Monkey King Sun Wukong can never jump out from under control in the Buddha’s palm. It is also impossible for Britain and the United States to throttle the anti-Japanese war. The flames of China’s anti-Japanese torch will be fanned by Stalin, and he can be counted on to fan them. If Japanese imperialism has the audacity to run amuck recklessly in the western part of China, they are sure to get badly bruised and battered, as there is not only the unshattered cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but also increasing cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. It is absolutely wrong simply to ignore or to underestimate the peace policy of the Soviet Union.

Will Japan not advance southward? Yes, it will. But at present it wants to go west first, in vain hopes of settling the China problem first of all. For the time being, its plan is for Hitler to strike fiercely at Britain and the United States, and for Japan itself to strike hard at China. It intends to cut the two transportation lines in Northwest China and Northeast China, and break through to the Beiping-Hankou railway. After a bout of forceful attacks, they will surely come with a round of softer attacks, instigating action by their fifth column (people like He Yingqin), and do their best to rope people in so as to achieve the aim of luring China into surrender. Japan’s two major magic weapons are hitting hard and winning over. It is estimated that at a certain juncture there will arise another capitulation crisis, so we should start to be vigilant right now. Japan’s wishful thinking is roughly as follows: to
solve, or by and large solve, the China problem in not too long a period of time, and wait until Britain and the United States are even less able to devote attention to the Orient, in which case either you willingly hand over the Pacific to us or we resort to armed force against you. In other words, I shall have everything "as I please." All such subjective calculations of the imperialists must not be viewed as results. Between their subjective calculations and the final results may be a fundamental contradiction or a world of difference. Japanese imperialism’s calculations should be viewed this way as well. Once again [the Japanese] want to "first dispose of" us. Let them try it again, then. No one can tell how many of their so-called "plans" for China have failed. Now let them fail once more. This is altogether possible; all reactionaries in this world have no way of calculating the development of the revolutionary forces, and this is a fatal weakness of the reactionaries.

To whom does the world belong in the last analysis? The imperialist thugs say it is undoubtedly their world, but the people insist that it is definitely the people’s world. To whom does China really belong? The Japanese imperialists say China, undoubtedly, belongs to them, but we insist that China definitely belongs to the Chinese people. "Please take a look and see whose realm our land is today?" Only the people, only we, can give a correct answer to this question. Only the people, only we, can be right, can be correct; definitely not the enemy, definitely not them.

People of the whole country, unite and oppose the attack by Japanese imperialism. We have every assurance of victory!

Reform Our Study

(May 19, 1941)

(This was my speech at a Yan’an cadres’ meeting in May 1941, which I have now revised on the basis of the original outline for publication and discussion by comrades.)

I propose that we should reform the method and the system of study throughout the Party. The reasons are as follows:

I

The twenty years of the Chinese Communist Party have been twenty years during which the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism has become more and more integrated with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. If we recall how superficial and meager our understanding of Marxism-Leninism and of the Chinese revolution was during our Party’s infancy, we can see how much deeper and richer it is now. For the past hundred years, the finest sons and daughters of the disaster-ridden Chinese nation fought and sacrificed their lives, one stepping into the breach as another fell, in quest of the truth that would save the country and the people. This moves us to song and tears. But it was only after World War I and the October Revolution in Russia that we found Marxism and Leninism,¹ the best of truths, the best of weapons for liberating our nation. And the Chinese Communist Party has been the initiator, propagandist, and organizer in wielding this weapon. As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, our Party, basing itself on the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin,² has taken a further step in its study of the concrete practice of this war and in its study of China and the world today and has also made a beginning in the study of China’s yesterday and the day before.³ These are all excellent signs.

According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 298–99, this report was delivered at a meeting of high-level cadres in Yan’an on May 19, 1941. The text was first published in Jiefang ribao, March 27, 1942. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 311–20, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao Zedong suanjii.

1. Marxism and Leninism ⇒ Marxism-Leninism
3. China’s yesterday and the day before ⇒ Chinese history
But we still have shortcomings, and very big ones too. In my opinion, unless we correct these shortcomings, we shall not be able to take another step forward in our work, or advance the great cause of integrating the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin\(^4\) with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.

First, take the study of current conditions. We have achieved some success in our study of present domestic and international conditions, but for such a large political party as ours, the material we have collected is fragmentary and our research work unsystematic on each and every aspect of these subjects, whether it be the political, military, economic, or cultural aspect. Generally speaking, in the past twenty years we have not done systematic and thorough work in collecting and studying material on these aspects, and we are lacking in a climate of investigation and study of objective reality. To behave like “a blindfolded man catching sparrows,” or “a blind man groping for fish,” to be crude and careless, to indulge in verbiage, to rest content with a smattering of knowledge—such an extremely bad work-style, a style utterly opposed to the fundamental spirit of Marxism-Leninism, continues to exist among many comrades in our Party. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us that it is necessary to study conditions conscientiously, and to proceed from objective reality and not from subjective wishes, but many of our comrades act in direct violation of this truth.

Second, take the study of history. Although a few Party members and Party sympathizers have undertaken this work, generally speaking it has not been done in an organized way. Many Party members are still in a fog about Chinese history, whether of the past hundred years (yesterday) or of ancient times (the day before yesterday). There are many Marxist-Leninist scholars who cannot open their mouths without citing Greece; they can only recite set phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin\(^5\), but as for their own ancestors—sorry, they have been forgotten. There is no climate of serious study either of current conditions or of past history.

Next, take the study of international revolutionary experience, the study of the universal truth of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin\(^6\). Many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin\(^6\), and not at all for the sake of the practice of the Chinese revolution.\(^7\) Consequently, though they study a great deal,\(^8\) they cannot digest it. They can cite set phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin very well,\(^9\) but are unable to apply the standpoint and method\(^10\) of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to the concrete study of China’s present conditions and her history or to the concrete analysis and solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude toward Marxism-Leninism does a great deal of harm, particularly among cadres of the middle and higher ranks, and among young students.

The three aspects I have just mentioned—neglect of the study of present conditions, neglect of the study of history, and neglect of the application of Marxism-Leninism—all constitute an extremely bad style of work. Its spread has harmed many of our comrades.

There are indeed many comrades in our ranks who have been led astray by this style of work. Unwilling to carry on systematic and thorough investigation and study of the specific conditions inside and outside the country, the province, the xian, or the district, they issue orders on no other basis than their scanty knowledge and “It must be so because it seems so to me.” Does not this subjectivist style still exist among a great many comrades?

They are not ashamed, but instead proud, to understand little or nothing of their own history. They really understand very little about the particularly important history of the Chinese Communist Party and the history of China in the hundred years since the Opium War. Hardly anyone has seriously taken up the study of the economic, political, military, and cultural history of the past hundred years. Some people are ignorant of anything that is their own, and so are left with only Greek and other foreign tales (they are really nothing but tales); this, too, is rather pathetic, consisting of odds and ends abstracted from old foreign books. For the past few decades, many of the returned students from abroad have suffered from this malady. Coming home from Europe, America, or Japan, they can only parrot a stock of undigested foreign things. They function as gramophones but forget their own responsibility to create something new. This malady has also infected the Communist Party.

Although we are studying Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin,\(^11\) the way many of our people study them runs directly counter to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.\(^12\) That is to say, they violate a fundamental principle earnestly enjoined on us by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin: the unity of theory and practice. Having violated this principle of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, they then invent an opposite principle of their own: the separation of theory from practice. In the schools and in the education of cadres at work, teachers of philosophy do not guide students to study the logic of the Chinese revolution; teachers of economics do not guide them

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\(^4\) Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin → Marxism-Leninism

\(^5\) Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin → Marxism-Leninism

\(^6\) Many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin

\(^7\) Not at all for the sake of the practice of the Chinese revolution → Not to meet the needs of revolutionary practice but, rather, purely for the sake of study

\(^8\) Study a great deal → Read it

\(^9\) They can cite set phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin very well → They can only cite odd quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in a one-sided manner

\(^10\) The standpoint and method → The standpoint, viewpoint, and method

\(^11\) Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin → Marxism-Leninism

\(^12\) Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin → Marxism
to study the characteristics of the Chinese economy; teachers of political science do not guide them to study the tactics of the Chinese revolution; teachers of military science do not guide them to study the special features of Chinese military affairs; and so on and so forth. The result is that error is disseminated, doing harm to the disciples. A person does not know how to apply in Fuxian what he has learned in Yan'an. Professors of economics cannot explain the relationship between the Border Region currency and the Guomindang currency, so naturally the students cannot explain it either. Seventeen- and eighteen-year-old babies are taught to nibble on Das Kapital and Anti-Dühring. Thus a perverse mentality has been created among many students; instead of showing an interest in China’s problems and taking the Party’s directives seriously, they give their whole hearts to the supposedly eternal and immutable dogmas learned from their teachers.

Of course, what I have just said refers to the worst type, and I am not saying that it is the general case. But people of this type do exist; what is more, there are quite a few of them and they cause a great deal of harm, so this matter cannot be treated lightly.

III

In order to explain this idea further, I should like to contrast two opposite attitudes.

The first type is the subjectivist attitude.

With this attitude, a person does not make a systematic and thorough study of the environment, but works by sheer subjective enthusiasm and has a blurred picture of the face of China today. With this attitude, he chops up history, knows only ancient Greece but not China, and is in a fog about the China of yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude, a person studies the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in the abstract, without any aim, and without considering their relevance to the Chinese revolution. He goes to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin not to seek the stand and method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution but to deal in theory purely for theory’s sake, and to deal in Marxism-Leninism purely for Marxism-Leninism’s sake. He does not shoot the arrow at the target but, instead, shoots at random. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have taught us that we should proceed from objective realities and that we should derive laws from them to serve as our foundation for action.

For this purpose, we should appropriate the material in detail and subject it to scientific analysis and synthesis. Many of our people do not act in this way but do the opposite. A good number of them are doing research work but have no interest in studying either the China of today or the China of yesterday, and confine their interest to books already written. Many others are doing practical work, but they too pay no attention to the study of objective conditions, often rely on sheer enthusiasm, and substitute their personal feelings for policy. Both kinds of people rely on the subjective and ignore the objective. When making speeches, they indulge in a long string of headings, A, B, C, D, 1, 2, 3, 4. When writing articles, they turn out a lot of verbiage. They have no intention of seeking truth from facts, but only a desire to curry favor by claptrap. They are flashy without substance, brittle without solidity. They think they are always right, the number one authority under Heaven, imperial envoys who rush around all over. Such is the work-style of some comrades in our ranks. To govern one’s own conduct by this style is to harm oneself. To teach it to others is to harm others. To use it to direct the revolution is to harm the revolution. In sum, this subjectivist method is inconsistent with science and to Marxism, is a formidable enemy of the Communist Party, of the proletariat, of the people, and of the nation; it is a manifestation of impurity in Party spirit. A formidable enemy stands before us, and we must overthrow him. Only when subjectivism is overthrown can the truth prevail, can the revolution be victorious, can the Party spirit be strengthened. The absence of a scientific attitude or the absence of a completely scientific attitude, that is, the absence of or presence of an incomplete Marxist approach of unifying theory and practice, means that the Party spirit is either absent or deficient.

There is a couplet which portrays this type of person. It runs:

The reed growing on the wall—top-heavy, thin-stemmed, and shallow of root;
The bamboo shoot in the hills—sharp-tongued, thick-skinned, and hollow inside.

Is this not an apt description of those who do not have a scientific attitude, who only know how to recite dogmas by rote, who enjoy a reputation unwarranted by...
any real learning, and who make a mockery of Marxism-Leninism? If anyone really wishes to cure himself of his malady, I advise him to commit this couplet to memory, or to show still more courage and paste it on the wall of his room. Marxism-Leninism is a science, and science means honest, solid knowledge; there is no room for playing tricks. Let us, then, be a bit more honest.

The second type is the Marxist-Leninist attitude or the attitude of dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

With this attitude, a person carries out a systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment. He does not work by enthusiasm alone, but combines revolutionary enthusiasm with practicality. With this attitude he will not chop up history and will not know only ancient Greece, but will also know China; he will know the revolutionary history not only of foreign countries but also of China, and understand not only today but also yesterday and the day before yesterday. With this attitude, one studies the theory of Marxism-Leninism with a purpose, which is to integrate it with the actual movement of the Chinese revolution and to seek from it the method with which to solve the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution. Such an attitude is one of shooting the arrow at the target. The “target” is the Chinese revolution, and the “arrow” is Marxism-Leninism. We Chinese Communists have been seeking this arrow for no other reason, but only because we want to hit the target of the Chinese revolution and of the revolution of the East. Otherwise this “arrow” is nothing more than a curiosity to play with, without any use whatsoever. To take such an attitude is to seek truth from facts. “Facts” are all the things that exist objectively; “truth” means the internal relations among objectively existing things, that is, the laws governing them, and “to seek” means to study. We should proceed from the actual conditions inside and outside the country, the province, the xian, or the district, and derive from them, as our guide to action, laws which are inherent in them and not imaginary, that is, we should find the internal relations of the events occurring around us. And in order to do that we must rely not on subjective imagination, not on enthusiasm, but on facts that exist objectively; we must “appropriate the material in detail” and draw correct conclusions from these facts and materials.

Such conclusions are not mere lists of phenomena in A, B, C, D order or writings full of platitudes, but are scientific conclusions. Such an attitude is one of seeking truth from facts and not of currying favor by claptrap. Such an attitude is the Party spirit, is the Marxist-Leninist style of unifying theory and practice, and is the attitude every Communist Party member should have at the very least. He who adopts this attitude will be neither “top-heavy, thin-stemmed, and shallow of root,” nor “sharp-tongued, thick-skinned, and hollow inside.”

IV

In accordance with the above views, I would like to make the following proposals:

1. We should place before the whole Party the task of making a systematic and thorough study of the situation around us. On the basis of the method of historical materialism, we should make a detailed investigation and study of developments in the economic, financial, political, military, cultural, and Party activities of our enemies, our friends, and ourselves, and then draw the proper and necessary conclusions. To this end, we should direct our comrades’ attention to the investigation and study of these practical matters. We should get our comrades to understand that the twofold basic task of Communist Party members and leading bodies is to know conditions and to master policy; the former means knowing the world and the latter changing the world. We should get our comrades to understand that without investigation there is no right to speak and that bombastic twaddle and a mere list of phenomena in 1, 2, 3, 4 order are of no use. Take propaganda work, for instance; if we do not know the situation with regard to the propaganda of our enemies, our friends, and ourselves, we shall be unable to decide on a correct propaganda policy. In the work of any department, it is necessary to know the situation first, and only then can the work be well handled. The fundamental link in changing the Party’s style of work is to carry out a policy for investigation and study throughout the Party.

2. As for China’s history in the past hundred years, we should assemble qualified persons to study it, in cooperation and with a proper division of labor, and so do away with the present disorganized state of affairs. First it is necessary to make analyses and studies in the several fields of economic history, political history, military history, and cultural history, and only then will it be possible to make synthetical studies.

3. As for education for cadres, whether at work or in schools for cadres, the focus should be on studying the practical problems of the Chinese revolution.

28. Carries out a systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment → Applies the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism to the systematic and thorough investigation and study of the environment
29. Enthusiasm → Sweep
31. Method → Stand, viewpoint, and method
32. Enthusiasm → Momentary enthusiasm
33. Books → Lifeless books
34. The Selected Works version adds here, "guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism.”
35. The method of historical materialism → The theory and method of Marxism-Leninism
36. A policy → Plans
37. Do away with → Overcome
38. Analyses and studies → Analytical studies
starting from there to study Marxism-Leninism, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded. Moreover, in studying Marxism-Leninism, the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be used as the principal material, all others to be used as supplementary material. The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the best synthesis and summing up of the world Communist movement of the past hundred years, a model of the integration of theory and practice, and so far the only comprehensive model in the whole world. When we see how Lenin and Stalin integrated the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Soviet revolution and thereby developed Marxism, we shall know how we should work in China.

We have taken many wrong paths. But error is often the precursor of what is correct. I am confident that, in the context of the Chinese revolution and the world revolution, which is so intensely alive and so richly varied, this reform of our study will certainly yield good results.

Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

(May 25, 1941)

1. A compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China and the creation of an Eastern Munich against communism and against the Soviet Union and Germany—such is the new plot that is now being hatched between Japan, the United States, and China. We must expose this plot and fight it.

2. Japan has announced the end of its latest round of military attacks, which was designed to force Chiang [Kai-shek] to capitulate, and there are bound to follow moves to induce him to capitulate. This is a repeat performance of the enemy's old policy of using the stick and the carrot, either alternately or simultaneously. We must expose this policy and fight it.

3. Simultaneously with its military attacks, Japan has launched a rumor-mongering campaign alleging that the Eighth Route Army does not want to fight in coordination with the [Guomindang] Central Army, that the Eighth Route Army is seizing every opportunity to expand its territory, that it is opening up an international route, that it is setting up another Central Government, and so on. This is a cunning Japanese scheme to foment discord between the Guomindang and the Communists and thus to make it easier for them to induce capitulation. The Central News Agency3 and the Guomindang press are copying and spreading these rumors, showing no qualms about echoing Japan's anti-Communist propaganda, and their intentions are thoroughly dubious. This, too, we must expose and fight.

4. Although the New Fourth Army has been declared mutinous and the Eighth Route Army has not been issued a single bullet or a single copper [from the Guomindang], it has never for a moment ceased fighting the enemy. The Eighth Route Army, moreover, has taken the initiative in coordinating its operations with the Central Army4 in the fighting in the present campaign in southern Shanxi, and

40. Wrong paths → Detours
for the past two weeks it has been launching attacks on all fronts in northern China, where fierce battles are raging at this very moment. The armed forces and the people led by the Communist Party have already become the mainstay in the War of Resistance Against Japan. All the calumnies against the Communist Party are aimed at sabotaging the War of Resistance and paving the way for capitulation. We should extend the military successes of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and oppose all defeatists and capitulationists.

**Policies in the Struggle Against “Nibbling” on the Plains of Hebei**

*(June 9, 1941)*

To Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for Peng [Dehuai], Zuo [Quan], and Luo [Ruiqing]:

1. The purpose of the enemy’s “nibbling” policy in southern Hebei is to reduce our area of operations and expand its own occupied area. If we do not smash it, then it will be very difficult for us to gain a foothold on the plains.

2. The main link in smashing this sort of policy lies in having a correct policy. The point of departure should be politics primarily, rather than military attack alone or mainly military attack.

3. Generally speaking, the starting point for the work of our Party and our army in this kind of triangular area should be to conceal ourselves well, to conserve our strength, and to always be considering the popular masses. The popular masses must be protected so that they are not harmed (which means protecting our own survival). As for certain actions to deal with the enemy taken by the popular masses when they had no choice under duress, not only is it wrong to oppose them severely (this is not Rightist backsliding), but based on the specific situation they should rather be made into planned methods for dealing with the enemy, or even tactics. Our Party and our army should help the popular masses come up with these methods to deal with the enemy. Only in this way will the masses not be divorced from us, and the enemy’s vicious plot to break up the unity between our army and the people be smashed.

4. A purely military struggle and a policy of sharp opposition on the surface would lead to brutal suppression by the enemy. The result would be, in fact, to create terror among the masses, which would accomplish precisely the purposes of the enemy bandits’ conspiracy.

5. Within these regions we should more often adopt a two-faced policy, strengthening our work with the puppet organizations and puppet armies, making more friends, and refraining from a lot of noisy boasting (in other words, conceal ourselves). Here associations and political power of the masses can be organized only

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 648–49, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
under cover, not the way it is done in the base areas. In sum, the more we are able to protect ourselves, unite the people, and isolate the Japanese bandits, the more likely we are to be able to hold out for longer. All methods are harmful that seek only the momentary gratification of fighting with all one’s might and pay no attention to twists and turns.

6. A fundamental condition for holding out on the plains is to improve and strengthen the local armed forces, which are led by local cadres and tied by flesh and blood to the local people. In this sort of triangular area, their role is particularly weighty and significant. Without this kind of local armed forces, it would be difficult to rely solely on dispersing the main forces to engage in guerrilla warfare.

7. The spirit embodied in your telegram of the 10th should be modified. At the same time, we hope that you will strictly examine the policies in this regard within the plains region. We feel that the occurrence of constant defections that have arisen recently among certain troops on the plains has something to do with this, and you must pay very serious attention to it.


Cooperate with Friendly Armies in the Battle; Resolutely Smash the Enemy’s Attack

(June 9, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We have drafted a telegram to Wei [Lihuang]. If you are in agreement, please send it on to Yuan Xiaoxuan.2

2. To Section Chief Yuan, for transmittal to Commanding Officer Wei for his perusal: The current overall situation cannot be sustained unless both the Guomindang and the Communist Party, your honorable troops and our troops, cooperate closely with each other. After taking southern Shanxi, it is possible that the enemy will advance on Zhengzhou, Luoyang, and Xi’an. Under the leadership of the Supreme Command and of you, our Elder Brother, the Eighth Route Army is resolved to cooperate with friendly armies in the campaign, resolutely smash the enemy’s attack, and fight to defend Zhengzhou, Luoyang, and Xi’an. Only there are two kinds of cooperation, direct and indirect. Direct cooperation produces its effect more rapidly; indirect cooperation produces its effect more slowly. Our humble army is responsible for attacking and destroying the [Beijing-Wuhan, Beijing-Tianjin, Tianjin-Pu Kou, Beijing-Shenyang, Beijing-Baotou, and Zengding-Taiyuan] railroad lines, the northern sector of the Baiji-Jincheng line, and the northern and central sectors of the Tong-Pu line, so as to pin down the enemy from the rear as well as the near rear. This is indirect cooperation. If the Eighth Route Army were to send strong forces to the Zhongtiao mountains and the triangular area in Fennan, and take responsibility for attacking and destroying the southern sector of the Tong-Pu line, the southern sector of the Baijin line, and the Dazhouqinghuazhen line, as well as taking control of the north bank of the Yellow River, to strike at the enemy from the flank and pin him down, so as to assist the efforts of your honorable army’s main forces to surround the enemy from the south and west bank of the Yellow

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1. Here the character hui (gray), commonly used in telegrams to signify the tenth day of the month, appears. We assume that it has this meaning, but there is no way of determining whether Mao was referring to a telegram of May 10th or to one sent earlier in 1941.

2. Wei Lihuang was then chief commanding officer for the Guomindang Army’s First War Zone.

3. That is, Chiang Kai-shek.
Our Present Policy Is to Drag Chiang Into the War of Resistance

(June 12, 1941)

Zhu [Rui], Chen [Guang], Luo [Ronghuan], Li [Yu], and Luo [Shunchu]:

It has been reported as follows: On the 20th, the 686th Regiment of our 115th Division, 1 as well as part of our troops advancing eastward started an attack on Wang’s regiment of Zhang’s division in the area around Renhezuang; on the 19th, a certain Second Regiment of ours and the Yimeng Detachment, around two thousand men, attacked Meng’s brigade of Chang’s division in the area of Qingshahu and Tangjialin; then, on the 24th, another unit of about three thousand men attacked the New Thirty-sixth Division at a certain village 2 in Chenzhuang; our forces under Xu [Shiyou], Yu, 3 and Peng [Jiaqin], about five thousand men, attacked Zhao’s division around Wujia near a certain mountain in Kaicheng, and so on. Please check and reply to us as to whether such events have occurred. Our basic policy at present is to drag Chiang into the War of Resistance. Our army should adhere to the Party Central Committee’s principle, “We shall not attack others unless they attack us; if others attack us, we shall definitely defend ourselves.” If such attacks have actually taken place, we hope that they will be stopped immediately. Likewise inform Peng [Deshuai], Zuo [Quan], Chen [Yi], and Liu [Shaoci].


Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1985, No. 3, p. 7 (pp. 171–72 of the annual volume).

1. Here and later in this telegram the letters “R” and “D” have been used instead of the Chinese terms for “Regiment” and “Division.”

2. Moujiacun, literally “a certain family village,” that is, the family name identifying this village is omitted.

3. The editors of Wenxian he yanjiu were unable to identify this person, and suspect a misprint in the original text.
To Lin Boqu
(June 13 and 15, 1941)

Venerable Lin:

I have gone over the budget and the final accounting of income and expenditures and am hereby returning them to you. Please let me know about such matters as they arise in the future. Although I can hardly relieve you of your cares and responsibilities, with regard to adjustments in personnel I can be of some small assistance to you.

What we talked about today was overall orientation and personnel policies and, thanks to your approval, we will certainly be able to put them into effect in the future.

I would like to call your attention to two more things:

1. Give approval to all expenditures that are absolutely unavoidable, allowing the recipient all that is asked for. If he is to collapse eventually, let him collapse (actually this will not happen), but at this point do not haggle over every penny with him. The principle is in the words “absolutely unavoidable.” Included within this principle is the idea of fostering the weak and the small.

2. Take on everything, whether it belongs to the Center, the army, or the locality, and make an overall plan. The army is not to be divided into a national army and local armies (no such designation is to be made), and all are to be included in the overall plan. The military was not included in the budget this time; please add it on in the future. We also request that you consider and decide whether or not what we have said is appropriate.

This is also for the venerable Xie.2

Mao Zedong, night of June 13

All in all, the line for development is entirely correct.

P.S. 1. Additional expenses will be unavoidable, because it is impossible to plan everything beforehand. For example, no one could have predicted the expenses for Jiefang ribao before it was decided to publish the paper. Therefore, the only solution is to increase the general reserve fund in the budget, and then make allocations afterward according to need (that which is absolutely unavoidable).

2. There is no need to fix the maintenance of the border region currency at 10 million; it would be best to figure on 15 million, which is less constraining.

3. The part that is raised independently should be indicated in the budget. For example, of the monthly expenditure of Kang Sheng’s office, which is 57,000 yuan, only 12,000 yuan will be allocated, and they will raise 45,000 yuan on their own; this figure should also be entered. Roughly speaking, public funding comprises one-third, and the remaining two-thirds is to be raised independently. It does not accord with reality to leave this sort of thing out of the budget. Therefore it is necessary to be in close touch with the actual state of affairs in each part of the Party, the government, and the army, and become familiar with their situations, before calculations can be made—especially the army.

4. It is not a good idea to persist in the theory of the proportionality of the circulation of commodities and money, as many new conditions should be taken into account and need to be studied at a later date. If we insist on it too strongly and it turns out to be inaccurate, our reputation will suffer. The above points are simply what comes to mind, and I have written them down for your consideration.

Mao Zedong
on June 15th

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Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 170–72, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.

1. As in the case of other letters, the words set in boldface were underscored by Mao in his handwritten manuscript.

2. Xie Juezai (1884–1971) was then deputy secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, secretary of the Party and the League of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government, and general secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government.

3. This refers to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Social Department, of which Kang Sheng (1898–1975) was the head at the time. Kang, who was also the head of the Intelligence Department, would play a key role in the Rectification Campaign of 1942.
Decision Regarding the International United Front Against Fascism

(June 23, 1941)

On June 22 the fascist rulers of Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This is a pernicious crime of aggression not only against the Soviet Union but against the freedom and independence of all nations. The Soviet Union's sacred war of resistance against fascist aggression is being waged not only in its own defense but in defense of all the countries and all the nations struggling to liberate themselves from fascist enslavement.

Throughout the world the task now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight international fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations. In the present stage, every effort must be concentrated on combating fascist enslavement, not on carrying out a socialist revolution.

For the Chinese Communist Party, the tasks throughout China are as follows:
1. Persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, persevere in Guomindang-Communist cooperation, drive the fascist Japanese bandits out of China, and by these means assist the Soviet Union.
2. Resolutely combat all anti-Soviet and anti-Communist activities of the reactionary elements among the big bourgeoisie.
3. In foreign relations, unite against the common foe with all those in Britain, the United States, and other countries who are opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

During the War of Resistance Our Tactics Toward the Big Landlords and Big Bourgeoisie Should Involve Drawing Them In While Attacking Them

(June 28, 1941)

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

I am in receipt of your telegram of the 12th; it is all correct, and I agree with all of it. Only in the second paragraph there seems to be something in item A that does not fit in with item B, so please check it again and think about it. Our Anti-Japanese National United Front includes all big landlords and big bourgeoisie who are still resisting Japan. It is an alliance of the entire nation, not just an alliance of the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie. It is indeed so as far as resistance against Japan is concerned, but where democracy is concerned, the big landlords and big bourgeoisie are forces to be opposed resolutely. Within our base areas, on the other hand, in order to protect their economic interests and wage a legitimate struggle against us, the landlords and big bourgeoisie may support our democratic régime. Therefore, during the course of the War of Resistance Against Japan, whether throughout the country or within the base areas, our policy toward the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, except in the case of Chinese traitors, should be to draw them in, on the one hand, and to attack them, on the other. That is, draw them in with regard to resisting Japan and attack their anti-Communism and opposition to democracy. At present, however, drawing them in is the main thing, and attacking is supplementary; attacking is a means to attain the end of drawing them in. This point is in agreement with your view in item B of paragraph 2, but it seems to be not in harmony with item A, and I very much hope you will take this into consideration. (To isolate the big bourgeoisie in China is different from isolating the bourgeoisie in Russia. In China we only isolate their anti-Communist aspect, while in Russia the policy is absolute isolation.) As for the mistakes in Peng Xuefeng’s telegram of May 3, I have a telegram in reply which will be sent to you at the same time, and when you receive it, please let me know what you think.

Mao Zedong

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 356–57, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript.
Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party Spirit

(Passed by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, 1941)

1. The Chinese Communist Party, tempered during twenty years of revolution, has now become an important and decisive factor in the political life of the whole country, yet what is before us remains a great and arduous revolutionary cause. Thus our Party must take a step further to become a Bolshevik party that is consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and all members of the Party and all its component parts must unite on the basis of unified intention, unified action, and unified discipline, to become an organic whole. Without such a resolute, unified, and centralized party, we shall be unable to cope with the protracted, grueling, and complicated struggle in the course of the revolution or to accomplish the great historical task we shoulder. Therefore, our major job today in consolidating the Party is to demand that all members of the Party, particularly members who are cadres, strengthen their training in Party spirit, subordinate personal interests to the interests of the whole Party, and subordinate the interests of an individual Party organization to those of the Party as a whole, so that the entire Party may be united as one single person.

2. Even though our Party has a history of twenty years of valiant struggle and is already a bolshevized party with close ties to the broad masses of people, the following must be pointed out: our environment is that of the vast countryside, that of guerrilla warfare which has long been dispersed and where independent actions have been going on, where small producers and intellectuals make up a large proportion of the Party membership, so that various tendencies which run counter to the Party spirit may easily arise among certain Party members, tendencies such as “individualism,” “heroism,” “a state of disorganization,” “assertion of independence,” and “anticentralized dispersalism.” If allowed to develop, these tendencies would undermine the Party’s unified intention, unified actions, and unified discipline and could develop into the organization of small groups and into factional struggles, and even go so far as open opposition to the Party, which would bring tremendous damage to the Party and the revolution. And if individuals with these tendencies fail to correct themselves, they could end up bringing ruin and disgrace upon their own heads. Traitor Zhang Guotao’s end may serve as a clear historical lesson. These tendencies that demonstrate a lack of Party spirit, although not a prevalent phenomenon within the Party today, do indeed exist in certain quarters and among certain comrades. These tendencies mentioned above are concretely manifested in the following ways:

   a. Politically, acting as one pleases, not asking for guidance or opinions from the Central Committee or higher authorities, not respecting the decisions of the Central Committee or higher authorities, speaking carelessly, coming up with something new in order to be different, substituting personal feelings or views for policy, making arbitrary decisions and taking peremptory actions, or inverting excuses to evade responsibilities, having a two-faced attitude, complying on the surface while opposing in private, and concealing things from the Party.

   b. Organizationally, becoming one’s own system and one’s own situation, emphasizing independent action, opposing centralized leadership, practicing departmental selfishness, not allowing people to be transferred out [of one’s department], ignoring the interests of the organization and thinking only of one’s personal interests; practicing paternalistic rule, demanding only that subordinates observe discipline but disregarding it oneself; resisting the Center, showing disrespect for higher authorities, solving problems by going over the heads of immediate superior leadership organs; allowing oneself to disobey resolutions adopted by the majority, attacking others and touting oneself; totally disregarding matters of principle on policy toward cadres, making promotions or demotions at will, trying to win support through sentimental ties, covering up one another’s misdeeds, secretly gangung, and engaging in factional activities.

   c. Ideologically, it is developing petty-bourgeois individualism to make use of it against proletarian collectivism, taking the individual as the starting point in all things, showing off the individual in all things, putting personal interests above all else, being conceited and arrogant, having an unduly high opinion of oneself, pushing oneself forward at every chance, seeking personal status, taking pleasure in flattery, talking big and exaggerating, hogging the limelight; failing to understand specific situations in a truthful way, failing to handle problems in a serious and prudent manner; being extravagant to make a good show on the surface but refusing to dig in for the hard work; failure to build truly close ties with the masses.

3. To rectify the above-mentioned tendencies that run counter to the Party spirit, the following measures must be taken:

   a. Within the Party, more emphasis should be placed on the unity of the entire Party, on the centralized nature of the Party, and on the importance of following the leadership of the Center. It is forbidden for any Party member or any local Party organization to exhibit the behavior of coming up with something new in order to be different, becoming one’s own system, or making proposals at will to the outside world on national issues. Demand that those in the leadership in the

Our source for this text is 马泽东文集. Vol. 7, pp. 53–56, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979.
various independent working districts pay special attention to the fact that it is more necessary today than at any other time to trust and obey the Center’s leadership. Within the Party a struggle should be waged against “dispersalism,” “assertion of independence,” and “individualism.”

b. Examination of the carrying out of all resolutions and decisions should be stricter, and the two-faced behavior of complying on the surface while opposing in private is to be eradicated with firm resolve.

c. Only by discovering and rectifying errors in a timely fashion and not allowing them to develop further can cadres be saved and harm to the work be prevented. Oppose the practice of being polite to the person’s face and making charges behind his back. All criticism should be made in a positive, frank, and sincere manner, the purpose being salvation and not an attack. Within the Party unity and mutual assistance should be stressed, along with concern for cadres and helping them make progress politically. But as for those who fail to mend their ways after repeated warnings, timely prevention must be exercised as well as disciplinary sanctions.

d. Education about observing discipline should be strengthened throughout the Party, because a unified standard of discipline is a necessary condition for victory of the revolution. These basic principles must be followed strictly: submission of the individual to the organization, submission of the minority to the majority, submission of lower levels to higher levels, and submission of the whole Party to the Center. This must apply to everyone, ordinary Party members and cadre Party members alike.

e. We should transform ourselves with the weapon of self-criticism and through the method of conscientious study so as to fit ourselves to the needs of the Party and the revolution. Every Party member, every responsible leading cadre in particular, should be expected to reflect on his weaknesses thoroughly, and regard the Party’s interests as of highest priority. No one should be guilty of a conceited and self-satisfied or a selfish attitude. The style to be promoted is one of selflessness, faithful loyalty and simple living, being willing to work hard, being down to earth, practical, and realistic, and guarding against arrogance and shallowness. The tendencies to divorce completely theory from practice and study from work should be corrected, so as to resolve more firmly our class stand, our Party stand, and our Party spirit.

f. Finally, it has been decided that all responsible leaders, from members of the Central Committee to heads of Party departments, must be organizationally affiliated with a Party branch, participate to a degree in Party organizational life, humbly listen to criticisms from rank-and-file Party members, and strengthen their own training in Party spirit.

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Prepare for Strategic Cooperation with the Soviet Army

(July 2, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

1. We trust that you have received our last telegram. It is extremely likely that war will break out between Japan and the Soviet Union, and relations between China and the Soviet Union will improve.

2. If Japan attacks the Soviet Union, for the purpose of eliminating its enemy in the rear, the enemy will step up its suppression in North China.

3. Our army must prepare to cooperate with the Soviet Army in combat and make such preparations right now so that, once the time is ripe, we can take action immediately. But this kind of coordination is strategic coordination, long-term coordination, not coordination in a single battle or temporary coordination. Please consider all questions on this basis.

Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the War of Resistance

(July 7, 1941)

Fellow countrymen throughout the nation, officers and soldiers in the War of Resistance!

It has been exactly four years that our great Chinese nation’s sacred war to resist the Japanese bandits and defend our motherland has been going on. As the fifth year of this War of Resistance begins, the international situation is at the same time in the midst of serious changes. The mad German fascist archcriminal Hitler has started a massive attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviet government is leading 200 million people and several million Red Army soldiers in a great war to smash the fascist aggression.

Fellow countrymen, officers, and soldiers! This antifascist war of the Soviet Union is entirely of the same nature as our war against Japan, both being just wars to safeguard independence and freedom and to resist aggression. On the other hand, as far as the German fascists are concerned, they are exactly like the Japanese fascists who are invading China, in that they are committing an act of aggression, of enslavement of others, and are unjust. Therefore, we stand on exactly the same frontline as the Soviet Union, sharing all victories and defeats and standing together through thick and thin.

Since the outbreak of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, sympathy for the Soviet Union has been spreading rapidly all over the world. The concern of our nation’s people in this regard is especially deep and intense. This is because, for one thing, the Soviet Union is a socialist state that has been supportive of oppressed nations, and, during the four years of our resistance war, the Soviet Union has been the one to give us the most and the strongest help; for another, because the war between the Soviet Union and Germany has a direct impact on our War of Resistance. Should Hitler succeed in the Soviet Union, China would face a serious crisis. So all the people of our country understand that the Soviet people are fighting a war not only to safeguard the Soviet Union but also to defend China and to defend the freedom and independence of all nations. The success or failure of the Soviet Union is also the success or failure of China, as well as the success or failure, for all nations, of democracy and freedom, of independence and emancipation, of righteousness and justice, of science and enlightenment. Thus Hitler is the enemy not only of the Soviet people but also of all free nations, especially China. Therefore, to defeat Hitler is not only the task of the people of the Soviet Union and the various other countries but also the task of the Chinese people. Without a doubt, the mad attacks of fascist Hitler will only hasten his doom, as the enemies of the fascists are all over the world. A powerful front against fascist aggression is now being formed in the world. Now is a time of great struggle worldwide between the fascist front and the antifascist front, and a decisive battle between the two has already begun.

With the aims of drawing in Japan, consolidating the fascist alliance, and opposing China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, the fascist countries in Europe have gone so far as to brazenly recognize the Chinese traitor, Wang Jingwei, and Hitler and Mussolini have already stretched their claws toward the Pacific. That they are the common enemy of our 450 million people as well as the whole of humanity is a fact that has already been exposed fully. Fascist Japan, for its part, has sunk into the quagmire of China to the West and is contending with Britain and the United States to the South; its economy is on the decline and its people are resentful, and now as it is about to tear up the Japanese-Soviet neutrality treaty and make an enemy of the great Soviet Union, the day of its disintegration and doom draws ever nearer without fail. But the more critical the situation gets, the more difficult it becomes to stop Japan from becoming desperate and trying to get its own way. The anti-Soviet danger has thus been increasing, the orientation of destroying China will certainly not be abandoned, and the ambition to go southward to encroach upon Britain, the United States, the Netherlands, and Australia still remains. The threat posed by the fascist alliance to the world is augmenting simultaneously in the West and in the East. Only by waging a resolute struggle on the basis of an international united front against fascism is it possible to extinguish the fierce flames as they burn and stem the tide as it rages. All forms of the mentality of taking pleasure at the misfortunes of others and hoping to win by mere luck are manifestations of shallowness and lack of understanding. As for Chamberlain’s following the old disastrous path, Wang Jingwei’s following in other people’s footsteps, the so-called pacification policy, and the capitulationist line, these are all moves that are hopelessly stupid, that should be rejected by China and democratic countries in Europe and America. The Chinese people will forever persist in their fight against the danger of a Far Eastern Munich.

Our great Chinese nation’s sacred War of Resistance Against Japan is not only to save our own motherland from destruction but is also of assistance to the international battle against aggression. During the past four years, soldiers and civilians throughout the country have been gallantly fighting the War of Resistance.

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, July 7, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 9-14, where it is reproduced from that version.
without begrudging sacrifice, without fearing hardship, stepping into the breach as soon as someone falls, making consistent and unyielding efforts. An enormous price has been paid, and numerous difficulties have been surmounted, thereby striking the enemy bandits with terror, winning respect all over the globe, laying the foundation for revitalization of the nation, and producing the embryonic form of a newborn China. All this is the result of our unity above and below, the concerted efforts of the army and the people, cooperation among various parties and groups, and aid from friendly countries. It merits our exuberant celebration and deserves to be writ large in the record.

The enemy’s attacks, on the other hand, are just in the ascendant, and colluding to destroy us is the brutal fascist alliance. The puppets in Nanjing are playing jackal to the tiger, and the pro-Japanese elements within our ranks are practicing all manner of deceit. Politics have yet to be clarified; the people’s livelihood is worsening all the time; friction remains among the parties and groups; the will of the people is far from prevailing, and all sorts of terrifying specters are looming larger and fiercer and fiercer on the horizon. What is most startling is that anticommunism has become policy, the term “alien party” appears in official documents, and the fine-sounding terms “army discipline” and “military orders” are applied to those most actively engaged in striking out against the anti-Japanese forces. And so the Southern Anhui Incident occurred, the New Fourth Army was disbanded, secret agents run rampant, and illegal arrests have been made one after another, such that the vitality of the War of Resistance has been undermined, and the new atmosphere during the early days of the War of Resistance has broken down. If all these dark aspects are not eliminated, then what has been achieved in the War of Resistance over the past four years may be lost in midstream, the soldiers and the people throughout the country would feel at a loss as to what to do, and international sympathies would also be lost. This is something that everyone in the country should be fully aware of and guard against.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is of the opinion that the present time, when the War of Resistance is entering its fifth year and the international situation is undergoing change, offers a good opportunity for us to get rid of the old and make way for the new. Many highly significant military tasks must be performed by the people of the whole nation, and new reforms and innovations should be made from foreign affairs to domestic policy before we can adjust to the current environment, assume a new posture before our people, and achieve our goal of fighting the War of Resistance and building up the nation. Despite the limitations on its understanding, this Party wishes to set forth the following points:

1. Support the international antifascist front, promote the united coalition of China, the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, and all other countries and nations that are opposed to fascism, oppose the fascist alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan, support the correct action of the National Government in severing diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy, and prepare for new measures.

2. Intensify the struggle against the puppet government of Traitor Wang [Jingwei], eliminate the remnant followers of Traitor Wang, and consolidate the anti-Japanese camp.

3. Speed up the reorganization and training of all national armies, improve military coordination among the various armies at the front, supply army provisions and ammunition to the anti-Japanese troops in the enemy’s rear, and wage active counterattacks against the enemy.

4. Improve the political, economic, and cultural facilities at all anti-Japanese base areas, which efforts are to be assisted financially by the government, so that they can persist in the enemy’s rear over a long period of time and make it impossible for the enemy to move troops to advance westward, northward, or southward.

5. Strengthen cooperation among all anti-Japanese parties and groups, readjust relations between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, resolve the issue of the New Fourth Army, acknowledge the lawful activities of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, stop arresting members of the Communist Party and all other patriotic elements, eliminate internal friction, and build up real power for the War of Resistance.

6. Grant to all patriotic people freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, and mobilize the talents and power of the people for resistance against the enemy bandits.

7. Reform political institutions, dismiss corrupt officials from office, make use of enlightened people, purge the hidden pro-Japanese elements from government organs, and eliminate the enemy’s fifth column.

8. Prohibit hoarding and speculating and manipulation of the national economy by corrupt officials, unscrupulous profiteers, and evil gentry, implement control over the grain supply, and regulate prices, so as to relieve the hardships of the people.

9. Reform the military service recruitment system, prohibit extortion, bribery, compulsion, and mistreatment, and substitute instead political mobilization through encouraging the people to go to the battlefront, so as to benefit the War of Resistance.

10. Readjust the relationship between the Center and the localities, trust and make use of local talent, and unite with the national minorities, so as to consolidate our rear.

This Party believes the foregoing items truly to be the basic guidelines for our foreign and domestic affairs today. If they could be put into practice, a new atmosphere would be created throughout the country, and all our difficulties could be overcome, thus laying a solid foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance and the construction of the country.

The Chinese Communist Party declares once again: This Party remains unchanged in adhering to its policy of the national united front against Japan and is willing to unite to the end with the Chinese Guomindang and all patriotic parties and groups and all patriotic people, and fight hard together for our common goals.
of the War of Resistance and building the country. This Party has in fact been the most faithful in implementing the Three People's Principles and the program for resisting Japan and building up the country. This Party has been true to its word in carrying out its declaration of September 22, 1937, without the slightest violation. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army have been part of the National Army from beginning to end, carried out their duties in the anti-Japanese war in the most faithful and most courageous manner, resisted and beaten more than half the enemy's forces, recovered a vast expanse of lost territory, and established a number of anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear. In these base areas, the Three People's Principles have been implemented step by step, the three-thirds system, a democratic political system that secure cooperation among various parties and strata, has been carried out, human rights, political rights, and financial rights are guaranteed for all anti-Japanese strata (including landlords and capitalists), a policy in the countryside has been carried out such that, on the one hand, land rent and loan interest are reduced, and, on the other hand, rent and interest must be paid, a labor policy has been implemented such that, on the one hand, the workers' livelihood is improved, and, on the other hand, labor discipline is strengthened, an economic policy has been carried out that develops agriculture, industry, and commerce and improves the livelihood of the people, and a cultural policy has been carried out to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance and enhance the spiritual quality of the nation. Each and every one of these instances testifies to the following: The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard in defending the motherland, a revolutionary political party that is true to its word, a model in unifying to fight the War of Resistance, and an exemplar of tough struggle. On the other hand, the enemy, Traitor Wang and the pro-Japanese elements, have all made this Party their target and take pleasure in trying to undermine and destroy it, because they know full well that this Party's existence is the biggest obstacle to fulfillment of their plan to destroy China, and that they would never be able to destroy China without first destroying the Communists. What is strange is that some persons within our country who are still in the War of Resistance harbor exactly the same intentions as the enemy to slander, frame, and sabotage this Party, calling it a bandit army and slandering it as a traitorous party, sparing no effort to devastate and suppress it. Faced with such a formidable enemy, to act in such haste is truly something unfathomable no matter how one looks at it. It is hoped that such things will quickly be eliminated, that the state of affairs at the beginning of the War of Resistance will be restored, that animosity will give way to harmony, and mutual obstruction will give way to mutual assistance. If all together give first priority to the country and the nation, the future of the War of Resistance will brighten immediately, and the situation in this fifth year of the War of Resistance will turn into one of unity, progress, and victory. This is what our Party prays for in all earnestness.

Fellow countrymen, officers, and men! The fifth year of the War of Resistance is a decisive year for the destiny of the world as well as for the destiny of China. Everyone should wake up, unite especially closely, make special efforts, persist in holding up our banner of national emancipation, keep our feet firmly planted on the ground, go forward in the fight, coordinate with the antifascist struggle of the peoples of all other countries, and strive for our complete victory. The Chinese Communist Party is thoroughly convinced that, as long as we persist in our efforts and do not make mistakes, we can surely achieve our goals. The final victory surely will be ours.

Down with Japanese imperialism!
Down with fascist enslavement!
Support the Soviet Union!
Long live the victory of the War of Resistance!
Long live the victory of the antifascist front of the whole world!

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
To Assist the Red Army of the Soviet Union, We Have Decided to Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle in the Form of Widespread Guerrilla War

(July 15, 1941)

Comrade [Zhou] Enlai:

1. The Central Committee held a discussion about the telegram you sent. With regard to military preparation, we have decided to begin with the three measures of learning the Russian language, learning natural sciences, and preparing cadres in the Northeast.

2. With regard to Hong Kong, we think it is, indeed, very important, and we are preparing to send someone. Only selection of personnel still needs to be considered. We feel it may not be adequate for [Li] Fuchun to go on his own; what do you think about Bo Gu’s going?

3. With regard to military operations, as soon as war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany, we began to step up our spying operations and our preparations to destroy communications so as to pin down the enemy, and we are determined under the present circumstances to do everything possible to help the Soviet Red Army win victory. But because the Japanese bandits have occupied North China for four years and have built strong fortifications in big cities, along railroad lines, and in the mines, besides which the discrepancy between our military technology and equipment and those of the enemy is too great, we face increasing difficulty with regard to manpower, material power, territory, and ammunition. If Japan invades the Soviet Union, I am afraid that our role in coordinating military actions will not be very large. Even if we take action regardless of all sacrifice to ourselves, it is still quite possible that we would be defeated and be unable to sustain the base areas for long. This would be a bad thing no matter how one looks at it. For this reason, rather than adopting a policy of putting all our eggs in one basket, we are adopting a policy of strengthening our base areas in the enemy’s rear, carrying out extensive guerrilla warfare, and fighting a long, drawn-out battle with the Japanese bandits. If we can enhance our provisions of ammunition, machine guns, cannons, and explosives, the effect of our operations will be even greater still. Rifle bullets are especially precious, because we have an average of only twenty bullets per rifle, our machine guns are very few, and our cannons are even fewer, nor can we get hold of the yellow explosive used in blowing things up. Please inform Elder Brother Cui of this and ask him to pass it on to our friends in a distant place.

4. With regard to the two incidents at Zhongtiao mountain in Luoyang described in the telegram of the 12th, we have drawn the attention of Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai] to the matter.

5. As for meeting with Chiang [Kaishek], since Zhang Chong has come twice to urge it, perhaps it is worth a visit to see what he has to say. If he can release Ye Ting and give the Eighth Route Army a few months worth of pay, relations between the Guomindang and the Communists can begin to improve right away. But still it would not do to be too hasty, as undue haste would be counterproductive. Your being unhurried is quite reasonable.

6. The agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union will become the pivot of world politics. Politically, the United States cannot but follow this line and will no longer be able to control everything. The British-Soviet agreement will have an impact on Japan, adding to its worries, and it will also have an impact on China, promoting improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union and between the Guomindang and the Communists.

7. The war between the Soviet Union and Germany has reached a stalemate in its third week, but the decisive battle is yet to come, and the danger is not over yet. If he is unable to fight his way in frontally, Hitler will strike at Turkey, Iraq, and the Caucasus, and this will be the main area in which the navies, armies, and air forces of Britain and the Soviet Union will coordinate their fighting.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 651–53, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.

1. The reference is to Zhou’s telegram to Mao of July 3, in which he argued that America’s policy of recognizing Japan’s special economic privileges in China, and thereby persuading Japan not to use military force in its advance to the south, was unlikely to succeed. From a military point of view, the Communists should increase their acceptance of new weapons and study the natural sciences, the Russian language, and modern military knowledge.

2. As noted above, Li Fuchun was serving at the time as deputy head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee.

3. Qin Bangxian (1907–1946), pseudonym Bo Gu, a leader of the Russian returned student faction, had been secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party in 1931–1935. Beginning in 1938, he had been a Communist delegate to the People’s Political Council, and his name appears as a signatory of a number of documents in the earlier part of this volume, but he was not, in fact, very influential at this time. He had, however, recently become editor-in-chief of Jiefang ribao.

4. This refers once again to Tsuikov, who since December 1940 had been the military attaché to the Soviet embassy in China and general military adviser to the Guomindang government.

5. As elsewhere, “in a distant place” refers to Moscow.
8. Japan has been concentrating its ships in the Pacific, appointed Itagaki chief commanding officer in Korea, and transferred part of its forces from China to Manchuria, seeming to be preparing to attack the Soviet Union. But it mainly still depends on the outcome of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, and it looks as if at present they are still observing the situation.

Mao Zedong

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army Should Adopt the Orientation of a Long-Term Struggle

(July 18, 1941)

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

Your telegram of the 12th has been received.\(^1\)

1. The slogan of counteroffense is correct. The slogan of an active offensive was already used in the July 7 Declaration, and in the future we may use a slogan of strategic counteroffense.

2. But it remains inappropriate for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to carry out operations on a large scale. The orientation should continue to be a long-term struggle over a long period of time, the reason being that our army is weak in all respects, and any large movement would surely sap our strength and be disadvantageous both to us and to the Soviet Union.

3. The overall situation will be determined by the Soviet Union’s winning victory. At present the Soviet Union’s several million reserve troops are just being used, and it is possible that in a few days there will be a decisive battle to halt the German army’s offensive, which would be most advantageous in terms of the overall situation. If Leningrad and Moscow fall, then Japan is certain to invade the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union’s difficulties will increase, and it will turn into a protracted war. But the agreement between Britain and the Soviet Union has already determined the basis for a final victory. A confrontation between the United States and Germany and between the United States and Japan is unavoidable, and the overall situation still does not favor the fascists.

4. It is Chiang [Kaishek]’s policy to take any advantage to contain the Japanese and contain the Communists, so therefore our policy toward Chiang should continue to be that of no concessions but no attack either. In actuality it is impossible

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\(^{6}\) General Itagaki Seishiro (1885–1948) was one of the leading partisans of Japanese expansion in China, and it was he who had issued the orders for the “Mukden Incident” of September 1931 which constituted the first step in carrying out that policy. Ironically, it was the crack 5th Division under his command that was the victim of Lin Biao’s victory of September 1937 at Pingxingguan. In 1939, he became chief of the general staff of the China Expeditionary Army. He was executed as a war criminal in 1948.

\(^{1}\) This refers to a telegram dated July 12, 1941, from Chen Yi and Liu Shaoqi to Mao, arguing that if Japan were to attack the Soviet Union, the Communists should call on the entire nation to counterattack, and if the Guomindang refused to do so, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should counterattack on their own.
for us to give up our territory to Chiang, and he certainly will not fight fiercely against the Japanese, as he is very opportunistic and very clever.

5. The suggestion in your previous telegram of using “The Communist Manifesto” and “On New Democracy” as textbooks for veteran cadres does not seem appropriate because they are too difficult to understand. It is better to compile some new textbooks, and the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department is making a start at that.

6. I hope you mail your two articles from Hong Kong so that I can read them as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong

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Be Prepared to Persist for a Long Time in the Orientation of Self-Defense

(July 30, 1941)

To [Huang] Kecheng, and for the information of Hu Fu [Liu Shaoqi]:

Both of your telegrams have been received. This anti-Communist propaganda campaign was carried out by He Yingqin under secret orders from Chiang [Kaishek], but it was opposed by the pro-British and pro-American elements such as Guo Taichi¹ and Wang Shijie,² and has been stopped for the time being after [Zhou] Enlai’s counterattack. Chiang and He’s purpose is none other than to prepare public opinion so that they will have an excuse to force us to move north of the Yellow River once Japan attacks the Soviet Union. But as long as the Soviet Union is able to defeat Germany (in the past two weeks the German army has made no progress), Japan will certainly not dare to attack the Soviet Union, and as long as the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain cooperate (Britain and the Soviet Union have already signed an agreement, and the United States and the Soviet Union are getting closer day by day), Chiang will certainly not dare to launch an extensive anti-Communist campaign, so the whole situation is to our advantage. If Japan risks attacking the Soviet Union and Chiang forces us to move northward, there still will be no change in our orientation; politically it will continue to be an anti-fascist international united front and an anti-Japanese national united front, and, militarily, until there are changes in our weaponry, it will remain a timeless protracted guerrilla war against the enemy that is neither adventurous nor passive. The troops in Central China and Shandong will certainly not move north; our policy toward Chiang’s attacks will be one of self-defense; our orientation toward all anti-Communist propaganda and every single anti-Communist action on the part of the Guomindang will continue to be that we will not attack anyone who does not first attack us. As for Chiang and He, if He attacks us we will attack him, and if He stops we will stop too. We should prepare to persist in this orientation for

¹ Guo Taichi was minister of foreign affairs for the Guomindang government at the time.
² Wang Shijie was then serving as secretary general of the Guomindang’s People’s Political Council.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 656–57, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

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a long time, and not be swayed by a particular incident or time. I hope you will pay attention to this.

Mao Zedong

Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Investigation
(August 1, 1941)

1. Over the past twenty years, although our Party has made gradual progress in studying the history and society of China and world affairs, gradually accumulating more and more knowledge, it is still greatly inadequate. Being crude and careless, being content with superficial understanding, arrogantly thinking oneself always in the right, and subjectivist and formalist work-styles still exist within the Party in a serious way. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, our Party has taken a big step forward with regard to understanding Japan, understanding domestic economic and political relationships, and understanding social conditions, and subjectivist and formalist work-styles have lessened as well. But what has been found out is still mostly crude and rough, like a caricature, lacking in systematic, detailed, or thorough understanding. And subjectivist and formalist work-styles have yet to be eliminated altogether. The seriousness of the harm done to the revolutionary work over the past twenty years as a result of the subjectivist and formalist mentality of many of our comrades and lack of thorough knowledge of various aspects has yet to be recognized fully by all leading organs of the Party and all our comrades. A number of comrades responsible for local work lack systematic and thoroughgoing understanding of the internal and external environment of the area in which they work, whether in relation to the society, the economy, and politics, to the enemy and the puppets, or to their own work. Many comrades within the Party have yet to understand the truth that without investigation there is no right to speak. They have yet to understand that a systematic and thoroughgoing investigation of society is the basis on which policy is formulated. They still do not know that the fundamental tasks of a leading organ are to understand conditions and to master policies, and that if conditions are not understood, then policies are bound to be in error. They still do not know how finely detailed are Japanese imperialism's investigation and study of our country. Nor do they yet grasp that the subjectivist work-style of being crude and careless and arrogantly self-righteous is the first manifestation of an impure Party spirit, whereas seeking truth

This resolution was first published in *Jiefang ribao*, September 8, 1941. *Nianpu*, Vol. 2, pp. 315–16, confirms that it was drafted by Mao. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji*, Vol. 8, pp. 17–19, which reproduces the text that appeared in *Jiefang ribao*.
actors, and prostitutes, they should be understood so that they may make some contribution to the cause of national liberation. It is even more necessary to have comprehensive knowledge about prominent enemy bandits and Chinese traitors, and the prominent elements who play the jackal to their tiger, or the targets of our present struggle, so as to achieve the objective of winning every battle by knowing both oneself and the enemy. Comrades of the prefecture and xian Party committees should be charged with sharing responsibility for this sort of biography. The contents of the biography must be true to the person’s actual life history and must not be distorted because of personal likes and dislikes. Sixth, conduct individual oral interviews. Either send people to ask questions or have people come to be questioned. Ask questions of cadres, workers, peasants, educated people, sympathizers, merchants, officials, vagabonds, captives, and so on, all of them. Seventh, collect and make a study of gazeteers for xian, townships, and provinces, family tree records, maps, and so on.

3. Carry out education about understanding objective conditions (those of the enemy, our friends, and ourselves) among cadres in office and in schools where cadres are trained. Praise and encourage those comrades who know more and better about actual conditions, and criticize those comrades who engage in empty talk and are unrealistic. Praise and encourage those comrades who not only understand actual conditions but also pay attention to policy, and criticize those comrades who not only do not know objective conditions but are also careless about policy. Make it so that this practice of knowing actual conditions and being careful about policy is closely linked with the practice of studying Marxist-Leninist theory. In study, oppose the practice of only memorizing doctrine while ignoring actual reality, and the harmful tendency of separating the study of Marxist-Leninist theory and principles, on the one hand, from the understanding of Chinese social conditions and solving the problems of the Chinese revolution, on the other. Cadres and students should be encouraged to read newspapers and given guidance in the way to read newspapers and in analyzing each change in the current situation. Cadres and students should be provided with factual material about all sorts of conditions both inside and outside the country, the province, and the xian. The teaching and study of these materials and the conclusions therefrom should be incorporated into the formal curriculum, be given the necessary time, and be tested and examined.
To Xiao Jun

(August 2, 1941)

Comrade Xiao Jun:

I have received and read both of your letters, and the books you asked for have been sent. Because I have had little contact with you in the past and do not know you well, there are certain things I have wanted to say to you, but then again I was afraid that, if my words went deeper than our friendship warrants, they would do you no good or even give rise to hard feelings, so I refrained from saying them at the time. There are very many bad things going on in Yan'an, and the ones you mentioned to me all merit attention and should all be corrected. But I would advise you at the same time to pay attention to certain of your own shortcomings, to refrain from thinking in absolute terms, to be patient, to take care of your relationships with others, and to force yourself deliberately to examine your own weaknesses. This is the only way to have a future and to "settle down and get on with one's life." Otherwise you will never be at ease, and that involves great suffering. You are an extremely frank and straightforward person, and I feel at ease with you, which is why I have made these suggestions. If you agree, I should like to talk with you again. Respectfully wishing you all the best!

Mao Zedong

The Defense Along the River Along the Jundu-Jikou Line Should Be Strengthened

(August 3, 1941)

To He [Long] and Zhou [Shidi], and to inform Peng [Dehuai] and Zuo [Quan]:

According to reports the enemy has concentrated more than four thousand men along the Jundu-Jikou line and is preparing to cross the river, and it is evident that the main forces of Wang's brigade have been transferred northward to deal with He Wending, so that defense along the river is hollow. It is very possible that the Japanese bandits will take advantage of this weakness to cross the river and launch an attack, and, if the river is not defended, the impact will be extremely heavy. We hope that He and Zhou will swiftly make arrangements to strengthen the forces defending the river, prepare to impose a heavy blow on the invading enemy troops crossing the river, and at the same time threaten the enemy from the side with another unit, to make sure the enemy cannot succeed. Let us know quickly what arrangements you make. We also hope to be informed as to whether or not Shidi should be sent to take command in Jiaxian.


Our source for this order is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, p. 658, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. He Long was then commander of the Eighth Route Army's 120th Division, and Zhou Shidi was its chief of staff.
2. Wang Zhen (1908–1993), a native of Hunan, participated in the Long March. Since 1937, he had been commander of the 359th Brigade of He Long's 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
3. He Wending (d. 1978) was a native of Shanxi who had been a member of the first class at the Huangpu Academy in 1924. At this time, he was commander of the 26th Division of the Guomindong Eighth War Zone.
To Xie Juezai

(August 6, 1941)

Comrade Juezai:

Recently I have been very interested in studying the problem of finance and economy in the border regions. Although my understanding is still not very deep, I feel that the law governing it, or its determining rule, seems to rest on two simple points, namely, (a) developing the economy, and (b) a balance of imports and exports. First is to develop a mainly private and partly public economy in the various fields such as agriculture, salt production, industry, animal husbandry, and commerce, and then to export to outside of the border more than 30 million yuan worth of products in exchange for bringing in 30 million yuan of necessities, so as to balance exports and imports or strive for a considerably favorable balance of trade. If these two things were accomplished, all problems would be solved. In turn, the key with regard to these two things lies in the management of grain and salt production. If grain production can be increased by 200,000 or 300,000 dan, and 300,000 to 400,000 pack animal loads of salt can be transported outside the borders, the two problems would basically be solved.

If we evaluate our work in relation to these two points, it follows that:

1. The fact that this year’s investment of 8 million yuan is limited to public enterprises alone and does not cover any loans to private agriculture or to cooperatives is nothing other than an expedient for the transitional period. From now on, investments in public enterprise must be stopped, and investments in private enterprise must be initiated. In other words, advance large loans to farmers and cooperatives, as well as to herdsmen and private merchants at the same time, for the purpose of increasing grain production, increasing the number of livestock, and achieving relatively prosperous commerce. If 3 or 4 million yuan can be invested in agriculture, in addition to the government’s mobilization for a spring cultivation and autumn harvest campaign, and the grain yield is increased by 200,000 to 300,000 yuan, then collecting taxes on 200,000 dan of grain and 10 million jin of hay will not affect the livelihood of the people, and it might even be possible to export tens of thousands of dan of grain to Sui[de xian] and Yu[lin xian]. If animal husbandry can be made to grow and commerce is developed to a considerable extent, then a tax on sheep bringing in 2 or 3 million yuan per year and a tax on commerce amounting to 7 or 8 million yuan a year would not incur resentment from the people, and our financial problems basically would have been solved. The reason attention was paid only to investment in public enterprise and we were unable to take care of private sector investment this year is that there was the extenuating circumstance of depending on public enterprises to help cope with an emergency. But the adverse effects thus produced were contending with the people for profits (monopoly) and failure to solve the larger problem. This orientation certainly cannot be continued next year. Investment in the salt enterprise alone should be continued next year, and only the necessary portions in other publicly run enterprises in agriculture, industry, and commerce should continue.

2. Salt is the only means or the primary means of achieving a balance between imports and exports. As long as 300,000 pack animal loads of salt a year can be exported in exchange for 30 million yuan worth of cotton and cloth (calculated at a hundred French francs per pack animal load), then imports and exports could be considered balanced, as according to what the bank tells me, imports of cotton and cloth to the border areas amount to only 30 million yuan a year. If 400,000 pack animal loads could be exported, aside from bringing in 30 million yuan worth of cotton and cloth, there would be 10 million yuan in cash coming in, which would be even better. As for collecting 6 to 8 million yuan in salt taxes to make up part of the financial deficit, this is only its secondary advantage; the first advantage of salt is in solving the problem of balancing imports and exports. Once the import and export problem is solved, the two major problems of price of goods and value of currency are solved. Viewed in this light, this year’s salt policy, of official supervision and the populace trading, not only gives little cause for criticism but is, rather, entirely appropriate. Although it is in no way certain that 300,000 or 400,000 pack animal loads can be sold, there is indeed no other way to solve the import and export problem, and as a consequence no other way but this to solve the two major problems of price of goods and value of currency. Therefore, the basic orientation underlying this policy is altogether legitimate. Because a policy of completely free trade cannot be implemented with regard to salt this year. The reasons are the high price of grain and of hay, as well as Guomindang restrictions. This year is different from last year, so there is no other way to be able to export 300,000 or 400,000 pack animal loads of salt except by official supervision and the populace trading (a semicercive measure).

I have not yet been favored with a reply to my previous letter from the Venerable Lin,² so perhaps the issues I raised in it were not proper or to the point. But

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Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 176–79, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Xie Juezai (1884–1971), a native of Ningxiang in Hunan, was then serving as deputy secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Northwest Bureau, Party and League secretary for the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government, and general secretary of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government.

2. Refers to Lin Boqu, then serving as chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government.
my humble intention was simply to see that this problem is solved in a rational manner so as to serve the purpose of unifying our determination and unifying our actions. The disunity of the past several months has been truly detrimental to the extreme. But unity rests first of all on a consensus with regard to the basic orientation for financial and economic construction. For this reason, I put forward the foregoing arguments as they came to my mind on reflection, so as to invite criticism and guidance from you and the Venerable Lin. If you and the Venerable Lin feel there are errors, I beg you to be frank and direct in correcting them one by one, so that a consensus may be reached. The Politburo held a meeting yesterday at which I was entrusted to call a meeting of the comrades concerned in order to find a solution to this problem. I think it would be best to have discussions with individuals first, and then hold the meeting. What is your opinion?
Respectfully wishing you the very best!

Mao Zedong

To Xie Juezai

(August 9, 1941)

Venerable Xie:

I have received both your letter of the 8th and the report on Ansai.¹ I have read them once and shall read them more carefully later. The summing-up meeting that is in preparation is a positive thing and is not only for the purpose of debating certain specific issues. Please prepare an active proposal, including the whole question of finance and the economy, enumerating all points item by item, and include what is to be done this year and what is to be done next year. Please let me see it after it is drafted so that I can study it beforehand and exchange views with you before discussion takes place. The Venerable Lin has made a three-year plan, which I would very much like to have a look at. He kindly wrote to me yesterday saying that he plans to expand and rewrite it, and I wonder whether he will be able to have the draft completed within ten days or so. Everyone hopes that we can unify our determination and our actions, and my opinion is that we must map out a program of action; otherwise, there is no way to unify. Such a program of action, moreover, cannot be discussed and confirmed unless views are exchanged around a specific plan and without detailed study. I am someone who has not studied the matter at all, so I wish to increase my understanding for the purpose of participating in this meeting, and I have read your various letters with great care. It would be even better, provided the state of your health permits, if you could sketch a plan in outline form, or else make some additions and revisions to Venerable Lin’s three-year plan on the basis of recent experience and study. For the moment I have not yet gone to bed; if I am able to sleep well in the morning, I might go down or send a car to fetch you here for a chat, and we can decide then. Respectful salutations to you!

Mao Zedong
early morning on August 9

¹ Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 180–81, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Ansai is a xian just north of Yan’an.
[Li] Fuchun and [Chen] Zhengren have each written a proposal, which I have previously perused roughly but failed to give proper attention to. I should like to read them again more carefully. Have you read these two pieces?

To Xie Juezai

(August 12, 1941)

Venerable Xie:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 11th.

That forced labor must be accomplished through political mobilization is absolutely correct, and herein lies the difference in principle between our forced labor and that of the Guomindang. Our distinctive feature is making revolution in addition to fighting a war.

The Party group in the [Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia] Border Region government should not be confused with the commissions of the government. A Party group is made of no more than three to five people, whose job is to be in control of policy, meeting to discuss matters as they arise. After the matter is agreed upon, or written up as a plan, and then approved by the Northwest Bureau (or passed by its standing committee), it is submitted to the government commission for adoption. You are the one to convene the Party group meetings, and not every section has to be represented; it should be limited to those who can handle policy matters. Please consider this matter.

The question of a deputy chairman merits consideration.

Respectful salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 182–83, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. At this time, the “Party group” (dangqu) was the Party organ leading the work of government, labor union, peasants’ associations, and other mass organizations in the Shen-Gan-Ning Border Region. At the Seventh Congress in 1945, the name was changed to dangtu.
**Talk with the Student Delegation from Sui[de] and Mi[zhi]**

(August 1941)

(From our local city reporter) Comrade Mao Zedong met yesterday at the border region government with a visiting group of a dozen or so student delegates from Sui[de] and Mi[zhi], and inquired about the conditions of the people in Sui[de] and Mi[zhi] and the demands of the popular masses. The meeting, which lasted about two hours, was like a big family gathering, with questioning and answers to the questions raised. He also exhorted them again and again as follows:

We Communists want to make China much better, which is what you hope for as well. We look forward to your going back and conveying this idea to your fathers and mothers and brothers and sisters in Sui[de] and Mi[zhi], and hope as well that you will study hard and help improve the work in your localities.

At the end, delegation members presented a flag with the inscription: “You are our glorious banner.”

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**Send One Regiment with Cadres to Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Zhongtiao Mountains**

(August 17, 1941)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Since there are only enemy and puppet troops and no friendly armies at all in the ten xian in the Zhongtiao mountains, it is quite correct to send one regiment with cadres there to develop guerrilla warfare. If necessary a considerable number more may be sent, as long as it does not reach the point where Wei [Lihuang]'s would feel threatened. Yan Xishan has a lot of conflicts with Chiang and is trying to come closer to us. Wang Jingguo's troops are moving eastward with the goal of occupying territory so as to be able to eat; we should let him occupy some of the territory and avoid friction with him.

Mao Zedong

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This text was first published in *Jiefang ribao*, August 15, 1941. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 7, p. 57, which reproduces this version.

1. Sui[de] and Mizhi are two neighboring towns in Shaanxi, located northeast of Yan’an.
Our Policies Toward the Puppet Troops and Our Views About the Treatment of the Puppet Officers and Soldiers

(August 17, 1941)

Chen [Yi] and Liu [Shaoqi]:

With regard to your telegram of the 6th on policies toward the puppet troops and treatment of the puppet officers and soldiers, we have the following views:

1. The method we should use toward the puppet troops is to apply both virtue and authority. If we do not fight, they cannot be compelled to submit and our army’s authority cannot be established. Yet fighting alone is bound to create life and death enmity. Both extreme policies, that of not fighting and that of fighting and nothing else, are disadvantageous to us.

2. Two-faced elements do indeed exist among the puppet troops and are bound to exist. We should acknowledge the position of the two-faced elements and control them so that they do not go over to the enemy’s side altogether and oppose us. This understanding is very necessary.

3. In principle, whether they are officers or soldiers and no matter what social background they come from, no puppet troop captives are to be killed. Even those elements who have a deep hatred for us and come back to fight us again after being released may be spared execution. That is, the method of repeated capturing and releasing is better than killing, and its impact is greater. In releasing captives, there should be absolutely no posting of bail, and they should not be made to vow that they will never be puppet soldiers in the future. But they can be required to swear that they will not really help the Japanese oppose the New Fourth Army in the future. And if they do actually violate their oath and help Japan fight us, then we should still patiently carry out the policy of "seven times capturing Meng Huo.""
Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning Recent International Events

(August 19, 1941)

With regard to the declaration of Roosevelt and Churchill as well as the Moscow Conference that is about to be held, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issues the following statement:

The declaration made jointly by U.S. president Roosevelt and British prime minister Churchill on August 14 and their proposal that a meeting of the three countries be held in Moscow are extremely important matters of world-historical significance and have opened a new stage in world history starting now. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal for a Moscow meeting indicate the determination on the part of the United States and Great Britain to defeat fascism. This determination is entirely beneficial to the Soviet Union, to Britain and the United States, to China, and to the whole world, for the reason that the gravest danger in the past and at present is a group of pro-fascist reactionaries within these two countries who intend to accept the fascist peace against the will of the people, but the declaration has refused any such kind of a peace. [The danger comes also from those] who advocate watching the fire from the other side of the river and letting the Soviet Union single-handedly take on the heavy burden of fighting the fascists, so that they may eventually take advantage and reap the benefits. But the action on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill to propose holding a meeting in Moscow so that military tasks and supply of war matériel may be specifically allocated strikes a blow at this sort of passive attempt. As long as Britain and the United States acknowledge that “to disarm all aggressor nations is necessary,” advocate “the final disintegration of Nazism,” and agree to share military tasks and supplies of war matériel, then victory for the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States is ensured, and so is victory for China and the whole world. The reality of what Stalin referred to in his well-known speech of July 3, which is that the Soviet Union abided by the treaty whereas Germany violated it and attacked the Soviet Union, created a long-term political factor. This factor is in actuality the foundation for military victory, which truth has been completely proved in the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal to hold a meeting in Moscow. The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration and their proposal to hold a meeting in Moscow demonstrate in particular that the United States has made up its mind to take part in the sacred fight against fascist aggression. And this determination on the part of the United States indicates that the great battlefront of the whole world against aggression has already been completed politically; it will be completed organizationally at the Moscow meeting. Fascism’s aggressive front is now in a state of isolation, and fascism’s fate of defeat has already been determined. The present situation could not have happened before the outbreak of the European war in the fall of 1939 because, at the time, although the Soviet Union and the people of the whole world strongly urged the formation of an antifascist front to ensure international security, the Munich policy, which was detrimental to others and themselves, still held sway in Britain and the United States. This erroneous policy was not changed until the cruel lessons of war were learned. In terms of direct factors, this was a result of the Soviet people’s valiant struggles. Because the Red Army checked the German Army’s offensive, Roosevelt and Churchill were able to summon the courage to hold this meeting and issue this declaration. It is also the result of the valiant struggles of the people of Britain and the United States. These struggles dealt a heavy blow to the pro-fascist reactionary elements within Britain and the United States, so that Roosevelt and Churchill dared to resist the temptation of a fascist peace, issued this declaration upholding justice for all humanity, and decided upon this politically far-sighted policy of firmly uniting the three great powers of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. It is, in addition, the result of the Chinese people’s valiant struggles. China blocked the attack of the fascist Japanese bandit troops, enabling Britain and the United States to summon the courage to call for disarming all aggressive nations. The declaration does not mention Japan by name. Article IV of the declaration hints that trade with and supplying raw materials to Japan is permissible, and Article VII implies that Japanese immigration is allowed, in an attempt to draw in Japanese interested in maintaining the status quo, indicating the aspect of a wish to compromise with Japan. But Article II of the declaration opposes the forced alteration of territorial boundaries; Article III calls for the restoration of states deprived of rights; and Article VIII in particular acknowledges the necessity of disarming all aggressive nations. All these are in active opposition against Japan. All in all, the people throughout China all welcome the declaration of Britain and the United States and welcome the meeting to be held in Moscow of the three countries, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Chinese people believe that this is not only the international foundation upon which the peoples of Britain, America, and the Soviet Union shall gain liberation from the fascist threat, but is also the international foundation upon which the people of the whole world shall gain liberation, as well as the international foundation upon which our Chinese people shall
gain liberation. The task of the Chinese people is to persist in unity and the War of Resistance, overcome the reactionary factors within the anti-Japanese united front attempting to undermine unity and the War of Resistance, and actively organize counterattacks against the Japanese bandits. Within China exists the enemy's fifth column, which are the pro-Japanese and pro-German factions. Going against national interests and the interests of humanity, within the country they advocate suppression of the Communists, which is purely a response to Hitler's call for an "anti-Bolshevik crusade" and clears the way for the Japanese fascists. Just now as the great unity of the whole world against fascism is being established, those in this sort of fifth column seem to be utterly without consciousness as they continue their criminal acts against the Communists, against the people, against the nation, and against the human race, and are bound to incur the contempt of the whole country and the entire world. We believe that as long as the people throughout the country increase their efforts and eliminate the fifth column, then unity can be consolidated, the War of Resistance can be continued, and counterattacks can be carried out. China is qualified to take part in the world antifascist front and become a powerful army therein. The fate of all of China and that of all humanity is tied up with this decisive battle against fascism. All parties and groups in China should take their rightful place in this chance of a lifetime, unite with the people of the whole nation, and strive as one toward the good and the progressive. This is what we Communists hope for most fervently.

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

To Chen Zhengren

(August 19, 1941)

Comrade Zhengren:

Zhu Lizhi¹ has written a report at my request, and it is of considerable value; I wonder whether or not he made a copy for you and Gao Gang.² If not, please ask him for a copy, which can serve as a reference when you draft the program for finance and the economy. Before you draft this document, please discuss the matter with Nan Hanchen,³ Gao Zili,⁴ Ye Jizhuang,⁵ Zhu Lizhi, and the various people in the grain bureau and the trade bureau. They are the ones doing the actual practical work, so that acquiring accurate materials and opinions from them is the way to make what you draft more accurate. With respectful salutations!

Mao Zedong

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Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 184–85, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Zhu Lizhi was serving at the time as president of the government bank of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
2. Gao Gang (1905–1954), a native of Shaanxi, was then secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Northwest Bureau.
3. Nan Hanchen (1895–1967), a native of Hongdong in Shanxi, was at the time head of the Finance Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government.
4. Gao Zili (1900–1950), a native of Pingxiang in Jiangxi, was then deputy chairman of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government and concurrently head of the Construction Department.
5. Ye Jizhuang (1893–1967), a native of Xinxiang, Guangdong Province, was then head of and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army’s General Rear-services Department.
Seeking Suggestions on the Construction of Military Districts from All Strategic Units in North China

(August 21, 1941)

To all stations in North China:

During the current stage in the War of Resistance, in order to sustain the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear and to prepare for new maneuvers of the main forces, the construction of military districts is more important. Meanwhile, since there are numerous differences in conditions for constructing military districts between the plains and the mountainous areas, for the purpose of discussing the work of the military districts, we are seeking suggestions on the following questions from the headquarters of all strategic units, and we hope you will study them and respond to us by telegram.

1. What are the main characteristics distinguishing the regular forces from the local forces?

2. Is it necessary to have some regular forces in certain plains regions where mobile warfare is impossible? What should be done with the regular forces that are already in these regions?

3. How should commanding organs of the military districts and the regular forces be (should there be concurrent posts or not)?

4. What should be the relationship between the establishment and command of the armed forces in the military districts (excluding the regular forces)?

5. Is it necessary in military subdistricts in plains areas to command two kinds of troops (regular forces and armed forces of the military subdistricts)?

6. As for xian and district guerrilla detachments in plains areas, should their military operations be under the command of the military subdistricts or the xian and districts' own Party and administrative organs?

7. With regard to organizing armed forces in the plains, is it better to have large regiments or small regiments?

8. What sorts of characteristics should be present in the political work system of local armed forces?

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 663–64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
To Xie Juezai

(August 22, 1941)

Venerable Xie:

I am in receipt of your letter of the 21st. What I asked for is what was drafted by the departments of finance and construction, per order of Venerable Lin [Boqu], not any other separate plans. You were right to say that with this year’s experience the plans will be more realistic. This year’s experience has been very full and actually unprecedented. The most significant experience is that problems were solved through cooperation between public and private (80,000 people cooperating with 1,400,000 others), proving that the policy is correct and that there are solutions. The mistakes and defects in carrying out the policy (with regard to border region currency, to the production, transportation, and trade of salt, to grain, to collection of taxes, and to publicly run industry and commerce) all resulted from lack of experience, and great efforts should be made to correct them in future. The reasons these policies were adopted this year have to do primarily with the two basic characteristics of revolution and war and only secondarily with other characteristics of border regions (such as extensive territory, sparse population, poverty, economic and cultural backwardness, and so on). In speaking, taking action, figuring things out, or making plans, anyone (and this includes Communist Party members) can take as his starting point or methodology nothing other than what he himself has seen and heard, which is to say his own experience. It is therefore very important to pay attention to absorbing new experiences; what one has not seen or heard one cannot even dream about. Having had this year’s experience in the border regions, many things will be easier to cope with next year. This year’s experience educated 80,000 people, and it educated another 1,400,000 as well (as is shown by the Luxian report); it educated cadres, and it educated leaders too. It is the duty of a leader to be good at summing up experiences. In the border regions there are various highly important matters to work on, such as politics, military affairs, the economy, finances, elimination of traitors, and culture, but if no major sudden changes occur in the present situation as it stands, then economic construction is the one central item among all the rest. When there is enough food, clothing, housing, and articles for daily use, then everything is enlivened, everything becomes manageable, and democracy or anything else need not be mentioned as the central work. I have not studied or thought very deeply about these ideas, and raise them only for your reference. Comrade Gao Gang sent me some material that merits attention; please give it back to Comrade Gao when you have finished reading it. I have read the account of Venerable Xu [Teli]'s life and handed it over to the Organization Department. The Central Committee is planning to deal with this problem as a whole, and not simply with Venerable Xu as an individual. Hereby wishing you all the best!

Mao Zedong

P.S. Zhou Wen² may be admitted into the Party group, to total six people; please raise this with the Central Bureau. The government’s Party group is responsible to the Central Bureau and carries out resolutions of the Central Bureau. Its tasks are to be in charge of policy and to sum up experiences; important matters must be cleared with the Central Bureau.

I would say that with regard to salt, supervision by the authorities and transportation by the populace involves partial forced labor rather than semi-forced labor, which is similar to your idea in speaking of mutual benefit between the public and the private. But the necessity of this partial coercion must be recognized. First, participation during slack seasons is mandatory and not negotiable; second, 60,000 pack animal loads of public salt is mandatory, not only this year but next year as well, and it should be included in next year’s budget. Mobilization for spring plowing and autumn harvest also involves partial coercion, but the transportation of salt involves somewhat stronger coercion than spring plowing and autumn harvest, although all this is very different from completely uncompensated military mobilizations such as for transporting grain, or economic mobilizations such as for building roads. But transporting grain and building roads are also necessary, and this too must be recognized. We are only opposed to the sort of mobilization in which money and manpower are wasted and in which there is all harm and no good.

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1. Xu Teli was then president of the Institute of Natural Sciences in Yan’an.
2. Zhou Wen was then director of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government’s Department of Education.
3. As in a few other texts in this volume, the words in boldface are those emphasized by Mao in his handwritten text by the use of dots under the characters.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 186–88, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.
Note to “Lu Zhongcai’s Account of the Long March”

(August 26, 1941)

This is a report written in clear and simple language by Comrade Gao Kelin which describes what actually happened, and is worthy of emulation by all. The practice of “writing torrents of words, all of which are miles from the mark” must now be wiped out, along with all that “indulging in exaggeration,” as well as subjectivism and formalism. Comrade Gao Kelin wrote this report after an investigation meeting one evening with three people. He did a good job in his investigation meeting, and his report is very well written. What we need is this kind of thing, not all those “indulgent exaggerations” that repeat each other endlessly, or all those Party eight-legged essays.

Cooperate with the Guomindang Army in the Conduct of Operations, and Strive to Improve the Current Situation

(September 9, 1941)

To Peng [Dehua], Zuo [Quan], and Luo [Ruiqing]; Chen [Yi] and Liu [Shaoqi]; and Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]:

The enemy is attacking northern Hunan and also attacking Zheng [zhou] and Luo [yang]. The Guomindang is gathering its forces to resist the enemy, and all of our forces in the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army should launch every possible attack on the important communication lines so as to cooperate with the Guomindang in its campaign. Meanwhile, all offensive operations against the various Guomindang troops in the enemy’s rear should be halted, and defensive measures adopted only when they attack us. At the same time every unit of the Guomindang troops should be issued notification asking for coordinated action against the enemy. The aim of all guidelines mentioned above is to try and improve the current situation.


This comment was first published in Jiefang ribao, September 14, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong xiwen gongzuo wenxuan, p. 58. The same text is reproduced in Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, p. 25.

1. According to a note to the Chinese text, this report describes Lu’s leading a transportation team carrying salt a long distance to the “Sanbian” (Yanbian, Jiaoliao, and Dingbian) area within the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region. Lu has not been identified.

2. At this time Gao Kelin was associated with the newly founded Nationalities Institute in Yan’an.

3. “Eight-legged essays” refers to a stereotyped form in which essays had to be written in the imperial examinations during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Mao (and other May 4th intellectuals) frequently used the term to signify formalistic jargon in general. Dang bagu, which we have here translated literally as “Party eight-legged essays,” is also frequently rendered as “stereotyped Party writing” or “Party formalism.”

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 665–66, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism

(September 10, 1941)\(^1\)

In the past our Party was dominated for a very long time by subjectivism. Both the [Li] Lisan line and the “Left” opportunism in the latter period of the soviet movement were subjectivist. The manifestations of subjectivism in the latter period of the soviet movement were more serious, their form was more complete, they were dominant for a longer time, and their consequences were more tragic. This is because these subjectivists claimed to represent the “international line”; they took on the outward appearance of Marxists, but they were sham Marxists.

In the latter period of the soviet movement, the spirit of the Fifth Plenum\(^2\) advocated carrying out a socialist revolution, denied the imbalance in the development of the revolution, and held that the struggle at the time was a decisive battle between two roads. All these things were manifested more completely in the political domain than the “leftist” tendency of the Lisan line.

In military affairs, the Lisan line did not influence the soviet area completely, but “leftist” opportunism in the latter period of the soviet movement did achieve complete influence over the soviet area, and caused the Red Army to suffer greater losses.

As regards organization, the latter period of the soviet movement attacked the cadres, disrupted the campaign for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, and so on; it was more terrible than the Lisan line.

The subjectivists proposed tasks incompatible with objective circumstances. For example, they demanded the expansion of the Red Army to a million men, attacks on the central cities, and so on.

Hitherto, the Party’s line for the period of more than three years from 1932 to December 1935 has never been summed up. Now we must prepare to summarize it at the Party’s Seventh Congress.

The resolution by the Central Bureau of the soviet area on May 11, 1932, was a totally subjectivist thing.

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3. Deng is Deng Xiaoping; Mao is Mao Zedong’s brother, Mao Zetan (1905–1935); Xie is Xie Weiyan (1908–1935); Gu is Gu Bo (1906–1935). Mao’s statement about “oblique accusations” (using the Chinese expression “to point at the chicken and abuse the dog”) refers to the fact that these attacks were in reality directed against him.

4. Regarding the “Luo Ming Line” see the Introduction to Volume IV, pp. lxi–lxiii. Jiangning and Taining in Fujian, and Lichuan in Jiangxi were xian controlled by the Chinese Communist Party in 1933.

5. This refers to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, held from September 29 to November 6, 1938.

6. The Chinese term isMakesizhuyihua. Thus Mao establishes a grammatical as well as a logical parallelism between the “sinification of Marxism,” and the “Marxification of Chinese reality.”
5. For those whose theory is detached from reality, we propose that their status as “theoricians” be abolished. Only those who study actual problems from a Marxist viewpoint, and can solve actual problems, can be regarded as real theorists. Stalin said that theory detached from reality is hollow theory.\(^7\) I consider that hollow theory is utterly absurd theory.

More should be paid for those articles which study actual problems. Only those teachers who can smite Marxism are good teachers, and they must be paid more.

6. There is sectarianism now, too. In Yan’an only leading cadres are respected, and many scientists and men of letters are looked down upon. Sectarianism is a style which rejects non-Party cadres, it is exclusivism. At the same time, it also rejects insiders. Phenomena such as asserting one’s independence, failure to obey decisions, and lack of discipline must be rectified.

The line is the “kingly way” [wangdao]; discipline is the “way of the tyrant” [badao]. Both are indispensable.\(^8\)

In the past, a responsible person in the health department violated the policy toward the experts, [engaging in] selfish departmentalism, and violated Communist morality, so he was removed from his post.

7. It is necessary to wage a principled fight against sectarianism and selfish departmentalism. We must carry out a struggle on two lines, opposing subjectivism and sectarianism, and also opposing dogmatism and routinism.

8. The newspapers should publish more articles, reward dialectical materialist articles, oppose subjectivist articles.

9. Carry out a reform of the educational system, and thoroughly smash all the norms of the past. The study of the methods of thought of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the study of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will constitute the heart of our studies, and we should read more antisubjective writings.

Organize study groups on methods of thought, beginning with the comrades from the Politburo.

The fundamental professional concerns of the Politburo include thought, politics, policy, military affairs, and organization.

In politics we must pay attention to the trend in the current situation. Central Committee members must increase their political knowledge.

Military affairs are a task that must be studied during the present wartime period. To master ideological education is our foremost task.

10. The method of analysis should be used to solve problems. This is the scientific method put forward by the bourgeoisie in the past, but we must also carry out synthesis. We must use the method of analysis and synthesis, choose a topic from among our work as a whole, analyze, and then synthesize.

11. Study the Central Committee resolutions from the Sixth to the Seventh Congress.

The Central Committee Study Group will study Marxist methods of thought on the one hand, and on the other hand, the resolutions since the Sixth Congress. Mao Zedong will be the group leader, and Wang Jiaxiang will be the deputy group leader.

12. The work of the education committee (headed by Luo Fu\(^9\)) will begin by carrying out an investigation before undertaking reform.

13. Hold a mass meeting to mobilize people in Yan’an. All the comrades of the Politburo of the Central Committee must go into action, everybody should get up on the platform and speak, gathering all our forces to oppose subjectivism and sectarianism.

14. Down with these two isms, but keep the person. Oppose subjectivism and sectarianism, but keep those cadres who have made such mistakes safe and sound.


16. Carry out a mobilization campaign in the whole Party. Apart from the Decision on Strengthening the Party Spirit and the Decision on Investigation and Study,\(^10\) we should also write some articles.

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\(^7\) The reference is probably to Stalin’s statement, in Part III of *Foundations of Leninism*, that “theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice.”

\(^8\) In other words, Mao, like many Chinese rulers, espoused both Confucianism and Legalism.

\(^9\) Luo Fu was the pen name of Zhang Wentian, who was at this time the secretary of the Central Committee and the head of the Propaganda Department.

\(^10\) The first of these resolutions was adopted on July 1, 1941, and the second on August 1, 1941. Both were drafted by Mao and are translated above.
Concerning Investigations in the Countryside
(September 13, 1941)

I. The Situation Is Understood Gradually, and This Requires Continuous and Uninterrupted Effort

It is certainly no easy matter to understand the world. Marx and Engels worked hard all their lives and did a large amount of investigative work before they completed the theory of scientific communism. Likewise, Lenin and Stalin did a lot of investigation as well.

Investigation and study are necessary in the Chinese revolution too, first of all to understand what is China (its past, present, and future). Unfortunately, many comrades are often subjective and opinionated, totally disregarding the work of investigation and study.

We have faith in science and do not believe in theology. Therefore our investigation work should be oriented toward the lower levels and does not consist of abstract illusions. At the same time, we believe that things are in motion, in change, in progress. For this reason, our investigations are also long term. Today we need investigation, and in the future our sons and grandsons too will have to make investigations before they will be able to come to know new things and acquire new knowledge continuously.

Our investigation work should be done with patience and in a planned way step by step, not hastily. As it was, it took me quite a few years of effort to understand the countryside myself.

I recall that it was not until 1920 when I first read Kautsky's Class Struggle, Chen Wangdao's translation of The Communist Manifesto, and History of Socialism written by an Englishman,1 that I came to know that class struggle has existed since the beginning of human history and that class struggle is the driving force for the development of society, and that I took the first steps in acquiring a method of understanding things. But China's Hunan and Hubei, or China's Chiang Kaishek and Chen Duxiu, were not to be found in these books. I took from them only two words: "class struggle," and then started to study earnest the actual class struggle. I worked in the peasant movement for four months and came to know some things about the conditions of the various classes. But this sort of understanding is extremely shallow, not at all thoroughgoing. Later the Central Committee put me in charge of the peasant movement. I made a resolution, and I went around for a month and two days holding investigations in the five xian of Changsha, Xiangtan, Xiangxiang, Hengshan, and Liling. These five xian were just the places where the peasant movement was on the upsurge at the time, and many peasants had joined peasants' associations. The Guomindang cursed us as being "excess" and "acting like vagrants" and cursed the peasants for "going to excess" in sullying the beds of the young misses in landlords' families by rolling around in them. Actually, according to what I gleaned from my investigations, not all cases were those of "excess" as they described; what happened was instead inevitable, necessary, because the peasants were too miserable. In my view, it is unavoidable that the peasants, who have suffered thousands of years of oppression, would go a bit "too far" once they had stood up, so they might just as well roll around a few more times in the young ladies' beds!

At the time, however, I still did not have a very clear understanding of the class structure in the countryside. It was not until after I got to the Jinggangshan and carried out investigations in Xunwu that my thinking on the problem of rich peasants and landlords became clear, and I proposed a solution to the problem of the rich peasants, which involved not only drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce but also drawing on the fat to make up for the lean, so that rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and farm laborers would all be able to subsist. If the landlords had been given no land at all, they would have had nothing to eat, and then if the rich peasants had been given only some poor land, they would have had a hard time feeding themselves, so that the rich peasants would have been forced to rebel and the poor peasants and farm laborers would have been plunged into isolation. At the time, some people cursed me as someone with a rich peasants' line, but, as I see it, this method of mine was the only correct one for that period. Today, of course, we are in the national united front against Japan, so it is not a time to deprive the landlords and rich peasants of their property rights but, rather, to reduce rents and reduce interest. Otherwise we would not be able to unite with them to resist Japan.

My thinking on the problem of the poor peasants and farm laborers became clear only after I had made investigations in Xingguo. Only then was I able to recognize the importance of the poor peasants' leagues in the land redistribution process.

As far as my own investigation of the countryside is concerned, then, it took six or seven years' time. Now that you have the benefit of other comrades' past

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1. The reference is to History of Socialism, Thomas Kirkup (1844–1912), translated into Chinese by Li Ji and published in October 1920 by the New Youth Publishing Company.
experience, you can take the straight road and complete within a few months the work of six or seven years. The task of our comrades today is to find things out and to make efforts in an earnest and down-to-earth manner. As long as you are not sleeping all day, working just six hours a day you will be able to accomplish a lot. But it requires continuous, ceaseless effort.

II. Methods

1. The unity of opposites and class struggle are our two starting points when we do anything. When we are looking at any given thing, all we are able to observe initially is the rough outline of the thing, and we can form only a general concept. This is exactly like someone who has just arrived in Yan’an, whose knowledge of Yan’an in the beginning is general and sweeping. But after he has visited the Anti-Japanese University and our Women’s University as well as the other institutions and schools in Yan’an, he will take the second step, which is to use the analytical method to study and analyze carefully, in an orderly fashion, the various parts of Yan’an. Then the third step would be to apply the method of synthesis, synthesizing the analysis of each individual part so as to obtain an overall view of Yan’an. At this point his understanding of Yan’an is different from what he knew when he first arrived. What he saw at first was the whole of Yan’an, and what he sees now is the whole of Yan’an as well, but his understanding is different from what it was in the beginning. Now he has scientific understanding and concrete knowledge of Yan’an. Observing an area in the countryside is just like this.

Marx used this sort of method in writing his Capital, first analyzing the various components of capitalist society and then synthesizing them, thereby discovering the laws governing the capitalist movement.

What deserves attention here in particular is analysis. What should be done is analysis together with synthesis, and, even in the second step of analysis, there is some degree of synthesis. The ancients said that the way of composing essays involves both opening up and closing down. This is correct. In studying history, Su Dongpo used the method of “facing the enemy on eight sides,” and he used the same method to study the Song dynasty, which is also correct. In our study of Chinese society today, we should also apply a method of “facing the enemy on four sides,” dividing our studies into four parts—political, economic, cultural, and military—arriving at a conclusion on the Chinese revolution.

If we observe things in the way one looks at flowers while riding on horseback, dabbling in a little of everything, that would only be a waste of time, and nothing would ever be accomplished.

Therefore we must be sure to grasp the [right] points of view in this regard, and these points of view are the unity of opposites and class struggle. The methods of analysis and synthesis I just described, for example, make use of these points of view. If you comrades make use of these viewpoints to analyze the countryside, you can find out what classes exist in the countryside, what their main features are, and how they are related to one another. One of the questions the comrades have raised for me is, What is a rich peasant? To my mind, a landlord mainly collects rent; a rich peasant mainly hires laborers and participates in the labor himself; a middle peasant’s main characteristic is that he does not sell his own labor power and tills his own land; a poor peasant has to sell his labor power, as what he gets from his own land is not enough to live on; a farm laborer has no land and lives wholly by selling his labor. Of course, only major features are discussed here.

Only by analyzing the various classes and strata in the countryside and their living conditions in this way can there be a correct and comprehensive understanding of the countryside.

We should employ a method of close and intensive study to analyze objective reality and to analyze classes. We must not turn a blind eye to actual problems, and “big talk companies” should be brought down. One should use one’s own head to think things over deeply, and one should combine theory and practice.

In 1905, Lenin advocated overthrowing the tsarist government and organizing a government of workers and peasants in Russia, but Trotsky believed that it was possible only to organize a workers’ government. This is because Trotsky did not truly combine theory with practice. We should draw from practice laws that govern the movement of matter and formulate new theories. For example, the protracted and lasting nature of China’s War of Resistance is the law governing it. When you comrades go down to the villages to make investigations today, these are the viewpoints and methods that should guide your practice; on the other hand, your own theories should be continually perfected through practice.

2. Assimilate the material in detail, and grasp the essentials. The more material collected the better, but one must be sure to grasp the essentials, or the specific characteristics (the principal aspect of a contradiction). Marx in studying capitalism and Lenin in studying imperialism both gathered a lot of data and material, but they did not incorporate all of it; they incorporated only the portion that best manifested the special characteristics.

Without investigation, there is no right to speak. But some comrades might ask, “Do I have the right to speak if I have investigated nine out of ten given matters, and there is only one that I have not investigated?” I am of the opinion that if the nine matters you have investigated are all of secondary importance, and you have left out the main thing, then you still have no right to speak.

The main contradiction in China today is the national contradiction, and class contradiction has become secondary. Before the Xi’an Incident, the principal contradiction was that between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but since the Xi’an Incident the main contradiction has been the one between China and Japan. Therefore, no matter what problems we solve today, we should take this principal contradiction as the starting point in understanding and solving the problem. Whoever fails to grasp the principal contradiction and instead goes in for the study of trivial things and minor details is like one who cannot see the forest for the trees and still has no right to speak.
Therefore, when we do the work of synthesis we must not fall into narrow empiricism.

III. Answers to a Few Questions

You comrades have raised many questions, and I can answer only a portion of them. Some of the questions, in fact, cannot be answered, because if they were all answered there would be no need for the comrades to go to the countryside. And it is necessary to go to the countryside oneself and make investigations before these many problems can be understood; depending upon varying specific targets and conditions, too, the solutions differ as well.

How is an investigation meeting held? Such a meeting not only raises questions, but must also provide ways of solving problems. It is best to have three to five people take part in an investigation meeting. During my investigations in Xingguo, I learned that the landlords owned 40 percent of the land, the rich peasants owned 30 percent, and the landlords and rich peasants shared ownership of another 10 percent in temple lands. In total, the landlords and rich peasants owned 80 percent of all the land, and the middle peasants and poor peasants only 20 percent. But the landlords made up only 1 percent of the population and the rich peasants 5 percent, whereas the middle peasants and poor peasants comprised 80 percent of the population. So, on the one hand, 6 percent of the population owned 80 percent of the land, and, on the other hand, 80 percent of the population owned only 20 percent of the land. Therefore there is only one word for the conclusion I drew: revolution. My confidence in the revolution was thereby strengthened as well, trusting that this revolution could win the support and assistance of more than 80 percent of the people.

How are typical subjects for investigation found? Typical subjects for an investigation can be divided into three categories: the advanced, the intermediate, and the backward. If two or three examples from each of these categories can be investigated, then the general conditions can be ascertained.

How are materials gathered and organized? All of this must be done firsthand. In the process of doing the work, one accumulates experience, and such experiences may be used as necessary to improve the subsequent work of investigation and organizing materials.

How does one get the truth from one's subjects? Everyone has different characteristics, so the methods used vary in each case as well. But the main point is to make friends with the masses, not to spy on them and make them detest you. When the masses fail to tell the truth it is because they do not know whether your intentions in coming to them are advantageous or not. In the course of conversing with them and making friends with them, they should be given some time to get to know you so that they can gradually come to understand your true intentions and regard you as their good friends. Only this way can you learn the real situation. If the masses do not tell the truth, the masses are not to blame, one has only oneself to blame.

When I was doing the investigations in Xingguo, I invited a few peasants to come over and talk with me. At first they were very suspicious of and apprehensive about me, not knowing what in the world I was going to do with them. So on the first day all we did was engage in a bit of chitchat about daily life. They didn’t crack the slightest smile and spoke very little. Then I treated them to a meal and gave them large warm quilts to sleep under at night. In this way they started to understand my true intentions, gradually began to smile a little and to have something more to say. In the end we became virtually without any restraints, everyone engaging in enthusiastic discussion, talking about everything under the sun, as warm and as close as members of one’s own family.

There is no need to go into the rest of the questions; it is better to have you go out as soon as possible to do your own investigations.

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2. The term used here is gongiang tudi, which refers to land belonging to various sorts of ancestral temples and religious societies, controlled primarily by landlords and rich peasants.
Telegram of Condolence from the Councilors in Yan’an on the Death of Zhang Jiluan

(Special to this paper) People of all circles in Chongqing are to hold a memorial meeting on the 26th of this month for People’s Political Council member and former editor-in-chief of Dagong bao, the respected Mr. Zhang Jiluan. Mao Zedong and four other councilors in Yan’an from our Party have specially sent a telegram of condolence, which reads as follows:

To the Memorial Meeting for Mr. Zhang Jiluan:

At every session of the Political Council, Mr. Jiluan insisted on unity and the War of Resistance, thus rendering meritorious service to the nation. We are shocked to learn of his death and feel deeply grieved. We solemnly send this telegram of condolence to express our sincere sorrow.

Mao Zedong    Chen Shaoyu    Qin Bangxian
Wu Yuzhang    Lin Zuhan

Decision of the Central Committee Regarding High-Level Study Groups

(September 26, 1941)

1. In order to raise the theoretical and political levels of high-level cadres in the Party, the Central Committee has decided to establish high-level study groups. The study groups shall be composed of members of the Central Committee, the various central bureaus and their sub-bureaus, and members of the district Party committees or provincial committees; the leading cadres of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army; certain staff members of the various high-level organs; and certain teachers from the various higher-level schools. For the whole country, the number of participants is limited to 300, with one-third from Yan’an and two-thirds from outside.

2. The method used shall be the unity of theory and practice. The first term will last half a year, which will be devoted to the study of the modes of thinking of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and the twenty-year history of our Party as the two topics. Subsequently, other questions with regard to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and China’s revolution will be studied, for the purpose of overcoming erroneous thinking (subjectivism and formalism) and developing revolutionary theory.

3. In Yan’an and other important outside locations, high-level study groups shall be established, in the military up to the level of divisions, military districts, or columns, and in the localities up to district Party committees or provincial committees. Each high-level study group shall have a group leader, a deputy group leader, and a study secretary. Under the study groups a number of small study groups shall be established, with a small study group leader in charge. The high-level study groups in Yan’an as well as all locations shall be managed and directed by the Central Study Group (to include members of the Central Committee, with Mao Zedong as group leader and Wang Jiaxiang as deputy group leader), which shall assign materials as scheduled, sum up experiences, and answer questions.

4. This study shall proceed under the condition that the major tasks for which the respective comrades are responsible are not hindered.

Central Secretariat

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, September 22, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, p. 27, where this version is reproduced.

1. Zhang Jiluan (1888–1941), a native of Shaanxi, had been a member of the Tongmenghui. In 1926, he became editor of the Dagong bao, and continued in that capacity until forced to retire by his last illness.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, pp. 61–62, where it is reproduced from a documentary collection published in China in 1979. Although this document does not bear Mao’s name, the text is quoted at some length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 329, where it is indicated that Mao revised it.
To the Central Research Group and the High-Level Research Groups

(September 29, 1941)

To all comrades of the Central Research Group and the high-level research groups:

The overall guideline for the research work of this group has as its objective the combining of theory and practice. With regard to the materials concerning practice, the comrades should please read the documents issued since the Sixth Congress (see separate listing). As for theory, emphasis for the moment is to be laid on the study of methods of thinking. All comrades should please read the following materials first:

1. Left-wing Infantilism (use the edition published in 1939 by Jiefangshe);
2. Chapter VIII of Ai [Siqi]'s translation of the Outline of the New Philosophy, “The Process of Cognition” (i.e., Chapter 4 of Selected Philosophical Writings);
3. Chapter VI of Li [Da]'s translation of A Course in Dialectical Materialism, “Materialist Dialectics and Formal Logic”;

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 189–90, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. “Research group” (yanjiu zu) was an alternate name for what are referred to above, in the document dated September 26, as “study groups” (xuexi zu).
2. This refers to the collection of documents that were formally published for inner-Party use in December 1941 under the title Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth Congress). On the preparation of this volume, see Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, p. 276.
3. The reference is to Lenin’s Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder.
4. Mao had read this chapter in 1939 in the second of the two sources cited here, but had little to say about it in his reading notes on philosophy.
5. Mao had read the Course in Dialectical Materialism, by M. Shirokov and others, translated by Li Da, in 1937, and taken copious notes, though his comments on Chapter VI are limited to a few question marks. For a complete translation of these materials and a discussion of the issues they raise, see Volume VI of this edition.

4. “Introduction” to An Outline of Economics, by Kawakami (mimeographed copies have been distributed).

Central Research Group
Group leader Mao Zedong
Deputy leader Wang Jiaxiang

6. Kawakami Hajime (1879–1946) was a Japanese Marxist economist.
7. Here Wang’s name is signed with the alternate character he sometimes used, as Wang Jiaxiang.
Build as Many Bomb Factories as Possible
(October 23, 1941)

To Peng [Dehui] and Zuo [Quan], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan], He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying], Nie [Rongzhen] and Tang [Yanjie],1 Chen [Yi], Liu [Shaoqi], and Lai [Chuanzhu], and Lu [Zhengcao] and Cheng [Zihua].2

1. The Military Commission intends to call on all base areas in the enemy’s rear to build as many bomb factories as possible as the major weapon for arming the popular masses in the enemy’s rear. Please inform us by telegram of the experiences where you are in setting up bomb factories, the significance thereof, and the role played, for our reference.

2. Please inform the Military Commission in detail, by telegram within a day or two, of the recent situation in manufacturing hand grenades where you are, the average monthly output, the respective proportions distributed for use by the regular forces, the guerrilla forces, and the militia forces, as well as the number of tools currently on hand, the number of workers, and so on.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 667–68, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Tang Yanjie (1909–1988), a native of Changsha, studied in the Soviet Union. He was at this time commander of the Eighth Route Army for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region.

2. Cheng Zihua (1905–1991) was a native of Shanxi. At this time he was political commissar of the central Hebei Military District.

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At the Eastern Anti-Fascist Congress, Comrade Mao Zedong Calls Upon All the Nationalities to Strengthen Their Unity
(October 30, 1941)

(Special to this paper) The central agenda of the fourth and fifth days of the Congress of the Nationalities Against Fascism was to have all the representatives continue to give presentations and analyses of their nationalities. At the meeting on the 29th, there were reports by the Vietnamese representative, Huang Zhenguang; the Tibetan representative, Sang Yuexi; the Taiwanese representative, Cai Qian; the Mongolian representative, Ulana; the Muslim representative, Mu Ying; the representative of the northeast, Yu Bingran; and the representative of the Dutch East Indies, Alihan. The 30th was the last day for special reports. After congratulatory telegrams from various quarters had been read aloud, first a representative from the Overseas Chinese Association gave a report. He explained in concrete terms the distribution of overseas Chinese in East Asia, their economic status, and their great contributions to labor and productivity. “They took risks to leave their motherland, bravely wandering all over to struggle ceaselessly for their own livelihoods and for the glory of their motherland. At the present time, when the world has been assaulted by violent waves of fascism, the overseas Chinese will form antifascist fighting fortresses all over!” At the end he confirmed this conclusion with concrete facts and evidence. The representative from Thailand, Mu Na, was the second person to speak: “Thailand is right now under the gun of Japanese aggression. At this point the trickster Japan has completely forsaken its false friendship of days gone by. The false friend of the past is in truth today’s sworn enemy.” When he spoke about the current situation in Thailand, he unmasked the conspiracies that Japan has perpetrated. For example: “buying bureaucrats, sowing discord between the government and the people, fomenting emotional discord between the Thais and the overseas Chinese, creating an antagonistic atmosphere between the Thais and the foreign nations of Britain and America, inducing Thai students to study in Japan, instigating Thailand to attack Vietnam, and so on and so forth.” At the end he stated to the gathering the wishes of the Thai people: “Internally, to unite all smaller nationalities and all classes within the country against Japan, and to ally with foreign nationals living in Thailand, especially the overseas Chinese, to form a united front against fascism. Externally, to ally with all Eastern nations to fight as one, join the world front against fascism, and support the Soviet Union.” Following this were reports by the representative of the Miao nationality, Shawajiegui, and by the representative of the Yi nationality, Mohan. Veteran worker Zhu Baoting conveyed greetings to the meeting on behalf of his employees’ union. He pointed out that the way for the Japanese workers and farmers is to join us in overthrowing fascism!

This article was first published in Jiefang ribao, October 31, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 29–31, which reproduces this version.
He went on to speak of older workers in the Soviet Union who are now giving up their pensions and working with fervor on their days off, British workers who are stepping up their production of tanks, American workers who are intensifying their national defense production, and the Chinese workers who are also working without stop despite all hardships. "I advocate the establishment of an antifascist alliance of workers, an antifascist alliance of peasants, of merchants, of students..." Comrade Zhu Booting's talk, which was akin to storytelling, several times aroused hearty laughter from the entire audience.

During a break, Comrade Mao Zedong arrived suddenly, having braved a drizzling rain, at which point the whole audience broke out in jubilation. He was full of vitality, glowing with health and radiating vigor. After asking the news reporters a few questions, he strode forcefully to the podium and addressed the crowd:

This conference must certainly be going very well, and today's reports and discussions are certain to have contributed a great deal. That all nationalities are able to unite and rise up in unison to deal with Japanese imperialism is a very good thing. I think that the main goal of the congress is unity; to promote unity among all nations to overthrow fascism together. Japan and Hitler have been able to act as contemptible wretches making trouble and to run rampant for a time precisely because they seized upon our weakness, which is disunity. This weakness has been present in China, in East Asia, and all over the world.

At this point, after providing a deep explanation of past history, he went on to point out:

Now, precisely because China is united, it is able to wage a war of resistance. But this unity is still sorely inadequate, as there are some people who, on the surface, appear to be fighting Japan but are sabotaging the unity behind the scenes. There is another sort of person who is fighting the War of Resistance, on the one hand, but creating friction, on the other. These two kinds of people are different. The former are Chinese traitors, and the latter are those who fail to understand the overall train of events. Yan'an is a place where unity is particularly emphasized. Here there is a mosque, a Society for the Promotion of Mongolian Culture, a Nationalities Institute... Here a congress of the nationalities against fascism can be held.

He then went on to expound upon the situation in the future:

There is an even bigger battle to fight in the future. The fascists have tremendous ambition; they still have more strength, and they will go in for more frenzied aggression. Hitler is striking wildly all over the place in the face of the solidarity among Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Difficulties exist, naturally, in the midst of war. Therefore, there will be a period of difficulty in the struggle against fascism. Everyone should be clear on this point. At present we face only 50 or 60 percent difficulties; 100 percent difficulties are yet to come. This meeting is of great significance. Moscow and the Far East are both holding meetings. This meeting of ours is also for the purpose of overcoming difficulties, and the fascists are taking advantage of these difficulties. In my view, the more territory the fascists occupy, the greater the danger [for them]. It is like with Napoleon, or the Macedonian Emperor Alexander, or Mongolia... And now as long as we are united, it will not be hard to tear the fascists limb from limb. Japan is about to make incursions northward and southward; it will happen one way or another. At present we have three united fronts. One is China's Anti-Japanese National United Front. Another is the Eastern ABCD Front. The third one is the allied actions of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In the face of these three united fronts, fascism will certainly be defeated. We need to acquaint ourselves with the circumstances and to overcome difficulties. We need not be afraid, rather we must have confidence. The revolutionary people are vital; historically they have life force. Fascism will die. The struggle of the popular masses must necessarily undergo difficulties before it can lead to victory.

At the end he told all those assembled:

Fascism is on its last legs, and we, the people, are in the prime of youth. Today, what is needed in the fight against fascism the world over is practical work, study of the problems, intensification of study... Even growing a bit more millet is a good thing. We should not indulge ourselves in exaggerations. Fascism has no soul, but we have souls. If we join hands tightly, unite together, love and help each other, then we will squeeze the fascists to their very death. I congratulate the congress for its success, for stressing equality, for emphasizing love and unity.

After a quarter of an hour, Comrade Mao Zedong ended his speech, surrounded by the audience, which rose and cheered.

Finally, the Jewish representative, Miss Yehua Sommerland, spoke as follows: "The 20 million Jewish people all over the world have recognized that Hitler is the deadly enemy of the Jewish people. We want to fight with determination to exterminate this plague upon the human race!"
In Refutation of the Third "Left" Line
(Selected Extracts)\textsuperscript{1}

(1941)

I

According to what has always been our way of thinking, that which is called an estimation of a situation is the internal association with regard to objective circumstances that is reflected in our brain after investigation and study have been applied to actual situations that exist objectively. Such internal connections exist independently outside the subjectivity of human beings, and we can neither recognize nor deny them at will. Whether they are of benefit to us or harmful to us, or whether they can mobilize the masses or not, we have no choice but to investigate them, consider them, and pay attention to them. If we wish to go further and change objective circumstances, then we can set guidelines for action according to this kind of estimation that accurately reflects the internal association with regard to objective circumstances and, in turn, influence the objective situation and transform it. At this time, if objective circumstances are favorable to our going forward, we will say to the masses, "Go forward!" If they are unfavorable to our advance,

we will say to the masses, "Call a temporary halt." (This is close to "attentisme"), or we will say, "You should retreat (which smacks very much of "opportunism")! To my way of thinking, this can be called Marxism's minimum point of view!

II

It must be understood that in all areas where the Japanese and the Guomindang have consolidated their rule (and such areas constitute more than nine-tenths of all regions in the country), the form of bloody armed struggle absolutely cannot be adopted; rather, only a form of bloodless, peaceful struggle can be employed.

Peaceful struggle, in turn, falls into two categories. One kind is lawful and open struggle, and the other is unlawful and secret struggle, but both take the form of bloodless, nonviolent, unarmed struggle. Unifying these two is the strategic line for areas under enemy rule.

It is necessary to adopt lawful and open forms of struggle in all regions where the Japanese and the Guomindang have consolidated rule. Even though China is not a democratic country ruled by law, the people have no political freedom, and oppression of the people is especially severe in the regions under Japanese rule, there are still many aspects of governmental law and social customs that can be made use of, and there are many contradictions, gaps, and loopholes that we can take advantage of. It is necessary to adopt all sorts of legal forms of struggle that can be carried out openly in order to have people participate, to avoid, on the whole, arrest and dispersal by the government, and to preserve and build up our own strength. The Provisional Central [Politburo],\textsuperscript{2} on the other hand, strenuously opposes such forms of struggle. There are many kinds of struggle that are originally unlawful, but have the possibility of victory only if carried out through the use of open and lawful means. Take the labor strike, for example, which is unlawful. If we want to achieve victory and avoid failure, then we must make use of various sorts of economic, political, and social conditions of the time and place, and if it is possible to strike we proceed, abandon the strike if not, and call a halt to it if we strike and fail to win victory. Only by doing things in a rational and reasonable way and carrying out the principles of legitimacy, gain, and moderation can we survive and be victorious. Ignoring all such realities, however, the Provisional Central [Politburo] just went ahead and gave orders to "use all forces to organize anti-Japanese strikes." Take resistance to Japan as another example. It is against the law, but certain work still can be carried out by making use of public opinion in society and all kinds of political spaces or gaps. Yet all the Provisional Central [Politburo] did was make a lot of loud noise and lash out at random, with the result

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These extracts are taken from a long article written by Mao in 1941, probably in October or November. Our source for this text is \textit{Mao Zedong wenji}, Vol. 2, pp. 339–48.

1. This text appears between two May 1941 texts in \textit{Mao Zedong wenji}, but according to \textit{Nianpu}, Mao wrote the long article from which these passages have been excerpted sometime after the Enlarged Plenum of the Politburo, which met from September 10 to October 22, 1941. This inconsistency is perplexing, but the clear and detailed statement in \textit{Nianpu} must be regarded as more authoritative. As can be seen from Mao’s address to the September 10 meeting of the Politburo, translated above, one of the main topics of discussion was the "Third Left Line," which had prevailed in the Chinese Communist Party from September 1931 to January 1935. Mao drafted the resolution on this subject adopted by the plenum. He then proceeded to compose a nine-part article on the same topic, of which this is the most complete text available. The complete article was not published or even circulated within the Party at the time it was written. In a note to a revised version, which he prepared in May 1945, Mao indicated that in 1941 in \textit{Yan’an}, he had sent it only to Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi, and had not even shown it to other members of the Central Committee. The reason for this, he added, "was probably that this article was couched in excessively sharp terms and was not conducive to uniting with comrades who had committed mistakes." (See \textit{Nianpu}, Vol. 2, pp. 349–51.)

2. Refers to the Provisional Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, established in September 1931 at the suggestion of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau.
that no even slightly broad or somewhat lasting anti-Japanese movement could ever get off the ground.

In addition to work that is open, there must be secret work to coordinate with it. This is our Party’s secret organizational work, the secret organizational work of the masses (serving as the core of the open mass organizations), the secret joint activities between political parties and groups, secret intelligence work, preparations done in secret beforehand for open organizations and open struggles, and so on. Without this sort of work, survival in regions under enemy rule would be impossible, and open work would lose its very soul as well. Yet the Provisional Central is not only unwilling to do open and legal work, but also unwilling to do secret work earnestly. In all things it goes into for exposing itself, showing its strength, playing the hero, and it likes to see overnight victory. As a result, within something over three years’ time nothing was left of the Party in the areas under enemy rule, nor of the little mass strength there had been.

Judging by all of this, what the Provisional Central calls “all kinds of forms” is nothing more than empty words. In actual fact they have only one form, which is to fight, to make trouble, and to scream; apart from this they have nothing whatsoever. They have no idea that what is particular to China is the unification of armed struggle and peaceful struggle and that, in terms of the peaceful struggle, it is the unification of open struggle and secret struggle. This is an entire system of political science that is extremely complicated, and if Chinese Communists do not master this complete system of political science, there is no way for them to win. Using the Provisional Central’s simplistic, one-sided, adventurous ways of doing things, how would it be possible to “make the working class the backbone in the anti-Japanese movement” and to “make the proletariat the leader and organizer of the Chinese nation”? No, instead it makes the working class into superfluous parts with no use and makes the proletariat into empty boosters and players without resources in China’s national liberation. Why is it that some comrades dare not even mention the word “nation”? Since these overlords advocate overthrowing everything and go in for an extremely narrow closed-roomism and an extremely risky putschism, how could they boast about nation? What use would it be even if they did use the word “nation”?

III

We would like to ask these overlords: Why is it that distributing all the land to all the people should be called “a thoroughly opportunistic viewpoint” or be called “completely ignoring the leadership of the proletariat”? Actually, I would like to teach these overlords a lesson or two myself! You people understand nothing at all and are totally removed from the lives of the peasant masses. You insisted on forcing on the soviet areas the erroneous line of “distributing no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants,” dubbing it a “clear-cut class line,” and then forced the elimination of the land distribution method favored and supported by the peasant masses in the south, such as Jiangxi and elsewhere, which was to “draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce and draw on the fat to make up for the lean,” calling it a “rich peasants’ line” and “totally opportunistic.” What is your justification for this? And are you aware that failing to distribute land to the landlords means to destroy them physically? Which tenet of Marxism-Leninism does this come from? Since in theory you do not advocate destroying the landlords’ digestive systems, you will have to let them eat. It is said that, after the October Revolution, Lenin once sent a group of landlords to Siberia to carry logs so as to give them an opportunity to do physical labor and to eat. This is true Leninism. But our “Leninists” do otherwise. They give the landlords neither logs to carry nor a plot of land to cultivate. The result is to force them to become green guerrillas, carrying weapons to fight the Soviets to the death. What is the good in this? Giving the rich peasants bad land reduces them to the level of abject poverty, which will turn this section of the peasantry against us as well. Just which item in Leninism says to use the policy of distributing no land and distributing poor land to landlords and rich peasants during the period of democratic revolution, before the democratic revolution has succeeded, at a time when a strong enemy is attacking and it is yet to be determined who will be victorious in the revolution? Can this nonsense of yours be called leadership? Absolutely not! This is destructive, a way to destroy the leadership role of the proletariat, a means of destroying the revolution!

On the land question, the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress holds that “in places where there are large numbers of unemployed and poverty-stricken peasants, a movement to ‘distribute land equally’ is bound to arise. If this slogan is espoused by the vast majority of the peasant masses, the Communist Party should lend its support, because this is a slogan that will thoroughly eliminate all dregs of feudalism, and it has a direct destabilizing effect on the system of private ownership.” Most of this is correct, because it accords with the conditions in China where land is scarce but the population is large (in the north the average plot per person is only 3 mu, and in the south it is only 1 mu per person). In this passage, only the last sentence is inappropriate, because the result of “distributing the land equally” was not to destabilize the whole system of private ownership but, rather, to shake up only the feudalistic system of private ownership and turn it into a peasants’ system of private ownership. Moreover, in the countryside there are still two possible future scenarios before us: to go the capitalist road or to go the socialist road, to say nothing of the fact that the private ownership system of the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in the cities was not destabilized at all. The resolution of the Sixth Congress went on to say that the peasants should be told explicitly that there is no possibility of realizing true equality under present conditions, so that the peasants should not be led in the direction of absolute egalitarianism (for example, violating the interests of the middle peasants or prohibiting the buying and selling of land after land distribution, which would mean not permitting the formation of new rich peasants). The Provisional Central Committee vio-
lated the Sixth Congress [resolution] and invented the Left-leaning opportunist line of “distributing no land to the landlords and poor land to the rich peasants.” With mistakes in the political, military, and organizational lines, this ended up bringing on a revolutionary failure. Should this, too, be called “absolutely correct”?

IV

Knowing the world is for the purpose of transforming the world, and the history of mankind was created by mankind itself. But one cannot transform the world without knowing the world, and “Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement.” In this respect, our overlords are utterly in the dark. For the realm of necessity to be turned into the realm of freedom, the two processes of cognition and of transformation must be undergone. European philosophers of the past already knew the truth that “freedom is the knowledge of necessity.” Marx’s contribution is not to have denied this truth but, rather, to have acknowledged it and then to have made up for what it lacked by adding the truth of “transforming the world” according to the knowledge of necessity. “Freedom is the knowledge of necessity”—this is the proposition of the philosophers of the past. “Freedom is the knowledge of necessity and the transformation of the world”—this is Marx’s proposition. A Marxist who does not understand that we learn about the world by transforming the world, and that we transform the world by learning about the world, is not a good Marxist. A Chinese Marxist who does not understand that we learn about China by transforming China, and that we transform China by learning about China, is not a good Chinese Marxist. Marx says that men differ as the bees in that, long before he builds a house, he has the design for the house in his mind. If we are to build the house of the Chinese revolution, we, too, must first have the design for the Chinese revolution. Not only is it necessary to have a large design, an overall design, but also many small designs and subdesigns. And these designs are nothing but the active reflections of objective, concrete conditions that we have gained in the actual practice of the Chinese revolution (the active reflections of the situation with regard to such things as class relations inside the country, relations among the nationalities within the country, international relations among the various countries, relations between the various countries in the world and China, and so on). The reason our overlords are subjectivists is that all of their designs for revolution, be they large or small, overall or partial, are not based on objective reality and are not in accordance with subjective reality. They have only a subjective desire to transform the world, or to transform China, or to transform North China, or to transform the cities, but they have no design worthy of the term. Their design is not scientific but, rather, subjective and arbitrary, a complete mess. Even though the overlords have no knowledge whatsoever of this world, they still have a vain desire to transform it, and as a result they not only have broken open their own heads but have led a great many other people down the path of breaking open their heads as well. Since the overlords are blind to the inexorability of the Chinese revolution but still have the vain desire to play the part of guides for the people, theirs is truly a case of what is called “the blind on blind horses coming to the edge of an abyss at midnight.”

V

What the leaders of the “Left” opportunist line from “September 18th” to the Zunyi Conference call the struggle on two fronts is nothing but subjectivism. This is first of all because their own line, by which they measure everything, was not based upon objective reality but, rather, arbitrarily fabricated solely according to their subjective wishes. To judge the thought of others by measuring against a yardstick of opportunist thought, and then to find “opportunism” everywhere, is just like those who believe in ghosts seeing ghosts everywhere. Second, because their method of viewing things is subjectivist, and they use this method to create both their own subjectivist political line and their own sectarian organizational line, they then regard anyone and everyone they dislike as an “opportunist.” They never view anything with a materialist, dialectical method, so naturally they would not view people in this way either. Yet trying to wage a struggle on two fronts divorced from a materialist, dialectical method would be nothing more than running wild on a rampage and could have no positive results to speak of. Third, they do not even have any idea what “a struggle on two fronts” is. They do not know that, in the eyes of a Marxist, to struggle on two fronts is a method of analyzing and synthesizing the past and present state of development of a given thing that moves across time and space, wherein its temporary stability may be assured (that is, the nature and attributes of said thing). For example, to know what the character of China’s existing society is, it is necessary to apply scientific and concrete analysis to the past and present states of Chinese society and understand that it is different from an independent feudal society (the struggle on the first front) and also different from an independent capitalist society (the struggle on the second front) before the synthesized conclusion can be drawn, that it is a semicolonial (semi-independent), semifeudal society. As another example, if one wants to know the nature of the present revolution in China, it is necessary to use as a starting point the fact that Chinese society is particular in being a semicolonial and semifeudal society, and then apply scientific analysis to understand the following: that it is not the same as a country in which there is no national oppression but only feudal oppression, and the proletariat has not yet been awakened, such as France two hundred years ago, where the bourgeoisie leads the revolution to overthrow the feudal dictatorship.

3. One of Lenin’s favorite axioms. See section 4 of the first chapter of “What Is to Be Done?”
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and a bourgeois dictatorship is established (a struggle on the first front), nor is it the same as a country in which, because of the awakening of the proletariat and after overthrowing the feudal class, both the social and political conditions permit the creation of a socialist system, such as Russia during the October Revolution, where the proletariat leads the revolution to overthrow the bourgeois dictatorship and a proletarian dictatorship is established (a struggle on the second front). Only then can a synthesized conclusion be drawn, to the effect that the present Chinese revolution is an anti-imperialist, antifeudal, new democratic revolution led by the proletariat to establish a joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes. With regard to every specific matter and every specific person, to know its nature it is necessary to employ this method of struggling on two fronts and to apply concrete analysis and synthesized investigation and study before it is possible to come up with a definite conclusion. As soon as one deviates even slightly from this method, or is not in accord with the reality of the given matter or given person, a correct conclusion cannot be drawn. In subjectively and presumptuously adopting what they called a method of fighting on two fronts, the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line were completely divorced from concrete and scientific research work, and therefore their conclusion cannot but be wrong. The subjective method of waging a struggle on two fronts by the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line caused the thinking within the Party regarding this method to become extremely confused and vague. Many people know that we should wage a struggle on two fronts, but large numbers of people have not the slightest idea how to go about it, so it has become a worthless piece of jargon. Fourth, the subjective method of waging a struggle on two fronts by the leaders of the "Left" opportunist line, that is, their method of indiscriminate struggle, naturally cannot be as it is stated in the epilogue to the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, that it is necessary not only to struggle against the "opportunistic factions within the Party—those who espouse 'economism,' the Mensheviks, Trotskyist elements, Bukharinist elements, and those with nationalistic tendencies," and smash them (article 4 of the epilogue) but also to promote criticism and self-criticism and correct mistakes in the work done by the Party and its members (article 5 of the epilogue). The "Left" opportunist line's method of indiscriminate struggle has no way to distinguish between these two things (dealing with the enemy and dealing with comrades who have made mistakes) but, instead, uses the method for dealing with the enemy to deal with comrades, and this gave rise to a habit of indiscriminate struggle within the Party. Regardless of right or wrong, black or white, all matters large and small are met with "the most resolute merciless struggle," and "hatred" and "fervor in the struggle" are everywhere, giving rise to an atmosphere in the Party rife with dissension and discord, in which there is a constant state of anxiety. Unless this sort of antiscientific, petty bourgeois, subjectivist method of indiscriminate struggle is rooted out altogether, the Party cannot possibly achieve true solidarity and unity.

**List of Reading Materials for Theoretical Study**

*(November 1, 1941)*

To group leaders and deputy group leaders of high-level study groups at all locations:

It is hereby stipulated that the portion on theory of study materials for high-level study groups at all locations shall consist of the following:

2. The Conclusion to the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.
3. Studies on the dissemination of the histories of the five Communist Parties of France, Britain, the United States, Germany, and Italy, and resolutions on the propagation of Marxism-Leninism (*Jiefang*, no. 105).

Please first read all of the above items; it would be best to memorize and read carefully one of them, or twice, and have the group leader or deputy group leader raise the main points of each piece of material and hold a discussion.

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Our source for this text is *Wenzian he yanjiu*, 1984, pp. 13–14 of the annual volume.
1. Dimitrov was, and had long been, the secretary general of the Comintern.
2. The reference is to an article originally published in the German edition of *International Press Correspondence* in August 1939, translated by Jing Lin and published in *Jiefang*, no. 105.
3. That is, Lenin's *Left-wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*.
4. The editors of the Chinese text state that the original manuscript reads in this somewhat garbled manner, and they suggest that it may have been meant to read: "it would be best to read them carefully once or twice."
7. Chapter 8 of the *Outline of Philosophy*, “The Process of Cognition,” translated by Ai [Siqi], that is, Chapter 4 of *Selected Philosophical Writings*.  
8. Chapter 6 of *A Course in Dialectical Materialism*, “Materialist Dialectics and Formal Logic,” translated by Li [Da].  
The above [X] may be read later.  
The last item may be read later, and the methods of reading and discussion are the same as for the previous items.

Mao Zedong    Wang Jiaxiang

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5. Regarding this and the following two items, see the notes to the text of September 29, 1941.

6. The editors of the Chinese source suggest that the two characters missing at this point in the original may have been “three items.”

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**Study Tasks and Study Methods for the Current Year**  
(November 4, 1941)

To group leaders and deputy group leaders of high-level study groups in all locations:

1. As a first step, the Central Study Group and all high-level research groups everywhere are to take as their scope Leninist political theory and our Party’s political practice since the Sixth Party Congress.

2. The study materials have been announced over the Party radio station (please inform us as to whether or not they have been received). It has been decided that within this year the two books, Dimitrov’s report to the Seventh Comintern Congress and Lenin’s *Left-wing Infantilism*, plus the eighty-three documents issued since the Sixth Congress, are to be read through once. The aim of such a reading through is to acquire an initial general idea so as to be able to enter the stage of deeper study by next spring.

3. During the period of reading through the material, detailed discussion will not be pursued, but all group leaders must take responsibility for adopting suitable measures to check up on whether all group members have actually read the designated material and for answering the doubts and questions that arise in the course of reading.

4. There will certainly be instances everywhere in which many of the eighty-three documents issued since the Sixth Congress are not available, in which case those that are available may be read first, or the group leader may report on the ones he can remember.

5. Research on methods of thought will not be carried out for the time being.

Central Study Group  
Mao Zedong    Wang Jiaxiang

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Our source for this text is *Wenxian he yanjiu*, 1984, p. 15 of the annual volume.  
1. As indicated in a note to the text of September 29, 1941, the volume containing these materials was published for internal use only in December 1941.
Comrade Mao Zedong Delivers a Broadcast Speech

(November 7, 1941)

(Xinhua News Agency dispatch from Yan'an) Today Comrade Mao Zedong delivered a broadcast speech as follows:

As the Chinese Communist Party used to point out over and over again, the current task of human beings of the whole world is to unite to oppose fascism, and the task of the entire Chinese people is to unite to oppose Japan's attacks. At present, it is necessary to strengthen a lot more these two kinds of unity.

From the standpoint of mankind as a whole, we maintain that Britain and America should use all means to offer more airplanes and tanks to the Soviet Union, to offer more funds and weapons to support China, and to offer more force to support the uprisings by the people of all nations that have been trampled by Germany. The United States should, without any hesitation, declare war against Germany, which is a step that absolutely cannot and should not be avoided. The longer this is delayed, the more American ships will be bombed and sunk by Germany. At the same time, the United States should never believe what it hears of Japan's conspiracies, nor should it reach any compromise with Japan. The United States should, together with China and Britain, punish the Japanese fascists with all its strength. Clearly this hope of ours is in accordance with the hopes of the majority of the people in Britain and the United States; it is a pity that within the governments and parliaments of these two countries, there is still a group of people who fail to understand the righteousness of the cause and are obstructing the realization of the people's will. Therefore, the British and American people must now make efforts to defeat such obstructions of the times and push to a higher stage the worldwide struggle against fascism.

The situation in China is likewise at a turning point toward moving a step further. Although the Japanese fascists are preparing to advance simultaneously toward the south and toward the north, they will, no matter which of these risky paths they take, necessarily attack the West in order to exterminate China. Japan, after encountering defeats in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region, Changsha, Zhengzhou, and other places, is now preparing for a new attack on China. The people and the armed forces of our whole country must certainly defend every front of resistance to Japan and have to smash the enemy's schemes for attack. The people of the whole country must become even better united, support the national government, persist in resistance to the end, and prepare all necessary conditions for a counterattack so as to drive the Japanese bandits out of China promptly. We Communists have consistently called for strengthening unity. On this very eve of a new enemy attack, improving relations among the various components of the resistance camp is even more urgently needed. We hope the Guomindang authorities are able to decide promptly and opportunistically to take various necessary measures speedily for this purpose. We believe that, as long as the whole country truly unites as one, attacks by Japan can surely be stopped, preparations for counterattack can certainly be accomplished, and the goal of driving out the enemy can definitely be realized.

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, November 7, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 33-34, which reproduces this version.
On Sending Out the List of Materials on Theory and Other Issues

(November 17, 1941)

Zhou [Enlai] and Dong [Biwu]:

We are in receipt of your telegrams of the 9th and the 12th. We did not, in fact, send out an outline of dialectics but, rather, sent out only a list of materials on theory, which included two sections, one on political theory and one on methods of thought. An outline of a history of the Chinese Communist Party can be considered. A selection of documents that have come out since the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has already been printed, and a copy may be sent to you when someone is available to take it. The report to the Seventh Congress is Dimitrov’s report. This in reply to your telegrams.

Central Study Group


Speech at the Assembly of Representatives of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

(November 21, 1941)

Members of the Assembly, comrades: Today’s inauguration of the Border Region Assembly of Representatives is of great significance. The Assembly has but one objective, the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and the building of a China of the Three People’s Principles. In the China of today there can be no other objective whatsoever, for our enemies are not domestic but, rather, foreign: German and Italian fascism and Japanese imperialism. At present the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States are allied as one against the German and Italian fascist invaders, and the Soviet Red Army is fighting for the destiny of the whole of mankind. Our objective is the same as theirs, which is only to oppose German, Italian, and Japanese fascism. Japan is continuing its aggression with the purpose of destroying China’s independence. The Chinese Communist Party stands for uniting all forces throughout the country to overthrow Japanese imperialism, and for cooperating with all parties, all classes, and all nationalities throughout the country. All Chinese people, except Chinese traitors, must unite as one in the common struggle. This has been the consistent stand of the Communist Party. For more than four years China has been heroically waging the War of Resistance, a war that has been led by Chairman Chiang and maintained through the cooperation of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and of all classes, parties, and

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1984, p. 16 of the annual volume.

1. As indicated in a note to the text of September 29, 1941, some sources indicate that the volume entitled Liuda yilai (Since the Sixth Congress) was published only in December 1941. Perhaps it was printed in late November and first distributed in December.
nationalities. But it is not yet won, and to win it we have to fight on and ensure that the Three People's Principles are put into effect.

Why must we put the Three People's Principles into effect? Because up to the present time Mr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles have not been translated into reality in all parts of China. Why don't we put communism into effect? Of course communism is a superior system and has long been in operation in the Soviet Union, but in China today the conditions for it are still lacking. It is the Three People's Principles that have been put into effect in the Shaaixi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. In no construction effort and in no solution to any practical problems have we gone beyond their principles. Of the Three People's Principles, the principle of nationalism means overthrowing Japanese imperialism, and those of democracy and the people's livelihood mean working in the interests not of just one section but of all the people nationwide who are resisting Japan. Throughout the country the people of all classes and nationalities should enjoy human rights, political rights, and property rights. They should all have the opportunity to voice their opinions, and they should all have the clothes to wear, food to eat, work to do, and schools to attend; some provision should be made for everyone. Chinese society is small at both ends and big in the middle, which is to say that the proletariat [at one end] and the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie [at the other] each constitute only a small minority, while the great majority of the people consists of the intermediate classes. No political party that wants to run China's affairs properly can do so unless its policy gives consideration to the interests of the intermediate classes, unless some provision is made for the intermediate classes, unless they have the right to voice their opinions, and unless they have clothes to wear, food to eat, work to do, and schools to attend. The three-thirds system and all other policies put forward by the Chinese Communist Party aim to unite all the people who resist Japan and take into account the interests of all classes, especially the interests of the intermediate classes.

The three-thirds system policies put forward by the Communist Party, which give all sections of the people the opportunity to voice their opinions and make sure they have work to do, policies embodying the genuine Three People's Principles. In agrarian relations, on the one hand, we carry out the policy of reducing rent and interest so that the peasants will have clothes to wear and food to eat, and, on the other, our policies provide for the payment of the rent and interest so that the landlords, too, have clothes to wear and food to eat. In the relations between labor and capital, on the one hand we carry out the policy of helping the workers so that they have both work and food, and, on the other, we pursue a policy of developing industry so that the capitalists may obtain some profit. In all this, our purpose is to unite the whole people in the common endeavor of resistance to Japan and joining together to build the country. This policy is that of New Democracy, or the policy of the Three People's Principles. It is neither what is called a one-party dictatorship nor the old-style democracy as in foreign countries but, rather, embodies the thinking of Mr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. It is the kind of policy that really suits the conditions in China, and we hope that its application will not be limited to the Shaaixi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region or to the anti-Japanese base areas in the enemy's rear, but will spread throughout the country.

We have pursued this policy with success and have won the approval of the people all over China. But there have also been shortcomings. Some Communists are still not good at cooperating with non-Party people in a democratic way and persist in the erroneous thinking of narrow-minded "closed-doorism" or sectarianism. They still do not understand the principle that Communists are duty-bound to cooperate with people outside the Party and have no right to shut them out, which is the principle of listening attentively to the views of the masses, keeping in close touch with them, and not becoming alienated from them. There is an article in the Administrative Program of the Shaaixi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region which stipulates that Communists should cooperate democratically with non-Party people and must not act arbitrarily or keep everything in their own hands. It is meant precisely to guard against those comrades who still fail to understand the Party's policy. Communists must listen attentively to the view of people outside the Party and give others the chance to have their say. If what they say is right, we ought to welcome it, and we should learn from others; if what they say is wrong, we should let them finish what they are saying and then patiently explain things to them. A Communist must never be opinionated or domineering, or think that he is good in everything while others are good in nothing; he must never shut himself

11. The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles
12. Here and in all subsequent references to the Three People's Principles, except where otherwise noted the Selected Works version inserts the word "revolutionary" before it.
13. Why don't we put communism into effect? → Why don't we now demand that socialism be put into effect?
14. Communism → Socialism
15. Beyond their principles → Beyond their scope
16. Before this clause, the Selected Works edition inserts the words "in the present context."
17. Human...and property rights → The right to freedom of the person, the right to take part in political activity, and the right to protection of property
18. The intermediate classes → The peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and other intermediate classes
19. All classes → All classes that resist Japan
20. The intermediate classes → The peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the other intermediate classes
21. Work to do → Work to do and food to eat
22. Have clothes to wear and food to eat → Can live
23. China → present-day China
24. Erroneous thinking → Work-style
25. People outside the Party → People outside the Party who resist Japan
26. Learn from others → Learn from the strong points of others
up in his little room, or brag and boast and lord it over others. Apart from the enemy—Chinese traitors, and those who sabotage the War of Resistance and sabotage unity, who have no right to speak—everyone is entitled to freedom of speech. It does not matter even if what he says is wrong. Affairs of state are the public affairs of the whole nation and not the private affairs of a single party or group. Hence Communists have only the duty to cooperate democratically with non-Party people and not the right to exclude others and monopolize everything. The Communist Party is a political party which works in the interests of the nation and people and which has absolutely no private ends to pursue. It should be supervised by the people and must never go against their will. Its members should stand among the popular masses and certainly must not set themselves above them. Comrades, of democratic cooperation with non-Party people is fixed and eternally unalterable, and right now should make a good start of beginning to be put into practice in this Assembly. With this policy of ours, I believe that Communist Party members of the Assembly will get a very good education here and overcome their “closed-doorism” and sectarianism. We are not a small opinionated sect, and we must learn how to open our doors and cooperate democratically with non-Party people. We certainly must learn the attitudes and work-style of being good at consulting with others. Perhaps even now there are Communist Party members who may say, “If we have to cooperate with others, then leave us out.” But I am sure that such people are very few. I dare assure you all that the overwhelming majority of our Party members will certainly be able to carry out the line of the Central Committee of our Party. At the same time, I wish to ask all non-Party comrades to endorse what we stand for, to understand that the Communist Party is not a small sect or clique pursuing private ends. No! The Communist Party sincerely and honestly wishes to set the affairs of state to rights. But we still have many failings. We are not afraid to admit them and are determined to get rid of them. We shall purge these shortcomings by strengthening education within the Party and by cooperating democratically with non-Party people. This is called attacking by crossfire from within and without, to remedy our failings and really set the affairs of state to rights.

Gentlemen members of the Assembly, you have taken the trouble to come here for this meeting, and I am happy to greet this distinguished gathering and wish it every success.

27. The enemy, Chinese traitors → Those Chinese traitors who are in league with the Japanese bandits
28. Those → Those reactionaries
29. Comrades → Gentlemen representatives, Comrades.
30. Our principle → The Communist Party’s principle
31. Right now it → So long as parties exist in society, people who join them will always be a minority, while those outside them will always be the majority; hence Party members must always cooperate with people outside the Party, and it
32. A very good education → Very good training
33. Endorse → Realize

High-Level Study Groups Everywhere Should Operate According to the Organizational Regulations

(30November 26, 1941)

To all central bureaus, all district Party committees, all military branches, and all military and political committees:

Because recently the organization of high-level study groups in all locations has been uneven in terms of strictness and laxity, uniformity has not been possible, and it is impossible for the Central Committee to investigate and approve each one in turn, organizational regulations for high-level study groups have been specially laid down. Upon receipt, each locality should check on everything according to these regulations and decide what to keep and what to eliminate. Except for the group leader, deputy group leader, and secretary, whose names and professions must be reported to the Central Committee, the rest can simply be reported as numbers of people involved. As for the process of study, the group leader and deputy group leader must take responsibility for making timely reports.

Central Secretariat

Our source for this text is Wenxian he yanjiu, 1984, pp. 16–17 of the annual volume. The editors note that it was drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central Secretariat.

1. Refers to the “Central Committee Decision Concerning Organizational Regulations for High-Level Study Groups,” adopted by the Central Secretariat on November 25, 1941.
2. The editors of the Chinese text suspect that this is a misprint in the original manuscript for “positions.”
Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party
Regarding the War in the Pacific
(December 9, 1941)

On the 8th of this month, the Japanese fascist government declared war on Britain and the United States and bombed Hawaii, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Its army landed in northern Malaysia. After the Japanese declaration of war, the United States and Britain likewise declared war on Japan. War has already broken out in the Pacific. This Pacific War is an unjust war launched by the Japanese fascists for the sake of aggression against the United States, Britain, and other countries. On the part of the United States, Britain, and other countries who have risen to resist this aggression, it is a just war of liberation in defense of independence, freedom, and democracy. This aggressive act by the Japanese fascists is exactly like their acts of aggression against China over the past ten years and exactly like the acts of aggression of the German and Italian fascists against Europe and the Soviet Union. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, all democratic countries throughout the world find themselves subjected to the aggression of the fascist countries. At the same time, all the democratic countries have risen in resistance. All countries and nations throughout the world have been divided into two camps: the fascist camp that has launched the wars of aggression, and the antifascist camp that is waging the wars of liberation. The situation is very clear. After the victory at Rostov, the great Soviet Red Army has moved to the phase of counterattacking the Germans. In the light of this change and the fact that the two great powers, Britain and the United States, possess enormous resources and military power, because China has fought heroically against the Japanese for five years, and because Germany, Italy, and Japan have nearly exhausted their resources and are facing domestic demoralization, the final defeat of the fascist camp and the final victory of the antifascist camp are now certain. This is certain even though Hitler and Mussolini might keep going for a while and the Japanese fascists might win many victories in the initial stage of the Pacific War, or might cut off the Burma Road, or might launch another cruel war against us. The Chinese government and people should continue the heroic war they have been waging for the past nine years, stand resolutely on the side of the antifascist countries, mobilize all their strength, and struggle for the final overthrow of the Japanese fascists. In order to reach this unique objective, the following important tasks must be carried out:

1. China must establish a military alliance with Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries fighting Japan, coordinate our battles, establish a united front of all anti-Japanese nations in the Pacific, and persevere in fighting the war against Japan until victory is complete.

2. Military forces throughout the country must actively attack the enemy and prepare for a large-scale strategic counterattack.

3. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should continue to endure hardships, persist in the war in the enemy’s rear in Central and North China, smash the enemy’s extermination operations, and tie down large numbers of the enemy’s troops.

4. Carry out ever more extensive anti-Japanese, antifascist propaganda and agitation among the Japanese army; the Japanese people; the peoples of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam; the Chinese people in the areas that have fallen to the Japanese; and those struggling for the establishment of an antifascist front inside Japan.

5. Strengthen the Anti-Japanese National United Front and cooperation among the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and other parties; solve the disputes between the Guomindang and the Communist Party; restore the New Fourth Army; and supply the Eighth Route Army with pay and ammunition.

6. Punish pro-Japanese and pro-German cliques and eliminate the enemy’s fifth column.

7. Carry out democratic politics, so that representatives from all parties and nonparty people can take on the political and organizational responsibilities of fighting the War of Resistance and building the country.

8. Strengthen the internal unity of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere; oppose the acts of division engaged in by some elements; at the same time, the overseas Chinese should work with all the friendly governments and local peoples to fight against the Japanese attacks.

Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
December 9, in the thirtieth year of the Republic
Directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Pacific Anti-Japanese United Front  

(December 9, 1941)

1. As the Declaration on the Pacific War of our Party’s Central Committee states, the War of Resistance Against Japan fought by Britain and the United States and all the Pacific countries is a just liberation war, and the victory of Britain and the United States over Japan is the victory of democracy and freedom. Therefore, the central task of the people of our whole country, of all our overseas countrymen, and of all the nations in Southeast Asia in the War of Resistance is to establish a broad united front to oppose Japan and to oppose fascism. The components of this united front should include the governments of all nations, parties, people of all social strata that oppose Japan’s aggression, people inside Japan who are opposing the war and the people of the Japanese colonies of Korea and Taiwan, and Vietnam. This united front should be an alliance of the upper strata but, at the same time, also of the lower strata, an alliance of governments but, at the same time, also of the popular masses. A military alliance against Japan of China, Britain, the United States, and the other Pacific countries should be realized. A close cooperation between governments of suzerain states and aboriginal peoples should be established. At the same time, the political and economic status of the aboriginal peoples should be improved, their popular masses organized, and their enthusiasm raised. Moreover, guerrilla warfare within all areas occupied by Japan should be developed. Without all of this, it is not possible to defeat the Japanese bandits.

2. The Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party are of particularly great significance to the united front of Britain and the United States. On the one hand, it is a prerequisite to China’s national liberation to annihilate the Japanese bandits, in cooperation with Britain and the United States. On the other hand, China’s being internally united as one, reforming its politics and military, actively pinning down and striking the enemy, and actively preparing for strategic counterattacks are all, in turn, important conditions for Britain and the United States in defeating the Japanese bandits. For these purposes, the Chinese Communist Party should sincerely and candidly make every effort to cooperate with British and American personages in all kinds of situations in order to strengthen British and American forces of resistance and to improve the situation in China’s War of Resistance.

3. We must greatly develop our work with the overseas Chinese in the areas of Southeast Asia, Britain, and the United States. The guiding principle of working with overseas Chinese should be to unite all overseas Chinese, and to unite all of their strata and parties in order to carry on a joint struggle against Japan, to propagate and support the motherland’s united War of Resistance, and to support and participate in all facilities and actions of anti-Japanese resistance by the governments in their localities. The ultraleft tendencies among the overseas Chinese and a group of Communist Party members should be corrected, and they should be asked to cooperate with the Chinese embassies and consulates in their localities, and with branches of the Guomindang. But toward the actions on the part of pro-Japanese and pro-German elements to split the unity of overseas Chinese and to sabotage the work of resistance to Japan, there must be firm but appropriate opposition.

4. Efforts must be made to develop anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the enemy-occupied regions of South China, Hainan Island, Vietnam, and all regions in Southeast Asia occupied by Japan and to coordinate, as much as possible, military actions with all friendly forces resisting Japan and the friendly nations resisting Japan such as Britain and the United States, and win their support in all areas. All policies carried out by guerrilla detachments should be in accordance with the demands of the anti-Japanese united front, and attention should be paid to preventing and correcting various leftist tendencies.

5. The work in all localities in Southeast Asia should be done in concert with the Communist Party of the given nation; help should also be extended to them in correcting existing leftist tendencies and in developing united front work on a broad scale.

This text was first published in Jiefang ribao, December 13, 1941. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 41–42, which reproduces this source. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 344, Mao presided over the revision of this directive, as well as of the declaration which appears above.
Estimate of the Situation in the International War

(December 12, 1941)

Zhou [Enlai]:

1. There is the possibility that the Japanese army could take all of Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, Guam, Midway Island, Kalimantan, the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand during the winter season. Within the next half year, neither Britain nor the United States can compete against Japan, but if two or three strongholds such as Singapore, Manila, and Darwin can be preserved, a situation of stalemate with Japan could occur after six months, so that after the Japanese army is exhausted a counterattack could be launched.

2. The overall orientation of Britain and the United States may be defensive toward Japan but offensive toward Germany, first gathering together the forces of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to defeat Germany, and then gathering together the forces of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China to take care of Japan. The Soviet Union will be the decisive force on both fronts. If a second front appears in Europe in a few months, Germany can be finished off relatively quickly. This is a truly advantageous orientation, but do those indolent British and American military and political personnel have the necessary stamina?

3. Germany is now caught in a dilemma, but since he has no way out on the Eastern front, Hitler may be forced to adopt a defensive posture on the Eastern front and an offensive posture on the Southern front or the Western front. If this happens, it is Hitler himself creating a second front, and it also creates the possibility that Britain and the United States may be forced to concentrate their main forces (in Britain’s case its main naval, infantry, and air forces, and in the American case its main air force and natural resources) to fight Germany.

4. The Pacific War offers six advantages for China and the Soviet Union: First, the enemy forces in North China and Central China will gradually be reduced, which is to say that there is no possibility of their increasing military forces on a large scale; second, the possibility of the Guomindang’s attacking the border regions will be reduced; third, it deals a fatal blow to the pro-Japanese and pro-

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, pp. 672–74, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript, preserved in the Central Archives.
To Cai Chang

(December 16, 1941)

Comrade Cai Chang:

I do not remember clearly when Comrade Li Liuru joined the Party; I only remember that he joined the League in 1921. This is my reply.

Mao Zedong

Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the Yan’an Cadre School

(This decision also applies to all anti-Japanese base areas)

(December 17, 1941)

1. The basic shortcoming of the current Yan’an Cadre School lies in the disconnection between theory and practice and between what is learned and what is used and in the existence of subjectivism and dogmatism, which are serious problems. This kind of problem is manifested mainly in having students learn a whole lot of abstract principles of Marxism-Leninism but paying no attention or scant attention to understanding their essence and how to apply them to the specific Chinese environment. To remedy this kind of problem, it must be emphasized that the purpose of studying the theories of Marxism-Leninism is to enable students to apply these theories correctly in solving the concrete problems of the Chinese revolution, and not to memorize and recite these bookish principles mechanically. First, students must be made to distinguish between Marxist-Leninist terminology and the essence of Marxism-Leninism; second, students must be made to understand this essence (not to interpret literally without real understanding but, rather, to know the meaning deep in their hearts); third, students must be made to learn to be good at applying this essence to China’s specific environment; all formalistic and hollow study, in other words, is to be discarded. To this end, in addition to correctly imparting Marxist-Leninist theory, it is necessary at the same time to step up education in Chinese history, China’s actual conditions, and the history and policies of the Party, so that students will learn both theory and practice and be able to connect the two in a lively way. For cadres above the prefectural committee level in the Party and above the regimental level in the military (after the literacy problem has been solved), the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be the basic curricular material for studying Marxism-Leninism.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 191, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. Cai Chang (1900–1990), a native of Hunan, was working at the time in the Chinese Communist Party’s credentials office for its Seventh National Congress. Like Mao, she had been a political activist in Changsha at the time of the May 4th movement.

2. Li Liuru was at this time head of Mao’s Secretariat.

This decision was first published in Jiefang ribao, December 20, 1941. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 8, pp. 43–47, which reproduces this version.

1. It is indicated in a note preceding the text that this decision was adopted by the Politburo at its meeting on December 17. According to Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 346, Mao not only chaired this meeting but revised the text of the decision before it was issued, adding several important sentences.
Particular attention should be paid to studying the concrete application of the basic concepts of dialectical materialism and historical materialism (not a huge pile of abstract principles in this regard), for the purpose of thereby overcoming the extremely pernicious problems of subjectivism and dogmatism.

2. Another shortcoming is that the various schools failed to stipulate clearly their own concrete goals. For this reason it is hereby stipulated that:

a. The Central Research Institute shall be the higher-level research institution for fostering the Party’s cadres in charge of theory.

b. The Central Party School shall be the higher-level and middle-level school for training cadres who have the ability to work fairly independently, in the Party above the prefectural committee level involved in practical work, and in the army above the regimental level involved in political work.

c. The Military Academy shall be the higher-level and middle-level school for training cadres above the regimental level in military affairs work who possess the ability to work fairly independently.

d. Yan’an University, the Lu Xun Art Institute, and the Academy of Natural Sciences shall be schools for training talented people, both Party and non-Party, in the various higher-level and middle-level specialized fields of politics, culture, and science and technology.

The curricula, teaching materials, and teaching methods of each of the various schools described above must be suited to its specific goals.

3. To strengthen the specific leadership of each school, and to see to it that the education provided in the various schools is coordinated with the various central organs doing the actual work, it has been decided that the Central Research Institute is to be directly under the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Party School is to be directly under the Central Party School Management Committee, the Military Academy is to be directly under the Military Commission’s Staff Department, and Yan’an University, the Lu Xun Art Institute, and the Academy of Natural Sciences are to be directly under the Central Cultural Commission. The organ responsible for each school should treat the work of the school it is in charge of managing as an important part of its own professional work. The Central Propaganda Department should, in concert with the respective organs in charge of management, carry out unified planning, inspection, and supervision of the curriculum, instructors, teaching materials, and expenses of each school.

4. To realize the specific goals of each of the schools, and to maximize the effect of the limited energies and financial resources available, all schools should operate on the principle of fewer but higher quality in recruiting students. All schools and the organs in charge of them should reexamine the makeup of the student body, taking as the principle that all students who do not fit the specific goals of a particular school are to be assigned jobs or transferred to study elsewhere.

5. Improving the quality of the instructors is a determining factor in running a school well. The education of all cadres above the prefectural committee level and above the regimental level should be under the personal direction of Central Committee members and comrades in charge of the various central organs. Instructors currently at the various schools should be reexamined and dealt with individually according to the new standards. The Central Propaganda Department should provide practical help to the specially appointed instructors at all schools so as to raise the level of quality. The political and material treatment of instructors should be improved.

6. The study of Marxist-Leninist theory is impossible without a relatively high level of education. Senior cadres above the xian level or the battalion level who are from worker and peasant backgrounds and who have too low an educational level but need to learn and are capable of it should first be given remedial lessons. This kind of remedial learning should not be limited to simply recognizing more characters, but should include the attainment of reading and writing skills and of rudimentary knowledge in history and geography, social politics, and natural sciences. The criteria for constituting such basic education classes should be the students’ level of education and not their rank on the job.

7. All schools of a specialized nature (such as military, politics and law, finance and economics, natural sciences, literature and the arts, normal education, medicine, and so on) should take as their main curricular focus the study of theory and practice relevant to their specialized field of work. The respective proportions of literacy courses, courses on politics, and courses in specialized subjects should be determined according to the situation at each school. Generally speaking, specializations should make up 50 percent of the courses (in schools where remedial education is not necessary, specialized courses should constitute 80 percent), literacy classes should make up 30 percent, and courses on politics should make up 20 percent. The abnormal phenomenon in the past of aiming to have courses on politics override all other courses must be firmly corrected.

8. All comrades who carry on educational work in the schools should earnestly examine the content of the curriculum and the teaching methods so as to put into effect the principle of unifying theory and practice with regard to curriculum content and teaching methods. As far as teaching methods are concerned, the style of inspiring, doing research, and experimentation should be adopted firmly so as to develop the students’ self-motivation and creativity in their studies, and the styles of cramming, force-feeding, and using hollow words should certainly be abandoned. As far as the teaching process is concerned, the practical materials used in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and its adjacent areas should be fully utilized through all sorts of investigative and research methods.

9. As far as the teaching and learning of Marxism-Leninism are concerned, the erroneous orientation of the past, in which emphasis was laid not on understanding its essence but, rather, only on knowledge of its form, and in which emphasis was laid not on its application but, rather, only on repetition by rote, should be corrected resolutely. The schools’ authorities and instructors must pay full attention

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2. The previous two sentences were added by Mao in the course of revising this decision. See Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 346.
to having the students progress from grasping the essence of Marxism-Leninism to specifically applying this essence to the study of China’s environment. The standard by which to measure whether or not the student has truly grasped (comprehended, come to know, understood) something is whether or not he is able to apply it. What is meant here by application is using the spirit and methods of Marxism-Leninism to analyze China’s history and current concrete problems and to sum up the experiences of China’s revolution, so that students will cultivate this habit of application, which will make them adept at applying the spirit and methods of Marxism-Leninism in analyzing problems and guiding their practice after they finish school.

10. As far as teaching materials in politics for the schools is concerned, full use should be made of Jiefang ribao, Central Committee documents, and the reference materials and books and publications put out by the various central departments and committees. Various sorts of necessary textbooks and supplementary reading materials should be compiled or reproduced according to a plan. In concert with the publishing organs and finance organs, the Central Propaganda Department should draw up a publishing plan and an expenditure budget in education for 1942 and submit them to the Central Committee for approval and implementation.

11. Necessary improvements should be made with regard to student life and educational facilities in all the schools according to present circumstances.

12. The general principle for administrative organizations in the schools is short and small in scope but strong and capable in action. The task of the Party branch within a school is to ensure the completion of the school’s educational plan and to correct the problematic phenomenon of the branch and the administration existing side by side. The branch may make suggestions to the school’s administration through Party channels, but this cannot be done in an interfering manner. In schools whose nature is that of the united front, the “Partification” work-style in which Party members run everything should be corrected.

13. Within the schools, the style of learning to be fostered among students includes thinking freely, seeking truth from facts, working hard and independently, abiding by discipline, being self-motivated and self-controlled, and helping one another in solidarity, and to be opposed firmly are the pernicious faults of subjectivism, sectarianism, dogmatism, aiming beyond one’s limitations, making arbitrary assertions or following blindly, indulging in exaggeration, considering oneself always in the right, and being crude and careless or content with superficial understanding. Regarding the cultivation of this style of learning, the instructors themselves should serve as examples.

14. This decision shall apply to Yan’an. All basic principles within this decision, however, are applicable at the same time to all other anti-Japanese base areas.  

Central Tasks in Our Work for the Year 1942  
(December 28, 1941)

To the main responsible comrades in the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Party:

The Pacific War is a long-term war, in that the Japanese bandits will be mired deeper and deeper in the southern Pacific, at present are moving troops southward from North China and Central China, and may possibly transfer other units in the future. Chongqing’s policy is to use only guerrilla forces against the enemy instead of using the main force to fight them, so that the enemy will retreat, and we, too, should adopt this policy. Our base areas suffered great damage in 1941, and in 1942 we should take advantage of the enemy’s being tied up in the Pacific and adopting a strategic defense position toward China to concentrate our efforts on regaining our strength. Firmly carry out the Central Committee’s December 13 Directive to develop better troops and simpler administration, develop the economy and the people’s movement, develop our work in enemy-occupied areas, develop the political offensive against the enemy and the puppets, and train cadres in a planned fashion. Militarily it is to smash any possible “mopping up” on the enemy’s part (any “mopping up” must be smashed firmly), regain areas from which the enemy has withdrawn; as for strongholds deep in our own areas, to the extent possible they should be forced into isolation and caused to withdraw of their own accord; with regard to certain of the most crucial places, the measure of regaining by force may be used in particular cases, but large-scale offensives should not be applied, as that could actually detain the enemy and provoke retaliatory “mopping up,” which, instead of helping, would in fact harm us. Anything with overtones of adventurism, which could arise among the troops or in the localities, must be prevented. The overall world situation as well as the domestic situation will force the Guomindang to make certain political changes, but this process will be slow. The

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3. The previous two sentences were also added by Mao during revision of this text.
propaganda of our Party and our army must avoid provoking the Guomindang but, rather, must calmly observe the changes, criticize less, patiently endure as much as possible without becoming agitated. In sum, the central tasks for next year are to store up our forces, to regain our strength, to consolidate our internal ranks, and to consolidate the Party, the government, the military, and the people. With regard to the enemy and the puppets, political offensives are primary, supplemented by guerrilla warfare. With regard to the Guomindang, mediation and unity are primary, supplemented by preventing it from fighting against the Communists. If the enemy does not attack the Soviet Union, this is the policy we adopt as we wait to prey upon the enemy army’s further weakness. If the enemy does attack the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union attacks the enemy, we have plenty of energy to coordinate with the Soviet Army in waging war. It is expected that all comrades will study this and carry it out.

Central Secretariat
Central Military Commission
Inscription for the First Issue of *Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army*  
(January 2, 1939)

Check the offensive of the enemy, and make preparations for our counterattack.

Our source for this text is the index volume to *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, p. 143.

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Inscription for *Yang Haiquan*  
(February 2, 1939)

Stay with the popular masses, and never keep aloof from them even for a second: then the Chinese Revolution will assuredly triumph.

Our source for this text is the index volume to *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, p. 143.

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Inscription for *New China News of Yan’an*  
(February 7, 1939)

Think more.

Our source for this text is the index volume of *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, p. 143.
Inscription for New China News of Yan’an

(February 10, 1937)

Turn New China News into a vital new force in the War of Resistance.

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 143.

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A Letter to Liang Yi

(March 23, 19 [X] [X])

China possesses excellent foundations. All we need to do is to organize them. First of all, we need to organize the people of the whole country in whom lies the victory of the resistance war.

To Comrade Liang Yi

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, where it is reproduced from a Red Guard collection of 1967.

1. The year is left blank in the available source.

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Inscription for the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(March 1939)

On the one hand, study, and on the other, produce. Overcome hardships and the enemies will lose heart.

Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144.

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Inscription for Chen Xingmin

(April 18, 1939)

Do not be afraid of difficulties or failures. If you insist on striving and studying hard, you will make progress and succeed!

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144.

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Inscription for the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(April 19, 1939)

The deciding factor that makes an intellectual a revolutionary, a non-revolutionary, or a counter-revolutionary lies in whether he is willing to, and actually does, unite with the workers, peasants, and popular masses. This alone marks the distinction.

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 144–45.
Inscription for New China News of Yan’an
(April 19, 1939)¹

Strive to eliminate illiteracy!

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Inscription for the Industrial Exhibit of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
(April 1939)

The proletariat are the vanguard in resistance to Japan. We must struggle resolutely to support the anti-Japanese war to the end, and to build a new China.

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Inscription for the Commemoration of the Third Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University
(June 1, 1939)

Stand at the foremost front line!

Dedication for Jiang Can
(July, 1939)

Where there is spirit, anything can be accomplished. With everyone working hard in the war of resistance against Japan and each person striving forward, there is no reason not to win after eight or ten years of fighting.

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Inscription for the Fuxiao Bao of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army
(1939)

Persist in the guerrilla war.

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Inscription for Xie Zizhang
(1939)

Comrade Xie Zizhang is a national hero; Comrade Xie Zizhang, though dead, lives in our hearts.
Elegiac Verse to the Memory of the Martyrs Who Died in the Pingjiang Massacre

(August 1, 1939)

The Japanese bandits have encroached on us, a national crisis threatens, and the guns should be pointed outwards. We advocate war, and can rely on the spirit of the people, our wills must be concentrated.

Our source for these verses is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 147.

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Speech at the Graduation Exercises of the Fourth Group of Students at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(September, 1939)

We will unite the popular masses of the whole country, and with that concerted might we will overthrow Japanese imperialism and build a new China. This is not, however, a task that can be accomplished in a short period of time, so we must "continue our efforts and strive for its realization."

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, where it is reproduced from Jiaoyu geming, no. 5.

Inscription for Han Zhongliang

(September 1939)

March along a bright road, struggle hard, and the final victory will be ours.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 149.

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Inscription for the Volume Veritable Records of the Shaanxi-Ningxia-Gansu Border Area

(1939)

The border area is a democratic base area for the war of resistance against Japan, a place where the Three People's Principles are being carried out most thoroughly.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 150.

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Inscription for Esperantists of Yan'an

(December 9, 1939)

I still maintain that Esperanto may and should be studied if it is used as a vehicle to convey the truths of genuine internationalism and revolution.

Mao Zedong
December 9

This text was first published in Popola Mondo, Vol. 1, no. 5. May 1950. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 131.
Inscription for Xi Zhongxun

(1939)

Put the interests of the Party in the first place.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 151.

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Inscriptions for the First Congress of the Cultural Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

Work hard for the building of the new culture of the Chinese nation.

Lu Xun’s orientation is the orientation of the national culture of China.

Our source for this text is the index volume of Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 152.

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Inscription in Balujun Junzheng Zazhi

(January 25, 1940)

Study while fighting, remain undaunted despite repeated setbacks, and make persistent efforts.

This inscription first appeared in Balujun Junzheng zazhi, Vol. 2, no. 1; we have translated it from the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 152.

Inscription for the Second Anniversary of the Founding of the China Branch of the Conference of the International Campaign Against Aggression

(1940)

Just wars are bound to defeat wars of aggression.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 153.

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Inscription for New China News of Yan’an

(February 7, 1940)

The war of resistance, unity, and progress—none of the three can be dispensed with.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 154.

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Inscription for Chinese Culture of Yan’an

(1940)

Let the cultural circles of Yan’an move into action, and struggle to defeat Japanese imperialism and build a new national culture.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 154.
Inscription for The Chinese Worker
(February, 1940)

Struggle to build a new-democratic Republic of China; best wishes on the publication of The Chinese Worker.

This inscription first appeared in no. 1 of Zhongguo gongren, February 1940. Our source is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 154.

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Inscription for Ma Jin
(Spring, 1940)

With a correct orientation and a style of hard struggle, victory will be ours.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 155.

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Inscription for Children’s Day
(April 4, 1940)

Make progress every day.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 155.

Inscription for the May 4th Youth Day
(1940)

The sole task confronting the young people of China at present is to defeat Japanese imperialism.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 156.

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Motto Inscribed for Lun Xun Academy of Art and Literature
(June, 1940)

Intensity, seriousness, industry, and modesty.

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 156.

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Inscription for the First Issue of American Overseas Chinese News
(July, 1940)

Arise, fight to the end for the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, p. 157.
Inscription for the United Garment Workers’ Union of the Overseas Chinese in New York, U.S.A.

(July, 1940)

Consolidate and expand the national united front against Japan.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 157.

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Inscription for Wang Zhongfang and a Few Other Young Men from the Zedong Young Cadres’ School

(January 27, 1941)

One who is willing to learn and to do hard work, and is also revolutionary, is definitely useful, and definitely has a future.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 165.

* * *

Inscription for Children’s Day

(April 13, 1940)

Take exceedingly good care of the children.

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 168.

Inscription on the Picture Album of a Painter

(April, 1941)

A hazy and smoky village and a beach in the fog,
Are easy to look at, but hard to paint;
Had the artist known that this would not be appreciated by his contemporaries,
He would have painted rather girls and flowers in red.

These lines were first published by He Qifang in Shidaide baogao, No. 1, 1980. Our source is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 168, which reproduces this version.

* * *

Inscription for “The Special Issue Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University”

(May, 1941)

Be brave, resolute and calm, learn in the struggle, and be ready at all times to sacrifice everything of our personal life for the cause of national liberation.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, p. 169.

* * *
To Liu Xuewei
(July 15, 1941)

Comrade Xuewei:

I have received and read your letter and the outline. Although I cannot advise you, I am in favor of your writing this book. This is my reply to your letter. With salutations!

Mao Zedong, July 15

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Elegiac Couplet for Mr. Zhang Huainan
(August 1941)

Supporting the great cause energetically, you have been working tirelessly to unite with the Communists internally and the Soviet Union externally, and constantly persisting in this for seven years in succession;

Hopelessly worn down by hard work, you have been hit by fever first and then by malaria, and deprived of your life to the accompaniment of endless weeping and tears.

---

Inscription for Comrade Wang Guanlan
(December 16, 1941)

Since we are here, we may as well make the best of it. You yourself do not worry at all, letting the forces of resistance gradually grow inside the body to fight against it until it is defeated in the end. This is the method for coping with chronic disease. If it is acute disease, you cannot do anything but let the doctor treat it. There is also no point in worrying about it, because your worry will not cure it. Toward diseases we should have strong fighting willpower, but not worry. This is my attitude toward disease.

I am writing this for Comrade Wang Guanlan for reference.

Mao Zedong
December 16

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This inscription was first published in 1961. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 7, p. 63, where it is reproduced from Dagong bao, March 16, 1961.
Elegy to Mourn the Death of the Editor-in-Chief of Liberation Daily, Yang Song
(December 26, 1941)

Comrade Yang Song was conscientious in his work, and was responsible. We should remember him, and learn from him!

Our source for this text is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji, Bujian, p. 173.

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As in previous volumes, we include here, for the convenience of the reader, the short titles used for certain works, which are likewise given on the first appearance of each entry in the notes.


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About the Editor

Stuart R. Schram was born in Excelsior, Minnesota, in 1924. After graduating from the University of Minnesota in physics, he took his Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University. From 1954 to 1967, he conducted research at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and from 1968 until 1989, he was Professor of Politics with reference to China at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Since 1989, he has worked at the Fairbank Center, Harvard University, on the edition of Mao Zedong’s pre-1949 writings of which this is the seventh volume.


About the Associate Editor

Nancy J. Hodes was born in Philadelphia in 1946, and spent her formative years in Beijing, China, where her father taught physiology at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. After graduating from Radcliffe College in Far Eastern Languages, she edited the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, taught Chinese, and worked as a freelance translator. She returned to China in the 1970s to teach English and work on A Chinese-English Dictionary at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (#1). Later she taught Chinese at Tufts University and Harvard Summer School, worked as a translator for M.E. Sharpe’s translation journals and the Mao’s Writings Project at Brown University, and served as Assistant Editor of the Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. After receiving her Ph.D. in Chinese literature from Harvard University, she taught East Asian Civilizations and Chinese at Boston College, and worked beginning in 1991 with Stuart R. Schram on the present edition of the Mao Zedong’s pre-1949 writings. Until 1995, she served concurrently as Associate Director of the Boston Research Center for the 21st Century, founded in 1993 by Soka Gakkai International President Daisaku Ikeda.
About the Guest Associate Editor

Lyman P. Van Slyke was born in 1929 in Duluth and grew up in the iron mining region of northern Minnesota. He graduated (1951) from Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota with a degree in mathematics, then spent four years in the U.S. Navy during and after the Korean War, experiences which sparked a lifelong involvement with Asia. At the University of California (Berkeley), he subsequently earned an M.A. in East Asian Studies (1958) and a Ph.D. in History (1964), presenting a dissertation on the place of the united front in Chinese Communist history, the subject of his first book.

In 1963, he was appointed to the history faculty at Stanford University, where he spent his entire career, retiring in 1994, but continuing to teach until 1998, twice winning teaching awards. During these years, he helped establish the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies, and served until his retirement as its Executive Director. He served three terms as Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford. From 1975 to 1978, he was Chairman of the China and Inner Asia Regional Council of the Association for Asian Studies. In 2004, he was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree by Carleton College.

Primarily a historian of modern China, Van Slyke has done much research and writing on the Chinese Communist revolution, particularly during the 1930s and 1940s. He has written extensively on Sino-U.S. relations. He is the author of a book on the Yangtze River, studies the Three Kingdoms period, and is engaged in a biography of Liang Ji, (1858–1918), father of the philosopher Liang Shuming.

Van Slyke lived for several years in Taiwan, and made his first visit to China in 1975. Shortly thereafter, he began leading lecture tours to many parts of the Peoples Republic and elsewhere in Asia for Stanford Alumni Association and other organizations. Since his retirement, he has continued to make two or three such trips each year.