MAO'S
ROAD TO POWER
Revolutionary Writings
1912-1949

Stuart R. Schram, Editor
Nancy J. Hodes, Associate Editor
Volume VII
New Democracy
1939–1941

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Stuart R. Schram, Editor
Nancy J. Hodes
Lyman P. Van Slyke
Associate Editor
Guest Associate Editor

The Cover

“The sole task of the Chinese youth at present is to defeat Japanese imperialism.” (Inscription to mark May 4th, Youth Day, 1940.)

An East Gate Book

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Volume V of our edition included five interviews with Mao Zedong conducted by Edgar Snow, which Mrs. Lois Wheeler Snow kindly authorized us to reproduce. In September 1939, Snow conducted two more long interviews with Mao, which fall within the scope of the present volume, and Mrs. Snow has again authorized us to make use of these. Once more, we wish to express our gratitude for her cooperation.

The guest associate editor of this volume, Professor Emeritus Lyman van Slyke of Stanford University, is the leading expert on the period in the history of the Chinese Communist Party dealt with here. It is he who prepared the first draft of the introduction, and though Stuart Schram played an active role in revising it, many of the key ideas expressed there should be attributed to Professor van Slyke. The two editors had detailed discussions regarding many issues raised in the text of the volume, and the final version is their joint work.

Nancy Hodes, Associate Editor of the series until her departure for Soka Gakkai University in 2000, was involved in all aspects of the work on the present volume. She played an active role in the revision and annotation of the translations, and in
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The editor, Stuart Schram, wishes to acknowledge yet again his indebtedness to Benjamin Schwartz, a pioneer in the study of Mao Zedong’s thought. Professor Schwartz carefully read the manuscripts of earlier volumes of this series, and made stimulating and thoughtful criticisms of the introductions. Subsequently, he continued, so long as his health allowed, to offer insightful comments on the themes raised by the materials translated.

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Ultimate responsibility for the accuracy and literary quality of the work as a whole rests with Stuart Schram as editor. For any remaining errors and inadequacies, the fault lies with him.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Revolution, 1912–1949

Mao Zedong stands out as one of the dominant figures of the twentieth century. Guerrilla leader, strategist, conqueror, ruler, poet, and philosopher, he placed his imprint on China, and on the world. This edition of Mao’s writings provides abundant documentation in his own words regarding both his life and his thought. Because of the central role of Mao’s ideas and actions in the turbulent course of the Chinese revolution, it thus offers a rich body of historical data about China in the first half of the twentieth century.

The process of change and upheaval in China which Mao sought to master had been going on for roughly a century by the time he was born in 1893. Its origins lay in the incapacity of the old order to cope with the population explosion at the end of the eighteenth century, and with other economic and social problems, as well as in the shock administered by the Opium War of 1840 and further European aggression and expansion thereafter.

Mao’s native Hunan Province was crucially involved both in the struggles of the Qing dynasty to maintain its authority, and in the radical ferment which led to successive challenges to the imperial system. Thus on the one hand, the Hunan Army of the great conservative viceroy Zeng Guofan was the main instrument for putting down the Taiping Rebellion and saving the dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth century. But on the other hand, the most radical of the late nineteenth-century reformers, and the only one to lay down his life in 1898, Tan Sitong, was also a Hunanese, as was Huang Xing, whose contribution to the revolution of 1911 was arguably as great as that of Sun Yat-sen.1 In his youth, Mao profoundly admired all three of these men, though they stood for very different things: Zeng for the empire and the Confucian values which sustained it, Tan for defying tradition and seeking inspiration in the West, Huang for Western-style constitutional democracy.

Apart from Mao’s strong Hunanese patriotism, which inclined him to admire eminent figures from his own province, he undoubtedly saw these three as

1. Abundant references to all three of these figures are to be found in Mao’s writings, especially those of the early period contained in Volume I of this series. See, regarding Zeng, pp. 10, 72, and 131. On Tan, see “Zhang Kundi’s Record of Two Talks with Mao Zedong,” September 1917, p. 135. On Huang, see “Letter to Miyazaki Tōzen,” March 1917, pp. 111–12.
forceful and effective leaders who, each in his own way, fought to assure the future of China. Any sense that these were contradictory symbols would have been diminished by the fact that from an early age Mao never advocated exclusive reliance on either Chinese or Western values, but repeatedly sought a synthesis of the two. In August 1917, Mao Zedong expressed the view that despite the “antiquated” and otherwise undesirable traits of the Chinese mentality, “Western thought is not necessarily all correct either; very many parts of it should be transformed at the same time as Oriental thought.” In a sense, this sentence sums up the problem he sought to resolve throughout his whole career: How could China develop an advanced civilization, and become rich and powerful, while remaining Chinese? As shown by the texts contained in Volume I, Mao’s early exposure to “Westernizing” influences was not limited to Marxism. Other currents of European thought played a significant role in his development. Whether he was dealing with liberalism or Leninism, however, Mao tenaciously sought to adapt and transform these ideologies, even as he espoused them and learned from them.

Mao Zedong played an active and significant role in the movement for political and intellectual renewal which developed in the aftermath of the patriotic student demonstrations of May 4, 1919, against the transfer of German concessions in China to Japan. This “new thought tide,” which had begun to manifest itself at least as early as 1915, dominated the scene from 1919 onward, and prepared the ground for the triumph of radicalism and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. But though Mao enthusiastically supported the call of Chen Duxiu, who later became the Party’s first leader, for the Western values incarnated by “Mr. Science” and “Mr. Democracy,” he never wholly endorsed the total negation of Chinese culture advocated by many people during the May Fourth period. His condemnations of the old thought as backward and slavish are nearly always balanced by a call to learn from both Eastern and Western thought and to develop something new out of these twin sources.

In 1919 and 1920, Mao leaned toward anarchism rather than socialism. Only in January 1921 did he at last draw the explicit conclusion that anarchism would not work, and that Russia’s proletarian dictatorship represented the model which must be followed. Half the remaining fifty-five years of his life were devoted to creating such a dictatorship, and the other half to deciding what to do with it, and how to overcome the defects which he perceived in it. From beginning to end of this process, Mao drew upon Chinese experience and Chinese civilization in revising and reforming this Western import.

To the extent that, from the 1920s onward, Mao was a committed Leninist, his understanding of the doctrine shaped his vision of the world. But to the extent that, although he was a Communist revolutionary, he always “planted his backside on the body of China,” ideology alone did not exhaustively determine his outlook. One of Mao Zedong’s most remarkable attributes was the extent to which he linked theory and practice. He was in some respects not a very good Marxist, but few men have ever applied so well Marx’s dictum that the vocation of the philosopher is not merely to understand the world, but to change it.

It is reliably reported that Mao’s close collaborators tried in vain, during the Yan’an period, to interest him in writings by Marx such as The 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. To such detailed historical analyses based on economic and social facts, he preferred The Communist Manifesto, of which he saw the message as “Jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng, jieji douzheng!” (Class struggle, class struggle, class struggle!) In other words, for Mao the essence of Marxism resided in the fundamental idea of the struggle between oppressor and oppressed as the motive force of history.

Such a perspective offered many advantages. It opened the door to the immediate pursuit of revolutionary goals, since even though China did not have a very large urban proletariat, there was no lack of oppressed people to be found there. It thus eliminated the need for the Chinese to feel inferior, or to await salvation from without, just because their country was still stuck in some precapitalist stage of development (whether “Asiatic” or “Feudal”). And, by placing the polarity “oppressor/oppressed” at the heart of the revolutionary ideology itself, this approach pointed toward a conception in which landlord oppression, and the oppression of China by the imperialists, were perceived as the two key targets of the struggle.

Mao displayed, in any case, a remarkably acute perception of the realities of Chinese society, and consistently adapted his ideas to those realities, at least during the struggle for power. In the early years after its foundation in 1921, the Chinese Communist Party sought support primarily from the working class in the cities and adopted a strategy based on a “united front” or alliance with Sun Yat-sen’s Guomindang. Mao threw himself into this enterprise with enthusiasm, serving first as a labor union organizer in Hunan in 1922–1923, and then as a high official within the Guomindang organization in 1923–1926. Soon, however, he moved away from this perspective, and even before urban-based revolution was put down in blood by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, he asserted that the real center of gravity of Chinese society was to be found in the countryside. From this fact, he drew the conclusion that the decisive blows against the existing reactionary order must be struck in the countryside by the peasants.

By August 1927, Mao had concluded that mobilizing the peasant masses was

2. Letter of August 1917 to Li Jinxi, Volume I, p. 132.
not enough. A red army was also necessary to serve as the spearhead of revolution, and so he put forward the slogan: “Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.” In the mountain fastness of the Jinggangshan base area in Jiangxi Province, to which he retreated at the end of 1927 with the remnants of his forces, he began to elaborate a comprehensive strategy for rural revolution, combining land reform with the tactics of guerrilla warfare. In this he was aided by Zhu De, a professional soldier who had joined the Chinese Communist Party, and soon became known as the “commander-in-chief.” This pattern of revolution rapidly achieved a considerable measure of success. The “Chinese Soviet Republic,” established in 1931 in a larger and more populous area of Jiangxi, survived for several years, though when Chiang Kai-shek finally devised the right strategy and mobilized his crack troops against it, the Communists were defeated and forced to embark in 1934 on the Long March.

There were periods during the years 1931–1934 when Mao Zedong was reduced virtually to the position of a figurehead by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, dominated in substantial measure by the Moscow-trained members of the so-called “Internationalist” faction. At other times, he was able to maintain a substantial measure of control over the military tactics of the Red Army, and to develop his skills both as a theorist and as a practitioner of the art of war. Even when he was effectively barred from that domain, he continued to pursue the investigations of rural conditions which had long been one of his trademarks. Such enquiries into the conditions in a particular area served as the foundation for an approach to revolution stressing the need to adapt the Party’s tactics to the concrete realities of the society in which it was operating.

The defeat of 1934 weakened the position of Mao’s rivals for the leadership. In meetings of the Politburo held in December 1934, in the course of the Long March, Mao was supported for the first time in over two years by a majority of the participants. At the conference held at Zunyi in January 1935, Mao began his comeback in earnest. Soon he once again played a dominant role in decisions regarding military operations, though his rise to unquestioned dominance in the Party was a long process which reached its culmination only in 1945.

In the course of the northward march from Zunyi to Shaanxi, Mao was driven at times by the continuing threat from Chiang Kai-shek’s campaigns of “Encirclement and Suppression” to advocate that the Red Army should fight its way to the borders of the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet aid and protection. Once the survivors of the Red Army had established themselves in Shaanxi Province in 1936, Mao’s perspective began to change, and a vision of the Chinese people as a whole as the victim of oppression came progressively into play. For a time, Mao’s line called for overthrowing the traitorous running dog Chiang Kai-shek in order to fight Japan, but soon the growing threat of Japanese aggression and strong Soviet pressure in favor of collaboration with the Guomindang led to a fundamental change in the Party’s policy. The Xi’an Incident of December 1936, in which Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in order to force him to oppose the invader, was the catalyst which finally produced a second “united front.” Without it, Mao Zedong and the forces he led might well have remained a side current in the remote and backward region of Northwest China, or even been exterminated altogether. As it was, the collaboration of 1937–1945, however perfunctory and opportunistic on both sides, gave Mao the occasion to establish himself as a patriotic national leader. Above all, the resulting context of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines allowed the Communists to build a foundation of political and military power throughout wide areas of Northern and Central China.

During the years in Yan’an, from 1937 to 1946, Mao Zedong also finally consolidated his own dominant position in the Chinese Communist Party, and in particular his role as the ideological mentor of the Party. Beginning in November 1936, he seized the opportunity to read a number of writings by Chinese Marxists, and Soviet works in Chinese translation, which had been published while he was struggling for survival a few years earlier. These provided the stimulus for the elaboration of his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, and in particular for his theory of contradictions. As noted above, another of the main features of his thought, the emphasis on practice as the source of knowledge, had long been in evidence and had found expression in the sociological surveys in the countryside which he himself carried out beginning as early as 1926.

While Mao attained a dominant and unchallengeable position in the Party only in the mid-1940s, the year 1938 was of crucial importance in his rise to power. In May and June, he produced two of his most important and influential military writings, “Problems of Strategy in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War” and “On Protracted War.” Meanwhile, it had been decided in March 1938 to send an emissary to Moscow to seek instructions from the Comintern in the face of the acute rivalry between Mao and Wang Ming, who had recently returned to China. In September the reply came back that the leading organs of the Chinese Communist Party, “with Mao Zedong as their head,” should strive for close unity. Having been thus appointed by Georgi Dimitrov, speaking on behalf of Stalin, Mao

5. See the relevant passages of the texts of August 7 and August 18, 1927, in Volume III, pp. 31 and 36.
7. See Volume IV, pp. xciii–xciv.
8. See below, the Introduction to Volume V, pp. xlv–xlvi, and also, in Volume V, the “Resolution on Problems of Military Strategy” of December 23, 1935.
9. See Volume VI, p. xlix
delivered in October 1938 his report “On the New Stage,” in which he put forward the call for the “Sinification of Marxism,” making it very plain that he was the one who best understood this imperative. By this term he meant the modification not only of the language, but of the substance of Marxism in order to adapt it to Chinese culture and to Chinese realities.

In 1939 and 1940, while paying lip service to the role of the Guomindang in China’s struggle against Japanese imperialism, Mao began increasingly to suggest that a successful Chinese revolution would only be possible under Communist leadership. By 1941, he made plain that in his view, no one else was capable of carrying out this enterprise, and attacked those in the Party who, in his view, preferred to translate ready-made formulas from the Soviet Union. The “Rectification Campaign” of 1942–43 was designed in large measure to change the thinking of such “Internationalists,” or to eliminate them from positions of influence.

When Mao was elected chairman of the Politburo and of the Secretariat in March 1943, the terms of his appointment to this second post contained a curious provision: Mao alone, as chairman, could out-vote the other two members of the Secretariat in case of disagreement. This was the first step toward setting Mao above and apart from all other Party members and thereby opening the way to the subsequent cult. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945 came apotheosis: Mao Zedong’s thought was written into the Party statutes as the guide to all work, and Mao was hailed as the greatest theoretical genius in China’s history for his achievement in creating such a remarkable doctrine.

In 1939–1940, when Mao put forward the slogan of “New Democracy,” he felt it necessary to define it as a régime in which proletariat (read Communist Party) and bourgeoisie (read Guomindang) would jointly exercise dictatorship over reactionary and pro-Japanese elements in Chinese society. Even as late as 1945, when the Communists were still in a weaker position than the Guomindang, Mao indicated that this form of rule would be based on free elections with universal suffrage. Later, when the Communist Party had military victory within its grasp and was in a position to do things entirely in its own way, Mao would state forthrightly, in “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” that such a dictatorship could in fact just as well be called a “People’s Democratic Autocracy.” In other words, it was to be democratic only in the sense that it served the people’s interests; in form, it was to exercise its authority through a “powerful state apparatus.”

In 1946, when the failure of General George Marshall’s attempts at mediation led to renewed civil war, Mao and his comrades revived the policies of land reform which had been suspended during the alliance with the Guomindang, and thereby recreated a climate of agrarian revolution. Thus national and social revolution were interwoven in the strategy which ultimately brought final victory in 1949.

In March 1949, Mao declared that though the Chinese revolution had previously taken the path of surrounding the cities from the countryside, henceforth the building of socialism would take place in the orthodox way, with leadership and enlightenment radiating outward from the cities to the countryside. Looking at the twenty-seven years under Mao’s leadership after 1949, however, the two most striking developments—the chiliasmic hopes of instant plenty which characterized the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, and the anxiety about the corrupting effects of material progress, coupled with a nostalgia for “military communism,” which underlay the Cultural Revolution—both bore the mark of rural utopianism. Thus Mao’s road to power, though it led to total victory over the Nationalists, also cultivated in Mao himself, and in the Party, attitudes which would subsequently engender great problems.

Revolution in its Leninist guise has loomed large in the world for most of the twentieth century, and the Chinese revolution has been, with the Russian revolution, one of its two most important manifestations. The Bolshevik revolution set a pattern long regarded as the only standard of communist orthodoxy, but the revolutionary process in China was in some respects even more remarkable. Although communism now appears bankrupt throughout much of the world, the impact of Mao is still a living reality in China more than two decades after his death. Following the Tiananmen events of June 1989, the continuing relevance of Mao’s political and ideological heritage was heavily stressed by the Chinese leadership, and elements of a new Mao cult even emerged. While that tendency has faded in recent years, the symbolic importance of Mao as the creator of the new China has thus far largely ruled out serious criticism of the Chairman.

Though the ultimate outcome of these recent trends remains uncertain, the problem of how to come to terms with the modern world, while retaining China’s own identity, still represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Chinese. Mao did not solve it, but he boldly grappled with the political and intellectual challenge of the West as no Chinese ruler before him had done. If Lenin has suffered the ultimate insult of being replaced by Peter the Great as the symbol of Russian national identity, it could be argued that Mao cannot, like Lenin, be supplanted by a figure analogous to Peter because he himself played the role of China’s first modernizing and Westernizing autocrat. However misguided many of Mao’s ideas, and however flawed his performance, his efforts in this direction will remain a benchmark to a people still struggling to define their place in the community of nations.
Introduction

By January 1939, following the recently concluded Sixth Plenum, Mao Zedong had emerged as the most important single leader of the Chinese Communist Party and the organizational structures it had called into being. The problem of Zhang Guotao, culminating in Zhang’s abandonment of the Communist Party and defection to the Guomindang in April 1938, was well behind him now. The more formidable challenge posed by Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) and the “Returned Students” had also been in significant measure overcome. Mao had succeeded in detaching a number of these young, well-educated, and often Russian-trained Communists from Wang Ming’s faction, either winning them over to his side or inducing them to remain neutral. He accomplished this task partly by persuasion, partly by judicious use of organizational means and personnel assignments, and partly through Moscow’s recognition of his leadership. At least equally important, however, was the fact that his policies were proving more effective than alternatives earlier proposed by erstwhile or potential rivals: his program of self-reliant guerrilla warfare and the establishment of base areas behind Japanese lines, his insistence on a flexible united front (with the Guomindang, with regional leaders, and with various social elements such as rich peasants and “patriotic” landlords), and his approaches to Party and army building were paying off.

Nevertheless, at this time, Mao had not yet reached the towering and unquestioned status, both ideological and organizational, that he would achieve in the years ahead. Mao had become somewhat more than primus inter pares, but he was surrounded by strong-willed and capable comrades, who did not feel dwarfed or intimidated by him. These were fellow revolutionaries who had fought alongside him—and sometimes contended with him—during the years when he was far from predominant. They were prepared, on occasion, to speak frankly, but they now recognized his leadership and, with rare exceptions, deferred to it. It was only after the Rectification (Zhengfeng) campaign of 1942–1943, and especially after the Seventh Party Congress of 1945, that Mao was apotheosized as the charismatic embodiment of the Chinese Communist Party and the revolution being made in its name. During the eight years of the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong thus rose from contender to leader and then to virtual demigod.

During the three years documented in this volume, we see Mao Zedong in the second phase—that of “leader”—in his ascent toward the pinnacle of power, following the “contender” stage running from the Zunyi Conference (January 1935) to the Sixth Plenum. Partly the source of correct theoretical understanding and of mobilizational energy, Mao was also during these years very much the busy executive, with his hands on all manner of political, military, economic, social, and cultural matters, both large and small, important and trivial. At the same time, he
was well advanced in building the coalition which, under his overall guidance, would lead the Communist Party and the Communist movement in China for more than two decades into the future.

Despite the richness of the writings contained in this volume, we see Mao Zedong only in some dimensions of his being. Of his personal side we catch only a fugitive glimpse now and then. Of the texture of life in Yan’an we see virtually nothing. David E. Apter and Tony Saich have evoked very well this gap in our apprehension of Mao’s Yan’an experience. Even after visiting Mao’s cave dwellings, they write, it remains difficult to imagine the sounds and scenes as they must have been, the clink of weapons and gear, the snort of horses. Missing is the sense of constant movement, couriers, dispatch riders, delegations, clusters of militia, or the smell of cooking pots, manure.1

Regarding the actual handling of day-to-day business, we are also partly in the dark. We know that conferences and meetings of all types took up a great deal of Mao’s time; chronologies indicate that almost every day Mao attended one or more meetings, many of which must have lasted for hours. But from the materials in this volume, we can infer only a little about how information was collected, processed, and exchanged; whether the many documents consigned by Mao were drafted primarily by him or were a collegial product; or the flow of communications into Yan’an, to which Mao was responding. Reading these documents thus somewhat resembles hearing only one side of a telephone conversation. Some information about these matters can be found in the detailed chronology of Mao’s life published in Beijing on the occasion of his centenary,2 but many points remain obscure.

Until late November 1938, Mao and other senior Party leaders lived in cave dwellings on Phoenix Hill, within the perimeter of Yan’an itself. Central Committee headquarters was also in this vicinity. But after Japanese aircraft bombed the town, Mao and the Central Committee moved to the greater safety of Yangjialing, about two miles northwest. Somewhat later, perhaps in 1942, he moved even farther out, to the Date Garden (Zaoyuan). Midway between Yan’an and Yangjialing was Wangjiaping, where the Military Affairs Commission and Eighth Route Army headquarters were located. Mao also had quarters there, which he probably occupied when military affairs were particularly pressing.

Many observers report that Mao created a singular impression on those around him. He was never fully predictable. Sometimes he was aloof, guarded, and suspicious, seeking to draw out the views of others without revealing his own. But on other occasions, he appears charming—chatty, informal, and unpretentious. Some observers also noted his unusual work habits, especially his penchant for working late into the night, when meetings were over, it was finally quiet, and the “constant movement” had ceased. His comments on the philosophy of Confucius and Mozi sent to Chen Boda (February 1, 1939) and Zhang Wentian (February 20 and 22, 1939) are marked “at night.” Yet, given the volume of business he attended to, both important and routine, he must have maintained some semblance of a regular schedule. At any hour, Mao seems clearly to have been the magnetic center of energy on every occasion where he was present.

This was also a time of change in Mao’s personal life, for in late 1938, he began living with Jiang Qing and was considered married to her by 1939. This relationship was apparently frowned upon by some of his colleagues, who thought unseemly and uncomradely his treatment of his former wife, He Zizhen, and his infatuation with this much younger actress of suspect background.3 In early 1939, Mao sent his new wife to Nanniwan, an agricultural colony and model of self-sufficiency, some thirty miles southeast of Yan’an. There she reportedly spent about six months. By midyear, after her return, she was pregnant with the daughter she bore Mao.4

Our only glimpses of Mao as a father during these three years are two letters to his sons, Mao Anying—later killed in the Korean War—and Mao Anqing (August 26, 1939, and January 31, 1941). Born to Mao’s first wife, Yang Kaihui, the two boys were then teenagers who had been sent to the Soviet Union. These letters, though brief, seem to mix a degree of warmth with the sort of paternal advice Polonius gave to Laertes, urging them to work hard and preserve a modest attitude.

In 1939, Mao continued to hold the positions he had already achieved: a leading member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, with consequent authority over the Central Committee’s Secretariat, and head of the Military Affairs Depart-

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2. See Mao Zedong nianpu (Chronological biography of Mao Zedong), ed. Pang Xianzhi (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 3 vols. Since Mao Zedong is the central figure in our edition, the short title for this work is simply Nianpu; in the case of similar chronological biographies of other figures, such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, our short title includes the name of the subject. Material relevant to the present volume is to be found in Vol. 2 of the Nianpu, covering the period July 1937–August 1945.

3. Even today the details of Mao’s marital and family life are not altogether clear. His marriage to He Zizhen, who had accompanied him on the Long March and had borne five of his children, broke down in mid-1937, when she violently confronted him (in the presence of Agnes Smedley) concerning his affair with the glamorous actress/interpreter, Lily Wu. Shortly thereafter she was sent to the Soviet Union, ostensibly for medical treatment. See Janice and Stephen R. MacKinnon, Agnes Smedley: The Life and Times of an American Radical (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 187–92; Roxane Witke, Comrade Chiang Ch’ing (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 152ff; Ross Terrill, Madame Mao, The White-Boned Demon (New York: Morrow, 1984), ch. 4.

4. In addition to her own daughter, Jiang Qing also raised the youngest of He Zizhen’s daughters. To both of them, she gave her own natal surname, Li. He’s daughter, born in 1936 or 1937, was called Li Min; her own daughter (b. 1940), Li Na. To Roxane Witke, Jiang Qing firmly denied rumors that she had other children by Mao. See Witke, Comrade Chiang Ch’ing, pp. 164–65.
ment. Although Mao did not become chairman of the Politburo and the Secretariat until 1943, in the aftermath of the Rectification Campaign, he certainly had sufficient organizational strength at this time to undergird his growing prestige and to put his stamp on the Chinese Communist movement.

At first glance, the years from 1939 through 1941 might appear to mark a lull in the development of “the thought of Mao Zedong,” but such a view is misleading. It is true that Mao produced fewer lengthy and strikingly original works than he had between the end of the Long March and the Sixth Plenum. Nevertheless, his writings during this period exhibit significant developments in his political perspective and tactical line.

These three years were by far the bleakest, harshest, and most perilous of the entire war. Beginning in 1939, conditions became increasingly difficult for the Chinese Communist Party and the base areas under its control, and these circumstances deeply affected Mao’s literary output. Japanese pacification efforts were stepped up, relations with the Guomindang were deteriorating and conflict with its armed forces became more frequent and more ferocious, capitulation was a serious danger, and China’s international isolation reached its deepest point. Thus Mao’s theoretical positions and the policy directions derived from them were put under severe and sustained pressure. It is quite likely that, if his policies had proved unsuccessful, his ideological and organizational primacy would have been called in question and perhaps challenged. Since that was not the case, Raymond Wylie is justified in calling this period, “the emergence of the prophet.”5 Beyond any question, the Mao Zedong we see in this volume is a figure of remarkable suppleness and versatility. As Apter and Saich put it:

In virtually every major essay, Mao deals in some fashion with large themes in the context of specific events. He is good at making connections between abstract thought and empirical knowledge. . . . Mao had an extraordinary ability to think on several levels at once, and could grasp the central issues and the large concerns.6

These traits—this ability to shift registers, this capacity to retain simultaneously a sense of the whole and a grasp of the disaggregated specific, this feeling for the dualistic and contradictory nature of social, political, and military realities—are nearly everywhere displayed in the writings of these years. This protean quality makes difficult any simple or straightforward classification of Mao’s writings.

From one perspective, these writings are rooted in and grow from earlier statements, for example, from the philosophical positions expressed in his “Lecture


Notes on Dialectical Materialism” of 1937, from which “On Practice” and “On Contradiction” were later derived, or from the military and political positions delineated in “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan,” “On Protracted War,” and “On the New Stage.” Yet these three years contain several statements of enduring importance. “Introducing The Communist” (October 4, 1939), “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” (December 15, 1939), and “On New Democracy” (January 15, 1940) laid out a new and firmer line regarding relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. “On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas” (March 6, 1940), “Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front” (March 11, 1940), and “Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught” (May 8, 1941) were important contributions to Mao’s military and strategic thought. Finally, “Reform Our Study” (May 1941) was a harbinger of the great Rectification Campaign of 1942–1943.

Laid into the analyses and policies set forth in these writings like individual tiles set into the larger designs of a mosaic are the highly concrete and specific writings that constitute so much of the bulk of this volume, in the same way that these writings fit into the even larger design of Mao’s thought as a whole. Apter and Saich speak of Mao’s alchemical talent for transmuting experience, including the most mundane concrete activities, into revolutionary narratives summing up the significance of events at various levels. These narratives, which “were made to fit inside each other like nesting boxes,” deal with the long story of the disasters caused by external imperialism and domestic reaction; the struggle between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek for the inheritance of Sun Yat-sen; the struggle against Japan and the building of territorial bases behind enemy lines under Communist leadership; and struggles within the Chinese Communist Party itself between Mao and his rivals, with their contending claims to higher truth.7

These four stories taken together constitute what Franz Schurmann has characterized as the “thought (sixiang) of Mao Zedong,” which rendered operational, concrete, and snifed the abstract “theory (liulan)” of Marx and Lenin.8 Thus, whether one speaks of “narratives” or of “thought,” the result is to endow with location, meaning, linkage (upward toward greater generalization or downward toward greater specificity) any event, big or small, within this differentiated totality.

Despite his narrative skills, during the 1939–1941 period Mao does not yet appear to claim the omniscience later attributed to him. He complains of his own shallow historical knowledge, and he asks other comrades for both information and opinions. Many of the writings included here are consigned and were in some cases shaped by extensive discussion at Party meetings. Although by this stage Mao’s theoretical for-

mutations were well developed, he had not yet elevated "thought" to the level where it defined and hence determined reality. Reality could still exercise some influence, albeit a narrowing influence, over the content and structure of "thought."

Nevertheless, we should not expect that, despite his overall and cumulative cogency, Mao would be always at the top of his game. Indeed, many of his writings here convey the tentativeness of someone thinking aloud, of trying out ideas on paper to see them more clearly. There are arenas and occasions—his analysis of international affairs and his treatment of conflict with the Nationalists in central China in late 1940 and early 1941 are perhaps the most salient examples—when Mao appears mercurial, contradictory, less than prescient. Sometimes, as in several of his public addresses and in some writings, Mao simply rambles in a way that must have confused his audience and confounded a stenographer ("The Current Situation and Our Party's Policy," July 13, 1940, is a good example).

For the sake of clarity, we will take up in turn the four narrative levels referred to above: international setting, including Japanese imperialism; relations between the Communists and the Guomindang; military struggle and the development of base areas; and Mao's progress toward primacy within the Chinese Communist Party. In each case, we will seek to tie our discussion of Mao's words as closely as possible to the specific events and the actual political, military, and social settings which gave rise to them. As we do so, however, we must realize that we are unraveling into separate and partial narratives a single historical fabric of events in which all the strands were both interwoven and interactive. Reading the documents straight through in chronological order will help to restore the confusions and complexities with which Mao and his colleagues had to deal.

A Dynamic International Setting, 1939–1941

In international affairs, Mao Zedong quite predictably keyed his analysis to China's War of Resistance against Japan and to the welfare of the Chinese Communist Party. At the beginning of 1939, tensions ran high in Europe, but war had not yet broken out. Nevertheless the Communist Party's views, which doubtless reflected Mao's own, closely followed Stalin's assessment: that the looming prospect of war was a contest among factions within the capitalist-imperialist camp, and a plague on both the fascist and bourgeois nations. Only the Soviet Union represented peace and international justice, and only China—supported by the Soviet Union—was actively engaged, against Japan, in the struggle for independence and justice. From time to time, Mao spoke with appreciation of the financial and military aid China was receiving from the Soviet Union, without noting that it was all flowing to the Chinese Nationalists (something which, we know from other sources, rankled him).9

Mao occasionally hinted, but did not explicitly assert in the writings here, that China was also assisting the Soviet Union by diverting Japan from what many in that country saw as her natural and eventual enemy.

Throughout 1939 and most of 1940, Mao was both hostile toward and contemptuous of Great Britain, France, and the United States. First, Great Britain and France were themselves imperialistic and had no interest in, or a positive dislike for, struggles for national independence in the colonies and semicolonies. Second, Europe was the scene of their vital interests, not the remote reaches of Asia. As for the United States, it would refuse to become directly involved, preferring as Mao often said, "to sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight."

On occasions too frequent to be enumerated (and therefore indicating a deep level of concern), Mao and the Chinese Communist Party predicted, warned against, and sought to prevent what they called "a Far Eastern Munich," by analogy with the original Munich conference of late September 1938. Just as that conference appeased Hitler and left the fate of Czechoslovakia to his tender mercies without any Czech representation, Mao feared the same sort of appeasement in Asia by the Western powers, leading essentially to recognition of and acquiescence in Japan's position in East Asia, especially China.

A "Far Eastern Munich" would also be likely, in Mao's view, to have profound implications within China. Isolated from outside support and facing an unbridled Japan, confidence in ultimate victory and the will to continue resistance might be sapped and the tide of capitulation grow. The defection of Wang Jingwei to the Japanese side in December 1938 was but the most spectacular evidence of capitulationist sentiment. Even more worrisome was the possibility that Chiang Kaishek himself might seek peace or accept one of the many Japanese proffers.

Mao understood that capitulation—a Sino-Japanese "accommodation"—was inseparable from anti-communism. Japan was, after all, an active member of the anti-Comintern pact (1936), and coming to terms with Japan would inevitably mean embracing that position. Should such a disastrous turn occur, the Chinese Communist Party, as the only remaining force within China which stood both for national independence and for internal reform, would face, alone, the combined power of both foreign and domestic enemies. Not only Wang Jingwei but others (identified by the Communists as "pro-Japanese elements"), such as He Yingqin, who were still close to Chiang Kaishek, had in one way or another expressed the view that the Communists were a more fundamental and serious threat than the Japanese. As the war in China moved toward stalemate, and particularly as strategic Japanese offensives against Nationalist forces wound down, Mao believed that the danger of such a "turn for the worse" was further aggravated. Mao's writings on international affairs and the worldwide strategic situation are notably dogmatic and rigid by comparison with his treatment of domestic affairs, where he was clearly more at home, more knowledgeable, and more supple.

A large part of Mao's analysis, shaped as it was by ideological categories, was devoted to whether the international situation made capitulation—and especially

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Chiang's capitulation—to Japan more or less likely. On some occasions, Mao wrote as though Chiang's actions would be determined largely by international rather than domestic considerations. Therefore, the most fundamental domestic policy derived from this analysis was to do everything possible to keep Chiang Kaishek and the National Government actively engaged in the war.

Although the tone of references to Chiang differs somewhat between public and confidential inner-Party statements, the message is entirely consistent: unless or until Chiang actively surrenders to the Japanese, treat him with respect, praise all indications of resistance on his part, and blame anti-Communist or peace-seeking measures on misguided subordinates or traitorous "pro-Japanese elements." Criticism of Chiang himself, if offered at all, should be circumspect and restrained. These approaches were stressed, especially, at times when Chiang's actions were most suspect: when it appeared most likely that he might abandon the war and come to terms with Japan. As those dangers receded, as Chiang seemed more unlikely to accommodate Japan and root out the Communists, Mao and the Communist Party could be correspondingly more forthright in word and deed.

This analysis continued essentially unchanged through 1939 and most of 1940, even through the stunning news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, immediately followed by the partition of Poland. Although Stalin's volte-face caught the Chinese—Chiang as well as Mao—by surprise, Mao put the best possible face on this radical realignment. While it must have been awkward to switch off the anti-fascist rhetoric previously aimed at Germany, from the standpoint of the Chinese Communist Party a reduction of the threat to the Soviet Union in Europe complicated Japan's position in Asia. Thus Mao declared on September 1:

The Soviet-German nonaggression pact is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government. The signing of the pact is no accident and has great significance. The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie . . . sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, exposed the lies of this reactionary clique against communism and the Communist International, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany . . . . In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China's forces of resistance, and deals a blow to the captulators. 10

This line was followed by the Chinese Communist Party during the balance of 1939 and throughout 1940. The outbreak of the European war in September 1939 simply reinforced it. Late that month, Mao told Edgar Snow that "the Soviet Union will not participate in this war, because both sides are imperialists, and it is simply a robber war with justice on neither side." 11 The following spring and summer, with the unstoppable German blitzkrieg overrunning the Low Countries and France, and with British forces driven in disarray across the Channel, China could expect even less in the way of support and even more in the way of appeasement of Japan in Asia. Beleaguered, Great Britain capitulated in July to Japanese demands that the Burma Road and Hong Kong be closed to China, thus breaking the last tenuous links with the Western world. Needless to say, the Vichy French government accepted every Japanese demand concerning Indochina and the Yunnan rail line. The Soviet Union—fearful of both Germany and Japan, dreading the possibility of a two-front war, and needing to build up his own forces—was gradually phasing out military aid to China.

During the summer of 1940, China was isolated as never before, outside assistance was more distant than ever, and Nationalist surrender was by no means out of the question. France had been defeated, and the Battle of Britain was very much in the balance. The United States, just awakening from isolationism, was looking more toward Europe than toward Asia; meanwhile, strong voices in the United States argued that no vital interests were at stake in Asia.

One might suggest that these circumstances caused the gradual softening in Mao's outlook late in 1940, as U.S. involvement in the conflict appeared nearer. Similarly, references to a Far Eastern Munich became less frequent. Doubts, however, still remained; in October, a secret telegram to Zhou Enlai in Chongqing contained the following:

America's preparations are not complete, so it might not enter the war right away. If Germany invades England, the United States navy will have to respond immediately in the Atlantic, and will not be able to concentrate its forces to deal with the Pacific, so when Japan attacks various places in Southeast Asia, a war between Japan and America will not necessarily result. 12

The year 1941 was a time of cataclysmic change in international affairs. Three great events affected the world, China, and the Chinese Communist movement. These were the five-year nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Japan (April 13); the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22), and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7). The first of these relieved Stalin of worry that he might face a two-front war; the second and the third merged the related but separate conflicts in Europe and Asia into one huge global war. From this year came the realignments and alliances that continued until the war ended in 1945.

10. "Interview with a New China Daily Correspondent on the New International Situation" (September 1, 1939), translated below. Passages deleted from the Selected Works are here italicized, as they are in all texts in this edition for which the original version is available to us. (See below, the "Note on Sources and Conventions.")

11. Interview with Edgar Snow on September 26, 1939, reproduced below.

The Soviet-Japanese pact was a blow both to Chiang Kaishek and to Mao Zedong because it meant that, in return for Stalin’s increased security in the Far East, Japan no longer had to worry about conflict with the Soviet Union and could devote more energy to the war in China, to the further domination and exploitation of Southeast Asian resources, and to the coming showdown with the United States. As recently as March 1941, Mao had written that if Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, war would break out soon, and that such an accord would cause the deterioration of relations between the Nationalists and the Communists, and between China and the Soviet Union. 13 The Chinese Communist Party therefore had to swallow hard even to appear supportive of this arrangement between its mortal enemy and its fraternal socialist comrade. This it did in a statement drafted by Mao and published on April 16, 1941, calling the pact a victory for peace and an elevation of the Soviet Union’s international standing.

This statement also argues, in terms that ring quite hollow, that the Soviet Union would still continue to aid China and that Stalin’s promises not to invade Manchuria (Manchukuo) or Outer Mongolia were, whatever one might think, helpful to China’s struggle. The statement ends with reiteration of the three fundamental wartime policies: unwavering resistance to Japan, continued cooperation between the Guomindang and the CCP, and ending “of all kinds of reactionary domestic policies.” 14 The following day, in a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao asserted that the Soviet-Japanese pact was “a severe blow to Chiang,” who had been counting on the Soviet Union for support against Japan, and that it would make both capitulation and anti-communism more difficult for Chiang. 15

Equally striking was the reaction to German invasion of the Soviet Union, beginning on June 22, 1941. In this case, also, the initial response was drafted by Mao, on behalf of the Central Committee. Hitler’s attack was, Mao said,

a perfidious crime of aggression not only against the Soviet Union but against the freedom and independence of all nations. . . The task in the world now is to mobilize the people of all countries and organize an international united front to fight international fascism and defend the Soviet Union, defend China, and defend the freedom and independence of all nations. . . .

In foreign relations, unite against the common foe with everybody in Britain, the United States and other countries who is opposed to the fascist rulers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. 16

In another telegram, drafted on June 26, Mao declared:

England, America, and China stand on the side of the Soviet Union. At present there is a confrontation between the fascist and antifascist fronts, of which the prospects are advantageous for the Soviet Union and for China. The current situation in China may change for the better. Our orientation is to secure such a change, and to strike at the Japanese invaders. 17

This completed the reorientation of Mao’s international policy line: those who in 1939 and 1940 had been bourgeois imperialists, fully as complicit as the Axis powers in the initiation of global conflict, were now united front allies in the struggle against fascism and for independence. Given Mao’s conviction that dualities lie at the heart of every phenomenon, this reorientation could be viewed as a working out of contradictions in the international arena, not simply as an abandonment of previously held positions. Here, as both earlier and later, Mao’s capacity to argue either side of a position in accordance with dialectics and contradiction served him well.

Finally, of course, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, made comrades-in-arms of the Allied Powers, the Soviet Union, and China. The Politburo was rapidly convened, and Mao proposed that a statement regarding these events be issued. After two days of discussion such a document, which had been revised by Mao, was put out in the name of the Central Committee on December 9. Its language was categorical:

This Pacific War is an unjust war launched by the Japanese fascists for the sake of aggression against the United States, Britain, and other countries. On the part of the United States, Britain, and other countries who have risen to resist this aggression, it is a just war of liberation in defense of independence, freedom, and democracy. . . . China must establish a military alliance with Britain, the United States, and other friendly countries fighting Japan, . . . and persevere in fighting the war against Japan until victory is complete. 18

In speaking to the Politburo on December 8, Mao had enumerated six points about the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, which, he said, were advantageous both to the Soviet Union and to China: (1) the Japanese armies in China would be weakened; (2) Guomindang attacks on the border region might be reduced; (3) pro-Japanese and pro-German factions would be hard hit, thus enhancing the prospects for persuading the Guomindang not to capitulate; (4) the future

13. See below, his dispatch to Zhou Enlai, March 17, 1941.
14. See below, the “Views expressed by the Chinese Communist Party on the Publication of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact,” April 1941. At the Politburo meeting which adopted the statement he had drafted, Mao observed that, with the signature of this treaty, the Soviet Union and Japan both gained more freedom, but that the problem of China had not been resolved. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 288.
15. See Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 288. The text of this telegram is not available to us.
16. See the “Decision Regarding the International United Front Against Fascism,” June 23, 1941, translated below.
17. This brief extract is given in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 309. The full text of the telegram is not available, nor is it known to whom it was addressed.
18. See below, the “Declaration of the Chinese Communist Party Regarding the War in the Pacific,” December 9, 1941. (Because of the international date line, the attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 8 Chinese time, so the Politburo did not wait a day before meeting.)
prospects for democracy in China would be improved; (5) the Soviet Union could move troops from the East to the West; (6) there was the possibility of a second front in Europe. The war in Europe would be shortened, but the war in the Pacific might be lengthened, though in the end British and U.S. forces would defeat Japan.19

Yet Mao still privately harbored serious doubts. In a confidential telegram to Zhou Enlai, he speculated accurately that during “the next half-year, neither Britain nor the United States can compete against Japan,” and he predicted that most of their Asian possessions would be lost. Nevertheless, “if two or three strongholds such as Singapore, Manila, and Darwin can be saved, a situation of stalemate will occur in six months. Then we can wait until the Japanese army is exhausted before launching a counterattack.” Vigorous efforts to open a second front in Europe could mean that “Germany can be finished off more quickly,” thus freeing resources for the war against Japan. “But,” Mao added, “do the indolent British and U.S. military and political personnel have the necessary stamina?”20

The New Stage: Cooperation and Conflict with the Guomindang

In 1939 as before, Mao continued to insist that Japanese aggression and the War of Resistance constituted the principal and antagonistic contradiction, which forced all other contradictions—including relationships with Chiang Kaishek and class struggle within Chinese society—into secondary, nonantagonistic positions. During 1938, Mao had presented in detail his views on the current situation in China’s struggle against Japan. In “On Protracted War” (May 1938) and “On the New Stage” (October 1938), Mao argued that the War of Resistance against Japan would be divided into three strategic phases: strategic retreat, stalemate, and strategic offensive.21 The second, or stalemate, stage, of indefinite but prolonged duration, was the pivotal stage during which first-stage imbalances of power would be gradually and cumulatively reversed, with China gaining strength and Japan becoming progressively weaker. Mao repeatedly stressed his confidence in ultimate victory and refuted with equal firmness those who believed in quick victory and those who felt that no victory was possible.

By early 1939, after the fall of Wuhan to the Japanese, Mao believed that the first phase was winding down and was more or less at an end. In October 1938, when Wuhan, Chiang’s temporary capital, was about to fall, Mao argued that Japan would gradually shift from strategic offense to a more defensive posture, though fairly large tactical operations were still likely. This was the “new stage” which China was now entering, a stage that would bring with it such difficulties as the growing dangers of puppet governments, capitulation, greater anti-Communist

pressures both from Japan and domestically, and pessimism within China. In late December 1938, Mao’s foresight was confirmed by the defection of Chiang Kaishek’s most formidable rival, Wang Jingwei, to the Japanese side.

At the heart of the Chinese Communist Party’s united front policy toward the Guomindang (which was only one aspect of the united front policy in general) was one of those Machiavellian contradictions so characteristic of Mao Zedong: how to champion unified and unconditional resistance to Japan while simultaneously expanding Communist influence at Nationalist expense, without pushing the Nationalists into Japanese arms. Mao therefore had to calibrate Communist Party actions so that Chiang Kaishek would not angrily conclude that peace with Japan was preferable to toleration of continued Communist expansion. The trick was to push to the very brink of rupture, but not into the abyss of Sino-Japanese peace and the danger of renewed civil war—perhaps with Japanese assistance. Most of Mao’s writings during these three years are relevant to this issue in specific political, military, social, and ideological terms; many address it directly.

Until 1939, relations between the two major parties were perhaps better than many observers had expected. The Chinese Communist Party had been granted at least semilegal status, with a sizable delegation in Wuhan (and later Chongqing), representation in the advisory People’s Political Conference, liaison offices in a number of cities, and publication of a newspaper and a magazine in Guomindang-controlled areas. Furthermore, the national government had acknowledged the existence of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia (Shaan-Gun-Ning) Border Region and the Shangxi-Chahar-Bebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) base in North China; it had authorized both the three divisions comprising the Eighth Route Army (designated by the national government the Eighteenth Group Army) and, later, the New Fourth Army in Central China. Finally, the national government was supplying monthly subsidies of 600,000 yuan to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the Eighteenth Group Army.

For its part, the Chinese Communist Party had recognized the national government as the legitimate government of China and Chiang Kaishek as its leader. It agreed to place its territories and armed forces under the broad authority of the national government, though this was but a fig leaf, hardly disguising their Party’s continued control of lands and armies. It pledged to terminate class struggle and the forcible confiscation of land, and to accept Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles”—which it redefined in its own terms—as the core of its program.22

20. See below, “Estimate of the Situation in the International War;” December 12, 1941. This telegram ends with the full text of the six points Mao had put forward at the Politburo meeting of December 8, indicating that they should not be made public.
This brief era of relative good feeling petered out, however, after the fall of Wuhan and the withdrawal of the national government to Sichuan. In January and February 1939, the Guomindang Central Executive Committee adopted a series of measures designed to restrict Communist influence and reassert the superiority of the Guomindang.23 These actions also reflected “the new stage,” in that the reduction of Japanese pressure allowed the Guomindang breathing space and resources to devote to them. The measures were aimed both at Communist influence in Guomindang-controlled areas and at the base areas themselves.

The first serious clashes between military forces of the two parties came in 1939; they became more widespread and more intense as the Communists sought to expand the territories and populations under their effective control, and the Nationalists sought to restrict or recover these territories, mostly behind Japanese lines.

Nationalist propaganda organs charged bitterly that despite their big talk the Communists had not in fact done much fighting, that their vaunted guerrilla warfare (youdi zhan, literally “moving and hitting”) was all you (“moving”) and no ji (“hitting”).24 Indeed, the Guomindang charged that it was the policy of the Chinese Communist Party to devote 70 percent of its effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the Guomindang, and 10 percent to anti-Japanese operations.25 Although no evidence supports the existence of such an explicit division of effort, the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party could be read in this way, and such propaganda was often effective; the Communists denied it with the vehemence and self-righteous outrage that shows a nerve has been struck.

In 1939, the Nationalists began to impose a progressively tighter blockade around the headquarters in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area and made military efforts to penetrate Communist-influenced areas of North China. This led to what the Communists euphemistically called “friction” (moxi), but which was actually a dirty, ruthless little war-within-a-war.26 Soon the most serious friction was taking place in central China.

In response to these hostile measures on the part of the Guomindang and also, no doubt, because of the confidence inspired in the Communist leadership by the growing power of their guerrilla bases behind the Japanese lines, Mao began in late 1939 to take a much firmer political line in discussing the role of the two parties. In his report of October 1938 to the Sixth Plenum, Mao had hailed the Guomindang as a party which, in the course of its “glorious history” and under the “two great leaders,” Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, had achieved great things for China. The Guomindang, he declared, “occupies the position of leader and backbone” in the anti-Japanese united front, and he predicted “a brilliant future” for it.27

Now, barely a year later, Mao put things very differently. As always, he adapted his message to the audience. In “On New Democracy,” directed at non-Communist intellectuals, he even went so far as to declare that, if the Chinese bourgeoisie (in other words, the Guomindang) could fulfill the responsibility of leading the people to drive out Japanese imperialism and introduce democratic government, “no one will be able to refuse his admiration.” But he made it abundantly clear that he did not believe Chiang Kai-shek could play this role, and therefore the Chinese revolution, which was “a great part of the world revolution,” would have to be led by the Communist Party. In “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” meant primarily for Party members, he stated bluntly, “Unless it is led by the proletariat, the Chinese revolution cannot . . . succeed.” And in his introductory editorial for The Communist, an internal publication which would be seen only by Party members, he did not even raise the question of leadership, but simply assumed that the Communists would exercise it and went on to discuss how they should go about it.28

Military Matters and Base Areas: Resistance and Expansion

Although this change in Mao’s political assessment is worthy of note, the controlling reality of these years was war: kengzhan, or the War of Resistance against Japan. Ostensibly a struggle between Japanese invaders and Chinese defenders, the war was actually several overlapping conflicts, the many interactions among which created an extraordinarily complex picture. On the Chinese side, the two principal forces—the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party—fought quite different wars against Japan. The Nationalists employed mostly conventional military tactics, while at Mao’s insistence the Communists adopted the unconventional guerrilla tactics learned during the prewar decade of internal war and brought them to higher levels of sophistication and effectiveness. Moreover, at times when Japanese military pressure was heaviest on the Nationalists (during the early and late war years), the Communists had a relatively free hand. Conversely, when the

23. These were (a) “Measures to Restrict the Activities of Alien Parties,” (b) “Measures for Dealing with the Communist Problem,” and (c) “Measures for Guarding Against Communist Activities in the Japanese-Occupied Areas.”
24. Referring to this taunt, Mao attributed it to Wang Jingwei, or to reactionary elements sympathetic to Wang (see below, his preface of March 2, 1939, to a book by Nie Rongzhen; his talk of July 9, 1939; and Section VIII of “On New Democracy,” January 1940, pp. 347–49). This manifestly reflected the policy, mentioned above, of avoiding direct criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters.
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28. See below, pp. 340, 300, and 244–54 passim.
This brief era of relative good feeling petered out, however, after the fall of Wuhan and the withdrawal of the national government to Sichuan. In January and February 1939, the Guomindang Central Executive Committee adopted a series of measures designed to restrict Communist influence and reassert the superiority of the Guomindang.23 These actions also reflected "the new stage," in that the reduction of Japanese pressure allowed the Guomindang breathing space and resources to devote to them. The measures were aimed both at Communist influence in Guomindang-controlled areas and at the base areas themselves.

The first serious clashes between military forces of the two parties came in 1939; they became more widespread and more intense as the Communists sought to expand the territories and populations under their effective control, and the Nationalists sought to restrict or recover these territories, mostly behind Japanese lines.

Nationalist propaganda organs charged bitterly that despite their big talk the Communists had not in fact done much fighting, that their vaunted guerrilla war was "youqi zhan, literally "moving and hitting" was all you ("moving") and no ji ("hitting").24 Indeed, the Guomindang charged that it was the policy of the Chinese Communist Party to devote 70 percent of its effort to expansion, 20 percent to coping with the Guomindang, and 10 percent to anti-Japanese operations.25 Although no evidence supports the existence of such an explicit division of effort, the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party could be read in this way, and such propaganda was often effective; the Communists denied it with the vehemence and self-righteousness that shows a nerve has been struck.

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Nationalist front was stalemated—as was the case during the middle years of the war (including the three years under review here). Japanese efforts to suppress or eliminate Communist-led resistance intensified to ferocious levels.

In idealized versions of the Chinese Communist movement during the Sino-Japanese war, guerrilla warfare occupies a hallowed place, as a special kind of struggle waged by a vanguard army and an aroused populace against foreign invaders and their native collaborators. The people’s inferiority in the hardware of modern warfare is offset by such crucial intangibles as patriotism, strength of purpose, a just cause, correct political stance, effective leadership, the unity of the fighters and the common people *laobaixing*, and endless resourcefulness. Mao Zedong, it is often claimed, brought guerrilla warfare to uncanny levels of effectiveness, and his model of guerrilla war might be adapted to winning revolutions almost anywhere—in Vietnam, in Peru, Cuba, or elsewhere. In the process, “guerrilla warfare” has become reified, a shibboleth to be invoked, rather than a description of real people engaged in real conflict.

During the Sino-Japanese War, Mao Zedong made no such extravagant claims for guerrilla war. In a major November 1938 statement, he wrote,

> In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, for only regular warfare can decide the final outcome of the war. ... In the intermediate stage [i.e., strategic stalemate] guerrilla warfare will become primary and regular warfare supplementary, because the enemy will be holding on to the areas he has occupied and we will be preparing for the counteroffensive, but will not yet be ready to launch it. Though this stage will possibly be the longest, it is still only one of the three stages in the entire war. If we take the war as a whole, therefore, regular warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary. Unless we understand this . . . we shall be unable to defeat Japan.\(^\text{29}\)

We know that a sharp debate over military strategy had finally been resolved by the time of the Sixth Plenum, with Mao’s insistence on guerrilla warfare having prevailed over some professionally minded generals who preferred regular warfare. One might argue that Mao was here seeking to reassure the generals that he too believed in regular warfare—in principle, in the past, and in the indefinite future. Meanwhile, he was winning his point by affirming the centrality of guerrilla warfare—in practice and for a present of considerable duration. Even if this is true, as it may well be, Mao was not being hypocritical. No evidence suggests that Mao then believed guerrilla warfare *by itself* could defeat Japan.\(^\text{30}\) The purposes of warfare, however defined, were to inflict casualties on the enemy, to clear territories which could then be organized into base areas, and to defend those base areas against attack from the Japanese, from puppets, or from Guomindang-controlled armies.

Because the Japanese occupation of North China had been at first very superficial, limited as it was to the major cities and the communications lines connecting them (the so-called “point-and-line occupation”), vast regions of the countryside were opened up to the Communists. While the Nationalists were being driven westward out of their most economically developed and politically reliable strongholds in the lower and central Yangzi region, Communist forces expanded eastward behind Japanese lines.

Thus, during the first year and a half of the war, through 1938, the Chinese Communist Party had succeeded in establishing its influence in much of North China behind Japanese lines. This was most evident in various regions of Shanxi and Hebei Provinces, where organized political structures were being set up, but it was also present in Chahar, Shandong, and Henan. In Central China, the New Fourth Army was still in its formative stage, but had created military and political nuclei both north and south of the Yangzi River.

These early beginnings were already growing into the anti-Japanese base areas which would form the true foundation of Communist power as the war continued. Mao Zedong understood that expansion behind Japanese lines certified the patriotic credentials of the Chinese Communist Party while simultaneously vastly increasing the territory, population, and resources of the Party. In 1939, as noted above, things began to change. Determined to take countermeasures, the Guomindang took threefold action: first, to blockade the headquarters area of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (the Yan’an base), and to restore the Guomindang’s own presence in areas behind Japanese lines in North China where base areas had already been established; second, to oppose vigorously the intrusion and expansion of Communist forces behind Japanese lines in Central China, where Nationalist forces still existed, but where the Communists’ New Fourth Army, reinforced by Eighth Route Army detachments sent southward, were becoming increasingly aggressive; and, third, to restrict, as much as politically possible, Communist activities in Guomindang-controlled areas of unoccupied China.\(^\text{31}\)

Later in the year, about 400,000 Nationalist troops were stationed in a blockade around the western and southern sides of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and the monthly subsidy to the Communists was terminated. Armed clashes between Nationalist (or regional) and Communist forces were also beginning to


\(^{30}\) Later, in 1948 and 1949, as victory over the Guomindang became more certain, Mao came closer to making such claims for guerrilla war. For example, he praised the victory of "millet and rifles" over "aircraft and artillery." In fact, however, by 1948 the Chinese Communist Party was indeed shifting to regular warfare and strategic counteroffensive against the Guomindang, using massive amounts of former Japanese and U.S.-made weapons and other equipment captured from (or surrendered by) Nationalist forces.

\(^{31}\) Actions aimed at the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the North China bases, in mid- and late 1939, constituted what the Chinese Communists called "the first anti-Communist upsurge" (or "high tide"). Conflicts in Central China, mainly in 1940 and culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941, were "the second anti-Communist upsurge." Suppression of Communist activity throughout Guomindang-occupied areas took place, with varying degrees of severity, throughout the rest of the war. See above, note 23.
occur. These escalated in the fall and winter of 1939–1940 into what the CCP called "the first anti-Communist upsurge." This was marked by Nationalist probing operations against exposed parts of the Shaan-Gan-Ning perimeter, by more determined Nationalist efforts to intrude its armies into Communist-controlled bases in Shanxi and Hebei provinces, and—most spectacularly—by Yan Xishan's split with the Chinese Communist Party.22 By spring 1940, however, the immediate crisis had passed; the Communists considered that the "upsurge" had been beaten back.

Throughout 1939 and into 1940, Mao addressed himself far more often to the problem of military relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang than he did to operations against the Japanese. This was not because he thought the latter less important than the former. Clearly, the war against the Japanese was utterly fundamental. But basic principles, strategies, and tactics had been enunciated earlier, during the first two years of the war—especially in "Problems of Strategy in the Guerrilla War Against Japan" (May 1938) and "On Protracted War" (also May 1938). By the Sixth Plenum, Mao's arguments had substantially carried the day, and his policies of base-building and independence within the united front framework had proved themselves in practice.

Thus, while the anti-Japanese effort remained crucial and extremely difficult, it was no longer so problematic as in the past. Much more difficult to manage were relations with various non-Communist military forces. Mao insisted on following a selective policy which employed both struggle (which the Chinese Communist Party, as noted above, called "friction") and conciliation, which he summarized under the three headings "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint" (you-li, you-li, you-je). Mao explained what he meant:

First, the principle of self-defense. . . . [W]e must never attack others without provocation, but once attacked we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of our struggle. Second, the principle of victory; we must never fight without a plan, without preparation, and without certainty of success. We must know how to exploit the contradictions among the die-hards and must not take on too many of them at a single time, but must direct our blows to the most reactionary of them first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Third, the principle of a truce. After repulsing one diehard attack, we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close before another attack is made on us. A truce should be made in the interval. We should then take the initiative in seeking unity with the diehards and, if they concur, we should make a peace agreement with them.33

The present task for our side is to strive for internal peace in the major regions so that we may be able to concentrate our forces to consolidate our positions within half a year. . . . If our military counteroffensive does not stop . . . the intermediate factions may regard us as too extreme and too excessive. There will then be the possibility that we might lose the sympathy of the intermediate factions. Therefore, whether from the point of view of consolidating our forces, or from the point of view of striving to win over the sympathy of the intermediate factions, it is necessary to halt temporarily the military struggle between the two sides.34

The other side of Mao's dialectical coin was his determination to continue the expansion of Communist influence and base areas. As to the regions in which base areas should be developed, during 1939 Mao spoke most often about consolidating the North China bases and expanding southward. For example, in March he argued:

The emphasis in consolidation should be placed on North China. Development should stress Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei. . . . The three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, in particular, are the centers of the whole country's protracted War of Resistance. . . . Cadres from Yan'an should be used mainly in Central China for a certain period of time in the future.35

Meanwhile, the first significant violence was beginning to take place between Communist-led military units in the base areas and various anti-Communist forces. But where this conflict involved local antagonists, without support at higher levels, it could be handled on the spot and posed no threat to larger united front concerns.

Provincial or warlord forces, often called informally zapai jun ("miscellaneous [i.e., second-rate] armies") could be more formidable and were sometimes used as cat's-paws for broader Nationalist anti-Communist policy. Mao, who knew that these zapai jun were not strong enough to overcome Communist forces, ordained an orchestrated response under the three headings of "justification," "benefit," and "restraint" described above.

22. Yan Xishan was the long-time governor of Shanxi Province. He was sometimes the rival and adversary but sometimes also the ally of Chiang Kai-shek. Since late 1936, the CCP had formed a close united front with Yan, helping him (and itself) to extend and deepen its influence throughout the province—or what was left of it after the Japanese invasion. The split occurred when the differences between Yan and the Communists became irreconcilable. See Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 130–42.


34. "Strive for Internal Peace in the Major Regions and Consolidate the Positions Won," March 5, 1940, translated below.

These tactics were all the more effective because provincial and warlord forces were usually unenthusiastic about trying to overcome the Communist-led base areas in the first place. Their commanders also strongly suspected that Chiang Kai-shek would shed few tears if both they and Chinese Communist forces happened to exhaust themselves in combat. Thus they were likely to accept some tolerable modus vivendi if it was offered to them. They might even be open to the patriotic blandishments of the united front, wishing to avoid being described, in effect, as betrayers of resistance to Japan.

Mao publicly blamed conflict at this level on pro-Japanese or "diehard" (i.e., strongly anti-Communist but not necessarily pro-Japanese) elements, describing them as initiatives that Chiang Kai-shek had not ordered and would have prevented, as harming the united front against Japan, had he known of them in advance. Mao almost certainly did not believe this explanation, but it justified striking back, and he knew that Chiang was in no position to dispute it.

Thus, in January 1940, even while "friction" was at its height in North China, the Party Secretariat sent a directive, drafted by Mao, to the leadership of the Shandong and Central Plains bureaus of the Chinese Communist Party, observing that "the regions in which we can, at present, expand our armed forces are limited principally to Shandong and Central China. . . . We request that you pay serious attention to making the expansion of armed strength the core of your work."36 Shandong was to add 150,000 troops, and the Central Plains bureau 100,000; and each was to aim at ten times that number in self-defense (militia) forces.

By 1940, Mao's concerns for base area expansion and development were increasingly focused on Central China, and upon a secure linkage between the North China bases of the Eighth Route Army and more southerly bases of the New Fourth Army. The thrust of his position was that the New Fourth Army should concentrate its efforts on those portions of Anhui and Jiangsu above the Yangzi River, on both sides of the Grand Canal. More specifically, the Military Affairs Commission, in which Mao was the dominant figure, and the Central Plains Bureau, now headed by Liu Shaoqi, had staked out those portions of Jiangsu north of the Yangzi River as the principal target for expansion, base construction, and linkage with the North China bases. While not ignoring Anhui, Hubei, and Henan, they now considered Jiangsu an altogether more promising area. The principal Nationalist military commander, Han Deqin,37 was a Jiangsu native and protégé of Gu Zhutong,38 but Han's armies were poorly trained, his subordinates were of uncertain loyalty, and he was disliked by many leading lights among the Jiangsu gentry; meanwhile Gu's forces were at a distance, south of the Yangzi River. Adding to these other considerations, the Japanese occupation of northern and central Jiangsu in 1939 and 1940 was very light, with large expanses of the countryside completely devoid of Japanese or even puppet troops.

Anhui was comparatively less attractive than Jiangsu as a target. Closer to reinforcement from unoccupied China, Anhui was under the jurisdiction of Li Zongren39 and the Guanzhi faction, with its better trained and more disciplined forces (the principal political and military commanders in the province were Liao Lei, until his death in late 1939, and then Li Pinxian).40 The Guanzhi faction was less hostile to the Communists than many other forces, at least until Li Pinxian took over, and its relations with Han Deqin were not particularly friendly.

Just how important this cluster of issues was to Mao is shown by the frequency with which he wrote about them. During the first three months of the year, statements concerning base area matters occur frequently. For the period from April to September, they comprise well over half the documents contained in this volume. And during the fall and winter, as Communist forces in Central China vanquished Han Deqin and moved ever closer to the disaster that befell them in the New Fourth Army Incident (January 1941), he spoke of almost nothing else.

Mao was equally concerned about the security and expansion of base areas north of the river and the vulnerability of New Fourth Army units located south of the Yangzi River, including army headquarters under Xiang Ying.41 Indeed, during the latter months of 1939 and the first half of 1940, substantial portions of the New Fourth Army were moved from south of the Yangzi to north of it, mainly across Yangzhong Island, where Guan Wenwei had established a strong presence. Chen Yi, a leading figure from the original nucleus of the New Fourth Army, moved northward with these units and did much to help establish them in central and northern Jiangsu. Other detachments of the New Fourth Army were also moving eastward, from Hubei and western Anhui. These northward and eastward deployments, of course, left the units still remaining south of the river in more vulnerable straits.

Mao first expressed his concern about the exposure of the southern forces in early January 1940, and returned to the subject with increasing frequency throughout

37. Regarding Han Deqin (1892–1988), see below the relevant note to the document of April 5, 1940, and the reference on p. Ivi.
39. Regarding the earlier career of Li Zongren (1893–1966), see Volume V, p. 365, note 1. Since 1937, he had been commander of the Fifth War Area, a post he retained until 1945.
40. Regarding Li Pinxian (1892–1987), see below, the relevant note to the document of March 16, 1940.
41. Regarding the early career of Xiang Ying (1897–1941), see Volume IV, p. xxxii, note 8, and the numerous references to him in that volume. When the main Communist forces left Jiangxi for the Long March, Xiang Ying remained behind with the mission of creating a new base in the area, but by 1936 his forces had been badly mauled. Following the outbreak of war with Japan, Xiang Ying became deputy commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army. His forces won several engagements with the Japanese, but as chronicled in this volume, they were crushed in the "New Fourth Army Incident" of January 1941, in which Xiang Ying was killed.
the year. In January, Mao and Wang Jiaxiang urged Xiang Ying and Ye Ting, urging them to cross the Yangzi northward, or at least to prepare a number of crossing points. Later in the year, as the “friction” described below became more heated, Mao and the Military Affairs Commission became increasingly concerned about the situation in southern Anhui, where the headquarters detachments of the New Fourth Army were located under the leadership of Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, and messages became more frequent. Partly worried by their military insecurity, he was also distressed by the compromises with the Nationalists and with local society which Ye and Xiang thought necessary.

In southern Anhui (i.e., south of the Yangzi River), geopolitical conditions were adverse to base building; powerful Japanese forces were nearby, and so were potent Nationalist units. Consequently, these elements of the New Fourth Army were more exposed and more vulnerable than those north of the Yangzi, particularly so after many of the combat units were transferred north. Probably for this reason, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying felt they had to be more circumspect and accommodating to the Guomindang—from whom they received a monthly subsidy and other badly needed supplies—than suited Mao. Mao may well have felt that their position violated the principle of independence and autonomy within the united front, and he may have questioned Xiang Ying’s obedience to his orders.

Meanwhile, north of the Yangzi, base area expansion in Central China was bringing the New Fourth Army into direct conflict with provincial armies both stronger and more closely affiliated with Chiang Kaishek than those in North China. The Nationalist political and military presence had long been strong there and had not been so seriously shattered as in the north. Furthermore, Communist forces had been unable to get into the region soon enough to take advantage of the temporary chaos of the first months of the war. This area was thus strenuously contested among the Japanese (and their puppets), the Nationalists, and the Chinese Communist Party. As the New Fourth Army, reinforced by Eighth Route Army units sent south, expanded into the central and northern reaches of both Anhui and Jiangsu

Provinces, they came into ever more serious conflict with the armies of Li Pixinian and Han Deqin, governors and military commanders of these two provinces.

With events quickly building toward the climactic battles around the central Jiangsu town of Huangzhao in October 1940, Mao first took a hard and aggressive line. On October 9, he telegraphed Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yi, “No matter which unit attackers, you must be determined to wipe it out. Only by wiping out anti-Communist forces such as these is it possible to attack the Japanese invaders.” Just two days later, however, Mao and his colleagues were once again counseling moderation: “Our current policy orientation is to reduce friction and emphasize unity...to reduce the tension in our relationship with Han [Deqin] and Li [Pixinian].” Having won the crucial battle and taken great strides in his plan to build consolidated and contiguous bases in north-central Jiangsu and Anhui, Mao now elected—as was his consistent practice—to pull back and offer an apparent olive branch to the defeated opponent.

A similar policy, however, could not be adopted south of the Yangzi, from whence many units had already been sent north. There the remaining forces were no match for the armies of Qu Zhutong, at this time commander of the Third War Zone, and the presence of New Fourth Army headquarters represented a terrible vulnerability. The danger grew more acute as Nationalist forces were defeated and driven out of the regions immediately to the north, and retaliation against these exposed southern Communists became more and more likely.

All through the autumn of 1940, Mao repeatedly expressed his anxiety about the southern detachments and about whether a conflict between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party was about to erupt into full civil war (including possible collaboration with Japan), and about what counteractive steps should be taken in the political and military realms. Time after time, Mao urged Xiang Ying and Ye Ting to move northward, recognizing the possibility of ambush along the way. He was also in frequent contact with Zhou Enlai in Chongqing.

On October 19, 1940, two of Chiang Kaishek’s most important military subordinates (He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi) raised the stakes by ordering all Communist forces to relocate to the north of the Yellow River by the end of the year. (This directive is often referred to as “the hao order,” hao being the telegraphic code designation for that date.) This was clearly a response to long-term Communist expansion and to the startling defeats so recently suffered by the Guomindang.

42. Regarding the early career of Wang Jiaxiang (1907–), see Volume IV, p. xxxvii, note 3. He participated in the All-China Congress of Soviets in 1931 and became the commissar of foreign affairs in the new soviet government. He made the Long March and, after receiving medical treatment in the Soviet Union for an air wound, returned to China in 1937 and founded the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. At this time, he was responsible for training cadres of the People’s Liberation Army.

43. Ye Ting (1897–1946) was one of the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising of 1927. After the defeat of the Communists, he broke with the Party and spent a number of years first in Berlin and Vienna and then in Hong Kong. In 1937, he persuaded Chiang Kaishek to approve the establishment of the New Fourth Army, which was formally created in 1938. The province by which his force came to be seen by the Nationalists as a threat, and was ultimately destroyed in 1940–1941, is chronicled in this volume.


45. The references are to Han Deqin, governor of Jiangsu and commander of Nationalist forces in that province and to Li Pixinian, who held the same positions in Anhui. Their forces were concentrated north of the Yangzi River. See below, “No Matter Which Unit Attacks Us, You Must Be Determined to Wipe It Out,” October 9, 1940, p. 519.


47. Mao and his colleagues were convinced that the Guomindang wanted Communist forces concentrated in a relatively limited and topographically disadvantaged area, where they would be highly vulnerable to Japanese attack. Furthermore, the designated area lacked the resources to support such a large influx of troops.
Mao consistently urged Xiang Ying and Ye Ting to move north—at one point (see the exasperated December 26 telegram) scolding Xiang Ying for timidity and hinting at deliberate disobedience. But in other documents, both earlier and later, Mao was more ambivalent. At various times, he counseled delay and negotiation and considered various routing options out of southern Anhui (even the possibility of moving southward into Zhejiang and beyond). Elsewhere he suggested that Chiang might be bluffing, or that by holding Han Dejin a kind of hostage in central and northern Jiangsu, an attack on Xiang Ying could be avoided. Thus Xiang Ying may well have felt that he was getting contradictory directions and that he would after all have to fend for himself and his detachments as best he could in the light of the actual circumstances facing him.

Some of these ambivalences were doubtless born of Mao’s need to consider various options or were the result of imperfect information in a complex and dynamically evolving situation. As regards our understanding of Mao’s mind and behavior, however, his reaction to these events shows a human and fallible side, where his own uncertainties led to something less than clear and compelling leadership.

The culmination came with the Guomindang’s crushing attack upon and destruction of the headquarters detachment of the New Fourth Army between January 4 and 15, 1941.48 On January 17, the Nationalists declared the New Fourth Army dissolved for insubordination and rebellious acts.

When the blow finally fell, Mao was not surprised, but he was downcast nevertheless. He deplored the lack of detailed knowledge about what, exactly, had happened: “How many men have broken through? How many rifles? Where are they now? How are things with them? How many men and rifles were besieged in Maolin? Who was the commander? Let us know as soon as possible for use in the negotiations.”49 Only gradually did the leadership in Yan’an come to see the full picture.

Zhou Enlai and others of the Communist group in Chongqing immediately lodged strong protests with the Nationalists, portraying the New Fourth Army as a group of martyred patriots, with accompanying outrage and injured innocence. In Yan’an, Mao and his colleagues remained publicly silent until a few days after the January 17 order dissolving the New Fourth Army. Then the Communist propaganda apparatus swung into action, describing the Southern Anhui Incident as “a move planned by pro-Japanese conspirators and anti-Communist diehards.” This lengthy statement went on to set forth twelve demands upon the Guomindang, as conditions for resumption of the united front.50

Despite this bold position, Mao privately sounded deeply pessimistic, apparently fearing the outcome that he had so long sought to avoid: the full outbreak of civil war and its probable corollary of Nationalist capitulation to Japan. On January 19, 1941, just two days after the national government had declared the New Fourth Army dissolved for its rebellious actions, Mao wrote to Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi, instructing them to prepare for the worst:

By declaring the New Fourth Army rebels and putting Ye Ting on trial, Chiang Kaishek seems to have made up his mind to break with our Party. . . Politically, we shall fully expose Chiang’s scheme (though making no mention of his name for the time being). . . Only a defensive posture will continue to be taken, so as to mobilize the masses of the people under the slogan of persisting in the war against Japan and opposing the civil war. Militarily, we shall first fight defensive warfare and fight our way, when necessary, to Gansu and Sichuan.51

The next day he wrote to them (and Zhou Enlai) again: “The relationship between the Guomindang and the Communist Party such as it is now is of no use at all to us and to the revolution. But the split was caused by Chiang, so it is rather to our advantage.”52 He spoke to Liu Shaoqi in even more desperate terms: “Chiang Kaishek’s order of January 17 marks the beginning of a sudden emergency on a national scale, the start of all-around capitulation and the breakup of the whole country. Our estimate made before December 17 is no longer applicable.”53

Soon, however, Chiang Kaishek drew back from the brink of civil war. It had become clear that the Chinese Communist Party was better able to play the patriotic, innocent victim than was the Guomindang to portray itself as the object of disobedience and disloyalty. Within a month, the campaign to discredit the Nationalists was paying off, both at home and abroad. Mao’s mood and estimate of the situation now both changed dramatically. In a telegram to Zhou Enlai in Chongqing, he presented an almost ebullient assessment, ending on a characteristically dialectic note:

Chiang has never been so besieged with reproach from within and without; we have never won such extensive support from the people (both at home and abroad). . . .

Our political offensive (the twelve demands) has prevailed over Chiang’s po-

48. An estimated 9,000 New Fourth army men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Ye Ting, who had followed a more northerly route, was captured in mid-January. Xiang Ying tried to break out of the Maolin trap on his own with only a small detachment, then rejoined the remnants of his army. Finally—facing almost certain annihilation—he and Yuan Guoping, accompanied by only a few soldiers and carrying the army’s gold reserves, sought once again to escape. Regarding Yuan Guoping (1905–1941), see below, the note to the telegram of March 19, 1940, addressed to him. In all probability, Xiang and Yuan hoped to form the nucleus of a new guerrilla unit, as had been done before, during the harsh years of 1937–1939. But in mid-March, they were betrayed, robbed, and murdered by one of their subordinates.

49. See below, p. 626, the telegram of January 13, 1941, to Ye Ting and others, signed by Mao and his colleagues on the Military Affairs Commission, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang, January 12, 1940. They did not know that Ye had been captured by the Nationalists. Only the brigade commander, Fu Qiutao, and a handful of his troops made a successful crossing to the north of the Yangzi River.


51. See the text of January 19, 1941, signed by Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, translated below, p. 645.

52. See below, the communication of January 20, 1941, p. 646.

53. See below, the dispatch to Liu Shaoqi dated January 23, 1941, p. 654.
litical offensive (the telegram of the 19th...). Our offensive has achieved results and more is yet to be gained.

Our purpose is not to get Chiang to acknowledge our twelve demands, ... as he will never bring himself to do so, ... but to defeat their offensive with our offensive.

The situation has changed. Before January 17, he was on the offensive while we were on the defensive. Things turned inside out after January 17, when he has landed in a defensive position. This has been our greatest victory.

Only a military offensive, which is an enormous wrong policy, will obstruct Chiang from fighting Japan, while a political offensive, on the contrary, will push Chiang to fight Japan. ... So the combination of military defensive and political offensive is absolutely correct, the two being both opposite and complementary to each other.54

By March 1941, Mao was able to declare that the "second anti-Communist onslaught was now over."55 Mao could now conclude that, if Chiang had not fundamentally changed policy as a result of Communist victories in northern Jiangsu and Anhui and his retaliation against the New Fourth Army, he never would. With the easing of this crisis, Mao's fundamental vision of the united front with the Nationalists was vindicated: They would neither initiate full-scale civil war nor surrender to Japan. This was a sweeping justification of Mao's policies toward the Nationalists, toward regional armies, and toward the strategic placement and defense of the base areas.

From this time forward, the Nationalists could no longer seriously challenge the Communists in the well-established base areas of North and Central China. Communist activity south of the Yangzi had been forced underground in the bloody attack on the New Fourth Army headquarters detachment, leaving only a tenuous presence, but these events had in effect served Mao's strategic vision of moving north of the river and eastward into areas behind Japanese lines, from which Nationalist-affiliated or local contenders could be ejected, co-opted, isolated, or rendered harmless. Beginning at this time, too, the New Fourth Army came to look more and more like the Eighth Route Army in command structure, training, and social composition.

In stark and quite surprising contrast to Mao's effusiveness during the Central China campaign and the New Fourth Army crisis was his almost total silence during the Battle of the Hundred Regiments (August 20 to mid-December 1940).56 The Hundred Regiments, the largest anti-Japanese campaign of the war, took place simultaneously with the conflicts between the Communists and the Guomindang in Central China just summarized, yet—so far as we now know—Mao had nothing to say about it. Standard accounts portray the Hundred Regiments as the largest and most nearly conventional military operation undertaken against the Japanese

54. "Relations Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party at Present and Our Tactics," February 14, 1941, pp. 886–89.

by Communist military forces during the Sino-Japanese War, but recently available evidence shows that these were sprawling, decentralized engagements—large and small—occurring in a huge area during more than three months.

Initially planned by the field forces of the Eighth Route Army (principally by Peng Dehuai, but with assistance from Deng Xiaoping, Nie Rongzhen, Zuo Quan, and others), the campaign was originally conceived as a counter balance to increasingly effective Japanese suppression tactics. Principal targets were the rail lines and strong points, which the Japanese were using as the "bars" of their "cage" strategy designed to isolate bases from one another and squeeze them ever tighter. Relying on the element of surprise, the Eighth Route Army at first achieved striking successes. By mid-September, however, Japanese reinforcements had arrived and fierce fighting ensued. From then on, Chinese forces were on the defensive, as the Japanese restored their precampaign positions. As a result of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, the new Japanese commander in North China undertook savage mopping-up operations, the infamous "three-all" (kill all, burn all, loot all) campaigns. These campaigns, which recurred throughout 1941 and 1942, and extended into 1943, were the most difficult times of the entire war for the North China bases. Communist-controlled territory was cut in half, and communist armies shrunken by about a quarter.

We now know that Mao and the Military Affairs Commission were informed in advance of plans for this campaign, but apparently did not respond. We are not aware of any contemporary statement unambiguously attributable to Mao concerning the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, and know of only one from the central authorities in Yan'an. Written during the heady early successes of the campaign, that one directive—which came from the Central Secretariat and not, as one would expect, from the Military Affairs Department—contains the following passage:

the full strength of our Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army should concentrate its attention on attacking the enemy; they should emulate the example of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments in North China. In Shandong and Central China, one or several well-planned, large-scale offensive actions should be launched against the enemy. In North China, offensive operations of the Battle of the Hundred Regiments should be enlarged.57

57. Dated September 10, 1940. This unsigned directive of the Central Secretariat appears in Baiwuân dâzhàn lîshì wênxiàn zìliào suànhuàn (Selected Historical Materials Regarding the Great Battle of the Hundred Regiments) (Beijing: Jiêfângjuâng chubanshe, 1990), p. 13. There is reason to believe that Mao either wrote or approved this directive. Given his deep involvement in and responsibility for military matters, it seems unlikely that such a sweeping strategy would have been set forth without his knowledge. Furthermore, the language here resembles in tone that of some other statements known to have been made by Mao, such as "Develop Guerrilla Warfare in the Broad Area from Shantung to Puzhou," April 30, 1941, translated below, p. 726. It also echoes the overconfidence exhibited by field commanders, especially Peng Dehuai, who imagined at this same time that the Japanese could be severely defeated and all the major North China bases could be amalgamated into one. Nie Rongzhen later described the mood as one of "brain fever."
Mao’s only reference to the campaign while it was actually taking place was brief, indirect, and late in the day: “Do not declare openly that the Battle of the Hundred Regiments has been concluded. Chiang Kaishek is about to launch an anti-Communist upsurge, and we still need to use publicity about the Battle of the Hundred Regiments to oppose him. Signed Mao, Zhu, Wang.”

There is, however, a brief but suggestive—and possibly critical—statement in a text of June 1941, addressed precisely to Peng Dehuai. “On the one hand,” said Mao, “we have to fight (fighting is mandatory) but, on the other hand, we cannot fight too fiercely (as in the Battle of the Hundred Regiments).” The rest of this statement, which suggests political and persuasive policies rather than direct military action to counterbalance Japanese operations against bases on the Hebei plains, is quite contrary in its thrust to that of the Hundred Regiments’ approach.

After these major combat operations against the Nationalists and the Japanese were concluded, from the spring of 1941 until the end of the year, Mao made only occasional statements concerning purely military affairs. As before, most of these had to do with relations between the Communists and the Guomindang. Although the War of Resistance and the ultimate defeat of Japan remain the underlying foundation for all these writings, one would not have guessed, from reading material authored by Mao, how serious were the Japanese mopping-up campaigns during 1941.

Complementing Mao’s external military concern for the location, expansion, and defense of the bases in their larger environments were his “internal” views of the social, economic, and political policies within the base areas. Once again, his silences may be as important as his statements. During most of 1939, while base area development and consolidation was still moving forward and “friction” had not yet become a serious threat, Mao directed only a few statements, couched in general language, at the base areas. These were contained mostly in public pronouncements or in policy papers intended for the Chinese Communist Party as a whole. We do not see specific orders issued to specific commanders in response to specific events, such as those described above in the military area. Under these relatively benign circumstances (compared to what was to come), earlier positions and policies seem to have sufficed.

This tone continued into the early months of 1940, until the issuance of the important statement, “On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas” (March 6, 1940). The first paragraph established the rationale: “This is a time when the anti-Communist diehards of the Guomindang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in North and Central China.” The united front was the key, in Mao’s view, to the social and political consolidation of the base areas under Communist Party leadership, to presenting a “democratic” alternative more attractive than the Guomindang version elsewhere, and to the avoidance of errors of both left and right. Of the two, Mao asserted, “At the moment, the ‘Left’ tendency of neglecting to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry is the more serious danger.”

Accordingly, Mao directed the adoption of what came to be called the “three-thirds” policy. “In accordance with the united front principle concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party Left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither Left nor Right.” This conciliatory political policy paralleled the economic policy of assuring landlords and money lenders that, after rent and interest had been reduced as required, they would in fact be paid. Mao meant these policies seriously both in the political and economic arena, but directed that they be applied flexibly, to serve the party’s ultimate objectives: increasing popular support, reducing or isolating possible adversaries, and enhancing the leadership, authority, and prestige of the Chinese Communist Party.

This policy was most often applied to the various popular assemblies in the base areas (which were, however, sounding boards and rubber stamps rather than true decision-making bodies). Sometimes it was carried out in the less crucial agencies of the base area administration. It was never instituted in the governance of military or security affairs, and could obviously not be applied within the Party.

Nevertheless, the “three-thirds” system was very successful, and reflected Mao’s characteristically dialectical approach to politics. During the periods of the greatest difficulty, such as began in late 1939 and continued well past 1941, when in many ways more had to be asked of those living in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the base areas behind Japanese lines, Mao moderated the contradictions between various social classes rather than sharpening them. Contrari-

58. See below the text of December 22, 1940, p. 586. Prefatory calligraphy by Mao also appeared in a Chinese Communist compilation of materials on the Hundred Regiments. This was Baitaixuan dazhan jieti (Special Collection on the Hundred Regiments Offensive) (Eighth Route Army Political Office, March 1941). Mao wrote, “Oppose Pétainism, and also oppose de Gaulleism. Firmly uphold the doctrine of the national revolution for independence and liberation.” The negative reference to de Gault is not surprising at this time, since Mao viewed Pétain (the running dog of Hitler) and de Gault (the running dog of British imperialism) as equally reprehensible. (See below the translations of the two documents dated October 25, 1940, pp. 523–27.) The fact that Mao allowed the use of his calligraphy obviously suggests that he approved of the book’s contents. He did, however, refrain from an explicit endorsement of the Hundred Regiments offensive.

59. See below, the telegram to Peng dated June 9, 1941, pp. 759–60.

60. See below, the directive of March 6, 1940, pp. 432–34.

61. For a thorough description and analysis of the three-thirds system, see Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 432–34. We are here concerned with “three-thirds” as part of the social and political consolidation of the base areas. But, coming as it did after the split with "Yan Xishan, toward the end of the “first anti-Communist upsurge,” and just after publication of “On New Democracy,” the policy was probably designed to counter Guomindang talk of constitutional rule. By seeming to make their own political structure more representative and broad-based, the Communists could argue that the Guomindang should do likewise. If Chiang agreed, the Communists would benefit; if not, the Guomindang would compromise its image.
wise, when overall conditions improved, those contradictions could be heightened once again and a harder line could be taken.

Leadership and Party Building

Leadership

Almost all historians of the Chinese Communist movement, both inside and outside China, agree that at the Sixth Plenum Mao Zedong achieved a higher degree of leadership and authority than ever before, and that between the Rectification (Zhengfeng) Movement of 1942 and the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 he was elevated to virtual cultic status.  Although within this general consensus there are some disagreements over emphasis, timing, and detail, the years 1939–1941 are recognized as a crucially important link in the process by which Mao strengthened his own leadership and sought to build a Party based on his vision.

This process involved, first, the elaboration and elevation of his own “thought”; second, the building of a powerful coalition committed to him, doctrinally and organizationally; third, the acquiescence in his leadership by former and potential rivals; and fourth, the propaganda and inculcation of his particular vision. Although Mao had moved to the fore by late 1938, he had not yet completely won over or neutralized his former rivals and he had not yet fully demonstrated in action the superiority of his policy lines to alternative possibilities.

In part, Mao was constrained by his stress on Party unity (under his own leadership, of course). His efforts to pursue this goal would be undercut by excessive emphasis on the mistakes and the misguided leadership of the past. Since many of his supporters—Wang Jiaxiang and Zhou Enlai among them—had only been recruited to his side fairly recently, a partisan approach would alienate them, not draw them closer to him.

But caution also grew out of Mao’s ambivalence toward the Communist International. On the one hand, Stalin’s (and the International’s) recognition of Mao as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party was a major asset in the consolidation of his leadership. But that recognition and the Sixth Plenum “did not eliminate differences with the Soviet Union or alter the legal, and in some respects the still practical, subordinate relationship of Yan’an to Moscow.” 63 Mao could not denounce Wang Ming’s “second line” (1932–1935) and other errors of the past without also criticizing, explicitly or by implication, the Comintern, which had designed and endorsed them. Mao recognized that the Soviet Union and the International still carried much prestige within the Chinese Communist Party, and he was unwilling to jeopardize the kiss on the cheek he had so recently obtained from the International. Nevertheless, Mao continued efforts characterized by Teiwes as “both prudent and relentless, developing a pattern of pushing forward his political programme at every opportunity but avoiding fracturing the carefully nurtured consensus which would mark his actions up to the Seventh Congress.” 64

Both Mao’s prudence and his relentless efforts are manifest in his editorial of October 4, 1939, for the first issue of The Communist, a new inner-Party periodical. Characterizing the united front, armed struggle, and Party building as “the three magic weapons” of the Communist Party in defeating the enemies of the revolution, Mao placed the main emphasis in this article on the third of these weapons, Party building. The construction of “a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally” was, he declared, imperative for the victory of the revolution. “We are now,” he added, “in the process of building such a Party.” Prudently, he dated the defeat of “Left” opportunism from the Fourth Plenum of 1928, at which a dominant role was played by the returned students from Moscow, as well as from the Zunyi conference of 1935, which saw a tactical alliance between Mao and members of the International faction. But he relentlessly hammered home the point that many of the Party’s earlier defeats stemmed from “lack of understanding of integrating the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution”—in other words, because they had failed to carry out the “Sinification of Marxism” which Mao had been advocating since 1938. There must be, he said, a thorough review of the CCP’s “eighteen years of experience.” 65

About a year later, in an important directive dated December 25, 1940, during the so-called “second anti-Communist upsurge,” when armed conflict between Communist and Guomindang troops had escalated seriously in Central China and the vulnerability of New Fourth Army detachments south of the Yangzi was well understood, Mao insisted that the policy we adopt is of decisive importance. But some of our Party’s cadres still do not realize that the Party’s present policy must be fundamentally different from its policy during the Civil War. It must be understood that in no circumstances will the Party change its united front policy for the entire period of the


63. Teiwes, Formation, p. 31.
64. Teiwes, Formation, p. 10.
65. See below, the translation of “Introducing The Communist,” October 4, 1939, pp. 244–54.
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63. Teiwes, Formation, p. 31.

64. Teiwes, Formation, p. 10.

65. See below, the translation of “Introducing The Communist,” October 4, 1939, pp. 244–54.
War of Resistance against Japan, and that many of the policies adopted during the Soviet period cannot be duplicated again. In particular, many ultra-Left policies of the latter Soviet period are not merely totally inapplicable today in the War of Resistance, but were wrong even then...66

This may have been Mao’s answer to Wang Ming’s reissuance in July 1940 of The Two Lines, originally published in 1931, under the new and provocative title of Strive for the Further Bolshevization of the Chinese Communist Party. In the new preface, Wang had sought to exculpate himself: “No true dialectical and historical materialist can deal with a problem apart from the conditions of a certain time and place. He cannot regard what was correct yesterday as entirely wrong today, nor decide what is incorrect today could not have been right yesterday.”67

This weakly defensive rationalization was clearly not acceptable to Mao, who had already made plain in his editorial of October 1939 that “Bolshevization” meant following his line. But by this time, Wang Ming had lost all power within the upper levels of the Chinese Communist Party. He had already expressed in unmistakably ritualistic language his praise of Mao, he had been removed as director of the United Front Work Department, and he had been appointed principal of the Women’s University in Yan’an. Mao could afford to take his time and to encapsulate his repudiation of Wang’s version of the past in a statement of current policy. Later, of course, he would confront Wang Ming’s history directly and crush it in the most powerful and dismissive language possible.

The latter months of 1940 and the first months of 1941 were taken up substantially with the military and political crisis between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, which peaked with the New Fourth Army incident of January 1941. But, later in that year, Mao returned forcefully to his reconstruction of Party history, perhaps feeling he could do so as the twin crises of capitulation and civil war eased, then faded into the background.

This reconstruction was inseparable, of course, from Mao’s concern with the inculcation of his theory, standpoint, and methodology among Party members more generally. The fact that he felt ready, by the middle of 1941, to take on these tasks suggests that he had sufficient confidence in his own authority and prestige within the Party to carry them out. But it also implies that his “thought” was now sufficiently “unified”—embracing domains from Marxist theory through the history of China and of the Communist Party to military strategy, politics, and social policy, right down to fact-finding investigation at the local level—to form a coherent, comprehensive, and communicable ideology.

So far as Party history and Mao’s position within that history was concerned,

the two most significant statements were “Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism” (September 10, 1941) and, above all, “In Refutation of the Third ‘Left’ Line” (precise date uncertain; probably October 1941).68 The first of these texts represents Mao’s opening remarks to an Enlarged Politburo Plenum held between September 10 and October 22, 1941, and the second was also laid before that gathering. This plenum, Mao himself recognized, was the most important formal meeting of Party leaders since the Sixth Plenum, exactly three years earlier, and it shows how much progress he had made in the consolidation and recognition of his leadership during this period. Teiwes notes that these meetings have been “a relatively neglected event in accounts of Mao’s rise...[but] the importance of the occasion can be seen in the developments which emerged from it.” He goes on to detail them:

the establishment of a senior cadres study group within the Centre led by Mao and Wang Jiaxiang, a measure normally regarded as the beginning of the rectification campaign; the reorganization of the Central Party School with Mao, Ren Bishi and Peng Zhen now taking control; the setting up of a “committee to clean up past history,” the start of a three and a half year process culminating in the Historical Resolution; the subsequent publication of “Since the Sixth Congress,” the basic materials for high-level cadre study of Party history during rectification; the setting up of a “white area work review committee” under Mao to review historical experience in underground work; and (most likely) the creation of a “cadre screening committee” under Kang Sheng.69

Party Building

Most accounts of Mao’s rise to power within the Chinese Communist Party focus on factional and ideological struggle at or near the top. Certainly, these matters concerned Mao profoundly. But Party building at middle and lower levels and among the rank and file also mattered deeply to him. When the War of Resistance began in 1937, the Chinese Communist Party claimed about 40,000 members, while its regular, full-time armies numbered perhaps 80,000. But during the first years of the war, both organizations experienced meteoric expansion, a “storm expansion” called for by the Party to meet the escalating demands of war, base-area construction, quasi-legalization throughout Guomindang-controlled areas, and so on. By early 1940, the Party had grown roughly twentyfold, to nearly 800,000; the regular armies (not counting local

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67. Wylie, Emergence, p. 133.
68. Both texts are translated below, pp. 808–911 and 826–32.
69. Teiwes, Formation, p. 11. Teiwes claims (p. 13), however, that “everything did not go completely Mao’s way” in this conference. Still at issue was when the “third left line” began. Mao wanted an earlier date that would make Wang Ming the principal culprit; other comrades—including Wang himself, of course—preferred to date it from September 1931, after Wang’s departure for Moscow.
and who are fairly loyal, hard-working, and able to endure hardship; we should
give them political education and help them to temper themselves in war and
work and to serve the army, the government, and the masses; and taking each
case on its merits, we should admit into the Party those who measure up to the
requirements of Party membership. As for those who do not qualify or do not
wish to join the Party, we should have good working relations with them and give
them guidance in their work with us. 71

Nevertheless, available data show that Party membership leveled off in 1940
and remained at or near 800,000 until a second growth spurt in 1944 and 1945,
during the last phase of the war—an expansive period for the CCP after the rigors
of the middle war years—in preparation for the Seventh Party Congress and the
postwar contest with the Guomindang.

Throughout these three years, Mao Zedong often expresses his concerns about
the training and socialization of new Party members and soldiers. Sometimes he
addresses these concerns directly, but they also appear in many of his statements
on social, political, economic, and military affairs.

In these statements and in other materials from these years, we can see at least
three strands, overlapping and interrelated but distinguishable, that by mid-1941
are flowing together. These are (a) straightforward cadre education: Marxism-
Leninism, history of the Chinese revolution, organizational structure, organiza-
tional behavior, specific task-oriented military or political training, even basic
literacy; (b) the construction and propagation of the Maoist vision of the Chinese
revolution, so central to the establishment of Mao’s own ideological and organiza-
tional primacy, and hence both to the final elimination of rivals and to the conver-
sion of colleagues into disciples; and (c) the need for interiorization and
psychological reconstruction at both individual and group levels, so that Party
members would not only know, in formal and intellectual ways, what Mao and the
leadership wanted them to know, but beyond that would internalize, embody, and
use as guides to action what Mao repeatedly called the standpoint, viewpoint, and
methods which combined the abstract truths of Marxism-Leninism with the con-
crete realities of the Chinese revolution.

Although no strict periodization is possible, Mao seems more concerned with
the first two strands during 1939 and 1940. These first two strands are seen in the
cadre education movement of 1939 and 1940, which Mao supported but came to
feel did not go far enough or reach deeply enough.

One of Mao’s most important statements during this period, “The Chinese Revo-
lution and the Chinese Communist Party” (December 15, 1939), was specifically
intended as “a textbook, written jointly by Comrade Mao Zedong and several other
 comrades in Yan’an.” The first chapter, “Chinese Society,” was drafted by others

70. See Lyman P. Van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement during the Sino-Japanese
War, 1937–1945,” in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (eds.), The Cam-
21. The figures for Party and army should not be added together, since many army men
were simultaneously Party members. Perhaps one-third of the armed forces had some sort
of party affiliation: regular, probationary, or prospective.

71. “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting
Intelectuals,” December 1, 1939, pp. 262–64.
and revised by Mao. Mao himself wrote the second chapter, "The Chinese Revolution." A third chapter, "Party Building," was never finished, perhaps because it raised issues and controversies upon which Mao was not yet quite ready to place his distinctive stamp.72

Apter and Saich list forty-four cadre schools established in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region between 1935 and 1945 (four of them set up before the outbreak of the war). Of these forty-four, half—twenty-two—were founded during the three years under review here. They range from the Workers’ College to the Chinese Women’s University (of which Wang Ming was appointed the first principal) to the Minorities Academy and the Military Affairs Academy.73 This educational system, Wylie observes, "gave Mao the means to exercise a degree of ideological control that had never been possible before. It was this educational system that was to serve as the incubator for Mao’s Rectification Movement of 1942–43."74

The third strand—holistic integration of empirical investigation, concrete policies, regional tactics, revolutionary strategy, and the general principles of Marxism-Leninism creatively applied to concrete Chinese realities, what Saich and Apter call the "single discourse"—appears more and more forcefully during 1941. A large number of writings address various interrelated aspects of this discourse.

The "Preface and Postscript to Rural Surveys" (March 17 and April 19, 1941, pp. 708–10 and 719–21 below) stress the need for detailed, hands-on, on-the-spot investigation. "Without investigation, there is no right to speak." The implications were clear: Mao had carried out many investigations; his rivals, on the whole, had not.

In a speech to high-level cadres in Yan’an on May 19, 1941, entitled "Reform Our Study," Mao inveighed against both subjectivism (following one’s own hunches) and dogmatism (following a mechanical and literal Marxism-Leninism). He deplored the fact that "many comrades seem to study Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin for the sake of study, not for the sake of the practice of the Chinese revolution." In an obvious attack on the returned students, he mocked "Seventeen- and eighteen-year-old babies who nibble on Das Kapital and the Anti-Dühring," but show no interest in China’s problems. Not surprisingly, this text would be published only in early 1942, after the launching of the Rectification campaign.

A "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Strengthening the Party Spirit," dated July 1, 1941, addresses a constellation of problems arising from the fact that our environment is one of the countryside, and one of guerrilla warfare where separate and independent activities have been going on and will stay so for a long

time, and the small producers and intellectuals make up a large proportion of the Party membership; factors that tend to give rise to "egoism," "heroism," "state of non-organization," "assertion of independence," and "decentralism" among some Party members... Should we allow these tendencies to develop, they would undermine the Party’s unified intention, action, and discipline, might generate the organization of small groups and factional conflicts, and even go so far as to oppose the Party, bringing tremendous damage to the Party and the revolution.75

Training, discipline, and, above all, "the weapon of self-criticism" and thorough study are prescribed. All cadres should adopt a style of work which is "selfless, faithful and honest, simple in way of life, hard-working, down-to-earth, practical and realistic, and watchful against arrogance and shallowness. The habit of completely separating theory from practice, and study from work, must be transformed."

On August 1, 1941, the Central Committee adopted a "Resolution on Investigation and Study" which had been drafted by Mao.76 This is a detailed statement of perspectives, procedures, and practices in the process of carrying out empirical investigations, which are prescribed for all Party members. Together with several communications with Xie Juezai during the ensuing two weeks, it forms the background of investigations carried out by Mao himself, published in December 1942 as Economic and Financial Problems.77

On September 10, 1941, as noted above, Mao Zedong made, in his opening address to a protracted and crucial meeting of the Politburo, his most explicit attack to date on the returned students. In this text, entitled "Oppose Subjectivism and Sectarianism," he denounced the "subjectivists" who claimed to represent the "international line" as "sham Marxists," and declared that their "leftist" tendency had been even more harmful than that of Li Lisan. "Hitherto," he asserted, "the line of the Party for the period of more than three years from 1932 to December 1935 has never been summed up. Now we must prepare to summarize it at the Seventh Congress." Because of the difficulties created by the war and by China’s internal situation, the Seventh Congress would not meet until 1945, but Mao was

75. This resolution appears in several volumes of Mao’s writings issued during the Cultural Revolution period and is reproduced in the Supplements to Mao Zedong ji. It is summarized at some length in Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 310, although it is not explicitly attributed to Mao there. It is, however, highly consistent with the tone and thrust of his known writings of this period, and it seems unlikely that such a resolution, explicitly labeled as having been issued on the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, would have been adopted at this time without his participation and agreement. We have therefore included it among the materials translated in this volume. See below, pp. 766–68.

76. See below, pp. 873–85. For Mao’s role, see Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 315–16.


73. See the Appendix in Apter and Saich, Revolutionary Discourse, pp. 335–36.

74. Wylie, Emergence, p. 60.
determined to move ahead in settling accounts with those who had dominated the Party during the Jiangxi period. To this end, he called for “creative Marxism,” meaning obviously Sinified Marxism, but also for the “Marxification of the rich reality of the Chinese revolution.”

On September 13, 1941, Mao addressed a group of women in Yan’an engaged in studying the lives of women regarding the techniques of investigations in the countryside. This prescriptive set of instructions rather systematically reiterated much that he had previously said. But here in this more informal setting, Mao allowed himself to become quite nostalgic about his own experiences during the 1920s and, especially, the 1930s, when he carried out investigations in Xingguo, Xunwu, and elsewhere. These experiences obviously carried much personal meaning for him and were not simply exercises in applied ideology.

Much more formal were the “Decision of the Central Committee Regarding High-Level Study Groups” (September 26, 1941), and “To the Central Research Group and the High-Level Research Groups” (September 29, 1941; see below, pp. 819–21). The first of these two documents directs that high-level cadres (ranks specified) in the Party, army, and government establish small study groups:

The method used shall be the unity of theory and practice. The first term will last half a year, which will be devoted to the study of the models of thinking of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and the twenty-year history of our Party as the two topics. Subsequently, other questions with regard to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and China’s revolution will be studied, for the purpose of overcoming erroneous thinking (subjectivist and formalist) and developing revolutionary theory. . . . This study shall proceed under the condition that the major tasks for which the respective comrades are responsible are not hindered.

In addition to studying a collection of seventy Party documents covering the period since the Sixth Congress of 1928, compiled by Mao and Wang Jiaxiang, the letter of September 29 called for the study of theory, with an emphasis on methods of thought. It listed four items under this heading, including translations of Lenin’s Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder and of two Soviet works on dialectical materialism, as well as the introduction to An Outline of Economics by the Japanese Marxist Kawakami Hajime.

The two documents dated September 26 and 29 were presented at the Enlarged Plenum (September 10–October 22, 1941) discussed in the previous section of this introduction. With good reason, an authoritative chronology of the war years lists the major themes taken up on this occasion and states that “this was in fact a Rectification meeting.”

Thus, we can see the Rectification campaign of 1942–1943 just over the horizon, and we know it will interweave seamlessly the three strands described above. Of the twenty Chinese documents compiled in 1942 for inclusion in the official corpus of study materials for this campaign, eight were written during the three years covered by the present volume. By contrast, only three documents come from any time prior to 1939. The remainder were written in 1942 or later, specifically for the purposes of the Rectification campaign. It is thus apparent that much of what we consider distinctive about the Maoist and Chinese Communist approach both to the content and to the style of political education took shape during the 1939–1941 period.

Conclusion

During the years from 1939 to 1941, Mao had thus achieved increasing acceptance for his line in all four of the domains discussed in this introduction: anti-imperialism and the conduct of the war against Japan, relations with the Guomindang, the building of territorial and social bases, and the definition of orthodoxy within the Party. The title of our edition, Mao’s Road to Power, is meant to evoke the conquest of power in China by the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong. It could, however, also be understood as referring to Mao’s own road to supremacy in the Party. At the end of 1941, he was poised to make decisive advances, during the next few years, toward both of these objectives.


82. An English translation of these materials is conveniently available in Boyd Compton, Mao’s China: Party Reform Documents, 1942–44 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952). This edition is complete except for six articles translated from the Russian, by Stalin, Lenin, and Dimitrov, which Compton omitted because they were already available in English.) The eight documents dating from the 1939–1941 period include four by Mao, three by Liu Shaoqi, and one by Chen Yun.
Note on Sources and Conventions

This edition of Mao Zedong’s writings in English translation aims to serve a dual audience, comprising not only China specialists, but those interested in Mao from other perspectives. In terms of content and presentation, we have done our best to make it useful and accessible to both these groups.

Scope. This is a complete edition, in the sense that it will include a translation of every item of which the Chinese text can be obtained. It cannot be absolutely complete, because some materials are still kept under tight control in the archives of the Chinese Communist Party. The situation has, however, changed dramatically since Mao’s death, as a result of the publication in China, either openly or for restricted circulation (neibu), of a number of important texts.

Although the Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (Department for Research on Party Literature), which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for the publication of Mao’s writings, has always disclaimed any intention of producing his complete pre-1949 works, it appeared at one time that an edition containing a very full selection was in fact on the way, at least for a part of his early career. An advertising leaflet dated December 20, 1988, announced the appearance, in the spring of 1989, of two volumes, Mao Zedong zaoqi zhuozuo ji (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong from the Early Period), and Jindang he da geming shiqi Mao Zedong zhuozuo ji (Collected Writings by Mao Zedong during the Period of Establishing the Party and of the Great Revolution [of 1924-1927]), and invited advance orders for both volumes. The events of June 4, 1989, led first to the postponement of publication, and then to the decision to issue only the first of these volumes, for internal circulation, under the new title of Mao Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6-1920.11 (Draft Writings by Mao Zedong for the Early Period, June 1912-November 1920).

Prior to June 1989, further volumes in a similar format were in preparation. These plans have now been set aside, and no complete Chinese edition can be expected unless there is a radical change in the political situation. But, as forecast in Volume I, the corpus of available materials has now been substantially expanded by the publication in Beijing of two major series to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of Mao’s birth. These are the Mao Zedong wenji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong), of which the first two volumes, for the years 1921-1942, appeared in December 1993; three more, covering the period 1943-September 1949 came out in August 1996; and three volumes, for the years 1949-1975, in 1999. A six-volume edition of Mao’s military writings, Mao Zedong junshi wenji (Collected Military Writings of Mao Zedong), published in December 1993, also contains an abundance of new materials, many of which are not of purely military interest.

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Sources. Despite the appearance of these two important collections, there is still no complete, or nearly complete, Chinese edition of Mao’s writings from December 1920 onward. This and all subsequent volumes of our edition must therefore be drawn from a variety of materials.

The twenty volumes of the *Mao Zedong ji* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) and the *Mao Zedong ji. Bijujuan* (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong. Supplement), edited by Professor Takeuchi Minoru and published in Tokyo in the 1970s and 1980s still constitute the most important single collection of Mao’s pre-1949 writings available outside China. (For details on this, and other sources cited below, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.) Apart from the *Selected Works* of the 1950s (discussed below), other official Chinese editions of Mao’s works, especially the two centenary series described above, contain a large number of important new items. The various specialized volumes issued in the 1980s to commemorate Mao’s ninetieth birthday also provide useful materials from the pre-1949 period. Those drawn on in this volume include *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* (Selected Correspondence of Mao Zedong), and *Mao Zedong xinwen zhuozuo wenxuan* (Selected Materials Regarding Mao Zedong’s Journalistic Work), both of which appeared in 1983.

As already indicated, all of these recent publications of the Party center are selective. Fortunately, we have been able to supplement them with materials drawn from an extremely wide range of sources, including contemporary newspapers and periodicals, individual texts published in China for restricted circulation, and facsimiles of handwritten materials.

Information regarding the source we have followed is given in an unnumbered footnote at the beginning of each text. We have also included in these source notes information about the first publication, or the earliest known version, of the writing in question, whenever available. To avoid ambiguity, all works referred to in these notes are designated by their Chinese titles, sometimes in a shortened version. (For indications regarding short titles, and for full bibliographical details regarding all works cited, including those mentioned above, see the Bibliography at the end of this volume.)

Other things being equal, we have very often referred the reader who wishes to consult the Chinese text to the *Mao Zedong ji* and the *Bijujuan* whenever the item in question appears there, because this series offers the convenience of a large quantity of materials in compact form. There are, however, many instances in which the version contained in recent official Chinese publications is more accurate or more complete, and we have accordingly taken it as the basis for our translation. In such cases, the nature of the more significant differences is indicated in notes to the text in question, but we have not sought to show the variants systematically. That has been done only in dealing with changes made in the original text of Mao’s writings when they were revised for inclusion in the official edition of his *Selected Works*.

Variants. While there are some differences between the various versions of texts by Mao published in the 1930s and 1940s, these are on the whole minor. Systematic revision of his pre-1949 writings was undertaken only from 1950 onward, in preparing the four-volume edition of the *Mao Zedong xuanji*, translated into English as the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. This problem did not arise in our Volume I, because its coverage ended in 1920, and the earliest item in the *Selected Works* is the “Analysis of All the Classes in Chinese Society,” written in 1925. Apart from this text, Volume II contained the well-known “Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan” of February 1927. Volumes III and IV each included four texts of this kind, Volume V included six, and in Volume VI, there were a dozen. In the present volume there are thirteen, including “Introducing The Communist,” and “On New Democracy.”

Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of which version of the texts included in the official canon is more authentic, or more authoritative. Despite the passions formerly aroused by this issue, the answer seems rather obvious. For purposes of the historical record, only the text as originally written (when it is available) can tell us what Mao actually said in the 1920s and thereafter. For the study of Mao Zedong’s thought, both versions have their uses in documenting how his ideas evolved over time. For purposes of defining ideological orthodoxy under the People’s Republic, the *Selected Works* version is, of course, the ultimate standard.

In any case, the purpose of this edition is not to lay down which was the “real” Mao, but to enable the reader to distinguish between what Mao wrote at any given moment in his life, and the revised texts which were produced in the 1950s under Mao’s close supervision, and often with his own active participation. As in previous volumes of this edition, we have endeavored to do this in the following manner:

1. The translations that appear here correspond to the earliest available version of the text in question.
2. Words and passages from this original version that have been deleted in the *Xuanji* are printed in italics.
3. Substantive and significant changes in the text, including additions made by Mao, or under his authority, in the 1950s, are shown in the footnotes. The *Mao Zedong ji* indicates meticulously all changes, including those that involve only matters of punctuation or style (such as the frequent replacement of the somewhat more literary conjunction *yu* by the more colloquial *he*, both meaning “and”). We have shown in the English version only those changes that appeared to us to have a significant impact on the meaning of the text. Any such judgement is, of course, in some degree subjective. We have sought to err on the side of showing too many variants, rather than too few, even when there was monotonous repetition in the changes, but we have not hesitated to leave out of account variants we regarded as trivial.

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In footnotes of this kind, the words that appear before the arrow reproduce enough of the original text to identify what has been changed. The words that
appear after the arrow correspond to what has been added or revised in the Xuanji. Because, in the rewriting of the 1950s, sentences and whole passages have often been substantially recast, it would take up far too much space, and make our text unreadable, to show every variant in detail. In some instances, it has been possible to show the new version in the form of complete sentences, but frequently we include only enough of the new wording to make plain the main thrust of the changes.

Because the official translation of the Selected Works has been available for nearly half a century, and has been widely quoted in the literature, we have taken this version as our starting-point, but have modified or corrected it as we judged appropriate, both to improve the accuracy of the translation and to bring it into conformity with the conventions adopted in this edition. In those few instances where other materials in this book had already been published in English, we have made our own translations, comparing them subsequently with existing versions.

Annotation. So that any attentive reader will be able to follow the details of Mao’s argument in each case, we have assumed no knowledge of anything relating to China. Persons, institutions, places, and events are briefly characterized at the point where Mao first refers to them. Some individuals of secondary importance, especially those who appear only as names in a long list, are not included in the notes. We have also kept to a minimum annotations regarding people or events in the West. Despite these limitations, the reader will soon discover that the personages who appear in these pages are as numerous as the characters in a traditional Chinese novel.

To keep the notes within reasonable compass, we have generally restricted those regarding Mao’s contemporaries to their lives down to the period covered by each volume. To make it easier to locate information, references have been inserted indicating where the first note about a given individual appears in the volume, or in previous volumes.

In most biographical notes dates of birth and death, separated by a hyphen, are given immediately after the name. A blank following the hyphen should, in principle, signify that the person in question is still living. In the case of individuals born at the beginning of the twentieth century, this is obviously unlikely, but in some instances even the editors working in Beijing have not been able to ascertain the facts. We have done our best to fill these gaps, but have not always succeeded. It should not be assumed that all those born ninety or more years ago for whom no second date is given are already dead; some of them are in fact very much alive as of today.

As pointed out in Volumes III and IV, Mao’s writings regarding military operations for the Jinggangshan and Jiangxi Soviet periods contain references to an extremely large number of places, many of them of no particular significance. To annotate all of the place names mentioned would have imposed an intolerable burden on the printer, and on the reader. We therefore provided notes regarding geography, or the terrain, only in exceptional cases. At that time, however, the action took place primarily in a relatively limited area of Jiangxi, Fujian, and neighboring provinces, so it was possible to include in those volumes maps showing the principal localities mentioned by Mao, in order to facilitate the understanding of the text. Because of the extremely extensive area in which the Red Army operated both during and after the Long March, the succeeding volumes would have required a large number of maps to cover the terrain in sufficient detail, and we must therefore refer the reader to an atlas of China—preferably one showing the place-names in use before 1949.

The introductions to the volumes in this series should be considered in a very real sense as an extension of the notes. These texts will, we hope, help readers unfamiliar with Mao Zedong, or with twentieth-century China, find their own way through Mao’s writings of the pre-1949 period. Any controversial or provocative statements which they may contain are intended to stimulate reflection, not to impose a particular interpretation on the reader. This is a collection of historical source material, not a volume of interpretation.

Use of Chinese terms. On the whole, we have sought to render all Chinese expressions into accurate and readable English, but in some cases it has seemed simpler and less ambiguous to use the Chinese word. These instances include, to begin with, zì (courtesy name) and hào (literary name). Because both Mao, and the authors he cited, frequently employ these alternative appellations instead of the míng or given name of the individual to whom they are referring, information regarding them is essential to the intelligence of the text. The English word “style” is sometimes used here, but because it may stand either for zì or for hào, it does not offer a satisfactory solution. The Chinese terms have, in any case, long been used in Western-language biographical dictionaries of China, as well as in Chinese works.

Similarly, in the case of second or provincial-level, and third or metropolitan-level graduates of the old examination system, we have chosen to use the Chinese terms, respectively juren and jinshi. We have also preferred xian to “county” for the administrative subdivision which constituted the lowest level of the imperial bureaucracy, and still exists in China today. Apart from the Western connotations of “county,” there is the problem that xian is also often translated “district” (as in the expression “district magistrate”), and “district” itself is ambiguous in the Chinese context. We have also preferred to use the Chinese word lù rather than to translate “Chinese league” (or simply “league”), or to give the equivalent in miles or kilometers.

Presentation. In the first five volumes of this series, Mao’s writings were arranged in a single chronological series, according to the date of composition. The only exception to this pattern occurred in Volume IV, where the forty laws to which Mao had put his signature as the Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic appeared in an appendix, and in a smaller type face, because it seemed unlikely that he had actually written these documents himself. In Volume VI, the diverse na-
ture of the materials included made it seem appropriate to arrange the texts by category. This is not the case to the same degree with the present volume, but we have once again placed very brief notes and inscriptions which are neither lengthy enough nor important enough to justify presenting them individually in a separate category at the end of the volume.

As already indicated, we have tried to turn Mao’s Chinese into good English. At the same time, since this is a work of reference, we have sometimes followed Mao in directions which do not accord with English usage. Mao frequently emphasizes words or phrases by placing dots or circles next to each of the characters involved. In this edition, the corresponding text has been set in bold. Usually we have also added a note explicitly pointing this out, but it should be clearly stated that all such highlighting is Mao’s, not ours. Also, some of the Chinese texts we have translated contain omissions, because the editors in Tokyo, or even those in Beijing, did not have access to a complete version of the document in question, or could not read a few characters. When the number of missing characters is small, each one is commonly represented in the printed Chinese text by a hollow square occupying the space which would normally be taken up by a single character. In our English version, each such square has been represented by the symbol [X], so the reader of the translation can see how much is missing. Where the gap is a long one, we have dispensed with this procedure, and conveyed the necessary information in a footnote.

Finally, like many Chinese writers, Mao tended to produce very long paragraphs, sometimes extending to several pages. Although this may seem monotonous to the English reader, we have generally followed his paragraphing exactly, because it must be presumed to reflect Mao’s own sense of where the crucial turning points in his argument are to be found. We have not followed this pattern rigidly; on occasion massive blocks of text containing figures and other data have been turned into tables which are easier to follow. For the most part, however, the translations in this volume seek to reproduce Mao’s original in form as well as in substance.
Foreword to Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army

(February 2, 1939)

Our comrades in the Eighth Route Army are publishing this Military and Political Magazine at a time when the Anti-Japanese War is developing toward the new stage. Its purpose is clear: to improve the combat capacity of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance and, at the same time, to provide the friendly forces and the people participating in the War of Resistance with some reference material regarding the experience of the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance.

In the past year and a half of the War of Resistance, under the leadership of Chairman Chiang and the commanders on the various fronts, under the leadership of Commander-in-Chief Zhu [De] and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng [Dehuai], commanders of various units and at various levels, as well as Communist Party members, the Eighth Route Army, in coordination with all friendly forces, has waged a valiant War of Resistance. Applying the correct strategic orientation of "basically fighting a guerrilla war, but not refusing to engage in mobile warfare under favorable conditions," it has persisted in and further developed guerrilla warfare in North China, established a number of anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, and reduced the enemy-occupied areas. It has pinned down a large portion of the enemy force, supported the main force in the War of Resistance on the front, and delayed the enemy action in attacking the northwest. It has inspired people throughout the country with hope and smashed the national defeatists, who believed that "it is impossible to persist in the War of Resistance in the enemy's rear," as well as the erroneous views of the pessimists. It has disproved the shameless rumors spread by China's reactionary Trotskyites, the pro-Japanese elements headed by Wang Jingwei, and certain diehards wedded to the past within the country.

Our source for this editorial is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 307–10, which reproduces the text as published in the first issue of Bafa junzheng zhai in 1939.

1. The reference is to the "new stage" which Mao had announced in his report of October 1938 to the Sixth Plenum.

2. Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), a former leader of the Guomindang left with whom Mao had worked closely in 1926 (see Volume II, passim), had been drifting for several years toward a pro-Japanese position. On December 18, 1938, he defected from Chongqing and shortly thereafter openly advocated capitulation to Japan. As a result, on January 1, 1939, he was deprived of his Guomindang membership.
In addition, a part of the Eighth Route Army—our rear detachments—has guarded the Yellow River and is now ready to counter the enemy attack on the Northwest in coordination with friendly forces from the Northwest. All these accomplishments of the Eighth Route Army are there for all to see; they are recognized by all except the reactionary Trotskyists, the pro-Japanese faction of Wang Jingwei, and certain diehards wedded to the past. On the side of the enemy, not only do they dare not look down upon the Eighth Route Army but there is abundant evidence to show that they are increasingly fearful of the Eighth Route Army. The Eighth Route Army men are ready to fight to the end and sacrifice their lives for the defense of our motherland. Evidence of their dedication and their invincibility is visible to the entire nation and the entire world; no one will dispute this except the reactionaries, the pro-Japanese elements, and certain diehards. Reports in this regard, both detailed and sketchy, by Chinese and foreign journalists, observers, and travelers have been published one after another. It is certainly not accidental that all unprejudiced people are willing to study the experience of the Eighth Route Army. Is the existence and development of the Eighth Route Army, with the Communists as its mainstay, beneficial or harmful to the Chinese nation? If people do raise such a question, we have only one answer for them: All those who believe that it is "harmful" are necessarily those who, in fact, do not want to see the War of Resistance triumph and spread rumors which directly assist the enemy.

What is the source of these achievements of the Eighth Route Army? It lies in the correct leadership of the upper levels, the valor of the officers and men, the support from the people, and the coordination with the friendly forces—these are the four reasons why the Eighth Route Army has been able to record such accomplishments. Among them, the coordination of the allied armies is plain to see. Without the courageous War of Resistance of the main forces against the enemy on the front, the successful unfolding of the guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear would have been impossible; without the support from the friendly forces also stationed in the enemy’s rear, such great achievements would also have been impossible. The officers and men of the Eighth Route Army should be grateful to the friendly forces for their direct and indirect cooperation in fighting, and especially to those officers and men of the allied armies who have offered us all kinds of well-intentioned assistance and sincere encouragement. In the face of the common enemy, the armies of China bear one another no old grudge and have become close friends who help and support each other. This is the foundation which guarantees that China absolutely cannot perish. In former times, people said, "He who reads Zhuge’s memorial on his military expedition and fails to shed tears is certainly not loyal; he who reads Li Mi’s appeal to the emperor and fails to shed tears is certainly not filial." Today we should say, "He who sees or hears how China’s armies, forgetful of old enmities and mutually supporting one another, have intimately united and is not moved is certainly not a patriot.” Should not those who are "making personal fortunes out of the national disaster, and living off the friction [between parties and factions]” engage in a bit of self-examination at this time?

Does the Eighth Route Army have shortcomings? Yes, it does, and not a few. First, it is poor in equipment and technology in comparison with the enemy and also with some of the friendly forces. This is a fundamental defect of the Eighth Route Army and of China’s armies in general. Consequently, how to improve its technology and equipment in order to defeat the enemy has become a serious task for the Eighth Route Army in the new phase of the War of Resistance. Second, the Eighth Route Army is well known for its guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, but some cadres do not know enough about the strategy and tactics for resisting Japan. Ordinary cadres, especially those recently promoted, have not yet made an initial study of the management and command of the new-style modern armies. Some cadres of worker and peasant origin have not yet solved the problem of raising their cultural level to the necessary extent. To solve these problems has become the number two task for the Eighth Route Army. Third, to consolidate and enlarge the national united front is the overall orientation for achieving victory in the War of Resistance and in building up the country, and the cadres of the Eighth Route Army have achieved great success in this, but some cadres, especially the new cadres, are lacking in an understanding of the united front, and, in some areas, they have done poorly in working together with the friendly parties and armies, and in adjusting the relationships between different social strata for the benefit of the War of Resistance. As a result, strengthening our education in the policy of the united front has become an important task. Fourth, the Eighth Route Army has long made it one of the three main tasks of its political work to win over the enemy and puppet soldiers and has achieved remarkable results in this. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be done in teaching spoken and written Japanese to soldiers and cadres in general, and in developing various methods to make them better able to do propaganda among the enemy rank and file and the lower-level officers about opposition to the war of aggression and about the united front. The successes in winning over the Mongolian puppet troops have been relatively great, but there is still room for improvement. Here, it is extremely important to collect and study all possible information about the enemy and puppet troops, but what has been achieved has not been as much as required. Fifth, one of the most difficult problems in a long-term War of Resistance will be the problem of finance and the economy. This is a difficult problem for the War of Resistance in the whole country, as well as for the Eighth Route Army, and we must raise our level of understanding of it. This problem has already attracted the attention of certain sectors of the Eighth Route Army, but not of the Eighth Route Army as a whole. In each and every anti-Japanese base area, not only must we see that correct local financial and economic policies are carried out as we have done before, but we must put forth the task for the army to take part in actual production, on condition that it does not interfere with military operations. In more or less consolidated base areas, the combat forces

3. Zhuge Liang (181–234), zi Kongming, was the prime minister of the Shu Han dynasty during the period of the Three Kingdoms (early to mid-third century); the memorial mentioned here figures in the novel regarding this era, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. Li Mi (222–?) declined appointment as eunuch to the heir apparent in a memorial pleading his duty to his aged grandmother, who had cared for him in his youth.
will take care of the fighting, while the personnel of rear units will be in charge of production. When combat circumstances permit, the fighting forces may also make use of the opportunity and get the soldiers to make their own shoes, socks, gloves, and so on. In consolidated base areas, noncombat forces can be mobilized to grow vegetables, raise pigs, chop firewood, and, in particular, run cooperatives. By so doing, on the one hand, the livelihood of the army will be improved and provisions supplemented; on the other hand, the morale of the army will be stimulated and combat capacity increased.

The issues discussed above—namely, improvements in equipment and technology, thorough study of strategy and tactics, correctly applying the policy of the united front, extensive efforts to win over the enemy and puppet troops, and the movement for participation by the army itself in production—all represent important problems to which the Eighth Route Army must pay greater attention during the new stage. Defects in other work will also be overcome along with the improvement on these important issues.

It is the task of all the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, and also of the Military and Political Magazine, to enhance our achievements and overcome our shortcomings. The War of Resistance will be long and cruel; it is urgently necessary to enhance the achievements of the Eighth Route Army and overcome its shortcomings, first for the sake of expanding the fighting capacity of the Eighth Route Army, and, second, in order to offer the experience of the Eighth Route Army to the people and allied troops who are also fighting Japan. The Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army should work hard toward this end.

To He Ganzhi

(January 17, 1939)

Comrade Ganzhi:

I read your letter with great pleasure. There are not many among our comrades as yet who are interested in Chinese history and resolved to study it. There is Comrade Chen Boda in Yan'an, who is doing research in this field, and now you are also planning to study our national history. This is very good; I hope you will work on it conscientiously. To do so has also been an unfulfilled ambition of mine. I wanted to collect materials on China's military history, but to this day I have never got started doing it. My tools are inadequate, and this year I have still been able to study only the tools, that is, to study philosophy, economics, and Leninism, mainly philosophy. In the future I plan to study modern history. Your advice in this respect would be most welcome.

I think you are right in your three approaches to the study of our national history, especially the second one. It will be of great help in the present anti-Japanese war if you can demonstrate in your book which of the two lines of national resistance and national capitulation is correct and which is erroneous, bitterly denouncing the national capitulationists and praising those in favor of national resistance from the Northern and Southern dynasties [420–581], the Southern Song dynasty [1127–1278], the last years of the Ming dynasty [1368–1644], and the last years of the Qing dynasty. There is, however, one thing that should have your attention, that is, the policy of aggression, aiming at "achievement and success" and the conquest of the nations of "the weak and the ignorant" (which has occurred in our history).

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 136–37, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. He Ganzhi (1906–1969), a historian, was born in Taishan, Guangdong Province. In 1929 he went to Japan to study, returning to China after the September 18 incident in 1931. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai in 1934 and went to Yan'an in 1937. At this time, he was a professor at the North Shaanxi Public School and chairman of the Section for Teaching and Research on China.

2. Chen Boda (1904–1989) was a native of Fujian. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, studied at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, and returned to China in 1929. In 1937 he went to Yan'an, where he became Mao Zedong's political secretary. At this time, he was also working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
should not be approved, and should not be confused with the positive policy of resistance. Attacks in the context of resistance, such as the cause embraced by Ban Chao of the Eastern Han dynasty, do not fall into the category of aggression.

I look forward to receiving a copy of each of your two books when they are published.

I wish you success in your efforts!

Mao Zedong

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3. Ban Chao (31–101), the younger brother of the historian Ban Gu, was a well-known general of the Eastern Han dynasty [25–220]. He fought for thirty-one years on China's western frontiers, achieving victories against the Xiongnu and obtaining the submission of more than fifty Central Asian kingdoms to the Chinese yoke. (The Xiongnu were nomads of the Northern Steppes, who threatened the Chinese empire at the end of the first and the beginning of the second century. They have often been identified with the Huns.)

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The Relationship Between the War of Resistance and Foreign Assistance

Preface to the English Edition of On Protracted War

(January 20, 1939)

Friends in Shanghai are translating my On Protracted War into English. I am naturally very happy to hear this, for China’s great War of Resistance concerns not merely China and the East but the whole world. In democratic countries such as England, America, and France, the broad popular masses, including all the progressive people of various social strata, sympathize with China’s War of Resistance and oppose the Japanese imperialist invasion of China. The only exception is a portion of the diehard faction, which oppose China’s War of Resistance. As regards the diehard faction, some are obstinate by nature and have all along been sympathetic to the Japanese warlords. Others—because they do not understand the ineluctable law that governs China’s War of Resistance, according to which Japan is doomed to failure and China is bound to win after traveling a difficult road—have become pessimistic, have lost hope, and refuse to assist China. I think there must be such people. It is, of course, my hope that my book will give them the opportunity to understand the truth of the matter. Perhaps there are still some even among those who are sympathetic to China’s War of Resistance and who make up the majority of the people who likewise do not understand the truth about China’s War of Resistance. They are sympathetic, but at the same time they feel depressed. We are even more obligated to free these people of their sympathetic depression. This little booklet of mine was written in May 1938. Because it covers all the phases of the Sino-Japanese war, its significance is of a lasting nature. As to whether the arguments put forth in the book are correct or erroneous, the entire experience of our War of Resistance in the past has verified them, and our experience in the future will continue to verify them. After the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the War of Resistance is just now progressing to a new phase—one that is favorable to us and disadvantageous to Japan. This is a stage of stalemate.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 19–20, which reproduces it from Baidi jinzheng zahi, no. 2, February 15, 1939. We have not been able to locate a copy of a British or American edition of On Protracted War, in order to compare our translation with that previously published.
between the enemy and us. This time will come soon, because the enemy will be forced to terminate his strategic offensive and go over to the strategic defensive, while we, thanks to our resolute resistance and growth in strength, will put an end to our strategic retreat (of the main force, not of the guerrillas) and enter into strategic contention. In the new stage, our entire task consists in preparing for the counterattack. The preparation may take a long time, but we will devote all our courage and energy to carrying out these preparations, and we certainly will and definitely can drive Japanese imperialism out of China. In the great War of Resistance, it depends mainly on China’s own strength to defeat the enemy: China’s forces are being mobilized right now, and they will not only become an invincible force but will prevail over the enemy and expel him from our country. There is no doubt about that. At the same time, however, we need assistance and support from without. Our enemy is an international enemy, and our War of Resistance is also an international war of resistance. History has already shown that the idea of a separate war is erroneous. There are people in democratic countries, like England and America, who still harbor the idea of standing alone; they do not understand that, if China is defeated, England, America, and other such countries will no longer be able to rest in peace. This idea is completely wrong and out of date. To support China is to support themselves: this is the concrete reality at the present time. That is why I hope that this book will arouse some sympathy in the English-speaking countries, for the benefit of China and also of the world. China is fighting a war in the midst of difficulties, but the flames of a war among the great powers of the world are drawing closer day by day. No country can remain aloof from it, however much it may wish to. We are in favor of President Roosevelt’s declaration in defense of democracy; we resolutely oppose Chamberlain’s policy of making concessions to the fascist countries. To this day, Chamberlain is still timid and over-cautious about Japan. I hope the popular masses of England and America will arise forcefully and demand that their governments adopt a new policy of opposition to wars of aggression, for the sake of China, and also for the sake of England and America themselves.

To Zhou Yang

(January 22, 1939, 10:00 P.M.)

Comrade Zhou Yang:

I have not read the whole of the manuscript, half of which was written by Li Liuru and the other half by He Peiyuan. It is of great importance in our propaganda directed to those outside the border region, so it should not be sent to press lightly before everything, from the form to the content, has been made right. I now request you to take full responsibility for the revision of the book; if you think it should be entirely rewritten, go ahead and do so. Although this will demand extra effort on your part, its significance is very great. It would be best if you could finish the work before February 15, so the book could be published at the end of the month.

It has been arranged that the author’s remuneration (1.5 yuan per thousand characters) will be divided up among you, Comrade Li, and Comrade He, to show my appreciation for your efforts.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, which reproduces it from the manuscript.

1. Zhou Yang (1908–1989) was a native of Hunan Province. After a period of study in Japan, he spent the years 1930–1937 in Shanghai, where he served as secretary-general of the League of Left-Wing Writers. When the war with Japan broke out in 1937, he went to Yan’an, where he became head of the Education Department of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government.

2. The reference is to the first draft of A True Record of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The book was published by Jiefang chubanshe in Yan’an in December 1939.

3. Li Liuru (1887–1973), a native of Hunan, had received military training and participated in the Wuhan Uprising of 1911. After a period of study in Japan, he returned to Hunan in 1919, and joined the Chinese Communist Party there in 1921. He participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927 and in 1930 went to the Central Soviet Area, where he occupied a number of posts. In August 1937 he went to Yan’an. At this time, he was chief secretary in Mao Zedong’s office. He Peiyuan was a secretary of that office.

4. Mao himself emphasized the words set in boldface by the use of dots under the characters.
On the Current War Conditions and the Political Situation

(January 28, 1939)

I am going to discuss the current situation. Since you comrades are scattered all over, and are not completely clear about the situation as a whole, I would like to take this opportunity to talk about it with you comrades.

We shall look at the problem according to the report and resolution of the Sixth Plenum. The Sixth Plenum said: “The resistance war can be sustained.” This was said in the first half of October last year, and three months have gone by since then. How are things going? On October 30 of last year, Chairman Chiang published his open letter to the people of the whole country. On December 26, he published his article refuting Konoe.1 It was very well done. He also deprived Wang Jingwei of his party membership. All these actions indicated that he wants to carry out resolutely the policy of the Resistance War and prove that the strength of the pro-Japanese faction is unable to shake the Resistance War. In the past, the first question was whether to fight or not, and there used to be a tendency toward compromise within the party of our friends, and they were talking about peace. This made things very difficult. Although our Communist Party is determined to fight no matter what happens, and we are not going to compromise, everyone knows that the Communist Party is still the minority in the country as a whole, it is still a small shareholder in the united front. If we were to fight Japan alone, it would be still more difficult. Now that the Guomindang has taken these measures, and has resolved to support resolutely the orientation of the Resistance War, under this condition of “fighting,” it is easy to make an issue of things. This is a good thing, it is a progressive element in the united front.

Let us now discuss the war situation.

Last October we predicted that, after the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, we would suffer more difficulties but would, at the same time, make more progress. As far as the difficulties are concerned, you comrades are all aware that, because of the fall of major cities and communication lines, the political power of the state as well as the battle terrain are territorially divided by the enemy, and financial and economic difficulties have increased. As regards progress, it is manifested above all in persistence in the Resistance War, and in the defeat of the peace party in the two meetings of the People’s Political Council. Well then, can progress overcome the difficulties? Our answer is in the affirmative. Moreover, only if we are more progressive, and work harder to overcome difficulties, can we make the war change into the New Stage. The central task put forward at the Sixth Plenum is also the task of the people of all China; it is to increase our strength, overcome difficulties, stop the enemy’s offensive, and prepare for our counteroffensive. Its correctness has been proved already and will continue to be proved in the future.

We say that the enemy’s attack has not yet stopped. During the past three months since the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the enemy has not undertaken any major actions at the front, but it is fighting fiercely on the flanks and in the rear. There are people who say that our estimate was wrong, because the enemy has already stopped his attacks. We do not say this, or think this, because the enemy may still attack places such as Xi’an, Lanzhou, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuzhou, and Hengzhou, and we must be prepared. Although until this moment, when I am speaking, my words have still not been borne out, it is nevertheless better to be prepared, for if we are not prepared our losses will be even greater. Why will the enemy continue to attack? To begin with, if he does not attack, the fascist warlords will collapse immediately, and the enemy has very great ambitions. Not only does he want to attack all of China, he also wants to attack Southeast Asia, Burma, Vietnam, and India. In China, his plan is to oppose Chairman Chiang, oppose the Communist Party, and sabotage the Anti-Japanese National United Front. He wants to believe that he can achieve his goal, but whether or not he can will depend upon the level of our efforts.

We say that the enemy’s attack will stop, but can it stop or not? We say, it must stop. Japan wants to destroy us, and we want it to stop, but how this can be achieved can be explained only on the basis of the situations on the enemy’s side and on our own. Because of the small size of the enemy’s country, its small population, and small number of troops, and because, on the other hand, the front is now so long, stretching to Guangzhou in the south and Baotou in the north, the enemy has suffered from the very beginning from the weakness of lack of troops. When you add to this the dispersal of forces, its strong army has become weaker. This lack of troops and dispersal of troops is an incurable disease. Its strength does not allow it to send more troops to China, because in addition it must be on guard against the powerful Soviet Union. Besides, Britain, America, and France are also its enemies. Finally, it has to be on guard against its own people and the people in its colonies. Therefore, it can send to China at most one-third of its forces. Now it is said that its troops there already number one million; in the future, it may be able to send at most another million and no more. This being the case, we will attack it every day from the front and from its rear; we will fight it with our regular forces and guerrillas to kill and injure its soldiers and exhaust them, so that its troops will be even

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1. The reference is to Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), who was prime minister of Japan from June 1937 until January 1939.
fewer in number and even more dispersed, so that it will consume more ammunition and supplies, its strength will be weakened, and it will have to stop the attack. On the other hand, our country of China will be stronger; we will be able to fight not only guerrilla war but mobile war, and there will be progress in various other respects. Though we are still unable to halt the Japanese attack now, we are absolutely sure that we will be able to make them stop it. We must make every possible effort to bring it to a halt.

As for our prediction that guerrilla warfare can be greatly developed in the enemy’s rear, and that base areas can be established, this has already been proved, and will be proved even more in the future. At the same time, we also pointed out that the guerrilla war would not all be smooth sailing. We must see that the enemy is sure to turn around and attack, and at that time guerrilla war will be even more difficult. We must be prepared for the arrival of this difficulty and strike back at it from a fighting posture. We must be prepared for this, for only thus can we avoid the misfortune of “unpreparedness.”

We say that the Anti-Japanese National United Front will develop, but there will be some difficulties. The Guomindang is making progress, but in this progressive stream there is a countercurrent. What has been proved in the past three months? The diehard element Wang Jingwei has become the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei, and naturally he may still make trouble in the future. The Guomindang has deprived Wang Jingwei of his party membership forever, and this is good. All the generals at the front in different places, Chen Cheng, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, our Commander-in-chief and Vice Commander-in-chief Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehui] have all telegraphed the National Government to issue a wanted circular, but an open circular has not yet been issued. We think that this wanted circular is necessary, for he has already become a Chinese traitor and mingled with the enemy. Even though it is not certain that we will be able to catch him now, when the time comes that the Japanese imperialists are defeated, where on earth can he escape to? Some people say that he will go to Germany or Italy, but at the time when the doom of all these world fascists is at hand, where else can he flee? In sum, so long as he is still on earth, we are sure to catch him in the end.

We say that in the overall forward movement of progress there will be some partial setbacks, and because of these setbacks, there will be friction. Not only will there be friction, but it will be somewhat worse than in the past. The force behind these setbacks can be further divided into two factions. One faction is pro-Japanese, anti-Chiang, and anti-Communist, and Wang Jingwei is its head. Now some of them have gone, but there are still some adherents left. The other group is the diehard elements, who advocate so-called resistance against Japan, support of Chiang, and opposition to the Communists. There are many people of this kind around the border region. They say: At present, we should first oppose the Communists, and then resist the Japanese; when the enemy comes, we will resist the Japanese first and then oppose the Communists. At the front, it is said that there are some people who advocate the so-called parallel progress of resistance against Japan and oppo-

sition against the Communists. As regards the group which is pro-Japanese and opposed to Chiang and the Communists, the following concrete examples illustrate the “carrying out” of their “views.” At the second meeting of the People’s Political Council, some draft resolutions with anti-Chiang contents were proposed. They claimed that the big fire in Changsha had something to do with Chairman Chiang, using this to criticize Chairman Chiang. They denounced guerrilla war as [the ac-
tion of] roving bandits, criticizing both Chairman Chiang and the Communist Party, since Chairman Chiang as well as the Communist Party has suggested that in the protracted War of Resistance, it is necessary to develop guerrilla warfare. There are also those, such as Zhang Junmai, who have responded to Wang Jingwei by writing articles saying how bad the Communist Party is! Why the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army should be done away with! The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is thus and so! In sum, they are applying their most vicious insults to the Communist Party as well as to the armies, administration, and people under its leadership. As for [Wang Jingwei’s] being pro-Japanese, before he fled, though he did not say things clearly, in his articles and speeches there was always a hidden message of unwillingness to resist Japan and the idea of seeking a compromise with the Japanese. The other group, in Xi’an as well as in places near the border region, is carrying on its work, which is welcomed by the enemy, even more assiduously than before. They are a bunch of hooligans who make a living out of creating friction without paying attention to the overall situation.

This countercurrent is retrogressive. Within the camp of the united front there is progress as well as retrogression, but if a fight takes place between two persons, one progressive and the other backward, who will win? Our answer is that the progressive tendency can overcome the retrogressive tendency.

We must understand that within the united front there is sure to be friction. The name of the united front itself contains the idea of friction, for when talking about unification, it is possible only if there are two or more. If there is only one, “one hand does not clap,” and there can be no friction, but if there are two, two hands will clap and make a loud noise, and friction will be unavoidable. If the united front lasts for ten thousand years, friction will also last for ten thousand years. So long as there is the united front, friction will exist, because when there are differences, there will be friction. But we are doing our best to reduce friction.

Some people are determined to create friction. If so, what should we do then? At the Sixth Plenum we said that we would never tolerate unreasonable friction. We must adhere to the principle: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we

2. Zhang Jiasen (1887–1969), zi Junmai, commonly known in the West as Carson Chang, a native of Jiangsu, studied in Tokyo and subsequently in Germany and England. For many years he was closely associated with Liang Qichao, and not on good terms with the Guomindang. In 1937, however, after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he accepted a post in Nanjing, while advocating his own brand of state socialism. In 1939 he followed the government to Chongqing.
are attacked, we will certainly retaliate.” This last principle is very important. For instance, I am standing in this room, and he pushes me. If I yield to him and back off one step, then he will push me back one step after the other until I have no place to stand in this room. Therefore, if he pushes, we will push back, until we have pushed him back to where he came from. If they want to create friction, we will oppose friction. They say that the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region Government is a puppet régime, they want to abolish the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region and the Communist Party as well, they want the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army to go to the desert area, and so on and so on. They have a great many variants like this, and we oppose all of them. They are creating a lot of friction around the periphery of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Take the occupation of villages, for example. If they take one village, we should take two of theirs. If they return one of ours, we should return the same number. If they take captives, and take two of our men, we will take four of theirs. If they lock ours up for three days, we will lock theirs up for six days before releasing them. Why should we treat them more severely than they treat us? This is because they attacked us first, justice is not on their side, and they must be punished. This is what is called opposing friction. We must love each other and unite, but we should stand up; otherwise, we will suffer the “pain of losing our Party.” At present, with the increase in friction, what is the future of the united front? We will definitely persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front. It can also be maintained during the anti-Japanese war, as has already been made clear in the report at the Sixth Plenum. Love and unity are the principles of the united front. Nonetheless, we must also insist on the principle of opposing friction; it is impossible without this point. Only by maintaining this principle can we strengthen and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

Now the Guomindang is holding its Fifth Plenum. We do not anticipate that the result will be bad, but at the same time we should not ignore the fact that friction is still possible.

Above I have talked about the situation on the Chinese side. I will now discuss the situation on the Japanese side.

Japan has changed its prime minister, because it now wants to use a new method, namely, the general mobilization of the whole country. This proves that at the present time its old methods are inadequate, and its difficulties have become more apparent. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that in the future it will attack China even more frenziedly, and that it is preparing to attack the entire world. It is in the situation [characterized by the saying] “when riding a tiger the hard part is getting off” and has no alternative to launching a general mobilization of the whole country.

As for Japan’s difficulties, in military terms they manifest themselves in the lack of troops and dispersion of troops. The economy is even more exhausted. Fewer commodities are now exported, because military industry has expanded. Conversely, imports are greater than in the past, because of the need to make large quantities of military supplies. In the past Japanese products were the cheapest (because it exploited most severely the great mass of workers and peasants), and they could be used to exchange for some foreign products. Now that this condition no longer exists, it has to use cash if it wants to buy raw materials from foreign countries, but Japan does not have large cash reserves. Moreover, in the more than one year’s war of invasion against China, it has spent nearly 9 billion yen in military expenses. Diplomatically, it is becoming more and more isolated. Britain, the United States, and France have already sent protests to Japan, asking why it violated the Nine-Power Treaty.³ This happened after the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou. Now Britain and the United States are discussing the use of economic sanctions to punish Japan. In the past America had a neutrality law, which was disadvantageous to China but advantageous to Japan. Now the relationship between Japan and the United States is not good, because Japan wants everything for itself, and the interests of Britain and the United States in China are weakened. At the same time, because Britain and the United States are separated from China by large oceans, additional shipping fees are added to their products, the prices of their products are higher than those from Japan, and they are unable to compete against the Japanese. Furthermore, using as its excuse the military implications, Japan does not allow British and American merchant ships to navigate the Yangzi and other rivers, and the commercial interests of Britain and the United States in China have been almost completely taken over. Now Japan is talking in fine words about returning the leased territories, but in reality it wants to change the leased territories of Britain and France into its own occupied territories. In addition, it is attempting to attack Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Australia, and other such places. Japanese imperialism has become “a rat running across the street, with everyone shouting ‘kill it.’” Its only friends are Hitler and Mussolini. All the democratic countries, such as Britain, the United States, and France, dislike it, let alone the Soviet Union.

Last October we said that Japan had not stopped its attack, but it undoubtedly would. Moreover, we pointed out the three conditions that would make it stop, of which the aforementioned difficulties of Japan constitute one.

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3. The Nine-Power Treaty, adopted at the Washington Conference of 1922, contained stipulations regarding the Open Door and equal opportunity in China.
4. Beginning in 1898, in the aftermath of the Boxer Uprising, foreign powers demanded and obtained from China so-called “leased territories,” which were excluded from Chinese sovereignty for terms often as long as ninety-nine years. The territory in Northeast China thus granted to Russia was for the most part handed over to Japan following the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and Germany’s territory in Shandong was likewise taken over by Japan, though it was returned to China in 1922. In 1939, there thus remained only three such territories: a large area controlled by Japan in Manchuria; the “New Territories” opposite Hong Kong under British rule; and the post of Guangzhouwan, opposite Hainan Island, under French control.
What, then, is the international attitude toward us? In the past we pointed out that the problem in Europe differs somewhat from the problem in Asia. In the past Britain and France made one concession after another to Hitler in Europe, but adopted in some respects a different attitude toward China. This has already been demonstrated. It is good that Britain and France lend money to us; this opens one door, and in the future we will have more ways out. Nevertheless, will they help us greatly? That can’t happen. There are limitations in the imperialist countries. Naturally we are not relying on the international environment to eat; we must put the main emphasis on China.

There are two kinds of countries in the world. One is the fascist countries, the other is the democratic countries. The contradictions between these two kinds of countries are daily becoming more acute. Now that the Spanish government army has become more dangerous, Germany wants to take back its old colonies, and Italy is scheming to take Tunisia and other places belonging to France. A war crisis among the big powers has drawn closer. Now a world war has already begun. The wars that have taken place in the past, and are taking place today, are wars in which the fascist countries are attacking the weak and small countries. In the future they will fight against big countries, but when that will happen we do not yet know. Do we, however, wish that it would take place as soon as possible, or what? If it were to begin now, that would certainly be a good thing in some respects. For example, a blow against the fascists in the West would weaken the power of Japan. But this is indirect, and thus it would be better if the attack came later, for in that case, Britain, the United States, and the other democratic countries would be able to help us more directly. The Soviet Union is not willing to fight now either. In a few years, when it has completed its third five-year plan and has become stronger, so that the mere mention of its name will scare the fascists to death, this will be more beneficial to China as well as to the world. The world is sure to fight a larger-scale war, but there is no way to predict when that war will break out.

Such is the present aspect of the war and the political situation.

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Inscription for the Artillery Regiment

(1939)

To all the comrades of the Artillery Regiment, officers and men:

It is already the first anniversary of the formation of the Artillery Regiment of the Eighth Route Army. I hope you will make great efforts in the study of political and military science and technical subjects, create a regiment which will be a powerful force in the anti-Japanese war, and achieve your goal of becoming ever-victorious and all-conquering, so as to win glory for the nation and become a model for the Eighth Route Army!

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Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 17, which reproduces it from a text published in China in 1982.
To Chen Boda

(February 1, 1939)

Comrade Boda:

I have read your article “The Philosophical Thought of Mozi.” It is a great contribution of yours to have identified a Chinese Heraclitus. I have a few specific comments, which you will find on another sheet, for your reference. They are mere reflections in the course of a casual reading, and not results of serious study.

Salutations,

Mao Zedong, on the night of February 1

1. The title

It might be better if it were changed to “The Philosophical Ideas of Mozi—An Ancient Materialist Philosopher” or “The Materialist Philosophy of Mozi.”

2. The existence of things does not depend solely on their properties; there is also their basic nature. Nature and properties are inseparable, but there is a distinction. An object can lose some of its properties and yet remain the same, because the object still retains its nature. In [the expression] zhiqi, zhi seems to refer to the nature of the thing, something that will never change (within the compass of the thing itself), while qi seems to indicate quantity as well as properties, things that do change.

3. The meaning of the sentence “The superior man [junzi] cannot distinguish between what is benevolent and what is not on the basis of his behavior” might be expressed somewhat more clearly by saying that when the superior man acts, he ends up doing only what is not benevolent, rather than doing what is benevolent.

4. The paragraph discussing cause and effect seems to be dealing with the question of necessity and contingency at the same time. “The matter being what it is” indicates necessity, yet the form in which this necessity manifests itself is accidental. All the forms in which necessity manifests itself are, as a rule, contingent. It always manifests itself in the form of contingency. Therefore it is correct to say “there could have been no Wuchang Uprising of October 10 without this partial cause.” However, the necessity of the 1911 Revolution (major cause) must have necessarily been provoked by another contingency (minor cause), and completed by way of numerous contingent causes. It might well have been the Hanyang Uprising of October 10 or an uprising in some other place on some other date. It is also right to say that “had it not been for the fact that it broke out at that most appropriate moment, it might not have spread like a prairie fire.” But it would have necessarily broken out at some other appropriate moment and become a prairie fire.

5. The question of the Doctrine of the Mean

Such doctrines of the Moist school as “in desiring it, one weighs the benefit; in aversion to it, one weighs the loss,“ maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side,” and “establish a position that is unshakable” mean the same thing as Confucian concepts such as “hold the two extremes and employ the Mean,” “choose the Mean, grasp it firmly, and do not lose it,” “stand erect in the middle and do not incline to either side,” and “maintain this course to death with-

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 140–43, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Chen Boda’s article was published in Jiefang, nos. 82, 102, and 104, in 1939 and 1940.

2. Heraclitus had been called by Lenin “one of the founders of dialectics.”

3. Chen Boda did not follow Mao in this, and the title of the published article remained as indicated above.

4. In modern Chinese, this two-character compound has the meaning of “will” or “aspiration.” Mao is discussing it here as used in the writings of Mencius, and also of Confucius. Chen Boda’s explanation of the meaning of the term (in part 1 of his article, Jiefang, no. 82, p. 22) is in harmony with Mao’s brief comment here.

5. Chen Boda’s article does not contain the exact words quoted by Mao, but the reference is clearly to Chen’s statement (Jiefang, no. 82, p. 22) that “the so-called ‘superior man’ … can tell you that this is benevolent and that is not, but when it comes to his behavior, his actions end up being only those lacking in benevolence rather than benevolent ones, which means that he has no idea what benevolence actually is.”

6. This is from Mozi, book 10, chapter 40, “The Canon” (Jing), part I. The context is a definition of the system of merit, in which officials are rewarded or punished according to their deeds.

7. This is from Mozi, book 10, chapter 42, “Exposition of the Canon” (Jingshuo), part I. A standard commentary to the text states that this is a gloss on the previous expression, and it is likely that Mao had this in mind in devising his interpretation.

8. From Mozi, book 10, chapter 41, “The Canon” (Jing), part II.

9. The Doctrine of the Mean, VI, reads: “The Master said, ‘There was Shun—He indeed was greatly wise! Shun loved to question others, and to study their words, though they might be shallow. He concealed what was bad in them, and displayed what was good. He took hold of their two extremes, determined the Mean, and employed it in his government of the people. It was by this that he was Shun!’” (Legge, Vol. I, p. 388). Mao is referring to the penultimate sentence of this paragraph.

10. The reference is to the Doctrine of the Mean, VIII, which reads: “The Master said, ‘This was the manner of Hui—he made choice of the Mean, and whenever he got hold of what was good, he clasped it firmly, as if wearing it on his breast, and did not lose it’” (Legge, Vol. I, p. 389).
out changing."\(^\text{11}\) They all confirm the stability of substantive disposition and make an argument for the stability of such substantive disposition along two lines: opposition to excess and to falling short.\(^\text{12}\) Here are a few of my objections: (a) That a two-line struggle is being waged or that the method of a two-line battle is being used to determine the relativity of substantive disposition; (b) The two schools, Confucian and Moist, mean the same thing although they use different words. The Moists made no special advance; (c) "Correctness" is a concept concerned with substantive disposition, which is the same as the Confucian’s "mean" (not veering to one side is called the mean). "To weigh" is not a concept concerned with substantive disposition but is, rather, a method for defining the distinction between one particular substantive disposition and another, which is the same as the Confucian school’s "hold," as in "hold the two extremes and employ the Mean." The "correctness" of "desire" is "benefit," differentiating it from loss. The "correctness" of "aversion" is "loss," differentiating it from benefit and avoiding any confusion between the two. "In weighing, maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side"\(^\text{13}\) should be explained as defining the particular substantive disposition of a thing and not letting it deviate to the left or to the right (that is, not having it veer toward a different substantive disposition), but this phrase is not as clear and appropriate as "excess is the same as falling short," so you should not say that it "is a further development over 'excess is the same as falling short'"; (d) To say that "maintaining a balance between the two without veering to one side shows precisely that Mozi saw that one particular substantive disposition contains two different sides and not veering to either one side or the other is the only correct way, the only way that truly conforms to that substantive disposition" is rather inappropriate, as it makes the Moist school out to be eclectic. A substantive disposition does have two sides, but in the course of a single process only one is the principal side, and it is relatively stable, so there must necessarily be some inclination, a veering toward this side. What is meant by a particular substantive disposition, or one substantive disposition, is this particular side, which is the substance; otherwise the substantive disposition will have been negated. Therefore, what Mozi means by "without veering to either side" is to avoid deviation to the right or the left, or veering toward a different substantive disposition, and not to avoid deviation toward one of the two sides of a particular substantive disposition (actually this would not be deviation but, rather, precisely, correctness). This is the explanation that should be made if the Moist school is, indeed, dialectical materialist.

6. The question of "halves" and "extremes"

This section in Mozi, and Hu Shi’s\(^\text{14}\) interpretation of it in particular, cannot provide proof regarding the issue of transformation of substantive disposition; it seems to be a discussion of the question of limitation and limitlessness.

\(^{11}\) The reference is to the *Doctrine of the Mean*, X, 5 (Legge, Vol. I, p. 390), which reads: "The superior man cultivates a friendly harmony, without being weak. How firm is he in his energy! He stands erect in the middle, without inclining to either side. How firm is he in his energy! When good principles prevail in the government of his country, he does not change from what he was in retirement. How firm is he in his energy!"

\(^{12}\) Mao’s analysis in all this hinges upon his interpretation of Mozi’s use of the word *zheng*, commonly translated as "appropriateness," "uprightness," "the Middle Way," and so on. This word appears in the first and last of Mao’s references to Mozi, and Mao clearly takes it in the "traditional Confucian" sense as just described, whereas we have rendered it in a more "neutral" way, as "it" in the first instance, and as "establish a position" in the second. For a fuller and clearer exposition of Mao’s ideas regarding the relation between excess [guo] and falling short [buij], which he equated respectively with leftist and rightist, see below, his letter of February 20, 1939, to Zhang Wentian.

\(^{13}\) The original *Mozi* text reads, "The wise man maintains a balance between the two without veering to one side," but the standard commentary takes "wise man" as "one who weighs things," and Mao is clearly following him here.

\(^{14}\) Regarding Hu Shi, see below the note to the text of February 22, 1939.
Unite, While at the Same Time Struggling

(February 5, 1939)

How do we consolidate the united front to achieve our goal: “the War of Resistance must be victorious, and building the country must be successful”? We must make use of the struggle on two fronts.

One is to oppose closed-doorism. We must talk about love for our former enemies, and unite with the landlords, capitalists, and petty bourgeoisie, provided only that they are willing. There are some here among us who are mortally afraid that they will be soiled by bourgeois garbage, and who say these people are no good, that we should not talk with them about love and should not talk with them about unity. They believe that we can win the War of Resistance all by ourselves if we just study Marxism behind closed doors. The thought of these people really is no good, and we should oppose it, for closed-doorism hinders unity and hinders the united front. There are also some other people whose thinking is very confused; these are the villains who “make money out of the misfortunes of the country” and who “make a living by creating friction.” Such people we must also oppose. The enemies of unity are those who sabotage unity and pay no attention to unity. The struggle is like a combat at the front. We have attacked those closed-doorists who do not care about unity, and also those diehard elements who make a living by creating friction, and this constitutes a front.

There is another front, and another thing we must attack. This thing we must attack is seeking to abolish the Communist Party and to incorporate it into the Guomindang, under the pretext of talking about “unity.” Such people often talk about “aligning the Communist Party with the Guomindang.” But to eliminate the Communist Party is harmful and not advantageous for carrying out [Sun Yat-sen’s] Three People’s Principles. We are the most resolute in carrying out nationalism (the anti-Japanese war). We are also the most thoroughgoing in carrying out people’s rights. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is an example of this. Recently an American reporter attended the meetings of the border region assembly for several days, and he said that the democracy is on a much higher level here than in America. In the entire country, it is we here who are carrying out the principles of people’s rights and people’s livelihood. Elsewhere, though they boast that they want to carry out the Three People’s Principles, in reality, they apply only one people’s principle (resistance against Japan), and moreover they do not carry it out very well. We are the loyal followers of the Three People’s Principles; we are indomitable in carrying the Three People’s Principles through to the end. If some people say that people’s rights and people’s livelihood should not be carried out, and you say “Well, all right,” this is wrong, it is capitulationism; if people say that they do not want communism and you reply, “Yes, yes,” this is also capitulationism. At present it is we who are resolutely carrying out the Three People’s Principles; in the future, we will carry out communism unconditionally.

On the one hand, the united front is about love and unity; on the other hand, it also requires struggle. Isn’t this self-contradictory? At the school, each one of you has both unity and struggle. If you make a mistake and you want to correct it, don’t you have to struggle? Confucius said, “The gentleman agrees with others, without being an echo. The small man echoes without being in agreement.” This is also the same as saying that there is struggle in unity. There are also both unification and struggle in the relationship between a father and a son, or between a ruler and his minister. On the one hand, the father loves his son, and his son is filial; the ruler is enlightened and his minister is worthy—this is loving and uniting, which is also unity. On the other hand, the son exalts his father regarding his mistakes and the minister renounces with the king regarding his errors. This is struggle, or what today is called education by persuasion. All of this shows that there is struggle in unification, and this applies to everything under heaven. If someone believes that there is only unity but no struggle, he has not yet studied Marxism properly. Unity and struggle are the two basic principles of the united front. Well then, are these two things of equal importance? Should we say that struggle is more important than unity? The answer to both of these questions is in the negative! The first fundamental principle of the Anti-Japanese National United Front is unity, which means we must talk with our friends about love, unity, mutual aid, and so on. But another principle is struggle, which means mediation, persuasion, education, and so on. This is an indispensable principle. Well then, why don’t we add the word “struggle” to the name of the “Anti-Japanese National United Front,” so that it will become the “Anti-Japanese National United Struggle Front”? I believe all of you comrades know the reason. Some people may not understand the word “struggle” in our sense, and may be frightened away as soon as they see the word “struggle.” At the same time, when we speak of struggle this does not mean that we have to struggle all the time. It is absolutely not the case that, as soon as we see a friend, the first thing we say is “I want to unite with you,” and the second thing we say is “I want to struggle with you.” In reality this is unnecessary. But the fact remains that struggle is a principle; nobody can or should forget it. This is the case...

during the War of Resistance, but will it be true also after the War of Resistance? That depends on how the other people behave. If the other people aim their machine guns at us and put their swords against our necks, do we still have to say "I want to unite with you," "I love you"? Comrades, if that happens in the future, we will have no alternative but to pick up the machine gun and sword to struggle, and that struggle can certainly not be carried on by persuasion and education. At that time, struggle will become the first priority. Marxism holds that there is nothing that does not contain struggle, and that there is not simply one form of struggle, but many and varied forms.

**Telegram from Political Councilors Mao and Chen Asking for Leave Because of Other Business**
(February 12, 1939)

Comrades Mao Zedong and Chen Shaoyu are unable to attend the Third Session of the People’s Political Council because of other business, and have sent a telegram to Chongqing asking for leave. The full text of the telegram, which we have obtained, reads as follows:

To the Secretariat of the People’s Political Council in Chongqing, and for transmission to Chairman Chiang of the Council for his perusal:

Because of other business, we are unable to attend the present session of the Political Council. We are sending this telegram to ask for leave.

Mao Zedong  Chen Shaoyu

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Our source for this telegram is *Mao Zedong jì Bùjuàn*, Vol. 6, p. 23, where it is reproduced from the text published in *Xin Zhōnghuá bāo* on February 13, 1939.

1. Although he had been criticized for his “rightist line” at the Sixth Plenum in September 1938, Chen Shaoyu (better known as Wang Ming) was nonetheless at this time a member of the Secretariat, and the head of the Party’s United Front Department.
The Chinese Army Should Learn from the Red Army of the Soviet Union

In Commemoration of the 21st Anniversary of the Red Army of the Soviet Union on February 23

(Written in Response to an Invitation from the Soviet Newspaper Pravda to Contribute Articles)

(February 16, 1939)

When we hear of the celebration of the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet Red Army, we feel there is a great force standing before the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, a force that has stretched out its friendly hand, offering to provide backing for our war of national liberation against Japan. This great force is the Red Army of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Red Army has been tempered and toughened over the past twenty-one years, and its army, its air force, and also its navy have become an invincible force. Under the leadership of the wise leader, Comrade Stalin, and the supreme commander, Comrade Voroshilov, because it is a people’s army of the workers and peasants, and because it possesses powerful technology and equipment, thorough military training, and correct political work, not only did it become the mainstay in the defense of the socialist Soviet Union a long time ago, but it has also long been the main force in maintaining world peace and in opposing fascist aggression, a model for all the armed forces in the world that are truly willing to fight against fascist aggression. In this latter sense, I believe that every officer and man of the Soviet Red Army, every Soviet citizen, understands the nature of the war that the Chinese nation and the Chinese people are fighting, and the circumstances of difficulty and hardship in which the war is taking place. But they also know what a bright future the war portends, and how the war is closely related to the Soviet Union and to the whole world. Conversely, in our country of China, not only in the Eighth Route Army, but among all the soldiers who are fighting Japan, there is no one who does not know that the Soviet Red Army is a good friend of the Chinese people and the Soviet Union is the one

that is assisting China in the most substantial way in the War of Resistance. In particular, they understand that the experience and lessons of the Soviet Red Army are the right thing for the Chinese armies and the Chinese soldiers to emulate. It is now clear to us that, to defeat the Japanese imperialists, the Chinese armies must also become armies with a correct political direction, gradually armed with new technology and equipment, with modernized military training, and political work for the national revolution. The Chinese armies are strong in many respects. In the past nineteen months, these strong points have gradually aroused astonishment from the enemy and admiration in the world. The Chinese armies will definitely be able to temper themselves in the long War of Resistance Against Japan, and thereby become a powerful contingent in the war against fascism in the world, in order to drive out the Japanese invaders and achieve the liberation of the Chinese nation, and also to assist in the worldwide antifascist war. But for historical reasons, the Chinese armies still to this day have many shortcomings, the major ones being inadequacy in political training, new technology, and modernized military training, and above all deficiencies in political work and the absence of correct policies. In these regards, we should learn from the Soviet Red Army. It is known to all that the two nations, the Soviet Union and China, have formed intimate relations over the past ten years or more, on the basis of opposing imperialist aggression. From 1924 to 1927, the Soviet Union and its Red Army assisted China’s Northern Expedition; now it is fighting side by side with China in opposition to the aggression by the Japanese fascists. At the present time, when the War of Resistance is entering a new and difficult phase, the friendly relationship between China and the Soviet Union should be strengthened and the spiritual connection between the Chinese army and the Soviet Red Army should become even closer. Both countries are faced with a formidable foe, and it is the right time for the two nations and the two armies to fight alongside each other. It is true that the fascist countries are stepping up their aggression against China, making preparations to attack the Soviet Union, devastating Spain, and planning another wretched war among the major powers of the world. Even so, the outcome is predictable; the final victory will absolutely not belong to the aggressors. The people of China, the Soviet Union, and Spain, as well as all the other nations of the world that are being invaded, will seize the final victory. At present, when the twenty-first anniversary of the Soviet Red Army is being celebrated, I, in my capacity as a member of the Chinese nation and the Chinese armies, hereby express my friendly antifascist salute to the Soviet people and the Soviet Red Army!

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 311-12, where it is reproduced from the Chungqing edition of the periodical Qunzhong, Vol. 2, no. 17/18, March 11, 1939.
**The Principal Staff of Political Organs at All Levels Must Be Party Members**

(February 19, 1939)

Our forces are constantly being enlarged. New units of all descriptions are being reorganized into our forces. Many of the political cadres may not be Party members. If that is the case, it will be difficult to maintain the Eighth Route Army’s fine tradition of a good political system. There will be even less assurance of Party leadership or of the application of its policies. In the future, no matter what kind of force it is, once it has been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, it is imperative that a Party organization be established within it. Its political instructors, instructors, and the principal staff of the political organs at various levels must be Party members and accept the leadership of the Party. Otherwise, it is better to have fewer forces organized in this way rather than many which are not.


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**To Zhang Wentian**

(February 20, 1939, at night)

I once had a look at Comrade Boda’s “The Philosophy of Confucius” (though not carefully), and thought it was good. This time I have read it again at your request, and still think it is good on the whole, but there are a few debatable points which I am listing below. Please think them over and discuss them with Comrade Boda. I really have not studied all these things of Confucius. The suggestions which appear below came to my mind as I was reading Boda’s article, and I am not confident that they are correct.

1. “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success…” If this is taken as the sole guiding principle of philosophy, it amounts to idealism, as Boda correctly points out. But if it constitutes only a part of philosophy, that is, if it is placed in an empiricist perspective, it is correct. The meaning is then similar to that of “without correct theory, there can be no correct practice.” If Confucius had prefixed the phrase “If names be not correct” with “If the facts are unclear, then the name will not be correct,” and if Confucius had truly recognized that reality is the basis, then he would not have been an idealist. This is not, however, the case, so Confucius’s system is idealist; but, as partial

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Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji*, pp. 144–49, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. Zhang Wentian (1900–1976), pseudonym Luo Fu, was a native of Nanhui, Shanghai. He had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and thereafter spent four years studying in the Soviet Union. Returning to China at the end of 1930, he became one of the leading members of the “International Faction” in the Party. In 1934, he supplanted Mao as chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In January 1935 at Zunyi, he threw his support behind Mao, and became secretary general of the Party. At this time he was head of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party. On the original manuscript of this letter from Mao Zedong to Zhang Wentian, the opening greeting is missing.

2. Chen Boda.

3. The article here called “The Philosophy of Confucius” was published in *Jiefang*, no. 69, April 15, 1939, pp. 20–24, as “The Philosophical Thought of Confucius.”

4. This is a somewhat disingenuous statement. Mao had devoted a great deal of time in his youth to studying “these things of Confucius,” as evidenced by the fact that there are over a hundred references to Confucius or to the Confucian classics in Volume I of our edition, covering the years 1912–1920.

truth, it is correct. All idealism contains some partial truth, and such was the case also with Confucius. This point should be mentioned in the article, lest the readers think that even if “names are not correct, and language is not in accordance with the truth of things,” yet “affairs” can nevertheless be carried to “success.” Not only Confucius, but we too, are engaged in “rectifying names.” Confucius was rectifying the names of the feudal order; we are rectifying the names of the revolutionary order. Confucius gave primacy to the names, while we give primacy to reality. The difference lies here. Idealist philosophy has another strong point, which is its emphasis on conscious activity. Confucius was like this, too, so he could arouse people’s attention and support. One of the important reasons why mechanistic materialism cannot overcome idealism is that it underestimates conscious activity. We should mention Confucius’s strong point in this respect.6

2. “The relationship between father and son in a family reflects that of a ruler and his minister in a society” should preferably be stated in reverse: “The relationship between ruler and minister in a society (it would probably be more appropriate to say in a state) reflects that of father and son in a family.” In fact, before the state appeared in slave society and feudal society, families already existed. The patriarchial system in the clan society of the later period of primitive communist society was the precursor of the formation of the state. Therefore, “filial piety became loyalty,” and not the other way around. All states (polities) manifest economic centralization. Whereas in a feudal state, the family is the basic unit of the small-producers’ economy of the time, or, as Boda says, “the basic cell,” the feudal state emerged in conformity with the centralization (the feudal centralization) of these units.

3. The Problem of the Doctrine of the Mean

Boda’s explanation is correct, but inadequate. “Excess is just like falling short” is a method of struggling on two fronts; it is one of the important methods of thought. All philosophies, all thought, and all everyday life must have a struggle on two fronts, in order to confirm the relative stability of the relationship between things and concepts. “A genuine quality contains a given quantity” (it would be better to say, “A given quality is inherent in a given quantity”) is correct, but the important thing is to find out and ascertain that given quality from the quantity of a thing, and set boundaries for it so that it can be distinguished from other different qualities. This is the purpose of fighting on two fronts. In the article it is best to quote from the Doctrine of the Mean, “There was Shun—He indeed was greatly wise! Shun loved to question others, and to study their words. . . . He took hold of their two extremes, determined the Mean, and employed it in his government of the people.”9 as well as “This was the manner of Hui—he made choice of the Mean, and whenever he got hold of what was good, he clasped it firmly, as if wearing it on his breast, and did not lose it,”10 which further illustrates the meaning of the doctrine of the mean. Zhu Xi commented on the phrase “There was Shun—he was indeed greatly wise,” saying, “The two extremes refer to the extremes of public opinion. For all things have two extremes, such as big and small, and thick and thin. Within the realm of good, one again examines the two extremes and chooses the mean and uses it. Then the choice is very carefully made, and the use optimal. But if it does not depend on whether my capacity for discernment is not inadequate, how can I achieve this? This is through knowing what is neither excessive nor falling short, and thus practicing the Way.”11 This annotation is basically correct, but “the two extremes” should not be explained simply as “the extremes of public opinion” but, rather, should be explained clearly to refer to “excess” and “falling short.” “Excess” is a “leftist” thing, and “falling short” is a “rightist” thing. According to our present point of view, excess and falling short refer to the movements of a certain object in time and space. When it develops to a certain state, quantitative relationships should determine a certain quality. This is “mean” or “the invariable mean,” or “the right time.” If we say that this thing is not in that state, but has entered into another state, then it has a different quality, and has become “excessive” or gone “to the left.” If we say that this thing still lingers in the same state without new development, then it is an old thing, a stagnant concept, conservative and stubborn; it is rightist and “has fallen short,” Confucius’s concept of the doctrine of the mean has no such idea of development. For the most part, it rejected ideas which differed from those it had already established. There is no doubt, however, that it did look for and ascertain quality from quantity, and oppose “left” and right deviations. This thought was indeed, as Boda says, a great discovery and a great achievement of Confucius. It is an important field of philosophy, and merits an explanation.

4. When we talk about Confucius being “anxious about personal gains and losses,” we need not give the example of his “expressing joy” when he was serving as prime minister of the state of Lu, because you cannot point out what other more

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6. The published text of Chen Boda’s article contains (p. 21) a brief paragraph referring to positive elements in Confucius’s thought, especially his emphasis on “conscious activity,” but the point is not stressed.

7. Chen Boda did not follow Mao completely on this point; he treats the filial piety of the son toward the father, and the loyalty of the minister to the ruler, as two closely linked concepts, both equally oppressive of the individual. “Filial piety,” he writes, “is the epitome of loyalty; loyalty is filial piety writ large” (p. 21).

8. In this case, Chen Boda added Mao’s formulation after his own as an alternative. See the published article, p. 22.


10. The reference is to the Doctrine of the Mean, VIII (Legge, Vol. I, p. 389). This and the previous quotation correspond to the same passages Mao cited in his letter of February 1, 1939, regarding Chen Boda’s article on Mozi.

11. The quotation is from Zhu Xi, Sishu jizhu (Annotations on the Four Books).
planations of many aspects of his dialectics, such as the relationship between name and reality, writing and substance, and words and action.

7. In addition, this article does not have an overall theme, so when a beginner reads it, he will feel it is not very systematic. If a brief explanation summing up the philosophy of Confucius could be placed at the beginning or the end of the article, pointing out its basic nature, that would be better. All of Boda’s articles that I have read so far seem to have the same defect.

I have just casually jotted down the points above, without thinking deeply about them.

Mao Zedong

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12. This example does not appear in the published version of Chen’s article. Apparently he responded to Mao’s criticism by deleting the whole passage.

13. This is a truncated version of a quotation from Zhu Xi’s Sishu jizhu, the section commenting on book I, chapter I of the Mencius, which is devoted to the relation between benevolence and righteousness. Zhu Xi wrote: “Benevolence is the virtue of the heart, and the principle of love. Righteousness is the structure of the heart, and what is appropriate to the circumstances.”
To Zhang Wentian

(February 22, 1939, at night)

I have read Comrade [Chen] Boda’s article again. The corrections are all fine. Yet there are still the following suggestions. Please pass them on to Comrade Boda for his consideration.

1. As regards Confucius’s achievement in popularizing education, he quoted Guo Moruo’s words, to the effect that Confucius’s only achievement was the popularization of education, and he had no other achievements at all. This is not in accord with the facts and is also in contradiction with this article, so I feel that this quotation can be omitted.

2. I added a sentence before the last paragraph, making it even more emphatic.1

3. This article and Boda’s articles on Laozi and Mozi2 have quoted many passages from the writings of Zhang [Binglin], Liang [Qichao], Hu [Shi], and Feng [Youlan].3 I have no objection to quoting their writings, but in the appropriate place there should be a critical statement, explaining that they have made contributions to the Chinese academic realm, but that there are basic differences be-

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Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 150–52, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. The first sentence of the last paragraph of Chen Boda’s article (p. 24) reads as follows: “Confucius is the first fully developed orthodox representative in the intellectual domain of the ruling class in our country’s feudal society, and at the same time he is truly the founder of China’s idealist philosophy.” We have no way of knowing whether or not this is the sentence Mao had written, and to which he refers here.

2. The article on Mozi is that commented on in Mao’s letter, translated above, dated February 1, 1939. The article on Laozi, entitled “Laozi’s Philosophical Thought,” appeared in Jiefang, no. 63/64, 1939.

3. Liang Qichao (1873–1929), hao Rengong, a native of Guangdong, was one of the two leading figures in the Reform movement of 1898, and Mao held him in high esteem during his student days. Hu Shi (1891–1962), a native of Anhui, took his Ph.D. at Columbia under John Dewey. He was the first to advocate writing in the spoken language, and played an active role in the May Fourth movement. At that time, Mao was influenced by him to some degree, but Hu was a Western-style liberal, and Mao’s attitude toward him soon changed as he evolved toward Communism. As for the two whose writings Mao says here “has not studied,” Zhang Binglin (1869–1936), a native of Zhejiang, was an eminent scholar and historian, who played a central role in the introduction of the concept of nationalism into China at the turn of the century. Feng Youlan (1895–1990), a native of Henan, who had obtained a doctorate from Columbia University, was a leading neo-traditionalist scholar.

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4. A note along these lines was indeed added at the end of Chen Boda’s article (p. 24).
Preface to Nie Rongzhen’s An Anti-Japanese Model Base—The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region

(March 2, 1939)

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Border Region is a fortress of the War of Resistance in North China. There they have put nationalism into practice by firmly maintaining resistance against Japan; there they have put into practice people’s rights through democracy and freedom; and there they have also begun to put into practice the principle of the people’s livelihood by improving the livelihood of the people. In a word, there they are putting into practice the Three People’s Principles, which are interconnected and inseparable one from the other. It will not do merely to talk about the Three People’s Principles, nor will it do to carry out only one of the Three People’s Principles. Empty talk has no effect on the actual situation. The enemy has already occupied more than half of China, and who with even a modicum of conscience could still today be offering only empty talk? The military War of Resistance in itself counts as putting into practice the principle of nationalism, but without resolutely putting into practice the principles of people’s rights and people’s livelihood in coordination with the War of Resistance, it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese bandits. In his last will and testament, Mr. Sun Yat-sen said that through his forty years of experience he was profoundly aware that to reach the goal of freedom and equality, it was necessary to carry out two great revolutionary principles, namely (1) to arouse the popular masses, and (2) to join together in a common struggle with all those nations in the world that have treated us as equals. How could we possibly fail to carry out Mr. Sun’s final instructions now that our nation’s peril is as grave as it is today? To arouse the masses is to put into practice the principles of people’s rights and people’s livelihood; there is no other way to do so. The principle of people’s rights in particular is like yearning for clouds in the face of drought and cannot be put off a moment longer. The program of a War of Resistance and nation building passed at the Guomindang’s Provisional National Assembly has been promoted by Chairman Chiang and the National Government at the top and supported by the popular masses all over the country from below, yet many people remain deeply silent about this program. Not only do they keep silent on the matter, they actually interfere with it. With regard to the parts of the program having to do with putting into practice the people’s rights, such as guaranteeing the people’s freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association, instead of being rewarded, those who carry it out are rather penalized. This is indeed an extremely bizarre situation and absolutely must undergo a change. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region’s spirit of resolutely carrying out the Three People’s Principles is worthy of admiration and merits reward. In the past Wang Jingwei and his ilk went about claiming all the time that the Eighth Route Army and the guerrilla forces were “roving around [you] but not hitting [ji],” or “were neither moving nor hitting,” and certain yesmen rose up to echo them. But Wang Jingwei himself “moved” right into the bosom of Japan, and the yesmen are engaging in “guerrilla warfare” within the world of their four and eight rounds of mahjong. They don’t even know enough to be ashamed of themselves! In the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region there are no Wang Jingwei followers, nor are there four and eight rounds of mahjong. There instead they are resolutely carrying out the Three People’s Principles and have founded the fortress of the War of Resistance in North China through the arduous struggle of guerrilla warfare. It is not without reason that Chairman Chiang has emphatically praised the war in North China. This small book by Comrade Nie Rongzhen paints a vivid picture describing the actual experience of this area over a year and a half and how they put into practice the Three People’s Principles and persisted in waging guerrilla warfare. It not only suffices to defeat the nonsense spread by the Chinese traitors and their yesmen, but also can serve as a model for other places in showing how to put into practice the Three People’s Principles and how to arouse the popular masses to coordinate efforts closely in the resistance against Japan. Anyone calling himself a nonbeliever should surely read this book. On the eve of its publication, I am delighted to write the preface for it.

Mao Zedong

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 25–26, where it is reproduced from Nie Rongzhen’s book, as published in December 1939 by the publishing house of Bujian junzheng zazhi.

1. This is a play on the Chinese term for guerrilla warfare, youji zhan, frequently used in Guomindang propaganda at this time to suggest that the Communist armies were not really fighting the Japanese. Mao returned to this issue in his talk of July 9, 1939, translated below. For the context, see above, the Introduction.
Views on Improving the Plan of Education at Branches of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(March 6, 1939)

To Zhu, Peng, Zuo, and Fu,¹ and for the information of He and Zhou² at the First Branch:

With regard to the education plan for branches of the Anti-Japanese University, there is a need to strengthen military education and intensify military life for the purpose of training junior military officers, and a need to readjust educational methods and to train instructors so as to make them more able to teach the new types of students who are receiving the education. We agree in principle with all of these proposals for change, but on several specific questions we would like to offer the following suggestions:

1. Even though the purpose is to train military cadres, political education should still occupy an important place, at least on a par with that of military education. For this reason, Leninism must be taught as part of the subject matter of political courses. This is a very basic question in arming their minds politically. In addition, movements of the popular masses, the question of the Communist Party, and the question of the Eighth Route Army should be taught as special courses. The united front, on the other hand, may be taught as part of the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement. Party building is to be part of education only within the Party, and ordinary students are to be taught only about the question of the Communist Party. The present international situation need not be taught either, so as to put the emphasis on education regarding current affairs.

2. In order to deepen education, it is imperative to maintain the tradition of fewer but better with regard to educational methods in school, so that under no circumstance should students attend more than six classes a week.

3. Therefore, it seems that there is too much military education. If the length of the educational course remains eight months, then, aside from giving priority to infantry tactics below the company level and guerrilla tactics, only a little strategic theory may be taught (using On Protracted War as the textbook), as well as the knowledge that junior officers must have, on building fortifications, weaponry, and topography. Although transportation, the military system, horsemanship, hygiene, and rules and regulations are also important, it may still be better not to teach these subjects because of time constraints.

4. The students will work mainly in the Eighth Route Army in the future, so, in order that Party education may be strengthened, Party branches should be brought into the open, and the Party’s system of scheduling the day should be put into effect.

5. During the eight months of study, it would be best for the students to have the opportunity to go into the armed forces for practical training for approximately one month.

It is hoped that you will give consideration to the above views.

Also please convey this to Nie and Peng,³ and to the Second Branch School.

Teng [Daiyuan]  Luo [Ruiqing]

¹. Zhu and Peng refer to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. Zuo and Fu refer to Zuo Quan and Fu Zhong, who were, respectively, deputy chief-of-staff and deputy head of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army.
². He and Zhou refer to He Changqong and Zhou Chunquan, respectively, president and vice-president of the First Branch of the Anti-Japanese University.
³. The reference is to Nie Rongzhen, who was then the commander and concurrently political commissar of the Eighth Route Army for the Shanxi-Chahar-Hexi Military Area, and Peng Zhen, who was secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 4. In addition to Mao and Wang, who had signed the previous telegram, this one bears the names of Teng Daiyuan (1904–1974), a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and was at this time chief of staff of the Military Affairs Commission, and Tan Zheng (1907–1988), a native of Hunan, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927, participated in the Long March, and was at this time deputy head of the General Political Department.
5. Luo Ruiqing (1906–1978), a native of Sichuan, was at this time vice-president and political commissar of the Anti-Japanese University.
Women, Unite
(March 8, 1939)

Comrades:

Today we are holding a meeting for women. A great many people are participating; there are female comrades and male comrades, old grannies, and even small children. Everyone has come to commemorate "March eighth," to mark this international women's day.

As regards the commemoration of "March eighth," all the women in the entire world, except those extremely dissolute female vampires, are participating and holding meetings wherever it is possible. Our female compatriots here in China, in every part of the country, except for those female Chinese traitors, are also participating in commemorative activities and holding meetings wherever possible.

Why are we commemorating "March the eighth" and holding meetings? Because we want to form organizations.

Why do women want to form organizations? For the purpose of winning freedom and equality for women.

At present, our Chinese nation is neither free nor equal; it is being tied up and oppressed by imperialism. The Chinese people are neither free nor equal; they are being tied up and oppressed by feudal forces. Therefore, our Chinese nation and our Chinese people must shatter the oppression of imperialism and the feudal forces, and struggle hard to obtain freedom and equality for the nation and the people. In every country in the world except the Soviet Union, none of the ordinary people are free and equal. Now they are struggling courageously for this very objective—freedom and equality.

The oppressed people throughout the world, men and women, total more than a billion. They are all carrying on a fierce struggle against the oppressors. In this China of ours there are 450 million compatriots, men and women, all of whom are locked in a cruel struggle against Japanese imperialism. In these struggles, whether in China or in the world as a whole, the men assuredly have a great deal of force, but what about the women? Do the women have strength or not? Some people say that women have no strength. Others say that women do have a bit of strength, but very little. Even among female compatriots themselves, there are those who express the view that their strength is not at all great. Such ways of speaking and thinking are wrong. In every struggle, if we say that the strength of men is very great, so is the strength of women. Without the participation of women, nothing in this world can be accomplished. If women do not participate in our fight against Japan, we will not succeed; if women do not participate in the production campaign, it will not succeed either. Whatever the matter in hand, without women, nothing can succeed.

In order for women to be strong, there must be one more condition—they must form organizations. Without an organization, their strength is scattered and dissipated. Each person is thinking only of herself. This is what is meant by [the saying] "If hearts are not united, strength cannot be combined." When there is an organization, hearts will be united, strength will be combined, and, then, with hearts and strength united, we can accomplish great things. [The saying] "When hearts are united, mountains can be moved" conveys the truth that in organization there is strength. If we take a look right now, do the female comrades throughout the country have women's organizations or not? Yes, some do, but very few. There are somewhat more in our Border Region, but in other places all over the country, there are very few. There are many places where there are simply none at all. As a result, the 225 million female compatriots in the entire country are not showing the strength which they should have in this great national war of self-defense. We should now hold big meetings, make speeches, write articles, and conduct propaganda to call on all the female compatriots throughout the country to join the common societies organized by men and women together, and to organize societies for the women themselves. They should join the self-defense army and so on. In addition, we should call on those women who are willing and determined to struggle for the realization of communism to join the Communist Party. In this way an enormous force will be created. For example, the one million women out of the population of two million in the border regions are all organized into societies. If the 225 million women in the whole country organized into groups, this strength would be greater. If the one billion women in the entire world were organized into groups, and if everyone understood the affairs of the world, as well as the truth about the world, so that their hearts were united, the result would be an even more tremendous force. Whoever dared to bully them would be exterminated by these women. In sum, they should organize into groups, organize all kinds of groups, from small groups to big groups, organize big groups out of small groups, unite hearts and minds, gather together the strength to carry on great struggles. This kind of struggle is sure to be victorious.

There are two kinds of people in the world at present. One kind is the good people; the other kind is the bad people. Those who help us and show us sympathy, such as the Soviet Union, the oppressed people in all the colonies and semicolonies, and the workers, the peasants, and the oppressed in all the capitalist countries are the good people. Those who bully and invade us, such as Japanese imperialists and
The struggle this time is different from those struggles in the past hundred years. We suffered failure every time in the past, but this time we will definitely win. Why? Because this time, the Japanese imperialists have invaded us and occupied so much of our territory that if this China of ours is going to survive, we must definitely drive them out, we must persist in the War of Resistance and carry it to the end. The majority of the people in all China agree to carry it to the end. In the past, a few wavering elements did not let the broad masses of the people join the anti-Japanese united front. Now these elements have gradually taken themselves off. As a result, more people have joined the anti-Japanese united front. There are united fronts established by men and women together; there are united fronts for women alone, and there are united fronts for children. In sum, the number of united fronts is increasing day by day, the groups are becoming bigger day by day, the minds of the people are becoming more united day by day, and, consequently, our strength is becoming greater day by day. If we continue to carry on the struggle in this way, there can be no doubt that final victory will be ours. Besides, because the world is now in a new era of war and revolution, an era in which the forces for socialist revolution are rising and the reactionary forces of capitalism are declining, this constitutes an excellent condition for the victory of the Chinese revolution. Consequently, this revolutionary struggle can never be like that of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the 1911 Revolution, and the May Fourth movement, nor will it be like the great revolution of 1925–1927, all of which suffered defeat. On the contrary, it can definitely be victorious.

In our border region, it is not only men who can hold big meetings; women can hold their own big meetings independently. Our Communist Party calls on all Chinese compatriots, male or female, to hold meetings and organize groups. Now we especially call on women to stand up. Today, at this gathering to commemorate "March Eighth," we are putting forward a call, launching a mobilization, to connect the big women's societies all over the country, to connect the big societies of both men and women all over the country. Let everyone come and contribute to the solving of China's problems. Down with Japanese imperialism, down with the Chinese traitors, down with the diehard elements, corrupt officials, local bullies, and bad gentry. Let the Chinese nation and the Chinese people have freedom and equality. Solve the women's problem, smash the social prejudice and oppression of looking down upon and insulting women, so that women can achieve freedom and equality. We must see to it that men do not suffer and woman do not suffer; we must ensure that no one suffers. We must ensure that everyone has enough food to eat, enough clothing to wear, and work to do, and carry forward the Chinese revolution to complete victory. Such is the appeal and the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and all our Communist Party members throughout the country, whether men or women, agree to it and support it, and are striving to put these views into practice. We hope that all the male and female compatriots throughout the country will strive hard to carry out these views. We Communists always stand together with those who fight for freedom and equality.
All the ordinary people in the country say that our border region is a good place and that there is freedom and equality here. Does this then mean that we have no shortcomings? Of course we may have shortcomings, but, compared with the country as a whole, we are much better. If you compare us with foreign countries, except for the Soviet Union, there is not a single one of the foreign countries that can compare with us. Nevertheless, we still do not feel self-satisfied about this. We must continue to progress; we want to establish a model for the whole world and the whole country, for North China and Central China, and for Xi'an. Over there in Xi'an, ordinary people are not allowed to hold meetings; they do not have freedom, nor do they have equality. We Communists totally disapprove of such things. Today we are having a meeting, and we will send a telegram to the whole country, to let the ordinary people out there see how the ordinary people here in our place are involved in management, how the women here are handling affairs, and how the ordinary people are living their lives. We also want the bad people out there to see how free is the strength which results when ordinary people have organized groups, and when women have organized societies. The bad people should awake, they should no longer hold blindly to superstitions such as "one man takes everything for himself" and "no one dares to harm me"; they should never again treat the ordinary people as "Adou." 1 The people are capable, theirs is the greatest strength, and once they have organized into groups, they will be a forever victorious and unrivaled army, which nothing under heaven can stop.

Comrades, just what is meant by freedom and equality for women? It is when women have the freedom to conduct their own affairs, the freedom to hold meetings, and the freedom of speech. Without these rights, it is impossible to talk about freedom and equality. We Communists promote these rights, we hope that all of you comrades will unite together and form a single bloc. Let the women in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region unite, before going on to organize in the country as a whole. The students of the Women's University2 should copy this method of Yan'an when they go to different areas in the future, apply the good methods of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. If they continue in this way for eight to ten years, by then, the people of all China will have achieved liberation. The 225 million men will have been liberated, and so will the 225 million women.3 It is impossible to achieve this goal in a short period of time—it will take eight to ten years. Nor will it be possible with only a few people; it can only be achieved by the people of the whole country working together. It will not be easy to accomplish; we must redouble our efforts. With the redoubled efforts of the people in the border region, and the efforts of the people in the whole country, and with the necessary time, we can certainly achieve our goal.

Freedom and equality lie ahead of us, comrades. Let everyone make great efforts!

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1. Adou was the son and heir of the founder of the Shu Han dynasty. The novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, one of Mao's favorite books, treats his stupidity and incompetence as a primary cause of the collapse of the kingdom founded by his father, Liu Bei.
2. The Women's University had just been founded in Yan'an.
3. A brief summary of this lecture was published at the time in Xin Zhenghua bao, March 13, 1939, and has been reproduced in Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, p. 27. After a few sentences evoking Mao's main theme, that China's liberation can be achieved only by the joint efforts of its 225 million women and 225 million men, this text continues:

We should learn from Krupskaia; we should learn from the model female leader martyred in the era of the Great Revolution, the Communist Party member Xiang Jingyu, who had struggled for the liberation of women, the liberation of the laboring masses, and the cause of Communism all her life. We need to cultivate thousands and hundreds of heroines, hundreds and thousands of professionals and "Ph. D's" [boshi] for the women's movement.

It is not clear why the official transcript makes no reference to Lenin's wife, Krupskaia, or to the revolutionary martyr Xiang Jingyu, who had been a close friend of Mao's in his youth. (See Volume I of our edition, especially his letter to her, pp. 595–96.)
Talk at the Evening Meeting Commemorating Marx and Sun Yatsen

(March 12, 1939)

(Special to our paper) . . . The majestic "Internationale" and the national anthem provided an ensemble combining the spirit of internationalism and the spirit of nationalism. After Comrade Mo Wenwu, on behalf of the presidium, proclaimed the significance of this meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong strode onto the platform amidst enthusiastic applause.

He explained the significance of commemorating these two great revolutionary teachers, and on the basis of the Director General's testament, he explained the important thought of Mr. Sun Yatsen' about arousing the popular masses to struggle together.

The Director General said in his testament that he had devoted himself to the revolution for forty years and that these forty years had led to the following two conclusions: (1) arouse the popular masses, and (2) unite with all those nations in the world that treat us on an equal basis. Mr. Yatsen had a deep understanding of the importance of arousing the popular masses and of the fact that without them we cannot defeat imperialism. . . . Now Marxism and the Three People's Principles have been linked together, and, as regards arousing the popular masses and uniting with all the nations in the world which treat us on an equal basis to reach the goal of attaining freedom and equality for China, they are basically identical.

The Guomindang and the Communist Party should unite very well, and cooperate for a long time to come!

The silence of the meeting hall was broken by thunderous applause, while the brilliant lights shone on a sea of excited faces.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 29, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 16, 1939.

1. Two points should be clarified here. First, Sun Yatsen's title, as leader of the Guomindang, was zongli, normally translated "director general." When he died and was replaced by Chiang Kaishke, Chiang was given a slightly different title because it was felt that Sun was unique and no one could succeed him as the founder of the party. Consequently, throughout this edition, "the Director General" is capitalized wherever it occurs and always refers to Sun even if his name is not mentioned. Second, Sun is, with Chiang, one of the two persons who are known in this edition by the Cantonese form of their names. In Sun's case, the matter is further complicated by the fact that he is rarely designated in Chinese sources by his hao Yatsen (Yixian in standard pronunciation) but, rather, by an alternative hao, Zhongshan, or by his original given name (ming), Wen. In the introduction to this text he is referred to as Sun Zhongshan and in the following paragraph Mao calls him "Mr. Zhongshan." For the sake of consistency we have rendered this as "Mr. Yatsen," even though that would sound odd in Chinese.
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The Guomindang and the Communist Party should unite very well, and cooperate for a long time to come!

The silence of the meeting hall was broken by thunderous applause, while the brilliant lights shone on a sea of excited faces.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 29, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 16, 1939.

1. Two points should be clarified here. First, Sun Yatsen's title, as leader of the Guomindang, was zongli, normally translated "director general." When he died and was replaced by Chiang Kaishek, Chiang was given a slightly different title because it was felt that Sun was unique and no one could succeed him as the founder of the party. Consequently, throughout this edition, "the Director General" is capitalized wherever it occurs and always refers to Sun even if his name is not mentioned. Second, Sun is, with Chiang, one of the two persons who are known in this edition by the Cantonese form of their names. In Sun's case, the matter is further complicated by the fact that he is rarely designated in Chinese sources by his hao, Yatsen (Yixian in standard pronunciation) but, rather, by an alternative hao, Zhongshan, or by his original given name (ming), Wen. In the introduction to this text he is referred to as Sun Zhongshan and in the following paragraph Mao calls him "Mr. Zhongshan." For the sake of consistency we have rendered this as "Mr. Yatsen," even though that would sound odd in Chinese.
Views on the New Fourth Army Staff Work Conference

(March 16, 1939)

Ye [Ting], Xiang [Ying], Zhou [Zikun], and Lai [Chuanzhu]:

Our views on the staff conference follow; please take them into consideration. The general orientation for the conference should be to review and summarize experiences and lessons learned from past staff work, to expand on its achievements, to correct its mistakes, to establish various systems for staff work, and to define the main content of staff work. We must insist that the political caliber of staff personnel be raised, and that the level of some former technical staff workers be raised to the level of tactical staff personnel and strategic staff personnel, in order to improve the work of the commanding organs and to prepare them to exercise leadership in battle under new circumstances. For this purpose:

1. In addition to summarizing past work, the conference should decide on future work, determine the tasks of staff departments at various levels and the division of labor among the various sections, establish various systems, formulate various rules and procedures, and stipulate the priorities in our work during a certain period of time.

2. In addition to discussing future work, the training of staff officers and the enhancement of their education should be discussed. This should be done on the basis of the priorities specified above.

3. The level of political position and conviction of staff personnel is to be raised.

4. Sufficient preparatory work should be done beforehand, such as holding smaller meetings in advance, and discussing separately the work of the various departments and various systems and regulations. It is expected that you will inform us by telegram of the results of the conference.


Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 458–59, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This was the New Fourth Army’s second conference on staff work, held at Army Headquarters in Yunling, Jingxian, in Anhui Province, from March 18 to 24, 1939.
2. Ye Ting (1896–1946), zì Xiyi, was a native of Guangdong. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924, while studying in the Soviet Union, participated in the Nanchang and Guangzhou uprisings of 1927, and then spent a decade in Europe, returning to China in 1937 on the outbreak of the war against Japan to become commander-in-chief of the New Fourth Army.

Xiang Ying (1898–1941), a native of Hubei, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922 and was active in the labor movement from then until 1927. In 1928, he went to Moscow to attend the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, at which he was elected a member of the Central Committee and of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. During the Jiangxi Soviet period, he occupied various responsible posts in the Party and the government. When the main Red Army forces embarked on the Long March, he was left behind to engage in guerrilla warfare. After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, he became deputy commander and political commissar of the New Fourth Army.

Zhou Zikun was deputy chief of staff, and Lai Chuanzhu was chief of staff.
To Nie Rongzhen
(March 18, 1939)

Comrade Rongzhen:

I have received the manuscript of the book you wrote, the album of photographs you sent me, and your letter. These are all very precious things. We plan to publish the book in both Yan'an and Chongqing (Director Wang [Jiaxiang] and I will each write a preface to it). The photographs are being passed around for all the comrades to see. I hope that you continue to struggle hard, deepen your studies, and write more new works.

Mao Zedong

Address at the Evening Meeting Commemorating “March 18th”
(March 18, 1939)

... “March 18th”—a magnificent and heroic day dyed in blood! Shortly after six o’clock, the Shaangong Auditorium was packed with people as usual, both inside and outside. The program of the meeting began in a solemn atmosphere. Waving his hand as if to sweep away all the traitors to the nation, Comrade Mao Zedong said:

If we want to eliminate the enemy we must wage two kinds of war: One is an overt war, and the other is a covert war. The covert war consists of both strategic offensives, striking deep within the enemy’s heart, and strategic defense to protect ourselves. To defeat the enemy it is necessary to attack from both within and without, so both are of equally great significance. ... [We] demand that every security staff member recognize the importance and honor of this task, and we hope that each and every security staff member has stamina and perseveres until the victory of the War of Resistance and until the final victory of Communism.

The audience responded with prolonged applause.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 153, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This refers to Nic’s book about the anti-Japanese struggles in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei (Jin-Cha-Ji) Base Area, which was published in Yan’an by the publishing house of the Balujun junzheng zazhi in December 1939. Its title, personally inscribed by Mao, was An Anti-Japanese Model Base Area—The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region. Mao, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang each wrote a preface to it (see above, the text dated March 2, 1939, for Mao’s preface).

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 31, where it is reproduced from Xin Zhonghua bao, March 22, 1939.
Collecting Information About the Deeds of National Heroes in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and Disseminating Propaganda About Them

(March 18, 1939)

Many national heroes have emerged during the War of Resistance from among the officers and soldiers of our Eighth Route Army and our New Fourth Army. Praising these heroes and their heroic deeds has important significance with regard to both outside propaganda and internal education. The various political organs should pay attention to collecting the deeds of such heroes, and, in addition to publishing them in various army newspapers, to selecting the most important ones to inform us by telegram and broadcast them. From now on, all military and political publications will include a special column on War of Resistance heroes of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, so it is hoped that political departments at all levels will supply these materials.

The Emphasis in Consolidation Should Be Placed on North China; Development Should Stress Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei

(March 19, 1939)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai, and for the information of Zhu [De] and Yang [Shangkun]:

I have taken note of your telegram, and my reply is as follows:

1. It is quite correct to expand the army to the fullest extent possible. As for laying the emphasis in consolidation upon North China, I have read all your plans, and they are all correct. Development, on the other hand, should stress the five provinces of Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, and for the moment please pay special attention to the province of Shandong. In this province we already have a foundation, but we lack a leadership backbone, so when the enemy’s new offensive begins, please think about solving this problem of a leadership backbone. Northern Jiangsu should also be developed by southern Shandong. As for the development of the three provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Hubei, Henan in particular is the pivotal region in the whole country’s protracted War of Resistance, and although it is not possible at present to achieve large-scale development, the greatest efforts should be made to prepare for it.

2. In the future for a certain period of time, cadres from Yan’an should be used mainly in Central China, and preparations should be made to use some in the northwest, some in the south, and some in the northeast. As for North China, the main thing is to provide teachers and teaching materials.

3. It may be possible to ask our friends for help in finding personnel for the munitions factory, but it is necessary to wait and see how the negotiations go. I am afraid this may not be dependable, and we should mainly rely upon searching within the country.

4. A production campaign is now being developed in the Border Region so that it will be possible to be self-reliant and self-sufficient when times are most difficult.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 173–75, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 173–75, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.
Cao Juru is now in charge of the Central Committee’s Finance and Economy Department and cannot be moved. Li Liuru can be spared and sent to where you are, but he is in poor health, and would not be able to go until he has had some treatment and rest. Meanwhile I am also considering other candidates and will let you know the results later.

5. It is quite right for the front to pay attention to banks and the collection of taxes, but the fundamental solution lies in production. Please consider mobilizing, within certain relatively stable areas, not only the popular masses but also the organizations, schools, troops (as long as it does not interfere with work, study, and combat), and that you yourselves should engage directly in production. The rear area already has considerable experience and can serve as a reference for you.

6. For cadres in posts, study is very important, and it should become a movement (as long as it does not interfere with work and combat). There should be organizations and methods to manage studying, and in relatively stable institutions a two-hour study regimen should be carried out. The Central Committee has established a Cadre Education Department, and the rear area’s experience can serve as a reference for the front.

7. It is quite correct to avoid meeting Lu Zhonglin. The only effective way to deal with such people is to stand one’s ground and respond with a firm and uncompromising counterattack. The same method should be used to deal with Shen Honglie in Shandong. Shen is now launching a fierce attack on us, so please be sure to give him a firm counterattack.

8. The meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, at which many important issues will be discussed, has been fixed for the end of April. General Headquarters and the Northern Bureau have decided to send Zhu Rui to attend. There is more than a month before the meeting; please consider the possibility of making a trip to Yan’an on that occasion.

Mao Zedong

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1. Cao Juru (1901–1981), a native of Longyan, Fujian, was then deputy head of the Department of Finance and Economy of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee.
2. Li Liuru was then chief secretary in Mao’s office.
3. Lu Zhonglin (1884–1966), zi Ruibo, a native of Dingxian (now the city of Dingzhou) in Hebei, had been an important military subordinate of Feng Yuxiang. In 1930 he broke with Feng and went over to Chiang Kai-shek. (Regarding Feng and his relations with Chiang Kai-shek, see the biographical note on p. 241 of Volume II of this edition, and Mao’s letter to him on pp. 460–461 of Volume V.) At this time he was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army’s Hebei-Chahar battle area, and governor of Hebei (then occupied by the Japanese).
4. Shen Honglie (1882–1969), a native of Tiammen, Hubei, was then deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang Army’s Shandong-Jiangsu battle area, commander-in-chief of the Shandong guerrilla forces, and governor of Shandong. Shen had succeeded Han Fuju as governor in 1938 when Han was executed for dereliction of duty.
5. The Politburo did not, in fact, meet until July 3, 1939. On this occasion, a declaration on the first two years of the War of Resistance, revised by Mao, was adopted and published on July 7. A longer and more important Politburo meeting took place from August 2 to 25. For a brief account of these sessions, see the Introduction.

6. Zhu Rui (1905–1948), a native of Jiangsu, had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924. He studied first at Sun Yatsen University and then at an artillery school in Moscow from 1925 to 1929, and while there joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Returning to China, he went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Shandong branch office and political commissar of the Eighth Route Army’s First Column.
The Political Direction for the General Mobilization of the National Spirit

An Address Given at the Meeting for General Mobilization of the National Spirit and Celebration of the “May First” Labor Day Held by All Circles in Yan’an

(May 1, 1939)

Comrades:

Today all circles in Yan’an are attending this grand meeting in order to carry out a general mobilization of the national spirit. Today is also the “May First” Labor Day, and the fact that we are holding this grand meeting to commemorate it is of great significance.

Today is May First. Today, all the proletarians of the whole world, and all the laboring people, are staging demonstrations wherever possible. Comrades! Against whom are they demonstrating? Against fascism! Against the aggressors! Today, all the oppressed peoples of the world, all the oppressed nations of the world, are staging marches and demonstrations everywhere, and are holding meetings against fascism and against the aggressor-bandits!

Here in China on this day, the whole of the working class and of the laboring people, wherever possible, are all without exception holding “May First” commemoration meetings protesting against the aggression of Japanese imperialism. At the same time, everywhere throughout China, the people of the whole country—workers, peasants, merchants, students, soldiers, parties, politicians, military, civilians, all parties and factions—are responding to Chairman Chiang’s call for the general mobilization of the national spirit. They all vow to oppose the traitors, support the War of Resistance, and concentrate their strength and their wills! To what end? To overthrow Japanese imperialism (applause from the entire audience), to save our China from peril, and to transform her into a new China. (Applause from the entire audience, followed by shouts of: Down with Japanese imperialism! Create a new China! . . .) This is the first point I want to make regarding the significance of today’s meeting.

Second, why is it necessary to mobilize the national spirit? Why did Chairman Chiang propose the general mobilization of the national spirit? Because our enemies, in order to achieve their goals and carry out their ideas, want to destroy all of China. The Japanese fascist warlords are engaged in mobilizing all of Japan’s national strength to continue the fascist war of aggression, to continue this bandit war, which slaughters the Chinese people. Moreover, right now the bad elements consisting of the Chinese scoundrels Wang Jingwei and his disciples and followers are conducting activities which aid Japanese imperialism, and are favorable neither to the War of Resistance, nor to the country and the nation. They are conducting activities to “overthrow Chiang and oppose Communism.” In Hong Kong and Shanghai, they have organized the so-called “Anti-Communist Alliance to Save the Country,” headed by Wang Jingwei, and aim to set up a puppet government which will capitulate to Japanese imperialism. Because Japan and these Chinese traitors are running wild in this way, we need to mobilize the national spirit in the whole country and call on all of the 450 million people to unite in a spirit of resisting to the end. We must oppose Japanese imperialism, oppose the Chinese traitors, oppose Wang Jingwei, oppose the Trotskyites, and all the gangs of scoundrels. We must support Chairman Chiang, support the National Government, support Guomindang-Communist cooperation, fight to the end, mobilize all forces, and achieve final victory! How far shall we carry our struggle? We must fight until we have reached the banks of the Yalu River! (Applause from the whole hall.) We must recover all our lost territories! (Applause from the whole hall.) We will never stop without achieving our goals. This is why Chairman Chiang has initiated the general mobilization of the national spirit and the Chinese Communist Party has supported Chairman Chiang’s call and the general mobilization of the national spirit. Today, all circles in Yan’an, all the Party, political, military, and popular organs, and all schools are meeting here to swear that they will carry out the platform for the general mobilization of the national spirit, and that, in order to achieve these same goals, they will assuredly defeat our enemies and build a new China! (Applause from the whole audience, followed by shouts of: Let the people of the whole country unite! Support Chairman Chiang! Carry out the general mobilization of the national spirit! Support the Guomindang! Support the Communist Party! Support the long-term cooperation of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party! Down with the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei! Down with the Trotskyites! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!)

Third, I will talk about the problem of the state and the nation. Our state is the state of the people of the whole country, the state of the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants. It belongs to all the patriotic people, and does not belong to the Japanese bandits, nor to the Chinese traitors, the followers of Wang Jingwei, or the Trotskyites. Our country wants to expel Chinese traitors like Wang Jingwei. There are still some individuals who do not understand our righteous
cause; either they are preparing to become Chinese traitors or spiritually they have been captured by the traitors. If they definitely want to follow Wang Jingwei, we will also expel them. For several thousand years, our nation has been an independent and self-respecting nation. It is a nation which cannot coexist with Japanese imperialism. Within our state and nation, we allow only an anti-Japanese government to exist; we will absolutely not tolerate any puppet government. We want to defend our native land; we want to liberate the Chinese nation completely. Japanese imperialism has violated the independence of our state and jeopardized the existence of our nation; we must overthrow it. We must also overthrow all those traitors and collaborators who have sold out the interests of the state and the nation. This is [what is meant by] "The state is supreme, the nation is supreme." (The whole audience shouted: Defend our native land, shed our last drop of blood in order to defend our native land! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation! Down with the Chinese traitors and collaborators!)

Fourth, in order to succeed in defending our native land, and in liberating the Chinese nation, we must achieve victory in the War of Resistance. The Chinese Communist Party has consistently advocated: "Resisting Japan comes first; everything else should be subordinated to resisting Japan; mobilize all forces so as to win final victory!" What does this mean? It means "Military actions come first, victory comes first." To win victory is our only criterion. Whatever it takes to help us win the war, whatever is conducive to the War of Resistance, we will do and we will support; whatever hinders victory, and whatever obstructs the War of Resistance, we will not do and we will oppose. We will oppose all the actions of Wang's faction, the Trotskyites, the troublemakers, the diehards, and the conspirators. We will destroy all those who are wrecking the War of Resistance! (The entire audience applauded and shouted: Resisting Japan comes first! Everything else is subordinated to resisting Japan! Mobilize all forces! Fight to achieve final victory! Military action comes first! Victory comes first! Oppose compromise and surrender! Oppose the traitors and collaborators!)

Fifth, if we aim to reach the goal of final victory, to fight all the way to the banks of the Yalu River, and to recover all the lost territory, we must unite and concentrate the thoughts, will, and strength of the people of the whole nation. This requires in turn that we carry out, strengthen, and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front or, in the words of Chairman Chiang's appeal, "Concentrate our will and our strength." All our wills should focus on the final victory. Could we focus on any other point? Could we reach a peaceful compromise with Japan? Absolutely not! We must fight for the final victory—we must reach this point. All of our forces must be concentrated on the single aspect of the anti-Japanese front. Can we concentrate on some other aspect? Absolutely not! Wang Jingwei wants to concentrate all our force on his front of Chinese traitors and on the front of capitulation to Japan. Would this do? Absolutely not! There are some troublemakers and creators of friction who do not bring the forces together but, on the contrary, disperse them. Is this right? Absolutely not. Therefore, all our wills should be focused on final victory, and all our forces should be entirely concentrated on the single point of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We should absolutely not violate these orientations. Those who do violate them we will oppose, overthrow, and regard as Chinese traitors. (Everyone shouted: Concentrate all our wills on the final victory! Concentrate all our forces on the anti-Japanese front!)

Sixth, in order to win final victory, in order to strengthen and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we must transform the spirit of the citizens of the whole country, and get rid of all the bad and wrong things. Selfishness, cravenly clinging to life instead of braving death, corruption and degeneration, dejection, apathy, . . . Are these good? (The audience shouted: No!) These have to be done away with. This is precisely what we mean by our repeated calls for a workstyle of arduous struggle. Our nation has always had a workstyle of arduous struggle, and we must continue to develop it. We must make a fundamental change in the practises of cravenly clinging to life instead of braving death, corruption and degeneration, dejection and apathy, which are currently so widespread among many people. The Communist Party has always advocated a firm and correct political direction. During the War of Resistance, we need to correct all the erroneous thinking that is harmful to the War of Resistance. First, there is the treacherous thinking of the Wang Jingwei faction and the Trotskyites. Such thinking, hostile to the state and to the nation, must be corrected. All other kinds of thought harmful to the War of Resistance must also be corrected. For example, some people say, "Marxism is not a good friend of the Three People's Principles." Is this saying correct? Absolutely not! Mr. Sun Yat-sen very clearly pointed out, "Marxism is a good friend of the Three People's Principles." Now these people have turned their backs on Mr. Sun's instructions, saying that these two ideologies are not good friends. Such thinking goes against the united front; it goes against the thought of more than 90 percent of the laboring people and against the thought of the nation. All this wrong thinking must be completely corrected and liquidated, for only thus can we have a firm and correct political orientation. This firm and correct political orientation is inseparable from the workstyle of arduous struggle. Without a firm and correct political orientation, we cannot promote a workstyle of arduous struggle; and without a workstyle of arduous struggle, a firm and correct political orientation cannot be put into practice. (Applause from the whole audience is followed by shouts of: Fight against selfishness! Fight against clinging to life and fearing death! Fight against corruption and degeneration! Fight against wrong thinking! Adhere to the firm and correct political orientation! Vigorously enforce the workstyle of hard struggle and plain living!)

Seventh and last, let us talk about our current overall policy orientation—the overall policy orientation of the War of Resistance and of building the country—the Three People's Principles. The Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and they should be completely carried out in the course of the struggle to resist Japan and build the country. Nationalism means that we must overthrow Japanese imperialism; People's Rights
means that the people of the whole country will enjoy freedom; and People’s Livelihood requires that the people of the whole country have clothes to wear, food to eat, and work to do. These are all very good and indispensable, and we must resolutely carry them out. From this day forward, the people of the whole country must truly carry out the Three People’s Principles! We must not simply talk about them, but also get to work to apply them. There are many people who profess to believe in the Three People’s Principles, but as I see it, they do not really believe in them. Because if they believed in Nationalism, they would have to fight to the end against Japan; but in fact they are prepared to compromise and capitulate. Wang Jingwei is one of those who have already capitulated. To believe in People’s Rights means that you cannot oppress the common people, but they are unwilling to grant the common people democratic rights. To believe in the People’s Livelihood means to pay attention to the problem of clothing and feeding the ordinary people, and yet they have absolutely no intention of improving the lives of the people. Can such people be called believers in the Three People’s Principles? (The whole audience shouted: No, they cannot!) Can such people be called faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yat-sen? (Again the whole audience shouted: No, they cannot!) Only those who wage the War of Resistance to the end, until we reach the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories, never surrendering, and never betraying the country, can be called true believers in Nationalism and faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalism. Only those who offer the common people democratic rights, and freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association, do not oppress the common people, and “arouse the popular masses” in accordance with Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s testament, can be called true believers in People’s Rights, and faithful disciples of Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s People’s Rights. Only those who strive to alleviate the suffering in the lives of the majority of the people, for example, by carrying out Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s “Land to the tiller,” and by carrying out the production movement, so that everyone has clothes to wear, food to eat, and a job to do, can be called true believers in People’s Livelihood and faithful followers of Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s principle of People’s Livelihood. Comrades! Let us all be faithful followers of the Three People’s Principles and good pupils of Mr. Sun Yat-sen. We must absolutely not be sham followers or bad pupils. We must not simply pay lip service to the Three People’s Principles but, rather, carry them out completely in practice. What do we call those who talk about it but do not do it? We call them sham adherents of the Three People’s Principles. We now call on all the people of the whole country to set their hands to carrying out the Three People’s Principles. Let us all be true adherents of the Three People’s Principles. I hope that all the people of the whole country will carry out the Nationalism that consists in overthrowing Japanese imperialism and liberating the Chinese nation; I hope that everyone will carry out the principle of People’s Livelihood, which consists in giving the common people clothes to wear, food to eat, and a job to do. What needs to be carried out at present in our whole country is this kind of Three People’s Principles, the genuine Three People’s Principles. We must struggle to the end for the realization of the true Three People’s Principles! (Everyone applauds and shouts: Let the whole country carry out the Three People’s Principles! Fight against the sham adherents of the Three People’s Principles, who talk about them, but do not actually hold them in their hearts!) These are the matters about which we are meeting here today. They are also the objectives of the general mobilization of the national spirit. In sum, we want to carry out the Three People’s Principles thoroughly and genuinely! We must mobilize all forces to win the final victory, fight until we reach the banks of the Yalu River, and recover all our lost territories. We must absolutely drive Japanese imperialism out of China and establish a brand new Republic of China! (Enthusiastic and prolonged applause.)
The May Fourth Movement

(May 1939)

The May Fourth movement twenty years ago marked a new stage in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism and feudalism. The cultural reform movement which grew out of the May Fourth movement was only one of the manifestations of this revolution. With the growth and development of new social forces in that period, the bourgeois-democratic revolution gained a vital new force, a force consisting of the working class, the student masses, and the new national bourgeoisie. Around the time of the May Fourth movement, hundreds of thousands of students courageously took their place in the van. In these respects the May Fourth movement went a step beyond the Revolution of 1911.

If we trace China's bourgeois-democratic revolution back to the Opium War, we see that it has passed through a number of stages in its development: the Opium War, the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the coup of 1898, the Boxer movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May Fourth movement, the Northern Expedition, and the war of the Red Army. The present War of Resistance Against Japan is yet another stage and is the greatest, most vigorous, and most dynamic stage of all. The process of the democratic revolution can be considered completed and the bourgeois-democratic revolution can be considered accomplished only when the forces of foreign oppression and domestic feudalism have been basically overthrown, and an independent democratic state has been established. From the Opium War onward each stage in the development of the revolution has had certain different characteristics and manifestations, that is to say, its own distinguishing features. But taken as a whole, all the stages bear the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. This last characteristic is the basic characteristic that is common in varying degrees to all the stages. The aim of this democratic revolution is to complete a social system hitherto unknown in Chinese history, namely, a democratic social system having a feudal society (during the last hundred years a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society) as its precursor and a socialist society as its successor. But this system itself is a democratic society. It is coming from a feudal society and will move toward a socialist society, but, during a certain historical period, it struggles to establish a democratic society. If anyone asks why a Communist should strive to bring into being, first, a bourgeois-democratic society and, then, a socialist society, our answer is: We are following the inevitable course of history.

China's democratic revolution depends on certain social forces for its accomplishment. These social forces are the working class, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the progressive bourgeoisie, that is, the revolutionary workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and businessmen, with the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force. It is impossible to accomplish the anti-imperialist and antifeudal democratic revolution without these basic revolutionary forces. Today, the principal enemies of the revolution are the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese traitors, and the fundamental policy of the revolution is the Anti-Japanese United Front. The components of this front are all the anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and businessmen. Final victory in the War of Resistance will certainly be won when this united front is greatly consolidated and developed.

In the Chinese democratic revolution movement, it was the intellectuals who were the first to awaken. This was clearly demonstrated both in the Revolution of 1911 and in the May Fourth movement. But the intellectuals will accomplish nothing if they fail to integrate themselves with the popular masses of the workers and peasants. This is the cause of failure of the Revolution of 1911 and the May Fourth movement. In the final analysis, the dividing line between revolutionary intellectuals and non-revolutionary or counterrevolutionary intellectuals is whether or not they are willing to integrate themselves with the popular masses of the workers and peasants, and actually do so. Ultimately it is this alone, and not professions of faith (professions of faith only) in things like the Three People's Principles and Marxism that distinguishes one from the other. A true believer in the

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1. The bourgeois-democratic revolution gained a vital new force ➔ A powerful camp made its appearance in the bourgeois-democratic revolution
2. The Opium War ➔ Its formative period
3. The movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom ➔ The revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom
4. The coup of 1898 ➔ The Reform Movement of 1898
5. The war of the Red Army ➔ The war of the Agrarian Revolution
6. Forces of foreign oppression ➔ Forces of foreign imperialism
7. Here the Selected Works version inserts a sentence reading, "Of these, the most important distinction is whether they came before or after the emergence of the Communist Party."

8. Complete ➔ Establish
9. With the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force ➔ With the workers and peasants as the basic revolutionary force and with the workers as the class which leads the revolution
10. Without these basic revolutionary forces ➔ Without these basic revolutionary forces and without the leadership of the working class
11. The May Fourth movement ➔ The May Fourth movement, and in the period of the May Fourth movement the intellectuals were more numerous and more politically conscious than in the period of the Revolution of 1911.
Three People’s Principles and a true Marxist\(^{12}\) must be one who is willing to integrate himself with the worker and peasant popular masses, and actually does so.

It is now twenty years since the May Fourth movement and almost two years since the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The young people and the cultural workers of the whole country bear a heavy responsibility.\(^{13}\) I hope they will understand the character and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution, make their work serve the worker and peasant popular masses, go into their midst, and become propagandists and organizers among them. Victory will be ours when the popular masses of the entire country rise up against Japan. Young people of the whole country, exert yourselves!

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\(^{12}\) A true believer in the Three People’s Principles and a true Marxist → A true revolutionary

\(^{13}\) A heavy responsibility. → A heavy responsibility for the democratic revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan.

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Speech at the Meeting in Yan’an in Commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the May Fourth Movement

(May 4, 1939)

Comrades, today is the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, and the youth of Yan’an are all gathered here for this commemoration meeting. I shall therefore take the occasion to speak on the orientation\(^{1}\) of the youth movement in China.

First, May 4 has now been designated as China’s Youth Day, and rightly so. Twenty years have elapsed since “May Fourth,” yet it is only this year that the day has been designated as the national Youth Day, and this is a most significant fact. For it indicates that the Chinese people’s democratic revolution against imperialism and against the feudal forces\(^{2}\) will soon reach a turning point. The anti-imperialist, antifeudal people’s democratic revolution encountered repeated failures over several decades, but now there must be a change, a change toward victory and not another failure. The Chinese revolution is now going forward—forward, that is to say, to victory. The repeated failures of the past cannot and must not be allowed to recur, and they must be turned into victory. But has the change already taken place? No. It has not, nor have we yet won victory. But victory can be won by uniting all the forces of the country. It is precisely in the present War of Resistance Against Japan that we are striving to reach the turning point from failure to victory. Just consider. For the past twenty years, “May Fourth” was not designated as Youth Day. Since March this year, it has been designated as Youth Day upon the proposal of youth organizations in Yan’an, and youth organizations outside Yan’an have also made it the Youth Day. Our hearts are like theirs. “We are of the same mind and follow the same reasoning.” We all want to fight against Japanese imperialism, and we all want to establish a new China. Isn’t this good news? Many people in the past were not in favor of designating “May Fourth” as the Youth Day, and refused to recognize the revolutionary significance of the May Fourth movement.

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This speech was first published in Zhongguo qingnian, no. 6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 325–37.

1. The orientation → Some questions concerning the orientation

2. The feudal forces → Feudalism
saying that the May Fourth movement was antigovernment. Now those who opposed it are also supportive. They have probably understood this point: The May Fourth movement was directed against a government of national betrayal, a government which colluded with imperialism and sold out the interests of the nation, a government which oppressed the people. Was it not necessary to oppose such a government? If it was not, then the May Fourth movement was simply a mistake. But it is very clear that such a government must be opposed; a government of national betrayal must be overthrown. Just consider, long before the May Fourth movement Mr. Sun Yat-sen was already a rebel against the government of his day; he opposed and overthrew the Manchus.3 Was he right in doing so? In my opinion he was quite right because the government he opposed did not resist imperialism but colluded with it, and was not a revolutionary government but one that suppressed the revolution. The May Fourth movement was a revolutionary movement precisely because it opposed a government of national betrayal. The youth of all China should see the May Fourth movement in this light. Today, when the whole nation has militantly risen to resist Japan, we are determined to defeat Japanese imperialism, and we shall not tolerate any traitors selling out the country, or allow the revolution to fail again, for we have taken warning from its failures in the past. The whole of China's youth4 has awakened and is imbued with this determination to triumph, and this is reflected in the designation of "May 4" as Youth Day. We are now advancing along the road to victory and, provided only that the whole people makes an effort (it is impossible without this condition), the Chinese revolution will definitely triumph through the War of Resistance. This is the first point I want to address today.

Second, what is the Chinese revolution directed against? What are the targets of the revolution? As everybody knows, imperialism is one target, and the feudal forces5 are the other. What are the targets of the revolution at this moment? One is Japanese imperialism, and the other the Chinese traitors. To make our revolution we must overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors. Who are the makers of the revolution? What is its main force? The common people of China. The motive forces of the revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry, the masses of young people, and all those members of other classes who are willing to oppose imperialism and feudalism. All these are the revolutionary forces opposing imperialism and feudalism. But who, among so many, constitutes the basic force, the backbone of the revolution? The workers and the peasants, forming 90 percent of the country's population. What is the nature of the Chinese revolution? What kind of revolution are we making today? Today we are making a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and we are not going beyond the scope of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. We should not destroy7 the bourgeois system of private property for the present; what we want to destroy is imperialism and the feudal forces.8 This is what we mean by the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the bourgeoisie is already incapable of carrying through this revolution, which can be carried through only by the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people. What is the goal of this revolution? To overthrow imperialism and the feudal forces and establish a people's democratic republic, such is its goal. This kind of people's democratic republic is a republic of the Three People's Principles.9 It will be different both from the semicolonial and semifeudal state of the present and from the socialist system of the future. Capitalists have no place in the social structure of a socialist society, but they are10 allowed to exist in this people's democracy. Will there always be a place for capitalists in China? No, there will not be, there will certainly not be. This is true not only of China but of the whole world. In the future no country, whether it be Britain, the United States, France, Japan, Germany, or Italy, will have any place for capitalists, and China will be no exception. The Soviet Union is a country which has already established socialism, and, beyond all doubt, just as "The turtles in front make the way and the ones behind follow," the whole world will follow in the future. China will certainly develop into socialism in the future; that is an irresistible law. But our present stage is not socialism11 but, rather, the destruction of imperialism and the feudal forces,12 changing the present semicolonial and semifeudal status,13 and establishing a people's democratic system. This is what the young people of the whole country must strive for. This is the second point I want to address today.

Third, what are the lessons of the past experience of the Chinese revolution? This is also an important question for our young people to understand. Strictly speaking, the Chinese people's democratic revolution14 against imperialism and feudalism was begun by Mr. Sun Yat-sen and has been going on for more than fifty years. Foreign capitalist aggression against China has, on the other hand, been going on for almost a hundred years. For the past hundred years, China's struggles, beginning with the Opium War against British imperialism,15 have included the war of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Boxer movement, the Revolution of 1911, the May

3. Manchus → Qing government
4. The whole of China's youth → The whole of China's youth, with some exceptions
5. Makes an effort → Makes a concerted effort
6. The feudal forces → Feudalism
7. We should not destroy → By and large, we should not destroy
8. The feudal forces. → Feudalism
9. The Three People's Principles → The revolutionary Three People's Principles
10. Are → Will still be
11. But our present stage is not socialism → But at the present stage we are not putting socialism into practice
12. Feudal forces → Feudalism
13. Status → Status of China at present
14. The Chinese people's democratic revolution → China's bourgeois-democratic revolution
15. British imperialism → British aggression
For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals.

It is now more than ten years since this venerable gentleman died, and if we add these ten years to the forty years of which he spoke, the total is more than fifty years. What is the lesson of the revolution during these fifty years? Fundamentally, it is the principle of “arousing the masses of the people.” Young people must know that only by mobilizing the great masses of workers and peasants, who form 90 percent of the population, can we defeat imperialism and the feudal forces. Today, unless we mobilize the workers and peasants of the whole country, it will be impossible for us to defeat Japan and build a new China.

Fourth, I will speak again of the youth movement. On this very day twenty years ago there occurred in China a great event known to history as the May Fourth movement, in which the students participated; it was a movement of tremendous historical significance. What role have China’s young people played since “May Fourth”? They have played the role of the vanguard, and this fact is recognized by everyone in the country except the diehards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and standing in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks. In the anti-imperialist and antifeudal ranks of the Chinese people, there is a contingent composed of the country’s young intellectuals and young students. This is a contingent of considerable size and, even if those who have died are not included, it now numbers several million. This contingent of several million is one of the front armies against imperialism and feudalism, and an important army too. But it is not enough to rely on this front army alone. We cannot defeat the enemy by relying on it alone, for it is not the main force. What then is the main force? It is none other than the broad masses of the workers and peasants. The young intellectuals and students must definitely go among the workers and peasants, who make up 90 percent of the population, and mobilize and organize them. Without this main force of workers and peasants, relying only on the contingent of young intellectuals and young students, we cannot achieve victory over imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, the young intellectuals and young students throughout the country must definitely unite with the broad masses of workers and peasants and become one with them. Only thus can a mighty force be successfully created, a force of hundreds of millions of people! Only with this huge force can the enemy’s strongholds be taken and his last fortresses smashed. The whole of China’s revolutionary movement found its origin in the initiative of young students and young intellectuals who had awakened. But every beginning must have a fulfillment. Thus, for

16. Have not → Have not yet
17. Those in power → The reactionaries
18. They have played the role of the vanguard → They have played in a certain sense the role of a vanguard
example, when the students in Yan'an reclaim land and plant grain, reclaiming the land is the beginning, but the fulfillment comes only with the harvest. The young students and intellectuals must unite with the broad masses of young workers and peasants. Only when the millions of students have become one with the tens of millions of worker and peasant youth can they form a powerful youth movement. Otherwise, they cannot become a powerful movement. If the young people wish to achieve results, they must also make friends with adults and unite with the majority of people who are above the age of twenty-five. Do we also need old people? Of course we need them too. Old people have experience; one cannot neglect them because they are old. Consequently, the young people must join forces with the old, even with those who are a hundred, and unite with them to fight against Japan. Aren't there people who want to organize an "old folks' army"? What can an "old folks' army" do? They can work as propaganda teams. Old folks are very good at doing propaganda work; the common people love to listen to them. Children are also important. Comrades, organizing children is also an important task of the youth movement. Children can form "children's armies," which are the Children's Corps. Japanese imperialism is busy out there training our children to make of them little Chinese traitors, so how could we refrain from alloying ourselves with the children? "People cannot be judged by appearances, and water in the sea cannot be measured by the dou." There was not only the case of "the eighty-year-old Taigong meeting King Wen," but also that of "a twelve-year-old Gan Luo becoming prime minister." As well! Once organized, children have great advantages. They can identify Chinese traitors, keep track of opium smokers, and confiscate mahjong sets and are especially good for standing sentry and checking road passes. In North China there are children's armies that are very fierce and very capable of keeping watch and checking road passes. Thus we see that young people must unite with adults, the elderly, and children. Only if they do so can they be effective in resisting Japan and saving the country, and only this will benefit the youth movement itself. Let the young people go among the 450 million of our people and organize them to make of them a great anti-Japanese revolutionary army. Only if we have such a revolutionary army can we defeat Japanese imperi-

21. Youth → Intellectuals
22. The dous is from the preceding text.
23. Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) was, with Li Dazhao, one of the two founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party. His influence on Mao Zedong during the May Fourth period had been very considerable (see Volume I, passim), and in 1924 Chen and Mao had worked together as chairman and secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (see the three documents signed by the two of them in these capacities in Volume II, pp. 215–21). In 1929, Chen had broken with the Party and rallied to Trotskyism. Arrested by the Guomindang in 1932 and held in custody until the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in 1937, he spent his last years in Chongqing, where he moved back toward an appreciation of the Western-style democracy he had supported during the May Fourth movement.
the counterrevolution. Didn’t Zhang Guotao once “believe” in Marxism too? Where has he gone to now?24 As a matter of fact, he has run away and landed in the mire. Some people style themselves “followers of the Three People’s Principles,” or even old stalwarts of these principles, but what have they done? It turns out that their Principle of Nationalism means conspiring with imperialism and their Principle of Democracy means oppressing the common people. What about their Principle of the People’s Livelihood? It means sucking the people’s blood, the more the better. These are phony advocates of the Three People’s Principles who pay lip service only but are not sincere. Wang Jingwei is the chief representative of these people. So when we assess a person and judge whether he is a true or false adherent of the Three People’s Principles, whether he is a true or false Marxist, we need only find out how he stands in relation to the broad masses of workers and peasants, and then we shall know him for what he is. This is the only criterion; there is no other. I hope that the youth of our country will never allow themselves to be carried away by this sinister adverse current but will clearly recognize the workers and peasants as their friends and march forward to a bright future. I hope that all young comrades will think this point over and judge whether there is truth in it.

Fifth, the present War of Resistance Against Japan marks a new stage—the greatest, most dynamic, and most vigorous stage—in the Chinese revolution. In this stage, youth shoulders tremendous responsibilities. Our Chinese revolution of the past several decades has gone through many stages of struggle, but at no stage has it been so vigorous and dynamic25 as in the present War of Resistance. When we say that the Chinese revolution now has features distinguishing it from the revolution in the past, that will turn it from failure into victory, we are referring to the fact that the broad masses of the Chinese people have made progress, of which the progress of youth is clear proof. Hence, the present anti-Japanese war will certainly be victorious and cannot fail to be victorious. As everyone knows, the basic policy in this war is the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and its aim is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and the Chinese traitors, transform old China into a new China, and liberate the whole nation from its semicolonial and semifeudal status. In other words, to carry out the Three People’s Principles of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, and build a new China of the Three People’s Principles. Recently, Chairman Chiang said, “The state is supreme, the nation is supreme.” This is a call to overthrow Japanese imperialism completely, and not to allow Japanese imperialism to trample on our state and our nation; it is a call to overthrow completely the Chinese traitor who is selling out his country, Wang Jingwei, and all his followers and adherents, and not to allow any overt or covert Chinese traitors, large or small, now or in the future, to sell out our national interests. What we demand is complete independence for our state, and complete national liberation, and that is what is meant by “The state is supreme, the nation is supreme.” What does Chairman Chiang mean when he says, “Military affairs take first place, victory takes first place”? This means that the War of Resistance must be carried through to the end, that resistance to Japan should take precedence over everything, and that all else should be subordinated to it. We must definitely mobilize all available forces, strive for final victory, fight to the banks of the Yalu River, and recover all our lost territory. So long as there is one inch of unrecovered Chinese territory, our war will never cease. If anyone dares to try to stop the War of Resistance Against Japan halfway, and to carry out a peaceful compromise, we shall declare ourselves irreconcilably opposed to him. Chairman Chiang has also put forward the slogan “Concentrate our will, concentrate our strength.” What is the meaning of this? It means that, if we want to secure final victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, all of the country’s strength must be concentrated on the united front and definitely must not be dispersed to opposing sides, thus increasing the importance of our task of consolidating and enlarging the united front. All the minds and wills in our country must definitely be concentrated on the single point of winning final victory, and we must definitely permit no one to entertain irresponsible thoughts of compromise and capitulation. Because of this, the masses of the youth of Yan’an and of the whole country must continue to urge the Three People’s Principles Youth Corps26 to join hands with us and to set up a united youth movement. You have already made several proposals to them regarding this point, but they have not yet written you in reply. That is a pity, but you should keep on putting forward proposals, for the present lack of unity of the Chinese youth movement is a great defect. You should continue to put forward proposals demanding unity, because only in unity is there strength. You must help the youth of the whole country to understand the present situation. Japanese imperialism is still fighting ferociously; militarily, they are going to attack the Southwest and the Northwest. Politically they are trying to destroy our united front, to destroy the Guomindang and the Communist Party. They are trying to overthrow Chairman Chiang; they call this “toppling Chiang.” They are trying to annihilate the Communist Party; this is called “opposing Communism.” The youth of the whole country must absolutely not be deceived by the enemy’s attempts to sow dissension and must never promote friction within their own ranks. They must expose the heresy of “toppling Chiang and opposing Communism,” to achieve unity and resist Japan to the end.

24. Although Zhang Guotao (1897–1979) and Mao Zedong were both founding members of the Chinese Communist Party, they had never enjoyed good relations. During the period of the Long March especially, they had often come into sharp conflict and taken different paths. (See Volume V, passim.) When Zhang and the remnants of his army finally sought refuge in Yan’an in 1936, Zhang was appointed to major offices in the Party and in the border region government, but enjoyed no real power. In April 1938, he was sent to participate in a ceremony in Xi’an honoring the Yellow Emperor, and took advantage of the occasion to travel directly to Hankow and place himself under the protection of the Guomindang.

25. Vigorous and dynamic → Broad

26. As the name suggests, this was the Guomindang youth organization.
Sixth and last, I want to speak about the youth movement in Yan’an. It is the model for the youth movement throughout the country. The direction it is taking is in fact the orientation for the youth movement of the entire country. Why? Because the orientation of the Yan’an youth movement is correct. You see, in the matter of unity they have acquitted themselves well, indeed very well. The Yan’an youth movement in itself has achieved solidarity and unity. The young intellectuals, young students, young workers, and young peasants in Yan’an at all levels are united. Large numbers of revolutionary youth from all over the country, and even from abroad beyond the South China Sea, are studying in Yan’an. Most of you attending this meeting today have come from thousands of miles away; whether your surname is Zhang or Li, whether you are a man or a woman, a worker or a peasant, you are all united as of one mind. Should this not be regarded as a model for the whole country? The youth in Yan’an, besides being united among themselves, have inte grated themselves with the masses of workers and peasants, and in this more than anything else are a model for the whole country. What have the youth of Yan’an been doing? They have been learning the theory of revolution and studying the principles and methods for resisting Japan and saving the nation. They have been carrying out the campaign for production and have reclaimed thousands of mu of wasteland. Even Confucius never did any such thing as reclaiming land or tilling the soil. When he ran his school, he had quite a number of students, “seventy worthies and three thousand disciples”—quite a flourishing school! But he had far fewer students than there are in Yan’an, and they did not go in for any such thing as a production campaign. When his student asked him for instruction on how to plow the fields, Confucius answered, “I don’t know, I am not as good at that as a farmer.” Confucius was next asked how to grow vegetables, and he answered, “I don’t know, I am not as good at that as a vegetable gardener.” In ancient times the youth of China who studied under a sage neither learned revolutionary theory nor took part in labor. Today, there is little revolutionary theory taught and there are no such things as production movements in the schools in other parts of China. It is only here in Yan’an that the young people are fundamentally different; the young people in Yan’an are truly the vanguard in resisting Japan and saving the nation because their political orientation is correct, as are their methods of work. That is why I say the youth movement in Yan’an should be the model for the youth movement throughout the country.

The meeting today is highly significant. I have said all I wanted to say. I hope you will all study the experiences of the Chinese revolution in the past fifty years, develop its good points and discard its mistakes, so that youth will be integrated with the people of the whole country, and the revolution will make the turn from failure to victory. When the young people of the whole country and the people of the whole country are mobilized, organized, and united, that is the day when Japanese imperialism will be overthrown. Every young person must shoulder this responsibility. Each young person must be different from before and strongly resolve to unite all the youth of China, to organize the people of the whole country, to overthrow Japanese imperialism, and to transform the old China into a new China. This is what I expect of you.

(Prolonged applause followed by the shouting of slogans: Youth of the country, unite! People of the country, unite! Promote the glorious tradition of the May Fourth movement! Oppose Chinese traitors selling out their country! Down with Wang Jingwei! Down with all Chinese traitors! Down with Japanese imperialism! Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!)

27. From abroad beyond the South China Sea → From Chinese communities abroad
28. In other parts of China → Over vast regions of our country
29. In Yan’an → In Yan’an and in the anti-Japanese base areas behind the enemy lines
To Pan Zinian

(May 11, 1939)

Comrade Zinian:

I have received your letter of April 2 and passed it on to Comrade Jiang Qixian, the minister of health, asking him to investigate and reply to you. For medical questions in the future, you, or Mr. Tao's nephew and others, may write directly to Comrade Jiang at the Yan'an Health Department, and they will answer you. Last year, after I received your letter, I sent you a letter in reply. I wonder whether or not you received it?

Wishing you improvement in your health!

Mao Zedong

Speech at the Educational Mobilization Meeting for Cadres at Their Posts in Yan'an

(May 20, 1939)

Comrades:

We have been preparing for this meeting for quite a long time. It was meant to be held earlier, but because of the production movement, it was postponed until today. Now, responding to the Central Committee's call concerning the study movement, the comrades in the various organs have organized study groups, and some have already begun to study and have achieved considerable results. This is very good. We have called today's meeting to discuss a few questions related to the study movement.

1. The Study Movement Is Necessary

On the basis of past experience as well as of the current situation, our Party has recently launched two movements. One is the production movement, and the other is the study movement. Both these movements have universal and permanent significance.

As everyone knows, the purpose of the production movement is to get food to eat and clothes to wear. Clothes to wear and food to eat are things we very much need, so our current production movement is extremely important. The whole country needs to eat food and wear clothing, so it is important for the whole country as well. This is likewise the case not only in the whole country but in the whole world. Therefore, the production movement has a universal nature. It is not only we ourselves who need food to eat and clothes to wear; our sons, grandsons, and their descendants need them too. Thus the production movement was not only needed in

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 154, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Pan Zinian (1893–1972) was a native of Yixing, Jiangsu. At this time, he was chairman of the Xinhua ribao in Chongqing.

2. We have been unable to identify Mr. Tao or his nephew.

Our source for this speech is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 176–85, where it is reproduced from the stenographic record in the Central Archives.

1. This meeting was convened by the Cadre Education Department of the Central Committee, and was attended by more than a thousand people drawn from the administration, schools, and mass organizations. See Zhongguo gongchandang Kangri zhanzheng shiqi dashiji, 1937–1945, ed. Xiao Yiping et al. (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988) (hereafter, Dashiji).
the past, and is not only needed in the present, but will still be needed in the future. This is the basis for the permanent character of the production movement.

Now, as regards the study movement. The ancients have said: “If a man cannot span past and present, he’s just a horse or ox wearing clothes.” That is to say, if human beings are not familiar with both past and present they are just like cattle and horses wearing the clothes of humans. What is meant by “the past”? “The past” means “history.” Everything that happened in the past is called “the past.” From the time Pan Gu separated the heavens and the earth until today, the whole process in between is called “the past.” “The present” means now. It is not enough for us to know only the present; we must also know the past. The people of Yan’an have to know the past and the present, the people of the whole nation have to know the past and the present, and the people of the whole world, too, need to know the past and the present. We Communist Party members, especially, need to know even more of the past and the present. To know the past and the present requires study. Not only must we study, but the people who come after us must also study. Therefore, the study movement also has a universal character as well as a permanent character.

Both our production movement and our study movement have universal and permanent significance. This is true in a general sense. Now I shall talk about the direct reasons for initiating the production movement and the study movement.

The immediate reason we started the production movement is that we had no food to eat and no clothes to wear. Although we do have a little now, in future when things become difficult we will not have enough to eat or enough to wear, so we must now make advance preparations. In this way the problems of clothes to wear and food to eat have become the direct reasons for our launching the production movement.

What, then, is the immediate reason for initiating the study movement? It is that our Communist Party wants to lead the revolution. In the past there were several tens of thousands of Communist Party members in the whole nation, now there are several hundreds of thousands, and in the future there will be several million. If these hundreds of thousands and millions of Communist Party members are to lead the revolution of tens of millions and hundreds of millions of people, it cannot be done if they have no learning. So Communists should understand all kinds of things. Consequently, to lead the revolution it is necessary to study, and this is one of the reasons we started the study movement.

In addition, it is urgently necessary to overcome the defects in our work. At present, the following contradiction has arisen in our ranks: if our cadre do not study, they will be unable to lead the work. Some of the veteran cadres have spent time in the past in other armies, where all the work depends on orders from above. But in our Red Army, relying solely on issuing orders will not work. If people do not listen to you and you resort to beating them, the result is that you cannot effectively lead the work, and many soldiers run away. Issuing orders in the army confers a certain power and prestige, but power and prestige by themselves without ability are useless. In addition to power and prestige, all cadres in our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and guerrilla units must also have abilities, which means they have to study. At present some of our soldiers know more characters than do their battalion commanders. They used to be completely illiterate, but now they can recognize five hundred, a thousand, two thousand, or three thousand characters, and are able to write short essays and put them up on wall newspapers. Our battalion and company commanders refuse to attend classes given by the political instructors because they think the classes are meant for the soldiers and that to join in would really be a “loss of status.” Because they want to maintain their “status,” the result is that they not only cannot write articles, but are ignorant of many things, while the soldiers are wiser than they are. For this reason there is a kind of panic in our ranks, which is not an economic panic or a political panic but, rather, a panic with regard to abilities. The skills learned in the past were very few, so if some are used up today and some are used up tomorrow, eventually they will run out. Just as in a store where there are few goods to begin with, they are sold out right away and the place is totally empty so that they cannot go on doing business. In order to keep going, goods will have to be brought in. For our cadres, “bringing in goods” means learning new skills, which is what many of our cadres urgently need. To do a good job, our cadres must know more. It is not enough just to get by on what little one learned in the past. That is only half-baked knowledge, and even though one can still get the work done in this way, it is insufficient for doing a decent job. If we want the work to be done really well, their knowledge must definitely be increased. Whether it is a question of Party cadres, state cadres, military cadres, cadres in people’s organizations, or educational cadres, they can do a better job only if they increase their level of knowledge.

I see now that some of our teachers are still using the text on basic politics that was published at the time of the Central Soviet Area. They are quite familiar with the material in this book because they are likely to have taught it seventy or eighty times already, but they know nothing else. This is really a case of “focusing on nothing outside the book itself, devoting oneself to nothing but basic politics.” They do not know how to develop further the material in the book by relating it to the new situation. Such conditions can also be seen in organizations of the popular masses, in the army, and in [Party] branches. To break out of this situation now and improve our work, we must intensify our study.

The third point that makes study an urgent necessity is a peculiarity of our Party. In the past the ranks of our Party were small, with only very few Party members. Even now the number of Party members is by no means large, but we have now shouldered the task of defeating Japanese imperialism and establishing

2. This line is from a poem by Han Yu (768–824), Fu dushou chengnan (Fu Studies South of the City), translated by Stephen Owen in The Poetry of Meng Chiao and Han Yu (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 273.
a new China, and this demands that we build a large Party. It was small in the past and now it needs to be large, so what is to be done? We are now in the process of going from small to big, and we need to recruit Party members throughout the country. But some people ask, “Why do you have to be large?” They do not want us to get large. But we feel that it is better to be somewhat bigger. And according to the view of the common people, they also want us to be larger, because they cannot find the Communists no matter how hard they look, and only if our Party grows in size will it be easier to find. On this we should be somewhat more stubborn. Unlike certain people, we want to build a large Party which is not an “undisciplined mob” of a party but, rather, one that is independent and endowed with fighting capacity. For this a large number of knowledgeable cadres is necessary to serve as a backbone. This task lies before us, and we must pay attention to it at all times. If we want to lead a revolution of several hundred million people, our present strength is clearly inadequate.

If we want to build a big Party, we cannot do so if our cadres do not study. Study is work to which we attach much importance, and it is of particularly urgent necessity that our comrades who are cadres study. If they do not study they will be unable to lead the work, to improve the work, and to build a large Party. Leading the work, improving the work, and building a large Party are the direct reasons for our study movement, and the resolution on the study movement at our Sixth Plenum is extremely important.

Our Party has always called upon all comrades in the Party to study. There was study in the past, but it was poorly organized, not as well as it is now. Now we have moved one step further in that there is organization instead of the anarchistic state of the past.

The Central Committee has now set up a Cadre Education Department, which is in charge of leading study in the whole Party. Our comrades cannot just read some books and leave it at that, but must study in an organized fashion. This sort of organ and this type of system must be established in Party offices at every level all over the country, and in the border region at all levels of government, in all organizations of the popular masses, and in schools at every level, to lead and carry out study. It is the same in the army, where an education department and a study system must be set up. The Central Committee is going to promote such a study system throughout the country, doing everything within the Communist Party’s power to move it forward so as to create a great tide of enthusiasm for study. Comrades, everyone must study hard and must not fall behind or be lazy and fall asleep. In the past Confucius’s student Zai Yu slept during the day, and Confucius berated him, saying: “Rotten wood cannot be carved.” Something like this could be said to the lazy people within our ranks, but those who have achieved something in their studies should be rewarded. There should be both rewards and punish-

ishment, and they should be clearly delineated. But we are mostly concerned with rewards, and it doesn’t matter if there is an occasional Zai Yu.

2. The Study Movement Is Possible

The study movement is necessary, all right, but is it possible? Our answer is that it is entirely possible. But then other problems arise—not many, only two of them. One is that everyone is extremely busy, and the other is being unable to understand what is read. These two problems are absolutely real. People are so busy with work, and if you then add to that the production movement, plus the fact that those at the front have to do battle, they are unable to study. Not only the ordinary people say so, but even senior cadres say this as well. “No time” has become the rationale for not wanting to study and the excuse for being lazy. It is wrong for Communist Party members not to study theory, and when there is a problem a solution should be sought; this is the true spirit of a Communist Party member. There is a way to solve the problem of being busy, and it is called “squeezing.” “Squeezing” may be used to deal with being busy. This is like when there are a great many people at a meeting, and people have to squeeze in to get a seat. Or it is like a carpenter driving a nail into a piece of wood so that clothes may be hung on it. In this case the carpenter “squeezes” it into the wood; only when the wood yields has he been successful. Ever since wood has been yielding in this way, so many pieces of wood have had nails driven into them, and tiny invisible threadlike holes have been “squeezed” to make such large openings. This shows that “squeezing” is an effective method. We are presently very busy with our work, so we could have it make some concessions by using the “squeezing” method to eke out two hours for study from our daily schedule of work, meals, and rest, and squeeze the work onto both ends, one at the top and one toward the bottom. This way two hours could certainly be squeezed out for study. Comrade Chen Yun has experience in “squeezing.” He has ways to “squeeze out” time for reading and attending meetings.

The other problem is being unable to understand what is read. This situation does actually exist. There are comrades who would “rather carry night soil than study theory.” If one is busy one can “squeeze,” which is one way out; there is also a way out if one cannot understand something one reads, which is called “digging into it.” This is “drilling” into something as a carpenter drills into a piece of wood.


4. Chen Yun (1905–1993), original name Liao Chenyuan, a native of Jiangsu, joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. He went to the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area in 1933, participated in the early part of the Long March, and played an important role at the Zunyi Conference of January 1935. Thereafter he was sent to the Soviet Union as a delegate to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. Returning to China in 1937, he became head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, a post which he still held at this time. It was thus natural that Mao should cite him as an expert in organizing and scheduling the Party’s work.
We need not be afraid of what we cannot understand, but should rather deal with it by "digging into it." In China, reading and studying were originally called attacking the books. To study Marxism means to attack Marx's theories. If you wish to read and understand Marx's theories, you cannot do so without attacking them. What cannot be understood in one's reading should be attacked as one would an enemy. Some people at present do not adopt an offensive posture, only a defensive one. This is wrong. Marxism absolutely cannot make concessions, so without attacking it there can be no result. In the past people used to say "checking against a foe" for "proofreading." Proofreading is indeed quite difficult, and it cannot be done successfully without treating it as a foe. As far as difficulty is concerned, we should attack it as if it were an enemy, and with the enemy we do not deal sentimentally. Therefore, while it is true that Marxist and Leninist theory is indeed very difficult, if we attack it unsentimentally with the attitude we adopt toward an "enemy," we are sure to win every single battle and can certainly capture its stronghold. In "Sacrificing a Crocodile," by Han Wengong, of ancient times, there is a passage about giving the crocodile three days to leave, and if it did not leave in three days, giving it five, and if it did not leave within seven days then killing it without ceremony in one stroke of the sword. We should do as Han Wengong did in sacrificing the crocodile, allowing ten days to understand it, then twenty, thirty, ninety days . . . , not stopping until it is finally understood. In this way, what cannot be understood can certainly be transformed into something that can be understood.

If one is unable to understand something directly, one may approach it from a different angle. It is like in war, if a tough enemy cannot be defeated from the front, he may be harassed and attacked from the side, or surrounded on all four sides and isolated, and thus easily defeated. It is the same with studying. If something cannot be understood directly at first, one can start by reading other things around it and laying a foundation, so as to be able to understand directly little by little.

If busy with work, one has to "squeeze," and if unable to understand, one has to "drill." Using these two methods to deal with it, one can certainly be victorious in one's studies.

3. There Will Be Achievements in the Study Movement

Some results have already been achieved in the study movement in that many study groups have been organized. In Yan'an, among those that have been organized already are a philosophy group, a reading group, and so on, and they have already achieved results. Those who did not understand philosophy before now understand it a little, and those who did not understand Marxism now also under-stand a little of it. Such organizations exist in the military as well, and they too have accomplished at least something. In many places outside [the border areas] there are such organizations as reading societies, which provide education similar to that of our education for cadres at their posts, and they may serve us as reference points. We Communist Party members are full of enthusiasm for study. I have been told that since the study movement began, many comrades have been very enthusiastic and happy, and that those who had asked to be transferred to other posts no longer wish to be transferred. This is another achievement of the study movement.

The foundation of the study movement is the conscious enthusiasm of our comrades. Our method is to coordinate individual activity with organized activity. In the beginning some schools ignored individual activity and did not allow free time for reading. The daily schedule was very full, and although things were good as far as organized activities are concerned, this is a rather serious shortcoming, since individual initiative cannot be brought into full play. We are trying to find a way to correct matters with regard to this point. We advocate the coordination of individual activity and organized activity, fostering both conscious enthusiasm and sound leadership with regard to study, so our study movement is bound to achieve results.

Here I want to discuss one point in passing, which is that among our cadres there are some who are a little older, and who think that it is hopeless for people to study when they are older. I believe it is wrong to think this way. Who says that older people cannot do it? There is an old saying, “Only when a person reaches fifty-five is he a tiger coming out of retirement.” Well, then, if you are fifty-four you are still a youth, so how on earth could you be incapable of studying?! This is the point I wanted to make in passing.

Our present educational system for cadres is very good. It is a new invention, a newly invented university system. Speaking of universities, we have here the Marxist-Leninist Academy, the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University, the Women's University, and so on, which are all very good. Outside there are Beijing University, Fudan University, and others, and in foreign countries there are Oxford University, the University of Paris, and so on. In all of them one graduates after five or six years of study, so they are called fixed-term universities. But this university of ours may be considered the first of its kind in the world. We call it a lifetime university, because it does not matter if you are a little older; as long as you are still alive you may enter our university. This university of ours is an original creation of Yan'an, but anyone can enter it no matter where he is, be it some place in North China, Central China, or South China, and no matter who he is, whether a Communist Party member or not. He can always enter this long-term university.

I can even mention some examples of people who became successful after studying in a lifetime university. From the very earliest times, the truly learned did not acquire their knowledge in school. Confucius did not learn his Confucian doctrine in school at all once. His teacher was called Xiang Tuo; this is confirmed in

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5. Han Wengong is Han Yu. We have been unable to locate this poem; Mao's memory of the title may have been approximate.
books. It is recorded in the *Three-Character Classic* that “Of old, Zhongni took Xiang Tuo for his teacher.”16 But he did not learn all of his doctrine from Xiang Tuo. It was not until he became a teacher and an official in the state of Lu that his Confucian doctrine came into being.

The same is true for Mr. Sun Yatsen. There was no such thing as the Three People’s Principles while he was in school. As everyone knows, his field of study was medicine, and his Three People’s Principles did not come into existence until after he was out of school. Furthermore, Mr. Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles did not appear all at once. At first there was only one People’s Principle, and later there were two People’s Principles. Finally he made a trip to Europe, observed various conditions such as that social problems had arisen in Europe, and that the workers wanted to overthrow the capitalists, and so on, and he came up with the additional principle of the People’s Livelihood. This is how the Three People’s Principles were finally put together.

As for foreign countries, there was the case of Marx, who did not study Marxism in school at all but, rather, idealism. The Marxism he later learned outside school was different from what his teachers taught. As for those with little formal schooling, I can give Gorky as an example. He is the world’s most famous “doctor” of literature, but he never attended primary school, nor did he ever go to middle school, and he certainly never went to college. But his writings are foremost in the world.

Therefore, going to school is all very well, but this is only a matter of entering a door, and if one wants to obtain further knowledge, one must certainly study outside school and study for a long period of time. It does not matter if you still do not know how to read now, because there is hope as long as you study hard.

4. Study Should Be Followed Through to the End

Study must be carried through until the very end. The biggest enemy in studying is not to carry it through to the very “end.” If one is satisfied with oneself after learning a little something and thinks that he need not continue to study, this sort of satisfaction is the biggest and most tenacious enemy of our study movement. After today’s meeting it should be overcome.

As Comrade Luo Mai7 has said, what we are learning includes things such as party-building and the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and these are things that we shall continue to study over the long run. We can certainly learn all these things very well as long as we overcome all difficulties in our studies, but the main thing is not to give up halfway. Otherwise, nothing will be achieved.

Apart from all this knowledge, there is the question of the current situation and the Party’s policy. These two items were not included in past plans, but they are absolutely necessary, because this is real knowledge, and it is “today’s” knowledge. As for the question of the current situation, the Central Committee is already selecting materials on the current situation in preparation for the compilation of a comprehensive anthology that may be supplied to the comrades for study and reference. As for the Party’s policy, everyone has probably read through the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum once, but it is wrong to discard them as soon as one has finished reading them; the Party’s policies should be studied frequently. All conference reports between the Sixth Plenum and the Seventh Plenum should be studied, including meetings of the Poliburo. To study the theory alone without studying the Party’s policy is inadequate and leads to separation from reality.

The present study movement for the education of cadres at their posts encompasses the Party, the government, the army, the people, and educational institutions, and includes all working cadres in organizations of the popular masses and schools. After this meeting of ours is over, everyone should work hard, help one another, and correct the old way of doing things, in which one kept any books to himself and refused to share his studies with others. From now on, we must help one another in our studies, serving as one another’s teachers and one another’s students, really becoming fellow students. The same applies to the comrades in the Central Committee; comrades should study together. Comrade Luo Mai told me that those at the lower levels are already asking for materials, that the comrades are studying already. This is very good and amply shows the comrades’ enthusiasm. All right! Everyone present today and all Party comrades, study and learn, everyone should study through to the end, should enter this lifetime university. The whole Party should be transformed into one big university. The leader of this university is the Central Committee. Each local Party office, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the guerrilla units are the subdivisions of this big university. Every Party comrade and all non-Party soldiers must enter this university.

We believe that if we adopt the orientation of studying through to the end we will surely be able to overcome the evil phenomenon of complacency.

Our study movement is necessary. We can study. Results have already been achieved in our studies, and there will be more achievements in the future. We have adopted the policy of studying through to the very end. Under the leadership of the Department for Cadre Education, I am confident that the results of the study movement for cadres will be very good. This method we are trying out now should be spread throughout the Party, and particularly in the Party in North China.

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6. Mao here quotes the lines numbered 267 and 268 from the *Three-Character Classic*. Zhongni was the hao of Confucius. See Herbert A. Giles, *Elementary Chinese*. Sanzijing (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1900), pp. 118–19.

7. Luo Mai was the pseudonym of Li Weinan (1896–1984), a native of Changsha, who had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. After studying in Moscow from 1931 to 1933, he returned to China, went to the Jiangxi Soviet Area, and thereafter participated in the Long March. At this time he was deputy head of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Cadre Education Department and president of the Central Party School.
In Commemoration of the Third Anniversary of the Founding of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(May 26, 1939)

The reason the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has become famous all over the country and all over the world is that, of all military institutions, it is the most revolutionary, the most progressive, and the best fighter for national liberation and social emancipation. This, I think, is the reason why visitors to Yan'an are so keen on seeing it.

The university is revolutionary and progressive because both its staff members and teachers and its courses are revolutionary and progressive, and also because its students are revolutionary and progressive. Without this revolutionary and progressive character, it could never have become the object of praise at home and abroad.

Some people attack the university; they are the capitulationists and diehards. This only goes to show that the university is a most revolutionary and progressive one, or otherwise they would not attack it. The vigorous attacks by the capitulationists and diehards testify to its revolutionary and progressive nature and add to its luster. It is a glorious military institute not only because the majority of people support and praise it, but also because the capitulationists and diehards strenuously attack and slander it.¹

In the past three years, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University has made a great contribution to the country, to the nation, and to society by training tens of thousands of promising, progressive, and revolutionary young students. It will certainly go on making its contribution to the country, the nation, and society, because it will continue to train such young students in large numbers.² The Huangpu Military Academy of the past and today's Anti-Japanese University reflect luster upon each other and emulate each other's virtues.

The educational guidelines of the Anti-Japanese University are as follows: a firm and correct political orientation, a style of work involving industrious effort and a fighting spirit, and flexible strategy and tactics. These are three essentials in the making of an anti-Japanese revolutionary soldier. It is in accordance with these essentials that the staff, teachers, and students of the university engage in teaching and learning.

The improvement and progress of the Anti-Japanese University over the past few years have been accompanied by certain shortcomings. It has developed, but difficulties have arisen too. The main difficulty is the shortage of funds, teachers, and teaching materials. But, led by the Communist Party, the Anti-Japanese University does not fear any difficulties and will certainly overcome them. There are no such things as difficulties for Communists, for they can surmount them.

It is my hope, and the hope of the people of the whole country and the entire world, that the Anti-Japanese University will correct its shortcomings and become still more progressive after its third anniversary.

Teachers, staff members, and students of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, let us redouble our efforts!

¹ Our source for this speech is Mao Zedong ji, Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 35–37, which reproduces the text as it originally appeared on May 30, 1939, in Xin Zhonghua bao and indicates the variants compared to the version published in Mao Zedong zhuzuo suanu (Beijing, 1964), pp. 150–52, under the title “To Be Attacked by the Enemy Is Not a Bad Thing But a Good Thing.” The Xin Zhonghua bao text has recently been reprinted without any changes in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 187–88. For this reason, we do not show the variants systematically here, but have indicated one or two of the most important in the notes.

² The 1964 Xuandu edition adds here: “In speaking of the university, people often compare it to the Huangpu Military Academy before the Northern Expedition. In fact, there are points of both similarity and difference between the two institutes. The similarity is the presence of Communists among the teachers and students in both. The difference is that, while the chief leaders and the majority of the students at the Huangpu Military Academy were members of the Guomindang, the entire leadership of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University is in the hands of the Communist Party and the vast majority of the students are Communist or Communist-inclined. For this reason, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University of today cannot but be more revolutionary and more progressive than was the Huangpu Military Academy of the past, and it will certainly make a greater contribution to national liberation and social emancipation.” The sentence which follows does not, of course, appear in the 1964 text.
Struggle Without Ceasing

(May 30, 1939)

Comrades:

I was delighted when I heard that a meeting was being held today to congratulate model youths, so I came to participate.

Just now Comrade Feng Wenbin spoke at some length, and what he said was very good. One sentence in his speech was, “We must struggle without ceasing.” This is the point I want to talk about today.

In the past, when I was a student, the conditions were not so good as those you enjoy today. First we read the works of Confucius, that is, the old stuff which goes, “Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application?” Later, I went to a foreign-style school and received some bourgeois education. Although in school I did hear something about what Sun Yat-sen and Marx had said, I did not learn the true doctrine of Sun Yat-senism and Marxism until after I had left school. Now you can hear about everything, except that there is a bit less about Confucius. You can read many books, such as Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles, the Director General’s Testament, and so on, as well as books on Marxism and on the strategy and tactics of the War of Resistance Against Japan. In former times, I did not have access to any of these books. Nineteen years ago, very few copies of the Communist Manifesto were printed in the entire country, so where would we have been able to find such a good theory? How could we be as happy as you are today? The age in which you are growing up now is a fortunate age, it is completely different from the era when I was a student.

You model youths were elected during commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, and this has tremendous significance. Twenty years ago the youths who participated in the May Fourth movement in Beijing were true model youths, for they opposed the government, which was selling out the country, they shed blood in the May Fourth movement and participated in such a struggle. These youths constituted the vanguard of the revolution, and they were extremely valiant in carrying out such a struggle for the liberation, independence, freedom, and happiness of the Chinese nation. Quite a number of them have survived until today; many of the best elements in the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard and the Northwest Youth Association for National Salvation are those who remained since that time. A considerable number of the revolutionary youths from those days later became Communist Party members. China’s youth movement has a very good revolutionary tradition, which is to “struggle without ceasing.” We in the Communist Party have inherited this tradition. We are carrying it on now, and we shall certainly continue it into the future. There are some people, on the other hand, who fought very valiantly in the May Fourth movement in Beijing but who later changed. One of these is Zhang Guotao, and there are others such as Kang Baiqing, Luo Jialun, and so on. They were all part of the vanguard during the May Fourth movement, but where are they now? They have now become part of the desertsers.

Before “May Fourth,” Wang Jingwei went in a fit of passion to assassinate the Xuantong emperor’s guardian, the prince regent. At that time he was extremely valiant. The news these days, however, is not very good, and he has stolen into Shanghai from Hanoi, then from Shanghai to the capital of Japan to visit the Japanese emperor, talked matters over with Japanese prime minister Hiranuma, and discussed the “[Wang] Jingwei-Hiranuma [Kichiri] Agreement.” Leaving aside how many words and articles there are in this agreement of his, it can be summarized in four big characters, which amount to “the destruction of China.”

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3. The Chinese National Liberation Vanguard was a youth group organized by the Chinese Communist Party and established in February 1936 as an outgrowth of the December Ninth movement. See below, Mao’s talk of December 9, 1939, “The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement.” In areas under Guomindang control it was forced to disband in 1938, and in the anti-Japanese base areas it was later incorporated into the broader-based youth organization, the Youth Association for National Salvation.

4. The Northwest Youth Association (or Alliance) for National Salvation was a mass youth group for resistance to Japan organized by the Chinese Communist Party and established in April 1937.

5. Kang Baiqing (1896–1958), a native of Anyue, Sichuan, was involved in the literary revolution movement in the early 1920s. Along with Fu Sinian, Luo Jialun, and others, he helped organize the New Tide Society (Xinchaoshe) in 1918 and joined the Young China Association the same year. He went to study in the United States in 1920, and on his return held office in various warlord armies and organizations.

6. Luo Jialun (1897–1969), a native of Shaoying, was active in the New Culture movement, the New Tide Society, and the May Fourth movement. He studied abroad from 1920 to 1926 and on his return held various offices in Guomindang military, educational, and governmental departments.
The Wang Jingwei of thirty years ago and the Kang Baiqing, Luo Jialun, and Zhang Guotao of twenty years ago were all very brave, but they all have one shortcoming, which is that they are not good at struggling and lack the spirit to “struggle without ceasing.”

What is a model youth? There must be this element of struggle without ceasing. Other qualities must, of course, exist as well, including those mentioned just now by Comrade Feng Wenbin, such as intellect, virtue, sportsmanship, aesthetic sensibility, a sense of the masses, and so on, but in my opinion, “struggle without ceasing” is the most important one. Without this element, everything else is empty. To what extent should one struggle? One should struggle for five years, ten years, forty years, fifty years, even sixty or seventy years. In a word, struggle hard to the death. Until one has died, he has not yet achieved the aim of struggle without ceasing. There is a poem from the past with the following lines: “Zhou Gong was filled with dread when rumors raged; Wang Mang was humble when he took a lower position.” Had they died at the time, who would have known the truth or falsity of their lives? In the parlance of historians, this is called “making a judgment upon closing the coffin lid.” In other words, the judgment of whether a person is good or evil cannot be made until the time of death. If Zhou Gong had died when rumors were raging, people would certainly have labeled him a “traitorous minister.” Or if Wang Mang had died when he had humbly declined a high position, then future generations would surely have praised him. But right now we are not discussing history, so we will not bother to argue about whether those two

7. Zhou Gong (d. 1105 B.C.) was the fourth son of King Wen of Zhou and younger brother to King Wu. He was adviser to his brother at the beginning of his brother’s reign, and at the time there were rumors that he intended to usurp the throne, although he was later known as a man utterly devoted to the state. Wang Mang (33 B.C. – 23 C.E. by contrast, was commonly known as “the Usurper” because of all his intrigues to gain power during the Han dynasty. Before he actually proclaimed himself emperor, however, he placed an infant on the throne and assumed the post of regent to the child.

8. These lines are quoted (not quite accurately) from the third of Bai Juyi’s five poems entitled as a group “Unfettered Words” (Fang yan), written in 815. See Quan Tang shi (Zhonghua shuju paperback edition), ce 13, juan 438, pp. 4874–75. The full text of this poem is as follows:

I hereby present a way to resolve all doubt;
no need to use tortoise shell cracks or mifoi sticks.
Jade is burned for three full days to test its authenticity,
a tree takes seven years to show its timber.
Zhou Gong was filled with dread when rumors abounded,
Wang Mang acted humbly before he usurped the throne.
Had they died in those early days,
who would have known the truth or falsity of their lives?

The author’s own notes to lines 3 and 4 of the poem read: “Real jade does not get hot if burned for three days,” and “A tree in Jiangxi grows for seven years before [its quality] can be known.”

were good or evil. Instead, it goes to show that only upon a person’s death can the truth about his merits and faults be properly assessed. When we say struggle without ceasing we mean struggle to the death. This struggle without ceasing is extremely important, and if we talk about moral values this is the one we should talk about. Model youths should be models with regard to this value. There are numerous other aspects in which to become a model. For example, there must be a correct direction in politics, yet it is far from enough just to have a correct political direction. If it is abandoned after three or four or five years, is it not all in vain? Therefore, after a correct political direction is attained, it must be firmly maintained, which is to say that there must be a “resolute and correct political direction.” This orientation must be kept to without wavering, and this direction must be firmly maintained with the moral integrity to “resist wantonness in the face of prosperity, resist wavering in the face of poverty, and resist submission in the face of force and power.” Youths such as this are the true model youths. Such morality is true political morality. This is our understanding of morality. Some people spout off all the time about morality and integrity, but they are politically irresolute and are likely to recant in midterm. This is a total lack of morality and virtue.

I have said that there have been two currents in China’s youth movement since its beginning: one is the revolutionary current, the other is the reactionary current. During the time of the May Fourth movement, one current demanded national independence, the realization of democratic politics, improvement of people’s lives, standing together with the workers and peasants, standing together with the common people. Their position was a glorious one. The other current went in for compromising with imperialism. They too talked about toppling imperialism, but they would battle imperialism for only three days; on the fourth day they would stop fighting imperialism and become friends with imperialism. They said they wanted revolution and democratic politics, but again it was only for three days, and on the fourth day they began to oppress the common people. “Awaken the popular masses” were the words spoken by Mr. Sun Yat-sen just before his death. The ancients said that “a person about to die speaks words of great merit.” Yet some people shouted [all this] for only three days and stopped on the fourth day. As for improving the people’s livelihood, that was certainly nowhere in evidence. This is the reactionary current, which we call the “countercurrent.”

During the period of the Great Revolution, there were two youth groups in Guangdong: one was the Young Soldiers Association, and the other was the Sun Yat-senism Study Society. These two groups represented those two currents. The
former was revolutionary; they stood together with the majority of youths throughout the country, together with the workers and peasants and laboring masses. The latter was antipopular and anti-Communist. They opposed the Communists for ten years, and some of them made big fortunes and became officials through their anticommunism. Now they continue to hold up both hands, one for fighting Japan, the other for fighting the Communist Party. They want to resist Japan and at the same time to oppose communism, but is this feasible? Some people investigate very little history and therefore do not know much about such matters. Viewed historically, Wang Jingwei struggled hard this way and that, but he ended up struggling his way to the Japanese emperor’s table for his supper, pitting himself in opposition to his whole nation. Now there are quite a few anti-Communists. On the one hand, they say that Japanese imperialism is despicable and must be toppled; on the other hand, they say that the Communist Party must be toppled as well. Some people forbade you to come to Yan’an and put you under arrest, so you had a difficult time getting here and made it to Yan’an through an ordeal of “numerous trials and tribulations.” They said you are no good, but I see that you are fine, that you are outstanding model youths. They forbade you to come to Yan’an, saying that Yan’an is no good. Yan’an is indeed no good in that there is little vegetation and not enough funds, but Yan’an has democratic politics and political freedom. In their eyes these things are certainly no good. Right now they are resisting Japan with one hand and fighting the Communists with the other, but in the future they may put both hands together and use them both to fight the Communist Party. The result can only be to become bedfellows with Japanese imperialism, surrender to the enemy, and turn into nonsisters to Japan.

“Anticommunism means the destruction of China.” These are the words of Chairman Chiang. These words must be publicly declared everywhere so that all the nation’s youths and common people throughout the country know that the Communist Party must not be opposed. At present, we Communists are eating millet, plus we have to fend for ourselves when it comes to getting food and carrying out a production campaign, but the anti-Communist experts manage to eat a lot and eat well, and they do all sorts of bad things. There is a good example right here. Yan’an xian has two xian magistrates, one with a monthly salary of 2 yuan, the other with a monthly salary of 180 yuan. The one who gets 2 yuan is a Communist Party member, and the one who gets 180 yuan is an anti-Communist expert. Yet the area under the anti-Communist expert’s control consists of only one cave, and what he does is just to fight the Communists, engage in sabotage, and do espionage work. If they keep up this anticommunism, they are sure to become running dogs of imperialism. There are no dogs in this world but running dogs, nor are there any anti-Communist experts but those who surrender to Japanese imperialism. All you model youth comrades should know that persisting in anticommunism leads to becoming a running dog of imperialism.

The purpose of their anticommunism is to destroy the Communist Party. The Communist Party is said to be bad because the Communist Party advocates fierce struggle. The Communist Party has a tradition of struggling hard and is able to endure hunger and starvation to fight Japanese imperialism. In the past, when the Red Army was crossing the grasslands on the Long March, it had no food for fifty days and lived on tree bark. Only the Communist Party could do something like this; no one else could. We Communist Party members “live on tree bark,” while the local bullies, bad gentry, and corrupt officials “live off the fat of the land.” Therefore, if the Communist Party were to be wiped out, China would be in trouble. Everyone should support the Communist Party, and the common people throughout the country should also support the Communist Party. On the other hand, those evil types who are anti-Communist, who make their fortunes off the nation’s peril, and who make a living by creating conflict, should be eliminated one and all.

Model youths present here today must battle these anti-Communist elements, oppose compromise and surrender, and oppose anticommunism. Your future is bright, and you must represent the majority of the common people throughout the country, represent all patriotic people, all people who resist Japan, as well as all people striving for China’s independence, liberty, and well-being, and you must represent them forever. In the future when you grow older, teach your children to represent them too, have your children tell their children, have your grandchildren tell their grandchildren, and this way it will be passed on from one generation to another and from one to ten, ten to a hundred, a hundred to a thousand, passed on all over China, never ceasing until the goal is reached. We must certainly make every effort to carry this out, and for the long run. We must certainly achieve success in the revolution, fighting to the finish. Model youths, you must always keep in mind this point: “struggle without ceasing.”
The Chinese and British Peoples Stand at the Same Front!

(June 1, 1939)

Just as the Chinese people’s resolute and unswerving War of Resistance Against Japanese aggression reaches its second full year, the British Support-China Committee is sponsoring “China Week” all over the country to express support for our War of Resistance. On behalf of Comrade Zhu De and the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, the soldiers in hospitals at the front and in the rear, and also on my own behalf, I want to express how deeply moved and encouraged we are by such gestures of sympathy and concern! We wish to express our thanks and offer a heartfelt salute to the British people who have been standing with us on the international front against aggression.

In the past two years, China’s War of Resistance has proved the power of democratic force in fighting against aggression. The War of Resistance over these past two years has demonstrated that even a country that is backward in industry and subject to all kinds of oppression and insults in its national life can, full of confidence in victory, resist attacks by the most barbarous and violent fascists. It has proved, in addition, that not only is it impossible to separate the Chinese War of Resistance from the worldwide antiaggression forces, but that the blows we dealt the aggressors have moved our country to the very frontlines in the international struggle to protect worldwide democracy and civilization, and to the main antifascist front.

As soon as the war started, we saw the British people aiding our War of Resistance with material goods, donating medical supplies, and sending medical teams to serve in China and expressing much actual sympathy with us. This shows that although there is a great distance between us and Britain, our War of Resistance is not something of no import to the British people. But because of the status of our War of Resistance in the worldwide struggle against aggression, we have the right to ask for more—more than the aid we have been given previously.

First, we ask that you pay strict attention to your government’s attitude. You must pressure it into taking resolute action to cease exporting weapons to Japan.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong Ji, Vol. 6, pp. 339–41, where it is reproduced from Qunzhong (Chongqing). Vol. 3, no. 10, July 23, 1939. According to a note at the end of that version, the article was written by Mao Zedong for China Week, a periodical sponsored by the British Support-China Committee, and had been translated back from the English. We have not had access to the English text.
Inscription for the First Issue of the Magazine
Chinese Women Published in Yan’an
(June 1, 1939)

Women have been liberated and are emerging suddenly as a new force.
Two hundred million in number, they have valiantly roused themselves.
When men and women keep abreast of one another, it is like the sun rising from
the east;
Thus they subdue their enemies; will the latter not fall?
The way to reach our goal is through arduous struggle;
Nothing in this world is difficult; where there is a will, it can eventually be achieved.
The publication of a women’s magazine is like clouds in the midst of a drought;
I expect to see this magazine be popular indeed.

Speech Given at the Meeting to Commemorate
the Third Anniversary of the Anti-Japanese
Military and Political University
(June 1, 1939)

(Special to our paper) . . . First there was the grand review of the guards of honor. Majestic
martial music was played in the splendor of the sunset, as several thousand valiant fighters,
in high spirits and in good order, lined up around the meeting place, saluting the officials
who walked past them to review them—Comrade Mao Zedong, all the responsible com-
rades of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the vice-president of
the Anti-Japanese University, Luo Ruqiang, and others.

After the review was over, because of filming, the order of the proceedings was tempo-
arily changed. First of all, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Comrade Mao
Zedong, was asked to give his speech. Then, his strong and loud and clear voice struck the
hearts of this group of young people:

Today is your third anniversary. The Anti-Japanese University has been in opera-
tion for three years, and our War of Resistance has been going on for nearly two
years. The Anti-Japanese University is for resistance against Japan. The purpose
of the Anti-Japanese University is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and thor-
oughly liberate the Chinese nation. For the past three years the Anti-Japanese Uni-
versity has created many strong anti-Japanese cadres to go to the front, to the
enemy’s rear, to attack the enemy, and to destroy the enemy. . . .

In our country today there are still many people of the Wang [Jingwei] fac-
tion—capitulationists, those in the capitulation faction. They are not in favor of
bearing through the War of Resistance to the end. They advocate making peace
with Japanese imperialism, and they advocate compromise and surrender. What
are we to do? We shall oppose surrender. “Carry on the War of Resistance until the
very end” is still Chairman Chiang’s rallying call and is supported by the people
throughout the country. We of the Anti-Japanese University are all in favor of “Op-
posing surrender and carrying out the War of Resistance to the end.” Among those
of us of the Anti-Japanese University, there can be no one who will not fight to the
very end, there can be no one who will not oppose surrender, and there cannot be

This inscription was first published in Renmin ribao, September 20, 1977. We have trans-
lated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, p. 39, which reproduces the text from this
source.

This summary of Mao’s remarks was first published in the Yan’an Xin Zhonghua bao, June
6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 41–42, which repro-
duces the text from this source.
a single person who would support peaceful compromise. If there is such a one, he is not an Anti-Japanese University student; he is, rather, the scum of the Anti-Japanese University, the scum of the nation. (All present applauded and shouted: Oppose surrender, carry on the War of Resistance to the end!) The same goes for all parties and factions in the country; no one may be allowed to make peace, and all must act in unison to carry out the War of Resistance to the end! This is the basic principle of the Anti-Japanese University. It has been this way for the past three years, and it will remain this way for the next three years and for many more years to come. “Oppose capitulation and wage the War of Resistance to the end,” this is the general guiding principle of the Anti-Japanese University.

All present loudly shouted the slogans, “Resist to the end!” “Long live the Anti-Japanese University!”

Talk at the Award-Giving Ceremony for Model Youth

(June 6, 1939)

(Special to our newspaper)... Amid prolonged applause and enthusiastic cheers, Comrade Mao Zedong walked up to the platform. He was especially happy, often wearing a smile.

“Young people should consider a resolute and correct political orientation as their top priority. The model youth represent the common people of China and should represent them all their lives.” “It is not enough to represent them yourselves; you should teach your sons to do so. China’s revolution has not yet succeeded, and we must struggle for a long time—we must struggle forever.”

His words were so warm and powerful.1

Our source for this extract from a report in the Yan’an Xin Zhonghua bao for June 6, 1939, is Mao Zedong ji. Bijuans, Vol. 6, p. 43.
1. According to the contemporary report, Mao Zedong and Wang Ming proceeded to hand the awards personally to more than a thousand young people.
Outline on Opposing Capitulation

Outline of the Report and Conclusions at the Yan’an Conference of Senior Cadres

REPORT

(June 10, 1939)

The Characteristics of the Present Situation

The characteristics of the present situation are as follows: the possibility of surrender by the Guomindang has become the greatest danger, and the Guomindang’s anti-Communist activities are steps in the preparation of that surrender. The possibility of the Guomindang’s surrender existed from the very beginning of the War of Resistance; it is not something that came up suddenly today. Its becoming the greatest danger in the overall picture at present is, however, a phenomenon of the current political situation. The Guomindang’s anticommunism has also existed since the establishment of the United Front and is not something that suddenly happened today, but turning anticommunism into a direct step in preparing to surrender is a reality of the present.

The current situation results from the following three factors: (1) the Japanese policy of inducing capitulation; (2) international pressure; and (3) the vacillation of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie. I will now discuss them one after the other below.

1. The Historical Development of Japan’s Policy of Inducing Capitulation

1. Japan’s basic policy toward China is to destroy China and establish a so-called “New Order in East Asia.” This is firm and unchanging, and is also unalterable in the eyes of the Japanese aggressors. The January 2, 1939, editorial of Tokyo’s National News (the official organ of the military) stated: “The problem immediately at hand does not allow for the slightest retreat, nor for a moment’s hesitation.

The incident has reached its concluding phase. Any misstep in ruling the state would not only result in losing the fruits of the war, but would also affect the country’s destiny. History teaches us that the latter phase of a war is many times more difficult than the initial phase. The unfortunate examples of Germany and Russia during the Great War in Europe must be thoroughly understood by politicians and citizens alike.” (Shijie zhishi, Vol. 9, no. 1, February 1.)

To sum up in a single sentence, this means that the basic principle of aggression must be thoroughly carried out; otherwise, dangers such as the German and Russian revolutions will arise. From this it is plain to see that to believe that Japan could make fundamental concessions and that the status quo before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident could be restored without a protracted war, by the application of pressure from Britain and the United States (as Chiang Kai-shek and many people in the Guomindang believe), is nothing but a fantasy.

2. Japan’s basic policy (general line) of “destroying China and establishing a New Order in East Asia” is firm and will not waver voluntarily. The methods (or tactics) for carrying out this basic policy, however, are a combination of soft and hard measures that have a certain flexibility, and certain temporary, partial, and superficial concessions may even be made in order to realize the fundamental goal.

In general, political enticement to surrender was the primary method before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident; military attack was the main method from Marco Polo Bridge to [the fall of] Wuhan; and political enticement to surrender has been primary once again from Wuhan to the present.

3. To understand that the enemy’s basic policy is firm and unchanging and that their tactics for applying it alternate between soft and hard methods, one need only look at the following materials:

a. Before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a hard policy was adopted, the Three Northeastern Provinces were actually occupied,¹ and the method of diplomatic enticement to surrender was applied to China as a whole.

i. Tanaka’s memorial to the throne before the Manchurian incident (the letter of July 25, 1927, the second year of Showa, from Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi² to the emperor delivered through Minister of Court Affairs Ichiki Kitokoro³ stated that “to conquer the world, China must be conquered first,” and laid down the policy of destroying China.

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 196–237, where it is reproduced from documents in the Central Archives. The outline of the report is based on a handwritten copy; the outline of the conclusion is taken from a printed text bearing Mao’s own corrections. The outline can also be found in Volume 2 of the 1948 edition of the Selected Works; there are slight textual variations between that version and the one translated here.

¹ The Three Northeastern Provinces, as they are commonly called in English (the Chinese, dong sansheng, means literally “three Eastern provinces”) were Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Fengtian. Together they constituted Manchuria.

² Tanaka Giichi (1863–1929) became prime minister in April 1927. He had served as minister of war, and was a forceful advocate of military values. Some doubts have been expressed about the authenticity of the memorial to the throne here attributed to him, but he consistently took a strong line in dealing with China.

³ Ichiki Kitokuro (1867–1944) became minister of court affairs in 1925. (The Chinese text has wrong characters for Ichiki’s given name or ming.)
ii. The occupation of Manchuria on September 18, 1931.4
iii. Amau’s statement of April 17, 1934 (the statement made by Amau5 on behalf of the Foreign Ministry) declared: “Peace in the East is Japan’s responsibility, so it opposes China’s actions contrary to peace in the East and the actions of any other country that hinders peace in the East.” This is an open declaration of their policy to destroy China.
iv. Hirota’s Three Principles of January 21, 19366 (Hirota formally announced the three principles in the Diet), namely: first, friendly relations with Japan; second, recognition of Manchuria [i.e., Manchukuo]; and third, joint resistance to Communism.
v. The six conditions in the secret report in the spring of 1937 by Matsumuro Köryō,7 chief of the Japanese North China Intelligence Organization, all expressed a combination of soft and hard methods to be carried out simultaneously.

b. From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident8 to [the fall of] Wuhan, to carry out their hard policy, firm military attacks were adopted as the primary method, and political enticement to surrender was secondary.

i. A few days after the July 7 incident9 of 1937, Foreign Minister Hirota made a declaration of nonexpansionism. Our Party’s August Resolution pointed out that this was a “smokescreen to cover up offenses” but, at the same time, implied that “by surrendering you will avoid attacks.”10

4. On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian Incident (also called the Mukden Incident) took place. Officers of the Japanese Guandong Army blew up a small segment of railway tracks some five miles north of the Mukden station, and taking this as a pretext, the Guandong Army seized control of most of southern Manchuria. The response of the United States, Britain, and the League of Nations was indecisive, and on September 15, 1932, Japan recognized Manchukuo.
5. The reference is to Amau Eiji (1887–1968), who was at this time chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This statement has often been referred to as an “Asian Monroe Doctrine.”
6. Hirota Köki (1878–1948) was foreign minister in January 1936; he became prime minister in February. Regarding his “three principles” and the Chinese reaction to them, see Volume V, p. 175, note 1, and numerous other references throughout that volume. He was the only civilian sentenced to death by the Tokyo Tribunal.
7. Matsumuro Köryō (1886–1969), also known as Matsumuro Takeyoshi.
8. Shortly before midnight on July 7, 1937, Japanese troops conducting maneuvers near the Marco Polo Bridge, a strategic rail junction located some ten miles from Beijing, were fired upon, or claimed to have been fired upon, by Chinese forces. The next day, in telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek and other Guomindang commanders, Mao called for a War of Resistance to recover the lost territories, and for shedding every last drop of blood to drive out the Japanese bandits. (See Volume V, pp. 695–96). On August 7, Chiang Kai-shek formally decided to wage an all-out War of Resistance.
9. I.e., the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

ii. On July 27, 1937, Army Minister Sugiyama11 made a war statement at a special session of the Diet: “Absolutely determined to take punitive action, the Army authorities have already made important preparations.” This indicates that the method would be the hard one of fighting to obtain surrender.
iii. The conditions for peace put forward by Japan since the outbreak of fighting. According to the British Evening Standard, responsible persons of the Japanese government have presented the following conditions to Chiang Kai-shek. There are six points altogether: (1) independence of Inner Mongolia; (2) autonomy of North China; (3) occupied Shanghai as a Japanese concession; (4) fishing rights along the coast from Shanhaiguan to Annan; (5) China’s withdrawal from the League of Nations; (6) no building of an air force (Jiefang bao, November 13, 1937). This shows the things it demanded, and to this day their demands are, generally speaking, still within this range.
iv. After Nanjing was occupied on December 13, 1937, the commander of the Japanese Third Fleet, Tanikawa Ryō,13 said on the 27th, “The Japanese empire will never be satisfied with its success up until now, as it is still far from the outcome of the overall plan. Imperial soldiers act according to the general intent of the empire, serve the eternal peace of the Orient, and hope to reach the goal of thorough progress.” This indicates that their intention is to continue military attacks.
v. Hirota’s New Year’s Eve (1937) speech: “If friendly ally China can understand the important point that Japan is striving for peace in East Asia, it can avoid today’s misery and pain. The Japanese government deeply hopes to begin a new peace in 1938 and resolve all problems.” This shows that soft methods could be used if there were surrender.
vi. The famous declaration of January 16. On December 11 (two days before the occupation of Nanjing) the Cabinet made the decision, the Imperial Court Conference adopted it on the 12th, Nanjing was occupied on the 13th, China’s Chairman Chiang issued an open letter to the people of the whole country on the 17th, and on January 16 the Japanese government put out this declaration. The essential idea is as follows: In the future, the National Government will not be regarded as an opponent, and a new government is expected to be set up. Chinese territorial and political sovereignty and the rights and interests of the various other powers in China shall be respected. This shows a policy that is hard, and methods that are hard as well.

11. Sugiyama Gen (1880–1945) was an enthusiastic partisan of a hard line against China. He committed suicide in 1945 after arranging for the surrender of the Japanese army.
12. Annan (Annam) was the current Chinese term for Vietnam.
13. We have been unable to find information about this person.
vii. On January 20, 1938, the Japanese ambassador to China, Kawagoe Shigeru,\textsuperscript{14} said in an interview with journalists: “I am being recalled to Japan, while Councilor Hitaka\textsuperscript{15} remains in Shanghai. The purpose of his remaining in Shanghai, however, is not at all because we still wish to make representations to the Chinese government, but, rather, to make arrangements with foreign diplomatic personnel with regard to incidents that might occur. The door is already closed on reestablishing negotiations with the National Government. Even if the National Government were to reconsider its attitude in the future, it could only enter into negotiation with the new Chinese institutions, and could not deal with Japan.” Since the declaration of January 16, this statement was the most undisguised in pointing to war as primary and accommodation as secondary and in talking about overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and establishing a new government.

viii. There remained, however, [an element of] peace within the war[like stance]. On January 20 Reuters reported that Hirota announced in the 73rd Diet four conditions of peace through German mediation: (1) abandon the alliance with the Communist Party to resist Japan and recognize “Manchuria”; (2) establish demilitarized zones in certain areas and set up administrative organs in these areas; (3) economic cooperation between China, Japan, and Manchuria; (4) reparations from China. These were the minimum conditions for negotiating peace, the conditions presented to Chiang by Trautmann.\textsuperscript{16} Chiang at one point considered accepting them, and Wang Jingwei’s “take one example” referred to this (Chiang, the two Chens,\textsuperscript{17} and He,\textsuperscript{18} as well as Sun,\textsuperscript{19} Yu,\textsuperscript{20} and Bai\textsuperscript{21} all took part in discussing the question of accepting). In the end Chiang rejected them, but Hirota announced them in the Diet.

ix. During the 73rd session of the Diet in late January: Konoe’s\textsuperscript{22} opening speech: “The solution to the war requires a long period of time.” “The present government has adopted firm policies and will no longer have any relations with China’s Guomindang government in the future.”

Hirota’s statement, announcing the four conditions put forward by Trautmann (see above).

Minseitō\textsuperscript{23} Diet members demanded that the government guarantee never to discuss conditions for peace with the Guomindang government.

Diet member Shimada Toshio\textsuperscript{24} asked straight out, why not declare war on China?

The Japanese government announced four key points in its policy toward China: (1) There would be absolutely no negotiations with the Guomindang government; (2) To stop arms shipments to China, it was still possible to declare war against China; (3) They would assume a position of guardianship toward the new régime in North China; (4) Third-party mediation would absolutely not be tolerated. But as late as January 29, Konoe indicated again in the same session of the Diet: “The act of declaring war is still under consideration. The decision depends upon China’s attitude in the future.” So the door to peace remained open.

This reflected the struggle within the Japanese government between those advocating peace and those advocating war. At the time, Sugiyama issued a statement on this question about “the need to prepare for a protracted war,” in opposition to the faction advocating peace.\textsuperscript{25}

x. The Japanese ambassador in Shanghai (to the Reform Government), Tani Masayuki,\textsuperscript{26} issued a statement on March 9, saying, “The Chiang
Kaishek régime is about to collapse, but it is imperative to continue to intensify the war so as to accelerate the downfall of Chiang’s régime and cause third countries to give up their attempts to assist Chiang. Means other than war may be more effective and cost less if they cause Chiang to negotiate for peace.” Here is one person advocating both war and peace in the course of a single speech.

xi. Konoe’s May 2nd speech on preparation for protracted war: “In order to overthrow Chiang’s régime and eradicate the source of disaster in East Asia, we should not hesitate to devote even several years’ time. At the same time, the whole country’s citizens should do their utmost to assist the two pro-Japanese and anti-Communist régimes of North China and Central China.”

xii. Hirota’s May 9th speech at the conference of local senior officials, advocating the prudent handling of the [China] Incident: “The China Incident has entered a second stage, in which Chiang Kaishek’s régime is propagating the idea of a protracted War of Resistance and going in for domestic unity, but has not been able to reach the goal of unity. On the other hand, the provision of military supplies by various countries and aid to China from the Soviet Union are actual facts. Therefore, the imperial government must take these facts into consideration and handle the present incident with care. When the Tianjin-Pukou line is occupied, the Provisional Government28 and the Reform Government should carry out a merger at once.29 The imperial government supports this to the utmost, for the purpose of merger and unification and for successful and positive development.” The enemy uses the Military and the Foreign Office, one to represent the hard line and one the soft, but there is either soft within the hard (espionage agencies in the military) or hard within the soft (the Foreign Office), alternately playing the hero and the villain.

xiii. After Xuzhou fell, the enemy vowed to fight on to Kunming. Xuzhou fell on May 19th, and on the 22nd the enemy’s frontline commander made a speech saying, “After the capture of Xuzhou, the war has by no means stopped. There are three steps in the war: The first step is the major battle of Xuzhou; the second step is the assault on Hankou; the third step is the attack on Chongqing or Kunming.” How firm a statement this is!

28. The “Provisional Government of the Republic of China” (Zhonghua minguo linshi zhengfu) was a Japanese puppet government established in Beijing in December 1937, with authority over Beiping, Tianjin, and provinces in North China controlled by Japan.
29. In March 1940, both of these puppet governments were merged with that of Wang Jingwei.

xiv. Minister Nagai30 issued a statement on June 17th that Chiang’s régime must be overthrown: “The government’s current policy toward China is aimed at toppling Chiang’s régime, assisting the new government, building a new China, and laying the foundation for a permanent peace in East Asia. Other policies must proceed along this line.”

xv. At the time of the Zhanggufeng Incident,31 it was reported that Japan put forward five conditions for peace: “As the border dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union intensifies day by day and may turn into a large-scale war, today (August 5) a breath of peaceful air between China and Japan has wafted over Hong Kong. The morning edition of the Zici ribiao32 carried initial reports on the five conditions of peace put forward by Japan to China, and by afternoon all the evening papers carried the news. The five conditions are: (1) Withdrawal of Japanese troops from occupied areas, but Chinese troops are not to move in; (2) Recognition of ‘Manchukuo’; (3) Leasing of Hongkou, Zhabei, and Jiangwan to Japan for a period of ninety-nine years; (4) Reparations for losses suffered during this war; (5) Joint defense against the Communists.” (Xingdao ribiao report from Hong Kong on August 5, 1938.)

xvi. The hard-line doctrine of Itagaki.33 Itagaki issued a statement on July 1: “As long as Chiang’s régime remains in existence, there is absolutely no possibility of peace between China and Japan. Today, Japan can no longer join hands with Chiang Kaishek in peace negotiations.” On the first anniversary of the Incident, on July 7, Itagaki issued this statement: “From now on, no matter how many years the war is prolonged, there is only one road for the empire to take (note: this refers

30. The reference is to Nagai Ryūtarō (1881–1945), minister of communications in the Konoe government, who was an enthusiastic partisan of “Asia for Asians” and the New Order in East Asia.
31. The reference is to an armed conflict lasting two weeks along the border between Korea (then a Japanese colony) and the Soviet Union near Zhanggufeng, a peak on the seacoast just inside Soviet territory, in late July and early August 1938. The Tokyo Tribunal concluded that Japanese troops had provoked the Soviet forces. In any case, they were roundly defeated, and a ceasefire agreement was concluded in Moscow. (The text in the Mao Zedong wenji is taken from a handwritten copy in the Central Archives. As pointed out by the editors in a note, the name of the mountain in this version contains an error: the middle character in Zhanggufeng has been replaced by an entirely different character pronounced “guo” instead of “gu.” We have not felt obliged to follow them by incorporating the wrong spelling in the text.)
32. We have not been able to identify this newspaper, which was apparently published in Hong Kong.
33. Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948) had been, in 1931, chief of staff of the Guandong Army and one of the prime movers in the “Mukden Incident,” which marked the beginning of Japan’s invasion of China. At this time, he was the Japanese minister of the army.
to the military conquest of China). Aside from this there is no way to achieve a hundred years of peace in the Orient.”

xvii. Establishment of a China Affairs Board to oversee the exercise of authority in China—a president, a vice-president, and five ministers. Not only the occupied areas, but the unoccupied areas as well would come within its jurisdiction.

xviii. The driving out of Ugaki by the Japanese Army Ministry on September 29th. Ugaki resigned in anger over differences with the Army Ministry regarding policy toward China.34

c. From [the fall of] Wuhan to the present—a change in tactics from hard to soft.

i. Having occupied Guangzhou on October 12th and Wuhan on October 25th, and having seen Chiang Kai-shek’s open letter to the people, issued on the 30th, advocating a protracted War of Resistance, the Japanese government chose November 3, Meiji Commemoration Day, or what is called Emperor’s Day, on which to issue an important declaration, clearly indicating a change in tactics. Its main points are as follows: (1) “The National Government has become a local government, and if it continues to resist Japan, then military actions will definitely not cease until this government is destroyed”; (2) “Japan’s objective is to build a new order of perpetual security in East Asia. This means Japan, China, and Manchukuo joining together and establishing relations of mutual assistance and interdependence in political, economic, cultural, and other spheres”; (3) “As for the National Government, if it is able to abandon its previous mistaken policies, and if it can be regenerated by other personnel and built up and maintained, then the Empire will not reject it.” The policy has changed, with the declaration that the policy of not regarding the National Government as an interlocutor and insisting on establishing a puppet government is to be abandoned, and according to the declaration the National Government may be accepted as an interlocutor, but only on condition that Chiang leave office.

ii. The Konoe statement of December 22, which was supported by Wang Jingwei in a circular telegram and bitterly repudiated by Chiang Kai-shek in a speech. Its main points are as follows: (1) “The three countries of China, Japan, and Manchukuo should regard the establishment of a new order in East Asia as the common goal, unite and have close and friendly relations, engage in a common defense against Communism, and offer one another economic support”; (2) “Therefore, China must establish full state-to-state relations with ‘Manchukuo’”; (3) “Conclude a Sino-Japanese agreement for defense against Communism, station anti-Communist troops in specified areas, and make Inner Mongolia a special region for defense against Communism”; (4) “Sino-Japanese economic mutual assistance: subjects of the empire have the freedom to reside and do business in China, and Japan is to be granted facilities to develop and make use of natural resources in North China and Inner Mongolia”; (5) “Japan is willing to consider returning the concessions and relinquishing extraterritorial rights.” This is a reiteration of the basic policies of the November 3 declaration, with added concrete content. The National Government and Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang’s existence is permitted beginning at this point) are both allowed to exist provided they submit to Japan. Japan may withdraw from Central and South China, but North China is to be kept, though nominal sovereignty may not be required.

iii. The Hiranuma Cabinet35 has maintained these policy guidelines unaltered up until the present.

iv. Japan’s instigating a broad “peace movement” in China, establishing a so-called “Association for Peace and the Cessation of War,” holding public meetings and distributing handbills everywhere. For a long time no mention has been made of establishing a unified central government. It has been touched on occasionally, but only to frighten Chiang. Unless Chiang fights a War of Resistance to the end, they may yet change their minds about him.

v. The huge plot to drive a wedge in the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and make use of the Three People’s Principles. The Japanese Matsumoto Shin’ichi wrote an article entitled “On the Question of Winning Over the Masses of the Chinese Nation,” in which he says: “The purpose of the empire’s use of force is, first, to defeat thoroughly the anti-Japanese régime and armed forces and, second, to bring about mutual assistance and harmony between the two nations of China and Japan, and the establishment of peace in the Orient. The former is the means to achieve the latter. But these two things prove that the reality in China is in fact one of mutually opposing contradictions. If we consider the developments since the Incident, although the guiding principles of the anti-Japanese régime were erroneous, Chiang’s régime in fact has the character of a national régime and enjoys the support of a majority of the Chinese nation. This is why the present régime has been able to win the enthusiastic support of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese Youth Party, the various anti-Japanese fronts, and the old soldiers. At present, we wish, on the one hand, to destroy Chiang’s régime and, on the other hand, to cooperate with the Chinese nation. In fact, this amounts to the fruitless exercise of climbing a tree to catch a fish. The more we seek to

34. Ugaki Kazushige (1868–1956) became foreign minister in May 1938, and resigned, as Mao indicates, in September.

35. Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867–1952) was prime minister at this time. A partisan of the alliance with Germany, he resigned the prime ministership in August 1939, following the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, which he saw as a betrayal.
overthrow Chiang, the more the Chinese nation will support him. If we try to overthrow Chiang, we will lose our hold on the popular masses, and if we wish to hold onto the popular masses, we cannot overthrow Chiang. Thus our country’s basic difficulty lies here.

“Both the Provisional Government and the Reform Government are still without a base among the popular masses. Those with a popular mass base are the northern and southern governments, which would not be difficult to merge. But the program of the new government should be under the banner of the Guomindang’s Three People’s Principles, and the task of the new government should be the realization of Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood. In other words, the enemy’s banner is similar to ours, and it is hard to avoid getting them muddled and confused. But we can tell them to use ‘Fight the War of Resistance while realizing the Three People’s Principles’ as a rallying call, while we respond with the call to ‘Cooperate with Japan as we establish the Three People’s Principles.’”

“Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists constitutes the backbone of the anti-Japanese united front, so it is truly necessary to smash it.”

“The objective of the battle at Wuhan was to shatter the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists, so the occupation of Wuhan is like a wedge driven between the Guomindang and the Communists, and both military and political tactics are aimed at dispersing the forces of the Guomindang and the Communists.”

(For the above text see Dagongbao, January 23 of this year.)

vi. The Shanghai Daobaobao pointed out as early as February 17 the danger of a Far Eastern Munich: “On the one hand, it seeks truth from facts and tries to strengthen local governments and organize so-called Jiang-Han type governments. On the other hand, it is carrying out an even larger conspiracy of an international nature. The main design of this conspiracy is to compel and entice the two countries of Britain and France to use the form of international conferences (open or secret) to force China and Japan into compromise with each other, even though Japan has declared in the past that it does not want the involvement of third countries in resolving the conflicts between China and Japan.” It also said, “It is wrong to believe that Wang Jingwei is finished and everything will be fine. He may play a very evil role in the future.”

The twenty-nine items I have listed above illustrate the historical development of Japan’s policy of luring China into capitulation, and fully illustrate the following three points:

36. “Jiang-Han” is the title of an ode in the Book of Poetry III, 3, 8 (Legge, Vol. IV, pp. 551–55). At one level, it can be taken here simply as a reference to Wuhan, which is located at the confluence of the Great River (the Yangzi) and the Han River. Some allusion may also be intended to the content of the ode in question, which is about putting down rebellion and establishing peace throughout the empire.

First, Japan’s overall policy of destroying China is extremely firm and will certainly never change. It is resolved to turn China into its colony and establish a so-called “New Order in East Asia.”

Second, however, its methods for carrying out this policy are a combination of soft and hard, with a shift in emphasis according to the times. Before Wuhan, force was primary, but there was peacemaking in the midst of war. After Wuhan, peacemaking has been primary, but there is still some fighting to press for surrender.

Third, it is still trying to manipulate Britain, the United States, and France into calling a peace conference in the Far East, so that the danger of a Far Eastern Munich hangs over the heads of the Chinese people.

4. In the above three sections, the first points out that [Japan’s] basic orientation is firm and unchanging. The second shows that it uses both soft and hard methods. The third indicates, by citing twenty-nine pieces of evidence, the historical development of its switch from the use of hard methods of application to soft ones and demonstrates that the greatest danger at present is surrender. Now this fourth section explains the reasons for its peace offer from the financial, economic, and military standpoints. Japan finds itself in tremendous difficulties in terms of finance (altogether 12 billion yen in three years; 2.55 billion the first year, 4.85 billion the second year, 4.65 billion the third year), the economy (huge increases in imports and a drastic decline in exports, military industries overshadowing peace industries, high inflation, deterioration in people’s standard of living, exhaustion of cash reserves, and unstable foreign currency reserves), and the military situation (insufficient forces and dispersion of forces). It still has to prepare to cope with an international war, so it tries hard to induce China to surrender, divide the anti-Japanese front, make use of Wang Jingwei to persuade and entice Chiang Kai-shek, and is preparing to make use of the Three People’s Principles and the Guomindang. This conspiracy is extremely vicious. The enemy’s war is nothing to fear, but its peace offer is very dangerous. The Dagongbao has called it a “peace of the hanged-man’s ghost,” in that it would bring China to its death.

5. To demonstrate its sincerity for peace to the Guomindang, Britain, and the United States, Japan has been using major force to carry out a “mopping-up” operation against the Eighth Route Army (fifteen divisions and regiments in North China) and now is further plotting to attack northern Shaanxi as a step to induce the Guomindang to surrender to Japan and oppose the Communists.

The above is Japan’s policy of inducing surrender.

II. Pressures from Britain, the United States, and France

The second factor making China’s surrender the greatest danger at present is the pressure exerted on the Chinese government by the British, American, and French capitulationists.

The laissez-faire policy of nonaggressor countries such as Britain, the United States, and France toward the war of aggression perpetrated by aggressor countries
is, as pointed out by Stalin, due neither to their lack of strength nor simply to their fear of revolution but, rather, stems from their conspiratorial scheme of “sitting atop a mountain to watch the tigers fight.”

In the beginning they encouraged Japan to go to war, saying that “China can be defeated within three months.” Subsequently they gave up Shanghai, causing the fighting to take place deeper in the interior. They were willing to let Hong Kong be encircled, allowing Japan to occupy Guangzhou and Hainan Island. They provided Japan with great quantities of military supplies, enabling Japan to carry out a war of attrition.

On the other hand, they also proclaimed their support for China and have already provided some assistance by lending small sums of money and donating a small quantity of military supplies, enabling China to engage in the war of attrition with Japan. They often talk up the “inevitability of China’s victory” to boost China’s morale in the war of attrition.

The central purpose of all this is to wear out the two sides in a war of attrition, so that they can wait until both sides are exhausted, and then come out with their “healthy bodies” and order both sides to cease fire and have both sides listen to them.

Their connivance at the aggressive acts of Germany and Italy in the West has this same purpose.

They hope that Germany and the Soviet Union will fight each other, so that they can stand on the sidelines and watch the war, and then plunder them when they are exhausted.

This is why they have never agreed to the general security plan proposed by the Soviet Union.

This is why they have not been willing to guarantee the security of the three Baltic states (making an opening to facilitate a German attack on the Soviet Union).

Herein lies the reason for the one-sided character of the war (the war of aggression is harmful to the interests of Britain, the United States, and France, yet Britain, the United States, and France have adopted the stance of onlookers).

When the snipe and the clam grapple with each other, the fisherman profits—this is the present policy of the British, American, and French imperialists.

There are deep contradictions between these nonaggressor countries and the aggressor countries, but unless things reach a certain point they will not abandon their “fisherman’s” policy.

Molotov’s statement “Britain and France have made some progress, but this so-called progress is superficial and without substance” and Stalin’s statement “Don’t be used by others” mean that Britain and France have not given up their fisherman’s policy and that one should not be taken in by them.

The possibility exists that Britain, France, and the Soviet Union may reach an agreement, but it is still difficult to be optimistic about it at present, and even after such an agreement were reached it could still be broken. The danger of a new Munich has by no means gone away.

The Sixth Plenum pointed out that the British, American, and French governments are not reliable, and that only their peoples can be relied upon. The antiharmonic forces among the British, American, and French peoples are gradually on the rise, and only such forces are ultimately reliable.

The Soviet Union has proclaimed its continuing support for China, but it absolutely does not approve of China’s surrender.

The Far Eastern Munich designed and promoted by Britain, the United States, and France is now approaching a critical moment. They seem to be thinking this way: hoping that China continues to fight for another half year, so that both sides are worn down somewhat, at which point the time will have come for the curtain to rise on a Far Eastern Munich.

The second factor in the danger of China’s surrender lies in this sort of international situation.

III. The Vaccination of the Chinese Landlord and Bourgeois Classes

1. The Inevitability of Betrayal by the Bourgeoisie.

a. The following was pointed out at the conference of soviet area representatives in May 1937:

“The Chinese bourgeoisie, which may be able to participate in opposing imperialism and feudalism under certain historical conditions, will, because of its political and economic weakness, waver and turn traitor given different historical conditions. This law has already been proved in Chinese history. Therefore, history has already rendered the verdict that the task of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal, bourgeois-democratic revolution in China cannot be carried out under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, but can achieve its objective only under the leadership of the proletariat.”

b. The Central Committee’s decision of August 25, 1937, states: “Because serious weaknesses, as described above, still exist in the present War of Resistance, many unfavorable circumstances such as setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and so on may arise in the future course of the War of Resistance. The loss of Beiping and Tianjin is the gravest lesson since the loss of the Four northeastern Provinces. Therefore, it should be recognized that this War of Resistance is an arduous and protracted war.”

c. The Sixth Plenum pointed out the serious existence of a crisis of compromise and placed opposition to capitulation and compromise in the first position. It pointed out that the Guomindang has a bright future, but that at the same time there are obstacles in its path, and that if they are not overcome there will be no bright future: “It is very obvious that the statement that all parties and groups have a bright future under the overall precondition of persevering in

37. The version of this document in the 1948 edition of Mao’s Selected Works gives the incorrect date of April 1936 for this conference.


39. When, as was increasingly the case, Mao referred to the Four rather than the Three Northeastern Provinces, the fourth was Jehol (Rehe), now incorporated into Hebei.

of the Soviet Union and the sympathy of the people of all countries. The governments of Britain, the United States, and France are inherently unreliable.

The seventh pretext—the enemy is too strong. This is false. The enemy is already greatly exhausted, will have expended in three years 12 billion yen, and its troops are insufficient and spread thin. Our terrain is better and our morale is higher.

There are many other pretenses.

The Future of the War of Resistance (a rough estimate, not to be viewed rigidly)

The War of Resistance must, however, absolutely be pursued. The Anti-Japanese National United Front and the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party must be consolidated and developed, and the banner of the Three People’s Principles and the slogan of a republic based on the Three People’s Principles must certainly be maintained. This is the Party’s basic mission.

The possibility of a Guomindang surrender and the possibility of a continuation of the War of Resistance are two different possibilities. There are capitulationists, and there are resistance fighters, which are two phenomena.

"Many setbacks, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises may occur"—this is one aspect. “But we believe that the War of Resistance that has already been launched, because of the efforts of our Party and the people of the whole country, will definitely break through all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." “As long as the masses in their millions can truly be organized to enter the Anti-Japanese National United Front, victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan is not in doubt”—this is yet another aspect. (All citations from the “August decision.”)

There are two possible futures for the War of Resistance: the first is that the majority resists and the minority surrenders; the second is that the majority surrenders and the minority resists.

As regards the protracted and tortuous nature of the Chinese revolution, in the first case the outcome will be prolonged and tortuous; in the second case, the outcome will be even more prolonged and tortuous.

We have never imagined that the War of Resistance should be won quickly or that it should be a linear progression (in the form of a straight line) but have, instead, always put forward the idea that it would be prolonged and subject to many twists and turns (a zigzag line). Nor have we ever suggested that capitulation could be overcome and victory won without mobilizing the people of the whole country and carrying out democratization of the state. Overcoming capitulation and winning victory must be accomplished by the majority of the people and by all patriotic and progressive elements from all parties and groups.

It is impossible to imagine that everyone in the entire Guomindang would surrender, without a solitary exception.

In the failure of the Great Revolution of 1927, the entire Guomindang surrendered to imperialism and launched an anticommunist war. But at that time the situation was that: (a) no imperialist [power] had fought its way into China; (b) all the imperialists aided Chiang Kaishuk in fighting communism, and all countries were in a stable situation for the time being; (c) the Guomindang had not suffered the bitterness of anticommunist war and was able to mobilize troops; (d) the people of the whole country had not had a taste of anticommunist wars or learned any painful lessons, nor had they any experience of being deceived; (e) the Communist Party did not have the experience of the period of the failure of the united front, nor did it have any armed forces (all had been defeated), and most of all it lacked experience in fighting a war; (f) the world was not in a period of revolution and war but, rather, in a period of reaction; and (g) the Soviet Union was not as strong as it is today.

But there were still people such as Song [Qingling], He [Xiangning], and Deng Yanda, who persisted in the revolution and did not turn traitor.

After “September 18” there were Feng Yuxiang, Cai Tingkai, Zhao Bosheng, Dong Zhentang, and Ji Zhentong, as well as Ji Hongchang and Ren Yiqi, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, and Chen Jitang and Sun Ke.

Moreover, there is today a history of two years of the War of Resistance.

Even if there were a Miaga or a Hacha, China is not, after all, Spain or Czechoslovakia.

1. If there are capitulationists (and this is inevitable; there is already a Wang Jingwei, and a Zhang Jingwei and a Li Jingwei are sure to emerge), there will also be those opposed to surrender.

2. If there are those who are resolved to surrender and never turn back, there may also be those who surrender for a time and prepare to fight again.

3. If there are those who capitulate first and join the fight later (some people have to be traitors to their country once before they can become good), there will also be those who capitulate first, then join the fight, and then surrender once again.

4. The people and officers may be deceived at the beginning, but wake up and resist later. For example, falsehoods such as “the Communist Party causes trouble,”

40. On these three, see regarding Song Qingling, Volume V passim, especially Mao’s letter to her on pp. 356–57, and regarding He Xiangning, Mao’s letter to her in Volume V, pp. 682–83. Deng Yanda (1895–1931), who had been director of the general political department of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition, opposed Chiang Kaishuk beginning in 1930 and became the leader of the Third Party. As a result, he was executed for treason in 1931.

41. As is obvious from the context, all of those cited here had shown themselves willing to cooperate with the Communists to a greater or lesser degree in the previous few years. On Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, the two protagonists of the Xi’an Incident, see Volume V, p. 61, notes 4 and 7. On Dong Zhentang, see Volume V, p. 89n.5. On Feng Yuxiang, see Volume V, p. 460n.1. On Cai Tingkai, see Volume V, passim. On Sun Ke (also known as Sun Fo), the son of Sun Yat-sen, see above note 19 on p. 108.

42. The reference is to José Miaga, commander of the Republican armies in Madrid, who rebelled and surrendered the city to Franco in March 1939; and Emil Hacha, president of Czechoslovakia, who accepted Hitler’s occupation of his country in the same month.
In future, there are only two possible outcomes to the War of Resistance, as mentioned above: (1) the majority fights a war of resistance and the minority surrenders; (2) the majority surrenders and the minority fights a war of resistance. If it is the second possible outcome that occurs, the circumstances may be as described above. But the first outcome is not completely hopeless at this point. Here are the reasons.

Domestically: (a) many soldiers support the War of Resistance; (b) the resistance faction within the Guomindang; (c) the Communist Party’s opposition to capitulation; (d) the people’s opposition to capitulation.

Internationally: (a) the Soviet Union’s assistance; (b) the lessons of Spain and Czechoslovakia; (c) public opinion among the peoples of Europe and America.

In Japan: financial, economic, and military difficulties.

It can be brought about, however, only through consolidation and expansion of the united front.

If the second outcome occurs, it means the breakup, not only of the government, but also of the Three People’s Principles and of the Guomindang:

The Three People’s Principles and Guomindang of the Japanese—now being created through Wang Jingwei. These are a fake Three People’s Principles and a fake Guomindang.

The intermediate Three People’s Principles and Guomindang—already in the bud, now in the process of racing ahead. These are a half-true and half-fake Three People’s Principles and Guomindang.

The Three People’s Principles and Guomindang of the Chinese people—now emerging, in the process of developing. These are the true Three People’s Principles and Guomindang.

Whether the Three People’s Principles and the Guomindang can avoid the kind of breakup described above (a breakup [of some sort] is inevitable) depends upon what kind of efforts are made by the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the people of the whole country.

Therefore, there are several kinds of possible scenarios for the stalemate phase:

1. A stalemate in which the majority resists and the minority capitulates—which means overcoming the possibility of capitulation and having the majority resist and continue fighting. Aside from sabotaging Japan’s political schemes, its military attacks are halted as well. This is the first possible scenario for the stalemate, the ideal one and the one most to be hoped for.

2. A stalemate in which the majority surrenders and the minority resists (the Communist Party and all those who refuse to surrender will continue the War of Resistance, despite being a minority)—even though the majority of forces have capitulated and only a small force is left to resist. But as long as the small forces and the bases of resistance can be consolidated, a stalemate with the enemy may still be maintained, the way a small contingent of the Red Army in the base areas maintained a stalemate with the enemy in the past. The difference is that it was a civil war in the past, but from now on it is against Japan and the Chinese traitors, not a civil war.
Given that this is holding a position rather than retreating further, and that this is the only anti-Japanese army in the whole country, it is also a kind of stalemate situation.

This is the second type of stalemate situation.

3. A stalemate that starts with the minority forces and ends up with the majority forces—this is the third type of stalemate.

By persisting in the War of Resistance, persisting in the united front, persisting in protracted warfare, persisting in cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and persisting in the Three People’s Principles, the minority forces will divide and win over the strongholds of the capitulationists and then strive to get the majority forces to fight in the War of Resistance. At that time, if a counteroffensive against the enemy cannot be mounted yet, it is still a stalemate.

We are striving for the first type of stalemate. There is also the second if we have no alternative, and in the future there may also be the third type.

Dangers do exist, but the overall future is bright.

People who express desperation in perilous situations and those who cannot see brightness when they are in darkness are simply cowards and opportunists.

As early as the 1937 congress of soviet areas, the inevitability of betrayal by the bourgeoisie was pointed out.

As early as August 1937 the Central Committee again pointed out that the “War of Resistance will be arduous and protracted” and that “many setbacks, retreats, internal divisions, and betrayals may occur.”

In November the dangers of national capitulationism, class capitulationism, and so on were pointed out.

We predicted all of this; its occurrence is no accident.

The future of the War of Resistance can be only good or bad. We are striving for a good outcome and are prepared at the same time to deal with even the worst possible situation if it should occur.

The overall future is bright, but a prolonged and tortuous process of struggle is required. There is no victory to be won in a short period or through a straight path. We have always opposed theories of quick victory and of the loss of our country, and we still do so today.

To equate betrayal by landlords and the bourgeoisie with the loss of the country means failure to see: (a) the existence of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army; (b) the anti-Japanese sentiments among the allied anti-Japanese forces; (c) the resistance faction in the Guomindang; (d) those among the bourgeoisie who are unwilling to capitulate at the moment; (e) the bourgeoisie who are still subject to oppression in the enemy-occupied areas; (f) the large numbers of petty bourgeoisie and peasants; and (g) aid from the Soviet Union. It is absolutely wrong to be blind to these growing forces, to see only the surrender of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and then conclude that the whole world is dark, and to panic, waver, and run away.

The Sixth Plenum said that the stalemate phase is bound to be a stage “even more difficult but, at the same time, more progressive.” More difficult because aside from the enemy, capitulation and betrayal have occurred. More progressive because the Guomindang could make more progress through various forms of struggle (including war), and because a Guomindang that persists in resisting Japan continues to cooperate with the Communist Party. Some turn traitor and the majority resist Japan—this is the situation we hope for. We hoped for this in the past and continue to do so now, and we must strive for it. The majority turns traitor (or even everyone seems to do so for a time) and some resist Japan—this situation is not what we hope for, but it is possible. If it occurs, we must turn it around; this is also possible, and we should strive to realize it.

The Present Tasks

Taking into account the two possible situations, favorable and unfavorable, described above, and particularly the possible unfavorable situation, what are the Party’s tasks?

First, the whole Party should strive to prepare itself ideologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so as to be able to cope with any incident at any time—all sorts of unexpected attacks and all sorts of big and small incidents.

Second, the whole Party should strive to ally itself very closely with all patriotic progressive elements, all patriotic progressive members of the Guomindang (at the upper levels, the middle levels, and the masses in the lower levels), and also to mobilize the masses together with them (in areas ruled by the Guomindang we must work together with them, not by ourselves alone). We must also wage anticapitulationist and openly expose the true nature of anti-communism as preparation for surrender, so that the capitulationist faction and the anticommunist elements may be isolated, and resistance against Japan may be continued.

Here it is necessary to strengthen the work on, and the personnel of, the united front.

Third, no matter what the circumstances, the Party’s basic task is to consolidate and enlarge the Anti-Japanese National United Front and persevere in cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and in the Three People’s Principles. This orientation must be adhered to, without allowing the slightest wavering.

These are the Party’s general tasks.

Based on the tasks described above, the Party should pay attention to understanding, explaining, and carrying out the necessary work on the following questions:

1. The question of whether or not the orientation of the Sixth Plenum is consistent with the current orientation.

The orientation of the Sixth Plenum is correct, and the Sixth Plenum has had a great impact throughout the country. Our orientation of actively uniting the whole country to strive for victory in the War of Resistance has penetrated the hearts of the people even more deeply from the dissemination of the documents of the Sixth Plenum. Our united front work and the Party’s organizational work have
developed further throughout the country because of the directives of the Sixth Plenum.

At present the danger of capitulation and anticommunist conspiracies becomes the primary danger. Therefore, it is necessary to point out this new situation (in the past, it had not yet become a reality, so it could only be pointed out in general terms; now it has already become a real possibility, and hence it needs to be pointed out specifically). Only thus can we overcome the danger of capitulation and also prepare to carry out the necessary policies for dealing with capitulation in timely fashion, when from being a possibility it becomes a reality. The basic orientation, however, remains that of the Sixth Plenum, and, provided only that we give proper guidance, the actual content of the War of Resistance may be developed to a higher stage.

2. The question of why we should now prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, and prepare public opinion and the masses as well.

Here one must understand the experience of the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927.

At that time there was no mental preparation, and this was the main reason for failure. Now preparations must be made.

At that time, there could not be another national front, but we were also too absolute in some respects. Now it is necessary to persist in a long-term national front.

At that time, there was a complete failure of the revolution as a whole, and the Party’s line was to first retreat and then attack. Now there is no question of retreat with respect to the line. At present, it is a question of partial and temporary tactical conservatism during continued attacks, or of taking cover to prepare for attacks right away (if capitulation becomes a reality).

At that time, because of the arrival of the reactionary period and the Party’s lack of preparation and experience, the ranks were in confusion and the measures taken were erroneous (adventurism, for example). Now there should be an orderly retreat and defense (some temporary and some long-term) or counterattacks in the areas that have already fallen and in areas occupied by those planning to surrender; in other areas, the offensive orientation is to be maintained.

At that time, large numbers of new Party members left the Party or betrayed it. Now such things may still happen under certain circumstances, so it is necessary to prepare beforehand. Historical experience shows that garbage inevitably falls off at revolutionary turning points (even if it is a temporary, partial turning point), and this is not a bad thing. But attention must be paid to guiding new Party members properly, especially the large numbers of young students; they will be useful in the future.

At that time, the domestic and international situation was dark; now it is basically bright.

At that time, the Central Committee was dominated by opportunism, and the Central Committee after reorganization still lacked experience. Such a situation no longer exists.

At that time, a large backbone of cadres had not yet been created; now it has been.

I have made eight points of comparison above. In spite of all this, it is still necessary to prepare ourselves psychologically and organizationally, and to prepare public opinion and the masses, so that we can triumphantly surmount difficulties, develop the war against Japan and the Chinese revolution to a higher stage, and avoid possible defeat.

3. The question of why the national front, cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and the Three People’s Principles should be pursued even if capitulation should become a reality.

The main reasons have already been addressed in explaining the future of the War of Resistance. Here I shall say only this:

a. The national united front must be preserved throughout the process of resisting Japan. Although many landlords and bourgeois elements leave it through betrayal and become its enemies, betrayal by the landlords and the bourgeoisie takes place gradually and not all at once. There must be cooperation with those who remain. To neglect this point will surely cause big mistakes. Hence, the united front should still remain, throughout the whole process of fighting Japan, a united front of various parties and factions, various classes, various nationalities, various groups, and various armies.

b. It is the same with cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. Some members of the Guomindang have left and become enemies, but with those who remain there should still be cooperation. We should use the authentic Guomindang to oppose the false Guomindang, and win over the neutral Guomindang. The possibility of a future alliance between the Guomindang and the Communist Party on an equal footing still exists. Cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party is the organizational basis of the united front, and neglect of this point will also give rise to big mistakes.

c. It is the same with the Three People’s Principles, which are the political basis of the united front, and are principles and guidelines applicable to the process of resistance against Japan. We should use the true Three People’s Principles to counter the false Three People’s Principles and win over the neutral Three People’s Principles. This is the policy that should be adopted in conditions where there are several types of Three People’s Principles. There are differences between the Three People’s Principles and Communism even in the process of resisting Japan, but in the process of resisting Japan they have one common point, which is that if the Three People’s Principles are understood as they were interpreted at the Guomindang’s First National Congress, the two do not fundamentally conflict with each other as regards the political program during the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It is therefore wrong for many people, both within and outside the Party, to look down on the Three People’s Principles, considering them a fundamentally reactionary, deceitful,
and empty ideology or dogma. This way of thinking stems from a failure to distinguish between the true Three People’s Principles and the false Three People’s Principles.

d. As regards the question of ideological struggle, over the past two years, and particularly over the past six months, those who write articles on behalf of the Guomindang, including Trotskyites such as Ye Qing and others, have issued many “divisive and erroneous thoughts” that are not only against Communism but also against the true Three People’s Principles. These amount to the thinking of the fake or intermediate Three People’s Principles and should also be severely denounced and repudiated. Of these, the most blatant are the arbitrary noises about the so-called theories of “national conditions” and “unification.” In fact, they claim that only the Three People’s Principles and the Guomindang are suited to the national conditions of China, but their false Three People’s Principles and false Guomindang are most unsuited to the national conditions of China, while Communism and the Communist Party are entirely suited to Chinese conditions. The claim that the border areas and the Eighth Route Army are not unified, and should be eliminated to complete their so-called unification, actually corresponds to a false unification that goes against nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood and runs completely contrary to the interests of the War of Resistance. It is arbitrary, empty talk that totally contradicts the differences and struggles in the course of unification which are a fact of social history. Before the old semifeudal régime changes into a truly revolutionary democratic régime, the border areas and the Eighth Route Army must exist. Only when the revolutionary democratic régime has been established, and the danger of anticommunism has disappeared, can the two abandon their present special characteristics. Otherwise this is nothing but a counterrevolutionary demand.

4. The question of supporting Chiang.

The slogan of supporting Chairman Chiang was correct in the past and is correct now. As long as Chiang leads the War of Resistance for a single day we shall continue to support him (of course the condition is fighting the War of Resistance), and he should be shown no disrespect.

43. Ren Zhuxuan, alternate name Ye Qing (1896–1987), spent the years 1920–1925 in France, where he joined the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, as well as the Guomindang. He soon became one of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in France, but was expelled from the country as one of the organizers of a demonstration against the Chinese legation. Returning to China in 1927 after a year in the Soviet Union, he led underground activities in Hunan, was sentenced to death, but somehow escaped with his life. In 1928, after being arrested again, he renounced his membership in the Communist Party, but retained his Marxist and socialist views. Following the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war in 1937, he concluded that Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles were the answer to China’s problems, and in 1939 he rejoined the Guomindang.

The possibility exists, however, that under certain circumstances Chiang may not persist in the War of Resistance. How we react at such a time merits careful consideration. Of course, there has to be some reaction at such a time, but it must be an appropriate reaction based on the principle of helping to unite the majority to fight the War of Resistance and continue the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. “Anti-Chiang” slogans may not be revived lightly or casually.

Chiang harbors enmity toward the Communist Party; this is a fact that he himself has demonstrated. We must strictly guard against sabotage of our Party by him and his subordinates; of that there is no doubt.

Actively helping Chiang and urging him to move in a positive direction remains our overall policy. To those outside [the Party], we should talk not about “capitulation by the Guomindang” but, rather, about the “capitulationist faction among the landlords and the bourgeoisie.”

5. The question of opposing Wang [Jingwei].

“It is wrong to think that Wang is already finished; Wang can still play a big role.” This is absolutely correct. There is no doubt that the Chinese traitors in Wang’s network are more harmful to China than other Chinese traitors. Wang has followers and sympathizers in the government, in Party organizations, and in parts of the army.

Opposition to capitulation must be linked with opposition to Wang; this is more convenient and realistic.

6. The question of fighting Japan and eliminating spies.

If a serious instance of betrayal should occur, the Party should pay utmost attention to appropriate countermeasures, in accordance with the principle of not divorcing itself from the majority of the Guomindang.

At such a time the slogan of resisting Japan and eliminating spies is necessary, and a war to resist Japan and eliminate spies (simultaneously resisting Japan and eliminating spies) is also unavoidable. But we must absolutely not detach ourselves from the majority of the Guomindang and lightly undertake rash actions. The war to eliminate spies can (and must) be launched only when it is understood and demanded by the majority of people. The current opposition to Wang, for example, is in line with this principle.

7. The question of democracy and the people’s livelihood.

It is impossible to lead the war against Japan to victory without a revolutionary democratic government. The masses of people throughout the country have long yearned for a democratic-centralist and clean government that would fight Japan and give freedom to the people. Hence, in the future, “striving for democracy” should be linked to the movement for “opposing capitulation and continuing the War of Resistance.”

“Improving the people’s livelihood” should also be linked to it in the same way. Only resisting Japan, however, makes it possible to practice democracy, and only resisting Japan and democracy make it possible to improve the people’s
lihood. This is the reality of the present political situation and should be clearly understood.

8. The question of friction.

The friction and armed struggles, having the character of sabotage and of preparation to capitulate, that have been carried out since the Fifth Plenum of the Guomindang in Hebei and Shandong, and especially in the border areas, must be resolutely resisted. Such resistance is useful, but it must be limited strictly to a position of self-defense and absolutely not allowed to overstep that boundary so as to provide the provocateurs with a pretext to break up the united front. The objective of such defensive battles against friction is to consolidate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. For this purpose, accommodation and concession are also necessary under certain circumstances.

Struggle is not to be forgotten in unity, and unity is not to be forgotten in struggle. Neither of the two may be neglected or abandoned, but unity is primary, and [there may be] "friction but no splits."

Strictly guard against provocations, and do not be taken in.

9. The question of not developing our Party organizations within friendly armed forces and withdrawing our Party organizations from within certain armed forces.

Based upon the experience of the past six months, the decision of the Sixth Plenum not to develop Party organizations among troops that are fighting Japan and cooperating is basically correct. Development of Communist Party organizations within Chinese armed forces should generally be restricted to Chinese traitor forces or forces that are preparing to turn traitor, the objective being to sabotage them. Such development should not be undertaken in other cases. A firm policy of sabotage should be adopted toward any armed forces that have become Chinese traitor forces or are directly preparing to become such. Where problems hindering cooperation have already arisen in certain anti-Japanese forces because of the matter of Party organizations, their withdrawal should be publicly announced so as to ensure the continuation of cooperation.

10. The question of assisting friendly parties.

a. Do our best to help all progressive elements, but the extent of assistance should also depend on the degree of progress.

b. Refuse to help all backward elements and hopeless elements so as to prevent them from turning around to attack us after building up their strength. There have been many lessons in this regard in the past. In a word, unconditional assistance will not be offered.

c. Make the utmost efforts to intensify work on all patriotic and progressive elements, urging them to oppose capitulation. Many capable cadres must be assigned to this work, and they must not slacken for a moment. Work on intermediate elements should also be intensified.

11. The work of the various departments of the Center after the Sixth Plenum.

Over the past three years, and particularly since the Sixth Plenum, various work departments of the [Party] Center have been gradually restored and established. In addition to such long-established departments as the Military Affairs Commission, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Department for Work in Enemy-Occupied Areas, and the Youth Commission, newly established organs are the United Front Department, the Women's Commission, the Labor Commission, the Department of Finance and Economy, the Department for the Education of Cadres, the General Political Department, the Commission for Party Newspapers, the Commission for North and Central China, the Commission for the Northwest, and the Commission for the South. The organization of the Secretariat has also been improved, making sixteen organs in all. The restoration and establishment of these central work departments is a great achievement after the severe losses suffered during the Long March, a great event that gladdens the heart.

12. The question of the organization of the Center.

a. The Politburo will meet once a week in the future.

b. The Secretariat handles day-to-day matters.

c. Notification on major matters is to be carried out in the name of the Center, and on minor issues in the name of the Secretariat.

d. Distribution of personnel is based on the principle of ensuring the soundness of leadership by the Center, while strengthening local leadership at the same time.

e. The various departments of the Center are to be streamlined and, at the same time, strengthened.

13. Education of cadres.

During the past two years, seventeen schools have been established under the Center's direct guidance: the Anti-Japanese University, the Shaanxi Public School, the Party School, the Marxist-Leninist Institute, the Lu Xun Academy of Art, the Youth Training Class, the Women's University, the Workers' School, the Medical School, the Communications School, the training class of the Organization Department, the training class for administrators, the Border Region Party School, the Lu Xun Normal School, the Border Region Middle School, the Lu Xun Primary School, and the Kindergarten. The larger ones have more than 10,000 students, and the smaller ones have several hundred or several dozen students. Several thousand cadres are engaged in educational work, and more than 30,000 students have either graduated or are still in training. This is a tremendous achievement, a phenomenon unprecedented in the past eighteen years. The significant results of the work done by these students are not evident yet, but in a few years they will be.

This orientation should be continued in the future. For material reasons and because of enemy dispositions, [the schools] are to be set up in the border areas and in North China. Those that go to the north remain under the direction and management of the Center, but their supervision has been delegated to the Northern Bureau.

14. The study movement.

a. The study movement launched by the Center after the Sixth Plenum for cadres throughout the Party has been of primary importance in raising the theoretical and cultural levels of all Party cadres.
b. All cadres currently working in all the various Party, government, military, popular, and educational organs should work and study at the same time.

c. Depending on the level, culture and theory may be stressed equally, or one may receive more emphasis.

d. This is a kind of long-term higher education.

e. The system of two hours of study every day.

f. Work, engage in production, and study at the same time.

g. Stress both spontaneity and compulsion, and the unity between theory and practice.

h. Diligent students are to be rewarded, and lazy ones punished.

i. Leading bodies and personnel in charge of cadre education are to be set up in all organs, schools, and military units at all levels.

15. The production movement.

Wherever, whenever, and however possible, the agricultural, industrial, and cooperative movement must be developed among the people, and within organs, military units, and schools, using the method of self-reliance to solve all or a part of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and daily necessities, and to overcome difficulties so as to contribute to the War of Resistance Against Japan.

The production movement in the border areas this year has been carried out in earnest. We must continue to sum up experiences to reach the goal of resolving difficulties.

16. The youth movement.

There have been achievements since the Sixth Plenum. It is correct for the Youth Commission and the Joint Office for Youth to concentrate on leading the youth movement.

The orientation for the youth movement: hold firmly to the united front among youth, maintain the attitude of the May Fourth letter to the Three People's Youth League so as to win over the majority of the youth under the banner of continuing the War of Resistance and of a democratic republic.

17. The women's movement.

The Center has promulgated guidelines for the women's movement and begun the work of building a women's commission. Local leading bodies for women's work are also in the process of being set up gradually. The greatest deficiency among our cadres has always been that in female cadres. Moreover, the experience of the women's movement has not yet been summed up. This shortcoming must be corrected. Without a group of capable and specialized female cadres, it will be impossible to develop the women's movement.

18. The labor movement.

Guidelines for work in the labor movement have been issued, a labor commission is beginning to be set up, and a workers' school has been opened. Among the mass movements, the labor movement is relatively weak. There are also too few workers among Party members. Improvements should be made in these two respects in the future.

19. The work of eliminating spies.

Under the new circumstances, the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage our Party, army, and border area governments is gradually showing itself to be increasingly serious and is bound to become more serious in the future. This greatly increases the importance of our struggle to eliminate spies. For this reason the entire Party must pay more attention to this aspect and must allocate and train the necessary numbers of capable cadres to work in this field.

All members of the Guomindang arrested or captured because of espionage or armed attacks against us are generally handled according to the principle of no executions and no capitulation (no capitulation means they should not be coerced into writing a confession or forced to declare the abandonment of their beliefs), so as to win over the majority of the Guomindang.

20. The question of Party organization.

a. Small in number but highly capable. Now is not the time for widespread expansion. In general, recruitment should cease, and the principle should be small in number but highly capable.

b. Tightly [organized].

c. Eliminate saboteurs, protect the Party.

d. Class education, Marxism.

e. Strictly carry out secret directives.


The Party, the army, everything. Be ready to cope with the worst conditions.

22. The question of North China.

The situation in North China could become extremely grave, and there is the possibility that the enemy's main forces will attack North China. Consequently, the Eighth Route Army and the Party in North China must pay serious attention to the possibility that this sort of situation may arise and make preparations on all fronts, including the military, politics, finance, Party organization, the united front, and so on, based on the principle of meeting the needs of persisting in a guerrilla war and coping with the greatest difficulties.

The Party in North China is responsible for providing the Center with the necessary funds. The political significance of such funds is enormous.

23. The question of Central China.

The work of the Party, the guerrilla war, and the movement of the popular masses in Central China must be greatly expanded, and our own bases built in a complex environment to serve as a pivotal area in the whole country's prolonged War of Resistance. United front work must be improved, and it should also be linked with expansion and progress in the work of the New Fourth Army. The basic principle is to send most of the cadres of the border areas to Central China.

24. Defend the border region.

a. The border region is our fundamental base, the place where the Center is located, the seat of authority for the whole country; it must be resolutely defended;
b. The enemy's attack against the border region is a step aimed at making China capitulate;
c. It is possible that the enemy may attack Yan'an;
d. Even if Yan'an should fall, the border region must still be maintained. Everyone should prepare to live the life of guerrilla warfare, a most difficult but most exciting life;
e. The number one problem is food. Overcome difficulties through self-reliance;
f. Large numbers of students and staff workers are to go to the front;
g. Do a good job of protecting and educating young students, new cadres, and new Party members;
h. Preserve a leadership group, an education group, and a military affairs group.
Relying on excellent terrain and the excellent masses, a way will certainly be found.
25. Mobilize large numbers of students and staff workers to go to the front.
a. Strengthen education, strengthen work at the front;
b. Return to the front after graduation, the sooner the better;
c. Because of the enemy situation;
d. Because of expenses;
e. It is decided that 10,000 people are to go.
f. Political and organizational mobilization should be carried out very well;
g. The rear area is suitable for leadership in education and for guerrilla warfare, but there are still quite a few people there;
h. Cadres must be given appropriate assignments;
i. More students must be kept in the rear area depending on circumstances;
j. Names of the schools must be preserved, both at the front and in the rear.
26. The Seventh [Party] Congress.44
a. Complete elections before August 1;
b. Meet in October;
c. Struggle to unite the whole Party and oppose capitulation;
d. Those who can come and those who can participate in the congress.
27. Struggle on two fronts.
a. Against the Right:
   Blind to the dangers of capitulation and anticommunism;
   Yielding to the pressure of the Guomindang;
   Seeing no way out of the current situation (losing sight of the future);
   Lacking a class stand;
   Fearful of and cowed by hard struggle.
b. Against the Left:

A dark China, a dark world, a dark border region, and a dark self;
Preparing to sabotage the united front, negate the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, abandon the Three People's Principles, isolate oneself, and take blind actions.
c. Veteran cadres should form the backbone and lead the large numbers of new Party members and new cadres to advance toward a higher stage of the resistance war, and attack the difficult positions.

a. There must be further unity:
   As long as the Center and the senior cadres are united, the whole Party can certainly unite.
   As long as the Communist Party is united, it will certainly be invincible.
   The savior of the people of the whole country is the Communist Party.
b. There must be further centralization:
   The individual obeys the organization, the minority obeys the majority, the lower levels obey the higher levels, and the whole Party obeys the Central Committee.
c. The whole country45 is united as one, its command is centralized, and it will conquer all.

Conclusion

(June 13)

1. The Question of the Current Situation
   1. It is absolutely correct to say that the main factor in capitulation is the waverning of the Chinese landlords and bourgeoisie.
   2. Two possible types of capitulation must be overcome—(1) partial surrender, and (2) surrender of the majority. The first is a possibility at present, in a situation where the majority is fighting the War of Resistance; the other is a possibility in the future, in a situation where the majority may have surrendered. But doing the present work facilitates future work; the two are inextricably linked.
   3. According to the definition of the Sixth Plenum, only a balance between enemy forces and our forces under certain circumstances constitutes a stalemate. In that case, not only is it impossible to call the present phase one of stalemate but, if a Li Jingwei appears, that will mean that the enemy has already organized (he is trying hard to organize) his strategic reserves and is deploying them in battle—encircling our positions from the rear (beyond a doubt, national counterrevolution is a strategic ally of imperialism). At such a point, there would be even less of a

44. It had been decided in 1938, at the Sixth Plenum, that the Seventh Congress should be held in 1939, as indicated in the text which follows but, because of the difficulties caused by the war, it took place only in the spring of 1945.

45. The version in the 1948 Selected Works has here "the whole Party," which makes more sense in the context.
stalemate between the enemy and ourselves, but we would rather have suffered a major defeat. Such a time would be characterized by the fact that we were being attacked by Japanese imperialism plus Li Jingwei (China’s Franco). Hence it would be much more serious than the past strategic withdrawal and would by no means constitute any sort of stalemate.

4. Right now, Japanese imperialism is organizing two strategic allied armies. One is that of international capitalism, and the other is of Chinese capitalists. The former is used to encircle China from without, and the latter is used to outflank China from within. The direction of our efforts is to mobilize the anticapitalist forces both internationally and within the country, to defeat these two allied armies of the enemy. So long as they have not been defeated, there is no stalemate phase.

5. The frontal enemy (the main forces of Japanese imperialism) may yet launch more military attacks. It is wrong to say that such a possibility does not exist. Although he faces economic and financial difficulties and problems of manpower and military capability, there still exists the possibility of enemy offensives in terms of real strength and timing. Therefore, not only is it necessary, on the one hand, to defend the flank attacks of the new enemy; it is also necessary, on the other hand, to prepare to continue to defeat the frontal attacks of the old enemy. This is the only way to achieve a balance of strength between the enemy and ourselves and to bring about a stalemate.

6. This is not to say, however, that a stalemate will emerge only when the real strength of the frontal and flank enemies has been reduced to such an extent that it is equivalent to that of our anti-Japanese armies in all respects. It is not a question of equalizing real strength but, rather, that our real strength plus the enemy’s weaknesses plus international constraints equals a stalemate.

7. Therefore, a stalemate may emerge under three conditions:
   a. A large geographical area, a large population, and a consolidated position can create a balance between the enemy and ourselves. For example, the midpoint of the Russian civil war and the midpoint of the war in Europe. China, since the beginning of the War of Resistance, has had large territory and a large population, but not a solid position (political corruption and troublemaking by the capitalism), so there is no stalemate yet. If efforts can be made to overcome the danger of surrender, and in the process of overcoming politics are reformed and positions consolidated, then a stalemate will occur. This is the first condition.
   b. A balance may also occur in areas that are small (meaning that directly controlled base areas are small, though the country is large) and have fewer people but have a consolidated position. For example, the Red Army’s ten years of fighting and, to a certain extent, the Northeast Volunteer Army, during a certain period. If betrayal by the majority became a reality in the future, the remaining minority could still create a balance, as long as the “Encirclement and Suppression” were continuously smashed, and in this way a condition of stalemate would be present. The current situation in North China can be described as a temporary small-scale stalemate. Prolonging the situation in North China will turn it into a protracted small-scale stalemate.
   c. The transformation of a small-scale stalemate, as described above, into a large-scale stalemate is achieved through expansion of the united front and victories in the anti-encirclement-and-suppression struggle. If at the time it is still impossible to launch strategic counterattacks (and it is still during a period of counteroffensive campaigns), then it remains a phase of stalemate.

8. If betrayal by the majority is inevitable in the course of the War of Resistance, then there will have to be an entire phase of stalemate according to the following formula: a temporary large-scale stalemate after Wuhan (the current situation can be called a stalemate in a certain sense, but it can only be called temporary because the positions are not solid)—a small-scale stalemate some time later—another large-scale stalemate some time later still.

   The main characteristic of such a change is that from an insecure to a consolidated position. A long-term stalemate demands consolidated positions. With this condition satisfied, a balance may be maintained even with small numbers, and, without it, even large numbers may not be able to achieve it. Therefore, it is necessary to strive for large quantities (many people and large areas). But the key element remains strong quality. What is meant by consolidated positions is consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas and consolidation of the united front.

9. There is a real stalemate situation in North China, but it is still temporary. By proposing to “persist in the guerrilla war in North China,” we aim to transform the temporary stalemate into a long-term one. If all other places except North China have become dark (as happened to the New Fourth Army and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region), then even though it is a partial situation in terms of geographical area and the number of people, North China will be the only region where anti-Japanese forces exist, and this will still signify strategic stalemate. This is a hard situation, but we should be prepared for it. We will continue to work to the end, and we can continue to work to the end, even if the major half of the sky becomes dark and there is only the Communist Party left to resist the Japanese. Continuing the work in this way for three to five years, arousing the masses, attracting friendly allied forces, and gradually forming a grand new anti-Japanese front, we will become the core and leading force in the War of Resistance against Japan and the salvation of the country.

   So, no matter how you describe it, our future is bright, but the road is a very difficult one.

10. At present, it is precisely the time for readjustment of the relationship between the enemy and ourselves (the forces of the enemy and our forces), to see which side can win over the majority and which side has the best quality, for this will decide which side wins and which side loses. The issue of who will win and who will lose is still undecided, and both sides are renewing their efforts to create favorable conditions.
The front will inevitably be reorganized and it must be reorganized. A portion of our allied forces (that consisting of the landlords and the bourgeoisie) may become a force allied with the enemy. But we should never allow all of them to go. We must seek support from another part of them, and it is entirely possible to do so. We still have broad allied forces which have not yet been mobilized. If the Chinese peasants, the Japanese workers, peasants, and soldiers, the international proletariat, and the power of the Soviet Union are mobilized, the enemies are doomed.

The enemies are counterrevolutionary and we are revolutionary. This difference in nature determines who wins the final victory. But the tactics used in directing the war play an even greater role in deciding which side wins. Without the latter factor, and relying only on one's superior quality, victory can still not be obtained.

II. The Question of Transformation

1. We have said that we should prepare ourselves to cope with new possible situations and a possible Miaga. This should be done in accordance with the general line of the Sixth Plenum. Under the general line of the Sixth Plenum, prepare to counter a possible Miaga (or a Hacha) and to adopt a policy of temporary retreat in the area occupied by a Miaga. So far, one cannot imagine a 180 degree change as compared to the Sixth Plenum. That is to say that if there are changes, they will not be changes in the line. They will be partial and temporary changes of strategy and tactics for the purpose of preventing unexpected attacks. This point must first be made very clear. We must adhere resolutely to the past general line.

2. At present, what we should strive for with the utmost efforts, with the whole strength of our Party, is to avert the possibility of capitulation; to win over the majority to resist Japan; and to support, help, supervise, and criticize the Guomindang and Chiang in order to enable them to overcome the tendency of capitulation in the struggle against Wang and in their future development. This is the central task at present.

3. Therefore, it is imperative to stress unity, unified actions, and long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, but not to stress other matters. These emphases are the only means to overcome the crisis of capitulation and are the only ways to prepare ourselves better to cope with possible turns of events. All of this is to isolate the capitalists and not oneself.

III. On Several Questions of Tactics

1. The question of consolidating the Party (the policy of organizational streamlining). Since the decision of the meeting held in March last year, the Party has grown greatly in numbers throughout the country. The present task is to consolidate it. So generally speaking, further recruitment should stop for the time being. Of course, this does not mean that not even one person should be admitted. There are some places where the membership should still be expanded. The suspension of recruitment is intended to facilitate consolidation, elimination of spies, and education. There will be further expansion in the future.

2. The Party should protect new Party members and cadres very well. The main responsibility rests on the shoulders of old Party members and old cadres. The relationship between new Party members and old Party members, and between new cadres and old cadres, should be dealt with well. If this is not done well, the old Party members and old cadres must bear the main responsibility. It is entirely reasonable to forgive new Party members and cadres, but there is no reason to treat old Party members and cadres in the same way. There were some erroneous viewpoints regarding this question in the past. The matter is broadly similar to the relationship between the main forces and the local and guerrilla forces.

Large numbers of cadres should be promoted from among the new Party members.

3. Intensify inner-Party education. Combine class education with national education. But at present, class education should be emphasized, while not neglecting education in the united front.

Textbooks of an intermediate level should be compiled, and, on philosophical questions, the emphasis should be on historical materialism.

4. Local cadres should be promoted. Without local cadres, including middle-level and senior ones, it is impossible to establish and consolidate the bases.

Oppose the tendency toward "imperial envoy," and oppose the attitude that despises "country bumpkins." Do away with the appellation "country bumpkins."

5. We must protect revolutionary intellectuals, and not repeat past mistakes. Without revolutionary intellectuals, the revolution cannot be victorious. The Guomindang is competing with us for young people, and the army should definitely take in large numbers of revolutionary intellectuals. Worker and peasant cadres should be persuaded to swallow them and not to be afraid of them. Without the help of revolutionary intellectuals, workers and peasants cannot improve themselves. Without intellectuals, the work of managing the country, the Party, and the army cannot be done. The government, the Party bureaus, and the mass movements should also attract revolutionary intellectuals.

6. The question of suspending the expansion of the Party and withdrawing the Party from friendly allied parties and troops. From the perspective of the overall situation, suspension and withdrawal are beneficial. Otherwise, the overall situation may be affected by this matter alone and the united front may be disrupted. The revolution cannot triumph without seeking the support of the Chinese armies, and, at present, this support can best be obtained in political terms. Setting up Party organizations there will hinder gaining political support.

Rely on mouths rather than on organizations (under the temporary conditions), and depend on higher levels rather than on lower levels.

On the one hand, withdraw the Party, and, on the other, strengthen liaison, accepting a certain independence of united front work.

In general, the policy of sabotage is to be carried out only in the armies, governments, and political parties of real capitalism. In principle, only the policy
of winning political support is adopted in all other cases. Some special departments may not follow the approach of withdrawal.

7. Not killing Guomindang members is of great significance. This does not mean not killing traitors and spies, and a few defectors, or those who endanger the revolution at critical moments.

8. It is inappropriate to put excessive emphasis on democracy and people’s livelihood. Now it is essential to stress the opposition to capitulation (emphasize the War of Resistance). There should not be several priorities at the same time. They are linkages and not priorities.

In the Guomindang-ruled areas, democracy and people’s livelihood are propaganda slogans, and not calls for action.

On troop recruitment, taxation, and production issues, an attitude of support as well as criticism should be adopted. The attitude of fundamental opposition cannot be adopted.

9. Local policies. There should be local policies that are clear and suitable to the local conditions and various situations. Later, the Center should give attention to providing guidance.

10. Mass movements should be strengthened. This is the meaning of what is called preparing the masses. It does not imply downgrading class struggle in order to overcome capitulationism. Only by correctly promoting class struggle, and linking it to the united front, can capitulation be overcome. It is dangerous to have only unity and no struggle. The masses are our ultimate support, and the ultimate support of the War of Resistance.

11. The problem of the Muslims.

12. The publication of internal Party periodicals should be started immediately. Localities should also run publications.

13. Other matters.

The overall conclusion is the following: Unite to surmount all difficulties.

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Views on the Eighth Route Army Staff Work Conference

(June 12, 1939)

Zuo: 1

It is almost two years since the beginning of the War of Resistance. The convening of a conference on staff work by the Army Group 2 General Headquarters is an event of great significance. Our views on this follow, and we hope that they will be taken into account:

1. The general orientation for the conference should be to summarize the experiences and lessons learned from staff work in our army over the past two years of the War of Resistance, to determine the general direction of staff work and the specific tasks that need to be carried out as a matter of urgency at present, and to raise the political caliber and improve the level of competence of staff personnel. It is hoped that technical staff will attain the level of tactical and strategic staff.

[We must] improve the commanding organs so that they are not only particularly skilled in staff work for carrying out guerrilla warfare, but are also capable of preparing for the transition to staff work in modern, regular warfare.

2. In reviewing merits and shortcomings in past work and searching for causes so as to correct mistakes and develop strong points, the conference should make the connection with carrying on the fine traditions of the Red Army era in the past, especially in examining and establishing various rules and regulations (the classified regulations and top-secret combat department regulations sent to you recently may be used as a basis for discussion. Please let us know whether or not you have received them).

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 463–64, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. This telegram is addressed to Zuo Quan (1906–1942), a native of Hunan and a graduate of the Huangu Military Academy. Zuo had been an army commander in the Red Army during the Jiangxi period and was a veteran of the Long March. At this time, he was deputy chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army.

2. The Communist forces commonly known as the Eighth Route Army had been officially designated the Eighteenth Army Group by the Guomindang in January 1938. This reference to an Army Group reflects that terminology.
3. To meet the needs of the present phase of army consolidation, the education section of the staff offices at various levels should be improved. When necessary, the chief of staff may serve concurrently as the chief of the education section, and there should also be a deputy section chief whose main task would be to provide teaching materials and to guide and monitor the implementation of educational programs.

4. To the extent possible, a way should be found to select personnel to run staff training courses under the direct leadership of the Army Group General Headquarters staff office so as to meet the demands of staff offices at various levels.

5. The military and political education of in-post staff should be regarded as a necessary precondition for army consolidation training.

6. Raising the political level, work skills, political standing, and beliefs of staff workers is a condition that cannot be separated from raising the efficiency of staff work.

7. Thorough preparations should be made so as to ensure that the conference can be carried out smoothly and that satisfactory results can be achieved. Each question should be discussed beforehand in small groups. Empty talk and trivial disputation should be avoided, and clear direction and practical, concrete methods are to be demanded.


To Xiao San

(June 17, 1939)

Comrade Zizhang,

1. I have read your work, and it gave me the feeling of a battle being waged. Such fighting works are needed now, for life at present is all about combat. I hope you will write more.

2. If no obstacles arise, I should be able to attend the Gorky Evening Party; it’s just that I have been rather busy lately.

3. I shall have to look into the question of a horse. This is actually not an easy matter. If you travel within the border region, I could let you use my horse once; if you go outside, we shall have to find another solution.

With respect and admiration,

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, pp. 155–56, where it is reproduced from the manuscript.

1. Xiao San (1896–1983), original name Xiao Zizhang, also known by his pen name of Emi Xiao (which reflected his admiration for Rousseau’s Emile), was a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan. He was closely associated with Mao in the New People’s Study Society and in other activities during the May Fourth period. (See the numerous references to him in Volume I of our edition.) Xiao studied in France in 1920 under the work-study program and joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1922. He attended the Moscow University of the Toilers of the Far East in 1923–1924, was active in the Chinese Communist Party during the First United Front, and returned to the Soviet Union in 1927. In 1939, he had just come back to China and gone to Yan’an, where he became head of the editorial department of the Lu Xun Academy of Arts.

2. Refers to the manuscript of a collection of Xiao’s poetry, some of which later appeared in his collections Heping zhi lu (The Road to Peace) and Xiao San shixuan (Selected Poems of Xiao San).
The Gravest Crisis in the Current Situation

(June 30, 1939)

On the second anniversary of the War of Resistance, the newspapers Liberation, Xinhua Daily, and New China, and the periodical Military and Political Review of the Eighth Route Army have asked me to write a commemorative article. I have collected many materials to hand, and planned to write an essay commemorating the second anniversary of the War of Resistance entitled “Once Again on Protracted War” to answer the criticisms, challenges, and queries regarding On Protracted War and On the New Stage that have come from certain quarters since their publication. Here I can only briefly address the issue of the crisis in the current situation.

Ever since the Chinese nation was confronted with the aggressor, Japanese imperialism, the first and foremost question has been whether or not to fight. This question aroused extreme controversy in the period from the September Eighteenth Incident to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The conclusion reached by all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow-countrymen was: “To fight is to survive; not to fight is to perish.” The conclusion reached by all capitulationists was: “To fight is to perish; not to fight is to survive.” For a time, the roaring guns of the resistance at Marco Polo Bridge decided the issue. They proclaimed the first conclusion right and the second completely wrong. But why was this question settled only temporarily and not once and for all? Because of Japanese imperialism’s policy of inducing China to capitulate, because of the international capitulationists’ attempts to bring about a compromise, and because of the wavering of certain people within our anti-Japanese front, the issue has been worded in a slightly different way as a question of “peace or war,” and a controversy has arisen inside China between those who favor continuing the war and those who favor making peace. Their respective positions remain the same. “To fight is to survive; to make peace is to perish” is the conclusion of the pro-war group, and “to make peace is to survive; to fight is to perish” is the conclusion of the pro-peace group. But the pro-war group consists of all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow countrymen, and they make up the great majority of the entire nation, while the pro-peace group, or the capitulationists, in terms of its numbers, consists of only a small wavering minority within the anti-Japanese front. Consequently, the so-called pro-peace group is compelled to resort to deceitful propaganda, which means, primarily, anticommunism. And so it has fabricated and released a spate of false news items, false reports, false documents, and false resolutions, such as that the Communist Party engages in disruptive activities, that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are merely moving about without fighting and refuse to obey orders, that a separatist régime has been formed in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and is expanding beyond its confines, that the Communist Party is expanding widely and is plotting to overthrow the government, and even that the Soviet Union is plotting to invade China. Its purpose is to hoodwink the masses and cover up the real facts in an attempt at gradually manipulating public opinion so as to realize its goal of making peace, or capitulating. The reason those in the pro-peace group, or the capitulationist group, are doing all this is that the Communist Party is the initiator and champion of national unity and resistance, or the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and unless they oppose it, they cannot sabotage the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, split the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and surrender. In addition, they pin their hopes on concessions from Japanese imperialism, believing that Japan is already at the end of its rope and will change its basic policy and voluntarily withdraw from central, southern, and even northern China, and that China can thus achieve victory without doing any more fighting. They further pin their hopes on international pressure. Many elements in the so-called pro-peace faction are hoping not only that the various international great powers will come out and put pressure on Japan so that she will make concessions and thereby facilitate a peace settlement, but that they will also put pressure on the Chinese government, so as to say to the pro-war faction: “Look! In the present international climate, is there any justification for continuing to fight? There can only be peace! A Pacific international conference would be to China’s advantage. It would not be another Munich but, rather, a step toward China’s renaissance!” This forms the sum total of the views, tactics, and schemes of China’s pro-peace groups, or capitulationist faction! All of this does not pertain only to Wang Jingwei himself; what is more serious is that there are many other Zhang Jingweis and Li Jingweis and the like concealed within the anti-Japanese front who collaborate with Wang Jingwei from within and without, some of them doing a two-man comic act, some of them wearing the red face [of the hero] or the white face [of the villain].

We Communists openly proclaim: At all times we stand with those who favor continuing the war, we support all the national policies of the War of Resistance openly proclaimed by Chairman Chiang and the National Government in the past, and resolutely oppose those so-called pro-peace elements. We have but one desire, which is, together with all other patriotic parties and all other patriotic fellow countrymen, to strengthen unity and strengthen the national united front and

This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 75/76, July 7, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 343–48.
1. The Gravest Crisis in the Current Situation → Opposing Capitulationist Activity
2. The issue has been worded → The issue has been raised again, worded
Guomindang-Communist cooperation, put the Three People's Principles into effect, support Chairman Chiang and the National Government to carry the War of Resistance through to the end, fight all the way to the Yalu River and recover all our lost territories. We firmly denounce the likes of Wang Jingwei, both overt and covert, who are creating an anti-Communist climate, engineering friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and even trying to provoke another split and civil war between the two parties. We say to them: In essence, all your divisive schemes are nothing but preparations for capitulation, and all your divisive and capitulationist policy simply reveals your general plan of selling out the interests of the nation for the selfish interests of a few individuals. All the people have eyes, and they will see through your scheming. We categorically repudiate the absurd view that a Pacific conference would not be an Eastern Munich, a preparation for turning China into another Czechoslovakia. We firmly denounce the groundless assertion that Japanese imperialism may come to its senses and make fundamental concessions. Japanese imperialism will never change its basic policy of subjugating China. Japan's honeyed words after the fall of Wuhan, for instance, abandoning the policy of "not accepting the National Government as the opposite party in negotiations" and turning around and recognizing the National Government as such, or, as another example, the alleged conditions for withdrawal of troops from central and southern China, are nothing but cunning schemes to bait the fish and hook them for cooking, so who ever gets hooked can expect to be cooked. The international capitulationists, in inducing China to surrender, are likewise pursuing a scheming policy. They have countenanced Japan's invasion of China, sitting atop the mountain, watching the tigers fight, waiting for the opportune moment to engineer a so-called Pacific conference for negotiation in order to profit at others' expense. Anyone who pins his hopes on such schemers will likewise find that he has been badly duped.

What was once a question of whether or not to fight has now become a question of whether to continue the war or to make peace, but essentially it is the same question, the most important and fundamental of all questions. In the past six months, with Japan pressing on with its policy of inducing China to capitulate, the international capitulationists intensifying their activities, and, above all, with some people in our anti-Japanese front wavering more than ever, a great clamor has arisen around the so-called pro-peace question. In this way, the possibility of capitulation has become the main danger in the present political situation, and anticommunism, which means breaking up the Guomindang-Communist cooperation and the unity against Japan, has become the most important, foremost move that group of capitulationists is making to prepare for surrender. Under these circumstances, all patriotic parties and all patriotic fellow countrymen must keep a close watch on the capitulationists' activities and must understand the true reality and main characteristics of the present situation, namely, that "capitulation is the chief danger and anticommunism is in preparation for capitulation," and they must do their utmost to oppose capitulation and a split. No group of people must ever be allowed to undermine or betray the war against Japanese imperialism, a sacred War of Resistance that has cost the whole nation two full years of bloodshed. No group of people must ever be allowed to disrupt or split the Guomindang-Communist cooperation and the Anti-Japanese National United Front, which has been forged and accepted by the common effort of the whole nation.

Fight on, continue to unite, and China will survive.

Continue to make peace, persist in splitting, and China will perish.

Which to reject and which to accept? Our compatriots must swiftly decide.

We Communists will definitely fight on and persist in unity.

All patriotic parties and all patriots throughout the country will also fight on and persist in unity.

Even if the capitulationists' plots to surrender and to cause splits should get the upper hand for a while, they will eventually be unmasked and punished by the people. The historic task of the Chinese nation is to achieve liberation through a united War of Resistance. What the capitulationists desire is the exact opposite, but however much they may have the upper hand, however jubilant they may be, fancying that "nobody [under heaven] dares harm them," under heaven, they cannot escape their fate of punishment by the whole people.

To oppose capitulation and a split—this is the urgent task now confronting all patriotic political parties and groups and all patriotic fellow countrymen.

People of the whole country, unite! Persist in the War of Resistance and in unity, and suppress all plots for capitulation and a split!

3. Pro-peace question → Question of peace and war
Persist in Long-Term Cooperation Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party

(July 9, 1939)

I think you comrades must have talked a lot, heard a lot, read a lot, and also done a lot about the problem of the united front. Why do I want to talk about it again today when you comrades are leaving for the front? You comrades must realize that if, today, we want to drive Japanese imperialism out of our country, overthrow the Chinese traitors, overcome difficulties, seize victory in the War of Resistance, achieve national liberation and social liberation, and all the rest, everything must depend on this magic weapon, the united front.

What is the united front? It is unity in the War of Resistance; it is the great unity of every class, every army, and every nationality in the War of Resistance. This great unity is called the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This anti-Japanese united front must comprise not only China but the whole world. It is not enough for it to consist only of China. We should organize all those in the world who are able to fight against Japanese aggression, whatever the degree of their opposition to it, into an anti-Japanese united front. This united front of ours includes Chinese forces as well as world forces; it is a great organization. In sum, the united front in China has already been organized and has become a nationwide anti-Japanese united front.

Nevertheless, in the course of the War of Resistance, in the process of development of the united front, and within this great organization, many people have taken the road of fighting Japan, and some of them will change. Already there are some who have changed, and others may change in the future. Taking the road of fighting Japan is like your going to North China. The color of your faces will certainly change a bit after exposure to the sun and rain on your journey. You may also fall and lose some skin from your feet, or you may suffer a bellyache, and so on. All of these are small changes. There are also greater changes, as when some people become deserters while on the road, and give up, simply decamping and slipping off. Comrades, it is only a short journey you are going to undertake from here to North China, but what I am talking about today is not a short journey but, rather, a long journey—the long journey during which we will have to fight all the way to the Yalu River. During this long journey, in the Anti-Japanese National United Front as a whole, it is certain that there will be deserters. Now there is already a Wang Jingwei. He fled first to Vietnam, then to Hong Kong, and finally to Shanghai. He says that our Eighth Route Army is “roving around [you] but not hitting [[i]],” but, in my opinion, he is the one who is roving without hitting. He first roved to Japan to see the Japanese emperor, then roved to Beijing, and finally roved to Nanjing. But he has never yet struck a blow at the Japanese invaders, so Wang Jingwei is really the only one who roves without striking. At present, according to those who come from outside [the Border Region], in the interior there are many Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, Zhao Jingweis, Qian Jingweis, and so on. In sum, there are many people of Wang Jingwei’s ilk. Who are they? They are the hidden Wang Jingweis. They want to perform a “Zhang Song presents the map.” In the era of the Three Kingdoms, there was a man named Zhang Song, who presented a map of western Sichuan to Liu Bei. As a result, Liu Bei entered Sichuan and founded the kingdom of Shu. Today, when the Japanese imperialists are invading China, Wang Jingwei is the first to present them with the map, but there are Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, Zhao Jingweis, Qian Jingweis, and so on, who are also preparing to present maps. Their plan is to present the map of the entire Republic of China to Japanese imperialism and to establish a “China” under Japanese rule. That is why we say that at present there is great danger, the danger of surrender and of compromising halfway. In seeking to achieve this goal, they first spread rumors, with the aim of creating a split, so as to cause the breakup of this great organization, the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and to bring about a split in the Guomindang. Wang Jingwei has also organized a “Guomindang” in Shanghai, and his doctrine is also called the “Three People’s Principles,” so now there are two Guomindangs and two Three People’s Principles. One is Wang Jingwei’s, and the other is Chiang Kai-shek’s. Actually there are three kinds of Three People’s Principles. One is fake, and Wang Jingwei’s fall into this category; one is half-real and half-fake; and one is real. Above all, we oppose the fake Three People’s Principles, oppose the fake Three People’s Principles and the fake Guomindang of the open Wang Jingwei as well as of the hidden Wang Jingweis. People such as Wang Jingwei and his ilk split the Guomindang, split the Three People’s Principles, split the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, split the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and split the entire

This text consists of extracts from Mao’s talk to a group from the North Shaanxi Public School (Shaanbei gongxue), which was about to leave for the front. Our source is Dangde wexian, no. 4, 1995, pp. 17–20.

1. Mao had rejected this criticism of the role played by the Red Army in the anti-Japanese war in very similar terms in his preface of March 2, 1939, to a volume by Nie Rongzhen, translated above.

2. This refers to an episode in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, one of Mao’s favorite traditional novels. Shu, where Liu Bei ultimately founded the so-called Shu Han dynasty, was one of the three kingdoms into which China was divided during part of the third century C.E.
front of the War of Resistance. In a word, their conspiratorial scheme seeks to promote splitting in order to achieve their goal of bringing about capitulation. This is the greatest danger, a possible tendency, and an important characteristic of the present situation. It requires that all the people of the whole country arise, beginning with revolutionary youth, all the progressive classes, and you comrades in particular, to oppose splits and oppose surrender. Splits, surrender, and compromise mean retreating and falling back; unity and the War of Resistance mean advancing and moving forward. The capitulationists are opposed to progress and are moving backward. At present, there are this sort of people throughout the country who do backward things, anti-Communist things, unscientific things. We say that Marxism is the most scientific thing; they say that it does not fit Chinese national conditions. Those who say this are Wang Jingwei, Zhang Jingwei, Li Jingwei, and so on. We ask, “What are China’s national conditions?” They are unable to give an answer. What are China’s national conditions? China’s national conditions are that it is a semicolonial and semifeudal society. Therefore, whenever we are asked the question “What are China’s national conditions?” we answer with the words “semicolonial and semifeudal.” This is the conclusion obtained by many Chinese and foreign social scientists after several decades of study. Semicolonial and semifeudal are diseases. That is to say that China has two diseases: one is imperialist oppression and the other is the oppression of the feudal forces. Marxism is the most effective medicine for curing these diseases; it is truly absurd to say that it does not fit Chinese national conditions! They want to use this set of antiprogressive, backward, antisecular fallacies to confuse China’s youth, but the revolutionary and progressive young people can never be taken in by them.

In the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and on the long road of fighting to the Yalu River which we wish to follow, many people will become deserters. Wang Jingwei was the first to desert, and there are quite a few who are preparing to desert as well. In the future, there will be some landlords and members of the bourgeoisie who, halfway through the journey, will be unable to stand the hardship and will also desert and go over to the side of Japanese imperialism. Nevertheless, so long as they have not run off, they are still our friends, we should still maintain affection and unity with them, and we should all resist Japan together. If they run away, then they become our enemies, and we should not speak politely to them any more. It is the same as regards the international camp. Whether a government is bourgeois or some other kind, so long as it helps us resist Japan, we are willing to be its friend. Such is our united front. The landlords and bourgeoisie are part of the united front, and, provided only that they fight the Japanese, we will unite with them all. But if some of them do not want to continue and want to leave, we can only let them go! “If the King of Hell decides to take a person’s life on the third watch [3:00 to 5:00 A.M.], he will definitely never let him live until the fifth [7:00 to 9:00 A.M.].” At present, the King of Hell is Japanese imperialism. He wants to invite these people to go; Wang Jingwei has already gone, and there are also Zhang Jingwei, Li Jingwei, and so on who are preparing to accept the invitation. This kind of thing has already happened in the process of resisting Japan and will continue to happen in the future. All of us must understand this. There are those who ask themselves whether, if this happens, the ranks of our anti-Japanese front will not be diminished. What can be done about this? We should look at the problem this way: When Wang Jingwei was still in the anti-Japanese front, he tried by every possible means to obstruct the development of the anti-Japanese mass movement, to obstruct the expansion of the anti-Japanese armed forces and the anti-Japanese mass organizations. Since he fled, our North Shaanxi Public School and Anti-Japanese University have been able to recruit more students, and we have been able to organize more workers’ national salvation unions and peasants’ national salvation unions and so on. The War of Resistance is a long-term thing, and the more such people leave, the smaller their numbers become in the united front, and the more good people come to join us. There is yet another problem about which I would like to say a word. Now that Wang Jingwei has gone, and Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei are also preparing to leave, if this continues, will not the whole of the landlords and the bourgeoisie eventually leave? That will not happen. We know that there are still many people among the landlords and the bourgeoisie who want to resist Japan. Hence we must definitely maintain the Anti-Japanese National United Front. We should not think that since Wang Jingwei has deserted, and Zhang Jingwei and Li Jingwei are preparing to desert, it is no longer a national united front but has become, rather, a popular front, an alliance of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie exclusively, not including the landlords and the bourgeoisie, so that we would perhaps be obliged to return to our policies of the past, attacking the local bullies and dividing up the land. Some people feel unhappy now because they are not able to overthrow the local bullies and divide up the land. Such thinking is wrong. We must bear in mind that revolution is not a matter of seeking gratification but, rather, something that requires hard struggle. We must definitely try our best to do the following: anyone who can be kept a day longer should be kept a day longer; keeping someone for half a day, or a single night is also good, or even having people eat breakfast before leaving. Everyone should understand one point, that we want to uphold the united front. The present situation has the following characteristic: The compromising and capitulationist elements want to cause splits, and we shall deal with them through the progress of the War of Resistance, the unity of the whole country, and our persistence in the united front. We will certainly not let fall the banner of the united front. This is an extremely important point.

Now I shall discuss the question of long-term cooperation once again. At present there are considerable numbers of deserters and people who are preparing to desert, so is it still possible for the two parties, Communist and Guomindang, to cooperate in the long run? Our answer is: “Yes!” The Wang Jingweis, Zhang Jingweis, Li Jingweis, and others are, after all, in the minority, and those remaining in the anti-Japanese camp still constitute the majority. If we organize this majority into the united front, then this united front will, as before, include various parties, various
bandit chief. You insisted on “suppressing” us, but what is most curious is that the more we were “suppressed” the more numerous we became. Our party used to be only as big as a little finger, but thanks to the “Encirclement and Suppression” campaigns it grew enormously and became as big as a thumb. Where do our guns come from? They were all gifts from you. The entire Red Army was forged by fighting you, and all the Red Army’s guns were given by you, so I invite my friends to consider it: To fight or not to fight? We, too, have thought about it; let’s everyone make peace!

There are presently some diehard elements, however, who always want to oppose the Communists and wish to keep fighting a civil war. We say: We do not wish to fight. I used to live in Hankou, and you insisted on fighting, so I had no choice but to go up to the Jinggangshan. If you go in for fighting the Communists again at this point and start to attack us once more, we will go up the mountains immediately. Yet I think it’s better that everyone live in the cities. In the past Li Yuanhong said, “When there’s food, everyone should eat it.” We propose to add another point, “When there’s an enemy, everyone should fight him.” Everyone has a share in eating as well as in fighting the enemy. It would be utterly unfair if only the bourgeoisie and the landlords had food to eat, and the workers and peasants had nothing to eat. Where do the food people eat, the houses they live in, and the clothes they wear come from? When drinking water, think of the source. All of this was produced by the workers and peasants, but if the workers and peasants had nothing to eat and nothing to wear, wouldn’t that be excessively unfair? We advocate that everyone have food and clothing, which means that the united front should not be ruptured. We can maintain long-term cooperation. Although there are deserters, long-term cooperation still exists. When you go to the front, you must keep this point firmly in mind: maintain long-term cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party.

There is another question, one that has been raised in a letter from the comrades at the Shaanxi Public School and has also been raised indirectly with me by the school. This is the question “In the final analysis, is our Anti-Japanese National United Front a matter of strategy or a matter of tactics?” They held a meeting to discuss this, and there was a very fierce argument about it. Nobody was clear on this. I thought about it for a few days, and there’s no need for you comrades to argue about it anymore. Combine the opinions of both sides and you still end up with a “united front,” in that the Anti-Japanese National United Front is both strategic and tactical. From the point of view of determining the proletariat’s primary direction of attack in a given stage of the revolution and the point of view of establishing a plan for the corresponding deployment of revolutionary forces, the Anti-Japanese National United Front is a matter of strategy. It determines strategic tasks, determines and deploys allied forces, and that constitutes an overall strategic plan. In today’s Anti-Japanese National United Front, its backbone, the proletariat, has as its domestic allies the peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, the landlords, and all other anti-Japanese elements, and all of them

3. Cheng Fangwu, who became president of North China United University, founded at this time by the union of North Shaanxi Public School and three other schools, and led the group bound for the front to set up this institution, indicates in a brief summary of Mao’s address on this occasion (which he wrongly dates July 7 instead of July 9, 1939) that Mao referred to the three “magic weapons” which he was later to discuss in the important editorial of October 4, 1939, translated below, “Introducing The Communist.” Cheng also states that Mao explicitly linked his presentation of the “three magic weapons” [ga ban] to the traditional novel Fengshen yanyi (The Investiture of the Gods) and quotes Mao as follows:

In that year when Jiang Ziya (Jiang Taigong) came down Mount Kunlun, Yuanshi Tiancun gave him three magic weapons: an almond-yellow flag, a monstrous beast (shixiang), and a spirit-beating whip. Now you are going to the front, and I also give you three magic weapons, which are the united front, armed struggle, and Party building.

Thus, he states, this talk constituted a preview of the editorial which would be published three months later. See Cheng Fangwu, Zhuanhuozhong de daxue (A University in the Midst of the Fires of War) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 75–76. Only the first of the three “magic weapons” is discussed in the text translated here.
together have organized a joint War of Resistance. Abroad, our allies are the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other countries, and all of them have united to fight Japan. Thus an anti-Japanese united front has been formed inside and outside the country. Consequently, the Anti-Japanese National United Front is strategic. As for how to carry out resistance against Japan, specific forms of warfare, and forms of organization, these are tactical matters. There are all sorts of organizational forms; for example, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, United University, the trade unions, the peasant associations, the Youth Association for National Salvation, and so on. Organizing the worker and peasant masses, the petty bourgeoisie, landlords, and the bourgeoisie all together to establish a political council is another form of organization and another form of struggle. Originally we were not in favor of the present political council, but it is all right to hold such a meeting now, because it is, after all, better than nothing. In the future it will no longer be sufficient to call political council meetings, and the rank and file will elect their own representatives and hold their own representative meetings. As far as organizing the Central Army, the Eighth Route Army, and so on to fight at the front is concerned, this is another form of organization and struggle. Though the forms vary a great deal, they are all carrying out strategic tasks. Therefore we say that the Anti-Japanese National United Front is strategic as well as tactical.

We must hold firmly to the united front. With this magic weapon, all difficulties may be overcome. This spirit-beating whip—the united front—is the first magic weapon I give you today. I hope that you comrades will use it to eliminate all the demons, ghosts, and monsters.

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4. The reference is to the People's Political Council (Guomin canzenghui), established by the Guomindang in 1938, of which Mao and several of his comrades were members. See above, the note to the text of January 28, 1939.

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Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Chinese Women's University

July 20, 1939

"Women's University." "Women's University!" This fresh and ringing name has been jumping from people's mouths for well over a month.

Rightly so. The "Chinese Women's University," a solemn cause that is connected with the liberation of China's 225 million women, turned the first page of its new life a month ago. Through the efforts of staff members of the whole university and the entire student body, and after busy preparations, it finally convened its opening ceremony in a solemn and august atmosphere and amid the celebration of a large number of people. . . .

Leading cadres were invited to speak. The first one was Comrade Mao Zedong.

Comrades, we are all very happy today, and I, too, am happy. . . .

The founding of the Women's University has extraordinary political significance. It cannot only educate large numbers of female cadres armed with theories, but also train large numbers of women's movement cadres who will engage in actual work and are ready to go to the front, the countryside, and factories, to organize 225 million women to take part in the War of Resistance. Without the awakening of the women, who constitute half the population in China, China's War of Resistance cannot triumph. Women play an extremely important role in the War of Resistance. Educating children, encouraging husbands, and educating the masses all require the participation of women. The mobilization of women will inevitably lead to the mobilization of the people of the whole country. There is no question about it.

The Women's University has now been set up, and it ought to be maintained in the future. To maintain it will demand a greater and more protracted struggle. Some people do not support us in running a women's university. First of all, those "diehards" do not approve of it. They set up barriers to prevent students from various places from coming to Yan'an to study. They do not want women to achieve thorough liberation.

Next, it is also necessary to fight against the viewpoint of looking down on women's movements, for such people are blind to the role of women and ignore the great power of women in the revolution. Only when these obstacles are overcome will the present Women's University be able to develop.

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This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, July 25, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 89–90, which reproduces that version.
I hope that the comrades making up the teachers and staff of the Women's University will set their minds to their work, and be resolved to work for a long time. Our Party should have many professional educational workers . . .

Finally, he concluded with a few highly significant words. "The day when the women of the whole country rise up is the time of victory of the Chinese revolution." The whole audience responded with warm applause and shouted, "Long Live the Women's University!" "Long Live Comrade Mao Zedong!"

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**Letter to President Lin Biao**

on the Study of Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee

(July 29, 19[X][X], 10 p.m.)

This group of graduates should be given no. 57 of *Jiefang* and the documents of the Sixth Plenum, and they should discuss them before they leave. The copies needed may be quickly obtained from the [X][X] Section. It may be also better to obtain a few copies first and distribute two or three copies to each team. The Central Secretariat will meet on the afternoon of the 30th. I will attend the meeting of the Military Commission on the afternoon of the 1st, and can come to talk about the conclusions of the Sixth Plenum on the 2nd.

Salutations!

Mao Zedong

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, Vol. 6, p. 91, where it is reproduced from Red Guard publications of 1967.

1. This letter is addressed to Lin in his capacity as president of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University.
2. The year is missing in the source cited, but clearly this text should be dated 1939.
3. Issue no. 57 of *Jiefang*, dated November 25, 1938, contained Mao's report to the Sixth Plenum, entitled "On the New Stage," which is translated in Volume VI of this edition. The volume of documents of the Sixth Plenum to be studied was probably *Zhongguo gongchandang de liuchong quanshui wenxian* (Documents of the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party) (Chongqing: Xinhua ribao, 1939).
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Elegiac Couplet for Mr. Guo Gaoru\(^1\)

(July 1939)

You, Sir, followed after the virtuous one,\(^2\) living in reclusion behind a humble gate; able to enjoy a ripe old age, in illustrious virtue and understanding of mysteries you far surpassed the ancients;

Your son is a distinguished master in the world of letters, exerting himself in military work to help drive out the Japanese bandits; his signal contributions engraved in stone inspire those to come.

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Instructions of the Central Military Commission on the Problem of Consolidating the Anti-Japanese University

(July 1939)

The overall policy for running the Anti-Japanese University and all other military and political schools and training groups organized by intellectuals should be as follows:

1. Training educated youth into proletarian soldiers or sympathizers and training them to become cadres of the Eighth Route Army are indeed hard work. We should endeavor to transform their thinking, pay attention to the process of their ideological transformation, and organize ideological contests and debates in appropriate ways. In reality, there must be struggles between bourgeois ideas and proletarian ideas in these schools.

2. All the work of schools should be aimed at transforming the thinking of students. Political education is the central link. There should not be too many courses, but the work of class education and Party education must be greatly strengthened. The Anti-Japanese University is not a school of the united front, but a school for Eighth Route Army cadres under the leadership of the Party.

3. The principles for educating intellectual youth are the following:
   a. Educate them to master Marxism-Leninism, and to overcome bourgeois and petty-bourgeois thinking and ideas.
   b. Educate them to be disciplined and organized and to oppose anarchism and liberalism.
   c. Educate them to go resolutely down to work at the grass roots and to oppose looking down on practical experience.
   d. Educate them to be close to the workers and peasants and to oppose the attitude of looking down on the workers and peasants.

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\(^1\) We have translated this couplet from Shici daijian, pp. 171–72, where it is taken from no. 14 of Chongqing wenshi ziliao.

\(^2\) Guo Zhaofei (1853–1939), zi Gaoru, had died in his native village in Sichuan on July 3, 1939. He was the father of Guo Moruo, who at this time headed the Literary Propaganda Section of the Political Department of the Military Commission of the National Government.

\(^2\) Here Mao is referring to Guo Gaoru as a reincarnation of the Eastern Han recluse Guo Tai, who was known for his virtues and refusal to serve as an official.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong ji, Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 93–94, where it is reproduced from the guide to an exhibition at the Military Museum in Beijing.
The Reactionaries Must Be Punished in Accordance with the Law of the Land

Speech at the Memorial Meeting for Victims of the Pingjiang Massacre

(August 1, 1939)

Comrades,

Today, August 1, we are gathered here for a memorial meeting. Why are we holding this great memorial meeting? Because our revolutionary comrades and fighters against Japan have been killed, and this is a grave matter. Who should be killed in these times? The Chinese traitors and the Japanese imperialists. China has been fighting Japanese traitors and the Japanese imperialists. We have been fighting Japanese imperialism for two years, but the outcome is not yet decided. Very few traitors have been killed. Yet our revolutionary comrades, all warriors against Japan, have been killed. Killed by whom? Killed by the troops. Why did the troops kill fighters against Japan? They were carrying out orders; certain people gave them the order to kill. Who gave them the order to kill? Part of the reactionaries. Comrades! Logically, who would want to kill fighters against Japan? First, the Japanese imperialists and, next, the Chinese collaborators and traitors such as Wang Jingwei. But the scene of the killing was not Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, or any other place occupied by the Japanese aggressors and Chinese collaborators;

This speech was first published in Jiefang, no. 81, August 20, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 6, pp. 349–55, where the text is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao’s works.

1. The attack by Guomindang forces on the Communist liaison office in Pingjiang, Hunan, took place on June 12, 1939. It was one of the earliest overt acts stemming from Chiang Kai-shek’s January 1939 decision to restrict and suppress the Communists, discussed above in the Introduction. This public statement was ostensibly delayed to see whether the perpetrators would be punished, but it also coincides with the founding date of the Chinese Red Army. Here, as elsewhere, Mao was careful at the time not to implicate Chiang, but to blame the massacres on sympathizers with Wang Jingwei and reactionary diehards.

2. Killed → Killed by the reactionaries
3. We → China
4. Very few traitors have been killed. → The traitors are still very active, and very few of them have been killed.

5. Reactionary butchers → Chinese reactionaries
6. These reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of their masters, the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, and killed the anti-Japanese comrades. → Preparing to capitulate, these reactionaries obsequiously carried out the orders of the Japanese and Wang Jingwei, and the first people they killed were the most resolute fighters against Japan.
8. Have done nothing. → Have done nothing. What is the reason? The reason is that China is not unified.
dead? Are the laws meant to encourage criminals? Now we have to come out and do something about this matter in the name of the people. We demand that the people of the whole country rise up and everyone pay attention to protecting the anti-Japanese fighters, combat the collaborators and reactionaries, and respect the laws. So, the purpose of holding this meeting today is not only to commemorate the persons who died but also to ensure the right to the protection of life of all comrades and compatriots against Japan.

China must be unified; there can be no victory without unification. But what does unification mean? It means that everybody should resist Japan, that all should unite and strive for progress and that there should be due rewards and punishments. Who ought to be rewarded? Those who resist Japan, those who uphold unity, those who are progressive. And who ought to be punished? The collaborators, reactionaries, and those who retrogress. Is our country now unified? It is not. The Pingjiang massacre proves it. It shows that there is no unification where there should be. We have long advocated the unification of the whole country. First, unification on the basis of the War of Resistance. But now, instead of being rewarded, Tu Zhengkun, Luo Ziming, and the other comrades who were resisting the Japanese have been brutally murdered, whereas scoundrels and capitulators who oppose resistance, prepare to capitulate, and commit murder go unpunished. This is not unification. We must oppose these scoundrels and capitulators, and arrest the murderers. Second, unification on the basis of unity. Those who stand for unity ought to be rewarded and those who oppose ought to be punished. But now, Comrades Tu Zhengkun, Luo Ziming, and the others who upheld unity have been punished, have been shot dead, whereas the scoundrels who undermine unity are allowed to go scot-free. That is not unification, and we must oppose it. Third, unification on the basis of progress. The whole country must move forward; the backward must try to keep pace with the progressive, and the progressive must not be held back. The Central Committee of the Communist Party put forward the following slogans:

- Persist in the War of Resistance to the end and oppose compromise half-way;
- Consolidate national unity and oppose internal splits;
- Seek progress in the whole country and oppose retrogression;

The butchers at Pingjiang killed progressive people. They have practiced retrogression, which we must oppose. We want laws and unity. We want laws that protect anti-Japanese officers and soldiers, and anti-Japanese people, and laws that punish the capitulators, saboteurs, and reactionaries. We want a unity of the whole country that is based on persistence in the War of Resistance and forbids retrogression. All capitulationist, splitist, and reactionary scoundrels ought to be punished in accordance with the law of the land.

The Pingjiang massacre is extremely grave. Although only a few people were killed this time, and it happened only in one place, Pingjiang xian in Hunan Province, it is a matter that concerns the whole country, a national incident. Comrades, just consider that if this continues, one Communist killed today and ten Communists killed tomorrow, then hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands, may be killed. If the same thing happens to patriotic people who are being killed by the tens, hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands, China will be destroyed and the Japanese and Wang Jingwei will be jubilant. More than dozens and hundreds of Communists and patriotic personages have been assassinated since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, and the Pingjiang massacre is just a recent incident. Should this continue, it will be a disaster for China, in which all those opposed to Japan will be killed. What is the purpose of killing anti-Japanese people? Carrying out the order of Japanese imperialism and Wang Jingwei, these scoundrels are prepared to capitulate, so they begin by killing anti-Japanese soldiers, Communists, and patriotic people. If they are not stopped, China will perish at their hands. That is why this incident is a national matter of the gravest importance, and we should talk about it everywhere in the whole country. How can we do it? We can send letters and telegrams all over the country, demanding that the National Government prosecute the case and mete out harsh punishments to those reactionaries, murderers, and saboteurs.

Comrades, we will not cease our action after the meetings today. Comrades in Yan'an should all realize that Japanese imperialism has recently intensified its disruptive activities, that international imperialism has become more active in helping Japan, and that the traitors in China, both the overt and the covert Wang Jingwei, are more active than ever in sabotaging the War of Resistance, wrecking unity, and turning the clock back. They want to surrender the whole of our country, cause an internal split, and engineer a civil war. Comrades, you should call upon the people of the whole country to arise and oppose this conspiracy.

A telegram from today's meeting in Yan'an should be sent out to all parts of the country, opposing recurrence of this incident or events similar to it, firmly demanding the enforcement of the laws, the realization of unity, and the protection of revolutionary comrades and anti-Japanese comrades, cadres and people. This is the only way to defeat Japanese imperialism and win victory. (Unanimous applause.) Otherwise, China will be in grave danger. Today, we are unanimous in opposing such incidents, in requesting that Chairman Chiang and Chairman Lin

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9. The collaborators, reactionaries, and those who retrogress.
10. Advocated → Demanded
11. Oppose → Undermine
12. Shot dead → Brutally murdered
13. Held back → Held back to the pace of the backward

14. The whole of → The greater part of
of the National Government execute the laws that protect revolutionary comrades and anti-Japanese comrades and in demanding that the whole nation unite on the basis of the War of Resistance, unity, and progress. If the laws are still ineffective and there is still no unity, the people of the whole country will go on making demands for the effectiveness of the laws, the realization of unity, the suppression of saboteurs, reactionaries, capitors, and other such scoundrels, and the prohibition of similar incidents in the future. (Warm and unanimous applause.)

At the present time certain secret measures known as “Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties” are being extensively enforced. They are reactionary to the core, helpful to the Japanese Fascist Party, and detrimental to resistance, unity, and progress. Which are the “alien parties”? The Japanese Fascist Party, Wang Jingwei, and the traitors. How can the Communist Party, the Guomindang, and all the other anti-Japanese political parties, which are united in resistance to Japan, be called “alien parties”? Yet the capitulators, reactionaries, and diehards are deliberately creating friction and splits in the anti-Japanese unity. Is this kind of activity right or wrong? It is absolutely wrong! (Unanimous applause.) When it comes to prevention and restriction, what sort of people should be prevented and restricted? Japanese imperialism, Wang Jingwei, the reactionaries, and capitulators. (Unanimous applause.) Why prevent and restrict the Communist Party, which is the most resolute in resisting Japan, the most revolutionary, and the most progressive? It is absolutely wrong. We the people of all walks of life in Yan’an voice our firm opposition and strong protest. (Unanimous applause.) We must oppose the “Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties,” for such measures are at the very root of all kinds of criminal actions that destroy everything, ignore the laws, and wreck unity. This is the purpose of holding this mass meeting today and it is not merely to commemorate the death of a few comrades. It is for the sake of continued resistance, unity, and progress. To this end, the “Measures for Preventing and Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties” must be abolished, the capitulators and reactionaries must be punished, and all revolutionary comrades and all the comrades and people resisting Japan must be protected. (Warm applause and shouting of slogans.)

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15. The reference is to Lin Sen (1868–1943), a native of Fujian, and an active participant in the Revolution of 1911. Beginning in 1923, he served under Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou, and played a leading role in the First Congress of the Guomindang in 1924. After a period of eclipse resulting from his participation in the Western Hills faction in 1925, and conflict with Chiang Kai-shek when in early 1931 he supported Hu Hanmin against Chiang, he returned to Nanjing in October 1931, and assumed the largely ceremonial post of chairman of the National Government, which he held until his death in 1943.

16. The Japanese Fascist Party → Japanese imperialism

17. Splits in the anti-Japanese unity → Disunity within the anti-Japanese ranks

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Epigraph Written in His Own Handwriting for the Martyr Xie Zizhang

(August 13, 1939)

Xie Zizhang, ming Deyuan, was from Anding xian. He joined the Communist Party in Beijing in 1925. From that time forward, he regarded Communism as the road to liberation for the Chinese people. He established training programs for the peasant movement, organized peasant associations, and led the people to participate in the movement against imperialists and warlords. As a result, the people called him Xie, the upright official. When the Great Revolution was defeated in 1927, Zizhang led a revolt in Qingjian and later participated in the Weinan Insurrection. His will unweakened by defeat, he rushed about to various places in the Northwest and North China. After the September 18 Incident, he raised an Anti-Imperialist United Army in areas bordering Shaanxi and Gansu, later renamed as the Shaanxi-Gansu Guerrillas of the Chinese Worker-Peasant Red Army, which was the predecessor of the Twenty-sixth Army of the Red Army. He went to Chahar in 1933 to join the Anti-Japanese United Army and, when it failed, returned to northern Shaanxi. There he organized the Twenty-seventh Army and built the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region together with Liu Zhidan and other comrades. He was wounded in the battle of Hekou in 1934 and died from his wounds in the spring of 1935. The Party, the government, the army, and the people, as well as all other circles were impressed by his merits and virtues, so they renamed Anding xian Zizhang xian in his memory. The above is written as a record when the government and the people are building a tomb for him.

Inscribed by Mao Zedong
The 9th day of the seventh month according to the lunar calendar
The 28th year of the Chinese Republic

Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong ji: Bujian*, Vol. 6, p. 97.
1. Xie Deyuan (1897–1935), whom Mao refers to here by his zi, Zizhang, was a native of Anding xian in Shaanxi Province. According to recent Chinese biographical dictionaries, he joined the Party in 1924.
2. The Chinese term here is qingtian, literally “clear sky,” a respectful sobriquet for a clean and upright official.
3. According to Mao’s appeal of July 15, 1936, to the Gelaohuui (see Volume V, pp. 144 and 245–47), both Xie Zizhang and Liu Zhidan were “not only leaders of the Red Army” but also “exemplary members” of that secret society.
Speech at the First Representative Conference of the Students’ National Salvation Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region

(August 13, 1939)

(Special report to this newspaper): ... Comrades Mao Zedong, Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, Deng Fa, and Zhang Diancheng quietly entered the conference room from a door on the left side immediately after the Conference approved the circular telegram. The whole audience stood up and welcomed them with enthusiastic and prolonged applause.

After a short interval, Comrade Mao Zedong strode up to the platform with joyful countenance. The applause broke out once again like spring thunder. Comrade Mao Zedong tried several times to begin speaking, but each time he was stopped by this overwhelming sound.

We are very happy because comrades are meeting here with great enthusiasm. We did not ask you comrades about the purpose of your conference, but we already know it. In this China of ours, there are two types of meetings. One type aims to thwart China's freedom and independence; such meetings are held by Chinese traitors and diehards. Another type demands China's freedom and independence. The meetings of the Communist Party and anti-Japanese elements all demand freedom and independence for China. ... It is impossible to overthrow Japanese imperialism and win final victory without democracy. Which is better for the country—to perish or not to perish? We say that it is better for the country not to perish. But there should be democracy. Without democracy, the country will definitely perish. What is democracy? Democracy is the right freely to take any road. This condition in itself is sufficient. With this right, we can go anywhere we like. We may go to fight the fascists, the Chinese traitors, and the Trotskyites. So we must definitely have these two characters. 1

Sun Yat-sen has an ism called people's rights. 2 But now there are some people who have forgotten it, but nevertheless insist that they are faithful disciples of Sun

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This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, August 18, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 95–96, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. i.e., the two characters minzhu, forming the Chinese term for democracy.
2. Minquan, Sun’s term for democracy, often used by Mao in this sense in the 1920s, and during the war against Japan.
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Sun Yatsen has an ism called people’s rights.² But now there are some people who have forgotten it, but nevertheless insist that they are faithful disciples of Sun

Yatsen. It is not enough for them merely to be disciples, they must be faithful ones too. ... Each sentence and each word moved the heart of every comrade. His voice is as firm as an iron hammer, striking powerful blows against those diehards who oppose democracy, oppose people’s rights, and oppose young people.

Another round of enthusiastic applause breaks out. Comrade Mao Zedong, surrounded by several thousand pairs of eyes, concludes his speech concisely and to the point.

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¹. I.e., the two characters minzhu, forming the Chinese term for democracy.
². Mingquan, Sun’s term for democracy, often used by Mao in this sense in the 1920s, and during the war against Japan.

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, August 18, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 95–96, where it is reproduced from that source.
To Mao Anying and Mao Anqing

(August 26, 1939)

Anying and Anqing, my sons:1

I have received your last letter, which makes me feel very happy!

How have you been doing lately? Have you made any progress?

I am all right. I have also read some books, but not many; in my heart, I feel far
from satisfied, unlike you, who spend most of your time studying.

I asked our old comrade, Lin Boqu,2 to buy some books for you and all the
young comrades and to send them to you. I wonder if you have received them?
Write and tell me. I will write again.

Wishing you growth, progress, and happiness!

Mao Zedong

Invitation to Mr. Nehru to Visit Yan’an

(August 27, 1939)

To the New China Daily in Chongqing, for transmittal to Mr. Nehru, the leader of
the Indian National Congress:

I have heard, sir, of your arrival in Chongqing. From this time forward, the two
great nations of China and India will unite even more closely in the struggle for
their freedom and liberation. I, your humble servant, would like to extend to you
our best regards and sincere welcome on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party
and the Chinese people. I would also like to welcome you to visit Yan’an, so that
we may hear your great instructions in person. The medical team your honorable
organization has sent to aid China in her resistance to Japan is now serving in the
Eighth Route Army. This has moved and encouraged the entire army, and we wish
to express our gratitude.

Mao Zedong

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1. Mao’s eldest son, Mao Anying (1922–1950), and his second son, Mao Anqing
   (1923– ), had been looked after by the Party in Shanghai following the execution of their
   mother, Yang Kaihui, in 1930. In 1936, they were sent to Moscow, out of concern for their
   safety and also so that they could receive an education. Mao Anying was killed during an
   American bombing raid in November 1950 while serving in Korea.

2. Lin Zuhun (1885–1960), hao Boqu, had long been Mao’s comrade both in the Chi-
   nese Communist Party, which he joined in 1921, and in the Guomindang during the First
   United Front (see Mao’s letter to him in Volume II, pp. 192–94). He had been commissar
   for finance in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, and had participated in the Long March. At this
time he was the representative of the Eighth Route Army in Xi’an and was thus in a position
to obtain books for Mao’s sons.

This letter was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, September 1, 1939. We have translated
it from Mao Zedong ji. Buyuan, Vol. 6, p. 99, which reproduces it from that source.
Mao Zedong, Leader of the Chinese Communist Party, on the Present International Situation and China’s War of Resistance

(September 1, 1939)

(Special report from our correspondent, September 4.) On September 1, our correspondent called on Comrade Mao Zedong and asked him for his opinions on questions concerning the present international situation and China’s War of Resistance. Comrade Mao’s replies were as follows:

Correspondent: What is the significance of the nonaggression pact suddenly reached between the Soviet Union and Germany?

Mao Zedong: The Soviet-German nonaggression pact is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government. The signing of the pact is no accident and has great political significance. This treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie, represented by Chamberlain and Daladier, sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, exposed the lies of this reactionary clique against communism and the Communist International, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. In the East it deals a blow to Japan and helps China; it strengthens the position of China’s forces of resistance to Japan and deals a blow to the capitulators. Thus it provides a basis for helping the people of the whole world to win freedom and liberation. Such is the full political significance of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact.

Question: People do not yet realize that the Soviet-German nonaggression pact is the result of the breakdown of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks, but think that the

Soviet-German pact caused the breakdown. Please explain why the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks failed.

Answer: Purely because of a lack of good faith on the part of Britain and France. For the past several years, the reactionary international bourgeoisie, above all that of Britain and France, has consistently pursued a reactionary policy, the so-called policy of “nonintervention,” toward the fascist aggression of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The purpose of this policy is to connive at wars of aggression and to profit from them. Consequently, Britain and France flatly rejected the Soviet Union’s repeated proposals for a genuine front against aggression. Instead, they adopted a “noninterventionist” position and connived at German, Italian, and Japanese aggression, while they themselves stood on the sidelines. Their aim was to step forward and intervene when the belligerents had worn each other out. In pursuit of this reactionary policy, they sacrificed half of China to Japan and the whole of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to Italy and Germany. In line with this policy, they also intended to sacrifice the Soviet Union. This has already been clearly revealed in the course of the recent Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks. These talks lasted for more than four months, from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. But, from start to finish, Britain and France rejected the principle of equality and reciprocity; all they wanted was for the Soviet Union to guarantee their security, while they refused to do likewise for the Soviet Union and the Baltic states, so as to leave a gap through which Germany could attack. They also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops through Poland to fight the aggressor. That is the fundamental reason why the talks broke down. Meanwhile, Germany gave up its anti-Soviet position, indicated its willingness to abandon in reality the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact, and recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers. Hence the conclusion of the Soviet-German nonaggression pact. The policy of nonintervention pursued by the international reactionaries, and primarily by the British and French reactionaries, is a policy of sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight, a downright imperialist policy of profiting at others’ expense. This policy was initiated when Chamberlain took office and reached its climax in the Munich agreement of September last year. Thus it finally collapsed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. From now on, the situation will inevitably develop into one of direct confrontation between the two big imperialist blocs, the Anglo-French bloc and the German-Italian bloc. As I said last year at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, “The inevitable consequence of Chamberlain’s policy will be like

This interview was first published in Xinhua ribao, September 6, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 9–16, which reproduces that text.

1. Mao Zedong, Leader of the Chinese Communist Party, on the Present International Situation and China’s War of Resistance → Interview with a New China Daily correspondent on the New International Situation

2. Britain and France → The British and French governments
3. This → This plot
4. The Baltic states → The little Baltic states
5. Gave up its anti-Soviet position → Showed willingness to stop opposing the Soviet Union

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‘lifting a rock only to drop it on one’s own toes’.” Chamberlain started out with the aim of injuring others and benefiting himself, only to end up by harming himself. This is the law of development which governs all reactionary policies.

Question: In your opinion, how will the present international situation develop?

Answer: At present, the international situation has already taken on a new aspect. During the previous stage, the second imperialist war, which began some time ago, had only a partial character, in the sense that, as a result of the policy of “non-intervention,” one group of imperialist states attacked while another simply looked on; as far as Europe is concerned, this will inevitably be replaced in the future by a situation of all-embracing war. The second imperialist war has already entered the second stage. In the East, although the situation is different, there will also be a new stage. In Europe, a large-scale imperialist war is imminent between the German-Italian imperialist bloc and the Anglo-French imperialist bloc, which are contending for domination over the colonies. In this war, in order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both sides in the conflict will shamelessly declare their own cause to be just and that of their opponents unjust. In fact, this is nothing but a swindle, because the aims of both sides are imperialist aims; both are fighting for domination over the colonies and semicolonies and over spheres of influence, and both are waging a predatory war. At present, they are fighting over Poland, the Balkan peninsula, and the Mediterranean littoral.6 The only just wars are nonpredatory wars, wars of liberation. Communists most strongly oppose any predatory war. They will, however, bravely step forward to support every just and nonpredatory war for liberation, and they will stand in the forefront of the struggle. With Chamberlain and Daladier practicing intimidation and bribery, the social-democratic parties affiliated with the Second International are splitting up. One section, the reactionary upper stratum, is following the same old disastrous road as in the First World War and is ready to support the new imperialist war. But another section will join with the Communists in forming a popular front against war and fascism. At present, Chamberlain and Daladier are following in the footsteps of Germany and Italy and are becoming more and more reactionary. Right now, they are taking advantage of the war mobilization to fascitize the state organization of their countries and to militarize the economy. In short, the two big imperialist blocs are feverishly preparing for war, and millions of people are facing the danger of mass slaughter. But such a situation cannot fail to arouse antiwar movements7 among the masses. Whether in Germany or in Italy, Britain or France, or anywhere else in Europe or the world at large, if the people do not want to be used as imperialist cannon-fodder, they will have to rise up and oppose the imperialist war in every possible way. Apart from the two big blocs discussed above, there is a third bloc in the capitalist world, headed by the United States and including a number of Central and South American countries. In its own interests, this bloc will not be drawn into the war, at least for the time being. As regards world peace, it can still work in concert with the Soviet Union and play a somewhat positive role. In the name of neutrality, American imperialism is refraining8 from joining either of the belligerents, so as to be able to come on the scene later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world. The fact that the American bourgeoisie is not yet prepared to discard democracy and a peaceetime economy at home is favorable to the world peace movement. As for Japanese imperialism, which has been badly hit by the Soviet-German pact, it is facing a future beset with still greater difficulties. Two factions within Japan are fighting over foreign policy. The fascist warlords are still contemplating an alliance with Germany and Italy for the purpose of gaining exclusive control of China, invading Southeast Asia, and expelling Britain, the United States, and France from the East. On the other hand, the liberal bourgeoisie9 would prefer the policy of making concessions to Britain, the United States, and France in order to concentrate on plundering China. At present, there is a strong tendency toward a compromise between Britain and Japan. The British reactionary bourgeoisie10 dreams of offering Japan the joint partition of China plus financial and economic aid, on condition that Japan serve as the watchdog of British interests in the East, suppress the Chinese national liberation movement, contain the Soviet Union, and defend the United States. Consequently, no matter what happens, Japan’s basic aim of destroying China can absolutely never change. The possibility that Japan will launch large-scale military offensives in some parts of China11 may not be very great, but it will step up its political offensive to “use Chinese to control Chinese”12 and its economic plundering of China to “sustain the war by means of war,” while keeping up its frantic “mopping-up” campaigns in the occupied areas; moreover, it wants to work through Britain to force China to surrender. At a favorable moment, Japan will propose an Eastern Munich and, with some relatively big concessions as bait, will try to coax and bully China into accepting its terms under duress, in order to attain its aim of subjugating China. No matter what cabinet changes the Japanese ruling class may make, this imperialist aim will remain unchanged until the Japanese people rise in revolution. Outside the whole capitalist world, there is a world of light, the socialist Soviet Union. The Soviet-German pact has raised the international status of the Soviet Union, increased the capacity of the

6. Here the Selected Works text adds: “This war is not at all a just war.”
7. Antiwar movements → Resistance movements
8. Is refraining → Is refraining temporarily
9. The liberal bourgeoisie → One section of the bourgeoisie
10. Reactionary bourgeoisie → Reactionaries
11. Military offensives in some parts of China → A frontal military offensive in China
12. Here Mao uses the expression yi Hua zhi Hua, a deliberate paraphrase of the policy yiyi zhiyi, “using barbarians to control barbarians,” i.e., playing off one Western nation against another, advocated by some Chinese statesmen in the nineteenth century.
Soviet Union to aid the world peace movement, to aid China in its War of Resistance, and to aid the liberation movements of all nations and peoples of the world. Such is my appraisal of the international situation.

Question: In these circumstances, what are the future prospects for China?

Answer: There are two futures for China. One is a future of perseverance in the War of Resistance, unity, and progress, which would be a future of national rejuvenation. The other is a future of compromise, splits, and retrogression, which would be a future of national subjugation. In the new international situation, as the Japanese bandits come up against increased difficulties and China resolutely refuses to compromise, the stage of strategic retreat will end for us and that of strategic stalemate will begin. This latter stage is that of preparation for the counteroffensive. But stalemate along the front means the reverse of stalemate in the enemy’s rear. As the possibility of a stalemate along the frontlines increases, the possibility of a stalemate behind the enemy’s lines will diminish. Consequently, from now on the large-scale “mopping-up” campaigns the enemy has been conducting in the occupied areas—mainly in North China—since the fall of Wuhan will not only continue, but will be intensified. Furthermore, since the enemy’s main policy consists in his political offensive to “use Chinese to control Chinese” and in his economic aggression to “sustain the war by means of war,” and since a Far Eastern Munich is the objective of British policy in the East, this will further increase enormously the very great danger that China may be lured into surrender, and that a split may be created. As for the relationship between China’s internal strength and that of the enemy, the difference is still very great, and unless the whole country unites in an arduous struggle, it will be impossible to build up strength for the counteroffensive. Therefore, China’s task in the War of Resistance is still an extremely important task and must never be neglected in the slightest degree. Consequently, without any doubt whatsoever, China must on no account miss the present opportunity or make a wrong decision, but must adopt a firm and correct political standpoint. This means, first, taking a resolute stand in favor of the War of Resistance and opposing any movement in favor of compromise. Resolute blows must be struck at all the Wang Jingweis, whether overt or covert. China must firmly reject any blandishments, whether from the enemy or from Britain, and must absolutely not participate in an Eastern Munich. Second, this means adhering firmly to the standpoint of unity and opposing any moves toward a split. Strict vigilance must be maintained against such moves whether they stem from the enemy, from other foreign countries, or from the capitulators at home. All friction harmful to the War of Resistance must be sternly checked. Third, this means firm adherence to the stand of progress and opposition to any retrogression. Whether in the military, political, financial, or economic sphere, or in the field of culture and education or the movements of the popular masses, every theory, every institution, and every measure harmful to the war must be reexamined and effectively changed to serve the War of Resistance and to respond to the aspirations of the entire country. If all this can be done, China will be able to build up its strength very well for the counteroffensive. From now on, the whole country must make “preparation for the counteroffensive” its overall task in the War of Resistance. At present, it is necessary, on the one hand, earnestly to sustain our defense along the frontlines and vigorously to assist the fighting behind the enemy lines and, on the other, to institute political, military, and other reforms, and build up tremendous strength, so that when the moment comes, our whole might can be thrown into a large-scale counteroffensive for the recovery of our lost territories. In the diplomatic field, the unswerving principle should be to treat those who support us as friends and those who support our enemy as enemies. For example, in the past, when Wang Jingwei and others proposed following the course of Germany and Italy, while Germany and Italy were assisting the enemy, this was a completely erroneous theory of Chinese traitors. But if in the future Germany and Italy abandon their policy of supporting the enemy, there is no obstacle to approaching them, in order to weaken the enemy’s strength. Again, if Britain supports the enemy and builds him up, we absolutely cannot rely on it, and must at all times be vigilant against its attempts to coerce and cajole us, in order to avoid being pulled into a vortex and harming the War of Resistance. As regards the Soviet Union, we should strengthen our friendship with it, and form a united front between the great Chinese and Soviet nations, in order to obtain more assistance from it, and consolidate the front of the War of Resistance. Our attitude toward the United States should be more or less the same. But it should be clearly understood that in all capitalist countries the most reliable friends supporting our War of Resistance are the broad masses of the people, and not the governments of these countries. In sum, the guiding principle for everything is whether it is advantageous for the War of Resistance. In the new international situation, as long as China is able to adopt a firm stand and carry out correct policies, it can reach the goal of final victory. Under the slogans of supporting Chairman Chiang and the National Government, opposing surrender and persevering in unity, opposing splits and persevering in progress, and opposing retrogression, the people of the whole

13. The Japanese bandits → Japan
14. As the possibility of a stalemate along the frontlines increases, the possibility of a stalemate behind the enemy’s lines will diminish. → As a situation of stalemate along the frontlines emerges, the struggle behind the enemy’s lines will become intense.
15. Main policy → Main policy at present
16. China → A great part of China
17. The enemy → Japan
18. The enemy → The Japanese imperialists
19. Friction → Internal friction
country should mobilize all their forces and struggle to prepare for the counteroffensive! Whether or not China's future counteroffensive will be successful depends on our standpoint and our work now. I hope that every patriotic party and faction, every patriotic person will give serious consideration to these great issues affecting the country, shoulder their responsibilities, and stride forward toward a great and brilliant future for the Chinese nation. The greatest struggle for liberation in the history of mankind is unfolding today. As long as we make every effort, there can be no doubt that the Chinese nation will win independence and liberation!

Our Views Concerning the Work of the Political Council in the Past and the Current Situation

(September 8, 1939)

It has been over a year now since the formation of the People's Political Council, on the first anniversary of the War of Resistance.

When we accepted the invitation to join the Council, we issued a statement, "Our Views on the People's Political Council." We pointed out, "Under the present circumstance of the intensified War of Resistance, the convening of the People's Political Council is a clear demonstration of progress toward a democratic system in our country's political life, and a clear demonstration of advances in unity and unification among our various parties, factions, nationalities, social strata, and geographical regions. Although in terms of the way it was established and the definition of its functions and powers the People's Political Council is not an altogether satisfactory plenipotentiary representative organ of the people, this by no means deprives it of its role and significance today—the role of further uniting all kinds of forces throughout the country in a concerted effort to continue the War of Resistance and strive for national salvation, and the significance of leading national political life toward the initial phase of genuine democracy. Therefore, we Communists will not only continue to work for the establishment in the future of a popularly elected plenipotentiary people's representative organ, but will also participate in the work of the People's Political Council with the most active, enthusiastic, and sincere attitude."

During the past year, the People's Political Council has met three times. From an overall perspective on the Council's work in the past, its greatest achievement lies with today's most pressing and central political question for China—persisting in fighting the War of Resistance of national self-defense to final victory and suppressing all kinds of tendencies and criminal activities of making halfhearted compromises along the way. All of this reflects the genuine demand of vast numbers of people throughout China. The Council's first meeting solemnly declared,

The text of these proposals was first published in the Chongqing edition of Xinhua ribao on September 9, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 17–26, which reproduces the text from this version.
1. For the full text of this document, dated July 5, 1938, see the translation in Volume VI of this edition.
“This Council hereby solemnly proclaims on behalf of the people of the whole country that the Chinese nation must persist in its unbending will to mobilize all its material resources and human power, for the sake of self-defense and humanity, to fight a protracted war against this most savage aggressor until the very end when final victory is won.” The second meeting, too, passed a unanimous resolution to “support the government’s established policy, as proclaimed by Chairman Chiang, of fighting a total and protracted War of Resistance and contending for the initiative,” and called upon the people of the whole country to “fight the War of Resistance resolutely, never capitulate, defend the country together, and accomplish the task of fighting the war and building the country.” The third meeting also resolved that “the established national policy of fighting the War of Resistance must be carried out to the end,” and called upon the people to “strengthen their confidence, keep in step with one another, and be of one heart and mind from beginning to end, in order to recover our territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity, and carry through to the end the great enterprise of fighting the War of Resistance and building the country.” In addition, participants in the three meetings put forward more than three hundred proposals on a wide range of concrete questions about fighting the War of Resistance and building the country. Although some of the matters raised were more urgent and some less so, and some of the proposals better thought out than others, it cannot be denied that all were products of careful consideration, and were designed to benefit the War of Resistance and the building of the country. What is regrettable is that the government has not been able to carry out truly and effectively the vast majority of the Political Council’s resolutions, thus reducing the effectiveness which the Council’s work should have had, and at the same time failing to satisfy the ardent hopes placed in the Council by our compatriots throughout the country.

In taking part in the work of the Political Council during the past year, we Communist Party members of the Council, in line with positions announced in our statement of July 5 last year, abiding by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s instruction for “a clear political stand and a sincere spirit of unity,” and urged on and encouraged by progressive people throughout the country, have been fighting together with other members of the Council to carry out the Chinese people’s will and demands. We firmly believe that today the people’s highest aspiration, resolve, and demand is to win victory in the War of Resistance, and to consolidate and expand the unity and progress of the whole nation, which are necessary for achieving and securing that victory. This is the reason that during the past three sessions of the Political Council we successively put forward the “Resolution on Supporting the Government in Carrying Out the Policy of Fighting the War of Resistance and Building the Country,” the “Resolution on Supporting Chairman Chiang and the National Government in Strengthening National Unity and Persisting in a Protracted War of Resistance to the Final Victory,” and the “Resolution on Supporting Chairman Chiang’s Strong Denunciation of [Japanese prime minister] Konoe, and Taking It as the Sole Criterion for the National Policy of Fighting the War of Resistance in the Future.” Thanks to the support of all fellow members of the Council, these resolutions were all adopted. In addition, we proposed special resolutions embodying our views on a variety of other basic issues in fighting the War of Resistance, such as building up the army, conscription, developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy’s rear, practicing democratic politics, protecting people’s rights, and so on. During the course of the past year’s work we have firmly adhered to our position: “We represent the Chinese Communist Party in our participation in the People’s Political Council, and we are sincerely willing to join hands and work very closely in the Council with comrades from the Guomindang and other political parties and factions, as well those without party affiliation, so that in a friendly and cordial manner we may discuss and decide on all the concrete measures and methods for applying them that are conducive to victory in the War of Resistance and success in building the country.” At the same time we have been firm in exposing and relentless in denouncing all erroneous statements that are detrimental to the War of Resistance or that advocate reconciliation and capitulation. During the first and second meetings, the mad reasonable views of Rebel Wang [Jingwei] and members of his clique such as Li Shengwu, though in disguised form, were denounced and refuted by us and by the great majority of our fellow Council members. During the past year of our work within the People’s Political Council, although we regret that we have not produced more results, we venture to say with confidence that we have maintained our clear-cut, principled position of unity for the War of Resistance and have not deviated in the slightest from compliance with the will and aspirations of the people.

Now that the government has decreed the extension of the term of office of Council members for another year, we, as Council members, wish to state our views to our fellow Council members and to the people of the whole country on the current situation and on the orientation for achieving future victories in the War of Resistance.

It is a characteristic of the present situation in the War of Resistance that, on the one hand, the enemy is beset with increasing difficulties after two years of its war of aggression, and our prospect of a future victory in the War of Resistance is opening up daily. On the other hand, however, far from changing their course of conquering and destroying China, the Japanese bandits have become ever more treacherous, ruthless, and vicious in carrying out their established plan of destroying our country and are also even more insidiously carrying out their policy of using Chinese to control Chinese, and using war to sustain war. Militarily, they have suspended their large-scale frontal offensives but are, instead, concentrating

2. Li Shengwu (1899–?), a native of Shandong Province, had pursued graduate study in Japan and England, obtaining a degree in law from Oxford University. After a period as editor of the official Zhongyang ribao in Nanjing, he served in the Foreign Ministry of the National Government from 1933 to 1937. From March 1940 until the summer of 1945, he occupied various important posts in Wang Jingwei’s puppet government.

3. On this term, see above the relevant note to Mao’s interview of September 1, 1939, in which he also employed it.
all their forces to mop up the area of guerrilla warfare in their rear. Their purpose in this, on one hand, is to sap our will to fight the War of Resistance and, on the other, to consolidate their foothold in the occupied areas. Politically, they are making every effort to support and make use of Rebel Wang, touting his absurd anti-Chiang, anti-Communist, and pro-capitulation views. They are stepping up their activities in creating a puppet government, a puppet political party, and a puppet army; and at the same time instigating the likes of Rebel Wang and his clique, and other elements who harbor disloyal designs to sow seeds of discord and carry out anti-Chiang, anti-Communist activities within the camp of the War of Resistance, in an attempt to bring about a situation that forces China to capitulate. Economically, they carry out plunder, extortion, dumping goods, and exploiting our resources, in the execution of their vicious plan of using war to sustain war and using Chinese resources to slaughter the Chinese people. At the same time, within the camp of the War of Resistance there are indeed a group of people who fail to make a correct assessment of the current situation. Either they believe that the enemy bandits have modified their policy of destroying China, or they think that it is possible to solve the Sino-Japanese problem by means of some sort of international conference. As a result they abandon the correct view, that of self-reliance, and make no concrete preparations for counterattacks. There are even those who go so far as to ignore the danger that the country may be destroyed and believe that our main energies should be directed toward domestic affairs, toward schemes for opposing Communism and disrupting the unity between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. They spare no effort to crack down on progressive forces and unremittingly to oppress the many promising young people. The impact of such self-inflicted wounds and fratricidal strife⁴ not only shakes the confidence of our compatriots in winning victory in the War of Resistance but also dampens the sympathy of international public opinion for the Chinese nation. Added difficulties in recruiting conscripts and devaluation of the government’s currency have led some people to feel that there is the will to fight the War of Resistance but not the skill to defeat the enemy. All these things have deepened and intensified China’s national crisis. Moreover, the development of the current international situation has brought about enormous changes in the environment of our country’s War of Resistance. As a result of the signing of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, the anti-Communist axis has disintegrated, thus further isolating diplomatically the Japanese bandits and causing a shock in their domestic politics. This should have a beneficial effect on the situation in our country’s War of Resistance. At the same time, because of the great European war brought about by the German fascists’ invasion of Poland, the Japanese bandits will take advantage of the tension in Europe to step up the execution of its policy of concentrating

⁴ What we have rendered here as “self-inflicted wounds and fratricidal strife” is in the original text an expression meaning “inflicting pain by burning beanstalks to cook beans,” that is, “fighting within the family instead of fending off attacks from without.”

its might on destroying China, and the British pro-compromise faction will try even harder to seek a possible compromise between Britain, Japan, and some other countries on the condition of sacrificing China. All this will create many new difficulties for our country’s War of Resistance. For this reason, at present both the internal and external environment in our War of Resistance are undergoing new and radical changes. Under the new circumstances both at home and abroad, the important task now facing people all over China is to understand clearly all the features and possible trends of the new domestic and international situation, to persist in the national policy of fighting the War of Resistance to the end, to oppose the danger of compromise halfway, to make every effort to strengthen the unity of the whole country, to oppose all sorts of divisive plots, to strive for the country’s continued progress, and to oppose all reactionary and retrogressive phenomena. At the same time, great efforts should be made to seize upon every incident and factor in the dramatically changing world situation that is favorable to us, so as to win more foreign assistance and support, overcome all dangers, surmount all difficulties, increase our strength, and prepare for the counteroffensive. To overcome the present difficulties and dangers, and to prepare our country’s strength seriously for the counteroffensive, we believe that efforts should be made at present in the following respects:

1. As regards the political aspect
   a. Mobilize the forces of the whole country to oppose compromise and capitulation, broaden the anti-Wang campaign, and eliminate all the hidden followers of the Wang faction and all capitulationist elements in the resistance camp;
   b. Strengthen the wartime government, unify the military and political leadership, draw in people of talent from all parties and factions, and improve the efficiency of the wartime administrative offices;
   c. Practice wartime democracy, severely punish illegal acts of oppression directed against the popular masses and against young people, and effectively guarantee the freedom of speech, of the press, of association, and of assembly of the people, as well as their right to armed resistance against invasion;
   d. Punish severely and dismiss corrupt officials, and practice local autonomy;
   e. Set up arbitration organs to settle disputes between labor and capital, and between tenants and landlords, so as to improve the livelihood of the impoverished workers and peasants. This will increase the enthusiasm of the popular masses for the War of Resistance and will aid in the conscription and mobilization of soldiers.

2. As regards the military aspect
   a. Develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy rear, to the point of turning the enemy’s rear into a battlefield and achieving a major victory by the accumulation of numerous minor victories. To do this requires the following:
      i. To prescribe and carry out the administrative program for guerrilla base areas, in compliance with the principles of the Program for the Resistance
military training and solid political education, and expected to maintain the good traditions of each unit;
iv. All national defense divisions should enjoy equal treatment in terms of equipment, pay, and provisions, which should be superior to those of ordinary units;
v. The national defense divisions should be trained regularly and in a planned way, by responsible officers who are capable and have performed meritorious military service. The training is to be done in their respective areas and to the whole army unit.
vi. To build up an industry of national defense and step up military purchases from foreign countries, so as to obtain sufficient modern equipment for the xx national defense divisions within two years.

3. As regards the economic aspect
We must disrupt the enemy’s construction and development, while carrying out our production and economizing. To do this requires the following:

a. Disrupt the enemy’s construction in the occupied areas and his exploitation of our resources. Arouse the popular masses to boycott Japanese goods completely and to prevent the selling to the enemy of local products that could be of use to him. If some special military supplies have to be imported from Japan, their purchase is to be controlled by the state;
b. The state is to provide financial support and rewards to private investment so as to expand the cooperative movement in industry and agriculture, promote extensively various useful industries, and increase agricultural production as much as possible;
c. Vigorously promote a movement for economy by military and political organs and by individuals.

4. As regards the financial aspect
Resolutely transform the old workstyle, and carry out thoroughly a wartime financial policy. To do this requires the following:

a. The issue of government currency must be appropriately coordinated with the circulation of capital, so as to eliminate the phenomenon of a price differential between coastal and interior areas;
b. Foreign currencies must be strictly and completely controlled, and a foreign currency committee should be set up by the Political Council, with the mission of checking periodically whether the approval and use of foreign currencies by the Finance Ministry is justifiable, so as to put an end to all fraudulent practices for private gain;
c. Private control of finance and disruption of the currency are to be strictly investigated and forbidden, especially financial malpractice and speculation by people in official positions, and the offenders must be severely punished;
d. Portions of provinces in the war zones, those in enemy-occupied areas in particular, are allowed to issue a certain amount of local currency or paper money for local circulation;

5. These twos appear in the Chinese text. There is no way of knowing with certainty whether the reference is to the number or to the identity of the divisions, but the repetition of this device in paragraph vi suggests Mao is talking about numbers.
e. Overseas Chinese and banking circles at home should be persuaded to buy more government bonds; they should be assured of the government’s possession of actual funds and compensated with advantages in investment at home;
f. As our national tax policy, progressive rates should be adopted in sales tax, income tax, and inheritance tax, land rent should be gradually reduced, and miscellaneous taxes and levies should be abolished;
g. Confiscation of the property of the Chinese traitors must be strictly carried out, and in the case of those landlords who have escaped to enemy-occupied areas, the government should collect in their stead the land rent, which should be less than originally demanded and treated for the time being as the direct revenue of the state;
h. The state budget, from the central level down to the local level, should be determined anew. The expenses that are related to the War of Resistance should be increased as required, and those that are not related to the war should be cut as much as possible, while those that can be dispensed with should be eliminated;
i. The salaries of government administrative personnel, and especially of high-ranking officials, should be uniformly reduced and reduced to a level lower than that of military officers of the same rank. Extra pay and double salary should be abolished, and commissions prohibited in government borrowing or purchases.

5. As regards the diplomatic aspect
If we wish to isolate the Japanese bandits as much as possible and strive to increase international support, it is necessary:

a. Truly to unite all the peoples and governments that support and sympathize with our War of Resistance and make every effort to win from them more material aid and moral support;
b. Resolutely to oppose all the plots of any state to make concessions to the Japanese bandits at the expense of China; resolutely support the orientation of independence and self-reliance in foreign policy;
c. In support of the People’s Political Council, all parties and factions, and all the various mass organizations should send delegations abroad to visit the various countries for extensive people’s diplomatic activities, in order to increase the aid to us from the forces of democracy and peace.

6. As regards cooperation among the various parties and factions
Strengthening the sincere unity among the various parties and factions participating in the War of Resistance, especially the friendly cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, is in fact a fundamental guarantee in carrying out all the measures mentioned above, surviving the present perils, and defeating the Japanese bandits and Traitor Wang. To do this requires the following:

a. To issue an explicit order guaranteeing the lawful rights of all parties and factions that are fighting Japan and to abolish in practice the many so-called measures to restrict the activity of alien parties;
b. To issue orders strictly forbidding discrimination and oppression directed against the Communist Party and against other parties and factions that are fighting Japan, and effectively prohibit threats to the occupation and the person of young people and others in industry, agriculture, the military, schools, and commerce on account of their party membership or their ideology, in order to create a situation of harmonious unity of the whole nation;
c. Talented people should be widely absorbed in every kind of work related to the War of Resistance from various parties and factions; they must not be discriminated against or rejected as people useful to the state on account of their party membership or their personal opinions.

At this time, when the bandits are penetrating deeply and disaster is threatening our nation, and when the world situation is stormy and changeable, it is the demand and aspiration of the people of the whole country to carry on the War of Resistance resolutely to the end, consolidate unity within the country, and strive for the progress of the whole country, in order truly to augment our strength in the War of Resistance and prepare for the counteroffensive against the enemy. It is as the representatives and emissaries of the people in the People’s Political Council that we have sincerely made this joint statement before the convening of its fourth session. We hope that the people of the whole country and all our fellow councilors will offer us their instruction, encouragement, supervision, and criticism. We also offer it as the orientation for the joint struggle of all our fellow countrymen both inside and outside the Political Council.

Mao Zedong
Qin Bangxian [Bo Gu]6
Wu Yuzhang7
Deng Yingchao9

Chen Shaoyu [Wang Ming]
Lin Zuhan
Dong Biwu8

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6. Regarding Qin Bangxian, better known under his pseudonym Bo Gu, who was at one time the dominant figure in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, see Volume V, passim.
7. Regarding Wu Yuzhang, see the note to Mao’s letter to him dated simply 1939, translated below.
8. Dong Biwu (1886–1975) was a member of the Central Committee.
Speech at an Evening Welcome Party for the Northern Route Comfort Corps of the National Comfort Corps of China

(September 9, 1939)

(Written specially for this newspaper) . . . The humming of the vehicles was heard coming from outside the windows. All of a sudden, the singing was interrupted, and a solemn silence prevailed in the whole hall. First, Mr. Zhang Ji1 and Mr. He Zhonghan,2 guided by Comrade Mao Zedong, entered the hall. All those present stood up at once, and thunderous applause arose. After the other guests had come in one after another and taken their seats, formal opening of the party was proclaimed. Comrade Mao Zedong went up to the rostrum amid an enthusiastic ovation and delivered an address of welcome.

Comrades:

Today we are very happy and very sincere in holding this evening party and in welcoming the many comrades who have come to visit Yan'an. First of all, on behalf of all the comrades present, I salute Chairman Lin of the National Government3 (the audience stands and applauds) and Chairman Chiang, the leader of the nation (the audience stands and applauds). . . .

It has been two years now since we united to resist Japan, and this circumstance has done away with the stagnation of two years ago. At that time, there was no War of Resistance, and no unity. Now unity and the War of Resistance have come into existence, and this is a new phenomenon, a new scene. We are very much gratified that this new scene has already entered its third year. During the past two years of the War of Resistance, there have, however, been some minor clashes and some minor friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party. As a result, the comrades of these two parties are anxious and solicitous about the problem of relations between the parties. This is truly a problem that has attracted everybody's attention. Not only the comrades within the two parties, but also ordinary people in society, are very concerned, and are awaiting a satisfactory answer to this problem. In fact, this matter is not all that difficult to comprehend. Everyone should be aware that the Three People's Principles are the political foundation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are its organizational foundation. The united front is a large union, which embraces all parties and factions, all circles and armies, all individuals—everyone, with the exception of Chinese traitors. Naturally, the Communist Party recognizes that, of the two parties, the Guomindang is the primary great party. Although, in addition to these two parties, there are various other parties and factions, various circles and armies, the fact remains that the Guomindang and the Communist Party constitute the foundation. If these parties were not united, the united front would be out of the question. That is why we say that the Guomindang and the Communist Party are the organizational foundation of the united front. During the past two years of the War of Resistance, the unity of the two parties has been the central issue. The problem today is a problem which arises after two years of the War of Resistance, but there has been, and should be, no change in our basic orientation, which is summed up in the word "unity." Unity is the basic orientation. Unity should be achieved on the basis of progress.

Recently, there has been some friction between the two parties in some places and among certain members. Such a phenomenon is not a good thing; but, as everyone knows, looking at the overall situation, the entire country is under the leadership of Chairman Chiang, and the people of all walks of life are concerned about one another, and urge one another on, so our unity in the War of Resistance can be relied on. We must definitely unite, no matter what happens; we have no orientation other than unity . . . .

Because the enemy is "opposing Chiang," we, the people of the whole nation, must rise in support of Chairman Chiang (all those present applauded). Because the enemy wants to overthrow the National Government, we, the people of the whole country, must support the National Government (all those present applauded); because the enemy and Chinese traitors such as Wang Jingwei are trying to wreck the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, we, the people of the whole country, should support the cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party (all those present applauded); because the enemy wants to smash the Anti-Japanese National United Front, we, the people of the whole country, should support the Anti-Japanese National United Front (all those present applauded);

This report was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, September 15, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 101–3, where this version is reproduced.

1. Zhang Ji (1882–1947), zi Puquan, a native of Zhili, was a charter member of Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui, and in the early 1920s he was active in the affairs of the Guomindang. After a brief eclipse because he had supported the anti-Communist Western Hills group in 1925, he soon returned to a leading role in the affairs of the Nanjing government. In 1939, he was head of the Central Comfort Corps and frequently visited military units in the field.

2. He Zhonghan (1899–1972), a native of Hunan, had studied in the Soviet Union in 1921 and attended the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East. After graduating from the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924, he went once again to the Soviet Union in 1925 and entered the Frunze Military Academy. In 1928, he went to Japan for further military and political studies. Returning to China in 1931, he became a member of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and occupied various important posts in the field of political training in the army. At this time, he was head of the Comfort Corps in the Northwest.

3. The reference is to Lin Sen; see above, the relevant note to “The Reactionaries Must Be Punished,” August 1, 1939.
because the enemy wishes to see internal conflict among us, we must not fight a
civil war (all those present applaud). We should do things that will gladden those
close to us and sadden the enemy, and do nothing that might hurt those close to us
and please the enemy. We must stick to our own stand and never confuse it with the
enemy’s slogans. Our slogan is opposition to the enemy on all points, absolutely
without the slightest confusion with the enemy. Any slogan that is identical with a
slogan of the enemy is a pretext for fawning on and capitulating to the enemy; any
statement like those of the enemy is a hackneyed tune that helps the enemy and
boosts the enemy’s arrogance. Anyone who wants to take over the enemy’s slogans
and, at the same time, talks about fighting the enemy is uttering nothing but deceitful
words, which will be cruelly exposed by an implacable history.

Today, only by uniting the whole country, supporting Chairman Chiang, suppor
ting the National Government, supporting the cooperation between the
Guomindang and the Communist Party, and supporting the Anti-Japanese National
United Front, resolutely persisting in the War of Resistance and opposing capitula
tion, persisting in unity and opposing dissension, persisting in progress and op
posing retrogression, can we defeat Japanese imperialism and drive it out of the
country. Only thus can an independent and free new China emerge.

Today we welcome our revolutionary elder, Mr. Zhang Puquan. He belongs to
the older generation of the revolution and has made tremendous contributions to the
cause of unity in the War of Resistance. So today we invite this venerable
gentleman to give us instruction. We also welcome all the comrades in the Com
fort Corps and ask for their instruction.

(All those present applauded and shouted: “Welcome to the Central Comfort Corps!” “Wel
come to the Central Political Work Delegation!” “Support the National Government!” “Sup
port Chairman Chiang and persist to the end in the War of Resistance!” “Support the coop
eration between the Guomindang and the Communist Party!” “Support the Anti-Japanese
National United Front!” “Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!”

The Communist Political Councilors Contribute
in Support of the Hong Kong Workers
Who Are Opposing Wang

(September 12, 1939)

To Xinhua ribao, for transmission to

Worker friends of the three newspapers Nanhua, Tianyan, and Ziyou in Hong Kong
who are on strike against Wang [Jingwei]:

In declaring a strike and refusing to work in the course of the struggle against the
Wang clique of Chinese traitors, you have manifestly set a good example for people
all over China; this also further illustrates the vanguard role of the working class in the
War of Resistance, and their resolute and unyielding spirit of active struggle.
The continuous development and expansion of this campaign is an extremely heavy
blow at the Japanese bandits and the Chinese traitors.

We are writing especially to send to you our warmest regards and highest re
spects with utmost sincerity. In addition, each of us has contributed 50 yuan (350
in total), to be passed on to you through Xinhua ribao, as a slight token of our
concern.

With national liberation salutations,

Mao Zedong Chen Shaoyu Qin Bangxian Lin Zuhan
Wu Yuzhang Dong Biwu Deng Yingchao

This document was first published in Xinhua ribao (Chongqing), September 13, 1939. We
have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, p. 27, which reproduces this text.
Outline of a Speech on the Second Imperialist War

Speech at a Cadres' Meeting in Yan'an
(September 14, 1939)

I. A New Stage in the War

The second imperialist war began a long while ago, and the fighting has been going on for many years. The aggression against China by the Japanese imperialists started in 1931. They first occupied China's Three Northeastern Provinces and then in 1937 staged a large-scale invasion of China proper. The Italian imperialists invaded Abyssinia in 1935. Germany and Italy jointly invaded Spain in 1936. In 1938, Germany occupied Austria and Czechoslovakia. In this period, more than 500 million people in the East and the West were drawn into the war, but imperialist countries such as Britain, the United States, and France were still not participating. Consequently, we call this period the first stage of the second imperialist war. Starting now, however, from the time when Britain and France have joined in the war, we call it the second stage, because the circumstances have already become completely different. If, in the past, it could still not be called a world war, because it was not taking place on a world scale, things are now different. Now the war has already become an imperialist world war, and this constitutes a new stage in the imperialist war.

II. The Cause of the War

According to historical facts and Lenin's doctrine, capitalist development in the age of imperialism is extremely unbalanced, so war between the various imperialist countries is unavoidable. Less than twenty years after the end of the first imperialist war, which aimed at dividing up the world anew, a second imperialist war has broken out, and the imperialist countries are trying once again to divide up the world. The initial phase of this new war, that is, its first phase, was founded on the last worldwide economic crisis. When the unprecedented worldwide economic crisis between 1929 and 1933 was over, it was followed not by prosperity, but by a peculiar kind of depression. Some imperialist countries, such as Japan and Italy, considered that they had received too small a share of the spoils of the First World War, while others, such as Germany, deemed that they had lost out in the distribution of booty in the previous war. So they rushed into the arena of war fully armed, in an attempt to evade the economic crisis and escape the collapse of capitalism. It was these circumstances that brought about the outbreak of the second imperialist war and shaped its first stage.

In the second stage of the second imperialist war, Germany, Britain, France, and Poland have launched a large-scale war; the various capitalist countries in the world will get involved, directly or indirectly, on the basis of the new economic crisis. The new world economic crisis, which began in 1937, has in recent years penetrated the so-called "peaceful" states such as Britain, France, and the United States, and is also developing in Germany, Japan, and Italy. On the foundation of this economic crisis, a grave political crisis has also been created. The people are dissatisfied with capitalism and with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Whether in the states that became fascist a long time ago or in the states where they are just now taking advantage of the war to carry out fascization, this political crisis, this popular discontent, are daily becoming more acute. On the other hand, the socialist Soviet Union has been strengthened to the point where it can no longer be invaded. Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie of all the imperialist states realizes that, without a vast war, without transforming the limited war into a total war, without demolishing its imperialist friends, it cannot escape economic and political crisis, nor can it escape its own doom.

Such, in every particular, are the calculations of the bourgeoisie of all the countries of the world on the eve of its death. The authors of these calculations cannot imagine that in this way—by making use of a war to divide up the world anew, in order to escape from the economic and political crisis and avoid their own death—they cannot fail to create an even greater economic and political crisis and hasten their own doom. They are like mad dogs, they are already mad, the capitalist system has made them altogether mad. They cannot do otherwise than hurl themselves pell-mell against their enemies and against the walls of the world. Such is the reality of life today in all the capitalist countries of the world. A fight between mad dogs—such is the present imperialist war.

III. The Goal of the War

"War is the continuation of politics." The nature of imperialism is predatory, and even in periods of "peace" there is no instance when the policy of the imperialist states is not predatory. But when the predatory policy of certain imperialist states encounters the obstacle of certain other imperialist states and cannot break through this obstacle by peaceful means, then these states use warlike means to break through it, so that they may pursue their predatory policies. Therefore, plunder is the one
and only political goal of imperialist wars. The aim of the second imperialist war is the same as that of the first imperialist war. It consists in dividing up the world anew, that is, in dividing up anew the colonies, semicolonies, and spheres of influence, in pillaging the peoples of the world, and in establishing their rule over the peoples of the world. This goal of the second imperialist war remains exactly the same, whether in the previous stage or in the present stage. Apart from aims of this kind, are there any other aims? Are there any good aims? There are none whatsoever. Whether it be Germany, Italy, or Japan, whether it be Britain, the United States, or France, all the imperialist states participating directly or indirectly in the war have only a counterrevolutionary goal, a goal of plundering the people, an imperialist goal. The “lasting peace” of Japanese imperialism, Hitler’s “national self-determination,” Chamberlain’s “opposition to National Socialism,” Daladier’s “support for Poland,” all come down in reality to a single word: “plunder.” Only because it sounds good, and to fool the people, do they order their secretaries to invent a few fancy synonyms, that is all.

IV. The Nature of the War

The nature of the war is in line with the political aims of the war. All wars can be divided into two categories. According to Comrade Stalin’s formulation, there are: (1) just wars, the aim of which is not pillage but liberation, and (2) unjust wars of pillage. By its nature, the second imperialist war, like the first imperialist war, falls into the second category, because neither of these wars has any purpose whatever other than the plunder of the people of the world, doing absolutely no good for the people of their own countries or of other countries. Therein lies the plundering, unjust, and imperialist nature of the war. Now both sides in the war, to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, are shamelessly declaring that they are just, while accusing the other side of being unjust. In reality, this is nothing but a farce, a kind of deception. Only wars of national liberation and wars for people’s liberation, as well as the wars waged by the socialist countries in support of these two kinds of liberation movements, are just wars. This time, many people have once again become confused. In their view, Germany is, of course, unjust, but Britain and France are democratic countries opposing fascist countries, and Poland is fighting a war of national self-defense, so Britain, France, and Poland have a somewhat progressive character. This is an extremely muddled view. The confusion arises from lack of clarity about the purpose of the war and about the differing characteristics of the first and the second phases of the war.

V. The Peculiarities of the First Stage of the War

The peculiarities of the first stage of the second imperialist war are as follows: (1) As regards the relations among the various imperialist countries, a portion of the imperialist states, the three fascist states of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were waging frenzied wars of aggression, violating the interests of all small and weak nations, violating the interests of all democratic countries, and unleashing a threat of fascism within each democratic country. Consequently, the people of the whole world demanded that aggression be resisted and democracy defended. They all demanded that another part of the imperialist states, the so-called democratic states of Britain, the United States, and France, intervene against these wars of aggression and that they allow the people to retain a small residue of democracy. The Soviet Union made known many times its willingness to establish a united front against aggression with all the so-called democratic states. If these so-called democratic states had intervened at the time against the aggressors; if, for example, they had been able, together with the Soviet Union, to assist the armies of the Spanish government in halting the aggression by Germany and Italy and to assist China in halting the aggression by Japan, such actions, such wars, would have been just, and would have had a progressive character. But these so-called democratic states did not intervene at all; they adopted a policy of “nonintervention.” Their aim was to bring about a situation in which the two sides—the side of the aggressors and the side of the victims of aggression—would be exhausted by war, after which they could come out to intervene and rake in the spoils. The sacrifice of Austria and Czechoslovakia to Germany by Britain and France was in fact made on a basis of give-and-take. That is, the sacrifice was made on condition that Germany attack the Soviet Union. Britain, France, and the United States wanted to provoke a clash between the Soviet Union and Germany, a strategy of murdering people with someone else’s hand and of making both sides suffer and neither side gain, which would allow them subsequently to achieve exclusive domination over the whole world. As a result of this “nonintervention” policy of theirs, only one group of imperialist countries was involved in the war, while another group was “sitting on top of the mountain and watching the tigers fight,” so the war remained lopsided, partial, and unchecked. The counterrevolutionary policy of “nonintervention” adopted by the bourgeois governments in the democratic countries, which the popular forces were unable to abolish, gave rise to this partial character, which was the first peculiarity of the first stage of the war. (2) Nevertheless, during this period, apart from the circumstance that German, Italian, and Japanese imperialism were waging unjust wars of pillage, and that the so-called democratic states were allowing them to continue, there was a circumstance of another kind, there were also wars of national liberation. These were Abyssinia’s war of resistance against Italy, the Spanish Republic’s war of resistance against Germany and Italy, and China’s great War of Resistance against Japan. Furthermore, the people of the whole world and the socialist Soviet Union have been sincerely supporting these wars. These latter wars are just wars, wars not of plunder but of liberation. Such are the two characteristics of the first stage of the war.

The one-sided character of imperialist wars and the existence of anti-imperialist wars have been the two peculiarities of the first stage of the second imperialist war.
VI. Our Revolutionary Policy During the First Stage of the War

On the basis of the peculiarities of the first stage of the war, there is not the slightest doubt that the revolutionary policy in this stage has been to set up a united front of the states which have been invaded, in order to resist the onslaughts of the aggressors; to organize increasingly intense antifascist struggles by the popular masses in various democratic countries so as to safeguard democracy; and, at the same time, not to abandon the struggle to organize and develop the joint effort of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries to halt aggression. As regards this last point, namely, the formation of a united front against aggression between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, even after Munich, because of the anger aroused among the broad masses of the English and French people and even among the left wing of the bourgeoisie by the defeat of Spain and the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, there was a possibility of compelling the Chamberlain and Daladier governments to abandon their policy of nonintervention and to organize, with the Soviet Union, a united front against aggression. This possibility has not yet completely disappeared at the present time. In a word, the overall task of the revolution in that period was to draw all possible forces throughout the world into a united front against fascism and aggression in order to check the frenzied invasion by the three fascist countries and to frustrate the fascist attacks from within in various other countries. Consequently, at that time the united front could be formed with the following four possible components: (1) in the capitalist countries, the united popular front, the united front of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie; (2) in the colonies and semicolonies, the united national front, the united front of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; (3) the socialist Soviet Union; and (4) the bourgeoisie and its government in the various democratic countries. The last component was still possible at that time because, in the face of the frenzied aggression by the fascist countries, the threat from the internal fascist forces, and the danger that was arising from the opposition to the Soviet Union, the bourgeois classes and their so-called democratic governments in these democratic countries had interests in common to some extent with the people of their own countries, with the people of their colonies and semicolonies, and with the Soviet Union. Of the four components, the Soviet Union was the main force. If the Soviet Union had been successful in forming a genuinely effective united front with all the so-called democratic countries to cooperate with the united fronts of the peoples of various countries and the national unified fronts of the colonial and semicolonial countries, it would have been possible to stop further aggression by the fascist countries and put off to a later date the outbreak of the world war. Furthermore, if war had broken out, it would have been possible to defeat all the fascist countries. Had this been done, it would have been truly advantageous to the people of the world, and to all the countries of the world except the aggressors, and it would have been supported by the world proletariat. So the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, concluded two treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, respectively, and finally entered into talks with Britain and France. Such a revolutionary policy was adapted to the world situation of the time and was necessary and correct. That was the only thing to do, and there was no other choice.

VII. The Breakdown of the Talks Between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, and the Beginning of the Second Stage

The bourgeoisie of the so-called democratic states fears on the one hand that fascist states may violate their interests; but they fear the development of the revolutionary forces even more. They fear the Soviet Union, they fear the liberation movements of the people of their own countries, they fear the national liberation movements in the colonies and semicolonies. Consequently, they rejected a genuine united front against aggression and a genuine war against aggression involving the participation of the Soviet Union, and instead organized by themselves on their own a counter-revolutionary united front and launched on their own a bandit war of plunder.

The Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations lasted more than four months, from April 15 to August 23. The Soviet Union, for its part, had already exercised the utmost patience. Britain and France, on the other hand, refused from beginning to end to recognize the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They simply demanded that the Soviet Union guarantee their security, and yet they refused to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union or of the small countries of the Baltic, thus leaving a breach through which Germany could send its forces. In addition, they would not allow the Soviet army to cross Poland to fight the aggressor. Naturally the Soviet Union was not willing to conclude a treaty like that proposed by Britain and France, which was not at all suited to revolutionary aims, but served only counterrevolutionary aims. What the Soviet Union was prepared to sign was a treaty based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, truly advantageous in halting the expansion of the aggressors and beneficial to the cause of world peace. That was the kind of treaty that Britain and France would never bring themselves to sign. This is the basic reason for the rupture of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations. During this period, Germany abandoned its anti-Soviet position and was ready to abandon in practice the so-called “Anti-Comintern Pact”; it recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontier, and so the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded. The absolute lack of sincerity of Britain and France in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, their absolute refusal genuinely to oppose aggression, and their determination to break off the Three-Power Negotiations, proves nothing less than that Chamberlain had already decided on war. Consequently, if the great war broke out, it was not only Hitler but Chamberlain who wanted to fight, for if he had really wanted to avoid the war, he could certainly have done so only with Soviet participation. Even Lloyd George of England, a representative of the bourgeoisie, understood this point. And yet there are some fools who still do not grasp it even today and still believe that Chamberlain’s entry into the war was not fully prepared beforehand. They also fail to see that Chamberlain entered into the three-power talks
solely in order to mobilize public opinion, so that he could declare to the popular masses: We, the British and French governments, have done everything humanly possible but are unable to form an alliance of the three countries, so the only alternative left for us is to declare war on Germany.

Under these circumstances, the war between Germany and the three countries of Britain, France, and Poland broke out in the first ten days of September, thus opening a new stage in the second imperialist war—its second stage.

VIII. The Peculiarities of the Second Stage of the War

At present, now that a great war has broken out, the circumstances have undergone a fundamental change. The distinction that existed in the past between the fascist states and the democratic states has lost all meaning. At the present time, if one wishes to distinguish between things of different natures, there are only the following two categories: (1) all the countries that are waging an imperialist war of pillage, as well as all the countries that are in reality supporting this war, which constitute the first category; and (2) those countries that are waging not wars of pillage but just wars of national liberation and people’s liberation, as well as the countries that support these wars, which constitute the second category. Now we must make new distinctions based on the new circumstances and abandon the old way of making distinctions, because things have already changed. The bourgeoisie in democratic countries has finally refused to compromise with the people and the Soviet Union, and has started a war of plunder. Today Britain has already become the most reactionary country in the world, and Chamberlain is already the number one anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, antidemocratic, and antipopular chieftain, the enemy of all small and weak peoples.

In these circumstances, all the Communists should understand that the period for winning over the bourgeoisie and its governments in the so-called democratic countries, so as to form a united front with the Soviet Union, the people of various countries, and various colonial and semicolonial states, is already over. Such a possibility no longer exists. The only thing possible today is a united front against war and aggression formed by the Soviet Union with the people of all capitalist countries and all the oppressed nations in colonial and semicolonial countries. At present, the category that is missing is the bourgeoisie of the so-called democratic countries. The fact that this component, after wavering, has finally joined the enemy camp, becoming one of the two parties locked in an imperialist war, constitutes a great change. As a result, the number of components that could possibly make up a united front has been reduced from four to three. This change has led, first, to the transformation of the second imperialist war from a partial to an all-embracing conflict (because the reaction has changed from partial to all-embracing). Second, it has caused the components that make up the new united front against war and aggression to be pure, unlike the old ones which were mixed. These are the two peculiarities of the second stage of the war.

Many comrades, paying no attention to the changing circumstances and the peculiarities of the new situation, think that things remain what they were. They let their thinking remain in the past stage, and they look on the changing situation from the old point of view. They have overlooked the qualitative changes in the new situation, thus falling unconsciously into a wholly erroneous position, into the position of the social democratic parties. I hope that the comrades who have made such mistakes will quickly correct themselves, and I am also persuaded that, having been once reminded, they can correct themselves.

IX. Our Revolutionary Policy in the Second Stage of the War

What should be the revolutionary policy of the proletariat, and especially of the Communist Party, in the light of the peculiarities of the second stage of the war? In my opinion, it should be as follows:

1. In all the imperialist countries participating in the war, it consists in calling on the people to oppose the imperialist war, unmasking the imperialist nature of the war, treating both sides in the war as bandits of the same ilk. In particular, it means opposing British imperialism, this bandit chieftain, awakening the people so that they will not be deceived by the imperialist bandits, carrying out propaganda among the people in favor of turning the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war, and forming a popular front against the imperialist war.

In all belligerent countries, if there are places where there are Communist members of the parliament, they should all vote against the war budget, as Comrade [Karl] Liebknecht, leader of the German proletariat, did in his valiant and resolute struggle in the German parliament during the first imperialist war. They must absolutely not vote in support of the war, thus confusing their image with that of the social democrats. For the social democratic parties in these countries, following in the track of the first imperialist war, are shamelessly supporting the war under the slogan of “defending the fatherland” (the fatherland of capitalist bandit gangs). The social democratic party in Japan, that is, the so-called socialist party of the broad masses, has long betrayed the proletariat and given its support to the war of aggression of the Japanese warlords. At present, the social democratic parties in Britain and France, in response to the coercion and inducements of Chamberlain and Daladier, are betraying the proletariat of their own countries and supporting the bandit war of British and French imperialism. The Polish Social Democratic Party is supporting the reactionary bourgeois government of Poland, a running dog in the pay of Chamberlain, and has betrayed the interests of the Polish nation. In Poland they should, without the slightest doubt, mobilize the whole people, and unite with the Soviet Union to resist the aggression of German imperialism, and fight for the defense of Poland and the liberation of the Polish nation. But the fascist government of Poland has, on the contrary, suppressed the national liberation movement in its country, rejected the assistance offered by the Soviet Union, and willingly led the Polish people to become the cannon fodder of British and
French financial capital, thus willingly turning Poland into a part of the reactionary battlefront of world financial capital. Though there is no doubt that we have sympathy for the Polish people, we have absolutely no sympathy for the reactionary government of Poland, nor can we tolerate the Polish Social Democratic Party, which is supporting such a government. Consequently, it is only by exposing the betrayal of the social democratic parties that the Communist parties in all belligerent countries, whether in Germany, Japan, and Italy, or in Britain, France, and Poland, can win over the masses of the people, organize a revolutionary united front, and prepare to use revolutionary war in order to put an end to the counterrevolutionary war.

2. In all neutral countries, such as the United States, Communist Party members should expose to the people the imperialist policy of the bourgeois government, that is, a policy which calls itself neutral, but in reality aids the war and seeks to enrich itself greatly in the war. The American imperialists, behind the mask of neutrality, have already made a great deal of money at one stroke in the Sino-Japanese war of the past two years, and are now again hoping to make money in the new war. Two weeks ago, in my talk on September 1, I said that the U.S. bourgeoisie would not go so far for the time being as to abandon democratic politics and normal economic practices at home. I did not expect that, within a very short span of only a few days, it would declare a "partial emergency." In so doing, it is following in the footsteps of Britain and France, and heading step by step toward becoming more reactionary and putting itself on a war footing. The Communist Party must oppose such sham neutrality, which in reality supports the imperialist war. It must oppose the political fascization of these countries, the betrayal by the social democratic parties of these countries, and the involvement of these countries in the war, which would lead to unlimited expansion of the war zone.

3. In all the colonial and semicolonial countries, the policy to follow is that of the national united front, either to resist the invader (as in the case of China) or to oppose the metropolitan country (as in the case of India), in order to attain the goal of national independence. It is necessary to oppose the actions by the national traitors at home in betrayal of the national interests before a united front can be created, and the enemy can be defeated. In all the colonies of belligerent countries, we must oppose the actions of the traitors to the nation in selling out and supporting the war waged by the metropolitan country, oppose the mobilization of the people of the colony to participate in the war on the front of the metropolitan country, and remind the people of the colony of their bitter experience during the first imperialist war. In the colonial and semicolonial countries, there can be no hope for the national liberation movement without opposing the traitors to the nation.

X. The Outcome of the War

The ongoing war will be a protracted war. I fully agree with Comrade Voroshilov when he said in his speech at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "In the contemporary era, the wars of the future will be protracted and continuous wars of attrition." He also said, "Without a doubt, in the inevitable and unavoidable general military conflict, there will eventually come an unprecedented juncture of life and death importance." His assessment is very correct. This protracted character is determined by the existence of both imperialist wars and anti-imperialist wars, both counterrevolutionary wars and revolutionary wars, by the fact that the war is both continuous and subject to local and temporary cessations, by reorganization and changes in the belligerents, by the destruction and reconstruction of the belligerents. All of these extremely complicated, changing circumstances have determined the protracted nature of the war. The second imperialist world war is an unprecedented disaster for the human race. All over the world, tragic instances of death, sickness, starvation, unemployment, deprivation of education, and broken families with their members separated or dead are rife. There can be no doubt that these circumstances will arouse the oppressed people in all the capitalist countries and the oppressed nations in all the colonial and semicolonial countries, who will awaken, unite, oppose imperialist wars, and organize revolutionary wars, the magnitude of which will far exceed that [of such wars] at the time of the First World War. During the First World War, no Communist parties existed except in Russia. Now things are different. Communist parties are to be found in dozens of countries, and have grown strong both politically and organizationally. There was no socialist country at the time of the First World War. Now things are different. The Soviet Union not only exists but has become one of the most powerful countries in the world. It firmly opposes the imperialist war and resolutely supports people's liberation wars and national liberation wars. In the present war, it will play the great role of safeguarding the interests of mankind and intervening against imperialism. Now the division in the world has become extremely clear. All those elements of the bourgeoisie that are directly or indirectly participating in the imperialist war are reactionaries and make up the reactionary camp. The present imperialist war is a war between two imperialist cliques within this big reactionary camp. The conflict between the two reactionary cliques within this reactionary camp will in no way hinder them from uniting in the future to oppose the Soviet Union, oppose the people's liberation movement in various countries, oppose the national liberation movement in colonial and semicolonial countries, and oppose the world revolution. It would be naive to believe that they will go on fighting each other endlessly and can therefore be easily overthrown by the revolutionary people. That is one side of the matter—the side of the world reactionary front. On the other side are to be found the Soviet Union, the people's liberation movements in capitalist countries, and the national liberation movements in colonial and semicolonial countries. All of these make up the reactionary front, the revolutionary camp. Their objective is to overthrow the world reactionary camp, overcome the imperialist war with revolutionary war, topple the chief culprits of the war, overthrow the bourgeoisie, and liberate the oppressed peoples and nations of the world from the oppression of capitalism and from the
imperialist war. This is a great process of struggle, a process of arduous and protracted combat, and a process in which to educate, awaken, and organize the people and lead them in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. The capitalist economy has already come to its end, and the era of great change and great revolution has already arrived. The present era is a new era of war and revolution, an era in which the entire world of darkness will be transformed into a world of light. We are right in the midst of this era.

The Chinese nation, which has been carrying on a War of Resistance Against Japan for two years, is a component part of the camp of world revolution, and an important and powerful part of that camp. The war by 450 million people for national liberation will definitely play a great role in the transformation of the world. The imperialist war is detrimental both to the world and to China, whereas the existence and growth of the Soviet Union, of the people’s liberation movement in various capitalist countries throughout the world, and of the national liberation movement in colonial and semicolonial countries, are all good friends to China and provide dependable assistance to China’s War of Resistance. China, the Soviet Union, the people’s liberation movements in various countries, and the national liberation movements in various countries should form a firm united front, a revolutionary united front which serves to resist the counterrevolutionary united front. In this respect it can be said that wars between imperialisms, and the mutual weakening of imperialisms, constitute a favorable condition for movements of popular liberation in various countries, for movements of national liberation in various countries, for China’s War of Resistance, and for the building of communism in the Soviet Union. Thus we can say that the darkness in the world is only temporary, and the future of the world is bright. Imperialism will surely perish, and the liberation of the oppressed peoples and of the oppressed nations is beyond any doubt. China’s future is also bright. Provided only that China’s anti-Japanese united front is further consolidated, and as long as we struggle with all our might, under the slogans of persistence in the War of Resistance and opposition to capitulation, persistence in unity and opposition to splits, and persistence in progress and opposition to retrogression, our enemy will also certainly perish, and a new, free, and independent China will emerge!

Mr. Mao Zedong’s Interview with Mr. Liu, Correspondent for the Central News Agency, Mr. Geng, Correspondent for Saodang Bao, and Mr. Zhang, Correspondent for Xinmin Bao

(September 16, 1939, at 6:00 p.m., in Yan’an)

Correspondent: We wish to consult you on a few questions. We have read your statement of September 1 in today’s Xin Zhonghua bao; it deals with some of our questions, but there are others on which we would like you to elaborate. Our written questions are divided into three groups, and we would be glad if you would give us your view on each of them.

Mao Zedong: I shall deal with them according to your list.

First, let us discuss the issue of the War of Resistance. You gentlemen ask if the War of Resistance has reached the stage of stalemate. I think it has in a sense—in the sense that there is a new international situation and that Japan is facing greater difficulties, while China has stood firm against compromise. This does not rule out the possibility that the enemy may still launch fairly big offensive campaigns; for instance, he may attack Beihai, Changsha, or even Xi’an. When we say that the enemy’s large-scale strategic offensive and our strategic retreat have in a sense largely come to an end, we do not altogether exclude the possibility of further offensives and retreats. As for the concrete substance of the new stage, it is to prepare for the counteroffensive, and this concept covers everything. That is to say, during the stage of stalemate China must build up all the strength required for the future counteroffensive. To prepare for the counteroffensive does not mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done unless the conditions are ripe. What we are talking about is the strategic, and not the tactical, counteroffensive. Tactical and partial counteroffensives, such as our repulse of the enemy’s “mopping-up” campaigns in southeastern Shanxi, are not only possible but absolutely necessary. But the time has not yet arrived for a large-scale strategic counteroffensive, and we are now in the period of actively preparing for it. In this

This interview was first published in Jiefang, no. 86, October 10, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 49–55, which reproduces this version.
period we shall still have to repulse a certain number of offensive campaigns the enemy may launch at the front.

To list the tasks of the new stage, in the enemy's rear we must keep up guerrilla warfare, smash his "mopping-up" campaigns, and defeat his economic aggression; at the front we must strengthen our military defenses and repulse any offensive campaign the enemy may launch; in the great rear area the main thing is to work actively for political reform. All these things constitute the specific content of our preparations for the counteroffensive.

Internal political reform is extremely important because at this stage the enemy is mainly carrying on a political offensive, so it is particularly necessary for us to strengthen our political resistance. In other words, the problem of democratic politics must be solved as soon as possible, for only thus can we increase our capacity for political resistance and build up our military strength. China has to rely mainly on our own efforts (zili gengsheng) in the War of Resistance. Although we have spoken of relying on our own efforts in the past, this has become even more important in the new international situation. The essential content of relying on our own efforts is democratic politics.

Correspondent: You have just said that democratic politics is essential to winning victory in the War of Resistance by relying on our own efforts. How can such a system be brought into being in the present circumstances?

Mao Zedong: The division into the three periods of military rule, political tutelage, and constitutional government was originally proposed by Mr. Sun Yat-sen. But in his "Statement on My Departure for the North" issued in the last year of his life, he no longer spoke of the three periods, but said instead that a national assembly must be convened in China immediately. This shows that Mr. Sun himself modified his doctrine many years ago in the light of changing circumstances. In the grave situation prevailing today, with the War of Resistance going on, both the early convening of a national assembly and the introduction of democratic politics are imperative for truly averting the calamity of national subjugation, and for driving out the enemy. Opinions differ widely on this question. Some say that the common people are ignorant, and democratic politics cannot be introduced. This is wrong. The common people have made very rapid progress in the war and, given leadership and direction, democratic politics can certainly be introduced. For example, it has already been put into practice in North China, even though this has still not been done thoroughly. There most of the heads of districts, townships, and the bao and jia are chosen by popular vote. Even some xian magistrates have been

chosen in this way, and progressive gentry and promising young people have been elected. Questions of this kind should be thrown open to public discussion.

In the second group on your list, you raise the question of "guarding against and restricting alien parties," that is, the question of the friction in various localities. You gentlemen are quite right to be concerned about this matter. There has been some improvement recently, but fundamentally the situation remains unchanged.

Correspondent: Has the Communist Party made its position on this question clear to the Central Government?

Mao Zedong: We have already protested.

Correspondent: In what form did you raise the question?

Mao Zedong: Our Party representative, Comrade Zhou Enlai, wrote a letter to Chairman Chiang as early as July. Then again on August 1, people from all walks of life in Yan'an sent a telegram to Chairman Chiang and the National Government, demanding the withdrawal of the "Measures for Guarding Against and Restricting Alien Parties," which had been secretly circulated and which are at the very root of the "friction" in various places.

Correspondent: Has there been any reply from the Central Government?

Mao Zedong: There has been no formal reply. But it is said that these things have not actually been given final approval by Chairman Chiang, and there are also many people in the Guomindang who disapprove of such "measures." As you know, an army that participates in the common fight against Japan is called a friendly army, not an "alien army," so a political party that participates in the common fight against Japan is a friendly party, not an "alien party." There are many parties and groups taking part in the War of Resistance and, while they vary in strength, they are all fighting in the same cause; they must absolutely unite and must in no circumstances "guard against and restrict" one another. What is an alien party? The party of traitors headed by Wang Jingwei, the running dog of Japan, is an alien party, because it has nothing in common politically with the anti-Japanese parties. That is the kind of party which should be guarded against and restricted. Between the Guomindang and the Communist Party there is common

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1. At this stage → At present
2. In the last year of his life → Shortly before his death
3. Doctrine → Views
4. Gentry → Elements
5. "Measures for Guarding Against and Restricting Alien Parties" → "Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties"
6. Many people → Some people
political ground, namely resistance to Japanese aggression and establishment of a democratic republic. Therefore, the problem at present is how we can concentrate all our strength to oppose and guard against Japan, and oppose and guard against Wang Jingwei; it is not a problem of opposing and checking the Communist Party. Slogans can be put forward only on this basis. At present, Wang Jingwei has three slogans: “Oppose Chiang,” “Oppose the Communists,” and “Be pro-Japanese.” He is the common enemy of the Guomindang, the Communist Party, and the entire people. But the Communist Party is not the enemy of the Guomindang, nor is the Guomindang the enemy of the Communist Party; they should unite and help each other rather than oppose or “guard against and restrict” each other. The slogans on our side must definitely be different from Wang Jingwei’s; they must be the opposite of his and must absolutely never be confused with them. If he wants to oppose Chiang, we must support Chiang; if he wants to oppose the Communists, we must unite with the Communists; and if he wants to be pro-Japanese, we must resist Japan. This was the way the people of China acted in the past, and it is the way they should act now and in the future. Whatever the enemy opposes we should support; whatever the enemy supports we should oppose. In articles nowadays people often quote an old saying from the Eastern Han dynasty. At that time, Zhu Fu, a high-ranking officer of the Han emperor Guangwu, wrote a letter to Peng Chong, the prefect of Yuyang. The letter contains the words, “Whatever you do, you must be sure that you do not offend your friends and gladden your enemies.” This statement expresses a clear-cut political principle which we must never forget.

In your list of questions, you gentlemen also ask about the Communist Party’s attitude to what has come to be known as “friction.” I can tell you frankly that we are fundamentally opposed to such friction between the anti-Japanese parties, which cancels out their strength. But if any party persists in treating us outrageously, tries to bully us, and resorts to repression, the Communist Party will have to take a firm stand in dealing with it. Our attitude is: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.” As the saying of an ancient Chinese sage goes, “What the rules of propriety value is . . . reciprocity. If I give a gift, and nothing comes in return, that is contrary to propriety; if the thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return, that is also contrary to propriety.” Our attitude is that we treat people in accordance with propriety. But our stand is strictly one of self-defense; no Communist is permitted to go beyond the principle of self-defense. This is a fact that everyone can see for himself; I need not talk more about it.

Correspondent: How about the friction in North China?

Mao Zedong: Zhang Yinfu and Qin Qirong are the two expert friction-mongers there. Zhang Yinfu is Hebei and Qin Qirong in Shandong are utterly lawless, and their actions are scarcely distinguishable from those of the Chinese traitors. They seldom fight the enemy, but frequently attack the Eighth Route Army. There is a mass of indisputable evidence, such as Zhang Yinfu’s orders to his subordinates to attack the Eighth Route Army. We have already sent these materials to Chairman Chiang.

Correspondent: Is there any friction with the New Fourth Army?

Mao Zedong: Yes, there is. The Pingjiang massacre is a major incident that has shocked the whole country.

Correspondent: Some people say that the united front is important, but that the border region government should be abolished for the sake of unification. What do you think of this?

Mao Zedong: Nonsense of all sorts is being talked everywhere, and the so-called abolition of the border region is one example of this. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a democratic anti-Japanese base area and is politically the most progressive region in the whole country. What grounds are there for abolishing it? Moreover, Chairman Chiang long ago recognized the border region, and the Executive Yuan of the National Government officially recognized it as long ago as the winter of the 26th year of the Republic. China does indeed need to be unified, but it must be unified on the basis of the War of Resistance, cohesion, and progress. If unification is sought on the opposite basis, China could well perish.

7. In the Selected Works version, the substance of the previous three sentences remains the same, but the text has been rewritten in slightly more modern and colloquial form. Zhu Fu’s statement is summarized instead of quoted in the original text, and Emperor Guangwu is referred to by his name, Liu Xiu, instead of by his reign title.

8. The “ancient Chinese sage” referred to is Confucius or, in any case, the Confucian canon, which was frequently cited by Mao at this time. The passage in question marks is taken word for word from Volume I, part I of the Li ji. We follow here the English version of James Legge, in The Sacred Books of China. The Texts of Confucianism, Part III, the Li Ki (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), p. 65. This translation was published as Volume 27 of the series The Sacred Books of the East, edited by Max Muller.

9. Zhang Yinfu (1891–1940), a native of Hebei, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy. At this time, he held the rank of major general and was chairman of the Hebei provincial government. Qin Qiyong (1903–1943), a native of Gansu Province, was a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy. At this time, he was a commissioner in the Shandong provincial government and a leading figure in the Guomindang party apparatus in that province.

10. See above, the text of August 1, 1939, on this topic.

11. Here there is a typographical error in the Mao Zedong ji (kunjie instead of tuanjie), which we have corrected on the basis of the text as reproduced in Lun muqian guoji xingshi yu Zhongguo kangan (On the Present International Situation and China’s War of Resistance) (Chongqing: Xinhua ribao, December 1939), pp. 23–29.
Correspondent: Since there are different interpretations of unification, is there any possibility of a split between the Guomintang and the Communist Party?

Mao Zedong: If we are merely talking of possibilities, both unity and a split are possible, and the issue will be determined by the attitudes of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and especially of the people throughout the country. For our part, we Communists have long made it clear that our policy is cooperation and that we not only hope for long-term cooperation but are working hard for it. It is said that at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Guomindang, Chairman Chiang also declared that domestic problems should not be solved by force. Confronted with a formidable enemy and bearing in mind the experience which both the Guomindang and the Communist Party have had in the past, everyone assuredly wishes to avoid a split. But in order to eliminate completely all possibility of a split, political guarantees must be provided for long-term cooperation, in the form of perseverance in the War of Resistance and the introduction of democratic government. If this can be done, unity can be maintained and a split avoided; it depends on the common effort of the two parties and the whole nation, and the effort must be made. “Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation,” “Persist in unity and oppose a split,” and “Persist in progress and oppose retrogression”—these are the three great political slogans our Party put forward in its Manifesto of July 7 this year. In our opinion, this is the only way China can avoid subjugation and drive out the enemy. There is no other way.

(Editor’s note: Mr. Mao’s talk includes a section concerning the imperialist world war, which is omitted here since it is more or less the same as his talk on September 1.)

Form a Firm United Front, Defeat Japanese Imperialism

(September 18, 1939)

Comrades:

Today we are holding a meeting to commemorate the “September 18 Incident.” It is already eight years since this incident took place. September 18 is a painful day for us to observe; “September 18” is the day on which the loss of the Three Northeastern Provinces began; “September 18” is the day on which the risk of losing our entire state began. Formerly, we spoke like this, but many people did not believe us. They thought that the September 18 Incident would lead only to the loss of the Three Northeastern Provinces, not to that of the whole country. They said that the reason why the Japanese imperialists took over the Three Northeastern Provinces on “September 18” was to launch a war against the Soviet Union rather than to fight against China. The occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces was only temporary, and once the two countries had fought, there would be no problem. The Three Northeastern Provinces would be easily regained, or Japan might simply return them to us. There are some people who still think this way. Yesterday the Soviet Union and Japan signed a cease-fire agreement, relating to the border clash between Outer Mongolia and the puppet state of Manchukuo. The Japanese imperialists did not dare to continue to fight and yielded to the Soviet Union, so there could be such a cease-fire agreement. And yet many people simply refuse to consider the matter seriously; instead, they blame the Soviet Union for signing this agreement with Japan and earnestly wish that these other people will fight a big war. This is Chamberlain’s view, an idea of watching two tigers fight while they sit on the top of the mountain with folded arms, waiting to reap the benefit, it is an idea of harming others and benefiting oneself. Nevertheless, as far as this is concerned our idea is different from theirs. As soon as the September 18 Incident occurred, we said that the occupation of the Three Northeastern Provinces by the Japanese imperialists was their first step to destroy China. Their second step will be to destroy the entire Chinese nation. Now the iron facts have already been placed in front of our eyes, and it has been proved which prediction is correct.

Our source for this text is Dangde wenxian, no. 4, 1995, pp. 20–22.
It is already eight years since the September 18 Incident, and it is two years since the War of Resistance of the whole country began after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, yet China is still wandering along two roads. One is the road of compromise, surrender, split, and retreat. This is the road to the destruction of our state. The other is the road of persistence in the War of Resistance and opposition to surrender, persistence in unity and opposition to splits, persistence in progress and opposition to retreat. This is the road to national revival. Only by taking the second road will we be able to regain all the lost territory, regain the Three Northeastern Provinces, and realize our slogan, “Fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all lost territory.” If we take an opposite road, preferring surrender to persistence in the War of Resistance, preferring splits to persistence in unity, preferring backwardness to persistence in progress, we will not be able to fight all the way through to the Yalu River, nor will we be able to regain our lost territory. We will not even be able to fight to the Marco Polo Bridge and Shanhaiquan. We have only one slogan, and that is, “Fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory.” The Three Northeastern Provinces must be regained. Now there are some people who are opposed to regaining the Three Northeastern Provinces. They will be satisfied merely with regaining Shanhaiquan or the Marco Polo Bridge. What is more, the people who say this are not at all prepared to use their own strength to regain these territories but intend to rely, rather, on foreign countries. They hope that the signers of the Nine-Power Treaty will call a meeting to force Japan to return our lost territory. It will be all right just to return the territory as far as the Marco Polo Bridge; Japan does not have to return the territory north of the Marco Polo Bridge. Is this view correct? No, it is completely wrong. We want to fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory! To achieve this goal, we must rely first of all on ourselves. We should absolutely never rely entirely on others. Comrades! Rather than helping China, some countries are helping our enemy, Japanese imperialism. It has already become apparent that Britain is such a country. Britain and Japan are plotting to create a “Far Eastern Munich,” they are bargaining with each other in order to carve up China.

At present, confronted with the German invasion launched by Hitler in Europe, Britain and France have declared war on Germany. The United States is still looking on. But in the future, the war between the imperialists may stop, and they may unite to attack the Soviet Union, attack the national revolution in China, and attack the people’s liberation movement and the national liberation movement in the whole world. Great changes have already taken place in today’s world, especially in the past two weeks. That is, the capitalist countries in the whole world under the rule of the reactionary bourgeoisie are already standing on the same front to deal with the world revolution. Although there are problems and contradictions among them, the present war in Europe is the result of the conflict between the German bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie in Britain, the United States, and France. Yet we must know that no matter where these bourgeoisies come from, all blackbirds under the sky are black, they are all reactionary. Therefore, although there are many contradictions among them, as far as dealing with the revolution, they can often achieve counterrevolutionary unanimity.

If we want to regain our lost territory and the Three Northeastern Provinces, the comrades from the Northeast should first unite. The comrades from the Northeast should not distinguish among provinces and xian, should not distinguish between those who made revolution first and those who made revolution later. Everyone should unite and form a big group. The comrades from the Northeast, whether they are Communist Party members or comrades from other parties and groups, should all unite together to establish a firm united front. The same applies to the people in all the enemy-occupied areas. Nobody should create disputes; the big enemy is in front of us, we are in danger of losing our state, so how can we still clash about differences of opinion? We have only one enemy—the Japanese imperialists. We have only one objective—to regain all our lost territory. The comrades from the Northeast should first unite closely with the common people in the Northeast, form a united front with their 30 million fellow countrymen in the Northeast, and then unite with the people of all China and form a national united front. The slogan the Communist Party has raised is to persist in the War of Resistance and oppose surrender; persist in unity and oppose splits; persist in progress and oppose retrogression. These three slogans are the three medicines against disease, for some people in China are suffering from very dangerous diseases. They are infected with three serious diseases, namely the disease of surrender, the disease of splits, and the disease of retrogression. We have prepared three kinds of medicines for them. The first is "persist in the War of Resistance and oppose surrender"; the second is "persist in unity and oppose splits"; the third is "persist in progress and oppose backwardness." This is giving out the prescription according to the disease; once the medicine is taken, the diseases will be gone. It is very good that you comrades support these three slogans. You should go everywhere throughout the country and tell the common people, tell your fathers and mothers, your brothers, and your friends, whether close or distant, about these three slogans. In this way, one tells ten, ten tell a hundred, a hundred tell a thousand, and a thousand tell ten thousand. In this way the message will continue to be propagated, so that the 30 million compatriots in the Northeast and the 450 million compatriots in the whole country will all understand and support these three slogans, and everyone will unite to form a solid united front. All the common people, and all the patriotic elements who participate in the War of Resistance, should be organized into this solid united front. This is the basic force. Consequently, without the united front, there will be no hope of regaining all our lost territory. If we want to regain all our lost territory, we must definitely form a united front.

Comrades! When you go out, you should all organize small united fronts. For instance, if you become a teacher you should organize your students and their families into a united front; if you become a company commander, you should organize a united front in your company; if you become a journalist, you should organize all the people around you, including your relatives and friends, into a
Comrades from the Northeast, you have already been working hard for eight years in the process of organizing this great united front, and you should continue to work hard in the future. You should act like Yu the Great. For the sake of the public welfare, "he was eight years away from his home, and though he thrice passed the door of it, he did not enter."¹ Now you have already been away for eight years and have not once returned home. Comrades, you should still be prepared not to be able to go home for several years. You should be prepared to swear never to go home if the enemy bandits are not wiped out! You should have the spirit of sacrifice, of sacrificing yourselves for the sake of the public good. In what year will you finally be able to go home? We cannot say definitely at present. It is now 1939: we must wage a protracted war, we must continue to fight. Everyone must be resolute, and we must absolutely drive the Japanese bandits out of China! The focus of our work is to organize united fronts—the united front in the Northeast, in all the enemy-occupied territories, in all of China, and in the whole world. Comrades, provided only that we are resolute and act in this way, we are sure to succeed. The Northeast can definitely be regained, and we can definitely fight all the way through to the Yalu River and regain all our lost territory. By then our forces will be ready, and we will fight all the way back to the Northeast. Comrade Stalin has already prepared a hammer, and he is going to hit the Japanese imperialists on the head. When Japanese imperialism has been defeated, instead of a memorial meeting we will have a celebration meeting. By then, if China is liberated, we will have a meeting to celebrate the liberation of the whole country. At present, every comrade must make great efforts; everyone should study hard and try his best to participate in the national liberation movement. We will not rest a single day until China is victorious!

¹. The reference is to the Mencius, III, I, IV, 7 (Legge, Vol. 2, p. 251). Mao had already used this allusion in his essay of 1917 on physical culture; see Volume I of this edition, p. 120.
Interviews with Edgar Snow

(September 24–26, 1939)

I. The United Front and Problems of Policy

Snow: There seems to exist some discrepancy between the Guomindang’s description of the political basis of the War of Resistance, and the Communist Party’s.

These interviews were first published by Edgar Snow in the China Weekly Review, January 13 and 20, 1940, under the title “The Chinese Communists and Wars on Two Continents.” As Mao states in the second interview, his own secretary took down the proceedings directly in Chinese. It is presumably this record which provided the basis for the text of the first interview, printed from a manuscript in the Central Archives bearing Mao’s own corrections, that appears in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 238–46. This version is considerably fuller than the published English text. The additional material may have been deleted either by Snow or by the editors of the China Weekly Review, in order to save space or because it was considered of lesser interest to the Western reader. In any case, we have taken this Chinese version as authoritative and have amended the translation of Mao’s remarks accordingly. Words and sentences thus added to the published version are set in italics. Generally speaking, Snow’s questions have been left as they appear in the published text, on the assumption that he himself knew best what he had asked, but in a few instances points have been added from the Chinese transcript in order to show what Mao thought he was supposed to be answering. Changes, not specifically noted here, have been made in the orthography of Chinese names and in other minor details to bring the usage into conformity with that in this series, and variants of little substantive interest between the English and Chinese texts have been ignored. In borderline cases, we have avoided tampering with Snow’s English version. For example, in order to retain the atmosphere of the period, “Chiang weiyanzhang” has been left as “Generalissimo Chiang,” or simply “the Generalissimo,” rather than replacing this by “Chairman Chiang.” Unfortunately, the second interview, dealing with international affairs, is not included in Mao Zedong wenji. The Chinese text in Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 105–23, comprises both interviews, but it is taken from a volume published in China in 1982 which simply translates the 1940 English version back into Chinese. In the case of the second interview, therefore, we have reproduced the text from the China Weekly Review, while correcting a few typographical errors and making minor changes in usage as indicated above.

1. In the China Weekly Review, the two interviews are dated September 25 and September 26, respectively. Mao Zedong wenji dates the first September 24. Nianpu, Vol. 2, p. 138, gives the same date for the first interview, but, although it alludes briefly to the content of the second interview, it does not indicate precisely when it took place. Assuming that the first interview, for which an official record is cited, was held on the 24th, the second might have been either on the 25th or on the 26th. The subtitles for the two interviews are taken from the version published in 1940.

2. The main titles of the two interviews are taken from the printed text of these interviews in the China Weekly Review.

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The latter repeatedly emphasizes that the united front is the political basis of the war (see Mao Zedong’s “On Protracted War,” “On the New Stage,” etc.), while this phrase nowhere plays a role in the Guomindang literature and statements. The Guomindang sees the political basis of the war as the submission of the Communists and all other political groups to the dictatorship of the Guomindang.

Thus, in Chongqing I had an interview with General Zhang Qun³ and asked him his opinion on this point. He said there was no question of a united front at present, that there was only one legal party in China, the Guomindang, and but one legal government, the National Government. The “border region governments” were completely illegal and eventually would be abolished. General Jiang Dingwen⁴ told me the same thing in Xi’an. He said there was no other legal party in China except the Guomindang. The Communist Party “ceased to exist” after its agreement with the Generalissimo. Therefore there is at present no question of a united front. [The Communist Party had no legal position whatsoever in China],⁵ although the former Communists, as part of the Guomindang army, had a right to maintain offices and depots. Chen Lifu⁶ last year said practically the same.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek himself recently told a German correspondent that “there is not a single Communist left in China,” which obviously denies the legal existence of the Communist Party, hence the conception of the united front.

What is your answer to such statements? Wherein lies the legal foundation of the united front? The legal foundation of the Communist Party? Is it possible to have a nominal united front between two parties when one party denies the existence of the other?

Mao: The united front has actually already existed in China for some time. In the minds of the majority of the people, and in their utterances, writings, and actions...

3. Zhang Qun (1888–1991) was a native of Sichuan Province. In 1908 he went to Tokyo to study at the Japanese Military Academy; while there, he joined the Tongmenghui. He returned to China at the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911, and, beginning in the 1920s he occupied various posts, first in the Beijing warlord government, and then in the Guomindang. In 1938, he was appointed deputy head of the National Government’s Executive Yuan. At this time, he was also head of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council of National Defense.

4. Jiang Dingwen (1895–1974), zhi Mingsan, was a native of Zhejiang Province. A graduate of the Zhejiang Military Academy, he played an important role at the Huanghai Military Academy from its first session, and there established close links with Chiang Kai-shek. In the 1930s, Chiang appointed him to various commands in the war against the Communists. During the Xi’an Incident, he served as intermediary between Xi’an and Nanjing. At this time, he was commander of the Tenth War Zone.

5. This and other passages in square brackets are missing from the Chinese text.

6. Chen Lifu (1900–2001), a native of Zhejiang, obtained a master’s degree in mining engineering from the University of Pittsburgh. On returning to China, he became confidential secretary to Chiang Kai-shek and, thereafter, thanks to his close links to Chiang, occupied various important posts in the Guomindang party and government. As noted in Volume V, he played a conciliatory role between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party during the Xi’an Incident of 1936. In 1939, he was head of the Organization Department of the Guomindang and minister of education in the National Government.
as well, the united front is recognized as something real as well as nominal. But a small minority, though in reality it must perhaps acknowledge the united front, verbally tries to deny it, so that in their utterances and writings there is no such thing as a united front. We used to call these people's attitude Ah Q-ism, because the character Ah Q portrayed in Lu Xun's story always said he was right, was triumphant, whereas others were always wrong, always defeated. From an Ah Q-ist's viewpoint, there seems to be no united front. If you do not believe that, just refer to Lu Xun's "True Story of Ah Q."

There is a small group of people in China who have always very much wanted to be like Hitler, ignoring facts. Everyone knows that Hitler said some time ago that the Soviet Union is only a name, and there is really no such country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated and made some progress. On August 23, 1939, he suddenly discovered not only the nominal existence of the USSR, but the reality of it. (He signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union—E.S.) Among China's Ah Q-ists I think there are many who may make similar progress. If today they still deny the existence of the united front, and even the existence of the Communist Party, it is quite possible that some day in the future they may recognize the existence in name and in reality of the Communist Party and of the united front. There was a sage long ago in China called Mencius, who once said: "My eyesight is sharp enough to examine a point of autumn hair, but I do not see a wagonload of faggots." These words would very aptly describe today's Ah Q-ists.

As for the question of our submission to the dictatorship of the Guomindang, perhaps there are some Guomindang members who believe that and say that, but I consider that they are free to think as they like. Since they eat, sleep, their tongues are in their own mouths, and they have so-called brains, which are unique to higher animals—since they meet all these conditions, they therefore have such a freedom, the freedom to talk nonsense. Personally, I support the democratic principle of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, and I will not interfere with this freedom of theirs. In fact, just now I am too busy to bother about it. As for submission, I don't know what the other political groups say, but I know that since the first day of its existence the Communist Party has been entirely independent and has never sacrificed its independence for one day, half a day, an hour, or one minute. It has never submitted to any party or any group or any person. It is the most difficult thing conceivable to secure such a submission from the Guomindang Party.

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9. Snow's text has "December" here; this is an obvious error.
11. Instead of "nonexistent," the 1940 text has "really very incompletely realized."
12. Snow's text in the Review here includes the words "democratic" and "units" to describe what China is not.
13. Snow's text adds "and parties" here.
14. According to Sun Yat-sen's theory, a period of tutelage (under the Guomindang, as indicated by Snow's parenthetical note) would be required to prepare the people of China for democracy and constitutional government.
15. The 1940 version has "Border Government" instead of "border region."
Government formally ratified [legislation giving it a legal position]. The fact that it has not yet been promulgated and that the appointment of officials for the border regions has not yet been approved merely proves that the Executive Yuan’s standard of efficiency must be far too low and that bureaucratism in the Chinese government is truly very serious. No wonder the people of the whole country are demanding the thorough reform of administrative organs. The situation should be improved.

Snow: China’s foreign policy emphasizes that China’s struggle is on the side of democracy, and against fascism, and that China belongs in the ranks of the democratic powers. Is there, then, any basis for such a claim that China is a democratic country? Has China made any progress toward democracy since the war began? Have the people gained any political power? Here I don’t refer to conditions in the border regions or in the guerrilla areas, but to that part of Free China under the direct control of the Central Government.

Mao: There is one basis for such a claim, which is the official name of our state. Do not the people of various countries call us Zhonghua minguo—the Chinese Republic? I think that this is the only basis for the claim. But if we refer the claim to reality it is obviously not true. China today is an undemocratic country. Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s principle of democracy has existed for decades now, but so far it has not been realized. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the country want to see it realized, and some day it probably will be realized. When that happens there will be another basis for the claim. I hope this claim will be added, because not only would it be advantageous for diplomatic discussion, but, most important, it would facilitate the War of Resistance.

Snow: If China has not made any progress toward democracy during the war, what change has actually taken place in the character of the Central Government? Is it not still an exclusively Guomindang dictatorship?

Mao: There have been some changes in [the government’s] policies, [if not in the government itself]. They have stopped fighting a civil war and have begun to fight Japan. This is a change in policy. But as regards other policies, such as those referring to democracy and people’s livelihood, there have been no changes. Therefore people throughout the country are now fervently demanding the realization of the principles of democracy and people’s livelihood. We cannot say that there has been any organic change in the government. It is still a one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang. This dictatorship has aroused discontent in the whole nation, and it is a condition which must be changed. During the recent session of the People’s Political Council in Chongqing, Mr. Chiang said in his opening speech that all talented people should be mobilized, and the Political Council passed a resolution proposing that the “period of tutelage” be brought to an end and that constitutional government be established. This is good news. The people all over China are now very anxious about all this, because if China’s domestic politics are not reformed and democracy is not realized, then not only will it be impossible to defeat Japan but China will surely be dismembered.

Snow: (During another conversation I asked Mao whether the Communists would actually participate in a coalition government if they were offered any cabinet posts. I said I had been told that in 1938, when the government was at Hankou, one or two minor cabinet posts had been offered to the Communists, but that they had declined. It was said that the Communists did not want to take part in a coalition government because they were afraid the foreign powers might not approve of such a development, it would frighten wavering Chinese elements into the camp of compromise and defeatism, and the Communists did not want to assume any responsibility in a government in which they could not control policy. Mao Zedong denied that any cabinet posts had ever been offered the Communists. He said that if any such proposal were made, the Communist Party would be glad to participate.) Have any changes occurred in the class basis of the Chinese government as a result of the war?

Mao: In my view there have been some partial changes. The richest people along the seacoast and [in the cities] along the Yangzi River have mostly become Chinese traitors and semitraitors. This group finds representation in Wang Jingwei. People of this class can no longer be relied upon to support the government. The basis of a government for the War of Resistance should mainly rest upon, and will eventually have to rest upon, the middle class and the vast peasantry, because only these classes are the great force maintaining the War of Resistance.

Snow: Do you mean that the government actually represents the middle class and the peasantry more than it did formerly?

16. With regard to the previous two sentences, there are major discrepancies between the Chinese version and Snow’s published interview. The second sentence does not appear in Snow’s text. The beginning of the first one, in Snow’s version, becomes the following two sentences: “Why was such a bill ever promulgated and why did the Central Government approve the appointment of officials for the Border Government, if both are illegal? Such confusion on the part of high officials merely suggests that their standard of efficiency is really too low.”

17. The Chinese text refers here to “territories not under enemy occupation,” rather than to “Free China.”

18. The Chinese text omits the preceding clause.

19. Snow’s text adds here, “regardless of party affiliations, to work for the country.”

20. The Chinese version adds here: “and that there are fewer capitalists represented.”
Mao: I am saying that reliance should be placed upon these two classes, not that it already has been placed upon them. I am talking about the future of the government and not its present condition.

Snow: Has there been a change in the classes represented by the government?

Mao: No, there has not been such a change.

Snow: Does the present government represent the landlords and the bourgeoisie?

Mao: Yes. The present government is still on the whole representative of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, but many representatives of these classes have already fled.

Snow: Then what do they represent?

Mao: In the sense of its anti-Japanese war policy, the foundation has mainly been placed upon the middle class and the vast peasantry, and these classes are already represented, but with regard to policies concerning democracy and livelihood, this has not yet been the case. 21

Snow: Because the Communist Party has abandoned propaganda emphasizing class conflict, abolished its soviets, submitted to the leadership of the Guomindang and the Guomindang government, adopted the Three People’s Principles, ceased confiscating the property of landlords and capitalists, 22 and stopped organizational work and propaganda in the Guomindang areas, many people now assert that Chinese Communists are in fact no longer social revolutionaries but mere reformists—bourgeois in methods and in aims. How do you answer such claims? Do you not still maintain that the Chinese revolution is anti-imperialist and antifeudal, with the possibility of transformation, at a certain stage, into socialist revolution and that the responsibility of the Communist Party is to lead the nation toward that revolution?

Mao: We are always social revolutionaries; we are never reformists. There are two main objectives in the thesis of the Chinese revolution. The first consists of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie together bringing about a national democratic revolution. We are now in the midst of achieving this part, and we are determined to do a thorough job of it. But the thesis has a second part, which consists of the proletariat leading the peasantry in carrying out socialist revolution. This, too,

must be achieved, and completely achieved. For the present the revolution is national democratic in character, but after it has developed to a certain stage it will be transformed into socialist revolution. The present “becoming” of the social revolutionary part in the thesis of the Chinese revolution will turn into its “being”—unless our work in the present phase is a failure, in which case there is no early possibility of social revolution.

Snow: Has China also the possibility of developing, before or after the completion of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution, toward fascist dictatorship? Are fascist groups in China increasing or decreasing in strength?

Mao: There is no possibility of a fascist dictatorship developing in China. Half the country is already colonized, and the other half is menaced by the same fate. The Chinese economy is still mostly semi-feudal in character. These are the reasons that our fascist dreamers have no future. If, in the past, we inaply and misleadingly described a certain Chinese political organization as “fascist,” and if we now refer to that force, we can see that it is weakening, not strengthening. It is very obvious that in such a country as China, anyone who tries to create fascism is destined to break his own neck. 23

Snow: The Communist Party claims to hold hegemony over the workers and peasants of China. Aside from the leadership of the peasants in the border regions, and the leadership of the Red Army, which has some proletarian elements, how does the Communist Party in actual practice assert its leadership over the industrial proletariat of China—80 to 90 percent of which is now dwelling in places held by Japanese imperialists? In what way is the Communist Party educating both peasants and proletariat to be conscious of the present anti-Japanese and antifeudal aims of the revolution?

Mao: The Communist Party’s claim to leadership over the workers and peasants is of two kinds, political and organizational. For example, in places such as the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and in the guerrilla districts in North China under the Eighth Route Army, we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony over the workers and peasants. Elsewhere, wherever there is a Communist Party organization, all peasants and workers who subscribe to the Communist Party main principles are following the Communist Party’s political leadership. Where they have already been organized there is organizational leadership as well.

21. The last four pairs of comments are greatly condensed and presented as a single question and answer in Snow’s version.
22. Here the Chinese version has: “ceased confiscating the land of landlords,”
23. Instead of this last sentence, Snow’s version has the following two: “But it is misleading to apply the term ‘fascist’ to such a force. For China is fundamentally too weak (in economic development) to support a fascist movement. Those who imagine otherwise, and try to create ‘fascism’ in China, are destined finally to break their necks.”
(Under this logic it is evident that the Communists consider all the armed forces participating in the anti-Japanese war as under their influence, since resistance is the central demand of the Communist Party in the present stage of the revolution. Other people would quickly deny this and call it wishful thinking; but it is the logic which enables the Communists to endure other restrictions on their activity. As long as resistance continues, they believe, revolutionary struggle continues, and consequently the period of “transformation” draws nearer. —E.S. ) 24

Education of workers and peasants to understand the need to fight Japan and oppose the forces of the Chinese traitors is being done by Communist Party members orally, in writing, and mainly through the Party’s actions in resisting Japan. 25

Snow: Do you think the War of Resistance thus far has strengthened or weakened the feudal elements in China? Just where, in the present Communist program, are the antifeudal aims of the revolution expressed? Are they being realized anywhere outside the border regions? Is it possible to win the war unless the antifeudal program of the revolution is simultaneously carried out on a national scale? 26

Mao: Here what I must say first is that in the present stage of the Chinese revolution the problem of primary importance is resistance to Japanese imperialism. Antifeudal tasks may [for a while] have to be subordinated to the major anti-Japanese issue. Our antifeudal program [in this period] consists of demands for nationwide democracy and the improvement of people’s livelihood by such measures as the elimination of exorbitant taxes and levies and the reduction of rent and loan interest.

There is a nationwide democratic movement growingly widespread among not only workers and peasants but also among the petty bourgeoisie such as large numbers of intellectuals, students and other youths, cultural workers, progressive thinkers, statesmen, scientists, military men, and so on. The obstacle that confronts this movement is an archaic political system that has impeded its development. Therefore, changing that political system (without endangering resistance) is an important task. Without a doubt, unless it is changed, and unless demo-

24. This note by Snow does not, of course, appear in the Chinese version.
25. In Snow’s text, the preceding paragraph reads as follows: “You ask how the Communists are educating the workers and peasants (in non-Communist areas) to fight against Japan and against feudalism. Something can be done, and is being done, by propaganda. Much is done through the organization of anti-Japanese activities, through which also the people can come to understand the necessity for the overthrow of feudalism.”
26. Here the Chinese version adds the following sentence to Snow’s question: “Since it is not even possible for the peasants to organize themselves to resist Japan—to say nothing of meeting the demands of reforming the countryside—could the antifeudal task of the revolution be realized in the midst of the war?”

27. In the Weekly Review version, this sentence is italicized for emphasis. To avoid confusion with the use of italics for variants, we have set it in boldface here.
28. In Snow’s version, these two sentences read: “In reality they do not want to use either edge of the sword. They are dragging the anti-imperialist struggle toward failure.” The text of this interview as published in the China Weekly Review ends here; the next question and answer do not appear in it.
Snow: I read your comment on the signature of the Soviet-German pact. You seem to think it unlikely that the Soviet Union can be drawn into the European War. . . . Do you think the USSR would remain neutral, as long as it is not attacked, even if Nazi Germany appears to be near victory?

Mao: The Soviet Union will not participate in this war, because both sides are imperialists, and it is simply a robber war with justice on neither side. Both sides are struggling for the balance of power and rule over the peoples of the world. Both are wrong, and the Soviet Union will not become involved in this kind of war, but will remain neutral.

But the Soviet Union will not adopt a neutral policy in all wars. In the case of righteous wars of liberation it will not remain neutral. This has consistently been the Soviet policy for twenty years. For example, the Soviet Union supported the Republican Army of Spain. From 1937 till now it helped China in the anti-Japanese war. The movement of Russian troops into Poland on September 17 was also for the purpose of liberating the Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples.

The Soviet Union will support national liberation movements in colonial and semicolonial countries and it will support people's (social revolutionary) movements in capitalist countries whenever they rise. It will support revolutionary warfare but remain neutral in purely counterrevolutionary wars.

As for the outcome of the present European war, the Soviet Union cannot be frightened by the threat of the victorious power to herself, whether it is England or Germany. Whenever the Soviet Union is attacked, it will have the support of the people of various countries and of the national minorities in colonial and semicolonial countries.

The center of the anti-Soviet movement today is no longer Nazi Germany. It is among the so-called democratic countries, with Great Britain in the lead. Under Chamberlain's leadership the governments of the so-called democratic countries are organizing a vast front which aspires to involve Italy and Japan. This they expect first to defeat Germany, and then to attack the Soviet Union. The present international situation has undergone profound changes.

Snow: I understand you to mean that you see no difference between fascism and the cause of the democracies of England and France?

Mao: No, there is no difference in their positions in this war. Chamberlain is organizing a world front with which to surround the Soviet Union, anti-Japanese China, and Germany. His purpose is to stop the war in China, overthrow Hitler, and isolate the Soviet Union, so that it will be convenient to organize an anti-Soviet drive later on. Chamberlain, as the leader of reactionary international capitalism, understands that if he does not act in that way the anti-Japanese war can achieve victory, Germany can recover her colonies, India can win her independence, and his own rule and that of his colleagues will collapse.

Snow: That seems to be a rather large order for Mr. Chamberlain. I wonder if you mean that, while fighting Germany, Chamberlain's real attention is centered upon the destruction of Russia? It appears to me that Chamberlain has got his hands full with Hitler for the present, without planning an even larger war against Russia. Would it not be logical for him to try to win Russia's friendship, if possible, in order to beat Hitler, even if he does have some designs on Stalin in the future? Do you mean that he formerly dreamed of diverting Hitler's attack toward the East, or that he is actively planning it now, or that he hopes to consummate such a front out of the present war?

Mao: He formerly dreamed of it, he actually plans it now, and he hopes to realize it later. Why? Because in front of Chamberlain there is not only the problem of Hitler, but also the problem of revolt in India, and among people in his own country, while the Soviet Union is the supporter of the colonial revolutions and the people's (revolutionary) movement in capitalist countries themselves. Hence Roosevelt also sympathizes with Chamberlain.

Snow: What effect will the European war have upon Japan's strategy in Eastern Asia and Japan's foreign policy?

Mao: Japan will utilize the European war for two purposes. The first is to intensify her invasion of China, and the second is to extend her aggression to the South Sea Islands. First of all, however, she must destroy China, and she will concentrate her main attention on that task, for the present. She will not take part in the European war. By remaining a nonparticipant she can continue to trade with France and Britain and America, and perhaps also borrow money from them. Without foreign trade and loans it will be difficult for Japan to overcome China.

Germany is quite busy with her own affair in Europe at present, and can no longer look after Japan. The Soviet Union has little trade with Japan; furthermore she will not loan one copper to Japan. The question is whether Britain, France, and America will help Japan to destroy China, and it is a very grave question.

The second Japanese objective during the European war involves ambitious hopes indeed. But whether or not Britain, France, and America are defeated in Europe, Japan will concentrate her fleet in the south. At that time a Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies will become a possibility, because they are an intermediate point between frontal Anglo-Japanese conflict, being a sphere of important British influence but not a British colony. Japanese militarists find the Dutch Indies very attractive, with abundant natural resources and a large population. If Great Britain, France, and the U.S.A. adopt a policy which helps Japan and makes it possible for her to achieve victory over China, they will simply be arming Japan for a future attack in which they themselves will be the target.

Japan hopes to get rich in this world war. Roosevelt also hopes to get rich. Roosevelt wants to win leadership in the capitalist world. He wants Chamberlain
for a secretary and Japan for part of his guard, his rearguard—with Hitler and Mussolini in the vanguard. But he shakes his head sadly at Stalin and says that Stalin is not useful to him.

**Snow:** Would you say that the war in Europe is likely to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the Sino-Japanese struggle, then?

**Mao:** If Britain, France, and the U.S.A. carry out a policy which gives material help to Japan it may have a decisive effect. . . . Otherwise, by relying mainly upon herself, and the principle of self-sufficiency, China can and should defeat Japan during this period of world war and chaos.

**Snow:** Obviously the European war must greatly weaken the position of Britain and France in China. That means, perhaps, the weakening of both Anglo-French resistance to Japan, and Anglo-French assistance to China. Where China’s dependence on foreign powers is concerned, therefore, the role of Soviet help is enormously increased, and in particular the Northwest route of supplies becomes more important. Likewise Soviet policy toward Japan in Siberia and Outer Mongolia. Is Soviet help to China likely to be enlarged to a degree sufficient to compensate for the weakening of Anglo-French assistance?

**Mao:** If China continues determinedly to resist, and cooperates closely with the Soviet Union, the latter’s help will not only compensate for diminishing Anglo-French assistance, but will far surpass it in importance. Fundamentally, Britain and France have not been “helping” China. Their policy is simply one of noninterference with the war, thus far, but not one of positive assistance to China.

**Snow:** In this connection, is it possible that this greater Soviet help to China’s liberation movement may take a form somewhat similar to what you called Soviet aid to the Belorussian and Ukrainian liberation movements? There is, for example, a powerful anti-Japanese national liberation movement in Manchuria, and there are similar liberation movements in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. Is it possible that the Soviet Union may give these liberation movements help by sending in armed anti-Japanese expeditions?

**Mao:** According to Leninism such a possibility exists. . . . But the fundamental question is whether the Chinese fight for themselves.

**Snow:** With the Soviet occupation of Poland, by agreement with Nazi Germany, Russia appears to be cooperating with the totalitarian Axis in the partitioning of weaker states. That will certainly be a widely expressed view. In any case, the new Soviet policy means the collapse of the so-called United Front of the democratic countries (including the USSR) against Fascism. How will this affect the political slogans of China’s war against Japan? Until now China has appealed for the support of the capitalist democracies against totalitarian Japan. Do the past slogans of Chinese diplomacy now lose their validity?

**Mao:** With the outbreak of the European war, world political relations underwent profound changes. Germany gave up her anti-Soviet and anti-Comintern (sic!) policy. On the other hand, the so-called democratic countries began to utilize war to bring an end to democracy. These so-called democratic countries became the center of anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, antidemocratic, and antipopular movements and the enemy of the colonial and semicolonial people’s movements.

Germany and England are both imperialist countries. Both the fascist countries and the so-called democracy England are robber imperialists. The war between them is an imperialist war, waged against the will of their own peoples, and against the will of the people of the USSR.

The center of world reaction now lies in England. Chamberlain is the world’s Public Enemy No. 1. Formerly the Soviet Union, and the Communist parties of all nations, made great efforts to win over Chamberlain, and induce him to resist fascism, in cooperation with the USSR. But the reactionary governments of the capitalist class in the so-called democracies, with Chamberlain in the foreground, finally rejected these offers, refused to cooperate with the USSR, and as a result the second imperialist war was enlarged.

Chamberlain was never sincere in opening Anglo-Russian negotiations. He was determined that the talks should lead nowhere. In this way he chose war, rather than peace, for it was obvious that, if the Soviet Union were excluded from cooperation, there could be no guarantee of peace. Even Lloyd George, a great spokesman for the capitalist class, recognized that.

Meanwhile Germany took advantage of Chamberlain’s policy, abandoned its anti-Comintern stand, and made a nonaggression pact with the USSR. That changed the face of the whole situation. With the liquidation of the Nazi anti-Soviet, anti-Comintern policy, the distinction formerly drawn between fascist and democratic capitalist countries lost its validity, and no longer serves as a political measurement. The period of attempting to win over the capitalist class and its governments to form a United Front with the USSR becomes a thing of the past. A new standard is necessary to distinguish between various countries, based upon a new situation. How shall we classify them?

In one category belong those countries which carry on, or help to carry on, or really openly and positively support, unjust and robber imperialist wars. In a second category belong those countries which support popular liberation wars. The

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29. The parenthetical remark *sic* appears in the text as published, and also in Snow’s manuscript. Its appearance here is puzzling. The Anti-Comintern Treaty of November 1936 between Germany and Japan was, after all, a fact of international life prior to 1939.
policy of Communist parties in different countries must be changed accordingly, for the policy followed until now has become inadequate.

Under the new situation, the possible participants in a worldwide revolutionary United Front can no longer include the capitalist class in the so-called democracies. This class has already become the enemy of the oppressed nations. Such a revolutionary united front must now consist of the following elements: (1) the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; (2) anti-imperialist elements in the semicolonial and colonial countries, including the proletariat and sections of capitalists; (3) the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

In a speech on September 14, I said that the imperialist war had already entered a new stage, distinguished by two characteristics. First, it had changed from one-sided war into universal war. (A reference to Stalin’s description of the second imperialist war, contained in his speech before the Communist Party Plenum last March.—E.S.) Second, the organizational makeup of the world revolutionary front has changed from the complex to the simple. The present slogans of world revolution become these: oppose imperialist war; destroy counterrevolutionary war; support the people’s revolutionary war by means of revolutionary war; support the people’s revolutionary wars in colonial and semicolonial countries. These can be similarly applied in all countries, including both fascist and so-called democratic countries which utilize war as a means of achieving fascism.

China’s anti-Japanese war is part of the world revolutionary front. The anti-Japanese United Front in China helps the people’s front in capitalist countries, and the national revolutionary united front in colonial and semicolonial countries everywhere helps the people’s front in capitalist countries, and such help is reciprocal.

(Here I interrupted to ask Mao why, if Germany was imperialist and no different from Britain and France, the Soviet Union should participate in Germany’s imperialist adventure to the extent of making available to Germany Russia’s great reserves of wheat, oil, and other war materials. Why, incidentally, did Russia continue to lease oil lands to Japan in Sakhalin, or to give Japan fishing rights? The latter were of great value in enabling Japan to export large quantities of fish, and thus establish foreign credits with which to buy munitions and carry on a “robber imperialist” war against the “national liberation movement” of “semicolonial China.”)

(Mao replied that it was an extremely complicated question, and could not be answered until one saw the end of the policy. The conditions under which the Soviet Union sells oil to Japan were not clear to him. In any case, the Soviet Union was supplying neither Germany nor Japan with any war instruments, and to maintain ordinary trade did not make her a participant in the war.

(I asked whether there was much difference, in modern war, between supplying a belligerent with tanks or airplanes, and supplying the tanks and planes themselves. Why was the United States a participant in Japan’s imperialist invasion of China, because she sold Japan the raw materials of war, but the Soviet Union not a participant in Germany’s imperialist war in Europe, nor Japan’s war in Asia, when she supplied the same kind of materials to the two combatants? (Mao chuckled and admitted that the distinction between trade in war materials and trade in war instruments was not great. What mattered, he said, was whether the country in question was really supporting imperialist war as a matter of policy, or whether it was supporting revolutionary wars of liberation. In that judgment there was no question where the USSR stood. She had given positive support to revolutionary wars in China, in 1925–27, in Spain, and in China at present. The Soviet Union would always be on the side of just revolutionary wars but would not take sides in imperialist war, though she might maintain ordinary trade with all belligerents.

(I suggested that, since it was a question “off the record,” I would not publish his comment. He replied that he had no objection; it had all been taken down by his own secretary, and was “on the record” as far as he was concerned. So I have included a summary of it here.—E.S.)

Concerning the question of Poland, it is necessary to look at it from several different angles, from the standpoint of the German, British, French, and Polish governments; and from the standpoint of the Polish people, and finally from the Soviet Union’s viewpoint.

German aggression in Poland is purely imperialistic, a war waged for the purpose of robbing and plundering the Polish people. Strategically Poland represents the Anglo-French front, and in striking it Hitler destroys one wing of that front. Naturally we are opposed to such a war.

For Britain and France, Poland was an object of plunder for finance capital. It was for the purpose of utilizing Poland to resist Hitler’s attempt to redivide the spoils of imperialism that Britain and France encouraged Poland to act as part of their imperialist front. Since that was the objective condition of Anglo-French participation in the war involving Poland, it is an imperialist position and should not be supported.

Poland itself had a semifascist government, ruled by the reactionary Polish capitalist class. It mercilessly exploited the workers and peasants among the Polish population. It mercilessly suppressed the Polish democrats and progressives. At the same time, its Pan-Polish policy resulted in the oppression of large national minorities within Poland’s boundaries, including 8,000,000 Belorussians, 3,000,000 Ukrainians, and 500,000 Germans. Its policy toward these minorities was imperialistic.

The Polish government, acting under instructions of British finance capital, willingly mobilized its population for gun fodder. It willingly acted as an organic part of the reactionary front of international finance capital, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people.

For twenty years the Polish government remained consistently hostile to the Soviet Union. During the Anglo-Russian talks it rejected the aid of the Soviet Union. It revealed its incompetence when, after but two weeks, it buried itself under the iron heel of Hitler. A million and a half Polish troops could not survive a single blow, and exposed Poland’s population to Nazi persecution. At Madrid the poorly equipped Spanish militia was able to hold a front for two years, but the Polish government’s forces were destroyed in two weeks! In China the Eighth
Route Army has defended its Shanxi-Hebei-Chahar war area for two years against Japan, but Poland had no “Wutai” (Wutai shan, the mountainous base of the Communist troops in northern Shanxi) and no Eighth Route Army. All this weakness clearly indicates the incompetence and wickedness of the Polish government. We should raise no tears over imperialistic Poland.

Finally, concerning the Soviet Union. The Nazi invasion of Poland presented the Soviet Union with the problem: whether to permit the whole Polish population to fall victim to Nazi persecution, or whether to liberate national minorities of Eastern Poland. The Soviet Union chose to follow the second course of action.

In Eastern Poland there is a vast stretch of territory inhabited by 8 million Belorussians and 3 million Ukrainians. This territory was forcibly seized from the young socialist Soviet republics as the price of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and fell under the domination of the reactionary Polish government. Today the Soviet Union, no longer weak and young, takes back its own and liberates them.

News dispatches from the front describe the welcome which the minorities of Poland are giving to the Red Army. The people carry food and beverages to the Red troops, hail and embrace them, and cheer them as saviors. There is no such news from places occupied by German and French troops. This shows that the war of the Soviet Union in this case is a just war, and in the interest of liberating national minorities and oppressed peoples.

Snow: But Domei reports much the same sort of hearty welcome wherever its Army takes the New Order to East Asia. I dare say the German press is telling the German public about the enthusiasm with which its bombs were received in Poland also. It is customary in these days for a conquered people not only to submit, but to congratulate their conquerors.

Mao: (laughing) Nobody believes Domei reports, and though I have not seen any German claims of a welcome in Poland I am sure nobody would believe them, if made. In the case of reports about the welcome given Soviet troops, there are independent observers there who can see for themselves whether or not they are true.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the main problem now facing the Soviet Union is the attempt made by Chamberlain to realize his old policy. On the one hand, he is blockading Germany and putting immense pressure on Germany’s western front. On the other hand, he is attempting to buy off Italy and Japan, and to appease Germany. By presenting Hitler with Hungary and Rumania, in exchange for the abrogation of the Soviet-German Pact, he hopes to turn German rifles toward the East.

Those aims of Chamberlainism not only exist at present but will continue to exist in the future. Soviet occupation of Poland is for the purpose of liberating the Belorussians and Ukrainians, and recovering the territory of the Union, but it is also a concrete method of consolidating the German-Soviet Pact, and frustrating the schemes of Chamberlain. Recent news indicates that the policy has achieved very great success.

On another occasion I asked Mao whether, in his opinion, Russia’s occupation of Poland was primarily justified by strategic-military necessity or political necessity. Mao seemed to think that the governing factor was strategic necessity, but that the move was partly military and partly political. The political side was not related directly to the world condition of the revolutionary movement but to the Soviet Union’s historic relations with Eastern Poland. The Soviet-German Pact, on the other hand, was not political but a strategic-military necessity. Stalin wanted it in order to block Chamberlain’s effort to build a coalition against Russia. Mao claimed that Chamberlain had clearly indicated to Hitler that he had to make a choice between fighting Russia or fighting England. If Hitler attacked Russia, Chamberlain was prepared to tolerate his occupation of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states. If not, he would use Poland to oppose Hitler. Stalin was then compelled to seek his own agreement with Hitler.

I suggested to Mao that the Soviet policy was bound to produce its own dialectical reaction, and quite possibly would strengthen Hitler to a degree which might represent a real menace to the USSR. The immediate effect of Soviet policy would be greatly to weaken Communist parties in England, France, and America, driving away from them especially the liberal petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and throwing great confusion into the ranks of the working class itself. If the C.P. opposed the war it would be suppressed—as it had already been in France. All peripheral left-wing groups who actively opposed the war would also be suppressed. Such a development would strengthen reactionary and conservative elements. Fascist dictatorial methods, under the guise of war mobilization necessities, would quickly spread. The paralyzing of this vanguard element would greatly weaken the opposition to appeasement efforts on the part of Chamberlain and Daladier in seeking a bargain with Hitler, and the chances for a future anti-Soviet combination might considerably improve. The transformation of the imperialist war into a united imperialist attack on the USSR was thus conceivably rendered possible by the present Soviet-German Pact.

Mao disagreed. He believed the Pact guaranteed Soviet Russia the security it needs against German attack. “Hitler is in Stalin’s pocket,” he said.

So all is well—unless it turns out that there is a hole in Stalin’s pocket.

30. This is the end of the September 26 interview. Snow’s concluding remarks follow. Nothing is known about the “other occasion” when Snow discussed these matters with Mao.
Letter Regarding Industrial Cooperatives

(Yan’an, September 25, 1939)

Bishop Hall, Chairman
Chen Han-seng, Secretary,
International Committee,
The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives
Hong Kong

Gentlemen:

I am in favor of the establishment of many small industries in China by means of cooperatives. Your great devotion to such a cause, and the splendid effort you have made to help our War of Resistance, are deeply appreciated.

If it is possible to build this kind of (cooperative) industries in the guerrilla districts of North China, and in the adjacent war regions in the northwest, the help would be greatly appreciated and warmly welcomed by the Eighth Route Army and my humble self.

I understand that such a plan is in fact already contemplated. It is very much hoped that it can be realized, for its contribution to our struggle would be incalculably great.

I would be most grateful if you would convey this thought to your committees abroad, and to our countrymen overseas. Here I wish especially to thank our fellow-countrymen in the Philippines, and the (Industrial Cooperatives) Promotion Committee there, for they have made great efforts to support our fatherland and the industrial cooperative movement.

In one word, if we struggle hard, and if China and her foreign friends cooperate together, there can be no doubt of our final victory over the Japanese!

With national anti-Japanese greetings.

Mao Zedong

Mao wrote this letter at the request of Edgar Snow, Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow), and others involved in the movement to create cooperative industrial enterprises. For Snow’s account of his dealings with Mao on this matter see Random Notes on Red China, pp. 71–72. Our source is a carbon copy of the typewritten English text, contained in the Edgar Snow Papers. A note at the top of the page reads: “Translation of an original letter in Chinese written by Mao Tse-tung.” The Chinese text does not appear to be available, but according to other documents in the Snow Papers, this version was reviewed by Mao’s representative and can therefore be regarded as accurate.

The Identity of Interests Between the Soviet Union and All Mankind

(September 28, 1939)

At the time of the twenty-second anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association has asked me for an article. On the basis of my own observations, I should like to clarify a few problems concerning the Soviet Union and China. These problems are being discussed widely by people in China, especially among various anti-Japanese parties and factions, anti-Japanese military men, students and youth, journalists, and people in cultural circles, and apparently no definite conclusions have yet been reached. It may not be a waste of time if I take this opportunity to set forth my views for the consideration of those who are concerned about the war in Europe and about Sino-Soviet relations.

The First Question, Concerning the Soviet Union and the Prevention of the Second Imperialist World War

Some people say the Soviet Union does not want the world to remain at peace because the outbreak of a world war is to its advantage, and that the present war was precipitated by the Soviet Union’s conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Germany instead of a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France. I consider this view incorrect. In the past, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union over a very long period of time has consistently been one of peace, a policy based on the close links between its own interests and those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Not only has the Soviet Union always needed peace for its own socialist construction, but it has also needed to strengthen the peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and all the countries of the world, so as to avoid the outbreak of anti-Soviet wars. It has also needed to check the aggression of the various fascist countries, curb the war-mongering actions of the so-called democratic countries, and delay the outbreak of an imperialist world war for as long as possible, in order to achieve peace on a world scale. Just look, for many years the Soviet Union has

This article was first published in Jiefang, no. 86, October 10, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 53–64, where it is reproduced from this source.
1. Soviet Revolution → Great Soviet Revolution
2. China → China at present
devoted great efforts to the cause of world peace. The proof of this is that, for example, it has joined the League of Nations, signed treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, and tried hard to conclude security pacts with Britain and all other countries that might be willing to have peace. When Germany and Italy jointly invaded Spain, and Britain, the United States, and France adopted a policy of nominal “nonintervention” but actually of not hindering their aggression, the Soviet Union gave active support to the Spanish Republican forces in their resistance to Germany and Italy, and actively opposed the “nonintervention” policy of Britain, the United States, and France. When Japan invaded China, and the same three powers adopted the same kind of “nonintervention” policy, the Soviet Union not only concluded a nonaggression treaty with China, but gave China active help in its War of Resistance. When Britain and France connived at Hitler’s aggression and sacrificed Austria and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union spared no effort in exposing the sinister aims behind the Munich policy and made proposals to Britain and France for further efforts to check aggression. When Poland became the burning question in the spring and summer of this year, and it was touch and go whether world war would break out, the Soviet Union negotiated with Britain and France for over four months, despite Chamberlain and Daladier’s lack of sincerity, in an endeavor to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance to prevent the outbreak of war. But all these efforts were blocked by the imperialist policy of the British and French bourgeois governments, a policy of conniving at, instigating, and spreading war, so eventually the cause of world peace was thwarted and the imperialist world war broke out. The bourgeois governments of Britain, the United States, and France had no genuine desire to prevent the outbreak of a great war; on the contrary, they helped to bring it about. Their refusal and their refusal alone to come to terms with the Soviet Union and conclude a really effective treaty of mutual assistance based on the principle of equality and reciprocity proved that they wanted not peace but war. Everyone knows that in the contemporary world rejection of the Soviet Union means rejection of peace. Even Lloyd George, that typical representative of the British bourgeoisie, knows this. It was in these circumstances, and at this time, when Germany agreed to discard its anti-Soviet stance, abandon the anti-Comintern pact, and recognize the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers, that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded. The plan of Britain, the United States, and France was to egg Germany on to attack the Soviet Union, so that they themselves, “sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight,” could get ready to come down and deal with both of them, after the two great peoples of the Soviet Union and Germany had worn each other out. The German-Soviet nonaggression pact smashed this vast international plot for putting the Soviet Union and Germany under their control. Those fellow-countrymen who ignored this international plot, and ignored the schemes of the British imperialists, who connived at and instigated war and promoted the plot to cause the outbreak of a great world war, have actually been taken in by the sugary propaganda of these conspirators. In dealing with the problem of Spain, the problem of China, or the problem of Austria and Czechoslovakia, these schemers were not the slightest degree interested in checking aggression; on the contrary, they connived at aggression and instigated war, playing the proverbial role of the fisherman who set the snipe and clam at each other and then took advantage of both. They euphemistically described their actions as a policy of “nonintervention,” but what they actually did constituted a policy of “sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight.” Quite a few people throughout the world have been fooled by the honeyed words of Chamberlain and his partners, failing to see the murderous intent behind their smiles, or to understand that the German-Soviet nonaggression pact was concluded only after Chamberlain and Daladier had made up their minds to reject the Soviet Union and bring about the imperialist war. It is time for these people to wake up. The Soviet Union offers a complete contrast. The Soviet Union wants not only peace for itself, but also peace for the world; it wants not only to prevent aggression by the fascist states against its own country and small and weak nations, but also to prevent the outbreak of the world war and stop the war mongering activities of the so-called democratic states or at least delay the outbreak of a great war. The unfortunate outbreak of the world war is entirely the result of the imperialist countries’ rejection and sabotage of the common efforts of the Soviet Union and the people of the world to maintain peace. The fact that the Soviet Union worked so hard to preserve world peace to the very last minute proves that the interests of the Soviet Union are identical to those of the overwhelming majority of mankind. This is the first question I wanted to talk about.

The Second Question, Concerning the Attitude Adopted by the Soviet Union Toward the Second Imperialist World War

Some people say that, since the second imperialist world war has now broken out, the Soviet Union may perhaps take sides—in other words, the Soviet Red Army seems to be on the point of joining the front of German imperialism. I consider this view incorrect. On whichever side, the Anglo-French or the German, the war at has just broken out is an unjust, predatory, and imperialist war. The Communist parties and the people of all countries should rise up against it and expose the imperialist character of both belligerents, for this imperialist war brings only harm

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3. Not hindering → Laissez-faire toward
4. War of Resistance → Resistance to Japan
5. Discard its anti-Soviet stance → Stop anti-Soviet activities
6. Deal with both of them → Take over
7. British → British and French
and no benefit whatever to the people of the world; they should also expose the criminal acts of the social-democratic parties in supporting the imperialist war and betraying the interests of the proletariat. The Soviet Union is a socialist country, a country in which the Communist Party is in power, and it necessarily maintains a clear-cut twofold attitude toward wars: (1) It firmly refuses to take part in any unjust, predatory, and imperialist war and maintains neutrality toward the belligerents. Consequently, the Soviet Red Army can never disregard principle and join an imperialist front. (2) It actively supports just and nonpredatory wars of liberation. For instance, it helped China in its war of the Northern Expedition thirteen years ago and Spain in its war against Germany and Italy last year. It has been helping China in its War of Resistance Against Japan for the last two years, and Outer Mongolia in resisting Japan for the last few months. It will certainly give help to any war of people’s liberation or national liberation which may break out in other countries in the future and will certainly give help to any wars that contribute to the defense of the Soviet Union. The history of the Soviet Union in the last twenty-two years has already proved this, and history will prove it again in the future. Some people regard the Soviet Union’s trade with Germany, which is based on the German-Soviet commercial agreement, as an act of participation in the war on the German side. This view, too, is wrong, because it confuses commercial relations with participation in war. For example, the Soviet Union traded with Germany and Italy during the Spanish war; yet nobody in the world said that the Soviet Union was helping Germany and Italy in their aggression against Spain. On the contrary, people said that it was helping Spain in resisting this aggression, since the Soviet Union actually did help Spain. Again, during the present Sino-Japanese war, the Soviet Union is trading with Japan, but nobody in the world is saying that the Soviet Union is helping Japan in its aggression against China; on the contrary, people say that it is helping China to resist aggression, since it actually is helping China. At present, both sides in the world war have trading relations with the Soviet Union, but this cannot be regarded as assistance to either, still less as taking part in the war. Only if the nature of the war changes, and the war waged by one country or several countries undergoes certain necessary changes, so that it becomes advantageous to the Soviet Union and to the peoples of the world, will it be possible for the Soviet Union to help or participate; otherwise it will not. As for the fact that the Soviet Union is obliged to trade to a greater or lesser extent on more or less preferential terms with one or another of the belligerents according to how friendly or hostile it happens to be, that depends not on the Soviet Union but on the attitude of the belligerents themselves. But even if one or several countries adopts an anti-Soviet attitude, the Soviet Union will not break off trade relations with them so long as they, like Germany before August 23, are willing to maintain diplomatic relations and conclude trade treaties with it and do not declare war on it. It should be clearly understood that such commercial relations do not mean assistance, much less participation in war. Of course, every clear-minded person should be able to predict a situation that is likely to appear. In the changing international situation, Chamberlain is trying to organize a world reactionary united front aimed at defeating Germany first and attacking the Soviet Union later, or attacking them both simultaneously. If this reactionary front is in fact successfully organized and makes the Soviet Union its enemy, the Soviet Union and Germany will have common interests and the nature of Germany’s war will become a war beneficial to the socialist countries. At that time, it is possible that the Soviet Union and Germany may form a united front, and the question of assistance or participation in war may arise. But until then such a question should not be posed. This is a manifestation of the identity of the interests of the Soviet Union and the majority of the people of the world. This is the second question I want to talk about.

The Third Question, Concerning the Sending of Troops to Poland by the Soviet Union

Many people in China are bewildered by this complicated question. The complexity of the issue causes people’s thinking to become confused. The Polish question should be viewed from various angles, from that of Germany, of Britain and France, of the Polish government, of the Polish people, and of the Soviet Union. Germany started the war in order to plunder the Polish people and in order to smash one flank of the Anglo-French imperialist front. Such a war is imperialist in nature; we can have no sympathy for it and should oppose it. This is the first point. As for Britain and France, they have regarded Poland as one of the objects of plunder for their finance capital; they have exploited it to thwart the German imperialist attempt at a world redifision of the spoils and made it a flank of their own imperialist front. Therefore their war is an imperialist war, their so-called aid to Poland being merely for the purpose of contending with Germany for domination over Poland, so this war, too, cannot be regarded with sympathy and should be opposed. This is the second point. As for the Polish government, it was a fascist government, a reactionary government of the Polish landlords and bourgeoisie. It ruthlessly exploited the workers and peasants the population of over 10 million people of Polish nationality and oppressed the Polish democrats. Moreover, it was a government of great Polish chauvinists, which carried out ruthless nationalist oppression against the non-Polish minority nationalities—the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Jews, Germans, Lithuanians, and others, who number more than 10

8. China → The Chinese people
9. Spain → The Spanish people
10. China → The Chinese people
11. Outer Mongolia → The Mongolian people
12. The Soviet Union → Peace

13. This complicated question → The fact that Soviet troops have entered Poland
million; it was itself an imperialist state. \(^{14}\) In the war, this reactionary Polish government willingly led the Polish people to serve as cannon fodder for British and French finance capital, and it willingly served as a sector of the reactionary front of international finance capital. For twenty years the Polish government consistently opposed the Soviet Union and, during the talks between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, it firmly rejected the Soviet offer to help it with troops. Moreover, it was an utterly incompetent government, which in just two weeks put Poland under the iron heel of German imperialism. Its huge army of over 1.5 million collapsed at the first blow, and it brought destruction from the German imperialists to the Polish people in just two weeks, leaving the Polish people to suffer the outrages of German imperialism. Such were the towering crimes of the Polish government, and it would be wrong for us to waste any sympathy on it. This is the third point. As for the Polish people, they are victims; they should rise up against the oppression of the German fascists, and against their own reactionary bourgeoisie, \(^{15}\) and establish an independent, free, and democratic Polish state. Without the slightest doubt, our sympathy must go out to the Polish people. This is the fourth point. As for the Soviet Union, its war has \(^{16}\) been perfectly just. It was confronted by two problems. The first problem was whether to let the whole of Poland fall under the rule of German imperialism or to help the minority nationalities of eastern Poland win their liberation. It chose the second course. A vast stretch of territory inhabited by Belorussians and Ukrainians had been snatched from the new-born Soviet state by the German imperialists as far back as 1918, when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, and it was later arbitrarily put under the rule of the reactionary Polish government by the Treaty of Versailles. What the Soviet Union has now done is merely to recover its lost territory, liberate the oppressed Belorussians and Ukrainians, and save them from German oppression. The news dispatches of the last few days show how warmly these minority nationalities are welcoming the Red Army as their liberator, offering it food and drink while not a single report of this kind has come in from western Poland, which has been occupied by German troops or from the places in western Germany, which have been occupied by French troops. This shows clearly that the Soviet Union’s war is a just and nonpredatory war of liberation, a war helping to liberate weak and small nations and free the people. On the other hand, the war being waged by Germany and by Britain and France is an unjust, predatory, and imperialist war for the oppression of the nations and peoples of other countries. The second problem confronting the Soviet Union was Chamberlain’s endeavor to continue his old policy. His policy was, first, to impose a large-scale blockade on Germany and bring pressure on it from the west; second, to try to form an alliance with the United States and to buy over Italy, Japan, and the countries of northern Europe so as to isolate Germany; and third, to bribe Germany with the offer of Poland, and even of Hungary and Romania. In short, Chamberlain resorted to all kinds of intimidation and bribery to get Germany to renounce the German-Soviet nonaggression pact and turn its guns on the Soviet Union. This intrigue is not only going on at present, but will continue. The powerful Soviet army’s entry into eastern Poland, with the aim of recovering the Soviet Union’s own territory and liberating the weak and small nationalities there, was at the same time a practical move to consolidate the German-Soviet nonaggression pact \(^{17}\) and to frustrate Chamberlain’s intrigue. Judging by the news reports of the last few days, this Soviet policy has been a very great success. It is a concrete manifestation of the identity of the interests of the Soviet Union with those of the overwhelming majority of mankind, including those of the oppressed people under reactionary Polish rule. This is the third question I wanted to talk about.

**The Fourth Question, Concerning Soviet Assistance to China**

Since the conclusion of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, a great blow has been struck against Japan, China has been helped, the position of those in favor of the War of Resistance has been strengthened, and a blow has been struck against the capitulationists. The Chinese people have welcomed this treaty, and that is very correct. However, since the signing of the Nomonhan truce agreement, \(^{18}\) British and U.S. news agencies have been busy spreading the story that a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression treaty is about to be signed, and this has caused a certain concern among the Chinese people. There are some who even think that the Soviet Union might no longer help China. I believe that this observation is incorrect. The nature of the Nomonhan truce agreement is the same as that of the previous Zhanggufeng truce agreement, \(^{19}\) that is to say, the Japanese militarists, being compelled to admit defeat, have had to recognize the inviolability of the Soviet and Mongolian frontiers. These truce agreements will enable the Soviet Union to increase rather than decrease its aid to China. As for the talk about a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression

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14. State – Government
15. Reactionary bourgeoisie → Reactionary landlords and bourgeoisie
16. Its war has → Its actions have
17. Consolidate the German-Soviet nonaggression pact → Prevent the forces of German aggression from expanding eastward
18. The Nomonhan truce agreement was concluded in Moscow in September 1939. In May 1939, Japanese troops and troops from the puppet state of Manchukuo had attacked troops of the Soviet Union and of the People’s Republic of Mongolia at Nomonhan, on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, and had been repulsed. The truce agreement provided for the formation of a commission with representatives from each side to demarcate the frontier in the disputed places.
19. This agreement had been concluded in Moscow on August 11, 1938, in the aftermath of a clash between Japanese and Soviet troops in the Zhanggufeng District on the border of China, Korea, and the Soviet Union. In this case, a bilateral commission had also been established to demarcate the border.
treaty, the Soviet Union has been proposing it for many years, but Japan has invariably rejected it. Now there is a section of the Japanese ruling class that wants such a treaty with the Soviet Union, but whether the Soviet Union will be willing to conclude it depends on the basic principle of whether the treaty will be in accord with the interests of the Soviet Union and of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Specifically, it depends on whether the treaty will conflict with the interests of China’s war of national liberation. Judging from Stalin’s report to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 10 this year and Molotov’s speech on foreign policy at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 30, I think the Soviet Union will not alter this basic principle. Even if such a treaty were to be concluded, the Soviet Union would certainly not agree to anything that would restrict its freedom of action in helping China. The interests of the Soviet Union and of China’s national liberation will always be in complete conformity and will never conflict. I regard this as absolutely beyond doubt. Those people who are prejudiced against the Soviet Union are capitalizing on the Nomonhan truce agreement and on the talk about a Japanese-Soviet nonaggression treaty in order to make trouble and stir up ill feeling between the two great nations of China and the Soviet Union. Such behavior is to be found among the British, American, and French schemers and the Chinese capitulationists; it is highly dangerous, and we must thoroughly expose their dirty tricks. It is obvious that China’s foreign policy must be a policy of the War of Resistance. This policy means relying primarily on our own efforts, while not ignoring any possibility of securing help from abroad. Now that the imperialist world war has broken out, foreign help is coming chiefly from three sources: (1) the socialist Soviet Union, (2) the people of all the capitalist countries in the world, and (3) the oppressed nations in the colonies and semicolonies. These are our only reliable sources of help. Apart from this, any other so-called foreign assistance, even if it should become available, can only be regarded as supplementary and temporary. Of course, China should try to obtain such supplementary and temporary foreign help, but must never depend too much on it or consider it reliable. China should maintain strict neutrality toward the belligerents in the imperialist war and not join either side. To maintain that China should join the Anglo-French imperialist war front is a capitulationist view, which is harmful to the War of Resistance as well as to the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and should be utterly rejected. This is the fourth question I wanted to talk about.

The above four questions are being widely discussed by our fellow countrymen. It is a very good thing that they are giving attention to the study of international problems, to the relations between the imperialist world war and China’s War of Resistance and between the Soviet Union and China, with the aim of victory over Japanese aggression. Here I have given some of my basic views on these questions, and I hope that readers will not spare their comments as to whether or not they are correct. The War of Resistance and the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation have great prospects.

Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for the Army Commander He Zhuguo, Mr. Snow, and Comrades Blestov and Magov

(September 29, 1939)

(Written specially for this newspaper) After a dinner of welcome given by Comrade Mao Zedong in their honor and accompanied personally by him, the group of guests—"friends from China and from abroad," to quote Comrade Mao Zedong—entered the Central Auditorium crowded with people and, amid warm applause, attended the evening welcome party sponsored by various circles of Yan’an. . . . In the midst of boisterous applause, Comrade Mao Zedong began his address of welcome:

We are here holding this grand evening party to welcome many friends and guests from this country and from abroad. First of all, we welcome General He Zhuguo, who has been valiantly fighting in the forefront of the War of Resistance for more than two years, where he has worked hard and done valuable service. At present General He Zhuguo is leading his forces to [X][X][X] from [X][X] via our border region. So we are holding this gathering to welcome him very warmly, as well as many other comrades of the [X] Cavalry Army.

In addition, we welcome Mr. Wei and Mr. Cai, both senior advisers from the headquarters of the Second Military District. The Eighth Route Army operates in the Second Military District, under the orders of Commander Yan. We welcome the visit of the comrades from the Second Military District.

This speech was first published in Xinhzhonghua bao, September 29, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bajuan, Vol. 6, pp. 125–26, which is reproduced from that source.

1. He Zhuguo (1897–1985), a native of Guangxi Province, was a graduate of the Baoding Military Academy, who had also studied cavalry tactics in Japan. In the aftermath of the 1936 Xi’an Incident, he had supported Zhang Xueliang. In August 1938, he had been appointed commander of the Second Cavalry Army, and in this capacity he had participated in the War of Resistance in the northeast.

2. Presumably the reference is to He’s Second Cavalry Army.

3. The reference may be to Wei Wei, a native of Henan and a graduate of the Huangpu Military Academy, who in 1938 had been appointed deputy commander of the Ninety-third Army in the Second Military District.

4. The reference is to Yan Xishan (1883–1960), who had played a major role in his native province of Shanxi since the late 1920s. In 1937 he had been appointed commander-in-chief of the Second War area by Chiang Kai-shek.
We also welcome guests from foreign countries. They fall into three categories. One is the American correspondent Mr. Snow, whose name is well known to us all. He was the very first one to visit the soviet area in northern Shaanxi in 1936. This is his second visit, and we warmly welcome him. America is a great nation. The masses of its people are opposed to imperialism and sympathetic to the liberation of the oppressed nations. Mr. Snow stands on the side of the broad masses of the people. He is a good friend of the Communist Party. It is hoped that, with the efforts of Mr. Snow, the two great nations of China and the United States will join hands, so as to help the Chinese people to overthrow Japanese imperialism.

Also at today’s evening party are the comrades of the Indian Medical Team. India is a great nation with a population of 320 million. Britain tried to force India into the war, but the Indian National Congress delivered a declaration, on behalf of the whole people, of their refusal to fight and their opposition to the imperialist war.

The leader of the Indian National Congress is none other than Mr. Nehru, who visited Chongqing not long ago. Mr. Nehru has sent the Indian Medical Team to assist China. The two great nations of China and India have united to defeat Japanese imperialism.

At this evening party, we would like to give an even greater welcome to the friends from the Soviet Union. The help from the Soviet Union in our War of Resistance will enable China to defeat the Japanese imperialists and win the final victory.

The fact that this evening we are welcoming the comrades who have been doing hard and valuable work in the War of Resistance is a manifestation of the unity of all China. We welcome our international friends, and we want all the great nations that are helping us—the American people, the oppressed people of India, and the Soviet Union—to unite. With our internal unity, plus international unity, Japanese imperialism will definitely be overthrown.

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**Telegram in Reply to Jiang Dingwen, Chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Government**

(September 29, 1939)

Mr. Jiang Mingsan, chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Government:

Your telegram has been respectfully received and read. When northern Shaanxi is suffering a drought, the Central Government has appropriated funds and southern Shaanxi has helped with grain. The whole area is covered with benevolence, and all the people are filled with jubilation. The border region has also suffered from the drought, though not so seriously as the Suiyuan and Yulin areas. So we also made a small contribution, just as an expression of good will from a neighbor. You put us to shame when you expressed your gratitude, and we really do not deserve it. This telegram is specially sent in reply, and to wish you good health.

Your admiring younger brother,

Mao Zedong

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This telegram was first published in *Xin Zhonghua bao*, October 6, 1939. Our source is *Mao Zedong ji. Bajuan*, Vol. 6, p. 127, which reproduces that text.

1. Regarding Jiang Dingwen, see note 4 to Mao’s interview of September 24, 1939, with Edgar Snow.
Study the Enemy-Occupied Areas

(October 1, 1939)

The problem of the enemy-occupied areas in China is a matter of life or death for Japanese imperialism. In the present stage, to concentrate all its strength for the invasion of China is the set policy of Japanese imperialism.

As for the pattern of the enemy invasion of China during the present stage, a frontal military attack or a large-scale strategic offensive (as distinguished from offensive campaigns of a certain magnitude), such as the attack in force on Wuhan, is no longer very probable. Basically, the enemy's mode of aggression has already come to take the two forms of political and economic attacks. By political attack, I mean splitting China's united front for resisting Japan, causing friction between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, and enticing China to surrender. By economic attack, I mean managing the occupied areas of China and developing the industry and commerce there, and using it to undermine our economy geared to the War of Resistance.

To achieve its goal of an economic attack, the enemy must necessarily launch "mopping-up campaigns" against our guerrilla warfare, set up a unified puppet régime, and eliminate the national spirit of our people in the occupied areas.

Therefore, the question of the occupied areas has become an extremely grave problem in the second stage of our War of Resistance—the stage of a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves.

The stage of a stalemate is, for the enemy, a stage in which to secure the territory it has occupied and prepare for the final conquest of the whole of China; for China, it is the stage for securing the territory which has not yet fallen and getting ready to recover the lost territory. The enemy is managing the occupied areas in such a way as to create the conditions for securing these areas and conquering the whole of China. In order to secure the territory which has not yet fallen, and recover the territory which has been lost, we have no choice but to make preparations in every domain. To support most actively the guerrilla war and to reform domestic politics are the two main political orientations for disrupting the enemy's plans and carrying out our own plans.

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Our source for this document is Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan, pp. 44–46, where it is reproduced from Shishi wenti congshu, no. 2, in which it was originally published in 1939.

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Introducing The Communist

(October 4, 1939)

The Central Committee has long planned to publish an internal Party journal, and now, at last, we can say that the plan has become a reality. Such a journal is necessary to build a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. This necessity is all the more obvious given the present situation. Special features of the present situation are, on the one hand, that the danger of capitulation, of fragmentation, and of retrogression within the Anti-Japanese National United Front is increasing daily and, on the other hand, that our Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party. The Party’s task is to mobilize the masses to overcome the dangers of capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression and to prepare against all possible eventualities, so that, should such things suddenly occur, the Party and the revolution would not suffer unexpected losses. At a time like this, the publication of an internal Party journal of this sort is necessary indeed.

This internal Party journal is called The Communist. What is its mission? What topics will it deal with? How will it differ from other Party publications?

Its mission is to help build a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, and which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. The construction of such a party is urgently needed for the victory of the Chinese revolution, and we are just now in the process of building such a party. On the whole, moreover, the subjective and objective conditions for building such a party are already present; indeed this great undertaking is now in the making. No ordinary Party publication is equal to the task of carrying out this great undertaking. A special Party periodical is necessary, and that is why The Communist is being published.

To a certain extent, our Party is already national in scale and already has a mass character. Moreover, so far as its leadership core, some of its members, its general line, and its revolutionary work are concerned, it is already a Bolshevik party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally.

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong jì, Vol. 7, pp. 65–79, which reproduces the text as it appears in the supplementary volume to the 1947 Chinese edition of Mao’s Selected Works.

1. Bolshevik → Bolshevikized (This change occurs repeatedly throughout the present document; subsequent occurrences are not footnoted.)

2. Large numbers of new Party members and many new branches → Many new branches composed of large numbers of new Party members
3. Civil war → Revolutionary civil war
4. A national party → A major national party
5. Bourgeoisie → Big bourgeoisie
semiccolonial countries and not to be found in the revolutionary history of any capitalist country. Furthermore, since China is a semicolonial and semifeudal country whose political, economic, and cultural development is uneven, a country whose economy is predominantly semifeudal and whose territory is vast, it follows that the character of the Chinese revolution in its present stage is bourgeois-democratic, that the revolution’s principal targets are imperialism and the feudal forces, and that its primary motive forces are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. At certain times and to a certain extent, various other elements, such as the national bourgeoisie, have also participated. It also follows that the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution is armed struggle. Indeed, the eighteen-year history of our Party may be called a history of armed struggle. Comrade Stalin has said: “A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the armed counterrevolution.” This is perfectly true. This specific feature, peculiar to semicolonial China, is absent or is different in Communist parties in the various capitalist countries. Thus, two basic specific features of the Chinese proletariat and the Chinese Communist Party emerged in the process of China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution: (1) a revolutionary national united front with the bourgeoisie is either established or forced to break up; and (2) armed struggle is the principal form of the revolution. Here we have not considered the Party’s relations with the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie as a basic special feature, first, because these relations are in principle the same for Communist parties all over the world and, second, because armed struggle in China is, in essence, peasant war, and the Party’s close relations with the peasant war and its relations with the peasantry are one and the same thing.

It is because of these two basic specific features, in fact precisely because of them, that the process of building up and bolshevizing our Party is proceeding under special circumstances. Its failures and successes, its retreats and advances, its contraction and expansion, its development and consolidation are all inevitably linked to its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When our Party takes a correct political line on forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization. Similarly, when our Party handles the question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it handles this question incorrectly, it moves a step backward in these respects. Thus, for eighteen years the processes of building and bolshevizing the Party have been closely linked to its political line, to the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This judgment has clearly been confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party’s history. Or, conversely, the more bolshevized the Party becomes, the more correctly it can decide upon its political line and handle the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party’s history.

Consequently, the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the three fundamental questions for our Party in China’s revolution. Having a correct grasp of these three questions and their interrelations with each other is tantamount to giving correct leadership to the whole Chinese revolution. We are now able to draw correct conclusions by virtue of our country’s abundant experience during the eighteen years of the Party’s history, a rich and profound experience of failures and successes, retreats and advances, contraction and expansion. Which is to say that we are now able to handle the questions of the united front, armed struggle, and Party building correctly. It also means that eighteen years of experience have taught us that the united front, armed struggle, and Party building are the Chinese Communist Party’s three magic weapons, its three principal magic weapons for defeating the enemy in China’s revolution. This is a great achievement of the Chinese Communist Party and a great achievement of the Chinese revolution.

Here let us briefly discuss each of these three magic weapons, each of these three questions.

In the last eighteen years, the united front of the Chinese proletariat with the Chinese bourgeoisie and other classes has developed under three different sets of circumstances or during three different stages: the first Great Revolution, ten years of civil war, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the course of these three stages, the following laws have been proved: (1) Because the greatest

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6. Feudal forces → Feudalism
7. “A specific feature of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting the armed counterrevolution.” → “In China the armed revolution is fighting the armed counterrevolution. That is one of the specific features and also one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.”

The above citation is from Stalin’s speech of November 30, 1926, to the Executive Committee of the International, entitled “The Prospects of the Revolution in China,” which appears in Volume VIII of his Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 379. Stalin’s own term was “armed revolution,” not “the armed people.” This is a particularly flagrant instance of citing out of context. As Mao knew very well, when Stalin made this statement, the “armed revolution” he was talking about was represented by the Northern Expedition, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, in whose revolutionary credentials Stalin still had full confidence.

8. In Communist parties → In the history of the revolutions led by Communist parties
9. With the bourgeoisie → Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie

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10. Correct conclusions → Correct conclusions concerning these three questions
11. Our country’s → Our
12. The first Great Revolution → The first Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927
13. Ten years of civil war → The war of agrarian revolution from 1927 to 1937
linked to its relations with the bourgeoisie and with armed struggle. When our Party takes a correct political line on forming a united front with the bourgeoisie or breaking it up when forced to do so, our Party moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it takes an incorrect line on its relations with the bourgeoisie, then our Party moves a step backward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization. Similarly, when our Party handles the question of revolutionary armed struggle correctly, it moves a step forward in its development, consolidation, and bolshevization; but when it handles this question incorrectly, it moves a step backward in these respects. Thus, for eighteen years the processes of building and bolshevizing the Party have been closely linked to its political line, to the correct or incorrect handling of the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This judgment has clearly been confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history. Or, conversely, the more bolshevized the Party becomes, the more correctly it can decide upon its political line and handle the questions of the united front and armed struggle. This conclusion, too, is clearly confirmed by the eighteen years of our Party's history.

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oppression in China is national oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie can be counted on to take part in the struggle against imperialism and the feudal warlords at certain times and to a certain extent. Therefore, at such times the proletariat should form a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as much as possible. (2) Because, on the other hand, the Chinese national bourgeoisie is economically and politically feeble, in other historical circumstances it will vacillate and become turncoat. Therefore, the composition of China's revolutionary united front cannot remain the same at all times, but is liable to change. At a certain time the bourgeoisie will take part in it, at another time it may not. (3) Because of the vacillating nature of the bourgeoisie, even when the bourgeoisie joins the united front alongside the proletariat in struggling against the common enemy, they still view as disadvantageous to them any ideological, political, and organizational development of the proletariat and its political party, try to impose restrictions on them, and employ disruptive tactics such as deception, blandishments, undermining, and savage attacks on them. Moreover, they are doing all this to prepare for capitulating to the enemy and splitting the united front. (4) The firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry. (5) The urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. Not only were these laws proved during the period of the first Great Revolution and during the ten years of civil war, but they are also being proved during the three years of the War of Resistance. Therefore, with regard to the question of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie (and, in particular, with the big bourgeoisie), the political party of the proletariat must carry on a stern, resolute struggle on two fronts. On the one hand, it must oppose neglecting the possibility that the bourgeoisie may make revolution at certain times and to a cer-

tain extent, regarding the bourgeoisie in China as the same as the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries and consequently neglecting the policy of forming a united front with the bourgeoisie and maintaining it for as long as possible. This is "Left"-deviationist closed-doorism. On the other hand, it must also combat treating the revolutionary nature and revolutionary program, policies, ideology, practice, and so on of the proletariat and those of the bourgeoisie as though they were one and the same, and neglecting the differences in principle between them; neglecting the fact that the bourgeoisie not only exerts an influence on the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry but does its utmost to influence the proletariat and the Communist Party in a strenuous effort to put an end to their ideological, political, and organizational independence, to turn them into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political party, and to ensure that it will reap the fruits of the revolution for itself or its party alone; and that they betray the revolution whenever the revolution conflicts with their own selfish interests or with those of their party. For us to neglect all this is Right opportunism. The characteristic feature of Chen Duxiuism in the past is that it amounted to a Right opportunism that led the proletariat to accommodate itself to the selfish interests of the bourgeoisie and its party, and this was the subjective reason for the failure of the first Great Revolution. This dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the bourgeois-democratic revolution has an enormous effect on the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and on party building. Without an understanding of this dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie it is impossible to understand the political line of the Chinese Communist Party and party building. One important component of the political line of the Chinese Communist Party is the political line of both unity with the bourgeoisie and struggle against it. An important component of the Chinese Communist Party's party building is, in fact, its development and tempering through both unity with and struggle against the bourgeoisie. Unity here means the united front; struggle means the "peaceful," "bloodless" ideological, political, and organizational struggle that goes on when we are united, and which turns into armed struggle when we are forced to break with the bourgeoisie. If our Party does not understand that it should unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, the Party cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop. If our Party does not understand that it should wage a stern and resolute "peaceful" struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, then the Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and the revolution will fail. If our Party does not wage a stern and resolute armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when forced to break with it, our Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will likewise fail. All this has been proved by the history of the last eighteen years.

14. Bourgeoisie → National bourgeoisie
15. In the Selected Works version, the following passage is inserted here:

(3) The Chinese big bourgeoisie, which is comprador in character, is a class that directly serves imperialism and is kept by it. For this reason, China's comprador big bourgeoisie has always been a target of the revolution. But because the various groups within this Chinese comprador big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialisms, when contradictions among these imperialist powers become sharper and when the spearhead of the revolution is directed against a particular imperialism, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other imperialist powers may join the struggle against that particular power to a certain extent and for a certain time. At such times, in order to weaken the enemy and add to its own reserves, the Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these big bourgeois groups and should maintain it as much as possible, provided that it is advantageous to the revolution.

As a result of this addition, points 3, 4, and 5 have been renumbered.

16. The bourgeoisie → The comprador big bourgeoisie
17. They → It continues to be very reactionary, and it firmly opposes
18. Ten years of civil war → Agrarian revolution
19. Three years of the War of Resistance → Present War of Resistance
20. It must oppose → It is necessary to combat the error of

21. The bourgeoisie → The bourgeoisie (and especially the big bourgeoisie)
22. Chen Duxiuism → Chen Duxiu's Right opportunism
23. United front → United front with the bourgeoisie
24. United → United with the bourgeoisie
The armed struggle of the Chinese Communist Party is peasant war under proletarian leadership. Its history, too, can be divided into three stages. The first stage was participation in the Northern Expedition of the bourgeoisie. At that time our Party had already begun to realize the importance of armed struggle, but it did not understand it fully, and it had not yet understood that armed struggle is the principal form of struggle in the Chinese revolution. The second stage was the ten years of civil war. Our Party had already established its own independent armed forces, learned the art of fighting independently, and established base areas of the people’s political power. Moreover, it was already able to achieve direct or indirect coordination of armed struggle, the principal form of struggle, with many other necessary forms of struggle—that is, to coordinate it directly or indirectly on a nationwide scale with the workers’ struggle, the peasants’ struggle (this is the main thing), the struggle of the youth, the women, and all the people, with the struggle for political power, the struggles on the economic, anti-spy, and ideological fronts, and with other forms of struggle. And this armed struggle was the agrarian revolution of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat, which constitutes the second stage in our Party’s history of armed armed struggle. The third stage is the present stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan. In this stage we are able to make use of our experience of armed struggle in the first, and especially the second stage, and our experience of coordinating armed struggle with all other necessary forms of struggle. In general, this kind of struggle means guerrilla warfare. What is guerrilla warfare? It is the unavoidable and therefore the best form of struggle for the people’s armed forces to employ over a long period in a backward country, a large semicolonial country, to defeat the armed enemy and create their own bases. For the past eighteen years both our Party’s political line and its party building have been closely tied to this form of struggle. It is impossible to understand our political line or to understand our party building in isolation from armed struggle, from guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle is an important component of our political line. For the past eighteen years, our Party has increasingly learned the line of armed struggle and has persisted in it. We have come to understand that, in China, without armed struggle neither the proletariat nor the people nor the Communist Party would have any standing, and it would be impossible for the revolution to triumph. Over the past eighteen years the development, consolidation, and bolshevization of our Party have proceeded in the midst of revolutionary wars and are inextricably linked to guerrilla warfare; without armed struggle, without guerrilla warfare, the Communist Party would not be what it is today. All comrades throughout the Party must not forget this experience, which was paid for in blood.

25. Ten years of civil war → War of agrarian revolution
26. This kind of struggle → Armed struggle at the present time
27. Unavoidable → Indispensable
28. For the past eighteen years → Down to the present

29. Both enemies and allies were scheming to stab our Party in the back → Our Party was caught in a maze of schemes and intrigues of both enemies and allies
30. Lack of a unified understanding of → Lack of skill in integrating
31. Ten years of civil war → War of Agrarian Revolution
32. Because of progress in linking → Because our cadres had a better grasp of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and had learned more about how to integrate Marxist-Leninist theory with Chinese revolutionary practice
33. Soviet struggle → Agrarian revolutionary struggle
the Party was able to rely firmly upon the peasantry. The Party organization not only developed once again, but also achieved consolidation. Although the enemy tried daily to stab our Party in the back, the Party drove out the saboteurs. Not only did large numbers of cadres come forward within the Party, but these cadres were able to become the Party’s backbone. The Party blazed the trail of people’s political power and thereby learned the art of ruling the country and bringing peace and security to the people. The Party created strong armed forces and thereby learned the art of war. All these were great advances and great successes for the Party. In the course of these great struggles, however, some Party members fell into the quagmire of opportunism or did so for a time. This stemmed once again from their failure to learn humbly from past experience, the fact that they did not understand the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution and sorely lacked knowledge of Chinese history and society, and their failure to achieve a unified understanding of the relation between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution. As a consequence, throughout this stage some people in the Party’s leading organs were unable to adhere completely and at all times to correct political and organizational lines. At one time the Party and the revolution were damaged by Li Lisan’s “Left” opportunism, and at another time by “Left” opportunism in the revolutionary war and in the work in the White areas. All of this, however, was defeated at two historic meetings of the Party, its Fourth Plenum and its Zunyi Meeting. It was after the Zunyi Meeting (the meeting at Zunyi, Guizhou, in January 1935) that the Party definitively took the Bolshevik road and laid the foundation for its subsequent victory over Zhang Guotao’s Right opportunism and for the establishment of an Anti-Japanese National United Front. This was the second stage in the process of the Party’s development. The third stage in the process of the Party’s development is that of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This stage has lasted three years already, and these three years of struggle have extremely great significance. Drawing upon its experience in the preceding two revolutionary stages, upon its organizational strength and the strength of its armed forces, upon its high political prestige among the people of the whole country, and upon its deeper and more unified understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution, the Party has not only established the Anti-Japanese National United Front but has also been conducting a great War of Resistance Against Japan. Organizationally the Party has stepped out of its narrow confines and has become a major national party. Its armed forces are also growing anew and are becoming still stronger in the struggle against the Japanese bandits. The Party’s influence among the people of the whole country is becoming more extensive. These are all great achievements. On the other hand, the Party has developed, but large numbers of new Party members and many new organizations have not been consolidated. There is still a vast difference between them and the older members and organizations. They do not yet have very much revolutionary experience. They do not understand, or have limited understanding of, the specific features and laws of the Chinese revolution or about Chinese history and society. They are still far from having a deeper and more integrated understanding of the unity between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution. During the expansion of the Party’s organizations in the past, even though the Central Committee stressed the slogan, “Greatly expand the Party, but do not let a single bad element in,” actually many careerists and enemy saboteurs did manage to sneak in. Although the united front was formed and has been maintained for three years now, the bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie, has constantly been trying to destroy our Party, the big bourgeoisie, and diehards have been instigating serious friction and conflict throughout the country, and the anti-Communist clamor can be heard everywhere. The big bourgeoisie, capitalists and diehards seek to use all this as preparation for capitulating to Japanese imperialism, breaking up the united front, and dragging China backward. Ideologically, the bourgeoisie is attempting to dissolve communism; politically and organizationally, it is trying to abolish the Communist Party, abolish the border regions, and abolish the Party’s armed forces. Under such circumstances, it is undoubtedly our task to overcome these threats of capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression, to maintain as far as possible the national united front and Guomindang-Communist cooperation, to strive for continued resistance against Japan and continued unity and progress, and at the same time to prepare against all possible eventualities so that, in case they occur, the Party and revolution will not suffer unexpected losses. To attain this goal, it is necessary to consolidate the Party’s organization and its armed forces, and to mobilize the people of the whole country for resolute struggle against capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression. The accomplishment of this task depends upon the efforts of the whole Party, upon the unrelenting and persistent struggle of all Party members, Party cadres, and Party organizations everywhere and at every level. We are confident, moreover, that the Chinese Communist Party, with its eighteen years of experience, will be able to accomplish all these goals through the joint efforts of its experienced older cadres and its vigorous and youthful newer members and cadres, through the joint efforts

34. Party members → Comrades
35. The Selected Works text inserts here: “Chinese history and society and”
36. Li Lisan’s → Comrade Li Lisan’s
37. The meeting → The meeting of the Central Politburo held
38. Bolshevik road → The road of bolshevization
39. Large numbers of new Party members → Large numbers of new Party members have not been given education, and
40. They → Many of the new Party members and new cadres
41. Very much → Sufficient
42. Greaterly → Boldly
43. Everywhere → Incessantly
44. Bourgeoisie → Big bourgeoisie
of its well-tried Bolshevik Central Committee and its local organizations, and through the joint efforts of its powerful armed forces and the progressive popular masses.

These are the principal experiences and principal problems of our Party in its eighteen years of history and during its three separate stages.

Eighteen years of experience tells us that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. The party organization is the heroic soldier wielding the two weapons of united front and armed forces to storm and shatter the enemy’s positions. That is how the three are related to one another.

How are we to build up our Party today? How can we build a “Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party, a Party that is national in scale and has a broad mass character, a Party that is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally”? All this may be grasped by studying our Party’s history, by looking at party building in connection with the united front and armed struggle, in connection with the problem of both uniting with and struggling against the bourgeoisie, and with that of persistence in guerrilla warfare against Japan by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the establishment of anti-Japanese base areas.

To sum up eighteen years of experience and the present new experience on the basis of a unified understanding of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution and to spread it throughout the Party so that the Party becomes strong as steel and avoids repeating past mistakes—this is our task.

Inscription for the Second Anniversary of the Anwu Youth Training Class

(October 5, 1939)

Young people, who bring fresh blood and enthusiasm with them when they join the revolutionary ranks, are all very precious, whether they are Communists or non-Communists. Without them, the revolutionary ranks could not grow and the revolution could not triumph. But lack of experience is the natural failing of our young comrades. Revolutionary experience must come, however, from personal participation in revolutionary struggle. If one begins working at the grass roots and if, for several years, one does work that is genuine, not false, then experience will come to those who do not have it.

This is written to commemorate the second anniversary of the youth training class.

Mao Zedong

This inscription originally appeared in 1940 on the cover of a volume entitled Zhongguo qingnian wenxuan. Our source is Mao Zedong Ji, Vol. 7, p. 81, which reproduces it from this publication.
To Lu Chao

(October 7, 1939)

To his excellency Mr. Hanquon:

Mr. Wang Youyu is on a visit to Yan'an, and we have had very delightful conversations. I have had the honor of reading your instructions and am all the more drawn to you. You, sir, serving in the Center, boast great achievements and command high prestige; we inferiors, craning our necks and looking up to you, cannot possibly suppress our admiration. When the country is faced with disaster, unity is of first and foremost importance; I believe I share this understanding and aspiration with you, sir. This reply is respectfully submitted. With best wishes,

Respectfully,

Your younger brother, Mao Zedong

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Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks

(October 10, 1939)

1. The outbreak of the imperialist world war is a new stage in the second great imperialist war; it is the result of the attempt of the imperialist countries to extricate themselves from a new economic and political crisis. Whether on the German side or the Anglo-Franco-Polish side, the war is unjust, predatory, and imperialist in character. The Communist parties throughout the world must resolutely oppose this war and must also oppose the criminal action of the social-democratic parties in betraying the proletariat by supporting it. The socialist Soviet Union is persevering as before in its policy of peace and is maintaining strict neutrality toward both belligerents. By sending its armed forces into Poland at a time when the Polish government had already collapsed, it has consolidated the German-Soviet Pact of Mutual Nonaggression, strengthened peace in Eastern Europe, and liberated its brother nations in western Ukraine and Belorussia who were oppressed by the Polish fascist rulers. The Soviet Union has, moreover, concluded a number of pacts with neighboring countries to prevent any possible attacks by the forces of international reaction and is struggling to restore world peace. China should maintain strict neutrality in the war between Britain, France, and Germany. We must resolutely oppose any political conspiracy that aims to lure China into joining the Anglo-French side, for this is merely a reactionary step in preparing for surrender to the Japanese bandits and disrupting national unity.

2. The policy of the Japanese bandits in this new international situation is to concentrate its attacks on China and settle the China question, in order to prepare for extending its international adventures in the future. The overall policy by which

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Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 158, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. Lu Chao (1890–1952), zi Hanquon, a native of Sichuan, had studied at the Baoding Military Academy, joined the Tongmenghui before the 1911 Revolution, and served in Sun Yatsen's Guangzhou headquarters in 1921–22. At this time he was chief of the Military Inspectorate in the National Government.

2. Wang Youyu was an inspector in the Guomindang Military Inspectorate.

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This document was first published in Jiefang, nos. 87/88, October 30, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong jji, Vol. 7, pp. 83–86, which reproduces that text.

1. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks → The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks

2. Consolidated the German-Soviet Pact of Mutual Nonaggression → Checked eastward expansion of the German forces of aggression

3. Japanese bandits → Japanese imperialism
it is settling\(^4\) the China question is total subjugation of the whole of China under the general slogan of what it calls “establishing a New Order in East Asia”:

a. With regard to the areas behind the enemy’s lines,\(^5\) its policy is to tighten its hold on the occupied areas, in preparation for subjugating the whole of China. To achieve this end, it must “mop up” the guerrilla war,\(^6\) exploit economic resources, set up puppet régimes, and destroy our national spirit.\(^7\)

b. With regard to China’s rear areas, its policy is to launch mainly political offensives, supplemented by military offensives. Political offensives mean concentration not on launching large-scale military attacks but on disrupting the anti-Japanese united front, breaking up Guomindang-Communist cooperation, and inducing China\(^8\) to capitulate.

In the present period the enemy is not likely to launch big strategic offensives, like the one against Wuhan, because of the blows dealt to the enemy by China’s heroic resistance during the past two years and the inadequacy of his armed strength and financial resources. In this sense, the War of Resistance has already basically reached the stage of strategic stalemate. From the standpoint of the enemy, this stage of strategic stalemate is the stage of the political offensive; from the standpoint of China, it is the stage of preparation for our counteroffensive. But, first, when we say that basically a strategic stalemate has already been reached, we by no means rule out the possibility of further offensive campaigns by the enemy; he is now attacking Changsha and may attack other places in the future. Second, as the possibility of a stalemate at the front grows, the possibility of a stalemate in the enemy’s rear areas will diminish, and the enemy will intensify his “mopping-up” operations against our guerrilla base areas. Third, if China is unable to disrupt the enemy’s occupation of the areas he has seized, and allows him to succeed in his attempts to tighten his hold on them and exploit them, and if China is unable to repulse the enemy’s political offensives and to persist in resistance, unity, and progress, so as to accumulate strength for the counteroffensive, then if China does not surrender of its own accord, the enemy may still launch big offensives.\(^9\) In other words, the strategic stalemate that has already been reached may still be broken by the enemy or by the captulators, and the grave danger of national subjugation still exists.

3. The danger of capitulation, splits, and retrogression within the anti-Japanese united front remains the greatest danger at present. The current anti-Communist

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\(^4\) Setting → Attempting to settle
\(^5\) The areas behind the enemy’s lines → The occupied areas
\(^6\) Guerrilla war → Anti-Japanese guerrilla base areas
\(^7\) Our national spirit → The national spirit of the Chinese
\(^8\) China → The Guomindang government
\(^9\) If China does not surrender of its own accord, the enemy may still launch big offensives. → Either the Guomindang will surrender of its own accord, or the enemy might still launch big offensives.

and retrogressive phenomena of vacillating elements among the bourgeoisie\(^10\) continue to be preparatory steps to their capitulation. It remains our task, in cooperation with all the patriots throughout China, to mobilize the masses for the effective application of the general policy\(^11\) put forward in our Party’s Manifesto of July 7: “Support Chairman Chiang,” “Persist in resistance and oppose capitulation,” “Persist in unity and oppose splits,” and “Persist in progress and oppose retrogression,” in order to build up strength for the counteroffensive. To achieve this objective, behind the enemy lines we must resolutely persist in guerrilla warfare, introduce political and economic reforms beneficial to the masses who are resisting Japan, consolidate the guerrilla base areas, defeat the enemy’s “mopping-up” operations, and disrupt his occupied areas. At the front, we must sustain military defense and repel any offensive campaigns the enemy may launch. In China’s rear area, we must speedily and strictly eliminate captulators, smash anti-Communist activities, stop retrogression, carry out political reforms, end one-party dictatorship,\(^12\) convene a national assembly truly representative of the people’s will and invested with real power, draw up and adopt a constitution, and put constitutional government into practice. Only thus will it be possible to avoid the danger of national subjugation and accumulate strength for the counteroffensive. Any vacillation or procrastination, any orientation contrary to this, is absolutely wrong. At the same time, the leading organs of our Party at all levels and all Party members must heighten their vigilance in the present situation and do their utmost to achieve the ideological, political, and organizational consolidation of our Party, as well as of the anti-Japanese armed forces and anti-Japanese organs of political power under its leadership, in order to be ready for any emergency endangering the Chinese national War of Resistance,\(^13\) and to prevent unexpected losses to the Party and to the national War of Resistance.\(^14\)

The Double Tenth Holiday of the 28th year of the Republic of China.

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\(^10\) The bourgeoisie → The big landlords and big bourgeoisie
\(^11\) The general policy → The three great political slogans
\(^12\) One-party dictatorship → The Guomindang’s one-party dictatorship
\(^13\) Chinese national War of Resistance → Chinese revolution
\(^14\) The national War of Resistance → The revolution
To Lin Zhonghe

(November 5, 1939)

To my elder brother and senior fellow student Roxu:

I seemed to be seeing my old friend again when I received and read your wonderful letter. I did not dare to procrastinate, because your first letter failed to reach me. Here enclosed please find a hundred yuan, merely a supplement to your salary. This is a very small sum, which serves only as a token of my regard. I sincerely hope you will keep up your efforts in imparting your knowledge to the young and training people for the War of Resistance. The south sky is within sight, and I will crane my neck to look in that direction. With respect and best wishes for success in your studies.

Respectfully,

Your younger brother, Mao Zedong

Inscription for Liu Xian

(October 1939)

I know very little about the methods of making woodcuts, but I like to look at them. It has not been long since Comrade Liu Xian came to the border region, but he has already produced many works. I hope he will continue his efforts and strive to create a new art of the Chinese nation.

Our source for this letter is Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, p. 159, where it is printed from the manuscript.

1. Lin Zhonghe, zi Roxu, was a native of Ningxiang, Hunan Province. He had been a classmate of Mao Zedong's at the Hunan First Normal School.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to Mao Zedong ji, Bujuan, p. 149.
Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals

(December 1, 1939)

1. In the long and cruel war of national liberation, in the great struggle to build a new China, the Communist Party must be good at recruiting intellectuals, for only thus can we organize great strength for the War of Resistance, organize the peasant masses in their millions, develop the revolutionary cultural movement, and expand the united front. Without the participation of the intellectuals, victory in the revolution is impossible.

2. Our Party and our army have made considerable efforts to recruit intellectuals during the last three years, and many revolutionary intellectuals have been recruited to join the Party, the army, and the organs of government and to participate in the cultural movement and the mass movement, thus broadening the united front. This is a major achievement. But many army units have still not paid attention to the importance of the intellectuals and still regard them with some apprehension or are even inclined to reject them. Many of our training institutes are still hesitant about enrolling young students in large numbers. Many of our local Party branches are still reluctant to recruit intellectuals to join the Party. All these phenomena result from the failure to understand the importance of the intellectuals for the revolutionary cause, the difference between intellectuals in colonial and semicolonial countries and those in capitalist countries, and the difference between intellectuals who serve the landlords and the bourgeoisie and those who serve the working class and the peasantry. They also result from the failure to grasp the seriousness of the situation in which the bourgeois political parties are desperately contending with us for the intellectuals and in which the Japanese imperialists are also trying in every possible way to buy over Chinese intellectuals or poison their minds. Above all, this problem results from the failure to understand the favorable conditions created by the fact that our Party and our army have already developed a strong core of well-tested cadres and are thus capable of leading the intellectuals. Because of this, erroneous tendencies have arisen regarding the question of intellectuals.

3. Consequently, from now on attention should be paid to the following points:
   a. All Party organizations in the war areas and all army units led by the Party should recruit large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals into our army and training institutes, and to work in our organs of government. Provided only that they are willing to fight Japan, and are fairly loyal, hard-working, and able to endure hardship, we should try in every possible way to recruit all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, give them political education, and help them to temper themselves in war and work and to serve the army, the government, and the masses. Taking each case on its merits, we should admit into the Party those intellectuals who measure up to requirements of Party membership. As for those who do not qualify, or do not wish to join the Party, we should have good working relations with them and lead them to work side by side with us.
   b. In applying this policy of recruiting intellectuals in large numbers, we must without a doubt take great care to prevent the infiltration of those elements sent by the enemy and the bourgeois political parties and to keep out other disloyal elements. We must be very strict about keeping out such elements. Those who have already sneaked into our Party, army, or government organs must be cleaned out resolutely but discriminatingly, on the basis of conclusive evidence. But we must not on that account suspect reasonably loyal intellectuals, and we must be strictly on guard against the false accusation of innocent people by counterrevolutionaries.
   c. We should assign appropriate work to all intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who are reasonably loyal and useful, and we should earnestly give them political education and guidance so that in the long course of the struggle they gradually overcome their weaknesses, revolutionize their outlook, identify themselves with the masses, and merge with the older Party members and cadres and the worker and peasant members of the Party.
   d. We must earnestly persuade those cadres, especially certain cadres in the main forces of our army, who are opposed to the admission of intellectuals to participate in our work and make them understand the necessity of recruiting intellectuals for our work. At the same time, we should work effectively to encourage worker and peasant cadres to study hard and raise their cultural level. Thus we will bring about simultaneously the transformation of worker and peasant cadres into intellectuals, and the transformation of intellectuals into members of the worker and peasant masses.
   e. In the main, the principles stated above are also applicable in the war zones and in the occupied areas, except that, on admitting intellectuals into the

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 87-89, which reproduces a version issued by the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in 1942.

1. The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Recruiting Intellectuals
   2. Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals
   3. United front → Revolutionary united front
   4. Army units → Army cadres

4. The war zones → The areas ruled by the Guomindang
5. The occupied areas → The areas occupied by the Japanese bandits
Party, even greater attention must be paid to their degree of loyalty, so as to ensure still tighter Party organization in those areas. We should maintain suitable contact with the broad masses of non-Party intellectuals who sympathize with us and organize them in the great struggle for resistance against Japan and for democracy and in the cultural movement and the work of the united front.

4. All comrades must understand that a correct policy toward the intellectuals is an important condition for victory in the revolution. There must be no repetition of the incorrect attitude toward the question of the intellectuals which Party organizations in many localities and army units adopted during the Agrarian Revolution. Moreover, the proletariat’s goal of producing its own intellectuals can absolutely not be attained without the help of the existing intellectuals. The Central Committee hopes that the Party headquarters at all levels and all Party comrades will give this matter their serious attention.

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The Clashes Between the New and Old Armies in Southwestern Shanxi, and Our Overall Policy

(December 6, 1939)

Zhu, Zuo, and Peng; Chen and Lin; Peng and Luo; and for the information of Liu and Deng, Nie, and Peng:

1. Serious armed clashes have already occurred between the new and old armies under Yan in southwestern Shanxi, making it increasingly apparent that the old faction in Shanxi is capitulating to the Japanese bandits and that its nature is to betray the cause of resistance to Japan. The details are as follows:

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong jingshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 497–99, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. The “Old Army” refers to forces in Shanxi loyal to Yan Xishan, the long-time governor of the province, which were anti-Communist to a greater or lesser degree. The “New Army” refers to more recently formed units under the command of secretly Communist officers or officers sympathetic to the Communist cause. Early in the war, Yan had invited collaboration with the Communists, and he was an important target of the united front in North China. From this start, the Communists expanded their influence, infiltrated much of Yan’s administration and military apparatus, and created territorial bases beyond his control. These actions led to the tension and conflict described here. See also below, the texts of December 31, 1939, and January 11, 1940.

2. The reference is to Zhu De, Zuo Qian, and Peng Dehuai. On Zuo, see above, the note to the telegram of June 12, 1939, addressed to him.

3. Chen and Lin are Chen Shiju (1909–1995), a native of Hubei, and Lin Feng (1906–1977), a native of Heilongjiang Province, who were at this time, respectively, commander and political commissar of the Western Shanxi Detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

4. Peng Shaohui (1906–1978), who was born in Mao’s native village of Shaoshan, Hunan, and Luo Guipei (1908–1995), a native of Jiangxi Province, were, respectively, commander and political commissar of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

5. Zhao Lin (1906–2003), a native of Jiangxi, was at this time secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Northwest Shanxi Bureau.

6. Liu and Deng are Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were at this time commander and political commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Nie is Nie Rongzhen, who was then commander and political commissar of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military District. Peng is Peng Zhen, then secretary of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
a. The Japanese bandits, after occupying Xianxian, Daning, and Puxian, all of a sudden withdrew of their own accord.
b. At exactly the same time, the sixty-first, nineteenth, and seventy-third armies of the Old Army suddenly joined forces to encircle the headquarters of the 196th Brigade of the New Army in the Sixth District from Wuchen, Puxian, Xianxian, Yonghe, and Shilou. The brigade headquarters were wiped out on the 3rd near the Yonghe xian town. In the other regions, the Old Army is being actively redeployed, in preparation for eliminating the New Army, the progressive governments, and the progressive mass organizations.
c. Armed rebellion against the New Army and against the cause of resistance to Japan may spread further in southwestern and northwestern Shanxi.

2. Our overall policy:
a. See clearly that such clashes may spread further. Notify the progressive elements quickly, and be on the alert immediately, so as to be prepared to deal resolutely with any incidents. We shall absolutely not yield in the face of the attacks of the rebel forces. We shall fight back resolutely, and immediately put forward, through the New Army, the slogan of opposing the rebel forces. But we should not oppose Yan.
b. Quickly consolidate Party leadership within the New Army. Resolutely replace those who are unreliable. Avoid panicking. All New Army forces should prepare to engage in guerrilla war against the rebel forces.
c. The Eighth Route Army itself should be even more on the alert, to guard against any unexpected events, and should also give encouragement, cover, and support to the New Army. In form, we should appear to play the role of mediation, to prevent the Old Army from attacking the New Army. For the time being, the Eighth Route Army should not advance the slogan of opposing the rebel forces.
d. If the rebel forces attack the Eighth Route Army, we should join forces with the New Army to wipe them out.
e. The strategic position in southwestern and northwestern Shanxi is extremely important. We absolutely cannot abandon it.

Military Affairs Commission
Mao [Zedong]
Wang [Jiaxiang]

Views on Military Work in Shandong

(December 6, 1939)

Xu and Zhu, Li and Jiang, and also for the information of Chen and Luo, Huang, Zhu and Peng, Yang, Zuo, and Fu and Lu:

Regarding the work in Shandong, apart from the telegraphic instructions from the Central Committee, we would submit the following views:

1. The work in Shandong has already achieved great successes as a result of our comrades' hard yet creative labor. Under the circumstances of an absence of

Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 500–502, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. Xu is Xu Xiangqian (1901–1990), zil Jiziping, a native of Shanxi. A graduate of the Hupeh Military Academy, Xu joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He was one of the founders of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet in the early 1930s, became commander of the Fourth Red Army, fought his way to Sichuan in 1933, and followed Zhang Guotao when Zhang and Mao split during the Long March. When he reached Yan'an in 1937, his Fourth Front Army was absorbed into the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. In the spring of 1939, he had been sent to Shandong to command the newly created First Column of the Eighth Route Army, with Zhu Rui as political commissar. Regarding Zhu see above, the relevant note to the text of March 19, 1939.

2. Li is Li Yu (1906–1986), a native of Shanxi, who joined the Communist Party in 1926, and worked underground in Beijing, Tianjin, and other northern cities. At this time, he was political commissar of the Shandong Column of the Eighth Route Army. Jiang is Jiang Hua (1907–1999), the director of the Political Department of the same column.

3. Chen is Chen Guang (1907–1954), acting commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. Luo is Luo Ronghuan (1902–1963), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was political commissar of the 115th Division.

4. Huang is Huang Kecheng (1902–1986), a native of Hunan, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was political commissar of the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

5. The reference is to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai.

6. Yang is Yang Shangkun (1907–1998), a native of Sichuan, who joined the Communist Party in 1926, studied in the Soviet Union from 1926 to 1931, and went to Jiangxi in 1933. He participated in the Long March and in the Zunyi Conference. At this time, he was secretary of the Central Committee.

7. Zuo is Zuo Quan; see the note to the previous text.

8. Fu is Fu Zhong (1900–1989), a native of Sichuan, who had studied in France and then in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, and participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Political Department for Eighth Route Army field troops. Lu is Lu Dingyi.
assistance from the Eighth Route Army or from enough cadres who have military experience, the local Party has already created all by itself forces which are relatively combat-effective and are on the way to becoming regular ones. They will become the main force with which to persist in the War of Resistance in Shandong.

2. Make an effort to expand the Shandong column and to engage in the work of consolidation and training, so as to turn them rapidly into regular forces. Use the troops to cover and support the local Party in the extensive organization of local armed forces, so as to check the enemy. Gradually replace the losses of the main force, in order to free it from regional constraints so it can cope with battles on a larger scale.

3. Establish a regular supply system. The temporary method of taking food from the people cannot last long and affects adversely the combat effectiveness and regularization of the forces. The Jiaodong Bank² may issue bank notes. After exchanging them for other currencies, they can be sent to southern Shandong and other regions for use. After we obtain political power, money shall be printed, grain procured, and taxes collected so as to develop a long-term plan for solving the problem of supplies for our forces.

4. Improve the work in the political organs and strengthen their linkages with the various contingents. Clarify the organizational principle of our forces (the Eighth Route Army is an armed force of the workers and farmers, and also of the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; it is not a united front armed force) and all the most important posts should be filled by Party members. Correct the improper democratic style of work and the local Party work-style in our forces.

5. Enhance the role of the Party cells and Party members. Not only is the Party cell a school to recruit and educate Party members, but also, in particular, it should become a strong fortress within the company. Every Party member should be not only a model soldier but also a leader for the non-Party masses.

6. There are many cadres with an intellectual background in the Shandong column. An effort should be made to do a good job in educating them, correcting their weaknesses and strengthening their revolutionary stand. We propose that the Shandong column send a batch of cadres of intellectual background to the 115th Division and the 115th Division send a batch of cadres with military experience to the Shandong column. This will be of great benefit to the work of both sides.

7. Those forces which are near the 115th Division may establish contact with it, organize tours by cadres, and absorb the experience of the main force. The 115th Division should take the matter of allocating 2,500 men to the Shandong column very seriously. A good job should be done to educate and explain things to those officers and men who are to be sent.

8. A study should be done with regard to work on the armed forces formerly belonging to the Buddhist associations which have already been reorganized into the Eighth Route Army. Generally speaking, an effort should be made to assimilate them and to turn religious armed forces into progressive armed forces. Party organizations should be set up within these forces. But caution and a step-by-step approach are required, so as to avoid provoking rebellion.

Teng [Daiyuan]  Tan [Zheng]

(1906–1996), a native of Jiangsu, who joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and participated in the Long March. In 1939 he was deputy head of the Political Department for field troops.

The distribution lists for this telegram, and for the preceding one of the same date, forcefully illustrate how far down the chain of command Mao was prepared to reach in order to communicate his instructions and opinions.

². The Jiaodong Bank was a branch of the Beihai Bank, which had been established in 1938 to serve the needs of the base areas. Its headquarters were in Shandong.
assistance from the Eighth Route Army or from enough cadres who have military experience, the local Party has already created all by itself forces which are relatively combat-effective and are on the way to becoming regular ones. They will become the main force with which to persist in the War of Resistance in Shandong.

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Teng [Daiyuan]  Tan [Zheng]

⁹ The Jiaodong Bank was a branch of the Beihai Bank, which had been established in 1938 to serve the needs of the base areas. Its headquarters were in Shandong.
The Great Significance of the December Ninth Movement

(December 9, 1939)

Comrades:

Today we are holding an assembly to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the "December Ninth movement." All the young people filling this hall are fresh and energetic. What a lively and vigorous meeting this is! This is not the first assembly to commemorate the "December Ninth movement" in Yan'an, but since I was unable to attend those in the past, I am extremely happy to come to this meeting today. I think that things in China are easier to manage now. What are the things in China? They include opposition to imperialism and to the dark forces. It has been a hundred years now since the Chinese people began to fight against imperialism and the dark forces in the Opium War. This is a very long time, and although this

Extracts from this talk delivered by Mao at an evening meeting on December 9, 1939, appeared in Xin Zhonghua bao. December 16, 1939, and are reproduced in Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 133-34. The present, much fuller text was first published in Hongqi, no. 23, December 1, 1985; that version is reprinted in Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 250-58, which is our source.

1. The December Ninth movement was an initially spontaneous response of university and middle school students in Beijing to Japanese pressure on five North China provinces to declare independence from the Nanjing government and also a protest at Nanjing's apparent willingness to accept these Japanese demands. After large-scale demonstrations in Beijing on December 9 and 16, 1935, the movement quickly spread into other areas and other strata of the population, becoming known as the National Salvation movement. From the very start, Communists (many of them under cover) played a leading role in the movement. In the official Chinese historiography, the December Ninth movement is seen as the beginning of a fundamental shift in public opinion, favoring internal unity and resistance against Japan.

2. Not only had Mao attended no meetings commemorating the December Ninth movement, but we have found few previous mentions of it in his writings. Nianpu, which refers to virtually all of Mao's utterances, even when it does not cite the texts, says nothing of any remarks by him on earlier anniversaries of these events. In his speeches of May 3 and 7, 1937, to a Party congress of the soviet regions, Mao stated that a "new period in the Chinese revolution" had begun with the December Ninth movement, but did not further dwell on the nature of that movement. (See the translations of these texts in Volume V of our edition.) Apart from this, the texts for the years 1935-1938 available to us and translated in Volumes V and VI do not even allude to December 9, 1935.

3. Li Chang (1914— ), a native of Hunan, joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in 1933. The following year, he became a student at Qinghua University in Beijing, and in that capacity he played a significant role in the December Ninth movement and in the creation of the National Salvation movement. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in May 1936 and occupied various responsible posts in the Communist Youth League. In October 1938 he went to Yan'an, where he attended the Sixth Plenum. Soon thereafter he became head of the Organization Department of the Party's Committee on Youth Work. In this capacity, he chaired the meeting on May 4, 1939, at which Mao gave the report on the May Fourth movement translated above.

4. As already noted, there is no available record in Mao's own words expressing any such sentiments. That is not to say, of course, that when news of the events in Beijing reached him, he was not happy to hear about the December Ninth movement, but, having just arrived in the northwest after the Long March, he had many other things on his mind. Regarding the situation in which he found himself and the views he did put forward in December 1935, see the Introduction to Volume V of this edition and the relevant texts.
such a great Long March, and the student comrades had launched such a great movement of national salvation in Beijing. Both of these were struggles for the liberation of the nation and the people, and the direct significance of both lay in promoting the War of Resistance Against Japan. Therefore, historically speaking, the December Ninth movement was an extremely important aspect of the preparation for the anti-Japanese war.

Some people say that the December Ninth movement is not equal to the May Fourth movement, that is to say, the political significance of the former is not as great as that of the latter. Is this correct? No, it is incorrect. We think that the significance of the two is equally great.

The May Fourth movement was the preparation for the Northern Expedition. Without the May Fourth movement, the Northern Expedition would have been unthinkable. Some people hold that student movements have no strength, but what are the facts? The May Fourth movement of the broad student masses gave an impetus to the struggle against imperialism and against the government that was selling out the country, as manifested in the nationwide strike of workers, merchants, and students on “June 3,” which developed into a movement of the whole nation. After the May Fourth movement, the Chinese Communist Party emerged, and this led to the first cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, to the May Thirtieth movement, and to the Northern Expedition, thus bringing about the First Great Revolution. Thus it is very evident that without the May Fourth movement, the First Great Revolution would have been impossible. The May Fourth movement truly prepared public opinion, and people’s hearts and thoughts, as well as the cadres for the First Great Revolution.

As regards the December Ninth movement, it was the preparation for the great War of Resistance Against Japan, just as the May Fourth movement was a preparation for the First Great Revolution. “December Ninth” pushed forward and prepared for the “July 7” War of Resistance Against Japan.

Let us consider the circumstances under which the December Ninth movement took place. On the one hand, it took place in the territory ruled by the Guomindang, in which the Communist Party was regarded as absolutely without authority or legitimate status. It took place at the time of a war to “suppress the Communists” by the Nationalist reactionaries, in an environment of military as well as cultural “encirclement and suppression.” In the previous so-called campaigns to “suppress the Communists,” the difficult situation of the Communist Party and that of the Red Army was so obvious that we need say little about it. Later the Red Army began the Long March, and once it began marching, it marched for 25,000 li. There were also people behind, “seeing us off” for 25,000 li, as well as people “greeting” us in front. To these must be added those who were “giving us gifts” from the sky above; these gifts were called bombs. Although those who were seeing us off did “see us off” trip after trip, and those who were greeting us did “greet us” at every stop, the Red Army still arrived in northern Shaanxi. Yet the enemy continued to use bullets as gifts to greet us in the front and see us off from behind. That is to say that after arriving in northern Shaanxi, the Red Army was still in a situation of being “encircled and suppressed.” Such was the situation of military “encirclement and suppression.” How about the cultural “encirclement and suppression?” The enemy’s “blockhouses” were built in schools, and in books, newspapers, and magazines, as well as in social, cultural, and educational societies, and it looked as if they were going to “go ahead steadily and strike sure blows, and consolidate at every step.” As far as this is concerned, it will suffice to read Mr. Lu Xun’s essays. His fighting essays criticizing and condemning the evils of the time were aimed at opposing cultural “encirclement and suppression” and opposing the repression of young people’s thought. On the other hand, the Japanese imperialists had already occupied the Northeast and were discussing a “special status for North China.” Moreover, they were actively preparing to destroy all of China. Consequently, every one of the 450 million people wanted to act and to fight Japanese imperialism. Nonetheless, strangely enough, some people obstinately refused to agree. They also wanted to fight, but against whom did they want to fight? They wanted to fight the Communist Party, the young students, and the progressive people in intellectual circles. The common people of the whole country told them: Your direction of attack is wrong, we resolutely oppose it. This is the other side of the circumstances in which the December Ninth movement took place. After the December Ninth movement, things gradually became easier to manage. With the peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident, the Guomindang government’s method of fighting only the Communist Party and not fighting Japanese imperialism was no longer feasible. Hence they had no choice but to give up the policy of suppressing the Communist Party, and take the road of preparing for a War of Resistance, which led to the Third Plenum of the Guomindang, and the Anti-Japanese National United Front was actually proclaimed. The December Ninth movement contributed greatly to these developments.

Here, there is one point to which we should pay special attention, namely, the close relationship between the Long March of the Red Army and the December Ninth movement. The December Ninth movement took place at the time when the Red Army had arrived in northern Shaanxi on its march to the north to resist Japan. The victory of the 25,000-li Long March helped the December Ninth movement, while at the same time the December Ninth movement also helped the Red Army. The combination of these two things helped to mobilize the people as a whole for the War of Resistance, helped the Chinese nation, and advanced the interests of the entire nation.

The August 1 Declaration by the Chinese Communist Party Central Commit-tee called on the people of the whole country to resist Japanese imperialism and

5. This declaration was not actually written or issued by Mao and the Central Committee in China, but was drafted by Wang Ming in Moscow, in the context of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. Mao learned of it only in November 1935, though copies had become available in some parts of China earlier. On these events, see the Introduction to Volume V of this edition. These facts about the origin of the declaration do not, of course, invalidate Mao’s argument, in the present document, about its impact in China when it did become known.
pushed forward the tide of the development of uniting the whole country for the anti-Japanese war. The December Ninth movement took place in circumstances when the Chinese Communist Party had published the August 1 Declaration, when the Red Army had won some victories after arriving in northern Shaanxi, and when Japanese imperialism was just then intensifying its invasion of China. The broad mass of young students stood up and opposed the authorities’ oppression of them, opposed the invasion of China by Japanese imperialism, and demanded an end to civil war and a unified resistance war against Japan. The outbreak of this movement caused a sensation throughout the country. In conjunction with the Red Army’s Northern Expedition to resist Japan, it promoted domestic peace and the War of Resistance Against Japan and turned the anti-Japanese movement into a nationwide movement. Thus, the December Ninth movement was a movement that mobilized the whole nation for a resistance war; it prepared the thoughts, the human hearts, and the cadres for the War of Resistance. If we make a comparison to the relationship between the May Fourth movement and the Northern Expedition, it is very plain that the relationship between the December Ninth movement and the Resistance War Against Japan is closer, and the interval between them is shorter, because the December Ninth movement was coordinated with the victory of the Long March of the Red Army. In sum, the December Ninth movement will become an extremely important date in Chinese history. After the December Ninth movement, after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, it is much easier to pursue the anti-imperialist cause in China.

Second, it is also much easier to oppose the oppression of young students and intellectuals by the dark forces, and it is harder for the dark forces to oppress the young students and intellectuals. This has been proved by the December Ninth movement. The dark forces oppress progressive thought, but, in the end, the dark forces always suffer defeat. Before the December Ninth movement, they had been carrying on anti-Communist education for more than eight years, and it was carried out according to plan. Every course in the schools which had political tendencies had as its first principle opposition to the Communist Party and to Marxism. Among the faculty, all those who were regarded as Communists and Marxists were dismissed and oppressed. Beginning in the second half of 1927, they used this kind of education and trained people for more than eight years. Most unfortunately, this training produced a “December Ninth.” In the eyes of those anti-Communist gentlemen in the Guomindang, this was certainly a colossal misfortune. Some people said that the December Ninth movement was a student rebellion. The students accepted this point; it was indeed a rebellion. Nevertheless, against whom did they rebel? They rebelled against those who oppressed the students, and those who sought to “encircle and suppress” thought, as well as those who propagated false Three People’s Principles. The purpose of their rebellion was to carry out the real Three People’s Principles, that is, the Three People’s Principles of uniting with the Soviet Union, uniting with the Communist Party, and assisting the peasants and workers. They rebelled in order to eliminate all the obstacles to carrying out the real Three People’s Principles. Was such a rebellion necessary or not? The answer is yes, yes, and again yes.

There are really strange things in this world. Some people hit their heads against a brick wall, but, afterward, they forget about it. Just consider that in the past some people simply refused to recognize the May Fourth movement, yet today everybody recognizes it. Now there are some people who refuse to recognize the December Ninth movement, but in the light of the experience of the May Fourth movement, at some future time, we cannot say exactly when, these people will have to recognize the “December Ninth movement.” If they persist in refusing to recognize it, then we should ask them to choose the best of the thirty-six stratagems, or to put it in simple words, ask them to beat it! Because the world is always moving forward, it is impossible to move backward. The Chinese people no longer have pigtailed, so they cannot pull us back even if they want to. The old and backward things will have to fall down and let the new and progressive things replace them. If, in the midst of the tide of progress, they still refuse to recognize the progressive December Ninth movement, and still want to look down upon this movement, then they will certainly be out of luck.

The young students now understand more truths and are much cleverer than when I was a young student. In the first few years after I went to school, I only learned stuff like “it is written in the Book of Poetry,” and “the Master says,” and in my heart I always thought that all those officials and emperors were good people. Later, when I entered a school run by foreigners, I encountered revolution. It was then that I learned that our master the emperor was no good, the capital of the United States is Washington, and the capital of England is London. I also heard about things such as x plus y equals z, molecules, atoms, and electrons. Now you know not only these things but also Marxism! At that time I did not know anything about Marx. This is one of the proofs that the present is more progressive than the past. During World War I, the upper strata wanted to join Britain and France of the Entente to attack Germany and Austria. Their speeches were beautifully delivered, and indeed some people were fooled. In 1918, when World War I ended, China also held a meeting in Beijing. At the meeting a tablet was set up, upon which the four characters [meaning] “universal truth is victorious” were inscribed. This was of great renown and influence for a time and confused the minds of some people for a time. Now things are different. China is forever moving forward. The people of China have now already come to understand the major events in the world; they understand revolutionary principles. They have understood these principles step by step; in the past, they understood little, but now they understand more. Everyone has understood that an imperialist war is unjust and predatory in nature, understands the plots and schemes of Japanese imperialism, understands the sinister and ruthless nature of the capitalism and the diehard faction, and understands democracy and constitutional government. They understand these things clearly and want progress, democracy, and participation in government and politics. But the true realization of democracy and constitutional government also
requires that everyone stand up and struggle hard. Only when the young students, workers, and peasants in the whole country stand up and struggle hard can we succeed in this matter. Now people are cleverer, and cannot be deceived so easily. Everyone’s eyes are wide open and watching. They want to see who does not want democracy. Who wants splits. Who wants to surrender. Who wants to go backward. In the novel *The Investiture of the Gods*, there is a character named Shen Gongbao. He is an unworthy classmate of Jiang Ziya; his face is at the back and his eyes look to the back.8 Hiding at present in the ranks of the War of Resistance are a pack of “Shen Gongbaos,” a bunch of experts in retrogression. They are holding China up and trying to make it go backward. The dark forces in China are oppressing the bright forces; this is called the freedom of oppression. Nonetheless, the great mass of young people, workers, and peasants throughout China also have another freedom: this is called the freedom to resist the dark forces. We will not allow the dark forces to pull China backward. Do we have confidence in our ability not to allow them to do that? Yes, we do. An important reason is that at present people are not easily duped; it is not easy to deceive the common people of the whole country. Now the majority of the people would not allow these people to oppress them like this and want to resist their oppression. They will not allow them to surrender and want to carry on the War of Resistance. They will not allow them to split and want to maintain unity. They will not allow them to go backward, and insist on progress. Let’s wait and see how this whole bunch of “Shen Gongbaos” ends up.

Third, how about the relationship between the December Ninth movement and the Chinese Communist Party? There is no doubt that the Communist Party played the role of backbone in the December Ninth movement. If the Communist Party had not served as the backbone, the December Ninth movement could not have taken place. First of all, the August 1 Declaration of the Communist Party provided the young students with a clear political orientation. Second, the Red Army had arrived in northern Shaanxi and was acting in concert with the National Salvation movement in the north. Finally, the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party and the Party organizations in Shanghai and other places provided direct leadership. Only this made it possible for the December Ninth movement to take place and, moreover, caused it to expand and develop at every level throughout the country and to become a great political force in the National Salvation movement of the entire nation. The young students were just like the firewood in the December Ninth movement; everything was ready, and the only thing needed was to set the fire. Who set the fire? It was the Communist Party. Ever since the day it came into existence, the Communist Party has been closely united with young students and intellectuals; by the same token, only in concert with the Communist Party can the young students and intellectuals take the correct road. If the intellectuals do not unite with the workers and peasants, they will not be able to have great strength and will be unable to achieve great things. Similarly, if there are no intellectuals in the revolutionary ranks, we will not be able to achieve great things either. Only when the intellectuals, workers, and peasants are properly combined will there be a force which will always be victorious and can never be stopped. Therefore, intellectuals must integrate themselves with the Communist Party, with the large number of worker and peasant masses, with the revolutionary armed forces, and with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Every Communist Party member must make it clear to non-Party sympathizers that our Communist Party welcomes intellectuals very much and wants to unite with the intellectuals. Of course, we are against those few bad intellectuals who sabotage the revolution, those intellectuals who are Chinese traitors, and intellectuals of the “Shen Gongbao” type. It is a crime if we do not oppose this kind of intellectuals; it will benefit both the country and the people to oppose this kind of intellectuals.

Now many young intellectuals do not have any freedom; they do not have the right to walk along the roads. Take the road from Xi’an to Yan’an, for example. Numerous security measures are set up along it, and it is very difficult for progressive educated youths to pass. Because they do not have green dragon crescent swords, or red horses that fly like the wind, and because they do not have the capacity to decapitate six generals at five paces,7 they can only go to the “training regiments” in the concentration camps. It seems that this is a rather difficult thing to deal with. But if the intellectuals join with the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the guerrillas, that is, if pens can be combined with guns, it will be easy to deal with things. Napoleon said that one pen can equal three thousand Mauser rifles. Nevertheless, if there were no Mauser rifles made of iron, this pen would be of no use. If you have a pen plus a Mauser rifle, according to Napoleon, you will have 3,001 Mauser rifles.8 With these, you will not fear any imperialism or any diehard elements. With these, will those dogs dare to come and bite you?

Beginning with the Opium War, the Chinese people have had a hundred years of experience in struggling against imperialism and the forces of darkness. If we add the Communist Party’s eighteen-year experience of struggle, will there be anything that we cannot accomplish? If you look at it this way, things in China are easier to manage than they were before. We must be determined to carry on the War of Resistance to final victory, overthrow Japanese imperialism, and create a

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6. Shen Gongbao, a character in the traditional Chinese novel *The Investiture of the Gods*, was skilled at summoning up the spirits. He did so in support of the last emperor of the Shang dynasty, commonly regarded as a tyrant; his antagonist, Jiang Ziya, armed with the weapons described above in a note to the text of July 9, 1939, fought on behalf of King Wu, the founder of the ensuing Zhou dynasty.

7. The reference is to the great sword and fleet horse of Guan Yu (long known in China as Guan Gong, the god of war), one of Liu Bei’s sworn brothers in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, and to his exploits in combat.

8. Regarding this anachronistic reference to Napoleon and Mausers, see p. 302 of Volume VI.
democratic republic! Although there are still imperialists and “Shen Gongbaos” who constantly try to stop us from doing so, that is of no importance. We are cleverer now, and stronger, too. We are no longer what we were yesterday; instead we are what we are today. Imperialists, “Shen Gongbaos,” it is time you got out of here!

The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party

(December 15, 1939)

Chapter 1: Chinese Society

A. The Chinese Nation

Our China is one of the largest countries in the world, covering a territory larger than the area of the whole of Europe. In this vast territory, there are large stretches of fertile land that provide us with food and clothing; there are mountain ranges, plateaus, and plains across its length and breadth, with extensive forests and rich mineral deposits; there are many rivers and lakes that provide us with facilities for water transport and irrigation; and there is a long coastline that facilitates communication with the various nations beyond the seas. From the most ancient times, the ancestors of our Chinese nation have labored, lived, and multiplied on this vast land.

Today, China borders on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the northeast, the northwest, and part of the west; India, Bhutan, and Nepal in the southwest and part of the west; Thailand, Burma and Indochina, and Taiwan as a close neighbor in the south; and Korea in the east, where it is also a close neighbor of Japan. China’s geographical setting has its advantages and disadvantages for the Chinese revolution. It is an advantage to be adjacent to the Soviet Union and fairly distant from all the major imperialist countries in Europe and America and to have mostly colonial or semicolonial countries around us. It is a disadvantage

This text was published as a pamphlet in Yan’an in 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 93–131, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao’s writings. According to a note to the Selected Works, the first chapter was written by others and revised by Mao; the second chapter was entirely Mao’s own. There was to be a third chapter on party building, but because of pressure of other work it was never completed.

1. Larger than the whole of Europe → About the size of the whole of Europe
2. The west; → The west; the Mongolian People’s Republic in the north
3. India, → Afghanistan, India,
5. The Chinese revolution → The Chinese people’s revolution
that Japanese imperialism, making use of its sea, land, and air proximity to China, is constantly threatening the very existence of China and the Chinese revolution.\(^6\)

Today our China has a population of 450 million or almost a quarter of the world total. Of these 450 million, nine-tenths\(^7\) are Hans. In addition, there are also many\(^8\) minority nationalities, including the Hui, Mongol, Tibetan, Man, Miao, Yi, and Li\(^9\) nationalities. Although they are at different levels of civilization,\(^10\) all have long histories. Thus China is a country with a very large population composed of many nationalities.

Developing along the same lines as the other great nations of the world, the Chinese people (here we refer primarily to the Hans) went through some tens of thousands of years of life in egalitarian and classless primitive communist societies.\(^11\) Five thousand years\(^12\) have gone by from the collapse of these primitive communist societies\(^13\) and the transition to the era of class society, which took the form, first, of slave society and then of feudal society. Throughout the history of the development of the civilization of the Chinese nation, mainly that of the Han nationality, its agriculture and handicrafts have been renowned for their high level of development; there have been many great thinkers, scientists, inventors, statesmen, and strategists,\(^14\) and there is a rich store of classical works. The compass was invented in China as early as three thousand years ago.\(^15\) The art of papermaking was discovered as early as 1,700 years ago.\(^16\) Block-printing was invented 1,200\(^17\) years ago, and movable type 800 years ago. Gunpowder was also used by the Chinese long before the Europeans. Thus China has one of the oldest civilizations in the world, with a history of five thousand years.\(^18\)

The Chinese nation is known throughout the world not only for its industriousness and endurance but also for its ardent love of freedom and its rich revolutionary traditions. The history of the Hans, for instance, demonstrates that the Chinese people can never submit to the rule of the dark forces, and, that in every case, they make use of revolutionary means to achieve the goal of overthrowing and trans-forming such rule. In the thousands of years of Han history, there have been hundreds of peasant insurrections\(^19\) against the dark rule of the landlords and the nobility. As for the dynastic changes, each and every one\(^20\) was able to succeed only as the result of a peasant insurrection. All the nationalities of China have always rejected foreign oppression and have always striven to shake it off by acts of resistance. They accept only a union on the basis of equality, but reject the oppression of one nationality by another. In its thousands of years of recorded history, the Chinese nation has given birth to many national heroes and revolutionary leaders and also to many revolutionary strategists, statesmen, men of letters, and thinkers. Therefore the Chinese nation has a glorious revolutionary tradition and a splendid historical heritage.

**B. The Old Feudal Society**

Although China is a great nation-state, and although it is a vast country with an immense population, a long history, a rich revolutionary tradition, and a splendid historical heritage, it stagnated for a long time after the transition from the slave system to the feudal system. This feudal system, beginning with the Zhou and Qin dynasties, lasted for more than three thousand years. Because of the prolonged existence of the feudal system, its economy, politics, and culture\(^21\) were sluggish and even at a standstill over a long time. For three thousand years, Chinese society remained a feudal society.

The main features of the economic and political system of China’s feudal era were as follows:

1. A self-sufficient natural economy predominated. The peasants produced for themselves not only agricultural products but most of the handicraft articles they needed. The land rent gained by the landlords and the nobility from agriculture\(^22\) was also chiefly for private enjoyment of the landlords and not for exchange. Although exchange developed as time went on, it did not play a decisive role in the economy as a whole.

2. The feudal ruling class composed of the landlords, the nobility, and the emperor owned most of the land, while the peasants had very little or none at all. The

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6. Of China and the Chinese revolution – Of all China’s nationalities and of the Chinese people’s revolution
7. Nine tenths – More than nine-tenths
8. Many – Dozens of
10. Civilization – Cultural development
11. Communist societies – Communes
12. Five thousand years – Some four thousand years
13. Communist societies – Communes
14. Strategists – Strategists, men of letters, and artists
15. 3,000 years ago – Very early
16. 1,700 years ago – 1,800 years ago
17. 1,200 years ago – 1,300 years ago
18. History of five thousand years – Recorded history of nearly four thousand years
19. Insurrections – Uprisings, large or small. Here, and throughout the whole of Mao’s writings included in the Selected Works, the expression baoding (insurrection), commonly used by the Chinese Communists in the 1920s and 1930s to refer to their own actions, has been replaced by jiuyi (uprising), which evokes an uprising in a righteous cause, rather than simply an act of violence. This variant, which occurs repeatedly in the present text, will not be footnoted again.
20. Each and every one – Most
21. Economy, politics, and culture – Economic, political, and cultural development
22. The land rent gained by the landlords and the nobility from agriculture – What the landlords and the nobility exacted from them in the form of land rent
peasants tilled the land of the landlords, the nobility, and the royal family with their own farm implements and had to turn over to them for their private enjoyment 40, 50, 60, or even 70 percent23 or more of the crop. In effect the peasants were still serfs.

3. Not only did the landlords, the nobility, and the imperial family live on rent extorted from the peasants, but the landlord state also exacted tribute, taxes, and corvée services from them to support a horde of government officials and an army which was used for their repression.

4. The feudal landlord state was the organ of power protecting this system of feudal exploitation. Whereas the feudal state was torn apart into rival principalities in the Zhou dynasty,24 it becomes autocratic and centralized after the first Qin emperor unified China, though some feudal separatism remained. The emperor reigned supreme and absolute in the feudal state, appointing officials in charge of the armed forces, the law courts, the treasury, and state granaries in all parts of the country and relying on the landed gentry as the mainstay of the entire system of feudal rule.

It was under such feudal economic exploitation and political oppression that the Chinese peasants lived like slaves, in poverty and suffering, through the ages. Under the bondage of feudalism they had no personal freedom. The landlord had the right to beat, abuse, or even kill them at will, and they had no political rights whatsoever. The extreme poverty and backwardness of the peasants resulting from ruthless landlord exploitation and oppression is the basic reason Chinese society remained at the same stage of socioeconomic development for several thousand years.

The principal contradiction in feudal society was between the panseyanry and the landlord class.

The peasants and the handicraft workers were the basic classes which created the wealth and culture of this society.

The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression of the Chinese peasants forced them into innumerable insurrections against landlord rule. There were hundreds of these, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars—from the uprisings of Chen Sheng, Wu Guang, Xiang Yu, and Liu Bang in the Qin dynasty, those of Xinshi, Pinglin, the Red Eyebrows, the Bronze Horses, and the Yellow Turbans in the Han dynasty, those of Li Mi and Dou Jiande in the Sui dynasty, those of Huang Chao25 in the Tang dynasty, those of Song Jiang and Fang La in the Song dynasty, that of Zhu Yuanzhang in the Yuan dynasty, and that of Li Zicheng in the Ming dynasty, down to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in the Qing dynasty. The scale of peasant insurrections and peasant wars in Chinese history has no parallel anywhere else. The peasant insurrections and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of the progress of Chinese history.26 For each of the peasant insurrections and wars dealt a blow to the feudal régime of the time and hence more or less changed the social relations of production and furthered the growth of the social productive forces. However, since neither new productive forces nor new modes of production, nor new class forces, nor any advanced political party existed in those days, the peasant insurrections and wars did not have the correct leadership of an advanced class or an advanced political party such as the proletariat and the Communist Party provide today; every peasant revolution failed, and the peasantry was invariably used by the landlords and the nobility, either during or after the revolution, as a lever for bringing about dynastic change. Therefore, although some social progress was made after each peasant revolutionary struggle, the feudal economic relations and political system remained basically unchanged.

It is only in the last hundred years that a change of a different order has taken place.

C. Present-day Colonial, Semicolonial, and Semifeudal Society

As explained above, Chinese society remained feudal for more than three thousand years. But is it still completely feudal today? No, China has changed. After the Opium War of 1840 China gradually changed into a semicolonial and semifeudal society. Since the incident of September 18, 1931, when the Japanese imperialists started their armed aggression, China has changed further into a colonial, semicolonial society. We shall now describe the course of this change.

As discussed in Section B, Chinese feudal society lasted for more than three thousand years. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, with the penetration of foreign capitalism, that great and fundamental changes took place in Chinese society.

The penetration of foreign capital played a part in the disintegration of China's social economy28; on the one hand, it undermined its29 self-sufficient national economy and wrecked the handicraft industries both in the cities and in the peasants' homes.26 The peasant insurrections and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of the progress of Chinese history. The class struggles of the peasants, the peasant uprisings, and peasant wars constituted the real motive force of historical development.

27. Modes of production → Relations of production
28. The penetration of foreign capital played a part in the disintegration of China's social economy; → As China's feudal society had developed a commodity economy, and so carried within itself the seeds of capitalism, China would have developed slowly into a capitalist society by itself even without the impact of foreign capitalism. Penetration by foreign capitalism accelerated this process. Foreign capitalism played an important part in the disintegration of China's social economy;
29. Its → The foundation of its
homes, and, on the other, it hastened the growth of a commodity economy in town and country.

Apart from its disintegrating effects on the foundations of China’s feudal economy, this state of affairs gave rise to certain objective conditions and possibilities for the development of capitalist production in China. For the destruction of the natural economy created a market for the sale of products for capitalism, while the bankruptcy of large numbers of peasants and handicraftsmen provided it with a market for the purchase of labor.

In fact, some merchants, landlords, and bureaucrats began investing in modern industry as far back as sixty years ago, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, under the stimulus of foreign capitalism and because of certain cracks in the feudal economic structure. About forty years ago, at the turn of the century, China’s national capitalism took its first steps forward. Then, about twenty years ago, during the first imperialist world war, China’s national industry expanded, chiefly in textiles, flour milling, and silk weaving, because the imperialist countries in Europe and America were preoccupied with the war and temporarily relaxed their oppression of China. During this period, the number of factories in China’s textile industry increased from 22 in 1915 to 44 in 1922; the number of factories in the flour milling industry increased from 67 in 1916 to 107; the silk weaving industry had 63 more factories. There were 108 more Chinese banks at the time.

The history of the emergence and development of national capitalism is at the same time the history of the emergence and development of the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat. Just as a section of the merchants, landlords, and bureaucrats were precursors of the Chinese bourgeoisie, so a section of the peasants and handicraft workers were the precursors of the Chinese proletariat. As distinct social classes, the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat are newborn and never existed before in Chinese history. They have evolved into new social classes from the womb of feudal society. They are twins born of China’s old (feudal) society, at once linked to each other and antagonistic toward each other. However, the Chinese proletariat emerged and grew simultaneously not only with the Chinese national bourgeoisie but also with the enterprises directly operated by the imperialists in China. Hence, the Chinese proletariat is older and more experienced than the Chinese bourgeoisie and is therefore a greater and more broadly based social force.

However, the development of capitalism is only one aspect of the change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China. There is another concomitant and obstructive aspect, namely, the collusion of imperialism with the Chinese feudal remnants to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism.

It is certainly not the purpose of the imperialist powers invading China to transform feudal China into capitalist China. On the contrary, their purpose is to transform China into their own semicolonies or colonies.

To this end, the imperialist powers have used and continue to use every military, political, economic, and cultural means of oppression, so that China has gradually become a semicolonies and colony. They are as follows:

1. After defeating China in war, the imperialist powers seized many Chinese protectorates and parts of China’s territory. Japan occupied Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Penghu Islands, and the port of Lushun. Britain seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hongkong, and France occupied Vietnam. Even a miserable little country such as Portugal seized our Macao. In addition to annexing territory, they exacted huge indemnities. Thus heavy blows were struck at China’s huge feudal empire.

2. In accordance with treaties, the imperialist powers have the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China, and they have carved up the whole country into imperialist spheres of influence.

3. The imperialist powers have gained control of all the important trading ports in China by these treaties and have marked off areas in many of these ports as concessions under their direct administration. They have also gained control of China’s customs, foreign trade, and communications (sea, land, inland water, and air). Thus they have been able to dump their goods in China, turn it into a market for their industrial products, and at the same time subordinate its agriculture to their imperialist needs.

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30. The Chinese proletariat → A large section of the Chinese proletariat
31. The development → The emergence and development
32. Feudal remnants → Feudal forces
33. After defeating → The imperialist powers have waged many wars of aggression against China, for instance, the Opium War launched by Britain in 1840, the war launched by the Anglo-French Allied Forces in 1857, the Sino-French War of 1884, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, and the war launched by the Allied Forces of the Eight Powers in 1900. After defeating
34. The imperialist powers seized many Chinese protectorates and parts of China’s territory. → The imperialist powers not only occupied many neighboring countries formerly under its protection but also took “leased” parts of its territory.
35. Japan → For instance, Japan
36. The port of Lushun → “Leased” the port of Lushun
37. Occupied Vietnam → “Leased” Guangzhouan. (Guangzhouan was a bay opposite Hainan Island used by the French as a naval station.)
38. In accordance with treaties, the imperialist powers have the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China. → The imperialist powers have forced China to sign numerous unequal treaties by which they have acquired the right to station land and sea forces and exercise consular jurisdiction in China.
39. Treaties → Unequal treaties
40. Thus they have been able to dump their goods in China, turn it into a market for their industrial products, and at the same time subordinate → Thus they have been able to subordinate
4. The imperialist powers operate many enterprises in light and some sections of heavy industry in China in order to utilize her raw materials and cheap labor on the spot, and they thereby directly compete with China’s national industry.41

5. The imperialist powers monopolize China’s banking and finance by extending loans to the Chinese government and establishing banks in China. Thus they have not only overwhelmed China’s national capitalism in commodity competition, but they have also secured a stranglehold on its banking and finance.

6. The imperialist powers have established a network of comprador and merchant-usurer exploitation right across China, from the trading ports to the remote hinterland, and have created a comprador and merchant-usurer class in their service, so as to facilitate their exploitation of the broad Chinese peasantry.42

7. Besides the comprador class, the imperialist powers still need larger social forces as the props of their rule in China.43 Imperialism “first forms an alliance with, the ruling strata of the previous social structure, with the feudal lords and the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people. Everywhere imperialism attempts to preserve and maintain those precarious feudal forms of exploitation (especially in the villages) which serve as the basis for the existence of its reactionary alliance”44 (the Guidelines of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International on the Movement of Colonies and Semicolonies). “Imperialism, with all its financial and military might, is the force in China that supports and promotes the feudal survivals, together with their entire bureaucratic-militarist superstructure, to Europeanize them and turn them into conservative forces” (Speech by Stalin at the Executive Committee of the Communist International in 1927).

8. The imperialist powers supply the Chinese government45 with large quantities of munitions and a host of military advisers, in order to keep the warlords fighting among themselves and to suppress the Chinese people.

9. Furthermore, the imperialist powers have never slackened their efforts to poison the minds of the Chinese people. This is their cultural policy.46 And it is carried out through missionary work, through establishing schools,47 publishing newspapers, and inducing Chinese students to study abroad. Their aim is to train intellectuals who will serve their interests and to dupe the people.

10. Step by step, the imperialist powers turned China into a semicolonial. This situation was the result of many brutal wars waged by them. For instance, the British Opium War of 1840, the attack on Beijing by the British and French Allied Forces in 1857, the Sino-French War of 1884, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the attack on Beijing by the Allied Forces of Eight Countries in 1900. The above-mentioned situation emerged when China became a semicolonial jointly ruled and rivaled for by the major imperialist powers after these wars. Since September 18, 1931, the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism has turned a big chunk of China48 into a Japanese colony.

These facts represent the other aspect of the change that has taken place since the imperialist penetration of China—the blood-stained picture of feudal China being reduced to semifeudal, semicolonial, and colonial China.

It is thus clear that in their aggression against China the imperialist powers have, on the one hand, hastened the disintegration of feudal society and the growth of elements of capitalism, thereby transforming a feudal into a semifeudal society and, on the other, imposed their ruthless rule on China, reducing an independent country to a semicolonial and colonial country.

Taking both these aspects together, we can see that China’s colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society possesses the following characteristic:

1. The self-sufficient natural economy51 of feudal times have been destroyed, but the feudal exploitation of the peasantry by the landlord class, which is the basis of the feudal exploitation,52 not only remains intact but, linked as it is with exploitation by comprador and usurer capital, clearly dominates China’s social and economic life, either in the areas controlled by the Chinese government that is resisting Japan or in the areas occupied by Japan.

2. National capitalism has developed to a certain extent and has played a certain part in China’s political and cultural life, but it has not become the principal pattern in China’s social economy; it is flabby and is associated with foreign imperialism and domestic feudal remnants.54 The destruction and plunder of most of the national industry by Japanese imperialism especially since the September 18 Incident have greatly changed the situation in China.

3. The autocracy55 of the emperors and nobility has been overthrown, and in its place there have arisen either the warlord-bureaucrat rule56 of the landlord class or

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41. Directly compete with China’s national industry → Directly exert economic pressure on China’s national industry and obstruct the development of its productive forces
42. The broad Chinese peasantry → The masses of the Chinese peasantry and other sections of the people
43. Besides the comprador class, the imperialist powers still need larger social forces as the props of their rule in China. → The imperialist powers have made the feudal landlord class as well as the comprador class the main props of their rule in China.
44. Forms an alliance with → Allies itself with
45. Alliance → Allies
46. Supports and promotes → Supports, inspires, fosters, and preserves
47. Chinese government → Chinese reactionary government
48. Cultural policy → Policy of cultural aggression
49. Schools → Hospitals and schools

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50. China → Semicolonial China
51. The self-sufficient natural economy → The foundations of self-sufficient natural economy
52. Feudal exploitation → System of feudal exploitation
53. Certain → Considerable
54. Feudal remnants → Feudalism in varying degrees
55. Autocracy → Autocratic rule
56. Warlord-bureaucrat rule → Warlord-bureaucrat rule of the landlord class
the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the big bourgeoisie. In the occupied areas there is the rule of Japanese imperialism and its puppets.

4. Imperialism controls not only China’s vital financial and economic arteries but also its political and military power. In the occupied areas, everything is in the hands of Japanese imperialism.

5. China’s economic, political, and cultural development is very uneven, because it has been under the complete or partial domination of many imperialist powers, because it has actually been in a state of disunity for a long time, and because its territory is immense.

6. Under the twofold oppression of imperialism and feudal remnants, especially as a result of the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized, living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found in other nations of the world.

Such are the characteristics of China’s colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society.

This situation has, in the main, been determined by the Japanese and other imperialist forces; it is the result of the collusion of foreign imperialism and domestic feudal remnants.

The contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feudal remnants and the great masses of the people are the basic contradictions in contemporary Chinese society. Of course, there are others, such as the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and the contradictions within the ruling classes. But the contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation is the principal one. These contradictions and their intensification must inevitably result in the incessant growth of revolutionary movements. The great revolutions in modern and contemporary China have emerged and grown on the basis of these basic contradictions.

Chapter 2. The Chinese Revolution

A. The Revolutionary Movements in the Last Hundred Years

The history of China’s transformation into a semicolonial and colony by imperialism in collusion with Chinese feudal remnants is at the same time a history of struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism and its lackeys. From the Opium War, the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reform Movement of 1898, the Boxer movement, the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement, the May Thirtieth movement, the Northern Expedition, and the Agrarian Revolution, to the present War of Resistance Against Japan—all these testify to the Chinese people’s unrelenting spirit in fighting imperialism and its lackeys.

Thanks to the Chinese people’s unrelenting and heroic struggle during the last hundred years, imperialism has not been able to subjugate all of China, nor will it ever be able to do so.

The valiant Chinese people will certainly fight on, even though Japanese imperialism is now exerting its full strength in an all-out offensive, and many landlord and big bourgeois elements, such as the overt and covert Wang Jingwei, have already capitulated to the enemy or are preparing to do so. This heroic struggle, already waged by the Chinese people for three years, will not cease until they have driven Japanese imperialism out of China and have achieved the complete liberation of the country.

The national revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people has a history of fully one hundred years counting from the Opium War of 1840, or of thirty years counting from the 1911 Revolution. It has not yet run its full course, nor has it yet performed its tasks with any signal success; therefore the Chinese people, and, above all, the Communist Party, must shoulder the responsibility of resolutely fighting on.

What are the targets of the revolution? What are its tasks? What are its motive forces? What is its character? And what are its perspectives? These are the questions we shall now deal with.

B. The Targets of the Chinese Revolution

From our analysis in the third section of Chapter I, we know that present-day Chinese society is a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal society. Only when we grasp the nature of Chinese society will we be able to understand clearly the targets, tasks, motive forces, and character of the Chinese revolution and its perspectives and future transition. A clear understanding of the nature of Chinese society, that is, of Chinese conditions, is therefore the key to a clear understanding of all the problems of the revolution.

Since the nature of present-day Chinese society is colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal, what are the chief targets or enemies at this stage of the Chinese revolution?

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57. Feudal remnants → Feudalism (This change occurs repeatedly in this text and is not further footnoted.)
58. Pauperized → Pauperized in large numbers
59. Contemporary → Modern
60. Ruling classes → Reactionary ruling classes

61. Agrarian Revolution → Agrarian Revolutionary War
62. Unrelenting → Indomitable
They are none other than imperialism and the semifeudal forces, the bourgeoisie of foreign countries and the landlord class of our country. For it is these two that are the chief oppressors, the chief obstacles to the progress of Chinese society at the present stage. The two collude with each other in oppressing the Chinese people, and imperialism is the foremost and most ferocious enemy of the Chinese people, because national oppression by imperialism is the more onerous.

Since Japan’s armed invasion of China, the principal enemy of the revolution has been Japanese imperialism together with all the Chinese traitors in league with it, whether they have capitulated openly or are preparing to do so.

The Chinese bourgeoisie, which is also a victim of imperialist oppression, once led or played a principal or partial role in glorious revolutionary struggles such as the 1911 Revolution and has participated in revolutionary struggles such as the Northern Expedition and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. In the long period from 1927 to 1936, however, they collaborated with imperialism, formed a reactionary alliance with the landlord class, betrayed the friends who had helped it—the Communist Party, the proletariat, the peasantry, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie—betrayed the Chinese revolution, became the common enemy of the people, and brought about its defeat. At that time, therefore, the revolutionary people and the revolutionary political party (the Communist Party) could not but regard the bourgeoisie as one of the targets of the revolution. In the War of Resistance a section of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Jingwei, has turned traitor and deserted to the enemy. Consequently, those among the people who are anti-Japanese cannot but regard these big bourgeoisie elements who have betrayed our national interests as one of the targets of the revolution.

It is evident, then, that the enemies of the Chinese revolution are very powerful. They include not only powerful imperialists, as well as powerful semifeudal forces but also the bourgeoisie, which, at times, collaborates with the imperialist and semifeudal forces to oppose the people. Therefore, it is wrong to underestimate the strength of the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

In the face of such enemies, the Chinese revolution cannot be other than protracted and ruthless. With such powerful enemies, the revolutionary forces cannot be built up and tempered into a power capable of crushing them except over a long period of time. With enemies who so ruthlessly suppress the Chinese revolution, the revolutionary forces cannot hold their own positions, let alone capture those of the enemy, unless they steel themselves and display their tenacity to the full. It is therefore wrong to think that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye or that China’s revolutionary struggle can triumph overnight.

In the face of such enemies, the method or principal form of the Chinese revolution must be armed struggle, not peaceful struggle, for our enemies have made peaceful activity impossible for the Chinese people and have deprived them of all political freedom and democratic rights. Stalin says, “The characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting against the armed counterrevolution.” This formulation is perfectly correct. Therefore, it is wrong to belittle armed struggle, revolutionary war, guerrilla war, and army work.

In the face of such enemies, there arises the question of special revolutionary base areas. Since China’s key cities have long been occupied by the powerful imperialists and their reactionary Chinese allies, it is imperative for the revolutionary ranks to turn the backward villages into advanced, consolidated base areas, into great military, political, economic, and cultural bastions of the revolution from which to fight their vicious enemies, who are using the cities for attacks on the rural districts, and in this way gradually to achieve the complete victory of the revolution through protracted fighting; it is imperative for them to do so if they do not wish to compromise with imperialism and its lackeys but are determined to fight on, and if they intend to build up and temper their forces and avoid decisive battles with a powerful enemy while their own strength is inadequate. Such being the case, victory in the Chinese revolution can be won first in the rural areas, and this is possible because China’s economic development is uneven (the rural economy not being entirely dependent on the cities), because its territory is extensive (which gives the revolutionary forces room to maneuver), because the counterrevolutionary camp is disunited and full of contradictions, and because the struggle of the peasants who are the main force in the revolution is led by the Communist Party; but, on the other hand, these very circumstances make the revolution uneven and render the task of winning complete victory protracted and arduous. Clearly then the protracted revolutionary struggle in the special revolutionary base areas consists mainly in peasant guerrilla warfare led by the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, it is wrong to ignore the necessity of using rural districts as revolutionary base

63. Semifeudal forces → Feudalism
64. Foreign countries → The imperialist countries
65. Chinese traitors → Chinese traitors and reactionaries
66. 1927–1936 → 1927–1937
67. They → Its upper stratum, namely, the section represented by the reactionary clique within the Guomindang.
68. The bourgeoisie → These bourgeois elements
69. The bourgeoisie → The bourgeois reactionaries
70. The Chinese revolution → The revolutionary Chinese people
71. The characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that the armed people are fighting against the armed counterrevolution. In China, armed revolution is fighting armed counterrevolution. That is one of the characteristics and one of the advantages of the Chinese revolution.
72. The rural economy not being entirely dependent on the cities → Its economy not being a unified capitalist economy
73. The Communist Party → The Communist Party, the party of the proletariat
areas, to neglect painstaking work among the peasants, and to neglect guerrilla warfare.

However, stressing armed struggle does not mean abandoning other forms of struggle; on the contrary, armed struggle cannot succeed unless coordinated with other forms of struggle. And stressing the work in the rural base areas does not mean abandoning our work in the cities and in the other vast rural areas which have not become base areas; 74 on the contrary, without the work in the cities and in these other rural areas, our own revolutionary base areas 75 would be isolated and the revolution would suffer defeat. Moreover, the final objective of the revolution is the capture of the cities, the enemy's main bases, and this objective cannot be achieved without necessary and adequate work in the cities.

It is thus clear that the revolution cannot triumph either in the rural areas or in the cities without the destruction of the enemy's army, his chief weapon. 76 Therefore, there is the extremely important task of disintegrating them. 77

It is also clear that the Communist Party must not be impecunious and adventurerist in its propaganda and organizational work in the urban and rural areas, which have been occupied by the enemy dominated by the forces of reaction and darkness for a long time, but that it must have cadres 78 working underground for a long time, must accumulate strength and bide its time there. In leading the people in struggle against the enemy, the Party must adopt the tactics of advancing step by step slowly and surely, keeping to the principle of waging struggles on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, and making use of such open forms of activity as are permitted by law, decree, and social custom; empty clamor and reckless action can never lead to success.

**C. The Tasks of the Chinese Revolution**

Imperialism and the feudal remnants 79 being the chief enemies of the Chinese revolution at this stage, what are the present tasks of the revolution?

Unquestionably, the main tasks are strike at these two enemies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal remnant 80 oppression, the foremost task being the national revolution to overthrow imperialism.

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81. Feudal remnants → Feudal landlord class
82. Unless the feudal remnants are wiped out, the imperialist rule cannot be overthrown, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of the imperialist rule in China → Unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow imperialist rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution
83. Achieve victory → Achieve victory in the war
84. Inappropriate → Wrong
85. Contradictory stages → Different stages
86. Semifeudal forces → Feudalism
87. Bourgeoisie, constituting the upper-stratum ruling classes → Bourgeoisie, the landlord class, and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie constituting the ruling classes in Chinese society
are the proletariat, the peasantry, and the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie, all of which are still the subjected classes in vast areas.

The attitude and the stand of these classes toward the Chinese revolution are entirely determined by their economic status in society. Thus the motive forces as well as the targets and tasks of the revolution are determined by the nature of China’s socioeconomic system.

Let us now analyze the different classes in Chinese society.

1. The Landlord Class

The landlord class, a representative of the feudal remnants, forms the main social base for imperialist rule in China; it is a class which exploits and oppresses the peasants, obstructs China’s political, economic, and cultural development, and brings no benefits whatsoever.

Therefore, the landlords, as a class, are a target and not a motive force of the revolution.

**However, the most reactionary in the landlord class is the big landlord stratum. Medium-size and small landlords, especially small landlords in bankruptcy and semibankruptcy, are rather different. When the revolution only opposes imperialism and the big landlords, they often can keep neutral and temporarily join the struggle. This is especially true for many intellectuals who come from such backgrounds and have received scientific education.**

In the present War of Resistance, a section of the big landlords, along with one section of the big bourgeoisie (the capitalist), has surrendered to the Japanese aggressors and turned traitor, while another section of the big landlords, along with another section of the big bourgeoisie (the diehards), is increasingly waver- ing even though it is still in the anti-Japanese camp. But a good many of the enlightened gentry who are medium and small landlords and who have some capitalist coloration display some enthusiasm for the war, and they are still worth uniting with in the common fight against Japan.

2. The Bourgeoisie

There is a distinction between the comprador big bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.

The comprador big bourgeoisie is a class which directly serves the capitalists of the imperialist countries and is nurtured by them; countless ties link it closely with the feudal forces in the countryside. Therefore, it is a target of the Chinese revolution, and never in the history of the revolution has it been a motive force.

However, different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe allegiance to different imperialist powers, so when the contradictions among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly against one particular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period. But they will turn against the Chinese revolution the moment their masters do.

In the anti-Japanese war the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie (the capitalists) have either surrendered or are preparing to surrender. The pro-European and pro-American big bourgeoisie (the diehards) are wavering more and more, even though they are still in the anti-Japanese camp, and they are playing the double game of simultaneously resisting Japan and opposing the Communist Party. Our policy toward the big bourgeoisie capitulationists is to treat them as enemies and resolutely strike them down. Toward the big bourgeoisie diehards, we employ a revolutionary dual policy; on the one hand, we unite with them because they are still anti-Japanese and we should take advantage of their residual anti-Japanese enthusiasm, but, on the other hand, we firmly struggle against them because they pursue a high-handed, anti-Communist, reactionary policy detrimental to resistance and unity, both of which would be jeopardized without such a struggle.

The national bourgeoisie is a class with a dual character.

On the one hand, it is oppressed by imperialism and fettered by feudal remnants and, consequently, is in contradiction with both of them. In this respect it constitutes one of the revolutionary motive forces. In the course of the Chinese revolution, it has displayed enthusiasm for fighting imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords.

But, on the other hand, it lacks the courage to oppose imperialism and the feudal remnants thoroughly because it is economically and politically flabby and still has economic ties with imperialism and the feudal remnants. This emerges very clearly when the people’s revolutionary forces grow powerful.

It follows from the dual character of the national bourgeoisie that, at certain times and to a certain extent, it can take part in the revolution against imperialism and the governments of bureaucrats and warlords and can become a revolutionary motive force, but that, at other times, there is the danger of its following the big bourgeoisie and acting as its accomplice in counterrevolution.

The national bourgeoisie in China, which is mainly the middle bourgeoisie, has never really held political power but has been restricted by the reactionary policies.
of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie which are in power, although it followed them in opposing the revolution in the period from 1927 to 1931 (before the September 18 Incident). In the present war, it differs not only from the capitulationists of the big bourgeoisie but also from the big bourgeois diehards, and so far has been a fairly good ally of ours. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to have a prudent policy toward the national bourgeoisie.

3. The Different Categories of the Petty Bourgeoisie

The petty bourgeoisie consists of the vast numbers of intellectuals, the urban poor, office workers, handicraftsmen, professional people, and small tradesmen.

Like the peasantry, they all suffer under the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and the big bourgeoisie, and they are being driven ever nearer to bankruptcy or destitution.

Hence the petty bourgeoisie constitute one of the motive forces of the revolution and are a reliable ally of the proletariat. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can they achieve their liberation.

Let us now analyze the different sections of the petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry.

First, intellectuals and student youth. Their numbers have grown considerably during the past few decades. Apart from that section of the intellectuals which has associated itself with the imperialists and the big bourgeoisie and works for them against the people, most intellectuals and students are oppressed by imperialism, feudal remnants, and the big bourgeoisie, and live in fear of unemployment or of having to discontinue their studies. Therefore, they tend to be quite revolutionary. They are more or less equipped with modern scientific knowledge, have a keen political sense, and can play a vanguard role or serve as a link with the masses in the present stage of the revolution. The movement of the Chinese students abroad before the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement of 1919, the May Thirtieth movement of 1925, and the December Ninth movement of 1935 are striking proofs of this. In particular, the large numbers of more or less impover-

ished intellectuals and semi-intellectuals can join hands with the workers and peasants in supporting or participating in the revolution. In China, it was among the intellectuals and young students that Marxist-Leninist ideology was first widely disseminated and accepted. Without the participation of revolutionary intellectuals, the revolutionary forces cannot be successfully organized and revolutionary work cannot be successfully conducted. But the intellectuals often tend to be impractical in their thinking and irresolute in action until they have thrown themselves heart and soul into mass revolutionary struggles or made up their minds to serve the interests of the masses and live like them. Hence although the mass of revolutionary intellectuals in China can play a vanguard role or serve as a link to the masses, not all of them will remain revolutionaries to the end. Some often drop out of the revolutionary ranks at critical moments and become passive, while a few may even become enemies of the revolution. Chen Duxiu and Zhang Guotao are representatives of these few intellectuals. Intellectuals are often subjective and individualistic. The intellectuals can wash away their shortcomings only in mass struggles over a long period.

Second, the urban poor. The urban poor includes bankrupt handicraftsmen, small tradesmen, peasants who left their native places to seek jobs in cities and cannot find work, and large numbers of coolies who earn their living by sporadic piece work. They constitute a big section of the masses, and their status, more or less similar to that of the poor peasants, is that of a kind of semiproletarians. Their status encourages them to support the revolution and makes them more receptive to the leadership of the proletariat. So, like the poor peasants, they are an excellent revolutionary force and natural allies of the proletariat.

Third, the office workers. This category consists of staff in industrial and commercial enterprises and the vast numbers of monthly salary earners in government

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94. The big bourgeoisie → The big landlord class and the big bourgeoisie
95. The petty bourgeoisie → The petty bourgeoisie other than the peasantry
96. Intellectuals, the urban poor, office workers, handicraftsmen, professional people, and small tradesmen → Intellectuals, small tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and professional people
97. Like the peasantry, they all suffer → Their status somewhat resembles that of the middle peasants, they all suffer
98. The petty bourgeoisie → These sections of the petty bourgeoisie
99. Student youth. Their numbers → Student youth. They do not constitute a separate class or stratum. In present-day China, most of them may be placed in the petty-bourgeoisie category, judging by their family origin, their living conditions, and their political outlook. Their numbers
100. Modern → Bourgeois

101. Impractical → Subjective and individualistic, impractical
102. Live with them → Become one with them
103. Wash away → Overcome
104. Second, the urban poor → Who hold a vacillating attitude toward the revolution. (i.e., the balance of this section, down to heading 4. The Peasantry) → Second, the small tradesmen. Generally they run small shops and employ few or no assistants. They live under the threat of bankruptcy as a result of exploitation by imperialism, the big bourgeoisie, and the usurers.

Third, the handicraftsmen. They are very numerous. They possess their own means of production and hire no workers, or only one or two apprentices or helpers. Their position is similar to that of the middle peasants.

Fourth, professional people. They include doctors and men of other professions. They do not exploit other people or do so only to a slight degree. Their position is similar to that of the handicraftsmen.

These sections of the petty bourgeoisie make up a vast multitude of people whom we must win over and whose interests we must protect because in general they can support or join the revolution and are good allies. Their weakness is that some of them are easily influenced by the bourgeoisie; consequently, we must carry on revolutionary propaganda and organizational work among them.
and cultural organizations. They are also an important revolutionary force, as they do not exploit other people, but make their living by selling their mental work or technical skills and are under serious threat of unemployment. This category has quite large numbers of people, and they are indispensable for the development of the country and its culture.

Fourth, the handicraftsmen and professional people. The handicraftsmen, being independent producers and very numerous, are the builders of China's economy. Hit by the competition of foreign goods and unable to extricate themselves from the trap of commercial usury capital, they can stand on the side of the revolution. They are also an important force of the revolution. Some of them employ a few workers, and others do not. The latter are more reliable allies.

Professional people such as doctors, often influenced by the bourgeoisie ideologically, belong to the same category as the handicraftsmen and constitute an indispensable sector of social life. They may also become a revolutionary force, as they are oppressed by imperialism and feudal remnant forces as well.

Fifth, the small tradesmen. They are generally under the oppression of imperialism and the big bourgeoisie class and make up a large number of the masses. The lower stratum of them do not exploit the labor of others and are themselves exploited by usury, thus they are a useful force in the revolution. Only members of the upper stratum who exploit other people's labor and are associated with imperialism, the comprador class, or feudal remnants are those who hold a vacillating attitude toward the revolution.

4. The Peasantry

The peasantry constitutes \(^{105}\) 80 percent of China's total population and is the main force in its national economy today. 

*Generally speaking, the peasantry are all petty bourgeois*, but a sharp process of polarization is taking place among them.

First, the rich peasants. They form about 5 percent of the rural population (or 10 percent\(^{106}\) together with the landlords) and are called the rural bourgeoisie. Most of the rich peasants in China are semifeudal in character, \(^{107}\) and are linked with the urban bourgeoisie. But the revolutionary government\(^{108}\) should not re-

gard the rich peasants as belonging to the same stratum\(^{109}\) as the landlords and should not prematurely adopt a policy of attacking\(^{110}\) the rich peasantry, because rich peasant production is indispensable for a certain period of time.

Second, the middle peasants. They form about 20 percent of China's rural population. They are economically self-supporting (they may have something to lay aside when the crops are good and occasionally hire some labor or lend small sums of money at interest); and generally they do not exploit others but are exploited by imperialism, the landlord class, and the big bourgeoisie. Apart from some rich middle peasants, most of them do not have sufficient land, nor do they have political power.\(^{111}\) Not only can the middle peasants resolutely join the anti-imperialist revolution and the Agrarian Revolution, but they can also participate in the socialist revolution.\(^{112}\) Therefore the whole middle peasantry can be a reliable ally of the proletariat and is a very good\(^{113}\) motive force of the revolution. The positive or negative attitude of the middle peasants is the factor\(^{114}\) determining victory or defeat in the revolution, and this will be especially true after the Agrarian Revolution, when they become the majority of the rural population.

Third, the poor peasants. The poor peasants in China, together with the farm laborers, form about 70 percent of the rural population. They are the broad peasant masses with no land or insufficient land, the semiproletariat of the countryside, the biggest motive force of the Chinese revolution, the natural and most reliable ally of the proletariat, and the main contingent of China's revolutionary forces. Only under the leadership of the proletariat can the middle and poor peasants achieve their liberation, and only by forming a firm alliance with the middle and poor peasants can the proletariat lead the revolution to victory. Otherwise neither is possible. The term "peasantry" refers mainly to the middle and poor peasants.

5. The Proletariat

Among the Chinese proletariat, the modern industrial workers number from 2.5 million to 3 million, the handicraft workers in the cities\(^{115}\) total about 12 million, and in addition there are great numbers of rural proletarians.\(^{116}\)

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105. Constitutes \(\rightarrow\) Constitutes approximately
106. 10 percent \(\rightarrow\) About 10 percent
107. Semifeudal in character, \(\rightarrow\) Semifeudal in character, since most of them let a part of their land, practice usury, and ruthlessly exploit the farm laborers.
108. But the revolutionary government \(\rightarrow\) But they generally engage in labor themselves and in this sense are part of the peasantry. The rich-peasant form of production will remain useful for a definite period. Generally speaking, they might make some contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses and stay neutral in the agrarian revolutionary struggle against the landlords. Therefore we

109. Stratum \(\rightarrow\) Class
110. Attacking \(\rightarrow\) Liquidating
111. Apart from some rich middle peasants, most of them do not have sufficient land, nor do they have political power. \(\rightarrow\) They have no political power. Some of them do not have enough land, and only a section (the well-to-do middle peasants) have some surplus land.
112. Participate in the socialist revolution \(\rightarrow\) Accept socialism
113. Very good \(\rightarrow\) Important
114. The factor \(\rightarrow\) One of the factors
115. The handicraft workers in the cities \(\rightarrow\) The workers in small-scale industry and in handicrafts, and the shop assistants in the cities
116. Proletarians \(\rightarrow\) Proletarians (the farm laborers) and other propertyless people in the cities and the countryside.
The Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities.\textsuperscript{117} What are they?  
First, the Chinese proletariat is much more resolute and thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other class because it is subjected to a threefold oppression (imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal), which is marked by a severity and cruelty seldom found in other countries. Since there is no economic basis for social reformism in colonial and semicolonial China, as there is in Western Europe (however, it must be noted that sometimes Chinese national reformism may easily influence a number of workers), the whole proletariat, with the exception of a few scabs, is most revolutionary.

Second, from the moment it appeared on the revolutionary scene, the Chinese proletariat came under the leadership of its own revolutionary party—the Chinese Communist Party—and became the most politically conscious class in Chinese society.

Third, because the Chinese proletariat by origin is made up largely of bankrupt peasants, it has natural ties with the peasant masses, and this facilitates its forming a close revolutionary alliance with them.

Therefore, in spite of certain unavoidable weaknesses, for instance, its smallness (as compared with the peasantry), its youth (as compared with the proletariat in the capitalist countries), and its low educational level (as compared with the bourgeoisie), the Chinese proletariat is nonetheless the basic motive force of the Chinese revolution. Unless it is participated in and led by the proletariat, the Chinese revolution cannot possibly succeed. To take an example from the past, the 1911 Revolution miscarried because the proletariat did not consciously participate in it and the Communist Party was not yet in existence. More recently, the Great Revolution of 1925–27\textsuperscript{118} achieved great success for a time because the proletariat consciously participated\textsuperscript{119} and the Communist Party was already in existence; it ended in defeat because the bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{120} betrayed its alliance with the proletariat and abandoned the common revolutionary program, and also because the Chinese proletariat and its political party did not yet have enough revolutionary experience. Now take the present anti-Japanese war—because the proletariat and the Communist Party are exercising leadership in the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the whole nation has been united and the great War of Resistance has been launched and is being resolutely pursued.

The Chinese proletariat, under the leadership of the Communist Party, completely understands\textsuperscript{121} that, although it is the class with the highest political consciousness and sense of organization, it cannot win victory by its own strength alone. In order to win, it must unite, according to varying circumstances, with all classes and strata that can take part in the revolution and must organize a revolutionary united front. Among all the classes in Chinese society, the peasantry is a firm ally of the working class, the urban petty bourgeoisie is a reliable ally, and the national bourgeoisie is an ally in certain periods and to a certain extent. This is one of the fundamental laws established by China’s modern revolutionary history.

China’s status\textsuperscript{122} as a colony and semicolonial has given rise to a multitude of rural and urban unemployed. Denied proper means of making a living, many of them are forced to resort to the so-called disreputable and illegitimate ones, hence the robbers, gangsters, beggars, prostitutes, and the numerous people who live on superstitious practices. This social stratum is unstable; while some are apt to be bought over by the reactionary forces, others may have revolutionary qualities.\textsuperscript{123} These people lack constructive qualities and are given to destruction rather than construction; they\textsuperscript{124} become a source of roving-rebel and anarchist ideology.\textsuperscript{125} Therefore, we should know how to guide\textsuperscript{126} them, pay attention to organizing revolutionary qualities, and guard against their destructiveness.

The above is our analysis of the motive forces of the Chinese revolution.

E. The Character of the Chinese Revolution

We have now gained an understanding of the nature of Chinese society, that is, of the specific conditions in China; this understanding is the essential prerequisite for solving all China’s revolutionary problems. We are also clear about the targets, the tasks, and the motive forces of the Chinese revolution; these are basic issues at the present stage of the revolution and arise from the special nature of Chinese society, that is, from China’s specific conditions. Understanding all this, we can now understand another basic issue of the revolution at the present stage, namely, the character of the Chinese revolution.

In the final analysis, what is the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage? Is it a bourgeois-democratic or a proletarian-socialist revolution? Obviously, it is the former, not the latter.

\textsuperscript{117} The Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities. \textsuperscript{118} In addition to the basic qualities it shares with the proletariat everywhere—its association with the most advanced form of the economy, its strong sense of organization and discipline, and its lack of private means of production—the Chinese proletariat has many other outstanding qualities.

\textsuperscript{118} 1925–27 \textsuperscript{119} 1924–27

\textsuperscript{119} Participated \textsuperscript{120} Participated and exercised leadership

\textsuperscript{120} The bourgeoisie \textsuperscript{121} The big bourgeoisie

\textsuperscript{121} Completely understands \textsuperscript{122} Should understand

\textsuperscript{122} The revised version inserts a heading, “6. The Vagrants,” before this paragraph.

\textsuperscript{123} Have revolutionary qualities \textsuperscript{124} Join the revolution

\textsuperscript{124} They \textsuperscript{125} After joining the revolution, they

\textsuperscript{125} Roving-rebel and anarchist ideology \textsuperscript{126} Roving-rebel and anarchist ideology in the revolutionary ranks

\textsuperscript{126} Guide \textsuperscript{127} Remold
Given that Chinese society is still a colonial, semicolonial, and semiformal society; that the principal enemies of the Chinese revolution are still imperialism and the semiformal forces; that the task of the Chinese revolution consists in a national revolution and a democratic revolution to overthrow these two principal enemies; that the motive forces of this revolution include at times the national bourgeoisie and even a part of the big bourgeoisie, so that even if the big bourgeoisie betrays the revolution and becomes its enemy, the spearhead of the revolution will still be directed against imperialism and feudal despotism and not against all capitalist and capitalist private property—since all these things are true, the character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist but bourgeois-democratic.

But in present-day China the bourgeois-democratic revolution is no longer of the old, general type, which is now obsolete, but of a special, new type. This kind of revolution is developing in China and in all other colonial and semicolonial countries, and we call it the new-democratic revolution. This new-democratic revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution; it resolutely opposes imperialism, that is, international capitalism. Politically, it means the joint revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries and opposition to the transformation of Chinese society into a society under bourgeois dictatorship. Economically, it means nationalization of all the big capital and big enterprises of the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries and the distribution of large landed property among the peasants, while assisting small and medium-size private enterprises without eliminating the rich-peasant economy. Thus, the new type of democratic revolution clears the way for capitalism, on the one hand, and creates the prerequisites for socialism, on the other. The present stage of the Chinese revolution is a stage of transition between the abolition of the colonial, semicolonial, and semiformal society and the establishment of a socialist society. It is a new revolutionary process, that of the new-democratic revolution. This process began only after World War I and the Russian October Revolution; it started in China with the May Fourth movement of 1919. A new-democratic revolution is an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. It is a revolution of the united front of several revolutionary classes. China can advance to the socialist revolution only by going through such a revolution; there is no other way.

This kind of new-democratic revolution differs greatly from the democratic revolutions in the history of various European and American countries in that it results not in a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie but in a dictatorship of the united front of all the revolutionary classes. In the anti-Japanese war, the anti-Japanese democratic political power which ought to be established is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. This is neither a “one-party dictatorship” of the bourgeoisie, nor a “one-party dictatorship” of the proletariat, but a “joint dictatorship of several parties” belonging to the anti-Japanese united front. All those who stand for resistance to Japan and for democracy are qualified to share in this political power, regardless of their party affiliation.

This kind of new-democratic revolution also differs from a socialist revolution in that it overthrows only the imperialists, Chinese traitors, and reactionaries, but does not overthrow all those capitalist elements which are still capable of participating in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle.

This kind of new-democratic revolution is basically identical to the revolution of the Three People’s Principles as proclaimed by Mr. Sun Yatsen in 1924 (the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang). In this manifesto, Sun Yatsen declared:

The so-called democratic system in various modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. Now, the Guomindang’s Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

He also said:

Enterprises, such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people; this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

Once again, in his Testament, Sun Yatsen pointed out the fundamental principle for domestic and foreign policy:

We must arouse the masses of the people and unite in a common struggle with those nations which treat us as equals.

The Three People’s Principles of the old democracy, which were adapted to the old international and domestic conditions, were thus reshaped into the Three

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127. Large landed property → The land of the landlord class
128. China → Chinese society
129. Revolutionary classes → Revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat
130. The anti-Japanese democratic political power which ought to be established is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front → The anti-Japanese democratic political power established in the base areas which are under the leadership of the Communist Party is the political power of the Anti-Japanese National United Front
131. One-party → One-class
132. “Joint dictatorship of several parties” belonging to the anti-Japanese united front → Joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat
133. In this manifesto, → In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang issued in that year.
People's Principles of New Democracy, which are adapted to the new international and domestic conditions. The Chinese Communist Party was referring to the latter kind of Three People's Principles and to no other when, in the manifesto of September 22, 1937, it declared, "The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization." These Three People's Principles embody Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies—Alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and union with the peasants and workers. In the new international and domestic conditions, any kind of Three People's Principles which departs from the Three Great Policies is not revolutionary. (Here we shall not deal with the fact that, while communism and the Three People's Principles basically agree on the political program for the democratic revolution, they differ in all other respects.)

Thus, the role of the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution cannot be ignored, either in the alignment of forces for the struggle (that is, in the united front) or in the organization of state power. Anyone who tries to bypass these classes will certainly be unable to solve the problem of the destiny of the Chinese nation or indeed any of China's problems. The Chinese revolution at the present stage must strive to create a democratic republic in which the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals all occupy a certain position and play a certain role. In other words, it must be the democratic republic of a revolutionary alliance of the workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and all others who oppose imperialism and feudalism. Only under the leadership of the policies of the proletariat can such a republic be completely realized.

6. The Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution

Now that the basic issues—the nature of Chinese society and the objectives, tasks, motive forces, and character of the Chinese revolution at the present stage—have been clarified, it is easy to see its prospects, that is, to understand the relation between the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian social revolution, and between the present and future stages of the Chinese revolution.

Since China's bourgeois-democratic revolution at the present stage is not a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the general, old type, but a democratic revolution of a special, new type—a new-democratic revolution—and since the Chinese revolution is now taking place in the new international environment of the 1940s and 1950s, characterized by the rise of socialism and the decline of capitalism, in the midst of the second great imperialist war and on the eve of the second world revolution, there can be no doubt that the prospect for the Chinese revolution is not capitalism but socialism.

There can be no doubt that the purpose of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is to change the existing colonial, semicolonial, and semifeudal state of society, that is, to strive for the completion of the new-democratic revolution. That being the case, it is not at all surprising, but entirely to be expected, that a capitalist economy will develop to a certain extent within Chinese society with the revolution sweeping away the obstacles to the development of capitalism after the victory of the revolution. A certain degree of capitalist development will be an inevitable result of the victory of the democratic revolution in economically backward China. Of course, it cannot be denied that this will be only one aspect of the outcome of the Chinese revolution and not its overall outcome. The overall outcome of the Chinese revolution will be the development of capitalist factors, on the one hand, and of socialist factors, on the other. What will these socialist factors be? They will include the growing relative weight of the proletariat and the Communist Party among the political forces in the whole country and the actual or possible recognition of the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party by the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie. All these will be socialist factors. Together with the favorable international environment, these factors render it highly probable that China's bourgeois-democratic revolution will ultimately avoid a capitalist future and move toward the realization of socialism.

7. The Twofold Task of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party

Summing up the foregoing sections of this chapter, we can see that the Chinese revolution as a whole involves a twofold task. That is to say, it embraces both the bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and a revolution that is proletarian-socialist in character, that is, the twofold task of the revolution both in its present and in its future stages. And the leadership in this twofold revolutionary task rests entirely on the shoulders of the party of the Chinese proletariat, the Communist Party. Without the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, no revolution can succeed.

134. The intellectuals → Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie
135. Petty bourgeoisie → Urban petty bourgeoisie
136. Social revolution → Socialist revolution (This variant occurs repeatedly below and is not further footnoted.)
137. 1940s and 1950s → 1930s and 1940s
138. The second great imperialist war → World War II
139. On the eve of → In the era of
140. Socialism → Socialism and communism
141. Petty bourgeoisie → Petty bourgeoisie; and the state sector of the economy owned by the democratic republic, and the cooperative sector of the economy owned by the working people
To complete China's bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new-democratic revolution) and to prepare for the transition to the stage of the socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are ripe—such is the sum total of the great and glorious revolutionary task of the Chinese Communist Party. Every Party member must strive for its accomplishment and must absolutely never give up halfway. Some immature Communists think that our task is confined to the present democratic revolution and does not include the future socialist revolution or that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is in fact the socialist revolution. It must be pointed out emphatically that both these views are wrong. Every Communist ought to know that the Chinese Communist movement as a whole is a complete revolutionary movement embracing the two stages of the democratic revolution and the social revolution. These are two revolutionary processes different in nature, and the second revolutionary process can be carried out only after the first revolutionary process has been completed. The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the social revolution, and the social revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution. And the ultimate aim of all Communists is to strive for the final building of socialist society and communist society. Only on the basis of a clear understanding of the differences between the democratic and the social revolutions, and of the interconnections between them, is it possible to lead the Chinese revolution correctly.

Except for the Communist Party, no political party (bourgeois or petty-bourgeois) is capable of assuming the task of leading China's two great revolutions, the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, to their complete realization. But the Chinese Communist Party, from the very day of its birth, has taken this twofold task on its own shoulders and for eighteen years has fought strenuously for its accomplishment.

Such a task is extremely glorious, but at the same time most arduous. It cannot be accomplished without a Bolshevik Chinese Communist Party which is nationwide in scope and has a broad mass character, a party which is fully consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally. It is therefore the duty of every Communist to take part in building such a Communist Party.

Next, we will discuss step by step the problem of building the Chinese Communist Party.

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Stalin Is the Friend of the Chinese People

(December 20, 1939)

December 21 of this year is Comrade Stalin's sixtieth birthday. It can be anticipated that this birthday will call forth warm and affectionate congratulations in the hearts of all those people in the world who are aware of this event and who know suffering.1

To congratulate Stalin is not merely doing something to observe the occasion. To congratulate Stalin means to support him, to support his cause, to support the cause of the Soviet Union, to support the victory of socialism, to support the orientation he points out for humanity, and to support our own close friend. Today in the world the great majority of humanity is suffering and only by following the orientation pointed out by Stalin, and with Stalin's aid, can humanity be rescued from disaster.

We Chinese people are now living in a time of profound calamity unprecedented in history, a time when help from others is most urgently needed. The Book of Poetry says, "Ying" goes its cry, seeking with its voice its companion."2 We are precisely at such a juncture.

But who are our friends?

There is one kind of so-called friends who style themselves our friends,3 and some among us also unthinkingly call them friends. But such friends can only be classed with Li Linfu of the Tang dynasty. Li Linfu was a prime minister of the Tang dynasty, a notorious man who was described as having "honey dripping from his tongue and a sword concealed in his heart." These friends today are precisely friends with "honey dripping from their tongues and swords concealed in their hearts." Who are these people? Part of those imperialists who say that they sympathize with China.

There is another kind of friends who are different; they have real sympathy for us, and regard us as brothers. Who are these people? They are the Soviet Union,4 and Stalin.

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1. Chinese Communist movement ➔ Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Chinese Communist Party
2. Bolshevik ➔ Bolshevized

This article was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, December 20, 1939. Our source is Mao Zedong Ji, Vol. 7, pp. 133-35, which reproduces that text.

1. Who know suffering. ➔ Who are revolutionary.
3. Our friends ➔ Friends of the Chinese people.
4. The Soviet Union ➔ The people of the Soviet Union.
Not a single country has renounced its special rights and privileges in China; only the Soviet Union has done this.

At the time of the Northern Expedition, all the imperialists opposed us, and the Soviet Union alone assisted us.

Since the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, not a single government of any imperialist country has really helped us. The Soviet Union alone has helped us with its great resources in men, matériel, and money.6

Is this not clear enough?

To the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, only the socialist country, the socialist leaders, the socialist people, and socialist thinkers, statesmen, and toilers are truly giving assistance. Without their help, it is impossible to win final victory.

Stalin is the true friend of the Chinese nation and of the cause of the liberation of the Chinese people. The Chinese people’s love and respect for Stalin, and our friendship for the Soviet Union, are wholly sincere. Any attempt, from whatever quarter, to sow dissension by rumor-mongering and slander will be of no avail in the end.

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5. At the time of the Northern Expedition → In the period of the First Great Revolution
6. With its great resources in men, matériel, and money → With its air force and material resources

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Speech at a Meeting of All Circles in Yan’an to Commemorate Stalin’s Sixtieth Birthday

(December 21, 1939)

Today we are holding a meeting to congratulate Stalin on his sixtieth birthday. “From ancient times, few men have reached the age of seventy,” and living to the age of sixty is also rare. But why do we celebrate only Stalin’s birthday? And why, moreover, are such celebrations taking place not only in Yan’an but in the whole country and in the whole world? Provided only that they know who the man is who was born this day, provided that they know what manner of man he is, then all those who suffer oppression will congratulate him. The reason is that Stalin is the savior of all the oppressed. What kind of people are opposed to congratulating him and do not like to congratulate him? Only those who do not suffer oppression but, on the contrary, oppress other people, first of all, the imperialists. Comrades! A foreigner, who is separated from us by thousands of miles, and whose birthday is celebrated by everyone—is this not an unprecedented event?

This is because he is leading the great Soviet Union, because he is leading the great Communist International, because he is leading the cause of the liberation of all mankind, and is helping China to fight Japan.

At present, the whole world is divided into two fronts struggling against each other. On the one side is imperialism, which represents the front of the oppressors. On the other side is socialism, which represents the front of resistance to oppression. Some people imagine that the national-revolutionary front in the colonies and semicolonies occupies an intermediate position, but its enemy is imperialism, and hence it cannot do otherwise than call upon the friendship of socialism, and it cannot but belong to the revolutionary front of resistance to the oppressors. China’s diehards imagine that they can play the harlot and, at the same time, set up arches in honor of their own virtue, fighting communism with one hand, and resisting Japan with the other. They call themselves the middle-of-the-road faction, but they will never achieve their aims. If they do not repent, they will certainly end by going over to the side of counterrevolution. Both the revolutionary and the counterrevolutionary fronts must have someone to act as their leader, someone to serve as their commander. Who is the commander of the counterrevolutionary front? It

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This speech was first published in Renmin ribao, December 20, 1949. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 137–40, where it is reproduced from this source.
is imperialism, it is Chamberlain. Who is the commander of the revolutionary front? It is socialism, it is Stalin. Comrade Stalin is the leader of the world revolution. This is an extremely important circumstance. Among the whole human race, this man, Stalin, has appeared, and this is a very great event. Because he is there, it is easier to get things done. As you know, Marx is dead, and Engels and Lenin too are dead. If there were no Stalin, who would give the orders? This is indeed a fortunate circumstance. Because there is now in the world a Soviet Union, a Communist Party, and a Stalin, the affairs of this world can be dealt with more easily. What does a revolutionary commander do? He sees to it that everyone has food to eat, clothes to wear, a place to live, and books to read. And in order to achieve this, he must lead a billion and more people to struggle against the oppressors and bring them to final victory. This is precisely what Stalin wants to do. Since this is the case, should not all those who suffer oppression congratulate Stalin? I think they should, I think they must. We should congratulate him, support him, and study him.

The two aspects of Stalin which we want to study are the doctrinal aspect and the practical aspect.

There are innumerable principles of Marxism, but in the final analysis they can all be summed up in one sentence: “To rebel is justified!” For thousands of years everyone said, “Oppression is justified, exploitation is justified, rebellion is not justified.” From the time that Marxism appeared on the scene, this old judgment was turned upside down, and this is a great contribution. This principle was derived by the proletariat from its struggles, but Marx drew the conclusion. In accordance with this principle, there was then resistance, there was struggle, and socialism was realized. What is Comrade Stalin’s contribution? He developed this principle, developed Marxism-Leninism, and produced a very clear, concrete, and living doctrine for the oppressed people of the whole world. This is the complete doctrine for establishing a revolutionary front, overthrowing imperialism, overthrowing capitalism, and establishing a socialist society.

The practical aspect consists in turning doctrine into reality. Neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin carried to completion the cause of the establishment of socialism, but Stalin did so. This is a great and unprecedented exploit. Before the Soviet Union’s two five-year plans, the capitalist newspapers of various countries proclaimed daily that the Soviet Union was in desperate straits, that socialism could not be relied upon, but what do we see today? Chamberlain’s mouth has been stopped, as have the mouths of those Chinese diehards. They all recognize that the Soviet Union has triumphed.

Apart from helping us from the doctrinal standpoint in our War of Resistance Against Japan, Stalin has also given us practical and concrete aid. Since the victory of Stalin’s cause, he has aided us with many airplanes, cannons, aviators, and military advisers in every theater of operations, as well as lending us money. What other country in the world has helped us in this way? What country in the world, led by what class, party, or individual, has helped us in this way? Who is there, apart from the Soviet Union, the proletariat, the Communist Party, and Stalin?

At present, there are people who call themselves our friends, but in fact they can only be classed with Li Linfu of the Tang dynasty. This Mr. Li Linfu was a man who had “honey dripping from his tongue and a sword concealed in his heart.” The imperialists all have honey dripping from their tongues and swords concealed in their hearts, and Chamberlain is a present-day Li Linfu. What imperialist country has abolished the special privileges enjoyed by many countries in China such as the right to station troops, consular jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, and so on? Not a single one. Only the Soviet Union has abolished them.

In the past, Marxism-Leninism provided theoretical guidance to the world revolution. Today something has been added: it is possible to give material aid to the world revolution. This is Stalin’s great contribution.

After we have celebrated Stalin’s birthday, we must continue to carry out propaganda among the people of the whole country to make these facts known. We must explain things clearly to the 450 million Chinese, so that our whole people understands: only the socialist Soviet Union, only Stalin, are the good friends of China.

1. This is the first known occurrence in Mao’s writings of the famous slogan which played such a central role in the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s.
In Memory of Norman Bethune

(December 21, 1939)

A member of the Progressive Workers' Party of Canada, Comrade Norman Bethune was more than fifty years old when, sent by the Progressive Workers' Party of Canada and the Communist Party of the United States to help China in the anti-Japanese war, he made light of a distance of thousands of miles and arrived in China. He came to Yan'an last spring, then went to work in the Wutai mountains and unfortunately died a martyr to his duties. What kind of spirit is this that would make a foreigner, with no selfish motive whatsoever, take the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, and every Chinese Communist must learn from this spirit. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can succeed only if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the people of the colonies and semicolonies, and the proletariat of the colonies and semicolonies supports the struggle for liberation of the proletarians of the capitalist countries. Comrade Bethune put this Leninist line into practice. We Chinese Communists must also carry out this line. We must unite with the proletarians of all the capitalist countries, with the proletarians of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy, and all other capitalist countries; only then can we overthrow imperialism and liberate our nation and people, and the nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both national chauvinism and narrow patriotism.

Comrade Bethune's spirit of utter devotion to others without any concern for the self was expressed in his boundless sense of responsibility toward his work and his extraordinary warm-heartedness toward all comrades and the people. Every

Communist must learn from him. Many people are irresponsible in their work, picking the easy jobs and shirking the hard ones, foisting the heavy burdens onto others' shoulders and taking the light ones for themselves. At every turn, they think first of themselves and then of others. Having made some small effort, they swell with pride and love to brag about it for fear that others will not notice. Toward comrades and the people they are not filled with ardent sincerity but are, instead, cold, indifferent, unfeeling. Such people are actually not Communists or at least cannot be considered entirely Communist. Whenever people returning from the front speak of Bethune, there is no one who fails to admire him, no one who is not moved by his spirit. Of the soldiers and civilians in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area, anyone who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had witnessed the way he worked could not but be deeply moved. Every Communist must certainly learn from Comrade Bethune this genuine communist spirit.

Comrade Bethune was a doctor, and his profession was the art of healing. He constantly strove to perfect his skills. In the Eighth Route Army's medical service as a whole, his medical skills were outstanding. This is also an excellent lesson for those irresolute people who change their minds as soon as they see something new or those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no future.

Comrade Bethune and I met only once. Subsequently he wrote me many letters. But because I was busy, I replied only to one of his letters, and I don't even know if he received it. I am deeply grieved over his death. Now we are all commemorating him, which shows how profoundly his spirit inspires people. We must all learn his spirit of absolute selflessness. With this as a starting point, one can become very useful to the people. An individual's capabilities may be great or small, but as long as he has this spirit, he is a noble-minded and pure person, a person of moral integrity, a person above vulgar interests, a person of value to the people.

Our source for this eulogy is Mao Zedong xuanji, vol. 2, pp. 659–61. No contemporary text is available.

1. Norman Bethune (1890—November 12, 1939) was a Canadian-born medical doctor, who in 1936 became a member of the Canadian Communist Party (known as the Progressive Workers' Party of Canada). He arrived in China in early 1939, after having served as a doctor to the Republican side in the Spanish civil war. By May 1939, he had passed through Yan'an on his way to setting up a forward field hospital in the Wutai mountains, a part of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei border area. In November, while operating on a wounded soldier, he suffered a minor wound that became infected, and he quickly died of sepsicaemia. During the Cultural Revolution decade, Mao's eulogy hailing him as a model of proletarian internationalism became one of the "Three Constantly Read Articles."
Speech at the Evening Welcome Party for General Ma Zhanshan, the National Hero

(December 22, 1939)

(Special to this newspaper) ... Following the speeches of welcome, Comrade Mao Zedong was invited to speak. He started with a welcome to General Ma and other gentlemen, who are constantly in their attitude, and will carry the War of Resistance through to the end. He went on to say:

In ancient times, our Chinese society admired people who were constant in their attitude and would bring what they had started to completion without stopping halfway. This has remained the case to the present day. Those who leave things unfinished are unwelcome. Resistance to Japan is a great mission; we must be consistent and continue to resist to the end. General Ma was among the first when he started to resist Japan in Heilongjiang Province eight years ago.1 The Red Army, then in the south, promptly sent a telegram to pledge our warm support. So, as early as eight years ago, the Red Army became a comrade of General Ma’s in fighting Japan. We are confident that General Ma will definitely persist in the War of Resistance to the very end. At present, there are some capitulationists, who, in like a lion and out like a lamb,2 are making compromises midway. We stand side by side with General Ma and all those throughout the country who are fighting Japan. We sincerely welcome these national heroes, who are consistent and will fight Japan to the end. Since they are fighting the War of Resistance to the finish, our welcome to them is equally endless. General Ma is now over fifty and is still contending with the enemy in the forefront. Such a spirit is worthy of the admiration of the entire nation.

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In Refutation of the Rumor Spread by the Military Headquarters in a Certain War Zone

(December 27, 1939)

(Special report to this newspaper) This newspaper has learned that the military headquarters in a certain combat district issued a circular stating: “It is reported that Mao Zedong has returned to Yan’an from Xinjiang. In his talk to responsible persons among his subordinates on the fifth of this month, he told them that Li Lisan,3 leading 730 people, some of whom are Russians, accompanied by a number of airplanes from the Soviet Union, will, taking advantage of our counterattack against the enemy, capture political power at the Center and make Lanzhou China’s Moscow.” Seeking confirmation of the report, our correspondent interviewed Comrade Mao Zedong, who had the following to say in reply:

This news was manufactured by the Japanese; how come it was spread by a Chinese military headquarters in a war zone? This is truly strange. It says that “I have returned to Yan’an from Xinjiang,” but as yet I have made no plans for a visit to Xinjiang. As for Li Lisan, shortly after his arrival in the Soviet Union, he was arrested because he had joined the reactionary Trotskyist clique, so I don’t see how he could have come back. All those who want to separate the Guomindang from the Communist Party and prepare to capitulate to the Japanese bandits have manufactured thousands of items of intelligence, but this one is the clumsiest. If there are people who believe even this, they are truly foolish. “To capture political power...

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This document was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao on December 27, 1939. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 137–38, where that version is reproduced.

1. Li Lisan (1889–1967) was a native of Hunan. He had been acquainted with Mao Zedong since their student days in Changsha, but, as Mao later remarked to Edgar Snow, their friendship “never developed.” During the period from late 1928 to the fall of 1930, when Li, although he never formally assumed the office of secretary general, was the dominant figure in the Chinese Communist Party, he and Mao were frequently in sharp conflict over the policies which should be pursued. For a discussion of the issues involved, see the Introduction to Volume IV, passim, especially pp. iv–vii. In December 1930, Li Lisan was summoned to Moscow for a “trial” conducted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, where he was denounced both for what were viewed as his “Trotskyite” tendencies and for his “extreme localism,” in other words, for his emphasis on the role of China in the world revolution. Thereafter, he remained in the Soviet Union, returning to China only in the spring of 1946. The rumor that Mao is refuting in this document was thus manifestly absurd, since even if Stalin had endorsed such a hare-brained scheme as that described, he would never have trusted Li Lisan to carry it out.

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at the Center,” what an idea! The fact is the capture of the Border Region. Xunyi, in the Border Region, was snatched in July of this year, and two more towns, Zhengyuan and Ningxian, have recently been seized, and with airplanes and big guns too. It is said that they also want to seize Qingyang, Heshui, Chunyao, and Luxian in the border region, so as to provide a basis for the capture of Yan’an. At the front, the Japanese are conquering large portions of China’s territory, while, in the rear, it is the Chinese who are seizing a small piece of land in the border region. Altogether, there are only twenty-three xian in the border region, of which only twenty remain. Even if they were all captured, these xian would not amount to one-tenth-millionth of what the Japanese have seized. Nevertheless, these gentlemen can be called brave. Your newspaper should write an article, exhorting these brave gentlemen to place more restraint on themselves and stop playing the tyrant. If they are truly brave, they should demonstrate it by going to confront the Japanese. Our past experience has already taught us that to swagger around at home will, in the end, lead nowhere.

The Present Situation in Western Shanxi and Our Military Deployment

(December 31, 1939)

1. As a result of battle between the new and old armies in southwest Shanxi, our Chen detachment and two decisive columns, with a total strength of five regiments, left southwest Shanxi on the 27th and reached Zhaokanzhen north of the Fenyang—Li’shi [blockade line]. The Internal Security Brigade and our Third Guerrilla Regiment, as well as four guerrilla brigades, are left behind in southwestern Shanxi.

2. At present, looking at the situation as a whole, Yan is going all out to attack southwestern Shanxi. After prevailing there, he is prepared to move to attack northwestern Shanxi, so as to sever communications between North China and the border regions and among the various regions in North China. For this purpose, the Central forces are being mobilized in southeastern Shanxi and are prepared to expand the war in southwestern Shanxi at any time. One division under Hu Zongnan has already reached a point southeast of Yichuan. This will have an impact on the whole situation in North China and affect the major struggles facing the whole Party.

Our source for this text is Mao ZeDong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 503–4, where it is reproduced from a copy in the Central Archives.

1. See above, “The Clashes Between the New and Old Armies in Southwest Shanxi and Our Overall Policy,” December 6, 1939, and the notes thereto. The tension had now peaked and broken out in actual combat. Mao was determined to avoid the separation of the various base areas in Shanxi and their isolation from one another. He was particularly concerned to maintain the corridor through northwestern Shanxi, which was the main line of communication between the Yan’an area and the bases farther east in North China.

2. The Western Shanxi Detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Shuju.

3. The reference is to the blockade line established by Yan Xishan along the highway between these two points.

4. Hu Zongnan (1896–1962), hao Shoushan, was a native of Zhejiang. He graduated from the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924, attracted the attention of Chiang Kai-shek by his performance, and rose steadily in rank. As commander of the Guomindang First Army, he fought against the Red Army during the Long March. (For details, see the many references to him in Volume V of our edition.) In August 1939, he had become commander of the Guomindang Thirty-fourth Group Army, and it was this force which was assigned the task of containing the Communists in northern Shanxi.
3. The central question for the present is to wage this struggle victoriously, so as to keep the base areas in Shanxi for resisting Japan within our hands and maintain communications between North China and the northwest. To this end:
   a. The 358th Brigade and the New Army in northwestern Shanxi shall immediately concentrate in suitable regions to get ready for combat.
   b. The 120th Division shall dispatch two to three regiments to northwestern Shanxi. He and Guan should immediately depart for northwest Shanxi to take command of the battle, the faster the better. For the question of command will affect victory or defeat in the battle, and we hope that there will be no delay.
   c. The defense sector of the 120th Division in the military district shall be completed by forces to be transferred from the middle of Hebei by Nie [Rongzhen]. Nie shall also make plans for wiping out all of Yan [Xishan]'s old forces in the surrounding areas of the military district.
   d. The Chen detachment and the new army under his command shall be strictly on guard against sudden attacks from the old army. Peng and Luo shall support them.
   e. Redeployments for southwestern Shanxi shall be made separately by Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai].


To Wu Yuzhang

(1939)

Venerable Mr. Wu:

I have written something of a theoretical character, with the primary purpose of refuting the diehards, and I am sending it to you with the request that you will favor me by reading and correcting it. Your instructions will be gratefully received!

Mao Zedong

Our source for this letter is *Mao Zedong shuxin suanjji*, p. 160.

1. Wu Yuzhang (1878–1966) was born in Rongxian, Sichuan Province. During the anti-Japanese war, he was member of the Standing Committee of the Culture Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, provost of the Lu Xun Academy of Art and Literature, and chairman of the Cultural Commission in the government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.

2. The reference is to Mao's article "New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture," which was published in the first issue of the Yan'an periodical *Chinese Culture* in February 1940. The article, translated below, was later retitled "On New Democracy."
Inscription for the Production Campaign of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

(1939)

At present, take part in production while studying; in the future, take part in production while fighting. Such is the style of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy, a style powerful enough to defeat any enemy.

Inscription on Women’s Liberation

(1939)

Women are becoming emancipated, and are suddenly coming to the fore; 200 million in number, they are striving to equal men. Men and women moving forward side by side, like the sun just rising in the east; thus they will dominate the enemy, for no enemy can resist them.

Our source for this inscription is the index volume to *Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan*, p. 151.

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Men and women moving forward side by side, like the sun just rising in the east; thus they will dominate the enemy, for no enemy can resist them.
Inscription in Commemoration of the Anniversary of Dazhong Ribao

(January 1, 1940)

Mobilize all possible forces, such as newspapers, periodicals, schools, propaganda organizations, cultural and artistic corps, political departments in the army, and mass groups, to develop the consciousness of the nation, stimulate national confidence and sense of pride, oppose any attempt to capitulate or compromise, and, defying difficulties and sacrifice, resolutely carry the War of Resistance through to the end. We must have freedom. We must win the victory.

Our source for this inscription is Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 9, p. 377, where it is reproduced from the text as first published in Dazhong ribao on January 1, 1940.
Get Ready to Cope with Rapid Changes in Central China

(January 5, 1940)

Comrade Xiang Ying

1. If there are rapid changes in the situation and you are unable to move north, naturally you can only move south. Your resolution is correct.

2. Chen Yi should strive by every means to go to the north of the Yangzi river.

3. Chiang Kai-shek’s capitulation will not take place immediately. You still have time to prepare, but the preparation should be carried out internally and secretly without leaving any traces behind.

4. Make an effort to win over sympathizers from all the forces. E. Rely on ourselves for everything. Do not rely on any outside assistance.

The Central Secretariat

At Present It Is Impossible to Take New Recruits

(January 11, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

Under the present conditions it is not possible to take new recruits. If the new recruits are to be trained within the forces, to recruit 24,000 men, food, bedding, uniforms, and so on will cost at least 600,000 yuan. At the moment, we do not have such financial capability. All we can do is increase the amount of training for the self-defense forces. The principle is that the civilians will eat their own food and wear their own clothes. Now is a transitional period between the stage of self-defense forces and the stage of taking recruits in the future. This was the method adopted in the Central Soviet Base Area. It was the same in the Wutai mountains, the Taihang mountains, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. This is my reply.

Zedong

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Our source for this order is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. II, p. 505, where it is reproduced from Mao’s manuscript as preserved in the Central Archives.

1. This is the first reference in the texts translated here to the problem of the disposition of New Fourth Army forces north and south of the Yangzi. Mao came increasingly to favor transfer north of the river, as urged by Liu Shaoqi, but he remained ambivalent about timing, circumstances, and whether any concessions could be obtained from the Guomindang.

2. Chen Yi (1901–1972) was a native of Sichuan Province, who participated in the Work and Study Program in France in 1919–1921. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 and was active in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1927. Thereafter he played an important role during the Jinggangshan and early Jiangxi Soviet periods. When the main Red Army forces embarked on the Long March, he was left behind together with Xiang Ying to conduct guerrilla warfare. When the New Fourth Army was established, he became its commander.

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Our source for this text is *Mao Zedong junshi wenji*, Vol. 2, p. 506, where it is reproduced from the manuscript as preserved in the Central Archives.
The Current Situation and Our Policies

(February 11, 1940)

Comrade [Peng] Dehuai:

The Secretariat has already sent a reply to your telegram of the 30th, and I expect that you have received it. At present, it is not yet the rainy season in the whole country. Our task in the whole country is still organizing the progressive forces, trying hard to win over the middle forces, and smashing the wavering and reaction of the big bourgeoisie. This possibility has still not been lost. The most serious problem right now is the reaction of Yan Xishan. He now constitutes the most reactionary segment of the big bourgeoisie. His plots are extremely vicious. He has already blockaded the Lüliang and Zhongtiao mountain ranges. Our policy is to use He [Long] and Guan [Xiangying]'s forces first of all to seize the whole or at least most of northwestern Shanxi, use our forces in southeastern Shanxi to consolidate those positions where there are not yet lost, and seize back some of the positions which have been lost. It is extremely urgent that a road to Luoyang be opened. Afterward, when He and Guan have opened a road to southeastern Shanxi, they should attack the Lüliang Range. At least they should recover the positions of Chen's detachment and a line of communication and break through the Yanshui Pass. If, by that time, Yan Xishan is willing to talk peace (such a possibility has not yet been lost), we will let him occupy the greater part of the Lüliang Range, and we will only occupy a small part of it and a line of communication, and leave it at that. Otherwise, the war is likely to expand. There is a tendency for the problem of the border region to evolve in a positive direction. The Ninety-seventh Division at Longdong has already been withdrawn, and, on orders from Chiang, Cheng Qian and Zhu Shaoliang have expressed a wish for peace. We have just sent the venerable Xie to Gansu as representative to the talks. Japan has decided to support Wang Jingwei. The policy of the Japanese forces in China is still hard, and this cannot but affect the attitude of the Guomindang. Hence, the possibility of a change for the better can still not be ruled out. At the present, the struggle within Japan is still one focusing on the issue of whether Japan should occupy China entirely for its own benefit or give some rights to Britain and the United States. The policy of the Japanese military according to which they should keep China all for themselves seems to have the upper hand. In Japan, the cabinet is just now being overturned, and in a few days we will know the outcome.

Zedong

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Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 507–8, where it is reproduced from the manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

1. These ranges are located, respectively, in western and in southwestern Shanxi.

2. For Mao's decision to entrust this mission to the 120th Division of He Long and Guan Xiangying, see above, the text of December 31, 1939.

3. The reference is to the independent detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chen Shiju.

4. Cheng Qian (1883–1968), zi Songyun, a native of Hunan Province, studied military tactics in Japan, where he joined the Tongmenghui. He participated in the 1911 Revolution and, in the early 1920s, was closely associated with Sun Yat-sen. In 1938, he became commander of the First War Zone. At this time, Cheng was in charge of the field headquarters of the Guomindang government's Military Commission in Tianshui. Zhu Shaoliang (1890–1963), a native of Fujian Province, studied at the Military Academy in Tokyo, participated in the Northern Expedition, and fought with limited success against the Communists in Jiangxi. At this time, he was commander of the Eighth War Zone.

5. Xie Weiyun (1884–1971), commonly known by his pen-name Xie Xuezai, was a native of Hunan who had participated in 1921–1923 in two of the organizations established by Mao at that time, the New People's Study Society and the Self-Study University. He joined the Guomindang in 1924 and the Chinese Communist Party in 1925. In 1933, he went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic and subsequently participated in the Long March. At this time, he was head of the Secretariat of the border region government. He is here referred to as "the venerable Xie" because he was a decade older than Mao and most of his comrades in the Party.
On New Democracy

(December 10, 1940)

I. Whither China?

A lively atmosphere has prevailed throughout the country ever since the War of Resistance began. There is a general feeling that a way out of the impasse has been found, and people no longer knit their brows in despair. Of late, however, the dust and din of compromise and anticomunism have once again filled the air, and once again the people are thrown into bewilderment. Most susceptible, and the first to be affected, are the intellectuals and the young students. So the questions "What is to be done?" and "Where is China headed?" have once again arisen. On the occasion of the publication of Chinese Culture, it may therefore be profitable to clarify the political and cultural trends in China. I am a layman in matters of culture; I would like to study them, but have only just begun to do so. Fortunately, there are many comrades in Yan'an who have written at length in this field, so my rough and ready words may serve the same purpose as the beating of the gongs before a theatrical performance. Our observations may contain a grain of truth for the nation's advanced cultural workers and may serve as a modest spur to induce them to come forward with valuable contributions of their own. We hope that they will join in the discussion to reach correct conclusions which will meet our national needs. To "seek the truth from facts" is the scientific approach, and presumptuously to claim infallibility and lecture people will assuredly never settle anything. The disaster that has befallen our nation is extremely grave, and only a scientific approach and a spirit of responsibility can lead us to the road of liberation. There

is but one truth, and the question of who has it depends not on subjective boasting but on objective practice. The only yardstick of truth is the revolutionary practice of millions of people. This, I think, can be regarded as the attitude of Chinese Culture.

II. We Want to Build a New China

For many years, we Communists have struggled not only for a political and economic revolution, but for a cultural revolution, as well. The goal of all these revolutions is to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. That new society and new state will have not only a new politics and a new economy but a new culture. In other words, not only do we want to change China that is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China that is politically free and economically prosperous, but we also want to change the China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into an enlightened and progressive China under the sway of a new culture. In short, we want to build a new China. Our aim in the cultural sphere is to build a new Chinese national culture.

III. China's Historical Characteristics

We want to build a new national culture, but what kind of culture should it be?

Any given culture (as an ideological form) is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence upon the latter; politics is the concentrated expression of economics. This is our fundamental view of the relationship of culture to politics and economics and of the relationship of politics to economics. It follows that the form of culture is first determined by the political and economic form; only then does culture influence the given political and economic form. Marx says, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." He also says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." For the first time in human history, these scientific formulations correctly solved the problem of the relationship between consciousness and existence, and they are the basic points of departure underlying the dynamic revolutionary theory of knowledge as the reflection of reality, which was later elaborated so profoundly by Lenin. These basic points of departure must be kept in mind in our discussion of China's cultural problems.

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This article, based on a speech delivered on January 9, 1940, at the first meeting of the Border Area Cultural Association, was given its final revisions by Mao on January 15, 1940, and was first published in the inaugural issue of Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture) on February 15, 1940, under the title "On New-Democratic Politics and New-Democratic Culture." When it appeared in issue no. 98/99 of Jiefang on February 20, 1940, the title was changed to "On New Democracy." Our translation is based on Mao Zedong ziji, Vol. 7, pp. 143–202, which reproduces the text from the 1944 edition of Mao Zedong xuanji, including a slight error in the date, which is given as January 19, 1940. Nianpu, Vol. 2, pp. 156–57, confirms that the manuscript was put into final form by Mao on January 15, as indicated at the end of the version in Jiefang.

1. Mao here uses one of his favorite metaphors, "Casting a brick to attract jade."

2. Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. Economics is the base and politics is the concentrated expression of economics.

3. Basic points of departure → Basic concepts

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Thus it is quite clear that the old national culture we want to eliminate is inseparable from the old national politics and economics, while the new national culture which we want to build up is inseparable from the new national politics and economics. The old politics and economics of the Chinese nation form the basis of its old culture, just as its new politics and economics will form the basis of its new culture.

What are China's old politics and economics? And what is its old culture?

From the Zhou and Qin dynasties onward, Chinese society was feudal, as were its politics and its economy. And the culture, reflecting the politics and economy, was a feudal culture.

Since the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist elements in Chinese society, that is, during the hundred years from the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War, the country has changed by degrees into a colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal society. China today is colonial in the enemy-occupied areas and basically semicolonial in the nonoccupied areas, and it is predominantly feudal in both. Such, then, is the character of present-day Chinese society and the state of affairs in our country. The politics and the economy of this society are predominantly colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal, and the culture, reflecting the politics and economy, is also colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal.

It is precisely against these predominant political, economic, and cultural forms that our revolution is directed. What we want to get rid of is the old colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal politics and economy and the old culture. And what we want to build up is their direct opposite, that is, the new politics, the new economy, and the new culture of the Chinese nation.

What, then, are the new politics and the new economy of the Chinese nation, and what is its new culture?

In the course of its history the Chinese revolution must go through two stages: first, the democratic revolution and, second, the socialist revolution. By their very nature they are two different revolutionary processes. But what I call democracy no longer belongs to the old category. It is not the old democracy; it belongs to the new category—it is New Democracy.

It can thus be affirmed that the new politics of the Chinese nation are the politics of New Democracy, and the new economy of the Chinese nation is the economy of New Democracy, and that the new culture of the Chinese nation is the culture of New Democracy.

Such are the historical characteristics of the Chinese revolution at present. Any political party, group, or person taking part in the Chinese revolution who fails to understand this will not be able to direct the revolution and lead it to victory, but will be cast aside by the people and left to grieve out in the cold.

IV. The Chinese Revolution Is Part of the World Revolution

The historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in its division into the two stages, democracy and socialism, but the first stage is no longer democracy in general, but democracy of the Chinese type, a new and special type—namely, New Democracy. How, then, has this historical characteristic come into being? Has it been in existence for the past hundred years, or is it of recent origin?

A brief study of the historical development of China and of the world shows that this characteristic did not emerge immediately after the Opium War, but took shape later, after the first imperialist world war and the October Revolution in Russia. Let us now examine the process of its formation.

Clearly, it follows from the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal character of present-day Chinese society that the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is to change the colonial, semicolonial, and semifeeudal form of society into an independent, democratic society. The second is to carry the revolution forward and build a socialist society. At present the Chinese revolution is taking the first step.

It can be said that the first step began with the Opium War in 1840, that is, when China's feudal society started changing into a semicolonial and semifeeudal one. Then came the movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the coup of 1898, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the 1911 Revolution, the May Fourth movement, the May Thirtieth movement, the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution, the December Ninth movement, and the present War of Resistance Against Japan. Together these have taken up a whole century and in a sense they represent that first step, being struggles waged by the Chinese people, on different occasions and in varying degrees, against imperialism and the feudal forces in order to build up an independent, democratic society and complete the first revolution. The 1911 Revolution was in a fuller sense the beginning of that revolution. In its social character, this revolution is a bourgeois-democratic and not a proletarian-socialist revolution. It is still unfinished and still demands great

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4. The old national culture → The reactionary elements of the old national culture
5. The culture → The dominant culture
6. Enemy-occupied areas → Japanese-occupied areas
7. The nonoccupied areas → The Guomindang areas
8. Feudal → Feudal or semifeeudal
9. The old culture → The old culture in their service
10. The first step → The preparatory stage for the first step
11. Here, as in his speech of May 4, 1939, translated above, Mao refers to the events of 1898 as a "coup." Obviously he was thinking of the suppression of the Reform movement, rather than of that movement itself. In the Selected Works version, this event has been moved to its proper chronological place, after the Sino-French and Sino-Japanese wars, but it remains a coup.
12. The Agrarian Revolution → The War of the Agrarian Revolution
efforts, because to this day its enemies are still very strong. When Mr. Sun Yatsen said, "The revolution is not yet completed, all my comrades must struggle on," he was referring to the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

A change, however, occurred in China's bourgeois-democratic revolution after the outbreak of the first imperialist world war in 1914 and the founding of a socialist state on one-sixth of the globe as a result of the Russian October Revolution of 1917.

Before these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution came within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, of which it was a part.

Since these events, the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution has changed, it has come within the new category of bourgeois-democratic revolutions and, as far as the alignment of revolutionary forces is concerned, forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

Why? Because the first imperialist world war and the first victorious socialist revolution, the October Revolution, have changed the whole course of world history and ushered in a new era.

In an era in which the world capitalist front has collapsed in one corner of the globe (a corner which occupies one-sixth of the world's surface), and has fully revealed its decadence everywhere else, in an era in which the remaining capitalist portions cannot survive without relying more than ever on the colonies and semicolonies, in an era in which a socialist state has been established and has proclaimed its readiness to fight in support of the liberation movement of all colonies and semicolonies, and in which the proletariat of the capitalist countries is steadily freeing itself from the social-imperialist influence of the democratic parties and has proclaimed its support for the liberation movement in the colonies and semicolonies—in such an era, a revolution in any colony or semic colony that is directed against imperialism, that is, against the international bourgeoisie and international capitalism, no longer comes within the old category of the bourgeois-democratic world revolution, but within the new category. It is no longer part of the old bourgeois and capitalist world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletarian-socialist world revolution. Such revolutionary colonies and semicolonies can no longer be regarded as allies of the counterrevolutionary front of world capitalism; they have become allies of the revolutionary front of world socialism.

Although during its first stage or step, such a revolution in a colonial and semicolonial country is still fundamentally bourgeois-democratic in its social character, and although its objective demand is still basically to clear the path for the development of capitalism, it is no longer a revolution of the old type, led entirely by the bourgeoisie, with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship. It is, rather, a revolution of the new type, in which the proletariat participates in or exercises the leadership, and having as its aim, in the first stage, the establishment of a new-democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. In the course of its progress, there may be a number of further substages, because of changes on the enemy's side and within the ranks of our allies, but the fundamental character of the revolution remains unchanged and it will remain the same until the time of the socialist revolution.

Such a revolution attacks imperialism at its very roots and is therefore not acceptable to imperialism, which opposes it. But it is acceptable to socialism and is supported by the socialist state and by the international socialist proletariat.

Therefore, such a revolution cannot but become part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.

The correct thesis that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution" was put forward as early as 1924—1927 during the period of China's Great Revolution. It was put forward by the Chinese Communists and endorsed by all those taking part in the anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggle of the time. At that time, however, the significance of this thesis was not fully expounded, and consequently it was only vaguely understood. I remember that during his eastern expedition against Ch'eng Jiong-ming in 1925, Mr. Chiang Kaishek made a speech on reaching Chao Shan, in which he also said, "China's revolution is part of the world revolution."

The "world revolution" no longer refers to the old world revolution, for the old bourgeois world revolution has long been a thing of the past; it refers to the new world revolution, the socialist world revolution. Similarly, to form "part of" means to form part not of the old bourgeois revolution, but of the new socialist revolution. This is a tremendous change unparalleled in the history of China and of the world.

The Chinese Communists put forward this correct thesis on the basis of Stalin's theory.

As early as 1918, in an article commemorating the first anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin wrote:

The great worldwide significance of the October Revolution chiefly consists of the following three points. First, it has widened the scope of the national question and

13. Classes. Classes. Thus, this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism.

14. Great Revolution. First Great Revolution

15. The reference is to Ch'ao-hsien and Shantou, two small cities in the northeastern corner of Kwangtung, or to the short railroad connecting them.

16. Chiang uttered the same identical sentence in a speech of August 1926 in Changsha during the Northern Expedition, in which he also declared: "In the present world revolution, there is the Third International, which can be called the general staff of the revolution." For a translation of the relevant passage from the Changsha speech, see S. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 83.
converted it from the particular question of national oppression to the general question of emancipating the oppressed peoples, colonies, and semi-colonies from imperialism. Second, it has opened up wide possibilities for their emancipation and the right paths toward it, has thereby greatly facilitated the cause of the emancipation of the oppressed peoples of the West and the East, and has drawn them into the common path of the victorious struggle against imperialism. Third, it has thereby erected a bridge between the socialist West and the enslaved East, thus creating a new front of revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through the Russian Revolution, to the oppressed peoples of the East. (See J.V. Stalin, Works [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953], Vol. 4, pp. 169–170.)

Since writing this article, Stalin has again and again expounded the theory that revolutions in the colonies and semicolonies have broken away from the old category and become part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. The clearest and most precise explanation is given in an article published on June 30, 1925, in which Stalin carried on a controversy with the Yugoslav nationalists of the time. Entitled “The National Question Once Again,” it contains the following passage:

Comrade Semich refers to a passage in Stalin’s book Marxism and the National Question, written at the end of 1912. There it says that “the national struggle is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves.” Evidently, by this Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining the social significance of the national movement under the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin’s pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists’ fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian socialist revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war in Europe, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article “The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,” Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian socialist revolution. I do not even mention many other profound works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. What significance can Semich’s reference to the passage in Stalin’s book, written in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the present epoch of world proletarian revolution? It can only signify that Comrade Semich completely quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the elementary requirements of dialectics and ignores the saying that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation. (See J.V. Stalin, Works [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953], Vol. 7, pp. 225–227.)

From this it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolutions. The first is in the bourgeois or capitalist category. The era of this kind of world revolution is long past; it came to an end as far back as 1914, when the first imperialist world war broke out, and above all in 1917, when the Russian October Revolution took place. The second kind, namely, the proletarian-socialist world revolution, thereupon began. This type of revolution has the proletariat of the capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semicolonies as its allies. No matter what classes, parties, or individuals in an oppressed nation join the revolution, and no matter whether they are conscious of this point or understand it subjectively, so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and hence becomes its allies.

Today, the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater significance. This is a time when the economic and political crises of capitalism are dragging the world more and more deeply into the second imperialist war, when the Soviet Union has reached the period of transition from socialism to communism and is capable of leading and helping the proletariat, oppressed nations, and all revolutionary people of the whole world in their fight against capitalist war and capitalist reaction, when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is preparing to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism, and when the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the petty bourgeoisie in China have become a mighty independent political force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Situated as we are in this day and age, should we not make the appraisal that the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater world significance? I think we should. The Chinese revolution is a great part of the world revolution.

Although the Chinese revolution in this first stage (with its many substages) is a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution and is not yet itself the newest type of proletarian-socialist revolution in its social character, it has long become a part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and now even a very important part and a great ally of this world revolution. The first step or stage in our revolution is definitely not, and cannot be, the establishment of a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but will result in the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes

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17. National oppression → Combing national oppression in Europe (We have included this and the immediately following variant to show how carefully those involved in revising Mao’s writings for the Selected Works in the early 1950s checked references to Stalin and other Soviet authors, restoring words which Mao, or the book he quotes here, had omitted.)
18. The national struggle → The national struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism
19. Imperialist War → World War
20. The petty bourgeoisie → Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie
of China.21 The revolution will then be carried forward to the second stage, in which a socialist society will be established in China.

This is the fundamental characteristic of the Chinese revolution of today, of the new revolutionary process of the past twenty years (counting from the May Fourth movement), and its concrete living essence.

V. The Politics of New Democracy

The new historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution is its division into two stages, the first being the new-democratic revolution. How does this manifest itself concretely in internal political and economic relations? Let us consider the question.

Before the May Fourth movement of 1919 (which occurred after the first great imperialist war of 1914 and the Russian October Revolution of 1917), the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie (through their intellectuals) were the political leaders of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the political scene as an awakened and independent class force, but participated in the revolution only as a follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Such was the case with the proletariat at the time of the 1911 Revolution.

After the May Fourth movement, the chief political leader of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution was no longer the single class of the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat also participated in the political leadership.22 The Chinese proletariat rapidly became an awakened and independent political force as a result of its maturing and of the influence of the Russian Revolution. It was the Chinese Communist Party that put forward the slogan “Down with imperialism” and the thoroughgoing program for the whole of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and it was the Chinese Communist Party alone that carried out the Agrarian Revolution.

Because the Chinese bourgeoisie23 is the bourgeoisie of a colonial and semicolonial country, and because it is oppressed by imperialism, it retains at certain periods and to a certain degree—even in the era of imperialism—a certain revolutionary nature which leads it to fight against foreign imperialism and the domestic governments of bureaucrats and warlords (instances of opposition to the latter can be found in the periods of the 1911 Revolution and the Northern Expedition, that is, during periods when the bourgeoisie itself did not exercise power). It can ally itself with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready to oppose. In this respect the Chinese bourgeoisie differs from the bourgeoisie of the old Russian empire. Since the old Russian empire was itself already a military-feudal imperialism which carried on aggression against other countries, the Russian bourgeoisie was entirely lacking in revolutionary quality. There, the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. But because China is a colonial and semicolonial country which is a victim of aggression, the Chinese bourgeoisie has a revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree. Here, the task of the proletariat is not to neglect this revolutionary quality of the bourgeoisie or the possibility of establishing a united front with it against imperialism and the bureaucrat and warlord governments.

At the same time, however, precisely because the Chinese bourgeoisie is the bourgeoisie of a colonial and semicolonial country, it is extremely flabby economically and politically, and it also has another quality—namely, a proneness to compromise with the enemies of the revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie,24 even when it takes part in the revolution, is unwilling to break with imperialism completely and is, moreover, closely associated with exploitation through the land25 in the rural areas. Thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism thoroughly, still less to overthrow the feudal forces thoroughly. So neither of the two basic problems or tasks of China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution can be solved or accomplished by the bourgeoisie. During the long period between 1927 and 1936, it26 nestled in the arms of the imperialists, formed an alliance with the feudal forces, betrayed its own revolutionary programs, and opposed the revolutionary people of the time. During the War of Resistance,27 the section of the big bourgeoisie represented by Wang Jingwei has once again capitulated to the enemy. This constitutes a fresh betrayal on the part of the big bourgeoisie. This is also a point with respect to which the bourgeoisie in China differs from the earlier bourgeoisie of the advanced countries in Europe and America, especially France. When the European and American countries were still in their revolutionary era, the bourgeoisie of those countries, and especially of France, was comparatively thorough in carrying out the revolution. In China, the bourgeoisie does not possess even this degree of thoroughness.

On the one hand, revolutionary nature28 and, on the other hand, proneness to compromise—such is the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie, which faces both ways. Even the bourgeoisie in European and American history shared this

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21. Revolutionary classes of China → Revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat
22. Political leadership. → Political leadership, although the national bourgeoisie continued to take part in the revolution.
23. Chinese bourgeoisie → Chinese national bourgeoisie (Throughout this text, Mao replaced “bourgeoisie” by “national bourgeoisie” in revising it for the Selected Works. This variant will not be noted again.)
24. Chinese bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie → Chinese national bourgeoisie
25. Through the land → Through land rent
26. During the long period between 1927 and 1936, it → As for China’s big bourgeoisie, which is represented by the Guomindang, throughout the long period from 1927 to 1936, it
27. During the War of Resistance → In 1927 and for some time afterward, the Chinese national bourgeoisie also followed the counterrevolution. During the War of Resistance
28. Revolutionary nature → Possible participation in the revolution
dual character. When confronted by a formidable enemy, they united with the workers and peasants against them, but when the workers and peasants awakened, they turned around to unite with the enemy against the workers and peasants. This is a general rule applicable to the bourgeoisie everywhere in the world, but the trait is more pronounced in the Chinese bourgeoisie.

In China, the situation is extremely clear. Whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the feudal forces will be able to win the people’s confidence, for the mortal enemies of the people are imperialism and the feudal forces, especially imperialism. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the savior of the people. If the Chinese bourgeoisie can fulfill this responsibility, no one will be able to withhold his admiration; but if it cannot do so, the responsibility will inevitably fall upon the shoulders of the proletariat.29

Therefore, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie undoubtedly constitute the basic forces determining China’s fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in the democratic republic of China.30 The Chinese democratic republic which we now desire to establish can only be a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all the anti-imperialist and antifeudal people.31 That is, it will be a new-democratic republic, a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new People’s Principles with their Three Great Policies.32

On the one hand, this new-democratic republic will be different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old democratic form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic of the newest Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in the Soviet Union, and which, moreover, will be established in all the capitalist countries and will undoubtedly become the dominant form of state and governmental structure in all the advanced countries.33 For a certain historical period, however, this form is not suitable for the colonial and semicolonial countries.34 During this period, there-

30. China. → China, with the proletariat as the leading force.
31. People → People, led by the proletariat
32. A republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People’s Principles with their Three Great Policies → A republic of the genuinely revolutionary Three People’s Principles or a republic of the Three People’s Principles with Sun Yat-sen’s Three Great Policies
33. Advanced countries → Industrially advanced countries
34. Suitable for the colonial and semicolonial countries → Suitable for the revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries

fore, a third form of state must be adopted in all colonial and semicolonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This is a form suited to a certain historical period and is therefore a transitional form; nevertheless, it is a form which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with.

Thus the multifarious types of state system in the world, classified according to their social character,35 can be reduced to three basic kinds: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.

The first kind comprises the old democratic states. Today, after the outbreak of the second imperialist war, there is already not the slightest trace of democracy in any of the capitalist countries. They have all been transformed, or are about to be transformed, into bloody military dictatorships of the bourgeoisie. Certain countries under the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie can be grouped with this kind.

Apart from the Soviet Union, the second kind is ripening in capitalist countries, and, in the future, it will be the dominant form throughout the world for a certain period.

The third kind is the transitional form of state in the revolutionary colonies and semicolonies. To be sure, the various colonies and semicolonies will necessarily have different characteristics, but these are only minor differences within the general framework of uniformity. So long as they are revolutionary colonial or semicolonial countries, their state and governmental structure will of necessity be basically the same, namely, a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes. In China today, the new-democratic state takes the form of the anti-Japanese united front. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also a united front, an alliance of several revolutionary classes. But unfortunately, despite the fact that the War of Resistance has been going on for so long, the work of democratizing the state has hardly started,36 and the Japanese imperialists have exploited this fundamental weakness to stride into our country. If nothing is done about it, our national future will be gravely imperiled. We hope that the movement for constitutional government that has just started will prevent this danger.37

The question under discussion here is that of the “state system.” After several decades of wrangling since the last years of the Qing dynasty, it has still not been cleared up. Actually it is simply a question of the status of the various social classes within the state. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, conceals the problem of class status.

35. Social character → Class character
36. Has hardly started. → Has hardly started in most of the country outside the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party
37. The importance of establishing constitutional government was a central theme in Mao’s discussion of political issues at this time and is mentioned frequently in the texts translated below. See in particular his speech of February 20, 1940, entitled “New-Democratic Constitutional Government.”
and carries out its one-class dictatorship under the “national” label. Such concealment is of no advantage to the revolutionary people and the matter should be clearly explained to them. The term “national” can be used, but the people of the nation do not include counterrevolutionaries and Chinese traitors, and consist of all the revolutionary people. The kind of state we need today is a dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counterrevolutionaries and Chinese traitors.

“The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. In contrast, the Guomindang’s principle of democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.” Such was the solemn declaration made in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, held in 1924.38 For sixteen years the Guomindang has violated this declaration, and as a result it has created the present grave national crisis. This is a gross blunder, which we hope the Guomindang will correct in the cleansing flames of resistance to Japan.

As for the question of “political power,”39 this is a matter of how political power is organized, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself. There is no state which does not have an appropriate apparatus of political power to represent it. China may now adopt a system of congresses,40 from the national congress down to the provincial, xian, district, and township congresses, with all levels electing their respective governmental bodies. But if there is to be proper representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, a proper expression of the people’s will, a proper direction for revolutionary struggles, and a proper manifestation of the spirit of New Democracy, then a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, property, or education, must be introduced. Such is the system of democratic centralism. Only a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight the enemies of the revolution most effectively. There must be a spirit of refusal to be “privately owned by the few” in the government and the army; without a genuinely democratic system this cannot be attained and the system of government and the state system will be out of harmony.

The state system, a joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes, and the system of government, democratic centralism—these constitute the politics of New Democracy, the republic of New Democracy, the republic of the anti-Japanese united front, the republic of the new Three People’s Principles with their Three Great Policies, the Republic of China in reality as well as in name. Today we have a Republic of China in name but not in reality, and our present task is to create the reality that will fit the name.

Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, should and must establish without fail; such is the orientation, the only correct orientation, for our present work of national reconstruction.

VI. The Economy of New Democracy

If such a republic is to be established in China, it must be new-democratic not only in its politics but also in its economy.

The big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises will become state-owned.

Enterprises such as banks, railways, and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

This is another solemn declaration in the manifesto of the Guomindang’s First National Congress,42 and it is the correct policy for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic.43 But at the same time the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as it does not “dominate the livelihood of the people,” for China’s economy is still very backward.

The republic will take certain necessary steps to confiscate the land of the big landlords and distribute it to those peasants having little or no land, carry out Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s44 slogan of “land to the tiller,” abolish feudal relations in the rural areas, and turn the land over to the private ownership of the peasants without establishing a socialist agriculture. A rich peasant economy will be allowed in the rural areas. Such is the policy of “equalization of land ownership.” “Land to the tiller” is the correct slogan for this policy.45

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38. In 1924 → In 1924 during the period of Guomindang-Communist cooperation
39. Political power → Political system
40. Congresses → People’s congresses
41. National congress → National people’s congress
42. Congress, → Congress held during the period of Guomindang-Communist cooperation
43. Republic, → Republic. In the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will have a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy.
44. Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s → Sun Yat-sen’s
45. Policy, → Policy. In general, socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage, though various types of cooperative enterprises developed on the basis of “land to the tiller” will contain elements of socialism.
China’s economy must develop along the path of the “regulation of capital” and the “equalization of landownership” and must never be “privately owned by the few”; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to “dominate the livelihood of the people”; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semifeudal society to survive. Whoever dares to go counter to this line of advance will certainly not succeed but will run into a brick wall.

Such are the internal economic relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, must and necessarily will establish.

Such is the economy of New Democracy.

And the politics of New Democracy are the concentrated expression of the economy of New Democracy.

VII. Refutation of Bourgeois Dictatorship

More than 90 percent of the people are in favor of a republic of this kind with its new-democratic politics and new-democratic economy; “without such a republic, nothing can be achieved, for it accords with the natural principles and people’s sentiments, goes with the trend of the world, meets the demands of the people, and has been pursued resolutely by people of foresight” (Sun Yat-sen’s words). There is no alternative road.

What about the road to a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship? To be sure, that was the old road taken by the European and American bourgeoisie, but whether one likes it or not, neither the international nor the domestic situation allows China to do the same.

Judging by the international situation, that road is blocked. In its fundamentals, the present international situation is one of a struggle between capitalism and socialism, in which capitalism is on the downgrade and socialism on the upgrade. In the first place international capitalism, or imperialism, will not permit it. Indeed the history of modern China is a history of imperialist aggression, of imperialist opposition to China’s independence and to its development of capitalism. Earlier revolutions failed in China because imperialism strangled them, and innumerable revolutionary martyrs died, bitterly lamenting the nonfulfillment of their mission. Today a powerful Japanese imperialism is forcing its way into China and wants to reduce it to a colony; it is not China that is developing Chinese capitalism but Japan that is developing Japanese capitalism in our country; and it is not the Chinese bourgeoisie but the Japanese bourgeoisie that is exercising dictatorship in our country. True enough, this is the period of the final struggle of dying imperialism—imperialism is “moribund capitalism.” But just because it is dying, it is all the more dependent on colonies and semicolonies for survival and will certainly not allow any colony or semicoloncy to establish anything like a capitalist society under the dictatorship of its own bourgeoisie. Just because Japanese imperialism is bogged down in serious economic and political crises, just because it is dying, it must invade China and reduce it to a colony, thereby blocking the road to bourgeois dictatorship and national capitalism in China.

In the second place, socialism will not permit it. All the imperialist powers in the world are our enemies, and China cannot possibly gain its independence without the assistance of the land of socialism and the international proletariat. That is, it cannot do so without the help of the Soviet Union and the victory of the struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and other countries against capitalism in their own countries. Their victory is a help to us. Although it cannot be said that China’s victory must necessarily wait upon the victory of the revolution in all these countries, or in one or two of them, there is no doubt that we cannot win without the added strength of their proletariat. In particular, Soviet assistance is absolutely indispensable for China’s final victory in the War of Resistance. Refuse Soviet assistance, and the revolution will fail. Don’t the anti-Soviet campaigns in China from 1927 onward provide an extraordinarily clear lesson? The world today is unquestionably dying and socialism is unquestionably prospering. In these circumstances, would it not be sheer fantasy to desire the establishment in China of a capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship after the defeat of imperialism and feudalism?

What if it is said that, owing to certain specific conditions (the victory of the bourgeoisie over Greek aggression and the extreme feebleness of the proletariat), a tiny Turkey ruled by a bourgeois dictatorship of a Kemalist type did still emerge after the First Imperialist World War and the October Revolution? Well, after World War II and the completion of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, there can be no second Turkey, much less a “Turkey” with a population of 450 million. In the specific conditions of China (the bourgeoisie, with its tendency toward compromise, and the proletariat, with its revolutionary thoroughness), things just never worked out so easily as in Turkey. After the Great Revolution failed in 1927, did not bourgeois elements in China loudly clamor for something called Kemalism? But where is China’s Kemal? And where are China’s bourgeois dictatorship and capitalist society? Besides, even the so-called Kemalist Turkey finally had to throw itself into the arms of Anglo-French imperialism, becoming more and more a semicoloncy and a part of the reactionary imperialist world. In the international situation of the 1940s and 1950s, the heroes and brave fellows, whoever they may be,

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47. China’s victory → Victory of the Chinese revolution
46. The bourgeoisie, with its tendency toward compromise, and the proletariat, with its revolutionary thoroughness → The flabbiness of the bourgeoisie with its proneness to conciliation and the strength of the proletariat with its revolutionary thoroughness
49. The 1940s and 1950s → Today
in the colonies and semicolonies, either line up on the imperialist front and become part of world counterrevolution or line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of world revolution. They must do one or the other, for there is no third way.

Judging by the domestic situation, too, the Chinese bourgeoisie should have learned its lesson by now. No sooner had the strength of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie brought the revolution of 1927 to victory than the Chinese bourgeoisie kicked the masses aside, seized the fruits of the revolution, and strained themselves to the limit in a war of “Communist suppression” for ten years. But what was the upshot? Today, when a powerful enemy has penetrated deep into our territory and the anti-Japanese war has been going on for two years, is it possible that there are still people who want to copy the obsolete recipes of the European and American bourgeoisie? A decade of war was spent on “suppressing the Communists” out of existence, but no capitalist society under bourgeois dictatorship was “suppressed” into existence. Is it possible that there are still people who want to have another try? True, a “one-party dictatorship” was “suppressed” into existence through the decade of “Communist suppression,” but it is a semicolonial and feudalistic dictatorship. What is more, at the end of four years of “Communist suppression” (from 1927 to the incident of September 18, 1931), “Manchukuo” was “suppressed” into existence and in 1937, after another six years of such “suppression,” the Japanese imperialists made their way into China south of the Great Wall. Today if anyone wants to carry on “suppression” for another decade, it would mean a new type of “Communist suppression,” somewhat different from the old. But is there not one fleet-footed person who has taken up the torch for this new enterprise of “Communist suppression”? Yes, Wang Jingwei, who has become the new-style anti-Communist celebrity. Anyone who wishes to join his gang can please himself, but wouldn’t that turn out to be an added embarrassment when talking glibly about bourgeois dictatorship, capitalist society, Kemalism, a modern state, a one-party dictatorship, “one doctrine,” and so on? And if, instead of joining the Wang Jingwei gang, someone wants to come into the “fight Japan” camp of the people but imagines that once the war is won he will be able to kick aside the people fighting Japan, seize the fruits of the victory of the fight against Japan, and establish a “perpetual one-party dictatorship,” isn’t he just daydreaming? “Fight Japan!” “Fight Japan!” But who is doing the fighting? Without the workers, the peasants, and the petty bourgeoisie, you cannot move a step. Anyone who still dares to try to kick them aside will break his own foot. Hasn’t this, too, become a matter of common sense? But the diehards among the Chinese bourgeoisie (I am referring solely to the diehards) seem to have learned nothing in the past twenty years. Aren’t they still shouting: “Restrict communism,” “Dis-

50. The Chinese bourgeoisie → The Chinese bourgeoisie, headed by the big bourgeoisie
51. Revolution, → Revolution, formed a counterrevolutionary alliance with imperialism and the feudal forces
52. Petty bourgeoisie → Other sections of the petty bourgeoisie
53. Will break his own foot → Will himself be crushed

solve communism,” and “Combat communism”? Haven’t we seen “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties” followed by “Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem” and still later by “Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problems”? Good God! With all this “restricting” and “dealing with” going on, one wonders what kind of future they are preparing for our nation and for themselves! We earnestly and sincerely advise these gentlemen: Open your eyes, take a good look at China and the world, see how things stand inside as well as outside the country, and do not repeat your mistakes. If you persist in your mistakes, the future of our nation will of course be disastrous, but I am sure things will not go well with you either. This is absolutely true, absolutely certain. Unless the diehards among the Chinese bourgeoisie wake up, their future will be far from bright—they will only bring about their own destruction. Therefore we hope that China’s anti-Japanese united front will be maintained and that, with the cooperation of all instead of the monopoly of a single clique, the anti-Japanese cause will be carried to victory. This is the only good policy—any other policy is bad. This is the sincere advice we Communists are giving and do not blame us for not having forewarned you.

“If there is food, let everyone share it.” This old saying, mentioned by the late President Li Yuanhong of the Republic of China, contains much truth. Since we all share in fighting the enemy, we should all share in eating, we should all share in the work to be done, and we should all share access to education. Such attitudes as “I and I alone will take everything” and “no one dare harm me” are nothing but the old tricks of feudal lords which simply will not work in the 1940s and 1950s.

We Communists will never push aside anyone who is revolutionary (so long as he rejects capitulation and does not oppose communism); we shall persevere in the united front and practice long-term cooperation with all those classes, strata, political parties, and groups and individuals that fight Japan to the end. But it will not do if certain people want to push aside the Communist Party; it will not do if they want to spoil the united front. China must keep on fighting Japan, uniting and moving forward, and we cannot tolerate anyone who tries to capitate, cause splits, or move backward.

VIII. Refutation of “Left” Phrase-Mongering

If the capitalist road of bourgeois dictatorship is out of the question, then is it possible to take the socialist road of proletarian dictatorship?

No, that is not possible either.

Without a doubt, the present revolution is the first step, which will develop into the second step, that of socialism, at a later date. And China will attain true happiness only when it enters the socialist era. But today is not yet the time to introduce socialism. The present task of the revolution in China is to fight imperialism and

54. Fight → Are willing to fight
feudalism, and socialism is out of the question until this task is completed. The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will require quite a long time and cannot be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and cannot divorce ourselves from the actual conditions confronting us.

Certain malicious propagandists, deliberately confusing these two distinct revolutionary stages, advocate the so-called theory of a single revolution in order to prove that the Three People's Principles apply to all kinds of revolutions and that communism therefore loses its raison d'être. Utilizing this "theory," they frantically oppose communism and the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Their real purpose is to root out all revolution, to oppose a thoroughgoing bourgeois-democratic revolution and thoroughly resist Japan, and to prepare public opinion for their capitulation to the Japanese aggressors. This is deliberately being fostered by the Japanese. Since their occupation of Wuhan, they have come to realize that military force alone cannot subjugate China and they have therefore resorted to political offensives and economic blandishments. Their political offensives consist in tempting wavering elements in the anti-Japanese camp, splitting the united front, and undermining Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Their economic blandishments take the form of the so-called joint industrial enterprises. In Central and southern China, Japanese aggressors are allowing Chinese capitalists to invest 51 percent of the capital in such enterprises, with Japanese capital making up the other 49 percent; in northern China they are allowing capitalists to invest 49 percent of the capital, with Japanese capital making up the other 51 percent. The Japanese invaders have also promised to restore the former assets of the Chinese capitalists to them in the form of capital shares in the investment. At the prospect of profits, some conscienceless capitalists forget all moral principles and let their heads go. One section, represented by Wang Jingwei, has already capitulated. Another section lurking in the anti-Japanese camp would also like to cross over. But, with the cowardice of thieves, they fear that the Communists will block their exit and, what is more, that the common people will brand them as traitors. So they have put their heads together and decided to prepare the ground in cultural circles and through the press. Having determined their policy, they have lost no time in hiring some "metaphysics-mongers" plus a few Trotskyites, who, brandishing their pens like lances, are tilting in all directions and creating bedlam. Hence the whole bag of tricks for deceiving those who do not know what is going on in the world around them—the "theory of single revolution," the tales that communism does not suit the national conditions of China, that there is no need for a Communist Party in China, that the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies are sabotaging the anti-Japanese war and are merely moving but not hitting, that the

Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region is a feudal separatist régime, that the Communist Party is disobedient, dissident, intriguing, and disruptive—and all for the purpose of providing the capitalists with good grounds for getting their 49 or 51 percent and selling out the nation's interests to the enemy at the opportune moment. This is "stealing the beams and pillars and replacing them with rotten timbers"—preparing the public mind for their projected capitulation. Thus, these gentlemen who, in all apparent seriousness, are pushing the "theory of a single revolution" to oppose communism and the Communist Party are out for nothing but their 49 or 51 percent. How they must have cudgeled their brains! The "theory of a single revolution" is simply a theory of no revolution at all, and that is the heart of the matter.

But there are other people, apparently with no evil intentions, who are misled by the "theory of a single revolution" and the fanciful notion of "accomplishing both the political revolution and the social revolution at one stroke"; they do not understand that our revolution is divided into stages, that we can proceed to the next stage of revolution only after accomplishing the first and that there is no such thing as "accomplishing both at one stroke." Their approach is likewise very harmful because it confuses the steps to be taken in the revolution and weakens the effort directed toward the current task. It is correct and in accordance with the Marxist theory of revolutionary development to say of the two revolutionary stages that the first provides the conditions for the second and that the two must be consecutive, without allowing any intervening stage of bourgeois dictatorship. However, it is a utopian view rejected by true revolutionaries to say that the democratic revolution does not have a specific task and period of its own but can be merged and accomplished simultaneously with another task, that is, the socialist task (which can only be carried out in another period), and this is what they call "accomplishing both at one stroke."

IX. Refutation of the Diehards

The bourgeois diehards in their turn come forward and say: "Well, you Communists have postponed the socialist system to a later stage and have declared: The Three People's Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization. All right then, fold up your communism for the time being." A fearful hullabaloo has recently been raised with this sort of argument in the form of the "one doctrine" theory. In essence it is the howl of the diehards for bourgeois despotism. Out of courtesy, however, we may simply describe it as totally lacking in common sense.

Communism is at once a complete system of proletarian ideology and a new social system. It is different from any other ideology or social system and is the most complete, progressive, revolutionary, and rational system in human history. The ideological and social system of feudalism has a place only in the museum of history. The ideological and social system of capitalism has also become a museum

55. The Japanese → The Japanese imperialists
The situation during the stage of the revolution in China is basically similar to the situation in the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the West. Three Principles are reinterpreted by Mr. Sun Yat-sen in 1924 to avoid misunderstanding and to make the revolution more effective. It is necessary to show clearly where the Two Principles and the Three Principles differ. The Three Principles are the basic political program, while the Two Principles are the program for the establishment of a democratic society. The Two Principles are dialectical and historical materialism, while the Three Principles are the principles for the establishment of a democratic society. The Three Principles are also the principles for the establishment of a democratic society.

The principles of the Two Principles differ from the Three Principles in that they are based on the principles of the Three Principles. The Three Principles are dialectical and historical materialism, while the Two Principles are based on the principles of the Three Principles. The Two Principles are the basic political program, while the Three Principles are the principles for the establishment of a democratic society. The Three Principles are also the principles for the establishment of a democratic society.

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Three People’s Principles, except for those completely loyal to the revolution and to truth, theory and practice do not go together and their deeds contradict their words; in other words, they lack revolutionary thoroughness. The above are the differences between the two. They distinguish Communists from the followers of the Three People’s Principles. It is undoubtedly very wrong to ignore this distinction and see only the aspect of unity and not of contradiction.

Once all this is understood, it is easy to see what the bourgeois diehards have in mind when they demand that communism be “folded up.” If it does not mean bourgeois despotism, then there is no sense to it all.

X. The Three People’s Principles, Old and New

The bourgeois diehards have no understanding whatsoever of historical change; their knowledge is so poor that it is practically nonexistent. They do not know the difference either between communism and the Three People’s Principles or between the new Three People’s Principles and the old.

We Communists recognize “the Three People’s Principles as the political basis for the Anti-Japanese National United Front,” we acknowledge that “the Three People’s Principles being what China needs today, our Party is ready to fight for their complete realization,” and we admit the basic agreement between the Communist minimum program and the political tenets of the Three People’s Principles. But which kind of Three People’s Principles? The Three People’s Principles as reinterpreted by Mr. Sun Yat-sen in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, and no other. I wish the diehard gentlemen would spare a moment from the work of “restricting communism,” “dissolving communism,” and “combating communism,” in which they are so gleefully engaged, to glance through this manifesto. In the manifesto Mr. Sun Yat-sen said: “Here is the true interpretation of the Guomindang’s Three People’s Principles.” Hence these are the only genuine Three People’s Principles and all others are spurious. The only “true interpretation” of the Three People’s Principles is the one contained in the manifesto of the First National Congress of the Guomindang, and all other interpretations are false. Presumably this is no Communist fabrication, for many Guomindang members and I myself personally witnessed the adoption of the manifesto.

The manifesto marks off the two epochs in the history of the Three People’s Principles. Before it, they belonged to the old category; they were the Three People’s Principles of the old bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolon, the Three People’s Principles of old democracy, the old Three People’s Principles.

After it, they came within the new category; they became the Three People’s Principles of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution in a semicolon, the Three People’s Principles of New Democracy, the new Three People’s Principles. These and these alone are the revolutionary Three People’s Principles of the new period.

The revolutionary Three People’s Principles of the new period, the new or genuine Three People’s Principles, embody the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. Without each and every one of these Three Great Policies, the Three People’s Principles become either false or incomplete in the new period.

In the first place, the revolutionary, new, or genuine Three People’s Principles must include alliance with Russia. The present situation is perfectly clear. If there is no policy of uniting with Russia, if we do not unite with the land of socialism, there will inevitably be a policy of uniting with imperialism, we will inevitably unite with imperialism. Is it not evident that this is exactly what happened after 1927? During the first two years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, because the great imperialist war had not yet broken out, the contradictions between Britain, the United States, and other countries, and Japan could still be exploited. Since the outbreak of the imperialist World War, these contradictions, although they have not entirely disappeared, have greatly diminished. If we were to make improper use of them, then Britain and the United States could demand that China participate in their struggle against the Soviet Union. If China then complied with their demand, it would immediately place itself on the side of the reactionary front of imperialism, thus putting an end to all national independence. Once the conflict between the socialist Soviet Union and imperialist Britain and the United States grows sharper, China will have to take its stand on one side or the other. This is an inevitable trend. Is it not possible to avoid leaning to either side? No, that is an illusion. The entire globe will be swept into one or the other of these two fronts, and henceforth “neutrality” will be merely a deceptive term. Especially is this true of China, which is fighting an imperialist power that has penetrated deep into its territory; its final victory is inconceivable without the assistance of the Soviet Union. If alliance with Russia is sacrificed for the sake of alliance with imperialism, the word “revolutionary” will have to be expunged from the Three People’s Principles, which will then become reactionary. In the final analysis, there can be no “neutral” Three People’s Principles; they can only be either revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. Would it not be more heroic to “fight against attacks from both sides” as Wang Jingwei once remarked, and to have the kind of Three People’s Principles that serves this “fight”? Unfortunately, even its inventor Wang Jingwei himself has abandoned (or “folded up”) this kind of Three People’s Principles, for he has adopted the Three People’s Principles of alliance with imperialism. If it is argued that there is a difference between Eastern and Western imperialism, and that, unlike Wang Jingwei who has allied himself with Eastern imperialism, you should ally yourself with some motherfucking [tama] Western imperialists to march eastward and attack, then would not such conduct be quite revolutionary? But whether you like it or not, the Western imperialists are determined to oppose the Soviet Union and communism, and, if you ally yourself with them, they will ask you to march

62. The Three People’s Principles → The world outlook of the Three People’s Principles

63. Imperialist Britain and the United States → The imperialists
northward and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. All these circumstances make it essential for the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles to include alliance with Russia and, under no circumstances, alliance with imperialism against Russia.

In the second place, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles must include cooperation with the Communist Party. Either you cooperate with the Communist Party or you oppose it. Opposition to communism is the policy of the Japanese imperialists and Wang Jingwei, and if that is what you want, very well, they will invite you to join their Anti-Communist Company. But wouldn’t that look suspiciously like turning traitor? You might say, “I am not following Japan, but some other country.” That is just ridiculous. No matter whom you follow, the moment you oppose the Communist Party you become a traitor, because you can no longer resist Japan. If you say, “I am going to oppose the Communist Party independently,” that is arrant nonsense. How can the “heroes” in a colony or semicolonies tackle a counterrevolutionary job of this magnitude without depending on the strength of imperialism? For ten long years, virtually all the imperialist forces in the world were enlisted against the Communist Party, but in vain. How can you suddenly oppose it “independently”?

Some people outside the Border Region, we are told, are now saying: “Opposing the Communist Party is good, but you can never succeed in it.” This remark, if it is not simply hearsay, is only half wrong, for what “good” is there in opposing the Communist Party? But the other half is true, you certainly can “never succeed in it.” Basically, the reason lies not with the Communists but with the common people, who like the Communist Party and do not like “opposing” it. If you oppose the Communist Party at a juncture when our national enemy is penetrating deep into our territory, the people will be after your hide; they will certainly show you no mercy. This much is certain, whoever wants to oppose the Communist Party must be prepared to be ground to dust. If you are not keen on being ground to dust, you had certainly better drop this opposition. This is our sincere advice to all the anti-Communist “heroes.” Thus it is as clear as can be that the Three People’s Principles of today must include cooperation with the Communist Party, otherwise those Principles will perish. It is a question of life and death for the Three People’s Principles. Cooperating with the Communist Party, they will survive; opposing the Communist Party, they will perish. Can anyone prove the contrary?

In the third place, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Rejection of this policy, failure wholeheartedly to assist the peasants and workers or failure to carry out the behest in Mr. Sun Yat-sen’s Testament to “arouse the masses of the people” amounts to preparing the way for the defeat of the revolution and one’s own defeat in the bargain. Stalin has said that “in essence, the question of colonies and semicolonies” is a peasant question.” This means that the Chinese revolution is essentially a peasant revolution and that the resistance to Japan now going on is essentially peasant resistance. Essentially, the politics of New Democracy means giving the peasants their rights. The new and genuine Three People’s Principles are essentially the principles of a peasant revolution. Essentially, mass culture means raising the cultural level of the peasants. The anti-Japanese war is essentially a peasant war. We are now living at a time when the “doctrine of going up the mountains” applies; everyone is on the top of the hills; meetings, work, classes, newspaper publication, the writing of books, theatrical performances—all is done up in the hills and all essentially for the sake of the peasants. And essentially it is the peasants who provide everything that sustains the resistance to Japan and keeps us going. By “essentially” we mean basically, not ignoring the other sections of the people, as Stalin himself has explained. As every schoolboy knows, 80 percent of China’s population are peasants, more than 80 percent after the fall of the big cities. So the peasant problem becomes the basic problem of the Chinese revolution and the strength of the peasants is the main strength of the Chinese revolution. In the Chinese population the workers rank second to the peasants in number. There are several million industrial workers in China and several tens of millions of handicraft workers and agricultural laborers. China cannot live without them, because they are the producers in the industrial sector of the economy. And the revolution cannot succeed without them, because it is the leader of the Chinese revolution and is the most revolutionary class. In these circumstances, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles must include the policy of assisting the peasants and workers. Any other kind of Three People’s Principles, which lacks this policy, does not give the peasants and workers wholehearted assistance, or does not carry out the behest to “arouse the masses of the people,” will certainly perish.

Thus it is clear that there is no future for any Three People’s Principles which depart from the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. Every conscientious follower of the Three People’s Principles must seriously consider this point.

The Three People’s Principles comprising the Three Great Policies—in other words, the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles—are the Three People’s Principles of New Democracy, a development of the old Three People’s Principles, a great contribution of Mr. Sun Yat-sen, and a product of the era in which the Chinese revolution has become part of the world socialist revolution. It is only the Three People’s Principles which the Chinese Communist Party

64. The question of colonies and semicolonies → The national question

65. Shaoshanzhuyi. Mao is referring to the tactics of going up the mountains (or hills)—the word is the same in Chinese), which he had advocated in July 1927 and applied on the Jinggangshan. (See Volume III of our edition, especially pp. 10–11, 18, and 34.) More loosely, the reference is, of course, to the practice of establishing bases in remote or inaccessible places, which Mao had pursued ever since 1927, and to what was then going on in Yan’an.

66. Them → The modern industrial working class
northward and attack, and your revolution will come to nothing. All these circumstances make it essential for the revolutionary, new, and genuine Three People’s Principles to include alliance with Russia and, under no circumstances, alliance with imperialism against Russia.

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66. Them → The modern industrial working class
regards as “being what China needs today” and for whose “complete realization” it declares itself pledged “to fight.” These are the only Three People’s Principles which are in basic agreement with the Communist Party’s political program for the stage of democratic revolution,67 namely with its minimum program.

As for the old Three People’s Principles, they were a product of the old period of the Chinese revolution. Russia was then an imperialist power, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with it; there was then no Communist Party in existence in our country and naturally there could be no policy of cooperation with it; the movement of the workers and peasants had not yet revealed its full political significance and aroused people’s attention, and naturally there could be no policy of alliance with them. Hence the Three People’s Principles of the period before the reorganization of the Guomindang in the 13th year of the Republic belonged to the old category, and they became obsolete. The Guomindang could not have gone forward unless it had developed them into the new Three People’s Principles. Mr. Sun Yat-sen in his wisdom saw this point, secured the help of Lenin68 and the Chinese Communist Party, and reinterpret the Three People’s Principles so as to endow them with new characteristics suited to the times. As a result, a united front was formed between the Three People’s Principles and communism, Guomindang-Communist cooperation was established for the first time, the sympathy of the people of the whole country was won, and the First Great Revolution69 was launched.

The old Three People’s Principles were revolutionary in the old period and reflected its historical features. But if the old stuff is repeated in the new period after the new Three People’s Principles have been established, or alliance with Russia is opposed after the socialist state has been established, or cooperation with the Communist Party is opposed after the Communist Party has come into existence, or the policy of assisting the peasants and workers is opposed after they have awakened and demonstrated their political strength, then that is reactionary and shows ignorance of the times. The period of reaction after 1927 was the result of such ignorance. The old proverb says, “Whoever understands the signs of the times is a great man.” I hope the followers of the Three People’s Principles today will bear this in mind.

Were the Three People’s Principles to fall within the old category, then they would have nothing basically in common with the Communist minimum program, because they would belong to the past and be obsolete. Any sort of Three People’s Principles that oppose Russia, the Communist Party, or the peasants and workers are definitely reactionary; they not only have absolutely nothing in common with the Communist minimum program but are the enemy of communism, and there is no common ground at all. This, too, the followers of the Three People’s Principles should carefully consider.

67. Democratic revolution → Democracy
68. Lenin → The Soviet Union
69. The First Great Revolution → The revolution of 1924–1927

In any case, people with a conscience will never forsake the new Three People’s Principles until the task of opposing imperialism and feudalism is basically accomplished. The only ones who do are people like Wang Jingwei. No matter how energetically they push their spurious Three People’s Principles, which oppose Russia, the Communist Party, and the peasants and workers, there will surely be no lack of people with a conscience and sense of justice who will continue to support Sun Yat-sen’s genuine Three People’s Principles. Many followers of the genuine Three People’s Principles continued the struggle for the Chinese revolution even after the reaction of 1927, and the numbers will undoubtedly swell to tens upon tens of thousands now that the national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory. We Communists will always persevere in long-term cooperation with all the true followers of the Three People’s Principles and, while rejecting the traitors and the sworn enemies of communism, will never forsake any of our friends.

XI. The Culture of New Democracy

In the foregoing we have explained the historical characteristics of Chinese politics in the new period and the question of the new democratic republic. We can now proceed to the question of culture.

A given culture is the ideological reflection of the politics and economics of a given society. There is in China an imperialist culture which is a reflection of imperialist rule, or partial rule, in the political and economic fields. This culture is fostered not only by the cultural organizations run directly by the imperialists in China but by a number of Chinese who have lost all sense of shame. Into this category falls all culture embodying a slave ideology. China also has a semifeudal culture reflecting its semifeudal politics and economy, whose exponents include all those who advocate the worship of Confucius, the study of the Confucian canon, and the old ethical code and the old ideas in opposition to the new culture and new ideas. Imperialist culture and semifeudal culture are devoted brothers and have formed a reactionary cultural alliance against China’s new culture. This kind of reactionary culture serves the imperialists and the feudal class and must be swept away. Unless it is swept away, no new culture of any kind can be built up. There is no construction without destruction, no flowing without damming, and no motion without rest; the two are locked in a life-and-death struggle.

As for the new culture, it is the ideological reflection of the new politics and the new economy which it sets out to serve.

As stated in Section III, Chinese society has gradually changed in character since the emergence of a capitalist economy in China; it is no longer an entirely feudal but a semifeudal society, although the feudal economy still predominates. Compared with the feudal economy, this capitalist economy is a new one. The political forces of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat are the new political forces which have emerged and grown simultaneously with this new capitalist economy. Various revolutionary parties, the Guomindang and the Communist Party being the most important among them, are the representatives of the
awakened bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. And the new culture reflects these new economic and political forces in the field of ideology and serves them. Without the capitalist economy, without the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, and without the political parties of these classes, the new ideology or new culture could not have emerged.

These new political, economic, and cultural forces are all revolutionary forces which are opposed to the old politics, the old economy, and the old culture. The old is composed of two parts, one being China’s own semifeudal politics, economy, and culture, and the other the politics, economy, and culture of imperialism, with the latter heading the alliance. Both are bad and should be completely destroyed. The struggle between the new and the old in Chinese society is a struggle between the new forces of the people (the various revolutionary classes) and the old forces of imperialism and the feudal class. It is a struggle between revolution and counterrevolution. This struggle has lasted a full hundred years starting from the Opium War and nearly thirty years starting from the 1911 Revolution.

But as already indicated, revolutions too can be classified into old and new, and what is new in one historical period becomes old in another. The century of China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution can be divided into two main stages, a first stage of eighty years and a second stage of twenty years. Each has its basic historical characteristics. China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution in the first eighty years belongs to the old category, while in the last twenty years, owing to the change in the international and domestic political situation, it belongs to the new category. Old democracy is the characteristic of the first eighty years. New Democracy is the characteristic of the last twenty. This distinction holds good in culture as well as in politics.

How does it manifest itself in the field of culture? We shall explain this next.

XII. The Historical Characteristics of China’s Cultural Revolution

On the cultural or ideological front, the two periods preceding and following the May Fourth movement form two distinct historical periods.

Before the May Fourth movement, the struggle on China’s cultural front was one between the new culture of the bourgeoisie and the old culture of the feudal class. The struggles between the modern school system and the imperial examination system, between the new learning and the old learning, and between Western learning and Chinese learning were all of this nature. The so-called modern schools or new learning or Western learning of that time concentrated mainly (we say mainly, because in part pernicious vestiges of Chinese feudalism still remained) on the bourgeois natural sciences and social sciences. 70 In addition to the natural sciences at the time, the new schools before the May Fourth movement were dominated by the ideology represented by Darwin’s theory of evolution, Adam Smith’s classical economics, Mill’s formal logic, and French Enlightenment scholar Montesquieu’s socialism introduced to China by Yan Fu. At the time, this ideology played a revolutionary role in fighting the Chinese feudal ideology, and it served the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old period. But because the Chinese bourgeoisie lacked strength and the world had already entered the era of imperialism, this bourgeois ideology was only able to last a few rounds and was beaten back by the reactionary alliance of the enslaving ideology of foreign imperialism and the “back to the ancients” ideology of Chinese feudalism; as soon as this reactionary ideological alliance started a minor counteroffensive, the so-called new learning lowered its banners, muffled its drums and beat a retreat, retaining its outer form but losing its soul. The old bourgeois-democratic culture became enervated and decayed in the era of imperialism, and its failure was inevitable. But since the May Fourth movement, things have been different. A brand-new cultural force came into being in China, that is, the Communist culture and ideology guided by the Chinese Communists, or the Communist world outlook and theory of social revolution. The May Fourth movement occurred in 1919, and in 1921 came the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the real beginning of China’s labor movement—all in the wake of World War I and the October Revolution, that is, at a time when the national problem and the colonial movements 71 of the world underwent a change, and the connection between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution became quite obvious. The new political force of the proletariat and the Communist Party mounted the Chinese political stage, and as a result, the new cultural force, in new uniform and with new weapons, mustering all possible allies and deploying its ranks in battle array, launched heroic attacks on imperialist culture and feudal culture. Although this vital force has not yet had the time to occupy the field of natural sciences and carry out a fight in it, in general allowing the bourgeois world outlook to dominate it temporarily, it has aroused a great revolution in the social science field, which provides the most important ideological weapons in the era of revolutions in the colonies and semicolonies. This new force has made great strides in the domain of the social sciences, 72 whether of philosophy, economics, political science, military science, history, literature, or art (including the theater, the cinema, music, sculpture, and painting). For the last twenty years, wherever this new cultural force has directed its attack, a great revolution has taken place both in ideological content and in form (for example, in the written language). Its influence has been so great and its impact so powerful that it is invincible wherever it goes. The numbers it has rallied behind it have no parallel in Chinese history. Lu Xun was the greatest and the most courageous standard-bearer.

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70. Bourgeois natural sciences and social sciences → Bourgeois social and political theories, which were needed by the representatives of the bourgeoisie

71. Colonial movements → Colonial revolutionary movements

72. Social sciences → Social sciences and of the arts and letters
of this new cultural force. The chief commander of China’s cultural revolution, he was not only a great man of letters but a great thinker and revolutionary. Lu Xun was a man of unyielding integrity, free from all sycophancy or obsequiousness; this quality is invaluable among colonial and semicolonial peoples. Representing the great majority of the nation, Lu Xun breached and stormed the enemy citadel; on the cultural front, he was the bravest and most correct, the firmest, the most loyal and the most ardent national hero, a hero without parallel in our history. The road he took was the very road of China’s new national culture.

Before the May Fourth movement, China’s new culture was a culture of the old-democratic kind and part of the capitalist cultural revolution of the world bourgeoisie. Since the May Fourth movement, it has become new-democratic and part of the socialist cultural revolution of the world proletariat.

Prior to the May Fourth movement, China’s new cultural movement, its cultural revolution, was led by the bourgeoisie, which still had a leading role to play. After the May Fourth movement, the culture and ideology of this class became even more backward than its politics, and it was incapable of playing any leading role; at most, it could serve to a certain extent as an ally during revolutionary periods, while inevitably the responsibility for leading the alliance rested on proletarian culture and ideology. This is an undeniable fact.

The new-democratic culture is the anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the broad masses; today it is the culture of the anti-Japanese united front. This culture can be led only by the culture and ideology of the proletariat, by the ideology of communism, and not by the culture and ideology of any other class. In a word, new-democratic culture is the proletarian-led, anti-imperialist, and antifeudal culture of the broad masses.

XIII. The Four Periods

A cultural revolution is the ideological reflection of the political and economic revolutions, and serves them. In China there is a united front in the cultural as in the political revolution.

The history of the united front in the cultural revolution during the last twenty years can be divided into four periods. The first covers the two years from 1919 to 1921, the second the six years from 1921 to 1927, the third the nine years from 1927 to 1936, and the fourth the three years from 1937 to the present.

The first period extended from the May Fourth movement of 1919 to the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. The May Fourth movement was its chief landmark.

The May Fourth movement was an anti-imperialist as well as an antifeudal movement. Its outstanding historical significance is to be seen in a feature which was absent from the 1911 Revolution, namely, its thorough and uncompromising opposition to imperialism as well as to feudalism. The May Fourth movement possessed this quality because capitalism had developed a step further in China and because new hopes had arisen for the liberation of the Chinese nation as China’s revolutionary intellectual class saw the collapse of three great imperialist powers, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, and the weakening of two others, Britain and France, while the Russian proletariat had established a socialist state and the German, Hungarian, and Italian proletariat had risen in revolution. The May Fourth movement came into being at the call of the world revolution of the time, of the Russian Revolution and of Lenin. It was part of the world proletarian revolution of the time. Although at the time of the May Fourth movement the Chinese Communist Party had not yet come into existence, there were already large numbers of intellectuals who approved of the Russian Revolution and had the rudiments of Communist ideology. In the beginning the May Fourth movement was a revolutionary movement of the united front of three sections of people—Communist intellectuals, revolutionary petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and bourgeois intellectuals (the last forming the right wing at that time). Its weak point was that it was confined to the intellectuals, and the workers and peasants did not participate in it. But as soon as it developed into the June Third movement, not only the intellectuals but the mass of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie joined in, and it became a nationwide revolutionary movement. The cultural revolution ushered in by the May Fourth movement was uncompromising in its opposition to feudal culture; there had never been such a great and thoroughgoing cultural revolution since the dawn of Chinese history. Raising aloft the two great banners of the day, “Down with the old ethics and up with the new!” and “Down with the old literature and up with the new!” the cultural revolution had great achievements to its credit. At that time it was not yet possible for this cultural movement to become widely diffused among the workers and peasants. The slogan of “Literature for the common people” was advanced, but in fact the “common people” then could only refer to the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois intellectuals in the cities, that is, the so-called urban intelligentsia. Both in ideology and in the matter of cadres, the May Fourth movement paved the way for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, for the May Thirtieth movement of 1925, and for the Northern Expedition. The bourgeois intellectuals, who constituted the right wing of the May Fourth movement, mostly compromised with the enemy in the second period and went over to the side of reaction.

73. Nine → Ten
74. 1936 → 1937

75. Intellectual class → Intellectuals
76. The term “June Third movement” refers to the wave of strikes by merchants and workers, and the boycotting of Japanese goods, which began around June 3, 1919, as an expression of sympathy and support for students who had been arrested because of their participation in the May Fourth movement.
In the second period, whose landmarks were the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, the May Thirtieth movement, and the Northern Expedition, the united front of the three classes formed during the May Fourth movement was continued and expanded.77 This united front78 also took form politically, this being the first instance of Guomindang-Communist cooperation. Mr. Sun Yatsen was a great man not only because he led the great Revolution of 1911 (although it was only a democratic revolution of the old period) but also because, "adapting himself to the trends of the world and meeting the needs of the masses," he had the capacity to bring forward the revolutionary Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers, to give new meaning to the Three People's Principles, and thus to institute the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Previously, the Three People's Principles had exerted little influence on the educational and academic world or on youth, because they had not raised the issues of opposition to imperialism or to the feudal social system and feudal culture. They were the old Three People's Principles, which people regarded as the time-serving banner of a group of men bent on seizing power, in other words, on securing official positions, a banner used purely for political maneuvering. Then came the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. The cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party and the joint efforts of the revolutionary members of the two parties spread the new Three People's Principles all over China, extending to a section of the educational and academic world and the mass of student youth. This was entirely because the original Three People's Principles had developed into the anti-imperialist, antifeudal, and new-democratic Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies. Without this development it would have been impossible to disseminate the ideas of the Three People's Principles.

During this period, these revolutionary Three People's Principles became the political basis of the united front of the Guomindang and the Communist Party and of all the revolutionary classes, and since "communism is the good friend of the Three People's Principles," a united front was formed between the two of them. In terms of social classes, it was a united front of three classes of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie,79 and the bourgeoisie. Using the Guomindang's Republican Daily News80 of Shanghai, and other newspapers in various localities as their bases of operations, the two parties jointly advocated anti-imperialism, jointly combated feudal education based upon the worship of Confucius and upon the study of the Confucian canon, and jointly opposed feudal literature and the classical language and promoted the new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an anti-imperialist and antifeudal content.81 During the wars in Guangdong and during the Northern Expedition, they reformed China's armed forces by the inculcation of anti-imperialist and antifeudal ideas.82 The slogans "Down with the corrupt officials!" and "Down with the local bullies and bad gentry" were first raised among the peasant millions, and great peasant revolutionary struggles were aroused. Thanks to all this and to the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Northern Expedition was victorious. But no sooner did the bourgeoisie83 climb to power with the help of workers and peasants than it put an end to this great revolution, thus creating an entirely new political situation.

The third period was the new revolutionary period of 1927–1936.84 As a result of the changes which had taken place within the revolutionary camp at the end of the previous period, with the bourgeoisie85 going over to the counterrevolutionary camp of the imperialist and feudal forces,86 only two of the three classes87 formerly within the revolutionary camp remained, namely, the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie (including the peasantry, the revolutionary intellectuals, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie). Thus the Chinese revolution inevitably entered a new period in which the Chinese Communist Party alone exercised the leadership.88 This period was one of reactionary89 campaigns of "encirclement and suppression," on the one hand, and of the deepening of the revolution, on the other. There were two kinds of reactionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression," the military and the cultural. The deepening of the revolution was of two kinds: both the agrarian and the cultural revolutions were deepened. At the instigation of the imperialists, the reactionary forces of the whole country and of the whole world were mobilized for both kinds of campaigns of "encirclement and suppression," which lasted no less than ten years and were unparalleled in their ruthlessness; hundreds of thousands of Communists and young students were

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77. Continued and expanded. → Continued and expanded, and the peasantry was drawn into it.
78. This united front → This multiclass united front
79. The petty bourgeoisie. → The peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie.
80. Using the Guomindang’s Republican Daily News → Using the Communist Guide Weekly, the Guomindang’s Republican Daily News
81. The new literature and the vernacular style of writing with an anti-imperialist and antifeudal content → The anti-imperialist and antifeudal new literature and the vernacular style of writing
82. Ideas → Ideas for the first time
83. The bourgeoisie → The big bourgeoisie
84. 1927–1936 → 1927–1937
85. The bourgeoisie → The big bourgeoisie
86. Forces → Forces, and the national bourgeoisie trailing after it
87. Two of the three classes → Three of the four classes. Here, and throughout the balance of this text, Mao envisages not a four-class bloc (workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie) but a three-class bloc (workers, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie), lumping together the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie in the second category. For comments on this usage, see above, the Introduction.
88. Exercised the leadership → Gave leadership to the masses
89. Reactionary → Counterrevolutionary
slaughtered, and millions of workers and peasants suffered cruel persecution. The people responsible for all this apparently had no doubt that communism and the Communist Party could be "exterminated once and for all." But the outcome was different; both kinds of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns failed miserably. The military campaign resulted in the northern march of the Red Army to resist the Japanese, and the cultural campaign resulted in the outbreak of the December Ninth movement of revolutionary youth in 1935. And the common result of both was the awakening of the people of the whole country. These were three positive results. But the negative result was the attack by a powerful enemy; this is the key reason why the people of the whole country to this day bitterly detest the anticomunism of those ten years. The most amazing thing of all was that the Guomindang's cultural "encirclement and suppression" campaign failed completely in the Guomindang areas as well, although the Communist Party was in an utterly defenseless position in all the cultural and educational institutions there. Why did this happen? Does it not give food for prolonged and deep thought? It was in the very midst of such campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" that Lu Xun, who believed in communism, became the giant of China's cultural revolution.

In the struggles of this period, the revolutionary side firmly upheld the people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal New Democracy and their new Three People's Principles, while the counterrevolutionary side, under the direction of imperialism, imposed the despotic régime of the coalition of the landlord class.

That despotic régime butchered Mr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Great Policies and his new Three People's Principles both politically and culturally, with catastrophic consequences to the Chinese nation.

The fourth period is that of the present anti-Japanese war. Pursuing its zigzag course, the Chinese revolution has again arrived at a united front of the three classes. But this time the scope is much broader. Among the upper classes it includes all the rulers. Among the middle classes, it includes the petty bourgeoisie in its totality. Among the lower classes, it includes the entire proletariat. All classes and strata of the country have become allies and are resolutely resisting Japanese imperialism. The first stage of this period lasted until the fall of Wuhan. During that stage, there was a lively atmosphere in the country in every field; politically there was a trend toward democracy, and culturally there was widespread activity. With the fall of Wuhan the second stage began, during which the political situation has undergone many changes, with one section of the big bourgeoisie capitulating to the enemy and another desiring an end to the War of Resistance. In the cultural movement, this situation has been reflected in the reactionary activities of Ye Qing, Zhang Junmai, and others, and in the suppression of freedom of speech and of the press.

To overcome this crisis, a firm struggle is necessary against all ideas opposed to resistance, unity, and progress, and unless these reactionary ideas are crushed, there will be no hope of victory. How will this struggle turn out? This is the big question in the minds of the people of the whole country. Judging by the domestic and international situation, the Chinese people are bound to win, however numerous the obstacles on the path of resistance. If we consider Chinese history as a whole, the progress achieved during the twenty years since the May Fourth movement not only surpasses that of the preceding eighty years, it truly surpasses that previously achieved in several millennia. Can we not visualize what further progress China will make in another twenty years? The unbridled violence of all the forces of darkness, whether domestic or foreign, has brought disaster to our nation; but this very violence indicates that, while the forces of darkness still have some strength left, they are already in their death throes, and that the people are gradually approaching victory. This is true in the East and in the entire world.

XIV. Some Wrong Ideas About the Nature of Culture

Everything comes from the forge of hard and bitter struggle. This is also true of the new culture, which has followed a zigzag course in the past twenty years, during which both the good and the bad were tested and proved in struggle.

The bourgeoisie diehards are as hopelessly wrong on the question of culture as on that of political power. They neither understand the historical characteristics of this new period in China nor recognize the new-democratic or the new Three People's Principles culture of the masses. Their starting point is bourgeois despotism, which in culture becomes the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie. It seems that a section (and I refer only to a section) of educated people from the so-called European-American school who in fact supported the government's "Communist suppression" campaign on the cultural front in the past are now supporting its policy of "restricting" and "corroding" the Communist Party. They do not want the workers and the peasants to hold up their heads politically or culturally. This bourgeoisie diehard road of cultural despotism leads nowhere; as in the case of political despotism, the domestic and international preconditions are lacking. Therefore this cultural despotism, too, had better be "folded up."

90. Revolution. → Revolution. The negative result of the counterrevolutionary campaigns of "encirclement and suppression" was the invasion of our country by Japanese imperialism. This is the chief reason why to this very day the people of the whole country still bitterly detest those ten years of anticomunism.
91. The landlord class → The landlord class and the big bourgeoisie
92. Three → Four
93. All the rulers → Many from the ruling class
94. In the East → In China, in the whole East
95. Everything → Everything new
96. As in the case of political despotism → As in the case of the erroneous direction of political despotism
So far as the orientation of our national culture is concerned, it is not yet a socialist culture. In the sphere of national culture, it is wrong to assume that the existing national culture is, or should be, socialist in its entirety. That would amount to confusing the dissemination of Communist ideology with the carrying out of an immediate program of action and to confusing the application of the Communist standpoint and method in investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work with the general policy for national education and national culture in the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. A national culture with socialist content will necessarily be the reflection of a socialist politics and a socialist economy. But we do not have such a politics and economy yet, so that there cannot be such a national culture. Since the present Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, the new culture of China today is part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture and is its great ally. However, it joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture, but as the anti-imperialist and antifeudal new-democratic culture of the broad popular masses. And since the Chinese revolution today cannot do without the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, China’s new culture at present cannot depart from the culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat, that is, it cannot do without the leadership of Communist ideology. But this kind of leadership means leading the masses of the people in an anti-imperialist and antifeudal political and cultural revolution, and not in a socialist political and cultural revolution.

Therefore, taken as a whole, the content of the new culture is still not socialist but new-democratic. Beyond all doubt, now is the time to expand the propaganda in favor of Communist ideas, and to intensify the study of Marxism-Leninism, for without such propaganda and study, not only will we be unable to lead the Chinese revolution forward to the future socialist stage, but we will also be unable to guide the present democratic revolution to victory. But the basic character of the present national culture is not socialist, but new-democratic; for it is the anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the broad masses of the people, not the anticapitalist culture of the proletariat. Consequently, we must keep the spreading of Communist ideas and propaganda about the Communist social system distinct from the practical application of the new-democratic program of action; we must also keep the Communist method of investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work distinct from the new-democratic line for national culture. It is undoubtedly inappropriate to mix the two up.

It can thus be seen that the content of the new culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie nor the socialism of the proletariat, but the anti-imperialist and antifeudal New Democracy of the masses, under the leadership of proletarian culture and ideology or of the new Three People’s Principles.

XV. A National, Scientific, and Mass Culture

New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to this nation of ours and bears our own national characteristics. It links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of other nations and establishes with them the relations whereby they can absorb something from one another and help one another to develop, mutually forming a part of a new world culture. But it can absolutely not link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation, for our culture is a revolutionary national culture. China must assimilate on a large scale the progressive culture of foreign countries, as an ingredient for enriching its own culture. Not enough of this was done in the past. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the older cultures of foreign countries, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we absolutely cannot gulp down any of this foreign material uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food—first chewing it in the mouth, then subjecting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions, and

97. It is not yet a socialist culture. Communist ideology plays the guiding role, and we should work hard both to disseminate socialism and communism throughout the working class and to educate the peasantry and other sections of the people in socialism properly and step by step. However, our national culture as a whole is not yet socialist.

Because of the leadership of the proletariat, the politics, economy, and culture of New Democracy all contain an element of socialism, and by no means a mere casual element but one with a decisive role. Taken as a whole, however, the political, economic, and cultural situation so far is new-democratic and not socialist. For the Chinese revolution in its present stage is not yet a socialist revolution for the overthrow of capitalism but a bourgeois-democratic revolution, its central task being mainly that of combating foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

98. And handling work

99. Economy

100. Such a national culture

101. It joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture, while this part contains vital elements of socialist culture, the national culture as a whole joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not entirely as a socialist culture.

102. The culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat

103. But, at the present stage, however,

104. The new culture

105. The Communist method

106. Handling work

107. Proletarian culture and ideology
So far as the orientation of our national culture is concerned, it is not yet a socialist culture. In the sphere of national culture, it is wrong to assume that the existing national culture is, or should be, socialist in its entirety. That would amount to confusing the dissemination of Communist ideology with the carrying out of an immediate program of action and to confusing the application of the Communist standpoint and method in investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work with the general policy for national education and national culture in the democratic stage of the Chinese revolution. A national culture with socialist content will necessarily be the reflection of a socialist politics and a socialist economy. But we do not have such a politics and economy yet, so that there cannot be such a national culture. Since the present Chinese revolution is part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution, the new culture of China today is part of the world proletarian-socialist new culture and is its great ally. However, it joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture, but as the anti-imperialist and antifeudal new-democratic culture of the broad popular masses. And since the Chinese revolution today cannot do without the leadership of the Chinese proletariat, China’s new culture at present cannot depart from the culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat; that is, it cannot do without the leadership of Communist ideology. But this kind of leadership means leading the masses of the people in an anti-imperialist and antifeudal political and cultural revolution, and not in a socialist political and cultural revolution.

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98. And handling work → Handling work and training cadres

99. Economy → Economy. There are socialist elements in our politics and our economy, and hence these socialist elements are reflected in our national culture; but taking our society as a whole.

100. Such a national culture → Such a wholly socialist national culture

101. It joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not as a socialist culture, → While this part contains vital elements of socialist culture, the national culture as a whole joins the stream of the world proletarian-socialist new culture not entirely as a socialist culture,

102. The culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat → The leadership of the culture and ideology of the Chinese proletariat

103. But, → At the present stage, however,

Therefore, taken as a whole, the content of the new culture is still not socialist but new-democratic. Beyond all doubt, now is the time to expand the propaganda in favor of Communist ideas, and to intensify the study of Marxism-Leninism, for without such propaganda and study, not only will we be unable to lead the Chinese revolution forward to the future socialist stage, but we will also be unable to guide the present democratic revolution to victory. But the basic character of the present national culture is not socialist, but new-democratic, for it is the anti-imperialist and antifeudal culture of the broad masses of the people, not the anticapitalist culture of the proletariat. Consequently, we must keep the spreading of Communist ideas and propaganda about the Communist social system distinct from the practical application of the new-democratic program of action; we must also keep the Communist method of investigating problems, undertaking research, and handling work distinct from the new-democratic line for national culture. It is undoubtedly inappropriate to mix the two up.

It can thus be seen that the content of the new culture at the present stage is neither the cultural despotism of the bourgeoisie nor the socialism of the proletariat, but the anti-imperialist and antifeudal New Democracy of the masses, under the leadership of proletarian culture and ideology of the new Three People’s Principles.

XV. A National, Scientific, and Mass Culture

New-democratic culture is national. It opposes imperialist oppression and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chinese nation. It belongs to this nation of ours and bears our own national characteristics. It links up with the socialist and new-democratic cultures of other nations and establishes with them the relations whereby they can absorb something from one another and help one another to develop, mutually forming a part of a new world culture. But it can absolutely not link up with any reactionary imperialist culture of whatever nation, for our culture is a revolutionary national culture. China must assimilate on a large scale the progressive culture of foreign countries, as an ingredient for enriching its own culture. Not enough of this was done in the past. We should assimilate whatever is useful to us today not only from the present-day socialist and new-democratic cultures but also from the older cultures of foreign countries, for example, from the culture of the various capitalist countries in the Age of Enlightenment. However, we absolutely cannot gulp down any of this foreign material uncritically, but must treat it as we do our food—first chewing it in the mouth, then subjecting it to the working of the stomach and intestines with their juices and secretions,
separating it into essences to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded—before it can nourish us. So-called wholesale Westernization is wrong. China has suffered a great deal in the past from the formalist absorption of foreign things. Similarly, in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or, in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must have a national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution. Chinese culture should have its own form, its own national form. National in form and new-democratic in content—such is our new culture today.

New-democratic culture is scientific. Opposed as it is to all feudal and superstitious ideas, it stands for seeking the truth from facts, for objective truth, and for the unity of theory and practice. On this point, the possibility exists of a united front against imperialism, feudalism, and superstition between the scientific thought of the Chinese proletariat and those Chinese bourgeois materialists and natural scientists who are progressive, but in no case is there a possibility of a united front with any reactionary idealism. In the field of political action Communists may form an anti-imperialist united front with some idealists and even religious people, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrines. A splendid ancient culture was created during the long period of China’s feudal society. Therefore, to clarify the process of development of this ancient culture, to discard its feudal dross and assimilate its democratic essence, is a necessary condition for developing our new national culture and increasing our national self-confidence, but we absolutely cannot swallow anything and everything uncritically. We must separate the fine, old popular culture, which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary character, from all the rotten things of the old, feudal ruling class. China’s present new politics and new economy have developed out of its old politics and old economy, and its present new culture, too, has developed out of its old culture. Consequently, we must respect our own history and absolutely cannot mutilate history. Respect for history means, however, giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its dialectical development, and not eulogizing the past at the expense of the present or praising every drop of feudal poison. As far as the masses and the young students are concerned, the essential thing is to guide them to look forward and not backward.

New-democratic culture belongs to the broad masses and is therefore democratic. It should serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants who make up more than 90 percent of the nation’s population and should gradually become their own. There is a difference of degree, as well as a close link, between the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary cadres and the knowledge imparted to the revolutionary masses, between the raising of cultural standards and popularization. Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for the broad masses of the people. It prepares the ground ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed essential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the revolution. People engaged in revolutionary cultural work are the commanders at various levels on this cultural front. “Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.” One can thus see how important the cultural movement is for the practical revolutionary movement. Both the cultural and practical movements must be of the masses. Therefore all progressive cultural workers in the anti-Japanese war must have their own cultural battalions, that is, the broad masses. A cultural worker or a cultural ideology detached from the popular masses is a “shadow” commander without an army, whose firepower cannot bring the enemy down. To attain this objective, written Chinese must be reformed under the requisite conditions and our spoken language brought closer to that of the popular masses, for the people, it must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture.

A national, scientific, and mass culture—such is the anti-imperialist, antifeudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy and the new Three People’s Principles, the new culture of the Chinese nation.

Combine the politics, the economy, and the culture of New Democracy, and you have the new-democratic republic, the Republic of China both in name and in reality, the new China we want to create.

Behold, New China is within sight. Let us all hail it!
Its masts have already risen above the horizon. Let us all cheer in welcome!
Raise both your hands. New China is ours!

108. Must have a national form → Must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form
109. Anti-imperialist → Anti-imperialist and antifeudal

110. A cultural worker or a cultural ideology → A revolutionary cultural worker
Congratulatory Speech at the Mass Meeting Sponsored by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to Celebrate the Sixtieth Birthday of Comrade Wu Yuzhang

(Visa 15, 1940)

(A sketch written for this paper)... Comrade Li Fuchun told the people present that the party was held to celebrate the sixtieth birthday of Comrade Wu Yuzhang. After that, Comrade Mao Zedong, beaming with heartfelt joy, stood up and said:

Today, you all gather joyfully in this hall to honor the venerable Wu on his birthday. I am reminded of what I felt when we were celebrating the birthday of the venerable Xu two years ago. On that occasion, I emphasized that it was not without a reason that we offered him birthday congratulations. I remember that when I was small, I did not like old folks, because they treated young people high-handedly. Who does not err when young? But you could not afford to err; they were so overbearing when you did. Children and young people had no say about anything. Young people of China suffered very bitterly from feudalism in the family and in society. But now the world has changed, and young people love old people. Thus our venerable Wu, Lin, Xu, Dong, and Xie, for example, are all...

This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, January 24, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujian, Vol. 6, pp. 39-40, where it is reproduced from that source.

1. Li Fuchun (1900-1975) was a native of Hunan, who had spent several years in France. He went to the Jiangxi Soviet Area in 1931, and participated in the Long March. This was when he was deputy head of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Regarding Wu Yuzhang, see above the note to Mao's letter to him dated 1939.

3. Regarding Lin Boqu, see the note in Volume V, p. 622.

4. The reference is to Xu Teli (1877-1968), who had been Mao's teacher at the First Normal School in Changsha. Regarding Xu's sixtieth birthday (not two) years earlier, see Mao's letter to him dated January 30, 1937, in Volume V, p. 601.

5. Dong was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. After studying in Moscow, he returned to China, went to the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, and then participated in the Long March. At this time, he was working with Zhou Enlai in the Eighth Route Army liaison office in Chongqing, and was also a member of the People's Political Council. Xie had joined the Communist Party in 1925, and worked in the Shanghai underground. He participated in the Long March, and was a leading official in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. The five individuals mentioned here by Mao are those who were commonly regarded as the "elders" of the Party.

6. Ma Liang (1940-1939), referred to here by his zi, Xiangbo, was a noted Catholic educator, who had also played a role in diplomacy under the empire. As early as 1906, he advocated democracy, and in 1931-1932 he wrote articles denouncing Japanese aggression. The birthday celebration to which Mao refers is presumably that in early 1939, when Ma attained the Chinese-style age of 100 sui. He had died on November 4, 1939, but Mao was probably not yet aware of this.
Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition of the Border Region

(January 16, 1940)

Comrades:

I have not been to the exhibition and cannot tell if it is good or not. But I am told that it is pretty good, better than the one held last year. I did go to see that one last year. If this one is better than the one of last year, the result has been brought about by the efforts of our comrades among the common people and those of the government workers. If the people in the government do not unite with the common people, not much can be achieved. There are two kinds of governments: one that knows nothing but extortion, and the other that helps the common people. The government of the border region is a helpful government that falls into the latter category. Behind the one or two packages of flour that the common people have sent from hundreds of li away to be exhibited, there is an important truth regarding our fight against Japan, that is, it demonstrates the enthusiasm of the comrades among the common people. The government of the border region, supported by the common people, has done a lot of good things, also out of enthusiasm, and we must develop this kind of enthusiasm. But enthusiasm alone is not enough, and there is something else: we must strive to make progress. There has been progress in this year’s exhibition. We should encourage and reward these labor heroes, because they are not only enthusiastic but also want to make progress. Among them, there are members of the Eighth Route Army, but the Eighth Route Army is also made up of the common people. So the army must not forget its origins, that is, the workers and peasants. Present at today’s meeting are many comrades from the Eighth Route Army. You should salute the common people and not abuse them. The common people may swear at us, but we must not swear at them, because they are the masters; our food is provided by them, and our houses are built by them. We want cooperation between the army and the people. The Eighth Route Army has two rules: one is cooperation between the officers and the men, and the other is cooperation between the army men and the people. If everyone unites closely and intimately, Japan will surely be defeated.

There are twenty-three xian in our border region, neither more nor less. But there are some elements bent on creating friction who have sent troops to attack us, and they have attacked several of our xian. That won’t do. What is more, you comrades who are leaving to work outside [the border region] should take the opportunity to tell them that we must rely on unity, and not on friction. If you rely on friction, it will cause you pain, it will kill people, and it will even cause the country to perish. Many comrades have come to attend today’s meeting, among whom are Mr. Zhang and comrades from Mongolia. All of us should rely on unity, and not on friction. The only friction should be friction with Japanese imperialism, designed to scrape them right into the ocean, and not friction within our own nest.

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This speech was first published in Xin Zhonghua bao, February 3, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan, Vol. 6, pp. 141–42, where it is reproduced from that source.
On Small Guerrilla Groups—An Important Form of Struggle in Guerrilla Areas

(January 22, 1940)

The experience of the War of Resistance in North China in the past two and half years tells us that the War of Resistance in the enemy rear in the future will involve protracted and hard struggle. Under the circumstances, if we want to persist in the struggle until victory is achieved, the work of the local Party organizations must concentrate on the launching of the mass campaigns, because the mobilization of the masses is the foundation for the performance of all the work of the Party, the government, and the army.

Broadly speaking, areas in North China can be classified into three categories. The first is the base areas for the War of Resistance, that is, those areas that are relatively consolidated, large, and already joined in one piece so the enemy cannot enter them at will, like Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, southeast Shanxi, and northwest Shanxi. The second is the enemy-occupied areas, that is, the strong points the enemy has seized by force and their neighboring areas. The third is the guerrilla areas, places held now by the enemy and now by us. The third category is the largest in area. The above-mentioned areas are not always fixed. They can and often do change categories from time to time. When urban and rural strongholds held by the enemy and their puppets are captured by us and after we have done some work there, they are turned from the category of guerrilla areas to that of base areas, and our already existing base areas are expanded. If a part of our base area is occupied by the enemy or by the puppets, that base area is reduced that much in area, and the enemy-occupied area or guerrilla area is augmented by that much. This kind of shift in category has happened before, is still happening now, and may well continue to do so for some time to come. It should be understood that temporary reduction of the base areas and the temporary augmentation of the enemy-occupied or guerrilla areas are possible. Our overall policy is to attack the enemy in guerrilla areas, reduce and eliminate the enemy strongholds, turn the guerrilla areas back again into base areas, and expand our base areas so that in the future they can be coordinated with the efforts of the whole country and finally drive the Japanese bandits out of China.

Our source for this text is Chen Yun wenxuan, Vol. 1, pp. 124–27. This text was written by Chen Yun in Yan’an and revised by Mao Zedong.

I am not going to dwell on the establishment of base areas or the work in enemy-occupied areas. Let us now study the methods that can be used to mobilize the masses to fight the enemy in guerrilla areas. What method have the people in the guerrilla areas of North China adopted? Nothing exceptional: all the activists among the people in the guerrilla areas have been organized into “small guerrilla groups” under the leadership of Party branches, township governments, or mass organizations. Although the small guerrilla groups vary in size, in weaponry, and in the role they are able to play, they have one thing in common, that is, they serve as links that join the Party, government, and mass organizations together and have dealt blows to the Japanese bandits. The small guerrilla groups are armed organizations of the masses. They were invented by the people in the Jiangxi soviet area when they were combating the five campaigns of “Encirclement and Suppression.” The invention later developed vigorously under the active leadership of the Party, and is now widely applied in North China. It has been proved by actual experience to be an important form of struggle and a pattern of organization well suited to the circumstances of the guerrilla areas. After a study of the circumstances in seven districts of North China, I have come to the conclusion that this experience can be widely applied. Naturally, the small guerrilla groups cannot last long without the backing of guerrilla detachments and regular armies.

The role that the guerrilla groups have played is very important. Specifically speaking, it is manifested in the following aspects:

First, the small guerrilla groups are a form that can best mobilize the masses to participate in the War of Resistance. In guerrilla areas, which suffer constant devastation from the enemy, the people, to protect their own interests, have to get organized and exercise armed resistance. Thus the struggle of these people to protect their own interests has become identical with the interests of the War of Resistance of the whole nation; the struggle of every household and every village to safeguard its home has become identical with the struggle of the people of the whole country to defend the base areas for the War of Resistance. That is why it is easy for the people in guerrilla areas to see that their own interest is inseparable from the interest of the War of Resistance. The use of small guerrilla groups as a method to mobilize the masses to participate in the War of Resistance is readily embraced by the masses of the people.

Second, in small guerrilla groups, Party members are toughened, cadres trained, and the Party, government, and mass organizations consolidated. Historical experience has demonstrated that only by relying on armed forces can the Chinese Communist Party survive (as a big party, not as an underground small party) and develop. This has become even clearer in the present war zone. The Party cannot survive without an armed force. The Party’s survival depends on armed struggle, and armed struggle in return can temper and develop the Party. Similarly, without armed struggle, it is impossible to set up and enhance political power in base areas. Had there been no guerrilla groups, guerrilla areas would have become enemy-occupied areas and, then, the Party and government organizations of the area in
question would have shrunk or even collapsed. Party members joining in guerrilla
groups and leading the masses of the people in the struggle against the enemy and
puppets: this is the best way to train new Party members. Bad elements who have
sneaked into the Party will reveal their true colors in ruthless struggle. Those wa-
vering elements who cannot endure will be cleared out. At the same time, military
cadres for local Party organizations will be trained and brought up from the tough,
complex, and extensive struggle.

Third, small guerrilla groups are a powerful aid to the regular armies and guer-
rilla detachments. Regular armies operate within the base areas and occasionally
in guerrilla areas, and guerrilla detachments, making the regions bordering base
areas and guerrilla areas their support, mainly operate in guerrilla areas, while
small guerrilla groups stay in regions bordering base areas and guerrilla areas and
in all guerrilla areas and serve as an aid to regular armies and guerrilla detach-
ments. Small guerrilla groups are the core of self-defense corps, and they exist
even in the absence of the latter. If the guerrilla areas are covered with guerrilla
groups, regular armies and guerrilla detachments will find it much easier to carry
out their operations. Small guerrilla groups are not only an aid to the regular armies
and guerrilla detachments but also a reliable foundation for the expansion of the
regular armies and guerrilla detachments.

So, the necessity to intensify our work with guerrilla groups is self-evident.

How shall we intensify our work with guerrilla groups?

First, it is important to enhance the understanding of the guerrilla groups by
the cadres, transform the perfunctory manner of dealing with them, and do a good
job in organizing small guerrilla groups, as a basic way of mobilizing the masses
to carry on the armed resistance against Japan. Party branches should become
the cores of guerrilla groups. At the initial stage, it is advisable to form one or two
guerrilla groups made up of advanced elements and, then, developing it step by
step, set up a large number of groups, with the primary group led by the cadres as
their center.

Second, do not incorporate guerrilla groups at the wrong time. When there is a
widespread growth of guerrilla groups, it is then right to incorporate some of them
into guerrilla detachments or regular armies, and at the same time continued efforts
should be made to foster more small guerrilla groups. The small guerrilla groups
should not be incorporated when they are only beginning to burgeon and their in-
corporation would deprive the masses of something they rely on, and consequently
make them vulnerable to the enemy’s devastation. In this case, guerrilla groups
should be helped to a vigorous growth before some of them get incorporated.

Last, Party organizations in all base areas for the War of Resistance Against
Japan and in all guerrilla areas should sum up the work, from the lower levels to
upper levels, on guerrilla groups and the growth of guerrilla detachments, self-
defense corps, and guerrilla groups in coordination with each other, and study
their correct interrelationship. The summing up of work will lead to further de-
velopment in our work in guerrilla areas: this is what we hope for.

Concentrate All Our Efforts to Develop Armed
Forces and Set Up Base Areas

(January 28, 1940)

To the Northern Bureau, the Shandong Subbureau, the 115th Division, and for the
information of the Central Plains Bureau, Peng Xuefeng,2 Xiang Ying,3 and Chen Yi:

1. The long telegram sent to you by the Central Committee on December 9
demanded that you raise an armed force hundreds of thousands strong and that
you organize a self-defense corps of several million men throughout Shandong
Province and North China. We understand that the Central Plains Bureau has al-
ready started the work, but, having received no telegrams from Shandong and the
115th Division, we do not know whether or not you agree with this plan, and
whether or not you think it feasible.

2. The development of the situation has fully demonstrated that only by exten-
sively expanding the revolutionary armed forces in coordination with the general
effort of the whole nation will it be possible to check capitulation and anticommu-
nism, consolidate the united front, and secure a change for the better in the situa-
tion. And at present, Shandong Province and North China remain the principal
places where the armed forces can be developed.

3. Consequently, we ask that you pay serious attention to this matter and make
the development of the armed forces the central focus of all your work. In the
course of this year, the Shandong Branch Bureau and the 115th Division should
raise an armed force (guerrillas included) of at least 150,000 men and rifles. The
115th Division should dispatch officers and men to all parts of Shandong, while
the Central Plains Bureau should raise at least one hundred thousand men with
the same number of guns. On the basis of these broad targets, concrete results should
be achieved by stages. On the basis of what people from Shandong have told us, to
the effect that a lot of guns are scattered among the population of the province,

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong jun shi wen ji. Vol. 2, pp. 509–11, where it is repro-
duced from Mao’s original manuscript, conserved in the Central Archives.

1. This telegram was drafted by Mao on behalf of the Central Secretariat.
2. Peng Xuefeng (1907–1944), a native of Henan, joined the Chinese Communist
Party in 1926 and served as political commissar in various units of the Eighth Red Army in
the early 1930s. At this time, he was commander and political commissar of the Sixth Detach-
ment of the New Fourth Army.
3. On Xiang Ying see above, the relevant note to the text of March 16, 1939.
there should be no problem about achieving this target. Hu Fu⁴ has informed us by
telegram that the Central Plains could reach the figure of a hundred thousand in
six months, but it is you who must decide on a concrete plan.

4. Without a broad expansion of the self-defense corps, it is impossible to ex-
pand the army in a big way or to build up and consolidate the base areas. Conse-
quently, a well-organized and properly trained anti-Japanese self-defense corps
should outnumber the regular armies and guerrillas by at least ten to one. For
example, Shandong, which has an army of 150,000 men, should have at least 1.5
to 2 million men in well-organized and properly trained self-defense corps; North
China, which has an army of 100,000 men, should have at least 0.5 to 1 million men
in well-organized and properly trained self-defense corps. At present your self-de-
fense corps is still much too small.

5. It is impossible to develop so large an armed force without political power.
You must, therefore, with resolute and step-by-step plans, make the utmost efforts
to see to it that the greatest part of the political power in Shandong, eastern Henan,
northern Anhui, and northern Jiangsu is held in our hands and those of other pro-
gressive personages.

6. Building up such armies, self-defense forces, and political power, as de-
scribed above, will involve a process filled with serious struggles. Consequently,
we must not avoid friction that is justified and favorable to us. We must strike
back resolutely at all the reactionary forces and diehards who obstruct the progress
of the War of Resistance and attack us. Toward such people, there must not be the
slightest concession on matters of principle. At the same time, we must try our best
to win over all the forces that are progressive or relatively progressive and work
with them to establish anti-Japanese base areas. As for the intermediate
forces, such as Yu Xuezhong and Li Mingyang,⁵ our policy is to neutralize them.

7. The Guomindang plans to send more troops to the war zone of Jiangsu and
Shandong, so you should speed up your deployment and have your positions con-
solidated before they arrive.

8. You must make all the cadres of our Party understand this correct line of
development, for only thus can you create a style of driving courageously forward
and carry out this plan. It is your primary task to concentrate all your efforts to
develop armed forces and set up base areas. You must make the cadres understand
that without powerful armed forces and vast revolutionary base areas, victory in
the resistance against Japan can never be achieved.

Central Secretariat

Overcome the Danger of Capitulation, and
Strive for a Turn for the Better

(January 28, 1940)

Current developments confirm the correctness of the Central Committee’s ap-
proais. The line of capitulation taken by the big landlord class and the big bour-
geoisie runs sharply counter to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletarian,
the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie, and there
is a struggle between the two. Both lines exist at present, and one or the other can
win out in the future. What all our Party comrades must realize in this connection
is that the serious cases of capitulation, anticomunism, and retrogression which
have occurred in various places should not be viewed in isolation. We should real-
ize their seriousness, combat them resolutely, and not be overwhelmed by their
impact. If we lack this spirit and a correct policy for dealing firmly with these
incidents, if we let the Guomindang diehards continue their “military and political
restriction of the Communist Party”⁶ and are in constant dread at the thought of
the breakup of the united front, then the War of Resistance will be jeopardized, capi-
tulation and anticomunism will spread throughout the country, and there will be a
real danger of the breakup of the united front. But it must be made abundantly
clear that many objective conditions favorable to our struggle for continued resis-
tance, unity, and progress are still present both at home and abroad. For example,
Japan’s policy toward China remains as tough as ever; it is very difficult to rig up
a Far Eastern Munich conference because there has been no real reconciliation
between Japan, on the one hand, and Britain, the United States, and France, on the
other, despite some lessening of the contradictions between them and because the
British and French positions in the East have been weakened by the European war;
and the Soviet Union is actively helping China. These are the international factors
which render it difficult for the Guomindang to capitulate or compromise, or to
launch a nationwide anticomunist war. In these circumstances, our Party has a
twofold task. On the one hand, it must resolutely resist the military and political
offensives of the capitulators and diehards. On the other, it must actively develop
the united front of the political parties, the government organs, the armed forces,
the civilian population, and the intellectuals; it must do its utmost to win over the

⁴ Hu Fu was the pseudonym of Liu Shaoqi, who was at this time the secretary of the
Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee and was also active in the headquarters
of the New Fourth Army north of the Yangzi River.

⁵ Yu Xuezhong (1890–1964), a native of Shandong, was the Guomindang commander-
in-chief of the Combat District of northern Jiangsu and Shandong. Li Mingyang (1891–
1978), a native of Jiangsu, was at this time the Guomindang general commander of guerrillas
in the areas bordering Shandong, Jiangsu, and Anhui.

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Mao for the Central Committee. Our source is the
majority of the Guomindang, the intermediate classes, and sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the organs of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both of these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a turn for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy of the Party is to strive for a turn for the better and, at the same time, to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale).

Now that Wang Jingwei has announced his traitorous pact, and Chiang Kaishek has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favoring resistance will grow. On the other hand, the "military and political restriction of the Communist Party" will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Guomindang may stress "unification against the foreign enemy" in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and regression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact in all parts of the country with Communist Party organizations. In his message, Chiang Kaishek states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence in the campaign against Wang Jingwei we should stress the following points: (1) support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end and oppose Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact; (2) the people of the whole country must unite and overthrow the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei and his puppet central government; (3) support Guomindang-Communist cooperation; (4) down with Wang Jingwei’s anticomunist policy; (5) anti-Communism is Wang Jingwei’s plot for splitting the anti-Japanese united front; down with the hidden traitors of the Wang clique; (5) strengthen national unity and eliminate internal friction; (6) introduce political reforms, unfold the movement for constitutional government, and establish democratic politics; (7) lift the ban on political parties, and grant legal status to anti-Japanese parties and groups; (8) guarantee the people freedom of speech and assembly, in order to combat the Japanese and the Chinese traitors; (9) consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas and oppose the disruptive plots of the Chinese traitors of the Wang faction; (10) support the armies that are fighting successfully against Japan, and give adequate supplies to the fronts; and (11) promote cultural activities which help the cause of the War of Resistance, protect progressive youth, and proscribe all expression of the views of Chinese traitors. The above slogans should be widely publicized. Large numbers of articles, manifestos, leaflets, talks, and pamphlets should be published everywhere, and other slogans suitable to local circumstances should be added.

A rally of the popular masses to denounce Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact is scheduled to be held on February 1 in Yan’an. Together with the people of all circles and with the anti-Japanese members of the Guomindang, we should organize similar mass rallies in all areas in early or mid-February, in order to create a nationwide upsurge against capitulation, against the Chinese traitors, and against friction.

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1. On December 30, 1939, Wang Jingwei signed a secret agreement with the Japanese, based on a "Program for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations" submitted to him by the Japanese in November 1939. It included five main provisions:

1. Manchukuo was to be recognized, and the "Mongolian territory" (i.e., the area north of the Great Wall), North China, the lower Yangzi valley, and the islands off China’s southern coast were to be marked off as "zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration," that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops.

2. From the central government down to the local governments, Wang’s puppet regime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisers and officials.

3. The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military instructors, and their equipment was to be supplied by Japan.

4. The puppet government’s fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises, and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China’s natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan.

5. All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited, and the Wang government was to cooperate with Japan in opposing communism.
majority of the Guomindang, the intermediate classes, and sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the organs of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both of these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a turn for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy of the Party is to strive for a turn for the better and, at the same time, to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale).

Now that Wang Jingwei has announced his traitorous pact, and Chiang Kaishek has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favoring resistance will grow. On the other hand, the “military and political restriction of the Communist Party” will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Guomindang may stress “unification against the foreign enemy” in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact in all parts of the country with Communist Party organizations. In his message, Chiang Kaishek states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence in the campaign against Wang Jingwei we should stress the following points: (1) support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end and oppose Wang Jingwei’s traitorous pact; (2) the people of the whole country must unite and overthrow the Chi-

1. On December 30, 1939, Wang Jingwei signed a secret agreement with the Japanese, based on a “Program for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations” submitted to him by the Japanese in November 1939. It included five main provisions:

1. Manchukuo was to be recognized, and the “Mongolian territory” (i.e., the area north of the Great Wall), North China, the lower Yangzi valley, and the islands off China’s southern coast were to be marked off as “zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration,” that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops.

2. From the central government down to the local governments, Wang’s puppet regime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisers and officials.

3. The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military instructors, and their equipment was to be supplied by Japan.

4. The puppet government’s fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises, and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China’s natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan.

5. All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited, and the Wang government was to cooperate with Japan in opposing communism.
The Forces in Southern Anhui Must Cross to the North of the River

(January 29, 1940)

Comrades Xiang [Ying] and Ye [Ting]:

1. Your main way out lies to the north of the river, and, though a good opportunity has already been lost, there is no way out except striving to cross the river to the north.
2. You should secretly prepare a number of crossing points, to be used in time of need.
3. There is no other source of funds; the whole Party will have to rely on its own efforts.


Abiding by the Principle of Self-Defense, Deal a Thorough Blow to the Attackers

(January 30, 1940)

Zhu [De] and Peng [Dehuai], Yang [Shangkun], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of Zhu [Rui] and Xu [Xiangqian], Chen [Guang] and Luo [Ronghuan]:

Any forces within the borders of Hebei and Shanxi, no matter if they are Central forces, Shanxi and Suiyuan forces, or Shi Yousan’s forces, if they attack the regions of the Eighth Route Army, we should resolutely resist and thoroughly eliminate them, abiding by the principle of self-defense when it is reasonable and beneficial to do so. We should call on all our Eighth Route Army forces and all the people of the two provinces to deal a firm blow at all those who are attacking from the rear of the front on resisting Japan. We should publicly and comprehensively propagate the following: “Those who are attacking from the rear of the resisting Japan front are Chinese traitors”; “Down with the Chinese traitors who are attacking the Eighth Route Army”; “Down with the Chinese traitors who are attacking the dare-to-die contingent”; and “Down with the Chinese traitors who are sabotaging the resisting Japan base areas.” Only by creating a trend of all forces and all the people opposing Chinese traitors, opposing the attacks, and dealing vigorous blows at the attackers, will the ploys of those schemers and adventurers be frustrated, will they be divided from within, will we prevent those wavering forces from daring to join the attacks, and will we effectively coordinate with the united front work, which is being energetically carried out within the armed forces. This policy also applies to Shandong. It is hoped that Shandong will firmly follow suit.

Central Secretariat

This telegram was drafted by Mao for the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Our source is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 2, pp. 513–14, where it is reproduced from Mao’s original manuscript, conserved in the Central Archives.

1. Shi Yousan (1891–1940), at Hanzhang, was a native of Jilin Province. In the 1920s and 1930s he served under Peng Yuxiang, Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Xueliang, and others. In June 1940, he concluded an “Anti-Communist Agreement” with the Japanese Army; as a result, he was executed for treason in December 1940.
Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks

(February 1, 1940)

1. One distinguishing feature of the domestic situation during this current period of strategic stalemate between the enemy and ourselves is the increasingly apparent and intense struggle between the big bourgeoisie’s capitulationist tendencies, on the one hand, and the orientation of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie toward resistance, on the other. Because the progressive anti-Japanese forces within the country are not yet sufficiently strong to prevail over the forces of capitulation and retrogression, the danger of capitulation and retrogression is still grave and remains the major danger in the current situation. But as a result of the resistance to capitulation and retrogression on the part of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army, on the part of a majority of the Guomindang, and on the part of people throughout the country, because of Japan’s resolve course toward the destruction of China, because of the continuing existence of relatively serious contradictions between Britain, the United States, and France, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, and because the war in Europe has weakened the positions of Britain and France in the Far East, thus making it very difficult to convene a Far Eastern Munich conference rapidly, as well as the strength of the Soviet Union and its policy of active support for China—all these internal and external conditions make it very difficult to capitulate and to launch an anti-Communist war on a national scale. The conditions prevailing on the two sides of the issue have given rise to a situation of intense conflict between the progressive anti-Japanese forces and the forces of capitulation and retrogression. The outcome of this conflict will be either a turn for the better or a turn for the worse in the current situation. But the possibility that the situation may improve has by no means been ruled out. If the overall policy is correct, and if in addition the whole nation makes an effort, it is possible to change the present situation and secure a turn for the better. Our primary task is to reinforce the progressive anti-Japanese forces, resist the forces of capitulation and retrogression, strive for a turn for the better in the situation, and prevent it from
taking a turn for the worse. It is obviously wrong to believe that the situation can only become worse and rule out the possibility of improvement and, as a result, to give up any effort in that direction and merely prepare passively to cope with any nationwide contingencies.

2. The recent disclosure of the Japan–Wang [Jingwei] agreement, the preparations for setting up a puppet central government, and the publication of Chiang Kai-shek’s declaration denouncing Wang have dealt a new blow to the capitulationist, anti-Communist, and diehard factions within the country and given a new impetus to the forces in favor of the War of Resistance, uniting with the Communists, and the pursuit of progress. This is conducive to the achievement of an improvement in the situation. But at present, not only have the forces of capitulation and retrogression not yet been dealt a fundamental blow, but they are likely to become even more rampant, and partial and localized incidents may continue to break out. This is because the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie headed by Wang Jingwei is working in concert with the domestic forces of capitulation and retrogression, while at the moment the progressive anti-Japanese forces are not yet able to unite rapidly to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression. In his declaration Chiang Kai-shek emphasized the War of Resistance, but he did not emphasize unity and progress. Without nationwide unity and progress, however, it would be impossible to persist in the War of Resistance or to win final victory. Therefore, a process of arduous struggle lies ahead in order to avoid a possible turn for the worse in the situation and to strive for a turn for the better. Also, we must be prepared at all times to deal with any incidents (at the moment, mostly partial and localized incidents) that may arise, and maintain a high level of vigilance at all times.

3. To strive for an improvement in the situation and overcome the danger of a turn for the worse, it is imperative to emphasize the three points of the War of Resistance, unity, and progress, without omitting a single one of them. Moreover, on that basis, we must resolutely carry out the following ten great tasks. First, we must make our propaganda against Wang and the Chinese traitors even more widespread and universal, resolutely expose all the plots for capitulation and splits, strike at the capitulationists and anti-Communists ideologically and politically, demonstrating resolutely, unequivocally, and concretely that to oppose the Communist Party is a counterrevolutionary measure of the capitulationists as they prepare to capitulate. Second, we must energetically develop the united front throughout the country in every domain, including parties, governments, armies, people, and scholarship; organize the progressive forces, and cooperate closely with the majority of the Guomindang members in order to oppose the capitulationists and anti-Communists. Third, we must launch a broad movement in favor of constitutional government and strive to create democratic politics. Without democratic politics, victory in the War of Resistance is mere fantasy. Fourth, we must resist all the attacks by the capitulationist and anti-Communist forces. All the attacks waged by capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards must be resolutely countered according to the principle of self-defense, applying the principle: “We will not

This text was first published in Jiefang, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 205–8, where it is reproduced from this source.
attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack. 1
Otherwise these forces may run rampant, the united front will disintegrate, and the War of Resistance will be lost. Fifth, we must develop in a big way an anti-Japanese movement of the popular masses. We must unite with all the intellectuals who are in favor of resisting Japan and help them to integrate themselves with the anti-Japanese movements of the popular masses and with the guerrilla war against Japan. Otherwise, our strength will be insufficient for striking blows against the capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards. Sixth, we must conscientiously carry out rent, interest, and tax reduction, improve the lives of the workers, and give economic assistance to the popular masses. Only thus can the anti-Japanese enthusiasm of the popular masses be unleashed; otherwise it would be impossible. Seventh, we must consolidate and enlarge all our anti-Japanese base areas and set up in all these base areas anti-Japanese democratic régimes which are wholly elected by the people and exclude completely the capitulationists and anti-Communists. Such régimes are not régimes of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie, but democratic régimes of all those who support resistance to Japan and support democracy. They are joint democratic dictatorships of several revolutionary classes. All the plots to undermine the anti-Japanese base areas must be resolutely smashed. All the Chinese traitors and anti-Communists who are hidden in the anti-Japanese armed forces, the anti-Japanese régimes, and the anti-Japanese organizations must be eliminated. Eighth, we must consolidate and expand the progressive armies, for without these armies China would perish. Ninth, we must expand and develop the anti-Japanese cultural movement and raise the cultural and theoretical level of the anti-Japanese people, armies, and cadres. Unless there is an anti-Japanese struggle on the cultural front, integrated with the overall anti-Japanese struggle, the resistance to Japan cannot be victorious. Tenth, we must consolidate the organization of the Communist Party and develop the Party organization in those localities where it is nonexistent or weak. Without a powerful Communist Party, none of the important problems relating to resisting Japan and saving the country can be solved. If the above-mentioned ten great tasks can be performed resolutely, concretely, and correctly, the progressive anti-Japanese forces can definitely be strengthened and consolidated, so as to overcome the forces of capitulation and retrogression, secure an improvement in the situation, avoid a turn for the worse, and smash the plots of the big-bourgeois elements to sabotage the War of Resistance and the united front.

4. The slogans for propaganda and agitation at present are:
a. Support the national policy of fighting Japan to the end, oppose the traitorous agreement signed by Wang Jingwei!

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1. Mao repeated this formulation of the "principle of self-defense" in the text of March 11, 1940, translated below, and in other statements of this period. He also used it freely, in rather different circumstances, in the course of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1969.
The Situation and Tasks in the Stage of Mutual Support

Speech delivered at a mass rally in Yan’an to denounce Wang [Jingwei] and support Chiang [Kaishek]

(Febuary 1, 1940)

Comrades, why have we, people from all walks of life in Yan’an, come here today to hold a big meeting? To denounce Wang [Jingwei] and support Chiang [Kaishek] and to fight Japan and save the country. Recently Wang Jingwei signed a treaty with Japan that totally sells out China. We had been fighting Japan for two and a half years and had achieved a breakthrough. The enemy went crazy and did a deal with Wang Jingwei, who sold out the country. Now the situation is different in several ways, and now we have several new tasks, which are what I want to talk about today. The weather is so cold today, yet so many people are here. We are not afraid of the cold, we want to clear up a number of things.

I. Japan wants to turn China into a colony, and Wang Jingwei, the representative of China’s big bourgeoisie, has knelt down before Japan

We Communists have repeatedly pointed out that it is the fixed policy of Japanese imperialism to destroy China. No matter what cabinet changes there may be in Japan, its basic policy of destroying China’s independence and turning China into a colony will definitely not change, because if this policy were to change, then Japan’s militarist capitalist government would fall. Frightened out of his wits by this fact, Wang Jingwei, the political representative of the pro-Japanese faction of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, grovels on both knees before his Japanese masters.

This speech was originally published in Jiefang, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong ji, Vol. 7, pp. 209–22, where it is reproduced from the 1944 edition of Mao’s works.

1. The title in the Selected Works is “Unite All Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Diehards.”
2. Denounce Wang and support Chiang
3. And to fight Japan and save the country
4. His Japanese masters
5. As for anticommunism, that is one plot within the plot of the Japanese masters and this fellow Wang Jingwei.
6. The proposal
7. Regarding the Pingjiang massacre of June 12, 1939, see above, the note to the text of August 1, 1939.
8. Six hundred
9. The reactionary proposal
10. Border region
the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. They have hired Trotskyites such as Ye Qing and others to write articles roundly condemning the Communist Party. All such rubbish has the sole purpose of splitting the unity of the war of resistance and turning the Chinese people into slaves without a country. All of this, in a word, is the plot of the Japanese and of those among the Chinese big bourgeoisie who are capitulationists or are preparing to join the capitulationists and to destroy China. We are holding this great meeting today precisely to oppose this plot, to expose this plot. This meeting of ours is called a denounce-Wang support-Chiang meeting, which shows what our orientation is. We have no other orientation than that of opposing the treasonous capitulation of Wang Jingwei and of supporting Mr. Chiang to fight Japan to the end.

II. Strive to turn the situation around and oppose pessimism and despair

Here I want to say a little more about the situation as it is now. Everyone understands that the Wang Jingwei traitors are in cahoots with the diehard faction, working together from the inside and the outside to create pandemonium. This situation has confused large numbers of people within the country who think that the times can only go against us, that the future cannot be turned around for the better. I believe that such a view is totally wrong. The Central Committee of our Communist Party has from the beginning pointed out that although both the destruction and the revival of the state, both a future that turns against us and a future that turns for the better, exist and are possibilities, domestic conditions and international conditions all determine that China can revive, that the times can turn around for the better. This is definitely not a time for sad laments or cries of despair. I wrote a small volume last June entitled "On Protracted War," and last November I wrote another small volume entitled "On the New Stage," both of which adamantly rejected the theory of national destruction and the theory of a quick victory. Regarding the Guomindang, I have stated firmly that there is a bright future for most of its members, that it is only a small portion of them for whom the future is black. These are the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; they are not just my personal views. They are also the views of the great majority of the people of the entire nation; they are not the views of just the Communist Party. Just look at how the great majority of the people throughout the nation have welcomed the proposals of the Communist Party and you will understand. But not everyone agrees with our views. There are some who do not understand the bigger picture. It is they who do not agree with us. When we came out with these two pamphlets, there were quite a few people who were skeptical of these views of ours. There are some who are still skeptical of our views. This is specially because the diehard faction of the Guomindang everywhere stirs up provocative strange things such as "the means for dealing with the activities of other parties," "the means for dealing with the problem of other parties," "the plan for dealing effectively with the problem of other parties," which, added to the fact that an atmosphere of domestic peace is brewing everywhere, really confuse a lot of people. They do not know how to distinguish the minority from the majority, and they do not know that, in dealing with the minority of bad eggs, we must use a policy different from that used to deal with the majority of anti-Japanese elements. There is no question but that, with regard to those conscienceless scoundrels who had the audacity to shoot from behind at the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, to perpetrate the Pingjiang and Queshan massacres, to disrupt the border areas, and to attack progressive armies, progressive organizations, and progressive individuals, these scoundrels must not be tolerated but must be dealt counterblows; any concession to them is out of the question. Otherwise, unity will be broken, resistance against Japan will fail, and China will perish. For such scoundrels have become so utterly devoid of conscience that they are even creating friction, perpetrating massacres, and causing splits at a time when our national enemy has penetrated deep into our territory and the nation and its people face a life-and-death crisis. Whatever they may think subjectively, their actions actually help the enemy and Wang Jingwei, they are actually subverting the national policy of a unified War of Resistance, serving as good friends to the Chinese traitors, and some of them have been undercover traitors from the very beginning. Our failure to punish these people, and our failure to strike the necessary blows against those who have dared to attack the progressive anti-Japanese forces, would be a crime; it would be an encouragement to the Chinese traitors and collaborators; it would be disloyalty to the national War of Resistance and to our native land. It would be a failure to maintain the united front firmly and an invitation to the scoundrels to disrupt the united front. It would be a violation of the Party's policy. But the sole reason for striking back at these capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards is to keep up the War of Resistance, to maintain unity and sustain forward progress, all of which is to safeguard the anti-Japanese united front. Therefore, toward the great majority of people who are loyal to resistance for
against Japan, toward all those who are not capitulators or anticommunists or diehards, and toward the great majority of the members of the Guomindang, we should always express goodwill and do our utmost to unite with them and do our utmost to respect them, and be willing to continue our long-term cooperation with them so as to put the country in order. Whoever does otherwise is not staunchly defending the anti-Japanese united front and is also violating the policy of the Party.

Here are our Party's two great policies. On the one hand, to oppose the progressive forces and all those loyal to the resistance against Japan—this is one policy. On the other hand, to oppose all the heartless scoundrels, all capitulators, anti-Communists, and diehards—this is another policy. Such policies of our Party have a single objective, which is to bring about a turn for the better so as to defeat Japan, and this objective can be achieved.

Why is it that the object of striving to bring about a turn for the better in order to defeat Japan can be achieved? We have many domestic and international conditions. Which conditions? The first one is the existence of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Whoever wants to revolt, whoever wants to capitulate—we first of all will not accept it, and we will definitely struggle with them to the end. The second condition is the great majority of Guomindang members who also oppose capitulating to Japan, who are in favor of the War of Resistance, and who agree with unity and being progressive. This is true of everyone in the Guomindang except the capitulationists, the anti-Communists, and the diehards. The third condition is the anti-Japanese progressive elements among the people of every party and every faction throughout China, who also oppose capitulation, divisiveness, and retreat. The three items above are the domestic conditions. The fourth condition is the fact that the Japanese plan to destroy China is extremely rigid. The Japanese militarists and capitalists have laid out two paths before the Chinese people and told us to choose one of them. These two paths are either the nation will be destroyed or it will be liberated. There is no middle road. The fifth condition is that today there is still no way to resolve the contradiction between Japan and Britain, the United States, and France. Since the outbreak of the European Great War, the situation has changed greatly. One of the important changes has been the reduction in the position of Britain and France in the Far East. As a result, the Far Eastern Munich conference that they wanted to convene very soon has become impossible. Unavoidably this has greatly disappointed a certain number of people. There were some who in the first half of last year were still suggesting that the nine-nation treaty conference be used to solve the China question. With the outbreak of the European war, they had no choice but to change their tune to propose that the China question could be solved only along with the European war. The United States is still sitting on the mountain watching the tigers fight. It still wants to make Japan and China fight it out. It is now holding the Pacific Conference. Since Japan is not attending, the United States too is reluctant. Although the United States has annulled the trade treaty with Japan, it still wants to do business, which means giving Japan the resources to wage war that will allow it to fight well. At the same time, it may still give China a tiny bit of material assistance. As I see it, the plan of the U.S. capitalists is to prepare to come forth and intervene sometime in the second half of this year or next year and order Japan to cough up a portion of the booty, in the name of the “Open Door Policy.” The United States will share the booty with Japan because the United States believes that Japan's economic strength cannot hold out beyond the second half of this year or the first half of next year or the second half of next year. This wishful thinking of the American capitalists is the same as the wishful thinking of the Chinese pro-European pro-American faction (which is different from the pro-Japanese big bourgeoisie). The two are singing a duet. Thus the danger of a peaceful compromise has certainly not been eliminated, and the fact that at present they are not singing the peace song is strictly temporary. In the future they will return to strumming the old melody again. But, just for the present, there is a rather serious contradiction between Japan and Britain, the United States, and France, and this is one condition that may turn the situation around for China. The sixth condition is the strength of the Soviet Union and its policy of actively assisting China. Everyone understands this quite clearly. Anyone who thinks that he can bypass the Soviet Union and covertly go on to solve the European question is definitely mistaken. Anyone who thinks that he can bypass the Soviet Union and covertly go on to solve the Far Eastern question is also mistaken. Even though there are still those wishful thinkers both in China and abroad who are still thinking of ignoring the Soviet Union or are even thinking of preparing to stir up some anti-Soviet magic, this is nothing but wishful fantasy. This too is an important condition that may make it possible to turn the situation in China around. Generally speaking, the three domestic conditions, the adherence to an anti-Japanese stance by the Communist Party, the Guomindang, and the people, and the three international conditions, the strength and rigidity of Japan, the situation of Britain, the United States, and France, and the Soviet Union's assistance to China—all these conditions are creating a tendency for the situation to turn around for the better. The task of our Communist Party and of the people is to concentrate all the anti-Japanese progressive forces to resist all the forces of capitulation and retrogression and fight hard to turn the times around for the better, to save the times from turning back. This is our basic policy. Seen in this way, what basis is there for pessimism or despair? Clearly there is none. We are surely not pessimistic or in despair. We are optimistic. We are not afraid of any attacks by the capitulators, anti-Communists, or diehards. We definitely must smash them, and we definitely can smash them. The national liberation of China is certain. China definitely will not perish. The progress of China is certain, and retrogression is only a temporary phenomenon.

III. Emphasize Unity and Progress, and Kick Out Japanese Imperialism

In our meeting today we also want to make clear to the whole Party and the whole country a certain stance, which is that we shall loudly proclaim that given the top

18. The whole Party and the whole country → The people of the whole country
against Japan, toward all those who are not capitulators or anticommunists or diehards, and toward the great majority of the members of the Guomindang, we should always express goodwill and do our utmost to unite with them and do our utmost to respect them, and be willing to continue our long-term cooperation with them so as to put the country in order. Whoever does otherwise is not staunchly defending the anti-Japanese united front and is also violating the policy of the Party.

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In our meeting today we also want to make clear to the whole Party and the whole country18 a certain stance, which is that we shall loudly proclaim that given the top

18. The whole Party and the whole country ➔ The people of the whole country
priority of resistance against Japan, unity also comes first, as does progress. Some people have emphasized the War of Resistance but are reluctant to emphasize unity and progress, and even fail to mention them. This is wrong. Without genuine and firm unity, without rapid and solid progress, how can we persist in resisting Japan; how can we overthrow Wang Jingwei; how can we drive out Japanese imperialism? That would be an utterly impossible pipe dream. The diehards within the Guomindang (I am talking about the diehards) emphasize unification, but their so-called “unification” is a sort of fake unification, not a genuine unification. It is a sort of irrational, rather than a rational, unification. It is in unification in form rather than in substance. Why is this? They clamor about unification, but what they really want is to liquidate the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border region on the pretext that China will not be unified as long as the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border region exist. They want to turn everything over to the Guomindang and not merely to continue their system of one-party dictatorship but to extend this system. If this were the case, however, what unification would there be? In truth, if in the past the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the Border Region had not stepped forth and sincerely advocated ending the civil war and uniting in resistance against Japan, there would have been nobody to initiate the Anti-Japanese United Front or to take the lead in the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident, and there would have been no way at all to carry out resistance against Japan. And if today the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the border areas did not step forth and sincerely sustain the resistance against Japan and combat the dangerous tendencies toward capitulation, fragmentation, and retrogression, the situation would be a terrible mess. The several hundred thousand troops of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are holding in check two-fifths of the enemy forces, engaging in battle seventeen out of the forty [enemy] divisions. Yet they have received only 730,000 yuan in pay. The Eighth Route Army got 600,000, the New Fourth Army 130,000, which makes a total of 730,000, but with devaluation of the currency by 75 percent, each person received less than 1 yuan per month, so why should they be disbanded? The border areas are the most progressive places in the country, they are democratic anti-Japanese base areas.

Here there are, first, no corrupt officials; second, no local bullies and bad gentry; third, no gambling; fourth, no prostitutes; fifth, no concubines; sixth, no beggars; seventh, no narrow self-seeking cliques; eighth, no atmosphere of dejection and laxity; ninth, no professional friction-mongers; and tenth, no war profiteers. So why should they be abolished? Only people with no shame could say something so shameful. What right have the diehards to breathe a word against us? Comrades, it is not so. What needs to be done is not to abolish the border areas but, rather, to have the whole country follow their example; not to disband the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army but, rather, to have the whole country emulate them; not to liquidate the Communist Party but, rather, to have the whole country follow its example; not to have progressives fall back to the level of those who are backward but, rather, to have the latter catch up with the former. We Communists are the staunchest advocates of unification. We initiated the united front, we maintained the united front, and we put forward the slogan for a united democratic republic. Who else could have proposed all this? Who else could have put all this into effect? Who else would accept pay of only 5 yuan [a month]? Who else could create such a clean, incorruptible government? There is unification and unification. The capitulationists have their idea of unification, which is for us to unify into capitulating; the anti-Communists and diehards have their idea of unification, which is to have us unify into fragmentation and retrogression. Could we ever accept these ideas? Could unification not based upon resistance, unity, and progress be considered genuine unification? Or rational unification? Or real unification? What a pipe dream! We are meeting here today to put forward our own idea of unification. Our idea of unification is that of the people of the whole country, that of every single person with a conscience. This idea of unification is based upon three things: resistance, unity, and progress. Only through progress can unity be achieved, only through unity can there be a War of Resistance, and only through progress, unity, and a War of Resistance can there be unification. This is our idea of unification, a genuine unification, a rational unification, a real unification. The idea of a fake, irrational, and formalistic unification is one of national subjugation and extermination, one of those utterly devoid of conscience. They want to destroy the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and the base areas, to wipe out all local anti-Japanese forces, so as to achieve unification under one party and one faction. This is a form of a plot, a way of carrying out autocratic rule under the guise of unification, of selling the dogmeat of their one-party dictatorship under the label of the sheep's head of unification, a plot of brazen-faced braggarts who are lost to all sense of shame. We meet today precisely to punch holes in this paper tiger of theirs. Let us relentlessly combat the diehards.

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19. Given the top priority of → In order to wage
20. Unity also comes first → The unity and progress of the people of the whole country are essential
21. The War of Resistance → Only resistance against Japan
22. Diehards → Anti-Communist diehards
23. Border region → Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
24. Border region → Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
25. And the border areas → The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the various anti-Japanese democratic base areas
26. Border areas → Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region
27. Base areas → Anti-Japanese democratic base areas
28. One party and one faction → The Guomindang
29. Diehards → Anti-Communist diehards
IV. The Communist Party’s Ten Major Tasks

We shall resolutely combat the diehards, firmly unite with the progressives, and use these two policies to reach our overall goal of gaining an improvement in the situation so as to triumph over the Japanese bandits. There is much work for us to do toward this end. Just a few days ago, the Central Committee of the Communist Party held a meeting and decided upon ten major tasks to gain an improvement in the situation. What are these ten major tasks? I shall now read to you comrades the Communist Party Central Committee’s resolution:

“To strive toward an improvement in the situation and overcome the danger of its deterioration, it is essential to emphasize resistance, unity, and progress—all three without exception—and upon this basis to carry out resolutely the following ten major tasks:

First is to expand greatly the propaganda against Wang Jingwei and the Chinese traitors, to expose firmly all plots to capitulate and cause splits, and combat the capitulationists and the anti-Communists ideologically and politically. Firmly, clearly, and concretely prove that anticomunism is a counterrevolutionary step taken by the capitulationists in preparation for capitulation.

Second is to develop vigorously a nationwide united front in the arenas of the Party, the government, the military, the masses, and education, to organize the progressive forces, and to collaborate closely with the majority in the Guomindang, for the purpose of opposing the capitulationists and the anti-Communists.

Third is to unfold broadly the constitutional movement and work hard for democratic politics. Without a democratic political process, victory in resisting Japan is no more than a fantasy.

Fourth is to defend against all attacks from the capitulationist anti-Communist forces. Any attack from capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards must be firmly resisted on the principle of self-defense and the principle of ‘we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.’ Otherwise, if they are allowed to run rampant, then the united front will be smashed and the War of Resistance Against Japan will end in defeat.

Fifth is to develop greatly the popular mass movement to resist Japan, unite all anti-Japanese intellectuals, and cause the intellectuals to cooperate with the anti-Japanese popular mass movement and anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare. Otherwise there will not be sufficient power to fight the capitulationists, anti-Communists, and diehards.

Sixth is to carry out earnestly reduction in rents, interest, and taxes and improvement in the workers’ lives. Only by giving economic assistance to the popular masses can their enthusiasm for resisting Japan be aroused; otherwise it is impossible.

Seventh is to consolidate and expand each anti-Japanese base area and, entirely by popular election, establish in these base areas anti-Japanese democratic régimes without the participation of any capitulationist or anti-Communist ele-
ments. Such a régime would not be one of the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie but, rather, a régime of all people who advocate resistance against Japan and also advocate democracy, a régime of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and a democratic dictatorship of the several combined revolutionary classes. All plots to sabotage the anti-Japanese base areas must be resolutely fought against. All Chinese traitors and anti-Communist elements hidden within the anti-Japanese armed forces, the anti-Japanese régimes, and the anti-Japanese organizations must be purged.

Eighth is to consolidate and expand the progressive armed forces. Without such armed forces, China will become subjugated.

Ninth is to develop broadly an anti-Japanese cultural movement so as to raise the cultural and theoretical level of the anti-Japanese people, the anti-Japanese armed forces, and the anti-Japanese cadres. It is also impossible to triumph in resistance against Japan without a struggle on the anti-Japanese cultural front to coordinate efforts with the overall anti-Japanese struggle.

Tenth is to consolidate the organization of the Communist Party and to develop a Communist Party organization in places where there is none or where the Party is weak. Without a strong and powerful Communist Party, it is impossible to solve any important problems in resistance against Japan and saving the nation.

If these ten major tasks can be resolutely, concretely, and correctly carried out, then the anti-Japanese progressive forces can surely be strengthened, the capitulationist and retrogressive forces be overcome, an improvement in the situation can be gained, its worsening can be avoided, and the plots of the big bourgeois elements to sabotage the War of Resistance and the united front can be smashed.”

Comrades, these are the ten major tasks recently decided upon by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Do you believe that these ten major tasks are appropriate ones? These ten tasks constitute a suitable remedy for our ills; they are bound to snatch the patient from the jaws of death and to drive out Japanese imperialism. The ten major tasks were put forth by the Communist Party, but when it comes to undertaking them, it cannot be done by the Communist Party alone; it has to be done by the people of the whole nation. This is not something that concerns only the Communist Party as a single party but, rather, something that concerns the people of the whole country. It is something of concern to all those with a conscience who wish to save the nation. Of course, Japanese imperialism is not happy about these ten major tasks, and nor is Wang Jingwei, nor are the anti-Communists, nor are the diehards. That they are unhappy is as it should be; there is no need for us to try to please them. Let them be displeased about this. We are holding this meeting today because we wish to shout out our cry to all people, parties, and groups nationwide, to save our motherland, which is in peril, to create a new China, to drive out Japanese imperialism, to bring down Wang Jingwei, and to bring down that bunch of anti-Communist “heroes.” We wish to proclaim loudly the following slogans:
Support the national policy of carrying out the War of Resistance to the end, and oppose Wang Jingwei's traitorous agreement;

People of the whole nation, unite to support Chairman Chiang and bring down the Chinese traitor Wang Jingwei;

Support the National Government and bring down Wang Jingwei's puppet Central Committee;

Support Guomindang-Communist cooperation, down with Wang Jingwei's policy of anticommunism;

Anticommunism is Wang Jingwei's plot to split the united front; down with all anti-Communist Chinese traitors;

Strengthen national unity; eliminate internal friction;

Reform domestic affairs, carry forward the constitutional movement, and establish democratic politics;

Liberalize bans on parties, and legalize the existence of anti-Japanese parties and organizations;

The people have the right to freedom of speech, publication, assembly, and association in order to resist Japan and save the nation;

Develop the movement of the popular masses, and bring about reduction in rents, interest, and taxes, and improvement of workers' lives;

Consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas; combat the plot of the Chinese traitors, anti-Communists, and diehards to sabotage them;

Support the troops with a fine record of service in resistance against Japan, and give ample material assistance to the front;

Develop a culture of the War of Resistance Against Japan, protect progressive youth, and suppress the expression of opinion by Chinese traitors;

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

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**Telegram from the Mass Meeting of the Popular Masses in Yan'an Denouncing Wang [Jingwei] and Supporting Chiang [Kaishek]**

(February 1, 1940)

To President Lin, Chairman Chiang, the various yuan, ministries, and associations of the National Government in Chongqing, the Central Committee and all departments of the Military Commission of the Chinese Guomindang, the People's Political Council, the Anti-Aggression Grand Alliance, the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association, the frontline party and government committees, the Shenghuo Bookstore, the Commercial Press, the China Publishing House, the Young Journalists' Association, the Resist the Enemy Association of Cultural Circles, the Central News Agency, the National News Agency, the Dagong Bao, the New China Daily News, the Saodang Bao, the Central Daily News, the Three People's Principles Youth League, all provincial governments, assemblies, party headquarters, associations of logistic support of the resistance against the enemy, provincial press associations and major newspapers, various universities in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Hanzhong,² garrisons in Xi'an and Zhulin, commanders of all war zones, commanders-in-chief of all army corps, officers and soldiers in the whole country, and anti-Japanese compatriots:

This mass rally against Wang Jingwei and for Chiang Kaishek, held in Yan'an on February 1, unanimously resolves, in righteous indignation, to denounce his treason and capitulation and to support Chairman Chiang in waging the War of Resistance Against Japan to the very end. To overcome the present crisis and ensure victory in the War of Resistance, we hereby submit ten major points for saving the country, in the hope that our National Government, all political parties and groups, all officers and men fighting in the War of Resistance, and all our fellow-countrymen will accept them and act upon them.

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² This document was first published in Jiefang, no. 98/99, February 20, 1940. We have translated it from Mao Zedong Ji, Vol. 7, pp. 223–29, which reproduces that source.

1. Telegram from the Mass Meeting of the Popular Masses in Yan'an Denouncing Wang and Supporting Chiang → Ten Demands Addressed to the Guomindang

2. Hanzhong was a prefecture in the extreme southwest corner of Shaanxi.
1. Let the whole country denounce Wang. Now that Traitor Wang has gathered his gang together, betrayed his country to the enemy, and signed the secret pact selling out the country, playing the jackal to the tiger, all our countrymen demand his death. But this only takes care of the open Wang Jingweis, and leaves out the undercover ones. The latter are either craftily seizing key posts and swaggering about, or working obscurely and worming their way deeply into society. In effect, the corrupt officials are part of the Wang Jingwei gang, and all the friction-mongers are its underlings. Unless there is a nationwide campaign to denounce the Wang Jingweis, a campaign in town and country and from top to bottom in which everyone is mobilized, including all political parties, government organs, armed forces, civilian bodies, the press, and the educational institutions, the Wang Jingwei gang will never be eradicated but will persist in its nefarious activities, doing incalculable damage by opening the door to the enemy from without and by subversion from within. The government should issue a decree calling on the whole people to repudiate Wang. Wherever the decree is not carried out, the officials should be called to account. The Wang Jingwei gang must be extirpated, and thrown to the jackals and tigers. This is the first point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

2. Strengthen unity. Nowadays, some people talk not of unity but of unification, and the implication is that unification means nothing short of liquidating the Communist Party, disbanning the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, abolishing the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, and demolishing the anti-Japanese forces everywhere. What this kind of talk ignores is the fact that the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region are the staunchest advocates of unification in all China. Was it not they who recommended the peaceful settlement of the Xi’an Incident? Is it not they who have initiated the Anti-Japanese National United Front, proposed a unified democratic republic, and worked really hard for both? Is it not they who are standing at the forefront of the nation’s defenses, resisting seventeen enemy divisions, shielding the Central Plains and the Northwest, defending northern China and the regions south of the lower Yangzi, and resolutely applying the Three People’s Principles and the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction? Yet the moment Wang Jingwei openly came out against the Communists and sided with the Japanese, sorcerers like Zhang Junmai and Ye Qing chimed in with tendentious articles, and the anti-Communist and diehard cliques joined in by stirring up friction. Autocratic rule has been imposed in the name of unification. The principle of unity has been discarded and the thin end of the wedge of disruption driven in. This Sima Zhao trick is obvious to every man in the street. The Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth

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4. During the period of the Three Kingdoms Sima Zhao, the prime minister of Wei, aspired to the throne. The emperor remarked, “Sima Zhao’s intention is obvious to every man in the street.”

Army, and the border region stand firmly for genuine and against sham unification, for rational and against irrational unification, and for unification in substance and against unification in form. They advocate unification for resistance and not for capitulation, for unity and not division, for progress and not for retrogression. Unification on the basis of these three—resistance, unity, and progress—is genuine, rational, and real unification. To seek unification on any other basis, whatever intrigues or tricks are used, is like “going south by driving the chariot north”: with that we beg to disagree. All the local anti-Japanese forces should be looked after equally well, without discriminating against some and favoring others; all of them should be trusted, provisioned, supported, and encouraged with rewards. There should be sincerity and not hypocrisy, large-mindedness and not pettiness, in dealing with people. If things are really done in this way, all except those with ulterior motives will unite and take the road of national unification. It is an unalterable truth that unification must be based on unity and unity in its turn must be based on progress, and that only progress can bring unity and only unity can bring unification. This is the second point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

3. Put constitutional government into effect. The long years of political tutelage have yielded nothing. Things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme; hence constitutional government is now on the order of the day. But there is still no freedom of speech, the ban on political parties has not been lifted, and actions contrary to constitutional government are constantly taken. If the constitution is drawn up on these lines, it will be a mere scrap of official paper. Such constitutional government will be no different from one-party dictatorship. Now that there is a profound national crisis, with the Japanese and W.a.g Jingwei harassing us from without and the traitors disrupting us from within, our existence as a nation and people will be placed in jeopardy unless there is a change of policy. Our government should immediately lift the ban on political parties, and encourage freedom of opinion, as a manifestation of sincere support for constitutional government. Nothing is more urgent than this in order to win the full confidence of the people, and shape the destiny of the nation anew. This is the third point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

4. Put an end to friction. Since the so-called “Measures for Restricting the Activities of Alien Parties” were introduced in February last year, the clamor for “restricting,” “corroding,” and “combating” the Communist Party has reverberated throughout the country, there has been one tragic incident after another, and

5. “Political tutelage” (tanzheng) was the second of the three periods in China’s progress toward democracy laid down by Sun Yat-sen, immediately preceding constitutional government. In his interview of September 16, 1939, translated above, Mao had argued that Sun himself had changed his views toward the end of his life, and that the immediate establishment of constitutional government was now on the order of the day.

6. Our government → The government

7. February → March
1. Let the whole country denounce Wang. Now that Traitor Wang has gathered his gang together, betrayed his country to the enemy, and signed the secret pact selling out the country, playing the jackal to the tiger, all our countrymen demand his death. But this only takes care of the open Wang Jingwei, and leaves out the undercover ones. The latter are either craftily seizing key posts and swaggering about, or working obscurely and worming their way deeply into society. In effect, the corrupt officials are part of the Wang Jingwei gang, and all the friction-mongers are its underlings. Unless there is a nationwide campaign to denounce the Wang Jingwei, a campaign in town and country and from top to bottom in which everyone is mobilized, including all political parties, government organs, armed forces, civilian bodies, the press, and the educational institutions, the Wang Jingwei gang will never be eradicated but will persist in its nefarious activities, doing incalculable damage by opening the door to the enemy from without and by subversion from within. The government should issue a decree calling on the whole people to repudiate Wang. Wherever the decree is not carried out, the officials should be called to account. The Wang Jingwei gang must be extirpated, and thrown to the jackals and tigers. This is the first point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

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6. Our government ➔ The government
7. February ➔ March
blood has flown freely. As if this were not enough, the so-called “Measures for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem” were introduced in October last year. Then there are the “Directives for Dealing with the Alien Party Problem” in the Northwest, in North China, and in Central China. People have been saying, and quite justifiably, that political restriction of the Communist Party has been succeeded by military restriction. In fact, restricting Communism equals anticommunism. And anticommunism is the cunning and pernicious scheme used by the Japanese and Wang Jingwei for subjugating China. That is why the people are suspicious and shocked and are telling one another about it, and are afraid that the bitter tragedy of a decade ago is being reenacted. Matters have gone far enough, with the Pingjiang massacre in Hunan, the Queshan massacre in Henan, the attack on the Eighth Route Army by Zhang Yiwu in Hebei, the attack on the guerrillas by Qin Qirong in Shandong, the ruthless slaughter of between five and six hundred Communists by Cheng Ruhuai in eastern Hubei, the large-scale assaults on the garrison forces of the Eighth Route Army by the Central Army in eastern Gansu, and more recently the tragedy in Shanxi, where the old army attacked the new army and invaded positions held by the Eighth Route Army. If such incidents are not immediately prohibited, both sides will be doomed, and what hope will there be then of victory over Japan? For the sake of unity in the War of Resistance, the government should order the punishment of all the perpetrators of these massacres, and announce to the whole nation that no such incident will be allowed to recur. This is the fourth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

5. Protect young people. Concentration camps have recently been set up near Xi’an, and people have been horrified to learn that more than seven hundred progressive young people from various provinces in the Northwest and in the Central Plains have already been interned there, subjected to mental and physical bondage, and treated like convicts. What crime have they committed to deserve such cruelty? Young people are the cream of the nation, and the progressive ones in particular are our most precious asset in the War of Resistance. Everyone should enjoy freedom of belief; ideas can never be suppressed by force of arms. The crime of the ten years of cultural suppression is known to everyone; why should anyone desire to repeat it today? The government should immediately issue a nationwide order for the protection of youth, for the abolition of the concentration camps near Xi’an, and for the strict prohibition of the outrageous attacks on young people in various places. This is the fifth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

6. Support the front. Troops who are fighting Japan in the very frontline and have scored successes, such as the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, and other units, are receiving the worst treatment; they are thinly clad, badly fed, and kept short of ammunition and medicines. Yet unscrupulous traitors are allowed to slander them. There is a deafening din of countless absurd slanders against them. Merit goes unrewarded and distinguished service uncited, while false changes and malicious plots become more and more brazen. This fantastic state of affairs dampens the ardor of our officers and men and wins applause only from the en-

emy; on no account must it be allowed to continue. To lift up the hearts of the troops and serve the war effort, the government should adequately provision the frontline troops who have good service records, and at the same time strictly prohibit the treacherous slanders and accusations against them. This is the sixth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

7. Proscribe the secret service organs. People are comparing the secret service agents to Zhou Xing and Lai Junchen of the Tang dynasty and Wei Zhongxian and Liu Jin of the Ming dynasty, because of their lawlessness and violence. Ignoring the enemy and concentrating on our own countrymen, they are committing innumerable murders and insatiably taking bribes; in fact the secret service is the headquarters of the rumor-mongers and a breeding ground of treason and evil. Ordinary people everywhere recoil and turn away in fear from these fiendish brutes of agents. To preserve its own prestige, the government should immediately proscribe these activities of the secret service and reorganize it, defining its duties as exclusively directed against the enemy and the traitors, so that the people’s confidence may be restored and the foundations of the state strengthened. This is the seventh point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

8. Dismiss corrupt officials. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance, there have been cases of officials netting up to 100 million yuan out of the national crisis and taking as many as eight or nine concubines. Conscription, government bonds, economic control, famine relief, and war relief, all without exception have become money-making opportunities for corrupt officials. With such a pack of wolves running wild, no wonder the country’s affairs are in chaos. The people are seething with discontent and anger, yet none dare expose the ruthlessness of these officials. To save the country from collapse, drastic and effective steps should immediately be taken to clear out all corrupt officials. This is the eighth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

9. The Testament of the Director General into effect. The Testament says: “For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution, with the aim of winning freedom and equality for China. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to achieve this aim we must arouse the masses of the people…. What great words these are. We, the 450 million people of China, are all familiar with them. But the Testament is more often chanted than carried out. Desecrators of the Testament are rewarded, while those who honor it in their acts are punished. What could be more preposterous? The government should decreed that anyone who dares to violate the Testament and who tramples…

8. Zhou Xing and Lai Junchen were notoriously cruel inquisitors of the Tang dynasty. Liu Jin and Wei Zhongxian were eunuchs of the Ming dynasty who controlled large secret services that tortured and murdered their opponents.


10. Since Sun’s death, his Testament had been read out at the beginning of every meeting of a Guomindang organ at whatever level.
on the popular masses instead of arousing them will be punished for profaning Director General Sun’s memory. This is the ninth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

10. Put the Three People’s Principles into effect. The government and Chairman Chiang have repeatedly enjoined that the Three People’s Principles should be carried out throughout the country, and regard this as an important matter.11 While it has been made in earnest, this injunction has fallen on deaf ears. Many people, making anticomunism their first duty, are giving up the war effort and doing everything possible to suppress and hold back the people as they rise to resist Japan. This is tantamount to abandoning [Sun’s] Principle of People’s Rights; they are ignoring the people’s sufferings, which is tantamount to abandoning the Principle of the People’s Livelihood. Such persons pay only lip service to the Three People’s Principles, and either ridicule as busybodies those who seriously try to put them into effect, or severely punish them. Thus, all sorts of fantastic abuses have sprung up, and the government’s prestige has reached rock bottom. An unequivocal order should immediately be issued for the strict carrying out of the Three People’s Principles throughout the country. Those who violate the order should be severely punished, and all who carry it out amply encouraged. It is only in this way that the Three People’s Principles can at long last be put into effect, and the foundations laid for victory in the war. This is the tenth point which we urge you to accept and act upon.

These ten proposals are essential measures for saving the nation and winning the war. Now that the enemy is stepping up his aggression against China and Traitor Wang is running wild, we dare not remain silent on what we feel to be crucial issues. Please accept and act upon these proposals, and great advantage will ensue to the War of Resistance and the cause of national liberation. It is with a keen sense of urgency that we state our views, and we await your considered opinion.


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11. The government and Chairman Chiang have repeatedly enjoined that the Three People’s Principles should be carried out throughout the country, and regarded this as an important matter. → The Three People’s Principles are the platform of the Guomindang.
the first to propose the organization of such an inspection corps at the Fourth Session of the National Council, or of those who are known for their seniority, good reputation, fairness, and selflessness, such as Zhang Yilin,2 Huang Renzhi,3 Jiang Hengyuan,4 and Zhang Biaofang, not a single one is included therein. With the exception of two gentlemen, Liang Shiqu,5 a member of the National Socialist Party, and Yu Jiaju,6 a member of the Nationalist Youth Party, both of whom made erroneous speeches supporting Wang and advocating peace, and therefore entered into a fierce argument with the Communists and other councilors who supported the War of Resistance, all the leaders and members of the inspection corps are counselor comrades from one party, that is, the Guomindang. No doubt, the materials collected and the conclusions reached by an inspection corps, organized in such a way, can only be biased and detrimental to the public interest. Taking into consideration that secret organs are working in collaboration with the inspection corps, we have all the more reason to believe that there is something going on behind the scenes. It is fresh in our memory that, in December two years ago, Zhang Junmai7 published his proposition that the so-called special positions of the border areas and the Eighth Route Army be abolished and Communism banned; not long after that, Wang Jingwei dispatched a public telegram going so far as to advocate a fight against the Communist Party. Assuming the inspection corps harbors the same purpose as Wang and Zhang, it may as well simply take the writings of Wang and Zhang as a draft, make a big fanfare out of it in Chongqing, and work it into a motion, so as to save the trip back and forth, traveling in this freezing wind and icy cold. If the designation of on-the-spot inspection is believed to be indispensable to manipulate public opinion, it is then ridiculous to have these people, who have such special connections, prepare a fat book of two or three hundred thousand words, based on the fabricated materials gathered from secret agencies, to denounce the Communist Party and have it serve as the legal basis for opposing, restricting, and dissolving the Communist Party. Political issues of the country can only be solved on rational political principles. How can mystifying the matter help

in the actual solution of the problems? Perhaps you will say that we Communists have misjudged the matter; the trip of the inspection corps is altogether for just and honorable purposes, without the slightest ulterior motive; its mission is to foster the cooperation of the two parties in order to lay a foundation of unity and progress and seek a rational solution of the problems in border areas. Should that be the case, we would be happy to be proved wrong because the state affairs will benefit and thus improve; when the inspection corps arrives in Yan’an, we will treat our fellow councilors to millet and to sorghum wine, specialties of Yan’an, raising our wine cups against a snowy background and talking to our hearts’ content about plans for unity and the salvation of the nation, and try to be good hosts to our distinguished guests. Your office is respectfully requested to convey this message. Kindest regards and best wishes.

Councilors of the People’s Political Council Mao Zedong, Chen Shaoyu, Lin Zuhan, and Wu Yuzhang bow respectfully

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2. Zhang Yilin (1867–1943), despite having been closely associated with Yuan Shikai, had in the 1920s and 1930s gained a reputation for integrity and public service. When the war broke out, he sought to organize an “Old Men’s Army” of men over sixty. He was the oldest member of the People’s Political Council, and was frequently outspoken in raising questions critical of and embarrassing to the Guomindang and the National Government.

3. Huang Yanpei (1865–1932) was a leading protagonist of vocational education. At this time, he had gone to Manila to supervise the sale of Chinese war bonds there.

4. Jiang Hengyuan (1886–1961) was a native of Jiangsu. He taught during the 1920s and 1930s at various universities.

5. Liang Shiqu (1903–1987), a native of Zhejiang, studied English literature at Harvard and Columbia, and later taught at Beijing University and other institutions.

6. Yu Jiaju (1898–1976) was a native of Hubei. He studied philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and afterward taught this subject at various universities.

7. On Zhang Junmai, see above, the relevant note to the text of January 28, 1939.