



MAO TSE-TUNG

**ON THE TACTICS
OF FIGHTING
JAPANESE IMPERIALISM**

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This is a report made on December 27, 1935 to a conference of Party activists held at Wayaopao, northern Shensi, after the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the same place in the same month. At the Political Bureau meeting, one of the most important in the history of the Party, the mistaken view then existing in the Party that it was impossible to line up China's national bourgeoisie with the workers and peasants in a common fight against Japan was refuted and the tactics of building up a national united front were decided. On the basis of the Political Bureau's decisions, Comrade Mao Tse-tung here explained in great detail the possibility and the importance of re-establishing a united front with the national bourgeoisie on the condition of resisting the Japanese. He stressed the decisive significance of the leading role to be played by the Communist Party and the Red Army in this united front. He pointed out the protracted character of the Chinese revolution and criticized narrow-minded sectarianism and revolutionary impatience which, prevalent over a long period, had been the basic cause of the severe setbacks sustained by the Party and the Red Army during the Second Revolutionary Civil War. At the same time he called the Party's attention to the historical lesson of the defeat of the revolution in 1927 caused by Ch'en Tu-hsiu's Right opportunism and pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek would inevitably try to undermine the forces of the revolution. Thus he enabled the Party to remain clear-headed in the new situation and conserve the forces of the revolution in spite of Chiang Kai-shek's endless intrigues and armed assaults.

At the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau held in January 1935 in Tsunyi, Kweichow, a new leadership

headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was established in place of the former "Left" opportunist leadership. As that meeting was held in the course of the Red Army's Long March, decisions could be made only on the most urgent military problems and on the reorganization of the Secretariat and Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee. It was not until the Red Army had reached northern Shensi after the Long March that the Party leadership had the opportunity of clarifying systematically the various problems of political strategy. This report gives a most comprehensive analysis of these problems.

Commission on the Publication of
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tung, Central Committee of the
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CONTENTS

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION	1
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT	23
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	29
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT	38

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Comrades, a far-reaching change has now taken place in the political situation. On the basis of this changed situation our Party has defined its tasks.

What is the present situation?

The main feature is that Japanese imperialism wants to convert China into a colony.

As everybody knows, China for nearly a hundred years has been a semi-colonial country under the joint control of several imperialist powers. Thanks to the Chinese people's fight against imperialism and the conflicts among the imperialist powers themselves, China has been able to retain her semi-independent status. The First World War for a time gave Japanese imperialism the opportunity of exclusive domination of China. But as a result of the Chinese people's fight against Japanese imperialism and intervention by other imperialist powers, the Twenty-one Demands¹ signed

¹ Put to the Chinese government on January 18, 1915, these demands were divided into five parts. The first four contained the following: transferring to Japan Germany's privileges and interests in Shantung and granting to Japan additional privileges and interests there; allowing the Japanese to lease or

by Yuan Shih-k'ai¹ the arch-traitor of that time, which surrendered China to Japan, became null and void. As a result of the Nine-Power conference called by the United States at Washington, a treaty² was concluded

own land, to reside, to engage in industry and commerce, and to have exclusive rights of railway building and mining in southern Manchuria and eastern Mongolia; reorganizing the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Steel Company in central China into a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise; and abstaining from leasing or ceding any harbours or islands along China's coastline to any third power. The fifth part demanded that Japan be allowed to control China's government, finance, police and army, and to build the vital railway lines connecting the provinces of Hupeh, Kiangsi and Kwangtung.

After the Japanese ultimatum on May 7, Yuan Shih-k'ai, the head of the Chinese government, accepted all the demands except those in the fifth part, about which he pleaded for "further negotiation".

¹ Head of the clique of the Northern warlords formed during the last years of the Manchu dynasty. When the Manchu regime was overthrown by the Revolution of 1911, Yuan took advantage of the tendency to compromise on the part of the bourgeoisie then leading the revolution and jockeyed for the position of the president of the Republic with the support of the imperialists and on the strength of a counter-revolutionary army under his command. He formed the first government of Northern warlords representing the big landlord and big comprador classes. In 1915 he restored the imperial regime with himself on the throne and accepted the Twenty-one Demands (see note above). An uprising in Yunnan province in December touched off nation-wide revolt. Yuan was forced to abolish the imperial government in March 1916 and died shortly afterwards.

² In November 1921, the United States government invited China, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Japan to a nine-power conference in Washington. It was really a duel between the United States and Japan for hegemony in the Far East. On February 6, 1922, a nine-power

in 1922 which once again placed China under the joint control of several imperialist powers. Before long, however, the situation changed again. The Incident of September 18, 1931,¹ marked the beginning of Japan's colonization of China. As Japanese aggression was for a time confined to the four north-eastern provinces² some people felt that probably the Japanese imperialists would advance no farther. Now things are different: there are unmistakable signs that the Japanese imperialists want to penetrate into China Proper and occupy the whole of China. They now want to convert China from a semi-colony jointly controlled by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolized

treaty was concluded under the U.S.-sponsored principle of the "open door" or "equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations". This treaty, besides establishing the joint control of the imperialist powers over China, defeated the plan of Japan, and facilitated that of the United States to place China under her own exclusive domination.

¹ On September 18, 1931, Mukden was seized by the Japanese army stationed in China's North-east. Under Chiang Kai-shek's order of "absolute non-resistance", the Chinese Army in Mukden and elsewhere in China's North-east withdrew inside the Great Wall. The Japanese troops were thus able to occupy in rapid succession the former north-eastern provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang, and later Jehol.

² The provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning and Jehol. The western parts of the first three provinces are now incorporated into the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, and most of Jehol is incorporated into the province of Hopei.

by Japan. The recent Eastern Hopei Incident¹ and the diplomatic parleys² between Chiang Kai-shek's government and the Japanese are clear indications of a trend of events which threatens the very existence of China as a nation. In these circumstances all classes and all political groups of the Chinese people are faced with the following question: What is to be done? Resist? Surrender? Or vacillate between the two?

Now, let us see how the different classes in China answer this question.

The workers and peasants in China are demanding resistance. The revolution of 1924-27, the agrarian revolution from 1927 up to the present day, and the anti-Japanese upsurge since the Incident of September 18, 1931, all prove that the Chinese working class and peasantry are the most resolute forces in the Chinese revolution.

The Chinese petty bourgeoisie also demands resistance. Have not the student youth and the urban petty

¹ Aided and abetted by the Japanese, Yin Ju-keng, a Kuomintang member, established on November 25, 1935 the bogus "Eastern Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Administration" over twenty-two counties in eastern Hopei.

² These refer to the diplomatic parleys between the Chiang Kai-shek government and the Japanese government on the so-called "Hirota's three principles": (1) China's suppression of all anti-Japanese movements; (2) Sino-Japanese-"Manchukuan" economic co-operation (Manchukuo being the puppet state set up by Japan in China's North-east); and (3) Sino-Japanese joint defence against communism. On January 21, 1936, Hirota, Japanese foreign minister, told the Diet that the Chinese government "has accepted the three principles proposed by the Empire".

bourgeoisie already started a broad anti-Japanese movement?¹ These Chinese petty bourgeois took part in the revolution of 1924-27. Their economic status, like that of the peasants, is one of small-scale production, which is irreconcilable with imperialism. Imperialism and the Chinese counter-revolution have done them great harm, driving many of them into unemployment, bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy. Now, faced with the immediate danger of enslavement by a foreign nation, they can have no alternative to resistance.

But what about the national bourgeoisie, the comprador and landlord classes, the Kuomintang, when they are confronted with this question?

The big local bullies and bad gentry, the big warlords, the big bureaucrats and the big compradors have long made up their minds. They maintain, as they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is worse than imperialism. These people have already formed the traitor's camp; the question as to whether or not they are to become slaves of a foreign nation simply does not exist, because, led by Chiang

¹ The year 1935 witnessed a new upsurge of the people's nation-wide patriotic movement. Students in Peking, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, organized a patriotic demonstration on December 9, shouting the slogans, "End the civil war!" "Unite against foreign aggression!" and "Down with Japanese imperialism!" In spite of the reign of terror imposed by the Kuomintang government in league with the Japanese aggressors, the movement immediately won nation-wide support, and has since been generally referred to as the "December 9 Movement".

Kai-shek,¹ they have already effaced all distinctions between nations and identified their interests with imperialism. This gang of traitors is the deadly enemy of the Chinese people. But for them, Japanese imperialism could not have been so blatantly aggressive. They are the jackals of imperialism.

The national bourgeoisie presents a complicated problem. This class took part in the revolution of 1924-27, but badly frightened by the devouring flames of

¹ At the time of this report Chiang Kai-shek, having already surrendered the North-east, was surrendering northern China to Japan while continuing his ruthless war against the Red Army. Therefore the Chinese Communist Party had to do its utmost to expose him as a traitor and did not include him in the National Anti-Japanese United Front which it proposed. But even in this report, Comrade Mao spoke of the possibility of broadening the united front in consequence of the prospective disintegration in the camp of the Chinese landlord and comprador classes. After Japan's aggression in northern China, her interests clashed with those of Britain and the U.S. In view of Chiang Kai-shek's close dependence upon the British and American imperialists, the Party concluded that Chiang might change his attitude towards Japan at the bidding of his imperialist masters, and accordingly adopted the policy of compelling him to resist Japan. In May 1936, upon its withdrawal to northern Shensi from Shansi, the Red Army appealed directly to the Kuomintang government at Nanking for cessation of the civil war and united resistance to Japan. In August of the same year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed a letter to the Kuomintang's Central Committee asking for a united front of the two parties against Japan and a parley between the representatives of both sides. But the proposal was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. It was not until the Sian Incident in December 1936 that Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the demand of the Communist Party for internal peace and resistance to Japan.

the revolution, it deserted to the people's enemies, the Chiang Kai-shek bloc. The question is whether, in present circumstances, there is any possibility of this class undergoing a change. We think there is. This is because the national bourgeoisie is not the same as the landlord and comprador classes: there is a difference between them. The national bourgeoisie is less feudal than the landlord class and less in the service of foreign capital than the comprador class. One section, the right wing, has more connections with foreign capital and Chinese landed interests than the other, and we shall not for the time being speculate whether it can change or not. The problem lies with that section which has fewer or even no connections of this kind. We believe that in the new situation, when China is in danger of being converted into a colony, this section may change its attitude. The change will be marked by vacillation. These people dislike imperialism on the one hand and fear the uncompromising character of the revolution on the other, and thus vacillate between the two. This explains why they took part in the revolution of 1924-27 and why, at the end of that period, they went over to the side of Chiang Kai-shek.

What is the difference between the present situation and that of 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution? It lies in the fact that China in 1927 was still a semi-colony but now she is in danger of becoming a colony. During the past nine years the national bourgeoisie has deserted its ally, the working class, and made friends with the landlord and com-

prador classes. What advantage has it gained? None at all; what it has gained is the bankruptcy or semi-bankruptcy of native industry and commerce. Therefore, we believe that in the present situation the national bourgeoisie may change its attitude. To what extent? Its general feature will be vacillation. But at certain stages of our struggle, one section, the left wing, may take part in the struggle. And the other section may change from vacillation to neutrality.

What class interest is represented by the Nineteenth Route Army under Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai¹ and his associates? It is the interest of the national bourgeoisie, the upper petty bourgeoisie, and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside. Did not Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and his associates once fight bitterly against the Red

¹ Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai was deputy commander of the Kuomintang's Nineteenth Route Army (the commander being Chiang Kuang-nai) and commander of one of its corps. This army had fought the Red Army in Kiangsi and had been transferred to Shanghai after Japan's invasion of China's North-east. When the Japanese marines attacked Shanghai in January 1932, it resisted but finally lost the battle through betrayal on the part of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. On Chiang's order, the army was then transferred to Fukien again to fight the Red Army. But Ts'ai and other leaders of the army gradually realized the futility of such a war. In November 1933, allying themselves with a section of the Kuomintang forces under Li Chi-shen and others, they publicly renounced Chiang Kai-shek, established in Fukien the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China", and concluded an agreement with the Red Army to attack Chiang Kai-shek and resist Japan. After the collapse of the People's Revolutionary Government, Ts'ai and his associates came into closer co-operation with the Communist Party.

Army? Yes, but later on they concluded an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang alliance with the Red Army. They attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi, but later resisted Japanese imperialism in Shanghai and came to terms with the Red Army in Fukien and opened fire on Chiang Kai-shek. No matter what course Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and his associates may take in the future and in spite of the fact that during the time of their Fukien People's Government they stuck to their old-fashioned ways and made no attempt to rally the people for the struggle, it must be considered an act beneficial to the revolution that their fire once trained on the Red Army was turned against Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek. This marked a split within the Kuomintang camp. If this section of people could break away from the Kuomintang camp in the circumstances following the Incident of September 18, 1931, why can there not be another split in present circumstances? Those members of our Party are wrong who think that the whole camp of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie is united, permanent and unchangeable under any circumstances. They not only fail to appreciate the present grave situation, but have also forgotten history.

Let me say a little more about history. In 1926 and 1927, from the time when the revolutionary army was advancing on Wuhan to the time when it captured Wuhan and marched into Honan, T'ang Sheng-

chih and Feng Yu-hsiang¹ took part in the revolution. In 1933, Feng Yu-hsiang even joined forces with the Communists to form the Anti-Japanese Allied Armies in Chahar.

Another striking example: Did not the Kuomintang's Twenty-sixth Route Army, which had once attacked the Red Army in Kiangsi in conjunction with the Nineteenth Route Army, stage the Ningtu Uprising² in December 1931, and transform itself into a Red Army? The leaders of the Ningtu Uprising, Chao Po-sheng, Tung Chen-t'ang and their associates have become steadfast comrades in the revolution.

The anti-Japanese activities of Ma Chan-shan³ in

¹ When the revolutionary Northern Expeditionary Army took Wuhan in September 1926, Feng Yu-hsiang announced in Suiyuan province, now part of Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the end of his alliance with the clique of the Northern warlords and joined the revolution. After Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei betrayed the revolution in 1927, Feng participated in anti-Communist activities, but was never admitted into the inner core of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. After Japan's invasion of China's North-east he began to favour a war of resistance and, in May 1933, joined forces with the Communists to form the Popular Anti-Japanese Allied Armies in Kalgan. In his later years Feng continued to co-operate with the Communist Party.

² This mutiny, in which more than ten thousand officers and men were involved, occurred in December 1931 in response to the Communists' call for resistance to Japan.

³ An officer of the North-eastern Army, whose troops were stationed in Heilungkiang. After the Incident of September 18, he and his troops resisted the Japanese invaders driving towards Heilungkiang via Liaoning.

the three north-eastern provinces constitute another split in the camp of the ruling classes.

All these instances indicate that when the range of the Japanese bombers extends to the whole of China, when the struggle changes its normal pace and suddenly surges forward, there will be splits in the enemy camp.

Now, comrades, let us turn to another aspect of the question.

Is it right to take exception to our views on the ground of the political and economic flabbiness of the national bourgeoisie of China and to argue that it cannot change its attitude in spite of changed circumstances? I think not. If the national bourgeoisie is flabby and therefore cannot change, why then did it change its attitude in 1924-27, not merely vacillating but even joining the revolution? Can it be that the flabbiness of the national bourgeoisie is a disease contracted after birth and not congenital? Can it be that the national bourgeoisie is flabby today, but not at an earlier date? The answer is that one of the chief characteristics of the politics and economy of a semi-colony is the flabbiness of its national bourgeoisie. This is precisely the reason why imperialism dares to bully the national bourgeoisie, and why dislike of imperialism is a characteristic of this class. Of course, we do not deny but fully admit that again because of its flabbiness, the national bourgeoisie is liable to fall an easy prey to the imperialists and landlords and compradors who can win it over by the offer of some

temporary advantage; hence its lack of revolutionary thoroughness. But in spite of all this, we cannot say that in present circumstances there is no difference at all between the national bourgeoisie and the landlord and comprador classes.

We have therefore stated categorically that the Kuomintang camp will split up when the nation faces a serious crisis. Such a split has become manifest in the vacillation of the national bourgeoisie and in the activities of such anti-Japanese figures as Feng Yuxiang, Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai and Ma Chan-shan, who are enjoying a spell of popularity. This split is fundamentally unfavourable to the counter-revolution and favourable to the revolution. The possibility of further splits is increased because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development and the resulting unevenness in the development of the revolution.

Comrades, so much for the positive side of the question. Now let me take up the negative side, namely, the fact that certain elements of the national bourgeoisie are often past masters at deceiving the people. What does this mean? It means that apart from the genuine supporters of the people's revolutionary cause, many of this class, by posing for a time as revolutionaries or semi-revolutionaries, may be able to deceive the people who find it difficult to see through their demagogy and discover their lack of revolutionary thoroughness. That being the case, it becomes all the more imperative for the Communist Party to criticize

its allies, unmask the false revolutionaries and win leadership. If we deny the possibility that during a great upheaval the national bourgeoisie will shift its position and join the revolution, we may as well abandon our Party's task of winning leadership in the united front, or at any rate not take this task seriously. For that is what we should do, if the national bourgeoisie, like the landlords and compradors, turned out to be barefaced traitors.

In making a general analysis of the attitude of the Chinese landlord class and bourgeoisie in a great upheaval, another aspect should be borne in mind, namely, that even within the camp of the landlords and compradors there is not complete unity. This results from the circumstances of a semi-colony, circumstances in which many imperialist powers are contending for China. When our struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, the pet dogs of the United States or Britain, in obedience to the varying tones of their masters' command, may engage in veiled strife or even open conflict with the Japanese imperialists and their pet dogs. There were many such dog-fights and we are not going to dwell upon them all. We will only mention the fact that even Hu Han-min,¹ a Kuomintang politician once imprisoned

¹ A well-known Kuomintang politician who opposed Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policy of co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and helped Chiang Kai-shek in staging the counter-revolutionary *coup d'état* of April 12, 1927. Later he was beaten by Chiang in the scramble for power and was placed

by Chiang Kai-shek, recently put his signature to the document of our Six-Point Programme for Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Nation.¹ Hu Han-min's backers, the warlords of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques,² have under the deceitful slogans "Recover the lost territory" and "Resistance to Japan side by side with annihilation of the bandits", also opposed Chiang Kai-shek whose slogan is "Annihilation of the bandits before resistance to Japan". Does all this seem rather strange? It is not strange at all; it is merely a particularly interesting instance of a fight among big and small dogs, well-fed and under-fed dogs; it is a rift rather than a split, a conflict which is irritating and hurtful to the enemy, but helpful to the revolu-

under arrest. Set free after the Incident of September 18, he went from Nanking to Canton and directed the warlords of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to oppose Chiang Kai-shek's government in Nanking.

¹ This refers to the "Chinese People's Basic Programme for Fighting Japan", proposed by the Chinese Communist Party in 1934, and published over the signatures of Soong Ching Ling (Mme. Sun Yat-sen) and others. The programme consisted of the following items: (1) Mobilize all the sea, land and air forces to fight Japan; (2) Mobilize the people throughout the country; (3) Arm all the people; (4) Confiscate the property of the Japanese imperialists in China and the property of all collaborators to defray war expenses; (5) Establish an all-China committee for the nation's armed defence, to be elected by the representatives of workers, peasants, soldiers, students and business men; and (6) Form an alliance with all the forces hostile to the Japanese imperialists, and establish friendly relations with all the countries that observe benevolent neutrality.

² The cliques headed respectively by Ch'en Chi-t'ang of Kwangtung and Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi of Kwangsi.

tion. We must try to bring together all such quarrels, rifts and conflicts in the enemy camp and direct them against the principal enemy.

Summing up the problem of class relations, we may say that the Japanese invasion of China Proper has brought about a basic change in the situation and, as a result, the relationship of the various classes in China has also changed, the camp of the national revolution has become stronger and the camp of the national counter-revolution weaker.

Now let us turn to the situation in the camp of the national revolution.

First, the Red Army. As you know, comrades, for nearly a year and a half the three main contingents of China's Red Army have been effecting large-scale shifts of positions. As soon as Comrade Jen Pi-shih¹

¹ One of the first organizers of the Communist Party of China. Since the Fifth National Congress of the Party in 1927 he was elected to the Central Committee at each Party Congress. At the Central Committee's plenary session of 1931 (the fourth since the Sixth National Congress), he was elected member of the Political Bureau. In 1933, Comrade Jen served as secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi border area and concurrently as political commissar of the Sixth Army Group of the Red Army. When the Sixth and Second Army Groups joined forces to form the Second Front Army, he became its political commissar. When the Anti-Japanese War began, he was the director of the General Political Department of the Eighth Route Army. From 1940 he was a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At the Central Committee's plenary session of 1945 (the first since the Seventh National Congress), he was elected member of the Committee's Political Bureau and of its secretariat. He died in Peking on October 27, 1950.

and his associates had in August last year led the Sixth Army Group towards the area where Comrade Ho Lung's army was stationed,¹ we started to shift our positions in October.² In March this year the Red Army in the Szechuan-Shensi border area³ also began

¹ The Sixth Army Group of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, originally stationed in the base area on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, was ordered by the Party's Central Committee in August 1934 to break through the enemy's siege. It joined forces with the Second Army Group led by Comrade Ho Lung in eastern Kweichow in October. These two groups formed the Second Front Army and created the revolutionary base on the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow border.

² In October 1934, the First Front Army, or the Central Red Army (comprising the First, the Third and the Fifth Army Groups) of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army embarked on the great strategic shift of position, known as the Long March. Setting out from Changting and Ninghwa, western Fukien, and Juikin and Yutu, southern Kiangsi, the Red Army traversed the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi. It climbed over high mountains snow-bound all the year round and crossed wild marshes where human beings were seldom seen. After undergoing untold hardships and having repeatedly routed the enemy in his attempts to encircle, pursue or intercept it in a continuous march of 25,000 li, the Red Army finally arrived in the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in October 1935.

³ This refers to the Fourth Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army which left its base in the Szechuan-Shensi border area in March 1935. One part was wiped out by the Kuomintang; another part, despite the disruption of the renegade Chang Kuo-t'ao (see note below), finally arrived in northern Shensi in October 1936 together with the entire body of the Second Front Army which had previously broken through the enemy siege and left the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechuan-Kweichow border area in June 1936.

to shift its position. Thus all three contingents of the Red Army have abandoned their old positions and shifted to new regions. As a result of these large-scale shifts the old areas have been turned into guerrilla zones. In the course of these shifts the Red Army was considerably weakened. If we consider this aspect of the over-all situation, we must admit that the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, while we have met with a temporary and partial defeat. Is this statement correct? I think it is, for it is a fact. But some people, for instance, Chang Kuo-t'ao,¹ say that the Central Red Army² has failed. Is this statement correct? No. For that is not the fact. In approaching a problem, a Marxist should not only look at the parts,

¹ Chang Kuo-t'ao, a renegade from the Chinese revolution, joined the Chinese Communist Party in its early period. He made many mistakes which led to monstrous crimes. In 1935, he opposed the northward march of the Red Army, and carried out his defeatist and liquidationist plan of withdrawing the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army to the regions of the national minorities on the borders of Szechuan and Sikang, thereby causing it heavy losses. At the same time he openly rebelled against the Party and the Party Centre by establishing a bogus party centre under his own control to disrupt the unity of the Party and the Red Army. Owing to patient educational work by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Party Centre, the rank and file of the Fourth Front Army and its cadres soon turned to the correct leadership of the Party Centre and played a splendid role in subsequent struggles. Chang himself remained incorrigible and in the spring of 1938 deserted from the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region to join the Kuomintang secret service.

² The Central Red Army, or the First Front Army, refers to the Red Army that was built up in the Kiangsi-Fukien area directly under the leadership of the Party Centre.

but see the whole. A frog squatting at the bottom of a well says, "The sky is only the size of the mouth of a well." That is wrong, for the sky is not limited to the size of the mouth of a well. But if it says, "A certain portion of the sky is only the size of the mouth of a well," it will be right, for that tallies with the fact. Therefore, we say the Red Army has failed in one respect, in maintaining its original bases, but has achieved victory in another respect, in carrying out the plan of the Long March. The enemy, on the other hand, has won victory in one respect, in occupying our original bases, but has failed in another respect, in carrying out his plan of encirclement and annihilation and of pursuit and annihilation. This is the only complete and correct statement of the position, for it is a fact that we have completed the Long March.

One may well ask: "What is the significance of the Long March?" We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind ever recorded in history, that it is a manifesto, an instrument of agitation and propaganda and, as it were, a seed-drill. Since P'an Ku divided heaven from earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors¹ reigned, has there ever been in history a long march like ours? For twelve months we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the air by scores of planes; we were encircled, pursued, obstructed and intercepted on the ground by a great

¹In Chinese mythology P'an Ku was the creator of the world and the first ruler of mankind. The Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors were legendary rulers in ancient China.

force of several hundred thousand men; we encountered untold difficulties and obstacles on the way; but by slogging on we covered more than 20,000 *li* through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Tell me, has there ever been in history anything like this? No, never. The Long March is also a manifesto. It proclaims to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes and that the imperialists and their jackals, Chiang Kai-shek and his like, are utterly powerless against us. It proclaims the utter failure of the encirclement, pursuit, obstruction and interception attempted by the imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek. The Long March is also a powerful instrument of agitation and propaganda. It declares to some two hundred million people of eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is the only road to their liberation. Without the Long March, how could the masses have heard so quickly of the existence of the great ideas upheld by the Red Army? The Long March is also a seed-drill. It has sown many seeds in eleven provinces, which will sprout, grow leaves, blossom into flowers, bear fruit and surely yield a harvest in the future. To sum up, the Long March ended with our victory and the defeat of the enemy.

Who led the Long March to victory? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, such a long march would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leadership, its cadres and its members are not afraid of difficulties or hardships. Anyone who questions our ability to lead the

revolutionary war will fall into the quagmire of opportunism.

A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was accomplished. In the battle at the town of Chihlo, the Central Red Army and the north-western Red Army, in brotherly solidarity, shattered the traitor Chiang Kai-shek's campaign of encirclement and annihilation against the Shensi-Kansu border area¹ and thus laid the cornerstone for the Party Centre's task of establishing the national headquarters of the revolution in the North-west.

This is the situation with regard to the main forces of the Red Army, now what about the guerrilla warfare in the southern provinces? Our forces have suffered some setbacks, but were not wiped out. Indeed, in many places they are beginning to reassert themselves and are growing and expanding.²

¹ The Kuomintang troops started their third campaign of encirclement and annihilation against the Shensi-Kansu revolutionary base area in July 1935. In a series of battles, units of the Red Army originally stationed in the base area, together with those arriving from central China and the Central Red Army arriving from southern China after the Long March, wiped out whole regiments and divisions of the Kuomintang troops between the Yellow river on the east and the Shensi-Kansu border on the west. The battle of Chihlo, south-west of Fu county, in which one of the enemy divisions was completely wiped out, was the last major engagement in which the Central Red Army took part after its arrival in October. By November the third campaign of encirclement and annihilation was completely smashed.

² When the main forces of the Red Army in southern China moved northward during 1934-35, some guerrilla units were left behind. These guerrillas held out in fourteen areas in

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the workers' struggle is now developing beyond the factory walls, from an economic struggle into a political struggle. The heroic struggle against the Japanese and the traitors on the part of the working class is now smouldering fiercely and, judging by the situation, will soon burst into flame.

The peasants' struggle has never ceased. Harassed by foreign aggression, civil war and natural calamities, the peasants have started extensive struggles in the form of guerrilla war, mass uprisings and famine riots. An anti-Japanese guerrilla war is being carried on in the north-eastern provinces and eastern Hopei¹ against the attacks of Japanese imperialism.

eight provinces: southern Chekiang, northern Fukien, eastern Fukien, southern Fukien, western Fukien, north-eastern Kiangsi, Fukien-Kiangsi border, Kwangtung-Kiangsi border, southern Hunan, Hunan-Kiangsi border, Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border, Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei border, Tungpo mountains in southern Honan and Hainan Island off the coast of Kwangtung.

¹ Upon Japan's seizure of China's North-east in 1931, the Chinese Communist Party called upon the people there to put up armed resistance. It organized anti-Japanese guerrilla corps and the North-eastern People's Revolutionary Army, and rendered assistance to anti-Japanese volunteer forces of every description. In 1934, all anti-Japanese contingents in the North-east were reorganized under the leadership of the Party into the Anti-Japanese Amalgamated Armies of the North-east with Comrade Yang Ching-yu as Commander-in-Chief.

In eastern Hopei, a province on the border of north-eastern China, the peasants staged an insurrection against Japan in May 1935.

The student movement has made great strides and will spread still farther. But only if it is co-ordinated with the struggle of the workers, peasants and soldiers can this movement be sustained and break down the martial law of the traitors and the policy of disruption and massacre carried out by the police, spies, academic stooges and gangsters and fascists.

We have already dealt with the possibility that the national bourgeoisie and the rich peasants and small landlords in the countryside may shift their position and even participate in the anti-Japanese struggle.

The national minorities, especially the Inner Mongolians, who are directly menaced by Japanese imperialism, are now rising up in struggle. In the future their struggle will merge with the people's struggle in northern China and the Red Army's operations in the North-west.

All this indicates that the revolutionary situation is no longer localized but becoming nation-wide and changing gradually from a state of unevenness into one of relative evenness. We are now on the eve of a great change. The task of the Party is to form a national revolutionary united front by co-ordinating the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie throughout the whole country.

THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

Having surveyed the situation of the revolution and of the counter-revolution, we shall find it easy to define the Party's tactical tasks.

What is the principal tactical task of the Party? It is to form a broad national revolutionary united front.

When the revolutionary situation changes, revolutionary tactics and the method of revolutionary leadership must change accordingly. While the Japanese imperialists and the collaborators and traitors make it their task to convert China into a colony, we must make it ours to transform China into an independent and free country with territorial integrity.

To win independence and freedom for China is a great task. It requires a fight against foreign imperialism and domestic counter-revolution. Japanese imperialism is determined to bluster and bludgeon its way into China. The domestic counter-revolutionary forces of the landlord and comprador classes are still stronger than the revolutionary forces of the people. As the overthrow of Japanese imperialism and of the Chinese counter-revolution cannot be accomplished in a couple of days or by small forces, we must be prepared to devote a long time to it and accumulate large forces. Both in China and throughout the world the counter-revolutionary forces are getting weaker and the revolutionary forces stronger. This is a correct estimate, but an estimate made from one angle only. For we must also admit that in China and throughout

the world counter-revolution remains, for the time being, stronger than revolution. This, too, is a correct estimate, an estimate made from another angle.

China's uneven political and economic development gives rise to the uneven development of her revolution. Generally speaking, revolution starts, develops and triumphs where the counter-revolutionary forces are comparatively weak, while in places where they are strong, it either has not arisen or is developing very slowly. For a long time in the past the Chinese revolution found itself in this situation. It may be anticipated that, at certain stages in the future, although the general revolutionary situation will have developed farther ahead, its unevenness will remain. The transformation of such unevenness into general evenness needs a long time, great efforts and a correct line in the Party's tactics. The revolutionary war led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union¹ lasted three years, but in the case of the revolutionary war led by the Chinese Communist Party, we must get rid of the impatience we displayed in the past and be prepared to devote more time to it, over and above the long years already spent, so as to dispose of the domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces completely and for all time. Moreover, sound revolutionary tac-

¹The war from 1918 to 1920 in which the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party beat off the armed intervention of Britain, France, Japan, Poland, the United States, etc., and suppressed the rebellion of the White Guards.

tics must be worked out; to mill around in a narrow circle as we once did will get us nowhere. This does not mean that things in China can only be done at a slow tempo; no, we must act boldly, for the danger of national enslavement will not allow us to slacken for a moment. From now on the revolution will certainly develop at a much greater speed than before, for both China and the world are entering a new stage of war and revolution. For all that, the Chinese revolutionary war will be protracted; this is determined by the strength of imperialism and the uneven development of the revolution.

We have said that the present situation is characterized by the imminence of a new upsurge in the national revolution, that China is on the eve of a great new nation-wide revolution: this is one characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This is a fact, or one aspect of the facts. But we wish to point out also that imperialism is still a force to be seriously reckoned with, that the unevenness in the development of the revolutionary forces is still a serious weakness, and that to defeat our enemies we must be prepared to fight a protracted war: this is another characteristic of the present revolutionary situation. This is also a fact, or another aspect of the facts. Both characteristics, both facts teach us and urge us to adapt ourselves to the situation, revise our tactics and alter our ways of deploying our forces and prosecuting the war. The present situation demands that we boldly shed sectarianism, form a broad united front and curb adven-

turism. We must not rashly risk a decisive battle before the time is ripe for it or our strength equal to it.

I shall not discuss here the relation between sectarianism and adventurism, or the danger that adventurism may arise as the general situation develops; we can leave this for future discussion. I shall only emphasize that the tactic of the united front and the tactic of sectarianism are diametrically opposed to each other.

The one is to assemble large forces so as to surround our enemies and annihilate them.

The other is to fight single-handed like a lonely horseman in a desperate combat with a formidable enemy.

The one is based on the assumption that without an adequate assessment of the possible changes in the alignment of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in China owing to the Japanese attempt to colonize her, we shall be unable to assess correctly the possibility of forming a broad national revolutionary united front. Without an adequate assessment of the strength and weakness of the Japanese counter-revolutionary forces, of the Chinese counter-revolutionary forces, and of the Chinese revolutionary forces, we shall be unable to gauge correctly the necessity of organizing such a broad national revolutionary united front, to take resolute measures to break down sectarianism, to make use of the united front as a means of organizing and rallying millions upon millions of

people and all potential friendly forces of the revolution to march forward and strike at our main objective—Japanese imperialism and its jackals, the Chinese traitors—or to apply our tactics against the main objective, but on the contrary we shall set ourselves diverse objectives with the result that our bullets may hit our lesser enemies or even our allies rather than the principal enemy. This means that we shall be unable to pick out the right target and shall waste our ammunition. Thus, we shall be unable to force the enemy into an isolated corner. Thus, we shall be unable to draw over from the enemy's camp all those who have joined it under compulsion, and from the enemy's battlefield all those who were hostile to us yesterday but may become friendly today. Thus, we shall be actually helping the enemy, holding back and isolating the revolution, causing it to dwindle and decline and even leading it to defeat.

The other is based on the assumption that such arguments are fallacious. The forces of the revolution must be pure, absolutely pure, and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight. Only what is recorded in the sacred books is correct. The national bourgeoisie is utterly and eternally counter-revolutionary. Never yield a single inch to the rich peasants. Fight the yellow trade unions tooth and nail. If we must shake hands with Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai, then while doing so we should call him a counter-revolutionary. Has there ever been a cat that does not love meat or a warlord who is not a counter-revolutionary?

The intellectuals can be revolutionary only for a day or two, and it is dangerous to take them into our ranks. The conclusion is that sectarianism is a magic wand that works wonders and that the united front is the tactic of opportunism.

Comrades, which is right, united front or sectarianism? Which is the Marxist-Leninist tactic? I have no doubt about the answer to that question. The Marxist-Leninist tactic is the united front and not sectarianism. Three-year-olds may have many correct ideas, but they cannot be entrusted with serious affairs of the state and the world, because they do not yet understand them. Marxism-Leninism is opposed to the infantile disorder found among the revolutionary ranks. The advocates of sectarianism are spreading an epidemic of infantile disorders. The path of revolution, like that of every other activity, is always tortuous, never straight. The alignment of forces in the revolution and counter-revolution may change, just as everything else in the world changes. The Party's new tactic to form a broad united front starts from the two fundamental facts that Japanese imperialism is determined to reduce the whole of China to a colony and that there are at present serious weaknesses in China's revolutionary forces. In order to attack the counter-revolution, the revolutionary forces today need to organize millions upon millions of the people and operate with a mighty revolutionary army. It's obvious to all that only such a force can crush the Japanese imperialists and the collaborators and traitors. Therefore, the tactic of the

united front is the only Marxist-Leninist tactic. The tactic of sectarianism is, on the contrary, the tactic of deliberately isolating oneself. In the manner of driving fish into deep waters and little birds to the thickets,¹ sectarianism will, to the enemy's satisfaction, drive the millions upon millions of people and the mighty army into the enemy camp. Sectarians are, in fact, the loyal slaves of the Japanese imperialists and of the collaborators and traitors. What the sectarians call pure and straight will be condemned by Marxism-Leninism, but welcomed by Japanese imperialism. We definitely reject sectarianism; what we want is only the national revolutionary united front which will be fatal to the Japanese imperialists, the collaborators and the traitors.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

If our government has hitherto been based on the alliance of the workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, then from now on it must be transformed so as to represent, in addition, members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.

¹A tyrant who drove his people to seek a benevolent ruler was compared by Mencius to the otter which "drives fish into deep waters" and the hawk which "drives little birds to the thickets".

For the present, the basic task of our government is to oppose the attempt of Japanese imperialism to annex China. This government will broaden its basis of representation so that not merely the representatives of those who are interested only in the national revolution but not in the agrarian revolution may join it, but also the representatives of those who will not oppose European and American imperialism because of their affiliations, but may oppose Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, may join if they wish. Therefore, the programme of this government should as a matter of principle be adapted to the main task of fighting Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, and we should modify accordingly our past policies.

The special feature of the revolution at present is the existence of a well-steeled Communist Party and a well-steeled Red Army. This is an asset of the utmost importance. Great difficulties would arise if there were no well-steeled Communist Party and Red Army. Why? Because the collaborators and the traitors in China are numerous and powerful and will certainly use every device to break up this united front, to sow dissension by intimidation, bribery and manipulation of alignments and alliances, and use armed force to oppress and crush separately all those comparatively weak forces that want to part company with them and join us in fighting Japan. In the absence of these two vital factors, the Communist Party and the Red Army, in the anti-Japanese government and the anti-Japanese army, the disruption of

the united front could hardly be averted. The revolution in 1927 failed chiefly because the opportunist line of the Communist Party at that time prevented us from expanding our own ranks, the workers' and peasants' movement and the armed forces led by the Communist Party, and relied solely on a temporary ally, the Kuomintang. As a result, imperialism ordered its jackals, the landlord and comprador classes, to use all kinds of inducements to bring over first Chiang Kai-shek and then Wang Ching-wei, thereby defeating the revolution. The revolutionary united front of that time had no mainstay, no strong revolutionary armed forces; when defections took place on all sides, the Communist Party, forced to fight single-handed, was powerless to foil the tactic of the imperialists and the Chinese counter-revolutionaries of crushing their opponents one by one. True there was an army under Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, but as it was not yet a politically consolidated body, and moreover, as the Party leadership was weak, it too was finally defeated. This lesson which we paid for with our blood taught us that the revolution failed because of the lack of a hard core of revolutionary forces.

Today things are quite different; now we have a strong Communist Party and a strong Red Army, as well as the base areas of the Red Army. The Communist Party and the Red Army are not only the initiators of the National Anti-Japanese United Front, but will inevitably become the powerful mainstay of the future anti-Japanese government and anti-Japanese

army, capable of preventing the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek from carrying through their policy of disrupting the national united front. We must be very vigilant, however, because the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly resort to intimidation, bribery, the manipulation of alignments and alliances and every other imaginable device.

Naturally we cannot expect all sections of the broad National Anti-Japanese United Front to be as firm as the Communist Party and the Red Army. In the course of action some bad types may be influenced by the enemy and withdraw from the united front. However, we need not be afraid of the loss of such people. They may drop out, but good types will come under our influence and join in. So long as the Communist Party and the Red Army exist and grow, the National Anti-Japanese United Front will also exist and grow. For this is how the Communist Party and the Red Army play their leading role in the national united front. The Communists, now no longer novices, are able to take care of themselves and get along with their allies. If the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek can employ such measures as manipulation of alignments and alliances against the revolutionary forces, the Communist Party can do the same against the counter-revolutionary forces. If they can win over bad types from our ranks, we can equally well win over those who are bad types to them but good types from our point of view. If we can win over a greater

number of people from their ranks, then the enemy will be weakened and we shall be strengthened. In short, in the present struggle between two forces in fundamental opposition, it is inevitable that all forces in between will have to line up on one side or on the other. The policies of subjugating and of betraying China, pursued by the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek respectively, will inevitably drive many over to our side, either directly into the ranks of the Communist Party and the Red Army or into a united front with us. So long as our tactics are not sectarian this prospect will be realized.

Why should we change the workers' and peasants' republic into a people's republic?

Our government represents not only the workers and peasants but the whole nation. This was originally implied in the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic republic, because the workers and peasants constitute from 80 to 90 per cent of the nation's population. The Ten-Point Programme¹ adopted by the

¹In July 1928, the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party adopted the following Ten-Point Programme:

- (1) Overthrow the rule of imperialism;
- (2) Confiscate all the banks and enterprises of foreign capital;
- (3) Unify China and recognize the right to national self-determination;
- (4) Overthrow the Kuomintang government of the warlords;
- (5) Establish councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' representatives as the form of government;
- (6) Enforce the eight-hour day, increase wages and institute unemployment relief and social insurance;
- (7) Confiscate the land of all landlords and redistribute it to the peasants;
- (8) Improve the soldiers' living conditions and give land and jobs to the ex-

Sixth National Congress of our Party represents the interests not only of the workers and peasants but also of the whole nation. But the present situation requires that we change the slogan to that of a people's republic. This is because Japanese invasion has changed the relations between classes in China and it is now possible not only for the petty bourgeoisie but also for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle.

The people's republic obviously does not represent the interests of the hostile classes. On the contrary, the people's republic stands in direct opposition to the landlord and comprador classes, the jackals of imperialism, and does not include them in the people. This contrasts with Chiang Kai-shek's "National Government of the Republic of China" which represents only the wealthy and not the common people who are not counted as citizens. As from 80 to 90 per cent of China's population is made up of the workers and peasants, the people's republic ought first and foremost to represent their interests. But if the people's republic casts off imperialist oppression and makes China free and independent, if it casts off the oppression of the landlords and frees China from semi-feudalism, it would benefit not only the workers and peasants but other sections of the people as well. The

servicemen; (9) Abolish all exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous assessments and adopt a consolidated progressive tax rate; and (10) Form an alliance with the proletariat of the world and with the Soviet Union.

sum total of the interests of the workers, peasants and other sections of the people constitutes the interests of the Chinese nation. Though the comprador and the landlord classes also live on Chinese soil, they are not concerned with the interests of the nation; their interests clash with those of the majority of the people. As we exclude only this small group and clash only with them, we have a perfect right to call ourselves the representatives of the whole nation.

There is, of course, also a clash of interest between the working class and the national bourgeoisie. We cannot successfully extend the national revolution if we do not give political and economic rights to its vanguard and enable the working class to exert its strength to cope with imperialism and its jackals who are betraying their country. But if the national bourgeoisie joins the united front against imperialism, then the working class and the national bourgeoisie will have interests in common. The people's republic in the period of the bourgeois-democratic revolution will not expropriate any private property that is not imperialist and feudal in nature, nor will it confiscate the industrial and commercial enterprises belonging to the national bourgeoisie, but on the contrary will encourage their development. We shall protect any of the national bourgeoisie so long as they do not support the imperialists and the traitors. In the stage of democratic revolution a limit is set to the struggle between labour and capital. While the labour law of the people's republic protects the interests of the

workers, it is not opposed to profit-making by the national bourgeoisie or the development of their industrial and commercial enterprises, because such development is detrimental to imperialism and beneficial to the Chinese people. It is thus clear that the people's republic represents the interests of the people of all classes who are opposed to imperialism and feudalism. The government of the people's republic is based primarily on the workers and peasants, but will also include representatives of the other classes which are opposed to imperialism and feudalism.

But is it not dangerous to let the representatives of such classes join the government of the people's republic? No. The workers and peasants form the basic section of the population of the republic. In giving the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other sections who support the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal programme the right to voice their opinion and to work in the government of the people's republic, the right to vote and stand for election, we are not endangering the interests of the workers and peasants. The essential part of our programme must be the protection of the interests of the workers and peasants. The majority in this government made up of the representatives of the workers and peasants, together with the leadership and activities of the Communist Party within it, will avert any danger that might arise from the participation of representatives of other classes. It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese revolution at the present stage is still a bourgeois-democratic, not a

proletarian-socialist revolution. Only the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists¹ will put forward the ridiculous argument that China has already completed her bourgeois-democratic revolution and that any further revolution can only be socialist. The revolution of 1924-27 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution which failed to achieve its purpose. The agrarian revolution led by us from 1927 up to the present is also a bourgeois-democratic revolution, because its task is to oppose imperialism and feudalism, not capitalism. It will remain so for a considerable time to come.

The motive forces of the revolution are still, in the main, the workers, the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie, but now the national bourgeoisie may also be included.

The transition of the revolution is a matter for the future. In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. The question as to when the transition will take place depends on whether the conditions for it are ripe, but

¹After the failure of the Chinese revolution in 1927, a small number of Trotskyists appeared in China. In 1929, they combined with Ch'en Tu-hsiu and other renegades to form a small counter-revolutionary clique and made such counter-revolutionary propaganda as that the Kuomintang had already completed the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese Trotskyists joined the Kuomintang secret service, and became the tool of both the imperialists and the Kuomintang in their oppression of the Chinese people. Acting on Trotsky's orders "not to impede occupation of China by the Japanese empire", they became the hired stooges of the Japanese secret service after the Incident of September 18.

it will certainly take quite a long time. Until all the necessary political and economic conditions are ripe, until the transition is not detrimental but beneficial to the greatest majority of the people throughout the country, we should not talk glibly about the transition. It is wrong to doubt this and to expect that a transition will take place within a very short time, as did some of our comrades in the past who maintained that the moment the democratic revolution began to triumph in key provinces, a transition in the revolution would begin. They made this mistake because they failed to understand what kind of country China is politically and economically, and did not realize that it is much more difficult and requires a good deal more time and effort for China than for Russia to complete her democratic revolution politically and economically.

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Finally, a word is necessary about the relation of the Chinese revolution to the world revolution.

Ever since the monster of imperialism came into being, world events have become so closely interconnected that it is impossible to separate them one from another. We Chinese people have the heroic courage to fight to the finish and at the cost of our blood, the determination to recover our lost territory through our own efforts, and the ability to maintain our position in the family of nations. But this does not mean

that we can dispense with international support; no, international support is necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country, of any people. There is an old adage, "There were no just wars in the Era of Spring and Autumn."¹ This is even more true of imperialism today; only the oppressed nations and the oppressed classes can wage just wars. All those wars in the world in which the people rise against their oppressors are just wars. The February and October Revolutions in Russia were just wars. The people's revolutions in various European countries after the First World War were just wars. In China, the Opium War,² the War of the T'ai'ping Heavenly Kingdom,³ the

¹ *Mencius*, Bk. VII, pt. 2, ch. 2. Mencius made this remark because in the period known as the Era of Spring and Autumn (722-481 B.C.) the incessant wars between the feudal princes were merely scrambles for power.

² Ever since the end of the 18th century, Britain exported large quantities of opium into China. In the middle of the 19th century, the Chinese people realized the pernicious effect of the drug traffic upon their national life and its inroads upon their silver reserve and vigorously protested. Under the pretext of safeguarding her trade, Britain launched armed aggression against China in 1840. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance, and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps." In 1842, however, the corrupt Manchu regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with the British, paying indemnities, ceding Hongkong, opening the seaports of Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Canton to foreign trade and agreeing to fix jointly with Britain the duties on imported British goods.

³ The revolutionary war waged by the Chinese peasants under the leadership of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, Yang Hsiu-ch'ing and others in the middle of the nineteenth century against the feudal rule and national oppression of the Manchus. The

Boxer War,¹ the Revolutionary War of 1911,² the Northern Expedition of 1926-27, the Agrarian Revolu-

T'ai'ping Heavenly Kingdom was established in 1851 after a successful uprising staged in Chintien village, Kweiping, Kwangsi; the revolutionary forces then marched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei and in 1853 took Nanking, which became the capital of the Kingdom. Though the T'ai'ping forces reached as far north as the vicinity of Tientsin, they did not establish consolidated bases in the areas under their occupation and, after the establishment of the headquarters of the government in Nanking, their leading group committed many political and military blunders. Finally the Kingdom fell in 1864 under the combined attacks of the Manchu and the British, French and American armed forces.

¹ The vast anti-imperialist mass movement of the peasants and handicraftsmen in northern China in 1900. They formed secret societies based upon superstitious cults and led an armed struggle against imperialism. The joint forces of eight imperialist powers, Britain, the United States, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and Austria, occupied Peking and Tientsin and suppressed the movement. The Manchu government signed in 1901 a protocol with the eight imperialist powers, providing that China was to pay them 450 million taels (a tael being about 1.33 ounces) of silver as indemnities, and that they had the right to station troops in the areas including Peking, Tientsin and the Shanhai pass at the eastern end of the Great Wall.

² The revolution, sparked off by an armed uprising on October 10 in Wuchang, capital of Hupeh province, overthrew the autocratic rule of the Manchu dynasty and was rounded off with the inauguration of the Chinese Republic with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President on New Year Day, 1912. The revolution owed its success to the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the peasants, the workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie, but finally failed because its leading groups did not confer any real benefits on the peasants, compromised with the imperialist and feudal forces and let political power slip into the hands of Yuan Shih-k'ai, founder of the clique of the Northern warlords.

tionary War from 1927 up to the present, and the present war against Japan and the traitors are all just wars.

In the present nation-wide anti-Japanese upsurge and world-wide anti-fascist upsurge, just wars will spread all over China and throughout the world. All just wars should support each other and all unjust wars should be turned into just wars—this is the Leninist line.¹ Our anti-Japanese war needs the support of the people of the whole world, above all the support of the people of the Soviet Union, and they will certainly support us, because we are bound together in a common cause. In the past the Chinese revolutionary forces were cut off for a time from the world revolutionary forces by Chiang Kai-shek and to this extent we were isolated. But now the situation has turned to our advantage and from now on will continue to turn even more to our advantage. We shall no longer be isolated. That is an essential condition of China's victory in her anti-Japanese war and her revolution.

¹ Cf. Lenin, "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution"; cf. also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course*, ch. 6, sect. 3.

毛 澤 东
論反对日本帝国主义的策略

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