MAO
ZEDONG'S
ART OF WAR

Liu Jikun
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Preface

In the several thousand years of Chinese history, Mao Zedong was the most outstanding military strategist of all times. With "millet plus rifles," he defeated the Kuomintang's "aircraft plus cannons." Starting with a handful of people and rifles, he created the Liberation Army of two or three million men. Following the motto: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," he eventually became the supreme ruler of the Red regime. These were facts that no one will dispute, whether he is a Chinese or a foreigner, a Leftist, middle of the roader or Rightist, belonging to the upper, middle or lower stratum. A mere scholar, Mao Zedong actually was able "to contrive strategic plans at his headquarters and win victories on the battlefield a thousand miles away." Even though this fact is not widely known, no one can deny that he was an extraordinary military genius.

Mao Zedong certainly did not win victories on the battlefield by good luck: he had made painstaking studies of wars and military affairs and devised a military strategy of his own, which is comparable to the art of war of the famous Sun Zi in ancient China, if not better.

In this book, Mao's military strategy is illustrated with stories of the battles he had fought. Even though the author of this book is only an armchair strategist, he believes readers will be benefited by knowing about Mao's art of war. As people say, "life is a battlefield," "the business world is a battlefield" and "the political arena is a battlefield." Readers will certainly find Mao Zedong's military strategy applicable and highly useful in their personal endeavours and careers.

As everyone knows, "Dear Comrade Jiang Qing" was not Mao Zedong's beloved wife. His beloved wife was Yang
Kaihui, a famous beauty of the period of the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Yang Kaihui’s father, Yang Changji, was Mao Zedong’s teacher.
In 1913, when Mao Zedong was a young student at the First Normal School of Hunan. Yang Changji was the teacher of ethics in that school.
An avid student, the young Mao Zedong listened attentively to Yang’s lectures and took careful notes. These notes, known as “Classroom Notes,” are now preserved in Mao’s birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan province.
Some of the notes are on the art of war:
When two armies are at war, the cool-headed one will win and the arrogant one will be defeated.
The spear kills and the shield protects, each having its use. This is called tool determining the man.
When pitting five thousand soldiers against an enemy of a hundred thousand, one must drive them as if they were an exhausted army or a newly broken horse. One must fight a desperate battle in order to survive.
Soldiers are defenders of the country. They cannot perform their duties unless they are physically strong and, in particular, they cannot perform outstanding services unless they are well-educated. People in our country are physically weak. As soldiers are recruited on a voluntary basis, thugs and ignorant persons are often enlisted. When they are driven to battle, they disperse before engaging the enemy. Over the years, our country has suffered a great deal from this.
When his hand was bitten by a poisonous snake, a brave man would cut it off at the wrist. This was not because he did not value his hand, but because he could not save his life without cutting off his hand.
Sun Zi thinks that going to war is the last resort. Long wars with much slaughtering are not justified and winning many victories in wars is a shameful deed. He never claimed to be a master of the art of war nor a man of wise words.
Fighting a hundred battles and winning a hundred victories is not the best of the best. Subjugating an enemy without fighting a battle is the best of the best. Therefore, a man good at fighting battles is not a wise man, nor a brave man. (Quoted from Sun Zi’s Art of War, “Preparing for War.”)
To kill is to let live.
Winning victory in a protracted war is the result of perseverance and, in the last analysis, the result of unremitting efforts.

Of course, Mao Zedong did not take down every word his teacher Yang had said in the classroom. He jotted down only the main points. But when Yang talked about the art of war, Mao Zedong wrote down almost every word because to him every word his teacher said was highly valuable.
Mao’s future father-in-law taught him many things, but a couplet gave him the deepest impression:
Don’t be disturbed even when Mount Taishan collapses in front of you:
Don’t be lose your wits even when a fierce tiger is at your heels.

In the scores of years of his life, Mao Zedong had braved untold dangers and shown extraordinary courage. This was inseparable from Yang Changji’s teachings. On many occasions “Mount Taishan collapsed in front of him” and “a fierce tiger was at his heels.” But each time he was able to turn danger into safety. He managed not only to save his life but also to turn defeat into victory.
The passages on military affairs in the "Classroom Notes" may be considered the embryo of Mao Zedong's art of war. From his teacher Yang Changji, Mao learned the rudiments of military strategy. There would have been no Mao Zedong, the military genius, without his teacher's initiation. Yang Changji's lectures on military strategy, though limited in content, were the source or origin of Mao Zedong's art of war.

Mao Zedong had written down some quotations from Sun Zi's Art of War in his "Classroom Notes," but he never read the military classic, neither at that time, nor in the next twenty years. It was not until 1936, the year before the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, did he earnestly study the book for the first time. By that time, he had already fought a great number of victorious or disastrous battles.

During a meeting with some senior intellectuals in the scenic Hangzhou on December 21, 1965, Mao said: "Kuomintang army officers who were graduates from the War College didn't know how to fight on the battlefield. On the contrary, those who'd studied only a few months at Huangpu Military Academy were competent commanders on the battlefield. Few of our marshals and generals are college graduates. I myself had at first never read any military books. I'd read Zuo's Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals, History as a Mirror and Tales of the Three Kingdoms. There are descriptions of battles in these books. But when I came to fight a battle, whatever impression I had about them went completely out of my mind. We didn't carry a single book with us when we fought battles. All we did was to analyse the situation of the struggle between the enemy and ourselves. the actual conditions."

Mao Zedong was the supreme commander of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of the Military Commission of the Communist Party's Central Committee. But when he first joined the army, it was not the Communist army but the Kuomintang army that he joined, because the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army did not exist at that time. On October 10, 1911, the whole of China was shaken by the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, which marked the beginning of the Revolution of 1911 that overthrew the Manchu or Qing dynasty and created the republic. Hunan was the first province to respond to the uprising, and the political situation there was very tense. Despite the fact that the Manchu governor Yang Wending had imposed a curfew on the whole city of Changsha, the provincial capital, members of the Revolutionary Party were still secretly active both inside and outside the city.

With the permission of the school principal, a member of the Revolutionary Party came one day to speak at Xiangxiang School in the provincial capital, where Mao Zedong was a student. The man made a stirring speech. Several students stood up from their seats afterwards and expressed support for his stand. They fiercely denounced the Qing government and called on the students to take action for the founding of a republic. Mao Zedong, too, was stirred by the speech and decided to go to Hubei province and join the Revolutionary Army led by the Hubei military governor Li Yuanhong. Transportation problems, however, prevented him from taking the trip.
Later, an uprising was successfully staged in Hunan, and a student army was organized in Changsha. But Mao did not join it because he thought it was a disorderly band. He decided to join the regular Revolutionary Army, which later became the National Revolutionary Army, that is, the army of the Kuomintang. After joining the army, Mao Zedong became a soldier in the Left Company of the First Battalion, 50th Regiment, 25th Mixed Brigade of the Hunan New Army. His salary was seven silver dollars a month.

After serving for half a year in the army without fighting a single battle, Mao became disappointed and left. In October 1916, a students' extracurricular voluntary army was organized in the First Normal School of Hunan, where Mao Zedong had enrolled to continue his schooling. This most irregular army had high-sounding declared purposes, which were "to foster patriotism, promote a military spirit, study military strategy and conduct national education." The student volunteers in the whole school formed a battalion, with two companies under it. As Mao was one of the first to join, he was elected a company commander.

Mao Zedong fought his first battle with this students' voluntary army on November 20, 1917, in which he successfully defended his school and disarmed some soldiers of a defeated Northern Warlord army.

A vivid account of the battle has been given by Zhou Shizhao, a close friend of Mao who studied at the same school:

"News arrived one day after lunch that some soldiers of a defeated unit of the Northern Warlord's Eighth Division were beating a precipitate retreat from the area around Zhuzhou and Xiangtan towards Changsha. They were already at Monkey Rock, less than two kilometres from the First Normal School. As the soldiers were not sure who had taken Changsha, they did not dare to proceed and were taking a rest there and seizing food from the peasants. The news threw the whole school into confusion. After hearing the conditions of the defeated unit and knowing they were hungry, fatigued and badly shaken and had no knowledge that the Guangxi army had not yet entered Changsha, Mao judged they could be driven away. He told more than two hundred of the bolder ones in the students' voluntary army to arm themselves with the wooden rifles they used in their daily drill and station themselves on top of Miaogao Hill behind the school. He then got in touch with the local police station and asked the police chief to send a number of policemen with real rifles to lay in ambush in front of the students. At dusk, as the Northern Warlord soldiers began to probe their way northward along the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway at the foot of Miaogao Hill. Mao told the policemen to open fire and the students on the hill top to set off firecrackers. They then shouted together, 'Fu Liangzuo is gone. The Guangxi army is in the city. Hand over your arms and live!' The defeated army did not dare to resist. A representative was sent over to negotiate and the entire unit was disarmed. The students in the whole school then came out and took the rifles and other weapons to the school.... The disarmed soldiers were told to sleep in the open on the school's playground. The following day, the city's commercial chamber distributed some money to the soldiers and sent all of them home. Mao Zedong's daring exploit became the talk of the whole school. All saying that he was 'a man of extraordinary valour.'"

Mao Zedong had another school friend named Zou Yunzhen, who had asked him at the time, "What if the defeated soldiers had returned fire? Wasn't it too dangerous?" The young Mao answered in a calm voice, "If the defeated soldiers had intended to take the city, they would have
started an attack that night. Since they had chosen this path instead of entering Changsha’s northern gate, they must have been too tired and discouraged. That’s why they immediately surrendered when we shouted at them.” In the first battle he had ever fought in his life, Mao Zedong had fully displayed his military genius. The battle ended close to what Sun Zi said that “Subjugating the enemy without fighting a battle is the best of the best,” which Mao had written down in his “Classroom Notes.” In the battle to disarm the Northern Warlord’s soldiers, Mao was also inspired by the battle fought in A. D. 383 between General Xie Xuan of the Eastern Jin dynasty and Fu Jian, ruler of the state of Qin. General Xie Xuan made an awe-inspiring display of his forces before launching an attack on the Qin city of Shouyang. When Fu Jian and his brother mounted the city wall and saw the neat array of the Eastern Jin soldiers, they were overawed. Even the bushes and trees on the nearby Bagong Hill appeared to them like enemy soldiers. In the end, the Fu brothers were utterly routed. Mao learned from Xie Xuan to make a powerful display of forces and succeeded in his first try. In 1918, another tangled war broke out between the northern and southern warlords. Changsha was occupied by Zhang Jingrao. Together with some others, Mao Zedong organized a guard on the basis of the students’ voluntary army to safeguard the school and served as its captain. At first, ‘the city was in great disorder. He organized a students’ peace-keeping guard together with students from other schools and patrolled the city streets until the northern army arrived.’ Later, ‘when war broke out in Hunan, the residents were aroused from their sleep by gunfire several times a night. The students were highly competent in safeguarding the schools.... The faculty and students even played music as if there was not a war raging around them.”

2

Go to the Mountains and Learn from the Bandits
— Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun

When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party fell out in the summer of 1927 after a short period of cooperation, Chiang Kai-shek started a “party purge” in which a large number of Communists were killed. Mao Zedong naturally did not want to stretch his neck and wait for the executioner’s knife to come down. He secretly slipped back to Hunan, where he made three different arrangements for those Communists who were members of the workers’ and peasants’ armed units:

1. All members of the Workers’ Guard and the Peasant Self-Defence Army who had been detected by the Kuomintang were to “go to the mountains and learn from the bandits.”

2. Members of the workers’ and peasants’ armed units who had not yet been discovered should continue to make use of their lawful identity and wait for an opportunity to start an uprising and display the Communist hammer-and-sickle flag.

3. Those workers’ and peasants’ armed units which were weak and not properly organized should bury their weapons in the ground and disband or join the armed units under He Long and Ye Ting or find their way into the Kuomintang army or local militia and try to engineer revolts and seize weapons.

In the view of the Kuomintang, “going to the mountains and learning from the bandits” was “going to the mountains and becoming bandits.” But Mao Zedong’s idea was different. He had obviously learned this from classical novels like Outlaws of the Marsh, which he had read vor-
ciously when he was a boy. The novel describes 108 heroes of the greenwood who banded together with heart and soul and fought for a common cause.

"We can build a base for our military force in the mountains," said Mao Zedong. "Without a military force, we shall be powerless to deal with any change in the situation in the future."

He also said, "I wanted to make friends with men of the greenwood. I decided to go to the mountains and lakes, where I can make friends with men of the greenwood."

"Going to the mountains and learning from the bandits" is a very important part of Mao Zedong's military strategy. If he did not have that courage and experience, he would never have been able to command an army of several million men and fought his way to victory in the whole country.

By the time of the autumn harvest in 1927, the workers' and peasants' armed units were no longer poorly organized bands of men; they had become a full-fledged army of considerable strength. Seeing that the time had arrived, Mao Zedong put forward a proposal to the Political Bureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee in which he stated: "People in Hunan are more extensively organized than in Guangdong. What they need are weapons. At the present time of upheavals, there is a more urgent need for weapons. A plan which I have drafted and the Standing Committee has approved not long ago calls for the formation of an army division, which can occupy five or six counties and establish a political base, wherefrom an agrarian revolution can spread to the whole province."

Mao also pointed out that in the agrarian revolution, "We should not carry the Kuomintang flag, but should hold high the flag of the Communist Party."

In a discussion on the military problem in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Mao Zedong for the first time put forward the world-shaking slogan: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." He said: "The purpose of the Autumn Harvest Uprising is to solve the land problem of the peasants. No one can deny this. To start the uprising, it is not enough to rely solely on the strength of the peasants. There should be military assistance with one or two army regiments. Otherwise, it will certainly end in failure. The ultimate aim of the uprising is to seize political power. It will be self-deception if there is not an army to guard it or seize it. Our Party committed mistakes because it overlooked military matters. We should now devoted 60 percent of our energies to military activities so that we can put into effect that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun and is built with guns."

Mao Zedong reorganized the armed units that had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising into the First Division of the First Corp of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. The division was composed of three regiments.

The First Regiment included the Headquarters Guard Regiment of the Second Front Army of the National Revolutionary Army's Fourth Group Army as its backbone, the Pingjiang Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers from Hunan province and the Peasants' Self-Defence Army of Chongyang and Tongcheng from Hubei province.

The Second Regiment was formed by the workers' armed units of Anyuan and the Communist-controlled police corps of the Anyuan coal mine as its backbone as well as by the armed peasants from Pingxiang, Anfu, Lianhua and Liling.

The Third Regiment was composed mainly of the Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers of Liuyang and some of the Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers of Pingjiang and some soldiers from the Guard Regiment.
There were about five thousand men in the three regiments. They were led by the Front Committee with Mao Zedong as its Party representative and Lu Deming its commander.

Mao Zedong and the others decided to attack Changsha along three routes:

The Second Regiment with Anyuan miners and the original coal mine police corps as its main force was to take the first route. They were to attack Pingxiang and Liling and coordinate with peasant uprisings in Liling and Zhuzhou to form a cordon around Changsha.

The First Regiment with the original Guard Regiment and Pingjiang's Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers as its main force was to proceed from Xiushui and attack Pingjiang, start peasant uprisings and march on Changsha after taking Pingjiang.

The Third Regiment with the Workers' and Peasants' Volunteers of Liuyang and a small part of the Guard Regiment as its main force was to attack Liuyang from Tonggu. Start peasant uprisings everywhere in Liuyang and then launch a direct attack on Changsha.

The forces advancing along the three routes were to coordinate their operations. After successfully carrying out their missions along the routes, they would be assisted by workers and peasants in Changsha who would stage an uprising in the city to coordinate with their attack from the outside.

This strategic plan of Mao Zedong's appeared to be perfect, but was in fact not "great." Changsha was guarded by the troops of the warlord Tang Shengzhi. The city's defence was practically impregnable. To take a city like Changsha was far from easy.

Before Mao Zedong was able to put his plan into execution, something happened to himself. While travelling past Zhangjiafang on the border between Liuyang and Tonggu, he was arrested by the local militia and almost lost his life.

Mao Zedong later recounted his hairbreadth escape from death to the American reporter Edgar Snow: "While I was organizing the army and travelling between the Hanyang miners and the peasant guards, I was captured by some min-t' uan militiamen, working with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang terror was then at its height and hundreds of suspected Reds were being shot. I was ordered to be taken to the min-t' uan headquarters. Where I was to be killed. Borrowing several tens of dollars from a comrade, however, I attempted to bribe the escort to free me. The ordinary soldiers were mercenaries, with no special interest in seeing me killed, and they agreed to release me, but the subaltern in charge refused to permit it. I therefore decided to attempt to escape, but had no opportunity to do so until I was within about two hundred yards of the min-t' uan headquarters. At that point I broke loose and ran into the fields. I reached a high place, above a pond, with some tall grass surrounding it. and there I hid until sunset. The soldiers pursued me, and forced some peasants to help them search for me. Many times they came very near, once or twice so close that I could almost have touched them, but somehow I escaped discovery, although half a dozen times I gave up hope, feeling certain I would be recaptured. At last, when it was dusk, they abandoned the search. At once I set off across the mountains, travelling all night."

After making his escape, Mao Zedong was elated and decided to put his military plan into execution.

On September 9, 1919, the Autumn Harvest Uprising broke out on the Hunan-Jiangxi border. Railway workers took the lead in destroying the railways connecting Changsha with Yueyang and Zhuzhou, cutting off the enemy's main arteries of transport.
At the same time, the First Regiment and the new Fourth Regiment departed from Xiushui and started to attack Pingjiang. When they reached Jinping, the Fourth Regiment suddenly revolted, turning its guns on the First Regiment and putting it at a disadvantageous position. The Third Regiment led by Mao Zedong himself proceeded from Xiushui in the direction of Liuyang. On the way, it fought a fierce battle with an enemy unit. When Mao learned that the First Regiment was being attacked from both the front and the rear and suffered setbacks, he decided to abandon the attack on Changsha and ordered all the troops to rendezvous with the Third Regiment at Wenjiangshi in Liuyang. Mao Zedong and his troops arrived at Wenjiashi on September 19. After what remained of the First and Second Regiments also arrived, the three groups were reorganized into a new unit of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. Mao Zedong had written a lyric poem about the Autumn Harvest Uprising:

Autumn Harvest Uprising
—to the tune of Xi Jiang Yue

A revolutionary army of workers and peasants.  
A hammer-and-sickle flag flying.  
They march through Kuang and Lu.  
Heading straight for the Xiao and Xiang.  
A deep hatred they hold against the landlords.  
Who oppress them on all sides.  
When the sky is overcast at autumn harvest.  
A revolt, like an angry thunder, broke out.

3 Establishing an Independent Regime by Armed Force—A Huge Vat Can Be Broken with a Small Rock

Mao Zedong abandoned the military action aimed at taking the city of Changsha because he did not want "to throw an egg against a rock" and to lead the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army to certain doom. But his good intention was not understood by everybody. A division commander named Yu Sadu was against him at the time, denouncing him for intending to run away and become a "bandit chieftain in the mountains." Mao argued, "It is not because we do not want to take Changsha, but because we cannot take it now. The reason is that the Chinese revolution is, in essence, a peasant revolution. The enemy's control of the countryside is weak, which is good for us to find a place to stay, strike roots, develop and expand our forces."

He also pointed out, "Throughout history, 'mountain bandits' have never been eliminated. If we are to become 'mountain bandits,' we shall be a different kind of 'mountain bandits.' These 'mountain bandits' are led by the Communist Party and have their political stand, policies and methods: they are different from the 'mountain bandits' of the old days."

Mao also stressed the importance of making a strategic retreat to the countryside in the border area of Hunan, Jiangxi and Guangdong provinces. "We can take part in a peasant uprising that may occur in any one of the three provinces in the future."

On the morning of September 10, a meeting of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army was held on the playground of a school in Wenjiashi.
In his address to the meeting, Mao Zedong further developed his idea: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

“Brothers, the Great Revolution has failed and workers and peasants are being brutally slaughtered. The revolution is at a low ebb. But victory and defeat are common occurrences to a military man. Failure is the mother of success. A high tide of the revolution will sooner or later arrive. We suffered in the past because we did not have guns. We must, therefore, have our own armed forces. Some people say that Chiang Kai-shek is very powerful and we are very weak. They doubt if we can achieve any success. In my opinion, we are weak only temporarily. We are like a piece of rock and Chiang Kai-shek is like a big water vat. There will certainly be a day when the small rock that is us will break the big water vat that is Chiang Kai-shek.”

At the end of his address, Mao again emphasized, “At present, the enemy is big and we are small, the enemy is strong and we are weak. A city like Changsha is not a place for us to stay. We must change our strategy and go to the countryside, where the enemy’s rule is weak and we can conserve our strength and develop our forces.”

Mao Zedong was a gifted speaker. His address to the meeting was like a bugle call, which was immediately responded by the men who followed him and marched southward.

The march was uneventful during the first few days. But on the early morning of the fifth day, the men of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army were aroused from their sleep by an enemy surprise attack. Lu Deming, the commander, was hit by a bullet and killed. Angered and saddened by the loss of their comrade-in-arm, Mao Zedong and his men attacked and took the county town of Lianhua, where they destroyed the Kuomintang county headquarters and county government. They broke into the prison and freed more than a hundred Communists who had been locked up there.

Continuing the march for three more days, they arrived at a village called Sanwan in Yongxin county. Sanwan was a very small village, but it occupies an important place in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. This was because an event known as the Sanwan Reorganization took place there. In the reorganization, Mao Zedong adopted some of the most important measures for the organization of an army. These measures included setting up Communist Party organizations at all levels in the army — a Party group in each squad, a Party branch in each company and a Party committee in each regiment — and appointing Party representatives to all units above the company. A Front Committee was established with Mao Zedong as its secretary.

The Party commands the guns! This was realized through the Sanwan Reorganization.

A Soldiers Committee was set up in each army unit to practise democratic administration and a system of political, military and economic democracy. New rules of discipline were laid down, which included the abolition of corporal punishments and the execution of deserters, prohibition of beating or swearing at people and of press-ganging labourers, and fairness in business transactions.

Mao Zedong also adopted a brilliant measure, which was regarded at the time as “buying popular support.” He declared that anyone in the army could “leave or stay on a voluntary basis.” Those who wanted to leave were given certificates and travelling expenses. These people did not necessarily look upon Mao Zedong as their saviour; they at least would not harbour hatred for him.

Shortly afterwards, Mao Zedong marched his army to the Jinggang Mountains in Jiangxi province, where he not
only "went up the mountains and learned from the bandits," but also "formed an alliance with bandits."

The Jinggang Mountains were then the hideout of two bandits named Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, each having over six hundred underlings and sixty dilapidated rifles.

Mao Zedong later told Edgar Snow: "Two former bandit leaders near Chingkanshan [[Jinggang Mountains]], named Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai, joined the Red Army in the winter of 1927. This increased the strength to about three regiments. Wang and Yuan were each made regimental commander."

Although the two bandit leaders had joined the Red Army, Mao Zedong did not regard them as comrades in the Communist Party and was on guard against them. He said, "These two men, although former bandits, had thrown in their force with the Nationalist Revolution, and were now ready to fight against the reaction. While I remained on Chingkanshan they were faithful Communists, and carried out the orders of the Party. Later on, when they were left alone at Chingkanshan, they returned to their bandit habits. Subsequently they were killed by the peasants, by then organized and Sovietized and able to defend themselves."

Making use of bandits for his own purpose is a brilliant part of Mao Zedong's art of war.

In the spring of 1928, Zhu De had fought his way to the Jinggang Mountains with what remained of the army in the Nanchang Uprising and a peasant army that had taken part in a southern Hunan uprising. On the Jinggang Mountains, Zhu De joined force with the army of Mao Zedong. This was the world-famous "junction on the Jinggang Mountains." The two armies joined together and formed the Fourth Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Zhu De as its commander-in-chief and Mao Zedong as its political commissar.

On the Jinggang Mountains. Mao made every effort to establish a Red regime so as "to carve out a territory by armed force. encircle the cities from the countryside and eventually attack and occupy the cities and liberate the whole of China." He knew that in order to consolidate the Red regime he must build a powerful and well-disciplined Red Army.

In the spring of 1928, Mao Zedong laid down the Three Rules of Discipline for the Red Army:

1. Obey orders in your actions.
2. Don't take anything from the workers and peasants.
3. Turn in all things taken from local bullies.

In the summer of the same year, he supplemented the Three Rules of Discipline with Six Points of Attention:

1. Put back the doors you have taken down for bedding.
2. Put back the straw you have used for bedding.
3. Speak politely.
5. Return everything you borrow.
6. Pay for anything you damage.

After 1929, Mao Zedong changed "Don't take anything from the workers and peasants" into "Don't take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses" and "Turn in all things taken from local bullies" into "Turn in all money raised" and then into "Turn in everything captured."

To the Six Points of Attention he added two more: "Don't bathe within sight of women" and "Don't search the pockets of captives." The Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention were later further improved and even set to music and sung by every soldier in the Red Army.
Mao Zedong paid particular attention to training an efficient army and preparing it for war. The Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention were part of the training and preparations.

4 The Enemy Advances. We Retreat

— Concealing the Army in the Mountains and Forests

In May 1929, Mao Zedong put forward his important sixteen-character formula:

_The enemy advances, we retreat;_
_The enemy camps, we harass;_
_The enemy tires, we attack;_
_The enemy retreats, we pursue._

The sixteen-character formula constituted the basic principles of his tactics in guerrilla warfare and a golden key to his extraordinary exploits.

The formula, however, was not coined in one day; it was a summing-up of the lessons Mao had learned in long years of bloody wars.

The earliest version of the sixteen-character formula was:

_He goes out, we come in;_
_He comes in, we go out;_
_Avoid the strong, attack the weak;_
_Keep our forces in hiding._

Mao Zedong's original sixteen-character formula was designed solely for the Red Army base area in the Jinggang Mountains. It meant: When the enemy leaves the mountains, we go in; when the enemy comes into the mountains, we leave; keep clear of the enemy's main force and attack his weak points; conceal the Red Army units and attack the enemy at unexpected places.

"When the Red regime is encircled by the White regime, it is necessary to make use of the dangerous mountain terrain," said Mao.

But why did Mao choose the Jinggang Mountains as his base area?

The answer can be found in a Chinese Communist book of history: "The reasons were: 1. The Jinggang Mountains form the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountains. They extend to Guangdong in the south and to Hubei in the north and form the border between Jiangxi and Hunan. All revolutionary activities there would influence people in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi provinces. 2. There were relatively well-organized Party cells, people who were sympathetic of the revolution, and an armed force with rich experience in the struggle. 3. There were villages in the Jinggang Mountains where rice and a variety of other food grain are produced. Close to the Jinggang Mountains were areas fairly rich in produce, from where the Red Army could collect food and money. 4. The Jinggang Mountains are located between Jiangxi's Suichuan, Ninggang, Yongxin and Lianhua counties and Hunan's Chaling county. With Ninggang as the centre, the mountains are 250 kilometres in circumference and forty kilometres in length and breadth. There were only five narrow and rugged paths leading into the mountains where there were many sheer precipices and tall trees. The dangerous terrain made the mountains easy to defend and hard to attack and provided the Red Army with a favourable place to create.
an independent regime."

The same question was also answered in a history book published by the Kuomintang: "The reason that the Red bandits were able to spread and grow was to be found in the geographical condition of the locality where they were active. Southern Jiangxi on the upper reaches of the River Gan is an area of high mountains about 700-800 metres above sea level. Long years of erosion had created many long and deep gorges in the mountains. There were, however, pieces of flat land in the mountains where there were fertile fields and beautiful ponds watered by sufficient rainfall. Steep mountains and dense forests made the place easy to defend and difficult to attack. Ordinary bandits usually built their dens in poor, out-of-the-way areas. But the bandit dens in Jiangxi, located behind natural barriers, were economically self-sufficient. The well-known bandit dens at Jinggang and Donggu were located on dangerous terrain. Every time the bandits were defeated, they withdrew to their dens, put up a stubborn defence at strategic spots and refused to come out."

What happened to the Jinggang Mountains after Mao Zedong had turned them into his revolutionary base? The Communist history book only says that "the masses were fully mobilized to strike down the local bullies, divide the land and establish a workers' and peasants' regime." A Kuomintang history book, however, gives a more vivid and objective account: "After having entrenched themselves in southern Jiangxi for several years, the Red bandits had not only eliminated the boundaries of the cultivated land (The boundaries of the former owners of the land were destroyed when land was divided), but also changed the local terrain. Except for the mountains and rivers which were beyond man's power to change, even the roads in the mountains had changed. A path that used to be a link between two villages might now be overgrown with bushes. Narrow trails now wound their ways through former gullies and marshes. Military maps are extremely important for an army on the march or during a battle. But if an army was to follow the old military maps there, it would soon lose its way."

From the above we can see that Mao Zedong had brought about vast changes in the Jinggang Mountains and that military maps had become useless and Kuomintang officers who followed the old maps became lost in the mountains.

The author had no intention of derogating Kuomintang generals. But Chiang Kai-shek himself had said at the time, "Putting down the bandits is even more difficult than fighting a great war. This is because they are familiar with the local terrain, coerce the people to follow them, avoid the strong and attack the weak. The government troops pursued them here and there and exhausted themselves without achieving any result."

As the movement started by Mao Zedong in the Jinggang Mountains steadily gathered momentum, even Chiang Kai-shek was alarmed. But was the movement always victorious without suffering any defeat? No. In July 1928 some fanatical "Leftists" in the higher hierarchy of the Chinese Communist Party advocated that "the petty bourgeoisie must be rendered propertyless before they can be forced to take part in the revolution." These people did not know how to fight on the battlefield but liked to issued orders. When Mao Zedong was in Yongxin away from the Jinggang Mountains, some "Leftist" officials took the Fourth Red Army to southern Hunan and attacked the town of Chenzhou. The battle led to the total fiasco of the 29th Regiment and the loss of half of the Red Army. As a result of the "Leftist" policies, the majority of people of the intermediate strata were driven to the side of the gentry; the poor peasants as a class became isolat-
ed: and most of the county towns and flat lands in the Red areas were occupied by the Kuomintang army. Mao Zedong himself, however, was not flurried by the attacks of the Kuomintang army. When the 28th and 29th Regiments were about to march to southern Hunan, he took two battalions of the 31st Regiment to Yongxin to block the invading enemy from Jian. Mao Zedong said that in that battle he used the tactic of “guerrilla warfare on all sides.” “Sheltered by the broad masses of the people,” he said, “we adopted the method of ‘guerrilla warfare on all sides’ and succeeded in detaining eleven regiments of the enemy for twenty-five days at a spot fifteen kilometres from the county town of Yongxin.”

### Turning Every Man into a Soldier

— Placing of the Party and People on a War Footing

In the lyric poem *Jinggang Mountains* (to the tune of Xi Jiang Yue) Mao Zedong wrote:

**Jinggang Mountains**

— to the tune of Xi Jiang Yue

*Below the mountains, flags and banners are in sight, On the mountaintop, bugles and drums echo. Surrounded by thousands of enemies We stand firmly to our ground.*

*Our defence is as strong as a fortress. And our wills unite us as one.*

As everyone knows, Mao Zedong always stood for fighting a “people’s war” and even advocated “turning the whole population into soldiers.” This military idea of his was formed as early as the period when he fought in the Jinggang Mountains. In “The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains,” he wrote: “Since the struggle in the border area is exclusively military, both the Party and the masses have to be placed on a war footing. How to deal with the enemy, how to fight, has become the central problems in our daily life. An independent regime must be an armed one. Wherever such an area is located, it will be immediately occupied by the enemy if armed forces are lacking or inadequate, or if wrong tactics are used in dealing with the enemy.” The defensive battle at Huangyangjie described in the poem above was a “people’s war.”

The battle at Huangyangjie was fought according to Mao’s tactics, but the troops were not commanded by him, but by a Red Army battalion commander named Chen Yian.

In mid-August 1928 Mao Zedong took two battalions of the Red Army 31st Regiment to the triangular area formed by Yongxin, Lianhua and Chaling counties. When news of the 29th Regiment being totally wiped out reached him, he immediately decided to lead the Third Battalion of the 31st Regiment to Guidong to meet the defeated 28th Regiment and ordered the First Battalion to rush back and defend the Jinggang Mountains.

The victorious enemy was now heading straight for the Jinggang Mountains. The Red Army battalion commander Chen Yian sped back with only two companies of the soldiers. They crossed a mountain peak and manned their po-
sitions at Huangyangjie. All the inhabitants in the mountains, both men and women, young and old, were then mobilized to defend the Red base with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on. Huangyangjie is located on the northern part of the Jinggang Mountains at an elevation of over 1,300 metres above sea level. It could be approached only through a narrow path in a deep gorge overgrown with brambles and flanked by sheer cliffs. As Mao Zedong described it: "After passing Huangyangjie, no precipitous place is worth a glance."

The enemy launched its first attack on August 30. With the Red Army firing from the mountaintops and with innumerable bamboo spikes planted by the people in the grass, it was extremely difficult for the enemy to move forward. Each enemy soldier had to keep a certain distance from the next one before he could fire his gun.

Although the enemy army attacking the Jinggang Mountains was more than a division strong, the soldiers who could be positioned at the first line of fire were limited by the terrain to no more than a battalion. The two companies of the Red Army reinforced their positions on the mountain and collected many rocks to throw at the enemy.

When the enemy failed to make any advance in a single file, they began to cover the attack with machine-guns. But when firing at a low angle, the machine-guns prevented their own soldiers from moving forward, and when firing at a high angle, the bullets flew into the air. Meanwhile the Red Army on top of the mountains could aim their guns quite accurately and hit targets every time they fired. The bamboo spikes were also formidable weapons. When an enemy soldier stepped on one of them, he was immediately put out of action.

The attack lasted until four o'clock in the afternoon when the Red Army on the mountain took out a 82mm mortar and fired three shots. Upon hearing the sound of the mortar, the enemy thought there were thousands of Red Army men with cannons on the mountains. Scared out of their wits, they turned and fled.

Mao Zedong not only wrote a poem describing the battle, but also reported the successful defence of the Jinggang Mountains to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. "When our men were returning but had not yet reached their destination," he wrote, "enemy units from Hunan and Jiangxi seized the opportunity to attack the Jinggang Mountains on August 30. Using their points of vantage, the defending troops, numbering less than one battalion, fought back, routed the enemy and saved the base."

What else did Mao Zedong do on the Jinggang Mountains? In today's words, Mao Zedong was very good at "doing political and ideological work."

In Sun Zi’s Art of War there are talks about the Tao: "The Tao enables the people to be of one heart with their superiors. They can be told to die or to live and they become fearless of danger."

Mao’s political and ideological work achieved the same purpose as the Tao in Sun Zi’s Art of War. In the words of the Kuomintang, "Mao Zedong made the Red Army and people on the Jinggang Mountains willingly sacrifice their lives for him." In Mao’s own words, "... making the men feel they are fighting for themselves and for the people and not for somebody else."

First of all, Mao Zedong told his men that "they are fighting for themselves, for the working class and the peasantry." If they were victorious, they could stand up and become their own masters and divide the land of the landlords. Words like these could certainly spur every poor man to action.
He also practised "democracy" in the army. "The officers do not beat the men: officers and men receive equal treatment: soldiers are free to hold meetings and speak out: trivial formalities have been done away with: and the accounts are open for all to inspect."

He believed his method could work wonders: "The very soldiers who had no courage in the White army yesterday are very brave in the Red Army today: such is the effect of democracy. The Red Army is like a furnace in which all captured soldiers are transmuted the moment they come over. In China the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army."

Mao Zedong was particularly good at working on captured enemy soldiers. Very frankly he said: "The most effective method in propaganda directed at the enemy forces is to release captured soldiers and give the wounded medical treatment. Whenever soldiers, platoon leaders, or company or battalion commanders of the enemy forces are captured, we immediately conduct propaganda among them: they are divided into those wishing to stay and those wishing to leave, and the latter are given travelling expenses and set free. This immediately knocks the bottom out the enemy's slander that 'the Communist bandits kill everyone on sight.'"

Mao Zedong's method had caused a Kuomintang official named Yang Chisheng to exclaim, "How vicious!" Mao was very pleased with himself when Yang's remark became known to him. Mao Zedong always cherished the memory of the days he spent in the Jinggang Mountains. In addition to the poem he wrote in the autumn of 1928, he wrote two more lyric poems on the Jinggang Mountains in May 1965:

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Jinggang Mountains
— to the tune of Nian Nu Jiao

Thousands of tall trees
Cover hundreds of miles.
Piercing the sky above spectacular southern mountains.
What do I see on my return to the old place?
More towers, pavilions and terraces.
Before the monument at Five Wells
And at Huangyangjie
Cars speed as if on wings.
The scenery is like a picture.
A green sea, as the ancients described it.
Thirty-eight years have passed in a flash.
The world has changed.
As though the sky has been overturned.
I still remember the days of war.
Braving dangers as if it happened yesterday.
The same lofty aspirations are still here.
A bright moon hangs in the sky.
While wind and thunder rage.
As the rooster crows,
All devils vanish like smoke and mist.

Reascending the Jinggang Mountains
— to the tune of Shui Diao Ge Tou

I have long wished to touch the clouds
And once again climb the Jinggang Mountains.
Coming to the old place from afar.
I find old scenes replaced by new ones.
Orioles sing and swallows dance everywhere.
And everywhere are babbling streams.
The roads ascend into the clouds.
After passing Huangyangjie,
No precipitous place is worth a glance.
Wind and thunder rage.
Flags and banners are unfurled
In the world of mankind.
Thirty-eight years have passed
Like a snap of the fingers.
We can climb to the Ninth Heaven to tie up the moon.
Dive into the Five Seas to catch turtles.
And return amid triumphant songs and laughter.
Nothing is too hard in this world.
If you are willing to scale the heights.

6 Casting a Net to Catch the Fish
— Casting It Wide or Drawing It In at Any Moment

In addition to the sixteen-character formula. Mao Zedong also put forward such guerrilla tactics as: “Divide our forces to arouse the masses; concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy” and “To extend stable base areas. employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.” Mao compared these tactics to casting a net. The net could be cast wide or drawn in at any moment, casting it wide to win over the masses and drawing it in to deal with the enemy.

Mao Zedong decided that the war fought by the Red Army must mainly take the form of guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare with a guerrilla character. The Red Army must fight a protracted war in strategy and battles of quick decision in tactics. overcome the many with the few in strategy and pit the many against the few in tactics. He also laid down such basic tactics as “luring the enemy in deep,” “concentrating the force,” “striking at one part of the enemy” and “destroying the enemy one by one.” Since the war fought by the Red Army took mainly the form of guerrilla warfare or mobile warfare, Mao pointed out that the main force must act in concert with regional forces: the regular troops, with guerrilla units and the Red Guards (militia); and the armed masses, with non-armed masses. Only then could the Red Army defeat the enemy who was many times stronger than itself.

This means that when fighting a battle, Mao Zedong not only mobilized his troops. but also all the ordinary people including even those who were old and weak and the wounded soldiers. Recounting the situation on the Jinggang Mountains. a book of the history of the Chinese Communist Party says. “The hospitals in the rear were also mobilized to action. Soldiers who suffered light wounds requested to go back to the front to fight the enemy; those who were seriously wounded were confident of their recovery and rested in peace. Also mobilized were the Children’s Corps and the Young Pioneers. who armed themselves with spears with red tassels. stood guard and check travel permits to prevent enemy spies from slipping in.”

A rare military genius as he was. Mao Zedong aspired a greatness more than that of “a mountain bandit” on the Jinggang Mountains. His ambition was “the liberation of all China.”

In January 1929. Mao decided to leave the Jinggang Mountains. He moved the main force of the Red Army to southern Jiangxi and western Fujian and established a larger revolutionary base with Ruijin in Jiangxi province as its centre. Two years later. in 1931. the base area already covered more than three hundred counties with a population of tens of millions. On November 7, the first
National Congress of Workers. Peasants and Soldiers was convened in Rujin. attended by more than six hundred deputies. The congress issued a declaration. adopted the "Outline Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic" and elected Mao Zedong chairman of the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government.

How strong was Mao's Red Army at the time? A Kuomintang history book says, "Within the boundaries of the Chinese Soviet Republic. there were 360,000 men in the regular Red Army and 650,000 men in the non-regular units." These astounding figures were probably the result of Mao's bluff and bluster. The main force of the Red Army was actually only 40,000 strong.

Chiang Kai-shek devised a plan for the "suppression of the bandits" in August 1930. "After giving thought to it," he said, "I've come to the conclusion that the suppression of the Red bandits cannot succeed overnight. The only way to succeed is to concentrate the troops, build fortresses and roads and develop communications, so that the bandits will have no place to hide and act stealthily and our government troops will be able to move freely and take the bandits by the throat."

In November, a great army of 100,000 men was assembled. With Lu Diping, governor of Jiangxi province, as the commander-in-chief, the government troops launched the first encirclement and suppression campaign against the Red base area headed by Mao Zedong. The invading army advanced in eight columns from north to south and adopted a strategy of "driving straight in and converge the attack along different routes."

Before the campaign started, the Front Committee of the First Front Army of the Red Army met at Luofang in Jiangxi's Xinyu county (today's Xinyu city) to make preparations against the encirclement and suppression campaign. The committee decided to make a strategic shift and not to attack Nanchang and other big cities. On November 1, Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army "to lure the enemy deep into the Red area and wait for an opportunity to wipe it out when it is exhausted." The main force of the Red Army left the Yuanshui River valley, crossed the river Ganjiang and marched eastward. It then withdrew to the central part of the base area with the intention of making use of the favourable conditions of the base area to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare when opportunity presented itself.

November 5. The Kuomintang troops advanced to the Yuanshui River valley. Failing to find the Red Army, they pressed toward the eastern bank of the river Ganjiang. The main force of the Red Army had by now moved to the area around Longgang.

December 6. The Kuomintang army started to attack the central part of the base area, searched for twenty days, but still could not find the Red Army and engage it in a decisive battle.

Since the Kuomintang troops were positioned along a 400-kilometre front from Wanan and Taihe in Jiangxi province in the west to Jianning in Fujian province in the east. Mao Zedong proposed that the Red Army should "make a breakthrough at the centre" and strike at enemy divisions under Tan Daoyuan and Zhang Huizan. The enemy troops would then be cut into two widely separated groups. and the Red Army could defeat them one by one.

December 24. Mao Zedong ordered the Red Army to engage the division under Tan Daoyuan which had "penetrated deep" into the Communist area. The Red Army held a rally to pledge resolution. A couplet written by Mao hung at the rally reads:

The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we ha-
pursue. We can win sure victory in guerrilla warfare.
Advance and retreat in giant strides; lure the enemy in,
depth: concentrate our forces; destroy the enemy one by one.
We will wipe out the enemy in mobile warfare.

The couplet actually embodied all of Mao Zedong’s strategy and tactics in guerrilla and mobile warfare.
At the meeting, Mao declared, “As we’ve followed the policy of luring in the enemy deep and of advancing and retreating in giant strides, the enemy has fallen into our trap. Changes have taken place in the conditions of the enemy, the terrain and the people. Conditions for victory are all here. Victory is just ahead.”
Tan Daoyuan, however, was not an idiot. He refused to take Mao’s bait and ordered his men to defend their positions resolutely.
Unable to touch Tan Daoyuan. Mao was overcome with anxiety. But at this moment the enemy’s 18th Division commanded by Zhang Huizan suddenly approached Longgang. Mao was overjoyed and said to Zhu De, “Heaven is helping us!” He immediately decided to attack Zhang Huizan.

By the afternoon of December 30, most of the units of the Red Army’s Third Army Group and the Fourth Front Army had converged on Longgang from the northwest and northeast and had Zhang tightly encircled. Defeating him became as easy as catching a turtle in a jar.

Soon after four o’clock in the afternoon, the Red Army headquarters signalled for an all-out attack. Rifle shots, bugle calls and battle cries resounded everywhere. The Red Army’s only mortar also went into action and fired a few shots.
The enemy division commander Zhang Huizan was captured alive. The more than 9,000 men who made up his division headquarters and two brigades were either killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Not a single man escaped. Mao Zedong wrote a poem after this victorious battle:

Against the First “Encirclement” Campaign
— to the tune of Yu Jia Ao

The trees are ablaze against a frosty sky.
The wrath of Heaven’s soldiers soars to the clouds.
Blurred by fog are Longgang’s thousand peaks.
All cry out together.
Our vanguard has captured Zhang Huizan.

An army of two hundred thousand has returned to Jiangxi.
Smoke bellows, obscuring half of the sky.
Millions of workers and peasants are aroused
To fight back as one man.
Below Mount Buzhou is a riot of red flags.

Recalling in later days the battle at Longgang where Zhang Huizan was defeated. Mao said, “The battle at Longgang was perfectly executed. It was the first battle against the encirclement and suppression campaign, and the enemy was totally destroyed, without a single man escaping the net. It rarely happened in the history of war.”
Chiang Kai-shek started the encirclement and suppression campaign with an army 100,000 strong. The Red Army of 40,000 men destroyed Zhang Huizan’s division of 9,000 men. This was a successful example of strategically “pitting one against ten” and tactically “pitting ten against one.”
Mao Zedong also described this method of fighting as “ex-
Manoeuvre Against Manoeuvre
— Guerrilla Warfare Plus
Mobile Warfare

Against the Second “Encirclement” Campaign (to the
tune of Yu Jia Ao) was another poem written by Mao Ze-
dong during the days when the Red Army was under the
siege of Kuomintang troops. It reads in translation:

Against the Second “Encirclement” Campaign
— to the tune of Yu Jia Ao
Clouds roll skywards on White Cloud Mountain.
Below the mountain are quickened battle cries.
Rotten wood and withered trees have joined in the
fight.
As a forest of guns press forward,
The Winged General descends from the skies.
We have marched seven hundred li in fifteen days.
Crossing the misty River Gan and Fujian’s green
mountains.
Rolling back strong enemy armies like a mat.
Someone is wailing:
What is the use of building bastions at every step?

How did the Red Army deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s sec-
ond encirclement and suppression campaign? As Mao Ze-
dong told Edgar Snow: “By January 1931 this First Cam-
paign had been completely defeated. . . . After a respite of
only four months, Nanking launched its Second Cam-
paign, under the supreme command of Ho Ying-ching [He
Yinqin], now Minister of War. His forces exceeded
200,000 men, who moved into the Red areas by seven
routes. The situation for the Red Army was then thought
to be very critical. The area of Soviet power was very
small, resources were limited, equipment scanty, and en-
emy material strength vastly exceeded that of the Red
Army in every respect. To meet this offensive, however,
the Red Army still clung to the same tactics that had thus
far won success. Admitting the enemy columns well into
Red territory, our main forces suddenly concentrated a-
gainst the second route of the enemy, defeated several
regiments, and destroyed their offensive power. Immedi-
ately afterwards we attacked in quick succession the third
route, the sixth and the seventh, defeating each of them
in turn. The fourth route retreated without giving battle,
and the fifth route was partly destroyed. Within fourteen
days the Red Army had fought six battles, and marched
eight days, ending with a decisive victory. With the
break-up or retreat of the other six routes, the first route
army, commanded by Chiang Kuang-nai [Jiang Guangnai]
and Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai [Cai Tingkai], withdrew without
any serious fighting.”

Mao also wrote in his “Problems of Strategy in China’s
Revolutionary War”: “The situation in the second cam-
paign was as follows: 1. The ‘suppression’ forces num-ering 200,000 were under the command of He Yinqin
with headquarters at Nanchang. 2. As in the first enemy
campaign, none of the forces were Chiang Kai-shek’s own
troops. . . . 6. Though our army (numbering over thirty
thousand men) was somewhat smaller than in the first campaign. It has had four months in which to recuperate and build up energy... we marched seven hundred li. fought five battles, captured more than twenty thousand rifles and roundly smashed the enemy's 'encirclement and suppression' campaign.

The Kuomintang side decided at the time "to concentrate a large force, form a tight cordon and proceed at a slow speed," adopted the strategy of "advancing steadily and striking sure blows, consolidating at every step and tightening the cordon gradually," and at the same time imposed an economic blockade.

The two encirclement and suppression campaigns were both smashed by Mao Zedong with guerrilla warfare plus mobile warfare. Mao was victorious because he never took his enemy lightly and because he knew he was dealing with Chiang Kai-shek, who was another military genius. The war between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek was a war between heroes, a war between two smart military commanders of the twentieth-century China. It was never a war between a hero and an idiot as described in Jiang Qing's model Beijing Operas. If Chiang Kai-shek could be defeated as easily as in those operas, Mao would have had no need to study military strategy assiduously.

What were the measures Chiang Kai-shek had taken against Mao Zedong?

Chiang Kai-shek, an avowed enemy of Mao Zedong, swore to kill every one of the Communists. In his speech "The Success or Failure in Suppressing the Bandits Means the Survival or Extinction of the Country," he outlined his strategy against the Communists as follows:

1. The policy of blockade: A complete blockade was to be imposed on the Red area so as "to cut off all the enemy's supplies of food and drinks and all his sources of information." Blockhouses were built everywhere in and around the blockaded areas in Jiangxi at the time, and secret agents wandered everywhere. The purpose was to cut off all lines of communications and prevent all materials and goods, including grain and salt, from entering the Communist area.

2. Communications policy: The communications policy was the opposite of the policy of blockade. While trying to stop all Communist communications, the government troops were to make every effort to develop their own communications, including roads, telegraphy, telephone, transport, and postal and courier services as well as the equipment and personnel required for the work. Communications were the life-lines of the government troops, deciding their victory or defeat, life or death. War is a struggle against time. The side that can save time and move swiftly wins. In other words, mobility decides the outcome of a war. The side that has the greater mobility will be the victor. The purpose of the communications policy was to give the government troops greater mobility and make them quick to react. This was one of the main strategic principles against the Communist army.

3. Fortifications policy: As soon as the government troops arrived at a place in the vicinity of the Communist area, they were to build defence works immediately whether they were to stay at the place for one or two days, or one or two months. Whenever they had time to spare, they were to urge the local inhabitants to build fortresses, blockhouses and defence walls and try to make them become one with the government troops. At the fortified points, the government troops would be able to defend themselves and fend off all attacks by the Communist army. Building a great many fortifications and depriving the Communist army of all supplies were the surest way of putting the Communist army to death. Following the principle that exuding more sweat means shedding less
blood, it would reduce the casualties of the government troops.

4. Following guerrilla tactics: The Communist army totally rejected regular military tactics and was good at running long distances, waiting for opportunities, carrying out reconnaissance, making disguises and launching surprise attacks. In order to eliminate the Communists, the government troops must know their ways and use the Communist army's tactics to destroy the Communist army. Basing on his own experience in putting down the uprising of the Taiping army towards the end of the Qing dynasty, General Hu Linyi said, "Defending one's own territory is not as effective as fighting outside one's territory." What he meant was that to destroy the Communist army, the government troops must constantly look for the latter's weak points, strike out as soon as an opportunity presented itself, turn from the defensive to the offensive and win by surprise. Chiang Kai-shek summed up this guerrilla tactic in four sentences: "Advance swiftly with light packs: make long-distance reconnaissance in the guise of civilians; move secretly and agilely; march at night and attack in the early morning."

5. Gaining the initiative: The most crucial basic principle to be observed by the government army in fighting all wars was to gain the initiative. An army that could determine the changes in the war situation as a whole according to its plan would gain supremacy or initiative. The side that had the initiative was usually the victor. Passivity would lead to certain defeat.

Chiang Kai-shek was well versed in military strategy and a competent general on the battlefield. He emphasized the following ten points in the strategy of gaining the initiative:

1) Overcoming movement with quietude. Hu Linyi once said, "The worst disturbances in the world can be quelled with quietude." What he meant was to "deal with the enemy as if a prepared host waiting for his guest" or "wait at one's ease for an exhausted opponent."

2) Overcoming trickery with steadfastness. If one understands what is meant by "overcoming movement with quietude," one can easily see the true meaning of "overcoming trickery with steadfastness." It meant that when the Communist army played tricks to disturb the government troops, the government troops should defeat it with patience, true strength and steadfastness.

3) Striking at the enemy's weak points with true strength. This meant to bring the strength of the government troops into full play and destroy the Communist army at its weak points. Concentrate the strength of the government troops to overcome the Communist army's bluffing and propaganda and destroy the organizations in the Communist area.

4) Advancing in zigzags instead of a straight line. When the government troops marched, attacked or pursued the Communist army, they were to "move in curves," sometimes intentionally following a small mountain path rather than the main road or even making a detour through a place where there was no road. Only when they were not afraid of the ruggedness and hardships could they become incalculable to the Communists, defeat them by surprise and avoid their ambushes which they often resorted to.

5) Fighting independently. The government troops should coordinate with one another in the suppression of the Communists. But as southern Jiangxi was mountainous, difficult in terrain and poor in communication facilities and the Communist army was cunning and full of tricks, each unit of the government troops, a corps or a division, a brigade or a regiment, must be ready to fight independently at any place or time.

6) Fighting all-out decisive battles. Before fighting a deci-
sive battle, the government troops must concentrate all the available forces so that every single soldier could play a role in it. This was the most economic and effective way of deploying military forces.

7) Putting up a strong defence wherever the government troops were. This came from the principle of "advancing steadily and striking sure blows," a principle which required the government troops to be always on guard whether they were marching, camping or fighting. "Defence is the means for realizing the purpose of attack."

8) Deployment in depth. The front line of a battle should be as narrow as possible, so that the government troops could keep half or two-thirds of their forces as reserves to be dispatched as reinforcements wherever they were needed.

9) Flexible deployment of forces. Based on the commander's talent and understanding, his courage to take risks and his wise decisions, he was to deploy his troops flexibly. The key to the flexible deployment of troops was to "advance or retreat without regularity: amass a large or a small force without regularity: concentrate or divide the troops appropriately: attack or defend appropriately." If a commander could correctly deploy his troops, he would face less dangers and have greater chances to win. The only important thing was to keep his deployment strictly secret so that the Communist army could not see through it.

10) Six tasks. The six tasks were reconnaissance, search, the posting of guards, liaison, taking cover and observation. These six tasks must be carefully and effectively carried out while marching, camping or fighting. Summing up the above, Chiang Kai-shek laid down his strategy as follows: "In tactics, adopt a defensive posture, overcome movement with quietude and defend for the purpose of attack. In strategy, take the offensive, striking at the enemy's weak points with true strength, and attack for the purpose of defence."

Chiang Kai-shek also raised three slogans, which were: "Not to withdraw when wounded: not to bend when captured: faithfully carry out one's mission." He told his men to pay attention to the concentration and division of forces, which were two main tactical principles. He laid special emphasis on prudence, explaining that since ancient times the use of force had always been the last resort and the side that was rallied by grief and indignation won. Quoting Lao Zi's words, he said, "When two armies are at war, the one that is filled with grief and indignation wins."

From the strategy outlined by Chiang Kai-shek, we can see that Mao Zedong was competing with a formidable rival.

8 Luring the Enemy in Deep
— Avoiding the Enemy's Main Force and Striking at His Weak Spots

Beginning from July 1931, Chiang Kai-shek started his third encirclement and suppression campaign against Mao Zedong's central base area. Amassing a great army of 300,000, including his own troops, Chiang served as the commander-in-chief himself, with He Yingqin as the front-line commander. They were assisted by British, German and Japanese advisors.

Since Chiang Kai-shek had an army ten times more numerous than the Red Army this time, he decided on a strategy of "driving straight in" with the aim of pressing the Red Army back against the river Gan and crush it there. He
could then divide his forces to encircle and totally destroy the central base area and the Red Army.

The main force of the First Front Army of the Red Army was at the time dispersed in the area around Jianning, far from the old base area. It had only about 30,000 men, who had fought many bitter battles in the second campaign and had not rested and been replenished.

In the face of a powerful enemy. Mao Zedong again decided to adopt the strategy of “luring the enemy in deep, avoiding his main force and striking at his weak spots.”

The main force of the Red Army under Mao Zedong and Zhu De left Jianning, made a great detour of 500 kilometres and assembled at Xingguo in southern Jiangxi, where it was then joined by the Red Seventh Army. They planned to move northward through Wanan but did not succeed. In August, the Red Army had to fall back to the western part of Xingguo.

The government troops were now advancing on the Red Army along several routes at great speed, placing it in a semi-encirclement. The Red Army made a thrust eastward through a gap of twenty kilometres in the cordon. From August 7 to August 11, it fought three successive battles and won all the three, wiping out more than 10,000 of the government troops. Upon discovering that the Red Army had moved eastward. Chiang Kai-shek immediately ordered all the government troops that were moving westward and southward to turn eastward, approach the Red Army along two routes and encircle it.

Adopting the tactic of “making a feint to the east and attacking in the west.” Mao ordered the Red 12th Army to masquerade itself as the main force and march towards the northeast, while the Red Army’s main force moved through ten kilometres of great mountains between two units of the government troops and returned to western Xingguo, where it recuperated and waited for the next opportunity. By the time the government troops had discovered that the main force of the Red Army was in the west, the Red Army had already rested for a fortnight. It had become increasingly clear that the government troops were in a passive position everywhere and the initiative was in the hands of the Red Army. Seeing that his troops had become utterly exhausted and the troops of the warlords of Guangdong and Guangxi were moving towards Hengyang in Hunan, Chiang Kai-shek decided at last to withdraw.

As the government troops were withdrawing. the Red Army, following Mao Zedong’s tactics of “The enemy retreats, we pursue,” gave chase in early September and attacked the retreating enemy twice. killing, wounding and capturing more than 4,000 men and on September 15 put a whole enemy division out of action.

In this campaign which lasted three months, more than 30,000 enemy troops were annihilated and 14,000 guns captured.

In an article which he wrote in later days. Mao complacently retold how the third encirclement and suppression campaign was thwarted:

“If the attacking enemy is far more numerous and much stronger than we are, we can accomplish a change in the balance of forces only when the enemy has penetrated deeply into our base area and tasted all the bitterness it holds for him. As the chief of staff of one of Chiang Kai-shek’s brigades remarked during the third ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign. ‘Our stout men have worn themselves thin and our thin men have worn themselves to death.’ Or, in the words of Chen Mingshu, commander-in-chief of the western route of the Kuomintang’s ‘encirclement and suppression’ army. ‘Everywhere the National Army gropes in the dark, while the Red Army walks in broad daylight.’ By then the enemy army, although still strong, is much weakened. its soldiers are tired, its
morale is sagging and many of its weak spots are revealed. But the Red Army, though weak, has conserved its strength and stored up its energy, and is waiting at it ease for the fatigued enemy. At such a time it is generally possible to attain a certain parity between the two sides, or to change the enemy’s absolute superiority to relative superiority and our absolute inferiority to relative inferiority, and occasionally even to become superior to the enemy. When fighting against the third ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign in Jiangxi, the Red Army executed a retreat to the extreme limit (to concentrate in the rear section of the base area): if it had not done so, it could not have defeated the enemy because the enemy’s ‘encirclement and suppression’ forces were then over ten times the size of the Red Army. When Sun Zi said, ‘Avoid the enemy when he is full of vigour. Strike when he is fatigued and withdraws,’ he was referring to tiring and demoralizing the enemy so as to reduce his superiority.

Chiang Kai-shek of course would not give up. Knitting his brows, he hit upon a new idea. Leaving Mao Zedong alone for the time being, he decided to attack Mao’s comrades in other provinces first.

Between July 1931 and March 1933, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a two-step strategy: attacking the Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Western Hubei-Hunan base areas of the Red Army first and, after succeeding there, then turning all the forces against Mao’s central base area. Assuming the post of commander-in-chief of the bandit-suppression army against Hubei, Henan and Anhui in May 1932, Chiang started the fourth encirclement and suppression campaign.

The attack against the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area began on July 14, 1932. On Chiang Kai-shek’s side was an army of 300,000 men, including 26 divisions and five brigades. The Fourth Front Army of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area had about 45,000 men organized in two corps, six divisions, four independent divisions and one independent regiment.

After storming into the Red area, the headquarters of the Communist-suppression army issued an order: “1. All able-bodied men in the bandit area are to be executed. 2. All houses in the bandit area are to be burned down. 3. Food grain in the bandit area is to be distributed to the Communist-Eradicating Volunteers. Food grain that cannot be taken away should all be burned. Decisive and drastic measures should be taken to carry out this order.”

Chiang Kai-shek’s National Army was successful this time. A history book of the Chinese Communist Party says: “Zhang Guotao, secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui sub-bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and chairman of its military commission, proposed at an emergency meeting held on October 10 that the main force of the Red Army should leave the Soviet area, fight on the exterior line and wait for an opportunity to come back. After the meeting, the main force of the Four Front Army of the Red Army, comprising more than 20,000 men, crossed the Beiping-Hankou Railway and shifted westward, abandoning in fact the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area.”

While converging on the Hubei-Henan-Anhui base area, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched an army of over 100,000 men and started an attack against the Western Hubei-Hunan base area. The Communist history book admits, “In early September, most of the base area was occupied by the enemy. The rear organizations and the masses of the people suffered heavy losses. More than 2,000 of the ill or wounded alone fell into enemy hands.”

In May 1932, while making preparations for the encirclement and suppression against the Hubei-Hunan-Anhui and Western Hubei-Hunan base areas, Chiang Kai-shek
had set up a bandit-suppression general headquarters headed by He Yingqin against the Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fujian border area. The headquarters was in command of the National Army in Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian and Hunan provinces and entrusted with the task of containing the Red Army in the central base area and making preparations for a large-scale attack against the central base area. By the end of that year, He Yingqin had assembled more than thirty divisions, comprising 500,000 men, who were to march on the central base area in three columns: left, central and right. In the central column, as the spearhead of attack in this fourth encirclement and suppression campaign against the central base area, were twelve divisions and 160,000 men of Chiang Kai-shek's own troops commanded by Chen Cheng.

The main force of the Red Army had by now grown to about 70,000 men organized in three group armies and four corps. Following Mao Zedong's strategy, the Red Army again employed the methods of making a feint to the east and attacking in the west. Laying an ambush with a large force and concentrating a superior force to fight battles of annihilation.

As the main force of the National Army was in the east, two divisions in its western column were exposed to the Red Army. Throwing in a numerically superior force, the Red Army ambushed the enemy in the western column and annihilated the two divisions after a battle lasting one and a half days. In an attempt to retaliate, the National Army diverted two of its divisions in the eastern column to reinforce the central column. The Red Army again concentrated a superior force, encircled and annihilated a division and a battalion of the enemy south of the Yihuang area. In the two victorious battles, the Red Army captured more than 10,000 guns and virtually smashed the encirclement and suppression campaign in March. "Since the days I

served as a staff officer. I've never suffered defeat as I have now," admitted Chiang Kai-shek.

9 Fighting Not for Territory — Give in Order to Take

In the four campaigns guided by Mao Zedong against encirclement and suppression, the Red Army achieved brilliant victories. According to statistics compiled by the Military Commission of the Communist Party, the regular Red Army, in the three years between 1931 and 1933, routed 780,000 enemy troops, annihilated 316,000, took 196,000 prisoners and captured 165,700 pieces of weapons and 19 radio sets. The Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Communist area had expanded and become linked with the central base area in southern Jiangxi, increasing its territory by 100,000 square kilometres. The central base area had a population of three million. After the fourth campaign, the Central Red Army started a recruiting movement, increasing its strength to 300,000 men.

Chiang Kai-shek, however, was not a rival easy to deal with. He instructed the National Army, saying that the basic way of eradicating the Communists was "30 percent military force and 70 percent politics." Quoting the ancients, he said, "Even in a village of ten households, there ought to be loyal and faithful people." He instructed the officers of the National Army "to distinguish between good people who are loyal and faithful and bad people who are cunning and deceitful and then pick the good people of a locality to weed out the bad people... Good people are the source of good soldiers: good soldiers are models of good people."
Chiang Kai-shek made all-round preparations for the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign against the Red Army. Militarily he adopted a new strategy of fighting a protracted war and building blockhouses. An officers’ training corps was set up on Mount Lushan for training large numbers of anti-Communist army officers loyal to him. and a foreign military advisory group headed by General Hans von Seeckt from Germany was invited to China. He also expanded the government arsenal by purchasing a large number of new aircraft, cannons and trucks.

The strategy of building blockhouses was immediately put into execution. By January 1934, 2,900 of them had been built in Jiangxi province alone.

When everything was ready. Chiang Kai-shek amassed a great army of a million men and two hundred aircraft and started the unprecedented, earth-shaking fifth campaign against the Red Army base area in October 1933.

The government troops converged on the heart area of the Communist base from all directions, advancing gradually and entrenching themselves at every step by building blockhouses. A specially heavy force was directed against the central base area. This great army of 500,000 men advanced in four columns. The northern column was led by Gu Zhutong; the western column by He Jian; the southern column by Chen Jitang; the eastern column by Jiang Dingwen. The main force of the Red Army in the central base area had only 100,000 men.

At this time, however. Mao Zedong was replaced by some ultra-Leftists as leaders of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and had practically no voice in the decision-making.

The historical rights and wrongs of Mao Zedong can be judged differently. But his military ideas, his strategy and tactics, are perfect and cannot be refuted. The army of the Chinese Communist Party won one victory after another when Mao Zedong was in command and suffered utter defeats when he was excluded from the leadership.

The ultra-Leftists in the Party, like Wang Ming and Bo Gu, were good at making high-sounding speeches and acted in contradiction to Mao’s ideas, condemning his ways as “guerrilla-ism.” They emphasized regular warfare, opposed Mao’s strategy and denied the fact that the Red Army was weak and the National Army strong. They opposed Mao’s principle of fighting a protracted war in strategy and battles of quick decision in campaigns and advocated fighting a war of quick decision in strategy and protracted battles in campaigns. As for the way of fighting the war, they stood for fighting positional warfare and regular warfare that relied solely on the main force of the army as against guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare with guerrilla characteristics. In tactics, they stood for “engaging the enemy outside the gates” as against “luring the enemy in deep”: dividing the forces for defence as against the concentration of forces; making “short swift thrusts” as against mobility and making detours: putting the enemy to rout as against battles of annihilation.

The fallacious ideas of the ultra-Leftists actually came from a German. According to a history book published by the Chinese Communist Party, “In October 1933 the Communist International sent a military advisor named Li De (originally Otto Braun) from Shanghai to Ruijin. Totally ignorant of the actual situation in China, he slavishly applied the experience of the Soviet Red Army in regular warfare and caused enormous losses to the Chinese revolution. Bo Gu, who was then one of those in charge of the provisional Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party placed complete trust in Li De. In fact, Li De and Bo Gu were the supreme military commanders of the Red Army in this war.”
"The Red Army was rendered helpless before the fierce enemy campaign," sighed Mao Zedong. Although Mao Zedong had forfeited his command, he had his own ideas of how the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign could be repulsed. When he was in Huichang county, southern Jiangxi, in June, he said to some Red Army officers, "The main force should be withdrawn now for consolidation. Small detachments should be used to fight a guerrilla war in coordination with local armed units and contain the enemy. In the consolidation, you should sum up your experience and think over carefully why the enemy could not be stopped, why you could not fight victoriously and why the enemy could not be destroyed."

He also said, "To preserve the main force of the Red Army and destroy the enemy, we should again adopt the strategy of fighting guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare with guerrilla characteristics. Make a careful reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain and prepare the battlefield at a spot between Huichang and Yunmen. Concentrate a superior force on the enemy’s flank and create favourable conditions to wipe out an enemy battalion or regiment first before winning more victories. You should have several plans of operations. For example, if the enemy advanced in a single column, we should not hit his head or body, but his tail. If the enemy approaches in several columns, we should hit the column on his flank. In short, always concentrate an absolutely superior force and strike at the enemy’s weak spots."

But Mao Zedong’s ideas were totally ignored. News of the National Army’s victory kept pouring in and Chiang Kai-shek was victorious in the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign. A Kuomintang history book says, "Our army availed itself of the dense network of highways and thousands of blockhouses to force the Communist area to contract continually. Its ultimate objective was to surround the Communist army and destroy it in a strong pincer movement. The military encirclement and economic blockade had been very effective. The bandit army and bogus government were eventually forced to start a long-distance exodus. Over 70,000 of the bandits broke out of the cordon and fled westward to avoid total annihilation. The shift was called the Long March, which lasted a whole year and covered 12,500 kilometres. By the time they reached northern Shaanxi, there were only 2,000 or 3,000 of them left."

The fiasco of the Red Army and the loss of the whole central base area, however, did not dishearten Mao Zedong. Instead, he coolly summed up the lessons to be learned from the defeat. He later wrote, "Those who advocate ‘engaging the enemy outside the gates’ oppose strategic retreat, arguing that to retreat means to lose territory, to bring harm on the people (‘to let our pots and pans be smashed,’ as they call it), and to give rise to unfavourable repercussions outside. During our fifth counter-campaign, they argued that every time we retreated a step the enemy would push his blockhouses forward a step, so that our base areas would continuously shrink and we would have no way of recovering lost ground. Even though luring the enemy deep into our territory might have been useful in the past, it would be useless against the enemy’s fifth ‘encirclement and suppression’ campaign in which he adopted the policy of blockhouse warfare. The only way to deal with this campaign, they said, was to divide up our forces for resistance and make short swift thrusts at the enemy. It is easy to give an answer to such views, and our history has already done so. As for loss of territory, it often happens that only by loss can loss be avoided: this is the principle of ‘Give in order to take.’ If what we lose is territory and what we
gain is victory over the enemy. plus recovery and also expansion of our territory. then it is a paying proposition. In a business transaction, if a buyer does not ‘lose’ some money, he cannot obtain goods: if a seller does not ‘lose’ some goods, he cannot obtain money.”

Mao also wrote. “The losses incurred in a revolutionary movement involve destruction. and what is gained is construction of a progressive character. Sleep and rest involve loss of time. but energy is gained for tomorrow’s work. If any fool does not understand this and refuses to sleep, he will have no energy the next day. and that is a losing proposition. We lost out in the fifth counter-campaign for precisely such reasons. Reluctance to give up part of our territory resulted in the loss of it all.”

Of course, the battlefield is not the only place where these bright ideas of Mao Zedong’s can be applied.

10 Long-Distance Exodus — A Strategic Shift to Preserve Strength

Although the main force of the Central Red Army was not totally smashed by Chiang Kai-shek, it had to pull out of its base area and start a long-distance exodus in October 1934.

The Kuomintang believed that “the Communist bandits in Jiangxi had been totally eradicated.” On December 1934, the fifth plenary session of the Kuomintang’s Fourth Central Executive Committee issued a declaration, which stated: “The Red bandits have entrenched themselves in Jiangxi and Fujian for years. Relying on natural barriers, they gathered a group of desperados and carried out wanton destructions. They not only have plunged the local inhabants into the depth of sufferings, but also have become a great hidden danger for the state and nation. Recently, the bandit-suppressing officers and men have fought courageously and selflessly and recovered one by one the places occupied by the bandits for years. They have totally destroyed the bandits’ dens located behind dangerous natural barriers.”

In fact, the “Communist bandits in Jiangxi” have not been totally eradicated. Senior cadres of the Chinese Communist Party, such as Chen Yi, Xiang Ying, Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng, were still in southern Jiangxi leading part of the Red Army to fight as guerrillas. They were still “a great hidden danger” for the Kuomintang.

The 12,500-kilometre exodus of the Red Army, which Mao Zedong euphorically called “the Long March” and Chiang Kai-shek condemned as “blind stampede,” was in fact a great strategic withdrawal and shift.

In early October 1934, the National Army had pushed its way into the heartland of the central base area. The three important towns of Xingguo, Ningdu and Shicheng fell one after another.

On the night of October 10, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and its Military Commission were forced to start a great strategic shift with 80,000 men of the main force of the Red Army, who departed separately from Ruijin and Yudu. It was an unprecedented, large-scale execution of the policy of “enemy advances we retreat.” To put it less euphorically, it was 80,000 men “running for their lives.” As the saying goes, “as long as the green hills are still there, one need not worry about firewood,” meaning that if these men could preserve their lives they would one day make a comeback. However, Mao Zedong had no voice in the decision-making. When directing the Red Army to break out of the encirclement and start the great shift, the leaders of the pro-
visional Party centre were in a great panic and did not know what were the right things to do. The soldiers were told to carry many heavy printing machines and machine tools for making weapons and ammunition. With so many men carrying so many things, it was extremely cumbersome for the Red Army to move about on its long-distance flight.

According to the plan made by the leaders of the Communist Party, the 80,000 men were to head for the western part of Hunan, where they were to join force with the Second and Sixth army groups and then march westward along the borders of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hunan and Guangxi, a route which the Sixth Army Group had travelled in the past.

When the National Army discovered the intentions of the Red Army, it immediately formed four blockade lines in southern Jiangxi, on the Hunan-Guangdong border, in southeastern Hunan and on the Hunan-Guangxi border and sent out massive forces to pursue and block the path of the Red Army.

The different units of the so-called National Army, however, were not of one mind in pursuing and blockading the Red Army because each had its own calculations. On the eve of its exodus from Jiangxi, the Red Army had, in early October, reached a five-point agreement with the troops under Chen Jitang in Guangdong, which included on-the-spot cease-fire, exchange of information, removal of blockade, opening to trade and, when necessary, passage through each other’s territory. Therefore, when the Red Army broke out of the first line of blockade and entered Guangdong province, Chen Jitang turned a blind eye to it. His troops fired into the air and permitted the smooth passage of the Red Army through the second line of blockade.

After breaking through the third line of blockade, the Red Army began to proceed toward the Xiangjiang river valley. Chiang Kai-shek had by now moved several hundred thousand troops to the area to pursue and block the path of the Red Army in three columns in an attempt to destroy the Red Army on the bank of the Xiangjiang. Hunan is Mao Zedong’s home province. He was very familiar with the area along the Xiangjiang. This is shown in his poem Changsha:

Changsha
— to the tune of Qin Yuan Chun

I stand alone in the autumn cold,
On the water’s edge of Orange Island.
Watching the River Xiang flowing northward.
I see a thousand mountains tinted red
And tiers of trees dyed in colours.
All along the river of clear blue waters,
A hundred boats are battling against the current.
Eagles sweep across the vast sky,
Fish swim in the shallows.
Thousands of creatures vie for freedom under the frosty sky.
Puzzled by this immensity,
I ask: “On this vast expanse of land,
Who is the master of fate?”

I was here with a throng of friends,
Vivid are my memories of those crowded years.
Schoolmates we were. still young.
In the flowering period of our lives.
Filled with students’ enthusiasm.
Casting all restraints aside,
We commented on affairs of the state
In passionate words.
Fighting a battle in the Xiangjiang area without Mao Zedong meant certain defeat to Bo Gu and the other leaders of the Communist Party, who were now at the end of their tether, but still refused to consult Mao. Ordering the troops to fight the enemy head-on, they landed themselves in a passive position and were beaten everywhere. A fierce battle lasting a whole week was fought south of Quanxian county on the eastern bank of the Xiangjiang in Guizhou. Although the Red Army eventually succeeded in crossing the Xiangjiang and breaking through the fourth line of blockade, it paid a heavy price for it: the loss of more than half of its men. Within three short months, the Red Army was reduced from 80,000 to 30,000 men. Seeing that the Red Army intended to move northward along the Hunan-Guizhou border and to join force with the Second and Sixth army groups in western Hunan, the government troops built four lines of blockhouses and concentrated a heavy force in that area, intending to wipe out the Central Red Army then and there. Bo Gu and Li De were blind to the enemy’s manoeuvre and stubbornly ordered the Red Army to proceed as planned. This placed the Red Army in a tight spot. If the Red Army did not change its plan, it would meet with certain doom. At this critical moment it was Mao Zedong who came forward with a bright idea. He suggested that the Red Army abandon its original plan of joining force with the Second and Sixth army groups and turn immediately westward to establish a new base area in Guizhou province where the National Army was relatively weak.

But Bo Gu and Li De still refused to change their plan. A meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau was held on December 18 at Liping in Guizhou province. After heated debates, the majority of the members agreed to Mao Zedong’s suggestion, and the Resolution on Establishing a Sichuan-Guizhou Base Area was adopted at the meeting. After the Liping meeting, Mao Zedong was able once again to display his talents. The Red Army marched towards the centre of Guizhou province and then turned northward. In early 1935, it crossed the Wujiang River, which was a natural barrier, and on January 7 occupied the important town of Zunyi in northern Guizhou.

If one wishes to know and understand Mao Zedong, one must remember Zunyi, which is as important as the Jinggang Mountains. Zunyi marked a turning-point in Mao Zedong’s career. In the words of the Chinese Communists, “At the Zunyi meeting, Mao Zedong’s leading position in the whole Party and army was established.”

An enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Zunyi, January 15-17, attended by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, Liu Bocheng, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun and Deng Xiaoping.

The meeting appointed Zhang Wentian to draft the Resolution Summing Up the Fight Against the Enemy’s Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign, which was later adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The resolution, which was in fact a paean to Mao Zedong’s military strategy, says, “Under the condition that the enemy is large and we small, the enemy strong and we weak, our strategy should have been one of decisive defence (offensive defence), concentrating a superior
force, picking the enemy’s weak spots and destroying with certainty a part or a large part of the enemy, so as to destroy the enemy forces one by one in mobile warfare and crush the enemy’s encirclement and suppression campaign. In the war against the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign, however, the strategy of decisive defence was replaced by a strategy of pure defence (defensive defence), and mobile warfare, by positional warfare and blockhouse warfare. The so-called tactic of making ‘short swift thrusts’ was adopted to support the strategy of pure defence. The enemy was thus able to attain its objective with his strategy of fighting a protracted war and a war of blockhouses."

11

Crossing the Sea by Deception
— The First of the Thirty-Six Stratagems

As the saying goes, “A man’s spirits heighten when a happy event occurs.” This has been true since ancient times. Mao Zedong’s spirits rose after he had gained the supreme powers in the Communist Party. To demonstrate his superb art of war, he commanded the Red Army in fighting a victorious battle.

To prevent the Central Red Army from marching northward to join with the Fourth Front Army or moving eastward to join with the Second and Sixth army groups, Chiang Kai-shek had directed hundreds of thousands of his own troops and the regional troops of Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan and Guangxi to converge on the Zunyi area in an attempt to destroy the Red Army there.

On January 19, Mao Zedong led the Central Red Army northward from the Zunyi area, intending to seize the county towns of Tucheng and Chishui and then look for an opportunity to cross the Yangtze River in the section between Luzhou and Yibin in Sichuan province. Displaying his own military genius, Chiang Kai-shek immediately deployed a heavy force along the Sichuan-Guizhou border to seal off the Yangtze River.

On January 28, the Red Army started to attack Tucheng. As enemy reinforcements continually poured into the battle, it soon became disadvantageous for the Red Army to continue the attack. After pulling out of the battle at Mao’s order, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River at the Yuanhous-Tucheng area the following day, marched westward and assembled at Zhaxi on the Sichuan-Yunnan border. At Zhaxi, the Central Red Army was reorganized by Mao Zedong into sixteen regiments under the First, Fifth and Sixth army groups.

The National Army in Sichuan and Yunnan soon converged on Zhaxi from the south, north and west.

At this moment, the Red Army decided to postpone its march northward across the Yangtze River and suddenly turned east to throw off the National Army. Between February 18 and 21, it crossed the Chishui River once again and re-entered Guizhou, launched a surprise attack on Loushan Pass and reoccupied Zunyi. In the battle to retake Zunyi, the Red Army destroyed two enemy divisions plus eight regiments and took 30,000 prisoners. It was the greatest victorious battle fought by the Red Army on its Long March.

Not discouraged by the defeat at Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the government troops to double back to the Zunyi and Yaxi area in several columns.

Seeing that the government troops were pouring into Zunyi from all directions, Mao Zedong immediately led the Red Army out of the net. Marched westward, crossed the Chishui River for the third time on March 16 and 17 and
re-entered southern Sichuan.
Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Red Army was intending to cross the Yangtze and march north and tried again to block its path with powerful forces.
At this juncture, Mao again ordered the Red Army to turn eastward and return to Guizhou. After crossing the Chishui River for the fourth time, the Red Army moved southward, made a feint attack on Guiyang and sent its forces to eastern Guizhou to lure the government troops out of Yunnan to reinforce Guizhou.
When all the government troops were moving towards Guiyang, the Red Army unexpectedly marched southward at the speed of sixty kilometres a day toward Yunnan, now devoid of government troops. After making a feint near Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan, it moved at lightning speed toward the northwest and crossed the River of Golden Sand known for its deep gorges and turbulent flow in early March.
After the Red Army had taken Loushan Pass, Mao Zedong wrote a stirring poem:

Loushan Pass
— to the tune of Yi Qin E
The west wind is fierce,
Geese cry under a frosty morning moon.
Under a frosty morning moon.
Horses' hooves clatter.
The sound of bugles is muffled.
Do not say the mountain pass is iron-clad.
We are now crossing it in firm steps.
As we cross it in firm steps.
The green mountains are like the sea.
The dying sun is blood red.

A history book of the Kuomintang recorded the events in those two years as follows: "With the bandit dens in southern Jiangxi destroyed, the remnants of the bandits broke out of the encirclement and fled toward the west, intending to harass Sichuan and Guizhou. The bandit-suppressing forces gave chase and tried to blockade their path. Considering that the government troops in Sichuan were not under a unified command and might not be able to play an effective role in wiping out the bandits, President Chiang brought himself to Sichuan in March, the 24th year of the Republic (1935), to supervise personally the suppression of the bandits. He flew from Chongqing to Guiyang, from Guiyang to Kunming, and then from Kunming to Chengdu. In August, he supervised the establishment of an officers' training corps on Mount Emei. He once flew with Long Yun, the governor of Yunnan province, in the same plane over Huili and Xichang to watch the movements of the bandits on the ground. On the plane, he pointed his finger at the mountains and rivers below and explained his military strategy to Long, who was deeply moved by President Chiang's explanation. With the government troops in hot pursuit all the way from Jiangxi to Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan and Xikang provinces, the Red bandits had no time to regain their breath and still less time to entrench themselves and coerce the local inhabitants into their ranks. The Wujiang River, the River of Golden Sand and the Dadu River, where to National Army marched, were known for their dangerous and difficult terrain. After arriving in Sichuan in March, the president made several trips to Guizhou and Yunnan. spent more than two months to supervise the tracking of the remanent bandits under Zhu De and Mao Zedong and did not come to Chengdu until late May. In mid-June, the remanent bandits joined with those under Xu Xiangqian in the Songpan and Maogong area in
northwestern Sichuan."

The River of Golden Sand was the upper section of the Yangtze River. It zigzags its course through deep gorges along the border between Sichuan and Yunnan. Its turbulent flow, surging waves and the sheer cliffs on either side of the river make it the most dangerous river to cross.

If the Red Army could not speedily cross the river, it was in danger of being pressed in the deep gorge and destroyed by the government troops.

In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly dispatched troops to reinforce Yunnan and flew to Kunming in person to supervise the war, while sending planes to reconnoitre the movements of the Red Army along the River of Golden Sand.

After marching through Wuding and Yuanmou, the First Army Group of the Red Army soon reached the ferry point at Longjiedu, a main passage between Sichuan and Yunnan. The ferry point was not an ideal place to cross the river because the river is wide at this point and enemy aircraft could attack the Red Army from the air. But Mao Zedong told the Red Army to make a show of erecting a bridge. This led the government troops into believing that the Red Army was going to cross the river at this place. Large forces immediately began to pour into the Yuanmou area in an attempt to wipe out the Red Army there.

While the government troops were concentrating at Kunming and the Yuanmou area, the Central Military Commission Column and the Third and Fifth army groups of the Red Army moved swiftly toward Luquan on the bank of the River of Golden Sand in two columns. The Military Commission Column and the Cadres Regiment was to take Windlass Ferry and the Third Army Group, Hongmen Ferry, while the Fifth Army Group acted as the rear guard.

At dusk on May 1, the vanguard of the Red Army arrived at Windlass Ferry and found all the boats for ferrying across the river were gone. With the assistance of the local people, they eventually managed to find seven small boats from nearby places and began to cross the river in these boats.

After crossing the river, Mao Zedong stayed in a cave near the ferry and spent days and nights directing the men of the Red Army to cross the river as speedily as possible. As there were too many men and too few boats, it took the entire army seven days and nights to ferry across the River of Gold Sand. After crossing to the other side of the river, the Red Army burned all the boats.

"Crossing the sea by deception" is the first of the thirty-six stratagems mentioned in ancient books on the art of war. Mao Zedong cleverly applied this stratagem in the Red Army's crossing of the River of Golden Sand.

12 Lightning Speed Is Important in War — Covering the Distance of Three Steps in Two

After crossing the River of Golden Sand, the Red Army continued to march northward through the Great Cool Mountains inhabited by the Yi people, and then headed toward the Dadu River.

It was at the Dadu River that Shi Dakai, the famous insurgent general of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and his army of 100,000 men were defeated nearly a century ago by the Qing soldiers commanded by Zeng Guofan.

Shi Dakai's army perished at Anshunchang, a ferry point on the southern bank of the Dadu River where lofty peaks stand on either side of the river. An army has no room to
manoeuvre in a gorge like this and is very easy to fall into an enemy ambush.

Chiang Kai-shek ordered the government troops under Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan to continue their pursuit and at the same time instructed the Sichuan warlords to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Dadu River by building blockhouses and defence lines along the river. He appointed the Sichuan warlord Yang Sen commander of the Dadu River garrison and required him to capture Mao Zedong alive by following the example of Luo Bingzhang, the Qing governor of Sichuan, who had captured Shi Dakai alive.

Mao Zedong did everything to bring up the morale of the Red Army, saying that Communists were men of indomitable spirit who would succeed where Shi Dakai had failed. The vanguard of the Red Army marched at lightning speed and reached Anshunchang on a night of fine drizzle. There were several hundred households living near the ferry and a small number of enemy troops waiting for the Red Army. But the enemy troops never expected the Red Army to arrive so quickly. Before they had fully waked up to the fact, they were disarmed by the Red Army.

After taking control of the Anshunchang ferry point, the vanguard of the Red Army immediately made preparations to cross the river. But all the boats had been taken to the northern bank by the enemy. The only boat available was a small one used by messengers. After finding this boat and the boatman, the Red Army decided to force a crossing in that boat.

The following morning, seventeen brave men led by their company commander formed a river-forcing squad and started to cross the river in the small boat under cover of the powerful gunfire of their comrades on the southern bank.

The Sichuan troops on the northern bank opened fire on the small boat. And bullets splashed into the water all around it. But the boat continued to move forward, braving waves and enemy bullets.

As soon as the boat reached the opposite bank, the seventeen Red Army soldiers jumped to shore, opened fire on the enemy and soon took over the blockhouse guarding the ferry. The small boat quickly returned to the southern bank and ferried more Red Army soldiers over. Under the Red Army’s fierce attack, the enemy troops on the northern bank soon lost heart and fled.

After taking control of the ferry on the northern bank, the Red Army seized two more boats from downstream. But it was impossible to ferry all the Red Army men to the opposite bank in the three small boats. Mao Zedong immediately decided that the First Division of the Red Army was to continue to be ferried across the river and then head northward along the western bank of the river, while the main force of the Red Army was also to head northward along the eastern bank of the river, and the two groups were to rendezvous at the Luding Bridge upstream.

The distance was 120 kilometres. The two groups must reach the bridge on foot in one day’s time because two brigades of government troops were on their way to reinforce the defenders of the bridge. The paths along the river zigzagged up steep mountains and down deep valleys and there were enemy interceptions along the way. But the Red Army must get there before the government reinforcements. Otherwise, the Red Army would never be able to cross the river.

Time was victory. The Red Army marched at the highest speed and tried to cover the distance of three steps in two. After marching at top speed for a whole day and night, the vanguard of the left group reached the Luding Bridge.
at dawn the following day and immediately seized the western end of the bridge.

The Luding Bridge on the Dadu River was a strategic passage between Sichuan province and the Xikang-Tibet area. The bridge was built with thirteen iron chains suspended over the river. Two iron chains on each side of the bridge served as guard rails while nine iron chains with wooden planks laid on them formed the bridge itself. The turbulent river roared deafeningly underneath the bridge as waters cascading down through the gorges upstream, throwing up innumerable waves and forming many whirlpools as they hit the rugged rocks at the bottom of the river.

Stationed in the town of Luding were two enemy regiments, who had built defence works at their end of the bridge and removed all the wooden planks on the bridge, believing that their defence works and the natural barrier formed by the turbulent river would prevent any Red Army men from making a crossing.

The vanguard of the Red Army picked twenty brave soldiers to form a shock brigade. In the afternoon on that day, at the sound of bugles, the twenty men, each armed with a cavalry sword, a pistol and with handgrenades in his belt, began to crawl along the bare iron chains, braving powerful enemy gunfire and under cover of fire from their own side. A company of soldiers followed immediately behind them and placed wooden planks on the iron chains as they advanced.

The sounds of bugles, gunfire and men shouting mixed together. The shock brigade crawled steadily forward, ignoring the roaring waters below and bullets whistling overhead. They had only one mind: to reach the other end of the bridge.

As they were fast approaching their objective, flames and black smoke suddenly began to bellow from the wooden structure at the other end of the bridge. The government soldiers had set fire to it to stop the advance of the Red Army men. Undaunted, the Red Army shock brigade continued to move forward even when their eyebrows and hair were burned. Overawed by the Red Army men's bravery, the defenders abandoned their defence works and fled. After taking the eastern end of the bridge, the Red Army rushed to the town of Luding and engaged the garrison in street fighting.

After the western group of the Red Army had taken the Luding Bridge and crossed the river, the eastern group also arrived at the spot. The main force of the Red Army then crossed the river in a continuous stream. Where Shì Dàkāi had failed nearly a hundred years ago the Red Army succeeded.

"Lightning speed is important in war." Mao Zedong had dexterously followed this principle of the classical art of war.

After crossing the Dadu River and breaking through enemy interceptions, the Central Red Army marched to Tianquan. Lushan and Baoxing and entered the Sichuan-Xikang border area, where it climbed the Great Snow Mountains or Jiajin Mountains, the first great mountains on its Long March. It then occupied Dawei and Maogong and joined force with part of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army that had pulled out of the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area. While crossing the Great Snow Mountains, Mao Zedong wrote three short poems:

Three Short Poems
— to the tune of Shi Liu Zi Ling

Mountains!
I whip my fast horse instead of dismounting.
Turning back my head, I am startled.
The sky is only three foot three away.
Mountains!
Like surging waves in a crushing sea.
Like ten thousand horses
Galloping in the heat of battle.
Mountains!
Piercing the sky, their barbs are not blunted.
The sky would fall
Without them supporting it.

Mao Zedong's instructions for the Red Army were: "After the First and Fourth front armies have joined forces, the general policy is to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu and establish a Soviet. The main force of the Fourth Front Army should expand its influence in the area between the Minjiang and Jialing rivers and consolidate in the Maoxian, Beichuan and Weiyuan area. Using it as a pivot for advancing northward. Places like the Maogong area, the banks of the Dadu River and Mount Emei are not areas for development."
However, his plan could not be carried out because Zhang Guotao, a leader of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, refused to follow his instructions.
The Fourth Front Army started a battle at the end of March 1935 for the forced crossing of the Jialing River for the purpose of finding a new area of development on the Sichuan-Gansu border and coordinating with the operations of the Central Red Army on its Long March at the borders of Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. After a fierce battle, the Red Army successfully crossed the river, disrupted the government army's plan of suppression in Sichuan and Shaanxi and took control of an area west of the Jialing River, 150 kilometres in length and width. The total strength of the Fourth Front Army soon grew to more than 80,000 men. The situation was highly favourable. But Zhang Guotao thought his Sichuan-Shaanxi base area held no promise. Without consulting Mao Zedong and the others, he abandoned it and moved the Red Army units to the western side of the Jialing River.
Mao Zedong accused Zhang Guotao of having committed "flightism" and "splittism." Later, Zhang made many more disruptive moves which had caused heavy losses to the Red Army. Mao settled score with him in April 1937. Zhang left the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area in the spring of 1938 and began to engage in anti-Communist activities. He later took refuge in Hong Kong and Canada.

13 Moving Deep into the Barren Land
— Hiding the True Intention from the Enemy

On August 17, 1935. Mao Zedong started to lead the Red Army across the Great Grassland. His destination was northern Shaanxi.
Mao Zedong's instructions for the vanguard of the Red Army was: "Marching north to fight the Japanese invaders is a correct line decided by the Party centre after studying the present situation. At present, Hu Zongnan has concentrated four divisions at Zhangla. Longhuguan and Baozuo in the Songpan area: the Sichuan army in the east and west has occupied the eastern bank of the Minjiang River and the town of Zagunao on the western bank; the army under Liu Wenhui pursuing us has reached Maogong and is moving toward Fubian: and the armies of Xue
Yue and Zhou Hunyuan are assembled in Yachuan. If we turn back and head for the south, we would be fleeing away from them and ruin the revolution.*

The enemy was on three sides of the Red Army. In front of it lay the Great Grassland. If they did not cross the grassland, they would "ruin the revolution." or in other words, "everybody would lose his life."

Mao Zedong also said, "We can only move forward. The enemy will believe that we are going east out of Sichuan and do not dare to risk crossing the grassland and move north to Shaanxi and Gansu. But the enemy will never be able to fathom out our true intention. We will take the road the enemy thinks we do not dare to take."

According to what is recorded in a Kuomintang history book, "In August and September, the 24th year of the Republic (1935), President Chiang ordered the Central Army and the armies from central Sichuan to intensify their encirclement and suppression. The Songpan plateau had become a world of ice and snow after September. The weather was bitterly cold. More than 70 or 80 percent of the local inhabitants were nomadic Tibetans not engaged in agriculture. As only a small quantity of maize was produced there, there was an acute shortage of grain. To obtain food, the Red bandits plundered cattle and sheep from the Tibetans and lamaist temples. The Tibetans and lamas came together spontaneously and desperately resisted the bandits. Forced by hunger and cold, the Red bandits decided to flee. The remnants of the bandits, 5,000 or 6,000 in number, moved to eastern Gansu along the Qinghai and Gansu border. Government troops intercepted them along the route, defeating and dispersing many of them.*

The Great Grassland was a large expanse of uninhabited marsh. The ground was overgrown with luxuriant green grass. but when a man stepped on it he would sink in an-

gle-deep mud. There were no people's houses to take shelter in at night: the Red Army had to sleep in the open, wet wilderness. They had to carry their own dry rations because there was no food grain to be obtained in the locality.

An American scholar described the Red Army's crossing of the Great Grassland as follows: The crossing of the Great Grassland in Gansu was the most frightening experience on the Long March. Mao Zedong lost several thousand of his soldiers. who were engulfed in mud holes, died of hunger or were killed by aborigines in the locality. But this had not affected Mao's strategy and tactics. A woman tribal chieftain was deeply hostile to the Han people. She threatened that any man who helped the Red Army would be scalded to death with boiling water. The Red Army was forced for the first time to kill and rob in order to obtain food. Mao later said, "This is the only debt we owe which we will definitely pay back in the future. Pay back the provisions we were forced to seize from the Miao people and the Tibetans.

The vanguard regiment took a fortnight from August 11 to August 26 to find a path through the boundless grassland. The whole army then followed.

In mid-September, Mao Zedong led the Shaanxi-Gansu detachment of the Red Army to Lazikou at the foot of the Minshan Mountains after crossing the White Dragon River and following an old and dilapided plank path built on cliff face.

Lazikou was an important pass in the Minshan Mountains and a gateway to Gansu from Sichuan. The pass was a gully about thirty metres wide between the sheer cliffs of two mountains. The deep and turbulent Shisha River flows at the bottom of the gully and was spanned by a wooden bridge, which provided the only passage to Lazikou.
Lu Dachang, the warlord of Gansu, stationed a strong force at Lazikou and built many defence works, which formed a network of fire in the vicinity of the bridge. With the main force of Hu Zongnan's troops on its left and Yang Shisi's 20,000 cavalrymen on its right, the Red Army had no choice other than moving north through Lazikou despite the fact that Lu Dachang had stationed a strong force and relied on the natural barrier to block the passage of the Red Army.

After studying the situation with his comrades, Mao Zedong decided to take Lazikou by force. At nightfall, thirty Red Army soldiers from the Sixth Company started a fierce frontal attack under dense covering fire. The government troops stayed put in their defence works and did not return fire at first. When the Red Army's covering fire stopped and the soldiers began to rush toward the bridge head, the government troops threw a large number of handgrenades at them. As the terrain was disadvantageous to them, the Red Army men tried several times but failed to attain their objective.

To overwhelm the enemy gunfire, the Red Army intensified their covering fire with heavy and light machine-guns. But the enemy threw out more handgrenades, preventing the Red Army men from making any advance.

Mao Zedong was very concerned about the progress of the battle. Several times he sent men to the forefront to take a look. He then ordered the shock team to pull back and take a rest before starting another attack.

To coordinate with the operations of the Sixth Company, the commander of the vanguard regiment decided to lead the First and Second companies and outflank the enemy from his rear. The steep cliff face on the right of the pass was very difficult to climb. After many tries, a man who was as nimble as a monkey succeeded in working himself up to the top. He then lowered down a rope and hoisted the others up.

After some rest, the Sixth Company organized a dare-to-die squad of fifteen men, who were to approach the bridge in two groups. The first group was to climb the bridge piers and work themselves forward to the enemy at the other end of the bridge. The second group was to coordinate with the first group and approach the bridge from the other end.

When fighting started again, the first group of soldiers groped their way to the foot of the bridge in the darkness of the night and climbed the piers, moving stealthily to the enemy at the other end. One of the soldiers, however, lost his hold when he was climbing a pier and fell into the water. The enemy was alarmed and began to open fire on those below the bridge. Unable to move forward, the Red Army men immediately took cover behind rocks. As the enemy was firing at the Red Army men under the bridge, the other group moved swiftly forward to the bridge, threw a row of handgrenades at the enemy and rushed into their defence works. A hand-to-hand fighting followed. The First and Second companies were also successful in their outflanking operations.

After the Red Army had taken Lazikou, the remains of the enemy withdrew to Minzhou. Mao Zedong was highly pleased with another victorious battle.

14 Pulling Back After Attaining the Objective — Assigning a Convincing Reason for the Use of Force

After fighting its way through Lazikou, the Central Red Army led by Mao Zedong marched to southern Gansu.
broke through the enemy defence lines along the Weihe River and between the Xian-Lanzhou and Pinggu highways, climbed over Mount Liupan and arrived at Wuqizhen in Baon county, northern Shaanxi, where it joined force with the Red Army of northern Shaanxi under Liu Zhidan. It took the Red Army a whole year, from October 1934 to October 1935, to complete the great strategic shift. The 12,500-kilometre long-distance running, which Mao Zedong called Long March, is described in a Kuomintang history book as follows: “The Red bandits call their pell-mell running the Long March. In the four months after the Zunyi meeting, their army was always on the move, frequently fighting fierce battles. After experiencing innumerable difficulties, crossing China’s longest and deepest river, tallest and most dangerous mountains and an extensive grassland and after suffering from freezing cold and broiling hot weather, wind and frost, rain and storm, it eventually reach northern Shaanxi.” Mao Zedong described the Long March in one of his poems.

The Long March
— a lù shì

The Red Army is undaunted by the trials of the Long March.
Making light the thousand rivers and mountains.
The River Ridges undulate like gentle ripples;
The majestic Wumeng rolls like balls of clay.
Warm are the cliffs lapped by the waters of the Golden Sand:
Cold are the iron chains on the bridge spanning the Datu.
The boundless snow on the Minshan is a joy to see.

The faces of the three armies brighten after crossing it.

In fact. Mao Zedong’s face was already glowing when he climbed over Mount Liupan.

Mount Liupan
— to the tune of Qing Ping Yue

The sky is high: the clouds, pale.
We watch the wild geese until they vanish southward.
If we fail to reach the Great Wall we are not brave men,
After we have marched twenty thousand li.
On the lofty peak of Mount Liupan,
Red flags flutter in the west wind.
With a long rope in hand today.
When can we tie up the grey dragon?

Mao was very proud about the Long March whenever it was mentioned. He wrote. “The Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history.... Since Pan Gu divided the heavens from the earth and Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors reigned, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours? For twelve months we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes. while on land we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge force of several hundred thousand men, and we encountered untold difficulties and dangers on the way: yet by using our two legs we swept across a distance of more than twenty thousand li through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal
In addition to writing poems and uttering proud words, Mao Zedong also said coolheadedly, "In one respect the Red Army has failed (i.e., failed to maintain its original positions), but in another respect it has won a victory (i.e., in executing the plan of the Long March)."

As early as 1931, the year when the Japanese invaders occupied China's three northeastern provinces. Mao Zedong had advocated resistance against Japanese aggression. But in the five years that followed, he never fought against any Japanese army. The reasons were that he was in the far-away Jiangxi province at the time and later was running for his life on the Long March.

In early 1936, the Central Workers' and Peasants' Democratic Government and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Anti-Japanese Red Army headed by Mao Zedong organized the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army of 12,000 men, with Peng De-hui as its commander-in-chief. Mao Zedong, its general political commissar, and Ye Jianying its general chief of staff. The "Order for the Red Army to Advance Eastward to Resist the Japanese and Punish the Traitor Yan Xishan" was issued on January 15, 1936, and the "Proclamation of the Eastern Expedition" on February 17. The proclamation declared that the purpose of the Red Army's crossing of the Yellow River and marching eastward was to resist Japanese aggression.

On the night of February 20, the Red Army crossed the Yellow River in two columns in a fifty-kilometre section of the river between Hekou in the south and Goukou in the north. After breaking through Yan Xishan's defence line of blockhouses alone the river, the Red Army entered Shanxi province.

Yan Xishan telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek for aid on the one hand, and on the other concentrated seven divisions of the Shanxi-Suiyuan army to stop the Red Army's eastward march.

On March 10, the headquarters of the Red Army on the eastern expedition issued the "Notice of the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army," in which it condemned Chiang Kai-shek and Yan Xishan's "reactionary" actions and reiterated the Red Army's desire to "stop all civil wars," "march eastward to resist the Japanese" and "save the nation from subjugation."

On March 23, Chiang Kai-shek moved more than ten divisions, totalling 300,000 men from such strategically important places as Luoyang, Xuzhou and Pukou into Shanxi to intercept the Red Army's eastern expedition against Japan and ordered the Northeast Army. Northwest Army and other units of the government troops in Shaanxi and Gansu to harass the Red Army's rear base. Chiang declared, "Today, we may declare that Japan is not qualified to be our enemy; our enemies are still the Red bandits. Once we have eliminated the Red bandits who are the internal roots of disaster, there is no problem in dealing with Japan. I hope everybody will realize that our objectives were opposing the Japanese invaders externally and opposing the Red bandits internally." What he meant was to implement the policy of "internal pacification before resisting foreign aggression."

The Red Army on the eastern expedition routed seven divisions of Yan Xishan's army in the Fenhe River valley, putting 13,000 enemies out of action, taking more than 4,000 prisoners below the rank of regimental commander and enlarged its own strength by recruiting over 7,000 new soldiers. It conducted propaganda in more than twenty counties on resisting Japan and the ideals of communism.

Attacking Yan Xishan was in itself an act of civil war. But Mao Zedong did it on the ground of fighting against the
Japanese — a convincing reason for the use of force. After having gained the upper hand and seeing that Chiang Kai-shek’s reinforcements of 300,000 men would soon arrive, Mao declared that as a large-scale civil war was imminent, the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Vanguard Army did not want to be involved in it, causing losses to China’s strength of national defence and pleasing the Japanese imperialists. and decided to withdraw to the western side of the Yellow River.

In May 1936, Mao Zedong and Zhu De jointly sent an open telegram, announcing the withdrawal of their army. The ‘Telegram Calling for Cease-Fire, Peace Negotiations and United Resistance Against Japan’ announced that the withdrawal of the Red Army to the western side of the Yellow River was “an action for showing its sincerity to the people of the whole country. We are willing. within a month’s time. to stop fighting and negotiate for peace with all the armed units attacking the Anti-Japanese Red Army so as to attain the objective of cease-fire and resistance against Japan.” As a warning to the Kuomintang, the telegram stated, “At a critical juncture when the nation is in danger of being subjugated and destroyed by genocide, it is time to turn a new leaf and stop the civil war in the whole country and, first of all, in Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia. If you obstinately refuse to change and want to be willing traitors, your rule will inevitably collapse and you will be rejected and overthrown by the people of the whole country.”

After the Red Army had withdrawn, the government troops started to attack northern Shaanxi. In order to smash the encirclement and meet the Second and Fourth front armies on their northward march, the Red Army in northern Shaanxi launched a western expedition. moved into Gansu and expanded its territory at the borders of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia. In October, it occupied Huining in Gansu province, where it joined force with the Second and Fourth front armies of the Red Army and effected the largest historic joining of the two main forces of the Red Army. As a result, the Red Army again grew in strength. Shortly afterward, the Red Army commanded by Mao Zedong destroyed three brigades of the government army under Hu Zongnan and won the last great victory in the ten years of civil war.

15 Giving a Little Ground — Attacking After Spotting the Enemy’s Weak Point

In 1936, the second year Mao Zedong was in northern Shaanxi, he wrote the Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War. a book comparable with the ancient Sun Zi’s Art of War. The following are some main points of the book.

More than any other topics he dwelled on in this book of military strategy, Mao wrote a great deal about “strategic retreat,” which is, in fact, the most important part of his military strategy.

Citing an example from the classical novel Outlaws of the Marsh, Mao wrote, “We all know that when two boxers fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at first, while the foolish one rushes in furiously and used up all his resources at the very start, and in the end he is often beaten by the man who has given ground. In the novel Outlaws of the Marsh, the drill master Hong, challenging Lin Chong to a fight on Chai Jin’s estate, shouts ‘Come on! Come on! Come on!’ In the end it is the Retreat Lin Chong who spots Hong’s weak point and floors him
with one blow.' He then went on to give another example. "During the Spring and Autumn Era, when the states of Lu and Qi were at war. Duke Zhuang of Lu wanted to attack before the Qi troops had tired themselves out but Cao Kui prevented him. When instead he adopted the tactic of 'the enemy tires, we attack,' he defeated the Qi army. This is a classic example from China's military history of a weak force defeating a strong force.'

He even quoted the entire text of "Cao Kui on War" from Zuo's Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals: "In the spring the Qi troops invaded us. The Duke was about to fight. Cao Kui requested an audience. His neighbours said, 'This is the business of the meat-eating officials. why meddle with it?' Cao replied. 'Meat-eaters are fools, they cannot plan ahead.' So he saw the Duke. And he asked, 'What will you rely on when you fight?' The Duke answered, 'I never dare to keep all my food and clothing for my own enjoyment but always share them with others.' Cao said, 'Such paltry charity cannot reach all. The people will not follow you.' The Duke said, 'I never offer to the gods less sacrificial beasts, jade or silk than are due to them. I keep good faith.' Cao said, 'Such paltry faith wins no trust. The gods will not bless you.' The Duke said, 'Though unable personally to attend to the details of all trials, big and small, I always demand the facts.' Cao said, 'That shows your devotion to your people. You can give battle. When you do so, I beg to follow you.' The Duke and he rode in the same chariot. The battle was joined at Changshao. When the Duke was about to sound the drum for the attack. Cao said, 'Not yet.' When the men of Qi had drummed thrice. Cao said, 'Now we can drum.' The army of Qi was routed. The Duke wanted to pursue. Again Cao said, 'Not yet.' He got down from the chariot to examine the enemy's wheel-tracks, then mounted the arm-rest of the chariot to look afar. He said, 'Now we can pursue!' So began the pursuit of the Qi troops. After the victory the Duke asked Cao why he had given such advice. Cao replied, 'A battle depends upon courage. At the first drum courage is aroused, at the second it flags, and with the third it runs out. When the enemy's courage ran out, ours was high and so we won. It is difficult to fathom the moves of a great state, and I feared an ambush. But when I examined the enemy's wheel-tracks and found them crisscrossing and looked afar and saw his banners drooping, I advised pursuit.'"

Analysing the battle. Mao wrote, 'That was a case of a weak state resisting a strong state. The story speaks of the political preparations before a battle — winning the confidence of the people; it speaks of a battlefield favourable for switching over to the counter-offensive — Changshao: it indicates the favourable time for starting the counter-offensive — when the enemy's courage is running out and one's own is high: and it points to the moment for starting the pursuit — when the enemy's tracks are crisscrossed and his banners are drooping. Though the battle was not a big one, it illustrates the principles of the strategic defensive.'

He then listed a number of famous battles in China's military history, such as the battles of Chenggao, Kunyang, Guandu, Chibi and Yiling, in which "the contending sides were unequal, and the weaker side, yielding some ground at first, gained mastery by striking only after the enemy had struck and so defeated the stronger side. The Battle of Chenggao was fought in 203 B.C. between the states of Chu and Han at Chenggao, an ancient town of great military importance in the northwest of today's Chenggao county, Henan province. It was a battle between Liu Bang, King of Han, and Xiang Yu, king of Chu. At first Xiang Yu captured Yunyang and Chenggao
and Liu Bang's troops were almost routed. Liu Bang waited until the opportune moment when Xiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing the Fanshui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chenggao.

The Battle of Kunyang was fought in A.D. 23, between Liu Xiu, founder of the Eastern Han dynasty, and Wang Mang, Emperor of the Xin dynasty. There was a huge numerical disparity between the two sides. Liu Xiu pitted his army of 8,000 to 9,000 men against Wang Mang's 400,000. Taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals, Wang Shun and Wang Yu, who underestimated the enemy. Liu Xiu with only 3,000 picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed up this victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops. The Battle of Guandu between Cao Cao and Yuan Shao took place in A.D. 200 at Guandu in the northeast of today's Zhongmou county, Henan province. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000 men while Cao Cao's army was much smaller and short of food and fodder. Taking advantage of the lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao men who belittled the enemy. Cao Cao launched a surprise attack with lightly equipped soldiers and set fire to Yuan's supplies. When Yuan's army was thrown into a great confusion. Cao attacked with his entire army and destroyed Yuan's main force.

The Battle of Chibi between Sun Quan of the state of Wu and Cao Cao of the state of Wei was fought in A.D. 208 at Chibi on the southern bank of the Yangtze River, to the northeast of Jiayu county, Hubei province. Cao Cao attacked Sun Quan with an army of 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be 800,000 strong. The latter, in alliance with Cao's antagonist Liu Bei, mustered a force of 30,000 men. Knowing that Cao's army was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat. the allied forces of Sun Quan and Liu Bei set fire to Cao's fleet and defeated him.

The Battle of Yiling, in which Lu Xun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the army of Liu Bei, ruler of the state of Shu, occurred in A.D. 222 at Yiling, east of today's Yichang county, Hubei province. At the beginning of the war between Wu and Shu, Liu Bei's army scored successive victories and reached as far as Yiling, which was almost three hundred kilometres inside Wu's territory. Lu Xun, who was defending Yiling, avoided battle for seven or eight months until Liu's army was exhausted and demoralized. One day, when there was a favourable wind. Lu Xun's men suddenly attacked and crushed Liu's army by setting fire to their tents.

Mao Zedong emphatically pointed out. "The object of strategic retreat is to conserve military strength and prepare for the counter-offensive. Retreat is necessary because not to retreat a step before the onset of a strong enemy inevitably means to jeopardize the preservation of one's own forces."

He ridiculed the policies of the Leftists, such as "Pit one against ten. pit ten against a hundred. fight bravely and determinedly. and exploit victories by hot pursuit"; "Attack on all fronts"; "Seize key cities"; and "Strike with two fists."

As we see it today. "Strike with two fists" sounds really ridiculous. Even an eight-year-old boy knows that striking with one fist hurts more than two fists together. But this was "a great principle" advocated by the ultra-Leftists who directed the operations of the entire Communist army, and led to the death of tens of thousands of Red Army men on the battlefield. Any one of the Communist Party members, including those who were not fighting on the battlefield, who was against "Strike with two fists," was condemned as an "opportunist." Mao Zedong himself was a target of their criticism. Deng Xiaoping and Tan
When doing propaganda, Mao Zedong often said that the Red Army was "great," but when it came to fighting on the battlefield, he repeatedly emphasized that the Red Army was "weak and small." To defeat a strong enemy with a weak force is certainly not easy. Mao had made exhaustive studies of how this could be accomplished, and set forth some brilliant views:

"One advantage of operating on interior lines is that it makes it possible for the retreating army to choose terrain favourable to itself and for the attacking army to fight on its terms. In order to defeat a strong army, a weak army must carefully choose favourable terrain as a battleground. But this condition alone is not enough and must be accompanied by others."

What are the other conditions? Mao said there were six:

1. The population actively supports the Red Army.
2. The terrain is favourable for operations.
3. All the main forces of the Red Army are concentrated.
4. The enemy's weak spots have been discovered.
5. The enemy has been reduced to a tired and demoralized state.
6. The enemy has been induced to make mistakes.

He also said, "Another essential condition for a weak army fighting a strong one is to pick out the enemy's weaker units for attack. But at the beginning of the enemy's offensive we usually do not know which of his advancing columns is the strongest and which the second strongest, which is the weakest and which the second weakest, and so a process of reconnaissance is required. This often takes a considerable time. That is another reason why strategic retreat is necessary."

When writing *Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War*, Mao Zedong read Sun Zi's *Art of War* for the first time in his life and learned to apply it. He wrote, "Finally, the object of retreat is to induce the enemy to make mistakes or to detect his mistakes. One must realize that an enemy commander, however wise, cannot avoid making some mistakes over a relatively long period of time, and hence it is always possible for us to exploit the openings he leaves us. The enemy is liable to make mistakes, just as we ourselves sometimes miscalculate and give him openings to exploit. In addition, we can induce the enemy to make mistakes by our own actions, for instance, by 'counterfeiting an appearance,' as Sun Zi called it, that is, by making a feint to the east but attacking in the west. If we are to do this, the terminal point for the retreat cannot be rigidly limited to a definite area. Sometimes when we have retreated to the predetermined area and not yet found openings to exploit, we have to retreat farther and wait for the enemy to give us an opening."

These theories of Mao Zedong's can indeed be regarded as "supreme instructions" even to those who "operate" on the business front today.

Mao Zedong emphatically pointed out, "The first battle in the counter-offensive is of the greatest importance," because "victory or defeat in the first battle has a tremendous effect upon the entire situation, all the way to the final engagement."

What he actually intended was to be a person described in
a saying, who “remains inactive unless he can startle the world with a brilliant feat.” Not without pride, he later said that the Red Army emerged on the battlefield of the civil war as a small and weak force and shook the world by repeatedly defeating a powerful enemy.

In the *Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War*, Mao summed up the lessons to be learned from the success and failure of the operations of the Red Army against the five enemy “encirclement and suppression” campaigns.

In the first “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the “suppression” army did not exceed 100,000 men. The two divisions under Zhang Huizan and Tan Daoyuan each had about 14,000 men and Zhang’s division was divided between two places. After making a correct study of the situation, Mao concluded that the Red Army could achieve absolute superiority by striking at one enemy division at a time. In addition, the Red Army decided to make a breakthrough at the centre and cut the enemy’s eastern and western columns into two widely separated groups. The Red Army, therefore, fought its first battle against Zhang Huizan’s main force and successfully hit two of his brigades and his division headquarters, capturing 9,000 men, including the division commander himself, without letting a single man escape.

In the second “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the enemy forces numbered 200,000 men. The enemy’s Fifth Army commanded by Wang Jinyu had newly arrived from the north and was fearful of the Red Army. Mao decided that the Red Army, totalling now only 30,000 men, should fight its first battle against Wang’s army. After winning victory in the first battle, the Red Army then engaged, each at a time, several more enemy units and defeated all of them.

The third “encirclement and suppression” campaign was started by the enemy with an army 300,000 strong, bearing down menacingly on the Red Army. The enemy followed a strategy of “driving straight in,” intending to drive the Red Army back against the river Gan and annihilate it there. The Red Army had not rested after the bitter fighting in the previous campaign and had marched five hundred kilometres to southern Jiangxi. Mao Zedong decided to avoid the enemy’s main force and strike at his weak spots. The first battle was fought against the division commanded by the bull-headed Shangguan Yunxiang. The enemy division was utterly routed and the Red Army captured several thousand rifles.

In the fourth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the enemy advanced on the Red Army in three columns. The eastern column was the enemy’s main force. But two divisions of the enemy’s western column were exposed to the Red Army at the spot where the Red Army was concentrated. Mao therefore decided to engaged the western column first and in the first battle destroyed the two enemy divisions.

In the fifth “encirclement and suppression” campaign, the Red Army was foiled in the first battle and then suffered one defeat after another.

With deep regret, Mao wrote, “In his fifth campaign the enemy advanced by means of his new strategy of building blockhouses and first occupied Lichuan. But, in attempting to recover Lichuan and engage the enemy outside the base area, we made an attack north of Lichuan at Xiaoshi, which was an enemy strong point and was situated, moreover, in the White area southeast of Xiaoshi, and again we failed. Then in seeking battle we milled around between the enemy’s main force and his blockhouses and were reduced to complete passivity. All through our fifth counter-campaign against ‘encirclement and suppression,’ which lasted a whole year, we showed not the
slightest initiative or drive. In the end we had to withdraw from our Jiangxi area."

He therefore drew the following conclusion:
First, the first battle must be won. The Red Army should strike only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain and popular support were all in the Red Army's favour and not in the enemy's. Otherwise, the Red Army should rather fall back and carefully bide its time. There would always be opportunities: the Red Army should not rashly accept battle. Losing the initiative at the very first move was really the worst and most stupid way to fight.

Second, "the plan for the first battle must be the prelude to, and an organic part of, the plan for the whole campaign. Without a good plan for the whole campaign it is absolutely impossible to fight a really good first battle. That is to say, even though victory is won in the first battle, if the battle harms rather than helps the campaign as a whole, such a victory can only be reckoned a defeat. Hence, before fighting the first battle one must have a general idea of how the second, third, fourth and even the final battle will be fought, and consider what changes will ensue in the enemy's situation as a whole if we win or lose, each of the succeeding battles. Although the result may not—and, in fact, definitely will not—turn out exactly as we expect, we must think everything out carefully and realistically in the light of the general situation on both sides. Without a grasp of the situation as a whole, it is impossible to make any really good move on the chessboard."

Third, "one must also consider what will happen in the next strategic stage of the war. Whoever directs strategy will not be doing his duty if he occupies himself only with the counter-offensive and neglects the measures to be taken after it succeeds, or in case it fails. . . . Even though future changes are difficult to foresee and the farther ahead one looks the more blurred things seem, a general calculation is possible and an appraisal of distant prospects is necessary. . . . In short, in the stage of retreat we must see ahead to the stage of the counter-offensive, in the stage of the counter-offensive we must see ahead to that of the offensive, and in the stage of the offensive we must again see ahead to a stage of retreat. Not to do so but to confine ourselves to considerations of the moment is to court defeat."

These principles laid down by Mao Zedong are indeed "golden rules." They are not only a guide to generals fighting on the battlefield, but also a philosophy of life, embodying the art of struggle in our daily life.

17 Fluidity of Territory
— Move Away When You Can't Win

Mao Zedong was a man who had "a whole bag of tricks." He stood for mobile warfare.

From the way the Red Army fought, he reached the conclusion that the Red Army must fight without fixed battle lines. "Fluidity of battle lines," he wrote, "leads to fluidity in the size of our base areas. Our base areas are constantly expanding and contracting, and often as one base area falls another rises. This fluidity of territory is entirely a result of the fluidity of the war."

When fighting a war, many people think it is important "to fight for every inch of the territory" and meet the enemy head on. But Mao Zedong thought otherwise. He said, "recognize fluidity is to our advantage. "We must base our planning on it and must not have illusions about a
war of advance without any retreats. take alarm at any temporary fluidity of our territory or of the rear areas of our army...."

He told the officers and men of the Red Army to lead a fluid way of life. "It is only by exerting ourselves in today’s fluid way of life that tomorrow we can secure relative stability... and eventually full stability."

What is mobile warfare? In the most popular way Mao Zedong described it, it is "Fight when you can win. move away when you can’t win."

Mao wrote, "There is no military expert anywhere in the world who approves only of fighting and never of moving, though few people do much moving as we do. We generally spend more time in moving than in fighting and would be doing well if we fought an average of one sizable battle a month. All our ‘moving’ is for the purpose of ‘fighting,’ and all our strategy and tactics are built on ‘fighting.’"

He said that under four situations it was best for the Red Army to move away. First, it was inadvisable to fight when the force confronting the Red Army was too large: second, it was sometimes inadvisable to fight when the enemy force, though not too large, was very close to other enemy forces: third, it was generally inadvisable to fight an enemy force that was not isolated and was strongly entrenched: fourth, it was inadvisable to continue an engagement in which there is no prospect of victory.

In the eye of your enemy, "moving away" means taking to your heels. But you must not mind what your enemy or others say when you move away. "It’s never too late to take your revenge." Only by taking to your heels can you laugh the last laugh.

When the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression broke out in July 1937, Mao Zedong formulated a military strategy for fighting the Japanese: It was to be an inde-
to take Xiaguangou, Caijiayu and Dongkou and reach Shangpuxi, where it was to rendezvous with Wang’s army which was to attack the Japanese army from the west.

The battle started in the early morning of September 26. The Chinese army pressed on northward and, by noon, had taken Caijiayu, Dongkou and Nanguangou, chasing the Japanese army to Shangpuxi and inflicting casualties on the Japanese army amounting to a whole regiment. The Japanese headquarters immediately sent a reinforcement of two regiments. When the reinforcement reached a deep gully at Xiaochai village, it was ambushed by the Chinese army and totally wiped out.

The gully to the west of Xiaochai village providing the only passage from Caijiayu to Pingxingguan was flanked by sheer cliffs on both sides. “Lay down your arms!” the Chinese soldiers shouted at the Japanese soldiers. Not knowing the language, the Japanese soldiers fought on desperately until they were almost all killed by bullets and handgrenades. The Sakagaki Division suffered a gory defeat.

On September 27, the Chinese army advanced to the vicinity of Lingqiu and defeated the Japanese twice more, killing 3,000 and capturing over 100 trucks, tanks and cannons and innumerable military supplies. Unable to maintain its foothold in the area, the Japanese army hurriedly pulled back.

After the Chinese army as a whole had suffered one defeat after another in the war against Japan, its victory at Pingxingguan formed the only glorious page in the history of the war in northern Shanxi.

A Chinese army officer who had taken part in the battle said. “The campaign proved that flexible tactics, offensive defence and mobile warfare are absolutely effective: they are the basic tactics for winning the war. Converse-

ly, position warfare and the strategy of pure defence are dangerous: they were the main reasons of the defeats we suffered in the past. The main reasons for the victory were: 1. Secrecy of movements. All our military movements were undetected by the Japanese army. 2. Lightning speed. It was already too late by the time the Japanese discovered our intention. On one occasion, the Japanese army and our army raced to control a hill top. The Japanese were already half way up the hill, but we reached the top before them. 3. Familiarity with the terrain. We could turn positional warfare into mountain warfare at any time. Mountain warfare is the best way of dealing with an enemy with superior weapons.”

Mao Zedong had listed many questions to be taken into consideration in mobile warfare, such as reconnaissance, forming judgments, making decisions, disposition of troops, directing a battle, concealing, concentrating and spreading out the forces, attacking, surprise attack, raiding enemy positions, defending one’s own positions, contact battle, withdrawal, night fighting, fighting under special circumstances, avoiding the strong and hitting the weak, encircling an enemy city and attacking his reinforcements, feint attack, air defence, manoeuvre between several enemies, fighting without a rear and the necessity of preserving one’s strength.

Mao must have given deep thought to all these problems, but unfortunately he did not dwell in length on them. The same questions, such as “the necessity of preserving one’s strength,” certainly also deserve our consideration in our dealings with others and in our struggle to live and excel.
Making Raids from the East and West
— Employing the Main Force on the Flanks

In an interview with the British journalist James Bertram in Yanan on October 25, 1937, Mao Zedong spoke in length on the strategy and tactics to be applied in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao told Bertram about the field operations of the Eighth Route Army first: "Strategically, the Eighth Route Army is centring its operations in Shanxi. As you know, it has won many victories. Examples are the battle of Pingyingguan, the recapture of Jingping, Pinglu and Ningwu, the recovery of Laiyuan and Guangling, the capture of Zijingguan, the cutting of the three main supply routes of the Japanese troops (between Datong and Yannengguan, between Weixian and Pingxingguan, and between Shuoxian and Ningwu), the assault on the rear of the Japanese forces south of Yannengguan, the recapture twice over Pingxingguan and Yannengguan, and the recent recovery of Quyuan and Tangxian. The Japanese troops in Shanxi are being strategically encircled by the Eighth Route Army and other Chinese troops. We may say with certainty that the Japanese troops will meet with the most stubborn resistance in northern China. If they try to ride roughshod over Shanxi, they will certainly encounter greater difficulties than ever."

Based on these observations of the situation. Mao said that the Eighth Route Army's tactics was "operating chiefly on the enemy's flanks and rear." tactics which had not been adopted by other Chinese troops.

He explained that he was not against employing part of the forces in frontal operations. But he emphasized that the main force must be used against the enemy's flanks and that it was essential to adopt encircling and outflanking tactics in order to attack the enemy independently and with initiative.

He said that the use of some of the forces against the enemy's rear was particularly effective, because they could disrupt the enemy's supply lines and bases.

He also said that even the frontal forces should rely mainly on "counter assault" and not on purely defensive tactics.

According to a Kuomintang history book. "After receiving orders to fight the Japanese, the entire Eighth Route Army marched to Hebei, Chahar and Shanxi provinces where they fought as guerrillas. Their missions were: 1. to disrupt the Japanese army's communication lines so as to reduce its effective strength; 2. to make raids upon the flanks and pin down the Japanese army; 3. to attack the weakly defended places and destroy the Japanese army."

After Yannengguan was taken by the Japanese army on October 2, 1937, Yan Xishan, the governor of Shanxi, decided to put up a frontal defence at the strategic Xinkou in order to stop the enemy's southward advance. protect the provincial capital Taiyuan and bring about a change in the war situation in Shanxi. Chiang Kai-shek immediately rushed the 14th Group Army commanded by Wei Lihuang to reinforce Yan Xishan.

Fighting in the Battle of Xinkou on the Chinese side were the Central Army. Shanxi-Suiyuan army. Sichuan army and the Eighth Route Army; on the Japanese side were the Fifth Division, part of the Guandong army and some special forces.

On October 6, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai asking him to inform the commanders of the National Army that after occupying Shijiazhuang, the Japanese would definitely attack westward and that the National Army should concentrate a strong force to defend
Niangziguan in order to win victory in the fighting north of Taiyuan.

Zhou Enlai was at the conference to discuss the concept of operations in the Battle of Xinkou. Seeing the Japanese army was advancing southward in three columns. Yan Xishan and the other commanders decided to deploy their forces in three regions, left, central and right, and place their main force in the central region for frontal defense. It was decided that the forces in the central region was to be commanded by Wei Lihuang: those on the right flank (including some Kuomintang forces), by Zhu De and Peng Dehuai; and those on the left flank, by Yang Aiyuan. The forces defending Shilingguan and the reserves in Taiyuan were under the command of Fu Zuoyi. After studying the actual situation of the war in the area, Zhou Enlai reminded them that frontal defense would result in heavy losses and offer little chance of winning victory. He suggested using a small force in the central region to pin down the enemy, strengthening the flanks and employing the main force in an attack on Daixian in the northeast to achieve the best result in preventing the enemy from marching south.

The battle started at Xinkou on the night of October 11. Following up their previous victories, the Japanese tried to overcome the Chinese troops at one swoop but were met with head-on resistance.

On October 13, the fighting became fierce. The well-prepared Chinese army won a big victory. Beginning from October 14, the different columns of the Chinese army started a general attack, assisted by several dozen aircraft, which destroyed all the Japanese artillery positions. The Japanese were pushed back. On the morning of October 14, a fierce battle took place at Southern Huaihualing and more than 1,000 Japanese troops were killed.

On the morning of October 15, the Japanese army started a counter-attack with several dozen tanks, which appeared for the first time in this battle. The Chinese army waited for the Japanese infantrymen to come closer. They then rushed out and engaged them in hand-to-hand fighting, forcing them to withdraw in defeat.

On October 16, the Japanese army came with a reinforcement of more than 3,000 men and made a breakthrough in the Chinese positions. The Chinese army also brought in reinforcements and had the Japanese surrounded. In the frantic battle that ensued, more than 2,000 Japanese were killed. In the several days of bloody battle, the Chinese army captured 500-600 rifles, over 40 light and heavy machine-guns and 20 artillery pieces. A Japanese heavy bomber was brought down on October 17.

When the Japanese army was preparing for its southward advance to Xinkou, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army assigned to its 115th and 120th divisions the task of disrupting communication lines and strongholds in the enemy’s rear from the east and west.

The main force of the 115th Division was active in northeastern Shanxi. It disrupted the communication line from Zhangjiakou to Guangling and Xinkou and its Independent Regiment and Cavalry Battalion raided southern Chahar and western Hebei. The main force of the 120th Division was active in northwestern Shanxi. It attacked the communication line from Xinkou to Yanmenguan, Ningwu and Datong. Its Yanbei Detachment made raids north of the Great Wall.

While fierce fighting was going on at the main front in Xinkou, the 115th and 120th divisions of the Eighth Route Army coordinated with fighting at the main front by making raids on the enemy’s flanks and rear. They repeatedly cut off the main communication lines in the enemy’s rear, destroyed a large number of Japanese army trucks, raided the enemy’s reinforcements and recovered
several county towns, seriously threatening the enemy’s rear and preventing the enemy’s supplies of food and ammunition from reaching the front.

On October 17, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Zhu De and Peng Dehuai in which he said, “Your Lin division and Zhang brigade have repeatedly performed remarkable feats in the war, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. They should be highly commended.”

The Battle of Xinkou was an earth-shaking event, a brilliant example of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation. Although the battle was not directed by Mao Zedong himself, Zhou Enlai, who attended the operational conference, adopted Mao’s military strategy, which included the Eighth Route Army’s attacks on the east and west and the use of the main force on the flanks.

On April 5, 1937, three months before the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War. Mao Zedong wrote the impassioned “Elegy on the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor,” which was actually a declaration expressing his determination to resist Japanese aggression. The full text reads in translation as follows:

Our glorious ancestor created China, our homeland:
His descendants regenerate and prosper
Among lofty mountains and majestic rivers.
His wisdom and knowledge shine over the remotest waste.
And his great creation stands heroically in the east.
But how the world has changed!
After several thousand years and repeated setbacks,
We are now bullied by a powerful neighbour.
Ryukyu and Taiwan were lost
And the three Hans reduced to ruins.
In Liao and Hai, Yan and Ji
Why are there so many traitors?

How can you cede territory to the enemy
To satisfy his greed?
It is like handing over the whip to the enemy
And reducing ourselves to slaves.
Remember how heroic our ancestor was
And how he forged his own destiny.
Fighting courageously at Zhulu,
He succeeded in pacifying the whole country.
Why are his descendants so lacking in prowess
And allow a great country to be humiliated by an enemy?
I and my friends are not men of talents.
But we are determined to pick up our swords
And march ten thousand miles to serve the country.
After several years of bitter struggle
And after experiencing all dangers and hardships.
We have not yet destroyed the enemy.
Where are we to build our homes?
All political parties and people of all circles,
Both the military and the civilians.
Both the rich and the poor.
Let us firmly unite to form a national front.
For to save the country this is the best way.
Four hundred million people will resolutely fight back.
United in a democratic republic with reformed politics.
Millions upon millions will fight with one mind
To win certain victory in war.
Recover lost territories and safeguard sovereignty.
We shall never forget this determination of ours.
And we shall train and strengthen our forces
And ask our ancestor to witness
That our determination is firmly carried out
In this land ours.
Come and Go Like a Shadow
— Building Bases Behind Enemy Lines

After arriving in northern Shaanxi. Mao Zedong put forward in clear terms the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. In his instructions for Zhou Enlai on September 25, 1937, he wrote. "Work in the entire northern China should be orientated towards fighting a guerrilla war: all work, such as mass work and the united front, should be centred on fighting a guerrilla war..... The whole Party should be informed that from now on there is no work other than fighting a guerrilla war."

On November 12, in the report (The Situation and Tasks in the Anti-Japanese War After the Fall of Shanghai and Taiyuan) delivered to a meeting of Party activists in Yanan. Mao Zedong pointed out. "In northern China, regular warfare in which the Kuomintang played the chief role has ended. and guerrilla warfare in which the Communist Party is playing the chief role has become primary."

Mao had reached the correct conclusion that the Chinese side could fight large-scale campaigns like the battles of Xinkou and Pingxingguan only occasionally at the initial stage of the war and could not afford to fight them regularly. He therefore emphasized guerrilla warfare.

In May 1938, in his second book on military strategy, Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, he gave strategic importance to guerrilla war. His reasons were: China was a large and weak country being attacked by a small and strong country. As this had happened in an era of progress and the enemy could not expect to conquer the large and weak country in a brief war. vast areas of China were occupied by the enemy and the war had be-
ter the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, the strategy outlined by Mao Zedong for it was: Fighting basically a guerrilla war, pinning down the enemy in his rear and building bases to support the front line. As the Eighth Route Army was about to send part of its troops to the Yanshan Mountains deep in the enemy's rear. Nankou fell to the enemy. It then received a directive from the Military Commission ordering it to proceed to Weixian to intercept the enemy. While the army was still on its way, Weixian also fell to the enemy. The headquarters of the Second Military Zone then ordered it to rush to intercept the enemy at Feihukou. By the time the army had reached Taiyuan. Feihukou also fell. The enemy was then fast approaching the defence line in northern Shanxi with the intention of taking Pingxinxingguan and Yanmenguann. The 115th Division then took a roundabout route to intercept the enemy in his rear and fought the first victorious battle at Pingxinxingguan on September 25. When the situation at Nianziziguan. Taiyuan and Xinkou became critical, the main force of the 115th Division immediately set out from the Wutai Mountains in the middle of the night to give aid. On October 23, Nie Rongzhen, deputy division commander and political commissar of the division, was ordered to defend the Wutai Mountains area and set up the first guerrilla base behind enemy lines. The forces under his command included only an independent regiment, a calvary battalion and two not fully complemented companies, totalling about 2,000 men. On November 7, the headquarters of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Zone headed by Nie Rongzhen was set up at the order of Chu De and Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief and deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army. Many large and small victories were won in the guerrilla areas behind enemy lines during the early stage of the Anti-Japanese War. According to incomplete statistics, in one year's time, from the fall of Taiyuan in November 1937 to October 1938, the Eighth Route Army in northern China engaged the enemy more than 1,500 times, inflicting 30,000 casualties on the Japanese army, capturing over 10,000 guns and destroying more than 1,000 motor vehicles.

In addition to the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area, there were several other important anti-Japanese base areas. The Shanxi-Chahar-Shandong-Henan anti-Japanese base area: In November 1937. the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army (division commander, Liu Bocheng, and political commissar, Deng Xiaoping) marched to the southeastern part of Shanxi province to intercept the enemy on the southern side of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway and destroy the puppet organizations set up by the enemy in the area. After Taiyuan was occupied by the enemy and the Kuomintang withdrew further to the south, the 129th Division made the Taihang Mountains its base and received support from the local Communist Party organizations in southeastern Shanxi and from the anti-Japanese forces in Shanxi organized mainly by refugee students from Beiping and Tianjin. In December, it smashed a six-pronged attack by the enemy and established the Taihang-Taiyue Mountains anti-Japanese base area. After suffering repeated setbacks and feeling threatened by the guerrillas, the Japanese army amassed a force of 30,000 men and launched a converging attack on southeastern Shanxi in nine columns, beginning from April 4, 1938. This attack was again smashed by the 129th Division and the victory laid the foundation for the establishment of the Shanxi-Chahar-Henan base area. With the fall of Shijiazhuang and Anyang into enemy hands, the great plain of Hebei, Shandong and Henan was a scene of utter confusion. The 129th Division began to fan out westward in several detachments in the direction of the Beiping-
Hankou Railway and engaged the enemy in fierce battles. It recovered altogether more than sixty counties in nineteen months after its eastward march in 1937 and eventually established the Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area.

The Shandong anti-Japanese base area: After the Shandong warlord Han Fuqu had fled without firing a shot before the invading enemy at the end of 1937, the Communist Party members in Taian county organized a number of refugee students from Beijing and Tianjin and some peasants into a Shandong column and staged an anti-Japanese uprising with three worn-out rifles. By the autumn of 1938, the column had grown into an army of nine detachments and 30,000 men. It recovered more than a dozen county towns and set up a guerrilla base in Jiaodong, Huangxian, Penglai and Yexian. In August that year, the column even succeeded in breaking into Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province, and fought its way more than once into the coastal city of Yantai, and occupied Weihaiwei.

The Central China anti-Japanese base area: In the spring of 1938, the New Fourth Army began to march into areas behind enemy lines on either side the Yangtze River to wage a guerrilla war and build bases. The units on the southern side of the river moved into the area around Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Danyang and Wuhu and built the Southern Jiangsu base area. In the three months from June to August, they fought more than thirty battles and dealt heavy blows to the enemy, forcing him to increase his forces from three regiments to three divisions in that area. The units of the New Fourth Army on the northern side of the river moved to the area around Lake Chaohu and Wuwei and Dingyuan counties and set up the North-of-the-River base area with Outang as its centre.

From these bases inside and outside the Great Wall, north and south of the Yangtze River and along the coastal areas, guerrillas came and went like shadows, dealing blows and inflicting casualties on the Japanese army behind enemy lines.

20 Outflanking and Encircling Tactics — Injuring a Man’s Ten Fingers Is Not as Effective as Chopping Off One

Mao Zedong often held unusual views of problems, views different from those of an average man. In his analysis of the War of Resistance Against Japan, he presented some surprising views on the question of "encirclement."

He said, "Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive and is operating on exterior lines while we are on the strategic defensive and are operating on interior lines. This is the first form of encirclement."

He then pointed out, "We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes because we apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior-line operations in campaigns and battles by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from exterior lines. This is the first form of our encirclement of the enemy.

"Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy’s rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the northwestern Shanxi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement.

"However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great
many enemy forces. . . . This is the second form of our encirclement of the enemy."

By taking the whole country into consideration and applying the dialectical method, Mao Zedong was able to reach the view that while the enemy encircled us, we also encircled the enemy.

He said, "Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of Go. Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of strongholds by the enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It is in the matter of dominating the spaces that the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the rear of the enemy is revealed . . . . If on the international plane we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, we shall then have one more form of encirclement against the enemy than he has against us and bring about exterior-line operations in the Pacific region by which to encircle and destroy fascist Japan."

In actual battles, Mao Zedong favoured encirclement of the enemy and battles of annihilation. "Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one," said he.

After having taken all the important cities and towns in northern Shanxi and occupied the southern section of the Datong-Puzhou Railway, the Japanese army deployed its forces and posed to cross the Yellow River in several columns and attack the Communist-controlled Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area in February-March 1938. Yanan, the capital of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region, was then defended by a 9,000-men garrison of the Eighth Route Army. Coordinated by the 120th and 115th divisions, the garrison adopted a strategy of active defence against the powerful enemy.

In mid-March, a unit of the Japanese army started to attack the Shenfu section of the Yellow River in an attempt to cross the river at that spot. The Sixth Garrison Regiment of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region met the attack calmly. It waited until the Japanese army had begun to cross the river and met the enemy with intensive fire from close formations. A mobile unit, which had crossed to the eastern bank of the river, then began to attack the enemy in his flanks and rear. The enemy was forced to abandon his attempt to cross the Yellow River and withdraw to Xingxian.

In April, another attempt by the Japanese army to cross the Yellow River at Lishi was thwarted. In early May, about a brigade of the Japanese forces advanced to Jundu and began to threaten the river defence of the Eighth Route Army at Songjiachuan. The main force of the Eighth Regiment of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia garrison crossed to the eastern bank of the Yellow River and ambushed and launched surprise attacks on the enemy in the area northwest of Lishi. After suffering heavy blows at the hand of the Eighth Regiment, the Japanese army was forced to give up its attempt to advance westward.

After his Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan, Mao Zedong's third book on military strategy was On Protracted War, which was published in May 1938. The book On Protracted War was a summing up of the first ten months of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.

The war situation at the time was as follows: The Japanese army with its superior weaponry had made a long drive into Chinese territory. After having occupied all principal cities and main lines of communications in northern China, it was pushing the front to central and south-
ern China and making preparations to seize Wuhan and Guangzhou. On the Chinese side, the National Army on the main front had suffered repeated defeats. Although it had won victories in one or two campaigns, it followed a strategy of pure defence and was in a strategically passive position. In the meantime, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army had penetrated deep into the enemy’s rear, where they had started a guerrilla war and built bases. They had not only won victories in several campaigns, but also gained strategic footholds for waging a protracted war.

In his *On Protracted War*, Mao Zedong refuted those who believed that the subjugation of China by the enemy was inevitable as well as those who upheld the theory that China could win quick victory in the war. “In the eyes of the subjugationists,” he wrote, “the enemy are superhuman and we Chinese are worthless. While in the eyes of the theorists of quick victory we Chinese are superhuman and the enemy are worthless. Both are wrong. We take a different view: the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war and the final victory will be China’s. These are our conclusions.”

Since the war was to be a protracted one, Mao pointed out, it would pass through three stages:
The first stage was to cover the period of the enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive.
The second stage would be the period of the enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive.
The third stage would be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.
Mao also stated that from the way the war was fought, it would be “a war of jig-saw pattern” on a large scale. This explained why the war would become a protracted and complicated one and how final victory was to be won.

Since the enemy was strong and we weak, China could not hope to defeat the enemy’s armed aggression and drive the enemy out of China in one stroke; since the enemy’s strength had not been reduced and our strength has not increased within a short period of time, we could not hope to turn immediately from strategic retreat to offensive. For these reasons, the War of Resistance Against Japan must pass through the three stages of strategic retreat, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive. Since the enemy was strong, he was attacking China with a superior force and had occupied parts of China; since China was weak, it was on the defensive. But strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, were relative and not absolute. They could be changed.

Moreover, owing to the enemy’s shortage of troops and China’s firm resistance, he could not keep on advancing and could not hope to occupy the whole of China. After attaining certain strategic objectives, he would inevitably turn to safeguard the occupied areas. As an extensive people’s anti-Japanese guerrilla war was being waged behind enemy lines, the enemy could only occupy the large cities, parts of the plains and some trunk lines of communications. A stalemate between the enemy and ourselves would then occur. This would be a period when the enemy could not advance any further and had to engage the guerrillas in fierce battles.

The stage of stalemate would be the most arduous period and would last longer than the other stages, and China’s strength would grow mainly in this period.
The guerrilla war would eventually developed into regular warfare. On this basis, added by international forces and the anti-war movement in Japan, the Chinese army would turn to offensive, engage the enemy in strategically decisive battles, destroy the enemy and recover lost territories.
21 Fighting a Protracted War
— Trading Space for Time

When Mao Zedong said that the War of Resistance Against Japan was going to be "a war of jig-saw pattern," a war of infinite complexity, he explained that its complexities were shown as follows: The Chinese forces would fight the enemy on both the exterior and interior lines and operate with or without a rear area. There would be both encirclement and counter-encirclement between the enemy and ourselves. The enemy might reach vast areas in China but could only control the big cities, some trunk communication lines and some of the plains. Militarily, he pointed out, the guiding strategic and tactical principle was "the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy."

First, the Chinese forces should, with initiative and in a flexible and planned way, conduct tactical offensives within the strategic defensive campaigns and battles of quick decision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. This principle should be followed for a long time and should not be changed before the stage of strategic counter-offensive began.

Because the enemy was strong and China weak, the enemy had adopted a policy of strategic offensive, fighting a war of quick decision and operating on exterior lines. China, on the other hand, had adopted a policy of strategic defensive, fighting a protracted war and operating on interior lines. Because the enemy was small and China large, the enemy was employing his small forces against a vast country. He could only occupy parts of China's territory, and even in the occupied territory there were still many unoccupied areas, which provided large spaces for China to conduct mobile and guerrilla warfare against the enemy. As a result, we could concentrate a superior force and fight offensive campaigns and battles of quick decision on exterior lines with initiative. We would then be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive; we on the exterior lines and the enemy on the interior lines; we would be fighting battles of quick decision and the enemy trying to gain time and waiting for reinforcements. Consequently, in specific battles, the enemy's position would change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces would change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior, and we would be able to win victories in campaigns and battles. Through the accumulation of these victories, the general balance of forces would gradually change: we would increasingly grow in strength, and the enemy steadily weaken until he was totally destroyed.

In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, the crucial point is the offensive; exterior lines refers to the scale of the offensive, and quick-decision, to its duration. It is the best principle for waging a protracted war and the principle for mobile warfare. But this principle cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility and planning.

Initiative here means an army's freedom of action. Freedom of action is the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. Initiative and passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war. The enemy's superiority at present was relative and limited. China could gain initiative through correct subjective direction. This meant that commanders should "know the enemy and know themselves," commit fewer mistakes, mislead the enemy and make use the subjective mistakes committed by the enemy.

Flexibility means the flexible employment of armed forces.
and the flexible application and change of strategy and tactics. Only then could more victories be won in quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines.
Planning is the concrete expression of flexibility in war. All the operations of an army should be carefully planned. Without planning, the operations would become "blind actions" and would certainly end in defeat. But plans in war can only be drawn with relative certainty and stability. They must change with the movement of the war and with the changes in the situation of the enemy.
Secondly, the War of Resistance Against Japan was to be fought in the forms of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. As Mao Zedong said, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions." The war was going to be a protracted one and China could not hope to win quick victory. It was therefore necessary to build bases for waging a guerrilla war and develop guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, that is, to turn guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. In order to fight an extensive guerrilla war in the enemy's rear, it was necessary, on the one hand, to arm the masses of the people and build local armed forces, and, on the other, to disperse the regular forces so that they could fight as guerrillas and organize themselves into guerrilla corps. These regular forces could also engage the enemy in mobile warfare when they were assembled together.
As soon as On Protracted War was published, Zhou Enlai recommended it to the Kuomintang general Bai Chongxi. After reading it, the latter expressed full approval, saying that the book embodied the highest strategic principle for overcoming the enemy and winning victory. Later, when Bai told Chiang Kai-shek about the book, Chiang also highly approved of it. Cheng Siyuan, Li Zongren's secretary, later recalled, "With Chiang Kai-shek's support, Bai Chongxi summed up the spirit of On Protracted War in two sentences: "Accumulating small victories into a big victory and trading space for time." With Zhou Enlai's approval, the Military Commission issued a circular order, making the two sentences the strategic guiding principle for the War of Resistance Against Japan.
In On Protracted War, Mao Zedong emphasized that "the army and the people are the foundation of victory" and "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people."
He repeatedly stressed that sometimes it was necessary "to trade space for time." that is, to make a courageous retreat and abandon territory in order to avoid a decisive battle under unfavourable conditions. He had written a brilliant passage on the subject: people of the business world today may still find inspiration in it.
"Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to empty your bowels — is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up — is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop — these are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life.
As everybody knows, although in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counter-offensive we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we have gained time. we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting enemy forces. we have acquired experience in fighting. we have aroused hitherto inactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and indeed to preserve territory. because if we do not abandon
part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalist must have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is no longer a capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks it all on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more."

22

All Is Fair in War
— There Is No Use for Asinine Ethics

In 638 B.C., the state of Song of the Spring and Autumn Period ruled by Duke Xiang was at war with the powerful state of Chu. The Song forces had completed their battle array when the Chu soldiers were crossing a river. A Song officer suggested that since the Chu forces were numerically stronger, the Song forces should attack when the Chu soldiers were in mid-stream. But Duke Xiang said, "No. A gentleman should not attack his opponent who is unprepared." When the Chu forces had crossed the river and had not yet formed their battle array, the Song officer again asked permission to attack. The duke said, "No. A gentleman will not attack an army that is not in battle position. He ordered the Song soldiers to attack only when the Chu army was fully prepared. As a result, the Song army suffered a crushing defeat and the duke himself was wounded. too.

Mao Zedong mentioned this story in On Protracted War when he talked about "All is fair in war." "We are not Duke Xiang of Song and have no use for his asinine ethics." said he.

"Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon him are the way of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative," he wrote.

What are misconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Bagong as an enemy soldier" is an example of misconception. "Making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is another.

Explaining the ways of creating misconceptions, Mao Zedong said, "In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds."

On how to create misconceptions for the enemy, Mao explained, "Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all the people who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last man, make widespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part."

Since the War of Resistance was a national war, it won much wider support from the people than the Agrarian Revolutionary War fought by Mao Zedong in the early years.

After the Japanese army had occupied Guangzhou and Wuhan in October 1938, the Sino-Japanese War entered the stage of stalemate as pointed out by Mao Zedong.

In the sixteen months of strategic offensive, the Japanese army had pushed the front to the line linking Baotou, Fenglingdu, Kaifeng, Xinyang, Hefei, Yueyang, Wuhu
and Hangzhou and occupied the economically more developed areas at the estuary of the Pearl River, along the banks of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and the railway trunk lines of north and central China.

By the end of 1938. Japan had thrown in altogether twenty-three divisions and sixteen brigades, totalling a million men, or two-thirds of the entire Japanese army, on the China front. As a result of the all-out resistance by both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Japanese army suffered more than 447,000 casualties.

From the outbreak of the War of Resistance to the fall of Wuhan. the Japanese army's attacks were directed mainly at the Kuomintang, which resisted the Japanese at the front on the battlefield. In the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Kuomintang army engaged the enemy in twenty-two campaigns and 1,117 large battles, most of which took place during the early period of the war.

Because the Kuomintang army was resisting the enemy at the front and had drawn the overwhelming majority of the Japanese forces to itself, it became easier for the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army to penetrate deep behind enemy line, fight a guerrilla war and open a battle front in the enemy's rear.

"Without the main force fighting heroically at the front of the battlefield, it is impossible to wage guerrilla warfare successfully in the enemy's rear," said Mao Zedong.

On December 6, 1938. the Japanese Ministry of Army laid down "Policies for Handling Affairs in China," which pointed out that after the occupation of Wuhan and Guangzhou, "the fundamental policy should be the restoration of peace and security" and that "the elimination of the remaining anti-Japanese forces should continue, but should be carried out mainly by manipulation and political means based on the force of arms." This policy led to the "security-tightening movement" started in north China.

The Japanese designated north China into three kinds of areas: "security area" (enemy-occupied area), "semi-security area" (guerrilla area) and "non-security area" (liberated area).

In the "security areas," the Japanese carried out a large-scale campaign "to clear the countryside." strengthened the organization of households. forcibly combining several villages into one large village. adopted a measure of punishing those who were related to a culprit, and organized the Security Army. Security Detachments. Police Detachments and other armed forces in an attempt to strangle all anti-Japanese activities. They also adopted a policy of mollification and carried out deceptive propaganda which described the enemy-occupied areas as "paradise on earth ruled in the king's way."

In the "semi-security areas," the Japanese implemented a policy of mollification on the one hand and a policy of terror on the other. Blockade trenches and walls and blockhouses were built everywhere. Villages were levelled to create no man's land. Mobile forces were dispatched frequently to make searches, kill anyone on sight, burn down houses and seize property.

The Japanese army launched "mopping-up" campaigns in the "non-security areas," and burned, killed and plundered in a more cruel way. Adopting a so-called "caging policy," it carved up the liberated area bound by railways, highways, blockhouses and blockade trenches and walls, into small separated pieces and employed an absolutely superior force to "mop up district by district with suitably organized units, which adopted flexible tactics of pursuit and suppression." These tactics included the so-called "ox-cleaver tactics, "water-draining tactics" and "breaking-in tactics."
When the War of Resistance entered the stage of stalemate the Japanese army's attack began to be directed against the base areas of the Chinese Communist Party. Between November 1938 and the end of 1940 the Japanese army in north China launched a total of 109 large-scale "mopping-up" campaigns against the Communist areas employing a force no less than 1,000 troops in each campaign. The forces employed in these campaigns totalled more than 500,000.

In the face of the Japanese army's rabid attacks. Mao Zedong remained calm and undisturbed. His strategic plan was to "consolidate in north China and develop in central China." He ordered the Eighth Route Army's 115th Division to march into Shandong. the 120th Division to penetrate into central Hebei. and the 129th Division to enter southern Hebei and the plain on the borders of Hebei. Shandong and Henan. to fight a more extensive guerrilla war. He believed that only by intensifying the people's war can prevent the Japanese army from attaining its aims by rabid attacks.

Late in January 1939, at Mao's order. He Long and Guan Xiangying led the main force of the 120th Division from northwestern Shanxi to central Hebei, where it joined force with the headquarters organizations of the Eighth Route Army in the central Hebei district and formed a military and political committee headed by He Long and the central Hebei command. After having smashed the Japanese army's third. fourth and fifth "mopping-up" campaigns the central Hebei command assembled a force of seven-plus regiments at the end of April and wiped out a Japanese unit of over 700 men at Qihui village in Hejian county. scoring an important victory in the Central Plain area.

In order to check the mobility of the Japanese mechanized units. the army and people in central Hebei pulled down town walls. destroyed highways and dug an innumerable ditches on the plain.

At the end of September 1939. assisted by Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei units. the main force of the 120th Division. which was returning to its base in the west from central Hebei. made use of the favourable mountain terrain and successfully ambushed and wiped out a Japanese and puppet force of more than 1,100 men which had come out of the town of Lingshou on a "mopping-up" campaign at Chenzhuang village in Lingshou county.

In the last quarter of 1939, the Japanese amassed a force of more than 20,000 men and launched a winter "mopping-up" campaign in the mountains of western Hebei and northern Shanxi. In early November. the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei army, coordinated by some units of the 120th Division. fought two battles of encirclement and annihilation at Yansu and Huangtuling in Laiyuan county and wiped out over 1,500 enemies. Lieutenant-General Apu Kisiwu. commander of the Japanese Second Independent Mixed Brigade. was killed in one of the battles. He was the highest ranking Japanese army officer killed by the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance. In mid-November. the Japanese army penetrated deep into the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area in a converging attack along several routes. In forty-three days. the Eighth Route Army fought 108 large and small battles and smashed the Japanese "mopping-up" campaign after killing and wounding over 3,600 of the enemies.
23 Taking Bold and Resolute Measures
— Converging on the Enemy in Coordinated Actions

During his life, Mao Zedong had vehemently reviled against the Kuomintang on countless occasions. But sometimes he reviled it only in words and not in heart, only in public and not in private. He stood for Communist-Kuomintang cooperation and had carefully studied the war history of the Kuomintang.

On November 1938, he published his Problems of War and Strategy, his fourth book of military strategy, in which a chapter is devoted to the war history of the Kuomintang.

Speaking about Chiang Kai-shek, he said, "After Sun Yat-sen came Chiang Kai-shek, who brought the Kuomintang's military power to its zenith. He values the army as his very life and has had the experience of three wars, namely, the Northern Expedition, the Civil War and the War of Resistance Against Japan. . . . He has created a huge 'Central Army' for counter-revolutionary purposes. He has held firmly to the vital point that whoever has an army has power and that war decides everything. In this respect we ought to learn from him. In this respect both Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek are our teachers."

He also said, "Since the Revolution of 1911, all the war-lords have clung to their armies for dear life, setting great store by the principle, 'Whoever has an army has power.'"

He then gave the following examples:

"Tan Yankai, a clever bureaucrat who had a chequered career in Hunan, was never a civil governor pure and simple but always insisted on being both the military and the civil governor. Even when he became President of the National Government first in Guangdong and then in Wuhan, he was concurrently the commander of the Second Army."

"There have also been parties in China, notably the Progressive Party, which did not want to have an army; yet even this party recognized that it could not get government positions without some warlord backing. Among its successive patrons have been Yuan Shikai, Duan Qirui and Chiang Kai-shek."

"A few small political parties with a short history, e.g., the Youth Party, have no army and so have not been able to get anywhere."

Mao Zedong openly declared, "Those who have guns have power, and those who have more guns have more power.

He said expressly, "Having guns we can create Party organizations, as witness the powerful Party organizations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China."

But he emphasized, "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."

Mao Zedong had harshly condemned Marshal Peng Dehuai on several occasions. One of Peng's crimes was trying "to command the Party with the gun." An article circulated during the Cultural Revolution told a great deal about Peng:

"From August 20 to December 5, 1940, Peng Dehuai, acting behind Chairman Mao's back together with Deng Xiaoping and others, launched the Hundred-Regiment Campaign, which was politically capitulationist and militarily adventurist in nature. Peng Dehuai's political purpose for starting the campaign was to defend Chongqing and Xian, back up Chiang Kai-shek and defend Chiang by sacrificing a large number of our soldiers. Making use of the powers in his hand, Peng amassed 115 regiments of
our forces, totalling 400,000 men (or 80 percent of our army), to start an all-out attack along a 2,500-kilometre front behind enemy lines. He engaged the Japanese and puppet forces in so-called 'large-scale active campaigns' of a mobile and regular war and acted in the most reckless manner. Because the fighters of the Eighth Route Army and the broad masses of the people in north China had fought heroically, some victories were won in these battles and more than 20,600 of the enemies were wiped out. But owing to basic mistakes in strategy and command, our army suffered over 22,000 casualties. The campaign was fought in total violation of Chairman Mao idea of the people's war: it was a product of Peng Dehuai's military adventurism and theory of quick victory. His employment of large forces to fight battles of attrition played into the hands of the Japanese, who sought to engage our main force in decisive battles, and prematurely revealed our army's actual strength. Chiang Kai-shek expressed hearty approbation of Peng's campaign. While the campaign was under way, Chiang Kai-shek sent a 'special telegram of approbation' to Peng, encouraging him to 'continue with the effort' and 'start another one.' Peng Dehuai launched the campaign without asking permission from Chairman Mao, who learned about it from the newspaper. Chairman Mao waged a resolute struggle against Peng Dehuai's grave mistake. While the Hundred-Regiment Campaign was going on, Chairman Mao called Wang Zhen to Yanan and said to him, 'Peng Dehuai started this important campaign without consulting me. Our strength is now fully revealed. The consequences will be very bad.' Peng was later criticized by Chairman Mao on several occasions for his grave mistake of launching the Hundred-Regiment Campaign without Mao's permission. This remarkable piece of writing revealed a top secret. Mao Zedong criticized Peng for the Hundred-Regiment Campaign because Peng had disrupted his strategic plan. According to Mao Zedong, the Hundred-Regiment Campaign performed a great service for Chiang Kai-shek. The Hundred-Regiment Campaign was fought in the following manner:

In the summer of 1940, the Eighth Route Army in north China started a large-scale offensive against the Japanese. As the campaign went on, the troops taking part in it increased to 105 regiments and over 200,000 men. It was therefore called the Hundred-Regiment Campaign. The first stage of the campaign lasted from August 20 to September 10. The objective was the destruction of the enemy's main lines of communications and the destruction of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway in particular.

On the night of August 20, the various units of the Eighth Route Army began to sally forth on different targets. The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Command mobilized a force of forty-six regiments which, under the command of Nie Rongzhen, destroyed the section of the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway east of Yangquan and west of Shijiazhuang, seized Nianziguan and other important enemy and puppet strongholds, and dynamited the Jingjing coal mine run by the Japanese.

The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Command and the 129th Division threw in forty-seven regiments. Under the command of He Long and Guan Xiangying, these forces occupied Yangfang, Kangjialing and other enemy strongholds, destroyed the Tatong-Yinqu section of the Datong-Puzhou Railway and the entire Fen-Li Highway to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway.

In the second stage, from September 22 to early October, attacks were continued on the enemy on either side of lines of communications and on the enemy and puppet strongholds deep in the base areas. Attempts were made
to seize the towns of Yushe, Liaoqian, Laiyuan and Lingqiu. But as a result of exhaustion through continuous fighting on the part of our troops and owing to poor technical equipment, none of the town were taken except Yushe which was taken and then lost. Altogether, 1,824 large and small battles had been fought in the Hundred-Regiment Campaign by the end of December. About 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops were killed or wounded and 281 Japanese soldiers and over 1,400 puppet soldiers were taken prisoner. More than 1,800 puppet troops came over to our side. Over 470 kilometres of railways, 1,500 kilometres of highways, 213 railway stations and bridges and 260 tunnels, and 293 enemy strongholds were destroyed. Among the booties were 53 cannons, more than 5,800 various types of guns and a quantity of other military material.

In the War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao Zedong urged the Kuomintang army to fight on the main front while the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army were to fight as guerrillas on the flanks. He wished the Kuomintang would be weakened in the war instead of growing stronger. Now that the Hundred-Regiment Campaign had revealed the actual strength of the Communist armies. the Japanese army`s attacks began to be directed mainly against the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army. The Communist armies could no longer fight only on the flanks but had to take on the enemy on the main front with resulting heavy casualties. This was the reason why Mao Zedong condemned the Hundred-Regiment Campaign. A cool-headed analysis, however, will show that the Hundred-Regiment Campaign was actually fought according Mao Zedong`s strategy of “concentrating a superior force to fight battles of annihilation” and therefore succeeded in putting the enemy to rout.

24 The Enemy Advances. We Advance—Penetrating Deep into the Enemy’s Rear

Mao Zedong often talked about the militia and the development of the militia in his military strategy. What was the role the Communist-led militia played in the War of Resistance Against Japan? During the War of Resistance Against Japan. the militia in the Communist areas had grown to a formidable force of 2,500,000 men. The duty of the militia in ordinary times was to stand guard and engage in reconnaissance. Disguised militia guards were often stationed at enemy watchtowers and militia spies worked inside enemy strongholds. When fighting broke out. the militia often fought at the outposts and coordinated with the manoeuvre of the regular forces. so that the regular forces could give full play to their might.

In the War of Resistance, the militia units fought a so-called “sparrow warfare” against the Japanese invaders. When the enemy conducted a “mopping-up” campaign. they usually employed a force of several hundred or several thousand men. It was difficult for the poorly equipped militia to defeat them in a head-on clash. The militia therefore divided themselves into small guerrilla groups of three or five men and harassed the enemy. Because they were highly mobile and could group together and disperse at will and strike at the enemy at unlikely places. they were like sparrows all over the sky, making it very difficult for the enemy to deal with them.

The small groups of militiamen could harass the enemy at any time and place. engage the enemy in a quick battle and withdrew quickly. When dealing with a large enemy
force. They could strike at its head, body or tail, so that the enemy would be exhausted in trying to protect each section. The enemy was also prevented from reaching their rendezvous on time by the militia's harassment. When the enemy withdrew, the militia from several villages would attack them at every possible place.

In the "mopping-up" campaigns, the Japanese invaders adopted a policy of "burn all, kill all and loot all." To deal with the enemy's cruelty, the militia helped the people clear all food grain and other useful things from their houses and fields and led them to places of safety before the enemy arrived. The enemy carried out a "mopping-up campaign" against the Taiyue mountain area in 1942. When they arrived at Qinyuan county (designated by the enemy as "an experimental district for the suppression of Communists in mountainous areas"), they could find nothing except the empty houses and fields in an area several dozen kilometres in circumference. As they could not even find drinking water, they had to admit defeat and withdraw.

Gunpowder, one of China's four great ancient inventions, was put to creative use during the War of Resistance Against Japan. The militiamen put gunpowder into household pots, bowls, jars and vats and turned them into improvised wooden, stone and porcelain mines and used them against the Japanese. As these indigenous mines could be easily assembled with readily available material, even a woman or a child could make them. They were suitable for carrying out an extensive people's war because they could be used in any terrain and hidden in every imaginable place.

According to the places where they were hidden, people called a mine hanging above a doortrame "the overhead mine": a mine suspended in a well. "dragonfly touching-water mine": a mine that could ignite several other mines.

"blooming-flowers mine": a small mine inside a big one. "mother-and-son mine." There were also "flying mine," "string-ignited mine." "time mine" and "jumping mine." The militia buried mines at every place where the enemy were likely to appear, giving them a hard time trying to avoid the mines.

The militia paid a great deal of attention to camouflage the spots where mines were buried. The ground surface was often covered with the imprints of chicken feet or donkey hooves to mislead the enemy. Sometimes the militia even put up provocative posters in a mine field to infuriate the enemy and lead them to the mines.

The land mine warfare threw the enemy into a great confusion, put them in constant fear and hindered their free movement.

The Japanese also adopted a policy of "nibbling" at the anti-Japanese base areas. They blockaded and carved up the base areas with communications networks, blockhouses and ditches and then launched "suppression" and "mopping-up" campaigns against each of them. To counter the Japanese, one of the militia's important missions was to disrupt the enemy's communication lines, destroy their blockhouses and level the ditches.

The militia also waged communication warfare against the enemy. While disrupting the enemy's communication lines, they made every effort to safeguard their own lines of communications.

The militia's most unusual achievement, however, was the tunnel warfare they had initiated against the enemy. The vast plains in north China offered good communications. But the absence of natural barriers made it difficult to wage guerrilla warfare. At first, the militiamen dug pits into the ground and used them as hiding places during an emergency. Later, they were inspired to dig underground tunnels. These tunnels were then extended to
form an underground network, linking up villages, districts and counties several hundred kilometres away. The militiamen could move about freely through these tunnels without emerging to ground surface. The exits of the tunnels were cleverly hidden in a brick platform bed, a brick stove, a well or even in a trough at a horse stable, or on the roof of a house. The militia could appear and disappear like shadows and attack the enemy from unexpected places. As the enemy had no definite target to fire at and could not see their opponents, they were exasperated. The highly developed tunnel warfare enabled the Chinese forces to establish their bases on the plains where the enemy had built innumerable blockhouses and anti-guerrilla ditches.

When the War of Resistance entered the third year in the autumn of 1939, news of Chinese victories began to pour in. Mao Zedong cool-headedly analysed the overall war situation. At an interview with three correspondents from the Central News Agency, the Sao Dang Bao and the Xin Min Bao on September 16, 1939, he said, "As for the specific task in the new stage, it is to prepare for the counter-offensive, and this concept covers everything. That is to say, during the stage of stalemate China must build up all the strength required for the future counter-offensive. To prepare for the counter-offensive does not mean launching it immediately, since it cannot be done unless the conditions are ripe." What Mao meant here was strategic counter-offensive and not tactical counter-offensive.

He emphasized, "To itemize the tasks of the new stage, in the enemy's rear we must keep up guerrilla warfare, smash his 'mopping-up' campaigns and defeat his economic aggression."

Therefore, the war was to be fought in this new stage still in the form of guerrilla warfare. But there were many new forms of guerrilla warfare.

"The enemy advances, we retreat" was the most important principle in Mao Zedong's well-known "sixteen-character formula." But in the War of Resistance Against Japan, he had proposed a totally contradictory principle, which was "the enemy advance, we advance."

This principle was put forward to deal with the enemy's policy of "clearing the countryside of anti-Japanese activities." It meant that as the enemy advanced, the anti-Japanese forces should advance to the enemy's rear. The Eighth Route Army organized armed working teams, which were to slip through the enemy blockade and move deep into the occupied areas.

An armed working team was not only an armed force; it was the army, the government and the people in one. It was an organization that combined military struggle with political struggle. In the enemyoccupied areas, the armed working teams appeared and disappeared mysteriously, carrying out open and secret, political and military activities to disrupt the enemy and puppet ruling organs and thwart their plans of pressganging young men into military service. robbing the peasants of their harvests. launching "development" projects and enslaving the people.

The armed working teams moved about in the "heart" of the enemy: they were visible to the people everywhere, but were invisible to the enemy.
Clearing the Door Front
— Driving Away the Enemy from the Bedside

Mao Zedong was shrewd and resourceful when he came to deal with his military rival. When the enemy adopted a new measure against him, he countered it with his own. Cunning and cruel, the Japanese invaders had by 1942 inflicted considerable casualties on Mao Zedong's men. The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army were reduced from 500,000 to 400,000 men. The enemy had occupied many grain-producing areas on the North China Plain, where the anti-Japanese forces could now only fight as guerrillas. As the anti-Japanese base areas had been reduced in size, the total population in the areas controlled by the anti-Japanese forces was reduced to 50 million from 100 million.

Refusing to take the setbacks lying down, Mao Zedong devised a new policy — "driving away the enemy from the bedside," by which he meant "driving away the enemy who had penetrated deep into the base areas."

In 1943, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army successfully dealt with the Japanese "mopping-up" campaigns.

In that year, the Eighth Route Army engaged the enemy over 24,800 times, killing and wounding more than 13,600 Japanese and puppet troops. In the battles against the puppet troops led by the big traitors Pang Bingxun, Sun Dianying, Sun Liangcheng and Liu Guitian, 51,000 puppet soldiers and 420 Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner, and more than 740 enemy strongholds were captured. In the same year, the New Fourth Army engaged the enemy more than 5,300 times, killing, wounding and capturing 66,000 Japanese and puppet troops and taking over more than 200 enemy strongholds.

Also in the same year, the Japanese army launched six "mopping-up" campaigns against the Taiyue Mountains in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area. The largest one took place between October 1 and November 19. Mobilizing an army 20,000 strong, Yasuji Okamura, commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in North China, was himself in command of the campaign and adopted the so-called "iron-rod new tactics of three tiers of forces," which meant concentrating a heavy force, deploying it in depth, pushing forward wave upon wave, killing all people and animals and destroying all property. The purpose of the campaign was not only to destroy the bases of the Eighth Route Army, but also to gain experience so that other Japanese invaders could follow suit in their battles against the Communists. A group of more than 180 Japanese army officers and staff officers were specially assembled by Okamura to observe on the spot how the battle was fought. On October 23, the enemy "observation group" was ambushed by the Chinese army at Hanlue village on the Lintun Highway, and all the observers except three were killed. The enemy troops approaching the base area along several routes were repulsed. After the utter defeat, the fuming Okamura stripped the commander of the enemy 69th Division of his command.

The Shanxi-Suiyuan area also repulsed several enemy "mopping-up" campaigns in 1943, and the number of armed working teams active in the enemy's rear grew to thirty-three. The enemy who had advanced deep into the liberated area were driven out after fifty-eight enemy strongholds were captured.

In 1944, the enemy launched more rabid attacks, first against the Kuomintang troops in Henan, driving into northern Hunan in May and southern Hunan and Guanxi in August. On October 2, the Japanese army of aggres-
sion reached Guizhou province an occupied Dushan. In eight short months, Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong, a large part of Fujian and a part of Guizhou were occupied by the enemy, who succeeded in opening up an overland line of communications from China’s Northeast to Vietnam. The Kuomintang lost 500,000-600,000 of its forces and 146 large and small cities and towns in this campaign. More than 60 million Chinese people fell under the Japanese fascist iron heel.

Meanwhile, in the Communist areas. Mao Zedong ordered partial counter-offensives in 1944. These counter-offensives actually started immediately after the large-scale Japanese “mopping-up” campaigns were smashed in the autumn and winter of 1943. They were, therefore, strategic counter-offensives in nature. In the seven years of anti-Japanese guerrilla war, the Communist forces had grown tremendously in strength. While the Kuomintang was losing ground on the battlefield, the Communist Party took the initiative to attack the Japanese invaders and ordered its crack main force to advance in the direction of the Japanese advance. thus taking the initiative into its own hand in a counter-offensive along the whole battle front. In this year, counter-offensives were launched in all the Communist areas in north, central and south China.

As early as the Jinggang Mountains period, Mao Zedong had proudly declared. “The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be aroused for struggle on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us.” Mao Zedong was good at sizing up the situation and devising ingenious tactics. Even the ferocious Japanese invaders found it difficult to deal with him.

After receiving Mao’s order to start partial counter-offensives, the Communist armies won victories everywhere. In the year 1944, the anti-Japanese forces in the Shandong area wiped out 36,000 Japanese and puppet troops. induced more than 10,000 of the puppet army to change sides. recovered eight county towns and over 118,000 square kilometres of territory and freed more than 7,400,000 people from Japanese oppression.

In the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area, more than 1,000 enemy blockhouses were taken over, and eight county towns and over 200,000 square kilometres of territory with a population of more than 5,000,000 on it were recovered in the same year.

The anti-Japanese forces in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area captured over 1,500 enemy blockhouses, took and then withdrew from 24 county towns, and twice broke into the cities of Shijiazhuang and Baoding. The area controlled by the anti-Japanese forces on the central Hebei plain was recovered and enlarged. The Eighth Route Army in the Beiyue area succeeded in destroying all the first-line fortresses blockading the Communist area.

In the Shanxi-Suyuan area, over 97,000 square kilometres of territory with a population of 370,000 were liberated, and the defence along the Yellow River was strengthened.

The Communist areas in central China also grew in size as a result of the partial counter-offensive during this period. The recovery of the ports of Xinhenggang, Zhanghuanggang, Shigang, and Chenjiagang south of Lianyanggang along the Yangtze River in northern and central Jiangsu blockaded the enemy’s sea route. The Communist army also took Funing and linked up the northern and central Jiangsu liberated areas. In southern Jiangsu, the separate guerrilla areas were joined together and became an anti-Japanese base area after Changxing, Liyang and Lishui.
were recaptured. The central Anhui anti-Japanese area expanded to Jiangpu in the east and western Anhui in the west, and the Hubei-Henan-Hunan-Jiangxi border area grew to 300,000 square kilometres with a population of more than 9,000,000.

The battle front in south China was also enlarged. The East River anti-Japanese area grew greatly in size to include Huiyang in the east, Sanshui and Xinhui in the west, Zengcheng in the north and the sea in the south, threatening Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The Qiongya Column persisted in guerrilla warfare on Hainan Island and was in control of the broad countryside.

In 1944, the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and the anti-Japanese columns in south China altogether engaged the enemy in more than 20,000 battles, killing or wounding over 260,000 Japanese and puppet troops, capturing over 60,000 and winning over more than 30,000 puppet troops. Sixteen county towns were taken back: more than 5,000 enemy strongholds, captured; and over 800,000 square kilometres of territory with a population of over 12,000,000, recovered.

26 Storming Fortifications — Going All Out to Reduce Enemy-Occupied Areas

Mao Zedong seemed to have a perfect plan for the future and was quite confident about victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan when he declared at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on April 24, 1945, that the Communist army had become the main force in the war against Japanese aggression. In an impassioned speech, he said: “Our army has already expanded to 910,000 men and the number of our rural militia who are not withdrawn from normal productive work, has grown to more than 2,200,000. Despite the fact that our regular army is still numerically much smaller than that of the Kuomintang (counting the Kuomintang units under local as well as central control), it has already become the main force in China’s War of Resistance, judging by the number of Japanese and puppet forces it is engaging and the extent of its battle fronts, by its combat effectiveness, by the mass support it enjoys in its operations, and by its political quality, cohesion and unity... Of the 40 divisions comprising 580,000 Japanese soldiers in China (not counting those in the three northeastern provinces), 22.5 divisions comprising 320,000 men or 56 percent of the total forces are engaged on the front of the liberated areas, and no more than 17.5 divisions comprising 260,000 men or 44 percent, are engaged on the Kuomintang front.”

As people differed in their opinion, the question of whether the Communist army had become the main force in the War of Resistance or not should be cleared up by later historians. It was, however, an indisputable fact that the Communist army had grown tremendously by 1945.

By August 1945, the Communist Party was in command of an army that had grown to 910,000 men, a militia of 2,200,000 men, and self-defence corps comprising 10,000,000 men. It had established 19 liberated areas in north central and south China, which covered 950,000 square kilometres in total area and were populated by 95,500,000 people.

The 19 liberated areas were: Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia, Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan, Hebei-Shandong-Henan, Shanxi-Suiyuan, Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning, Shandong, Northern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Jiangsu-

Stationing himself in Yanan in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia liberated area, Mao Zedong had indeed succeeded in “sitting in the command tent and devising strategy for winning victory a thousand miles away.” This was no exaggeration at all.


In central China, the ten liberated areas — Northern Jiangsu. Central Jiangsu. Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui. Eastern Zhejiang. Huaibei. Huainan. Central Anhui. Henan. Hubei-Henan-Anhui and Hunan-Hubei — were located between the Yangtze and Huaihe rivers and the Yellow and Hanshui rivers. reaching the sea in the east. the Wudang Mountains in the west. Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces in the south and the Longhai Railway in the north. They included most of Jiangsu province, a greater part of Anhui and Hubei provinces, parts of Henan and Zhejiang provinces, and a small part of Hunan province, threatening Nanjing. Shanghai. Xuzhou. Hangzhou and other important cities and commanding the Tianjin-Pukou Railway. the southern section of the Beiping-Hankou Railway and the Huainan Railway and the crisscross network of land and water communication lines.

In south China were the East River and Hainan liberated areas. The former commanded the southern section of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway and the Guangzhou-Kowloon Railway and threatened Guangzhou and Hong Kong, while the latter controlled the vital passages to Vietnam. Malaya. Indonesia and the Philippines.


Mao Zedong put forward the slogan: “Expand the people’s forces” at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. From the military point of view. “expand the people’s forces” meant expanding the Eighth Route Army. New Fourth Army and other Communist-led anti-Japanese armed forces. expanding the Communist-controlled areas and reducing the enemy-occupied areas.

He proposed a new strategy: The strategy of turning guerrilla units into regular armies and turning guerrilla warfare into regular warfare.

The basic strategic principle was: “Continue to follow the
line of the people's war." The regular armies were to combine with the armed units of the masses of the people and the main forces with local forces. The entire population were to support the army and do everything for the battle front.

His order to the Communist armies was: "Weaken the Japanese and puppet forces, develop our forces, reduce the enemy-occupied areas and expand the liberated areas." Beginning from May 1945, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army launched a large-scale summer offensive against the Japanese and puppet forces. The Communist army of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area started the offensive on May 12. wiped out a total of over 20,000 Japanese and puppet troops. expanded the liberated area and pushed the enemy to the area along the railways and to the cities. The army and people of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area began a series of campaigns on May 17 against Dongping. Anyang. Yanggu and other county towns. inflicted heavy casualties on the Japanese and puppet armies and recovered sixteen county towns and many enemy strongholds.

In early June, the army and people of the Shandong area began their offensive first against the puppet army under Li Wenli and engaged the enemy in more than a dozen campaigns, killing and wounding over 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops and recovering nine county towns. The Shanxi-Suiyuan area started the offensive on June 19, laid siege on the Japanese army in Jingle and along the railways and succeeded in pushing the enemy to the areas along the railways and a few highways.

The New Fourth Army launched the Sunan campaign in late May. In this campaign which ended in early July, the New Fourth Army recovered several towns and succeeded in linking up the eight counties under the New Fourth Army's control into one liberated area. This was followed in mid-June by the Guining campaign, in which the county town of Guining and a large number of enemy strongholds to its southeast were liberated, freeing 200,000 people from enemy oppression. The New Fourth Army units in the Northern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Huainan, and Hubei-Henan-Anhui liberated areas also went over to the offensive and enlarged the anti-Japanese base areas. After the summer offensive in 1945, the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army continued to tighten their encirclement against the enemy-occupied spots and lines, linked up many of the separate anti-Japanese areas. As they gradually gained the initiative on the battlefield, they began to switch from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare and prepared the conditions for the final, all-round offensive.

27 Pursuing the Hard-Pressed Enemy — Competing Politically and Militarily for Territory

On August 9, 1945. Mao Zedong published "The Last Round with the Japanese Invaders," a statement in which he pointed out that since the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan, China's War of Resistance Against Japan had reached the last stage. He said, "In these circumstances, all the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people should launch a nationwide counter-offensive... The Eighth Route Army. the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people should seize every opportunity to launch extensive attacks on all the invaders and their
running dogs who refuse to surrender. annihilate their force. capture their arms and materiel. vigorously expand the liberated areas and reduce the areas under enemy occupation. We must boldly form armed working teams which, by hundreds and by thousands, should penetrate deep into the rear of the enemy-occupied areas, organize the people to wreck the enemy's communication lines and fight in coordination with the regular armies. We must boldly arouse the people in the occupied areas in their tens of millions and immediately organize underground forces to prepare armed uprisings and to annihilate the enemy in coordination with the troops attacking from without. * 

On August 10 and 11, Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, issued seven orders on accepting Japanese surrender and launching all-out attacks on the Japanese invaders. The orders urged all the anti-Japanese forces in the liberated areas to serve notice on the Japanese and puppet troops in the vicinity requiring them to hand over their weapons within a given time and resolutely to wipe out those who refused to surrender and hand over their weapons. All the anti-Japanese forces were to match into the cities, towns and fortresses occupied by the Japanese and puppet troops and impose military control.

After receiving the orders from Mao Zedong and the general headquarters, the Communist forces in all the liberated areas immediately organized large counter-offensive forces, delivered ultimatums to the Japanese and puppet troops and then started an all-out counter-offensive.

The Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region delivered an ultimatum to the commander-in-chief of the Japanese army in North China requiring the Japanese troops under his command to hand over their weapons and surrender. When the Japanese army refused to surrender, the military region command started an all-out counter-offensive with a main force 110,000 strong and militia units 630,000 strong. These forces attacked and seized Datong, Fengzhen, Jining and Shangdu. laid siege to Taiyuan in a joint operation with the army of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region, surrounded Beiping and attacked Zhangjiakou, Zhangbei, Duolun, Guyuan, Tangshan, Qinhuangdao, Huludao, Tianjin, Tanggu, Shijiazhuang and Baoding.

The Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region delivered the ultimatum to the Japanese and puppet troops in its vicinity on August 11. When no answer was received after twenty-four hours, part of its troops started an attack northward along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway; another part proceeded northward along the Yellow River and attacked Guisui; a third part laid siege to Taiyuan in the south from the western side of the Datong-Puzhou Railway. In the five days from August 15 to 19, they succeeded on taking over all the Japanese strongholds on the perimeter of Taiyuan, broke once into the county town of Jinyuan south of Taiyuan and formed a cordon around the city.

The Communist forces of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area began a general counter-offensive against the Japanese and puppet troops on August 13. To strengthen the military command in this area, the Central Committee of the Communist Party established the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region on August 20, appointing Liu Bocheng as its commander-in-chief and Deng Xiaoping, its political commissar. At the same time, the Southern Hebei Military Region was restored. The counter-offensives started at various places became better coordinated under the new military command. Part of the Taihang forces attacked Xinxiang and Boai and broke into the city of Boai on the night of August 16. Another part laid siege to Taiyuan. The Taiyue forces reached Pingyao on August 20 and attacked the Japanese and puppet troops.
in the area between Pingyao and Jiexiu to coordinate with the attack on Taiyuan by the Shanxi-Suiyuan forces and to cut off communication along the Datong-Puzhou Railway in the Jiexiu and Linfen section. Part of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan forces launched attacks on Kaifeng, Xinxiang, Anyang and Handan, while another part operated jointly with the troops of the Shandong liberated area in a siege to Jinan. The Southern Hebei forces attacked first the puppet troops east of the Grand Canal and then Linqing, broke into the town and intercepted most of the enemies who tried to flee.

The Shandong Military Region deployed its forces for the general counter-offensive on August 11. It organized its main force and local forces into the Shandong Field Army and 100,000 militiamen, who were temporarily released from productive work, into several dozen People’s Corps to coordinate with the operations of the main force. These forces were then divided into five columns. The first column, formed by the Central Shandong forces, advanced on the counties between Jinan and Yanzhou. The second column, formed by the Pinhai troops, attacked Qingdao and Lianyungang in coordination with the Jiaodong forces and the New Fourth Army. The third column, formed by the Jiaodong troops, advanced on the perimeter of Qingdao and the coastal cities and towns of Jiaodong Peninsula. The fourth column, formed by the Bohai troops, advanced along the railway between Jinan and Cangzhou. The fifth column, formed by the Lunan forces, attacked the Tianjin-Pukou Railway between Xuzhou and Yanzhou.

In central China, the troops from the New Fourth Army’s Jiangsu-Zhejiang, Huabei, Northern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Hebei-Henan-Anhui-Hunan-Jiangxi and Henan military regions began their counter-offensive in mid-August against the Japanese and puppet forces along both banks of the Yangtze River, the southern section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, the eastern section of the Longhai Railway and the Shanghai-Nanjing Railway, pushed to the vicinity of the cities of Nanjing, Shanghai and Wuhan and recovered large stretches of territory.

In south China, beginning from August 14, the East River Column, the Qiongya Column and other units concentrated their forces and launched fierce attacks against the strongholds of the Japanese and puppet armies along the Guangzhou-Kowloon Railway and both banks of the East River and on Leizhou Peninsula, expanded the Communist-controlled areas and threatened Guangzhou, Shantou and Haikou.

In two months’ time, from August 11 to October 10, the Communist armies recovered 315,200 square kilometres of territory, liberated a population of 18,717,000, recaptured 190 cities and towns, and killed or wounded over 230,000 of the enemies.

On August 11, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army "to stay where they are and wait for orders" and not to make "unauthorized moves" against the Japanese and puppet armies.

On August 13, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai sent a telegram from their general headquarters to Chiang Kai-shek, refusing to obey his order.

On August 15, Japan announced its unconditional surrender.

On the same day, Zhu De ordered Yasuji Okamura, commander-in-chief of Japanese forces in China, and all the troops under his command to stop military actions, wait for orders from the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column and surrender to the Communist armies. He also sent telegrams to the governments of the United States, Britain and the
Soviet Union, stating that the Communist armies had the right to accept the surrender of the Japanese and puppet forces encircled by the Communist armies.

On September 2, the Japanese foreign minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and chief of general staff of the Japanese forces, Michiro Umezu, representing the emperor, the government and the imperial general headquarters, signed surrender terms aboard the U. S. battleship _Missouri_. The surrender of the Japanese army of 1,280,000 men to China marked the victorious conclusion of China’s War of Resistance Against Japan.

## 28 Pincer Movements

— Intercepting Enemy Reinforcements

History has proved that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could not cooperate with each other and clashes between the two parties were inevitable.

After victory over Japan, the clash between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party started once again. Both sides paid lip service to cooperation. Mao Zedong even flew to Chongqing on August 28, 1945, to carry on peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. The negotiations even produced the ostentatious “October 10th Agreement,” in which it was declared that “civil war will be resolutely avoided.” “peace and democracy will be the basis for unity” and “an independent, free, prosperous and strong New China will be built.” But in actuality, both sides were making active preparations for war.

On the day after Mao Zedong’s arrival in Chongqing for the peace negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek secretly circulated a reprint of his early _Handbook on Bandit Suppression_ among his subordinates and required them to study and apply it creatively.

In a secret telegram to his commanders of the War Zones on September 20, Chiang Kai-shek stated, “The purpose of entering into negotiations with the traitorous party was to fathom its demands and intentions and to stall for time and relax international attention, so that the National Army could take this opportunity speedily to seize the major cities in the enemy-occupied areas. After the National Army has taken control of all the strategic points and communication lines and accepted the surrender of the Japanese invaders, it can then conduct specific negotiations with the traitorous party from a favourable and superior military position. If the traitorous party refuses to bend under the principle of unified military command and government administration, it will be denounced as bandits and totally suppressed.

Two days before Mao Zedong flew to Chongqing, he drafted “On Peace Negotiations with the Kuomintang — Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.” in which he wrote, “Moreover, our Party is powerful, and if anyone attacks us and if the conditions are favourable for battle, we will certainly act in self-defence to wipe him out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely.” After his return from the Chongqing negotiations, Mao Zedong made a report to a meeting of cadres in Yanan on October 17. Revealing some facts about the civil war, he said, “Peace, though written into the agreement, has not in fact been realized. In places like the Shangdang area in Shanxi province there is fighting on a fairly large scale. The Shangdang area, rimmed by the Taihang, Taiyue and Chongtiao mountains, is like a tub. This tub contains fish and meat, and Yan Xishan set thirteen divisions to grab it. Our policy also was set long ago — to give tit for tat, to fight for every inch of land....
We wiped out all thirteen divisions. Their attacking forces had 38,000 men, and we employed 31,000 men. Of their 38,000 men, 35,000 were destroyed. 2,000 fled and 1,000 scattered. Such fighting will continue.

It was clear from the above passages that the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party could not be avoided. Nobody could prevent it from breaking out.

The following is an account of a campaign fought against the Kuomintang by Deng Xiaoping under Mao Zedong’s directions.

The Beiping-Hankou campaign, also known as the Handan campaign, was fought between October 21 and November 2, 1945, by Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng and directed from afar by Mao Zedong.

Chiang Kai-shek had given secret orders to suppress the Communists and was at the same time hurriedly sending his troops to take over Beiping, Tianjin and the northeast which had been occupied by the Japanese.

Among the Kuomintang troops that were pushing northward along several routes were the 30th Corps, 40th Corps and the New Eighth Corps, totalling 45,000 men, under Sun Lianzhong, commander-in-chief of the 11th War Zone. These forces, directed by deputy commanders-in-chief Ma Fawu (concurrently commander of the 40th Corps) and Gao Shuxun (concurrently commander of the New Eighth Corps), proceeded northward along the Beiping-Hankou Railway and were followed by the 32nd Corps, the puppet troops under Sun Dianying and the follow-up units of four more corps. Some of these troops had entered Xinxiang, and others were about to enter.

In order to safeguard the gateway to north China and ensure the strategic operations of the Communist armies in the northeast, Mao Zedong decided to employ part of the troops of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region to intercept the Kuomintang forces marching northward along the Datong-Puzhou Railway while concentrating the main force to stop the advance of the Kuomintang troops along the Beiping-Hankou Railway.

In a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao explained, “It will take at least one more month for the main forces from Shandong and central China to shift to the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning area; two to three more months are needed for these forces to be deployed for battle. to familiarize themselves with the local terrain and to complete the initial preparations after their arrival at their stations. Stopping and delaying the northward advance of the die-hard forces, therefore, is our overwhelming strategic task at present.” He emphasized, “The forthcoming new Beiping-Hankou campaign is an offensive against the Kuomintang’s main force and a move for the realization of peace. Victory or defeat in this campaign will have an extremely important bearing on the situation as a whole. . . . A main force of over 60,000 men from the Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan areas is to be placed under the unified and personal command of Liu and Deng to deal with the die-hard army advancing northward along the Beiping-Hankou Railway and to ensure that a part or a greater part of it is eliminated.”

With Mao Zedong’s directives from afar, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping acted without hesitation. They assembled a main force of 60,000 men, including the First, Second and Third columns and the troops from the Taihang, Southern Hebei and Hebei-Shandong-Henan military regions, and 100,000 militiamen and civilians and prepared to battle continuously in the next two months and destroy the enemy advancing northward along the Beiping-Hankou Railway.

In order to concentrate their forces in a pincer movement against the enemy from both the eastern and western sides
of the railway. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping designated the First Column and the troops of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region as the eastern column. and the Second and Third columns and the troops of the Taihang and the Southern Hebei military regions as the western column. They also organized an independent detachment with part of the troops of the Taihang Military Region. which was to operate jointly with the local forces and militia of the Taihang and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan areas and block the enemy in the area between the northern bank of the Yellow River and Anyang so as to gain time for the main force to converge on the Beiping-Hankou Railway from the Shangdang and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan areas and to force the enemy to leave a large force to guard the area along the railway south of Anyang. and to reduce the enemy forces marching northward. After the enemy had crossed the Zhanghe River. the independent detachment was to seize the ferry point and prevent the enemy reinforcements from crossing the river. The remaining local forces and militia were to continue to block the enemy south of Anyang. 

The entire campaign was fought in four stages: blocking. encircling. general attack. and pursuing and destroying. Together with Zhu De. Mao Zedong studied military maps in Yanan and issue directives to the front while Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping followed every one of the directives to the letter. 

As expected. the first column of three Kuomintang army corps. eager to win more victories. proceeded northward from Xinxiang and was continually harassed by the Communist independent detachment and the local forces and militia.

29 Conserving Strength  
— Carving Up and Destroying the Exhausted Enemy

On October 22. the enemy's first echelon of three corps crossed the Zhanghe and advanced northward along three routes. Part of the enemy occupied Cixian county. and another part attacked Dongfang village in the south. while the main force moved northward along the eastern side of the railway. To prevent the Kuomintang forces from entering Handan so that they could be destroyed later in field battles. the first column of the Communist army. leaving a regiment to intercept the enemy north of Linzhang. moved its main force to the south of Handan and north of Xiangyang and put up a strong defence to pin down the enemy.

On the morning of October 23. before the Communist army had completed its defence works. the vanguard of the Kuomintang army began to attack the positions of the First Brigade of the First Column. The First Brigade put up a stubborn defence and repulsed several enemy assaults.

On October 24. the enemy 30th Corps. 40th Corps and New Eighth Corps pushed vigorously northward after crossing the Zhanghe River. Under cover of concentrated fire. the 106th Division of the 40th Corps launched repeated attacks on the First Brigade of the Communist Army. The Communist defenders resolutely fought back and beat back the enemy by firing at close range and launching counter-assaults. A fierce battle lasted a whole day. At dusk. the Kuomintang troops concentrated their attacks at several points and succeeded in breaking into the Communist positions. The Kuomintang army. however. did not know that by this time the other Communist forces
had arrived on the scene and had encircled the Kuomintang army on three sides. The First Column of the Communist army had succeeded in pinning down the enemy at the pre-arranged battlefield and gaining time for the Communist main force to concentrate.

After arriving on the field of battle, the main force of the Communist army immediately began to attack. But as the assaults were hastily started, no remarkable results were achieved that night.

On the night of October 25, after all the units of the Communist Second Column had arrived, the Communist army launched a new attack. The Kuomintang army took cover in the densely located villages on the plain, placed barricades of felled trees around the villages and organized crossfire from bunkers. The Communist army again failed to achieve much result. The Kuomintang army had by now found that it had been surrounded by the Communist army on four sides and could neither advance nor withdraw. When it learned that its New Eighth Corps had contacted the Communist army with the intention of changing sides, it began to waver and fail in its morale.

On October 26, Hu Zongnan’s 16th Corps and Sun Lianzhong’s 32nd Corps came respectively from Shijiazhuang in the north and Anyang in the south to reinforce the Kuomintang troops.

In order to concentrate the main force and annihilate the surrounded enemy, the Communist side moved part of the troops of the Taihang Military Region and part of the troops of the Shanxi-Chara-Hebei Military Region to intercept the enemy reinforcements and at the same time strengthened the positions along the Zhanghe River.

To stop the enemy reinforcements from moving north from Anyang, the Communist side mobilized the guerrilla and militia units from the Taihang and Hebei-Shandong-Henan military regions to divert the enemy with guerrilla activities.

Since the surrounded enemy still maintained their positions and suffered little loss, the Communist army decided not to start the decisive battle before the Communist follow-up units arrived. It only sent out small details to close in on the enemy and carve up and penetrate into the enemy positions so as to tire out the enemy. At the same time, it tried by every means to urge the New Eighth Corps to change sides.

In a telegram to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong stated, “The deployment is appropriate. Conserve your strength and wait for the arrival of the follow-up units. By that time, the enemy will be both hungry and tired, and his weak points will be exposed to us. We should concentrate our main force, find the enemy’s weak spot and wipe out one or two enemy divisions. The enemy’s arrogance will certainly be deflated.... There are fourteen enemy divisions altogether — eight enemy divisions in Shijiazhuang and Xinxiang and six divisions in front of you. When you destroy one or two of the enemy divisions in front of you, there may be enemy reinforcements coming from both the north and the south. You must be prepared to destroy four or five enemy divisions in several continuous battles before a change will take place in the situation.”

By October 28, all the Communist follow-up troops had arrived and all preparations had been made. The general offensive against the surrounded enemy started in the evening.

The Communist army had divided its forces into two groups. The northern group was the assaulting troops of the general offensive, directing its blows at the enemy’s 40th Corps. It also converged on the enemy from both the northwest and the southeast, aiming mainly at carving up and destroying the enemy’s 106th Division, which had al-
already suffered some losses and whose positions were over-
extended on the northern side.
The southern group pinned down the enemy’s 30th Corps
and made feint attacks on the New Eighth Corps. It also
intensified its effort to win over the New Eighth Corps by
sending its chief of staff Li Da to meet Gao Shuxun, com-
mander of the New Eighth Corps.
By October 30, the Communist army had taken more than
twenty towns and villages, destroyed a greater part of the
106th Division of the 40th Corps and inflicted heavy losses
on the 30th Corps.
The enemy’s reinforcements from the north and the south
were blocked respectively on the southern side of the
Zhanghe River and in the vicinity of Gaoyi. In order to de-
stroy the surrounded enemy first and then the enemy rein-
forcements, Mao Zedong sent an urgent telegram to Zhao
Erlu: “Lead six regiments of the main force to the south
and assist the Taihang forces to wipe out the 15th Corps
which is moving southward from Shijiazhuang.”
In the face of threats and promises, Gao Shuxun staged a
mutiny at Matouzhen and led the New Eighth Corps and
the Hebei local forces, a total of over 10,000 men, to the
Communist side.
On the morning of October 31, the enemy main force be-
gan to try to break out of the encirclement in the south.
As the Communist army had foreseen this possibility, it
intentionally left an opening. After the Kuomintang
troops had deserted their positions, the Communist army
pounced on them from both the eastern and the western
sides. Another part of the Communist army pushed up-
wards from the northern bank of the Zhanghe River. A
large number of the militia also intercepted the enemy
along the communication lines. In the afternoon, the
Communist army concentrated a superior force and
launched fierce attacks on the remaining 20,000 men of

the enemy under Ma Fawu, who resisted stubbornly from
village to village.
On November 1, when the Communist army broke into
the headquarters of Ma Fawu, the Kuomintang forces lost
their commander and began to disperse in all directions.

30 Leave the High Road Alone
— Seizing the Less Conspicuous Places

When we study the history of the Kuomintang-Communist
strife, we must read the history books put out by both
parties, make comparisons and carry out analysis before
we can acquire a truly objective understanding of this his-

tory.
A certain history book says that in 1946 “the seizure of
the northeast was one of the important and immediate ob-
jectives of the Kuomintang government in provoking a civ-
il war.”
The northeast is part of the territory belonging to the mil-
ions of the Chinese people as a whole; it is not to be
seized and possessed by a single party or group.
In fact, it was not the Kuomintang but the Communist
Party which “seized” the northeast first. The northeast
was an industrial base. Mao Zedong knew that the north-
east was a thousand times better than the Jinggang Moun-
tains and the Yanan region as a base area. The seizure of
the northeast meant the liberation of half of China.
As soon as Japan had surrendered, the Communists began
to dispatch large numbers of troops and cadres to the
northeast.
On December 28, 1945, half a year before the
Kuomintang tried to “seize” the northeast. Mao Zedong
wrote "Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast." in which he outlined his plan to turn the northeast into stable base areas. He wrote. "It should now be made clear that these base areas are not to be built in the big cities or long the main communication lines that are or will be occupied by the Kuomintang; under present conditions this is not practicable. Nor are they to be built in regions close to big cities or main communication lines held by the Kuomintang. The reason is that the Kuomintang, having seized the big cities and the main communication lines, will not let us build stable base areas in regions very close to them. Our Party should do adequate work and set up our first line of military defence in these regions, which must never be lightly abandoned. But they will be guerrilla zones for both parties and not our stable base areas."

The regions in which to build stable bases. said Mao, were the cities and vast rural areas comparatively remote from the centres of Kuomintang occupation. He laid down his strategy for seizing the northeast in eight Chinese characters, meaning "Leave the high road alone and occupy the land on both sides." This meant that the Communists were to seize the less conspicuous and out-of-the-way places while allowing the Kuomintang to take over the cities and main communication lines for the time being.

Mao's order to the Communist army entering the northeast was: "Promptly delimit military areas and sub-areas in western, eastern and northern Manchuria and divide our force into field armies and regional troops. Distribute a considerable part of the regular troops among the military sub-areas to arouse the masses, wipe out bandits, set up organs of political power, organize guerrillas, people's militia and self-defense forces so as to make our areas secure. coordinate with the field armies and smash the Kuomintang attacks."

By "smashing the Kuomintang attacks." Mao actually meant "making preparations to attack the Kuomintang." He would not say so because it was not good propaganda and he wanted all the Chinese people believe it was the Kuomintang, and not the Communist Party, which fired the first shot in the civil war.

Would anyone believe that the civil war in China could have been avoided and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party would have existed in peace if the Kuomintang had not attacked? If you believe it. Mao Zedong certainly did not. According to his theory, the solution of national contradictions would give rise to class contradictions. While the Kuomintang wanted to maintain its rule, the Communists wanted to overthrow it and liberate the whole country. The two political parties were as incompatible as water and fire. A decisive battle between the two parties could not be avoided.

Mao Zedong calculated. "This time over 100,000 of our troops have entered the northeast and Rehe: the army there has recently expanded by more than 200,000, and the trend is to keep on expanding. Adding Party and government workers, we estimate that the total will exceed 400,000 within a year."

The Kuomintang certainly would not hand over the northeast to the Communist army.

On December 22, 1945, the U.S. Seventh Fleet began to transport the government troops under Du Yuming to the northeast. The U.S. navy again transported three more corps of government army to the northeast in March the following year and two more corps between April and May.

Chiang Kai-shek's directive to Du Yuming was. "You must fight your way to the other side of the Great Wall. . . . Two corps can fight their way out of the pass of
Shanhaiguan first ... to destroy the Communist army."
On April 18, when the Communist army marched into the city of Changchun after the Soviet army had withdrawn, the Kuomintang wanted to take it from the Communists. A bloody battle broke out between the two armies, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. The Kuomintang army lost over 10,000 men while the Communist army over 8,000. When large Kuomintang reinforcements began to pour in, the Communist army sensed that it was not to its advantage to put up a stubborn defence. It withdrew from the city on May 19.
The situation of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at that time was "fighting skirmishes inside of the Great Wall and large-scale battles outside of the Great Wall."
In a directive to the Communist army on July 20, 1946, Mao Zedong stated, "For defeating Chiang Kai-shek the general method of fighting is mobile warfare. Therefore, the temporary abandonment of certain places or cities is not only unavoidable but also necessary. Certain places or cities are temporarily abandoned in order to win final victory, which would otherwise be impossible."
Why did Mao Zedong, who had always advocated guerrilla warfare, stopped talking about it and ordered the Communist army to engage the enemy in mobile warfare? The reason was that the Communist army had by now become fully fledged. It had grown into a formidable force of 1,200,000 men, and the population in the Communist-controlled areas exceeded 100 million. Unlike the days on the Jinggang Mountains when the Communist forces fought with home-made guns and cannons, the Communist army had become more like a regular army equipped with some advanced weapons. It could operate in large formations instead of small groups.
Chiang Kai-shek was determined to wipe out the Commu-

nists. Employing 80 percent of his regular forces, he started an all-out attack on the Communist areas. His forces were deployed as follows:
East China area: 58 brigades (about 460,000 men).
Central Plains area: 25 brigades (210,000 men).
Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan area: 28 brigades (about 250,000 men).
Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei area: 20 brigades (97,000 men).
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia area: 19 brigades (155,000 men).
Guangdong guerrilla areas and Hainan Island area: 9 brigades (75,000 men).
These 193 brigades (which were divisions before the reorganization) totalling 1,600,000 men were more than 80 percent of the Kuomintang regular army of 248 brigades (divisions) of 2,000,000 men.
At Mao Zedong's order, the Communist army voluntarily abandoned some cities to avoid the blows of the superior enemy forces. It shifted its forces and resorted to destroying the enemy in mobile warfare.

31 Killing a Chicken with an Ox Cleaver — Concentrating the Forces to Destroy the Enemy

We have mentioned the Beijing-Hankou campaign fought by Deng Xiaoping under Mao Zedong's direction. The following is an account of the Dingtao campaign which was also fought by Deng Xiaoping under Mao's direction.
In August 1946, in order to divert the enemy's attention from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army which was trying to break out of the encirclement in the Central Plains and in order to coordinate the operations of
the Communist army in central Jiangsu, the Communist forces suddenly sallied out along the Longhai Railway. After occupying more than a dozen important towns, breaking into the city of Kaifeng and annihilating more than 16,000 Kuomintang troops, it seized control of three hundred kilometres of the Longhai Railway between Kaifeng and Xuzhou.

This thrust into the middle section of the Kuomintang forces disrupted the Kuomintang's plan of operations on the southern front. To counter the Communist offensive, Chiang Kai-shek amassed 14 reorganized divisions comprising 32 brigades and about 300,000 men, and pounced murderous upon the Communist Shanxi-Hebei-Shan-dong-Henan area on August 28. The situation was very tense. The Kuomintang forces closed in on the Communist army like the two jaws of a big pincer. The eastern column, comprising more than five brigades from the Xuzhou Pacification Headquarters, advanced along the Dangshan and Yucheng line to the Shanxian, Chengwu, Fengxian and Yutai area, while the western column, comprising ten brigades from the Zhengzhou Pacification Headquarters, proceeded along the Fengqiu, Kaifeng and Shangqiu line to attack the Dong-ming, Dingtao and Caoxian area. Their operations were supported by a large number of more Kuomintang forces from Anyang and other areas in northern Henan.

The objective of the Kuomintang army was clear. It intended to employ a force numerically twice superior to the Communist army to catch and destroy the latter in a narrow strip of land north of the Longhai Railway and south of the former riverbed of the Yellow River when it had become exhausted after continuous fighting along the Longhai Railway.

As the huge enemy forces approached the Communist-controlled areas, Mao Zedong instructed the Shanxi-Hebei-

Shandong-Henan Field Army in a telegram to assemble on the northern side of the railway to rest and reorganize. The field army was to lure the enemy in deep and look for an opportunity to destroy it. He told its commanders not to fight a battle when they were not sure of winning. Every time they fought, they must be sure of winning victory. They must concentrate a superior force, three or four times and even five or six times the enemy strength, to destroy one part of the enemy forces first and then another part, so as to destroy the enemy forces one by one.

Following Mao's instructions, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, commanders of the field army, told their troops to take advantage of the intervals between battles to rest and prepare for more fighting. After carefully analysing the situation, they found the enemy's eastern column was composed of troops under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control, who were better equipped and higher in combat effectiveness, but among the five reorganized divisions in the western column, only the Third Reorganized Division was Chiang Kai-shek's own troops and the others were miscellaneous troops not under Chiang's direct control. If they could lure the Third Reorganized Division to a prepared battlefield, encircle and destroy it with a superior force, the miscellaneous troops would not enthusiastically come to its rescue because there were deep-rooted contradictions among the enemies themselves. A strong enemy would thus become a weak enemy, who could be easily defeated. Once the Third Reorganized Division was wiped out, the enemy in the western column would be shaken and the enemy's plan would be thwarted. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping therefore decided to strike at the enemy's Third Reorganized Division first. The task of luring the Third Reorganized Division into the "bag" was assigned to the Sixth Column of the Communist army.
At this moment, another telegram arrived from Mao Zedong, instructing the Communist army to aim at annihilating the enemy's effective strength and not at holding or seizing a place. The Communist army must concentrate a superior force, three or four times the enemy strength, to wipe out totally and completely a whole enemy brigade or division.

On September 5, the entire Third Reorganized Division was lured onto the battlefield planned by the Communist army. The enemy's 47th Reorganized Division which had advanced by side with the Third Reorganized Division was stopped at a place twenty kilometres from the battlefield. The Communist army then closed in on the enemy in two large groups. The Second and Sixth columns in the right group and the Third and Seventh columns in the left group. The enemy's Third Reorganized Division was placed in a tight cordon.

In the afternoon on that day, Liu Bocheng brought himself to the headquarters of the Sixth Column and gave instructions to the column commanders for the coming battle. He required the Sixth Column to start the general attack on that night. He said that the Sixth Column should use the method of "killing a chicken with an ox cleaver," meaning employing a means more than adequate for the end. by throwing in all the troops of the Sixth Column to destroy the 59th Regiment of the enemy's 29th Brigade first. The 59th Regiment was the main force of the Third Reorganized Division: it was fully complemented and best equipped. The destruction of the enemy's strongest unit would terrify the entire enemy division and shake its morale. It would achieve the effect of "pulling a single hair to throw the entire body out of balance." The Communist army could then wipe out the entire isolated Third Reorganized Division.

After a whole night of fierce fighting, the 59th Regiment was totally destroyed on the morning of September 6.

When Zhao Xitian, commander of the Third Reorganized Division saw that his division headquarters was exposed to the Communist army's direct attack, he hurriedly re-deployed his forces and tried to flee towards the south where they could join force with the 47th Reorganized Division. But as soon as his men departed from their dugouts, the Communist columns began to give chase. Battle cries echoed everywhere on a large expanse of the plain. By the afternoon, the 20th Brigade, 30th Brigade and the division headquarters of the Third Reorganized Division had been destroyed while they were on the move; Zhao Xitian, the division commander, was taken prisoner. On September 7, while the 41st and 47th divisions were withdrawing towards Kaofeng, they were ambushed by the Communist army, and two of their brigades were wiped out. The 55th and 68th divisions also lost a regiment when they were withdrawing towards Kaifeng.

Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping immediately informed Mao Zedong by telegram of the victory in this campaign in which more than 17,000 enemy troops were destroyed.

After victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao Zedong renamed the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army the People's Liberation Army to win the support of the people.

He divided the Communist areas (or liberated areas) into six war zones.
1. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping.
2. The East China liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin.
3. The Northeast liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of Lin Biao and Luo
Ronghuan.
4. Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of Nie Rongzhen.
5. The Shanxi-Suiyuan liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of He Long.
6. The Central Plains liberated area, where the Communist army was under the command of Li Xiannian and Zheng Weisan.

On September 16, 1946, Mao Zedong wrote a brilliant article: "Concentrate a Superior Force to Destroy the Enemy One by One," in which he explained the tactic described by Liu Bocheng as "killing a chicken with an ox cleaver."

"With regard to the disposition for a campaign, when the enemy employs many brigades (or regiments) and advances against our army from several directions, our army must concentrate an absolutely superior force — six, five, four or at least three times the enemy strength — to pick an opportune moment to encircle and wipe out one enemy brigade (or regiment) first. It should be one of the enemy’s weaker brigades (or regiments), or one that has less support, or one stationed where the terrain and the people are most favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy." wrote Mao.

"In the disposition for a battle, when we have concentrated an absolutely superior force and encircled one of the enemy detachments (a brigade or regiment), our attacking formations (or units) should not attempt to wipe out all the encircled enemy simultaneously at one swoop and thus divide themselves and strike everywhere without enough strength anywhere, losing time and making it hard to get results. Instead, we should concentrate an absolutely superior force, that is to say, a force six, five, four or at least three times that of the enemy, concentrate the whole or the bulk of our artillery, select one (not two) of the weak spots in the enemy’s positions, attack it fiercely and be sure to win. This accomplished, swiftly exploit the victory and destroy the enemy forces one by one."

These brilliant tactics of Mao Zedong’s certainly deserve applause. Without them, the Communist army could not have swept across the whole of China to victory.

32 Advance and Retreat in Giant Strides — Turning Passivity into Initiative

Following Mao Zedong’s tactics, the Communist army won a series of victories.

In July 1946, the Communist army of the Central Plains area broke out of the enemy encirclement and shifted to the Hubei-Henan-Shaanxi area after it had successfully tied up a strong enemy force. The enemy attacking northern Jiangsu was met head-on by the Communist army of the East China area. Between July 13 and August 27, the Communist army fought seven successive battles and won seven victories. Although several deserted towns had been abandoned, it wiped out seven enemy brigades and five communications police corps, a total of 56,300 men.

The seven victories in seven battles showed that Mao Zedong’s tactics really worked. As a Communist military commander commented, "The key to winning seven victories in seven battles lies in firmly adhering to Mao Zedong’s strategic principles: Advance and retreat in giant strides and turn passivity into initiative for the purpose of destroying the enemy’s effective strength in large numbers."

Under Mao Zedong’s strategic guidance, the Communist forces in the various war zones coordinated their operations and actively looked for opportunities to destroy the
enemy.

After four months of fighting from July to October 1946, the Communist army forfeited control of 105 cities and towns. but succeeded in wiping out 298,500 Kuomintang troops. After taking over the cities and towns, the Kuomintang army had to divert forces to defend them and thus weaken its offensive.

From then on, the Communist army grew steadily stronger in the fighting. In one battle fought in northern Jiangsu in December 1946, the Communist army of the East China area succeeded in destroying three Kuomintang brigades, a total of 24,000 men. Fighting its way to southern Shandong, the same army wiped out five more Kuomintang brigades, a total of 50,000 men, in January 1947. Infuriated by the setbacks, the Kuomintang amassed a huge force of fifty-three brigades, totalling more than 310,000 men. and started a offensive against the East China liberated area from both the north and the south. Adopting the tactics of advancing and retreating in giant strides, the Communist army concentrated its forces to strike at only one column of the enemy at a time and scored a staggering victory in February in the Laiwu area of central Shandong. Seven whole enemy brigades, totalling over 60,000 men, were wiped out. Among them, 49,000 men, including Li Xianzhou, deputy commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang Second Pacification Zone, were taken prisoner.

The situation at the time of the Laiwu campaign was as follows: Chiang Kai-shek had amassed sixty-two reorganized brigades (divisions), totalling about 500,000 men, or one third of the regular forces he used against the Communist areas, in this campaign. His intention was to seize the Communist areas in Jiangsu and Anhui and destroy the Communist main force in that area, or force it to withdraw to Shandong, and then look for an opportunity to engage it in a decisive battle.

By the end of January 1947, the East China Field Army had successively fought several battles in central Jiangsu, northern Anhui and southern Shandong and score a victory of annihilating almost 200,000 enemy troops. Following the strategic principle of destroying the enemy on interior lines, it voluntarily abandoned some towns and districts, moved the battlefield to Shandong province and concentrated its main force in the Linyi area.

Chiang Kai-shek concluded that the Communist army had suffered heavy losses and was not strong enough to continue the fighting. When he learned that the main force of the Communist army had concentrated in the Linyi area, he believed the Communist army would put up a stubborn defence at Linyi, which was the central city in the Communist area in Shandong. After drawing up a plan for the southern Shandong campaign. Chiang Kai-shek replaced Xue Yue with Chen Cheng, his chief of general staff, as commander-in-chief of the campaign, and attacked the East China Field Army under the command of Chen Yi. Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, with a massive force of over 300,000 men.

Chen Cheng deployed a frontal force of eight reorganized divisions, comprising over twenty brigades, under the command of Ou Zhen, thirty kilometres north of Xinanzhen on the eastern section of the Longhai Railway. This frontal force was to approach Linyi from the south in three columns, left, central and right, followed by a reserve force of four more reorganized divisions. Its flank was protected by the 42nd Group Army under Hao Pengju at Baitafu and Tuofeng. A secondary attacking force of three corps under the command of Li Xianzhou, deputy commander-in-chief of the Second Pacification Zone, advanced on Laiwu and Xintai from the north along the route of Zichuang, Boshan and Mingshui. Approaching the tar-
get from both the north and the south. The Kuomintang aimed at encircling and destroying the main force of the Communist army.

It was said that Chen Cheng had declared that even his 300,000-plus men were as useless as bean dregs. The Communist army would bloat to death after swallowing them. He had included a crack unit in each of the three southern columns: the 11th Reorganized Division in the left column, the 74th Reorganized Division in the central column, and the 25th Reorganized Division in the right column.

Mao Zedong sent many telegrams to the East China Communist army, in which he directed, "You should aim at destroying six or eight of Ou Zhen's brigades.... If you think beating Ou Zhen requires the concentration of more forces, consider if either the Fourth Division or the Ninth Division can be kept there and return to central Shandong after the battle against Ou Zhen.... From tomorrow, the entire army, except the unit that is attacking Zaozhuang, are to rest and consolidate for two weeks, so as to concentrate all the forces to destroy Ou Zhen."

While the Communist army was making preparations to attack Ou Zhen, the Kuomintang army in the south started the offensive against the Communist army on January 31. It adopted a tactic of "concentrating the forces, striking sure blows, advancing side by side, and avoiding sticking out." It advanced at an average speed of less than ten kilometres a day and entrenched at a newly occupied place before making further simultaneous advance.

To deal with this situation, Mao Zedong directed Chen Yi and the others in a telegram, "It appears that the best principle for our army to follow is to lure the enemy in deep. Not only should we refrain from attacking the Longhai Railway. Even when the enemy reaches the Yancheng and Matou area, we still should think carefully if we should strike out.... Lure in the enemy deep. We shall not attack when the enemy stays put. Nor shall we attack before the enemy has reached a locality favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy. In this way we can take the initiative wholly into our own hands.... The enemy's present policy is to induce us to sally out early. After fighting and exhausting us, he can then advance steadily and occupy Linyi. You should never allow yourselves to be fooled. The best policy is to wait until the enemy has advanced to the area between Yancheng and Linyi (closer to Linyi) before fighting the first battle."

Faithfully following Mao's directives, the Third Column of the Communist army stubbornly blocked the advance of the enemy along the central route at the area around Chongfang. Yancheng and Taolin. The purpose was to allow the enemy forces on the two flanks to move forward so that the Communist army could destroy one of them before defeating one by one the enemy moving along the other routes. When the enemy along the central route was checked by the Communist army, the enemy forces along the other routes, however, also stopped moving forward. In order to create favourable conditions for battle and destroy the enemy, the Communist army decided to allow the enemy forces to advance to the Yancheng and Linyi area before destroying them. The Communist Ninth and 10th columns were speedily transferred southward to take part in the fighting.

At this moment, however, the Kuomintang army in the north had reached the Laiwu area and was threatening the Communist rear. Seeing the enemy forces on the southern front were concentrated, moved very carefully and could not be carved up, the Communist army decided to change its plan of operations for the defence of Linyi and hoped that a change might take place in the overall situation.
On February 5, 1947, in a telegram to Mao Zedong, Chen Yi, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin proposed three alternative plans of operations.

According the first plan, the Communist army was to attack the enemy under Hao Pengju with one column of its forces so as to lure the enemy along the right route to come to its aid in the north or to draw the enemy along the middle and left routes northward, which might present opportunities for destroying the enemy.

The second plan was: If the first plan failed to achieve any result, only one column would be positioned south of Linyi to keep watch on the enemy, and the main force was to be assembled in the area north of Linyi to rest and wait for further opportunities.

The third plan suggested that if the enemy forces still did not move to the north or were difficult to destroy when it did, only one column would stay behind in the Linyi area and harass the enemy, the rest of the main force was to rush speedily northward to destroy the enemy on the northern front, attack the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway and threaten the city of Jinan. This would draw the enemy on the southern front to move into the mountainous area north of Linyi or reinforce the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway. The Communist army would then start an all-out offensive and destroy the enemy one by one.

Mao Zedong was highly pleased with the telegram. In his answering telegram, he stated, "Full approval for the third plan in the telegram of 15:00 hours, February 5. It will give us full initiative and put Chiang Kai-shek in a totally passive position."

On the night of February 6, the Second Column of the Communist army, at Chen Yi and Su Yu's order, suddenly made a thrust towards the southeast. In one battle fought on February 7 in the Baitashan and Tuofeng area, it destroyed the main force of the Kuomintang's 42th Group Army under Hao Pengju, which formed the wing of the enemy along the right route. Hao Penju himself was taken prisoner. When Hao Pengju's troops were under attack, the Ou Zhen group did not dare to move northward to reinforce. The enemy along the left route even retreated. On February 8, the enemy on the northern front occupied Xintai.

According the way the campaign developed, Mao Zedong issued the following directive in a telegram on February 9:

"It is very good that Hao Pengju's forces were disposed of. But in view of the strategic plan as whole, the fighting has started too early if your intention is to defeat the enemy on the southern front. The various enemy units may advance more carefully. After beating Hao Pengju, you should take no further action (be extremely patient) and allow the various enemy units to advance towards the north before destroying them one by one. If your intention is to deal with the enemy on the northern front first, the destruction of Hao Pengju's troops will not impede your plan. What you need is to choose between the two plans."

On February 10, the East China Field Army finally decided to concentrate a force of fifty-three regiments, destroy the enemy's 73rd Corps and a division of the 12th Corps first and then shift its forces to defeat the 46th Division that had occupied Xintai. It would then push northward towards the Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway and totally destroy the enemy forces on the northern front. This decision was approved by Mao Zedong.

Leaving the Third Column and the Second Column behind to block and mislead the enemy, the main force of the
East China Field Army abandoned Linyi and marched day and night to the north to attack the group of enemy forces under Li Xianzhou. After the East China Field Army had shifted to the north, Mao Zedong directed, "In order to defeat totally the three enemy corps of twenty-three regiments on the northern front, it is advisable to move the Wei Guoqing Column and the Eighth Division to the north to take part in the battle."

Linyi was the capital city of the East China Communist area. After the Communist army had abandoned this important city, Chen Xuepei, head of the Propaganda Department in Nanjing, declared, "The occupation of Linyi was an unprecedented victory for the National Army in the decisive campaign in southern Shandong." Chen Cheng said, "What remained of Chen Yi's troops have no strength to engage the National Army. They intend to join force with Liu and Deng. The National Army is in pursuit of the enemy. The overall situation in Shandong will soon be decided."

The main force of the Communist army was, in fact, marching at double speed to the Laiwu and Xintai area. When Wang Yaowu, commander-in-chief of the Second Pacification Zone in Jinan, discovered signs indicating that the main force of the Communist army was moving northward to the Laiwu and Xintai area, he immediately ordered Li Xianzhou's forces, which had occupied Xintai, to withdraw. But Chen Cheng refused to believe the bridges on the Grand Canal erected by local Communist forces were for the main force of the Communist army to move westward and northward. "The East China Communist forces have suffered heavy losses. They have no strength to fight a decisive battle with the National Army. They are trying to steal across the Grand Canal to join force with Liu and Deng's troops," he concluded. Annulling

Wang Yaowu's order, he commanded that Li Xianzhou's troops should re-occupy Xintai, advance to Mengyin and cut off the route of the Communist army's westward retreat. "This will destroy the main force of the East China Communist army," said he. Li Xianzhou had no choice but to order the 46th Corps and 73rd Corps to rush back to the Xintai and Yanzhuang area. While this 60,000-70,000-strong National Army was moving back and forth between two places, the Communist army had arrived from afar and had the Li Xianzhou group of forces encircled in the Xintai and Laiwu area.

On the night of February 20, the Eighth and Ninth columns of the Communist army started the attack at Hezhuang and wiped out the Kuomintang's 77th Division that was moving southward from Boshan to rejoin the 73rd Corps. The enemy's route of retreat to Boshan was cut off.

On the morning of February 21, the Communist First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth columns had the city of Laiwu and its north encircled at lightning speed. The 73rd Corps led by Li Xianzhou and the 46th Corps that had just withdrawn from Yanzhuang were trapped. Li's route of retreat to Jinan was cut off that night when the Kuomintang's New 36th Division of the 12th Corps was wiped out by the Communist Sixth Column at Tusikou north of Laiwu.

After several days of fierce battle, all the important heights in the east, south and west of the city of Laiwu were occupied by the Communist army. Sensing that the city of Jinan was weak in defence. Wang Yaowu ordered Li Xianzhou's forces to break out of the encirclement and move towards Jinan. A large number of Kuomintang aircraft, under the personal command of Zhou Zhirou, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang air force, began at this moment to bomb and strafe the Communist forces in an
Upon receiving Wang Yaowu’s order, Li Xianzhou began to lead the 73rd and 46th corps away from Laiwu on the morning of February 23. When these forces, marching in three columns, reached a valley, measuring ten kilometres north-south and three kilometres east-west, they were ambushed by the Communist forces.

The Communist forces swept down on them from all sides and cut them into small sections. In a ferocious battle lasting more than six hours, Li Xianzhou was captured alive and his two corps and a division were totally annihilated.

In this campaign, the Communist army put over 60,000 enemy troops out of action and recovered thirteen cities and towns. For forty days the Kuomintang forces did not dare to fight again. Shandong was completely under Communist control.

Under Mao Zedong’s direction, the Communist army succeeded in wiping out 415,000 enemy troops in the four months between November 1946 and February 1947. It abandoned eighty-seven cities and towns and recovered the same number of cities and towns. Altogether, in eight months of fighting, the Kuomintang army occupied 105 cities and towns in the Communist areas, but suffered 710,000 casualties, averaging 7,000 casualties for every city or town.

He said this when he was directing the Battle of Yanan in 1947.

In early March that year, Chiang Kai-shek had amassed thirty-four brigades, a military force 230,000 strong, to attack the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Communist area. The foremost target of the attack was Mao Zedong’s den — Yanan.

Yanan was invaded by fifteen brigades under the command of Hu Zongnan. As the Communist army defending Yanan was only one-tenth of the Kuomintang forces. Mao decided to pull out of Yanan and lure the enemy forces in deep into the Communist area so as to destroy them one by one.

Many people did not understand at the time why Mao had decided to abandon Yanan, and were unwilling to leave. Patiently, Mao explained to them: “We have lived in Yanan for ten years. We have dug cave dwellings, sown millet and directed the revolution in the whole country from here. All China and the world know there is Yanan. We must defend it. but we are not going to defend it to the death.” He explained to them again and again that the outcome of a battle is not decided by gaining or losing a city or land: the most important thing is to destroy the enemy’s effective strength.

“The enemy has 230,000 men,” continued Mao. “We have just over 20,000 men. It is difficult for the 20,000 men to destroy 230,000 men. To win victory over the enemy, we must adopt a correct method of fighting. At present, it depends on you ‘to torture the enemy mentally,’
lead the enemy along. wear out the enemy and make the enemy circle around you in vain. This method is called the tactic of ‘wear and tear.’ In northern Shaanxi, the mountains are high and the roads, narrow. You are to lead the enemy to climb the mountains. When he has climbed enough mountains and become exhausted and hungary, we will find an opportunity to destroy him.

On March 16, after paying a heavy price, Hu Zongnan’s men had reached the reclaimed area of Jinpingwan and Nanniwan in the vicinity of Yanan. Mao Zedong stayed at his post and did not leave his office in Yanan until March 18 when enemy troops had reached Sanshilipu on the outskirts of Yanan and gunfire could be clearly heard.

“The Kuomintang’s attack on Yanan and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.” Mao pointed out. “is a vain attempt to settle the Northwest question first. cut off our Party’s right arm. drive our Party’s Central Committee and the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army from the Northwest. then move its troops to attack northern China and so achieve the objective of defeating our forces one by one.”

On March 12, at the head of the main attacking force of 140,000 men. Hu Zongnan approached Yanan along the Luochuan and Yichuan line in two columns. He was assisted by Qinghai’s Ma Bufang and Ningxia’s Ma Hongkui with twelve divisions and by two divisions of the 22nd Corps from Yulin, which invaded Yanan from the west and the north. The Kuomintang also used more than a hundred aircraft to drop bombs on Yanan and its vicinities on an extensive scale.

On March 16, the Communist Northwest Field Army was formed at Mao Zedong’s order with Peng Dehuai as its commander and concurrently its political commissar and Xi Zhongxun, its deputy political commissar, to give unified command to all the Communist forces fighting in the

Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region.
After having occupied Yanan. Hu Zongnan’s army eagerly searched for the main force of the Communist army in the northwest, intending to engage it in a decisive battle. The Northwest Field Army adopted an unfathomable mobile tactic. A small force, masquerading as the Communist main force, engaged the enemy and retreated steadily, leading the enemy main force towards Anhai to the northwest of Yanan, while the Communist main force assembled and hid in ambush in the area south of Qinghuabian to the northeast of Yanan. When the headquarters unit of the enemy’s 31st Brigade and a regiment of over 2,900 men, covering the flank of Hu Zongnan’s invading army, fell into the trap on March 25, they were totally annihilated after more than an hour’s fighting.

On April 17, Mao Zedong drafted “The Concept of Operations for the Northwest War Theatre.” in which he pointed out: “The enemy is now quite tired, but not yet tired out. He is in considerable difficulties with his food supply, but not yet in extreme difficulties... Unless we reduce the enemy to extreme fatigue and complete starvation, we cannot win final victory. This may be called the tactics of ‘wear and tear,’ that is, of wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out.”

Having discovered the whereabouts of the Communist army in the Battle of Qinghuabian. Hu Zongnan’s army immediately headed for the northeast of Yanan and gave chase. This great army of tens of thousands of men turned in circles in the Yanchuan, Qingjian and Wayaobao area but could not find its prey. In mid-April. Hu Zongnan moved eight of his brigades westward from Panlong and Qinghuabian and the 135th Brigade southward from Wayaobao in an attempt to wipe out the main force of the Northwest Communist army in the area northwest of Panlong and Qinghuabian. The Communist army used part of
its forces to draw the enemy's main force westward and positioned the greater part of its forces in an ambush south of Wayaobao. On April 14, when 4,700 men of Hu's 135th Brigade entered the Yangmahe area in their southward march, they were completely wiped out by the Communist army after eight hours of fierce fighting.

Towards the end of April. Chiang Kai-shek, believing that the Communist Party Central Committee and the main force of the Northwest Communist army intended to cross the Yellow River and move to eastward, ordered Hu Zongnan's forces to speed northward along the Xianyang-Yulin Highway and the 22nd Corps to move southward from Yulin so that they could catch the Communist army in a pincer movement in the area of Bixian and Wubao or force it to move eastward across the Yellow River. The Communist army again lured the enemy main force northward with a part of its forces, while sending four brigades southward to raid the enemy's important supply base at Panlongzhen. The four brigades launched an attack against Panlongzhen on May 2 and put all the 6,700 enemy troops out of action in the battle which lasted for two days and three nights.

May 2-4 — An enemy brigade headquarters unit and a regiment, comprising 6,700 men, were totally destroyed. May 30-June 30 — 4,400 of Ma Hongkui's men were wiped out.

August 6-11 — More than 5,200 enemy troops guarding the outer perimeters of Yulin were annihilated.

August 20 — Over 6,000 enemy troops were wiped out in the Shajiadian area, northeast of Mizhi.

Hu Zongnan's attack against the key areas of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region was completely defeated in the seven battles.

After having suffered more than 100,000 casualties in just over a year's time, Hu Zongnan was forced to withdraw from Yanan. Mao Zedong was able to return.

In 1936, Mao Zedong wrote Snow, which is considered the most brilliant of his poems:

Snow
— to the tune of Qin Yuan Chun

Northern country scenery:
A thousand miles sealed in ice.
Ten thousand miles of drifting snow.
On both sides of the Great Wall,
A vast expanse of white.
Up and down the Great River.
The roaring waves are suddenly stilled.
The mountains are like dancing silver snakes.
And the plains, scampering wax-coloured elephants.
Trying to match heaven in height.
Wait for a fine day.
The land will be clothed in white, adorned in red.
Becoming exceeding enchanting.
The rivers and mountains are so full of charm.
Making countless heroes bend their backs.
Regretfully, the Qin emperor and Han Wudi were
Slightly lacking in literary talent;
Tang Taizong and Song Taizu
Did not have enough grace and charm;
And Genghis Khan.
The proud hero of his time, favoured by heaven,
Knew only to bend his bow to shoot at great vultures.
All are gone now.
To find truly great men.
We must look to the present.

After recovering Yanan, Mao Zedong was indeed more like a great ruler!
Driving Straight In
— Thrusting a Dagger into the Enemy’s Heart

A fundamental change took place in the war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in July-September 1947. The Communist army went onto the strategic offensive from the strategic defensive while the Kuomintang changed from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive. This change was marked by the Communist army’s crossing of the Yellow River and bringing the war to the Kuomintang-controlled areas south of the river. This change was certainly not brought about by Mao Zedong’s good luck, but by the development of the general situation of the war.

After a whole year of fighting, a tremendous change occurred in the balance of forces between the two parties. The Kuomintang’s total military strength of 4,300,000 men at the beginning of the civil war was reduced to 3,700,000. Its regular army of 2,000,000 men dwindled to 1,500,000. There were far less troops available for the Kuomintang on the battlefield. In the mean time, the Communist army grew from 1,200,000 men to 1,950,000, with more than 1,000,000 men in its regular forces. As most of the Communist areas were in the countryside, the Communist army did not have to divert its forces to garrison the cities in the rear and guard the supply lines. It could put more troops on the battlefield.

Mao Zedong’s strategy for the second year of the civil war was: “Our army’s basic task is to launch a country-wide counter-offensive, that is to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the Kuomintang areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines and completely wreck the Kuomintang’s counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to continue to carry the war into the Liberated Areas. Further damage and drain our manpower and material resources and make it impossible for us to hold out very long.”

The spearhead of Mao Zedong’s strategic counter-offensive was directed, out of many people’s expectation, at the Dabie Mountains area. The Dabie Mountains sprawl across the borders of Hubei, Henan and Anhui provinces between Nanjing and the strategic city of Wuhan in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. To the Kuomintang army, the Dabie Mountains were strategically the most sensitive area, where the defence was the weakest. As the mountains used to be a base area of the Communists, the Communist army could easily establish a foothold there. If the Communist army had penetrated into the Dabie Mountains, it could imperil Nanjing in the east, threaten Wuhan in the west, block traffic on the Yangtze and bear down on the Central Plains. Chiang Kai-shek would certainly not allow anyone else to sleep at his bedside. He would certainly transfer his troops attacking Shandong and northern Shaanxi back to reinforce this area and fight against the Communist army for this strategically important area. If he did that, he would be doing exactly what Mao Zedong expected him to do, and Mao Zedong would attain his strategic end.

Mao Zedong’s strategic plan of marching into the Dabie Mountains and seizing the Central Plains was to be carefully executed by the coordinated operations of three armies and two containing movements on the flanks. The three armies included the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, which was to march straight into the Dabie Mountains in the middle; the East China Field
Army under the command of Chen Yi and Su Yu was to be the left army, which was to advance into the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan-Anhui region: the Taiyue Army under the command of Chen Geng and others was to be the right army, which was to thrust into western Henan. On the flanks, the Communist army in northern Shaanxi was to strike out at Yulin to draw the main force of Hu Zongnan’s army to the north, and the Communist forces in Shandong were to launch attack in the Jiaodong area to draw Gu Zhutong’s army to the sea coast, to facilitate the operations of the three armies.

On the night of June 30, 1947, the country-wide offensive began when the main force of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, totalling 120,000 men, crossed the Yellow River by force along a 150-kilometre section in western Shandong and marched into the Dabie Mountains. Not to be outdone, Chiang Kai-shek declared the Nationwide General Mobilization for the Suppression of Turmoil and at the same time amassed large forces in an attempt to destroy the army of Liu and Deng between the Longhai Railway and the Yellow River or drive it back to the northern side of the Yellow River.

In a directive to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong wrote: “Your march into the Dabie Mountains should not be made by pushing steadily forward and occupying one city or area after another as in the Northern Expedition: it must be a hopping offensive. You should be determined not to have a rear. Drive straight in and reach the Dabie Mountains in half a month. You are to occupy several dozen counties at the centre of the Dabie Mountains, eliminate the local militia, mobilize the masses, establish bases, induce the enemy to attack, and engage the enemy in mobile warfare.”

Mao Zedong foresaw three kinds of future for the Communist army that was marching into the Dabie Mountains:

1. After paying a price, the army could not establish a foothold and was forced to turn back;
2. After paying a price, it could not establish a firm foothold and was forced to fight as guerrillas in the surrounding areas;
3. After paying a price, it succeeded in establishing a firm foothold.

He warned the Communist army to be mentally prepared for the worst and work hard for the best.

After crossing the Yellow River, the Communist army destroyed nine and a half enemy brigades in southwestern Shandong in mid-July, continued to push southward and occupied most of the county towns in southeastern Henan, eastern Hubei and eastern Anhui in early August, and reached the Dabie Mountains on August 27. Then, after fighting more than three months of bloody battles, it established Communist political power in thirty-three counties and the Dabie Mountains base area. It thus succeeded in thrusting a dagger into the Kuomintang’s heart area (the area between Wuhan and Nanjing).

On August 23, another part of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Communist army forced the Yellow River in southern Shanxi and started to push towards western Henan. In the areas north of the Longhai Railway, south of the Yellow River, in western Henan, it fought a series of battles in which the enemy forces were destroyed. By occupying a vast area in western Henan and on the Henan-Shaanxi border, it isolated the enemy’s important city of Luoyang in western Henan and threatened Hanguan.

At the end of August, the main force of the East China Field Army sallied out westward to the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and the Grand Canal in an attack against the enemy in southwestern Shandong. It wiped out the enemy’s 57th Reorganized Division in Heze’s Shatuji in western Shandong on September 8, crossed the Longhai Railway.
marched southward and occupied more than twenty county towns on the borders of Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu at the end of September. The enemy at the strategic city of Kaifeng became isolated.

Making a breakthrough at the centre, advancing in hops and penetrating deep into the enemy area was a brilliant strategic plan that had hit the enemy’s vital point and brought about a change in the overall situation of the war. Moving a great army of over a hundred thousand men far away from its base and deep into the enemy’s rear in hops was an unprecedented form of offensive. It was a clever move in Mao Zedong’s art of war.

The Communist army thus succeeded in fighting its way to the exterior lines, opening a new battlefield more than five hundred kilometres in length and breadth, south of the Yellow River, north of the Yangtze, from the Han-shui River in the west to the sea in the east. In the few months of fighting, the Communist army advancing along three routes had destroyed 190,000 enemy troops, captured over a hundred county towns and established the Central Plains base area.

In the “Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation,” a directive for the Communist army, Mao Zedong pointed out: “The keys to victory in fighting in the Kuomintang areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined and win as many battles as possible; and, second, to carry out resolutely the policy of winning the masses and enable the broad masses to benefit so that they side with our army. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory.”

In those days, the Communists were called “Communist bandits” by the Kuomintang. But as Mao Zedong’s Communist army was determined to “enable the broad masses to benefit,” which included dividing the land and giving it to the poor, millions of the poor “sided with the bandits” and regarded Mao Zedong as a great saviour.

36 Cutting a Tangle of Hemp with a Sharp Knife
— Dealing Crushing Blows to the Enemy

In October 1947, Mao Zedong issued his “Manifesto of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” in which he arrogantly and aggressively declared that the Communist armies had “now launched a large-scale counter-offensive,... Our armies on the southern front are advancing to the Yangtze River valley, our armies on the northern front are advancing on the Chinese-Changchun Railway and the Beiping-Liaoning Railway. Wherever our troops go, the enemy flees pell-mell before us and the people give thunderous cheers.” He ordered, “All officers and fighters of our army must improve their military art, march forward courageously towards sure victory in the war and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all enemies.”

Shortly afterwards, Mao Zedong publicized the Communist army’s ten major principles of operation, which produced wide repercussions in the whole country and the whole world. These principles of operation, which marked the zenith of Mao Zedong’s art of war, are:

1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.
2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
3. Make wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our main objective: do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place
is the outcome of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.

4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (two, three, four and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy. This is to concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces. Strive to avoid battles of attrition in which we lose more than we gain or only break even. In this way, although we are inferior as a whole (in terms of numbers) we are absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a whole and eventually wipe out all the enemy.

5. Fight no battle unprepared. Fight no battle you are not sure of winning: make every effort to be well prepared for each battle. Make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves.

6. Give full play to our style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest).

7. Strive to wipe out the enemy through mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.

8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Seize at opportune moments all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength. Provided circumstances permit, As for strongly defended enemy fortified points and cities, wait till conditions are ripe and then take them.

9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army’s main sources of manpower and materiel are at the front.

10. Make good use of the intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Periods of rest, training and consolidation should in general not be very long, and the enemy should so far as possible be permitted no breathing space.

Beginning from September 1948, at Mao Zedong’s order, the Communist army launched an autumn offensive of unprecedented scale on the Northeast, East China, Central Plains, North China and Northwest fronts.

One of the important campaigns in this autumn offensive was the seizure of Jinan. Jinan, the junction of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and Jiaozhou-Jinan Railway, is a city of strategic importance in north China. The dangerous local terrain makes the city easy to defend and difficult to attack.

The city was defended by 110,000 Kuomintang troops under the command of the famous Kuomintang general Wang Yaowu. The defenders had built a permanent system of defence around the city covering six hundred square kilometres, with the inner city as the nucleus, the outer city and business area as the basic defence area, and the towns and villages from twenty to thirty kilometres around the city as the perimeter of defence.

Before the Jinan campaign, the main force of the Kuomintang army in East China was grouped in three armies: The Second Army commanded by Qiu Qingquan was assembled in the area around Shangqiu. The Seventh Army commanded by Huang Botao was deployed in the Xinanzhen area. The 13th Army commanded by Li Ni was in the Suxian and Guzhen area.
Mao Zedong decided that in the third year of the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Communist armies were to continue to fight in the north of the Yangtze River and strive to wipe out no less than a hundred enemy regular brigades. The East China Field Army was required to wipe out about forty enemy brigades and to attack and capture Jinan between August and September.

Mao Zedong proposed that in the Jinan campaign the Communist army should adopt the tactic of "capturing Jinan and attacking the enemy's reinforcements." "The purpose of this campaign," he said, "is to capture Jinan and wipe out part of the enemy's reinforcements. In the disposition of the forces, part of the troops should be used to attack Jinan and the greater part should be concentrated to strike at the enemy's reinforcements."

Towards the end of August 1948, the East China Field Army held a high-level meeting to discuss plans for the Jinan campaign. It was decided that a group of seven columns, including the entire Shandong Army and part of the forces on the exterior line, under the command of Tan Zhenlin and Xu Shiyou, was to assault the city, and another group of eight columns was to strike at the enemy's reinforcements, with its main force positioned in the Juye, Jiaxiang, Jining and Yanzhou area on either side of the Grand Canal to block and destroy the enemy's reinforcements. The city-assaulting forces were divided into the eastern and western groups. The main assault forces were positioned on the western side of the city to occupy the airfield and cut off the enemy's air supplies. The two groups were then to coordinate their operations in the assault of the city.

The Jinan campaign started at midnight on September 16. The eastern and western groups of the Communist army opened fire on the defenders on the perimeter of the city along a fifty-kilometre front on each of the four sides of the city.

Fighting on the eastern outskirts was the fiercest. On the morning of September 17, under cover of concentrated howitzer and mortar fire, the Communist infantry began to attack Maoling and Yanchi hills that screen the city of Jinan on the eastern side, and captured the two hills after a hot battle lasting a whole night against the enemy's 15th Brigade.

The fierce fight on the eastern outskirts of the city led the Kuomintang commander Wang Yaowu to believe that the main assaulting force of the Communist army was on the eastern side. He hurriedly transferred his troops to the eastern outskirts. But all these troops were repulsed by the Communist army.

By midnight on September 19, all the positions on the perimeter of the city had been taken by the Communist forces. The Communist assaulting forces then encircled the city on the western, southern and northern sides, occupied the airfield and cut off the enemy's air supplies. Wu Huawen, commander-in-chief of the enemy's western defence zone and commander of the Reorganized 96th Corps turned his coat and went over to the Communist side with his three brigades of about 20,000 men.

Seeing the situation was deteriorating, Wang Yaowu wanted to abandon the city and break out of the encirclement. But he was ordered to put up a stubborn defence and wait for reinforcements.
Attacking a City and
Striking at Reinforcements
— Blocking the Enemy at Every Step

Based on the development of the Jinan campaign, Mao Zedong directed his generals in a telegram: “Preparations must be made before hand so that when our army has fought its way into the city and when Wang Yaowu and his die-hard followers try to break out of the encirclement and flee along different routes. they must be totally destroyed and none of them are to be allowed to escape the net. You should deploy ring upon ring of blocking forces along the main and secondary escape routes both far and near.” In addition to the regular forces, he also directed the regional forces and militia to position themselves along all the escape routes “to block the enemy at every step.” Wang Yaowu also adjusted his disposition of defence. Pulling back the main force into the city, he left a strong force to defend the business district. where the headquarters of his Second Pacification Zone was located.

At 6 p.m. on the evening of September 20. the various columns of the western group of the Communist city-assaulting forces started a sudden attack on the business district and. after more than forty hours of exchange of intensive gunfire and continuous demolition, the Communist army succeeded in breaking into the enemy’s defence positions at several points and began to move forward in depth.

The 10th Column attacked the business district from the north and seized the city’s railway station which was defended by the enemy’s armoured vehicles. It then wedged itself all the way to the foot of the outer city wall and blocked the route of retreat of the defenders in the city. The 13th Column and the Central South Shandong Col-umn attacked the business district from the south towards the northeastern direction and severed the defenders from those inside the city.

The Third Column moved speedily forward along the Jinger and Jingsan roads. two thoroughfares running east-west of the business district and leading to the headquarters of the Second Pacification Zone. Although Wang Yaowu himself had moved into the city, the headquarters was still defended by his best troops. The network of defence consisted of several tall concrete and steel buildings and an innumerable number of open and hidden bunkers on the surrounding streets and inside and outside the headquarters courtyard. There were altogether more than a hundred machine-gun nests and more than a thousand gun embrasures.

On the evening of September 21. under cover of gunfire, the shock brigades of the Communist army broke into the headquarters courtyard through a heavily defended high wall. Bitter fighting continued until the afternoon of September 22 when the Communist soldiers climbed to the top of this group of tall buildings and rounded up all the remaining defenders of the business district.

Without a single pause. the Communist army started a fierce attack on the outer city at 6:30 p.m. on the same day. Under powerful artillery fire and successive demolitions, the Communist forces soon made several breaches in the city wall. poured into the city and engaged the enemy in street fighting. By September 23. a greater part of the outer city had been occupied by the Communist army, which began to close in on the inner city.

In order to rescue Jinan. Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly ordered the Kuomintang forces in Xuzhou to reinforce the city from the south and sent aircraft to bomb the Communist forces which were already inside the city.

The Communist forces began to assault the inner city in
waves on September 23. At 5 p.m. in the evening, the Communist artillery began to bombard the defensive works and the inner city wall, which was fourteen metres high and ten metres thick. The various assaulting units crossed the city moat and rushed together to the city wall. The Kuomintang defenders under Wang Yaowu put up a stubborn resistance. When part of the Ninth Column from the eastern group of the Communist assaulting forces broke into the city from the southern side of the city's eastern gate, more than a company of Communist soldiers mounted the city wall and engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.

Two battalions of the 13th Column succeeded in breaching the city wall from the southwestern corner. After beating back the enemy's counter-attacks, two companies of soldiers rushed into the city and engaged the enemy in street fighting.

On the night of September 24, the Communist forces started another fierce attack. The 73rd Regiment of the Ninth Column successfully broke into the city and occupied the city's southeastern corner opposite the Black Tiger Spring.

The 109th Regiment from the 13th Column of the western group of the assaulting forces made a breach in the city wall and fought a bloody battle with the enemy to gain control of the southwestern corner of the city near Baotu Spring.

The main force of the 13th Column and the entire Third Column poured into the city one after the other and penetrated the enemy defence eastward and westward in house-to-house fighting.

The two columns of the Communist forces soon closed in like the two jaws of a big pincer on the Shandong provincial government building, where Wang Yaowu had dug in and waited for reinforcements. When the Communist sol-

To Be Able to Extend and Contract at Will — Encircling First and Attacking Later

The Taiyuan campaign was another campaign against a strongly fortified enemy city in the autumn offensive. Taiyuan, capital city of Shanxi province, is located in the northern part of the Central Shanxi Plain, on the eastern bank of the River Fen. The terrain to the north and south of the city is slightly undulating. Five kilometres to the east of Taiyuan is Hanshan Hill, which is five hundred metres higher than the city itself and commands a
panoramic view of the entire city. Known for its rugged and treacherous terrain, the hill is a natural defence for Taiyuan. Six kilometres to the west of Taiyuan are the Thousand Rocky Hills. There were two airfields in Taiyuan, one at Wusu to the south of the city and the other at Xincheng to the north of the city, which channelled supplies and reinforcements into Taiyuan.

At the time of the campaign, Taiyuan was defended by Yan Xishan’s troops, which included sixteen divisions of regular troops, three divisions of special forces and a Peace Preservation Corps, totalling 100,000 men and 600 artillery pieces. Making use of and relying on Taiyuan’s favourable terrain for defence, Yan Xishan built strong fortifications and planned to fight a decisive battle against the Communist army on the perimeter of the city. He deployed his headquarters troops inside the city and the rest of the troops at the fortified points around the city to form a system of defence radiating from the centre to the four directions. Taiyuan was virtually turned into “a city protected by walls of iron and bronze.”

In July 1948, the First Army and some other units of the Communist North China Field Army, which had just won victory in the Central Shanxi campaign, began to close in on Taiyuan.

In a telegram to Xu Xiangqian on July 16, Mao Zedong stated, “Taiyuan has become isolated. It becomes possible for our army to capture Taiyuan ahead of time. . . . Your entire army is to be positioned near Taiyuan for rest and consolidation and make preparations for the seizure of Taiyuan during this period of rest and consolidation.”

Following Mao Zedong’s directive, Xu Xiangqian intensified preparations for battle and laid down the tactics of “pinning down, disintegrating, attacking and gradually weakening the enemy before capturing Taiyuan at one swoop.”

While the Communist army was making preparations, the defenders of Taiyuan amassed nine infantry divisions and sallied out from southern side of the city on October 2. Xu Xiangqian decided to start the Taiyuan campaign before the scheduled time and destroy the enemy troops in the south of the city. When this decision was approved by Mao, the 60th and 61st corps of the Communist army speedily had Yan Xishan’s 44th and 45th divisions surrounded. After two days of fighting on October 5 and 6, the two enemy divisions were wiped out.

When Mao Zedong was informed of the victory, he sent a telegram to Xu Xiangqian, saying, “Pleased to hear the destruction of two enemy divisions. . . . You now have a good opportunity to destroy the enemy forces in the south and east of the city. When you succeed, the enemy will be shaken. Hope you will take advantage of your victory to wipe out the enemies on the perimeter one by one and occupy every airfield.”

After eleven days and nights of fighting that followed, the Communist forces made a breach in the enemy’s southern line of defence and pushed six kilometres forward into the enemy positions and occupied the southern airfield. The northern airfield came within Communist gunfire. A breach was also made in the enemy’s defence system on the eastern side of the city.

To enlarge the victory, the Communist forces decided to take Dongshan Hill when the enemy’s defence on the eastern side of the city was weak, and turn it into a base for controlling and seizing the city.

At this time, the war situation in the whole country was developing more and more in favour of the Communist army. Mao Zedong had decided to launch a campaign to take Beiping and Tianjin. To prevent the enemy troops in Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou and Tangshan from fleeing and facilitate their annihilation on the spot, Mao Zedong
sent a telegram to Xu Xiangqian: "It is estimated that a premature attack on Taiyuan will make Fu Zuoyi feel isolated and force him to abandon Beijing, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou and Tangshan and retreat to the south or in several groups to the southwest. and therefore increase the difficulty of destroying them later. Please consider stopping the attack and starting a political offensive after you have taken several key fortified points on the perimeter and occupied the airfield for good in the next week or two. Our troops are to strengthen their positions, rest and consolidate on the spot and attack Taiyuan again at the beginning of January next year when our army in the northeast moves to this side of the Great Wall and begins to attack Beijing and Tianjin.

Following Mao’s order, Xu Xiangqian postponed the attack on the city of Taiyuan, but continued to seize key strategic points and gained control of the two airfields to cut off completely the enemy’s airlift supplies. Between November 29 and December 1, the Communist forces seized some fortified points around the makeshift airfield so that they could seal it off with their gunfire. This marked the end of the first stage of the Taiyuan campaign, in which over 34,000 enemy troops were put out of action.

In March 1949, Yan Xishan’s army was reinforced by the 83rd Division, which had been successfully airlifted to Taiyuan. To boost the morale and make up the number of his forces, he incorporated the useless Peace Preservation Corps and People’s Defence Army into the regular army and formed three new divisions, known as the "Iron and Blood," "Unflinching Loyalty" and "Dauntless Courage" divisions, by reorganizing what remained of the 44th Division and drafting new recruits. He also organized the new 10th and 15th armies, while preserving his six armies of sixteen divisions and three divisions of special forces. Altogether, his troops were equipped with about nine hundred artillery pieces. After readjustments in the deployment of forces, Taiyuan was divided into five defence zones — north, west, south, east and southeast.

At the end of March 1949, the Communist army that had surrounded Taiyuan was joined by some of the forces that had taken part in the Beijing-Tianjin campaign, increasing the total attacking forces to about 300,000 men.

The second stage of the Taiyuan campaign began on April 20.

In the northeastern part of the city, the Communist 20th Army broke into Zhangzitou, pushed speedily westward and occupied the northern airfield south of Xincheng. Another Communist force advanced southward from Lancun along the western bank of the River Fen and headed straight for the steel bridge on the river west of the northern airfield. Operating in coordination, the two Communist forces succeeded in cutting the route of retreat of the enemy troops north of the northern airfield.

In the western part of the city, the Communist 19th Army and the troops from the Central Shanxi Military Region destroyed one after another all the fortified points west of the River Fen and advanced swiftly to the Wanbailin area, where they joined force with a Communist division moving southward, cut off the route of retreat of Yan Xishan’s troops west of the river and had them surrounded. Another column of the Communist forces broke the line of enemy defence at Yangjiabao on the eastern bank of the river, occupied East and West Kouzhuang and cut off the link between Shuangtasi and the city of Taiyuan.

In the eastern part of the city, the main force of the Communist 18th Army and that of the Seventh Army of the Northwest Field Army seized Jianziwan and the storehouse area and then occupied Heitugang and Dadongguan. By April 22, all the strongholds of Yan Xishan’s army
around the city had been destroyed. and thirteen enemy divisions. wiped out.
After losing all his forces outside the city. Yan Xishan immediately re-deployed his forces to defend the city itself. The Communist army also re-deployed its forces and began to build assaulting positions. On the evening of April 24. the Communist forces launched the general offensive under cover of powerful artillery fire and advanced on the city along twelve routes from all the four directions. It took only an hour for all the Communist forces along the twelve routes to reach the city proper. The fighting ended at 10 o’clock in the evening after all the defending troops had been put out of action. Taiyuan had been surrounded for more than half a year before it was finally taken over by the Communist army. This strategy of surrounding first and attacking later has rarely been practised anywhere in the world.
Mao Zedong was not in Yanan at this time. He and Zhou Enlai and the other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were moving to Xibaipo village. Pingshan county. in western Hebei province. from where Mao began to direct the fighting of the Communist forces in the whole country from May 1948.

39 Directing the Attack at One Point
— Swiftly Gaining the Initiative

Mao Zedong knew that if he wanted to win nationwide victory. he must further expand his army. Although the Communist army had won many victories. it had suffered heavy casualties. In order to replace the losses. it was necessary to enrol and train new recruits. Mao Zedong had devised many methods for training the new recruits. In the spring of 1948. he put forward the slogan: “Officers teach soldiers. soldiers teach officers. and the soldiers teach each other.”
He said to the Communist army officers. “The soldiers have a wealth of actual experience in battle. An officer should learn from the soldiers and turn the soldiers’ experience into his own: he will then become more competent.” By the autumn of 1948. the Communist army had grown to 2,800,000 men. who could fight not only in mobile warfare. but also in positional warfare. The Communists now controlled 25 percent of China’s land area with a population of 150 million on it. Although the Kuomintang still had 3,650,000 troops. only 1,700,000 could be used on the first line of battle. It had to switch from “all-round defence” to “defence of key points.”
The Kuomintang then had five strategic groups of forces. which were tied down on five battle fronts:
On the Northeast front was Wei Lihuang’s group of 550,000 troops. deployed in three isolated areas in Changchun. Shenyang and Jinzhou.
On the North China front was Fu Zuoyi’s group of 600,000 troops. defending such key places as Zhangjiakou. Beiping. Tianjin. Tangshan and Shanhaiguan.
On the East China front was Liu Zhi’s group of over 600,000 troops. concentrated in the area around Xuzhou.
On the Central Plains front was Bai Chongxi’s group of about 750,000 troops. positioned along the southern section of the Beiping-Hankou Railway and around Hankou.
On the Northwest front was Hu Zongnan’s group of about 300,000 troops in the Guanzhong area around Xian.
Mao Zedong now cherished soaring aspirations and was highly confident of victory. He declared. “We are prepared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the Kuomintang in about five years. counting from July 1946.
This is possible. Our objective can be attained provided we destroy about 100 brigades of Kuomintang regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five years."

When he was young, Mao Zedong was a student poor in arithmetics. But this time he was very smart when he came to work out when and how the Kuomintang army could be totally destroyed: "In the past two years our army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of 95 brigades a year, or nearly 8 brigades a month. In the next three years it is required that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars. Between July this year [1948] and June next year we expect to destroy some 115 brigades of enemy regulars."

The task of destroying 115 Kuomintang brigades was to be shared by his field armies and armies as follows:
The East China Field Army — about 40 brigades.
The Central Plains Field Army — about 14 brigades.
The Northwest Field Army — about 12 brigades.
The army of Xu Xiangqian and Zhou Shidi in North China was to destroy about 14 of Yan Xishan's brigades.
The Northeast Field Army and the two armies of Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu were jointly responsible for the destruction of about 35 brigades under Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi.

After comparing the relative strength of the two sides, Mao Zedong decided that the time had come for the Communist army to fight strategically decisive battles against the Kuomintang forces. In order to wipe out large numbers of enemy forces and gain nationwide political power, the Communist army must attack the enemy's heavily defended big cities and battle against the enemy's powerful and mechanized troops.

At a military conference held in Nanjing in August 1948, the Kuomintang planned to pull out of the Northeast, safeguard Central China and strengthen South China, but was hesitant in making the final decision.

Mao Zedong maintained that if the Kuomintang succeeded in moving all its forces to the south of the Great Wall and to Central and South China, it would make it far more difficult for the Communist army to destroy them in later days. Before the Kuomintang had made the final decision, the Communist army must decide promptly and seize the opportunity to engage the enemy in strategically decisive battles and destroy the enemy's powerful armies.

As a result, Mao Zedong decided to engage the Kuomintang forces in three large-scale campaigns. He directed the operations of the Communist army from afar with telegrams.

The first decisive campaign was the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign fought in the Northeast.

The Kuomintang had altogether 550,000 troops, including 480,000 regulars, in the Northeast, while the Communist main and regional forces totalled more than 700,000. In a telegram to the two Communist generals, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, Mao Zedong stated: "If in the two months of September and October, or a little longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Jinzhou to Tangshan and take Jinzhou, Shandong and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out some 18 enemy brigades. In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Jinzhou, be prepared also to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang."

Why did Mao Zedong choose to attack Jinzhou first instead of the picturesque Changchun or the industrial Shenyang?
This was because where the Communist army directed its attack first was a question that would affect the war situation as a whole. The city of Changchun had for a long time under the siege of the Communist army and was not a very strongly defended city on the Northeast front. It would not have been a difficult task if the Communist army had intended to seize the city and eliminate the threat on its rear. The Kuomintang wanted to use Changchun to contain the Communist army, cover Shenyang and improve the situation of the defenders at Jinzhou, and was making preparations to retreat to the other side of the Great Wall. If the Communist army had attacked Changchun, it would have played into the hands of the Kuomintang. The fall of Changchun would frighten the enemy forces in Shenyang and Jinzhou into fleeing away, which would affect the campaign and the war situation in the whole country. The situation in Jinzhou was different. Although there were more enemy forces in Jinzhou than Changchun, they were scattered at several points along the railway between Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan and each unit was isolated from the others. The Communist army was more sure of victory. When fighting broke out in Jinzhou on the Beiping-Liaoning Railway, the Kuomintang forces in Changchun and Shenyang might come to its rescue and offer an opportunity for the Communist army to destroy them. It could also separate the two Kuomintang strategic groups of forces in North China and in the Northeast. To the enemy forces, Jinzhou was a gateway through which they could move to North China. If Jinzhou fell, the door was closed on the Kuomintang forces in the Northeast, and the Communist forces could close in on them from the two flanks. In another telegram, Mao Zedong pointed out, "You must centre your attention of the operations in Jinzhou and strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives is attained and Jinzhou alone is captured, you will have won the initiative, which in itself will be a great victory."

40 Making Long-Distance Raids — Converging on the Enemy from the Flanks

It has been mentioned above that Mao Zedong’s adversary, Chiang Kai-shek, was also a strategist of great talent and bold vision. For a time, Chiang had considered abandoning Shenyang, pulling his main force back to Jinzhou and using it later in North and Central China. After weighing the advantages and disadvantages, however, Chiang decided to defend the Northeast resolutely so that he could consolidate North China. He adopted the policy of "concentrating the forces, defending the key places, safeguarding Shenyang, Jinzhou and Changchun and, when opportunity appeared, opening up the Beiping-Liaoning Railway." The Kuomintang forces were deployed as follows: Changchun was defended by Zheng Dongguo, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression Headquarters and commander of the First Army with six divisions in two corps, totalling 100,000 men, to contain the main force of the Communist army in the Northeast. The line between Yixian and Shanhaiguan was defended by Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression Headquarters and head of the Jinzhou command, with fourteen divisions in four corps, totalling 150,000 men, to ensure land and sea routes of communications between the Northeast and North China.
with Jinzhou and Jinxi as the main areas of defence. Shenyang and its surrounding areas, the centre of defence in the Northeast, was defended by Wei Lihuang, commander-in-chief of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression Headquarters, with twenty-four divisions in eight corps, totalling 300,000 men, not only to safeguard Shenyang, but also to give aid to Changchun and Jinzhou whenever necessary. The Communist forces, following Mao Zedong's directives, deployed one column (corps) and seven independent divisions to continue the siege of Changchun and employed six columns, one artillery column and a tank battalion to attack Jinzhou. Two more columns were positioned in the Tashan-Gaoqiao sector, southwest of Jinzhou: and three more columns in the Heishan-Dahushan-Zhangwu sector, to intercept any Kuomintang reinforcements from Jinxi and Huludao and from Shenyang to relieve Jinzhou.

Fighting in the Jinzhou area started on September 12. Just as the Communist army was mopping up the enemy on the perimeter of Jinzhou after taking Yixian, Chiang Kai-shek himself flew to the Northeast to direct the operations of the Kuomintang army. He hurriedly transferred five divisions of the North China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters from Beining and two divisions from Shandong to reinforce the four divisions of Kuomintang forces in Jinzhou. Together the eleven divisions started a fierce attack on the Communist positions at Tashan on October 1, but never succeeded in breaking the Communist line of defence.

This was followed by Liao Yaoxiang’s Ninth Army of eleven divisions and three cavalry brigades, which was rushed to Jinzhou from Shenyang, but was blocked by the Communist army in the area northeast of Heishan and Dahushan.

The Communist army started the assault on Jinzhou on October 14 and, after thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, completely destroyed the defending Kuomintang forces. Fan Hanjie, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast Bandit-Suppression Headquarters, and Lu Junchuan, commander of the Sixth Army, and more than 100,000 enemy troops under their command were taken prisoner. Intending to recapture Jinzhou and reopen the line of communications between the Northeast and North China, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Liao Yaoxiang’s army to continue its advance towards Jinzhou.

After taking Jinzhou, the Communist army immediately swung back to the northeast and closed in on Liao’s army from the north and south of Heishan and Dahushan and, on October 26, had Liao’s army encircled in the Heishan, Dahushan and Xinmin area and, after a bitter fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped it out, capturing army commander Liao Yaoxiang and corps commanders Li Tao. Bai Fengwu and Zheng Tingji and more than 100,000 men.

Following this victory, the Communist army attacked and took Shenyang and Yingkou on November 2 and wiped out 149,000 more enemy troops. The whole of the Northeast thus came under Communist control. A total of more than 470,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out in the campaign.

After the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, the Communist forces grew to more than 3,000,000 men while the Kuomintang forces were reduced to 2,900,000 men.

In the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, Mao Zedong applied the principles of battles of annihilation for the first time on the strategic scale, which marked a further development of his art of war.

The Liaoning-Shenyang campaign was fought on a large battlefield under extremely complicated conditions, involving vast numbers of forces. Proceeding from the actual conditions on the battlefield, Mao instructed the Com-
munist army in the Northeast to take the actual conditions into consideration and adopt different forms of fighting, including long-distance raids, storming strong fortifications, mobile warfare, positional warfare and mobile defence. By adopting various forms of fighting in a campaign, the Communist army had accumulated experience for organizing the large-scale battles of annihilation it was to fight in later days.

In the second half of the 1940s, Mao Zedong began to take a special interest in figures. He listed the following figures on October 10, 1948:

"In the last two years of fighting, from July 1946 to June 1948, the People's Liberation Army has wiped out 2,640,000 enemy troops, including 1,630,000 captured. The main war booty of the two years amounts to nearly 900,000 rifles, over 64,000 heavy and light machine-guns, 8,000 pieces of light artillery, 5,000 pieces of infantry artillery and 1,100 heavy mountain and field guns. In these two years the People's Liberation Army has grown from 1,200,000 men to 2,800,000. Our regular troops have increased from 118 brigades to 176, that is, from 610,000 men to 1,490,000. The liberated areas now cover 2,350,000 square kilometres, or 24.5 percent of China's total area of 9,597,000 square kilometres; their population is 168 million, or 35.3 percent of China's total of 475 million; and they have 586 large, medium and small cities. From county towns up, or 29 percent of China's total of 2,009 such cities."

Highly elated, Mao Zedong concluded that the duration of the civil war might be shortened. He said on November 14, 1948: The original estimate was that the Kuomintang government could be completely overthrown in about five years, beginning from July 1946. As we now see it, only another year or so may be needed to overthrow it completely.

Mao Zedong had by now become truly and really the supreme commander of the mighty and powerful Communist army. He reorganized all the troops of the big strategic areas into field, regional and guerrilla forces. The field forces were organized into field armies. A field army was composed of armies, an army of corps (originally called columns), a corps of divisions, and a division of regiments. In accordance with their locations, the field armies were designated the Northwest Field Army, Central Plains Field Army, East China Field Army, Northeast Field Army and North China Field Army. The number of armies, corps and divisions in each field army differed according to the actual conditions in each big strategic area. Later the Northwest Field Army was renamed the First Field Army, comprising two armies: the Central Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, comprising three armies; and the East China Field Army was renamed the Third Field Army, comprising four armies; and the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army, comprising four armies. The three armies making up the North China Field Army were placed under the direct command of the General Headquarters of the Communist army.

In April 1949, the hierarchy of the Communist army was as follows:

The Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party:
Chairman: Mao Zedong.
Vice-Chairman and Commander-in-Chief: Zhu De.
Vice-Chairman and Director of the Political Department: Liu Shaoqi.
Vice-Chairman and Chief of General Staff: Zhou Enlai.
Vice-Chairman and Deputy Commander-in-Chief: Peng Dehuai.
Deputy Chiefs of General Staff: Nie Rongzhen and Ye
Jianying.
First Field Army:
Commander and Political Commissar: Peng Dehuai.
Second Field Army:
Commander: Liu Bocheng.
Political Commissar: Deng Xiaoping.
Third Field Army:
Commander and Political Commissar: Chen Yi.
Fourth Field Army:
Commander: Lin Biao.
Political Commissar: Luo Ronghuan.

41
Effecting a Breakthrough in the Middle
— Revealing Not the Main
Target of Attack

After the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign, the Communist army began to look for an opportunity to engage its opponent in another decisive battle.

Liu Zhi, commander-in-chief of Kuomintang's Bandit-Suppression Headquarters in Xuzhou, had contracted his front. At the end of October 1948, he had deployed his four armies, four Pacification Zones, totalling twenty-five army corps and about 600,000 troops, along the Longhai Railway and the Tianjin-Pukou Railway with Xuzhou as the centre, to prevent the Communist army from marching south and protect the capital Nanjing. The troops were positioned in heavy concentrations so that reinforcements could be rushed swiftly to any spot that had been threatened.

On September 25, 1948, Mao Zedong's Central Military Commission decided to launch the Huai-Hai campaign.

The concept of operations for this campaign was outlined in a telegram to the front drafted by Mao on October 11. Mao Zedong required the East China Field Army, in the first stage, to concentrate forces so as to wipe out the Kuomintang's Seventh Army and effect a breakthrough in the middle; in the second stage, to destroy the enemy in the Haizhou-Lianyungang area; and in the third stage, to engage the enemy in the Huaiyin and Huaian area. The Central Plains Field Army was required to attack the Zhengzhou-Xuzhou section of the Longhai Railway with its main force to coordinate the operations of the East China Field Army and prevent the Kuomintang's 16th Army from being transferred to the east. In order to wipe out the enemy's Seventh Army completely, mislead the enemy and prevent him from finding out the main target of the Communist army's offensive. Mao Zedong studied the enemy's dispositions and told the East China Field Army to employ half of its troops to contain and intercept the enemy forces and approach Xuzhou from the north, south and west, so that more time could be gained for the complete destruction of the Seventh Army.

Xuzhou, a vital communication pivot between North and Central China, that protects Nanjing and Shanghai in the south and is linked with Hebei and Shandong in the north, has always been a place contested by strategists in Chinese history. When Chiang Kai-shek found that the Communist forces were active between the Tianjin-Pukou, Longhai and Beiping-Hankou railways, he decided to concentrate all his forces in Xuzhou and engage the Communist army in a decisive campaign.

The campaign developed rapidly. Since the Kuomintang's main force was now concentrated in Xuzhou, Mao Zedong had sent a telegram to the front, stating that the Communist army must strive to wipe out twenty-one or twenty-two enemy divisions under Huang Botao and Li Mi in the
first battle. If this task could be successfully accomplished, the whole situation would be changed and it would become possible for the East China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army to advance to the area between Xuzhou and Bengpu. If the enemy did not move his troops from Xuzhou and its surrounding area to the south of Bengpu, the Communist army could fight the second battle and destroy Huang Wei and Qiu Qingquan’s armies and totally isolate the enemy forces in Xuzhou. As the situation changed continually, Mao Zedong changed the dispositions of his forces. Four columns of the Central Plains Field Army were placed under the direct command of Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping to strike out from Suxian and cut the road between Suxian and Bengpu. Two columns from the East China Field Army were to advance northward on Huangkou and Xuzhou from the Xiaoxian area and join force with units of the Central Plains Field Army in Suxian. If the Kuomintang troops in Xuzhou began to retreat to the south, the Communist army would employ six columns of forces to destroy them. The East China Field Army was to launch an all-out attack against Li Mi’s army, with three columns approaching the prey from north to south and one column from south to north, so as to gain control of the section of railway between Xuzhou and the Grand Canal. The main force of the Communist army east of the Grand Canal was to fight and destroy Huang Botao’s army. In this way, the Kuomintang forces would be carved up and the Communist forces could then concentrate superior forces, wipe them out one by one and occupy Xuzhou.

The two Communist field armies followed Mao’s directions and closed in on Xuzhou at lightning speed from east and west, north and south. Thirteen columns of the East China Field Army swept southward from Shandong and overtook the enemy positions in a three-hundred-kilome-

tre-wide area north of the Longhai Railway. Three columns of the Northern Jiangsu Army sallied out from the southeast of Xuzhou to the northwest. After several days and nights of fighting, the enemy forces were cut into several isolated groups. When Huang Botao’s army in the east was encircled by Communist forces, Huang Botao was alarmed and began to withdraw towards the west, intending to move closer to Xuzhou, but the route of his retreat was cut off by the Communist Shandong Army. Huang and his entire army of several tens of thousands of men were encircled by Communist forces in the Nianzhuang area to the east of Xuzhou.

Following Mao Zedong’s instructions of “Making every effort to keep the enemy on the move and engaging him in mobile warfare: paying closest attention to learning the tactics of storming enemy positions and fortifications,” and adopting the tactic of “Attacking the weak enemy first and the strong enemy later: striking at the enemy’s headquarters to throw the enemy into confusion.” the Communist forces gave full play to their superior skill in night fighting, approached the enemy by digging ditches at night and thrust into the areas between the villages. They intensified reconnaissance, made full preparations and concentrated their troops and weapons to seize the places one by one and destroy the enemy forces one by one.

The Kuomintang’s 100th Corps and 44th Corps on the western and southern sides of the Communist cordon were relatively weaker in fighting capacity. They were completely wiped out after four days of fighting.

On the evening of October 19, the Communist forces started a general attack on Nianzhuang where the headquarters of Huang Botao’s army was located, and occupied it on the early morning of October 20. The enemy army headquarters and the headquarters of the 25th Corps were destroyed and over 10,000 enemy troops taken pris-
oner. Huang Botao fled to a house in a big courtyard and continued to resist. In the evening on October 20, after seventeen days of mobile and positional warfare, the seven corps under the command of Huang Botao and one corps from the Ninth Pacification Zone, also under his command, totalling ten divisions and about 100,000 men, were put out of action.

In an attempt to save Huang Botao, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Liu Zhi, commander-in-chief of the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Xuzhou, and Du Yuming, deputy commander-in-chief, to come speedily to Huang’s rescue with all their forces. A total of five corps that made up Qiu Qingquan’s army, Liu Zhi’s main force, and Li Mi’s army, under cover of twenty aircraft, over a hundred tanks and over a hundred heavy artillery pieces, began to move eastward along either side of the Longhai Railway. The defence of Xuzhou was reinforced by Sun Yuanliang’s army, and by Huang Wei’s army which had been swiftly transferred to the Xuzhou-Suxian line along the Beiping-Hankou Railway.

Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, the Communist army fought a positional battle of defence in the east and south of Xuzhou to defend what it had already gained.

The Communist forces positioned three columns to the east of Xuzhou to check the advance of the Kuomintang reinforcements while despatching five columns to attack Xuzhou and threaten the enemy’s flank. Even after Huang Botao was killed and his army totally wiped out, Qiu’s and Li’s armies were still blocked by the Communist forces at a spot twenty-five kilometres from the Nianzhuang area, suffered over 10,000 casualties and lost more than thirty tanks.

The two Communist field armies fought in close coordination and brought the first stage of the Huai-Hai campaign to a victorious conclusion.

Even though the Kuomintang forces had suffered defeat in the first stage of the campaign, the defenders of Xuzhou were still high in their morale. To prevent a disaster like Huang Botao’s from being repeated, the three armies under Qiu Qingquan. Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang were immediately assembled at Xuzhou to strengthen the city’s defence.

Having suffered a heavy blow from the Communist forces, Li Yannian’s army in the south did not dare to venture north. But the army under Huang Wei was caught in a trap set by the Communist Central Plains Field Army.

42 **Wait for the Prey to Fall into the Trap**

—— *Never Try to Do Anything Out of Bravado*

Mao Zedong had a clear idea of what was going on on the battlefield even though he was far away. He decided to exploit the recent victory and wipe out Huang Wei’s army. The Central Plains Field Army was to play the main role in this battle, assisted by part of the East China Field Army. The tactic to be adopted was to block Huang’s army from both the north and the south and then encircle and destroy it in the middle.

Mao pointed out in particular that when Huang Wei’s army was being encircled, the entire Kuomintang army defending Xuzhou might flee to the south in a stampede. He reiterated his determination to wipe out the Kuomintang’s main force on the northern side of the Yangtze River and told Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping to make the necessary arrangements. so as “to carve up the enemies, destroy them one by one and never
allow them to run away."

On November 15, the Central Plains Field Army closed the ring of encirclement around Huang Wei's army in the Shuangduiji area, and the East China Field Army began to close in on Renqiao and Guzhen. Chiang Kai-shek mistakenly thought that the Communist army was going to attack the armies of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming first. He ordered these two armies to retreat southward to Bengpu, defend the Huaihe River and prevent the Communist army from marching further south. At the same time he also ordered that Huang Wei's army was to move towards Bengpu and that Du Yuming was to abandon Xuzhou and move southward to coordinate with Huang Wei's movement. "In order to defend the Yangtze River, it is necessary to strengthen the defence of the Huaihe River," he emphasized.

Encircled and attacked by the Central Plains Field Army, Huang Wei's army suffered heavy losses and, on November 28, no longer dared to try to break out of the encirclement. The defenders of Xuzhou marched southward in full strength but was blocked by Communist forces in the area north of Sibao. They fought desperately for seven days but failed to make any headway. Another part of the East China Field Army pursued and attacked Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's armies and wiped out a part of them.

In a desperate attempt to turn the tide, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Du Yuming to Nanjing and told him to avoid the frontal defence of the Communist army along the Tianjin-Pukou Railway and make a detour to the southwest of Xuzhou before marching south. He ordered Liu Zhi, commander-in-chief of the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Xuzhou, to fly to Bengpu, organize a new command and urge Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's armies to start an offensive towards the north, so that the Kuomintang forces could attack the flanks and rear of the Central Plain Field Army and rescue Huang Wei's army from the Communist siege. The Kuomintang forces could thus preserve their strength and retreat together to the south.

On the night of December 1, Du Yuming abandoned Xuzhou and began to flee towards the southwest at the head of a great army of 270,000 men with Sun Yuanliang's army, an inferior force, and Li Mi's army fighting as the vanguard, and Qiu Qingquan's army, a superior force, protecting the rear.

The East China Field Army immediately ordered its mobile units in the south to pursue and attack. The Communist army pursued and attacked the fleeing Kuomintang army along a line parallel with the movement of the enemy. It blocked the path of the Kuomintang army with multiple barriers and waylaid and rounded it up everywhere. After three days of pursuit and attack, all Du Yuming's three armies commanded respectively by Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang were encircled in the Chenguanzhuang area, sixty-five kilometres southwest of Xuzhou on the morning of December 4. Sun Yuanliang's army tried to break out but was totally destroyed by the Communist army. Sun alone escaped with his life.

The enemy troops now encircled by the Central Plains Field Army and East China Field Army were the best of the Kuomintang troops.

In order to accelerate the progress of the campaign, Mao Zedong analysed the situation and decided to "concentrate a superior force to destroy Huang Wei's army, pin down Du Yuming in an encirclement and stop the advance of Li Yannian."

From the night of December 6 to December 15, the Central Plains Field Army adopted a tactic of "tightening the encirclement, starving and tiring out the enemy." It attacked the enemy from village to village and never allowed
the enemy a breathing spell.  
After more than twenty days of fierce fighting, Huang Wei’s army was completely wiped out on December 15 in southwestern Suxian. Huang Wei, the army commander, and Wu Shaozhou, the deputy army commander, were taken prisoner. The second stage of the Huai-Hai campaign thus ended in victory for the Communist army. The Communist army was powerful enough to have swiftly wiped out Du Yuming’s forces then and there. But it did not do so. On December 22, Mao Zedong directed that as long as Du’s forces did not try to break out of the encirclement in strength, the Communist army should take a rest and start to attack on January 5, 1949. His decision was based on an analysis of the situation of civil war in the whole country.

While Chiang Kai-shek was lamenting over the loss of Huang Botao’s and Huang Wei’s armies, the Beiping-Tianjin campaign had started on the North China front. Fu Zuoyi, with over 600,000 Kuomintang troops under his command, was alarmed by the defeat of the Kuomintang army in the Northeast and the communication line between Dagu and Tianjin being severed by Communist forces. He hastily pulled back his forces and planned to flee to the south by the sea route or retreat westward to Suiyuan province. On December 20, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered Tang Enbo, the Shanghai-Nanjing-Hangzhou Garrison Commander, to complete speedily the Yangtze River defence, and Liu Zhi to send non-essential personnel and heavy equipment to the south. Chiang’s intention was to move his main force to positions in the south and set up defences along the Yangtze River. As for the Kuomintang troops in North China, “when it becomes absolutely necessary to withdraw to the south.” Chiang Kai-shek would send ships for them.

Before the Kuomintang forces put the plan of retreating to the south into execution, the Communist army on the Huai-Hai front and North China front adopted the method of "encircling without attacking or cutting off without encirclement" and postponed the general attack. The purpose was to relax the war situation and mislead Chiang Kai-shek into believing that he did not have to ship his troops in the Beiping-Tianjin area to the south for the time being and could continue to fight on the Huai-Hai front. The Communist forces could gain time to make full preparations to wipe out large numbers of enemy forces on the Huai-Hai front and Beiping-Tianjin front. To spare the remainder of Du Yuming’s armies was to put out a bait, so that when the time came for the Communist army to attack Du Yuming’s forces, Li Yannian’s army might come to their rescue from the south and the Communist army could wipe out part of Li’s army, too. Encircled and harassed by the Communist army and with their supplies cut off, Du Yuming’s troops suffered both hunger and cold. As they had nothing to eat, they fed on tree barks, killed their horses and there were even instances of them eating human flesh.

In early January, 1949, after the Northeast Field Army and the North China Field Army had encircled and cut off Fu Zuoyi’s forces, Mao Zedong ordered the Communist army on the Huai-Hai front to start the general attack. After a fierce battle that lasted from the evening of January 6 to the evening of January 10, the Communist army succeeded in destroying Liuji, the enemy’s last stronghold. Du Yuming was taken prisoner and Qiu Qingquan was killed. Only Li Mi managed to escape in disguise.

In the sixty-five days of the Huai-Hai campaign, the Kuomintang lost 56 divisions in 22 corps, a total of 555,000 troops.
When Mao Zedong celebrated the victory with wine at Xibaipo, he certainly did not sigh over the shortness of human life as many poets of the past had done.

43

Cutting the Enemy into Two
— Eating the Flesh Before Cracking the Bones

After the Liaoxi-Shenyang campaign that ended in early November, 1948. Fu Zuoyi, commander-in-chief of the North China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters, was like a bird that would start at the mere twang of a bow-string. Because he had miscalculated that it would take three months for the Communist forces in the Northeast to march to North China, he decided to linger in Beijing and Tianjin. Keep the route to the sea clear, expand his forces. and wait and see in which direction the situation would change before making the final decision.

Based on his temporary decision, Fu Zuoyi contracted his front and deployed his forces of twelve corps in four armies, a total of 550,000 troops, in Beijing and Tianjin and along a five-hundred-kilometre railway line from Tangshan in the east to Zhangjiakou in the west.

The war situation in the whole country showed that if the Communist forces could detain Fu Zuoyi’s army in North China and then wipe it out there, it would be advantageous to the Communist side.

Mao Zedong, therefore, decided to transfer the Northeast Field Army to North China ahead of the scheduled time. Together with the Second Army and Third Army of the North China Military Region and the regional forces, a total of one million troops, it could launch the Beijing-Tianjin campaign and destroy Fu Zuoyi in North China before he made his final decision to bolt.

Fu Zuoyi could have abandoned the cities and beat a quick retreat any time he wanted. The success of the campaign therefore depended on whether the Communists could make Fu stay where he was.

For this reason, Mao Zedong decided to mislead the enemy by lifting the siege of Guisui, postponing the attack on Datong and entering into negotiations with Fu Zuoyi. At the same time, he ordered the main force of the Northeast Field Army to march secretly and speedily to North China. Together with the Communist forces already in North China, the Northeast Field Army was to encircle but not to attack the enemy on the western front and to cut off but not to encircle the enemy on the eastern front, so that the enemy would eventually be tightly encircled before he knew it.

Based on Mao Zedong’s concept of operations, between November 29 and December 21, 1948, the Northeast and North China field armies cut up and encircled the enemy forces in Beijing, Tianjin, Tanggu, Xinbaoan and Zhangjiakou, five isolated places, and blocked their westward road of retreat.

The Communist army seized Xinbaoan on December 22 and Zhangjiakou on November 24, destroying Fu Zuoyi’s crack 35th Corps and 11th Army.

On January 14, 1949, the Communist forces started a general offensive against Tianjin and occupied the city on the 15th. Chen Changgeng, the garrison commander, was captured alive.

The city of Tianjin faces the sea on the east, and the urban area is cut up by five rivers into many sections. It is a city easy to defend and difficult to attack. As early as in 1947, Chen Changgeng had begun to draft personnel and requisition supplies to strengthen the city’s defences. Pillboxes were built on every street leading up to the cen-
The Communist army employed an overwhelmingly superior force of twenty-two divisions in five columns and a large number of artillery units, tanks and engineering corps on the Tianjin front.

Tianjin is an elongated city, narrow in the east-west direction. Chen Changgeng placed strong forces in the north and powerful fortifications in the south. But the middle section was weakly defended.

If the Communist army launched a powerful attack from both the eastern and western sides, it could cut the defenders into two separate groups, disrupt the entire defensive system and push freely northward and southward. The commanders of the Communist army therefore decided to attack the city from the eastern and western sides, cut off the enemy in the middle section, push southward first and then northward, before encircling, carving up and destroying the enemy. It was a method of “eating the flesh before cracking the bones.”

The Communist army started the general attack against the Kuomintang troops in Tianjin at 10 a.m. on January 14, 1949, and took the city after twenty-nine hours of bitter fighting. All the 130,000 Kuomintang troops, including Chen Changgeng, were put out of action.

After the battle of Tianjin, the Northeast and North China field armies, totalling 900,000 troops, had the 200,000 Kuomintang troops tightly encircled in Beijing. For the siege of Beijing, the Communist army had concentrated all its artillery forces, which aimed their big guns, including the powerful 155mm cannons, at the city wall. In addition to exerting military pressure, the Communist army started a political offensive against the Kuomintang forces defending Beijing and conducted peace negotiations with Fu Zuoyi’s representatives, trying by every means to induce the Kuomintang general to go down on his knees in surrender.

Fu Zuoyi actually had long been “in touch with the bandits.” Since the day when the Communist army began to encircle Beijing in mid-December 1948, Fu’s representatives had been secretly in touch with Communist representatives. The secret negotiations for peace had been going on for more than a month with little results, because Fu had been halfhearted.

After the Communist army had wiped out all the Kuomintang forces along the Beiping-Suiyuan Railway, Mao Zedong declared the eight terms for peace on January 14. On January 15, Tianjin was taken by the Communist army. On January 16, the headquarters of the Communist army on the Beiping-Tianjin front sent a message to Fu Zuoyi on the conditions for the peaceful liberation of Beijing. It was pointed out in the message that the only way out for the Kuomintang forces was to lay down their arms and accept peaceful reorganization and that otherwise “our army will attack the city with highly skillful tactics. Do not say that you have not been warned.” Sensing that his defeat was inevitable, Fu had no choice but to accept the peaceful reorganization of his troops.

On the morning of January 22, Fu Zuoyi’s troops marched out of the city through the city gates and assembled at rearranged places. At noon on that day, the
Beiping radio station announced the turncoat general Fu Zuoyi’s decision to move all his troops out of the city and wait for reorganization. By January 27, most of Fu’s troops were out of the city. A division of the Communist army then marched into the city on January 31 to make preparations for taking over the city.

On February 3, the Communist army made a show of its strength by holding a march-in ceremony and entered Beiping in style.

The Beiping-Tianjin campaign lasted altogether fifty-six days from December 5, 1948 to January 30, 1949. More than 530,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out or reorganized during this campaign, and the entire North China came under Communist control.

After the three campaigns, Mao Zedong became more arrogant than ever. He began to call Chiang Kai-shek a war criminal. in the New Year message he wrote for the Xinhua News Agency, he boasted. “The People’s Liberation Army was already able to conduct not only mobile warfare but positional warfare as well.... It has been able not only to capture the Kuomintang’s heavily fortified cities but also to surround and destroy strong formations of Kuomintang crack troops, a hundred thousand or several hundred thousand at a time.”

He declared. “In 1949, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will advance south of the Yangtze River and will win even greater victories than in 1948.”

Whoever has guns has power. Whoever has more guns can speak in a louder voice. Less than a fortnight later, on January 14, Mao Zedong for the first time issued a statement in his own name. This was the “Statement on the Present Situation by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” in which he did his utmost to ridicule and satirize the Kuomintang government.

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44

Reaching Out for a Yard
After Taking an Inch
— A Million Bold Warriors
Crossed the Great River

When Mao Zedong was sure of victory, he began to reach out for a yard after he had taken an inch. On April 21, 1949, he issued the “Order to the Army for the Country-wide Advance,” in which he said that the People’s Liberation Army was to “annihilate resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely all the Kuomintang reactionaries... and arrest all the incorrigible war criminals. No matter where they may flee, they must be brought to justice and punished according to law.”

Before issuing the order for the country-wide advance, Mao had organized a great army of a million troops, which included all the twenty-four corps of the Second and Third field armies and part of the Fourth Field Army. This great army under the unified command of a general front committee headed by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin was to cross the Yangtze River in its lower reaches, seize Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou, and destroy the enemy main force in the triangular area between Nanjing, Zhenjiang and Wuhu.

Acting upon Mao Zedong’s instructions, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping and the others divided the great army into three groups. The eastern group formed by eight corps of the Eighth and Tenth armies of the Third Field Army, totalling 350,000 troops, was to cross the river between Zhanghuanggang and Sanjiangying. The middle group formed by seven corps of the Seventh and Ninth armies of the Third Field Army, totalling 300,000 troops, was to cross the river between Yuxikou and
Zongyang. After crossing the river, the two groups were to push speedily eastward and westward, encircle and attack the enemy main force in the Wuhu. Nanjing and Zhenjiang area in a pincer movement. The ring of encirclement was to be closed at the Changxing-Yixing area. The western group formed by nine corps of the Third, Fourth and Fifth armies of the Second Field Army, totalling 350,000 troops, was to cross the river between Zongyang and Wangjiang. Part of this group was to head direct for the highway between Zhejiang and Jiangxi and cut off the link between the eastern and western groups of the enemy troops. While its main force was to advance swiftly eastward to attack and occupy Wuhu and Nanjing. The advance troops of the Fourth Field Army and the troops from the Central Plains Military Region were placed under the command of the western group and positioned at Wuhan to contain the Bai Chongxi group of the Kuomintang army and coordinate their operations with the movement of the main force.

On the Kuomintang side, the section of the Yangtze River between Hukou and Shanghai was defended by twenty-five corps, totalling 450,000 troops, under Tang Enbo, commander-in-chief of the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Garrison Headquarters. Eighteen of these corps were positioned to guard the river, and the other seven were deployed in strategic depth along the highway between Zhejiang and Jiangxi and in eastern Zhejiang. The middle reaches of the Yangtze was defended by fifteen corps, totalling 250,000 troops, of the Kuomintang army under Bai Chongxi, commander-in-chief of the Central China Bandit-Suppression Headquarters. Thirteen of these corps were positioned to defend the section of the river between Yichang and Hukou and garrison Wuhan. The other two corps were deployed in strategic depth in Changsha and Nanchang. The two groups of defenders under Tang Enbo and Bai Chongxi were reinforced by the Kuomintang navy’s Second Fleet and the River Defence Fleet and the Kuomintang air force. In total, the river was defended by 700,000 Kuomintang troops in forty corps, 133 naval vessels and over three hundred aircraft. These forces formed a joint army, naval and air defence to prevent the Communist army from crossing the river and marching southward.

On the night of April 20, the central group of the Communist army began to fight its way across the Yangtze River in the section between Yuxikou and Zongyang. The Kuomintang’s line of river defence was cut in the middle on the morning of April 21. The Communist army occupied Tongling, Nanling and Wuhu, smashed the Kuomintang forces in front of it and advanced rapidly towards Xuancheng.

The eastern and western groups of the Communist army crossed the river in force simultaneously on the night of April 21. By April 23, the eastern group had occupied Zhenjiang and Changzhou, and the western group had taken Qingyang. Gaotan and Zhide. Li Zongren, acting president of the Nanjing government fled from Nanjing to Guangzhou on April 22.

On April 23, the Communist army attacked and occupied Nanjing, capital of the Kuomintang government. Overjoyed, Mao Zedong wrote a poem to celebrate it:

The People’s Liberation Army
Captures Nanjing
a lü shì

A storm sweeps over Mount Zhongshan.
As a mighty army, a million strong,
Crosses the Great River.
Like a crouching tiger and a coiled dragon.
The city is a better place than ever. 
In this heroic triumph. 
Heaven and earth are overturned. 
With forces to spare. 
We must pursue the fleeing foe 
And not idle fame 
Like the Conquering King. 
If Heaven has feelings, 
It, too, will grow old. 
The true way in man’s world is: 
Seas become mulberry fields.

Under the powerful onslaught of the Communist army, the line of Kuomintang’s river defence collapsed completely. The defending forces east of Changzhou began to retreat towards Shanghai in an attempt to put up new defences for the Wusong-Shanghai area. Having detected the enemy’s movement, the eastern and middle groups of the Communist army marched day and night, joined force near Wuxing on the night of April 27, and completely wiped out the five Kuomintang corps in flight in the Langxi-Guangde area on April 29. On May 3, Hangzhou was captured by part of the Communist Seventh Army. The two groups of Communist army then pushed straight to the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Highway and Anhui-Zhejiang Highway, outflanked Tang Enbo’s forces and advanced towards Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces. On May 7, the Communist forces were in control of the two-hundred-kilometre section of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Highway between Yiwu and Dongxiang, smashing all attempts of the Kuomintang forces to organize new defences and cutting off the link between the Tang Enbo group and the Bai Chongxi group of the Kuomintang forces.

After the remaining twenty-four divisions of Tang Enbo’s 200,000 troops in eight corps had retreated to Shanghai, Mao Zedong ordered the Third Field Army to fight a battle “to liberate the greater Shanghai” and the Second Field Army to assemble at the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Highway for rest and consolidation. The Ninth and Tenth armies of the Third Field Army attacked Shanghai on May 12 and occupied the city on May 27. Tang Enbo and 50,000 of his troops fled in warships. But the other 150,000 of his troops were taken prisoner. On June 2, Chongming Island was occupied by the Communist army.

While the battle of Shanghai was raging, the Seventh Army of the Third Field Army attacked and occupied eastern and western Zhejiang. Part of the Second Field Army, assisted by local guerrilla units, occupied western Zhejiang, northern Fujian, northeastern Jiangxi, central Jiangxi and the cities of Jiujiang and Nanchang. When two corps from the advance troops of the Fourth Field Army crossed the Yangtze River at Huanggang in eastern Hubei on May 15, the Bai Chongxi group of the Kuomintang army retreated further south.

The victorious Communist army was now like a ferocious tiger pouncing on anything that was in its way. It occupied Hankou on May 16 and Wuchang and Hanyang the following day.

The campaign for the crossing of the Yangtze River began on April 20 and ended on June 2. In the forty-three days, more than 430,000 Kuomintang troops were wiped out. A minor episode took place while the Communist army was fighting its way across the Yangtze River. H. M. S. Amethyst and three other British warships intruded into the Communist line of defence on the river. Despite the warning shots fired by the Communist army, the British warships continued to steam upstream. A fierce exchange of gunfire followed and H. M. S. Amethyst was damaged.
In the name of the spokesman of general headquarters of the Communist army, Mao Zedong issued a statement, in which he severely condemned the British. “We denounce the preposterous statement of the warmonger Churchill,” he said. “In the British House of Commons on April 26, Churchill demanded that the British government should send two aircraft carriers to the Far East for ‘effective power of retaliation.’ What are you ‘retaliating’ for. Mr. Churchill? British warships together with Kuomintang warships intruded into the defence area of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and fired on the People’s Liberation Army, causing no less than 252 casualties among our loyal and gallant fighters. Since the British have trespassed on Chinese territory and committed so great a crime, the People’s Liberation Army has good reason to demand that the British government admit its wrongdoing, apologize and make compensation.”

Mao Zedong’s statement was indeed the most incisive denouncement of the British in the one hundred years after the Opium War of 1840. Any Chinese who has been bullied by the British should applaud for it.

All his life, Mao Zedong was never afraid of “foreign devils.” Even the anti-Communists admit that since he took control of the whole of China, “foreign devils” could no longer harm the Chinese people. No one has ever denounced him as “a scum of the Chinese nation.” He was indeed the No. 1 “hero of the Chinese nation.” from whom many Chinese today should learn.

45

Driving Continuously Forward
— Smashing All Enemy Resistance

After crossing the Yangtze River, the Communist army drove continuously forward towards the Southeast. Central South. Northwest and Southwest, conquering the whole country like the autumn wind sweeping up fallen leaves.

Even before the Communist army attacked and occupied Shanghai, Mao Zedong had issued the following instructions:

1. The First Field Army was to advance to the Northwest to destroy Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui’s troops and part of the Hu Zongnan group of the Kuomintang army, liberate and control Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang provinces: part of this army was to make preparations to march into Sichuan.

2. The Second Field Army was to assemble its main force in southern Anhui, eastern Jiangxi and western Zhejiang to be ready to advance to the Southwest. Assisted by part of the First Field Army, it was to wipe out the main force of the Hu Zongnan group of the Kuomintang army that had retreated from the Qinling Mountains to Sichuan as well as the regional warlords’ forces in the Southwest, liberate and control Sichuan, Guizhou, Xikang and Yunnan provinces.

3. The Third Field Army was to march into Zhejiang and Fujian and then take control of Shandong. Jiangsu. Anhui, Zhejiang and Fujian provinces.

4. The Fourth Field Army was to advance to the Central South. destroy the troops of the Bai Chongxi group and those under Yu Hanmou. liberate and control Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong and Guangxi.

Mao Zedong’s instructions for the Communist army com-
manders were: “In the operations to wipe out the enemy, our army must use the method of making a long distance outflanking movement, laying a wide ring of encirclement and carrying out large-scale annihilation. Only by cutting off their escape route can we thoroughly wipe out these enemies.”

His instructions for the operations in the Southwest were even more specific: “It is imperative to advance from the south and cut off the enemy’s route of retreat. Long-distance outflanking movements should be carried out against all the enemies in the Southwest. Penetrate into the enemy’s rear and have him completely encircled before attacking.”

His detailed instructions were: “Simultaneous with the Fourth Field Army’s advance into Guangxi, the main force of the Second Field Army should make a long-distance outflanking movement and lay a wide ring of encirclement by pushing straight into Guizhou from the Hunan-Guizhou border and occupy eastern and southern Sichuan to cut off the route of retreat into Yunnan of the Hu Zongnan group and other enemies in Sichuan and Sikang. The Eighteenth Army and other units in the Baoji and Tianshui area along the western section of the Longhai Railway is to retain the Hu Zongnan group in the Qinling Mountains area first and then march speedily into Sichuan and occupy northern Sichuan and the Chengdu area when the main force of the Second Field Army has entered Sichuan and cut off the enemy’s retreat. The two armies can then coordinate their operations and destroy all the enemy troops in Sichuan province.”

The ones charged with the task of liberating Southwest China were the now famous Deng Xiaoping and Marshals Liu Bocheng and He Long.

In order to mislead and catch the enemy by surprise in a long-distance outflanking movement and a wide ring of encirclement, the Eighteenth Army launched an attack against the Hu Zongnan group of Kuomintang forces. The Nineteen Army, active in southern Shaanxi and western Hubei, also made feint movements to attract the enemy’s attention before the Second Field Army made its move. When the headquarters organizations of the Second Field Army arrived at Zhengzhou by train from the Nanjing area, Liu Bocheng, its commander-in-chief, falsely declared that the army was advancing towards the west. The Heng-Bao campaign and Guangdong campaign launched by the Fourth Field Army were also for the purpose of covering up the movements and amassing of the Second Field Army. All these movements which aimed at misleading the enemy created favourable conditions for the surprising outflanking movement of the main force of the Second Field Army from the Sichuan-Guizhou border to the enemy’s rear.

To assist the Second Field Army in its advance into Sichuan and coordinate the march of its own main force into Guangxi, the Fourth Field Army transferred nine of its divisions westward from northwestern Hunan and western Hubei and placed them under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping at the end of October. Liu and Deng therefore decided to move the main force of the Third Army and the troops from the Fourth Field Army from the Hunan-Hubei border to Sichuan in an outflanking movement, destroying the Song Xilian group of the Kuomintang army in the Pengshui and Qianjiang area first before marching westward to Jiangjin to coordinate the movements of the Fifth Army. The Fifth Army and the Tenth Corps were to make a great detour to Guizhou, seize Guiyang and Zunyi and attack Yibin and Luzhou, to cut off the enemy’s retreat into Yunnan. After accomplishing the tasks above, these forces were to fight side by side with the Eighteenth Army and wipe out the Hu Zong-
nan group in the Chengdu area.

The Communist army started its advance into Sichuan on October 1.

On October 10, the Fifth and Tenth armies entered Guizhou province and headed straight for Guiyang and Zunyi.

At the same time, the line of defence of the Song Xilian group of the Kuomintang forces were broken by the main force of the Second Army and the nine divisions from the Fourth Field Army.

The Communist army began to advance on the enemy in several columns on a five-hundred-kilometre front from Badong in the north to Tianzhu in the south.

These movements of the Communist forces caught the Kuomintang army by surprise and totally disrupted its defensive dispositions.

To prevent the Song Xilian group from making a planned retreat and organizing resistance, the various units of the Communist army pushed swiftly forward according to plan.

The Communist army took Guiyang on November 15. occupied Pengshui and reached the eastern bank of the river Wujiang on November 16 and destroyed the enemy’s 14th Army fleeing westward on November 19.

On November 21, after leaving some personnel to take over the city of Guiyang, the front committee of the Second Field Army under Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping instructed the main force of the Fifth Army to execute a swift outflanking movement to southern Sichuan and cut off the enemy’s retreat. The main force of the Third Army and the nine divisions from the Fourth Field Army were to force the Wujiang River and encircle the enemy 12th and 15th armies in southern Sichuan and the area east of it. After crossing the Wujiang by force, the Communist troops began to converge on the enemy forces in the

Nanchuan area. occupied the county town of Nanchuan on November 24. wiped out most the enemy’s 12th and 15th armies in the mountainous area north of Nanchuan and began to attack and capture the strongholds on the perimeter of Chongqing.

On November 30, the Communist attacked and occupied Chongqing, the largest city in Southwest China.

Chengdu, capital city of Sichuan province, fell into Communist hand on December 27.

On December 9, the Kuomintang generals Lu Han in Yunnan and Liu Wenhui. Deng Xihou and Pan Wenhua in Sichuan and Xikang surrendered to their enemy respectively in Kunming and Yaan and handed over Yunnan and Xikang provinces to the Communist army.

In the march to the Southwest, the Communist army had wiped out a total of 930,000 Kuomintang troops and gained control of the entire Southwest China except Tibet.

46 Attacking from Both Inside and Outside

— Stealing Across the Sea in Junk

After the Guangdong and Guangxi campaign fought in December 1949. the entire Central South China came under the control of the Communists.

In a speech made on August 25, 1934. Chiang Kai-shek had said: "Victory and defeat in a war are decided by the army fighting on the battlefield. but there are tactics governing the fighting, military strategy governing tactics, and political strategy governing military strategy. Since we are materially inferior to others, we must make every effort to find ways of overcoming the enemy in spirit.
This is certainly possible. If we cannot defeat the enemy in fighting, we should win by tactics. If we cannot win by tactics, we should win by military strategy. If we still cannot defeat the enemy by military strategy, we must win by political strategy. Tactics, military strategy and political strategy, however, are to be applied by generals, particularly the supreme commander, who must be able to cope skilfully with the changes in the situation.

Mao Zedong was a supreme commander who was “able to cope skilfully with the changes in the situation.” He was head and shoulders above the others in fighting a battle as well as in tactics, military strategy and political strategy. After the Communist army had occupied the Central South. Mao Zedong’s order was “Making preparations to liberate Hainan Island.” He emphasized that the liberation of Hainan Island must take place between spring and summer.

Hainan Island is a strategically highly important gateway to South China. The island was defended by the Kuomintang general Xue Yue with 100,000 troops, fifty warships and thirty aircraft, which formed a three-dimensional system of defence.

The invasion of Hainan Island was the first sea-crossing battle ever fought by the Communist army. The shortest distance from Leizhou Peninsula to Hainan Island is only twenty kilometres. But as the boats carrying the troops had to steer clear of the reefs and avoid the enemy’s gunfire, they had to navigate for sixty kilometres at the least. The Communist army had no experience in sea-crossing, no mechanized landing vessels and no naval and air support. To smash the enemy’s land, sea and air defences was certainly not an easy task. Moreover, as most of the soldiers in the Communist attacking units had come from Northeast China, they did not know how to swim. It would be disastrous if their boats capsized.

Mao Zedong’s instructions to the Communist troops was: “Make use of a large number of junks and available equipment; give full play to the might of the people’s war and defeat the well-equipped enemy with inferior equipment.” The Communist army then began to train its troops for fighting across the sea. In just over two months’ time, the soldiers from the Northeast had mastered the skills of dealing with tide and wind and fighting on the sea.

Before landing en masse, the Communist army sent a reinforced regiment to Weizhou Island, a small island off the coast of Guangxi, and seized four hundred enemy junks. Upon discovering the Communist army’s intention to invade Hainan Island. General Xue Yue strengthened the island’s coastal defence and sent some of his forces to encircle and attack the Communist guerrilla bases on the island’s Wuzhi Mountains. In order to reinforce the Communist guerrillas on Hainan Island, test the training of the troops and carry out reconnaissance, the Communist commanders decided to ferry a reinforced battalion to the island by stealth.

On the night of March 5, fourteen junks carrying eight hundred Communist soldiers set sail and headed straight for Hainan Island. At two o’clock in the afternoon of the following day, they successfully landed at Baimajing on the western side of Hainan Island, undetected by the enemy.

On the night of March 26, the Communist army organized another stealthy crossing of a regiment of soldiers. The junks sailed smoothly at first. But there was a sudden change in the weather and a thick fog rose from the sea. Having lost signal contact, most of the junks drifted to a section of the island where there were powerful enemy defences. The situation was critical. Instead of retreating, the regiment of Communist soldiers fired back at the enemy warships, aircraft and troops on the island and landed
on the island by force. Ten battalions of Kuomintang troops tried but failed to stop them. After killing, wounding and capturing more than eight hundred enemy troops, the regiment marched to the Communist guerrilla bases in the Wuzhi Mountains.

Since even junks could make the crossing, there must be loopholes in the enemy defence. the Communist commanders suddenly realized. They concluded that the time had come to take the island.

The Communist commanders differed in their opinion as to how the landing was to be made. Some stood for sending all the junks out at once and land on the island en masse: others suggested that stealthy landing in small groups might be a better way.

In fact. Mao Zedong had already clearly pointed out in his order for the liberation of Hainan Island: A whole army corps should be ferried across all at once. The troops were to carry at least three days of ration. land by force and establish a firm beachhead. They could then fight independently and push inland without relying on logistic support.

On April 16. more than a thousand junks with Communist soldiers on board set sail and headed straight for Hainan Island. Before they had covered twenty kilometres, they were discovered and attacked with dense gunfire from Kuomintang aircraft and warships. The landing fleet fired back and continued to push swiftly forward. Hainan Island came in sight at two o’clock in the early morning.

When the junks were fifty or sixty metres from shore. the Communist soldiers from the Northeast who had by now learned to swim began to jump into the sea and swim towards the shore. The three-dimensional system of defence painstakingly built by Xue Yue collapsed within an hour. The Communist soldiers completed their landing in four hours.

As the large Communist force started to push inland, they were joined by the Communist units who had sneaked onto the island and the Qiongya Column of Communist guerrillas. Among them was probably the famous Red Detachment of Women.

The Communist landing force had the town of Lingao surrounded the following night but did not met any resistance from the enemy. Nor were there any signs of the enemy’s mechanized forces. Where was the enemy’s main force? After analysing the enemy’s dispositions and movements. the landing force concluded that Xue Yue must have concentrated his main force on the eastern side of the island and intended to destroy the Communist beachhead on that side of the island first and then defeat the other Communist forces one by one. The landing force immediately decided to hand over the task of encircling and attacking Lingao to the guerrillas and the units that had sneaked across. and move eastward to Chengmai.

When the Communist army had reached the north of Chengmai. it learned that a enemy division had moved to Meiting. The Communist army then rushed speedily to Meiting. braving continuous enemy bombing.

Xue Yue was a general known for his courage and wisdom. He speedily moved four divisions of his forces and placed the Communist forces that had landed on the eastern side of the island in a counter-encirclement. Attacked by the enemy from both the front and the back. the Communist forces on the eastern side of the island were in a critical situation.

The Communist forces on the western side of the island then executed a pincer movement and placed the enemy forces in a counter-counter-encirclement.

The fighting then developed in a jigsaw pattern. There was fighting on both the interior and exterior lines. The two sides were often engaged in hand-to-hand fighting.
As the two sides were equal in strength, the battle raged relentlessly until the early morning of April 23 when Xue Yue forces were overwhelmed and the Communist forces on both sides of the island joined force. Seeing the situation had become hopeless, Xue Yue ordered a general retreat. He himself departed from the island in an airplane.

47 Changing the Insignia
— Showing Military Prowess on Foreign Soil

Mao Zedong was not afraid of foreigners. He was not afraid of the British nor the Americans. He looked upon the United States as a "paper tiger."

When the Korean War broke out in 1950 and the U.S. and South Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and began to threaten China’s Northeast, Mao Zedong decided to teach the Americans a lesson. He sent Marshal Peng Dehuai and the Chinese People’s Volunteers into Korea to contest against the U.S. army.

His instructions for Peng Dehuai were: "After entering Korea, our army should open up a base area in the large mountainous area north of the Wunsan and Pyongyang line and build two or three lines of defence north of this line and south of the Tokchon-Yongwon Highway. Fight only defensive battles at the initial stage and wipe out small groups of the enemy. If the enemy attacks, carve him up and destroy him in front of our positions. Our army will coordinate with the Korean People’s Army in launching counter-attacks when our army is fully equipped and trained and begins to enjoy overwhelmingly superior conditions both on land and in the air."

On October 18, 1950, Mao Zedong issued an order in the name of chairman of the Chinese People’s Revolutionary Military Committee to the effect that "the Northeast Frontier Army is to be reorganized as the Chinese People’s Volunteers and march swiftly into Korea.... The Chinese People’s Volunteers are to be formed by the 13th Army and its 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd corps, the Frontier Artillery Headquarters and its First, Second and Eighth artillery divisions. The above units are to complete their preparations at once and wait for orders to set off.... The Northeast Administrative Region will be the general rear base for the Chinese People’s Volunteers."

After the Second World War, the United States, with its enormous industrial might and plenty of money, began to dominate the world as a superpower. But Mao Zedong’s "People’s Republic," despite its vast territory, rich natural resources and huge population, was a poor country with a war-torn, backward economy. The U.S. forces were equipped with powerful warships and guns and innumerable bombs. But Mao Zedong’s Volunteers were armed mainly with rifles and a limited number of machine-guns and cannons. They had only hand grenades and no aircraft to drop bombs and, needless to say, atomic bombs. As the disparity in strength between the two sides was so great, it was really audacious in the extreme for Mao Zedong to engage the United States in a war. Comparing him with those who fawned on and cringed before the Americans, Mao Zedong indeed projected the lofty image of a national hero.

The enemy advanced faster than Mao Zedong had expected. Shortly after the People’s Volunteers had crossed the Yalu River on October 19, the South Korean army on the American side occupied the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and quickly overtook the predetermined line of
defence of the Volunteers.
In a telegram to the Volunteers on October 21, Mao told them to abandon the original plan and adopt the tactic of wiping out the enemy on the move. "The question at present is to create opportunities for battle and complete the deployment in the next few days, so that our army can engage the enemy in battles: it is no longer a question of spending a period of time to deploy the forces for defence before talking about attacking the enemy," he said.
Mao Zedong had never been to the Korean peninsula, but he seemed to know the local terrain like the back of his hand. In his instructions for the deployment of the Volunteers, he stated: "If our army is not ready to fight the first battle against South Korea’s Capital Division and Third Division on the eastern front, a division from the 42nd Corps positioned in the Changjin area to block the enemy’s advance will be enough. It will be appropriate to position the main force of the 42nd Corps in the area south of Minsan (where South Korea’s Sixth Division is moving) so as to cut off the railway connection between Wonsan and Pyongyang, contain the enemies in the two places and prevent them from reinforcing the enemies in the north, so that we can concentrate the main force of three corps to wipe out South Korea’s Sixth, Seventh and Eighth divisions. Pay attention to gaining control of the heights such as the Miaosang and Sobaik mountains to cut off the link between the enemies in the east and west." He emphatically pointed out. "There is an extremely good opportunity at present to destroy three or more divisions of the South Korean army, fight the first victorious battle outside the country and bring about a change in the situation of the Korean War."
He warned. "The enemy is advancing rapidly. It is extremely important to seize an opportunity for battle. It will be too late if there is any delay."

These instructions were followed to the letter by Peng Dehuai.
In a telegram to the Volunteers on October 22, Mao wrote. "Avoid the Chongju-Pakchon-Koonwoori line and the area twenty kilometres north of it when moving forward, to prevent the enemy from discovering us prematurely, stopping moving forward or even drawing back.... In this battle, the best place for encircling and wiping out the enemy is at Pakchon. Koonwoori and the area to their north."
This again was faithfully carried out by Peng Dehuai.
On October 23, in a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Mao Zedong pointed out that the outcome of the Korean War was to be determined by the following conditions:
1. Can our army take the enemy by surprise and wipe out two, three or even four South Korean divisions in the battle now being prepared? If we can win a great victory in this battle, the enemy will have to re-deploy his forces, and under the present conditions of military strength, the enemy will be in a passive position. Otherwise, the situation will be favourable to the enemy.
2. To what extent can enemy aircraft kill and wound our men and hamper our movements? How skilled is our army in marching and fighting at night? Can our army battle to our advantage when it is harassed by a large number of enemy aircraft?
3. Will the United States send more troops to Korea (such as five or ten more divisions)? Or before the United States increases its troops, can our army annihilate several American and South Korean divisions in mobile warfare and by attacking isolated strongholds?
Mao Zedong also directed that every effort must be made to win victory in the first campaign and to maintain a high morale and fight vigorously even under enemy bombing, and that every effort must be made to wipe out several
groups of the enemy before more enemy troops were brought over from the United States or other places, so that the enemy would suffer more losses than he could replenish. In brief, the Volunteers were "to proceed from a steady and reliable basis and strive to win every possible victory."

By renaming the Northeast Frontier Army as the People's Volunteers, Mao Zedong changed only the name but not the essence. The Communist army was still the Communist army. The new name sounded much better in both domestic and foreign propaganda. It was intended to make people believe that the Volunteers had gone to war to aid North Korea in resisting invaders and to protect the Chinese people's homes and defend their country. If the name of Liberation Army were used, it might mean that the army had gone to liberate North Korea, which meant aggression. From the new name we can see that Mao Zedong must have devised the new name after much deliberation.

Cutting Off the Head and the Tail
— Beating the Underling to Embarrass the Master

On October 25, 1950, the "United Nations forces" and the South Korean army driving north in divisions or regiments on the western front had reached the positions of the 40th Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteers: their vanguard units had even reached south of Mount Chosan by the Yalu River on the Sino-Korean border. In the early morning on that day, the Volunteers which had moved to the east of Bookjin had occupied the heights on the north-
Korea's First, Sixth and Eighth divisions. The Volunteers "can accomplish it in several large and small battles before engaging the American and British armies." This method is known as "beating the underling to embarrass the master."

On October 29, although the enemy forces had regrouped, they were still scattered in several places. This offered the Volunteers a good opportunity to destroy them. Peng Dehuai therefore decided to outflank the enemy troops and move to their rear while continuing the frontal attack. When the enemy's link between the south and the north was cut off, the Volunteers could concentrated their forces and destroy the enemies one by one in the area north of the Chongchon River.

At 9 a.m. on November 1, the units of Volunteers on the western front also started to attack.

Closely following the progress of the campaign, Mao Zedong instructed Peng Dehuai and the others: Pay attention to use the 38th Corps to gain control of the Anju-Koonwoori-Chochang area, focusing in particular on Koonwoori, and make sure that the link between the enemies north and south of the Chongchon River were cut off. Destroy the reinforcements from the U.S. Second Division moving north from Pyongyang and what remains of South Korea's Eighth, Seventh and Eighth divisions and make every possible effort to advance southward to the vicinity of Pyongyang. He said, "A victory in strategy can be achieved if this move is successful.... The key to the whole situation lies in the seizure of Koonwoori. Kachon. Anju and Sinanju with lightning speed by the 38th Corps and cut off the link between the enemies in the north and south: All other moves are secondary."

The encircled enemy tried repeatedly to break out of the cordon with the aid of aircraft and tanks without success. On the night of November 3, the Communist army launched an all-out attack on the enemy forces and wiped out all of them. The was the famous Battle of Woonsan. The Battle of Woonsan was the first battle in which the poorly equipped Volunteers succeeded in destroying the bulk of the Eighth Regiment of the U.S. First Cavalry Division and part of the 12th Regiment of the First Division of the South Korean army equipped with modern weapons, killing, wounding and capturing 2,046 enemy troops (including 1,840 Americans), destroying and capturing 28 enemy tanks, 176 trucks, 190 cannons of various types and other booty.

Simultaneous with the victory of Woonsan, the Volunteers on the western front also scored a series of victories. The 40th Corps succeeded in wiping out part of South Korea's Eighth Division and an artillery unit of the U.S. First Cavalry Division. The 66th Corps advanced to the outskirts of Koosung, where it blocked and pinned down the 24th Division of the U.S. Army. The 50th Corps of the Volunteers crossed the Yalu River from Andong to Sineuiju to check the advance of the British 27th Brigade which had reached Namsitong.

On November 1, while the war was raging on the eastern front, the enemy threw the First Division of the U.S. Marine into battle at Hansin. Under cover of more than fifty aircraft and forty tanks, the U.S. marines launched repeated fierce attacks on the Volunteers' positions, but was repulsed by the Volunteers in a counter-attack at midnight. Fierce fighting also went on elsewhere.

In the blockading battle on the eastern front, the Volunteers engaged the U.S. and South Korean forces continually for thirteen days and nights, repulsed the ferocious onslaughts of three enemy divisions and wiped out more than 2,700 enemy troops. They thwarted the enemy's attempt to outflank the Volunteers at Kangkyui and successfully coordinated the operations of the Volunteers on
the western front. In the first campaign, the Volunteers and the North Korean People's Army succeeded in wiping out over 15,000 enemy troops, smashing the U.S. army's plan to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula before Thanksgiving and driving the enemy from the Yalu River to the south of the Chonchon River. As a result of the victory in the first campaign, the situation of the war on the Korean Peninsula was initially stabilized.

Mao Zedong always stressed that victory must be won in the first battle. In the Korean War, the Volunteers under Mao Zedong's control from afar also succeeded in winning victory in the first battle. Following Mao Zedong's instructions, the Volunteers were also victorious in the later campaigns.

The signing of the cease-fire agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, by Peng Dehuai, commander-in-chief of the Volunteers, and General Mark W. Clark, commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces in Korea, marked the end of the Korean War. The United States lost of 390,000 soldiers in the Korean War and defiled the pages of U.S. history with a great humiliation.

From then on, although the U.S. army continued to act like an overlord elsewhere, it no longer clamoured about invading China's mainland.

Mao Zedong was highly complacent when he talked about the Korean War in a speech at a conference of representatives of the Communist Parties held in Moscow on November 18, 1957: "At the beginning of the Korean War, a division of the U.S. army was equipped with eight hundred cannons while three divisions of the Chinese Volunteers had only about fifty. But when the fighting started, the Americans were driven like a flock of ducks from the Yalu River to the south of the 38th Parallel, a distance of several hundred kilometres, in a few weeks. Later, the Americans concentrated their forces and launched counter-attacks. We and Comrade Kim Il Sung then withdrew to the 38th Parallel and held and built our positions there. After its outbreak, the Korean War continued for almost three years. American planes were like hornets while we did not have a single plane at the front line. The two sides agreed to negotiate for peace. Where was the negotiation to be held? They suggested that it be held on board a Danish ship. We suggested Kaesong on our side of Korea. They said it was all right. Since Kaesong was on our side, they came to the meeting every day carrying a white flag and went back after the meeting also carrying a white flag. Later, they found it was embarrassing to fly a white flag every day and suggested moving the place of meeting to Panmunjom located between the lines of battle of the two sides. We said it was all right. Although the negotiation went on for about a year, the United States was unwilling to sign. But the Americans, fierce as they were and having so much steel, had no other choice."

As early as August 1946, in his talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, Mao Zedong compared the United States to a paper tiger. But when it came to actual fight against the United States, Mao Zedong did not dare to slight the United States; he dealt seriously with it as he would a powerful enemy.

At the Wuchang meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held on December 1, 1958, Mao Zedong said that American imperialism had a dual characteristic: it was a live tiger, an iron tiger and a real tiger on the one hand, but it would eventually be transformed into a paper tiger, a dead tiger and a beancurd tiger.

The following passage by Mao Zedong may enlighten us in our struggle on the battlefield of life: "Intrinsically, from
a long-term of view and strategically, we must look upon imperialism and all reactionaries as paper tigers, which they really are. On this we base our strategic thinking. But on the other hand, they are live tigers, iron tigers and real tigers and can eat people. On this we base our tactical thinking. This was his idea of "despising the enemy strategically and taking full account of him tactically."

About the Author
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The publication of Liu Jikun's Stories Behind Mao Zedong's Poems and Mao Zedong: Complete Poems in Hong Kong has evoked strong repercussions. The two books have been published in their Taiwan edition by the Ocean Breeze Publishers in Taibei and were reported or reviewed on the mainland by the Liberation Daily, Wenhui Weekly Reading, Shenyang Daily, Sichuan Daily, Information on Party History, Shanghai's Xinmin Evening News, Hunan's Weekly Digest, Sichuan's Digest of the Week, Shanghai's Digest from Newspapers and Periodicals, the Hunan People's Broadcasting Station and other media.

Born in an overseas Chinese family in Indonesia, Liu Jikun returned to China to continue his schooling in 1960 and then studied at Sichuan University's Department of Chinese Literature. He was subjected to unjust treatment during the Cultural Revolution. In the mid-1970s, he moved to Hong Kong, where he is now engaged in journalistic and cultural work.

Liu Jikun is a prolific writer of remarkable talent. His Snow Falls on the Land of China records his unusual experience during the Cultural Revolution when he was confined in a "cowshed," locked up in prison and sent to do physical labour in a "May Seventh" Cadres' School. Written in a lively and fascinating style, the book is an outstanding piece of realistic literature based on facts. The Great Jokes in the Cultural Revolution compiled by Liu Jikun is a collection of 160 jokes heard and experienced by the author during the Cultural Revolution. Illustrated with more than thirty pictures by Fang Cheng, a famous
cartoonist in Beijing, the book reflects diverse aspects of 
human nature during a specific period of history. Grief is 
expressed in the humour of the jokes, and sorrow hides 
behind what is laughable. In response to the proposal 
made by the great master of Chinese literature, Ba Jin, 
for the construction of a museum of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the author has supervised the publication of the 
"Museum of the Cultural Revolution" literary series, to 
warn people not to forget the historic tragedy of the so-
called Cultural Revolution.

Collected in *Mao Zedong: Complete Poems* are more than 
sixty poems and thirty couplets written by Mao Zedong. 
It took Liu Jikun ten years to collate and sieve through the 
materials he had collected. All the poems and couplets are 
authentic works of Mao Zedong, and there is hardly any-
thing that has been missed. The compiler's comments on 
Mao's poems are both interesting and humorous. Taking 
a realistic and seeking-truth-from-facts approach, he 
ever tries to give strained interpretations or make far-
fetched comparisons. For seven months running after its 
publication, the book stood at the top or among the first 
few in the best-seller list of Hong Kong's Sanlian Book-
store.

In the *Stories Behind Mao Zedong's Poems*, the author 
discusses Mao's poems against the historical background 
of modern and contemporary China, revealing not only 
the social significance and artistic value of the poems, but also 
Mao's line of thoughts and the objectives of his life as 
well as his breadth of vision. Romantic sentiments and un-
usual aesthetic pursuit as a statesman and a poet. Of all 
these, the author gives a truthful and refreshing account. 
Liu Jikun is an honest, warmhearted and patriotic intellec-
tual. Despite all the frustrations he has experienced in his 
life, he is able to examine the past and think of the future 
coolheadedly. He strives to be objective and impartial 
when writing about the life, exploits and artistic achieve-
ments of Mao Zedong for readers both in China and 
abroad. He devotes most of his energy to the study of 
Mao Zedong and has reaped rich fruits, for which he has 
won favourable comments both in China and in other parts 
of the world. Liu Jikun's example is an indirect reflection 
of the powerful coagulability of the Chinese nation. Fu-
ture historians will certainly write more penetratingly 
about it.

(From Xiangtan Daily September 8, 1991)
Mao Zedong in Ruijin, Jiangxi province, 1931.
A proclamation issued by the Red Army on its march to southern Jiangxi in 1929.

This photograph, taken in Yanan in 1937, shows some of the men who had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and were eventually led by Mao Zedong (seventh from left, front row) to the Jinggang Mountains in October 1927.

Mao Zedong (third from left) and some of the men who had taken part in the Autumn Harvest Uprising.
Mao Zedong at the Congress of Poor-Peasant Leagues from eight counties in western Jiangxi and southern Fujian, 1933.

Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De after they had led the Red Army to northern Shaanxi.

From right: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu) after they had reached northern Shaanxi at the end of the Long March.
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Yanan.

Mao Zedong in northern Shaanxi, 1937.
Mao Zedong at work in Yanan, 1946.

Mao Zedong on a drill ground in Yanan, 1944.

Mao Zedong in Yanan, 1946.
Mao Zedong on the march during the northern Shaanxi campaign, 1947.

Mao Zedong speaking at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in Yanan during the War of Resistance Against Japan.

Manuscripts of the Problems of War and Strategy by Mao Zedong.
Mao Zedong and Zhu De discussing military operations during the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1944.

Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek exchanging toasts during the Chongqing peace negotiations in August 1945. Each had a dagger hidden behind his bland smile.
Mao Zedong on the move during the northern Shaanxi campaign when the Kuomintang army under Hu Zongnan attacked Yanan in 1947.

Mao Zedong studying a military map in northern Shaanxi, 1947.
A sketch map prepared by the staff office of the General Headquarters of the Eight Route Army, showing the disposition of troops during the Hundred-Regiment Campaign.

Mao Zedong at the airfield in Yanan on his way to Chongqing for peace negotiations with the Kuomintang on August 28, 1945.
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Xibaipo, seat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party after May 1948.

Draft of Mao Zedong's telegram, which sets forth the concept of operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign.

Draft of Mao Zedong's telegram for the Huai-Hai Campaign.
A Xinhua News Agency release drafted by Mao Zedong on the crossing of the Yangtze River by the Communist Army.

Mao Zedong reviewing units of the People's Liberation Army at Xiyuan airfield in Beijing on March 25, 1949.
Mao Zedong in Beiping reading a newspaper which reported the liberation of Nanjing.

The Communist army marched into Nanjing on April 23, 1949.

The Communist army marched into Shanghai on May 27, 1949.
In eight years beginning from July 1937, the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese forces wiped out altogether 1,360,000 Japanese and puppet troops and won victory in the Anti-Japanese War.

Autumn 1927. Mao Zedong led the peasant militia in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi in staging the Autumn Harvest Uprising.

April 1928. Mao Zedong and Zhu De joined forces in the Jinggang Mountains and established the Central Base Area.


Between July 1946 and May 1950, the Liberation Army destroyed a total of 9,070,000 Kuomintang troops. The Nanking government was overthrown.

In November 1948, 370,000 enemies wiped out.

In January 1949, 150,000 enemies wiped out.

In September 1948, 100,000 enemies wiped out.

Crossing the Yangtze January 1949, 550,000 enemies wiped out.

Liberated areas at outbreak of civil war in July 1946.
Areas where important campaigns were fought in the three-year War of Liberation.
Route of the Red Army's Long March.
Areas not controlled by the Communists.

Battles and Campaigns Fought by the Communist-Led Liberation Army
Rural Revolutionary Base Areas (1928-July 1935)

The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army Marching to the Enemy's Rear (July 1937-October 1938)

Anti-Japanese Base Areas Behind Enemy Lines (August 1945)